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HENRY OF GHENT AND JOHN ON SKEPTICISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURALLY ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE

Martin Pickavé

Distinction 3 of the fi rst book of the Sentences is a locus classicus for the assessment of John Duns Scotus’s relationship to Henry of Ghent. Th e topic of the knowability of provides Duns Scotus, in his vari- ous lectures on the Sentences, with an occasion to critically discuss key issues of Henry’s metaphysics and epistemology. It is here where Scotus dismisses Henry’s rejection of intelligible species and his teaching on the concept of being, and where he refutes Henry’s understanding of God as the fi rst known (primum cognitum) of the human intellect. We should therefore not be surprised to fi nd Scotus in this context also discussing Henry’s theory of , one of the most notorious doctrines of his predecessor. However, Duns Scotus’s treatment of the question “whether any sure and pure truth can be known naturally by the intellect of a person in this life without the special illumination of the uncreated light”, in both the early Lectura and the Ordinatio,1 diff ers signifi cantly from the many other questions in which he attacks Henry’s teaching. Henry of Ghent is not the only 13th-century theologian or who

1 Ordinatio I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 4 (ed. Vaticana, vol. III, Vatican City, 1954, p. 123, n. 202): “Quaero an aliqua veritas certa et sincera possit naturaliter cognosci ab intel- lectu viatoris, absque lucis increatae speciali illustratione.” Lectura I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 3 (ed. Vaticana, vol. XVI, Vatican City, 1960, p. 281, n. 144): “Utrum intellectus alicuius viatoris possit naturaliter intelligere aliquam certam veritatem et sinceram absque speciali infl uentia a Deo, sicut ignis potest comburere stuppam generali infl uentia Dei, absque alia speciali infl uentia.” Although I occasionally refer to the Scotus’s Lectura, my article is mainly focused on the more extensive treatment in the Ordinatio. Th e English quotations of John Duns Scotus are taken from R.N. Bosley/M.M. Tweedale, eds., Basic Issues in Medieval , 2nd ed. (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), but I take the liberty to amend them without further notifi cation whenever necessary (this also applies to the other translations used in this paper). For a general, although not very illuminating, discussion of the Lectura and the Ordinatio question see J. Brown, “Duns Scotus on the Possibility of Knowing Genuine Truth: Th e Reply to Henry of Ghent in the ‘Lectura prima’ and in the ‘Ordinatio’ ”, Recherches de Th éologie ancienne et médiévale 51 (1984), pp. 136–182. 62 martin pickavé argues for the need of a special divine illumination in human cognition and supporters of divine illumination commonly refer to Augustine, whom they regard as their ally on this issue.2 Duns Scotus, therefore, does not simply attempt to refute the arguments of his adversary before he advances his own solution. He also aims to show that Henry’s (and Henry’s predecessors’) reading of Augustine is erroneous and that the bishop of Hippo never defended a theory of divine illumination.3 Duns Scotus thus concludes that Henry’s teaching is not “in accordance with Augustine’s intention”, and, what is worse, were his arguments in favor of illumination really conclusive, they would rather lead “to the view of the Academics” than establish the need for a special divine support in the process of cognition.4 Consequently, Duns Scotus sees himself also compelled to advance a general defense of the possibility of sure and infallible natural cognition, something that modern commentators have termed his “refutation of skepticism”,5 although he himself of course never uses this last expression.6 Duns Scotus’s charges against Henry and Scotus’s refutation of skepticism set the stage for this article; I will not deal with Scotus’s interpretation of Augustine, which is, at least from a historical point of view, interesting in its own right, and I shall be as brief as possible in my remarks on illumination.7 My main interest lies in the discussion of skepticism that is at the heart of the debate between Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. Th is discussion is interesting for various reasons. On the one hand, it is the fi rst time in later that (ancient) skeptical positions receive broader attention. On the other hand, it illustrates the methodological role that skeptical arguments have in medieval epistemological accounts. From this perspective it is

2 For a survey covering several 13th-century proponents of divine illumination see S.P. Marrone, Th e Light of Th y Countenance. and Knowledge of God in the Th irteenth Century, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2001). 3 Th is strategy may have contributed to render theories of divine illumination rela- tively unpopular in the 14th century. 4 Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 4 (ed. Vaticana, p. 132, n. 218); Lectura I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 3 (ed. Vaticana, p. 289, n. 162). 5 See, e.g., W.A. Frank/Allan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus, Metaphysician (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue Press, 1995), p. 164. 6 On the absence of the terms skepticus (or scepticus) and skepsis as well as their cognates from medieval Latin see P. Porro, “Il Sextus Latinus e l’immagine dello scet- ticismo antico nel medioevo”, Elenchos 15 (1994), pp. 229–253, esp. 235. 7 For a more detailed analysis of Henry’s doctrine of illumination see my Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft . Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 57–79.