Synthese Library

Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science

Volume 415

Editor-in-Chief Otávio Bueno, University of Miami, Department of Philosophy, USA

Editors Berit Brogaard, University of Miami, USA Anjan Chakravartty, University of Notre Dame, USA Steven French, University of Leeds, UK Catarina Dutilh Novaes, VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands The aim of Synthese Library is to provide a forum for the best current work in the methodology and philosophy of science and in epistemology. A wide variety of different approaches have traditionally been represented in the Library, and every effort is made to maintain this variety, not for its own sake, but because we believe that there are many fruitful and illuminating approaches to the philosophy of science and related disciplines. Special attention is paid to methodological studies which illustrate the interplay of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal (logical, set-theoretical, mathematical, information-theoretical, decision-theoretical, etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical methods to epistemology as well as philosophically and methodologically relevant studies in logic are strongly encouraged. The emphasis on logic will be tempered by interest in the psychological, historical, and sociological aspects of science. Besides monographs Synthese Library publishes thematically unified anthologies and edited volumes with a well-defined topical focus inside the aim and scope of the book series. The contributions in the volumes are expected to be focused and structurally organized in accordance with the central theme(s), and should be tied together by an extensive editorial introduction or set of introductions if the volume is divided into parts. An extensive bibliography and index are mandatory.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6607

The Sylvan Jungle

This book is part of a collection of four books that present the work of the iconic and iconoclastic Australian philosopher Richard Routley (né Sylvan).

The four books are:

• Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond • Noneist Explorations I • Noneist Explorations II • Ultralogic as Universal?

All books are published in the Synthese Library. Editorial team of the Sylvan Jungle:

• Maureen Eckert • Ross Brady • Filippo G.E. Casati • Nicholas Griffin • Dominic Hyde • Chris Mortensen • Graham Priest • Zach Weber Richard Routley and Val Routley Authors Dominic Hyde Editor

Noneist Explorations I The Sylvan Jungle — Volume 2 with Supplementary Essays Richard Routley and Val Routley (deceased) rEdito Dominic Hyde Philosophy, HPRC University of Queensland St. Lucia, QLD, Australia

Synthese Library ISBN 978-3-030-26307-2 ISBN 978-3-030-26309-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26309-6

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Editors’ Preface

This volume continues the reprinting of a new edition of Richard Routley’s 1980 mono- graph Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond: An investigation of noneism and the theory of items.

Some of the work reprinted in this volume contains material co-authored with Val Plumwood (formerly Val Routley), in particular, chapter 4. Other material was developed with Val, for example parts of chapter 7 (cf. the footnote beginning §7.7(2)). For this reason, she is listed as co-author.

We have sought to correct obvious errors, and have updated some references. As noted in the preface to Vol. 1, attempts were made to locate and reproduce the photographs that Sylvan included in the original publication (see the introductory essay by Hyde, Vol. 1), but the passage of time has erased their tracks. We have, however, been able to ﬁnd further photographs of the same area as that pictured in the original mono- graph by one of the original photographers, Henry Gold, and with his kind permission reproduce another of his photos, Vines and epiphytes,inthisvolume.

For help in the production of this second volume, thanks go to: Louise Sylvan for her permission to reprint Richard’s original material; Elizabeth Smart for permission to reprint the essay by J.J.C. Smart; the ever-helpful archivists at the University of Queensland Fryer Library (where Sylvan’s extensive archive is housed); Michael Kebrt and the Word-to-LaTeX crew; and funding from the University of Adelaide.

*****

Anoteonreferencing:theoriginal1980editioniscitedas“EMJB1”(availableat: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/14805), and this four-volume reprint is cited as “EMJB2”.

Page, section and chapter references are to EMJB2. The Sylvan Jungle Editors:

Maureen Eckert Ross Brady Filippo Casati Nicholas Griﬃn Dominic Hyde Chris Mortensen Graham Priest Zach Weber Contents

Editors’ Preface v

Contributors xi

Introduction: Some Personal Reﬂections – Priest xiii

ORIGINAL MATERIAL xix

First Edition Front Matter [Abridged] xxiii Acknowledgements ...... xxiii

CHAPTER 2 Exploring Meinong’s jungle and beyond. II. Exist- ence and identity when times change 1 §1 Existence is existence now ...... 1 §2 Enlarging on some of the chronological inadequacies of classical logic and its metaphysical basis, the Reference Theory ...... 5 §3 Change and identity over time; Heracleitean and Parmenidean problems for chronological logics ...... 11 §4 Developing a nonmetrical neutral chronological logic ...... 18 §5 Further corollaries of noneism for the philosophy of time ...... 48 1Realityquestions:therealityoftime?...... 48 2Againstthesubjectivityoftime:initialpoints...... 50 3 The future is not real ...... 51 4Allegedrelativisticdifficulties aboutthepresenttimeandas to tense ...... 53 5 Time, change and alternative worlds ...... 56 6Limitationsonstatementsaboutthefuture,especiallyasto naming objects and making predictions? ...... 57 7Fatalismandalternativefutures...... 61

CHAPTER 3 On what there isn’t 67

CHAPTER 4 Further objections to the theory of items disarmed 87 §1 The theory of objects is inconsistent, absurd; Carnap’s objections, and Hinton’s case against Meinongianism ...... 88 §2 The attack on nonexistent objects,andallegedpuzzlesabout what such objects could be ...... 95 §3 The accusation of platonism; being, types of existence, and the condition on existence ...... 97 §4 Subsistence objections ...... 105 §5 The defects of nonentities; the problem of relations, and indeterminacy109 §6 Nonentities are mere shadows, facades, verbal simulacra; appeal to the formal mode ...... 112 §7 Tooley’s objection that the claim that there are nonexistent objects answering to objects of thought leads to contradictions .... 116 §8 Williams’ argument that fatal difficulties beset Meinongian pure objects ...... 119 §9 Further objections based on quantification and on features of truth-definitions ...... 123 §10 Findlay’s objection that nonentities are lawless, chaotic, unscientific 125 §11 Grossmann’s case against Meinong’s theory of objects ...... 127 §12 Mish’alani’s criticism of Meinongian theories ...... 140 §13 A theory of impossible objects is bound to be inconsistent: and objections based on rival theories of descriptions ...... 144 §14 Identity again: Lambert’s challenge and how Quine hits back ... 150 §15 Further objections based on theories of descriptions ...... 155 §16 The charge that a theory of items is unnecessary: the inadequacy of rival referential programmes ...... 160 CHAPTER 5 Three Meinongs 165 §1 The mythological Meinong again, and further Oxford and North American misrepresentation ...... 165 §2 The Characterisation Postulate further considered, and some draw- backs of the consistent position ...... 174 §3 Interlude on the historical Meinong: evidence that Meinong intended his theory to be a consistent one, and some counter-evidence 178 §4 The paraconsistent position, and forms of the Characterisation Postulate in the case of abstract objects ...... 183 §5 The bottom order Characterisation Postulate again, and triviality arguments ...... 187 §6 Characterising predicates and elementary and atomic proposi- tional functions, and the arguments for consistency and nontri- viality of theory ...... 192

CHAPTER 6 The theory of objects as commonsense 203 §1 Nonreductionism and the Idiosyncratic Platitude ...... 204 §2 The structure of commonsense theories and commonsense philosophy 208 §3 Axioms of commonsense, and major theses ...... 212 §4 No limitation theses, sorts of Characterisation Postulates, and proofs of commonsense ...... 216 1Nolimitation(orFreedom)theses...... 216 2 Characterisation (or Assumption) Postulates ...... 219

CHAPTER 7 The problems of fiction and fictions 225 §1 Fiction, and some of its distinctive semantical features ...... 228 §2 Statemental logics of fiction: initial inadequacies in orthodoxy again 238 §3 The main philosophical inheritance: paraphrastic and elliptical theories of fiction ...... 244 §4 Redesigning elliptical theories, as contextual theories ...... 257 §5 Elaborating contextual, and naive, theories to meet objections; and rejection of pure contextual theories ...... 263 §6 Integration of contextual and ordinary naive theories within the theory of items ...... 270 §7 Residual difficulties with the qualified naive theory: relational puzzles and fictional paradoxes ...... 276 1Relationalpuzzles...... 276 2Fictionalparadoxesandtheirdissolution...... 290 §8 The objects of fiction: fictions and their syntax, semantics and problematics ...... 293 1 Common quantificational and second-order logics of fiction .. 293 2Avoidingreducedexistencecommitmentsandessentialistpuzzles295 3Transworldidentityexplained...... 297 4Duplicateobjectscharacterised...... 299 §9 Synopsis and clarification of the integrated theory: s-predicates and further elaboration ...... 300 §10 The extent of fiction, imagination and the like ...... 303 1“Fictions”inthephilosophicalsense...... 304 2Imaginaryobjects,theirfeaturesandtheirvariety:initialtheory304 3Worksofthefineartsandcrafts,andtheirobjects...... 306 4Typesofmediaandliteraryfiction...... 308 5Fictionalobjectsversustheoreticalobjects,andthemistake of fictionalism ...... 310 6 The incompleteness and “fictionality” of the theory of fictions advanced ...... 311

Bibliography 313

SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS 341

AcritiqueofMeinongiansemantics–Smart 343

Routley’s theory of ﬁctions – Reicher 353

Routley’s second thoughts – Kroon 383

Index 405 Contributors

Graham Priest, Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, USA

J.J.C. Smart (deceased), Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian Na- tional University, Canberra, Australia

Maria Elisabeth Reicher, Philosophy, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

Fred Kroon, Philosophy, University of Auckland, New Zealand Introduction: some personal reflections

Graham Priest

With the perspective aﬀorded by time, Richard Sylvan, nè Routley (1935-1996), will, Ibelieve,cometobeseenasthemostimportantAustralasianphilosopherofthe20th Century. This is not at all to denigrate his currently better known compatriot contempor- aries: a number of these made highly signiﬁcant contributions to philosophy. But what set Richard apart was the originality he deployed and the scope of his vision. He made original contributions to logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, value theory, environmental philosophy, political philosophy. Moreover, though he never wrote anything that integrated all of these, it is clear to those who know his work that his views on all these matters formed part of an overall and systematic philosophical picture.

Richard’s work is not as well known as it could be for a number of reasons. One is that he paid no heed to contemporary philosophical sensibilities. He delighted in taking unpopular views, articulating and defending them. He was in his element demolishing the views of his opponents. In other words, he was asking to be ignored, particularly since he was working in an outpost of the philosophical world. He did not have the prestige of an Oxford, Princeton, or Paris, behind him to force people to take note. Next, Richard’s work was not always user-friendly. It was exemplary in clarity and argumentation, but he did not have the literary style of a Quine or a Ryle. His work could often appear heavy and laboured. Third, the work was often not easily accessible. He distrusted professional publishers, their connection with “the establishment”, and their proﬁt-driven motives. Hence, much of his work appeared in typescript form in in-house publications and pre-prints that never got beyond the pre stage. (His work predates the current era, when computers and programs such as Latex can produce elegant documents in-house.) Introduction Graham Priest

Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond –orThe Jungle Book, as it became known to Richard and his friends – ﬁts neatly into this picture. When Richard started to write on the topic, the view that some objects do not exist was about as unpopular as it is possible to be – just a shade short of insanity. As Ryle said of Meinong’s view in an article in the Revue de Metaphysique in 1973: “Gegenstandstheorie is dead, buried and not going to be resurrected”. Richard coined the term noneism for the view that Meinong – and incidentally, all the great medieval logicians – held, that some objects do not exist. Richard was one of the small band of philosophers (and to my mind the most thoroughgoing of them) who worked to bring noneism back from the dead; and he set about it with the intellectual power of a steam-roller.1

The Jungle Book collects the many papers he wrote on the topic, pulling them together from a number of places, of various degrees of accessibility. The result is the thousand-and-some page book – termed coyly, “Interim Edition” – which appeared ori- ginally in 1980. It was published in-house and distributed from Richard’s office at the Australian National University (ANU), by himself and his research assistants. Both the length of the book and the fact that it is in typewriter font make it particularly hard to read. (I suspect that the number of people who have read the whole thing can still be counted on the fingers and toes of a normal human being.) The manuscript never went through the mill of professional editing. It would certainly have benefitted from this, by being cut down to get rid of the repetitions, being reorganised so as to structure the material better, and having some of the weaker parts removed. Still, what it gave us was Richard’s uncensored iconoclastic and creative brilliance.

The book was highly inﬂuential amongst Richard’s friends and colleagues, but the circumstances around its accessibility mean that it never achieved the distribution and uptake it deserved. So I’m delighted that it has been possible to have the book reappear in the current multi-volume Latexed form. It will make the work much better known, as is its desert – though I have no doubt that were Richard to come back from the grave, since the work is being published by Springer, he would veto the project.

The ﬁrst of the four volumes contains the core of Richard’s noneism: what eventually became his Princeton PhD thesis – submitted many years after he left prematurely

1 By the way, I often meet philosophers – especially non-native-English speakers – who mis-pronounce the word or, at least, who pronounce it in a way that Richard did not intend. Say the English word none,andjuststickism on the end. In other words, don’t pronounce the middle e.

xiv because he didn’t like the place. The fourth volume contains an appendix of the original book, “Ultralogic as Universal?”. This is an important essay in its own right, and well worth the republication, though it has little connection with the rest of the book. I think that the reason Richard appended it was simply his somewhat optimistic desire to make it more accessible. The other two volumes, of which this is the ﬁrst, contain the other chapters. These are on a variety of themes with nothing much in common except noneism. There was no way to cut these chapters up in a systematic fashion to produce volumes with greater integrity, so the contents of each are patently diverse.

That does not mean, of course, that the essays in the volumes lack interest. They certainly do not. But it does mean that it is hard to write an editorial introduction to the essays of the usual kind. So I decided not to try. Just read the essays! What I have decided to do instead in the rest of this introduction is to say a bit more about Richard himself.

I well recall the ﬁrst time I met him. This was at the ﬁrst conference I ever attended after I moved to Australia from the UK in 1976. It was a meeting of the Australasian Association for Logic in Canberra at the ANU. Richard and the other ANU logicians of course attended the meeting. I gave the paper which was to be published a few years later as “The Logic of Paradox”. As I was leaving the session, I recall hearing someone saying (not to me), “What a seditious paper”. That was not Richard’s reaction. As we were walking up the stairs to the Coombs Building tea room for a break, Richard turned to me and said “So you’re a dialectician, are you?” “Dialectician” was the word he was using for what is now called “dialetheism”, a word that we junked soon afterwards because of its heavy intellectual baggage. At any rate, so started our close friendship and collaboration which was terminated only 20 years later by Richard’s untimely death. Richard was not a dialetheist at the time I met him, but he had been playing with the idea. Targetting the very big apple of the Principle of Non-Contradiction greatly appealed to his iconoclasm.

Richard was already a noneist when I met him, though. I was outraged by the idea. My Quinean orthodoxy told me that this really was beyond the pale – much more so than dialetheism! So although we saw many things in very much the same way in our collaboration, noneism was not one of them; we argued about it a lot. In the end, I had to agree that all the Quinean objections that I thought were so devastating were just lame. I didn’t become a noneist at that time, though. There was still the question of how to

xv Introduction Graham Priest address the characterisation problem is a satisfactory way. The characterisation problem is this: under some condition or other, a thing has the properties it is characterised as having (the Characterisation Principle). Everyone, noneist or otherwise, accepts this, but no one can accept it in full generality. It leads in a two-line argument to triviality. The problem was how best to accommodate the Principle in a noneist context. The various suggestions for doing so mark the crucial diﬀerence between current Neo-Meinongians. Richard struggled with the problem in the Jungle Book,thoughheneverreallysolved it to his satisfaction. Indeed, he was still wresting with it in his ﬁnal essay on noneism, “Re-exploring Item Theory” (pp. 546-81 of Volume 1 of this edition of the Jungle Book).

I finally became a noneist when I found a solution to the problem which satisfied me, and which resulted in my own Towards Non-Being.UnfortunatelyIdidnotfindthis till some years after Richard’s death, so we never had the pleasure of arguing about it.

Richard and I argued a lot; but there was never anything confrontational about the arguments. We were both interested in the other’s ideas, and intent on getting to the bottom of things in a collegial fashion. This was the way that Richard argued with people with whom he was intellectually sympathetic. Arguments could be quite diﬀerent with people with whom he was not.

When it came to disagreement, Richard was no shrinking violet. He could be blunt in saying that an idea didn’t stack up. This could be, and sometimes was, interpreted as personal hostility. And indeed, Richard didn’t have much time for people whom he thought were intellectually closed-minded. So bad blood could easily develop. And at the ANU, it eventually did. In the heyday of the Canberra Logic Group – the group of logicians which formed around Richard and Bob Meyer – the chair of the Department was Jack (J.J.C.) Smart. Jack, being a committed Quinean, disagreed with Richard’s views deeply, but the two always got on well together. On his retirement in 1985, Jack was replaced by Frank Jackson, and for reasons that are not part of the story here, Richard and Frank did not get on well together. Matters went from bad to worse. And after all the other logicians in the Department left it to found the Automated Reasoning Project, Richard found himself completely isolated in the Department. (Why Richard didn’t leave with the other logicians was never entirely clear to me.) By the end of his life he had become entirely alienated from the Department. After his death, when someone else

xvi moved into his oﬃce, the copies of the Jungle Book, which ﬁlled its long back wall, were simply disposed of.

Richard’s tensions in his personal relationships with other people could be exacer- bated by the fact that he did not have the mannerisms which put people at their ease. Most people, when they chat with others, do things with their words, tone of voice, and body language, which serve to put them at their ease. When these are not forthcoming, it is naturally interpreted as hostility. Richard had none of these mannerisms. This was not normally due to the fact that he felt hostile, however. He was in fact, a rather shy person, and I think that social graces did not come easily to him. I must confess that it took me a few years to realise all this about Richard; and though our relationship was never anything but friendly, it was not till I finally did so that I felt completely at ease in his company. Indeed, once you came to understand all of this about Richard, you came to see a very different side of him. Under his rather tough exterior, Richard was a genuinely warm and caring person. This bred loyalty and affection in his friends, close colleagues, and students. Indeed, as a supervisor of graduate students – there were no undergraduate students in the Department – Richard was everything one could wish for: conscientious, supportive, friendly. Students or groups of them would often go out to his home on Plumwood Mountain, where they would work with him on the land whilst discussing philosophy, before they adjourned to the house for something to eat and a few bottles of good Australian red wine.

Richard loved the land. He was a committed environmentalist, and he and his ﬁrst wife, Val Routley, made important contributions to both environmental ethics and policy, such as in their book Fight for the Forests.Hecaredgreatlyfortherainforestaround his house on the mountain, as he cared for his graduate students, and for philosophy. It is no accident that the cover or the original jungle book was a photograph of Australian rainforest. The term “Meinong’s jungle” was coined, as far as I’m aware, by William Kneale in his book Probability and Induction. It was meant, I am sure, as a put-down: jungle = tangled mess. Richard, however, adopted it as a term of love: jungle = complex and integrated eco-system. He was greatly at home in sylvan environments, both those of existent trees and those of non-existent objects.

xvii ORIGINAL MATERIAL

First Edition Front Matter [Abridged]

Acknowledgements

My main historical debt is of course to the work of Alexius Meinong. But, as will become apparent, I am also indebted to the work of precursors of Meinong, in particular Thomas Reid. I have been much helped by critical expositions of Meinong’s work, especially Findlay 1963, and, in making recent redraftings of older material, by Roderick Chisholm’s articles. I have been encouraged to elaborate earlier essays and much stimulated by recent attempts to work out a more satisfactory theory of objects than Meinong’s mature theory, in particular the (reductionist) theories of Terence Parsons. That I am, or try to be, severely critical of much other work on theories of objects in no way lessens my debt to some of it.

Among my modern creditors I owe most to Val Routley, who jointly authored some

of the chapters (chapters 4, 8 and 9 [the latter two reprinted in Vol. 3 —Eds.]) and who contributed much to many sections not explicitly acknowledged as joint. For example, the idea that the Reference Theory underlay alternatives to the theory of objects and generated very many philosophical problems, was the result of joint work and discussion.

I have proﬁted – as acknowledgements at relevant points in the text will to some extent reveal – from constructive criticism directed at earlier exposure of this work, in particular extended presentations in seminar series at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, in 1969, at the State University of Campinas in 1976, and at the Australian National University in 1978.

****** Acknowledgements Richard Routley

Some of the essays which follow are redraftings, mostly with substantial changes and additions, of previous essays, which they supersede. Main details are as follows:

Chapter 2 – which has not been subject to nearly as much revision as it de- serves – incorporates virtually all of “Existence and identity when times change”, a 69 page typescript from 1968. The paper was subsequently re-entitled “Exploring Meinong’s Jungle. II. Existence and identity when times change”. Professor Sobocinski kindly oﬀered in 1969 to publish both parts, I and II, of “Exploring Meinong’s Jungle” in the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic.Perhapsfortunatelyforothercontributorstothe Journal, part II was never submitted in ﬁnal form, and part I has recently been with- drawn.

Parts of several of the essays [included in this Volume —Eds.]havebeenpublished elsewhere; Chapter 3 in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; Chapter 6 in Grazer Philosophische Studien;andChapter 7 in Poetics; while some of Chapter 4 has previously appeared in Revue Internationale de Philosophie,theremainderofthepaperinvolved 2 (referred to as Routley 1973) being largely taken up in Chapter 1 [see Vol. 1 —Eds.].

Excerpts from earlier articles on the logic and semantics of nonexistence and inten- sionality and on universal semantics have also been included in the text; these are drawn from the following periodicals: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (papers referred to as EI, SE, NE), Philosophica (MTD), Journal of Philosophical Logic (US), Communic- ation and Cognition (Routley2 1975), Inquiry (Routley 1976), and Philosophical Studies (Routley 1974). Permission to reproduce material has been sought from editors of all the journals cited, and I am indebted to most editors for replies granting permission.

Parts of many of the essays have been read at conferences and seminars in various parts of the world since 1965 and some of the material has as a result (and gratifyingly) worked its way into the literature. It is pleasant to record that much of the material is now regarded as far less crazy and disreputable than it was in the mid-sixties, when it was taken as a sign of early mental deterioration and of philosophical irresponsibility.

******

References, notation, etc. Two forms of reference to other work are used. Publica- tions which are referred to frequently are usually assigned special abbreviations (e.g., SE, Slog); otherwise works are cited by giving the author’s name and the year of publication.

xxiv In case an author has published more than one paper in the one year the papers are ordered alphabetically.

The bibliography records only items that are actually cited in the text. Delays in production made feasible – what was always thought desirable (as even the authors of Slog have repeatedly found) – the addition of an index: this too was compiled by Jean Norman.

In quoting other authors the following minor liberties have been taken: notation has been changed to conform with that of the text, and occasionally passages have been rearranged (hopefully without distortion of content). Occasionally too citations have been drawn from unﬁnished or unpublished work (in particular Parsons 1978 and Tooley 1978)orevenfromlecturenotes(Kripke 1973): sources of these sorts are recorded in the bibliography, and due allowance should be made.

Standard abbreviations, such as “iﬀ” for “if and only if” and “wrt” for “with respect to”, are adopted. The metalanguage is logicians’ ordinary English enriched by a few symbols, most notably “ ”read“if...then...”or“that...impliesthat...”,“&”for ! “and”, “ ”for“or”,“ ”for“not”,“P ”for“some”and“U” for “every”. These abbreviations _ ⇠ are not always used however, and often expressions are written out in English.

Cross references are made in obvious ways, e.g. “see 3.3” means “see chapter 3, section 3” and “in §4” means “in section 4 (of the same chapter)”. The labelling of theorems and lemmata is also chapter relativised. Notation, bracketing conventions, labelling of systems is as explained in companion volume RLR; but in fact where these things are not familiar from the literature or self-explanatory they are explained as they are introduced.

******

Notes for prospective readers.Byandlargethechapters(andevensections)can be read in any order, e.g. a reader can proceed directly to chapter 3 or to chapter 9, or even to section 12.3. Occasionally some backward reference may be called for (e.g. to explain central principles, such as the Ontological Assumption), but it will never require much backtracking.

In places the text becomes heavily loaded with logical symbolism. The reader should not be intimidated. Everything said can be expressed in English, and commonly is so expressed, and always a recipe is given for unscrambling symbolic notation into

xxv Acknowledgements Richard Routley

English. However the symbolism is intended as an aid to understanding and argument and to exact formulation of the theory, not as an obstacle. Should the reader become bogged down in such logical material or discouraged by it, I suggest it be skipped over or otherwise bypassed.

Richard Routley Plumwood Mountain Box 37 Braidwood Australia 2622.

xxvi