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The Continuum Companion to Anarchism
The Continuum Companion to Anarchism 9781441172129_Pre_Final_txt_print.indd i 6/9/2001 3:18:11 PM The Continuum Companion to Anarchism Edited by Ruth Kinna 9781441172129_Pre_Final_txt_print.indd iii 6/9/2001 3:18:13 PM Continuum International Publishing Group The Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane 11 York Road Suite 704 London SE1 7NX New York, NY 10038 www.continuumbooks.com © Ruth Kinna and Contributors, 2012 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitt ed, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the permission of the publishers. E ISBN: 978-1-4411-4270-2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record of this title is available from the Library of Congress. Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India Printed and bound in the United States of America 9781441172129_Pre_Final_txt_print.indd iv 6/9/2001 3:18:13 PM Contents Contributors viii Acknowledgements xiv Part I – Research on Anarchism 1 Introduction 3 Ruth Kinna Part II – Approaches to Anarchist Research 2 Research Methods and Problems: Postanarchism 41 Saul Newman 3 Anarchism and Analytic Philosophy 50 Benjamin Franks 4 Anarchism and Art History: Methodologies of Insurrection 72 Allan Antliff 5 Participant Observation 86 Uri Gordon 6 Anarchy, Anarchism and International Relations 96 Alex Prichard Part III – Current Research in Anarchist Studies 7 Bridging the Gaps: Twentieth-Century Anglo-American Anarchist Thought 111 Carissa Honeywell 8 The Hitchhiker as Theorist: Rethinking Sociology and Anthropology from an Anarchist Perspective 140 Jonathan Purkis 9 Genders and Sexualities in Anarchist Movements 162 Sandra Jeppesen and Holly Nazar v 9781441172129_Pre_Final_txt_print.indd v 6/9/2001 3:18:13 PM Contents 10 Literature and Anarchism 192 David Goodway 11 Anarchism and the Future of Revolution 212 Laurence Davis 12 Social Ecology 233 Andy Price 1 3 Leyendo el anarchismo a través de ojos latinoamericanos : Reading Anarchism through Latin American Eyes 252 Sara C. -
Effective Altruism's Underspecification Problem
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by PhilPapers Effective Altruism’s Underspecification Problem Travis Timmerman 1. Introduction Whether any given act is supererogatory, obligatory, merely permissible, or impermissible depends upon the alternative acts available to the agent. But what exactly are the relevant alternative acts available to an agent? It turns out that this is a surprisingly difficult question to answer, yet it’s one on which any complete normative ethical theory must take a stance. It’s also one on which any effective altruist must take a stance. This may be unwelcome news for effective altruists since, as I will demonstrate, each of the dominant views in the literature generates verdicts that are (i) implausible in their own right and (ii) seemingly at odds with typical effective altruist commitments. Considering a particular case will help make this issue less abstract: The Gig Brandi has been invited by her friend, Chad, to attend his musical gig. Brandi can easily decide to attend the gig, and then decide at the gig to be supportive of Chad, which would be the best outcome. Unfortunately, Chad is a mediocre musician. Consequently, Brandi would not in fact decide to be supportive of Chad if she decided to attend his gig due to being irritated with Chad’s performance—even though she could decide at the gig to be supportive. Since Chad would be deeply hurt, this would be the worst outcome. Brandi could alternatively decide not to attend Chad’s gig, which would be better than the worst outcome, yet worse than the best outcome.1 To be sure, Brandi can decide to attend the gig, and once, there she can decide to be supportive of Chad. -
Journal of Applied Logic
JOURNAL OF APPLIED LOGIC AUTHOR INFORMATION PACK TABLE OF CONTENTS XXX . • Description p.1 • Impact Factor p.1 • Abstracting and Indexing p.1 • Editorial Board p.1 • Guide for Authors p.5 ISSN: 1570-8683 DESCRIPTION . This journal welcomes papers in the areas of logic which can be applied in other disciplines as well as application papers in those disciplines, the unifying theme being logics arising from modelling the human agent. For a list of areas covered see the Editorial Board. The editors keep close contact with the various application areas, with The International Federation of Compuational Logic and with the book series Studies in Logic and Practical Reasoning. Benefits to authors We also provide many author benefits, such as free PDFs, a liberal copyright policy, special discounts on Elsevier publications and much more. Please click here for more information on our author services. Please see our Guide for Authors for information on article submission. This journal has an Open Archive. All published items, including research articles, have unrestricted access and will remain permanently free to read and download 48 months after publication. All papers in the Archive are subject to Elsevier's user license. If you require any further information or help, please visit our Support Center IMPACT FACTOR . 2016: 0.838 © Clarivate Analytics Journal Citation Reports 2017 ABSTRACTING AND INDEXING . Zentralblatt MATH Scopus EDITORIAL BOARD . Executive Editors Dov M. Gabbay, King's College London, London, UK Sarit Kraus, Bar-llan University, -
I Was Among Those Who Wanted to Become Richard Sylvan (Né
The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic Volume 4, Number 3, Sept. 1998 IN MEMORIAM: RICHARD (ROUTLEY) SYLVAN 1935-1996 I was among those who wanted to become Richard Sylvan (ne´ Routley). Logician, metaphysician, social and environmental philosopher, builder of systems and houses, colleague and adviser, lover of Nature–Richard had many personae. But the ambition to be Sylvan was (and is) too large. And anyway it must be withdrawn, after his sudden death on 16 June, 1996 of a massive heart attack while visiting the island of Bali, Indonesia, with his second wife Louise. Sylvan was a great credit to our ANU Institute of Advanced Studies. Sadly, he did not always receive optimal support, for reasons that reflect badly both on him and on us. On him, because he was a difficult (though not unpleasant) man. In response we his colleagues sometimes had difficulty in suffering him, often on grounds that shame our pretensions to be a great university. Nonetheless Sylvan’s academic record was outstanding. He bore individ- ual or joint responsibility for some 27 books and booklets, together with scores and scores of highly innovative professional articles. In philosophy Richard “covered the waterfront,” tackling topics in (among others) logic, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and environmental philosophy. For his contributions he was elected to the Australian Academy of the Humanities in 1977, but he resigned from that body in 1980. Richard Routleywas born in New Zealand in December, 1935. He received his bachelor’s degree from Victoria University of Wellington, going on to graduate study in philosophy at Princeton in 1959-61. -
The Profoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution
Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School April 2019 The rP ofoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution Pol Pardini Gispert [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Pardini Gispert, Pol, "The rP ofoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution" (2019). LSU Master's Theses. 4915. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/4915 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE PROFOUNDEST PROBLEM OF ETHICS: ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROFOUND SOLUTION A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in The Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies by Pol Pardini Gispert B.A., Universitat de Girona, 2001 May 2019 For my mother and father, For as many books as I read, your actions are still my moral compass. ii Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... iv Preface ............................................................................................................................................ -
Truths Containing Empty Names Michael Mckinsey
In Philosophical Approaches to Proper Names, P. Stalmaszczyk and L. Fernández Moreno (eds.).Peter Lang, 2016. Truths Containing Empty Names Michael McKinsey 1. A problem for direct reference. According to the thesis of Direct Reference (or the DR-thesis for short), the propositions expressed by sentences containing the proper names and indexical pronouns of natural language are a strict function of the semantic referents of the names and indexicals, as opposed to being a function of any Fregean descriptive senses or contents that the names and indexicals might be alleged to possess.1 Another way of expressing this idea is to say that the sole semantic contribution that a proper name or indexical can make to the propositions expressed by sentences containing the term is the term’s semantic referent. Bertrand Russell called terms of this sort ‘names in the logical sense’ (1918, 201). I will call them ‘genuine terms’. Following standard practice, I will call the propositions expressed by sentences containing genuine terms, ‘singular propositions’. Like many others, I endorse the DR-thesis. In my case, the primary reason for endorsing the thesis lies in the modal considerations first briefly introduced by John Searle (1958) and later clarified and forcefully applied by Saul Kripke (1972a), considerations which show that proper names do not have the meanings of contingent definite descriptions. David Kaplan (1989) raised related points to support the conclusion that indexical pronouns are also genuine terms. In recent work I have argued at some length that the DR-thesis entails both that (a) a sentence containing a non-referring name or indexical can express no proposition, and hence that (b) such sentences can have no truth value, that is, can be neither true or false. -
Richard Sylvan (Born Richard Routley) on Nonexistent Objects
Richard Sylvan (born Richard Routley) on Nonexistent Objects https://www.ontology.co/sylvanr.htm Theory and History of Ontology by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: [email protected] Richard Sylvan [born Richard Routley] on Nonexistent Objects INTRODUCTION "On the June 16th, 1996, Richard Sylvan died of a sudden and unexpected heart attack. His death, at the relatively young age of 60, robbed Australasia of one of its greatest philosophers, arguably the most original that it has ever produced. Richard was born Francis Richard Routley at Levin, New Zealand, on 13 December, 1935. He changed his name to Sylvan -- much to the confusion of a number of people -- when he remarried in 1983. After studying at the Victoria University of Wellington, he took a job at the University of Sydney, in Australia, where he lived for the rest of his life. He had several other jobs in Australia, including one at the University of New England, where, with Len Goddard, he trained a generation of Australian logicians. In 1971, he took up a position at the Australian National University, in Canberra, where he worked until his untimely death. Richard was a most unusual person -- by any standards. He would rise at dawn, write philosophy till lunch, then pursue his hobbies, like building houses or tending the forests that he owned, till the sun went down, when he would open a bottle of wine and relax. To those who did not know him well, he could appear blunt, aggressive, and he could certainly be a difficult person for university administrators to get on with. -
ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: for the END IS a LIMIT
ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: FOR THE END IS A LIMIT: THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE ENVIRONMENT Ozguc Orhan, Doctor of Philosophy, 2007 Dissertation Directed By: Professor Charles E. Butterworth Department of Government and Politics Professor Ken Conca Department of Government and Politics This dissertation argues that Aristotle’s philosophy of praxis (i.e., ethics and politics) can contribute to our understanding of the contemporary question concerning the environment. Thinking seriously about the environment today calls for resisting the temptation to jump to conclusions about Aristotle’s irrelevance to the environment on historicist grounds of incommensurability or the fact that Aristotle did not write specifically on environmental issues as we know them. It is true that environmental problems are basically twentieth-century phenomena, but the larger normative discourses in which the terms “environmental” and “ecological” and their cognates are situated should be approached philosophically, namely, as cross-cultural and trans-historical phenomena that touch human experience at a deeper level. The philosophical perspective exploring the discursive meaning behind contemporary environmental praxis can reveal to us that certain aspects of Aristotle’s thought are relevant, or can be adapted, to the ends of environmentalists concerned with developmental problems. I argue that Aristotle’s views are already accepted and adopted in political theory and the praxis of the environment in many respects. In the first half of the dissertation, I -
1 from Viktor Frankl's Logotherapy to the Four Defining Characteristics of Self-Transcendence (ST) Paul T. P. Wong Introductio
1 From Viktor Frankl’s Logotherapy to the Four Defining Characteristics of Self-Transcendence (ST) Paul T. P. Wong Introduction The present paper continues my earlier presentation on self-transcendence (ST) as a pathway to meaning, virtue, and happiness (Wong, 2016), in which I introduced Viktor Frankl’s (1985) two-factor theory of ST. Here, the same topic of ST is expanded by first providing the basic assumptions of logotherapy, then arguing the need for objective standards for meaning, and finally elaborating the defining characteristics of ST. To begin, here is a common-sense observation—no one can remain at the same spot for life for a variety of reasons, such as developmental and environmental changes, but most importantly because people dream of a better life and want to move to a preferred destination where they can find happiness and fulfillment. As a psychologist, I am interested in finding out (a) which destination people choose and (b) how they plan to get there successfully. In a free society that offers many opportunities for individuals, there are almost endless options regarding both (a) and (b). The reality is that not all purposes in life are equal. Some life goals are misguided, such as wanting to get rich by any means, including unethical and illegal ones, because ultimately, such choices could be self-defeating—these end values might not only fail to fill their hearts with happiness, but might also ruin their relationships and careers. The question, then, is: What kind of choices will have the greatest likelihood of resulting in a good life that not only benefits the individual but also society? My research has led me to hypothesize that the path of ST is most likely to result in such a good life. -
Compositionality and the Metaphysics of Meaning
“This is not the first time such a view has been put forward. If it could be worked out in detail, so rigorously that not the smallest doubt remained, that, it seems to me, would be a result not entirely without importance.” - Gottlob Frege University of Alberta Compositionality and the Metaphysics of Meaning by Jeffery Fedorkiw A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Philosophy ©Jeffery Fedorkiw Fall 2011 Edmonton, Alberta Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms. The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis and, except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatsoever without the author's prior written permission. Dedicated to Helen Fedorkiw Abstract The principle of compositionality states that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its con- stituent parts and the way those parts are combined. Jerry Fodor has argued that semantic productivity and systematicity requires compositionality and that compositionality requires atomism about semantic values. Atomism is here the thesis that there are simple meanings which are assigned to grammatical terms completely inde- pendent of any other (i.e. -
Recovering What Is Said with Empty Names 239 Volume 40, Number 2, June 2010, Pp
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYRecovering What Is Said With Empty Names 239 Volume 40, Number 2, June 2010, pp. 239-274 Recovering What Is Said With Empty Names1 GUALTIERO PICCININI University of Missouri – St. Louis St. Louis, MO 63132 USA and SAM SCOTT Toronto, ON M6K 3B2 CANADA I Introduction As our data will show, negative existential sentences containing so- called empty names evoke the same strong semantic intuitions in ordi- nary speakers and philosophers alike. 1 Many thanks to Fred Adams, Kent Bach, Anthony Everett, Mitchell Green, Thomas Hofweber, Stephen McLeod, Phillip Robbins, Rob Stainton, Nicole Wyatt, and sev- eral anonymous referees for comments on previous versions of this paper, to Brett Hyde and other members of the Semantics Reading Group at Washington Univer- sity in St. Louis, to the audience — especially Kit Fine — at the 2008 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, and to Jim Virtel for editorial assistance. Gualtiero Piccinini gratefully acknowledges support from the Center for International Studies at the University of Missouri – St Louis. 240 Gualtiero Piccinini and Sam Scott (1) (a) Santa Claus does not exist. (b) Superman does not exist. (c) Clark Kent does not exist. Uttering the sentences in (1) seems to say something truth-evaluable, to say something true, and to say something different for each sentence. A semantic theory ought to explain these semantic intuitions. The intuitions elicited by (1) are in apparent confl ict with the Mil- lian view of proper names. According to Millianism, the meaning (or ‘semantic value’) of a proper name is just its referent. -
Virtue Ethics in This Paper, I Am Going to Discuss the Common Objection To
Virtue Ethics In this paper, I am going to discuss the common objection to virtue ethics that William Frankena and other moral theorists have posed: virtue ethics cannot tell us how we ought to act (i.e. that it is not a normative theory). In doing this I will discuss how Rosalind Hursthouse successfully defends virtue ethics against this charge and makes it more appealing than both deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics. I will then argue that Hursthouse’s defense shows that deontology ethics better serves as a heuristic for virtue ethics, than its own ethical theory. I will finish the paper by arguing Hursthouse’s defense of normative virtue ethics reveals a counterintuitive conclusion, but one that I am willing to accept in favor of the moral framework. In William Frankena’s “A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics” Frankena brings up the common criticism that a virtue ethics theory cannot tell us how to act, but instead gives us a way to cultivate and teach ourselves and others the existing moral principles we should hold. He does believe virtues have a valuable role to play in “moral education and development,” but ultimately believes they do not serve the purpose of providing us with a direction when we are faced with a moral dilemma (Frankena p. 353). He writes, “the function of the virtues in an ethics of duty is not to tell us what to do but to ensure that we will do it willingly in whatever situations we may face” (Frankena p. 353). He argues that because we have to appeal to existing principles defined by different ethical theories such as trait egoism, trait utilitarianism, trait deontological theory, ect, virtue ethics is just an extension of these theories (Frankena p.