Human Souls and the Triad of Intellectual Operations

chapter 6 Human Souls and the Triad of Intellectual Operations

As we have seen, all animals are superior to plants in that they have not only vegetative powers but also sensory, that is, cognitive powers. The possession of cognition is what establishes a psychological continuity between nonhuman and human animals. However, there is also a crucial discontinuity and it is this discontinuity that brings us closer to theories of animal rationality. In short, the discontinuity between humans and other animals consists in the fact that only the former have rational or intellectual souls. Consequently, humans are not simply animals but a very peculiar kind of animals, namely, ‘rational animals’ (animalia rationalia).1 They are, so to speak, ‘animals plus x’ with ‘x’ being the faculties of intellect and reason. Nonhuman animals are, in turn, ‘animals without x’. This lack of intellect and reason is why they were often called ‘irrational animals’ (animalia irrationalia) or ‘brute animals’ (animalia bruta), as mentioned before. The possession of a rational soul thus establishes what modern scholars usually call an anthropological difference because it sets humans apart from all other animals. Medieval philosophers stressed this point. In his commentary on De animalibus, Peter of Spain, for instance, states that ‘humans excel any other animal by the nobility of intellect and reason’ (homo enim excellit quodlibet animal nobilitate intellectus et rationis).2 In his Sentences commentary, Peter of John Olivi defines human beings as ‘intellectual animals or animals having intellect’ (bestiae intellectuales seu intellectum habentes).3 On the one hand, this shows that the animal nature of human beings was not denied. On the other hand, it emphasises that something crucial is added to this animal nature, namely, intellectual or rational faculties. Consequently, if these faculties are subtracted from a human animal, one no longer has a human animal. All that remains is an

1 ‘Animal rationale’ is simply the Latin translation of Aristotle’s Greek ‘zoon logon echon’ from Politica I.2, 1253a7-10. 2 Peter of Spain, Questiones super libro ‘De animalibus’ Aristotelis, lib. i, q. 4, ed. Navarro Sánchez (2015), 117. See also Köhler (2008), 191. 3 Peter of John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 57, ed. Jansen (1924), 338.

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Human Souls and the Triad of Intellectual Operations 37 animal, as Henry of Ghent points out in his Quaestiones quodlibetales.4 There- fore, it is obviously the rational soul that defines humans qua humans and so ‘in reality, mankind is nothing else but the rational soul’, as Thomas Aquinas puts it in the Summa contra gentiles.5 Since this definition of humans was usually taken for granted by medieval philosophers, one can rightly say that it was a fundamental ontological presupposition or a fundamental metaphysical and anthropological presupposition to which they subscribed.6 Yet, the most inter- esting question is, how do the rational souls of humans compare to the sensory souls of nonhuman animals? If having a soul means having certain capacities or engaging in certain operations that are characteristic of this soul, what are the specific operations of rational souls? In order to answer these questions one might first need to ask whether there is actually a difference between ‘intellect’ (intellectus) and ‘reason’ (ra- tio) because, on the one hand, they seem to be used interchangeably, and yet, on the other hand, it would be superfluous to speak of intellect and reason if they were not distinct powers. This question seemed to puzzle medieval authors, too. In the Summa theologiae, Thomas Aquinas, for example, explicitly addresses the question of whether intellect and reason are ‘separate powers’ (diversae potentiae).7 He first presents a number of opinions from other authors who seem to suggest that intellect and reason are indeed distinct powers. The author of the influential De spiritu et anima, for instance, says that there is a clear hierarchy: first come the external senses, then the internal senses, then comes reason and then comes the intellect. Hence, the intellect is superior to reason. Augustine, in contrast, employs them synonymously and so do others. Aquinas’ tries to solve this contradiction by arguing that intellect and reason are not separate powers. Nonetheless, he concedes that there is a certain difference between rational and intellectual cognition, between ‘ratiocinari’ and ‘intelligere’. While the latter means ‘to apprehend an intelligible truth per se’ (simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere), the former means ‘to pro- ceed from one intelligible object to another in order to cognise an intelligible truth’ (procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cogno- scendam). One could illustrate this difference by comparing it to the difference between solving a mathematical problem by intensive thinking or by

4 Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones quodlibetales i, q. 15, ed. Macken (1979), 93: “Excepto enim eo quod intellectus est, non manet homo nisi bestia […].” 5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, lib. iv, c. 81, ed. Leonina xv (1930), 253: “Et secundum hoc, humanitas non est aliud realiter quam anima rationalis.” 6 This is how Köhler (1992), 718, and (2008), 295, puts it. 7 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i, q. 79, a. 8, ed. Leonina v (1889), 274f.

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38 chapter 6 sudden inspiration. If one solves the problem by intensive thinking it takes some time until one arrives at the solution. One might have to search for the right approach, take notes, and so forth. That is, one makes various steps and so jumps from one partial solution to another. In the case of a sudden inspiration, however, the solution immediately appears. One sees the problem and – in a flash of insight – knows the solution. The latter is certainly a much more impressive way of solving mathematical problems. In this sense, intelligere is somehow superior to ratiocinari. Still, both ways lead to the same result and both cognitive acts are brought about by one and the same cognitive power, according to Aquinas. Admittedly, Aquinas’ view is only one among many. Other medieval authors had (slightly) different thoughts about the distinction between reason and intellect.8 For the present study, however, the more decisive question is whether this distinction matters for the aspect of animal rationality. On the one hand, it seems to be negligible because neither of these faculties of the soul was ascribed to nonhuman animals by any of the authors covered here. So even if some of them held the view that there is a difference between the two, it remains relatively insignificant if one is looking at animals which, by definition, lack both of these powers. On the other hand, the distinction might not be entirely irrelevant insofar as there were at least some authors who ascribed the capacity of ‘reasoning’ (ratiocinari) to other animals, as we will see in Part 4. Thus, the slight inferiority of rational cognition in comparison to intellectual cognition might actually imply a greater proximity to the powers and operations of the sensory soul (see Chapter 33). But before dealing with these details we first need to see what kind of operations and capacities were usually taken to come along with the possession of a ‘rational’ or ‘intellective soul’ (anima rationalis; anima intellectiva). What are the typical tasks or operations of the higher faculties? In most accounts there are three main intellectual operations, namely, (i) universal cognition and concept formation, (ii) judging, and (iii) reasoning. These operations built upon each other, as, once again, Thomas Aqui- nas points out.9 First of all, the intellect ‘apprehends the quiddity of a thing’ (apprehendit quidditatem rei), say, the quiddity of a rose. Apprehending the quiddity of a rose significantly differs from apprehending a rose via the senses.

8 For the full picture from Augustine to Buridan see Enders (2001); Speer (2001); Hoenen (2001). On the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic origins of the distinction see also briefly Sorabji (1993b), 74f. 9 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i, q. 85, a. 5 co., ed. Leonina v (1889), 341. On this article see also the analysis by Pasnau (2002), 273.

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Human Souls and the Triad of Intellectual Operations 39

If one sees, smells, or touches a rose, for example, one perceives certain features of a particular thing. It is this or that rose one sees or smells or touches and one would not have any of these perceptions if no rose were presently there. Hence, sensory cognition is of present and particular things. But what if one remembers or imagines a rose? In this case, one does not presently perceive a rose but still has a sensory impression. In fact, one can have sensory impressions without presently perceiving things. But these sensory impressions are nonetheless the impressions of a particular thing such as of the particular rose one saw yesterday in the garden. To apprehend the quiddity of a rose, however, means to abstract from any material and temporal conditions because the quiddity of a rose is what is common to all roses, not only to this or that particular rose one has perceived at this or that particular time and place. The colour red, for instance, does not belong to the quiddity of roses because there are also white or yellow roses. Having petals, on the other hand, seems to be part of the quiddity of roses because all roses have petals even if they are coloured differently. Once one has grasped the defining universal features of roses, one knows the universal ‘rose’. One could also say that one has formed the concept ‘rose’. This concept is universal in that one can apply it to all roses no matter where they stand, what colour or size they have, when one has seen them, and so forth. Since this kind of cognition goes beyond sensation, it was usually attributed to the faculties of intellect and reason. There are, admittedly, many medieval theories of how concepts are formed, and, likewise, there are numerous theories of what universals are.10 However, all of these theories suggest that the cognition of universals and the formation of concepts rely largely, if not entirely, on the powers of the rational soul. Many authors stressed that the sensory faculties play a role in this process insofar as they deliver the necessary material out of which concepts are formed. That is to say, we would be incapable of forming the general term ‘rose’ without having previously sensed particular roses. Nonetheless, it is the intellect that cognises the universal and forms the concept ‘rose’. Consequently, the intellect is also responsible for the second operation, the task of ‘composing or dividing’ (componere vel dividere) these concepts, that is, the formation of judgments.11 Once we have acquired concepts, we can combine them with others concepts ad libitum. We can, for instance, form propositions such as ‘Roses are plants’ or ‘Roses are a genus in the family of Rosaceae’. Thus, general terms or concepts are the building-blocks of judgments or propositions, at least according to the

10 For an overview see, for instance, Adams (1982) and Holopainen (2014). 11 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i, q. 85, a. 5 co., ed. Leonina v (1889), 341.

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40 chapter 6 so-called “‘building-block model’ of propositions and concepts.”12 This model is still influential today and it was, in one way or another, held by the majority of late medieval authors, too.13 According to the building-block model, it does not actually matter what kind of theory one holds concerning the formation of concepts because concept formation is a different cognitive act than the formation of propositions. Therefore, someone like William of Ockham who held a different theory of concept formation than Aquinas nevertheless agreed that ‘to form propositions and to syllogise is the proper task of the intellect’ (formare autem propositiones et syllogizare proprium est intellectui).14 As Ockham’s phrasing shows, this not only applies to the formation of propositions, that is, the act of judging, but also to the act of ‘syllogising’ (syllogizare). Aquinas adopts a slightly different terminology by saying that the third intellectual operation consists in ‘going from one composition or division to another, which means to reason’ (ex una compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est ratiocinari).15 Still, syllogising and reasoning are synonymous insofar as syllogising is a prominent form of reasoning. If, for instance, we move from the premises ‘All roses are plants’ and ‘All plants have a vegetative soul’ to the conclusion that ‘All roses have vegetative souls’, we have syllogised as well as reasoned because our reasoning took the form of a syllogism, more precisely, a syllogism of the so-called modus Barbara. We have thus combined a certain number of propositions or judgments – the premises – in order to arrive (by way of dividing and com- bining their concepts) at another judgment – the conclusion. Such reasoning, then, is the third element of the triad of intellectual operations. These intellectual operations amount to more than just a mere play with words. They are, as Albertus Magnus points out, the foundation of human knowledge because they lead us to ‘the principles of arts and sciences’ (prin- cipia artium et scientiarum).16 Thus, one could say that humans are rational animals not only because they form and combine concepts and propositions but also because they form a whole body of knowledge which they divide into different fields or disciplines. This is also one of the reasons why Aristotle ’s

12 On this model see, for instance, Glock (2010), 15–19. 13 For a brief overview of medieval theories of judging see Tachau (1993) and Perälä (2014). The most comprehensive and insightful studies are Nuchelmans (1973) and (1980); Perler (1990) and (1992). 14 William of Ockham, Quaestiones in iv Sententiarum (Report.), q. 14, eds. Gál & Green (1984), 288. 15 See p. 39 n11. 16 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1328.

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Human Souls and the Triad of Intellectual Operations 41

logical writings played such an important role in medieval philosophy and other disciplines. His logic – or the medieval teaching of his logic, more precisely – begins with the study of concepts (in De interpretatione), contin- ues with the study of judgments (in the Categoriae), and ends with the study of syllogisms (in the Analyticae as well as in the Topica and the De sophisticis elenchiis). It thus provides the foundation for and guarantees the validity of any other discipline because any mistake in the division or combination of concepts or propositions will produce erroneous conclusions. One could, of course, argue that sensory cognition also produces some kind of knowledge. If I see that this petal is red, I have also acquired some knowledge about it, at least in a broader sense of the term. Still, even if one accepts such a broader notion of knowledge, there remains a difference between the knowledge deriving from the senses and the knowledge created by reason and intellect: while the former remains at the level of particulars, the latter is universal. This also applies to statements about particulars. If one forms the judgment ‘This rose is a flower’, one does, on the one hand, make a statement about a particular rose. On the other hand, however, one employs general terms, such as ‘rose’ or ‘flower’. Similarly, when making statements about in- dividuals, such as Socrates, one employs general terms because one says, for instance, that ‘Socrates is a human being’. This universality is characteristic of intellectual cognition, and it was usually explained by the peculiar nature of the intellect. Unlike the powers of the vegetative and the sensory soul, the intellect has no organ, as Aristotle fa- mously says in De anima III.4.17 Unlike the eyes or the intestinal tract, intellect and reason are not corporeal or material powers. Rather, they are immaterial. For many medieval interpreters of Aristotle, this “immateriality condition” is a necessary condition with a view to the three operations of concept formation, judging, and reasoning because they all abstract from material conditions.18 Whereas the sensory impression of a rose is material, at least to some extent, the concept ‘rose’ is not. Admittedly, this is an overly simplified account of the intellect’s immateriality. Many of the medieval theories were much more sophisticated than this account suggests and there was much debate over how this immateriality is to be understood.19 Furthermore, there were also some authors, such as

17 Aristotle, De anima III.4, 429a19-28. 18 I borrow the expression “immateriality condition” from Black (2009), 331. 19 On some of the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian theories of the intellect see Black (2009).

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42 chapter 6

John Buridan, who doubted that there is a (necessary) connection between the intellect’s operations and its nature.20 However, this was the view of a mi- nority. The majority of authors agreed that intellect and reason are immaterial. For Christian authors, this view was also attractive because it was highly compatible with the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul. For if one supposes that the human soul is immaterial, it is much easier to explain how it can persist after the death of the body. Again, the details of this doctrine gave rise to many discussions. And, especially before the thirteenth century, there were also some authors, such as John Scotus Eriugena and Adelard of Bath, who held not only that human and angelic souls are immortal but the souls of nonhuman animals, as well.21 Yet, as in the case of the intellect’s immateriality, this was not the view of a majority. The connection between the intellect’s operations and its nature shows that it is not the case that the animal/human boundary can only be described in terms of capacities. It can also be described in more general terms as being largely identical with other dividing lines. First, it is identical with the sensory/intellectual divide because nonhuman animals have sensory powers while humans have intellectual faculties in addition. Since the latter were usually taken to be immaterial, the animal/human boundary is, second, co-extensive with the divide between material and immaterial powers. Of course, even sensory souls are immaterial insofar as they are forms, not matter. And yet, sensory faculties are bound to corporeal organs and it is in this sense that they are material. If one takes for granted that only immaterial powers can provide cognitive access to universals, the animal/human boundary runs, third, along the lines of particularity and universality. Furthermore, immaterial powers survive the death of the body and so there is a fourth dividing line between humans and other animals, namely, the line that divides mortal from immortal souls. Humans, of course, stand on both sides of these divides. They have both sensory and intellectual, corporeal and incorporeal powers, hence access to both particulars and universals. Moreover, some of their powers pass

20 On Buridan’s position see Klein (2016). 21 See John Scotus Eriugena, Periphyseon, lib. iii, c. 39, ed. Jeauneau (1999), 169–172; Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales q. 14, ed. Burnett (1998), 118. On Eriugena’s view see Nitschke (1967), 240–242; Dronke (1985), 817–822; Lauzi (2012), 208–217. The idea that nonhuman animals’ souls are immortal can also be found in later authors such as Nicholas of Cusa; see Dohm (2013). Furthermore, it is present in medieval Islamic thought; see Kruk (1995), 31, and Druart (2016), 73.

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Human Souls and the Triad of Intellectual Operations 43 away at the moment of death, while some persist.22 This standing on both sides is why humans are a species of animals, not angels.23 Nonetheless, they are a very peculiar species of animals because they significantly differ from other animals in various regards.

22 This idea gave rise to numerous discussions on the cognitive capacities of so-called ‘separate souls’ (animae separatae); see, for instance, Roling (2015). 23 On human cognition in comparison to angelic cognition see Roling (2008) and Iribarren & Lenz (2016), esp. Part iii. On animals, humans, and angels, see Daston (2005).

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