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Pdf the Monarchs' Pawns? June 2020 The Monarchs’ Pawns? Gulf State Proxy Warfare 2011-Today Alexandra Stark Last edited on June 11, 2020 at 10:06 a.m. EDT Acknowledgments Thank you to David Sterman for his careful editorial guidance and support throughout the production of this report, to the rest of the International Security Program team, and Joe Wilkes for formatting the report. I would also like to thank my PhD dissertation advisor Dr. Lise M Howard, and committee members Dr. Andrew Bennett and Dr. Daniel Byman. Their guidance greatly shaped my dissertation framing and research, which in turn helped me conceptualize the framework for this report. Many thanks also to Nate Rosenblatt, the reviewer of this paper, and Andrew Leber for their thoughtful feedback. Any remaining errors are mine alone. newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-monarchs-pawns/ 2 About the Author(s) Alexandra Stark is a senior researcher for the Political Reform program. She has a PhD from the government department at Georgetown University. About New America We are dedicated to renewing the promise of America by continuing the quest to realize our nation’s highest ideals, honestly confronting the challenges caused by rapid technological and social change, and seizing the opportunities those changes create. About International Security The International Security program aims to provide evidence-based analysis of some of the thorniest questions facing American policymakers and the public. We are focused on South Asia and the Middle East, extremist groups such as ISIS, al Qaeda and allied groups, the proliferation of drones, homeland security, and the activities of U.S. Special Forces and the CIA. newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-monarchs-pawns/ 3 Contents Executive Summary 5 Key Findings: 5 Introduction 8 Early Arab Spring Strategic Concerns and Possibilities (2011 - Mid-2014) 12 Opportunity or Threat: Gulf Monarchy Strategic Perceptions of the Early Arab Spring 12 Gulf Interventions (2011 - 2014) 16 Inflection Point (2014) 25 Libya and Syria Turn Ugly: The Unforeseen Consequences of Proxy 25 Wars Declining U.S. Engagement and Refusal to Back Revisionism in the Region 26 Intra-Gulf Tensions Come to the Fore 29 Growing Threats to the Peninsula from Iran and ISIS 30 Post-Arab Spring Crisis Containment (Late 2014 - Present) 32 Operation Inherent Resolve (2014) 32 Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen (2015 - Present) 33 Qatar in Yemen (2015 - 2017) 36 Libya (2014 - Present) 37 Competition in the Horn of Africa 39 Conclusion 41 newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-monarchs-pawns/ 4 Executive Summary As the wave of Arab Spring protest movements challenged governments across the Middle East and North Africa, the Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar emerged as key sponsors of proxy warfare across the region. These states’ efforts to shape the politics of other countries reveal profound shifts in the character of proxy warfare in the Greater Middle East since 2011. The Gulf monarchies’ interventions have reshaped conflicts from Libya to Yemen and the Horn of Africa to Syria, competing not only against their regional rival Iran but also amongst themselves for political influence and economic access. In doing so, they illustrate the complexity and dynamic nature of the multipolar proxy war environment, where conflicts between the United States and Russia, and the United States and Iran, are layered over multiple axes of regional and sub-state competition. However, since 2011, all three Gulf monarchies have shifted their approach to proxy warfare. Their initial aims of reshaping the regional balance of power in their favor—by supporting revisionist proxy actors in arenas like Libya and Syria while working to shore up allies like Bahrain— ran into the challenges that sponsors of proxies often face. As a result of this, as well as their perceptions of the United States’ policy orientation in the region, the Gulf monarchies adopted more conservative goals in their use of proxy warfare, aiming to protect their interests and manage threats to the status quo across the region rather than reshape it. In addition to this shift, diplomatic divisions among the three monarchies have intensified due to differences in their proxy war strategies and their perceptions of the Arab Spring. These divisions hold the potential to spark further conflict in areas where proxy sponsors’ interests collide. The shift to status quo maintenance-driven strategies has not ended Gulf state sponsorship of proxy forces. Instead, it has led to ongoing warfare in the name of crisis management, and in many cases, the virtual absence of efforts to end wars through negotiations, political settlements, and the provision of reconstruction aid and other forms of assistance. Key Findings: • In the early years of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar sought to use proxy warfare to re-order the Middle East in their favor. The rise of these Gulf states as sponsors of proxy newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-monarchs-pawns/ 5 warfare increased the complexity of U.S. efforts to stabilize the region. • The proxy strategies of these three Gulf monarchies have shifted since the 2011 Arab Spring from seeking revisionist and opportunistic aims to efforts at crisis management: ◦ Revisionist/opportunistic: From 2011 through about 2014, the Arab Gulf monarchies saw the instability wrought by the Arab Spring as an opportunity to revise the existing regional balance of power in their favor by replacing opponents with friendly regimes, as in Libya and Syria (with the notable exception of Bahrain, where a regional coalition intervened to shore up the regime). ◦ Crisis management/status quo maintenance: By about 2014, the Arab Gulf regimes no longer believed that they could win a decisive victory in the region’s conflicts. At the same time, the proximate costs of regional instability resulting from these unresolved conflicts became too high a cost to bear. These three Arab Gulf states’ proxy strategies therefore largely shifted to a crisis containment mode. While they continued to engage in proxy conflicts, notably launching an intervention in Yemen’s civil war in March 2015, the Gulf monarchies’ proxy strategies were increasingly oriented towards upholding the status quo rather than overturning existing regimes. • By 2014, the Gulf monarchies changed their proxy warfare strategy as it became increasingly clear that their proxies could not achieve decisive victory but more often fragmented and extended civil wars that gave their opponents an opportunity to gain regional influence. • Growing divisions among these three Gulf states exacerbated competition among the proxies they supported, thereby prolonging conflict. Different approaches to regional policy, including their choices of proxy affiliates, sharpened long- standing diplomatic divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand and Qatar on the other. • The monarchies’ shift towards status quo maintenance has not meant an end to proxy war. In the absence of U.S. pressure on regional actors to resolve regional disputes and investment in demobilization and the creation of alternative livelihood opportunities, proxy wars will continue where the leadership of the Arab Gulf monarchies perceive a newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-monarchs-pawns/ 6 conflict party as a threat to their regional interests or when crises spark new conflicts. • Despite the shift towards status quo maintenance, splits among the three monarchies over their threat perceptions and willingness to support different kinds of proxy forces persist and could fuel further conflict. Qatar, in particular, has supported Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated and other Islamist proxies, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE see these groups as dangerous to their own regional interests, and have supported Salafists, more “moderate” groups, autocratic regimes, and others who oppose Muslim Brotherhood affiliates. This split continues to shape conflicts in which the three monarchies are involved. • When the Obama administration began to signal that it was looking to disengage from the Middle East and would not support Gulf state revisionist strategies with direct military force, Gulf states adopted more conservative, status quo maintenance aims. • Gulf proxy strategies have also been shaped by intra-Gulf competition, local conflict dynamics, and regional politics more broadly. • The most important step that U.S. policymakers can take to increase stability in the Middle East—a core U.S. strategic goal—is to end civil wars and other forms of sub-state conflict, and therefore close off opportunities for regional proxy intervention. Sustained diplomatic attention and investment in development will be necessary, if not sufficient, to end these deeply complex and intractable conflicts. newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-monarchs-pawns/ 7 Introduction In 2011, at the beginning of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar viewed this new source of instability as an opportunity to revise elements of the existing regional balance of power through proxy warfare. Over time, however, this assessment soured, as proxy warfare no longer appeared to be a policy tool with the potential to achieve a new favorable regional order while insulating their homelands from threat. As a result, they increasingly shifted to proxy strategies aimed at managing specific crises with an eye toward maintaining the regional status quo. To varying degrees, Saudi Arabia,
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