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MARCHING ON THE STORM: THE EBBS AND FLOWS OF GULF WAR PROTESTS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of the Ohio State University

By

Eric William Swank, M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University 1998

Dissertation Committee:

Approved by Professor Keith Kilty, Adviser

Professor Virginia Richardson A ym er Professor James Upton College of Social Work UMI Number: 9822373

UMI Microform 9822373 Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeh Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 ABSTRACT

In 1991 the United States waged a war against Iraq. While few Americans died in this “fast” war, many U.S. citizens objected to Operation Desert Storm. Numerous

Americans privately disapproved of the war while others defiantly created a movement of

Gulf War dissenters. This reenactment of the antiwar movement will be the focus of this dissertation. More specifically, the document will trace the inception, growth, and decline of this oppositional movement. In doing so, the issues of protest intensity and demonstration size will be of paramount interest.

This project studies the movement's ebbs and flows through several means.

Initially, the dynamics of a local mobilization are elaborated through an ethnographic study. Later, this case study of San Diego is supplemented by a content analysis of various news sources. In the end, the report of twenty “mainstream” and “alternative” news services becomes the springboard of national information.

When situating protest information within the socio-political context, some substantive and methodological insights appear. On the substantive side, this study reveals an unique movement trajectory. While most antiwar movements react to ongoing wars, this mobilization had a proactive side. That is, the movement’s largest protests fell

11 around the January onset of the war. Hence, this movement broke with past antiwar patterns since it had a protest peak around the first days of bombing.

On the methodological questions, this study accentuates the problems of media reliability. That is, individual news papers were a terrible source of information since they neglected most protests and routinely misstated the size of demonstrations.

Furthermore, not all of the papers were equally inadequate. In fact, some of the most famous news sources showed grave reporting errors, while less famous sources gave the most complete accounts (i.e., the New York Times andUSA TODAY had the worse coverage practices).

lU ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An endless amount of mentors have contributed to the author’s intellectual growth. Since it is impossible to list the entire crew of helpers, I will stick to those who can be consciously identified.

Californian Professors James Wood and David Preston initiated me into the world social research. During my stint in the OSU Sociology department, I received numerous insights from Giesela Hinkle and J. Craig Jenkins. Subsequently, my Social Work foray also lead me to some great academicians. For example, Keith Kilty showed me that

“praxis” is possible since he successfully combines the elements of political activism and scholarly inquiries. Virginia Richardson’s succinct comments were always beneficial and

James Upton’s class lectures presented a coherent schemata of the social movement literature.

Adding to these professorial influences were a litany of influential friends.

During my thesis days, the editorial comments of Amber Ault, Lake Jagger, and Patrick

Hart were quite instructive. Around the same time, my comrades Sanjutka Ghosh, Jean

Gregoric, David Smith, and Joel Woeller introduced me to the world of cultural studies and critical theory. Later, my “positivistic” buddy John Clapp furthered my quest for the

IV perfect research design and my colleagues at Morehead State University were a encouraging lot.

As reassuring as these folks were, three women were the most influential. From the days of elementary school speech classes to the instances of graduate school frustration, my mom consistently promoted an optimistic faith in the future. Without her long hours of patiently working with a dyslexic child, I would have never graduated from high school. In a different way, my sister’s never ending prodding inspired my nimble communication skills and the study of this antiwar movement. Finally, Karen Kovacik showed me an emotional and intellectual honesty that was both smoothing and stimulating. Furthermore, I learned how to a better feminist in her presence. Thus, without my bonds to these compassionate and engaging women, this person would have never entered or finished grad school. VTTA

May I, 1966 ...... Bom - San Diego, California

1988 ...... AÆ. Sociology, San Diego State University

1988 -1991 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, Sociology, Ohio State University

1992...... M.A. Sociology, Ohio State University

1992- 1993 ...... Adjunct Professor, Columbus State

1993-199 6 ...... Instructor, Columbus College of Art and Design

1994-1996 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, Social Work, Ohio State University

1996 - present...... Assistant Professor, Morehead State University

PUBLICATIONS

Eric Swank, 1993/1994. “Shall We Overcome? The Sense of Power Among Gulf War Protesters.” Critical Sociology 20:31-50.

Keith Kilty and Eric Swank. 1997. “Institutional Racism and Media Representations.” Sociological Imagination 34:105-28.

Eric Swank. 1998. “Welfare Reform and Bill Clinton’s Domestic Advisors.”Journal of Poverty 2:1-19.

FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Social Work

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Abstract...... ii

Acknowledgments...... iv

V ita...... vi

List of Tables...... x

List of Figures...... xi

Chapters:

1. Introduction...... 1

2. Relevant Movement Theories...... 4

2.1 Defining a Movement...... 4 2.2 Movement Size, Movement Resources, and Protest Outcomes .. 6 2.3 The Concept of a Protest Cycle...... 8 2.4 Protests Against the Persian Gulf War...... 10

3. Methodological Concerns...... 14

3.1 Defining a Protest ...... 14 3.2 Counting Procedures...... 15 3.2.1 Methods of Counting...... 16 3.2.2 Sources of the C ount...... 17 3.3 Reliability of Newspapers...... 19 3.3.1 The Selectivity Issue ...... 20 3.3.2 The Biased Content Issue...... 22 3.4 Newspapers and Antiwar Movements...... 23 3.5 Gulf War Reporting...... 25 3.6 Data Sources for this Project ...... 27

Vll 3.6.1 Participant Observation at a Local Protest Scene...... 28 3.6.2 Secondary Sources and the National Mobilization...... 32 3.6.3 Sampling National Papers...... 33 3.7 Unit of Analysis for the Papers...... 43 3.8 Finding Appropriate News Stories...... 45 3.9 Reading the Transcripts through a Content Analysis...... 47 3.10 Crafting the Categories for a Content Analysis...... 48

4. San Diego Protests...... 51

4.1 The San Diego Protest Cycle...... 51 4.2 Analyzing the Patterned Accounts of the Protest Cycle...... 80

5. America’s Antiwar Movement...... 85

5.1 A Mater of Size...... 86 5.2 The Protest Cycle...... 92 5.3 Appraisals of Relative Size Issues ...... I l l

6. Uncovering Source Reliabilities...... 114

6.1 The New York Times ...... 116 6.2 The Washington Post...... 119 6.3 The Los Angeles Times...... 127 6.4 USA TODAY ...... 138 6.5 United Press International...... 143 6.6 News Bank ...... 152 6.7 Assessing Selectiveness...... 172 6.8 Credibility and Size Estimates...... 179 6.9 Concluding Remarks...... 187

7. Conclusion...... 191

7.1 Salient Questions...... 191 7.2 A Small Mobilization it was n o t...... 193 7.3 An Unique Protest Cycle...... 194 7.4 Checking the Veracity of a Local Newspaper ...... 198 7.5 Examining the Comprehensiveness of Prominent Sources 199 7.6 Noting the Counting Problems of Eminent News Sources...... 202 7.7 Final Pronouncements on Newspapers...... 204 7.8 What is Next?...... 205

vui Appendix A: A Chronology of the W...... ar 209

Appendix B: The Social Backgrounds of Gulf War Protesters...... 213

Works Cited...... 219

IX LIST OF TABLES

Table EâgÊ

4.1 Estimates for San Diego Protests...... 82

5.1 Largest Protests in US Cities...... 87

5.2 Mid-Size Protests...... 90

5.3 Most Active Days of Protest ...... 102

6.1 Number of Protest Covered by Prominent Sources...... 173

6.2 Number of Large Protests Covered by Prominent Sources...... 177

6.3 Estimates of the Largest Protests by Prominent Sources...... 180

6.4 Protest Size by Prominent Sources...... 183

6.5 Comparing Separate Sources to the Sample...... 186

7.1 Competing Descriptions of the Protest Cycle...... 196 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

4.1 Number of Protesters in San Diego...... 62

5.1 Number of U.S. Protesters...... 95

5.2 Number of U.S. Protests...... 98

XI CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

“We must guard against the ‘pilgrim’s progress’ reading of history. In this line of thought, only the successful and powerful are remembered— the blind alleys, lost causes, and losers themselves are forgotten” — E.P. Thompson, The Making o f the English Working Class

In 1991 the United States waged a ferocious war on Iraq. Despite George Bush's insistence that "the country is solid, there is no antiwar movement out there," millions of

Americans were voicing antiwar sentiments to pollsters. However this rejection of the war was not limited to the confines of survey instruments as thousands of Americans chose to express their discontent by protesting in the streets.

By the middle part of the I990's the existence of these protests had faded from the public's consciousness. Not only had "normal citizens" forgotten this movement, but the world of academia has also been infected with this collective amnesia. I have heard several colleagues at conferences inquire, "Were there protests against that war?" Even usually insightful peace scholars have minimized the size of this recent antiwar movement. For example, the gifted peace historian Charles Chatfield (1992) wrote, "So brief and militarily successful was the [Gulf] war... that no significant opposition evolved” (p. xi), and a research team headed by Sam Manille said that Gulf War created a brief "'minisurge' in peace activism" (MaruIIo, Pagnucco, and Smith, 1996, p. 10).

While some individuals have drawn conclusions on this subject, their conclusions have been a bit hasty. To date, no research has systemically traced the ebbs and flows of these protests, nor have any research centers collected a protest data set. To compensate for this void, this dissertation will be the first project to systematically address this forgotten mobilization. Hence, the characterizations of a "minimal" protest movement will be countered with the first "empirical analysis" of this magnitude issue.

The concept of magnitude has several dimensions. One aspect of research interest is the actual size o f a given protest. Thus, a measure of this attribute is forthcoming.

Frequency is another relevant component, so this analysis will focus on the number of protesters for the mobilization. Since mobilizations develop over time, the temporal ordering of pretests will be added to this study. Finally, demonstrations must happen in a spatial location, so the study will be attentive to geographical markers. Thus, the understanding of the growth and decline of this protest movement will evolve through the analysis of protest dates, protest sizes, and protest settings. In putting these concerns into research questions, I offer four items:

1) How many Gulf War protests occurred within the United States' geopolitical

boundaries?

2) How many people attended these U.S. based Gulf demonstrations?

3) How did the size and activity variables fluctuate over the time continuum?

4) How were these protests dispersed throughout the entire U.S.? To answer these questions, some qualitative methods were utilized. In collecting data, in-the-field observations were supplemented with mass media information sources.

More specifically the findings will spring from the direct observations of a local peace coalition and a content analysis of newspaper stories. As expected, an elaboration of these research procedures will reside in a later section of this dissertation. CHAPTER 2

RELEVANT MOVEMENT THEORIES

"Postmodern politics is mostly about the reallocation of attention. Public attention is the must coveted and struggled for commodity in the land of political struggles.” — Zygmunt Bauman,Intimations o f Postmodernity

"A community will evolve only when the people control their means of communication.” — Franz Fannon,Wretched o f the Earth

2.1 Defining a Movement

The definition of a social movement can take numerous configurations. For the sake of this project, a social movement is seen as the collective process of a structurally disadvantaged group challenging an elite opponent through the use of non-electoral techniques (Tilley, et. al., 1977; Piven and Cloward, 1977, McAdam, 1982).

In distilling the major components of this definition, one should note that a movement has to have a communal quality. This means that a single person cannot make a movement, nor can a small cadre of fifteen activists. Instead, social movements are coalitional structures which unite the constituents of various organizational and cultural domains. With this coalitional structure, movements are hard to construct and sustain. That is, creating and maintaining cooperation among diverse interest groups is a difficult and precarious task (i.e., inevitably factions of the movement bicker over goals and tactics).

One can also note that a movement is composed ofindividuals who posses small doses of structural power. More concretely, movements are the result of power arrangements which lets elites reject or nullify the requests of these protesters (see

Domhoff, 1984). Simply put, movement participants do not have the money, connections, nor legal power to create change through the conventional electoral channels of change. For example, the working-class renter who is breathing polluted air cannot simply go to an elected official and convince the state to close the power plant since the elected official probably has allegiances with the corporate executives who created the pollution and financed his or her campaign.

Finally, with a lack of influential institutionalized options, dissenters turn to extra­ institutionalized forms of struggles. In a less obscure language, one may say that a movement uses some tactics which break from the electoral mold of interest group politics. That is, for a pressure group to become a movement it must do more actions than speaking to congressional hearings or contributing to campaigns. Instead a movement must engage in some direct-action activities which try to disturb tire daily routines of societal institutions (i.e., work slow downs, public vigils, or civil disobedience).

Because of this definition, I will argue that the antiwar protests of 1990 and 1991 should be considered a social movement. First, the protest linked a wide range of groups into a communal force of Gulf War opponents (see chapters four and five). Second, this collection of "dissident citizens" had a platform which challenged the foreign policies of

the person who sat in one of "legitimate" seats of power. Finally this contention with an

"acting president" came through the means of many "direct action" strategies. That is.

people held protests, blocked military bases, stormed legislative offices, poured blood on

the White house lawn, walked-out of classes, and snuck guerilla made videos onto some

televised airways.

2.2 Movement Size. Movement Resources and Protest Outcomes

Social movements are coalitions of loosely connected groups that attempt to

change a social target (i.e., the government, business, or the "community"). These social

movements are created when disenfranchised communities consider the standard political channels as ineffective means of producing target concessions (i.e., they have no PACs or well-placed lobbyists to pass a bill for the group).'

Although starting with an electoral power disadvantage, these grassroots agitators start with some indigenous power derivatives (McAdam, 1982 Morris 1984). This early cadre may have some tangible resources such as money, photocopy machines, buses, safe meeting spaces, while other movement leader may have the intangible resources of charismatic personalities, innovative thinking skills, and tons of energy for free labor.

More importantly, hierarchial structures create a large number of subordinates who can disrupt the smooth functioning of organizations if they withdraw their adherence to the

Social movement activities can take many forms (i.e., recruitment drives, organizational meetings, letter writing campaigns, lobbying efforts). The act of protesting is but one option of the continuum of movement tactics, but this act of "demonstrating" is the distinct quality that separates a social movement from an interest group. mores of their assigned social roles (i.e., laborers who strike can stop production at the

factory or in the household and armies would cease to exist if every solider deserted).

Thus, this core group of local challengers may confront their opponents with an initial round of activity that springs from the foundation of grassroots sources.

After this original round of insurgency, the protesters must contemplate the movement’s outcomes. More often than not, elites can ignore and dismiss the protester’s introductory demands. After an early setback the movement is at a decisive point. It can either disband, maintain its position or increase its ranks (for greater details see the upcoming section on protest cycles).

Activists can increase intensity by recruiting new participants or implementing confrontational tactics (Tarrovv. 1989; Snow and Bedford, 1992). With this choice at hand, many movement organizations try to solicit support from unattached bystanders since "movements create bargaining resources when they "activate 'third parties' to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways that are favorable to the protestors"

(Lipsky, 1968 p. 1146). Thus, scholars have linked movement outcomes to the question of movement size. In effect, rebellions that draw millions of participants will probably have greater resonance than a protest of 300 individuals.

While size influences movement results, it clearly is not the only factor in this relationship (i.e., 300 generals can rule the masses under the right circumstances). In fact, the literature on movement outcomes is wrought with continuous theoretical debates

(researchers cannot even agree on the proper measurements of outcomes). However, even with the raging controversies over the proper explanatory model, the majority of theorists think size is some sort of a confounding variable (Omega and FCIandermans,

1995)

2.3 The Concept of a "protest cvcle"

This description alludes to the transient nature of movement mobilizations (i.e., they appear and disappear during specific periods). When movements are "active," their

intensity fluctuates over extended time periods. Moreover, movements seem to follow episodes or stages of initial expansion and subsequent declines.

These modifications of movement size and activities have been called "protest spirals.” Although other scholars have addressed protest fluctuations, Sidney Tarrow

(1989) has presented the most comprehensive cycle account (for other characterizations see Lofland, 1992; Snow and Benford, 1992; or Frank and Fuentes, 1994). In outlining some common features of “protest cycles, ” Tarrow found five processes of movement modifications. First, movements must justify their existence by communicating to their opponents, supporters, and attentive bystanders. However, the production and mediation of symbolic packages are always evolving since protesters are perpetually presented with new circumstances. For example, protesters must come up with new rationales after the police outlaw their organization. Second, mobilizations go through bouts of coalitional formation and destruction. That is, challenging groups may try to befiiend a church congregation or the leadership of a local newspaper. However, most of these alliances are tenuous since many endorsements are flighty in nature (many groups withdraw their support when collaboration seems futile, boring, or risky). Third, mobilizations also try to recruit individuals. However, the diffusion of activity from

8 some small clusters of activists to the larger populace is an ambiguous excursion.

Traditionally, most mobilizations linger in anonymity since Americans are usually uninspired by any sort of political campaigns. However, there are rare moments when masses of people flock to some political mobilizations. Hence, the fate of these protest cycles hinges on how they handle the daunting task of sustaining the commitment of thousands of participants. Fourth, tactics and repertoires of contention are eternally in a state of flux. In the early stages of the cycle challengers must invent interesting and captivating tactics. However, as the political alignments change, so must the tactics (i.e., there are times to lobby, times to throw bombs, and times to hide from the law). Finally, all of these convulsions alter the group’s rapport with established leaders. That is, the severity of conflicts will vary with the ever changing parameters of the battle (i.e., elite’s evaluate the challenger’s strengths and weaknesses before they decide to concede, suppress, or neglect the mobilization).

As this narrative suggests, Tarrow sees protest cycles as the outgrowth of five interdependent processes. That is, protest cycles embody these amalgamated dimensions.

With such a wide range of possible combinations, the fate of a cycle can take many turns.

In effect, the endless amount of possible mixtures grants each cycle a unique evolutionary path.

With cycles emerging from unknown and dynamic forces, many scholars have questioned the value of apriori theorizing. In conceding to the chaotic nature of non­ institutionalized political battles, theorists have seen the fallaciousness of constructing deductive meta-theories that try to predict the unpredictable (see Cohen, 1985; Melucci, 1989; Lofland, 1992; Whittier, 1995). Subsequently, a new camp of researchers has

turned away from the quest of testing universal theories. In its place rests a wave of

'‘grounded” studies which situate particular mobilizations within their particular

historical milieu. In adding to this strain of research, this paper tries to gain a nuanced

understanding of a specific protest cycle. More precisely, this study provides an

idiosyncratic portrayal of the expansion and contraction of the 1990 and 1991 antiwar

movement.

2.4 Protests Against the Persian Gulf War

To date, there are few published accounts of the "Desert Storm" protests. These

investigations have provided some rudimentary descriptions of the early 1990's antiwar movement. Previous studies have looked at the shifting levels of mass support for the war (Schuman and Reiger, 1992; Fan, 1993; Iyengar and Simon, 1993; Norrander and

Wilcox, 1993; Zaller, 1993; Heibron, 1994; Parker, 1995), the extent of bystander sympathy for protesters (Pan et. al.. 1993; Mueller, 1994; Beamish, Molotch and Flacks,

1995; Mendel-Reyes, 1995; Shephard and Shephard, 1996), the goals of the antiwar movement (Carter, 1992; Hunt and Benford, 1994; Coy and Woehrle, 1996); the structure of movement organizations (Peace, 1991; Elbuam, 1992; Epstein, 1992), the debates about tactical matters (Gannage and Huxley, 1992; Chaloupka, 1993; Jospeh, 1993; Levi and Detray, 1993), the impact of protests on congressional war votes (McDougall,

Minicucci, and Meyers, 1995), the role of churches and intellectual communities in the mobilization (Murphy, 1993, Wilcken, 1995; Hunt 1997), and the importance of identity

10 and value commitments in antiwar activism (Gomes, 1992; Swank, 1993-94; Loeb, 1994;

Duncan and Stewart 1995; Spatt, 1995; William and Malaney, 1996).

Of these articles, the essays by Roger Peace (1991) and Max Elbaum (1992) are

the only ones to address the protest cycle issue. Both authors furnished similar four-stage

renditions of a swiftly paced protest cycle. They agree that from August 1990 to late

October the mobilization went through the initial stages of organizational building (the

first waves of U.S. troops were being deployed in Saudi Arabia for "defensive" purposes

at this time). During this stage, long term activists were starting to form the core of the

movement. As dissenters were devising coalitions and movement structures, a handful of

intermittent protests occurred in several metropolitan centers that are famous for dissent

(i.e., San Francisco, New York City, and Boston).

Stage two emerged when U.S. policy makers showed their first signs of waging an

aggressive war against Iraq. By November, these fledgling antiwar coalitions felt

compelled to organize mass demonstrations in response to the placement of hundreds of

thousands of solders in Saudi Arabia and the recently signed U.N.'s resolution to remove

Iraq from Kuwait by "any means necessary." In this attempt to preempt an imminent war,

the organizations started to expand its base of activists. Instead of relying on experienced activists, the movement started to solicit the participation of bystander publics. In trying

to recruit the politically disengaged populace, the antiwar organizations ran advertisements in newspapers, brought speakers to community centers, put unsolicited peace literature in their personal mailboxes, and leafleted parking lots. With this push to

foster new levels of participation among "average Americans," the movement began to

11 create slightly larger protest circles and demonstrations occurred on a more routine basis

(i.e., participants would now meet every weekend for a vigil in a park).

This mid stage of the cycle lasted until the start of 1991. By the January 15 deadline for war, the antiwar movement had jumped into a large scale mobilization. A new flood of activists entered the movement in the middle part of January as protests became daily events that were scattered throughout the country. In the large cities.

Federal buildings and campus auditoriums saw protests that numbered in the thousands, while governmental officers in smaller cities were greeted by peace demonstrations that generally exceed 500 participants. Even rural settings in the South and Midwest saw groups of individuals chanting "no blood for oil." Finally, by the end of January, these dispersed actions were integrated into massive demonstrations on both coasts. On

January 19, demonstrations in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco each drew over

25.000 activists while the January 26 demonstrations in these same cities attracted over

75.000 a piece (see findings section for precise numbers).

While Elbaum and Peace agree on when the peak started, neither of these authors agreed on its duration. Elbaum suggested the movement peaked for a montli (from

January 16 to late February), while Peace puts the apex in a two week slot (from January

16 to February 4). Despite these differences on the termination point for movement's pinnacle, both authors concur that the fourth period saw a drastic contraction of the movement. By the time of the February 22 land invasion of Kuwait, both authors agree the movement had lost most of its activists. In fact, the movement seemed to whither so

12 drastically that Elbaum suggested that the movement had an "implosion" during the last

week of February.

While either model may present an accurate account the movement, one should

note that each author relied on impressionistic readings of the movement. This, in turn,

could threaten the validity of these models since private memories usually miss gradual

growth of movements. In fact, Tarrow (1989) notes that "the peaks [in movement activity] that leave inedible impressions in the public consciousness are really only the high grounds of broader swells of mobilization" (p. 208). Thus, with this shortage of basic information 1 set out to produce a study that captures the full extent of protest activity.

13 CHAPTERS

METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS

3.1 Defining and Operationalizing a protest

The process of capturing protest surges is entangled with methodological riddles.

This section highlights the procedures used to untangle this complex phenomena. But before addressing the technical issues, it is necessary to define the concept of “a demonstration.” Traditionally, most researchers define demonstrations and protests with a behavioral model. That is, protests can constitute a non-institutionalized gatherings of two or more people who verbally or visually present political grievances against an external target (i.e., Tilley, et. al., 1977; Snyder and Kelly, 1977; McCarthy, McPhail, and

Smith, 1996).

This study echoes this conceptualization of protests. Hence, my operational definition leaves a wide range of activities that were considered protests (i.e., teach-ins, sit-ins, organizational meetings, federal building vigils, or acts of civil disobedience).

While this definition encompassed many deeds, it also excluded certain movement routines, A litany of non-contentious movement actions were left out of this analysis.

For example, a night of licking stamps for movement mailings or an escapade of door to

14 door recruiting did not meet the criteria of a protest- Finally, the covert or personal

strategies for peace fell out of the privy of this study (i.e., private prayers or graffiti

excursions were excluded from the study).

As like any study, there were some perplexing dilemmas when applying this

definition to an actual event. The nebulous nature of protests present some measurement

predicaments. For instance, the fact that curious bystanders can mingle with protestors

hinders the identification of protest boundaries. Thus, the apparently simple task of

delineating protest parameters can become quite vexing. Additionally researchers need to

manage certain temporal factors. For instance, one needs to determine the protest begins

and ends. Furthermore, the researcher must decide on the best time to make the crowd counts. If one makes a count before or after the moment of most activists, the estimate

will automatically undercount the size of the actual crowd.

Clearly the fluid nature of protests precludes any universal solutions to these

problems. Ultimately, researchers must formulate temporal and geographic operationalizations based on the nature of the events under study. At a minimum, such operationalizations should have face validity and maximize reliability.

3.2 Counting Concerns

After these definitional questions are settled, one encounters a new line of instrumentation dilemmas. On one level, the scholar must deal with the issue of counting methods. Clearly the best research design would adopt the most reliable procedure of counting. On another level, the researcher must select a source of data collection. That is, the researcher must allocate the responsibility of estimating to a particular human.

15 3.2.1 Methods o f Counting

There are several ways to count a crowd. A person can sit at home and invent the size of the crowd in their head. With a lack of empirical inputs, this approach has a terrible chance of accurately gauging protest size. Other individuals may attend the gathering and do the impressionistic approach. That is, they may casually look at the crowd before they concoct a wild guesstimate. Another researcher can pass around an attendance sheet or do a head count of the people in the crowd. Finally the researcher can do the "grid/density" approach that was originally formulated by Jacobs (1967) and later modified by Seidler, Meyer, and Gillivray (1976).

The "grid/density" approach is a systematic schemata that provides an empirically based crowd count. Its procedures are as followers: 1) Observe or photograph the entire crowd from an opportune vantage point; 2) Apply a symmetrical grid to the full extent of the established boundaries; 3) Count the number of participants residing in a single quadrant; 4) multiply the number of individuals in this single quadrant by the total number of quadrants; 5) report the summation as the total crowd count.

The grid approach displays several advantages over the other ways of making estimates. First, reliability is improved since it establishes a consistent measuring approach. Second, the grid approach is less vulnerable to estimator bias than either the

"arm chair" and "intuitional" modes (hunches can be deceptive). Third, the use of attendance sheets can become extremely unruly in larger informal settings (i.e., some people will not sign the sheets, the sheet can get stuck in one comer of the protest, or the sheet may even get lost). Finally, trying to do a head count over the entire crowd is

16 usually impossible because some people are too small to be seen (which will produce an

undercount), and other people keep moving during protests (which could result in

counting the same person twice or not at all).

These reasons make the grid method the best approach available. However, there

are two shortcomings associated with this technique. Sometimes the grid approach must

be discarded or modified since some demonstrations come in asymmetrical shapes (i.e., a

circle shaped vigil or protestors seizing different sized rooms). Furthermore, gatherings

can show different levels of density throughout its many quadrants (people are packed

around the stage and widely dispersed near the outer limits of the gathering). This issue

of variance among quadrants can skew the final score if the researcher chooses an unique

or "outlier" quadrant as the base score. Thus in the end, even this reliable method of

counting can only be seen a relatively good method of producing valid estimates.

3.2.2 Sources o f the Count

Adding to this matter of how to do the count is the question of who should do the

counting? This question of "data sources" is germane for several reasons. First, the

commitment to the cannons of the "scientific method" seems to vary throughout the

nation's plethora o f subcultures (i.e., presumably Economists are more concerned with epistemological issues than police officers). Second, the groups that are less committed

to the "scientific method" are less likely to utilize a reliable method of crowd counts (i.e., one might assume that a graduate student in Sociology is more likely to take systematic

notes of a protest than your average pilot). Finally, people should be suspect of size

17 estimates that descend from members of the subgroups which, routinely depend on

"intuitional" or "impressionistic" methods of counting.

Even with these over-arching suspicions one sees only a few researchers who have done the estimates themselves (Jacobs, 1967; Edelman, 1986). Instead most studies have turned to secondary sources for their numbers (consequently they abdicate control of the counting process to another party). A handful of studies relied on official archive records

(i.e., Tilly et. al., 1975) or activist generated histories (i.e., Hannan and Freeman, 1987;

Rupp and Taylor, 1989), while the vast majority of studies used newspapers as their source of data (i.e., Eisinger, 1973; Taylor and Jodice, 1983; McAdam, 1982; Burstein,

1985; Jenkins and Eckert, 1986; BCerbo and Shaffer. 1992; Soule, 1992; Khawaja, 1993; fCoopmans, 1993; White, 1993; Silver, 1994).

There are several reasons for the popularity of the newspaper route. Most authors argue that logistical issues require a dependence on newspapers(i.e.. Burastein, 1985;

Jenkins and Eckert, 1986; Kerbo and Shaffer, 1992). These authors admit that they are stuck with papers since they started their analysis after the movement dissipated (maybe these "empiricists" should get their bodies out to ongoing mobilizations more often). For other cases, newspapers may be the only viable data source for a national mobilization (a researcher cannot attend every protest dispersed throughout the country).

Another line of scholars shun the practicality justification and assert that newspapers are the best sources around. This cluster of scholars insist that reporter's estimates are always better than the estimates of other folks. Susan Olzak, an avid proponent of this position, suggests that newspapers provide the most "complete accounts

18 of events" (1989 p. 128), while Doug McAdam’s (1982) chose theNew York Times as a data source because it "is unlikely that dieTimes was guilty of failing to report a major story relevant to the [civil rights] movement" (p. 236).’

This claim of media preeminence has not gone unchallenged. Instead, most studies on this topic refute such "naive" assumptions on media reliability (maybe the

Times would not report on every relevant movement event). Thus, this next section will begin with a review of the "new school" of media criticism and end with a discussion of how to use in the press in a more "reflective" manner.

3.3 The Reliability of Newspapers

Activist groups on the left and on the right consistently throw out the platitude

"the media is against us." Luckily there are some methodological frameworks that can assess such claims. For example, the conceptual work of Rucht and Ohlemacher (1992) provides some distinctions that can lead to a well rounded appraisal of news sources.

These authors call for a new level of skepticism that looks for the issues of

"selectiveness" and "representativeness" of media accounts.

Selectiveness deals with the frequency in which protests events are covered for a given region (i.e., San Diego). Or in other words, did the reporters attend all of the protests that occurred? Representativeness addressees the concern as to whether the data from one location can adequately reflect the dynamics found in other locations. Or in

McAdam writes that theNew York Times is a more robust source since nine early descriptions of movement activities found 536 protests while theTimes reported on 4,817 protests (1982, p. 237).

19 other words, do the findings in one sample reflect the attributes of the larger phenomena?

Thus, representativeness is of greater concern when using a case example to study a national mobilization. For instance, researchers concerned with resistance to the Gulf

War would need to determine whether newspaper data for San Diego could represent the dynamics of protests in Detroit, Boise, or New Orleans.

Given these issues, fCielbowcz and Scherer (1986) noted that several “regularities” of news production can jeopardize the reliability and validity of newspapers when studying collective action. Specifically, the authors noted the following threats to reliability and validity: 1) reporters commonly neglect the substance of political critiques, instead focusing on the dramatic and unique vestiges of the movement; 2) reporters tend to disproportionately rely on the statements of conventional authorities and officials to define the movement; 3) editors customarily send novice reporters to protests and similar events; 4) the schedules of reporter beats affect the probability of events being covered; 5) the number of media outlets within the vicinity of demonstrations affects the amount and nature of media coverage; 6) reporters’ identities, political commitments, and conceptions of professional norms influence the type of coverage that movements receive.

3.3.1 The Selectiveness Issue

With these practices in place, many scholars insist that the media rarely deems protests as "newsworthy" (Gans, 1981; Small, 1994). Subsequently, this widespread minimalization of protests activities then lead the media into missing most protest events

(making the press very weak on selection issues).

2 0 In the past, most of these assertions about media selectively sprung from antidotal forms of evidence. Media critics were stuck with weaker forms of evidence since there was an absence of independent sources to juxtapose against the media descriptions.

Fortunately, two studies by Snyder and Kelly (1977) and McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith

(1996) have filled this gap in the movement literature.

A much cited article by Snyder and Kelly (1977) documented the general ineptness of theNew York Times. These authors discovered that theNew York Times ran stories on a grand total 22 stories about the protests o f 1968. Conversely, the local papers of 43 U.S. cities covered 120 protests during the same contentions year (this means that Times missed around 81% of the protests covered by other papers).

A later study by McCarthy, McPhail and Smith (1996) showed that other papers mirrored the Times inability to cover protests. In their study of the District of Columbia they found that only 7 % of the 1,856 protests logged in police files were ever covered by the New York Times, Washington Post, ABC, NBC, andCBS (McCarthy, McPhail, and

Smith in press). Moreover, all sources but the Washington Post covered less than 2 % of the total protests (the Post was best at six percent). Conversely, this means that all of these various new sources failed to run a report on 93 % of the protests that had police surveillance.

Other studies suggest that the tendency to neglect social movements is not a homogeneous phenomena. A bevy of researchers suggest that the amount of coverage is also influenced by the type of goals expressed by the movement (movement goals can range from mild conversions of a single person to radical transformation of the entire

21 social structure). Gamson and Wolfson (1993) suggest that reporters often feel as if they

are elite surrogates who should determine which groups should be taken seriously.

Furthermore, this gate keeping mentality leads newspapers into rejecting groups that challenge the elite in ftmdamental ways. Conversely, those mobilizations that support elite priorities are more likely to be considered "news worthy" by media outlets.

3.3.2 The Biased Content Issue

The Media's "spin" on events are also connected to movement grievances.

Mobilizations that support the status quo usually receive favorable coverage while

"radical" group are usually greeted with derogatory labels. For example. Shoemaker

(1984) found that centrist lobby groups were habitually given the positive labels of "hard working,” "fair,” and "intelligent” while oppositional groups were typically described as

"traitors” or “lunatics.” Similarly, when tlie U.S. government engaged on its “War on

Drugs” newspapers printed a narrative that beckoned citizen involvement in law enforcement campaigns (Merriam, 1989; Surette 1992). Georlicks (1989) study of the iVew York Dally News found that people who participated in citizen crime prevention efforts were portrayed as "courageous citizens" and a study ofTime magazine found articles that repeatedly endorsed and glorified community programs that "fought drug dealers" (Barlow et. al., 1995). Finally, the most comprehensive study of this topic

(Ericson et. al., 1991) found that Canadian reporters repeatedly told their audience that

"the police are dependent on citizen involvement to detect and solve crimes" (p. 315).

2 2 3.4 Newspapers and Antiwar Movements

This general predisposition against "radical" movements bleeds into media images of antiwar movements. Moreover, every study on this topic found a strong tendency to vilify movements that protest an ongoing war.

When writing on the protests against the Vietnamese war, historian W.J.

Rorabaugh (1989) suggests that the national and Bay Area newspapers frequently ignored

University of California antiwar protests. Both Todd Gitlin (1982) and Melvin Small

(1994) expanded on Rorabaugh's premise when they argued that newspapers repeatedly missed small and medium size protests because editors quickly grew tired of covering

"ordinary" or "conventional" demonstrations against the Vietnam war. Subsequently, the protests that occurred late in the protest cycle had to exhibit "sensational" flair in order to be considered "news worthy" events (e.g., the spectacle of enormous size, or the exhibition of illicit behaviors by protesters).

Ironically, this editorial demand for "exciting" and "outrageous" actions commonly resulted in a further trivialization of the movement. Communication scholar

Daniel Hallin (1986) found that media tended to focus on the perceived moral deficiencies of antiwar activists. Hallin's study found that almost every CBS news story between 1965 and 1968 showed antiwar protestors as "traitors," "hard-core deviants," and "young misfits" who "sympathized with the enemy" and "threatened law and order."

However, this monolith of marginalization lessened somewhat after antiwar candidate

Eugene McCarthy entered the election and reporters got clubbed in the 1968 democratic convention. Yet in the end, this shift to normalizing protest was minimal since negative

23 statements about the protest continued to out pace positive statements at a two to one

ratio after the 1968 New Hampshire primaries.

This propensity for degrading movement activists filtered into subsequent peace

mobilizations. A study of Toronto newspapers discovered that two-thirds of all news

stories of the 1987 Canadian peace movement contained negative cormotations (Stone,

1989). These negative reports accused the movement of being engulfed by "drunken

youths," "obsessive women," "unrealistic students," "sneaky speakers" and people who are part of a communist plot. A study by Entman and Rojecki (1993) found that Newthe

York Times andWashington Post suggested that the I980's disarmament movement emerged out of irrational impulses, that activists were a little bit "kooky," and that movement participants lacked the expertise to legitimately question the policies of the

U.S. government.

Several studies suggest that tliis distrust of activists transfers into the reporter's capacity to estimate the size of demonstrations. Anecdotal, Todd Gitlin (1982) noticed that a New York Times reporter admitted that he intentionally relied on police estimates although he knew they were severe undercounts, while Small's (1994)bookCovering

Dissent shows how mainstream newspapers deflated movement counts by using police estimates to guide their front page headlines. In a similar light, Leon Mann's (1974) study of 22 U.S. newspapers found a statistical relationship between a paper's editorial position of the Vietnamese conflict and its ability to count people at antiwar protestors.

That is, after classifying papers into the categories of "dove" or "hawk," Mann found that the four "dove" papers put 33,000 participants at a 1965 demonstration, while the seven

24 "hawk" papers provided the average estimate o f20,600 for the same event. Finally, a paper by Murray Edelman (1986) highlights the extent of paper undercounts. After collecting estimates through the grid/density approach, Edelman turned to the pages of the San Francisco Chronicle andNew York Times for their official accounts. Predictably,

Edelman found that paper estimates for leftist demonstrations were always smaller than his grid/density counts of the same event (i.e., a demonstration against the Moral Majority produced a police estimate of 100 while the grid found 1000, an anti-KKK rally found a police count of 100-200 while the grid showed 350, and a Jesse Jackson speech drew 375 according to the police and 2000 according to the grid).

3.5 Gulf War Reporting

Recent studies suggest that the media’s endorsement of "war efforts" reached new highs during the Persian Gulf War. Along these lines, the press has been criticized for

"idealizing U.S. war efforts," "celebrating war technologies," "demonizing of Saddam

Hussein," "sanitizing the war" and "neglecting important facts" (Heibert. 1991;

Farmanfarmaian, 1992; Mowlana, Gerber, and Schiller, 1992; Umberson and Henderson,

1992; Hallin and Gitlin, 1993; Jowett, 1993; Jansen and Sabo, 1994; Soesio, and

Washburn, 1994).

Additional studies indicate that "corporate" media tried to suppress images of Gulf

War opposition. During the war, several "inside" reporters chastised the media for ignoring antiwar sentiments (Yant, 1991; Mac Arthur, 1992), andWashington a Post columnist went as far as saying that the "nationalism that joined press and state.

25 combined with the superficial coverage of antiwar protests, meant that the peace

movement did not fail, it never had a chance to be heard" (McCarthy, 1991).

Academic studies have substantiated these reporters' perceptions. A stack of

articles concluded that televised news reports were woefully inadequate on the

"selectivity" issue. A study of televised news casts found that only 29 of the 2,855

minutes on "Desert Shield" were dedicated to stories of opposition to the military

intervention (Lee and Devitt, 1991). However, the weakness in reporting was not

confined to the "groove tube." The national newspapers devoted an average of 2.7%

percent of their war stories to features on the peace movements (Dennis et. al, 1993),

while a study ofWashington Post front page articles found that only 2% of all war stories

focused on antiwar positions (Kaid et. al., 1993).

Papers outside the "East Coast beltway" were just as negligent in tlieir reporting of protests. A content analysis of three Kentucky newspapers found that4% of all Persian

Gulf War reports contained information on demonstrations (Haney, 1993). While local papers in California 36 stories on the "yellow ribbon" fad as compared to 19 stories on the organized opposition to the war.

While these cited studies show that a small proportion of the paper's total coverage was devoted to protests, one can argue that this really doesn't show any

"selective bias." One can even say that the lack of press coverage was a "true reflection" of the small protest. Or in other words, there were few stories since there were few protests.

26 However the work by McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith (1996) shows the errors of such arguments. When comparing the files of police departments against published accoimts they found that only 33 % of the Gulf War protests at the White house were ever covered by the Washington Post.

Adding to this tendency to neglect the protests was the habit of applying negative labels to the movement. After studying the national nightly news Yows (1992) concluded that reporters rarely justified activist perspectives and routinely insinuated that the activists were "out of touch with real American sensibilities." In another study of Texas television outlets, Resse and Buckalew (1995) found that reporters implied that protesters were violent and that Texans were overwhelmingly pro-war. Finally, when examining

76 stories from newspapers, Hackett and Zhao (1994) found that 46% of the stories showed the protesters in the "enemy within" frame. Another 28 percent of the stories portrayed activists as "oddballs" who were ill-informed, overly emotional, immature and morally out of step with American values, whereas only 26 percent of the stories showed the peace movement as a group with "legitimate grievances."

3.6 Data Sources for This Project

In gaining information on these protests, this dissertation does not repeat the mistake of depending purely on newspaper depictions (the last section should show the rationale of such a decision). In supplementing the information gained from reporters, this dissertation adds the accoimts of movement participants and a social science investigator. Thus, the sketch of this protest cycle is derived through the encompassing practice of using of several types of data sources.

27 This "triangulated design" was seen as a way to counteract the problems associated with the use of a single informant (Denzin, 1973; Berg 1989). it was assumed that the use of several informants grants greater access to the total number of protests in the national population (thus enhancing both the selectivity and representativeness of the study). It was also assumed the use of researcher generated estimates would enhance the reliability of this project. That is, readers can be assured that at least one set of informants routinely used the ‘"grid system” to compile size estimates. Finally, it was believed that the use of several indicators would accommodate the testing of “convergent validity.” Or in other words, the use of different "independent measures" fosters the ability to examine biases since "the appropriate assessment of bias requires a credible record of the population of events" (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith, 1996).

3.6.1 Participant Observation at a Local Protest Scene

During a qualitative study of Gulf War protesters, 1 attended the protests of a local antiwar mobilization (San Diego. California). Being a native San Diegoian who knew many peace activists, it was extremely easy to acquire information as to where activities were occurring. Furthermore, it was easy to gain entree into this social context since the groups activities were open to everybody (this was not a secretive or clandestine movement which made newcomers prove their loyalty). Finally, my role as a partieipant- observer meant that most antiwar activists embraced me as one of them. That is, activists knew me in the dual role of a researcher who did a little volunteer work on the side

(several times I stuffed envelopes and distributed fliers).

28 I was around the protesting circles throughout the entire mobilization (August

1990 to March 1991). These were busy days since I was balancing my time between

interviewing activists and inspecting antiwar events. Luckily, my financial situation

never obstructed my ability to get a movement event. That is, my living circumstance

gave me the freedom to attend every announced protest.

This caveat of free time was important for several reasons. First, the mobilization

was vast enough to have an event on almost everyday of the calendar. Thus, I never

missed a day’s amount of the movement because of other obligations which impinged on

“Field time.” Second, the somewhat chaotic nature of social movements means that one

cannot predict how long a protest event will take. In sharp contrast to bureaucratized

organizations which adhere to a strict time schedules (i.e., schools or industry), one finds

that movement meetings can fluctuate between two minutes and five hours. Obviously

the same thing can be said about demonstrations and the always long sleep-ins. Hence

the option of sustaining long observational periods meant that I saw a full range of the protest events. For example, one protest took over a lush shopping mall at 11:30 at night.

Clearly, there were no “part-time’ researchers or reporters at the late hour transgression.

While traversing San Diego's antiwar scene I routinely found myself in the local hubs o f antiwar activity. These centers of antiwar activism hovered within the organizational domains of the San Diego Coalition for Peace in the Middle East, the

University of California Alliance for Peace, and the San Diego State Coalition for Peace in the Middle East. The group with the largest and broadest contingency was the San

Diego Coalition for Peace in the Middle East (SDCPME). The SDCPME was a

29 community based organization that tried to maintain an ad-hoc organization of

"progressive" groups (for example the steering committee had activists from Greenpeace,

The Middle East Information Center, Act-up, La Raza Unida, and Committee Opposed to

Militarism and the Draft). This umbrella group fostered some public teach-ins, provided speakers for radio and televised talk shows, and collected signatures for a stop the war petition. Moreover, the SDCPME spent most of its resources in bringing more people to their weekly vigils that were staged in a scenic park near downtown San Diego.

The other sites of organized dissent were on the campuses of Southern Californian universities. The University of California San Diego (UCSD) saw an outpouring of peace protests. The UCSD Alliance for Peace was formed when a few Communication professors combined forces with some students from the radical bookstore, leftist student newspapers and social justice organizations. This Alliance went on to hold student run teach-ins, sleep-ins, and a couple of protests (one protest saw a die-in at a dean's office).

The students at San Diego State University (SDSU) also mounted their own antiwar drive. In fact the campus chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America and some

English graduate students were able to throw several protests in front of the school library.

These three organizations acted as my sampling unit. In doing so, I limited my attention to protests which rested within these organizational domains. Conversely, the few small protests which were created by impromptu collectives were automatically excluded from data collection. Thus, I did not cover every protest in San Diego since I was unable to observe the few cases of unaffiliated peace actions (i.e., the three unknown

30 “peace grandmas” who once stopped trafSc at a local beach never made their way into the study).

In assessing these organizations I was able to attend every protest for the San

Diego Coalition for Peace in the Middle East. Furthermore, I observed every SDSU and

UCSD protest which did not overlap with the protests of the SDCPME. Fortunately, protests rarely evolved at the same time, thus I was able to attend all but few campus protests.

This sampling technique lessened the problem of selection bias. Or in simpler terms, by observing almost every protest in San Diego one can be self assured that the study has an excellent measure of the number of protests.

The demonstrations that transpired in these realms became my unit of analysis.

While watching these demonstrations and vigils, 1 took notes on the variable "protest size." These notes were not done in any half-hazard manner. Instead. 1 took care when using the "grid/density" approach to devise the size estimates.

While the grid approach had to be slightly modified for each protest scenario, some standardized procedures were followed. Before attending a demonstration 1 would visit the potential protest site. This preparation gave clues to feasible vantage points and helpful geographical markers. Fortunately, most of the marches were held on paths that contained uniformed slabs of concrete. Then these cement slabs became functional quadrants that could yield body counts.

With these visible guidelines in place I would simply linger around the site.

After surveying the crowd, 1 would determine when the protest reached its peak, and then

31 count the number of residents in the "typical" slab (obviously the interpretations of peak

and typical are subjective calculations). Then I would quickly calculate the number of

slabs encompassed by the rally and then do my multiplications.

After completing this study of a regional protest, I sought other sources to address

the national scope of the movement. This imperative to gather a national sample was

driven by three major concerns. First, I thought my data on San Diego was sound but I

was concerned that the protest cycle in San Diego might not correspond with the national cycle. I kept pondering the question as to whether the San Diego patterns reflected the national trends or was an unique outlier which bucked the national trends? Clearly, certain types of answers to this question could dampen process of generalizing from my

San Diego case study. Second, I thought the termination of the project at the local level would result in an incomplete picture since the protests challenged a federal entity. That is, the protestors were not challenging a mayor so why keep the analysis at only a local level? Finally, I wanted to probe the topic of media bias, how my observations would stack up against the portrayals placed in famous newspapers. Thus, I needed some mass mediated messages in order to engage in some illuminating comparisons.

3.6.2 Secondary Sources and the National Mobilization

With these curiosities, I decided to use to the mass media for retrospective information. While the mass media shoulders a wide range of mediums, 1 decided to use newspapers as a source of information. The omission of televised and radio accounts was based on two premises. First, televised reports of protest usually concentrate on the visual side of protests (Gitlin, 1979; Small 1994). Consequently, televised reports rarely

32 provide verbal statements about the size of crowds. Combined with this emphasis of

"looks" over content is the reporter’s imprecise excerpts. More precisely, reporter talk

on TV is usually so glossy and vague that it is deplete of nuance understandings o f the

topic (i.e., reporters are prone to saying “a small protest happened today”).

With such shortcomings in the televised realm one has to go to other sources.

Previous researchers have embraced newspapers for several reasons. At the most

important level, newspapers show a greater tendency toward including estimates into their

written texts. Furthermore, these newspaper estimates are usually more meticulous than

their t.v. counterparts. That is. estimates usually come at the numeric and interval level of measurement. Thus, newspapers can be envisioned as a source that is one step above

terrible.

Adding to the relative rigor of newspapers is the realization that most research is retrospective (research is started after the event has happened). With this being so, researchers must count on surrogates to provide information. Up to the middle 1990's, the technological landscape made newspapers the easiest surrogates to retrieve (who knows how research will change with the use in the Internet), Stated differently, most libraries specialize in printed documents and have no backlog of recorded newscasts.

Thus, the absence of video recordings usually necessitated an use of newspapers.

3.6.3 Sampling National Papers

The perfect researcher would acquire a census of the population under analysis.

For example, a scholar who is examining the images of TV game shows in the 1970's can acquire every episode of the Price is Right, The Gong Show, Card Sharks, etc. However,

33 it is a rare feat when a reacher can ascertain every piece of relevant information. In fact, the act of observing all parts of an expansive population is usually impossible. For instance, the researcher who wants to analyze the occupations of Asian-Americans in detective novels can not humanly read every paperback from 1920 to the present.

The parameters of this study presents such a problem. No matter how dedicated and energetic a person is, one cannot acquire every news-story which ever ran on the phenomena called Gulf War protests. Simply put, a single researcher cannot read every story that resides in the immense world of U.S. newspapers. Instead, a researcher must chose to read some newspapers and forget others. Or in the language of science, a researcher must select a sample of papers which can act as a representative of the entire universe of newspaper accounts.

In the past, award-winning scholars have used the purposive method of sampling.

Many landmark studies created a sample of one famous paper (i.e. Doug McAdam used

The New York Times). However, the literature review showed how this approach is quite problematic. Remember how many papers were missed by theWashington Post andNew

York Times? Therefore, 1 broke from the norm of the "single paper" study and sided with some research methodologists who urged the use of multiple papers (Francico 1987;

Meyer, 1991).

While this obtuse plan of "getting more papers" had strong methodological justification, it is also brought some sampling enigmas. With the shortage of previous sampling routines to copy, I had to develop a new approach to handle this problem of paper inclusion.

34 We know that all research textbooks extol the implementation of a random sample

(Babbie, 1996). However, this is not a viable option in this project. The unfeasibility is

due to several confounding factors. Initially, there is a problem with sampling frames.

After exploring the cataloging systems ofBooks in Print, andWORLD CAT, I could not

find a directory which lists the names of every U.S. paper (theGale Directory came the

closest but I noticed that it missed many Ohio papers which I was aware of). More

importantly, even if such a list exists it would be impossible to access all papers. In fact,

most small U.S. papers are not saved by libraries or computerized systems.

In place of a random sample, I enacted a multi-staged stratified sample. While

this descriptive term may sound complex, the actual process was quite straight forward.

In effect the sampling process went like this. First I invented a typology of newspapers

(national papers, news-services, regional papers, alternative press, and activist newsletters). Then with the attributes of each strata established, 1 found papers to represent each sort of paper.

The actual stages of the sampling process went as follows. First, the population was conceived as every newspaper in the United States. Second, the population of U.S. papers was broken into separate "stratums" or groupings of papers (each strata retained the important qualities of being mutually exclusive). Third, the researcher selected some representative papers from each strata. Finally, the selection of papers from each strata took a purposive form since archiving practices do not grant access to every paper in the

United States (the following sections will explore the library’s role in eliminating the possibility of a random sample of newspapers).

35 The first strata in this sample were "prominent," “national” newspapers(The New

York Times, Los Angeles Times, JVashington Post, andUSA Today ). This cluster of papers were deemed national in scope since they purport to be covering the entire nation.

In fact they advertise themselves as having complete portrayals of the U.S. populace.

Moreover, these papers are canonized so much that readers throughout the world view them as the best records of what actually happens in the United States (i.e., theUSA

Today logo exclaims “First in Daily Readers” while ehNew York Times presents the grandiose boast of printing “All the News that is Fit to Print”).

After exhausting the list of national papers, I went to other sorts of national news sources. In this subsection I picked up wire-service reports. After looking at the computerized system LEXIS/NEXIS, I placed the United Press International (UPI),

Gannett, and Reuters into my sample. Unfortunately the Associated Press (AP) was excluded from my sample since it is not available on LEXIS/NEXIS.

After examining these national papers and news services I turned to an unique catalogue calledNews Bank This microfiche series is a condensed clearing house of metropolitan newspapers (over 600 papers were cited in 1991). In effect, this catalogue provides a yearly anthology o f "historical milestones" by saving articles that are found in small and inaccessible newspapers (inaccessible means not available in online services).

Thus, I had hoped that this compilation would broaden the scope of the paper since it may have reports form cities that are neglected by the major papers and news-services.

After depleting the pool of national sources I searched for appropriate local newspapers. However I quickly noticed that this goal elicited another sampling enigma.

36 An enigma in the sense that the use of every newspaper in the country would require the reading of over 481,800 local newspapers (Olzak and Shannon, 1994). Being overwhelmed by such a unsurmountable task, I had to establish a way to select local papers. In doing so, I had to create some acceptable criteria for organizing this strata of

“local papers.”

At first I explored the criterion of library availability. I thought about using my library privileges to collect articles from available newspapers. Being a graduate student at the Ohio State University I planned on examining the holdings of the libraries which belong to the consortium called Ohio-LINK (the participating libraries are at Bowling

Green, Cleveland State, Case Western, Kent State, Otterbein, University of Akron,

University of Dayton, University of Cincirmati, and Wright State). However, I quickly discovered that such a strategy was riddled with problems. The most glaring limitation is that libraries holdings have embraced the ethnocentric notion of “regionalism.” That is, the issues of proximity seems to govern the subscription choices of librarians.

Subsequently, Ohio libraries have collections which tend to coalesce around tlie Midwest and neglect the other sections of this vast country (The OSU library has complete holdings of theChicago Tribune, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Columbus Dispatch, Los

Angeles Times, New York Times, St. Louis Post-Dispatch and theSan Francisco

Chronicle).

After seeing the biases of “library availability” I contemplated the act of suing inter-library loan to access papers from every identified Standard Metropolitan Statistical

Area (SMSA). At first I liked the notion of use SMS As since it would insure that all

37 large cities got into the sample. However, I quickly found this approach as unproductive on two counts. First, SMSA's are unequally distributed throughout the country (there is a giant cluster of SMSA's in the Northeastern seaboard and California). Thus, we would know information on densely populated states but protests that happened in scantly populated areas would be automatically omitted by this approach (i.e., we may have numerous details on Southern California and sparse information on North Dakota).

Second, the use of all SMSA’s seemed logistically unfeasible. That is, the fine people at

OSU’s inter-library loan office insisted that they could not help me locate every article that this procedure demanded. Finally, I did not have the money to personally search the archives of this nation’s most comprehensive libraries (i.e., the Library of Congress or the

Vanderbelt newspaper achieves).

In light of these constraints, I decided to let spatial considerations guide the process of "local paper" inclusion. That is, I wanted to create a web of papers that would incorporate all the geographical sectors of the United States. Thus, I thought if every section of the nation had a representative paper, one might conclude that protests in every

U.S. city had the possibility of being covered by a local metropolitan newspaper. Or in other words, it was concluded that the best way to approximate a random sample was through the implementation of a sample that followed the spatial contours of the country.

While this may sound like a simple accomplishment, one quickly finds that this nation does not have clearly demarcated regions. When listening to "casual" conversations with colleagues and professors, 1 saw the emergence of a cantankerous debate about the shape of the "real American regions." In fact, the lack of consensus was

38 so widespread that people argued about the basic dimensions as the shapes and numbers of U.S. regions.

To resolve such ambiguities, I tumed to the U.S. Census for an operational definition. The Census Bureau'sCity and County Data 5oofc (1994) includes a map which standardizes the types of U.S. regions. In doing so, this much cited book provides a coherent schemata which breaks the country up into ten separate categories (New

England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West

North Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific and Southwest).

There are several advantages to using this schemata. First. The system encompasses every state in the nation. Second, the system clearly identifies spatial parameters as it situates each state in a region. Finally, the use of ten regions is much more precise than the East/West or North/South dichotomies that permeate casual conversation. Conversely, this improved taxonomy still has limitations. There is no uniformity in the amount of acreage covered by each region. Hence, one sees that some regions are much larger than others (i.e., the Mid-Atlantic contains New York, New

Jersey, and Pennsylvania while the Mountain states hold Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico,

Montana, Utah, and Wyoming in its grasp). There is also a lack of cultural uniformity is some regions. During comparisons it is clear that some o f the regions show a high level of cultural homogeneity while other sections are an eclectic mix of diverse sub-cultures

(e.g., the South Atlantic stretches from Delaware to Florida while New England is confined to the states between Maine and Massachusetts.).

39 Then with these categories in place, I then searched for largest newspapers in each

subsection (largest as defined by number of daily subscribers). After using the directory

Newspapers Online (1992), the papers which fit this size/region criterion were identified

{Boston Globe for New England,Philadelphia Enquirer for Middle Atlantic,Atlanta

Constitution for the South Atlantic. Houston Post for West South Central, Minneapolis

Star-Trihune for West North Central, Louisville Courier-Journal for East South Central,

Detroit Free Press for East North Central, Denver Post for Mountain,San Francisco

Chronicle for Southwest and theSeattle Times for Pacific).

Following this construction of a list, this plan hit another snafu. While most of

these papers were accessible through online computer systems, some of these largest

papers are not found in such data bases. More precisely, theMinneapolis Star-Trihune and theDetroit Free Press cannot be found in the cyber-world of LEXIS/NEXIS. With

this technological glitch, I was forced into accepting the "second largest" paper from

West North Central and East North Central regions. In making these modifications, the

Chicago Tribune become the substitute paper for the Minneapolis Star-Trihune andSt.

Louis Post-Dispatch did the same for theDetroit Free Press.

While it is impossible to determine the consequences of such switches, I have a nagging suspicions that the loss of theMinneapolis Star-Trihune has made the movement seem a bit smaller. This hunch is based on the premise that other papers report that the protest scene in Mitmeapolis was much larger than the antiwar community in St. Louis and Chicago (more on this point will be presented in the findings section). However this

40 loss may be mitigated somewhat since the other papers seem to indicate that the protests

in Chicago were bigger than the protests in Detroit.

After generating a list of mainstream sources, I wanted to broaden the vista by using an "alternative" periodical (see Hallin, 1986 and Small, 1984 for studies on how the

"alternative" press cover stories that are neglected by the corporate press). That is, I wanted to use sources that were governed more by activist concerns than profit margins.

But due to an assortment of historical factors, the U.S. lacks a daily paper of the left.

With such a void, one has to choose between a list of weekly papers and monthly periodicals. After scanning the "alternative presses" ofThe Nation, Z Magazine, The

Progressive, Utne Reader, andIn these Times, I added the New York weekly, the

National Guardian, to the sample. The National Guardian was embraced for several reasons. First, Melvin Small (1994) suggests theGuardian provided the best coverage of the antiwar movement during Vietnam. Second, theGuardian had editors who were committed to covering Gulf War dissent. One feature of this commitment was the six month special section of Gulf War protests. While another part of their commitment lead to the practice of including articles that were written by the antiwar activists themselves.

Finally, 1 tumed to a peace movement paper. While the national organizations had fragmentary movement histories, a small group called the Nuclear Resisters collected an extensive list of protest endeavors. This Phoenix based collective became the

"unofficial" clearinghouse of activist manuscripts because hundreds of antiwar coalitions faxed their reports to their Arizona office. This tiny group was so efficient in their efforts that they inundated their newsletter with paragraph size vignettes of local antiwar stories

41 (Some of the editions Nuclear Times saw a ten page hodgepodge of events printed in very small fonts).

In the end, this multistage procedure of selecting papers resulted in a sample of 20 news sources {Atlanta Constitution, Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune. Denver Post,

Gannett,Guardian, Houston Post, Los Angeles Times, Louisville Courier-Journal, New

York Times, News Bank, Nuclear Times, Philadelphia Enquirer, Rueters, San Francisco

Chronicle, Seattle Times, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, UP I, USA TODAY, and Washington

Post). While this sample has the limitation of neglecting thousands of cities and hamlets, it also has the advantage of covering all sections of the United States. Coupled with this strong point is the fact that this sample attracted different types of news sources (ranging from large for profit enterprises to small activist clearinghouses). Finally, this use of twenty sources far surpasses the number of sources that are usually associated with studies of protest cycles.

This spectrum of papers furthers some important insights. By increasing the number of media voices, one can hear more accounts of protest activities. In turn, this inclusion of more accounts should enhances the proportion of protests covered (i.e., local papers cover protests that national papers miss). However, the use of numerous papers does not simply provide a more "complete" picture of the protest cycle. This plethora of sources also facilitates an instructive study of the "socially constructed" nature of media narratives. That is, the juxtaposition of the various accounts can spark nuanced

42 understandings of the separate visions of the Gulf War protests. In effect, the act of comparing news accounts can show what each paper said about the protest cycle.^

3.7 Unit of Analysis in the Papers

When doing research, the investigator must uncover relevant information. In finding salient items, studies must designate the parameters of their reading process. In starting this process, a researcher must identify the unit o f analysis (BCripendorf 1980;

Weber 1990). There are many steps to this specification assignment. First, the researcher must locate the physical unit o f analysis. In doing so, the researcher should articulate the tangible medium of the images (i.e., comic books, slasher movies or the pages of the

World Wide Web). This precision is essential since the media is not a monolith of identical organizations. That is, messages may vary among media distributors since some outlets have preserved a sense of relative autonomy (i.e., paradoxical images may emanate from TV talk shows, literary novels, video games, pom flicks, dissertations, news letters, etc.) And with the possibility of clashing messages among remote mediums, the vigilant researcher must guard against the formulation of hasty generalizations (i.e., a researcher would be making an error if they say the images of Clint

Eastwood’s Dirty Harry movies match with the connotations ofMS magazine and the lyrics of the punk band theSex Pistols).

In addition, researchers should delineate referentialthe unit o f analysis. Simply put, the research should recognize which parts of the physical unit are worthy of research.

The veracity of these assertions will be examined in the ensuing finding chapters of this dissertation.

43 In doingso, the researcher must specify which segments will be studied and which parts

will be ignored. For example, a researcher may restrict their analysis to the photos of a periodical. Ideally, the referential unit of analysis should logically correspond with the research questions. That is, a researcher who is interested in the relationship between the media and crime attitudes may focus on police shows (i.e.,Miami Vice, COPS, NY

BLUE), while a person studying the toddler socialization process might watch productions that are directed toward children (i.e..Power Rangers, Barnie, or Mr

Rodger's Neighborhood).

Next the researcher must stipulate thesyntactical unit o f analysis. This entails some reflections on the issue of communication forms. With communication being a multidimensional phenomena, meanings are found in the creation of language rules (i.e., paragraphic and sentence structure), the use of specific colloquiums (each community has their own vernacular), the implications of speech patterns (tone, speed, and enunciation styles), the inferences of discourse maneuvers (who gets to speak and interrupt), the connotations of body movements (gestures, postures, and proximities) and the ownership of props (possession of recognized artifacts). Hence, a single speaker or writer conveys an endless amount of ménagés since each communication form supplies a complicated batch of innuendos. Facing such an abundance of social cues, the researcher must pinpoint the proper facets of analysis. That is, they must know if they are watching the use of congacate verbs, the application of stigmatized labels to teenagers, or the number of times that audience members yawn in a lecture hall.

44 Given these distinctions, the physical unit of media analysis is ‘‘newspapers.”

Conversely, this study did not get antiwar information from the television, radio. E-mail discussion groups, posters, police records, or activist archives. The referential unit of analysis are “hard news” articles. So, this dissertation examines “factual new stories” which are supposedly crafted with ethic of “objectivity.” On the other hand, the studies forgoes an analysis of any pieces that are not suppose to be impartial accounts of a protest cycle (i.e., editorials, comics, horoscopes, and advertisements). Finally, the syntactical unit of analysis in this study focus on the words and numeric codes which recall the size of a particular social movement. This meant, every instance of size estimates were transcribed into a code book. Consequently, nominal and interval data were chronicled since reporters sometimes used numbers or phrases to describe the protest size (i.e., a reporter would write “the protest was big” while another reporters would claim “ 10 people protested in Las Vegas today”). Conversely, other newspaper traits were not examined (i.e., the length of antiwar articles, the size of titles for antiwar pieces, the page number of the columns, or the type of antiwar photos offered).

3.8 Finding Appropriate News Stories

Obviously, this analysis did not examine every news story in every sampled newspaper. Instead, the collection of articles was govern be the principle of “possible relevance.” That is, I copied any article that might have contain a size estimate. There were several routes for finding relevant articles. First, a human scanned some paper bound indexes. Unfortunately, the reference section at the Ohio State University had only seven hard- back indexes{New York Times, News Bank Los Angeles Times, Chicago

45 Tribune, Denver Post, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, andUSA TODAY). Second, these citations were supplemented with references found in the computerized service called

Newspaper Abstracts. This computerized system absorbs references for nine of the sampled papers (Atlanta Constitution, Boston Globe, Houston Post, Los Angeles Times,

Mew York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, USA TODA and Y,

Washington Post). Third, word searches were conducted in the cyberworld of

Nexis/Lexis. This system contains the complete articles for over 100 newspapers and had the verbatim articles for every source except Mews Bank, the Guardian, and theNuclear

Resister. Finally, I read examined the titles of every edition for the two alternative papers which had no indexes (theGuardian and theNuclear Resister). While this use of three indexes may seem a bit excessive, I wanted to evade the problem of depending on the competencies of single indexing system.

The search of these indexes followed several guidelines. On a temporal front, the indexes were scanned for the entire duration of the antiwar movement (August 1990 to

April 1991). Since this was a relatively short time period, the daily editions of each paper were examined. With this time frame in mind, 1 then searched theses indexes and computer systems. Following the logic of these directories, I perused assorted subject headings. In inspecting these manuals, my search concentrated on the stories which appeared under the categories o f'‘antiwar,” “peace movements,” “demonstrations,”

“protests,” and “Persian Gulf War.”

The guides alluded to 1,029 antiwar articles (this should be a virtual census since I sued numerous indexes). Of this group, some two hundred reports lacked size references.

46 Since these essays never considered this integral variable, they were removed from the

investigation. After purging these extraneous documents, some 827 compositions were

kept in the study. In providing vital information, these 827 sketches became the

cornerstone for much of this investigation.

3.9 Reading the Transcripts through a Content Analvsis

As indicted earlier, the syntactical unit of analysis were the words and numerical

symbols that addressed size estimates. To find these attributes, I employed the analytical

tool of a “content analysis.” In doing so, this method furnishes a constellation of rules

which examine the messages of recorded and printed documents (Walizer and Wient,

1987; Fren, et. a l., 1992; Singletary, 1994). Or in other words, a content analysis uses

formalized and systematic methods to categorize and classify the "manifest meanings"

from a series of texts.

These “formal” and “systematic” stipulations means that an explicit set of

procedures govern the entire process of inquiry. Subsequently, each document is greeted

by the same rules of observation. Adding to this "standardized" reading process is the

emphasis on the "apparent" or "manifest" meanings of the words. That is, a content analysis focuses on the explicit meaning of words and does not look at the structure of the argument. Hence, my analysis emphasized the words in the text while an concentration on sentence lengths, verb forms, or punctuation techniques did not develop.

The approach seemed appropriate for several reasons. First, the research question asks for relatively overt information (i.e., the numbers of a crowd). Thus, the methods which explicate the "implied" or "submerged" meanings of the texts did not seem fitting

47 (i.e., discourse analysis, phenomenology, or hermeneutics). Second, the precise and

systematic nature of this method suits the study of media biases (Stemphel, 1989; Wimer

and Dominick, 1987). In effect, a content analysis grants the word frequencies for a

given source (i.e., how many times did theBoston Globe call the protesters "traitors”).

However, this approach is not limited to the analysis of a single news source. Instead,

this approach enumerates the frequency distributions for many papers (i.e., how many

times did theBoston Globe and theAtlanta Constitution call protesters “heros”). Hence, a content analysis has extensive comparison potentialities. With such an analysis the researcher can evaluate the number of protests covered by news sources, and determine what each news source conveyed about these protests (Gino Stemphel suggests that the content analysis is great at answering the question of “who said what to whom?”).

Hence, these comparisons can indicate what topics are considered “newsworthy” and what are the common modes of addressing such “newsworthy” topics.

3.10 Creating Categories for the Content Analvsis

In starting the analysis of the news sources. I showed great attention to the words and numbers which dealt with size issues. Whenever a size reference was discovered, I highlighted the section with a writing instrument. Then these statements were directly transferred into a discrete codebook. Along with these direct quotes, I extracted information on protest dates, protest locations, and estimate sources. Hence, my ledger contain five columns. One column noted the newspaper’s name, while the other columns highlighted event dates, event locations, the occupation of the person who created the estimate, and the estimate itself.

48 At this point, an inquisitor may ask if the categories correctly reflect the qualities of these newspapers? In response, I would suggest this project has a high degree of face validity. That is, the study is probably measuring what is claims to be measuring. First, this topic has clearly defined boundaries between salient and irrelevant information.

Simply put, I found it relatively easily to differentiate between the words which represent city names and protest sizes from the words that name different concepts. Second, it seems safe to assume that other people would agree with my classifying decisions. Or in other words, the mass education of this fine land insures that most people share the same names of cities. Furthermore, most humans use the Arabic counting system in a fashion that is similar to my approach (whole numbers that were added or subtracted). Third, the use of standardized maps and numeric systems guarantees mutually exclusive data

(assuming that I is never 2 and cities/states do not change their names on a regular basis).

Fourth, the categories should be exhaustive. In effect, each metropolitan area has a distinctive name and the interval measurements can reach the total number of the North

American population.

While this approach has some face validity, I took some steps to test the stability of my coding procedures (Andrean, 1981; Babbie, 1996). In being a glutton for punishment, I read all 800 articles twice. In doing such a laborious task, I wanted to see if I skipped any protests during the first round of analysis. Luckily, this process showed that I was a diligent investigator since I missed only two protests during the initial round of reading.

49 Next I applied the idea of inter-rater reliability to this study. In creating a third and fourth codebook, I enlisted the help of two readers (a Social Work Ph.D. candidate and a friendly elementary school teacher). After I reviewed the logic of a content analysis, both individuals independently coded the stories Newin the York Times and

Washington Post. When they finished this task, I compared our results in an item by item basis. As expected, the findings replicated each other. In fact, out of 176 protests there was only one case in which the three readers had any discrepancies (i.e., the entries were the same except when the elementary teacher missed a protest Washingtonin Post).

Thus, this similarity among three readers seems to suggest that this study retains a high degree of reliability.

50 CH A PTER 4

SAN DIEGO PROTESTS

“Most People are going to see through Bush’s deception and jump on our side.”

— 40 year old protester in San Diego

“Let’s admit it, the movement is minuscule because a majority of Americans get some perverted joy from the start of war”

— 22 year old college protester from San Diego

As the literature review indicated, social movements are loosely connected

confederations of local protest groups. In exploring one of these protest scenes, this

chapter will focus on the general augmentation, expansion, and eventual decline of San

Diego’s protests. The narration will take the form of a dialogue since information will

emerge from two sources. On one hand, the text will be bound to personal grid counts.

On the other hand, a local newspaper will provide some data. Ultimately, it is hoped that

this juxtaposition and synthesis of theSan Diego Union Tribune and the grid system will

address both substantive and methodological questions.

4.1 The San Diego Protest Cycle

In early August 1990, the country of Iraq invaded the country of Kuwait. In an

instant response, President George Bush moved thousands of troops into Saudi Arabia

51 (there is evidence that Bush was prewamed of the invasion by ambassador April Glaspie but did nothing to stop the assault). The placement of troops in Saudi Arabia sparked a wave of conversations across San Diego. This conversation probably took a sense of urgency since San Diego has three military bases, and several weapon manufactories

(more than 50,000 Marines and Sailors are stationed in San Diego). However, these conversations were not confined to the circles of military personnel. Individuals who belonged to San Diego’s left began assessing the possibility of a new Persian Gulf War

(one that had direct U.S. involvement). Accordingly leaders of local groups began the process of seriously speculating on the issue of an upcoming war. However, these seasoned activists did not keep their conversations to war possibilities. Rather, they talked about the ways in which they could turn their “abated” organizations into a united front against war.'

These phone calls resulted in a meeting of eight full-time activists. At this meeting, one foimd local representatives from “various” progressive organizations. The list of participants included members from an environmental organization (Greenpeace), a disarmament group (Alliance for Survival), an anti-draft group (Committee Opposed to

Militarism and the Draft), the radical jurisprudence group (National Lawyers Guild), and several anti-interventionist groups (the Middle East Cultural and Information Center and

Abbeyed organizations are small protest centers which have survived from the heights of a previous mobilization. For example, the mobilization against Reagan’s interventions in Nicaragua and El Salvador left some the reminents of organizations with small staffs (CISPES, or the Central America Information Center).

52 the Friends of Nicaraguan Culture). Conversely, this meeting did not include representatives from all progressive and liberal quarters. For example, none of the traditional peace churches sent spokespersons, nor did any “single issue” feminist or civil rights organizations (this is noteworthy since previous antiwar movements were headed by religious pacifists and radical feminists).

After examining the severity of the problem, these eight activists decided to form an umbrella group - the San Diego Coalition for Peace in the Middle East (SDCPME).

During this meeting, the SDCPME formalized some of its goals. When rejecting the sanctions possibility, the SDCPME took a more radical stance. In essence, the SDCPME challenged the legitimacy of all US interventions. Starting with a preamble that opposed

US militarism in general, the Coalition’s first plank called "a complete withdrawal of all

U.S. troops in the Middle East." After rejecting the premises of an US military presence in the Gulf, the Coalition went on to condemn the “distorted military budget,” the

“Corporate-induced energy polices,” and the “classist and sexist methods of a voluntary army.”

The first act of the group was to launch a petition drive which asked to "Stop the war before it begins." Then the group outlined its strategies to expand its membership base. Simply put, all organizations agreed to lobby acquaintances who were connected to other social justice circles. Finally, the throng discussed the possibility of joining the first day of national protest on October 20, 1990. Without much contemplation, this was deemed the “first day of local protests” since all participants consented to this initiative.

53 From August to early October, the SDCPME put most of its energy into block recruiting. When taking the block route, the SDCPME tried to attract the attention of preexisting groups (rather than recruiting on an individual by individual basis). So, the core activists of the SDCPME began attending and speaking at the meetings of associations that could be receptive to the antiwar pitch.

During these Summer months, the group had little success in getting endorsements from “mainstream organizations.” Many liberal and electorally based groups did not accept the invitations to join this burgeoning antiwar coalition. For example, the National Association of Colored People, the Chicano Federation, and the

National Organization of Women (NOW) did not want to prematurely endorse such a controversial matter. All of these organizations said they did not oppose the SDCPME’s efforts, but that an affiliation with the antiwar cause was too risky or time consuming In an apologetic voice the local chairperson of NOW claimed that she was “against the sexist ways of war, but my group would lose donors if we took a stand on this war.”

However, these polite rejections were civil in comparison to some union reactions.

Several unions refused to let SDCPME members speak and some teamsters yelled “you people are unpatriotic” as they roughly escorted the SDCPME member out the door.

While these incrementalist groups were reluctant to join the SDCPME, clusters of smaller “direction action” groups were enthusiastically joining the coalition. The outreach team found that minority “grass-roots” groups were unequivocally adding their support to the organization. That is, Greg Akkali of the Afro-American Organizing

Project became a member of the steering committee and individuals of the Coalicion

54 Pro-Derechos de la Raza began donating their time as legal and artistic consultants (both

of these Afro-American and Chicano groups also offered their prized phone bank lists).

At the same time, many socialist and internationalist groups collaborated the compact. In the end, the month of September brought the Central American Information Center, the

Democratic Socialists of America, the Green Party, the Peace and Freedom Party,

Solidarity and US/Cuba friendship into official endorsers status.

These new allies began sending delegates to SDCPME meetings and started making in-kind donations (i.e., using their fax machines or giving the SDCPME free paper). More importantly, the affiliates relayed the SDCPME’s message to their own constituents. This was of great significance because groups like the Central American

Information Center began the laborious task of calling the 10,000 phone numbers which resided in their computer system.

As the coalition added affiliates, the city showed different sorts of antiwar endeavors. Many college campuses saw the inklings of independent peace groups.

When the September quarter began at the University of California San Diego (UCSD), a handful of students from Palestine, Chicano, anarchistic, and feminist groups met at the student ran Che Cafe. During this conversation at the co-op which house’s murals of

Fidel Castro, Emma Goldberg, and Angela Davis, these students decided to devise the

UCSD Alliance for Peace. With such a decree the Alliance began planning a future teach-in, and started their antiwar media blitz. Concurrently, a law professor at the

University of San Diego (USD) was holding study groups on war issues. However, Dr.

Robert Simmons efforts were of little avail since the largest study session drew six

55 students. Similarly, small bands of English and Sociology graduate students at San Diego

State University (SDSU) were trying to establish their own version of an antiwar coalition. Still, their early efforts showed sparse results since few showed any interest in making a movement at their commuter school (one organizer told me that “SDSU’s study body is most famous for being ranked the number one party school byPlayboy

Magazine").

With these college groups in their infancy, the SDCPME held its inaugural public protest in late October. In coordination with other protests throughout the country, four- hundred activists attended the first “no-blood for oil” protest on October 20,1990 (my grid density count). As the SDCPME distributed literature on the “the environmental hazards of war,” and “‘the U.S. financing of Sadam’s war machine,” a group of street actors performed a bad rendition of 1960's guerrilla theater. The crowd was predominantly White and the age distribution saw clumps of people in the late teens and middle age intervals (bimodal peaks). Later, the director of the Peace Resource Center told me that most of the participants were from endorsing groups since she “personally knew about one-half of the crowd.”

As this protest occurred, a beat reporter of theSan Diego Union-Tribiine decided to observe the proceedings (see table 4.1 for summaries of grid and reporter estimates).

His two paragraph story suggested that there were “fewer than 200" protesters in San

Diego. Furthermore the scanty story contained no protestor quotes as it focused on the

‘angle’ who of the speaker who had no legs. Thus, the story had little substance but some

56 sensationalistic flair as it described how Brian Wilson had his legs severed when blocking

the entrance of a weapon’s plant in 1987.

This preponderance of familiar faces bothered the SDCPME steering committee.

Many of these long-term activists envisioned a likely war. Furthermore they feared that

the war would be grotesque and large scale. Some leaders were quoting projections of a

war that could kill millions of people, and a few voiced worries about a possible nuclear

holocaust (they thought Israel might use it nuclear weapons after an Iraqi attack).

These dire appraisals worried this band of activists. They saw an ominous future and sensed that their small circle of activists could not stop the rush to war.

Consequently, SDCPME leaders decided to urgently put all of their energy into expanding movement boundaries. As the SDCPME tried to expand its ranks, they veered their energy into a particular group of potential participants. The recruiters de­ emphasized their block recruiting efforts and went for the sympathetic Americans who had no formal attachments to established interest groups. In effect, they wanted to inspire

large sections of "mainstreamers” who were usually politically passive.

This attempt to mobilize the sympathetic and uninterested took many visions and

forms. In an early November gathering, one faction of self-appointed leaders demanded to enhance organizational efficiency through bureaucratic means. They predicted that the codification and delineation of a formal division of labor could enhance the coalition’s efficiency. So they presented several proposals that envisioned an organizational structure that allocated tasks to specified committees. In short, these folks believed that a

57 clearly demarcated division o f labor would insure that the completion of organizational

necessities.

With this elaboration of this model, a smaller faction objected to the process of

“bureaucratization.” These dissenters argued that such a system would replicate the problems of institutional hierarchies. Some said that this organizational model would be undemocratic since it may move some people out of the decision making process. Others added that this “new oligopoly” would dappen the morale of peace folks who were already movement participants. Finally, these dissenters argued that the abandonment of

“participatory democracy” would hinder recruiting since future converts would be

“treated like pawns” as they were assigned into laborious and boring jobs.

After a cankerous debate, and several tense votes, the majority decided to formalize the arrangements. In effect, the group decided to create a two-tiered power structure. On the top rested the steering committee. The steering committee was supposed to oversee the general running of the SDCPME. This mandate was officially achieved by surveillance mechanisms and the steering committee’s right to veto the actions of other subcommittees (steering committee members belonged to each of

SDCPME’s subcommittees but vetoed few actions). Below this central steering committee rested a layer of subcommittees that constructed and carried out policies. This second wedge of committees were constructed around particular assignments such as media relations, event safety, outreach, information gathering, legal aid, or the acquisition of porta-potties. In theory, this fragmentation of members into separate teams was

58 supposed to improve specialized skills and make volunteers accountable to their subcommittee colleagues.

After these organizational boundaries were set, the various subcommittees implemented their assorted plans. For example, the outreach subcommittee sponsored many publicity events. In some cases, they held a “rap” concert and ordained a speakers bureau. Naturally, the November and December lectures of Barbara Ehrenreich and

Michael Parenti were supplemented with pleas to join the SDCPME.

Throughout November, the SDCPME held no protests. In lacking a public presence in November, the December 2 meeting for new organizers became a movement watershed. With 150 volunteers at this "public" organizational meeting, the SDCPME began a serious discussion on the nuances of protest planning. Initially the group talked about movement goals. As expected, the original consensus of goals broke down. The presence of new members brought a heterogeneous mixture of conflicting goals. On the incremental side, some people said the movement should plead for increased diplomatic efforts. Some of these diplomatic solutions were “extending the deadline for war” or asking the president to “keep the embargo, but forgo a ground war.” Other folks took different variants of this “realist position” of foreign affairs. This caveat, which believed in the just war principle, suggests that Americans should fight in the “good wars” and object “to bad wars.” As one proponent suggested “I’m for good wars that support the ideals of democracy, but this war is not about democracy.” Conversely, a large percentage of the gathering sneered at such claims. Instead, many pacifists objected to all military interventions and suggested that their colleagues had internalized numerous

59 “pax-americana” premises. Thus, comments such as “the US should stop being the world’s rent a cop” and “remove all U.S. troops form the Middle East” became the rally call for the left flank of this meeting. A third set of commentators focused on the effects of militarism in the domestic realm. In connecting military procurements with fiscal woes, many in the crowd wanted to drastically cut the military budget while a few called for the “spending more on education by eliminating the US military.”

After two-hours of deliberation, meeting facilitator Pat Gardener outlined the assorted goals on a spare chalkboard. Once the positions were specified, the crowd took a vote. In a lopsided tally, they approved the strongest antimilitaristic positions. That is, the group made the broad pledge to oppose any forms of US military actions in the Gulf area. Hence, the group wanted the embargo lifted, a permanent cease fire, and the withdrawal of all US troops from Middle Eastern military bases and ports.

With the closure of the “purpose” debate, the discussion tumed to tactical matters.

In a round of relatively cordial conversations, the group decided to sponsor an endless litany of Sunday vigils. These nonviolent vigils were to be held in the public setting of

Balboa Park (a geographically centralized park which houses the Zoo, gardens, and museums). In creating reoccurring events in a well-known venue, the SDCPME wanted to give the impression of an expanding antiwar movement. Furthermore, the activists hoped that the activism garnered by these protests would coalesce into a giant protest on the official eve of war (the United Nations had established the January 15 commencement of war against Iraq).

60 As organizational changes brewed at SDCPME, the first campus protests

emerged. For example, the University of San Diego (USD), a Catholic liberal-arts

college, held the first campus protest in San Diego. Under the tutelage of Law Professor

Robert Simmons, undergraduate students produced a day of song, poetry, and lectures on

December 10. After these antiwar proceedings ended, Santhe Diego Union-Tribune

wrote that 200 students attend the University Against War rally and “on lookers were casually supportive.” Remarkably, our estimates virtually matched as I fbtmd 210 participants at this event. However, this presence of coinciding estimates would not last long. As the students at the University of California San Diego held their first protest on

December 14,1 spotted 30 activists and theUnion-Tribune found this event unworthy of coverage.

Around the same time, the SDCPME initiated their first Sunday vigil (12/9). This original version of a weekly event drew 300 people and was missed by the local paper.

As the Union-Tribune neglected this event, I observed the developing norms of the vigils.

First, activists would meet at the tourist haven called Balboa Park. When mingling at this manicured park of palm trees and green grass, the activists would casually chat, sign petitions and make signs as they anticipated the upcoming vigil.

As the clock approached noon, the "renegade band" would put on their gas masks and start pounding their drums, cow bells, and pots. Drawn by a melody of street instruments, the members of this disorganized crowd would gather around the musicians.

Then using this music as a pace setter, a steering committee member would turn this band

61 into the role of “pied pipers.” That is, a line of activists marched behind the trial blazed

by hippie musicians and steering committee members. Then once the demonstrators were

15000 13500 12000 S 10600 % 9000 1 7500 t 6000 13 4500

Source: "grid/density'’ Instruement

Figure 4.1 : Number of Protesters in San Diego

in a MI stride, the gregarious protesters began chanting "No blood for oil," or "Hell no, we won’t go. We won’t die for Texaco."

After the jaunt finished its loops around fish ponds and water fountains, the protesters would converge at the speaker’s stage. This signified the beginning of endorsed pontifications (orators who were ofiRcially given the mike by the speaker’s subcommittee). After twenty minutes of polemical speeches the donation buckets would

62 be passed around and speakers exhorted the activists to bring more people to the next

event.

When the next vigil occurred on December 16, the crowd had grown to one

thousand individuals. Adding to this larger size was a higher pitch of communal intensity

(i.e., louder noise, people seemed to concentrate more and looked quit serious). More

people had brought their own signs and banners (some of them read “Bury Your Car.”

“Stop the Rambozos,” and “Send Dan Quayle”). Finally, SDCPME speakers asked for

“extra-large” donations since they were planning to place an antiwar addLos in the

Angeles Times. This reference to buying their way into the press was quite revealing

since the San Diego Union-Tribune left this protest out of their printed pages.

The promises to make the next vigil larger were to no avail. Instead the

December 23 vigil shrank to crowd of 800. Noticing this loss in vigil size, SDCPME speakers made urgent pleas to get to "get the word out." They told the faithful to do whatever they could: inundate the press with letters; speak up at their churches; tell educators to remove pro war memorabilia; and talk with neighbors. Another speaker tried to lift the mood of the crowd by bragging that the national petition drives had collected more than one million antiwar signatures. Adding to this size let down in this, this pre-christmas vigil was the first engagement with counter-protestors who carried signs such as “Nuke Iraq” and “Love it or leave.”

Although the crowd was smaller, the coalition got the victoiy of newspaper coverage. However this accomplishment was sullied by the story which minimized the political importance of the vigil. The Union-Tribune article, which estimated the crowd

63 at 500, sounded as if the reporter watched a playful Marti Gra. In doing so, the article

fixated on the colorful feathers of a Native American peace dancer, the activist who

brought two dogs to the vigil, and the signs which had a Christmas messages (i.e., "Peace on Earth” and “Bring the Troops Home for the Holidays”). Adding to the five paragraphs on activist wardrobes was the eight word sentence on the reason for protesting. Hence, the Union-Tribune’s crude representation simplified the goals of the mobilization by focusing on clothes and implying that there was only one reason to be against the war.

On the last day of December, the coalition held its next vigil. This vigil was remarkably uneventful. People walked circles around the park’s central fountain and some un-inspirational speeches were made. Most of the protesters were familiar faces and the energy level for the collective seemed listless. At an intuitional level the crowd seemed tired. In the end, the grid suggested that almost 900 appeared at this vigil.

However, none of the attendees were reporters and the protest never made its way into the paper.

As the UN’s deadline moved closer, the scope of the vigils was recasted. The

January 6 vigil saw its ranks swell to 2,000 participants. Furthermore, this influx brought a wider range of participants. On an organizational level, the coalition added new groups since several noncommittal organizations reversed their official positions (37 groups were official SDCPME members by the beginning of January). For example, a contingency from NARAL openly joined the march and a wing from Queer Nation marched down the street chanting “we’re here, we’re queer, and we want to stop this war machine.” On an individual level, many unaffiliated activists attended an antiwar protest for the first time.

64 This expansion created some reactions by a previously unresponsive San Diego elite. On one hand, some local politicians condoned the antiwar movement. Several

“liberal Democrats” sent the SDCPME letters of support while city-councilman [sic] Les

Williams (D) and Congressional candidate Dan Kripke (D) talked at the January 6 protest.' On other hand, the expanding coalition caught the ire of a local media pundit.

That is, a conservative radio personality told “real Americans” to disrupt these unpatriotic protests. So a gang of about fifty flag waving ditto-heads planted themselves in the middle of the protest and started yelling the epithets “die you faggot commies” and “were going to kill your traitor asses.”

This protest resulted in a briefUnion-Tribune blurb. This two-sentence memo acknowledged the presence of 500 demonstrators. However, that was the full extent of precise information. That is, the rest of the terse stanzas were useless since they failed to mention any information on activist actions.

A few days after the SDCPME’s largest vigil, the students at the University of

California San Diego created another significant demonstration. After bringing 2,000 students and professors to the Nelson Mandela library, the partition went to the

Mandeville Auditorium for a teach-in. In the fashion of the Berkeley free speech movement, the speakers were a potpourri of prepared and spontaneous orators. The twenty-six who took the mike showed a diverse range of topics and rhetorical styles.

At the same time, some Democratic Congresspeople were challenging Bush’s war plans by holding Senatorial hearings and forcing a war vote.

65 Audiences heard an energetic rant on the “oppressive system” right after the highbrow

treatise by a pedantic Economics professor.

As the teach-in transpired, a group of six students carried lumber and nails to the

undergraduate library. Acting like young carpenters, this section of UCSD students went on to build a little shant>' town on the steps of the library. With banners that read “You bomb Baghdad, we occupy the library” and “Here to the end,” this outfit of students began an illegal sleep-in on campus property. While campus police asked them to clear a path to the library door, the university tacitly let this shanty town exist (janitors nor police never tore it down). In the end, this group would have enough stamina to maintain this shanty town throughout the entire Winter. Moreover, in early January, the crowd at the sleep-in grew to over one hundred a night.

The Union-Tribune neglected this element of antiwar carpentry. Instead, the paper focused on the 500 people who attended this so called “retro-sixties” teach-in. The opening sentences proclaimed;

Bob Dylan wasn’t there, but a hard rain fell. In a throwback to the campus protests that signaled a nation divided by war two decades ago, hundreds of UC San Diego students marched through steady showers to rally against American military action in the Persian Gulf War.

In subsequent paragraphs Tribune writer John Wilkens wrote on the abundance of sandals and headbands in the crowd. Thus, this article replicated earlier reports since it focused on protester apparels and slighted the principles that instigated the protest.

While the UCSD students reinvigorated the “teach-in,” the SDCPME was engaged in some diligent organizing. In anticipating an imminent war, every

66 subcommittee was concenttating in recruiting and publicity. From January 8 to January

14 the twelve person outreach subcommittee distributed over 100,000 leaflets at twenty- five supermarkets (one the energetic fellow used his roller blades to place over 3,000 fliers on car windshields). Concurrently, the media committee was trying to procure firee air time. This effort took countless approaches. In one case, an SDCPME spokesperson was clever enough to become a guest speaker on a local newscast. In another case, a thirty-year-old secretary put on her Sunday school dress and entered a talk show audience.

Then once the formally invited ex-generals began their spiels, she rushed the stage and debated these retired commanders.

Other publicity efforts took calmer approaches. In using logical arguments the letter writing subcommittee besieged theUnion-Tribune with letters to the editor (five of the 72 subcommittee letters were published in the Union-Tribune). In using financial arguments some of SDCPME’s endorsing organizations bought their way into the mass media. The senior citizen group the Gray Panthers purchased a half-page ad Santhe

Diego Union-Tribune, the environmental group Greenpeace placed an antiwar ad in the

San Diego Reader, and the SDCPME obtained a full page advertisement in Losthe

Angeles Times{\h& ads cost more than $4,000 in total).

All of this preparation bolstered the coalition’s momentum. The January 13 vigil created another expansive protest of 2,500 participants. In addition to this larger size, the vigil seemed to have a more heterogeneous nature. Quite simply, this vigil showed greater racial diversity as more Latinos and Afiican-Americans filled the crowd. Also, the age spectrum shifted as more high school students and senior citizens marched against

67 the war. Finally, the vigil was greeted by a much greater police presence. Over three

hundred cops were either strolling around the participants, viewing from roof tops, or

putting video recorders in protestor faces.

The Union-Tribune's account of this vigil was remarkably well handled.

Although their estimate of 1,000 participants undercounted my grid by 1,500 individuals,

the writers gave extended quotations to two steering committee members and gave nuanced descriptions of the vigil dynamics. For example, the writer noted that antiwar protesters carried home made signs while the pro war demonstrators touted mass- produced signs that were furnished by corporate sponsors.

As the war’s deadline became imminent, the coalition’s slow and gradual increase was truncated. On January 14, the night before the bombing was suppose to start, the downtown protest drew 10,890 protesters (grid count). This enormous turnout, which quadrupled the coalition’s previous high, seemed to astonish many observers. In fact, one steering committee member remarked “’I didn’t think we could bring so many people out here” and a thirty-year police officer claimed that “this is the biggest protest I ever saw.”^

When listening to music by Country Joe, the crowd seemed to take an apprehensive tone. The entire night of protest had an anguished tone. All of the speakers conveyed a sense of dread. One Vietnam veteran foreshadowed great pain as he recalled his ghastly encounters in Southeastern Asia. Another orator slowly read the names of U.S. soldiers who had died during the Gulf War buildup. Then in a sorrowful

Unfortunatelythe union-Tribune does not maintain a complete archive so a long term comparison is impossible.

68 reaction, the crowd simultaneously echoed the names of the dead back to the speaker.

The final speaker spoke of upcoming events. In a bit of aggressive bravado, he

announced that a “vigorous campaign of protests” would erupt on the first night of

bombing. He concluded his fiery speech with the veiled warning of “as the war escalates

so might our tactics.”

In an interesting twist, theUnion-Tribune's estimate almost matched the grid count (10,890 to 10,000). Coming with this similar estimate was a moderately nuanced story. In creating a review of protester backgrounds, reporter Sharon Jones did not rely on vague and indiscriminate descriptions of protesters. Rather, the author depicted the diverse crowd by writing

Military families, college students, north county retirees, urban professionals, ethnic activists and others crowded in the Federal Building . . . They wore business suites, tie-dyed T-shirts, military uniforms and plaid flannel shirts. They pushed baby strollers and carried briefcases. Some walked with crutches; some road skateboards.

Supplementing this delineation of backgrounds was an inclusion of 11 activist quotes.

The quotes were arranged in a manner which listed the numerous reasons to be against the war.

On January 17, the war with Iraq began. As bombs fell on Baghdad, the

SDCPME held an impromptu “emergency protest.” As promised, the crowd of 4,500 did not retain a polite and obedient demeanor. Instead, protesters showed some contentious gestures. With an "open-mike" and “ffee-speech” policy, the SDCPME let anybody take center stage. This let the most angry and indignant protesters speak in an uncensored

69 manner. Subsequently, these speeches did not reiterate the same diplomatic and

conciliatory messages of earlier protesters. In fact, the new Line of speakers threatened to

“destroy capitalism,” “smash the imperialist state,” and “fuck-up the system.”

This new “radicalism” was not confined to the words of protesters. In a unique

move, a splinter group rejected the demands of the police and began a “permit-less”

march through the streets of San Diego. During a cat and mouse game of tag, officers in

“riot gear” followed this crowd around the pristine downtown streets of San Diego. This

dance was slow and deliberate until the police responded to the chants: “Hit um were it

hurts, take away the freeway.” Being in Southern California, the police quickly

blockaded freeway on-ramps. Ironically, this police action funneled protesters into San

Diego’s “premiere shopping strip.” With this new path, the marchers trounced through

an upscale mall. Needless to say, the sound of antiwar chants bouncing off Neiman

Marcus billboards had a surreal flare.

While neglecting these dramatic scenes, theUnion-Tribune dedicated a bland sentence to this protest (i.e., “About 3,000 protestors briefly blocked downtown streets last night”). In failing to identify the “radicalized” and antagonistic nature of this affair, the text limits the possible interpretations of such an event. That is, the sanitized version of the protest leaves the impression of a drab and uninspiring protest. And in a world of entertainment crazed Americans, a so-called “dull event” may be considered too trivial to notice (i.e., if the news lacks titillating hooks than the news does not warrant attention)."*

The spectacle of police violence in the 1968 Democratic convention caught the attention of reporters and many US citizens. Consequently, the recognition of state repression can

70 This upsurge in activism transcended the world of SDCPME activities. The bombing of Iraq triggered some impromptu protests in public schools. In some cases, students stomped out of their high school and junior high classes. In other cases, principals gave students the permission to protest. In all cases, the day of January 17 saw around 1,100 protesters in cafeterias, football fields, and school parking lots. Moreover, with these protests materializing in diverse geographical locales, students from different races and social classes protested in this segregated town (i.e., both affluent “white-flight schools” and cash starved inner city schools had protests).

While the Coalition and juvenile groups expanded during the initial days of war, the collegiate scene went in various directions. The weekly protests at San Diego State

University seemed to stagnate. Exhibiting a clear case of organizational fatigue, a set of

SDSU protests could not surpass the 300 person mark (January 17 and 28). Furthermore, the SDSU Coalition for Peace was in such disarray that it had lost over two-thirds of its

“governing body” by the end of January (many of the so-called leaders quite attending meetings or returning phone calls aher the war started).

On the other side of town, the students at the University of California San Diego

(UCSD) created two large mid-January protests. On January 16, 1,000 students met the

Nelson Mandella Library{Tribune put the number at 600). This crowd was somewhat subdued as they calmly listened to organizers read their demands. However, these college protesters showed a decidedly different demeanor at a January 21 protest. As an

800-person throng, the UCSD students surrounded the local Chancellor’s office. When drive the protest cycle in many directions (see Opp and Roehl, 1990 or Francisco, 1995).

71 denouncing ‘imperialism’ through their bullhorns, a dozen students staged a die-in the

UCSD administration offices. Pretending to be casualties in black body bags, these

protesters blocked the standard paths to the school’s president and admission offices.

This two-hour standoff lasted until some campus police escorted them to retention cells.

However, those participants who were not arrested had enough stamina to keep their

drums pounding until the sunrise of January 22.

In a unique development, I was unable to attend to high school protests which the

Union-Tribune decided to cover. However, this improved selectivity may be a bit suspect

since it had a bit of an alarmist zeal as it warned of “students who disobeyed their

teachers.” Furthermore this coverage on young protesters who “marred the campuses”

could have created the erroneous view that the Gulf War protests were a result of teen-age

rebellion against authority figures (i.e., grievances are not legitimate since protesters are

wayward adolescents).

By January 20, the Coalition repeated its weekly vigil. Being the first vigil of

ongoing war, the signs and statements of protesters were slightly modified. As the bombing waged on, activists called for an ending of the air war. Many of these arguments revolved around the death of Iraqi citizens. Furthermore, these comments highlighted the negative facets of a “pool system” which created a highly censored media.

One speaker recalled the surrealistic idea of outlawing the transmission of dead peoples he said: “If you watched this war on TV, you would see reporters glorifying US weapons.

They will call them patriots, and claimed that they hit their targets every time. But on the other hand, you will never see unfortunate folks who happen to get blown up when tlie

72 bomb hits it mark.” Other people echoed such sentiments by carrying signs that read

“Collateral Damage= Dead People” and “Smart bombs kill.”

As the vigil proceeded, some counter-protesters decided that their derogatory comments needed some behavioral reinforcements. After screaming at the antiwar gathering for thirty minutes, two counter protesters displayed some aluminum baseball bats as they ventured into the crowd. While in the middle of the crowd, they shocked onlookers as they started slugging the backs of antiwar individuals. Within a few seconds, several antiwar activists subdued these bullies. Remarkably, even with more than fifty law enforcers on the protest perimeter, it still took the police ten minutes to walk over to this fracas.

Before this little bout, my grid system estimated the crowd at around 2,500 participants. Thus, 1 saw the crowd at about the same level as the January 13 vigil. To my surprise, the Union-Tribune made a drastic inversion in its estimating practices. It suggested that 5,000 people attended the protest. Remarkably, this was the first case in which the newspaper had a higher estimate than the grid. Moreover, this aberration was not a small reversal since the Union-Tribune doubled my size estimate as it added 2,500 participants.

However this size overestimation did not show a total transformation in reporting frames (i.e., antiwar protesters were not transformed into a “good citizen” caricature). In the article which combined images of antiwar and pro war demonstrations, the author felt inclined to write 14 paragraphs on the 400 person pro war protest, while the antiwar demonstration with 5,000 protesters was confined to seven paragraphs. Additionally,

73 prowar participants were given ten quotes while the antiwar demonstrators had five quotes (three protesters and two police officers gave their impressions of the antiwar protest).

In spite of this disproportionate distribution of space, the article implied that both groups were comprised of idiots and heros. As several of the pro war demonstrators were called respectable citizens, others were shown as xénophobes (i.e.. one stanza read “Bob

Zimmerman wore an ‘I’d fly 7,000 miles to smoke a camel’ T-shirt depicting warplanes dive-bombing an Arab riding a camel” ). Also, some of the antiwar protesters were depicted as flaky artists and dope smokers while other protesters were shown as caring wives who had military husbands.

The January 27 protest was a typical vigil event. Although there was a slightly smaller crowd of 1,800, the proceedings were quite ordinary. In the hour before the vigil began, loud speakers bellowed Phil Oaks and Mid-Night Oil songs (I was later told that this music was played at high decimals to drown out the chants of counter-protestors).

Then the march went as planned. Finally, the speeches generally rehashed the same ideas of earlier events. Nevertheless, the last speaker climatically addressed the consequences of an upcoming ground war. In giving an ominous forecast, the messenger anticipated a death toll of over 200,000 Americans and 300,000 Iraqis. With these foreboding predictions, the speaker pleaded for a surge of activism that would obstruct the future ground war.

The Union-Tribune found this vigil hardly newsworthy. In the last page of the community section, a two-paragraph article suggested that the 250 people converged on

74 Balboa Park. Filling out their scanty description was the brief reference of “No outburst of violence occurred.” Hence, this inadequate story linked spurious accusations of activist violence with an undercount of 1,560 activists.

The next vigil was not a solemn encounter. With the war going into its third week, the February 3 crowd of around 1,500 activists showed a high sense of impatience.

Many of the activists were frustrated as they felt that the antiwar movement was growing politically irrelevant. For example, several activists reluctantly told me that “Bush -won’t give into us” and “We are trying to do the impossible” (Swank 1993/94,42).

This sense of movement impotence changed the vigil’s dynamics. For instance, two schedule speakers skipped their speaking engagements (one told me that his words would not stop the war, so he did not want to talk to the crowd). With these cancellations came a shorter stint of speeches and a longer vigil march. However, the length of the march was not the only atypical aspect of this march.

Many of SDCPME’s dissenting voices decided it was time to change the march’s attitude. In bringing their own microphones and signs, a clan of eight to ten activists began saying “were tired of this marching in circles crap.” In using their megaphones with great efficiency, these activists went on to say:

It is time to bring it to the man. We have to get into the systems’s face and fuck it up... Let’s go the jail and bum it down. Let’s go to the fireeways; and block the damn road. Let’s go the military base and rip down the buildings.

75 As these fellows spoke, some participants diverted their attention toward these insurgents.

Within ten minutes, these rebels had stolen the show and had more than half of the crowd fixated on their provocative spiels.

In tiring of the SDCPME’s official itinerary, this crowd of eight men said ‘"follow us.” Then to the dismay of SDCPME officials, this invitation was accepted and about

500 people left the SDCPME event and started marching with these “militant” fellows.

As this makeshift throng was chanting “bum it down,” they illegally seized a four-lane street. With cars slamming on their breaks, the crowd departed for downtown San Diego.

Within a few seconds this group was surrounded by a large number of police officers who knew that an interstate on-ramp was simply three blocks away. Nonetheless, when this splinter group came close to the freeway, it was discovered that these revolutionary slogans were more posture than actual commitment. In the end, this splinter group dispersed within half-an-hour as individuals meandered their way back to the larger

SDCPME protest.

The Union-Tribune neglected these dramatic aspects of the protest. Instead of focusing on “spectacle,” the paper decided to put a personal spin on the story. In traditional fashion, the descriptions of protesters began with a statement on their clothes:

In his crisp gray suit and silk tie, Ken Blalock looked like he was about to enter a corporation board room instead of march for peace . .. Lee is a 26-year-old Marine lance corporal who is decked out in formal military dress.

Then the article went onto to summarize the lives of both protesters. The author noted that Ken and Lee are Republicans who supported the Vietnamese War. Then the article

76 gave some reasons on why they had a conversion on this war: “I’m not antiwar, I supported the initial deployment because there are times when you have to protect your economic interests. But when Bush started escalating it, it was for his own agenda. I believe it’s to cover his poor performance on the economy.” After focusing on these so- called representatives of 1990's protesters, the article suggested that 1,000 individuals attended this vigil.

As the SDCPME lost control of its protest, the region saw the emergence of several unaffiliated demonstrations. During the early weeks of February, several college campuses produced some small “wildcat” protests. On February 6, the students at the

University of San Diego created a protest of around 100 protesters. One day later, the students at San Diego State University and University of California San Diego held their own protests. With signs that read “money for books, not for bombs” about 400 students held a silent vigil in front of SDSU’s library, while about 500 students created a mock funeral at UCSD. Finally on February 2, a group of 100 students from three Northern San

Diego High Schools held a protest on a deserted soccer field.

During the rest of February, the SDCPME began slowly unraveling. There was greater level of accusatory comments after the insurgent group broke away from the

SDCPME demonstration. Some steering committee members started publicly blaming coalitional failures on their counterparts and some members at-large went on long tirades against the steering committee and the whole SDCPME. Furthermore, the coalition saw a massive defection of volunteers. More specifically, the flight of hard working activists

77 was not minor since the middle of February had seen the steering committee lose one-

third of its members and most of the other committees were defunct by Valentines Day.

Paralleling this loss of labor was the shrinking size of vigils. With the contraction at hand, the February 10 vigil drew only 640 activists (the smallest vigil since early

December). As the exodus occurred, some qualities of prewar vigils resurged. The crowd returned to an older constituency as the proportion of high scale and college students dwindled. Also, the vigil seemed to reclaim its primary-group nature. That is, people acted as if they personally knew each other as they displayed fnendship gestures more frequently (smiles and “his” were displayed more often and one protester personally thanked everybody for attending the vigil).

The Union-Tribune's also pegged about 600 people at this vigil. Additionally, this article claimed that the coalition’s remained diverse in nature. TheUnion-Tribune wrote: “demonstrators from a rainbow of groups, including the Church of the Brethren and the Gray Panthers, marched behind a giant peace now banner.” Finally, the article quoted some of the funnier sections of the comedy skit that was produced by the

Committee to Intervene Anywhere.

SDCPME’s constriction continued into the February 17 vigil. This time, only

360 people attended the vigil. In trying to excite the spirits of this sparse crowd, the steering committee member’s abandoned the idea of having speeches. Instead, they asked local folk singers to play their guitars and induce musical camaraderie. While this was perceived to be a bit campy to many of the protesters, the act of harmonizing voices

78 seemed to build solidarity among the participants. Then after the vocal experience finished, the only official speech reminded people of the Coalition’s upcoming protests.

As March loomed closer, the SDCPME made a last ditch recruitment drive.

Trying to generate an activist upsurge, the SDCPME put its dwindling resources into the pre-invasion demonstration. With cash reserves at a low point, the coalition could not buy any space in the mass media. Moreover, SDCPME could only afford the distribution of 10,000 filers. Thus, the group tried to advertise their protest through “celebrity power.” That is, they convinced several television stars and famous scholars to speak on behalf of the movement (i.e., communications professor Herb Schiller and a

Thirtysomeching actor hit the pavement for the coalition).

The diligent work of twenty organizers had some concrete effects. The coalition temporarily reversed its downward spiral as 1,000 people attended the February 23 demonstration (theUnion-Tribune pegged the crowd at 400). But, this slight reversal did not remove the melancholy mood of the coalition. Instead, the participants at this demonstration seemed exhausted and resigned to apparent failure. Many of the activists spoke of the inevitable movement toward a land war and their growing isolation firom the general US populace (i.e., a member of the education subcommittee told me “Most people think the war is going great and hate us ‘peace-nicks’ who oppose these moments of national glory”).

After this demonstration, the allied forces made their quick romp through Kuwait.

In response to the land invasion, the steering committee convened a general meeting. At this meeting, some thirty wary activists spoke of their emotional fatigue. Then after the

79 airing of such sentiments, one member proposed to dissolve the coalition. Others

seconded the motion, but the general meeting decided to have one last vigil. The march

was supposed to be a ceremonial death march that countered the gingoism of few dead in

Kuwait (at the time, most media sources spoke of only US causalities and forgot to

mention that an estimated 100,000 Iraqis had perished during the bombing of Iraq).

As the death march proceeded, 300 mourners silently carried four coffins to the

local war museum. Once in front on the war shrine, clerics from Christian, Muslim, and

Jewish communities gave short funeral eulogies. Then the protest disbanded and the coalition quit protesting the war.

The Union-Tribune claimed that there were around 300 people at this ceremony.

In a grossly slanted story, the paper allotted one quote to an activist. Conversely, the political scientist who never attended a protest was given four quotations. Lacking any empirical knowledge, the UCSD professor closed theTribune's reporting with the statements of: “No aggressor can be more despicable than Hussein, no cause can be more just, no victory can be more certain.”

4.2 Analyzing the Patterned Accounts of the Protest Cycle

Until this segment, this chapter has followed an inductive approach. The reader has listened to the accounts of two informants. These accounts have addressed the minute details from each protest. Because of an emphasis on size matters, these descriptions have followed the chronological escapades of this local mobilization. In ceasing this mode, the remainder of the chapter will inspect the general quality of both

80 accounts. In doing so, the questions of selectivity and estimator bias will be the cornerstone of this analysis.

In looking for patterns of coverage, the analysis must include all of the pertinent estimates. In creating such an inventory. Table 4.1 reiterates the appraisals of 33 protests.

In listing all of these assessments the selectivity propensities become clearly visible.

This table of 33 protests offers some revealing insights. Interestingly, the table shows that both sources covered a majority of these 33 protests. Nevertheless, the sources did not cultivate the same breadth of coverage. TheUnion-Tribune wrote on 18 of the 33 (55%) protests while I observed 29 of the 33 protests (88%). In fact this was not only a cosmetic difference since the discrepancy was large enough to be considered statistically significant at .05 alpha. That is, tlie Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) had a F- ratio of 7.259 at a probability of .011.

Adding to these different patterns of selection was in interesting temporal relationship. The paper concentrated on January protests as it neglected the protests on each end of the protest cycle. For example, theUnion-Tribune covered only three of the nine 1990 protests and missed four February protests. Thus, theUnion-Tribune lessened the length of mobilization by neglecting a large proportion of the early and late protests.

Conversely, the researcher’s approach was not infallible. All intentions aside, I missed four protests. However, these omissions did not follow the same structure as the

Tribune’’s errors. Rather than dismissing earlier or later protests, my body rejected the

81 Date Researcher San Diego Union Tribune

10-20-90 410 200 12-2-90 150 — 12-9-90 300 — 12-10-90 210 200 12-14-90 30 — 12-16-90 1.000 — 12-23-90 800 500 12-30-90 870 — 1-6-91 2.020 500 1-9-91 2.000 — 1-10-91 200 — 1-13-91 2,540 1.000 1-14-91 10.890 10.000 1-16-91 4.520 3.000 1-16-91 1.000 600 1-17-91 — 300 1-17-91 — 200 1-17-91 — 300 1-17-91 — 100 1-17-91 300 — 1-20-91 2520 5.000 1-21-91 1.000 — l-ZT-ll 1.810 250 1-28-91 80 — 2-2-91 100 —

2-3-91 1.510 1.000

2-3-91 — 100 2-7-91 400 —

2-7-91 500 —

2-10-91 640 600

2-17-91 350 —

2-23-91 1.000 400

3-3-91 300 300

Entire Mobilization 37.450 24.550

Table 4.1: Estimates For San Diego Protests

82 possibility of attending simultaneous protests. Thus, I missed a couple of protests that

happened on the most active day of protest (January 17).

Confounding these omission patterns is the issue of size discrepancies. As the

table indicates, the sources did not agree on the entire size of the mobilization. My grid

put around 37,450 protesters in the San Diego scene. Conversely, theSan Diego Union-

Tribune found 24,550 protesters (theUnion-Tribune numbers were at 65% of the grid’s

total tally). Hence, the discrepancy was large enough to see about one-third of the grid’s

protesters disappear from the Union-Tribune’s story lines.

These discrepancies can be attributed to the differing crowd counts of the

individual protests. When doing comparisons of the 14 “joint estimates,” one notes the

rarity of equivalent estimates. In fact, only four days yielded estimates that showed

somewhat similar proportions (December 10, January 14, February 10, and March 3).

However, the absence of similarities did not indicate an absence of estimating tendencies.

As predicted, theTribune routinely provided lower crowd counts than the grid. Only once did we find a higher newspaper count (January 20). Instead,Tribune the provided smaller estimates for twelve of the fourteen “joint estimates” (86%). Hence, the paper routinely provided the lower version of the two estimates of the same event.

However, the simple conclusion that paper provided lower estimates would be an understatement. TheTribune not only provided lower counts, it habitually dispensed much smaller crowd counts. There were six occasions in which the paper undercounted the grid by at least 500 people (43% of all joint counts). More remarkably, the table exhibits four cases in which the paper chopped of 1,500 or more participants (January 6,

83 January 13, January 16, and January 27). Finally, the grid’s estimates were at twice as

large as paper estimates on four dates (October 20, January 6, January 13, January 27, and

February 23).

In putting this chapter into perspective, we might see several conclusions. On the

bright side, the Union-Tribune did not fare as badly as some critics might expect. That is,

the paper was not totally remissive as it covered half of the local protests. On the other

hand, the reliability of the paper’s data remains suspect since an adequate research

instrument should not miss half of the actual protests. Furthermore, the paper gives false impressions on vital issues. The Tribune's inclinations toward undercounts are a severe case of measurement errors. Moreover, this is not a case of random mis-measurements since the prevalence of underestimates creates a systematic distortion of the protest cycle.

Adding to these numerical perversions is a false temporal sketch. In effect, the researcher who uses the Union-Tribune would assume that the protests briefly flourished around the middle January. Subsequently, this tainted data could lead to the misguided applications of certain "movement emergence” theories. That is, the newspapers would substantiate Walsh’s "suddenly imposed grievance” theory (that is, protests are sometimes emotive reactions to unanticipated problems). However, the grid suggests that organizational structures and protests predated the war, hence McAdam’s "political process” model would be more germane (i.e., protest cycles start on the indigenous resources of challengers and transforms into interactions between targets, challengers, and third parties).

84 CHAPTERS

America’s Antiwar Mobilization: Watching the Ebbs and Flows of Protests

‘We are pretty small, but the attempt is all we have’' — a protester from Pittsburgh

‘Everybody I know is against this war” — a social worker from Kansas City

This chapter leaves the confines of San Diego and turns to the national mobilization. Although this section addresses the familiar questions of size and movement growth, it utilizes different methodological practices. Due to logistical constraints, 1 have abandoned the use of first-hand observations (a person cannot be in two places at once). With this lack of researcher grid counts, all of the forthcoming information comes from the printed pages of various news sources{Atlanta Constitution,

Chicago Tribune, Boston Globe. Denver Post, Guardian, Houston Post, Los Angeles

Times, Louiseville Courier Journal, New York Times, News Bank, Nuclear Resister,

Philadelphia Enquirer, San Francisco Chronicle, Seattle Times, St. Louis Post Dispatch,

USA Today, Washington Post).

The analysis of these sources will be organized and presented in two chapters.

This chapter will explore the substantive questions of the protest cycle (i.e., the number

85 of protests, the size of protests, the location of protests, and when the protests occurred).

In furnishing an overview of the phenomena itself, source information is integrated into a descriptive narrative. Or in other words, data from the content analysis is condensed and squeezed into a composite index. Then once this topic has been fully elaborated, the next chapter will unravel this aggregated account. In effect, the concerns of

“selectiveness” and “counting” are addressed through the delineation of the different ways of crafting the antiwar storey. Accordingly, the last chapter will elaborate the particularistic styles of coverage which emanate from the separate sources of information.

5.1 A Matter of Size

As noted earlier, this chapter is primarily interested in the number of protesters and the frequency of protests. With that in mind, our sources found 1,225,567 activists at a total of 1,365 protests. Hence, one can conclude that the mobilization had approximately one-million-two-hundred-thousand protesters if these sources made perfect estimates of every protest in the United States. But, this premise of perfect estimates is highly suspect. The impossibility of perusing every US newspaper implies that this figure must be a drastic undercount (i.e., the sample detected only four 4 San Diego protests while the San Diego Union-Tribune covered 18 protests). Moreover, the inclusion of every U.S. paper would not guarantee an adequate portrayal of the movement’s vitality. News services miss numerous protests (the Union-Tribune found only 55% of San Diego’s protests), and papers have been criticized as being biased estimators of size (i.e., only once did theUnion-Tribune offer a higher estimate than the grid). Hence, the savvy researcher will realize that the mobilization had the bare

86 minimum of 1,225,567 protesters and the actual size may be significantly grander. For

example, if the sample maintained the same ratio of my grid to theSan Diego Union-

Tribune(L32), then the actual size of the crowd would be around 1,862,861. However,

this figure is probably an underestimate since my grid and Union-Tribunethe had the

same unit of analysis (San Diego protests), while this cannot be said for the sample (the

papers of thousands of cities were excluded from the sample).

Since mobilizations are loose connections of individual protests, it seems

reasonable to begin with a discussion of specific events. In designating the largest

City Size City Size

Washington ( 1/26) 154.565 Seattle (1/19) 5 J0 0 Portland (I/I 1) 5.000 San Francisco (1/26) 95.000 Chicago (1/14) 5.000 New York (1/14) 5.000 San Francisco (1/19) 49.000 Washington (1/14) 5.000 Washington (1/19) 40.290 Chicopee. MA (1/15) 5.000 Seattle (1/14) 30.000 New York (I/I5) 5.000 Austin, T S ( 1/16) 5.000 Portland (1/12) 14.000 Minneapolis (1/16) 5.000 New York (10/20) 13.000 New York (1/16) 5.000 Boston (12/1) 12.000 Portland (1/16) 5.000 San Diego (1/16) 5.000 Minneapolis (1/13) 10.000 San Francisco (1/16) 5.000 San Francisco (1/15) 10.000 San Antonio ( 1/29) 5.000 San Francisco (1/16) 10.000 Chicago (12/8) 4.500 Portland (1/18) 10.000 Austin (I/I 1) 4.500 Chicago (1/17) 4JOO San Francisco (10/20) 3.000 Washington (1/15) 4200 San Diego (1/14) 8.000 Settle (12/1) 4.000 Denver (1/12) 4.000 New York ( I /I 7) 7.500 Los Angeles (1/13) 4.000 San Francisco (2721 ) 7.000 Milwaukee (1/14) 4.000 Chicago (I/I2) 6.000 Atlanta (1/15) 4.000 San Francisco (1/21) 6.000 Boston (1/15) 4.000 Los Angeles (1/12) 6.000 Cincinnati (1/15) 4.000 Portland (2/16) 6.000 Minneapolis (1/17) 4.000 San Francisco (1/17) 5.700 Los Angeles (1/26) 4.000 Los Angeles (2/1) 5.500 Oakland (2/24) 4.000 New York (2/17) 5.500 San Deign (1/19) 4,000

Table 5.1: The Largest Protests in US Cities

87 protests. Table 5.1 accentuates the existence of 52 large protests (protests were deemed

large if they surpassed 3,999 protesters). Four of the largest protests were the result of

national coalitions (the Coalition Against U.S. Intervention in the Middle East and the

Campaign for Peace in the Middle East). On January 19, the Coalition Against US

Intervention held massive demonstrations on the West and East coasts. In describing the

San Franciscan affair, theSan Francisco Chronicle exclaimed that the presence of almost

50,000 protesters created the “biggest rally since 1971.” Similarly, the Coalition’s 40,000

in Washington led theGuardian to write that the “streets were so jammed, it took people two hours to snake along the half-mile parade route.” However, the scope of these

January 19 protests was eclipsed by the Campaign for Peace protests on the following weekend. On January 26, Washington’s Quad was engulfed by more than 150,000 activists and 90,000 participants assumed a 14-block radius around the San Francisco

Civic Center. Hence, these protests brought immense crowds to the doorsteps of the

Capital and the Bay Area pavilion on successive weekends in late January.

Although the four largest gatherings were of the national sort, some local antiwar groups mustered up some fairly large protests on their own part (conceptually, this point has salience since most people will not travel long distances to protest and movement promoters are usually tied to regional communication networks). One local protest almost reached national dimensions as 30,000 “yuppies and anarchists, toddlers and elderly, Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, and Jews” filled a four-lane thorough-way in

Seattle. Conversely, the rest of the pronounced demonstrations never duplicated such

88 hefty quantities. Three protests drew well over 10,000 adherents. On one date, 14,000 protesters “clogged the adjoining streets of Portland’s Pioneer Park” (1/12), while another date saw a “six block” crowd of Laborers, Veterans, Seniors, and Palestinians make up a crowd of 13,000 Manhattan protesters (10/20). Similarly, 12,000 New Englanders overtook Boston Commons in early December.

In distilling the entire table, four protests drew ten thousand participants (i.e., ten thousand individuals filled up the University of Miimesota’s parking lot and another

10.000 encircled the San Francisco Federal Building), and eleven protests netted between

8.000 and 5,500 protesters (i.e., 6,000 Los Angilitos tried to speak to Representative Dick

Doraan before the January war authorization vote and 6,000 Chicagoans stopped traffic in the financial loop district). Finally, there were a litany of 5,000 to 4,000 person protests

(n=29). A few of these protests became rambunctious exchanges ( i.e., the 5,000 participants who blocked Chicopee’s Air force base or some of the Cincinnatians who slung back the rocks that were hurled by counter-protesters). However, most of these four thousand person protests were filled with marchers who broke no laws. Some of these subdued protests tried to beseech action by so-called “liberal” politicians (i.e., the

4.000 University of Texas students who tried to speak to Governor Ann Richards) while others tried to present serene and peaceful messages. For example, Afiican-American preachers read antiwar scriptures to the 5,000 who had met near Martin Luthem King’s grave sight, and 5,000 Coloradans sang “peace, love, and harmony” songs in Denver.

In looking for tendencies, some patterns emerged. Towns with less than 500,000 inhabitants lacked large protests and certain sections of the country had higher

89 percentages of protests. The majority of the towering protests were housed in West coast and Northeastern metropolitan centers. All prominent Pacific port cities had large protests (San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, Seattle) and the older cities of

Boston, New York, and Washington had imposing protests (conversely, the East coast centers of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore were missing). Next, many Great

Lakes’ cities made the list (Minneapolis, Milwaukee, Chicago, Cincinnati) while others were absent (i.e., Cleveland, Columbus, Detroit). Finally, only a few Southern municipalities were represented. Two Texas locales made this collection (Austin, and San

Antonio) and one “new South” conglomerate was recognized (Atlanta).

The extent of mid-size protests is represented in Table 5.2. This profile

Size Size

3.000 to 3.909 2.000 to 2.999 Berkeley (2) Los Angeles (5) Los Angles (2) Seattle (4) New York (2) Boston (2) San Jose. CA (2) Des Moines. lA (2) Santa Barbara. CA (2) Madison, W[ (2) Santa Cruz (2) Montpelier. VT (2)

Atlanta. New York (2) Bellingham. WA Ann Arbor, Ml Boulder. CO Berkeley. CA Boston Bloomington, IN Cincinnati Columbus, OH Denver Denver Milwaukee Eugene, OR

Reno. NV Houston Philadelphia Missoula. Montana San Diego Oakland San Jose Olympia, WA Sl Louis Philadelphia Washington. DC San Diego San Francisco

Table 5.2:Mid-Size Protests

90 recognizes 23 protests in the 3,000 to 4,000 person range. In contrast to the table on the

largest protests, this list has a wider scattering of vicinities (5.1 vs. 5.2). With an

inclusion of cities such as Bellingham, Berkely, Boulder, Cincinatti, Denver, Milwaukee,

Reno, Philadelphia, Santa Cruz, and St. Louis, it becomes apparent that II of the 50

states had 3,000 person assemblies. Adding to the greater geographical breadth was a

new equity between the extent of college and community events (e.g., 12 college protests

and 11 community events). Thus, unlike the Vietnamese war, an analysis must meander

down to the mid-size protests before they find a preponderance of youth driven protests

(or, this campaign did not spring from the so-called “politically correct” halls of the

University).

This movement also showed a prolific number of two thousand person protests

(n=35). Obviously, the familiar names of Los Angeles, Seattle, and Boston still inhabit

this batch. However, several new cities moved into this register (i.e.. Des Moines,

Montpelier, Bloomington, Columbus, Eugene, Houston, Missoula, and Olympia). As

like the other size groupings, most of these 2,000 person protests were sponsored by religious, disarmament, civil rights, feminist, and socialist groups instead of college students (most of these protests were created by advocacy groups such as the American

Friends Service Committee, Colored Women Against War, the Democratic Socialists of

America, and the Mobilization for Survival).

91 5.2 The Protest Cvcle

The deliberation on size cannot end at size alone. While it generates some germane information, this decontextualized discussion implies that protests are freestanding entities which lay outside of historical milieus (citing numbersminimizes the interplay between public sentiments, antiwar actions, and the maneuvers of political opponents). To counteract such impressions, this section will place size estimates within their appropriate chronological and socio-political settings. Thus, the rest of this chapter will discuss the mobilization’s formation, growth, and decline in the light of the impinging domestic scene.

On August 2 Iraq invaded its neighboring country of Kuwait. Minutes after the invasion. President George Bush sent battleships closer to Kuwait and told his generals to devise their war plans. After some dialogue with the United Nations and King Fahd, the

United States gets over 60,000 troops into Saudi Arabia by August 15.

Lacking the organizational capacities of a president, peace and justice groups did not evoke many public protests during this initial deployment (14 protests in September).

But, the occasional protest sometimes grabbed the media’s attention. On September 10, the nation was introduced to the People’s Antiwar Army who removed teenagers from a

Manhattan military store. Later, 30 people joined Beat poet Allen Ginsberg at a “Howl

Against War” (8/26), and 200 University of Colorado students carried “May all cars rest in Peace” banners at their school (8/29).

By early September George Bush had publicly labeled Sadam a “Hitler type” and

Defense Security Cheney claimed that “we are in Saudi to defend and deter.” In

92 response, some peace organizations held press conferences (i.e., spokespeople from the

Catholic Archdiocese, the New Jewish Agenda, and Arab-American Anti-discrimination said “No to War” on September 13) and students at the University of Wisconsin and UC-

Berkeiey held “US out” protests at their campuses (around 500 people attend these

September 22 and 26 events). Finally, a coalition of New York socialists and anarchists held a 2,000 person teach-in at the Cooper Union in Manhattan (9/13). Nevertheless,

September remained a mostly quiet and sluggish month for antiwar advocates.

For the start o f October, public displays of discontent evolved at a somewhat faster pace (28 protests appeared from October 1 to October 18). While a majority of these intermittent protests developed in cities with longstanding “social justice” outfits

(i.e., New York, San Francisco, Milwaukee), a few of these protests appeared in regions that are not known for confrontational politics (i.e., 240 citizens tried to bring body bags into the Sacramento Federal Building, and 30 lowans shouted antiwar slogans at a

Republican fimd raiser in Des Moines).

Also, during this September and October stint, some bands of seasoned activists were assembling the initial vestiges of national antiwar groups. On September 18, more than three hundred socialist, anarchist, and radical minority groups sent representatives to the first meeting of the Coalition Against U.S. Intervention in the Middle East (some of the representatives were from the Socialist Workers Party, Refuse and Resist, Act Up,

American Indian Movement, CP USA, Democratic Socialists of America, Committee for

New Priorities, Love and Rage, International Committee Against Racism, Pink Panthers, and the Peace and Freedom Party). Since these groups generally carried “critical” and

93 “insurgent” agendas, the Coalition constructed a profoundly anti-interventionist platform.

The Coalition was not restricted to stopping a potential war, but it also called for the

“total removal of U.S. Forces in all foreign countries,” “the acceptance of a Palestine

Country,” “the elimination of Oil Cartels with the despotic leaders of Saudi Arabia and

Kuwait,” and “cutting the military budget by three-fourths of its present spending.”

As these militant groups consolidated into a national alliance, some of the more liberal pressure groups slowly created an alternative coalition (the National Campaign for

Peace in the Middle East was brought together by the Mobilization for Survival, the

American Friends Service Committee, SANE/FREEZE, Beyond War, and Greenpeace).'

Since the Campaign was started by citizens who retained some faith in electoral processes, the Campaign originally put most of its resources into Washington lobbying efforts.

With such a tactical choice, the Campaign watched their radical counterparts instigate the first round of coordinated protests. With Campaign in the halls of Congress, the Coalition Against U.S. Intervention in the Middle East convinced a confederation of fledgling groups to hold concurrent protests on October 20. This effort netted some results since some of the 21 demonstrations reached large proportions. A “six-block” scene in New York drew 13,000 while 8,000 activists strolled through the Castro District

'In effect, the differences between the Marxist and non-Marxist Coalitions were not that drastic. Both groups wanted to stop the pending war, bring home the troops, and allocate more money for domestic programs. Hence, their only substantive difference came on the issue of US imposed sanctions of Iraq. In fearing a sympathizing with the enemy impression, the National Campaign took “no position” on the sanctions question. Conversely, the Coalition wanted the sanctions abolished since they were “tired of Western attempts at economic imperialism.”

94 in San Francisco. However, these four digit tallies were the exception since most protests hovered at much lower levels. In fact, 500 protesters were seen at a South Central park in

Los Angeles and 350 individuals condemned the war machine in Indianapolis (some of the other protests drew 200 at Washington, 600 in Portland, 200 in Cleveland, 150 in

Atlanta, 80 in Baton Rouge, 300 in Boston, and 400 in Miimeapolis).

35000U 325000' 300000 275000' LH 250000 5 225000 CO 200000 fl) 175000 J 150000 5 125000 100000 75000 50000

%

Figure 5.1: Number of US Protesters

When October ended there were over 100,000 troops were in Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the mobilization's energy had dissipated, and the rest of the month was at a virtual standstill. With a bout of inertia, only ten protests occurred between October 2 1

95 and Halloween. As most of these scarce protests were dinky (e.g., 100 in Denver or 30 in

Stillcome), the city of New York housed a 3,000 person protest on October 30.

In November, the leadership of the national coalitions delayed any further

attempts of coordinated protests. Similarly, regional groups concentrated on outreach

and recruitment efforts. This meant that a cadre of peace activists put most of their

efforts into turning war critics into possible war protesters (the common problem of

motivating like-minded people into doing controversial and daunting tasks). This

strategy of building long term mobilization potentials resulted in short-term protest holes.

That is, the diverting of resources into recruiting drives meant that protests would be

placed irregularly throughout the month of November (70 November protests).

Most of these intermittent November protests were small. For the first two weeks

of November, all 13 community protests netted less than 300 activists (i.e., 100 Boston

veterans formed a “No More Vietnams” enclave within a “god Bless America” parade

and 80 Islanders stopped traffic at a Hawaiian military base). However, many of the

community denouncements in the latter half of November showed some slightly higher

totals (16 of the November 15 to November 30 protests surpassed the 300 person line).

For example, 1,000 Missourians marched with Chicago Seven activist Dave Dellinger on

November 19, and more than 500 souls marched in Sacramento (11/23), Topeka (11/24),

Madison (11/25), Stratford (11/28), Missoula (11/30), and Los Angeles (11/30).

While civic activists were trying to recruit new sympathizers, the first inklings of college protest were starting to evolve. In doing so, 27 of the 70 November protests developed on University grounds. Under the baimer of growing student opposition, a

96 handful of “Ivy” universities generated protests that merged up to 1,000 participants (i.e.,

Stanford, Columbia, and Dartmouth). Other private Universities presented hundred

person assemblies (500 at Brandies, 350 at the University of Chicago, 230 at Washington

University, 150 at the University of Louisville, and 100 at Swarthmore and Harvard).

Concurrently, public institutes entered the fracas as six University of California campuses

saw protests (i.e., 1,200 demonstrators at UC Santa Cruz and UC Santa Barbara, 1,000 at

UC Berkeley) and large land grants showed antiwar spirit (i.e., 1,500 at the University of

Michigan, 600 at the University of Wisconsin, 200 at Iowa State, 150 at Indiana

University and 100 at the University of Kansas and the University of Illinois). Finally, some less famous commuter schools had their set of antiwar affairs (i.e., 100 at protesters at San Francisco State University, Cal State Fresno, Montana State, and the University of

Utah). By early December, an advancing war looked likely. U.S. ambassadors had driven a war authorization act through the United Nations and the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee was holding embargo hearings (interestingly, most retired National

Security Advisors pushed for the sanction approach, while Henry Kissinger supported a quick round of bombing). At the same time, the movement experienced some new synergy (101 protests happened in the first two weeks of the twelfth month). As separate entities, both the collegiate and public coalitions were expanding their membership rolls.

Furthermore, the usually segregated collegiate and “real world” populaces began forming new town-gown relationships. With this increase of cross generational alliances, the mobilization became strong enough to generate some regional protests that numbered in the thousands. For example, 13,000 residents from New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maine,

97 Massachusetts, and Rhode Island descended on Boston (12/1). While not as giant as this

Massachusetts affair, other protests attracted crowds of four to five thousand. On

December 7, the Berkeley wing of the War Resisters League brought 5,000 protesters to

the Bay Area BART system. During the next two days, 4,000 participants from eight

states chanted “How many Lives per Gallon?” in Chicago, while George Bush was

CATE

Figure 5.2: Number of US Protests

serenaded by 5,000 antiwar singers as he slept in New York’s Waldorf-Astoria Hotel

(12/9). Protests of a little smaller stature were found in the 3,000 person “sue the president” march in Seattle (12/1), the 2,000 bring a body bag to Washington protest

98 (12/8), the 1,500 person teach-in at Los Angeles (12/16), and the 1,500 “honk for peace”

rally in Amherst (12/6).

The first weeks of December did not simply alter the routines the bustling cities of

San Francisco, Boston, and New York. It also brought protests to docile settings which

had not experienced an antiwar protest in twenty years. In Lincoln, 700 people carried a

“we will not be silent” banner (12/8) and 1,000 middle-aged activists growled in

Philadelphia (12/20). Along the Ohio river, 250 activists protested outside of the

Louisville office of Senator Mitch McConnell (12/7) while Atlanta, Columbus, Detroit,

Eugene, Milwaukee, and Phoenix were confronting protests that netted hundreds of activists. However, many of these homegrown protests prompted smaller turnouts. In

Concord, 80 Green party members burnt “peace candles” at a military center and about

120 chanted “No war, domestic peace, get us out of the Middle East” in Evanston,

Illinois. Similarly, many small protests were dispersed in towns like Akron, Bozeman,

Doylestown, Lafayette, Lauderdale Lakes, Marshall, Omaha, Portsmouth, San Antonio,

Stratford, and Annapolis.

As gestures of dissent entered bucolic towns, many college groups were holding pre-break rallies. The largest college protests brought 2,500 activists to the fenced ruminants of Berkeley’s People’s Park (chants of “We will bring it back” rebuffed the memories of Governor Reagan’s assault on the Park’s unofficial architects). In more sedate terms, 200 Indiana University students spoke about alternative energy sources

(12/1), 350 students from Northwestern, DePaul, Columbia College, North Eastern

Illinois, and Roosevelt formed the Chicago Campuses Against War (12/5), and several

99 hundred St. Louis University students erected 52 white crosses for the US solders who

had died during the troop buildup (12/9). Similarly, antiwar initiatives were displayed at

other campus backdrops (University of Illinois, Colgate, George Mason, Queens City

College, SUNY-Binghamton, Bard College, Georgetown, Loyola, Princeton, Stanford,

Texas A &M, University of Michigan, University Minnesota, University of Oregon,

University of Wisconsin).

However, these early December stirrings were simply a two-week blip. By the end of December, activity subsided again. The college protests evaporated as the halls of

knowledge were deserted during the Holiday season. Similarly, the gift-giving season sapped the power of the community protests. With chestnuts roasting on the open fire, the nation saw 33 protests for the last ten days of December. Moreover, only a San

Francisco protest could draw over 1,000 activists.

As the new year began, the mobilization was entering a new phase. The war’s deadline was on the horizon and many folks feared massive destruction (i.e., some policy groups claimed the land invasion would kill 300,000 solders and others worried about an

Israeli nuclear response to Iraqi missiles). With this context at hand, the mobilization cranked up 37 protests in the first week of January. A set of larger protests occurred in familiar towns. In San Francisco, 6,000 of the faithful listened to a Methodist Bishop say

"our response must be prayer, but more than prayer alone, it must also have action” (1/7).

Similarly, a Los Angeles Coalition of “Clerics, Communists, and Libertarians” drew

2,000 activists to a January 6 protest, and a Miimeapolis teach-in on the same day attracted 1,000 participants. Conversely, most of the January 1 to 7 protests remained

1 0 0 small in size. Many of these smaller protests were like the 300 Chicago suburbanites who

gave Senator Paul Simon black film canisters which had “No Blood for Oil” labels (1/4),

or the 300 Wisconsinites who constructed a missile replica with tax forms (l/l). Other

less eventfiil events were held in Corpus Christs (300 on January I), Allentown (400 on

January 4), Napa (100 on January 4), Boise (80 on January 7), Springfield (150 on

January 7).

On January 8 an attack on Iraq looked imminent. President Bush was seeking war approval from Congress and more than one million troops from 15 countries were located on Kuwait and Iraq’s borders. With this in mind, the movement continued a modest but steady expansion for the next three days (January 8 to 11). As a triad of days with ten or more protests, several of the protests reached significant proportions. In Portland, 5,000 gathered near their federal building ( I/I I), and 4,500 filled the Austin City Coliseum

(l/l I). Likewise, 2,500 Midwestern students met on the grassy oval of the Ohio State

University ( 1/8). However, these large protests did not hold the ordinary form as most protests were comparable to the 600 Madisonites who stuffed body bags with Marine

Corps literature and the 300 believers who prayed at the doorsteps Rochester’s

Congressperson (other reports saw 800 activists in Tallahassee, 500 in San Antonio, 300 at Salt Lake City, and 50 at Knoxville from January 8 toII).

The third week of January proved to be a pivotal stage of the mobilization (see

Table 5,3). The gradual and incremental growth in the movement came to an abrupt halt, and in its place was a vortex of exponential growth. On January 12, Congress approved the use of force against Iraq and the country experienced 36 protests. Cities such as

lOl Ashald, Little Rock, Peterson, and Rockford made protests which numbered in the

hundreds. Other locales saw their ranks swelling wider. January 12 protests in Ann

Arbor, Fort Collins and Tallahassee drew over 1,500 participants a piece, while Chicago,

Chicopee, and Los Angeles had protests which passed the 4,000 marks. However, the

city of Portland embodied the growing wave of activism as it brought 14,000 people to a

protest.

After a lethargic January 13, the nation saw enormous outpourings of Gulf War

protestors. On January 14, dissenters clogged the roads and Federal Buildings of 85

Date Frequency Total Number January 12,1991 36 55,450 January 13,1991 17 24,392 January 14,1991 85 83,419 January 15,1991 144 124,622 January 16,1991 95 84,464 January 17,1991 133 82,079 January 18,1991 49 28,815 January 19,1991 42 131,455 January 20,1991 11 10,620 January 21,1991 23 20,705 January 22,1991 7 2,040 January 23,1991 15 1,890 January 24,1991 11 2,543 January 25,1991 6 1,412 January 26,1991 18 261,815

Table 5.3: Most Active Days of Protest

102 cities. With this bustle came vocal protests in the most galvanized cites of Boston, New

York, Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Los Angeles. Elsewhere, protests

were viewed in Eastern and Southern seaboards (New Orleans, Portland, Tampa),

Mid-Atlantic states (Knoxville, Louiseville), Southwestern vistas (Albuquerque, Denver,

Flagstaff, Provo, Salt Lake City, Tucson), and the woods of the Northwest (Bellingham,

Eugene, Everett). But, the briskest source of protests came from the Midwest.

Americans marched in Ann Arbor, Chicago, Des Moines, Duluth, Detroit, Indianapolis,

Milwaukee, Richmond, Rivergrove, St. Paul and St. Louis.

Following the January 14 outburst came three days of pervasive protesting (two

days surpassed 100 protests and one came close). The papers spoke of 144 January 15 protests (the night in which the war was suppose to begin). These numerous protests stretched into every comer of the United States (protests were recognized in all states but

Mississippi, Alabama, North Dakota, and Wyoming). The frenzy brought scenarios with handfuls of protesters (i.e., Dover, Houland, Syracuse, Eureka), while others collected hundreds of participants (i.e., Austin, Bellingham, Boise, Bozeman, Colorado Springs,

Lexington, Miami, Providence, Tacoma). However, the days of hundred person protests were experienced in most locales. On January 15, the papers observed 22 protests that sat in the low thousands (i.e., Berkeley, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbia University, Eugene,

Harvard, Olympia, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Stanford University, Toledo) and 10 protests that flourished in the mid thousands (i.e., Atlanta, Boston, Chicopee, Cincinnati, Los

Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Santa Barbara, St. Louis, Washington).

103 Similarly the protests of January 16 and 17 showed a cornucopia of sizes,

locations, and forms. In addition to the San Francisco, Washington, and New York

enterprises, other protests were found in the frozen lands of New England (i.e.. Cape Cod,

Boston, Burlington, Concord, Hartford, Portland, Rutland) and the frigid Midwest (i.e.,

Athens, Bloomington, Carbondale, Cedar Rapids, Chicago, Cleveland, Iowa City,

Lansing, Minneapolis, Omaha, Kent). Protests also occurred in warmer Southern

climates (i.e., Austin, Baltimore, Danville, Nashville, Northfolk, Rockbridge, Richmond,

Russelville, Tampa, Virginia Commonwealth University) and brighter Southwestern

mesas (i.e., Albuquerque, Davis, Denver, Fresno, Montezuma, Northern Arizona

University, Palo Alto, Irvine, Sacramento, San Diego, Tucson). Finally, the cloudy skies

of the Northwest rained down on numerous protests (i.e., Boise, Corvallis, Eugene,

Moscow, Portland, Salem, Seattle).

When specifying this tumultuous period’s patterns, a bevy of interrelated

tendencies surfaced. First, many of the earliest organizing metropolitan centers become

magnets for large hordes of activists (i.e., Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York,

Minneapolis, Portland, San Francisco, and Seattle). For cities of this sort, protests

routinely numbered in the thousands during this January peak. In fact, these cities

produced 31 protests that surpassed the 5,000 participant level from January 12 to

January 26. Second, the hubs did not simply add participants but they also altered their

protest schedules. Rather than generating the weekly protest, these locations fostered

protests on a daily basis. For example, one sees that San Francisco had 17 protests from

January 12 to January 17. With this rapid tempo. San Franciscans blocked the entrances

104 to the Federal Building, stopped traffic at the Golden Gate and Bay Bridges, prayed at the

Presidio Military Base, marched through the hills of the Castro District, adventured into

Highway 101, poured blood on the step of the Pacific Stock Exchange, Picketed Oil

Companies, disrupted hamburger production at McDonalds, and listened to mother earth

poetry in a park. In a close second. New York had 12 protests in a five-day stretch. In a

string of events. New Yorkers surrounded the United Nations, marched in solidarity with

homeless people in the Lower East Side, debated news personality Peter Jennings,

performed satirical street theater, took over the Brooklyn Bridge, and trounced through

Wall Street.

Third, the bombing of Iraq instigated the sort of rebiliouss tactics that draws

media attention. The sense of urgency drove people out of their routine habits and into the 24-hour vigil. The Federal Buildings of Denver, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, San

Francisco, and Seattle were surrounded by unofficial antiwar campsites (the San

Francisco antiwar enclave became so permanent that a complex of plywood and cardboard huts sat on Federal property). Other antiwar groups in Chicago, New York, and Boston saw their extended stays thwarted by the night sticks of police officers. Also, these days of elevated intensity unveiled some stronger acts of defiance. The White

House was a place of many symbolic acts of resistance. For example, the White House fence was repeatedly climbed as nuns put blood into the presidential fountain, homeless advocates chained themselves to President Wilson’s trees, and a dentist poured oil on

Bush’s neatly manicured lawn. Elsewhere, desperate activists turned to other sorts of confirontational tactics. Rush hour traffic was stopped in hundreds of cities and affinity

105 groups blocked entrances to Federal buildings in Athens, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles,

New York, Portland, San Francisco, St. Louis, St. Paul, and Seattle. Moreover, some of

these confrontations became remarkably adventurous. Over a hundred students seized the

legislative chambers of the Washington statehouse, 11 anarchists decried Sam Nunn’s

pro war manifesto during official senatorial proceedings, two activists skirted in front of

Dan Rather’s camera as he spoke at a live CBS newscast, one police car was burnt in San

Francisco, and a Massachusetts man protested the war by setting himself afire.

Fourth, the proliferation and escalation of protests migrated to most US cities.

Although they were miles away from the “liberal” centers of New York and San

Francisco, 2,000 activists marched with Representative Bemie Sanders in Vermont, 2,000

protesters met at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, 1,500 walked with the Women

Against War in Iowa City. Similarly, cities such as Baltimore, Cincinnati, Des Moines,

Fort Collins, Houston, Little Rock, Milwaukee, Missoula, New Orleans, San Diego, Salt

Lake City, St. Louis, and Tallahassee had protests that exceeded 1,000 participants.

Around the same time, many protests in medium sized cities bordered the thousand person mark. In Boulder, 900 members from Queer Nation, MECHA, and the Feminist

Alliance left raw meat at an Army Recruiting Center, while 800 activists surrounded the

Robert McNamara Federal Building in Detroit. Likewise, the cities of Albuquerque, Fort

Wayne, Duluth, Eugene, Hartford, Honolulu, Indianapolis, Knoxville, New Haven,

Phoenix, Lafayette, Louisville, Pittsburgh, Richmond, Rockford, San Antonio,

Sacramento, and Tampa had protests that sat in the 700 to 1,000 range. Furthermore, the wave of activism gushed into even smaller towns. Five-hundred activists left bloody

106 hand prints on the Tucson office o f Senator John McCain, 400 teachers carried “books not bombs” signs in Gainesville, and 300 people held an antiwar forum in Bowling

Green, Kentucky. Similarly, the quiet towns of Boise, Bozeman, Concord, Flagstaff,

Fresno, Lansing, Omaha, Rapid City, and Wilmington created protests that came close to

500 participants.

Finally, colleges were inundated with protests. In effect, protests spread to 102 campuses from January 13 to January 18 (37 college protests on January 17 alone ).

Some of these protests were quite large, as 10,000 appeared at the University of

Minnesota (1/13) and 5,000 marched at the University of Washington (1/18). However, most protests did not reach such sizes. Three campuses had protests of about 3,000 participants (UC-Santa Barbara, UC-Santa Cruz, and UCLA), and three demonstrations garnered 2,000 partisans (University of Michigan, University of Wisconsin, and Western

Washington University). Instead, the majority of college protests had less than 2,000 protests and the modal score was around 500/

- Protests were on all sorts of campuses. Elite establishments encountered antiwar commotions (i.e.. Brown, Columbia, Dartmouth, Harvard, Penn, Stanford, University of Chicago, University of Virginia, and Yale). Publicly financed research complexes also had a share of University protests (i.e., Arizona State University, Bingham Young University, Indiana University, Michigan State, Northwestern, Ohio State, Purdue, Syracuse, University of Colorado, University of Florida, University of Kentucky, University of Missouri, University of New Mexico, University of North Carolina, University of Illinois, University of Iowa, and the University of Oregon). The antiwar spirit visited a wide smattering of state schools (i.e., Boise State University, Georgia State, Montana State Miami University, Murray State, University, St. Cloud State, University of Northern Iowa, Eastern Michigan, and Wayne State). Finally, the sample found protests at many private four year colleges (Bryn Mawr, Chapman College, Drexel, Earlham, Heidelberg College, La Salle, Liberty College, Providence, Sienna, Spellman, Swarthmore, Trinity, Union College, Washington U-St. Louis, William and Mary)

107 By the end of January, the political scene had moved against the mobilization.

The bombing had resulted in few US casualties and Congressional Democrats were

praising the war effort. Concurrently, military spokespeople bragged of “the clean war of

precise bombing,” and much of the mainstream media was uncritically repeating these

positions. Moreover, public attitudes were shifting into the prowar stance since much of

this “priming” led sections of the US populace into the patriotic craze of “rallying around

the flag” (see Wilcox or Mueller).

In response to the changing political climate, the local activists began preparing

for the national demonstrations. Motivated by the hope of reversing the growth of prowar

sympathies, many of the dispersed antiwar communities sent members to the San

Francisco and Washington protests. These efforts resulted in some immense blocks of

humanity. In effect, over 40,000 visited the cities of San Francisco and Washington on

January 19 and our national capital had around 120,000 protesters and the Golden Gate

Bridge held over 75,000 protesters on the following weekend.

While these national protests were large, their existence signified a turning point.

This pinnacle would be a transitory sensation and the two-week high would quickly slide

into a noticeable descent. Once February developed, the number of protests dropped dramatically. The first day of February had ten protests while the next six days produced

27 protests. By the second week of February, this retreat turned into stagnation (i.e., the days from February 8 to 14 had a mean of 4.3 protests per day). With such sweeping declines, the amount of February demonstrations receded to December like numbers. In

fact, two December and February weeks were virtual copies of each other (i.e., December

108 8 to 15 had 24,114 participants while February 1 to 6 protests had 24,732 protesters or

December 16 to 23 showed 7,345 participants while February 7 to 13 displayed 7,977 protesters).

The February contraction took three routes. First, February protests were supposedly confined to cities with lefty reputations (i.e., Austin, Berkeley, Los Angeles,

Minneapolis, Madison, San Francisco, Seattle, Washington). Subsequently, the sources insisted that protests had ceased in small town USA (cities such as Boise, El Paso, Fort

Wayne, and Shreveport had supposedly discontinued their brief flurry of January protests). Second, the organizations in “progressive cities” endured but did not thrive.

During February, these formerly dynamic groups lost many of their temporary adherents and showed little success in reaching new antiwar converts. With this substantial withdrawal of activists, progressive cities watched their large protests disappear. For example, in place of Chicago’s 6,000 person protest on January 12 were “windy city” protests of 600 (2/16) and 300 (2/23). Similarly, Minneapolis demonstrations fell from a

January 13 height of 10,000 to the February 10 low of 600. ^ Third, our sources suggest that protests on college campuses almost evaporated in early February. In fact, the sample detected only 11 protests from February I to February 14 (Cal-State Fullerton,

Columbia University, Howard, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Rutgers, UCLA, UC-

Irvine, University of Montana, University of Northern Carolina, University of Louisville,

Virginia University).

^ Some areas showed smaller loses in membership. Protests in Los Angeles did not wilt away as 6,000 and 2,000 attended February I and 8 protests. Similarity, Seattle’s “Dawgs of Peace” could attract 3,500 and 2,000 to February protests.

109 Fearing a pending invasion of Kuwait, movement leadership tried to counteract the early February slump. In aiming for a rejuvenation, their recruiting attempts were met with limited results in different areas. Occasionally the locations which had been protest-free in February saw their inactive and disintegrating groups create some last- ditch protests (i.e.. Alpin [2/14], Kinenbunkport [2/15], Milwaukee [2/15], Houston

[2/15], Rochester [2/16], Olympia [2/17], Amherst [2/18], New Haven[2/22], Dallas

[2/24], Detroit [2/25], Providence [2/25], Spokane [2/26]). Moreover, some of the teetering metropolitan groups hastily resurrected some larger crowds by mid-February.

For example, 5,000 New Yorkers shouted “Stop Bombing Now” and “War is a

Permanent Failure” on February 17, and four days later 3,000 obstructionists disrupted the Boston Stock Exchange (also Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle had protest which surpassed the 3,000 mark in late February).

Even with this boost, this revitalization was only a partial success. The college scene remained in a February state of shambles (from February 14 to February 20, only 5 college protests were recorded). Furthermore, the day of “collegiate dissent” had a lackadaisical execution. After hundreds of organizing packets were distributed, the anticipated tidal wave attracted a small list of 22 campus protests (some of the universities were Columbia, Emory, Howard, Georgetown, Occidental, UCLA,

University of Michigan, University of Minnesota).

With the slumping college scene and a slightly resurgent community scene, the

February rebirth never reached the January highs. In fact, the busiest January day had four times as many protests as the busiest February day (144 vs. 32) while the next

110 busiest day was stuck at the one-seventh ratio (144 vs. 20). Additionally, only five of the

largest 52 and eight of the largest 107 protests were found in February (see tables 5.1 and

5.2).

This tempered upswing was the mobilization’s last hurrah. By the first days of

March, the mobilization had become a husk of its former self. Most coalitions had

become unraveled and the once strong New York alliance was too depleted to throw a

March protest. Thus, the February tendencies toward dwindling protests were juxtaposed

by a glaring absence of March protests. In fact, the mobilization was so barren, that the papers found only 16 protests for the third month of the year.

5.2 Appraisals of relative size issues

As this chapter unfolded, the text and tables implicitly challenged the scholars who minimalize the scope of the mobilization. With such a presentation, the project indirectly questioned the “brief minisurge” or “no significant opposition” declarations.

In making these rebuttals more explicit, the rest of this chapter will define terms and put these claims to an empirical test.

In addressing the size issue, some simple conclusions emerge. Although there are no universally accepted definitions for "maxi," "midi," or "mini" surges, I would still assert that this was a "significant opposition" in many ways. In absolute numbers, this was not a trivial event. Regardless of definitional squabbles, I would think minisurges never have more than one million participants (the sources found 1,225,567 protests). In fact, the mobilization looks quite large when one realizes that a study of all 1982 protests found less than a million protesters (McCarthy et. al., 1996).

I ll Moreover, who could honestly argue that 1,365 protests constitute a minor mobilization?

The chapter reveals other size insights. When looking at particular protests, some news sources recognized the enormous nature of the national protests. After scanning theWashington Post archives in 1993, a senior reporter found only thirteen protests which surpassed the January 27 Gulf War protests (Byant, 1993).

Furthermore, the mobilization created profound number of medium sized protests.

That is, the mobilization had 74 protests with more than 3,(XX) participants, while a thirty-year study of Washington Post articles found only 43 protests that reached that plateau (Everett, 1992). Finally, this movment was goegraphicaly dispersed. In fact, protests happemd stractched into all sorts of towns and happend in 46 of the 50 states.

Nevertheless, one should not overstate the size of this mobilization. The Gulf

War protests did not reach the heights of the 1930's labor movement since Historian

Melvyn Dubofsky (1986) found that 1,700 strikes erupted in 1933, 1,856 in 1934,

2,200 in 1936, and 4,740 in 1937. Similarly, the civil rights movement of the 1950's and 60's was considerably larger since the WevvYork Times found 2,199 civil rights protests from 1961 to 1965 (McAdam, 1982). Moreover, this mobilization should not be considered the biggest antiwar movement in U.S. history. These protests did not reach the heights of the 600,000 demonstrators at the 1969 Viemam War Moratorium or the 500,000 at the 1971 Vietnam "Out Now" rally (numbers by Bryant 1993).

Similarly, it is clear that the 1990's college protest scene did not match the estimated

4,350,000 smdent protestors of the 1960's and 1970's (Heinemen, 1993, p 249).

112 However, a strictly numerical comparison can be misleading. Each antiwar

mobilization was set in different socio-historical contexts. The Presidential rationales

for the wars were different. One war was supposedly stopping the "spreading cancer of

Communism, " while the other war was said to be the freeing of a virtuous country from

a rogue Arab state. The fate of the wars also differed. One war required a draft, had

higher causalities, and lasted three decades, while the Gulf War was seen as a quick drubbing of Iraq which cost few American lives. Moreover, the media played different

roles in each war. The media removed sights of mutilation from Gulf War footage while the images of death from Southeast Asia were consistently brought into American family rooms. Finally, it may have been easier to organize an antiwar mobilization in the sixties since college students had more free time and there were blocks of seasoned activists who could siphon off the civil rights movement.

Since contemporary activists face such an unconducive situation, one may be surprised by the existence of any Gulf War protests. Others may be shocked by the anomaly of a proactive antiwar movement. That is, researchers should take note that this mobilization preceded the bombing while other U.S. antiwar movements were reactions to ongoing wars (keep in mind that first national protest against Vietnam came after years of American involvement in that "police action"). Hence, a two-fold conclusion emerges.

This antiwar movement showed an initial capacity to mobilize early protests, but these capacities were quickly tapped as the movement shrunk into abeyance within a few months.

113 CHAPTER 6

UNCOVERING SOURCE RELIABILITIES

“If we let people see Iraqi soldiers being sliced in half, there would never again be any war” ~ A Senior Pentagon Censor

“This Gulf War reporting is die best coverage I have ever seen” — Pentagon Spokesman Pete Williams

The preceding findings chapters were substantive in nature. In effect, the narrative revolved around the information which was gathered. With an emphasis on the collected data, the chapters presented a positivistic manner on inquiry (find the “real” world which rests outside of the intersubjective domains of humans). In partially embracing the philosophical “realist” approach, I have hoped that this analysis would closely approximate the actions of an “external” phenomenon. Hence, the earlier chapters focused on the comprehension of the actual protest dynamics.

While some researchers may end at the results point, I think a thorough inquiry should not end at this juncture. At a general level, one would be naive to neglect the epistemological questions of knowledge generation. To date, even the most fervent opponents of the postmodemistic, phenomenonological, and hermeneutic critiques of

114 “scientism” will admit that knowledge is initiated through a human decision making

process. Hence, all scientific axioms are undeniably linked to the creative and

idiosyncratic processes of defining concepts and collecting the data. Or in other words,

the ways in which a researcher incorporates theories, operationalizes concepts, invents

instruments, and assembles a sample will have a great bearing on the type of results

which loom in the final outcome.

At a more specific level, my methods discussion and grid observations should

dispel any romantic notions on newspaper reliability (selection and content biases). With

papers losing their voice as the authoritative source of information, I will explore the

consequences of drawing certain samples of newspapers. Essentially, this chapter

presents an exploration into the ways in which separate papers create their own versions

of the protest cycle.

In scrutinizing this process of selecting and crafting antiwar stories, this section

will activate two lines of inquiry. Initially the narrative will present a chronological rehashing of the estimates in four national papers and two news services{New York

Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, USA TODAY, UP I, andNews Bank). In discerning the themes and structures of the news narratives, some of the strengths and weakness of sources will become transparent. That is, the “close reading” of each source will give us a preliminary sense of the value-laden, disjointed, and imprecise nature of transcripts. After this qualitative examination ends, this rest of the chapter will switch

into a comparative mode of analysis. In effect, the similarities and differences of reporting styles will be ascertained through a process of juxtaposition.

115 When placing accounts next to each other, the divergent patterns of coverage can be discerned. Initially, the issue of "selectiveness" can be highlighted since one can see what protests were addressed by whom. That is, the identification of coverage rates can display the relative breadth of each source’s story line (i.e., unveil which papers dealt with the December protests in Las Vegas). Following this round of analysis will be a discussion of estimating practices. During this comparison of crowd counts, the biases of each source will become more apparent. In essence, the sources which routinely provided higher or lower estimates will be identified though this method of comparison.

1 begin this section with the enumeration of the antiwar stories in theNew York

Times. This front-runner status is granted theNY Times since it is an icon of high culture and renowned researchers swear to its worth (see Olzak and McAdam quotes in methods section). The analysis of the remaining papers resembles the preferential order of research utilization (how often are they used for scholarly studies of protest cycles).

Nearing the end of this protracted chapter is an overview and delineation of the general patterns of coverage (summaries trail an elongated deep reading).

6.1 The New York Times

The New York Times (NY Times) started its sporadic antiwar tale on October 20.

After obtusely claiming that 16 cities protested against the Gulf War deployment, theNY

Times described the "parade of peaceftil New York marchers." After quoting a police estimate of the six block ceremony at 5,000, theNY Times added the organizer’s 25,000 estimate. Then the article finished with the appraisal that 125 people rallied in front of

116 the White House while 1,000 marchers gathered in San Francisco, 200 in Cleveland, 200

in Boston and 100 in Atlanta.

After this brief story, the actions of the antiwar movement fell out of theNY

Times' universe for over a month. It was not until November 20 that theNY Times ran a

story on a group of 85 Quakers who were protesting in front of an Air Force base in

Westover, Massachusetts. After another month long pause (12/30), theNY Times decided to include a story on 11 the individuals who poured fake blood into the White House

fountain.

In bringing in the new year, theNY Times invigorated another blackout for the

first two weeks of January. Then on January 14, theNY Times switched its editorial patterns and decided to run protest stories for three consecutive days. That is, on January

14 the NY Times included stories on 2,000 New York protesters, 4,000 Los Angeles activists, and the 111 people who stormed the U.S. congress during the War Powers deliberation. Then the next day’s edition provided reports on seven local crusades.

Readers were treated to accounts of the 1,000 minors who clashed with police at the

Union Square in New York City, the 2,000 Minnesotans who blocked the entrance to the

Federal Building in St. Paul, and the 100 Roman Catholics who held a quite prayer for peace in downtown Pittsburgh. Finally, on January 16 theNY Times wrote a two-page story that covered some of the larger and smaller rituals of January 15. For New York, this story described the "five thousand demonstrators who thronged across United

Nations Plaza and spilled noisily onto streets" and the 2,000 participants who heard Kurt

Vonnegut and Noam Chomsky speak against the war at Columbia University. The paper

117 also rehashed the campaign in Atlanta which drew 1,000 people to an antiwar blood drive and 4,000 protesters who chanted "Peace Now" at the Boston Commons in

Massachusetts.

After three days of regular reporting, theNY Times went into another hiatus as it delayed coverage until January 20. Then in this mid-January rendition, the caption of a

January 20 photograph suggested that 20,000 people marched in San Francisco while

15,000 gathered at Lafayette Park in Washington. Yes, the caption was the only estimating source since the sloppy articles by Anthony DePalma and Peter Applebome did not describe these large protests. Instead Mr. Applebome wrote on 20 protesters who delayed a nationally broadcasted basketball game at the University of Montana while Mr.

DePalma penned a trite article which was laden with platitudes (i.e., DePalma’s obscure statement of the "campuses have become alive with protests" is not coupled with any examples of campus protests).

One week later the NY Times ran a seven paragraph story on the national undertakings of January 26. With a peculiar sense of proportions, Mr. Applebome dedicated more passages to the 125 pro war truckers than the 75,000 antiwar protesters in

Washington. Similarly, the assertion that anywhere between 30 and 225 thousand protested in San Francisco was followed by several clauses which minimized the magnitude of the crowd (i.e., "protests came at a time when polls showed an overwhelming support for Mr. Bush's policy").

The NY Times continued its skimpy and erratic reporting into the month of

February. Antiwar information was absent until a February 10 incident at the University

118 of Northern Carolina. As these members of the "College Republican SCUD Team" threw

water balloons at the Chapel Hill peace shanty town, 35 peace campers heard shrieks of

"Now you know what it is like to be a person of Kuwait."

After noting this bizarre act, theNY Times concluded its antiwar reporting with

February 18 and February 22 features. In these medleys theN Y Times rhapsodized on

four community and four college protests. The February 18 piece addressed the 5,000

New Yorkers who protested in sub-freezing weather, the 500 people who objected to the

TV coverage in Chicago, the 14 laborers who dug graves in the capital lawn in Olympia,

and some 1,400 Southern Californians who shouted against “the disrespect of human

life.” In ending its antiwar description,\ia& NY Times centered the "international day of

student action" by writing on the 600 protesters at the University of Massachusetts, and

the crowds of several hundred at Columbia University, University of California Los

Angeles, the University of Michigan and Boston College (2/22). After this mid February

piece, the NY Times dismissed the remaining two and half weeks of protests.

6.2 The Washington Post

Like \hs NY Times, the Washington Post (WP) missed tlie earliest forms of protests and began its coverage on the first day of national events (October 20). After claiming that 500 people were involved in a White House demonstration, the paper turned to stories of seven reservists who had refused to fight. Then the article concluded that

10,000 to 15,000 activists joined an eclectic Manhattan affair.

It took another month and a half to get another antiwar report out of theWP. In admitting that sixteen previously staged D.C. protests had gone unrecognized,WP the

119 became interested in this demo for two reasons. Originally, the gathering was considered large (n=3,000). But more importantly, 50 people had "protested without a permit" at sit- ins at the Lincoln and Vietnam Veteran's memorials. Hence,WP displayed their apparent preferences for the confrontational script of activism.

The next antiwar snippet came on December 6. When addressing the college

Pearl Harbor’s anniversary, the WP gave several references to college protests. Fifteen coeds were arrested at Duke University, 350 students appeared at the University of

Wisconsin, and teach-ins were staged at Georgetown University, the University of

Oregon, and San Francisco State University. Ultimately, theWP added that "some teach- ins on the Persian Gulf occurred in September," and "a group of students at the University of Louisville announced that they would buy antiwar advertisements in local and campus newspapers."

In keeping to its monthly schedule of reporting, the next commentary appeared on

January 4. This testimony stated that 35 Christians brought "Killed in Action" signs to a congressional swearing-in ceremony. Then the column ended with an anecdote on the five Community for Creative Non-Violence members who had illegally prayed on the

White House lawn (CCNV is the largest homeless shelter in the District of Columbia and was led by Mitch Snyder).

For the next week,WP ran three articles. On January 6, a document focused on the 250 demonstrators who submitted pleas to stop "putting a death sentence on the folks at home" by cutting social programs. As this crowd mingled, two CCNV affiliates poured fake blood on their bodies and handcuffed themselves to a White House fence

120 (again the hint of lawlessness was linked to newsworthiness^. Similarly, the January 8 piece named the 60 demonstrators who illegally poured red dye in the presidential fountain (these activists were from the religious based human service groups of the

Dorothy Day and Olive Branch Catholic Workers). By January 11 theWP finally chose some protests which had no claims to civil disobedience (see McCarthy and Zald, 1996 for the numerous nonviolent protests which were neglected by theWP). This document wrote on the "businessmen who fashioned antiwar signs," some "health care workers who made a sign on computer printout," a "computer scientist who was for negotiation," and some tourists who had driven from Hampton, VA., and Evansville, IN.

For the next ten days, theWP was deluged with sixteen antiwar articles (January

13 to January 23). On January 13, theWP claimed that "almost 2,000 people" appeared on the Capitol grounds as Congress authorized the war effort. After writing that protesters included "babies in strollers and older people leaning on canes,"WP the quoted a Unitarian minister from Upstate New York, a father of two Marines from Kentucky, a student from Vermont and a Realtor from Ohio. Then on January 15, WPthe catalogued the many D.C. demonstrations that "capped a day of demonstrations." It praised the actions of the 70 ambassadors from the Military Family Support Network (MFSN). This group, which furnished Former Navy Secretary James Webb as a spokesperson, held a morning protest after congressional staffers rebuffed the MFSN’s invitation to dialogue.

Then in the afternoon, a coalition of 1,500 anarchists and socialists positioned themselves around the White House sidewalk. Later that night, 500 African-Americans listened to the antiwar speeches of Eleanor Holmes Norton and Effi Barry at the Lincoln Memorial.

121 Finally, the fVP reported that 5,000 parishioners marched in a vigil that was led by the interdenominational alliances of priests, ministers, rabbis, and the editor of the religious- based magazineSojourners.

Also on January 15, theWP remembered that this mobilization was a national phenomena. In a dictum titled "Americans Voice Anxiety, Depression Over Persian Gulf

Events," the WP claimed that 3,000 people marched through downtown Chicago and

1,500 did the same in Santa Cruz ("depression" implies a state of passivity, yet no quotations indicated any passivity or resignation among the protesters). Furthermore, demonstrators blocked the Federal Building in Mirmeapolis, blocked the Golden Gate

Bridge in California, gave sanctuary to war resisters in Seattle, and “stormed” a military recruiting center in Detroit. In a companion piece, theWP proclaimed that

"demonstrations in Los Angeles and Tallahassee each drew more than 1,000 and hundreds marched in Philadelphia, Ann Arbor and Portland."

The circumscribed prose of a January 16 sidebar alluded to the nearly two hundred who joined Jesse Jackson in an antiwar trek to the D.C. City Council and the fifty adolescents who left their classes in Paint Branch High School. Finally, the last sentence of the piece casually added that "several thousand people appeared outside of the

White House to protest those [war] policies."

For the next three days, theWP had more than one bulletin a day. Next to a

January 17 photo of protesters being clubbed by law officers, theWP argued that a melee materialized the moment that bombing began in Iraq. With no explanation as to why the protesters were hit with batons, the WP went onto brief descriptions of the 400 people

122 who marched at Times Square in New York City, the 20,000 "who ripped threw police brigades" in San Francisco and the 30 individuals who blocked the entrance to the Boston

Harbor tunnel. Eventually, this discussion of "erupting demonstrations" concluded with an appraisal of the T-shirts worn by 500 Los Angeles protesters, the hunger strikes of 49

Arizonian college students, and the manners of the several hundred citizens who took over the chambers of Washington's statehouse. In another January 17 sidebar, thefVP wrote on the so-called “unique qualities of Gulf War demonstrators.” In presenting their version of the historical record, the WP proclaimed: "What has been most distinct has been the presence of so many people lacking of distinctiveness, what you might call regular folks. Men in suit and ties have chanted 'No blood for oil' in unison with angry members of the America is always-wrong-brigade." Hence, the main point of unity among “antagonistic” forces was packaged within a capitalist set of values. That is, people gain political legitimacy by the price and style of their wardrobe, “power suites” are restricted to men, and there is an ominous brigade of violent people who are trying to destroy the American dream.

A January 18 opus was laden with estimates. It alleged that 200 people gathered at Lafayette Square in Washington and a "wandering body of 3,000 protesters" materialized in San Francisco. In Boston, 1,000 individuals listened to Howard Zirm speeches and in Chicago 2,000 protested for the fourth straight day (WP did not rectify their negligence by submitting estimates of those three protests which they missed). At the end of the essay, theWP alluded to the 4,000 demonstrators who had shuffled down

Manhattan’s Broadway and the 700 which gathered at Kent State (the Kent State angle

123 was deemed interesting, while the reactions at Jackson State were neglected— papers must find less importance in the remembrance of murdered African-American activists).

The provision of the massive January 19 demonstration was placed on page A27.

After leading with a police estimate of 25,000, theWP managed to note that former attorney general Ramsey Clark, film-maker Michael Moore of Roger and Me, and radio host Casey Kasem spoke at this rally of "hard-line radical groups" (in the defense of the

WP, this manifestation was spearheaded by members of several Trotskyist and Black

Militant organizations). After dedicating five paragraphs to the beliefs of 150 "pro-Bush" enthusiasts, the WP confessed to some misgivings with the 25,000 spiel. They noted that organizer Brian Becker revealed that more than 500 buses transported riders from around the country. Then if these buses transported at least 50 people, then the 25,000 mark was already achieved. Hence this estimate seems preposterous, since there had to be hordes of protesters who did not take these tourist buses to the event.

The January 20 companion piece tapped into several regional escapades. After asserting that anywhere between 35,000 and 100,000 union, church, environmental, and gay activists "rampaged through the streets" of San Francisco, theWP spent most of its space on a plane which flew a "Go Desert Storm" banner, the twenty Soviet immigrants who wore "Pro USA" T-shirts, the 200 people who carried "Red, White and Blue balloons" to the Richard Nixon Library, and the fear that protesters might disrupt the traffic at the 49'ers football game.

After these January 20 articles, the WP deferred their antiwar coverage for another week. In covering the vast January 26 Washington demonstration, theWP said that the

124 crowd sat between the police and activist estimates of 75,000 and 250,000. In crafting a paradoxical composition, theWP seemed to marvel at the demonstrations apparent magnitude. The reporter was “impressed” by the fact that demonstrators created a

"continuous parade 30-people wide for more than three hours." However in a later passage, the WP reporter minimized the scope of the effort as it quoted one poll that claimed that 75% of Americans approved of U.S. policy. Hence, the insertion of this poll implied that this enormous demonstration did not represent a broad shift against the war

(turn to Mueller for a list of other polls which could have led to alternative interpretations).

Two nights later, the WP claimed that the antiwar movement had lost its

"proactive tactics." After saying that 50 to 75 protesters tried to get arrested in a "die-in" on the White House lawn, the WP asserted that police "undercut the civil disobedience effect" by choosing to ignore the actors. In a hyperbolic ending, theWP predicted that the police's "flexibility in avoiding arrests" would decimate the recruiting efforts o f the mobilization (it seems suspect that the police practices would be the primary factor in protest ebbs).

During the following week, the WP ran several antiwar human interest stories.

There was a January 31 meditation on a Department of Treasury Economist who had left his job and "found fame" when he joined a peace brigade in Iraq and some interviews with the capital percussionists whose inspired Bush’s scorn— "I wish those incessant drummers can be moved out of here." One week later, theWP ran an investigation into the "emerging black antiwar movement"(2/8). In concentrating on the actions of the

125 National African-American Network Against U.S. Intervention, a clause noted that there had been "black led protests in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Selma and New York"

(date and sizes were unspecified). In attesting to the overlaps with the earlier civil rights movement, the WP noted that Corretta Scott King, Joseph Lowry, Jesse Jackson,

Benjamin Chavis, Ron Dellums and Charles Rangle had addressed antiwar congregations.

After suspending coverage for another two weeks, theWP ran a special section on campus endeavors. When claiming that February teach-ins at the University of Michigan,

Georgetown, and Columbia drew less than 300 participants apiece, theWP concluded that recent college protests "lacked size and intensity." Nonetheless, theWP also divulged that 1,000 University of Massachusetts-Amherst pupils rallied and some other 230 colleges devised the February Youth Campaign protests.

In rounding out the February coverage, theWP emphasized that 400 "activists with years of experience" attended a "small protest" (2-24). After this nebulous size appraisal, WP claimed the mobilization lacked structure and was in disarray since "most

Americans think it is unpatriotic to speak out against war." In continuing the same message, the March 3 and 5 editions had titles of "Anti-War Turnout Falls Short" and

"Antiwar Movement is Fighting a Losing Battle." Despite their claims, these titles were unsubstantiated since these abrupt fragments contained no size estimates (this does not mean their appraisals were misleading, just shoddily documented).

After a week's intermission of coverage, the WP ended its antiwar coverage with a

March 9 response to a "feminist" protest. Fifty women from the National Organization of

Women, the Committee for Creative Non Violence, and International Women's Day met

126 in front of the Department of Health and Human Services building and demanded a change in budgetary priorities. One speaker said "I think it is important that we demand money for housing and schooling, rather than spending 500 million dollars a day to maim and kill."

6.3 The Los Angeles Times

Of the national sources, theLos Angeles {LA Times) submitted the first antiwar sound-bite. On September 22, artist Danny Finegood climbed up the ridge o f a Southern

Californian valley and modified the spelling of the infamous HOLLYWOOD sign. With a bit of creativity, Mr. Finegood was able to change the icon's spelling to OIL W AR. In skipping to October 5, the LA Times listened to the lawyers who supposedly spoke with

"vintage Vietnam rhetoric" as they trained conscientious objection counselors.

The first focus on actual protests came from a guest columnist. Ruth Rosen, a

Historian at the University of California Davis, wrote that the collegiate antiwar movement was "blossoming in less-prestigious institutions whose students identify with the young men and women who went into the military as a means of upward mobility."

To support this thesis, Rosen added that early protests had occurred in the University of

Montana, Juanita College in Pennsylvania, Manchester in Indiana, and James Madison in

Virginia. Later in the document. Rosen suggested that many community organizers came from military kin networks. For example, army parents founded the Military Family

Support Network, and the thirty Oakland mothers had held the first Bay Area vigils in

September.

127 When moving to October 20, theLA Times let a staff member assemble a story.

In doing so, the LA Times employee placed 4,000 New Yorkers at Central Park and put

200 picketers in Washington, D.C., Cleveland, and Boston. When contemplating on the crowd in Los Angeles, reporter Edwin Chin noted that Ron Kovic,Born of o f the Fourth o f July fame, spoke under a "Rich Men Start Wars, Poor people Fight them" banner.

After interrupting coverage for two weeks, the LA Times wrote on the 100 Orange county protesters who received cheers and taunts from passing motorists on November 12

(Orange County is the extremely affluent county which votes 90% Republican and houses the Richard Nixon Library). A week and a half later a Capistrano High School protester declared that "we are not just the radicals and the druggies, but the Homecoming queen and prep squad are out here too" (n=IOO). Eventually, the November 24 edition supplied a story on the antiwar actions of a group called the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement.

This network of 60 African-Americans had recently surrounded the Compton military recruiting center (some of their signs and quotes read: "Black Gls Come Home, Fight

Against the Klan" and "when you get back, the police will still shoot you dead").

On December 3, the lA Times recorded a group o f400 protesters who converged near aMelrose Place mall. In making their report, the LA Times noted that speakers came from the Grey Panthers, the Alliance for Survival, a Feminist Theater, and the Arab

American Anti-discrimination Committee. In the December 9 edition, a caption quipped that 150 people protested in the coastal city of Costa Mesa, CA. In the same section, the paper noticed that 200 dissenters converged at the West Los Angeles Federal Building

(Los Angeles has several Federal Buildings). After quoting a reverend who said "War is

128 sweet to them who know it not," the article went on to write "although thousands of young people may die in the Desert, only a handful of the protesters were under 30 years old." Adding to this coverage, the next day's edition remarked that 100 "grandmothers to teenagers" denounced the war in Ojai, CA.

When beginning a December 16 composition on a "highly eclectic peace movement," the LA Times recalled the October 20 protests o f4,000 in New York, 1,500 in San Francisco, and 400 in Los Angeles (interestingly, this reporter discovered a San

Francisco estimate which was not present in the printed October piece). After familiar meditations on the "diverse group of adherents," theLA Times switched their attention to a 100-person protest at the University of California Riverside, and the 400 Los Angelito protesters (in showing occupational diversity, theLA Times spoke with a psychoanalyst, an attorney, a registered nurse, a retired biochemist, and several teachers).

During the next day's news, theLA Times plucked the "hate the war, not the warrior" sentiments o f a 1,500 person teach-in at Los Angeles High school. Then on

December 23, the LA Times moved their coverage to the ice laden land of southwestern

Minnesota. In greeting the protests in a rural Midwestern town, this commentary exposed

Senator-elect Paul Wellstone speaking with the 350 farmers who did not believe in Bush's promises to have a short war.

On the same page, the LA Times incorporated a column by the famous movement scholar Todd Gitlin. In a historical summary, Gitlin asserted that "military deployment and antiwar demonstrations escalate in parallel fashions." Hence, Gitlin noted a

129 "striking" fact that the "antiwar movement has jump started" without a draft, shooting

war, or body bags. In confirming the presence of early demonstrations, Gitlin offered:

By now, teach-ins have brought out 1,200 students at UC Santa Barbara. 400 and then 500 at UC Davis, 300 and 900 at UC Berkeley, 500 at San Jose State, 1,500 at the University of Michigan. Rallies have drawn 1,000 at Stanford and the University of Minnesota, 250 at Indiana, 100 at Chicago's Loyola and 50 at Texas A & M.

After this descriptive monologue. Gitlin attached the hypothesis that the size of the

movement hinged on the extent of elite unity (at this time, some elected officials were publicly challenging the build up of troops in Saudi Arabia).

On January 6 readers learned of a drug counselor who "was not going to sacrifice

my sons to this" (n=lOO). Three days later, theLA Times uncovered some 90 protesters who interrupted a Los Angles fund-raiser for Vice President Dan Quayle. When

informally inviting themselves to this expensive night of GOP dining, the protesters called out "No war in the Middle-East" and "Draft Dodger, War Monger" before they were removed from this garish affair. By January 10, the focal point advanced southward as the L4 Times reproduced a photograph of the UC San Diego teach-in that held "more than 1,000 students" (interestingly, no verse accompanied the visual image of an 82-year- old ex-marine speaking to the college crowd).

In a set of January 11 transcripts, theLA Times gave a set of contradictory evaluations. The "Uneasy Alliance" vignette wrote of a "fragile coalition" that was having a "tough time presenting a unified front." Supposedly the heterogeneous framework of the Los Angeles Coalition Against U.S. Intervention had resulted in a

130 "tenuous" compact between incompatible organizations. In fact, the author intimated that disarmament groups such as SANE/FREEZE were ready to withdraw their endorsement since they saw their collaborators for being "anti-American and too far left." However, the LA Times contested this imagery since a bordering article perceived an "energized" and "galvanized" peace movement. When envisioning a movement with "fortitude" rather than discord, this second treatise predicted that the upcoming protests will

"multiply" in size as the war's deadline approaches (the recent weekend had brought

2,000 protesters to the LA Federal Building, 60 to Representative Christopher Cox's

Newport office, and 300 to a Pierce College rally).

January 12 and 13 netted four articles, while antiwar material disappeared on

January 14. For January 12, the Orange county division of theLA Times looked at the

"several hundred person" UC Irvine proclamation of "giving economic sanctions more time to work." In highlighting the decentralized hubs of the Southern Californian, LAthe

Times found protest in Ventura, Laguna Beach, and South Coast Counties (around 100 at each of these events). An ensuing brief noted that the "fifth consecutive" Westwood rally drew over 5,000 protesters (revealing a glaring shortage of previous estimates).

As the war’s deadline approached, several reporters were assigned to the antiwar realm. This team of reporters submitted eight articles for January 15 and 16. Amy

Wallace noticed that Irvine's former mayor Larry Agon was a panelist at a four hundred person "war dialogue" at UC Irvine and 150 Santa Annan Chicanos bellowed "we don't want them dead." Later Wallace’s estimate of a large San Diego gathering (n=3,500) was supplemented by the quote of "the fact that this is happening in such a conservative

131 military city is an indication of widespread opposition across the nation" (note that the grid andUnion-Tribune saw around 10,000 protesters at this event). Sam Fullwood wrote that "black clad" mourners marched with a coffin in Washington, another 600

Minnesotans torched a flag in a garbage bin, and "as many as 3,000" strollers hampered traffic in Chicago. Finally, Scott Harris added that hundreds of unaffiliated protests were hastily emerging since the sense of urgency "outraced the ability of fledgling national antiwar organizations." In tracing Californian principalities, Harris heard that there were

400 protesters at LA, 500 in an Oakland park, and 400 at the southern edge of the Golden

Gate Bridge.

In traversing the happenings of January 16, Scott Harris witnessed the "several thousand noisy protesters who packed the sidewalks of Los Angeles." Following a lunchtime stoppage of the Hollywood Freeway, some 1,000 protesters ventured into an afternoon vigil at Westwood. In gazing northward, a military officer reported that 500

"vandals" were arrested at the Bay Bridge. Later, the piece commented on the 5,000 that surrounded the UN building in New York, 1,500 who "braved freezing rain" in Missoula, and 1,000 Atlantans who congregated in a "driving rainstorm." When looking at

Southern Californian communities, reporter Tina Daunt found that 500 protested at

Ventura, 200 prayed at a Camarillo, 300 stomped in Ojai, and 2,500 met at the offices of

UC Santa Barbara's president. With the last report of the day, Amy Wallace quoted a San

Diegoan who organizes an antimilitaristic group for youth (day long protests were held in the San Diego high schools of Sweetwater and Helix).

132 The LA Times began their January 17 release with the sentence of "antiwar

activists launched a wave of militant and peaceful demonstrations nationwide after allied

forces had attacked Iraq." Accordingly, the monologue focused on diverse protests.

After saying that tourists were annoyed by the 1,000 protesters who inhabited the "famed

Whilshire Boulevard," the LA Times noted that federal agents struck a nonviolent

protester in downtown Los Angeles. When inspecting Central California, the paper

allotted 78 words to a "small protest [that] angrily tore through police barricades," 31

words to a "less volatile" gathering of 20,000 San Franciscan protesters, and 12 words to

a "several thousand" person boycott of classes at UC Santa Cruz (again, tiny gangs of

destructive protests get more space than immense gatherings of tranquil activists).

Behind these statements were obscure allusions to the protesters "who hit the streets in St.

Louis, Portland, Austin, and Harrisburg, PA."

The January 17 Metro section referred to four regional protests. Twenty-five

surfing protesters met at a pier in Laguna Beach, one hundred colleagues marched in front

of UC-Irvine's ROTC, and 100 Santa Annans listened to a young solider's son say "wars

shoot people." Another report on the 100 Thousand Oaks protesters featured the

imprecise quotes of counterprotesters (with unspecified pronouns, innuendos and double

meanings flourished — "This war is about stopping a madman from getting nuclear weapons" and "I don't think they know what is going on, they just memorize bumper stickers").

The January 18 version had some collections on college protests. At the

University of Southern California, 300 African-American students said it was "offensive"

133 to install a war deadline on Martin Luther King's birthday. Across the city, 1,500 UCLA

educatees controlled the administrative building for hours while 3,000 learned peoples

rallied against the war at UC Santa Barbara (UC Irvine had 500). However, this intensity

was not isolated to college settings. Over 20 Los Angeles post offices saw small protests

(i.e., 60 in Santa Anna, 50 in Ventura, 40 in Thousand Oaks) andLA the Times noted a

"splinter group of 300 demonstrators broke away from a larger cluster of 3,000 and

clogged traffic on downtown San Diego" (interestingly, this report revised the Monday estimate as it moved the size firom 3,500 to 8,000). When leaving the state, theLA Times alluded to the partisans who carried body bags in Boston, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and the 5,000 New Yorkers who seized the Brooklyn Bridge.

When opening a summary of January 19 milestones, theLA Times exclaimed

"young people strike a sense of deja vu with bongo drums, tie-dyed shorts, and granny glasses." After this familiar mantra about the supposedly outdated adornments of youthful wanna-bes, theLA Times suggested that 20,000 individuals marched in San Francisco,

8,000 in Los Angeles and anywhere between 25,000 and 100,000 appeared in

Washington. In ending its story, theLA Times hinted that "protests were staged in

Anaheim, Albany, Baton Rouge, Boston, Fayetville, and Salt Lake City," In a contiguous article, the LA Times asserted that between 2,000 and 3,000 protesters attended the San

Diego rally which had the signs of "They're Lying Again," "Brave Soldiers, Smart

Missiles, Stupid Leaders," and "We Ain't Fighting for Rich Gringos."

After concentrating on these massive demonstrations, the amount of antiwar information dwindled. In the next week, only four antiwar utterances were published

134 (three had less than 150 words). The January 21,22 and 23 snippets suggested that 40 gray haired adults dissented at the Santa Anna Civic Center, 175 multiracial gays carried

“The Worst Type of Hate Crime is War" signs in North Hollywood, and 200 Thousand

Oaks protesters were "unable to identify the driver of a White pickup truck that threw the urine-filled balloon" at them. On January 25, one sermon cautioned that "300 zealots failed in the bid to shut down Chevron’s corporate headquarters," that 75 Quakers had held vigils in Pasadena since November and 200 Pomona juveniles left school after being forced to write pro war essays for their teachers.

On January 27, the LA Times noticed that the "ranks at anti-war rallies surge."

After attributing this surge to the actions of the National Campaign for Peace in the

Middle East,LA Times writers reiterated the range of 70,000 to 300.000 Washingtonian protesters and 35,000 San Franciscans. In the "metro" section LAthe Times knew that

2,000 protesters attended a Westwood rally, but their estimation of the downtown protest was much less decisive. In admitting the methodological dilemmas of making estimates, the Times confessed that this "English and Spanish" speaking congregation had "police estimates [that] ranged as low as 2,500 and organizers boasted numbers as high as 15,000 or 20,000." Then in a unique step toward reflective information gathering, theLA Times offered the golden rule of "doubling the police estimates and cutting the organizer's in half, then divide the difference." After offering this formula, theLA Times viewed banners from Orange County, Santa Barbara, Victorville, as well as groups from Young

Korean United, Greenpeace, Young Communist League, and Lesbians Against War.

135 On February I, the L4 Times reported on the San Diego police sergeant who

bragged of sending "undercover intelligence officers to some demonstrations to find out

the known agitators and criminals." After condoning this covert surveillance of police

defined "agitators and criminals," LAthe Times noted that the most recent SDCPME vigil

drew 1,500 activists while the previous Sunday vigil mustered up 5,000 activists. Three

nights later, an article wrote that February "protests are typically gentle" and that a

"democratic spirit prevails." In equating gentleness with real notions of politics and democracy, the author saw 1,000 New York City protesters as "respectable middle

Americans" that do not belong to a "rebellious counterculture" that calls "police pigs" and sing "vilifying chants such as 'Hey, Hey, LBJ? How many kids have you killed today?"

On February 7, the LA Times borrowed an Associated Press newsflash on the

1,000 urbanites who stood in a pouring rain to denounce George Bush's visit to the New

York Republican Committee. Two days later, the cynical antiwar title read "Protesters reach lull in their battle to end the war" (the use of "battle" has a mocking sound, something such as 'pacifists are warriors too'). Noting that a February 8 Westwood protest topped out at 2,000, the LA Times insisted that early protests were at least three times larger. In explaining movement woes, reporter Scott Harris claimed the public has

"chastised" the demonstrators sinceNewsweek'poW a found 23% of its respondents agreed to a banning of demonstrations.

On February 9 the shrinking movement theme was reiterated. In claiming that only 250 people attended a "speak-out" at Cal State Fullerton and 400 picketed the military think tank named RAND, ilieLA Times insisted that movement was puttering out

136 and that "rallies are losing their intensity." Midweek reports consistently rehashed the

constricting image as the ZXTimes observed only 150 presenters unveiled a mile-long

peace scroll at the Westwood Federal Building and 200 mourners silently marched to a

funeral procession at UCLA.

On February 17 and 22 theLA Times repeated their claims of movement decay.

Although "more than 1,500" attended the February 15 Westwood protest, theLA Times

was certain that the "crowds had diminished" and "the movement was waning toward

immediate oblivion." On February 22, theLA Times wrote on the "scant crowds" at the coordinated protests of 180 college campuses. The paper underscored movement hrailty by offering the line of "even with the prospects of bloody ground war only 150 students protested at UCLA and Occidental College.”

In sharp contrast to reality, these predictions of movement cessation were premature. In noting the reversal of the slide into obscurity, theLA Times reported that the "first day of an allied ground offensive" stimulated some the "largest protest marches in weeks" (February 25). In observing a slight revival in crowd size, theTimes noted that

4,000 Bay Area residents promised to stop the war, 700 San Diegoans carried the "make bread not bombs" placards, 800 New Yorkers appeared at a court house as lawyers tried to indite George Bush for war crimes, and 200 toyed with empty water bottles in Chicago.

The next antiwar account was slotted into the "music desk" of the paper. In viewing a demonstration as a rock concert, music critic John D'Agositino charged that protesters "grooved" to the tunes of antiwar performers. After some tracts on the subtleties of Mojo Nixon's song of "Elvis is Everywhere" and the "energetic production

137 by the Dead Kennedys," the author casually conceded that this "2,000 person gig had something to do with the Gulf War."

After this musical foray, the LA Times offered three March articles. When writing on a "thin Malibu women joined 300 peace activists at their usual spot at the Federal

Building," theLA Times offered another disingenuous title of "Peace Activists Refuse to

Declare Cease-Fire" (activists cannot declare a cease-fire since it is the state which wages war). After this March 3 protest received a quick sketch, the LA Times ventured into

America's com belt. When writing on the Peace Institute of Iowa, theLA Times wrote "In the heart of America, supposed bastion of Richard Nixon's silent majority, lays a peace movement that has grown into a vast patchwork quilt." With their eclectic group of farmers, environmentalists, "nuclear freezers," and feminists, the Des Moines peace movement could generate a 2,000 person protest and have letter writing parties of more than 100 people (no dates). Finally, theLA Times offered their last antiwar feature on

March 12. When visiting a "war victory banquet," 100 activists disrupted a Dan Quayle monologue by wailing "Draft dodger, war monger" and "death for your gain, but not in our name."

6.4 USA TODAY

USA TODAY discovered the mobilization somewhat early. On October 2, an article on "60's flashbacks" discussed protests at U.S. universities (500 at the University of Wisconsin, 500 at the University of California Berkeley, and "some" at a Georgetown teach-in). Then for the rest of OctoberUSA TODAY ran some small blurbs on the antiwar sphere. For example, there were one sentence bits on the "250 onlookers" of a Seattle

138 Vietnam Veterans Against War protest and the 50 New Englanders who crashed a GOP

fund-raiser in Massachusetts. By the end of the month, the October 20 protests garnered

a three sentence story that stated "the antiwar movement is growing. . . rallies took

place in at least 20 cities . . . [and] 300 people shut down Pennsylvania Avenue [while]

15,000 people took over the streets in New York."

For the month of November, USA TODAY showed an inattentive eye. Being preoccupied with stories on "pump up bras" and the fate of Roseann Barr's marriage,USA

TODAY postponed their antiwar stories until December. When December rolled around,

USA TODAY decided to run a full page expose on the burgeoning antiwar movement. A

December 2 sidebar detected a modest George McGovern teach-in at Connecticut

(n=250) and the blockage of the entrances at the Westover Air force base in Chicopee

(n=900). More importantly, this paper spotted 8,000 protesters in Boston.

In the following weeks USA TODAYpcovidsd some sentence long briefs on four small December protests. In early December they wrote on the 70 people who blocked the gates of the Alameda Naval Air Station on December I and the New York protest which was led by Coretta Scott King, Dick Gregory, and representative John Lewis (n was not given). By late December, it addressed a 100 person picket of a Tallahassee oil station.

When the new year appearedUSA TODAY argued that the "Antiwar Movement

[was] Picking up Steam" in their January 7 edition. In this stipulation author Carol

Castaneda cited the January 5 protests in San Francisco which merged 27 denominations and 5,000 parishioners into a spiritual antiwar vigil. Additionally, a stanza recalled the

139 400 homeless activists who locked themselves to the White House fence and the 75

senior citizens who led a protest in Massachusetts. In another section, the paper wrote

about the activists who heckled their pro-war governor Richard Snelling as he was being

sworn in as the governor of Vermont (n was not cited). Lastly, the article advertised a pledge to bring antiwar students from several Ohio colleges to the Oval of the Ohio State

University (this event was never covered in the subsequent pages ofUSA TODAY).

A week later, USA TODAY assembled the information on January 12 protests.

When scanning New York, this paper discovered a religious gathering o f2,000 Catholics who beseeched the president to abandon his war plans. When scanning the rest of the nation, the paper discovered a protest of 15,000 in Portland and a cluster of truck drivers who put antiwar signs on their semis.

As the War came into fruition,USA TODAY allotted more attention to the Gulf

War protesters. In fact, USA TODAY had vignettes of the movement for the days of

January 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21,23,25, and 28. In starting this stretch,USA TODAY ranted on the aggressive tactics of the movement. On January 15 they scolded the 100 people who paralyzed roads in Chicago, the several hundred who obstructed rush hour traffic on the Golden Gate Bridge, the 500 bicyclists who blocked access into a military recruiting station in New York and two dozen New Englanders who commandeered the office of a

Vermont Senator who voted for the war resolution.

On the following dayUSA TODAY ran two articles. One January 16 exegesis echoed the same "disruptive" rendition: "As the nation prepared for w ar. . . In San

Francisco more than 400 were arrested by riot police. . . In Eugene 2,000 people snarled

140 morning rush-hour. . . At the United Nations, 5,000 gathered and 30 were arrested as

they tried to climb the railings around the UN headquarters." Yet, in an ensuing January

16 piece, the LA Times portrayed a clan of 1,000 Los Angeiitos who were calmly rubbing

shoulders with actors Ed Asner and Tim Robbins.

The January 17 coverage of antiwar protests was confined to sentence long

descriptions of regional events. In mentioning a total o f seven January 16 protests,USA

TODAY provided snippets of the 5,000 San Francisco protesters, the hundreds of Texans

who burnt an effigy of George Bush, the plumber in Kannapolis, N.C. who led antiwar

sermons, and the family of protesters who had taken up residence in a post office near

Nashville, Tennessee.

By the time January 18 rolled around,USA TODXT began to repeat its familiar

protesters as deviants theme. Mimi Hall's first paragraph read "Peace demonstrations

erupted in violent clashes with police Thursday, included incidents of rock throwing."

Then the text wrote of the "trouble started" by the 3,000 people who blocked the entrance

to the Federal Building in San Francisco. The text ended with tirades about the

"disobedienf'students who were protesting the war.

During the January 19 editionUSA TODAYncsxHed its antiwar information within

its tale of the "backlash to the highly visible, highly vocal peace demonstrations." In this document on the prowar celebrations, the only antiwar details were found in the listings of future protests(Boston, Des Moines, Houston, Honolulu, Kansas City, Los Angeles,

Minneapolis, Seattle, Shreveport). In a terseness January 21 announcement,USA

rODi4T covered three of these nine forenamed protests. In a cursory overview, the

141 January 19 protests o f25,000 in Washington, 40,000 in San Francisco, and 3,000 in

Boston were granted one sentence each. Forty hours later, this paper ran a human interest

story of 50 antiwar demonstrators who heard jeers and taunts from freedom loving

Americans in Virginia Beach. Finally, the week’s coverage ended with a blurb on the 200

activists who lived in an antiwar shanty town at the University of Indiana in

Bloomington.

In ending its accounts of January protests,USA TODAY did a minimal sketch of

the largest protests against the war (1/26). The description simply read: "At least 75,000 converged on the U.S. Capital in Washington to protest the war; 30,000 rallied in San

Francisco." These minimalistic characterizations foreshadowedUSA TODAYs growing

aversion to antiwar coverage.

After this abrupt synopsis of the January 26 apex the manner of antiwar coverage exhibited a qualitative shift. Instead of focusing on the tactics or size of the movement,

USA TODAY dtcXdcd to predominantly run stories on the moral dilemmas of protesters.

With this emphasis on micro concerns, such as the personality traits of national antiwar leaders, the discussion of size disappeared.

For the entire month of FebruaryUSA Today made twelve references to actual protests. Nine of these references were incomplete since they overlooked size factors.

For example readers were given glimpses into the cases of "some people" who burned a flag in Cleveland, rode bikes for peace in Seattle, and picketed a supermarket in

Lauderdale Lake, Florida. Conversely, only three articles gave detailed references to protest size. In the beginning of the monthUSA TODAY a college enrollee describe a

142 1,500 person protest at Rutgers University. In the middle of the month,USA TODAY

pronounced that 1,000 person funeral mourned the death of an Amherst man who

committed suicide through a seif-inflicted fire (a Buddhist ritual of objecting to the

gravest of governmental travesties).

In the proceeding month,USA TODAY did not reverse its disjointed and

incomplete February practices. InsteadUSA TODXK furnished one March reprimand on

the 50 activists who dumped chunks of Iraqi cement on the White House Lawn. Hence

this image of broken cement ended the two-month streak of intermittent coverage for

USA TODAY.

6.5 United Press International

The United Press International{UPl) started their coverage with a perfunctory

story on August 30. The 173 words suggested that 300 University of California students

protested at the Plaza which spawned the 60's free speech movement. This point was not

missed by protesters as one said "This is Berkeley — students said no Vietnam twenty

years ago and we'll say no to war with Iraq." Moving Eastward, 2,000 protesters turned

out to a September 13 rally in the East Village of New York. This crowd of punk

rockers, professors, clergy, attorneys and students denounced the decision to put U.S.

troops in the Middle East.

With their Pacific and Atlantic bureaus contributing to a story,UP I dispensed

information on four October 20 protests (this meantUPI covered less than one-fifth of all

October 20 protests). When glancing at New York,UPI foimd 5,000 iconoclasts surrounding an antiwar microphone (speakers came from groups such as ACT-UP, the

143 Grey Panthers» the African National Congress and William KuntslePs law firm). When

looking to the left coast, UPI claimed that nearly 500 gathered in Los Angeles and Seattle and 200 demonstrators were attracted in Olympia (a sign read "George Bush and his buddy Mag will put your kids in a body bag").

Postponing coverage for two weeks, UPI picked up the antiwar beat at a

November 10 meeting. In this document, one learned that a coalition of some professional lobbyists were trying to persuade legislatures to evoke the War Powers Act and a large umbrella group had paid for a "war is not the answer" ad inWashington the

Post (contributors were the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Americans for

Democratic Action, SANE/FREEZE, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and the

Women's International League for Peace). After another three-week black out, the protest of 50 Toledoans was inspected byUPPs Ohio department on November 28.

UPI returned the antiwar scene on December 2. In providing a superficial snippet on the 4,000 to 10,000 protesters in Boston, the C/P/staff fixated on the attire of protesters. Following this fashion review, UPI covered the December 3 teach-in at the

University of Michigan. In describing a mixture of "strange bedfellows," the 700 audience members heard speeches from "isolationist" Republicans, liberal Historian

Arthur Schlesinger, and War Resisters League spokesperson. After another episode of

December silence, UP/wrote on the 30 Chicagoans who set up antiwar public address system outside of a rap concert. These NAACP members thought their presence at a

Public Enemy production could galvanize the disenfiranchised minority youth into a collective force.

144 When moving into January,UPI provided a retrospective tale of antiwar actions in

"small-town" Illinois. While talking with a solider’s mom,UPI learned that a band 75

housewives had organized 30 teach-ins in Springfield and small city halls across the state

(75 to 200 participants). After forestalling articles for another week, C/PJ noted that

students from over 40 colleges met and protested at the Ohio State University (1/9).

When estimating the crowd at 1,500, the author relayed that motorists drove from campuses in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, West Virginia, and Wisconsin (also the main speaker was the governor’s wife Dagmar Celeste). Then in a case of vague verbiage, a January 10 dispatch acknowledged that seven people were arrested for affixing antiwar banners to Boston’s Federal Building.

Two pieces emerged on January 11. A dozen antiwar activists delivered leaflets to soldiers at the Military Airlift Terminal in Philadelphia and 11 Pledge of Resistance members made antiwar chants in the U.S. Senate's Galleries when Democratic Sen. Sam

Nunn spoke on behalf of the president's Gulf plan. Next,UPI supplied three articles for

January 12. In Los Angeles, the "fifth weekly rally" coupled state legislators Tom

Hayden (ex-SDS aficionado) and Richard Palemo (former brown power member) with

4,000 antiwar compatriots. Turning to the windy city,UPI saw 100 Lutherans holding a silent vigil and 50 physically impaired activists said "with this war, people with disabilities face the erosion of the budgetary gains that have been won over the decades of struggle" When scanning the Eastern seaboard, UP/found vigils at the famed New York churches of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine and the Riverside Church (this Harlem church was instrumental in previous civil rights mobilizations). In other locales, about

145 300 protesters chanted "War is not the answer" in Paterson N.J., and "hundreds carried signs opposing military force" at the White House.

After skipping January 13, this news service offered four January 14 dispatches.

In New York 1000 youths descended on a Union Square petition drive. In Chicago

"5,000 slogan-chanting protesters clogged the downtown area" and another 2,000 demonstrators marched in Minneapolis. In Inner Grove, Minn., homeowners "left their porch lights burning for a symbolic plea for peace," and 300 cars drove behind an empty coffin in San Antonio.

When the January 15 deadline appeared, UP/dramatically expanded its coverage.

When examining the capital,UPI noticed representative Pat Schroeder speaking with the

1,000 people who jammed Washington’s afternoon sidewalks and that 5,000 marched with Bishop Edward Browning during the night (the residing pastor at Bush's church). In moving to the Golden state,UPI found a busy California scene. Six thousand "colorftil" protesters paraded in San Francisco’s Castro District, 500 artists put a peace sign around the armored Trojan statue at the University of Southern California, and 2,000 "spike­ haired punk rockers, Vietnam veterans, and brown robed monks" stalled traffic on the

Bay Bridge.

In jumping to the Midwest,UPFs Michigan and Ohioan departments found numerous events. Wayne State held a 70 member antiwar forum and police officers who were "brandishing riot sticks" used excessive force against 400 Detroit activists. The

Buckeye state was equally active, as 1,000 protesters surrounded the British Petroleum headquarters and 200 Mothers Against War protested with Oberlin college students.

146 Elsewhere, "several hundred demonstrators turned out for a noon rally in Columbus," and

1,000 Veterans for Peace rallied in front of the city hall Christmas tree in Toledo.

When drifting back to Manhattan,UPI found over 2,000 people of color declaring messages of "Black people must not fight brown, red, or yellow peoples," and "send my son back" at the United Nations Building. In Rochester "a smattering of protesters called for diplomacy to stave off war, " while himdreds of concerned citizens protested in the cities of Ithaca, Albany, and Syracuse.

C/P/found some events on January 16. First off, California was active again. San

Francisco saw an "intense" crowd of 3,000 at its downtown quad and 200 constituents surrounded the governor's house in Sacramento. Further South, the Federal Building in

West Los Angeles was assailed by 2,500 "subdued" protesters and the LA's downtown

Federal Building was swarming with 3,000 antiwar inhabitants.

Adjoining these Californian reports were fragmentary anecdotes on the "several thousand gathered at plaza in Portland" and "50 demonstrators sat down around the large state seal in the Rotunda of the Salem statehouse." When deriding the Philadelphians who choose Independence Mall as a protest site,UPI thanked the police who sequester

350 away from the Liberty Bell. At the collegiate level, UPI saw many incarnations of unrest. Folksinger Pete Seeger performed at SUNY New Paltz and 500 University of

Iowa enrollees bounced through the streets of Iowa City. In Delaware and Virginia, over

20 high schoolers were suspended for refusing to return to their classrooms after they learned of the initial bombing of Iraq.

147 In responding to a hectic round of January 17 protests, C/PJ generated 12 pieces.

Some of these features referred to the "angry nature" of community demonstrations.

David Anderson insisted that 100 protesters “improperly” closed down the Federal

Building in Gainesville, 80 "belligerents" disrupted Internal Revenue Service offices in

St. Louis and Ithaca, and 29 Federal Building occupants were arrested in St. Cloud, Minn.

However, the actions of San Francisco's protesters became the preferred exemplar for this unruly characterization. In displaying a group-think mindset, over half of the regional reports directly quoted the original dispatch on the San Franciscans who "rampaged" in utter disrespect for private property. More precisely, the regional write-ups used the same metaphors of a midnight rally that set a California Highway Patrol car afire, that pedestrians formed a human chain at Highway 101, and "more than 3,000 people formed ranks and blocked the entrance to the San Francisco Federal Building."

While UPI reporters consistently emphasized these Californian skirmishes, the text in the regional stories shows how these tumultuous protests were the anomaly. In

Florida, 70 calmly marched in Fort Lauderdale, 100 tapped their tambourines in Miami and 50 demonstrators in Tallahassee were surrounded by pro war vendors who blasted their ice cream tunes from their Mr. Frosty mobiles (must have been surreal to hear "get your popsicles" interlaced with "no blood for oil"). In the Garden State, hundreds called for the end of bombing. At Baltimore, two hundred held prayers at the center for World

Culture and 150 chanted "shame! shame! shame!" at their Representative who publicly backed the war. In Philly, Ben Franklin's statue was encircled by 2,000 walkers and the frozen land of New England saw 200 protesters huddled in Concord and Providence.

148 Finally, the Wolverine state displayed 150 coffin bearers in Lansing and hundreds in

Detroit.

In scanning the college scene, C/P/found 400 person protest at the Ivies of

Harvard, Columbia, and Dartmouth. Out West, 2,000 University of Texas students marched in harmony and 1,000 University of Southern Californian students calmly walked out of their class at 2:00 p.m. Nonetheless, these peaceful demonstrations were not always treated with reciprocal courtesy. For example, 200 Eastern Michigan

University protesters were pelted with ice balls as they hiked in Ypsilanti and 300

Michigan State students were harangued by skin heads in fatigues.

On the same day, C/P/also discovered that Generation X’ers were not apathetic slackers. In Albany, 200 High Schoolers spoke with a reservist who refused to be deployed to Saudi Arabia while 1000 Borough Middle Schoolers held a "racially mixed" demonstration at their Los Angeles center for the "intellectually gifted." Finally, 100 teenagers from San Diego's posh Ft. Loma High school picketed the gates of the nearby

Naval Training Center (neither theUnion-Tribune nor Swank covered this event).

C/P/transmitted stories from three of their state bureaus on January 18. The

Michigan branch found six demonstrations (1,000 in Ann Arbor, 750 at Detroit, 700 at

Michigan State, 150 at Kalamazoo, 80 at Lansing, 50 at Eastern Michigan), their Ohio

Counterparts found six demonstrations (3,000 at Ohio State University, 300 at Ohio

University, 300 in Cleveland, 200 at Kent State, 150 at Wright State, 75 at Ohio

Wesleyan University) and Californian affiliates discovered four antiwar happenings

(1,000 at San Francisco, 700 at UCLA, 400 at Sacramento). Interestingly the sports

149 section added information since two groups drifted to the camera saturated world of athletics. At Madison, 250 demonstrators pounded on the doors of the gym which displayed a Wisconsin ball game and 15 demonstrators laid down on the Montana State basketball court during televised game of hoops. Considering the extent of small protests for these three states, one can only imagine the momentous length of a 50-state report.

The day of National protests on January 19 received three terse reviews. The full extent of San Francisco coverage was "at least 40,000 marched peacefully along city streets to the Civic Center" and the Washington appraisals were limited to three sentences on the 15,000 protesters who demonstrated outside of the White House. Smaller demonstrations received the same curt reporting as the 3,000 Boston and 1,500

Sacramento protests were granted one sentence of coverage apiece and the "thousands" of

Los Angeles protesters were bestowed one stanza on the car driver who fired a paint- pellet into their ranks.

From January 20 to January 24, UPI offered five stories. January 20 saw 300

Pittsburghites marching down the congested alleys of the city’s open market while

January 21 saw 200 protesters at the Brooklyn Bridge and 50 demonstrate at Chicopee.

Three days later the 500 students at UCLA attended the teach-in which the University reluctantly sponsored. During the next day, the American Petroleum Institute was greeted by 300 vocal opponents as they read their press release on the milestone of oil profits reaching a ten-year high.

UPI's coverage of Californian demonstrations started with "As the Persian Gulf ran black with crude oil" and ended with "35.000 to 50,000 showed up for a San

150 Francisco march." Along the way, the reporter added that "2,000 appeared at Westwood

and 4,000 gathered on the South lawn at the City Hall of Los Angeles." In a Washington

byline, 75,000 to 250,000 had supposedly "attempted to breathe life into a national

antiwar movement." However, this near death metaphor seemed inapplicable since the

author admitted that "busloads of demonstrators from Kentucky, New York,

Massachusetts, the Eastern Seaboard and Midwest converged on the Capitol."

On January 30, the news establishment became the target of criticism. One

thousand two-hundred activists took their grievances to the Manhattan ofBces of NBC,

CBS, and ABC as they asked television executives and news anchors to explain their

"blatantly pro-American picture of the war." After hearing speaker comments on blow

horns, Peter Jennings became the only newscaster to leave their business offices and debate Allen Ginsburg on the issue of "ignoring the growing antiwar sentiment at home."

As February sprung upon the nation, the quantity and quality UPIof articles diminished. On February 6,UPI reported that 900 activists brought a fern and peace symbol to their local Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) office in Chesterfield, CA.

After asking the local DMV supervisor to place these peace adornments next to the public display of American eagle devouring Sadam Hussien, the calm people were told to take

their unwanted gifts elsewhere. On February 7 and 9, New York saw protests of 1,000 and 3,000 demonstrators while February 12 saw twenty Los Angeiitos stop rush hour

traffic on an eight-lane interstate. Forty eight hours later, the University of Pittsburgh and

Indiana University of Pennsylvania threw a 2,000 person gesticulation in the rural lands of Western Pennsylvania. After a ten day interlude,UPI wrote on the 250 dissenters in

151 Times Square and gave a blurb on a Philadelphia event. In its last report,UPI

contemplated on the lives of West Virginian activists who were brave enough to speak

out "even in the face of retribution" (no numbers).

6.6 News Bank

The final data source isNews Bank (NB). This source departs from conventional

news formats in many ways. First and foremost, WB is a repository which never writes

any original stories. Instead, it gathers information through a third-person process.

Initially, hundreds of free standing newspapers send copies of their workN B.to Then,

editors read through these solicited pages and choose the most “provocative” and

“relevant” articles. In the end,N B works as a central clearinghouse that reprints stories

from over 400 local papers.

There are other distinguishable features ofNB. When dealing with operational

procedures, NB runs on a unique time line. Being a quarterly, it does not have to follow

the “dailies” obsession with immediate events (i.e., the fire, drug bust, or tornado of the day). Accordingly, the chance of drawing on four months of reporting can influence the quality and quantity of reporting. NB also has a narrow audience. Rather than sending advertisements to a heterogeneous mass of individual subscribers,NB sells it services to libraries and research institutes. This dependence on highly-literate benefactors could sway its presentation style. That is,NB may have less “tabloid” stories since editors may assume that “educated readers” want substance over sensationalism. However, this claim may be baseless since the “high brow-low brow” dichotomy may be empirically useless since working “proles” will read theWall Street Journal and the educated WASPS

152 subscribe to the National Inquirer (Bourideau and others would claim that these

categories are political tools that reify the supposed refined superioty of those who went

to college and have “cultural capital).

News Bank (NB) began their coverage with an alarmist August 30 article. When the Austin AmericanStatesman discussed the twenty conveners of a Texas press conference, the speakers were characterized as “plotters,” “street fighters” and “rank and

file troops who are ready to strike at America.” However, all of these allegations were conjectures, since the prose lacked any examples of these dangerous predispositions. iVS’s next article spoke of the “unlawful” actions of September protesters. In using the

Oakland Tribune as a conduit,NB inferred that 200 protesters had illegally disrupted a

Republican fund-raiser. In getting the facts, the Tribune quoted police officers who arrested the crashers of George Bush's $1,000 a plate dinner party.

The next bulletin came from the October 14 pages of theDallas Times Herald.

Rather than seeing protesters as hooligans, theDallas Times wrote that “cliched images of radical fringe elements” did no apply to this group. Instead the 50 protesters were deemed “mainstream people” (entrepreneurs, war veterans, college students, senior citizens, and housewives).

Next theNB went back to the Oakland Tribune's stories of mayhem. This

October 30 story conferred on the “rowdy protesters” who "wrecked havoc" in San

Francisco’s financial district. When depending on police accounts, readers were told that

“screaming protesters” set off a smoke bomb in a Charles Schwab brokerage office.

153 poured oil on the steps of the Pacific Stock exchange, and “angrily burnt an American

flag.”

For the most part, the November texts showed a different reporting style. Rather than depicting protester behaviors, the journalists swerved to the psychological predicaments of dissenters. In applying a “human interest” schemata, readers were greeted to briskly sketched biographies (i.e., a November 10 feature looked at a 50-year- old Economics professor who anguished over the possibility of another "misguided war").

While these approaches “humanized” the plight of protesters, they also contributed fewer details on the size attribute. Hence, theWashington Post vaguely scribbled “antiwar activities have consisted of a handful of college teach-ins and isolated protests in cities around the country,” theTopeka Capital Journal ineptly added that some people rallied on the South side of the Kansas statehouse, and theBaltimore Sun haphazardly scribbled that a protest once happened in Baltimore.

Fortunately some November pieces contained information which is relevant to this dissertation. A long piece in theSan Francisco Examiner identified the 600

“ranchers’ sons, clean-cut fraternity men, and long-hairs” who made up a Missoula antiwar protest. In the next stanza, the treatise dwelled on the “20,000-person march on

New York City on Oct. 20,” the November 16 gathering of 600 dissidents at the

University of Wisconsin and the “several hundred UC-Santa Cruz students who blocked the entrance to the local armed forces recruiting office.” Lastly, there were fleeting references to different campus programs — such as the 500 and 1,000 person teach-ins at

154 Columbia and Stanford Universities or the various draft advice sessions at Swarthmore

College, UCLA, San Francisco State University, and City University of New York.

In December, NB disclosed a wider spectrum of coverage. Starting with a story

on the “gentle, angry” people of Westover (MA), aSpringfield Republican report

suggested that a crowd of 1,200 to 1,500 listened to the speeches of a Catholic priest and

a Marine reservist on December 2. On the same date, theBoston Herald conversed on

the “nearly 10,000" people who protested at the Boston Commons. In this ten-paragraph

story, the Herald noted that the protesters “were not violent” and several famous 60's

personas spoke (i.e., comedian Dick Gregory and the source of thePentagon Papers).

In moving the spotlight West, NB included December stories for Austin, Billings,

Los Angeles, and Salt Lake City. TheAustin AmericanStatesman wrote of the December

8 protest which encompassed “draft-age men, college students, and middle age baby

boomers.” One day later, theSalt Lake Desert News told of “the scent of Marijuana in

the air,” and the role of the Unitarians in a 1,000 person protest (I am not sure the

Unitarian reference conveys to the people of Utah). In the final Western story,NB carried the Los Angeles Times account of the October 20 protests (4,000 were estimated in New

York, 1,500 in San Francisco, 400 in Los Angeles and 100 on the UC- Riverside campus).

In finishing its round of December reports,NB selectedBaltimore Sun andAkron

Beacon Journal interpretations. TheSun commentary skipped size estimates and reiterated the protesters are not radicals moral. Reporter Dan Fesperman was astonished to discover that “today’s protests are a coalition between right-to-lifers and pro-choicer,

155 Democrats and Republicans. This is really Main street America [since] it carries an air of

patriotism and respect for the armed services.” Hence, the subtext goes as follows, these

people have some legitimacy since they do not fit the stereotype of draft-dodging traitors.

Then on Christmas Eve, theAkron Beacon sentimentalized antiwar mothers. After focusing on the devotion and “protective instincts” of mother protesters, Beaconthe wrote on the local Catholic Commission that supported nonviolent civil disobedience, the protests of the British Petroleum building (this matemalist frame is ambiguous, on one hand it reinforces the orthodox precepts of motherhood, but on the other hand it legitimizes protesters since many Americans think moms have kind hearts and should look after their children’s safety).

During the first ten days of January,NB solicited few articles. Moreover, these rare articles contained incomplete bits of information. For example,Morning the Call of

Allentown, PA, confined its coverage of the antiwar sphere to a couple lines on the use of

“body bags” in petition drives and theRichmond News Leader suggested that the antiwar movement was led by Palestinians and other Muslims (these skimpy articles lacked any empirical data). Nevertheless, two of the early January articles carried some usable material. When studying the “youth culture,” theColorado Springs Gazette hinted the 70

Colorado College and 40 high school enrollees held a sympathy strike for a Marine who refused to fight in the war (January 6). Then theTampa Tribune reported that the

Sunshine State was having “a rash of street-comer demonstrations.” In fact, the cites of

Tallahassee and Gainesville had protests of 1,000 in the first weeks of the new year.

156 As the mobilization expanded from January 11 to January NB20, enlarged its daily selection of newspaper vignettes. On January 11,NB highlighted Texas encounters as it captured stories from the Dallas Morning News and theHouston Post. Both of these stories focused on the role Catholic Bishops in the antiwar realm. One document centered on a priest who organized 25 war objectors in Dallas while the other stories examined the Houston Bishop who tried to deliver an antiwar message to George Bush.

Then on January 12, some southwestern activists were accentuated again. TheTucson

Citizen reported on a group of Vietnam Veterans who had been arrested for camping on the grounds of the Federal Building. Then in Texas,Austin the AmericanStatesman assembled a minuscule story on the 4.500 Austin protesters. Rather than focusing on the sentiments of little-known protesters, these passages reminisced about the careers of the celebrities who performed at the "Only One Sky” rally (the famous attendees were BCris

Kristofferson, Willie Nelson, and Jim Hightower).

The seven January 13 articles drew from wider geographical domains (even with the geographical extension, the number of publications seems insufficient). TheDenver

Post claimed that 3,000 individuals attended a Denver protest, and 1,000 gathered in Fort

Collins and Boulder protests. After theSan Antonio Express told of the 400 people who attended a January 6 teach-in, it wrote that “protesters are mainly middle-aged professionals with children and mortgages . . . They pay taxes, live within the mainstream of America, and hold nonviolent demonstrations." Finally,Sacramento the

Bee gave an inventory of size estimates. After saying that the “700 to 1,000 mostly young people marched through downtown Sacramento,” theBee posited that the Ad Hoc

157 Committee for Peace had staged a November protest of over 500 marchers (again it’s unclear as to whether sloppy observations or actual differences created these diverse interpretations of protester attributes). Habitually, theBee snatched the stock Associated

Press clippings that had 12,000 people marching through Portland, 1,000 in Tallahassee,

700 in Philadelphia and 11 in Indianapolis.

News Bank picked 7 January 14 escapades. Several of these drafts noticed an involvement of elected officials. TheSacramento Bee noted that 1,000 protesters listened to the Davis mayor read an official condemnation of Desert Shield (the city council of

Davis California voted unanimously on this antiwar resolution). When encountering ‘"the biggest crowd in the country,” thePortland Oregonian noted that an estimated 12,000 to

15,000 protesters frequented the antiwar speeches of some priests and a local city councilperson. This paper also mentioned that about 200 protesters stepped though the slush and melting snow of Ashland, Bend, La Grande, and McMinville, OR.

Other January 14 transcripts described the religious side of the antiwar domain.

The Phoenix Gazette outlined the ways in which a rabbi. Catholic priest, and Methodist minister led a 300 person prayer vigil in Arizona (these leaders did not object to the maneuvers of PaxAmericana, but rather they prayed for a delaying of war and the

“courage not to shoot”). In a similar light, theSan Antonio Express News wrote on the

Episcopalian, Methodists, and Catliolic leaders who eulogized for the "future dead" at

Fort Sam Houston (700 people met at this monument to Texas expansionism).

January 15 was a busy day forNB. On this date,NB usurped nine articles from

Western and Midwestern newspapers (conversely,NB missed newspaper accounts from

158 the South and the East). In adopting Midwestern papers, Desthe Moines Register characterized the lowans who occupied the lobby of their Federal Building. These 250 protesters, one of which was city councilperson, were arrested after they established an antiwar base in the post office (the crime was that the folding chairs and some cards table were blocking a direct view of a Bill of Rights replica). In Indiana, theIndianapolis Star wrote on the 500 protesters who did a “rerun of twenty years ago.” In placing the protesters in a deviant stigma, the lingo claimed that this overly “rhetorical” crowd consisted of “professional protesters, peace nicks, posers, and collegians who dressed for the television cameras” (I would like an operational definition for posers and professional protesters— this obscure concept implies that there are high paid models who strut for the viewing audience). In Illinois, theChicago Sun Times exposed the 5,000 antiwar pedestrians who impeded traffic on the infamous downtown loop. After cautioning that

“this group shocked police with its disorderly manners,” the Sun Times concluded with a harangue against the tagger who painted “this is no movie” on the Amoco building.

When heading North, theMinneapolis Star and Tribune surveyed Minnesotan affairs.

After allotting one sentence to the “peaceful” 10,000 protesters who attended a University of Minnesota manifestation, the Star granted 18 paragraphs to the 1,000 intruders who engrossed the Minneapolis Federal Building. After disparaging the throwing of blood, burning of flags, and the scrawling of antiwar slogans on the walls, the diatribe linked these “rowdy hooligans” with “advocates for the homeless, gays and lesbians, and

American Indians.”

159 The last two January 15 stories came from Western papers. When writing on

Boulder protests, the Daily Camera called a clergy led vigil “genteel” and “serene”

(n=500). On the other hand, the section on the “Queer Nation, Feminist Alliance, and

MECHA” protest belittled the unruly actions of those who placed “raw meat, pig blood and smoke bombs” on the doorsteps of an Army recruiting office. Finally, there were two

January 15 stories from the state of Utah. The Provo Daily Herald notched a quick story on the protest placards at Brigham Young University (i.e., “Ego isn't worth dying for,” or

“whatever happened to a kinder, gentler country?”), and Saltthe Lake City Tribune remarked on the 300 University of Utah students who had a teach-in and the 250 people

“who braved icy conditions” to demonstrate in front of Senator Orin Hatch’s office.

On January 16, MB expanded is article pool. Six of the twenty January 16 vignettes came from East coat outlets. The News Journal of Wilmington Delaware noted that 350 minors created a “Give Peace a Chance” rally at their secondary school and that the twenty-degree temperature did not halt a University of Delaware protest (n=270).

When writing on “hell no, we won’t go” attitude, theBaltimore Sun wrote on the two grandmothers who wore running shoes as they circled the Baltimore harbor with "No to

War and Yes to Diplomacy" signs. Then in an imprecise fashion, the Sun cited a City

College demonstration of 300, a suburban Baltimore protest of" several hundred," and a

200 person American Friends Service Committee protest (no dates for these events).

Later, the paper announced that Maryland Universities "were active in the peace movement" and “many parents are fully behind the efforts of the college activists.” On the same day, theAlbany Times Union composed some lines on the Russell Sage nuns

160 that ran some peace benedictions and the 30 Sienna College students that vigiled around a humble campfire. Then the Boston Globe alluded to the somber 4,000 Massachusetts dissenters who listened to the monologues of famous academicians.

The state of New Jersey added two January 16 primers. TheAshbury Park Press became preoccupied on the reactions to the 25 Americans who picketed outside of Fort

Mammoth. In listing the comments by motorists, the Park Press made the picketers seem like scorned objects (Cold War mentalities came through the slurs of "get a job,” “‘go to

Russia,” or “If we don't fight now, then we might be fighting in our streets’). Then in an antiwar expose which was stacked with American Legionnaire "you have to die for democracy" quotes, the Newark Star Ledger carelessly wrote “scattered protests were held throughout the state.” Then after an aside on the breaking of Representative Robert

Torricelli’s office windows, the Ledger charged that 330 Montclair high school teenagers who stormed out of their classes” and the “80 protesters [who] demonstrated in front of the New Jersey Air National Guard Base.” After this association of window smashing with antiwar congregations, the Star added that "Torricelli sponsored the war authorization act... But it could not be determined if the vandalism was related to his support for military intervention.” Hence, the paper prints an unsubstantiated accusation, and the perception of a violent mob got amplified.

NB used three Midwestern papers for this active day of January 16. The

Cincinnati Enquirer suggested that the 2,000 to 3,500 protesters at the University of

Cincinnati were pelted by some rocks that were thrown by counterprotesters. The

Cleveland Plain Dealer wrote on the 1,000 protesters who barred transactions at the

161 British Petroleum building. In addition, the dialogue contained brief blurbs on the case in which a White counterprotester broke the glasses of an antiwar African-American teenager and the five demonstrators who linked hands in front of a gasoline station in

Athens, Ohio. Finally theDetroit Mews suggested that 200 University of Michigan-

Dearbom ‘‘shouted disapproval. . . [but] remembered to thank the people many Vietnam- era protesters forgot - the troops” (recycling the spitting on troops notion).

Three Texan papers added to the January 16 coverage. TheDallas Morning News briefly alluded to a 10 person event in Dallas and the Seattle throng of 30,000 (this article highlighted the innovations of organizing through the use of email and camcorders — such as the local access documentaries called “Paper Tiger’s Gulf Crisis TV”), and when talking about the 250 protesters “who mimicked the dead by lying on the ground as others drew chalk around them” theHouston Post wrote on the ACT-UP protester who was roughed up by “some men in Army camouflage jackets.” TheAustin American-

Statesman incorporated the activities of Texas youth. After addressing the chants of 100 students who ditched school to attend Governor Ann Richards swearing-in ceremony, the paper devoted a paragraph to the teens who congregated outside of Bowie High school for six hours and the lunch hour protest at Convington Middle School (quotes chided student motives: “most people come for selfish reasons, to get in front of the camera and to get on

TV”).

Papers from the Pacific Northwest filled much of the January 16 platter. The

Bozeman Daily Chronicle alluded to the 200 students who packed a Montana State

University ballroom and theMissoulian wrote on the largest Missoula protest of 2,000.

162 The Missoulian's in-depth essay captured many interesting slogans, such as “our government gives sound bites,” “impeach King George,” and “feed the Poor, not the war.” The Idaho Statesman showed that a Boise State University coalition of campus

Greens and Central American activists could generate a 200 person protest and the

Boulder Daily Camera discussed the 50 nonconformists who sat in front of an Army recruiter’s doorway. In focusing on a 72-year-old German man, theDaily Camera included quotes such as “I can remember when Nazi troops moved into Poland, I was a conscientious objector in that war and ever since.” Nevertheless, this composition dedicated most of its space to lamenting the aesthetic shortcomings of the antiwar percussionists who banged on pans.

When moving further west, the Portland Oregonian wrote on the Veterans for

Peace activities. After depicting the 400 veterans who were urging federal employees to abandon their work shifts, this paper mentioned that Portland had a 12,000 person protest a few nights before (speakers included two city commissioners and two members of the

House of Representatives). In another Oregonian paper, theEugene Register Guard described a “hectic day of activities.” After writing on the 200 demonstrators who ate smoke when the police fired tear gas on their occupied interstate exit, the Register detailed “calm march” of a different group of 1,500 “church goers and pacifists” (the person who led this march was an ex-marine who had fought with a unit that suffered an

89 percent casualty rate in Vietnam). Then the Olympian chastised the “nasty” interveners who seized the chambers of the Washington House after legislators refused to

163 debate the merits of the war (clearly the state’s docket was interrupted as these 70 students slept on the ornate furnishings of this state edifice).

ConcurrentlyNB grabbed a couple Golden State articles. TheSan Francisco

Chronicle deliberated on that city’s “epic day of dawn-to-dark protests.” This piece described the thirty block protest which drew 10,000 “business suites [sic], grandmothers and young parents” to the Chevron building in the Mission District. Next it apprised of the mayor’s reluctance to use coercive police maneuvers against those who disrupted the routine functions of Federal Building employees. However, this annotation ended with an aside on the fervor in which Governor Wilson deployed the Californian Highway

Patrol at “a rock-throwing clash” with the protesters who ventured onto the Bay bridge.

Finally, NB used the San Diego Union-Tribune which focused on the protests at San

Diego City College (interestingly,NB neglected theUnion-Tribune s coverage of the major 10,000 person protest which had happened the night before).

In ending the January 16 coverage, theWashington Times provided a quick synopsis of various antiwar events. In Washington, Jesse Jackson spoke to 2,500 midnight protesters. In Chicago, 100 members of the African-American Caucus of the

Vietnam Veterans Against the War read some passages from Reverend Martin Lurther

King's writings. In New York, the African-American Coalition Against U.S. Intervention brought around 5,000 protesters to the United Nations building and hundreds of Des

Moines citizens disrupted the prowar tirade of Iowa’s governor.

During the next day of protests,NB selected seven dispatches (down somewhat for an active day). In accepting familiar newspapers, theAustin American-Statesman

164 mentioned the 3,000 protesters who shouted “Ann, please take a stand,” and the

Sacramento Bee wrote on the 850 UC-Davis “bikes not bombs" protest and the 300 folks

who created “social unrest” at the Federal Building.

The date of January 17 also saw some previously uncovered areas. The Tucson

Citizen included the quotes of several teenagers as they delineated the attitudes of “800 people who chanted antiwar slogans” (one student gave the familiar Marxist epigram of

“the capitalist government always values money over human lives,” and another student provided the pacifist maxim of “nothing in this world justifies the killing another person”). The Albuquerque Tribune described the “tears” of 300 “peace proponents” who met at the University of New Mexico a few hours after the initial air attack. TheNew

Haven Register noted that college and community activists had held several protests although the Spring semester at Yale had not convened and the last days were filled with

“chilling downpours of rain.” Finally, theGreensburg Tribune Review identified the ISO high school students who marched out of class.

As January 18 marked the first full day of war, the editors atNB utilized 20 papers. Many of these papers wrote on the fervor of these post-bombing protest.

Occasionally the passion was seen as unique or even momentous occurrence. Such as when the Pittsburgh Post Gazzette was impressed that 400 screamers could be so “loud” and “articulate” as they blocked the entrance of the Federal Building or when the

Minneapolis Star and Tribune was astonished by the “antiwar movement that flexed its muscles as several thousand people stomped around in the snow and listened to fiery speeches."

165 This tempered respect was not the typical interpretation as the bulk of papers saw these contentious struggles as a threat to social order. In a few write-ups, there were conspicuous 'protesters as criminal' characterizations. A headline in theHartford

Courant read "Antiwar demonstrations results in arrests, havoc.” and Burlingtonthe

Free Press murmured that protesters were ‘‘obscene vandals [who] . . . burned one small American flag, threw tax forms into the air, banged on the windows of the U.S.

Army Recruiting Office, threw snowballs, and harangued drivers.”

While some reports contained direct statements of distrust or contempt, the stigmatization process regularly deferred to the subtler forms of debasement. For example, papers repeatedly implied that antiwar folks were wholeheartedly disliked or disregarded by mainstream Americans. Some cited public opinion polls that tracked the rally around the flag phenomena, while most reporters stacked their stories with anecdotal polemics from the miniature bands of counterprotesters. For example, theSacramento

Bee relayed a "these protesters suck" comment, the Idaho Statesman included the claim that "protesters are bitchers and moaners," and theCincinnati Enquirer contained the quote "Americans should love it or leave it." Finally, the Boulder Daily Camera wrote that counterprotesters are speaking for the millions of Americans who "want to tell them to shut up" and TheRapid City Journal alleged that Desert Storm supporters told the protesters "You save the Whales, we will save America."

In going bask to the size issue, N B found a new wave of community civil disobedience. Six hundred "staged their own invasion" as they blocked the doors of the

New Haven Federal Building and several thousand did the same in Minneapolis(New

166 Haven Register, Minneapolis Star-Tribune). Twelve people were arrested as they tied green ribbons to the chairs in an Army recruiting ofRce in Des Moines and 55 people gathered in Cedar Rapids, Iowa{Des Moines Register). The Albany Times Union wrote on the 1,000 “passionate, often angry” protesters who blocked a downtown intersection.

NB also found a bevy of routine demonstrations. About 400 protesters marched in

Cincinnati and Tucson, 750 in Detroit, 300 in New Brunswick, N.J., some 80 senior citizens demonstrated in Newark, N.J.{Cincinnati Enquirer, Arizona Daily Star, Detroit

News, Newark Star-Ledger). Two hundred people participated in "Peace Please" vigils in

Boulder and Denver{Boulder Daily Camera). The Cleveland Plain Dealer detailed the interdenominational prayers at four churches (n=650) and Idahothe Statesman found 350 religious protesters in Boise.

NB also captured a dispersed scattering of January 18 college scene protests.

Private bastions were animated asNB found 150 protesters at the University of Virginia and Yale{Richmond News Leader, New Haven Register). Famous land-grant universities had protests as 1,500 individuals attended an UC-Davis protest, 1,000 met at a University of Michigan "We Don't Want Bush's War" rally, while similar protesters drew 400 at the

University of Minnesota, University of Iowa, University of Arizona, and Arizona State

University {Sacramento Bee, Detroit News, Minneapolis Star-Ledger, Arizona Daily

Star). Additionally,N B found wide range of small antiwar rituals at many commuter universities. In Ohio, 103 antiwar coeds were arrested at Ohio University while hundreds dissented at the University of Cincinnati and Miami University{Cincinnati Enquirer).

When examining Michigan's institutes of higher learning,Detroit the Free Press spotted

167 50 Wayne State, 50 Michigan State, 200 Eastern Michigan, and 150 Western Michigan

fomenters. Similarly the Des Moines Register, Arizona Republic, andSacramento Bee

found small gatherings at the University of Northern Iowa, Loras College, Northern

Arizona and Gal State Sacramento (n ranged from 25 to 200).

Nffs January 19 montage included seven bulletins. When canvassing the nation,

Milwaukee Journal said that 7,000 enthusiasts "threw rocks, shouted obscenities, and clashed with police" in the stock exchange section of San Francisco, and that 36 partisans were arrested in New York, 23 in St. Louis, 9 in Austin, 24 in Los Angeles, and 100 in

Sacramento (these numbers are probably severe undercounts since most humans try to avoid incarceration). When addressing regional shindigs,Milwaukee the Journal added that a coalition of 21 labor, peace, and spiritual groups created a 3,000 person protest in

Milwaukee and 2,000 antiwar minstrels chanted "war is no game" as they perturbed

University of Wisconsin football fans (the Madison scene must have been significant since they summoned 2,000 participants to such a risky event).

In sticking to their local mobilization, theSt. Paul Pioneer Press had a hyperbolic title of "Punch in the Face Mars one Antiwar Protest" for the one misguided blow in an

"otherwise orderly demonstration" of 1,000 (the aberration was transformed into tlie eye grabbing hook of the story). The Tucson Citizen insisted that the mood of protesters

"dramatically changed" when the police arrested a 71 old activist who had "incorrectly bolted " into a busy street intersection (the reporter was surprised that chants of "No

Blood for Oil" changed to "No Police State" after this fellow was roughly thrust into a

168 paddy wagon). TheIndianapolis Star wrote on the arrests of 90 "fake dead" who laid

motionless in an Army recruiting Center at Indiana University.

January 20 brought nine stories into theNB files. The Washington Post covered

the Washington enactment of the national protests by claiming that 25,000 audience

members listened to speeches by former Black Panther leaders, a former U.S. attorney

General, and Jesse Jackson. When stirring westward, theSacramento Bee put 20,000 at

the Los Angeles and somewhere between 40,000 to 100,000 at the primary San Francisco rally. The Bee added that the Sacramento protest took "a decidedly middle-class turn as attorneys, social workers, and liberal lobbyists joined hands with students in tie-dyed T- shirts" (n=700).

On other fronts, theMinneapolis Star Tribune stressed a "shouting match" between some members of 700 person Alliance for Peace rally and the 30 counterprotesters from SMASH (Students Mobilized Against Sadam Hussein). With a large medley of contemptuous bystander quotes, the explication seemed to favor the protesting is immoral position (one war devotee said "I think the people who are protesting against the war are ignorant and out of work. They don't have anything better to do. God is a God of just warfare"). TheNews and Observer wrote that nearly five hundred people attend a North Carolina State teach-in (It also led with the Senator Jesse

Helms quote: "I can't help but contrast these clean-cut, dedicated young men in the military with some of those scraggly protesters"). The Pittsburgh Press chronicled the attitudes of some secondary school truants who yelled at 300 antiwar activists. Finally the state of Idaho supplied two stories. TheLewiston Morning Tribune described the

169 Moscow protesters who carried a message for peace to their local representative (n=250)

andCoeur d’Alene Press suggested that 65 "new agers" protested in Sandpoint, Idaho.

Several of these January 20 stories collected the biographies of particular protesters. After estimating a Salt Lake protest at 1,500, the Salt Lake City Tribune collated some brief synopses of the "political careers" of a Sociology professor, a retired school teacher, machinist, and a priest. TheProvidence Journal Bulletin registered the activist callings of three senior citizens who participated in a 400 person antiwar jaunt

(one was a former priest, one a History professor at Brown University and one was a leader of a third party called the Citizen's Party).

News Bank included three stories for its January 21 coverage. TheBlade carried

Father Anthony Gallagher's speech to 300 antiwar Toledeans (Ohio). When supplementing a story on the 1,000 Texans attended a Houston protest,Houston the Post added that one Houston coalition was "irked" by the other coalition's burning of a flag.

The Des Moines Register disclosed that 2,000 participants stood in 12 degrees weather as they called for "U.S. money being spent on the war to be spent at home on human services."

For the coverage of January 22 events, NB again used three stories. TheDallas

Morning News reviewed the"snickers to puzzled looks to outright hostility" for the performance of Guerilla Theater at tlie University of Michigan (antiwar audience= 2,600).

The Newark Star Ledger suggested that 50 Rutgers alumni protested in frigid conditions and 30 Trenton suburbanites held an "impeach Bush" rally. Finally, Omahathe World

170 Herald insisted that 150 individuals partook in a University of Nebraska "Save Lives, Not

Oil" protest.

After January 22, NB dramatically restricted its antiwar coverage. On January 25 the Berkshire Eagle wrote on the 20 educators who were distributing antiwar pamphlets at a Williams College beer party. Then after this dry spell,NB had only two articles for

January 27. The Washington Post covered the January 26 D C. shindig that was

"estimated at 75,000 by police and at least 250,000 by march organizers." On the same day, the Boulder Daily Camera encased a Denver demonstration of 800.

After creating the critical faux pas of forgetting to include stories on the enormous

San Francisco and Los Angeles protests of January 26,NB closed its January coverage with two short blurbs. For January 28, the Tucson Citizen maintained that 600 antiwar

Arizonians were greeted by a "heartfelt rally of some 250 America-at-war supporters." A

January 31 article in theHartford Currant had the title of "UConn peace rally angers war's supporters." This Currant publication situated ten pro war captions around a two- paragraph vituperation on the 250 University of Connecticut protesters (some quotes were "when I see them, I feel real disgusted," and "everyone one else pretty much believes in the war").

When moving into the next month,N Bs coverage went almost silent. There were no dispatches for the first week and a half of February. Then on February\Q,N B returned to the antiwar realm through a personal memoir in theMontpelier Times-Argus.

However this diatribe added no estimates as it demeaned the mobilization for "lacking creativity" and "regurgitating uninspired speeches." Following another hiatus,NB

171 grabbed some messages from the February 18 edition of the New YorkDaily News. This

tabloid had two paragraphs on the actions of the 5,000 protesters in Times Square and

five paragraphs on the 30 counterprotesters (these folks made comments such as "they

want to let Sadam continue his build up of nuclear weapons," "Nuke them now," and

"USA, all the way").

In ending its coverage,N B selected three articles in the last days of the

mobilization. On February 22 theBoston Globe explained that "several hundred"

protesters blocked the Boston Stock Exchange because"oil companies reported record

profits during the final three months of 1990." TheDallas Morning News on February 22

wrote that the "movement is in a quandary" since "only 50 people filtered into a local

protest" and the "war is a rapid success." Finally,NB ended its coverage with a

discussion of Indiana protests. That is, theLafayette Journal and Courier commented on

how the February 23 teach-in a Purdue University was less than one third of the size of

the early 1,000 person protest on January 16.

6.7 Assessing selectiveness

If length was the sole judge of worth, this long section might imply an extensive sense of coverage. That is, the mere presence of bulky stacks of stories might insure an exhaustive account of the mobilization. But, weight is not everything, and the breadth of these accounts seem less impressive when they are translated into aggregated tables. In counting the number of protests covered, table 6.1 demonstrates a sample which found

1322 protests between October 8 to March 7 (this figure embodies a composite score of

172 the sampled news sources). In comparing this total to the separate sources, this

arrangement dwarfs the individual papers. With their abridged and truncated

Date Sample NYT WP LAX USA ÜFI NB

Oct 8-15 16 0 (0%) 2(13%) 7 (44%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) Octl6-23 29 6(21%) 2 (7%) 15(52%) 3(10%) 4(14% ) 3(10%) Oct24-30 8 0 (0%) 1 (13%) 1 (13%) 1 (13%) 0 (0%) 3 (38%) Nov 1-7 11 0 (0%) 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 1 (9%) 2(18%) 0 (0%) Nov 8-15 25 0 (0%) 2 (8%) 6 (24%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 5 (20%) Nov 16-23 35 1 (3%) 1 (3%) 9 (26%) I (3%) 0 (0%) 5(17%) Nov 24-30 22 I (4%) 3(13%) I (4%) 1 (4%) 2 (9%) 2 (9%) Dec 1-7 65 1 (2%) 18(28%) 16(25%) 5 (8%) 1 (2%) 4(6% ) Dec8-15 45 1 (2%) 5(11%) 14(31%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 5(11%) Dec 16-23 30 1 (3%) 2 (6%) 5 (16%) 2 (6%) 2 (6%) 10(33%) Dec24-30 19 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 3(16% ) 1 (5%) 3(16% ) 0 (0%) Jan 1-7 37 0 (0%) 3 (8%) 3 (8%) 5(14%) 2 (5%) 7(19%) Jan 8-15 318 18(5%) 25 (8%) 48 (15%) 20 (6%) 42(13% ) 92(29%) Jan 16-23 375 8 (2%) 24(6%) 58 (15%) 28 (7%) 90 (40%) 66(17%) Jan24-30 51 2 (4%) 6(12%) 7(14%) 4 (8%) 8(16% ) 10(20%) Feb 1-6 34 0 (0%) 3 (9%) 7 (20%) 2 (6%) 3 (9%) 2 (6%) Feb7-13 27 2 (7%) 4(15%) 8 (30%) 2 (7%) 3(11%) 1 (4%) Feb 14-20 67 4 (6%) 2 (3%) 19 (28%) 6 (9%) 3 (4%) 3 (4%) Feb21-28 94 8 (8%) 13(14%) 13(14%) 2 (2%) 4 (4%) 6 (6%) Mar 1-7 14 0 (0%) 3(21%) 1 (7%) 0 (0%) I (7%) 1 (7%)

Entire Duration 1322 54 (4%) 121 (9%) 241 (18%) 86 (6%) 171 (13%) 226(17%) Notes; The Sample column is the aggregated number of covered protests for the entire sample (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). Also, scores in brackets represent the percentage of total sample protests which were covered by that particular paper.

Table 6.1:Number of Protests Covered by Prominent Sources

styles, the best source could not attend even one-fifth of the sample's protests(Los

Angeles Times at 18%) while the worst source fell below the measly one-twentieth stripe

(New York Times at 4%).

While each paper contributed fleeting glimpses of the full mobilization, some

sources were more fragmentary than others. In ranking the comprehensiveness of these constricted sources, theLos Angeles Times andNews Bank stand above their laconic

173 counterparts. The Los Angeles Times found 241 (18%) of the 1322 protests andNews

Bank delivered information on 226 (17%) demonstrations. Beneath this layer of less than

mediocre papers were the clusters of papers with poorer selection rates. UP I found just

171 (13%) protests and the Washington Post studied a measly 121 (9%) protests.

Astonishingly, the flawed showings of these sources were eclipsed by the miserable

displays of the widest read U.S. papers.USA TODAY found only 86 (6%) protests while

the esteemedNew York Times found the meager sum of 54 (4%) demonstrations. Hence,

this lionized paper from New York held the dubious distinction of being the least

competent paper among a handful of feeble compatriots.

In testing the hypothesis of difference between the sources, the data was run

through an ANOVA statistic. This maneuver, which calculates the relative variance

between and within sources, found unequivocal confirmation of the difference hypothesis. The F-score of 6.345 would be statistically significant at any conventional alpha level (p=.000, d f=139). Hence, both the descriptive and inferential approaches confirmed the notion of unequal coverage rates among the sources in this chapter.

When including the time factor, some patterns emerged. The weakest papers were uniformly incomplete throughout the total mobilization. For example, theNew York

Times maintained low percentages as it surpassed the lowly 6% line for only three of the twenty intervals while USA TODAY was a bit better as it surpassed this 6% milestone eight times. The other sources showed some slightly wider ranges of reporting since they periodically left the single digit percentiles. On exceptional occasions,Los the Angeles

Times and UP/surpassed the 40% plateau (October 8-15 and 16-23 theLAT and January

174 16-23 for UPI), while other periods sawNews Bank and theLos Angeles Times run in the

30 to 39% range (NB=2, LAT=1). Finally, theLos Angeles Times andNews Bank led the way in 20 percentile durations (LAT=5, NB=3, WP=2, NYT=l).

In analyzing the paths of these fluctuations, some of these changes were meandering messes. For example, the shifting coverage from theWashington Post took a seemingly chaotic fashion (i.e, rates go up and down regardless of the homefront situation). Similarly News provided the jerky order of 6%, 10%, 38%, 0%, 20%,

17%, 9% and theLos Angeles Times zig-zagged through 52% to 13% to 0% to 24% to

28% to 4% and 25% again. However, some trails were less contorted and some patterns surfaced in some cases. During the beginning and middle phases o f the mobilization,

UPI showed an indifferent outlook (most of its coverage never reached 18% for 1990 and early 1991). Then after a one-time burst of coverage for the busiest days of protest

(January 16 to 23 netted a whopping 40% of the protests), C/P/abruptly went back to its spotty rates of coverage for the rest of the mobilization. In another case of rhythmic reporting. News Bank’s sporadic coverage rate halted in late January. Then after being a sometimes strong source. News BankXook. a February swoon to the New York Times levels of austerity (earlier times intermittently sat in the 20% and 30% range while the

February intervals produced numerous 6% and 4% scenarios).

In looking for coverage patterns, some critics may claim that Table 6.1 overstates the lackluster nature of the coverage. These imagined critics might insist that it is unfair to assume that a single paper should cover all U.S. protests. Instead, critics may assert that sources are obliged to cover only the largest sorts of demonstrations (i.e., theNew

175 York Times should be exonerated from the responsibility of covering small protests in the

Great Plains). Hence, those who prioritize the size criterion would demand a different presentation (conversely, others may dismiss this contention and argue that Table 6.1 understates source inepmess since it simply compares ineffectual papers with their woeful peers).

In responding to these considerations. Table 6.2 isolates the largest protests in the sample (any protest which surpassed the 4,000 individuals was considered large). When distilling these 53 protests into a table, some interesting insights emerge. At one level, different coverage rates did not disappear. With an absence of codified and uniformed coverage rates, there were no exact matches (tallies ranged from 51% to 28%). In fact, the differences between the best and worst sources still showed significance at the .05 alpha (F-score 2.28, df=317, p=.046). However, the difference between the source was not as large as the previous table. Whereas the large protest had a .046 probability, the difference for all protests was stuck at the .000 probability. At another level, the size factor seemed to improve coverage rates. Although the sources did not function on an equal basis, all sources elevated their performance. In fact, three sources heightened their ratings by about 30 percentage points (USA went from 6% to 38%, UPI 13% to

49%, NB 17% to 51%) and the rest saw other sorts of boosts (LAT 18% to 45%, NYT

4% to 30%, WP 9% to 28%).

176 Protests Size NYT WP LATUSAUPI NB

All Protests over 4,000 (n=53) 16(30%) 15 (28%) 24(45%) 20 (38%) 26 (49%) 27(51%)

Size Intervals

160.000 to30.000 (n = 5) 4 (80%) 4(80% ) 4 (80%) 4 (80%) 4 (80%) 4 (80%)

29,999 to 10,000 (n = 7) 2 (28%) 2 (28%) 2 (28%) 4 (57%) 5(71%) 4 (57%)

9,9999 to 5,001 (n = 12) 3 (25%) 2(16%) 7(58%) 2(16%) 4 (33%) 7 (58%)

5,000 to 4,000 (0 = 29) 7 (24%) 7(24%) 11(38%) 10 (34%) 13 (45%) 12(41%)

Note: n represents the number of protests that were recorder by the entire sample (see tables52 and 5.3).

Table 6.2:Number of Large Protests Covered by Prominent Sources

When looking at the separate size clusters, the differences dissolved on the

30,000-plus demonstrations. As these sources found four out of the five “giant” protest,

these uniformed improvements still missed a massive demonstration. When moving to the 29,999 to 10,000 confine, one sees diminishing coverage rates for every source (no source stayed in the 80% range). Additionally, these contractions were not identical as some sources slid into brevity faster than others. Empirically, theLos Angeles Times,

New York Times, andWashington Post all lost over 50% points while the other sources showed a more gradual loss in stature{UPI 9% and 23% forUSA TODAY andNews

Bank). / 177 In a similar fashion, the next cluster saw another general deterioration of coverage rates (9,999 to 5,000). In fact,UP [and USA TODAY plunged dramatically (losing around

40%) while the New York Times andWashington Post saw their diminutive coverage rates reach lower numbers. In sharp contrast, theLos Angeles Times ran in an unique direction as it expanded its coverage for this lower ring of demonstration (percentages went from 28 to 58). Finally, the last layer presented more anomalies. As expected, many sources continued to constrict their coverage for these 5,000 to 4,000 person protests (i.e.. News Bankweni from 58% to 41% or the Los Angeles Times slid from 58% for 38%). Conversely, some of the weakest sources showed some slight improvements in coverage (i.e., Washington Post jump 16% to 24% or USA TODAY moved from 16% to

34%).

In summarizing the data in this table, some patterns can be discerned. Initially, the giant protests displayed uniformly high rates of coverage. Then these higher rates of coverage dissipated as the sources descended down the size hierarchy. Hence, the massive protests were more likely to be covered than the mid range protests. However, one must caution that this relationship was not deterministic. While most sources shrunk their breadth in the successive size tiers, there were some exceptions to the rule. For example, theLos Angeles Times andUPI showed some aberrant tendencies as their breadth of coverage improved in one of their lower stratums (i.e., one group of smaller protests raised from the lame 28% level to the somewhat respectable level of 58%).

However, even with these outliers in place, it seems safe to argue that news sources seem less likely to the cover protests which sit on the smaller side of the size spectrum (please

178 see this impression as exploratory since I can not test for confounding variables which

might influence coverage rates).

6.8 Credibility and size estimates

In leaving the number of protests question, this section will address the issue of

protester quantities. When starting with the truism of “sources must mention protests to

give them size estimates,” one might assume an interaction between estimating capacities

and coverage rates. That is, one might presume that theLos Angeles Times with its

reports on 241 protests will probably find more protesters than the 54 protests which were

addressed by theNew York Times. Nonetheless, this outcome is not a given. The crux

is, less complete sources can see larger mobilizations if they consistently provide lavish

estimates (or the complete sources can systematically dispense dramatic undercounts).

In studying the size dilemma, I have created four tables. To accentuate the matter

of immense contrasts, table 6.3 examines the actual estimates of the largest

demonstrations in the nation. Among other things, these cases exemplify the lingering

effects of divergent assessments. That is, the mismeasurement of a quarter-of-a-million

person can subsequently misconstrue the size of an entire mobilization (i.e., the range of

high and low estimates transcend 100,000 in January).

Although conflicting estimates were the norm, this table detected some similar estimates. All sources have roughly the same lower end estimates for the January 26 demonstrations (the 70 and 30 thousand marks). In frank admissions, the reporters attributed their low estimates to the minds of the police (so they all granted “expert status” to on-duty law officers). While some sources comfortably adhered to the police

179 perspective (i.e., USA TODAY), other papers dislodged these police opinions with extra inputs from activists and reporters (i.e., theWashington Post). These duel guesstimates

Location NYT WP LAT USAUPI NB

Washington 1-26 75,000 p 75.000 p 70.000 p 75,000 p 75.000 p 75.000 p 250.000 a 300.000 a 250.000 a 250.000 a San Francise 1-26 30.000 35.000 r 35.000 30.000 35.000 — 225.000 100.000 a 50.000 Washington 1-19 15,000 25.000 25.000 25.000 15,000 25,000 100.000 a 100.000 a 100,000 a San Franciscl-19 20,000 40.000 r 20.000 40.000 r 40,000 r 40.000 r 100.000 a 100.000 a Seattle 1-14 — — — — — 30.000

Portland 1-12 — — — 15.000 ——

New York 10-20 5.000 r 10,000 4,000 15,000 5,000 20.000 25.000 a 15,000 Boston 12-1 — — — 8.000 r 4.000 p 10,000 10.000 r Minneapolis 1-13 2.000 —- — — 2.000 10,000

San Franciscl-15 — 20.000 — — 6,000 10,000

San Francise 1-16 — — 20,000 5,000 3,000 3.000

Portland I-18 --- — — — — —

Note: "p” means police estimate, "a" signifies an activist estimate, anti "r" represents a reporter estimate, and estimates that have no identified source are without an affixed letter. Finally, the Portland estimate came from another paper in the larger sample.

Table 6.3: Estimastes of the Largest Protests Covered by Prominent Sources

problematized police statements since the second estimates always doubled, tripled, or quadrupled the size of police appraisals (i.e., when theLos Angeles Times encompassed activist excerpts, the Washington crowd jumped from 75,000 to 300,000). Thus, news sources that solely depended on police offerings will convey the smallest of available counts, whereas twin-estimates always net much larger estimates (i.e., the averaging of

180 high and low estimates for DC 26 gets 162,500 for the Washington Post while the single police estimate netted 75,000 for USA TODAY).

When leaving the national days of protest, one notices some very different patterns. The discussion of dual estimates became irrelevant since activist testimonies are seldom utilized (see New York and Boston for the last twin estimates in single source). Similarly, the discussion of congruent estimates among the source becomes another mute point. In fact, contradictions became so prevalent that no days of total agreement appears and only two exact matches surfaced in the rest of the table (two of three sources agreed on Minneapolis 1/13 and two of five concurred at San Francisco

1/16). With this lack of consensus, most of the sources donated wildly paradoxical appraisals of the same event. Start with the comically incompatible estimates of the

October 20 New York protest. News Bank thought 20,000 marched through Manhattan,

USA TODAY put 15,000 at the event while UPI ond the Los Angeles Times claimed

4,000 to 5,000 showed up (others smacked discordant numbers onto the crowd). For other bits of absurdity, turn to the San Francisco protests on January 15 and 16. Hence, it becomes blatantly clear that the presence of discordant size portrayals are inherent to the business of news production.

In looking for patterned under or over counts, some proclivities emerged. When ranking papers from highest to lowest, both News Bank and theWashington Post tended to provide higher estimates. News Bank had 7 higher end estimates, one medium estimate

(San Francisco 1/15) and one low estimate (San Francisco I/I6). Similarly, the

Washington Post had five high estimates and one medium estimate (New York 10/20).

181 Conversely, the New York Times consistently supplied lower estimates. Of its six estimates, the New York Times reached the higher and medium peaks in one time shots

(San Francisco 1/26 and New York 10/20). Finally, C/P/showed several low estimates

(Washington 1/19, New York 10/20, Boston 1/12, Minneapolis 1/13, San Francisco 1/16) and a few medium estimates(Washington 1/26, San Francisco 1/19, San Francisco 1/26).

With these details in place. Table 6.3 facilitates some tentative insights (Clearly the tables “n” is too small to produce any definitive results). First, police estimates were always lower than activist estimates. Second, these organizations routinely encompassed police sentiments. Third, these same sources rarely included activist viewpoints.

Subsequently, the sources which boycotted activist perspectives left a smaller movement impression than those sources which had spatterings of activist interpretations (i.e.,USA

TODAY vs IVashington Post). In another vein, even without police assistance, some sources routinely gave lower estimates on their own part. Simply put, the Washington

Post andNews Bank generally gave the highest estimates, the New York Times habitually gave the lowest estimates, and the other sources fell within these outer extremes (future research ought to try to explain these separate affinities).

Table 6.4 takes us to a condensed version of the total scene. When combining all estimates, the sample found 1,211,166 protesters. As this compilation discovered over a million participants, the individual sources never reached the half-a-million amount.

Instead,News Bank and theWashington Post found around four-hundred fifty thousand protesters while their companions chopped off even more protesters{UPI 402,892, Los

Angeles Times 3X9M9, USA TODAY2&2,5\(>, and theNew York Times 276,380). Thus,

182 News Bank with its highest total still missed over three-quarters of a million protesters while its lackluster compadres provided impressions that are even more off base.

With these organizations offering such different total counts, the ANOVA generated an interesting result. Although the differences between the sources seem striking, these deviations were not broad enough to be deemed statistically significant.

Stated otherwise, the model which simultaneously tested the difference between all of the sources could not reject any null (F-score of 1.455, p=.19, df=139).

Date Sample NYT WP LATUSA UPI NB

Oct 8-15 2.685 0 275(10%) 70 (4%) 0 0 50 (2%) Oct 16-23 28.794 16625 (57%) 9500(33% ) 11800(40%) 15300(51%) 6200 (21%) 21900 (76%) Oct 24-30 6.478 0 200 (3%) 600 (9%) 48 (0%) 0 900(14% ) Nov 1-7 1.246 0 50(4% ) 0 0 300 (24%) 0 Nov 8-15 4.726 0 100 (21%) 700(15%) 0 0 2400 (50%) Nov 16-23 II.I9 5 85 (0%) 300 (0%) 1910(2%) 0 0 1700(15%) Nov24-30 6 J I3 0 600 (9%) 400 (2%) 0 775(12%) 350 (5%) Dec 1-7 40.653 0 3000 (7%) 5865(14%) 9470 (23%) 7000(17%) 14725 (36%) Dec 8-15 24.114 0 8100(33%) 3250(13%) 0 4000(16%) 1295 (5%) Dec 16-23 7.345 0 18(0%) 2220(30%) 135 (2%) 0 900 (12%) Dec 24-30 3.461 51 (1%) 0 100(3%) 75 (2%) 260 (8%) 0 Jan 1-7 18.630 0 390(2% ) 1600(9%) 5625 (30%) 150(1%) 1645 (9%) Jan 8-15 299.789 27452 (9%) 21454(7%) 37126 (12%) 34854 (12%) 37374(12%) 27607 (9%) Jan 16-23 362.068 35.633 (9%) 171885(47%) 135038(47%) 99673 (28%) 125243(35% 195131(54% Jan 24-30 275375 187515(68%) 223775(81%) 98720 (36%) 105500(38%) 212800(77% 185370(57% Feb 1-6 24,732 0 3600(15%) 7025(28%) 1600 (7%) 2000 (8%) 450 (2%) Feb 7-13 7.971 105(1%) 700 (9%) 970(12%) 100(1%) 3520 (44%) 200 (3%) Feb 14-20 37.128 6914(19%) 250(0% ) 4045(11%) 1088(3%) 2340 (6%) 5300(14%) Feb 21-28 45.363 2000 (4%) 5450(12%) 7650(17%) 48 900 (2%) 1500(3%) Mar 1-7 3.100 0 1156(37%) 100(3%) 0 30(1% ) 50 (2%)

Entire 1211166 276380 450.803 319.189 283.516 402.842 461.473 Duration (23%) (37%) (26%) (23%) (33%) (38%)

Notes: The Sample column is the aggregated number of protesters for the entire sample (see figures 5.2 and 5.3). Also, scores in brackets represent the percentage of sample protesters that were covered by that particular paper.

Table 6.4:Protest Size by Prominent Sources

183 When contemplating this statistical output, I developed some reason that promoted this counter-intuitive outcome (at face value, I thought the differences of 50,

100 and 200 thousand protesters would create a significant computation). There are several pressures which mitigated the colossal differences between the sources. At a core level, the phenomenon itself brought a great deal of variance within. After going through small modifications during the generally slow periods of 1990 (October 16 to 23 and

December I to 7), the size skyrocketed from January 16-30. Then after these two weeks of grandeur, the movement cascaded to low February marks before its late February blip.

Adding to this diverse protest cycle were the inconsistent and arbitrary practices of the papers. In showing uneven propensities, many of the sources seem to unpredictably vacillate between different levels of reporting. In its capricious manner,USA TODA Y assembled the successive rates of 53%, 0%, 0%, 0%, 0%,0%, 2%, 2%, 30%, 12%, 28%,

38%, and 7%. Similarly, the other sources followed such twisted paths (i.e..News Bank's tempestuous roller-coaster went from 2% to 76% to 14% to 0% to 50% to 15% in a two month period and f/P/rambled from 12% to 35% to 77% to 8% to 44% to 6% in another interim). Even the notoriousNew York Times hit some unanticipated spurts of excellence

(October 16-23 and Jan 24-30).

After noting such disjointed and convoluted paths, one may infer that the estimates were totally random and whimsical. However, total chaos did not rule as some loose regularities emerged. In many cases, the extent of “completeness” seemed linked to mobilization spurts (middle October and late January). More precisely, in the slower days of 1990, most sources dwelled in the lower size percentiles. Conversely, during

184 mobilization surges, several of the sources came closer to the sample’s total. For example, UPI languished with numerous small rates until it netted 35% and 77% in later parts of January. Similarly, the majority of sources showed their best scores in the surges of October and January(New York Times hit spates of 57 and 68%, Washington Post 47 and 81%,USA TODAY3% and 51%,UPIlT/o, andNews Bank 76, 54, and 67% during surges).

Although this surge-coverage relationship shows signs of existence, this connection is not without equivocation (many counter-factuals show that the presence of surges did not guarantee improved days of coverage). Before the war began,UPIàxà not show an enormous increase in October and some sources saw modest increases in the

January peak (NYT sat at 9% in the middle of January andUSA TODA Y saw minuscule increases for the same period). Furthermore, dramatic increases did not occur during the last surge in February. In fact, none of the sources came close to their middle January booms since only theNew York Times teetered on the 20% line for late February.

Subsequently, some confounding factor blocked the surge/coverage relationship during late February (perhaps the notions of patriotic duty that marginalizes dissent during a time of war).

In trying to rate the best to the worst sources, I was in a bit a predicament. When ranking the source percentages for the twenty intervals (i.e., October 8-15), one sees clear and not clear propensities. Obviously, theNew York Times andUSA rOD/4 F consistently lingered in the lowest quadrants. But this banishment was not consistent

185 as they sometimes provided the best numbers on some episodes (i.e., October 16-23 and

February 14-20 for the New York Times). While these sources were indisputable fiised to the lowest slots, the battle over the “best estimator” was much murkier. The remaining sources took rotating turns as the best and second best source for an interval. So, to rank these sources, 1 went to the ANOVA for one last time.

When trying to discern the relative merits of each source, I compared the source’s scores to the sample’s scores (sample vs NYT, sample vs WP, sample vs LAT, sample vs

USA, sample vs USA, sample vs NB). Knowing that the F-score is a standardized statistic, I reasoned that the smallest F-scores would indicate the best sources. Hence,

Source df F-score Probability News Bank 39 1.814 .186 Washington Post 39 1.823 .180 UPI 39 2.178 .148 Los Angeles Times 39 2.720 .100 New York Times 39 3.134 .082 USA TODAY 39 3.340 .075 note; table consists of six ANOVA’s in which each source was separately compared to the sample data.

Table 6.5: Comparing Separate Sources to the Sample

Table 6.5 presents F-score distributions. As expected,USA TODAY and theNew York

Times were the furthest from the sample (largest F-scores). Next satthe Los Angeles

Times with a F-score that resided halfway between theNew York Times and theUPI.

Then after another jump theWashington Post andNews Bank lounged in greater obscurity.

186 6.8 Concluding remarks

In the methods sections, the reader was introduced the concepts of source

selectiveness and estimator biases. Drawing information from these “prominent sources,”

this chapter adds some vital insights. Ultimately all of the sources failed the litany test

for comprehensiveness. None of the sources could reach the minimal plateau of

mentioning one-fifth of the sample’s protests, so their value as empirical measures is

highly suspect (they are neither reliable or valid). However, this group of flawed sources

were not equally myopic. For example, the sluggish lapses of theNew York Times and

USA TODAY were more severe than the information holes of theLos Angles Times and

News Bank. Hence, not all of the sources were the same since the sources differentiated on their capacities to attend protests (LAT covered 18% of the sample protests, NB 17%,

UPI, 13%, WP 9%, USA 6%, and NYT 4%).

After discovering this array of derelict accounts, one encountered the coverage and size connection. In effect, increased sizes seemed to translate into increased coverage possibilities (all sources showed wider breadth in the “large” protest table). However, the size factor was not a panacea. Even with some improved scores, the focus on large protests did not end source negligence. Simply put, size did not ameliorate the source ineptness practices since the best sources still missed about half of the largest demonstrations while the worst papers neglected over two-thirds of the largest demonstrations. Hence, all of the discussions on selectiveness raises a cautionary tale. A tale in which papers missed most protests and the inclusion of size factors did not eliminate the persistent selectivity errors of media sources.

187 In another caveat, the size factor did not dramatically alter the comparative

selectiveness of these sources (i.e., sources maintained their relative strength regardless of

the extraneous variable called size). In most cases, the lower ranked sources persevered

in the bottom stratums for both large and small protests (theNew York Times, andUSA

Source All Source Large Protests Protests

LAT 18% NB 54% NB 17% UPI 49% UPI 13% LAT 45% WP 9% USA 38% USA 5% NYT 30% NYT 4% WP 28%

Table 6.6:Percentages of Coverage

TODAY moved only one spot). Similarly, the news-services moved only one slot{News

Bank andUPL) while the higher papers migrated the most as they shifted two spots{Los

Angeles Times and theWashington Post).

As the focus moved to the realm of estimating practices, other conclusions emerged. With a hodgepodge of irreconcilable statements, each of the largest protests received a contradictory mix of idiosyncratic estimates (never did the six sources agree on the size of these largest protests). As each protest was portrayed differently, some of the proportions reached the point of absurdity. For example, on October 20, the various sources claimed the streets of Manhattan were filled with four, five, twelve, fifteen, and twenty thousand protesters.

Another line of insights came from these large protest discussions. The deliberation stressed the repercussions of the “who gets heard” matter. When the police

188 were the sole voice of reason, the crowds were characterized in much smaller terms.

Conversely, size portrayals exploded when these police perspectives were situated against activist interpretations (reporters and activists generally doubled or tripled the police statements). However, as soon as this realization came into fruition it became irrelevant, since sources chronically exercised a sole estimator. Finally, the study of estimator biases became impossible since sources regularly left their estimates unattributed to any sort of human (as if praxis had nothing to do with the numbers).

After this examination of the largest protests, the analysis turned to an aggregated representation of the entire mobilization. With their varied degrees of success, all of the sources provided remarkably incomplete size portrayals. As the “best” source. News Bank neglected 749,693 of the sample’s 1,211,380 protesters. In greater shows of futility, the Washington Post missed 760,363 protesters, C/f7 avoided 808,324, the Los Angles Times omitted 891,977, USA TODAY forgot 927,650, and the New York

Times bypassed 934,786. Hence, with most of these sources missing over half of the sample’s protesters, one might contend that these sources were better at missing protesters than finding them.

When looking at the temporal side of the estimating, one sees several manifestations. First, any pretense of consistency is absent. In it place was a set of sporadic and inexplicable estimating practices (i.e., quality bounced from 2% to 76% to

14% to 0% to 50% to 15% to 5% to 36%). However, these erratic and uneven interludes were sometimes superseded by a faint pattern. Frequently, sources improved their comprehensiveness during the moments of activist surges. Nevertheless, this surge

189 phenomenon was not constant as sources showed great indifference to the last surge of mobilization. Thus, one may wonder why the relationship did not hold up during the last wave of February (Did editors grow tired of the protest story? Did papers lack the labor pool to cover pretests during a time of impending land invasions? Did the news engage in self-censorship during an ongoing war?) Finally, the apparent differences among the raw score did not translate into a statistically significant difference. That is, the unpredictable manner of estimating meant that every source could be considered equally inept at discerning protest sizes.

In finalizing this chapter, it seems obvious that none of these sources did an impeccable job of coverage. With these flaws becoming transparent, the crafty activists and researchers ought to foresee the possible political and methodological ramifications of using such misleading news sources. Thus, the concluding chapter will elaborate some procedures that can assist it the vexing task of delineating protest cycles.

190 CHAPTER?

CONCLUSIONS

7.1 The Salient Questions

The project opened with a list of questionable claims. While the specificity of these claims varied in form, they shared similar evaluations of the Gulf War protests. In totally missing an antiwar presence, some individuals believe that no Americans protested against the Persian Gulf War. Others insisted that the mobilizations garnered only a small trace of protesters (i.e., peace historian Charles Chatfield wrote, "no significant opposition evolved"). A third interpretation acknowledged a cache of protesters before it dismissed the mobilization as yet another modest campaign (i.e.. Sociologist Sam

Marullo said that Gulf War created a brief "'minisurge' in peace activism"). What links these perspectives is the assertion of a nonexistent or meager antiwar collective.

As a skeptic, I found these claims highly suspect. The logic seemed shaky and the conclusions sprung from the dubious use of anecdotal evidence. To counteract their shoddy investigations, I created a research design that explored three substantive concerns. The first question dealt with protest frequencies. Simply, I wanted to know how many protests happened within the United States? The second question looked at

191 size issues. This meant I tried to comprehend how many people attended these demonstrations. The third question brought these issues into a temporal context. That is,

I placed the mobilization’s growth and decline within a chronological continuum.

To address these questions, a multifaceted research strategy was implemented.

Initially, the researcher used the grid-density approach to study the protests of San Diego.

With these empirical observations chronicled, the analysis then veered to secondary data sources. For the San Diego sampling frame, I accessed the computer records of the local for-profit newspaper{San Diego Union-Tribune). After this case study was completed, the national mobilization was examined. In seeking the population of U.S. protests, an elaborate sampling of news sources was constructed. With a stratified sample in place, news sources came from the categories of “national newspapers,” “national news sources,” “regional papers,” and “alternative presses.” With the intentional move toward the diversity of sources, it was hoped that the sample’s breadth would enhance the reliability and validity of this project.

Within a week into the dissertation, I realized that this sampling procedure stimulated a secondary line of questions. In effect, the use of many informants begged the question of informant quality. In submitting to these nagging questions, my mind wondered if any of these informants did a superior job of covering the protests?

Similarly, I reflected on the ways in which the grid-density and the various news sources would characterize the cycles, and 1 contemplated the idea of some sources providing unsatisfactory and misleading interpretations of the protests. Hence, this dissertation gravitated toward an analysis of media reports.

192 To analyze the quality of the sources, I turned to the concepts of “selectiveness” and “estimator biases.” The topic of selectiveness deals with the comprehensiveness of coverage. That is, quality hinges on the extent in which newspapers cover national and local protests. For example, one can examine the worth of theChicago Tribune by examining the ratio of Chicago protests which made their way into theTribune's printed pages. However, the proportion of covered protests is not the only pressing issue.

Readers must evaluate the communicated messages as well. That is, the way in which protesters are characterized has a great bearing on the fallaciousness of news reports.

While protesters can be qualitatively portrayed as something they are not, distortions can also come through quantitative means. That is, reporters and editors can utilize systematic counting techniques whichrfry to accurately discern event size, or media makers can develop quirky measurements that misconstrue crowd sizes. Hence, the movement researcher should explore the degree in which news sources amplify or obfuscate the knowledge of protest events. In doing so, the critic should ask the frequency of protests covered, the consistency of counting practices, and the skills of those individuals who are using such counting techniques.

7.2 A small mobilization it was not

On the matter of size, the analysis reached several conclusions. Even with an absence of operational definitions for "maxi," "midi," or "mini" surges, the data refutes the “minamalistic” portrayals of the mobilization. On the question of protest numbers, apathetic mobilizations do not amass at least 1,365 protests nor do stale campaigns encompass more than four hundred cities. Likewise, sluggish movements do not bring

193 protests to “small town USA” nor do they have over one million protesters. On the subject of individual protests the mobilization showed moments of grandeur. One

Washington protest had over 150,000 participants while a San Francisco protest teetered on the 100,000 mark (the Washington Post has only seen thirteen protests that were larger than the January 27 Gulf War protest). In other regions, local protests reached considerable heights. Four provincial protests surpassed the 12,000 designation, four demonstrations had around 10,000 adherents, and two protests netted 8,000 participants.

Finally, in putting these protest sites into context, the news sources found 74 Gulf War protests with over 3,000 participants while a thirty-year study ofWashington Post articles found only forty-three protests that reached that plateau (Everett, 1992).

Nevertheless, one should not overstate the size of the movement. While systematic studies of protest cycles are rare, studies of the Depression era strikes and the

I960's sit-ins found larger mass movements (of course, future studies may find larger mobilizations). Moreover, some historians have argued that the major Vietnam protests dwarfed the size of the Gulf War demonstrations (the 1969 Moratorium and the 1971

Vietnam "Out Now" rallies probably tripled the largest Gulf War protests). Additionally, the “new left” presence on I960's college campuses was much larger than the

“Generation-X” protesters of the I990's.

7.3 A Unique Protest Cvcle

After addressing the size issue, some auxiliary matters were inspected. When addressing the protest cycle, this mobilization has an unique antiwar trajectory. Most antiwar movements are slow growing proceedings which react to ongoing wars. That is,

194 antiwar sentiments usually wallow in anonymity during the war’s initial phases. Then if war promises go astray and Americans perceive excessive causality tolls, then some mass movements have surfaced (i.e.. Unionist antiwar protests came after Lincoln installed a draft midway throughout the Civil War). Antithetically, this mobilization did not emulate this customary path. Rather than seeing waves of protests after the body bags amassed, the mobilization had significant protests before the war commenced. More precisely, the frenzy of local protests came on the eve of bombing (January 12 to January 18) and the largest national protests happened on the first weekends of air raids (January 19 and

January 27). Hence, this mobilization ran on an atypical schedule since many of its protests preceded the ground offensive. On the other hand, this was not a purely preventative mobilization since the rush of activism corresponded with the initial air raids of Iraq.

In elaborating on this timing issue, an assessment of the entire protest cycle seems in order. When examining the entire development of the protest cycle, the four-staged models of Elbaum and Peace seem moderately accurate (see table 7.1). In the early stages of the mobilization, there is a clear-cut correspondence between the author’s descriptions and the sample’s information (please see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). As predicted, two stages appeared in 1990 and early 1991. The pace started slowly with a small number of protests happening in the organizational activation stage (August to early October), and expanded slightly in an organizational extension stage (late October to early January).

Similarly, the forecasts of a January 15 rush were substantiated. At a numerical level, hundreds of protests were unfolding around the war’s deadline (85 protests on January

195 14,144 on January 15,95 on January 16, and 133 on January 17), and 40 of 50 largest

protests surfaced during the “days of fiiror”(January 12 to January 26). On a spatial level,

these antiwar torrents went beyond “liberal” urban centers and careened into reputably

conservative towns. Thus, all of the perspectives agree on when the first three stages

appeared.

Roger Peace Max Elbaum Sampled Newspapers Organizational Activation Organizational Activation Organizational Activation August 15 to October 19 August 15 to October 19 August 15 to October 19 Organizational Expansion Organizational Expansion Organizational Expansion October 20 to January 7 October 20 to January 7 October 20 to January 7 Organizational Explosion Organizational Explosion Organizational Explosion January 8 to February 7 January 8 to February 21 January 8 to January 28 Organizational Implosion January 29 to February 15 Partial Rebirth February 16 to February 26 Organizational Decline Organizational Decline Organizational Dissipation February 8 to March 15 February 22 to March 15 February 27 to March 15

Table 7.1 : Competing Descriptions of the Protest Cycle

While the models and the newspapers agreed on when the peak began, they contradicted each other on the date of the peak’s end. The sample said the peak ebbed by

January 28. Peace said the peak stretched into the first week of February while Elbaum insisted that the peak sputtered at the third week of February. Therefore, they dispute the

196 duration of the movement’s zenith since the descriptions confined the rush to two, three,

and five weeks.

When moving into February, the models and the sample departed again. As

Elbaum and Peace prolonged the movement’s climax into February, they did not identify

any February rejuvenations (one does not rejuvenate something that is already strong).

On the other hand, the sample’s assertion of a late January tailspin permitted a different

characterization. That is, the sample’s detection of a January collapse let the tepid

February revival seem like a partial rebirth. Thus, if the sample’s portrayal is accurate,

the mobilization traversed through six different stages. The mobilization supposedly

started with an organizational activation stage (August to early October), and then went to

an organizational extension stage (middle of October to the first week of January). These

stages were replaced by an organizational explosion stage (Middle of January to the last

days of January), an organizational implosion stage (the first two-and-a-half weeks of

February), a partial rebirth (last weeks of February), and an organizational dissipation stage (first weeks of March).

Before accepting this six-staged portrayal as reality, some cautionary remarks may be in order. It would be the ecological fallacy to equate the sample measurements with the actual world. While such extrapolations are tempting, they could lead to potential misimderstandings. In fact, there are several reasons for such a warning. One dilemma is that my operational definition of dissent overlooks many forms of antiwar actions. With an emphasis on protests and public displays of contention, the private forms of antiwar resistance were excluded firom the analysis. Consequently, this study

197 could have missed a transformation of tactics during any stage of the mobilization. That is, the instrument that recorded a constriction of early February activism could have simply misread a widespread shift to low-profile forms of opposition (i.e., in February activists could have turned to the hidden resistances of burning incense at military bases, scrambling military satellite transmissions, or convincing troops to desert the military).

Second, the media data should not be taken at face value. News sources are not objective conduits of unbiased information. Rather, news outlets craft antiwar fables through an intricate process of choosing what is newsworthy. Since such practices can be faulty, the next section will recap some of the findings on the extent of media misinterpretations of reality.

7.4 Checking the Veracitv of a Local Newspaper

The San Diego chapter highlighted some media shortcomings. First, the local paper had selection problems. TheSan Diego Union-Tribune lacked comprehensiveness since it missed 45% of the region’s 33 protests. Second, theUnion-Tribune's acts of omission followed a temporal order. As the grid/density followed the cycle throughout the total mobilization, the Union-Tribune clustered their attention around the January outburst. Conversely, the Union-Tribune presented a truncated version of the mobilization since it neglected a large proportion of the early and the late protests (i.e., the Union-Tribune covered 33% 1990 protests and missed three of the February protests).

In connecting these findings to broader patterns, these findings may indicate a widespread tendency of antiwar blackouts during an apparent route of the enemy. That is, when people on the domestic firont think that the war is relatively quick and painless, then

198 editors may be reluctant to print those stories which challenge the notion of a triumphic

intervention. If this is so, then the supposed deficiencies of Elbaum and Peace’s models may be inflated since the sampled papers could have exaggerated the February decline.

Or put otherwise, attitudes of a victorious conquest could have mitigated the newspaper’s capacities to cover February protests (unfortunately, these issues cannot be fully explored since there is an absence of national grid/density coimts).

Adding to theUnion-Tribune's porous selection habits was a fully impaired counting system. With its faulty observational routines, theUnion-Tribune consistently undercut the grid/density tallies. In absolute terms the grid put around 37,450 protesters in San Diego, while theSan Diego Union-Tribune found 24,550 protesters in the same terrain. At the individual protest level, similar shrinkages emerged. Of the 14 cases of grid and newspaper counts, theUnion-Tribune undercut the grid/density on 12 separate occasions. Furthermore, many of the undercounts were not of the trivial sort. There were six occasions in which the paper undercounted the grid by at least 500 people and four instances in which the paper erased 1,500 or more participants.

7.5 Examining the Comprehensives of Prominent Sources

After relaying the foibles of the San Diego Union-Tribune, the infallibility of the national news sources came under scrutiny. When analyzing the performances of prominent news sources, these reputable sources did not fare very well. As a totality, the sources were remarkably inept at finding protests (see table 6.1). The best source, theLos

Angeles Times, missed 82% of the sample’s total protests while three papers missed more than 90% of the protests{USA TODAY, Washington Post, andNew York Times). Hence,

199 those who read one news source would get a grossly deflated impression of the number of

Gulf War protests.

As every source faltered on the selection issue, each source had their own level of incompetence(Los Angeles Times at 18%, News BankaX. 17%, UPIdX 13%, Washington

Post at 9%, USA TODAY at 6% and theNew York Times at 4%). With each source clinging to distinct levels of negligence, the differences were deemed statistically significant at the .001 level. Accordingly, this stat suggests that all of the sources had their own level of ineptitude.

After establishing the different shades of inadequacy, I wondered about the stability of such inefficiencies. Or stated more directly, I questioned if changing conditions would alter the selection biases of the news sources. With such a thought, the analysis probed the elasticity of selection rates throughout time and size spectrums. On temporal issues, a cluster of insights emerged. When slicing the mobilization into twenty time segments, three papers showed erratic and volatile coverage rates. For example.

News Bank went from 6% to 11% to 33% to 0%, before it slid into a February fiasco of

6%, 4%, 4%, and 6% (another sign of the media’s misrepresentations of the February protests). Similarly, the Los Angeles Times bounced through the periods of 0%, 24%,

26%, and 0% in November, and UPI left its listless tendencies and recorded a remarkable

40% of the January 16 to January 23 protests. However, these alterations were not seen in three sources. As a cluster of static entities theNew York Times, USA TODAY, and the

Washington Post generally lingered in a fixed range o f scores (i.e., for twenty intervals.

200 the New York Times surpassed the 10% line once, whileUSA TO DAY hit double digits three times).

These fluctuations netted some long term consequences. In effect, the sources that showed some mutability presented temporary glimpses of comprehensiveness, while the sources with little variance were incessantly terrible since they were inseparable from their miserable rates (i.e., the New York Times andUSA TODAY consistently lingered at the bottom of the news pack the Los Angeles Times andNews Bank normally had the best and second best coverage rates among the six sources). Hence, the sources that had spells of relative comprehensiveness had higher overall coverage rates than the sources which eternally dwelled in the lowest ends of the coverage possibilities (ironically, this meant that sources with higher degrees of reliability were also less valid).

After noting the importance of temporal matters, the paper examined the coverage of the largest demonstrations. In evaluating the selection rates for the largest protests, some new revelations occurred (see table 6.2). On one level, larger protests were more likely to be covered than smaller protests. That is, each paper improved their coverage rates by at least 19% when 1 compared their selection rates of large and all protests. On another level, these enhancements did not ameliorate the selection problem. Simply put, information deficits were not eradicated since most large protests were still missed by these sources {News Bank missed 49% of the largest protests while UPI neglected 51%, the Los Angeles Times overlooked 55%, USA TOD/4f ignored 62%, New York Times disregarded 70%, and theWashington Post skipped 72% of these big protests). Lastly, each source had their distinctive selection habits, but the selection differences for big

201 protests were not as broad as for the entire mobilization (selection rates for the entire sample were significant at the .001 alpha, but the largest protests rejected the null at the

.05 level).

When allocating the largest protests into separate size categories, the relationships between size and coverage rates were further established. In most cases, the larger protests were covered better than the smaller protests. That is, every paper started with

80% coverage rates for the massive protests before they compressed their coverage rates for the ensuing clusters of large protests (i.e., theNew York Times coverage rates fell from 80% to 28% to 25% to 24% for the descending divisions of large protests).

Nonetheless, this correlation was far from perfect. In fact, five of the six sources had one lower stratum which bucked the downward swoon (i.e., theWashington Post went from

80% to 28% to 16% to 24% or the Los Angeles Times went from 80% to 28% to 58% to

38%). Thus, one can say that the sources are less prone to cover smaller protests, but this pattern has its outliers and exceptions (these exceptions are probably due to confounding variables).

7.6 Noting the Counting Problems at Eminent News Sources

When encountering coverage lapses, failures were not limited the issue of coverage rates. Rather, the sources also specialized in disregarding the people who attended such protests. In addressing the number of protesters for the entire mobilization, none of the sources came close to the sample’s grand total of 1,211,116. With the news outlets locating anywhere between 460 and 270 thousand protesters, every source missed between two-thirds and three fourths of the sample’s protesters. Moreover, their

202 misinterpretations of the actual protest size must be even greater since the sample itself missed Gulf War protesters (i.e., the sample found only four of the 33 San Diego protests).

While misrepresentations persisted, some subtle changes evolved. Unlike the selection discussion, the ANOVA claimed that the estimating practices were not statistically different (p=.l9). This meant that the sources were insufficiently different to be considered separate sorts of estimators. Or put otherwise, the source dissimilarities were too small to profess any sort of unique counting styles.

In trying to interpret this statistical outcome of “sameness,” 1 observed the variance within the news sources (wide variances within sources wreck f-scores). In looking at the estimates for the New York Times, I found a topsy-turvy sequence of numbers. In this paper, the persistence of incongruent estimates destroyed any notions of rhyme or reason. Furthermore, these twisted tales of inexplicable variance were not limited to one source. Rather, all of the sources showed estimating sequences that were overwhelmed by sensational and unexpected turns (i.e..News Bank’s tempestuous roller­ coaster went from 2% to 76% to 14% to 0% to 50% to 15% in a two month period).

Hence, these paths of inconsistent appraisals suggested that estimating patterns were extremely faint or invisible.

Before I concluded that arbitrary whims ruled the whole counting process, I tried on more analysis. When considering each source’s deviance from the sample score, some obscure regularities appeared (see table 6.5). Six paired ANOVAs showed that some sources were slightly less likely to stray from the sample estimates. In the end, the

203 standardized F-ratio showed thatNews Bank and theWashington Post had the least

deviations from the sample’s mean (sores of 1.814 and 1.823 respectively) and that UPI,

the Los Angeles Times, New York Times andUSA TODAY all had their distinctive set of

departures from the sample's estimates.

Finally, the analysis of large protests unearthed an extraneous relationship. That

is, paper citation rituals can influence the perceived size of a demonstration. In effect, the

papers which customarily used police quotes also gave the lowest size estimates.

Conversely, the papers that relied on reporter or activist perspectives had larger estimates.

Consequently, the incorporation of police excerpts seems to exasperate the effervescent

tendencies to undercount a crowd of antiwar protesters (this supports Mann and

Edleman’s claims in the literature review).

7.7 Final Pronouncements on Newspapers

In molding these findings into a coherent whole, a sense of newspaper reliabilities

emerges. On the point of “selectiveness,” the dissertation puts forth seven propositions.

First, newspapers seem to miss most of the protests. Second, every news source missed a different level of the protests. Third, some papers have stable coverage rates, some papers have volatile coverage rates. Fourth, papers with erratic coverage rates are more

likely to cover protests than papers with constant coverage rates. Fifth, protests at the mobilization’s peak are more likely to be covered than protests which transire during the early and late stages of a mobilization. Sixth, large protests get covered more frequently than small protests. Seventh, even with size as a factor, the majority of large protests still went unreported.

204 On the point of estimating habits, some axioms were recognized. First, ail news sources profoundly shrunk the mobilization size. Second, papers presented erratic and unpredictable counting scenarios. Third, while news sources had competing size appraisals, their differences were not statistically different. Fourth, size statements seem contingent upon who does the counting. In effect, police officials routinely undercut reporter estimates and reporter estimates habitually undercut the grid-density scores.

7.8 What is Next?

As like any document, this dissertation may have various meanings for different audiences. In a political sense, this project should debunk some prevalent myths which exist on this topic. Media pundits, pro war hawks, diligent instructors, and consciousness voters should no longer believe that the protests were tiny. Furthermore, a widespread recognition of this movement strength’s could have some bearing on future wars. In the electoral realm, presidents may be less prone to wage wars when they realize that these endeavors can generate a proactive movement. That is, the probable backlash of a late

1990's protest mobilization may sway president Clinton’s present day calculations on the virtues of bombing Iraq. Similarly, recollections of past wars can effect citizen reactions to upcoming wars. That is, some theorists argue that perceptions of tiny mobilizations inhibit the recruiting efforts of future struggles against state-sponsored militarism (see

Omega and BClandermans, 1996; Downtown and Wehr, 1996). Conversely, the rememberence of significant mobilizations can promote a pool of sympathizers who are willing to join prospective political campaigns.

205 This dissertation also contributes to the body of social movement research. At a basic level, this project should reenforce the necessity of empirical investigations. While the worth of empirical studies is probably a self-evident truism, this message is paramount to this line of inquiry. Presently, theoretical articles have so inundated the literature that the editor of the journal Mobilization has lamented that the field is

“overtheorized” and understudied (Johnston, 1997). Subsequently, this lack of research lets myths fester since unsubstantiated declarations can stand as proper interpretations of the social world.

Another rudimentary insight is that this project accentuates the merits of triangulated research designs. With this abundance of uiureliable secondary sources, serious scholars are impelled to generate primary data sets. To achieve such a task, researchers must venture into the field of contention and observe some ongoing mobilizations (i.e., there is no other way to control the application of grid/density counts).

On the other hand, researchers who lack vigilance will be condemned to retrospective studies which scan the archives of police, news, or activist organizations. And. if this dissertation does anything, it should reaffirm the precarious notions of trusting secondary sources for protest information.

While this project diagnoses the problems of retrospective studies, it also offers some corrective procedures. For those unfortunate researchers who are studying a bygone mobilization, take the advice of using multiple news sources. More precisely, disregard the conventional wisdom which lulls researchers into a sole dependence onNew the York

Times (this study suggests that the proponents of this approach have probably steered

206 junior faculty into one of the worse national sources). Furthermore, adding more sources is helpful but not sufficient. Rather, scholars should invent sampling procedures that incorporate papers from diverse geographical and organizational milieus.

In the end, this study does not presume to have the final word on methodological or substantive issues. Rather, this study begs for future investigations. Since researchers have neglected this protest scene, the topic of Gulf War protests requires many more inquiries. At the minimum, people may want to explore the Gulf War protest cycles in other countries or address the cultural and political effects of this mobilization.

However, the multifaceted nature of movements leaves the topic full of interesting themes.

On a different level, colleagues may augment these findings with additional analysis. People may want to apply various theoretical configurations to this dissertation which lacks an explanatory exegesis on the causes of cycle modifications.

However, this may be easier said than done, since only a methodological genius can find reliable longitudinal information on the litany of independent variables. Or put otherwise, how would a person get weekly information on the public’s perception of protesters, the amount of governmental repression, the efficacy and breadth movement communication networks, the pools of resources available to all protest groups, or the daily attitudes of millions of movement sympathizers?

Communication scholars may take these findings in another direction. Since it is likely that the selection and estimating tendencies of sources may vary among different sorts of social movements, researchers may want to explore the generalizability of my

207 news source findings. That is, researchers should see if these antiwar findings translate into similar portrayals of pro-life, gay rights, white supremacy, or millennium social movements. On anther level, this recognition of varying news accounts may inspire the reexamination of previous studies (those studies which used one news source). Then through the process of replication, readers can determine if our previous conclusions were well grounded.

208 APPENDIX A: A Chronology of the War

August 2,1990: Iraq invades Kuwait. UN Security Council passes Resolution 660 which demands an immediate Iraqi Withdrawal. U.S.freezes Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets.

August 3 : Bush sends battle ships to Persian Gulf to "defend" Saudi Arabia.

August 6: UN Security Council passes Resolution 661 calling for worldwide economic sanctions against Iraq. President Bush and British Prime minister Thatcher meet with NATO Secretary-General Manfred Womer as they create "Operation Dessert Shield". Secretary of War Dick Cheney meets Saudi King Fahd to discuss Iraqi "threat of Invasion". Iraqi announces it does not want to invade Saudi Arabia.

August 7: King Fahd "invites" U. S. military presence into Saudi Arabia. First wave of U.S. and British troops are let into Saudi Arabia.

August 8: Military imposed the "pool system" for reporters. This meant that only "militarily approved" reporters were allowed to enter Saudi. Furthermore, reporter’s locations were controlled by the military, and military censors controlled the stories and photographs going back to the U.S. Eleven alternative press news agencies legally challenge the pool rule, while the major reporting agencies do not contest the pools.

August 12: New York Times poll finds that over half of all polled U.S. oppose the sending of troops. New York Times editorial responds by writing that "sophisticated citizens" support the war, and this minority of must "educate ordinary citizens" abut the necessity of this war.

August 15: Sixty thousand U.S. troops are in Saudi.

August 22: Bush calls Sadam a "Hitler type" and orders an additional fifty thousand reservists to the Arabian Peninsula. France begins to send troops.

August 23: Iraq proposes to withdrawal from Kuwait in return for a lifting of sanctions, guaranteed access to the Gulf; White House rejects the proposal.

August 29: Cheney repeats Bush's position "We’re there to deter and defend... were not there in an offensive capacity, were not there threatening Iraq".

209 September 4: Secretary of State Baker calls for the creation of large scale security structure in the Persian Gulf. September 25: Israel begins to hand out free gas masks, but Palestinians must buy them.

October 7: Washington Post editorial calls Sadam Hussein a "beast".

October 20: Newsweek labels Sadam a "monster".

October 25: Bush sends a 100 thousand more U.S. troops and claims the 300 thousand soldiers stationed in Saudi are still for defensive purposes.

November 3: Baker lays groundwork for UN Securities Council authorization of force against Iraq.

November 12: Cheney activates 70 thousand reservists.

November 20: 245 Congress people file court suit to force Bush to get congressional approval to start a war.

November 28-30: The Senate Armed Services Committee hears testimony from retired National Security Council advisors and former Secretaries of Defense. Only Kissinger supports the January launching of the war. The others want to let sanctions do the work.

November 29: UN Security Council passes Resolution 678 which authorizes an UN attack if Iraq has not withdrawn by January 15, 1991 (this is date is also known as Martin Luther King's birthday).

December 26: Sadam Hussein says he is ready to participate in serious and constructive dialogue.

January 3 and 9, 1991 : Baker meets with Iraqi minister Azziz.

January 8: Bush asks Congress to approve of UN resolution.

January 12: Congress authorizes use of force against Iraq. Senate vote is 52-47 and House vote goes 250-183.

January 16: U.S. launches an air attack on Baghdad, and Kuwait. This first day bombing of Baghdad has the explosive power of three Hiroshima type atomic bombs. President Bush states "The world knows when this war began and when. It began on August 2nd, when Saddam invaded and ransacked a small, defenseless neighbor".

January 17: Military press briefings claim that the "smart bombs" are hitting their target

210 over ninety percent off the time. They also say that no U.S. pilots had been killed and there is little "collateral damage" (i.e. dead civilians).

Tedd Koppel onNightline asserts that the U.S. bombing missions lead to "feeling of euphoria throughout the coimtry."

January 18: George Will onThis Week with David Brinkley said "The military-industrial complex has made some pretty good products."

January 22: Iraq fires SCUD missile at Israel as it promised. Military officials claim Patriot missile shot down these SCUDS before they could cause any damage.

January 23: U.S. announce that it has flown 12,000 bombing missions.

January 28: Bush "this war has everything to do with what religion embodies— good versus evil, right versus wrong, human dignity versus tyranny... this war is [a] just war and it is a war [in] which good will prevail."

T.V. tabloidHard Copy reporter hears a man state that the war was "great" and pronounces "this is every true American's Opinion... And anybody who doesn't like it, shouldn't be living here."

January 29: Bush on protestors "If they act up again. We'll start kicking butt. Hell, we'll put the I.R.S on their tails. They will wish they were never bora" {Nation June 7, 1991).

January 17 to January 30: Nightly news programs at CBS, NBC and ABC that interview "experts" on the war, only 1.5 percent of those interviewed hold an anti-war perspective, while 47 percent of those interviewed were representatives of the government (Flanders 1992).

February 4: The U.S. starts carpet bombing Southern Iraq in preparation for a land invasion.

February 4: Newsweek featured articles are titled "New techno-marvel missiles" and "Going for the Kill", whileU.S. News and World Report does a story on "The amazing Patriot Missiles".

February II: Afire weeks of boming, David Gergen inU.S. News and World Report rejoices that the Gulf war brought confidence back to Americans.

February 15: Iraq says it will withdraw from Kuwait, Bush calls it a "cruel hoax."

211 February 17: Newsweek fires Israeli Bureau Chief for not clearing reports with Israeli censors.

February 21: Soviet Union and Iraq agree on peace plan which would give Iraq 21 days to leave Kuwait if the U.S. agrees to cease-fire. Bush returns with an ultimatum, leave by the 23 of February or the land war will begin.

February 23: Pentagon announces a press blackout and the ground war began.

February 23-28: laqi soliders put up little battle as coaltiosn forces invade Iraq. Then after unfettered advances in Southern Iraq, U.S. troops hald theri progression and Sadam Hussein is left in power.

February 28: A senior Pentagon official explained why U.S. military censors refused to release video footage of Iraqi soldiers being sliced in half by a helicopter cannon fire:'Tf we let people see that kind of thing, there would never again be any war"{Progressive December 1991).

212 APPENDIX B: The Social Backgrounds of Gulf War Protesters

The Winter of 1996 marked the five-year anniversary of the Persian Gulf War. During this "time of remembrance" several news outlets ran stories about "Desert Storm" (i.e., a PBS special called theGulf War). As these stories quoted the "pro war" ideas of retired generals and ex-cabinet members, they also shrunk depictions of war dissenters to snapshots of protesters carrying signs. Furthermore, the narrative structure left the perspectives of antiwar activists out of the dialogue. This omission of antiwar sentiments is not surprising. During the war the media rarely searched for nuanced understandings of Gulf War protesters. Instead, "objective" new sources routinely deployed the two-pronged treatment of neglecting and chastising Gulf War protesters. For example, McCarthy et. al. (1996) found that theWashington Post reported on only 30% of all District of Columbia protests and Hackett and Zhao (1994) discovered a U.S. press that consistently depicted protesters as an "internal enemy" that was ill-informed, overly emotional and morally out of step with American values (also see Lee and Devitt, 1991; Greenberg and Gantz, 1993; Reese and Buckalew, 1995; Beamish, Molotch and Flacks, 1995). In the rare cases of "in-depth" reporting, one saw a contradictory mismatch of reporter appraisals. When writing on the social background of protesters.New York Times reporter Lyn Ames (1991) claimed that the antiwar movement was primarily composed of "blue-jean cladded teenagers" while media pundit David Horowitz (1991) insisted that the movement was run by communists and ex-hippies who "had the nihilistic goal of destroying America". In sharp contrast, Losa Angeles Times writer said that the protests drew from a "diverse crowd of adherents" (Zamichow, 1990) and a Diego Tribune reporter wrote that "protester wore business suits, tie-dyed shirts, military uniforms and flannel shirts. They pushed baby strollers and carried briefcases. Some walked with crutches, some road skateboards" (Jones, 1991). Adding to these incomplete and incompatible media assessments is the realization that few scholars have systematically studied this antiwar mobilization. While the works of Max Elbaum (1992), Barbara Epstein (1992), Charlene Garmage (1992), John MacDougall (1995) and Patrick Coy (1996) have delineated some aspects of this movement, the literature as a whole could be considered quite barren (we do not even know of the movements' tactics or its size). This essay will counteract this dearth of information by addressing the research question of who protested against the Persian Gulf War? In doing so, the paper will critically examine four "empirical" reports which offer insights into the demographic distributions of Gulf War protesters. Each antiwar movements draws participants from distinct social circles. Some antiwar movements were fueled by "nativist" anti-interventionists and church based

213 pacifists while other movements attracted socialists and suffergists. Other peace mobilizations motivated middle class dissenters, while other protests sprung from working-class interests. Hence, this ever changing nature of movements means that researchers must repeatedly return to the "field of contention" to discern the social composition for each and every generation of antiwar movements. The Gulf War Protests Gulf War protests began in August 1990 and ended in March 1991. In this period, thousands of cities were greeted by antiwar events. While the size of the mobilization grew slowly in 1990, the nation rocked to a wave of protests around the January 16 commencement of the war (the nation saw over 300 regional protest from January 16 to January 18). In fact the waves of protests between January 12 to January 26 were strong enough to produce 16 local protests that had over 6,000 participants (in cities such as Austin, Chicago, Portland, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, San Diego and Seattle). A facet of this January surge was the establishment of two national days of protest. On January 19, the "anti-imperialist" Coalition to Stop U.S. Intervention in the Middle East brought 35,000 protesters to Washington and 40,000 to San Francisco. On the following weekend, the "liberal" Campaign for Peace in the Middle East attracted 120,000 protesters in Washington and 75,000 in San Francisco. National Davs of Protest As thousands chanted "no blood for oil," two teams of researchers traversed the Washingtonian crowds (unfortunately the crowds in San Francisco went unstudied). A team of Washington Post reporters led by Richard Morin (1991) spoke with 827 activists on January 26, while graduate student Thomas Shriver (1992) interviewed 69 activists at the January 19 and January 26 protests. Although Vice President Dan Quayle insinuated that protesters were "abnormal deviants," thePost team found an aggregate that seemed "quite American" on several accounts. On one hand, the sample closely mirrored the gender and racial characteristics of the entire U.S. populace (53% female and 84% White, 9% Black, 4% Hispanic, and 3% Arab-American). On the other hand, the age stratification resembled the nation's age pyramid. That is, 40% of the protesters were under 30 years old while 36% of the nation's young adults also fit in that age category. Other proportions were reproduced since 31% of the protests were between 31 and 44 years old, 21% had experienced around 45 and 60 birthdays and 7% had passed the 60 year mark. Additional traits suggest that protesters were well integrated into "mainstream" institutions. The crowd showed a strong work ethic since 61% of protesters had full-time jobs and 31% were full time college students (760 of the 778 non senior citizens were either students or paid employees). Adding to this high level of employment is that fact that 11% of the sample had previously served a "patriotic duty" by doing a stint in the military. While the aforementioned characteristics can be considered quintessentialy "American," there were some qualities that separated protesters from "typical" Americans. Instead of avoiding education, the protesters showed a proclivity to formal learning. A whopping 91% of the demonstrators had been to college, while 46% of

214 Americans have been enrolled in college. Adding to this tendency toward education was the preponderance of so-called "liberal" perspectives. Forty percent o f the sample called themselves "very liberal" and 41% took the "somewhat liberal" label. However, the political scale which ended at liberal may not accommodate the range of ideologies since 16% allied themselves with parties that resided outside of the traditional Democratic/Republican confines (i.e., the Green Party, the Socialist Workers Party). On top o f these "liberal leanings" the respondents were exceptionally political. When politicians bemoan that "most Americans don’t vote," 91% of the protesters voted in the last election. Furthermore, these activists did not confine their political actions to quick jaunts to the ballot box. Ninety percent of the activists belonged to other social movements, and 65% of the sample had attended earlier Gulf War protests. Thus, this crowd was overwhelmingly composed of individuals who had the stamina to sustain long-term commitments to social justice campaigns. A study by Shriver adds subsequent insights. After speaking with 69 protesters at the January 19 and January 26 protests, Shriver also discovered that the demonstration's contours closely approximated the racial divisions of this country (85% European, 8% African-American, 4% Native-American, 1.5% Latin-American, and 1.5% Asian- American). After this initial similarity with the Post, Shriver put forth some incompatible interpretations. First, Shriver discovered a "gender gap" among the protesters. Instead of seeing an equal proportion of men and women, Shriver found that around two-thirds of his informants were women (65.7%). Second, Shriver's sample had a much younger nucleus. Supposedly, 81% of the 69 dissenters were under 25 years while 12% had 26 to 35 years on them and only 3% were over 46 years old. With the "young" sample came the common occupation of student. Seventy-five percent of the crowd said they were students while 13% said they were presently engaged in "blue collar" jobs. Another 6% said they were professionals and 4% placed themselves in the ranks of the unemployed. With this considerable amount of students came an elevated number of protesters who brushed the poverty line (U.S. standards that is). For the 1990 calendar year, 76% made an income of less than $10,000, 13% brought in a salary between $10,001 and 25,000,9% maintained incomes at the $25,001 to 50,000 level, and 2% made over $50,001. These figures suggest that most of the protesters were poor at the time of the interview. However an inference that most protesters came from poor communities can be mistaken due to the contradictory class position of college student. Simply put, the college students generally come from middle-class families before entering the temporarily impoverished role of student. Unfortunately, this assertion of "transitory poverty" is pure speculation since Shriver did not ask questions about parental incomes. As in the Post study, most of the respondents acted on their political commitments. On the issue of antiwar involvement, 83% indicated that they were veterans of previous Gulf War protests, and 10 out of 14 baby-boomers had engaged in

215 I960's antiwar protests. The protesters were also dedicated to other "social justice" movements. Eighty-nine percent of the assembly were members of environmental groups such as Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, or the Youth Greens whereas 88% had links to Pro- choice groups such as Planned Parenthood or NARAL. Another 55% of the crowd had involved themselves in "women's liberation groups," and 44% were in the "gay rights" movement. Finally, 42% percent of the crowd were immersed in organizations that worked and agitated for "poor people's interests" (i.e., the Long Beach Soup Kitchen of Advocates for Shelter Action). While it is interesting to note that many of these activists spilled into so-called "new social movements," far fewer were associated with "older movements." Remarkably, not a single person mentioned union membership (in a similar vein, none of the major unions "officially" endorsed the national protests and several unions even ran prowar adds in newspapers). Joining this absence of union figures was the somewhat small showing of traditional peace and disarmament groups. Although the disarmament movement was big in the 1980's, one finds that only 21% expressed ties to peace groups such as the War Resisters League or SANE/FREEZE. Adding to this relatively low number of "secular peace folks" was the smaller number of "peace church" members. Only 11% of the protesters were connected to religious peace groups (six of the seven religious activists came from Catholic denominations, and not a single Quaker was found). Regional Protests As the Washington protests evolved, parallel demonstrations in Ann Arbor and San Diego were studied by other peace scholars. When interviewing activists in San Diego, Eric Swank (1993-94) found that his sample was broken into 25 males and 23 females. On further inspection of his transcripts. Swank saw that this Southern California mobilization had an extremely White complexion (with a sample of 48, only three activists were Mexican-Americans and four individuals were Middle Eastern). Clearly, this suggests that San Diego's antiwar movement showed week ties with the local minority populations which stands at 21% Hispanic, 8% Asian and 6% African- American. After determining the ethnicity of the protesters. Swank explored the protester's "subjective" and "objective" class position. On the impressionistic question "What social class are you in?" Swank discovered a sample that generally considered itself "middle- class." Thirty one individuals identified themselves as middle-class, while eight said they were working-class and five said they were poor. On the "objective" question of employment, it seems that the sample was less middle-class than they thought (other studies show that most Americans consider themselves middle-class regardless of their occupations or incomes). In light of Eric Wright's (1985) class schemata, none of the activists would be of the upper-class since everybody depended on their wages for a living (not a single bourgeois in the crowd). Instead 15% were upper middle-class "expert technocrats" (3 professors, 3 engineers and I lawyer), 13% were middle-class workers of a "semi-credentialed" sort (2 social workers, 2 elementary school teachers, 1 journalists, and 1 desktop publisher) and 37% were in working-class jobs (10 had "pink

216 collar" jobs such as waitress, typist or maid, and 7 had "blue collar" jobs such as carpenter, cook or deckhand). Finally, 35% of the protesters were not paid for their labor since they were matriculating at a local university. These protesters were an educated lot Forty percent of the sample was actively enrolled in college, while 36% had B.A. degrees, 11% hadM .A .S , and 5% had Ph.D.s. Adding to this academic bent was the fact that only six demonstrators said they belonged to any sort of an organized religion (three Buddhists, two Catholics, and one pagan). Finally, the sample leaned to the left side of the political continuum. Twenty-five were left of liberal (Socialists, Marxists, anarchists, and radical feminists), fifteen stuck to the liberal label, and only one person called himself a "true blue conservative." When Swank spoke with Californian dissenters, the students in a University of Michigan political psychology course were given a political activity survey. After the students completed the instrument, investigators Laura Duncan and Abigail Stewart (1995) discovered that 25 of the 157 students had attended some Gulf War protests. This 22% rate of protesters probably shows that the University of Michigan was an antiwar hotbed and political Psychology classes attract students with higher levels of political involvement. Familiar themes emerge when examining the characteristics of these 25 protesters (data acquired through correspondence). First, women slightly outnumbered men (14 females, 11 males). Second, the vast majority of the protesters came from European stock. That is, 13 of the protesters came from European-American families while the labels of African-American, Latino, and Asian-American were accepted by two students a piece (interestingly, six of the protesters did not answer this question of race). Finally, the group had few connections to organized religion. Only seven of the twenty-five declared a membership in a formal church (four Catholics, one Methodist, one Buddhist and one Jew). General Patterns? In deriving conclusions from these studies the reader should proceed with caution. Discretion is necessary since each study shows some methodological shortcomings. First, the studies obtained informants by "purposive" and "snowball" manners (as compared to random samples). Consequently, the findings may be misleading since every sub-group did not have the same chance of being selected for the study. Thus, one may wonder if these studies adequately reflect the qualities of protesters in Washington, San Diego, or Ann Arbor. Second, temporal factors may hinder each study's validity. That is, protester characteristics probably change over time but each study gathered in a particular stage of the mobilization. In other words, these studies looked at the middle of the protest cycle and missed protestor demographics during early or later days of the mobilization. Finally, the fact that each study had a local unit of analysis can add further problems when generalizing. Even if the researchers correctly portrayed the qualities of local protests, one may wonder if these findings can approximate the profiles of protests in other cities. In other words, the act of generalizing can be misleading since there is no guarantee that the types of people who protested in San Diego will share the same characteristics of protesters in Topeka or Atlanta.

217 Yet even with these methodological limitations, this meta-analysis can lead to some definitive conclusions (definitive due to the consistent replication o f findings). First, most protesters were of Anglo descent. More specifically, the racial distribution closely mirrored the racial breakdown of the general populace (except Asian-Americans were conspicuously absent from the samples). Second, this group was disproportionally educated. Protests were jammed with currently enrolled college students and people with graduate degrees. Third, the protests were full o f people who were steadily performing some sort of political behaviors. Almost everybody in the sample voted, and most people had dedicated long hours to different sorts of political endeavors (i.e., lobbying, community organizing, picketing, or running for office). Fourth, most activist biographies were connected to "new movements" such as the environmental or women's movements while links to "old movements" were less than anticipated. Finally, few protesters espoused attachments to organized religion. Moreover, only the Catholic denomination showed any visible presence among the protesters. While these studies point to some clear interpretations, other points remain more murky. Two studies maintain that the protests had a wide age range, while one claimed the protests were dominated by college age humans. Three of the studies suggest that protests contained a balance among the genders, while one argues for a high female presence. Finally, the studies which tracked social-class issues offered conflicting verdicts. When Shriver emphasized the income dimension of class, he discovered an extremely "poor" crowd. In sharp contrast. Swank's probing of occupations found that the middle-classes and working-classes were about equally represented in the protests of San Diego. Such ambiguities should be explored in a new round of studies. Clearly subsequent studies should focus on the age, gender, and class compositions of this movement. In addition to these descriptive projects, researchers may want to explain the factors which propelled the different sectors of the population into and out of the protest arena. Scholars might want to test the different theories which suggest that activist "framing" practices, the "political opportunity structure," and "network configurations" determine movement cleavages. In the end, any sort of inquiry into this subject is necessary since we as a nation should feel compelled to understand grassroots movements which try to protect human life.

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