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UQFL291 Richard Sylvan Collection FRYER LIBRARY Manuscript Finding Aid UQFL291 Richard Sylvan Collection Size 172 boxes Contents Correspondence, manuscripts, publications, research material compiled on various philosophical subjects. Biography Richard Routley, who later changed his name to Richard Sylvan, was a philosopher and key figure in research on relevant logic, non-standard logic and environmental philosophy. Notes Unrestricted access Arranged by subject with cross-references to file number. The index of file numbers included at the end of this document was compiled by Sylvan's literary executor prior to transfer to the library. Material in boxes 159 to 172 were passed on to Dr Ross Brady after Sylvan’s death in 1996. Brady edited the second volume of Sylvan’s book Relevant Logics and their Rivals, published in 2003. Environmental Ethics Box 1 1731, 1711, 1710, 1723, 1727, 1705, 1713 Box 2 1561, 1476, 1712, 1714, 1716, 1717, 1706 Box 3 1707, 1783, 1715, 1734, 1735, 1744, 1782 Box 4 1779, 1718, 1818 Box 5 1863, 1767, 1736, 1746, 1759, 1769, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1972, 1998, 1996, 1988, 2006, 1992, 1993, 2000, 1989, 1997, 1991, 1467 Last updated: 22-03-2021 © University of Queensland 1 FRYER LIBRARY Manuscript Finding Aid Box 6 1768, 1758, 910, 917, 1221, 1766, 1772, 1390, 1367, 1365, 889, 973, 974 Box 7 312, 309, 900, 1198, 1197, 1196, 1195, 1194, 1074, 792, 191, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 667, 668, 66, 603, 664, 665, 656, 657, 190, 733, 794, 770, 769, 768, 767, 766, 765, 761, 759, 757, 755, 754, 788 Box 8 647, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 666, 602, 611, 612, 609 Box 9 607, 606, 605, 189, 187, 627, 617, 618, 291, 292, 293, 304, 572, 576, 575, 574, 578, 896, 311, 686, 685, 693, 690, 688 Box 10 687, 224, 571, 570, 615, 614, 616, 619, 604, 601, 599, 600, 598, 596, 592, 533, 594, 638, 640, 641, 642, 643, 645, 646, 597, 644, 639, 637, 629, 624, 623, 622, 620, 610 Box 11 613, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 282, 283, 284, 348, 337, 202, 203, 192, 193, 229, 227, 225, 313, 649 Box 12 648, 751, 349, 753 Green Projects in Progress (DG Ethics, DG Theory, Authentic DE, Green Econs, Anarkism) Box 13 999, 996, 998, 997, 948, 956, 957, 960, 961, 959, 964, 968, 972, 992, 991, 988, 987, 986, 985, 983, 982, 981, 979, 980, 978 Box 14 977, 976, 994, 995, 1004, 1003, 1002, 1978, 1975, 1965, 2051, 2073, 40, 1765 Last updated: 22-03-2021 © University of Queensland 2 FRYER LIBRARY Manuscript Finding Aid Box 15 1921, 1719, 1721, 1720, 1732, 201, 1161, 1165, 951, 1065, 1055, 1063, 1164, 1031, 1475, 315, 175 Box 16 342, 763, 774, 764, 758, 760, 756, 775, 778, 1841, 1224, 1386, 1186, 1223, 1243, 1858, 829, 1725, 1567, 1566, 899, 891, 635, 1418, 1251 Box 17 1414, 1413, 830, 302, 44, 827, 828, 1005, 1240, 1264, 1265, 971, 993, 989, 984, 1783 Box 18 1235, 1570, 965, 967, 1722, 1225, 825, 632, 1419, 1250, 1245, 1244, 1249, 1252, 1254, 57, 51, 3, 144, 970, 341, 174, 301 [1001 not located] More Green Box 19 671, 673, 771, 783, 782, 781, 780, 779, 776, 773, 750, 749, 336, 711, 628 Box 20 772, 787, 785, 784, 133, 709, 720 Various unnumbered items (versions of Human Chauvinism etc) Box 21 727, 710, 708, 706, 705, 672, 675, 674 Box 22 676, 669, 670, 677 Unnumbered correspondence files, c1970 to c1989 Box 23 Unnumbered correspondence files, c1970 to c1989 Last updated: 22-03-2021 © University of Queensland 3 FRYER LIBRARY Manuscript Finding Aid Files on Articles Box 24 1700, 1695, 1696, 1697, 1698, 1699, 1701, 1702, 1703, 1704, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1693 Box 25 1687, 1688, 1689, 1690, 1691, 1692, 1694, 1682, 1681, 1680, 1673 Box 26 1678, 1677, 1675, 1676 Unnumbered papers and files Box 27 2028 (card file) Unnumbered papers and files Object Theory (Parts still in Progress) Box 28 714, 713, 697, 1296, 1234, 1160, 1159, 897, 1157, 101, 777, 240, 186, 128, 100 Box 29 2074, 2075, 1017, 1036, 1053, 1051, 1054, 715, 1368, 1366, 1384, 1813, 1804, 1815, 1814 Box 30 4, 718, 717, 716, 1271, 1278, 1280, 1281, 1284, 1291, 1292, 1294, 1295, 1802, 1801, 1803 Box 31 1800, 1799, 1798, 1646, 1845, 1869, 1847 Box 32 1657, 1816, 1741, 1740, 1743, 1568, 1571, 1218, 1797, 1796, 1878, 1879, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1945, 2044, 1859, 1861 Last updated: 22-03-2021 © University of Queensland 4 FRYER LIBRARY Manuscript Finding Aid Box 33 1844, 1843, 1842, 712 Box 34 375, 1479, 1480[?], 1482, 1817 Files on Individuals Daniels, Simons, Medlin, Smith, Val, Aiken [not complete] Box 35 290 (Parner), 1674 (Pena), 1416 (Aiken), 172 (Smith), 222 (Smith) Box 36 300 (Martin), 37 (Medlin), 892, 608, 170, 316, 496 (all C Daniels), 940, 908, 966, 958 (all Val) Relevant Logic Box 37 1971, 1969, 1968, 1964, 2062, 2063, 2077, 2076, 1917, 1919(?), 1236, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1862, 1881, 1882, 1896, 1895, 1899, 1887, 1886, 1891 Box 38 1898, 1954, 1961, 1949, 1955, 1956 Box 39 1952, 1948, 1555, 1311, 1310, 1309, 1308, 1304, 1303, 1950, 1645, 1669, 1560, 1559, 1558, 1557, 1556 Box 40 1554, 1553, 122, 117, 113, 834, 1497, 1380, 251, 231, 238, 254, 232, 112 Box 41 1840, 1839, 1874, 1757, 1753, 1752, 1751, 1755, 1750, 1747, 1748, 214, 831, 1381, 120, 125 Last updated: 22-03-2021 © University of Queensland 5 FRYER LIBRARY Manuscript Finding Aid Logic in Australia, Informal Logic and Natural Logic Box 42 1973, 920, 943, 1247, 800, 898, 1383, 1360, 587, 869, 870, 871, 836, 1038, 867, 866, 863, 862, 865, 864 History of Logic Box 43 Unnumbered papers and folders Box 44 Unnumbered papers and folders Miscellaneous Logic Box 45 2050, 2052, 702, 703, 704, 694, 1920, 1911, 208, 153, 156, 158, 159, 160, 162, 165, 166, 326, 323, 329, 330, 331, 205, unnumbered papers Box 46 328, 360, 347, 294, 305, 307, 86, 84, 97, 119, 107, 700, 110, 111 Box 47 118, 127, 952, 946, 942, 903, 902, 895, 256, 237, 242, 243, 244, 252, 250, 248, 249, 218, 219, 221, 260, 255, 259, 268, 270, 495, 494, 1204 Box 48 821, 818, 817, 816, 812, 832, 1011, 1006, 1007, 1008, 1009, 1010, 855, 848, 847, 841 Box 49 506, 505, 262, 321, 299, 1405, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1344, 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, 1350, 1355, 1334, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1397, 1396, 1394, 1395, 1330, 1331, 1377, 1373, 1374, 1372, 1505, 1493, 1489, 1490, 1661, 1272, 1402, 1388, 1389, 1410, 1353[?], 1362, 1385, 1363 Last updated: 22-03-2021 © University of Queensland 6 FRYER LIBRARY Manuscript Finding Aid Box 50 1203, 1369, 1371, 1754, 1667, 1552, 271, 1030, 904, 1213, 1212, 1211, 1208, 1206, 1478, 1477, 1638, 1639, 1642, 1644, 1646, 1647, 1648, 1649, 1651, 1652, 1653, 1654, 1658, 1659, 1660, 1662, 1663, 1665, 1666, 1668, 1673, 1323, 1322, 1321, 1320 Box 51 1313, 1314, 1312, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1492, 1495, 1256, 926, 1287, 1283, 1279, 1276, 1526, 1523, 1532, 1531, 1535, 1534, 1538, 1539, 1540, 1543 (?8), 1541, 1549, 1545, 1546, 1488, 1496, 1498, 1506, 1514, 1515, 1529, 1375, 1379, 1376, 1332, 1333, 1329, 1328, 1327, 1326, 1324, 1302, 1301, 1300, 1299, 1298, 1372, 1297, 564, 332, 502 Paraconsistent Logic Box 52 1507, 1202, 200, 272, 306, 188, 253, 1494, 131, 324, 345, 333, 925, 53, 1551, 161 (crossed out), 1547, 1542, 1209, 1210, 1518, 1519, 1516, 1517, 1513, 1199, 245, 246, 241, various unnumbered folders Box 53 266, 152, 220, 223, 230, 234, 1533, 1536, 1046, 1080, 1047, 1023, 1025, 1043, 806, 1077, 819, 1076, 1066, 1050, 1045, 1041, 1205, 1081, various unnumbered folders Paraconsistent Logic and History of Logic Box 54 History of Logic folders 811, 820, 810, 87, 104, 1646, 1641, 1640, 1656, 1655, 1756 Miscellaneous Logic (Modal, Nonmonotonic, A1, Decisions) Box 55 Unnumbered papers and folders Box 56 Unnumbered papers and folders Last updated: 22-03-2021 © University of Queensland 7 FRYER LIBRARY Manuscript Finding Aid Miscellaneous Logic, History of Logic, Miscellaneous Philosophy Box 57 Unnumbered papers and folders Box 58 Unnumbered papers and folders Nuclear Box 59 1875, 1894, 1873, 1780, 1775, 1774, 1776, 1525, 680, 682, 683, 681, 689 Ethics and Theoretical Ethics Box 60 2054, 1994, 1999, 1883, 2010, 1726, 1724, 1465, 1466, 1729, 1728 Box 61 1730, 1737, 1761, 1857, 1463, 1770, 1777, 1733, 1464, 1784, 1764, 1763, 1762, 1771, 1491, 1500 (?), 684, 296, 295, 1338, 1333, 1415 Philosophical Sciences, Sciences, History of Logic Box 62 Folders and publications Box 63 Folders and publications Modal Logic, Connexive Logic Box 64 Folders Last updated: 22-03-2021 © University of Queensland 8 FRYER LIBRARY Manuscript Finding Aid Paradoxes Box 65 Folders Non-Substitutional Logics, Logics, Logics – Others Box 66 Folders Logic – Others Box 67 Folders Box 68 Folders Unlisted and Untitled Boxes Box 69 Unnumbered folders and publications [Disarmament, Nuclear, Ecology, Politics, Theory, Paraconsistency, Science and Myth] Box 70 Unnumbered folders and publications [Modality, Philosophy, Anarchism, Logic, Formal Logic] Box 71 Unnumbered folders and publications [Logic, Ethics, Theory, Philosophy, Nuclear] Box 72 Unnumbered folders and publications [Theory, Semantics, Logic, Annual Reports, Ethics, Philosophy, Science] Box 73 Unnumbered folders and publications [Philosophy, Science, Sociobiology, Nuclear, Logic] Last updated: 22-03-2021 © University of Queensland 9 FRYER LIBRARY Manuscript Finding Aid Box 74 1877, 1893, 1182, 2059, 1888, 2057, 2007, 2005, 1995, 2004, 2001, 2080, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2036, 2039, 2037, 2020, 2021, 2019, 2018, 1986, 1985, 1982, 1981, 1984, 1944, 134, 1187 Box 75 [Logic, Ethics, Theory, Philosophy] 950, 887, 1241, 1871, 1528, 1544, 945, 1176, 721, 1068, 797, 1501, 590, 1340, 1248, 1502, 1503, 1510, 314, 1708, 1282, 1262, 636, 226, 34, 1048, 799, 54, 1520, 2053, 1521, 1548, Papers on Relativity and Ecology Box 76 [Theory, Philosophy, Politics, Maths] 1550, 1487, 1509,
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