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2004 The Rise and Fall of a : The Political Career of Louis-Marie Stanislas Fréron, Representative on Mission and Conventionnel, 1754-1802 Karen L. Greene

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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

THE RISE AND FALL OF A REVOLUTIONARY:

THE POLITICAL CAREER OF LOUIS-MARIE STANISLAS FRÉRON,

REPRESENTATIVE ON MISSION AND CONVENTIONNEL, 1754-1802

By

KAREN L. GREENE

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2004

Copyright © 2004 Karen L. Greene All Rights Reserved

The members of the Committee approved the dissertation of Karen L. Greene defended

on 6 April 2004.

______Donald D. Horward Professor Directing Dissertation

______Patrick O’Sullivan Outside Committee Member

______Jonathan Grant Committee Member

______Peter P. Garretson Committee Member

______Nathan Stoltzfus Committee Member

The office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A dissertation is the result of much more than the hard work and efforts of just one individual. When I began work on this dissertation in the summer of 2000, I did not anticipate the difficulties I would face along the way or the length of time it would eventually take me to complete this project. Indeed, it would not have been completed at all were it not for the help and support I have received from various individuals and organizations that deserve to be acknowledged for their kindness, assistance and generosity. I would first like to thank my major professor, Dr. Donald Horward, without whose guidance, extreme patience and assistance this project and my degree would never have been realized. I have never met a professor who cared so much about his students. Time and again, he has gone to great lengths to provide me with funding and opportunities. He has worked tirelessly, pouring over my manuscript, and offering advice and encouragement. Dr. Horward has had a profound, positive influence upon my efforts as both a scholar and a teacher, and I sincerely hope that this dissertation is a reflection of those qualities he has instilled in me. In addition to Dr. Horward, I would also like to thank the four distinguished professors who agreed to serve on my dissertation committee: Dr. Jonathan Grant, Dr. Peter Garretson, Dr. Nathan Stoltzfus and Dr. Patrick O’Sullivan. They have taken time out of their schedules near the end of a busy semester to read my work and to offer their guidance. Not only am I grateful for the knowledge they have shared as my mentors, but also for the friendship they have shown me throughout the years that I have worked towards my degree at Florida State University. Without financial assistance from several individuals and institutions, my research would have been impossible. For countless semesters, Florida State University generously supported my studies with University fellowships and teaching assistantships. Ms. Debbie Perry and many other members of the staff and faculty in the History Department have been instrumental in helping me to utilize the department’s resources. iii

Most important is the funding I have received from the Institute on and the , under the direction of Dr. Horward, which channeled money into several of my academic endeavors. I owe much, especially to the funding that Dr. Ben Weider has given to the Institute. This money contributed to my research trip to in the summer of 2000 and has allowed me to participate in several academic conferences. Special thanks also to Dr. Skip Vichness whose generous donations to the Institute contributed to my participation in the latest Consortium on Revolutionary Europe in February 2004. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Florida State University Graduate School for awarding me with a grant that was also used toward my Paris research. But, generous funding was not the only important factor behind the research that went into this dissertation. I also owe a great deal to the staffs of the many archives where I have conducted my research. Their assistance in locating and retrieving materials has proved invaluable to the writing of this dissertation. At Florida State University, I am extremely grateful for the assistance I have received from the Special Collections department of Strozier Library and its commendable staff. I wish to particularly acknowledge and thank Lucy Patrick, the department head, as well as Patricia Brinkley, Garnett Avant and Chad Underwood. I would also like to thank the wonderful staff of the Strozier Subbasement and Chuck McCann, the head of Strozier’s Multimedia Center, who assisted me with the reproduction and placement of map and figures into my text. Finally, I am grateful for the assistance I received from the staffs of several archives in : the Archives Nationales, the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Bibliothèque historique de Paris. I also wish to express my gratitude to my many friends and fellow graduate students who have listened patiently to my numerous complaints and offered the advice and moral support I needed to accomplish this task. They have filled my years in graduate school with happiness, fun times and cherished memories. I would especially like to thank Amy and Paul Reese, Llewellyn Cook, Kevin McCranie, Hal Blanton, Mike Jones, Jack Sigler, Kenny and Marieve Johnson, Alexander Mikaberidze, Jennifer Pierce,

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Becky Hayes, Pam Robbins, and Rick Parrish. Of these, I would like to express my additional appreciation to Kenny Johnson, who took time out of his own research trip to France, to locate and copy Fréron’s dossier from the Archives des Outre-Mer in Aix-en- . I would also like to thank Llewellyn Cook, an excellent friend and landlord, who allowed me to rent his townhouse in Tallahassee for three years at virtually no financial profit for himself. Finally, I wish express my heartfelt gratitude to Otmar Olsina. Not only has he brought me happiness and encouragement these past two years, but he also made it possible for me to broaden my knowledge and experience as a historian through our travels throughout Eastern Europe. And finally, my entire family deserves a large portion of the credit for my achievements. But, above all, I am most indebted to my Mother, Faye Godfrey. Over the years, she selflessly supported and encouraged me, even though I am sure there were times when it seemed that I would never finish. If not for the moral and financial support that she gave me over all these years, I would never have finished this dissertation or this degree. My success, in the end, is a tribute to all the years of faith and guidance she has shown me.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures vii Abstract viii

INTRODUCTION 1

1. THE RISE OF A REVOLUTIONARY JOURNALIST 8

2. FRÉRON’S FIRST MISSION 32

3. FRÉRON IN 53

4. FRÉRON AND THE SIEGE OF 77

5. THE LONG ROAD FROM MARSEILLES TO PARIS 96

6. FRÉRON AND THE 124

7. TWILIGHT OF A POLITICAL CAREER 162

CONCLUSION 188

BIBLIOGRAPHY 194

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 202

vi

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Stanislas Fréron 2

2. Élie-Catherine Fréron 11

3. Provence 38

4. Toulon 81

vii

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the Revolutionary career of Louis-Marie Stanislas Fréron (1754-1802). As a youth, Fréron led a privileged life in a family that had close connections with the royal families of France and . His father, Élie-Catherine Fréron, was a prominent author and literary critic who championed the traditional institutions of France against and other . But, with the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, Fréron made a complete break with his father's principles. He joined the Club, embraced , and became a well-known, radical journalist through his notorious newspaper L'Orateur du Peuple. Along with his work as a journalist, Fréron pursued a political career. In 1792 he was elected to the and was subsequently sent as a representative on mission to the departments of southeast France (1793-94). It was here that Fréron gained a notorious reputation as a ruthless Terrorist, especially as a result of his activities in the cities of Marseilles and Toulon. With his friend and colleague , Fréron later played a leading role in the coup of 9 (27-28 July 1794) that toppled Robespierre's government and began the process to dismantle the Terror. During the following chaotic period of the Thermidorian Reaction, Fréron sought to disassociate himself from his past activities as a Jacobin and agent of the Terror. Once again he took on the mantle of journalist, resurrecting his Orateur du Peuple as a voice of the Reaction. Through his newspaper he attacked his personal enemies and all those accused of remaining loyal to the person or principles of Robespierre. Moreover, he encouraged the street violence carried out by anti-Jacobin vigilantes, the jeunesse dorée, and was soon hailed as their leader. But, public knowledge of Fréron's past activities as a representative and participant in the Terror as well as his support and encouragement of violence after Thermidor ultimately brought him criticism and condemnation. His political career was irrevocably damaged and he was not reelected to the Legislative Corps of the Directory government (1795- 1799).

viii

In the final days of the National Convention, Fréron obtained one last assignment as a representative on mission to southeast France. On this mission Fréron showed great moderation and sagacity in the implementation of his duties. However this was not enough to erase his past, cleanse his tarnished reputation or silence his political opponents. As a result, the last seven years of Fréron’s public and private life were plagued with disappointment and failure. After failing repeatedly to win a seat in the Legislative Corps, Fréron drifted, debt-ridden, able only to obtain insignificant employment. Not only were his hopes of resurrecting his political career shattered, but so too were his plans to marry Napoleon Bonaparte’s young sister, Pauline, whom he had met while on his last mission in Marseilles. But his connections to the Bonaparte family, especially his friendship with , most likely influenced the First ’s 1802 decision to appoint Fréron to a position as sous-préfet to the French colony of Saint-Domingue (). But this mission was to be his last. Fréron contracted yellow fever, just weeks after his arrival there, and died alone and forgotten.

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INTRODUCTION

Although not as well known as many of his contemporaries, Stanislas Fréron played a significant role in the French Revolution. He was a close friend and associate of some of the most influential Jacobin leaders such as , Jean-Paul Marat and . He was a participant in many of the great events of the Revolution such as the storming of the , the journée of 10 August 1792, the , and the coup of 9 Thermidor. Through his activities as a radical journalist, representative on mission and member of the National Convention, Fréron aided the ’ efforts to establish and maintain a in France. He also emerged as a staunch proponent of freedom of the press, despite the fact that he often shamelessly abused this freedom for his own ends. As a representative on mission, he contributed to the suppression of counter-revolution in southeast France and worked to break down regionalism to centralize these areas under the Convention’s control. But his cruel and arbitrary actions during his first mission, especially in the city of Toulon, earned him a reputation that ultimately damaged his political career. In an attempt to rehabilitate his image, Fréron emerged as one of the leading figures of the Thermidorian Reaction. Following the demise of Robespierre, he helped to direct the policies of the Convention. Through his unbridled use of both the press and the jeunesse dorée, Fréron significantly contributed to dismantling the Terror and breaking the power of the Jacobin Club. But, in pushing the Thermidorian Reaction too far, he “fanned the very flames that ultimately engulfed him” along with his political opponents.1 In the end, Fréron’s ruthless methods deprived him of his supporters and his political office. Failing to gain a seat in the Council of 500 during the period of the Directory, Fréron spent the last years of his life riddled with debts, and with few prospects for his future. His meteoric rise to power and influence had ended as quickly as it had begun and Fréron ended his days in poverty and obscurity.

1 F.A. Aulard, Paris sous la consulat Recueil des documents pour l’histoire de l’esprit public à Paris, (Paris, 1903-1909), II, 57-58. Quote taken from a report of the prefecture of police, 12 December 1800.

1

Figure 1

Historians of the French Revolution have not ignored Fréron completely, but they have tended to ignore the more positive results of his achievements by focusing primarily upon the most notorious aspects of his career. They have often recalled how, as a radical journalist, he

used “his poisonous pen, his shameless rabble-rousing, and the meanest personal attacks”2 to direct the Parisian public to acts of violence and to ruin the reputations of his political colleagues through libel and slander. Even more attention has been given to how, as a representative on mission, he was an outspoken advocate of the Terror, favoring the demolition of towns and the

2 Bronislaw Baczko, Ending the Terror: The French Revolution After Robespierre, (Cambridge UK, 1994) 90. 2 executions of hundreds of innocent people. “The name of Fréron seems condemned, in literature and history, to obtain nothing but a bad celebrity,” wrote one author.3 Fréron was not innocent of these actions, but to present him simply as a bloodthirsty villain who reveled in cruelty and carnage is to ignore the complexities of both his character and his achievements. In addition to ignoring his more positive contributions, historians have tended to be interested in Fréron’s career only to the extent that it relates to their own major area of study. Since Fréron was one of the most influential of the Revolutionary journalists, and his Orateur du peuple among the most widely read journals of its day, most histories of the Revolutionary press include some discussion of his importance. Fréron is most often featured along with his friend and mentor, Jean-Paul Marat, since the two often collaborated and shared a talent for extremism and a desire to use the press to slander individuals and incite violence.4 As a representative on mission to southeast France, Fréron was charged with requisitioning food, supplies and munitions for the republican armies, keeping a watchful eye on the commanders, and establishing revolutionary justice in those regions. While the nature of his duties was both political and military, historians have tended to treat these two aspects individually. Older works on the representatives5 primarily feature Fréron’s involvement in military preparations in the Midi and his participation in the siege of Toulon. More recent studies, however, have focused instead on the complex political struggles that Fréron and his colleagues faced in Marseilles and its environs.6

3 This comment was made by the editor of the 1824 edition of: Stanislas Fréron, Mémoire Historique sur la Réaction Royale et sur les Massacres du Midi, (Paris, 1824), i.

4 See, for example, Jeremy Popkin’s Revolutionary News: the Press in France and Hugh Gough’s The Newspaper Press in the French Revolution. A very extensive discussion of Fréron and his newspaper can be found in Leonard Gallois, Histoire des journaux et des journalistes de la Révolution française (1789-1796) precedée d'une introduction générale, II, (Paris, 1845- 1846).

5 These are Henri Wallon, Les Réprésentants du peuple en mission et la justice révolutionnaire dans les departments en l’an II (1793-94), (Paris, 1889) and Edmond Bonnal de Ganges, Les réprésentants du peuple en mission pres les armées 1791-1797; d'aprés le Depôt de la guerre, les séances de la Convention, les Archives nationales, (Paris, 1898-1899).

3 Fréron also frequently appears in histories of the Thermidorian Reaction.7 These works have classified him among the many “turncoat Terrorists,” such as Tallien, Barras and Fouché, who turned their backs on their Jacobin pasts to emerge as leaders of the reaction against the Terror. Special emphasis has been given to Fréron’s use of both the Orateur du peuple and the jeunesse dorée to achieve the ’ goals. Finally, Fréron can also be found occasionally in works concerning the history of the Bonaparte family.8 His ill-fated courtship of Napoleon’s sister, Pauline, has ensured him a place in any biography of her life. Despite the many roles that Fréron played in the Revolution, until now there has been only one work that has attempted to provide a synthesis of his Revolutionary activities in a biography of his life. This is Raoul Arnaud’s 1909 work, Le Fils de Fréron: Journaliste, Sans- Culotte et Thermidorien. 9 Much of Arnaud’s work is well researched, utilizing journals and some archival materials, and he provides a useful narrative of Fréron’s life. Though he was accused by one critic of being too sympathetic to Fréron,10 Arnaud appears to have been dedicated to producing a work that attempts to present an unbiased assessment of Fréron’ character and motivations. In this sense, Arnaud’s work definitely has its merits, but it also has some weaknesses. Arnaud’s literary style, while enjoyable to read, raises some suspicions that he has taken a few liberties with his narrative in order to fill in the gaps of Fréron’s personal life, for which there is little historical information. But, this is only a minor criticism. The major drawback to Arnaud’s biography is its age. Since 1909, the of the French Revolution has grown to include many new studies that have provided important analyses of various aspects of the Revolution, such as the

6 See, for example, Michael Kennedy, The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution, 1793-1795, (New York, 2000) and William Scott, Terror and Repression in Revolutionary Marseilles, (New York, 1973).

7 See, for example, Baczko’s Ending the Terror: The French Revolution After Robespierre, and François Gendron, The Gilded Youth of Thermidor, (Montreal, 1993). 8 See, for example, Theo Aronson, The Golden Bees: The Story of the Bonapartes, (Greenwich, CN, 1964) and Hector Fleischmann, and Her Lovers, (London, 1914).

9 Raoul Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron: Journaliste, sans-culotte et Thermidorien, (Paris, 1909).

10 Arthur Chuquet, Historiens et marchands d’histoire, (Paris, 1914). 4 Revolutionary press, the history of the Terror in southeastern France, and the Thermidorian period. These works have enabled this dissertation to place Fréron more adequately in context of the larger events of his time. The information provided in these works also draws attention to some important points that are lacking in Arnaud’s discussion. One area, in particular, where this weakness can be seen is in Arnaud’s analysis of Fréron’s role as a representative on mission, particularly concerning his actions in Marseilles. Arnaud ignores, for example, the difficulties faced by Fréron and Barras when dealing with the Jacobin leadership of Marseilles and especially the popular societies of the Midi. He also fails to examine the great lengths to which Fréron went to promote the career of his brother-in-law, General Jean La Poype. Finally, he fails to recognize the significance of Fréron’s long-term struggle in the National Convention with his colleagues from Marseilles and the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône. This struggle dominated and consumed the greater deal of Fréron’s efforts, from 1794 throughout the Thermidorian Reaction. This dissertation attempts to fill in these, and other, important gaps in Arnaud’s work. In doing so, it seeks not to refute Arnaud’s biography of Fréron, but to augment it with information gathered not only from these secondary works, but, more important, from a wide variety of archival and other primary sources including official documents, correspondence, newspapers, political pamphlets, and debates. These sources have been utilized to gain insights into Fréron’s actions and motivations. Many of these sources have been obtained from the Archives Nationales de France, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and the Bibliothèque Historique de Paris. Original copies of Fréron’s official correspondence, written while on mission to the Midi from 1793-1794, are housed in the Archives Nationales. Fortunately, the greater part of these have been transcribed and published and can be found in François-Alphonse Aulard’s Recueil des Actes du Comité de salut publique.11 Some of Fréron’s more personal correspondence with colleagues and friends has been obtained from Edmond Poupé’s Lettres de Barras et de Fréron, and M. Matton’s Correspondance inédite de .12 Since Fréron left behind no

11 François-Alphonse Aulard, Récueil des actes de la Comité du Sault Publique, avec la correspondance officielle des réprésentants en mission et la register du Conseil executif provisoire, publie par F. A. Aulard, (Paris, 1889-).

12 Edmond Poupé, Lettres de Barras et de Fréron, (, 1910) and M. Matton, Correspondance inédite de Camille Desmoulins, (Paris, 1836). 5 personal memoirs, his correspondence has to serve as the chief source for determining his personal thoughts and opinions. However, his friend and colleague, Paul Barras, did write his memoirs, and Fréron is frequently featured in the first two volumes.13 Proceedings of the various revolutionary assemblies, and Fréron’s speeches and activities as a member, have been obtained primarily from the printed collection of the Archives Parlementaires and from the journal Le Moniteur universel.14 Additional information has been obtained from Buchez and Roux’s multi- volume Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française, which includes primary source excerpts with additional commentary.15 Another important collection is François Aulard’s six- volume work on the Société des Jacobins that provides the minutes of the meetings of the Paris Jacobin Club, of which Fréron was a member.16 Additional information on Fréron’s political opinions has been obtained through the use of his journal L’Orateur du Peuple.17 During the Thermidorian Reaction, Fréron’s political enemies targeted him though numerous political pamphlets. The majority of these have been obtained from the small archival collection housed in the Bibliothèque Historique de Paris. Several of Fréron’s own political pamphlets as well as transcribed collections of his family’s letters have been obtained from the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. Finally, information on Fréron’s short mission to Sainte- Domingue has been obtained from a small dossier housed in the Archives des Outre-Mer in Aix- en-Provence. Through the use of these sources, this dissertation seeks to provide a balanced assessment of Fréron’s contributions to the Revolution as well as its impact upon him.

13 Paul Barras, Memoirs of Barras, member of the Directorate, I-IV, (New York, 1895- 96). 14 Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860; recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des chambres françaises imprimé par ordre de Sénat et de la Chambre des députés sous la direction de M. J. Mavidal…et de E. Laurent, 1st series, 1787- 1799, (Paris, 1862) and Le Moniteur universal, Paris: Agasse (1789-1830) Daily.

15 P. J. B. Buchez and P.C. Roux, Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution Française, ou Journal des Assemblées Nationales, depuis 1789 jusqu'en 1815, (Paris, 1834).

16 François-Alphonse Aulard, La Société des Jacobins. Récueil des documents pour l’histoire du club des Jacobins de Paris, (Paris, 1889-97).

17 Stanislas Fréron, L'Orateur du peuple, (Paris, 1790-1795).

6 Moreover, it will be the first biographical work on Fréron written in English. The primary focus will be upon Fréron’s political career, beginning in 1792, when he was first elected to the National Convention, and ending in 1796 when he was recalled from his last mission and subsequently drifted into political obscurity. Stanislas Fréron played many roles in the French Revolution. He was a radical journalist, ardent Jacobin, determined Terrorist, and self-serving Thermidorian. This dissertation seeks to examine each of these roles. An analysis of his multi-faceted career provides not only insights into his personal character, but also into the world of a revolutionary journalist, politician and representative on mission. His work as a journalist affords a look into the early years of the Revolution when the French press enjoyed a freedom of expression and a vast influence over public opinion unknown during the ancien regime. Furthermore, his political activities reveal the extent to which violence and could advance or destroy the political career of an ambitious and unscrupulous individual living in such an extraordinary era.

7 CHAPTER 1

THE RISE OF A REVOLUTIONARY JOURNALIST

Today, the name of Stanislas Fréron is most closely associated with the history of the Terror in southern France. Few may realize, however, that the political career of this representative on mission was built upon his popularity and success as a radical, left-wing journalist. Though he was born the son of a renowned literary critic, Fréron enjoyed little success as a journalist until the coming of the Revolution. The freedoms of speech and press guaranteed by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen ushered in a brief, new era in the history of the French press and presented many opportunities for struggling journalists like Fréron. He became an ardent defender of this new press freedom, not only because he remembered and despised the censorship of the old regime, but also because he wanted to be free to use his journal as in instrument to influence public opinion. Through his newspaper, l’Orateur du peuple, Fréron emerged as a popular spokesman for the radical left and made significant contributions in their efforts to destroy the old regime and establish a republic in France. From his birth, Stanislas Fréron seemed destined to a career as a writer and journalist. His father, Elie-Catherine Fréron, was one of the most famous literary critics of his day. Born in the Breton town of Quimper on 20 January 1718, Elie Fréron was educated first at the Jesuit college of Quimper and later at the well-known Louis-le-Grand in Paris.1 He had dreams of becoming a poet, but was soon apprenticed to the Abbé Pierre-François Desfontaines, who taught him the art of literary criticism. For years he worked with Desfontaines2, adopting his mentor’s views on the great authors of the period, especially his loathing for Voltaire. On 21 January 1751, Fréron married his half-niece,3 Thérèse-Jacquette Guyomar, at the Saint-Suplice church in Paris.

1 At the age of twenty, he was named to the Jesuit faculty at Louis-le-Grand.

2 He contributed to Desfontaine’s Observations sur les ecrits moderns and after his mentor’s death in 1745, he published Lettres sur quelques écrits de ce temps.

3 Elie Fréron’s father had married a total of three times. Thérèse-Jacquette Guyomar was the daughter of Elie Fréron’s half-brother.

8 Together they would have eight children, of whom only three survived to become adults. Their only surviving son, Stanislas-Louis-Marie Fréron, was born in Paris on 17 August, 1754.4 As a child, Stanislas Fréron was raised in a conservative environment that supported the , the Church and the status quo. Through his role as a literary critic, his father emerged as a popular opponent of the philosophes and encyclopedists. This career, along with a faculty position at Louis-le-Grand, enabled Elie Fréron to provide a comfortable life for his family, allowing them to associate with many wealthy and noble families. Among those who appreciated his talents were Stanislas Leczinski, the former King of Poland, and his daughter, Marie Leczinska, the queen of France. They became the patrons and close friends of both Desfontaines and Fréron. The Queen and her father even agreed to serve as godparents to Stanislas, who was given his godfather’s name. Leczinski resided in the town of Nancy, where he was surrounded by a small court, which became a principle center of opposition to the philosophes. Elie Fréron often visited there with his family and young Stanislas would sometimes read his father’s poetry to his godfather. There, too, Stanislas was coddled by the female members of the royal family, especially by Madame Adelaide, the sister of Louis XV.5 In 1747, Elie Fréron launched the publication of a journal of literary criticism that was to become his life’s work. This was the Année Litteraire. In this publication, he was often merciless in his critiques of the authors and playwrights of the day. Given his own conservative opinions, his critiques were usually harsh on the works of philosophes. It was no surprise then that many writers reviled him, but none so much as Voltaire.6 The two men would carry on a war that was both public and private for many years. 7 This war was so vicious, that Stanislas Fréron would later accuse Voltaire of being partially responsible for driving his father to an early grave.8

4 Stanislas had two sisters who survived childhood: Louise-Philippine (baptized 24 April 1757) and Thérèse-Jean (baptized 5 April 1761).

5 Edmond Bonnal de Ganges, Les réprésentants du peuple, II, 127.

6 In his play Le Café ou l’Ecossaise (1760), Voltaire ridiculed Fréron through the character of “Frelon” (“Wasp”) and by coining the saying: “a serpent bit Fréron, but it was the serpent that died.”

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Figure 2

It is important to note, however, that the critiques Elie Fréron delivered in his journal were not reserved merely for the philosophes. He levied equal criticism against anyone whose works he considered to be poor examples of literary achievement. Unfortunately for Fréron, he lived in an era of strict press censorship. In order to publish a journal such as the Année litteraire it was necessary to obtain the required “privilege” from the royal authorities and to expect anything published to be subject to royal censorship. Thus, a writer could not easily criticize individuals who had powerful patrons at court since privileges could be withdrawn just as

7 Elie Fréron was even involved, on 5 November 1749, in a sword fight with Marmontel, a protégé of Voltaire. Anthony Levi, Guide to French Literature (London, 1994), 300, see Elie- Catherine Fréron.

8 See, for example, Stanislas Fréron, L’Année Litteraire, IV (1776): 224-30. He said: “My father succumbed to the efforts of the powerful cabal of M. Voltaire; the persecutions of his merciless enemies made him descend with bitterness into the tomb.”

10 quickly as they were granted. There were several times, for example, that Elie Fréron’s denigration of friends of Madame de Pompadour led to his punishment. He was sent to prison, the publication of his journal was temporarily suspended, and bailiffs of the courts entered his home to confiscate his papers.9 Stanislas was only a child during this period, but given his opinions later in life, it is obvious that the difficulties his father faced made an impression upon him. Regardless of what paths he took in life, Stanislas Fréron would always be a proponent of freedom of the press. The stress created by Elie Fréron’s incarcerations and the continuous slanders launched by his enemies against his family eventually proved too great for his wife to bear. In 1762 Madame Fréron died. She had always been a frugal woman who had ensured that her husband managed the family expenses wisely. With her loss, Elie Fréron appears to have quickly become a bon vivant. At the time of his wife’s death he was making more money than ever from the Année Litteraire and he used this money constantly to entertain his friends and co-workers through lavish banquets. Moreover, he purchased a vast estate near Paris worth 26,740 livres, which he called Fantaisie. There young Stanislas Fréron spent his childhood playing in the enormous house and the gardens of the estate with his sisters, witnessing the extravagant entertainments his father provided for his friends.10 Elie Fréron’s neglect of his children soon led his friends to encourage him to find them a new mother. On 4 September 1766, Elie Fréron, forty-eight, married nineteen-year old Annetic Pennanrum Royou, the daughter of a close friend. From that point on, Stanislas not only had a new stepmother, but a new family as well. The Royou clan came often to visit and a few members even lived with them at Fantaisie. Annetic’s brother, Thomas-Marie Royou, was treated by Fréron as his own son and soon he was invited to become a collaborator on the Année litteraire.11 How Stanislas Fréron, only twelve years old, must have felt about his new mother and step-uncle can only be guessed. Indeed, it may have been difficult for him to accept anyone

9 As a result he was put in prison (in the Bastille, Vincennes, and other fortresses) and was even exiled from Paris several times. But always he had the Leczinskis to protect him and his days spent at any time in prison were never difficult.

10 Raoul Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 30-40.

11 Robert L. Myers, The Dramatic Theories of Elie-Catherine Fréron, (Paris, 1962), 29.

11 taking his mother’s place, let alone a woman who was young enough to be his sister. Years later, after the death of his father, his stepmother admitted to a friend: “I confess that my stepson has given me grief for a long time.”12 It is clear, however, that Elie Fréron’s second marriage introduced people into his son’s life who wanted to usurp his position as his father’s heir. What probably began, as mere familial tension between the Royous and Stanislas would eventually evolve into a war over control of the Année litteraire. After five years with Stanislas, Annetic and her brother advised the elder Fréron to send his children away to school. So, while his sisters were sent to convent school, seventeen-year-old Stanislas was sent to Louis-le-Grand in Paris.13 That same year, 1771, Louis-le-Grand also accepted Camille Desmoulins who was destined to become one of Stanislas’ closest friends. Also attending Louis-le-Grand was Maximilien Robespierre. It is possible that, over the eight years he spent there, Stanislas was influenced by the radical, liberal ideas of these two friends. Though not a stellar student, young Fréron no doubt benefited from his father’s reputation and the fact that the school administrators were friends of Thomas Royou.14 While Stanislas was away at school, things were not going well for his father. By the early , the Année Litteraire suffered a decline in subscriptions and soon Elie Fréron’s expenses began to exceed his income. In addition, his health began to decline. Perceiving Fréron’s situation, his enemies at court went on the offensive and this time succeeded in having the Année Litteraire’s privilege withdrawn.15 By pleading to the king, Madame Fréron was able

12 Madame Royou-Fréron to M. Triboudet, 14 February 1784. Jean Balcon, Le Dossier Fréron (Correspondances et documents) (St. Brieuc, 1975), 392. She continues her letter by saying that despite the trouble Stanislas has given her, “I have forgotten all. The son of a husband that I cherished with all my soul cannot have unpardonable faults.”

13 Elie Fréron also chose to enroll and support the education of Claude Royou, another of Annetic’s brothers. See Archives Nationales H3 2517, Registry of enrollments for Louis-le- Grand. This registry records that Stanislas was admitted on 30 September 1771. On the next page of the registry, the enrollment of Camille Desmoulins (1 October 1771) is recorded.

14 Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 47-48. Like Elie Fréron, Thomas Royou had been an instructor at Louis le Grand. At one point he held the chair of philosophy.

15 It is important to note that by the early 1770s, the philosophes had systematically gained control of the prestigious Academie française (respect for which was demanded by law).

12 to have the privilege restored, but by the time she returned to Fantaisie with the news of her success, on 10 March 1776, Elie Fréron was dead. Stanislas, now twenty-five, inherited the Année litteraire, but little wealth. His father’s death had left his family deeply in debt. Much of their furniture and possessions had to be sold to the highest bidder and Fantaisie was sold to a banker, M. de Ptirieux.16 Voltaire and other enemies of Elie Fréron, such as Jean-François de La Harpe and Louis- Sebastien Mercier, lost no time in expressing their delight at his death and attempting to vilify him, and his unfortunate family. For example, Voltaire even went so far as to claim that, in desperation, Annetic Fréron had written to him asking that he help in finding a husband for Stanislas’ sister Louise.17 Mercier and La Harpe, for their part, blamed Elie Fréron for having hindered their success as writers. Stanislas was furious and decided to respond to these attacks through the Année litteraire. His step-uncle, Thomas Royou, as well as other editors for the journal, the Abbés Grosier and Geffroy, aided him.18 In addition, his father’s immense correspondence provided him with much insight regarding his father’s friends and enemies.“ I tell you,” he wrote in the Année litteraire, “…that my father never burned a single letter he received, and that I am the agent and I will be able to combat those who wish to denigrate his memory.”19 He said that his father had shown him these letters and told him that he should read them and use them as necessary after his death. He now poured through these letters to find evidence to counter the accusations and insinuations

In this way, they had succeeded in taking over the literary establishment in France. Levi, Guide to French Literature, 303-04.

16 Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 56.

17 Voltaire had helped find a husband for the daughter of Corneille.

18 His father’s friend, Simon Linguet, also defended Stanislas against Voltaire and his allies: “Be gentle with Stanislas,” he wrote, “Despite the wrongs of his father and his allies against Voltaire, Fréron’s children are innocent.” Taken from Annales, tome IV as cited in Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 55.

19 Année litteraire, IV (1776): 348. See also Stanislas Fréron, Addresse aux amis de la liberté, 30 June 1790, Archives Nationales Y10508b, doc.3, 14.

13 of Voltaire and his allies.20 Likewise, he sought out his father’s friends for positive anecdotes on his career.21 He also asked that friends in Paris keep him informed of Voltaire’s activities.22 Stanislas Fréron was to realize soon, that Voltaire and his allies were not as great a threat as were his own relatives. In the years following his father’s death in 1776, a struggle began between Stanislas and the Royous for control of the Année litteraire. This struggle seemed to have raged back and forth, with each side attempting to eliminate the other from the journal, until around 1781 when Thomas Royou gained enough support to wrest overall control of the journal from Fréron. The way in which the Royous triumphed was rather indirect. They profited from a misfortune that befell Fréron when, like his father before him, he was censored for the Année litteraire’s severe criticism of an influential actor. In 1781, the Année Litteraire carried a review of M. Imbert’s play Jaloux sans amour. The play’s principle actor, Denis Dechanet, (known professionally as Desessarts), was ridiculed by the Année litteraire as nothing more than a “fat ventriloquist” who brought nothing to the role he played. Desessarts, who had powerful patrons, quickly brought a complaint against the journal. Though he had not personally written the article,23 Fréron was summoned by the Châtelet24 where he was questioned and rudely insulted by the lieutenant of police. When the police refused his offer to retract the criticism of Desessarts in the next issue of his journal, Fréron, infuriated, drew his sword and thrust it into the wall. The police acted quickly and Fréron

20 He revealed, for example, a letter written by Mercier to his father (dated 1763) in which Mercier thanked Fréron for encouraging his “weak essays.” Myers, Dramatic Theories, 34. As for Voltaire, Stanislas attacked him in the Année litteraire: “From the breast of his opulence he insults the sad state of our family…he plays, without any sense of modesty, on our tears and regrets. Here is the “apostle of humanity,” this protector of oppressed innocents!…this man whom we raise in statues!…it is a consolation for us to think that our cruel persecutor, in wishing to blacken us, has only succeeded in dishonoring himself.” Année litteraire, IV (1776): 224-30.

21 See his letter to M. Triboudet, 19 December 1777. Dossier Fréron, 385.

22 Voltaire at this time was making a sensation in Paris by his return there.

23 Salaun, a collaborator on the Année Litteraire, had written it.

24 The Châtelet was the Paris police authority and royal court responsible for the enforcement of civil and criminal law under the old regime.

14 was subdued.25 Although the police wanted to imprison him, the ultimate decision was to revoke the privilege of the Année litteraire. Stanislas appealed to the king’s sister, Mme. Adelaide, and to other patrons for support. Unfortunately for Stanislas, a new Queen, Marie-Antoinette, now dominated the French court and many of his old patrons no longer wielded the influence they once possessed. In the end, the privilege was restored, but to the Royous.26 Stanislas was forced to sign a contract with his stepmother whereby he was allowed to continue to collaborate in the publication and to benefit from the profits27 of the Année litteraire so long as he promised never to found or write for another journal under the name of Fréron.28 Though his small income was now secured, his relationship with the Royous was all but destroyed. The only family member with whom he remained close was his sister, Thérèse-Jean. He often visited in at her at the convent school in Paris.29 Though he continued to work infrequently on the Année litteraire until 1786, he could only grow increasingly disinterested in a journal that no longer belonged to him.30 With no real sense of direction, Fréron soon drifted into the intellectual underworld of pre-revolutionary Parisian society, using his small inheritance to carry on a libertine and parasitical lifestyle. He made friends with bankers and financiers, who could give him loans. He frequented their parties, flattered their vanity and shared in their vices.31 But he also renewed contact with old friends, such as Desmoulins, and made the

25 Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 66-67. Years later, during the Revolution, Fréron would seek his revenge on Desessarts by ridiculing him in the Revolutions de France et de Brabant.

26 Privilege granted on 6 February 1784. Archives Nationales, T546, doc.2.

27 He was to receive 55 livres per every 32 pages. See Dossier Fréron, 391.

28 This contract was signed on 26 February 1784. Archives Nationales, T546, doc.1.

29 He would later introduce his sister to his good friend, the Marquis de La Poype. Out of this relationship, La Poype would marry Thérèse-Jean in 1785. His other sister, Louise, had married Annetic Fréron’s brother, Claude Royou, and she and Stanislas had become estranged as a result.

30 Madame Fréron, with the assistance of her brother Thomas Royou and the Abbés Grosier and Geffroy, succeeded in keeping the Année Litteraire in publication until 1790. In the 36 years of its existence (1754-1790), the Année litteraire had reviewed some 12,000 books. Levi, Guide to French Literature, 301

15 acquaintance of other struggling writers who, like himself, had encountered the injustice of censorship and the obstacles of the literary establishment. As the Revolution drew near, he and Desmoulins frequented the Palais Royale, a popular gathering place for the exchange of liberal ideas. It was through Desmoulins that Stanislas would become acquainted with individuals such as Georges Danton and Jean-Paul Marat. Under their influence, Fréron soon turned his back completely on his father’s principles and embraced his friends’ liberal and democratic ideas. When the Revolution broke out in 1789, Fréron got his first taste of rabble-rousing when, on 14 July, he aided Desmoulins in inciting the Parisians to launch their attack on the Bastille.32 His pro-revolutionary speeches and activities soon brought him public attention and, as a result, on 18 September 1789 he was elected to represent the Bonne-Nouvelle district in the newly formed Paris Commune.33 The role he played in the Commune seems to have been very minimal. He joined his colleagues, for example, in deputations sent to the royal family and participated in patriotic speechmaking.34 Despite what appeared to be a promising political career, Fréron sought to resume his career as a journalist. The new era of press freedom brought about by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen would allow him to do this. Freedom of speech and press, guaranteed by Article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, led to a breakdown of the old, royal system of censorship. Almost overnight, there was a proliferation of newspapers and journals reflecting all types of political views. At last, many writers, like Fréron, who had chaffed under the old regime press laws or who had been rejected by the literary establishment, were now free to write what they wished.

31 Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 77-78.

32 Fréron’s brother-in-law, the Marquis de la Poype, was an officer in the Gardes Françaises. Fréron may have used La Poype’s influence with the Gardes during the attack on the Bastille. Stanislas Fréron, Addresse aux amis de la liberté, 12. In August 1790 Desmoulins and Fréron, along with other patriotic journalists, were invited to attend a solemn service held by the Conquerors of the Bastille in commemoration of the event. Sigismund LaCroix, Actes de la Commune de Paris pendant la Révolution, (Paris, 1895), VI, 459-60.

33 LaCroix, Actes de la Commune, II, 688.

34 On 7 December 1789, he was appointed to a delegation to the Queen to express the Commune’s condolences on the death of her sister, the Abbess of Innsbruck. On 5 February 1790 he was part of a deputation sent to the King to thank him for his address to the National Assembly. On 30 September he is recorded as having participated in a serment de gratuité. LaCroix, Actes de la Commune, III, 143; IV, 1-2; VI, 336.

16 Paris was soon flooded with a dearth of monthlies, weeklies and dailies. There were royalist, moderate and radical publications available throughout the capital. Some were literary and well written while others were satirical or little more than scandal sheets. With the erosion of censorship, the way now appeared open for criticism of the authorities, church officials, the king, or anyone. As expected, such an uncontrolled atmosphere soon led to abuses often resulting in court cases of libel and slander. Another major change brought about by the eradication of the old regime press system was the opportunity of the press to reach a wider audience. During the ancien régime newspapers and journals, such as the Année litteraire, had been sold only through subscription. But now the latest titillating headlines could be shouted out from every street corner by vendors hired by journalists to peddle their papers to the public.35 The press now had the power to influence a wider range of the public and perhaps even to incite popular unrest. In the first two years of the Revolution, the Paris Municipality and Châtelet, remnants of the police power of the old regime, took what measures they could to prosecute articles deemed a threat to public order.36 However, the National Assembly remained unwilling to pass any restrictive legislation upon freedom of speech and press.37 As a result, scandalous and radical journals of the extreme left and right were allowed to thrive and exercise a profound and often destructive influence on public opinion and actions. It was not long before many of Fréron’s friends began to make a name for themselves through the printed word. Camille Desmoulins found success through political pamphlets as well as his newspaper Les Révolutions de France et de Brabant. Moreover, Marat, whom Fréron had

35 J.Gilchrist and W.J. Murray, The Press in the French Revolution, (Great Britain, 1971), 9.

36 The ancien regime courts and police authorities remained in existence until the autumn of 1790.

37 Some members of the National Assembly had attempted, via motions, to pass some sort of laws that would place limits on the ability of the press to do and say what it wished. The Abbé Siéyès had, for example, in January of 1790, proposed a program whereby press offenders/offenses would be brought to trial before a special jury. But this proposal, like so many others, failed to pass the Assembly. For more details see Raymond Manevy, La Révolution et la liberté de la press, (Paris, 1964), 19-22.

17 especially come to idolize, soon become a major voice of the radical left through his newspaper L’Ami du peuple. Fréron longed to share in their success, fame and profit. In spite of the contract that still bound him to the Année litteraire, Fréron soon accepted an offer to collaborate on L’Ami des citoyens. This patriot newspaper, which enjoyed a modest clientele in the provinces, consisted of articles focusing on agriculture, commerce and some politics. In his unsigned articles, Fréron attacked the nobles as well as the expenditures of the government. 38 But ultimately, he found that he was not satisfied at this journal, disliking the low pay he received and the lack of public renown that he desired.39 Fréron soon made the fateful decision to found his own journal. Originally, he planned that this journal would be a daily newspaper and that its name would be either Reveil matinal or the Nouvelles du Matin.40 Unable to publicly attach his name to it, he decided to create a front man for his new journal. While at the Palais-Royale one day, catching up on the latest news, Fréron made the acquaintance of a man in threadbare clothes carrying printing proofs. This was Marcel Enfantin, a clerk he recognized from the bureau of L’Ami des citoyens. Fréron offered Enfantin the job of serving as editor for his new journal and Enfantin accepted.41 Next, Fréron sent his brother-in-law, Jean La Poype, in search of vendors to sell his journal. A poor bookseller on the rue de la Boucherie, l’Espinasse, and his wife agreed to accept nine livres a day to distribute his journal. Fréron’s attempts to secure a printer for his work were more troublesome. His first choice was the printer Laurens Jr. on the rue Saint-Jacques. But the radical lines of the first edition prompted the printer to reject the offer. Fortunately, the

38 This was a foreshadowing, perhaps, of the type of articles that he would soon write for his own paper. L’Ami des citoyens was Jean Lambert Tallien’s newspaper. Tallien and Fréron would, after Thermidor, work together again, but this time in opposition to their former Jacobin compatriots. Claude Bellanger and Jacques Godechot, Histoire Générale de la Presse Française, (Paris, 1969), I, 524-25.

39 Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 103-104.

40 Ibid, 105.

41 As the “front man,” it would be Enfantin’s job to carry the manuscript of the journal to the printing house, sign it with an assumed name, see to its distribution and collect the subscriptions. But, above all, he was not to mention Fréron’s name in any manner. Archives Nationales, Y10508b, doc. 8 (dossier relating to the arrest of Marcel Enfantin).

18 l’Espinasses told Fréron of two printers in search of work, Chambon and Delachave, who agreed to print it.42 As a result, on 23 May 1790 the first edition of Fréron’s newspaper was issued, but with a new title and an updated image.43 Instead of a daily, as he had planned, the Orateur du Peuple, as it was now called, appeared every two days and consisted of eight pages.44 Although Fréron was the true author, the paper was attributed to the fictitious “Martel.” To catch the eye of its readers, every issue began with the phrase: “At the sound of my voice France awakes! Kings, be attentive! People, lend me your ear.” Like many journalists of the Revolution, Fréron used his newspaper to foster the political education of the by keeping his readers informed on the day-to-day decisions and events taking place in the National Assembly. But the Orateur du peuple was much more than simply a dry record of political events. On the contrary, it displayed all the radicalism, sensationalism and even demagoguery that can be seen in many of the left-wing journals of this period. These journals all shared the increasingly radical, pro-republican ideas professed in the political clubs in which their authors participated, such as the . Fréron, for example, used his newspaper to criticize Assembly reforms that he regarded as too moderate and to attack those individuals, such as the Marquis de Lafayette, or , whom the Cordeliers considered their enemies. He considered himself and his journalist

42 Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 107-108.

43 There has been some debate among historians as to the official date of the first issue of the Orateur du people. Determining this date was difficult because no dates are given in the body of the journal. As a result, the dates of issues have had to be determined by their content (i.e. events which were discussed, decrees of the Assembly mentioned, etc.). While some historians contend that Fréron’s newspaper was first issued in December of 1789, others believe that it was either the 23 or 24 May 1790 because the first issue discusses what appears to be the Nootka Bay crisis and the second issue discuses the decree giving the National Assembly the right to control foreign affairs. Which was decreed on 22 May 1790. B.J. Buchez and P.C. Roux, Histoire Parlementaire de la Revolution Française, ou Journal des Assemblées Nationales, depuis 1789 jusqu’en 1815, (Paris, 1834), VI, 132fn. See also Leonard Gallois, Histoire des journaux, II, 234; and L. E. Hatin, Histoire politique et litteraire de la presse en France (Paris, 1860), 203-04.

44 Almost all of the major daily newspapers of this period consisted of a single sheet folded over twice to make a newspaper of four quarto pages. The Orateur du peuple, which came out every two days, had one supplement added to this, thus making it eight octavo pages (i.e. eight pages long). Gilchrist, The Press in the French Revolution, 8-9.

19 colleagues as “missionaries of liberty”45 whose mission was to speak out against all those who would infringe upon the liberties guaranteed by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. And of all the liberties Fréron was determined to uphold, press freedom was the most important. Therefore, he trained his pen against the royal police agents and judges of the Châtelet, who, in direct defiance of Article II of the Rights of Man, persisted in their attempts to censor the printed word. It is no coincidence that many have compared Fréron’s Orateur du peuple with the journals of Desmoulins and especially Marat. Fréron emulated the polemical style seen in the journals of both men. Marat and Fréron had known each other for some time and Marat often referred to Fréron as his “lieutenant” and his “dear brother in arms.” 46 Their two newspapers were, at times, similar thematically, using almost the same turn of phrase or literary allusion. This is not surprising since the two often collaborated. Marat sometimes edited entire editions of the Orateur du peuple.47 In addition, Fréron frequently published Marat’s “observations” and the correspondence that transpired between the Orateur du peuple and the Ami du Peuple. By July 1790, Fréron was also collaborating with Desmoulins on the Révolutions de France et de Brabant. Not only did he provide some financial backing for Desmoulin’s journal, but he also agreed to write at least one half of each issue.48 Like his comrade Marat, Fréron often used the Orateur du peuple to encourage public violence against groups or individuals through rumor and accusation. Fréron’s frequent denunciations of certain citizens more than once signaled popular vengeance. An excellent example can be seen in the sacking of the home of the Duc de Castries on 12 November 1790. The Duc de Castries had recently fought a duel with Charles de Lameth, a popular hero. De

45 Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, IV, no. 29, 228.

46 See, for example, Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, IV, no. 58. Fréron frequently published Marat’s letters to him. In this issue Marat writes: “You are my lieutenant, my dear brother in arms.” Another time, Fréron referred to Marat as “my dear colleague and master.” Ibid, III, no. 54, 423

47 Hatin, Histoire politique et litteraire, VI, 201-202.

48 See the contract signed (4 July 1790) between Fréron, Desmoulins & the bookseller Laffrey. Reproduced in Jules Claretie, Camille Desmoulins. Lucille Desmoulins. Etude sur les Dantonistes d’après des documents nouveaux et inédits (Paris, 1875), 85-86. Fréron’s collaboration commenced with no. 33 of the journal and lasted for over a year.

20 Castries had wounded Lameth. In response, Fréron called on the people of Paris to take vengeance upon de Castries: “The hôtel de Castries should be destroyed from top to bottom until not a stone remains, and the cowardly assassin who lives there should pay with all his blood for attempting to murder one of the heroes of the Revolution.” 49 And in the following issue, Fréron told his readers that a rumor was heard that de Castries had deliberately put poison on his epée. Unfortunately for de Castries, Fréron’s advice was followed and his home was invaded and sacked by a Parisian mob, the inhabitants only escaping death through flight.50 In addition to using his newspaper to attack individuals, Fréron also made frequent revelations of supposed “massacres” being planned by counter- at court. He often referred to the “Austrian committee” in the Tuileries, which was working on plans for counter- revolution. He accused the King’s former finance minister , for example, of leaving a secret treasure of 500,000 francs to the French court “to furnish the expense of counter- revolution.” 51 In another issue, Fréron claimed, “30,000 men are secretly armed in Paris and the outskirts, and are only waiting for the signal for massacre.” 52 Such stories terrified the common people of Paris, intensifying their paranoia and their hatred for nobles and the royal family. As could be expected, there were those in the National Assembly who were appalled by the liberties that were being taken, not only by the left-wing press, but also by the radical right who employed threats and slanders just as often as Fréron and his colleagues. There had been many instances in which members of the Assembly had denounced the abuses of such journals. But, unfortunately there were only a few, brief occasions in which the legislature proved willing to take action against the press. Only the Châtelet, eager to maintain its old powers of censorship, demonstrated the courage to take bold measures. In the summer of 1790, it directed its efforts against the Orateur du peuple. Sometime around 23-26 June 1790, charges were laid against the Orateur du peuple for having, in the articles “Horrible maneuvers of the Austrian Committee in the Tuileries” and

49 Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, III, no. 30, 236-39.

50 Ibid, III, no. 31, 245-48.

51 Ibid, IV, no. 57, 467.

52 Ibid, III, no. 66, 526.

21 “Provable conspiracy against liberty,” threatened public order in Paris.53 As a result, Marcel Enfantin, whom the authorities believed to be Martel, was arrested in his home and taken to police headquarters. Like so many of the journalists that found themselves in such circumstances, Enfantin invoked freedom of the press and the “rights of man” in his defense. He was, nevertheless, accused of and was taken to La Force prison under guard. In addition, Joseph Claude Ducros, an employee of the Ami des citoyens, who had been found carrying the printing proofs of the Orateur du peuple, was also seized and held at the disposal of the tribunal. Fréron’s printers and M. and Mme. l’Espinasse, his distributors, were also arrested.54 When Fréron learned that Enfantin and the others had been arrested, he protested in his newspaper with vehemence and called on all citizens and journalists to defend Martel as well as their right of freedom of speech and press: Citizens, can you believe it? The Orateur du peuple is in chains! He had only taken up the pen in defense of your rights, he was a dynamic writer of the most ardent patriotism…he fought the ministerial hydra with a club, and the aristocracy with ridicule…Well, the Municipality has slandered [his] intentions…it has poisoned his innocent phrases…[but] the voice the Orateur du peuple will pierce the vaults of his prison…the articles of the Rights of Man were made to be used by this French citizen…so that he may publish his opinions.55 Fréron continued to publish his newspaper. In fact, the next day the vendors cried in the streets: Grande denunciation du Sieur Mitoufflet comme criminel de lese nation.56 In this article, Fréron attacked the Châtelet and the King’s prosecutor, Mitoufflet de Beauvais, whom he labeled an “” and “a vile despot.”57 Fréron said that they were the

53 Archives Nationales, Y10508b. Both articles can be found in this dossier. They can also be found in L’Orateur du peuple, I, nos. 13 and 30. See also LaCroix, Actes de la Commune, VI, 350-51.

54 Archives Nationales, Y10508b (dossiers on Enfantin and Ducros), doc. 12. Statements were also taken from Chambon and Delachave as well as François Roux de Briere, the director of the bureau of L’Ami des citoyens.

55 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, I, no. 22.

56 Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, I, no. 23.

22 guilty ones because they had violated the guarantee of press freedom in the Rights of Man. Fréron’s friends and fellow journalists, Desmoulins and Elisée Loustalot, took up the Orateur du peuple’s defense as well as the Cordeliers who, at the instigation of Danton, declared that “Martel’s” imprisonment was an attack on the law clearly pronounced in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. 58 Meanwhile, two weeks passed for Enfantin in La Force where the King’s counselor questioned him. He eventually confessed all and, most important, he and Ducros named Fréron as the true author of the Orateur du peuple. 59 Learning that Enfantin had denounced him and knowing that he would soon be arrested, Fréron went to the bureau of the Ami des citoyens and announced boldly to all who would listen that he was indeed “Martel.” He brought with him, to be printed, an article in which he attempted to justify himself. This was his Adresse aux amis de la liberté, which he addressed to the representatives of the Paris Commune. In it, he related the events of his life, how he and his father had both suffered the persecution of the Châtelet, and he spoke out against the accusation of treason that had been levied against Enfantin.60 He appealed to all citizens, to the National Assembly, and to all the Cordeliers and journalists for support. He compared Enfantin’s arrest with the letters des cachet once used by the nobility and he asserted that the Châtelet’s pursuit and persecution of journalists only demonstrated that the aristocrats were attempting to strike at the freedom of the press.61 If the Châtelet was not stopped, he asserted, then “anyone who used their pen for the nation’s cause” could be arrested. He even suggested forming a league of all patriotic journalists in order to institute a club dedicated to

57 Ibid.

58 Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, VI, 326. This was on 1 July 1790.

59 After this confession, witnesses heard by the counselor Millon agreed that Enfantin had no part in the journal. The wife of l’Espinasse confessed that the true authors were “Fréron and the Comte de Poix [La Poype] who aided him in going to collect the news from the Palais- Royale.” The printers, Chambon and Delachave, Laurens jr. and Pellier all made the same confession. Archives Nationales, Y10508b, see doc. 8.

60 Fréron, Addresse aux amis de la liberté.

61 Ibid, 3.

23 defending liberty of the press against those who wanted to destroy it.62 It was not long before the King’s prosecutor ordered Fréron’s arrest. In the end, this order was never carried out. Fréron managed to elude the police until other events occurred which eventually rendered the judicial pursuits null. On 31 July 1790, a member of the Assembly, Pierre Victor Malouet, made a speech in which he denounced Marat’s latest pamphlet C’en fait de nous! as well as an article by Desmoulins.63 Malouet wanted these journalists and those like them charged with treason.64 Desmoulins, with Fréron’s help, responded first by passing out a petition on the Champs de Mars in favor of press freedom and then they appeared in person in the National Assembly where they attempted to justify themselves. They were quickly expelled from the Assembly hall, but their courage had made an impression on many députés. Soon, many members of the Assembly began to speak against setting limitations on press freedom. As a result, the Assembly eventually agreed that all charges, save those against Marat, should be dropped.65 This would not be the only time that Fréron’s journal brought him into conflict with the municipal authorities. He frequently faced lawsuits, due to his slander of prominent individuals. At one time, for example, he was ordered by the Municipality to pay 20,000 francs in damages to a M. Etienne and later 6,000 francs total to various others.66 Moreover, he continued to face accusations for preaching insurrection. He was continually accused of slandering the King’s ministers, the Châtelet, the Municipality and even the agents of the police as well as for

62 Ibid, 8.

63 C’en fait de nous! Was aimed particularly at the émigrés whom Marat claimed were conspiring with Austrian nobles and the King and Queen to destroy the people of France. Marat proposed that five or six hundred heads should roll “to assure peace, liberty and happiness.” Louis R. Gottschalk, Jean-Paul Marat; a Study in Radicalism (New York, 1966), 68.

64 Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, I, nos. 30 and 59.

65 Ibid, I, no. 61, 493. The headlines to this edition read: “Victory of Camille Desmoulins over his denouncers; Great triumph of freedom of the press and the vendors.”

66 Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, IV, no. 23. Fréron had denounced Etienne as an informer working in the pay of Bailly and Lafayette.

24 defending his vendors when they came under the scrutiny of the authorities.67 Fortunately for Fréron and his fellow journalists, by September 1790, the Châtelet was abolished and replaced by a new court system. With his enemies in the Châtelet eliminated, Fréron continued to use the Orateur du peuple to discredit the royal family and their supporters and, above all, to press for the establishment of a republic. In many ways, Fréron’s task was made easier by the suspicious behavior of the King and Queen and their reluctance to fully support the Revolution. In fact, ever since they had been brought under duress from Versailles in October of 1789, the royal family had been hoping and planning for a way to leave Paris.68 But, whether or not they should be given the liberty of movement was a matter of debate not only in the halls of the Assembly, but within the newspaper press as well. The opinions of the left wing press were voiced by Fréron who, as early as the summer of 1790, had warned the people of Paris that if the King was ever allowed to leave the capital, he would flee the country and join with the forces of counter- revolution. It was therefore necessary, he said, to stop any attempts of the royal family to leave Paris and even to imprison the King for the good of the nation.69 This issue became more pressing when, on 17-18 April 1791, the royal family heard mass from a non-juring priest and decided to go to confession and communion outside Paris at Saint Cloud. The Orateur du peuple was the first newspaper to make the king’s plans for departure publicly known. Fréron asserted that the royal family’s desire to visit Saint Cloud concealed a

67 Fréron came out in defense of his vendors several times. In one instance, he used their arrest to appeal to freedom of the press: “…the unfortunate peddlers, in selling this new journal, are thrown into La Force and their merchandise confiscated!..those useful men who were, since the first days of the Revolution, the heralds, the trumpets of liberty…Liberty of the press should be without boundaries, as in England and the United States.” Another time, Fréron recommended that the persecuted vendors and other citizens should appeal to the Orateur du peuple if the laws did not uphold their rights. L’Orateur du peuple as cited in Gallois, Histoire des journaux, II, 241 and 247.

68 Many friends of Marie Antoinette had been working on escape plans to carry the royal family to the safety of their relatives in Austria or elsewhere. The Comte de Mirabeau had also been urging the King to leave Paris (though he did not advocate flight to the frontiers).

69 This is taken from the article “Provable Conspiracy Against Liberty.” This was one of the two articles for which the Châtelet arrested Marcel Enfantin. Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, I, no. 13, 105.

25 secret project for their flight. If they succeeded, Fréron warned, the King would return with an Austrian army to reclaim his throne and massacre the people.70 This inflammatory article was later credited with having aroused the populace in their subsequent actions to prevent the king and the royal family from leaving Paris. Thereafter, Fréron continued to insist that the royal family was planning another escape. He warned, for example, that the king had prepared for a band of brigands to set fire to parts of the city in the middle of the night. During the confusion, which would naturally ensue, the people and the would be occupied in putting out the flames, so the King and his family could make their escape.71 While Fréron may have been mistaken about the methods, he was not mistaken that the royal family was planning an escape. On 20-21 June 1791, Louis XVI and his family fled Paris in disguise and made for the Belgian border. Recognized, they were stopped short of the border at the town of Varennes and immediately were returned to Paris. Louis XVI was suspended from his functions and the National Assembly now governed on its own. Afterwards, demands for the deposition of Louis XVI and the establishment of a republic grew stronger than ever. The radical press now called for popular action to depose the king. Fréron launched a vicious attack on the royal family demanding that they be made to pay for their treason. It is ironic that the same young man who had once enjoyed the protection and respect of members of the royal family should now be the one to call for Louis XVI to “lose his head on the scaffold” and demand that Marie Antoinette “be dragged through the streets of Paris by a horse’s tail.” 72 Compounding this politically unstable situation was the fact that since the spring of 1791, France was threatened with invasion by foreign powers bent on aiding Louis XVI and destroying the Revolution. To many, the time was now ripe to sweep away the monarchy for good. But

70 Fréron threatened the King: “Do you think that we believe you are truly patriotic? If your mask falls today, tomorrow it will be your crown!…If you leave…we will seize your chateaux, your palace, your civil list; we will proscribe your head.” Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, 18 April 1791, III, no. 44, 365.

71 The Orateur du peuple, IV, no. 44.

72 Ibid.

26 despite the demands of the radical left for a republic, a majority of the National Assembly remained committed to the . Fréron and his allies were not discouraged. Not only did they voice their republican ideas through the press, but they also decided to take more direct action. Beginning on 14 July 1791, thousands of citizens assembled on the to celebrate the second anniversary of the . The Cordeliers and other pro-republican groups decided to use this gathering as a means to circulate a petition in favor of the overthrow of the King and the establishment of a republic. Fréron had been heavily involved with his fellow Cordeliers in the creation of the petition. He went with Desmoulins to the Champ de Mars in order to harangue the people for support.73 By 17 July over 50,000 people had gathered and around 6,000 had signed the petition. When the National Guard was called out to break up the demonstration, the situation turned violent and 40 to 60 demonstrators were shot. 74 The crowd was violently dispersed and martial law was declared. As a result, the Assembly took aggressive action against the incendiary press and Fréron, like Marat and others, was placed under another arrest mandate. In a rare show of force, the National Assembly issued the following decree of 18 July 1791: “All persons who have provoked murder, arson, or pillage, or who have formerly advised disobedience to the law through placards, through public writings and peddling…or public assemblies are to be regarded as seditious troublemakers and the officers of the police are…to arrest them and hand them over to the tribunals to be punished.” 75 In the weeks that followed, radical newspapers were temporarily closed and many republican activists were arrested while others fled Paris.76 Le Moniteur reported that on 22 July,

73 An eyewitness, the Marquis de Ferrieres, attested to their presence on the Champ de Mars stating that they were there making speeches dressed in the style of the sans-culottes. Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 159.

74 William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (Oxford, 1989), 154.

75 Ch. de Monseignat, Un Chapitre de la Revolution Française, ou Histoire des Journaux en France de 1789 à 1799, (Paris, 1853), 156. It is important to note that the Feuillants in the National Assembly saw this incident as a means to stifle the voice of the radical left-wing press and to put the Cordeliers out of commission. See also Raymond Manevy, La Revolution et la liberté de la presse, (Paris, 1964), 34-35.

27 “they went to seize M. Fréron, author of the Orateur du peuple, but he was not at home.”77 Leaving his journal in the hands of his trusted friend, Labanette, Fréron fled with Desmoulins to Versailles where they took refuge in the home of M. Lecointre, a friend of Marat.78 But the National Assembly had considered these measures as only temporary expedients to ensure public order. It was not long before both Fréron’s arrest mandate and the press restrictions in Paris were lifted.79 Fréron did not resume authorship of the Orateur du Peuple upon his return to the capital. Instead, the journal continued with the same philosophy under the direction of his colleague, Labanette, until 1792. Meanwhile, Fréron turned his attention to new projects and politics. By April 1792, he had become president of the Cordeliers and in that same , he and Desmoulins decided to found a new journal, the Tribune des Patriotes. But, due to a lack of sufficient funds, they were forced to cease publication (by May 1792) after only four issues.80 During the summer of 1792, within the radical sections of Paris and the Cordeliers, plans were being laid for insurrection to oust the King from power. As a result, on 10 August 1792, the

76 Not long after the Assembly’s decree, the Commune began to pursue the street vendors. On 27 July 1791, the mayor of Paris, Bailly, ordered that all vendors who were caught selling the Orateur du peuple or the Ami du peuple were to be arrested. Archives Nationales, AFII, 48/376, doc. 43. On 6 August, the Mercure de France reported: “Many arrests were delivered by her [the Commune] against the vendors of incendiary papers. They are forbidden to sell namely the Orateur du peuple and the Ami du peuple.” Mercure de France, 6 August 1791.

77 Le Moniteur Universel, 24 July 1791, no. 205, 845. Danton escaped to England, while Marat also went into hiding. Ironically, Fréron’s step-uncle, the Abbé Tomas Royou, was also arrested.

78 Labanette was an obscure gazetteer who had published, in 1790, the amusing Journal du Diable and had worked on the Révolutions de France et de Brabant. Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 161-63.

79 They were withdrawn via an amnesty in mid-Sept. 1791. On 21 August 1791, the Committee on the Constitution declared that it was impossible to deal with the excesses of the press with one repressive law. The short-lived Constitution of 1791 guaranteed freedom of the press, but Articles 17 and 18 of the Penal Code of 1791 determined which specific press violations would be punished. But this Constitution did not last long and by 1792, the newly organized jury was weak and filled with unqualified men who recoiled before the power of the press. Monseignat, Un Chapitre de la Revolution Française, 156-57.

80 Claritie, Camille Desmoulins. Lucille Desmoulins, 177.

28 people of Paris stormed the . The King and his family were forced to flee to the safety of the Assembly, while the attackers massacred some six hundred of the King’s Swiss Guard. The Legislative Assembly was invaded and the frightened members forced to depose the king and call for elections for a new National Convention. Fréron was there on that fateful day along with Danton, Desmoulins and other Cordeliers members. While little is known of the individual part that he played in the actual event, Lucile Desmoulin’s diary tells how her husband, Danton, Fréron and others gathered at her home on the night of 9 August and awaited the sound of the tocsin. Fréron, she recalls, “had the air of one determined to perish.” He dramatically exclaimed that he had resolved to die because he was “tired of living.” 81 After the event, Danton, Desmoulins and Fréron went to the Cordeliers Club where they received homage for their victory. In the days that followed, the Legislative Assembly ceased to function as a viable body. Fréron joined Danton, Desmoulins and other republicans to form a provisional revolutionary commune. Fréron and his friends had no sooner achieved their victory over the monarchy than they learned that Prussian forces, under the Duke of Brunswick, had invaded France. Danton emerged now as the new Republic’s leader and was determined to stop the Prussian advance. He began by naming thirty commissars with vast powers to the army. Fréron was appointed, along with two others, to the department of the Moselle at the end of August 1792.82 From the city of Metz, Fréron and his colleagues were to keep Paris informed of the situation there and to use all their means to maintain the public spirit.83 They were also charged with rallying the patriotism of the troops, observing the commanding officers, and seeing to the clothing and food supplies of the soldiers. It was through this brief assignment that Fréron gained the knowledge and experience in the role that would later become the “representative on mission.” This was a role that he would reprise many times in the following years. In early September 1792, while Fréron was in Metz, elections were held for the new National Convention. Fréron was elected as a député to the Convention on 13 September.

81 , Journal, 1788-1793. Texte établi et présenté par Philippe Léjune. (Paris, 1995), 154.

82 Aulard, Réceuil des Actes du Comité du Salut Publique, I, 38-39. Provisional Executive Council, séance of 29 August 1792.

83 Ibid, I, 40-42.

29 Returning to Paris, he took his seat among his fellow Montagnards. Together they proclaimed the establishment of the Republic. It was in this capacity that Fréron voted, on 16-17 January 1793, for the execution of Louis XVI, demanding, along with his colleague Marat, that execution should be carried out within twenty-four hours.84 In the weeks that followed, Fréron seems to have played a minimal role in the National Convention.85 It is evident, however, that he was being hounded by his creditors, one of whom even showed up in the Convention on 24 February to ask that Fréron pay him the money owed to him.86 But Fréron was soon given an opportunity, at least temporarily, to escape his creditors. On 9 March he was appointed, along with Paul Barras, to serve as a representative on mission to the department of the Hautes and Basses Alpes in southern France. Stanislas Fréron had come a long way from his days as the disinherited, indolent son of a famous literary critic. Like so many of his contemporaries, the Revolution had offered a realm of new opportunities and taken his life in a far different direction than what he might have originally envisioned. He had participated in many of the greatest events of the Revolution, such as the storming of the Bastille and the journée of 10 August 1792. He was close friends and colleagues with many who were destined to be remembered as the great heroes and leaders of the Revolution. Probably more important, Fréron had benefited immensely from the unlimited press freedom of the first years of the Revolution. Through the creation of the Orateur du peuple, Fréron had been able to step out of his father’s shadow and finally make a name and reputation, however notorious, for himself. Indeed, many of the political positions he attained after 1791 were due, in part, to the popularity he enjoyed from the Orateur du peuple. But, as has been shown, the Orateur du peuple was far more than simply a stepping-stone to political office. It

84 Archives Parlementaires , LVII, 417.

85 The records of the Convention reveal that he spoke out only twice during this time. One instance was February 1792 when he defended his colleague, Jean Panis, who was accused of having mismanaged funds while serving as administrator of the Paris Commune. Archives parlementaires, LVIII, 442.

86 The Archives Parlementaires records that on 24 February 1793 a petitioner (name unknown) appeared at the bar of the Convention demanding to be paid a “certain sum” owed him by Fréron. No response by Fréron is recorded, however, another député by the name of Chabot moved that the inviolability of Convention members should not excuse them from paying their debts. See Archives parlamentaires, LIX, 132.

30 had been his weapon in his crusade to defend and maintain the Revolution’s guarantee of freedom of speech and press, for Fréron, like his father before him, had experienced the injustices that occur when such freedoms were denied. And yet, while he cherished press freedom, Fréron, like so many other journalists of the Revolution, did not always use this freedom responsibly. The Orateur du peuple had been the rostrum from which Fréron and his colleagues had delivered radical and often dangerous views. It had served as an instrument through which to control public opinion, to threaten and slander enemies, and to incite public violence. There is no doubt that Fréron’s taste for extremism and the desire to have power over public opinion were things that he both appreciated and enjoyed. His new role as a representative on mission would provide him with further opportunities to use his talents and present him with new and greater challenges. For almost two years, Fréron’s life would be devoted to the task of preserving the republic that he had helped to create. This did not mean, however, that he had abandoned journalism forever. Fréron had learned well how to wield the power of the press and the Orateur du peuple had not yet outlived its usefulness.

31 CHAPTER 2

FRÉRON’S FIRST MISSION

On 9 March 1793, the National Convention issued a decree sending representatives on mission throughout the departments and to the armies to explain and expedite war measures. In accordance with this decree Fréron was appointed as representative to the departments of the Hautes and Basses Alpes. Accompanying him would be the future Director, Paul Jean Barras.1 Perhaps no two men could have been better suited to work together. Both were nearly forty years old and had been born into privileged families. Both had spent, or rather wasted, their youth primarily in pursuit of comfort, luxury and pleasure. This pursuit had not been dimmed with the coming of the Revolution even though both joined the Montagnards and, at least vocally, embraced their sans-culotte . For both men, the Revolution provided an opportunity for demagoguery and self-aggrandizement. As they worked, lived and traveled together, it became clear that they shared the same perspective on how their missions were to be interpreted and fulfilled. Though Barras would later, in his memoirs, attempt to present their close association as one born primarily out of circumstances, Fréron’s assessment of their relationship is more appropriate: “A perfect accord has always been maintained between Barras and me. This

1 Paul Jean Barras was born in Fox-Amphoux (in the Department of the ) on 30 June 1755 to one of the oldest noble families in the Midi. After a brief military career in the regiment, he moved to Paris in 1783. When the Revolution began, he joined the Jacobin Club and participated in many key events such as the storming of the Bastille and the attack on the Tuileries (10 August 1792). After serving as a representative on mission (1793-94), he would play a leading role in the overthrow of Robespierre and the subsequent Thermidorian Reaction. After the creation of the Directory in 1795, he became one of the original five Directors (a position he would maintain for the duration of that government). Napoleon’s Coup of (9 November 1799) removed Barras from power. He would spend the period of the Consulate and Empire in exile. Following the second abdication of Napoleon, in 1815, he returned to France and spent the remainder of his life at his Chaillot estate (near Paris) where he would die on 29 January 1829. A. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des Conventionnels (Brueil-en-Vexin, 1973), see Paul Jean Barras. See also Edmond Bonnal de Ganges, Les répresentants du peuple, II,125-26 and Jean-Paul Garnier, Barras, Roi du Directoire (Paris, 1970).

32 is why we have obtained success together. If they separate us, they take away half of our strength.”2 As representatives of the nation, Fréron and Barras were charged with a number of important duties such as the requisitioning of food, supplies, manpower and money for the Republic’s struggle against its enemies. In addition, they were to establish revolutionary justice and ensure that the inhabitants in their jurisdiction were adequately informed of their patriotic duties to the new Republic. Representatives to the armies were also charged to keep a watchful eye on commanders as well as to encourage the patriotic education and build morale among the men in the ranks.3 In short, as representatives of the people, they were the very embodiment of the power of the National Convention and, through it, the sovereignty of the French people. In the eyes of many Frenchmen during this period, the representative on mission was considered “the most august being that could exist on earth.”4 This was a role that appealed to a man of Fréron’s appetite for demagoguery and extremism. Through his newspaper, he had already shown his lust for violence and his ability to direct it. And now, as a representative, he would use the authority of the National Convention to order acts of retribution and terror that, as a journalist, he had only been able to persuade his readers to fulfill. Moreover, he could use such a position to advance his political career. A few days after receiving their appointment, Fréron and Barras left Paris for their destination. They wanted no one to mistake their office, for they traveled impressively clothed in the flamboyant costume of the representatives: boots, yellow calfskin pants, vests, blue coats and hats adorned with tri-color plumes affixed to the hat by ornamental fasces. Accompanied by an impressive escort of chasseurs à cheval,5 they were soon to find that not everyone respected their trappings or their claim to authority in the Hautes and Basses Alpes. Together they would have to stand resolute against all who ignored, disputed or attempted to rival their powers. For both men, what began as a standard mission of recruitment and instruction in republican idealism

2 Fréron to Moyse Bayle, (Toulon) 26 December 1793. Edmond Poupé, Lettres, 103.

3 Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Army of the French Revolution (From Citizen Soldiers to Instruments of Power) (Princeton, NJ, 1988), 192-94.

4 R.R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled (Princeton, NJ, 1941), 132.

5 Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 185.

33 would, over the course of a month, be transformed into a struggle to maintain the fledgling Republic’s control in southern France. A turn of events in the National Convention and the streets of Paris would soon change the nature and direction of their mission. Since the King’s trial and execution, in January of 1793, factional tensions between the and the Montagnards in the National Convention had escalated. While these two factions disagreed on many issues, one of the most important was that of the role that Paris would continue to play in the Revolution. The Montagnards believed in intensifying control from the capital and in instituting centralized controls at least for the duration of the war.6 On the other hand, the Girondins, alarmed by the recent extremism and mob violence in the capital, feared and detested the social and political radicalism of the sans-culottes and the Montagnard deputies in the Convention who catered to them. As a result, they viewed the Montagnard representatives on mission as potential agents for a Parisian dictatorship and they tried to warn against them. Moreover, through their newspapers and propaganda, they attempted to stir up the principle cities against the growing radicalism of the capital. As these two factions set out to destroy each other, the struggle in Paris was soon mirrored in many other great cities of France such as , and Marseilles. In these cities, Girondins and their sympathizers incited inhabitants against the radical direction of events and centralization of power in the capital. So when Barras and Fréron set out on their first mission, it is clear that they intended to uphold not merely republican principles but, more specifically, those of . After about a week’s journey, on 19 March, Barras and Fréron reached Marseilles, a city teetering on the brink of internal turmoil. Just prior to the arrival of Fréron and Barras, Moyse Bayle and Joseph-Antoine Boisset, representatives of the Bouches du Rhône and Drôme, had arrived and had, with the help and support of the local Jacobin Club, initiated house to house searches and established a , reinforced by the use of the .7 These

6 To placate the militant masses in the capital, for example, they pursued a loose welfare state-type policy. As the war lengthened they proposed and gained the institution of price controls, legislation against hoarders, decrees for requisitioning and rationing supplies, and security measures against internal enemies. See , The French Revolution (New York, 1956), 313-27.

7 Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 188. See also Henri Wallon, Les répresentants du peuple en mission, III, 9-10.

34 measures had only served to irritate many ordinary citizens of the city and especially those who resented the meddling of these Montagnard representatives. Consequently, the presence of these representatives had only encouraged the city’s radicals, led by the Marseilles Jacobin Club, who now were emboldened to act rashly against all those they deemed as enemies. While they only remained for two days in the city, Fréron and Barras voiced their support for their colleagues’ measures. Whether Fréron had made the acquaintance of Bayle prior to Marseilles is unknown. But a friendship between the two men developed and continued. Throughout the duration of their missions, Fréron and Barras maintained a continual correspondence with Bayle, confiding in him many of their most secret thoughts.8 In a visit to the Marseilles Jacobin Club, where they were received with acclamations, Fréron and Barras made a speech in which they called on the Marseillais to support the National Convention against all Girondin-inspired “federalists” who wished to defy the central authority of the government in Paris.9 There is little doubt that these representatives were to blame, in

Moyse-Antoine-Pierre-Jean Bayle was born in Chène, near , on 16 July 1755. He was descended from a Protestant family which had sought refuge in Switzerland upon the revocation of the Edict of . It is unknown in what year he came to live in Marseilles where he made a modest living as an accountant. At the beginning of the Revolution he tried to obtain a place on the municipal administration of Marseilles but was refused on the grounds that he was not a native inhabitant of the city. However, he soon became the procurer general-syndic of the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône, after which he was elected as a representative of that department to the Convention. In the trial of Louis XVI he voted for death without reprieve. On 9 March 1793 he was charged, along with Boisset, with the execution of recruitment in the departments of the Bouches-du-Rhône and of the Drôme. Returning to Paris in August of that year, he would serve on the Committee of General Security and at one point as president of the National Convention. He later became involved in a bitter political struggle with Fréron. Joseph-Antoine Boisset was born in Montboucher (Drôme) on 7 October 1748. When the Revolution began, he served as administrator of the district of Montélimart and as president of the Jacobin Club of Cette. He was elected as a député of the Drome to the National Convention. As a representative on mission, he served the Convention and Directory in many departments throughout 1793-95. In 1795 he was elected to the were he served until the 18th Brumaire. Afterwards, he returned to the region of his birth where he became inspector of weights and measures. In April of 1813 he was named Counsellor of the prefecture of Ardèche, but probably never fulfilled any of his duties due to his death in Montboucher on 15 September 1813. A. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des Conventionnels (Brueil-en Vexin, 1973), see Moyse Bayle and Joseph-Antoine Boisset.

8 Poupé, Lettres, v.

9 William Scott, Terror and Repression, 56.

35 many ways, for the increased arrogance and hostility with which the Jacobin Club threatened the inhabitants of Marseilles10 Moreover, they exacerbated the already prevalent tensions between the Girondin dominated city sections and the Jacobin Club.11 From Marseilles, Barras and Fréron traveled to their intended destination, the Departments of the Hautes and Basses Alpes. Throughout April and May they toured these departments to arrange the enforcement and fulfillment of troop levies, to carry out inspections of hospitals and fortifications and to note the patriotic character, or lack thereof, of the inhabitants. While they did not really do anything that might be considered exceptional or beyond what was required of any other representative, it is obvious that both men took their roles and the fulfillment of their first mission seriously. Rather than remain in the comfort of the major cities, they journeyed on horseback over difficult and dangerous, snow-covered mountain trails and precipices, sometimes traveling eighteen miles a day. They viewed their mission as a difficult one, but found themselves “supported by the idea to be useful to the Republic and to show ourselves worthy of the confidence with which the National Convention has honored us.”12 Their travels through the Department of the Basses Alpes brought them to the town of Sisteron where they were well-received by the inhabitants who vowed fidelity “to the unity and indivisibility of the Republic.” were fired and the city was illuminated for the duration of their stay. Fréron and Barras were pleased, for was successfully implemented there. The only problem was over a flag which had been carried by the town battalion of chasseurs on which the word Constitution was written in bold letters. Believing that the soldiers were ignorant of this flag’s association with the now defunct Constitution of 1791, Fréron and Barras ordered the flag to be ceremoniously shredded and burned, and replaced by a new flag

10 The radicals of Marseilles had taken the establishment of the Revolutionary Tribunal in Paris as an excuse to establish their own and they levied a forced loan on the rich to aid with “revolutionary vigilance.” Doyle, History of the French Revolution, 230.

11 Scott, Terror and Repression, 67; Kennedy, The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution, 13. Cameron also draws the same conclusion, citing how Bayle encouraged the Club to form a committee to discover all unfaithful or suspect administrators in the city. John Burton Cameron, “The Revolutions in the Sections of Marseilles: Federalism in the Department of the Bouches-du-Rhône,” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,1971).

12 Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 10 May, 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, IV, 92-95.

36 which carried the words Republique Française. This lesson in Republican patriotism was reinforced when they insisted that the town’s inhabitants fall to their knees and sing about “sacred love for the nation.” After a careful inspection of the town’s defenses, the two representatives departed for Gap, the administrative center of the Hautes Alpes. If they were pleased with what they had witnessed in the Basses Alpes, they found the Hautes Alpes a completely different matter. “Everything there is malevolence, aristocracy and royalism have 13 been able to undermine our operations there” they wrote to the Convention.

Figure 3 Fréron and Barras observed that public spirit was non-existent in the Hautes Alpes. They found the constituted authorities there were “cold towards the Revolution.” For Fréron and

13 Ibid.

37 Barras, this “coldness,” probably born more of apathy than hostility, made these civic leaders suspect in their eyes as “secret enemies” of the Republic. Not only did they find the recruitment process behind schedule, but they learned that disarmament was not being enforced, that refractory priests were being harbored there, and that certificates of civism were being haphazardly given to anyone who requested the document. In short, the representatives felt that the inhabitants lacked patriotism. While they concluded that there were many reasons for the lack of public spirit in that department, Fréron and Barras pointed to two factors in particular. First, they pointed to the limited number of popular societies in the Hautes Alpes.14 What few there were, the representatives complained, were concerned more with meeting simply to read the latest news from Paris, than with serving the Republic in their region. It was evident that Fréron and Barras regarded the popular societies as a key instrument to educate the local inhabitants in their duties to the state and, as in Marseilles, to help the representatives further the establishment of Montagnard supremacy in those areas. As to the second factor responsible for the lack of public spirit, Fréron and Barras blamed the “bourgeois aristocracy” of Gap and surrounding towns. These bourgeois dominated the administrative bodies and, according to Barras and Fréron, “intrigued and conspired” against them to make the local inhabitants despise them. In contrast, Barras and Fréron assured the Convention that the inhabitants of the countryside possessed a true patriot spirit and had not been corrupted like the many cities. These patriots, they claimed, were in desperate need of food due to bad harvests and the fact that bread was being sold at high prices. They implored the Convention to aid these people and, in turn, told the people that they could count on the Convention’s maternal care.15 From Gap they traveled to Embrun where the inhabitants made a good outward show of patriotism, but Fréron and Barras remained skeptical of this “bourgeois dominated” town. They were especially bothered by the fact that the inhabitants “lacked the courage” to denounce anyone. But they were soon able to vent their annoyance upon a group of unfortunate nuns whom they discovered while making an inspection of a hospital. Outraged by the fact that these women were dressed “as in 1788,” Fréron and Barras scolded them severely for their ignorance

14 Barras and Fréron estimated that there were only three to four popular societies in the Hautes Alpes as opposed to the seventy in the Basses Alpes. Ibid, 93-94.

15 Ibid.

38 of the law. From Embrun, they traveled to Briançon and Mont where they harangued the garrisons about their patriotic duties to the Republic. Moreover, they attempted to alleviate tensions that existed between the volunteers and regulars in these garrisons. Their tour ended in the town of Digne where they busied themselves with the inspection of fortifications.16 It was while they were in Digne that they learned of the latest events in Marseilles. Since Fréron and Barras’ departure from Paris, news of General Dumouriez’s treason had dealt a severe blow to Girondin prestige and aided the Montagnards, who soon gained the upper hand in the Convention. As a result of the turn of events in Paris, Bayle and Boisset encouraged the Marseilles Club to take increasingly radical measures. In response, the Girondin dominated city sections moved quickly to seize control and close down the Jacobin Club. Bayle and Boisset were forced to flee north to Montélimar.17 News of the downfall of the Marseilles Jacobins provoked similar resistance to the clubs elsewhere in the Midi in cities such as Aix, , and . In Aix a “security committee” established by the sections of that city, arrested two representatives on mission, Jean-Baptiste Bo and Charles-Louis Antiboul, who were promptly sent to Marseilles and placed in prison.18 Though this section-inspired uprising in the Midi was not initially counter-revolutionary, as the movement grew, it would draw in elements, such as royalists and ultimately foreign powers, who did have as their goal the destruction not merely of the Jacobin Republic but of the Revolution in its entirety. Fréron and Barras’ mission had not yet ended when, as a result of events, Barras received a new assignment. He was named as one of four representatives to the Army of , then headquartered in .19 Fréron, however, was not given a new assignment and was

16 Ibid. It appears that Barras and Fréron were correct in their skeptical assessment of the levels of republican patriotism in the department of the Hautes Alpes. On 14 June 1793, the Hautes Alpes would declare itself ready to follow the path of federalism taken by Marseilles, Bordeaux and Toulon. Wallon, Les répresentants, III, 15.

17 Bayle and Boisset fled Marseilles for Montélimar on 27 April 1793.

18 Antiboul to the Committee of Public Safety, 22 June, 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, V, 56. Bo and Antiboul would be freed when, on 25 August, Republican forces under Carteaux captured Marseilles.

19 National Convention decree of 30 April 1793. Aulard, Récueil des Actes, III, 539. Barras was appointed to the (primarily as a recruiting commissioner) along with

39 therefore expected to return to Paris to retake his seat in the National Convention. Nevertheless, Fréron did not wish to return to the Convention; he wanted to remain with Barras.20 One can only speculate on Fréron’s specific reasons. He would later declare that he had wanted to return but all the main routes back to Paris had been blocked by the Girondin sections. Moreover, it was evident from his letter to the Convention that he was apprehensive to attempt such a return for fear of capture. This fear was not unfounded considering the fate that had already befallen Bo and Antiboul as well as news Fréron had received of two patriots who had been pulled from their horses and dragged to prison in the town of Gap. No doubt, these very inhabitants of Gap remembered his recent visit to their town and, according to Fréron, had already damned him as the “brother” of Marat and vowed to send him to the guillotine in Lyons. “I will not stretch my neck to those chains which have been placed on our colleagues Bo and Antiboul,” he told the Convention.21 So Barras was accompanied by Fréron, first on an inspection tour to Toulon and then to Nice, where the other representatives to the Army of Italy approved of Barras’ action. Fréron was attached to their mission and invested with provisional powers until the Convention could officially approve of his appointment.22 “All this was perhaps not too strictly legal,” Barras

Pierre Baille (1753-1793), Charles-Nicolas Beauvais (1754-1794) and Antoine-Joseph Despinassy (1757-1829). Despinassy, who bore a distaste for the harsh measures of his colleagues, would later be accused by them of abandoning his post at a critical moment. A detailed discussion of Despinassy’s activities as well as a short biographical sketch can be found in the following chapter.

20 Paul Barras, Memoirs of Barras, member of the Directorate, I, 105. Barras commented “He (Fréron) didn’t want to return to Paris until I did.”

21 Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 8 July, 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, V, p. 215-216. On 24 June 1793, the National Convention issued a decree stating that any of its members who were on leave or who had been recalled from their missions were to return to its halls within three weeks time. If they failed to return by the deadline, then they were to be declared to have voluntarily abdicated their duties and were to be replaced. Hearing of this decree, Fréron wrote on 8 July 1793 to the Committee of Public Safety asking to be exempt from this decree on the grounds that he was unable to return because all routes back to Paris were now blocked by the sectionnaires. He added moreover that the representatives of the Army of Italy had made a decree provisionally appointing him to that commission and that he asked that the Committee and Convention approve it.

40 admitted later, “but taking the times into consideration, during and even outside revolutions, is there anything that is legal except victory?”23 This was an attitude that would characterize the approach that Barras and Fréron would take over the course of the next few . When Fréron and Barras arrived in Nice, they presented themselves at the headquarters of the commander in chief of the Army of Italy, General Gaspard-Jean-Baptiste Brunet.24 According to Barras, their reception from Brunet and his officers was anything but warm.25 Fréron and Barras were soon to find Brunet to be a major obstacle to their ability to carry out the objectives of the Convention. A ci-devant nobleman and former officer in the royal army, the fifty-nine year old Brunet was opposed to the political opinions, methods and even the very presence of these two Montagnard representatives.26 Much of this attitude came from the fact that Brunet disapproved of the radicalism of the Montagnards. Moreover, he had allowed himself to be influenced by his officers who were hostile to the Mountain’s recent attacks on the Girondins in the Convention. This initial tension born of differing political between the general and the representatives only increased as the situation in the Midi deteriorated. While there were differences of opinion between Brunet and the representatives on many issues, perhaps the most critical concerned the strategy needed in dealing with Marseilles and other rebels in the Midi. Fréron and Barras felt, and rightly so, that time was vital and that they must move decisively with military force against the insurgents. Therefore, they wanted to detach a substantial force

22 At the request of their colleagues Roubaud and Despinassy, Barras and Fréron traveled first to Toulon, arriving there on 6 June. See their letter in Aulard, Récueil des Actes, IV, 473.

23 Barras, Memoirs, I, 119.

24 Brunet was born in Valensole (in the Basses Alpes) on 14 June 1734. His life was devoted to a long military career. He served first as a lieutenant in the regiment of Lorraine (1755); then as a captain (1759); chevalier of St. Louis (1773); as a major of an artillery regiment in (1778). In 1779 he became a lieutentant-colonel and after 1789, he served as a member of the Directory of the Department of the Basses-Alpes with the Army of the Var (1792). He was made commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy in 1793. Poupé, Lettres, 11.

25 Barras, Memoirs, I, 107.

26 Brunet especially disliked the representatives for what he considered to be their interference in strategic matters. Phipps, The Armies of the First French Republic, (Oxford, 1931) III, 90-91.

41 from the Army of Italy to aid Jean-Baptiste Carteaux’s newly formed Army of the Midi.27 Brunet disapproved of the representatives’ insistence on extreme measures. He feared that by detaching some of his force, he would be weakening his army’s ability to guard against foreign enemies on the frontier, which he believed to be his primary objective. Conflicts within the Midi, he naively believed, could be resolved through diplomacy between the representatives and the leaders of the sections in Marseilles.28 There is little doubt that he sympathized with the inhabitants of the Midi, whom Fréron and Barras were eager to punish, and he forewarned the representatives that the application of such force might cause Toulon to open her ports to the enemy. 29 In an attempt to assert his authority over the two representatives, Brunet, aware of Fréron’s unofficial presence, refused to acknowledge Fréron’s authority 30 In the meantime, Fréron anxiously awaited news about his appointment, but by mid-July no word had been

27 The Army of the Midi was formed from contingents of the Army of the Alpes and reinforcements on the march to join the Army of the Pyrenees. On 2 July, Carteaux marched from Grenoble on Avignon to intercept a Federalist force which was pushing up the Rhône from Marseilles. Ibid, III, 92. Jean Baptiste Carteaux had been born the son of a dragoon in Gouhenans (Haute-Saône) on 31 January 1751. After serving in various dragoon regiments, he quit the service in 1779 to become a painter. When the Revolution began, he joined the National Guard and served as an aide de camp to Lafayette. He participated in the attack on the Tuileries on 10 August 1792. He was then sent to the Army of the Alpes where he became an Adjutant-General and then a General of Brigade in July 1793. After being arrested in December of 1793, he spent his incarceration in the until his release in August 1794. During the Directory he served as Commandant of the department of l’Ain and then in different divisions of the Army of Batavia during the Consulate. He was named civil administrator and commandant of the principality of Piombino in September 1803. In 1805 he retired from the service. He died in Paris on 12 April, 1813. George Six, Dictionnaire Biographique des Généraux et Amiraux Français de la Révolution et de l’Empire (1792-1814) (Paris, 1934), I, 195-96.

28 Barras, Memoirs, I, 113. Barras claimed that Brunet refused to send troops “against the loyal citizens of the South” because troubles there were just a “temporary effervescence” due to the turmoil in the Convention; he was convinced that political agitation would eventually end. See also Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic, III, 90-95.

29 Brunet would continually resist requests for troops to be sent against the sectionnaries. The warning he gave Barras and Fréron concerning Toulon would damn him later when Toulon did open its ports to the enemy. Barras and Fréron would interpret these words as a threat.

30 Wallon, Les Répresentants, III, 27.

42 received from the National Convention that would make his appointment official.31 Fréron was careful during this uncertain period to always place the disclaimer “member of the national Convention, adjoined to the Commission” beside his name on all correspondence. He did not want the Committee of Public Safety to think that he had the audacity to name himself an official representative to the Army of Italy. In addition to the personal enmity between Fréron and Brunet, there was also the issue of Fréron’s brother-in-law, General Jean-Baptiste La Poype, who had recently served a Brunet’s chief of staff.32 Brunet despised La Poype not merely because the latter was an ardent Jacobin, but also because he suspected that LaPoype desired to replace him as commander of the Army of Italy.33 Fréron’s letters to friends in Paris reveal that Brunet’s suspicions were not entirely unfounded. Many letters to the Convention and Committee of Public Safety from Fréron praised La Poype’s patriotism and Jacobinism; he consistently intimated that his brother-in-law would make a very capable, and a far better, commander for the Army of

31 This delay may have been a result of the situation in the Midi, the dispatches to and from the representatives to Paris were constantly being delayed or intercepted by the sectionnaires. Fréron’s letter to the Committee of Public Safety (dated 8 July 1793) was not even received by the Committee until 9 August. Aulard, Récueil des Actes, V, 215.

32 Jean-François de La Poype was born in Lyons on 31 May 1758. He entered service with the Gardes Françaises in 1777 and worked his way up to the rank of sous-lieutenant. In 1791 he served as a lieutenant-colonel in the volunteers battalion of the Oise. He was named chief-of-staff of the Army of Italy on 2 February 1793 and became a general of on 15 May 1793. He was married to Fréron’s sister, Therese-Jean. He would later serve as governor of Lyon in 1795 and then in numerous armies during the Directory period. He later served under Napoleon during the First Empire. He was made a Baron of the Empire in 1812 and then served first as the governor of Spandau and then of Wittemberg in 1813, and Lille in 1814. After his retirement from the service in 1815, he was elected as député of the 3rd arrondisement of Rhône; he sat on the extreme left. He was not reelected in 1824, but served in the 1830s in the reserves and was made a grand officer of the Legion of Honor. He died in Brosses (in Isère) on 27 January 1851. Six, Dictionnaire, 59-60.

33 Both Brunet and La Poype had written letters to the , each presenting his views of the other. When Brunet attempted to rid himself of La Poype by placing him in command of the coast from Fréjus to the Var, La Poype complained that he was being victimized for his political beliefs. He demanded to be transferred to the Army of the . His request was approved, but never carried out, perhaps due to Fréron’s arrival to the Army of Italy. Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic, III, 88-89. See also Barras and Fréron’s letter of 5 August 1793 in which the two complain that, among other things, Brunet had lied about La Poype and that intriguers had persuaded Brunet that the representatives planned to replace him with La Poype. Archives Nationales, AF II 44, doc. 3.

43 Italy.34 And, as Brunet would not be the first to experience, Fréron was always ready to criticize or denounce any rivals to La Poype’s ambitions for command.35 As for Brunet, any hopes or plans that he may have had of ridding himself of La Poype were made all the more unlikely due to Fréron’s presence with the Army of Italy. If the events in Marseilles and Brunet’s refusal to deal decisively with them were not enough to frustrate Fréron and Barras, developments within Toulon throughout the month of June threatened to make matters even more difficult. As in Marseilles, the factional struggles in Paris and the Jacobin seizure of power in the Convention on 2 June did not go unnoticed in Toulon. But events in Paris merely exacerbated the continuous struggle for control in Toulon that had existed for almost two years between the local Jacobins and the Toulonnais bourgeoisie. Since the summer of 1792 Toulon had been dominated by the Jacobin radicals of the Club of Saint-Jean who were strongly supported in their actions by Montagnard representatives on mission, such as Fréron and Barras’ colleagues Pierre Baille36 and Charles-Nicolas Beauvais.37 But there were many Toulonnais who, like their counterparts in Marseilles, resented this Jacobin dominance and the presence of the Montagnard deputies.38

34 See Fréron’s letter to Moyse Bayle, 26 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 104.

35 See Fréron’s complaints about Carteaux in the following chapter.

36 Pierre-Marie Baille is believed to have been born in Marseilles sometime around 1753. When the Revolution began, he served as secretary of the administration of the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône and was in 1792, extraordinary député to the Legislative Assembly. He was the elected to the National Convention and sent as a representative on mission to the Army of Italy. Arrested and imprisoned, along with his colleague Beauvais, by the sections of Toulon, he committed suicide in prison on 2 September 1793. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Pierre-Marie Baille, 16-17.

37 Charles-Nicolas Beauvais was born in Orléans on 1 August 1745. A doctor by profession, he was elected to the Third Estate in 1789 and then as député to both the Legislative Assembly and National Convention. In April 1793 he was sent as representative on mission to the Army of Italy. Arrested and imprisoned by the sections of Toulon, he was liberated when that town fell to republican forces. His health, however, was irrevocably damaged due to the ill treatment he had received while in prison and he died in on 23 March 1794. Ibid, see Charles-Nicolas Beauvais, 43.

38 William Cormack, Revolution and Political Conflict in the , 1789-1794 (Cambridge, 1995), 173-181. See also Malcolm Crook, Toulon in War and Revolution

44 Fréron and Barras had sensed this hostility when they paid a visit to the city to review the fleet in early June. While there, they perceived the resentment of the naval officers, especially admirals Jean-Honoré Trogoff and Martin-Benoît Chaussegros. When the representatives had made their review of the squadron, Trogoff had refused them a gun salute on the pretext that such an act required the permission of the Executive Council who had forbidden them to waste powders. Fréron and Barras regarded this as a personal insult; and later they fumed in a letter to the National Convention, complaining that Trogoff had later ordered his ships to fire a salute to the city sections but he would not do the same for the national representation. Barras and Fréron would not forget this insult when they had Toulon’s naval officers at their mercy several months later.39 By early July 1793, the downfall of the Marseilles Jacobins weakened the power of the Jacobins who dominated Toulon. Encouraged by the sectionnaires of Marseilles, the Toulonnais bourgeoisie exploited the mounting discontent in the city over Jacobin policies and quickly turned the tables on their opponents on 12 July. Seizing control of the city, the sectionnaires invested their power in a General Committee and established a Popular Tribunal. The Club of Saint-Jean was closed and over thirty Jacobins were brought to trial and eventually executed. Moreover, on 15 July, Baille and Beauvais were arrested and imprisoned.40 Prior to their arrest, Baille and Beauvais had written to Fréron and Barras in Nice and requested that they come to Toulon and aid them in their efforts. Answering this call, Fréron and Barras set out in a convoy for Toulon on 14 July with an escort of eight dragoons. Also accompanying them were their secretaries, Victor Grand and César Roubaud, as well as La Poype, his pregnant wife (Fréron’s sister, Therèse-Jean) and young daughter. On the route from Nice to Toulon, they stopped for the night in the small town of in the district of , some twenty miles from Toulon. The following morning, they awoke to the news that

(Manchester, 1991), 126-35. Both Crook and Cormack mention the exchange of deputations carrying messages of fraternity, support, and expressions of similar views on the activities of the Montagnard representatives, between the sections of Marseilles and Toulon. Crook takes his information from letters written as early as May 1793 between the two cities.

39 Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 26 June, 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, V, 385.

40 Ibid, 391.

45 their colleagues had been arrested. Deciding that it was prudent for their party to return to Nice, they mounted their horses and carriages. On their way out of Pignans, the town’s municipal officials, under orders the sections of Marseilles and Toulon, blocked their route and attempted to place them under arrest. 41 Drawing their pistols and swords, Fréron, Barras, Lapoype and two dragoons fought their way out and fled, abandoning the carriages and the rest of their party.42 Immediately, the town council of Pignans dispatched couriers along various routes in pursuit. But Fréron and his refugee party managed to make their escape along back roads to Saint-Tropez where the mayor of the city council offered them shelter and a fishing boat to take them to Nice.43 After eluding British ships and spending a night in hiding at Fréjus, they finally reached Nice on 18 July “in absolute destitution.” In his letter to the Convention, Fréron lamented the loss of their carriage, effects and papers in Pignans, yet most of all, he feared for his sister and niece, who, along with their secretaries, had been taken as prisoners to Toulon. In the pages of his letter, he expressed his desire for vengeance against the “veritable brigands, assassins and traitors” of Toulon. He and Barras warned the Convention: “If these attempts go unpunished, there will be no little village in the Republic that will not chase after your representatives as after wild beasts. An example is necessary, and this example must be terrible.”44 Upon their return to Nice, the two representatives moved quickly to take important steps to secure those few regions in the Bouches du Rhône and Var still loyal or under the control of

41 Barras, Memoirs, I, 109. In their letter to the National Convention, 27 July 1793, Barras explained that later: “We learned of a placard that was posted in Marseilles…on which it was said, among other things, “ that the two cannibals Barras and Fréron” were coming to Toulon to place liberticidal plots into action….” Aulard, Recueil des Actes, V, 403.

42 Fréron and Barras later commended these two dragoons, LaSalle and Montmajor, for their loyalty in a letter to the National Convention. Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 27 July 1793, Ibid, V, 401. The National Convention approved this request on 9 September, 1793.

43 Fréron and Barras to Martin (municipal officer of St. Tropez), 1 October, 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 30. Fréron and Barras commended the mayor of St. Tropez for his “truly Republican conduct.” The National Convention also had commended him on 9 September 1793. Ibid, V, 401.

44 Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 27 July 1793, Ibid, V, 402.

46 the Republic. To bolster the morale of the Army of Italy, they increased both pay and wine rations for the soldiers.45 To requisition additional manpower, they decreed that the gendarmerie of all the districts of the Bouches du Rhône, Var and the Basses Alpes would reinforce the Army of Italy.46 The National Guards of the departments were placed under permanent requisition and Barras and Fréron even formed a legion of sans-culottes, “defenders of the Constitution of 1793.” 47 They also took steps to secure the port of Nice and the coasts through the use of embargos and patrols to search for enemy ships. On 20 July they implemented measures to raise money from the districts and communes. To deny their enemies access to these funds, they ordered the paymaster of the Army of Italy, then in Toulon, to refuse any requests for funds from Toulon rebels on the pain of having his goods and property seized by the Republic.48 Finally, on 27 July, after purging the departmental administration of the Var, they declared its transfer from Toulon northeast to .49 It was also vital, in Fréron and Barras’ opinion, to obtain the acceptance of the surrounding districts and the Army for the new Constitution of 1793. “The Constitution is the club that will crush the conspirators” they asserted. When they sought the Army’s acceptance, Brunet challenged their authority. He feared that if the representatives made speeches and openly solicited his army’s acceptance of this new and radical Constitution, it could generate dissension among the men in the ranks. Therefore, Brunet told the representatives that the corps d’armée were forbidden to hold discussions on political issues, and suggested instead that they simply declare that the Constitution was accepted. Therefore, in their letter to the National Convention of 27 July, Fréron and Barras stated vaguely that the majority of the Army and six out of nine

45 They also made speeches to the troops and assisted their “brothers in arms” at civic banquets. Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 27 July 1793, Ibid, V, 388.

46 Decreed 21 July 1793. Archives Nationales, AF II 144, doc. 28 (plaquette 1147).

47 Decreed 23 July 1793. Apparently they were still in the process of raising this sans- culottes legion by 25 August 1793. From Draguignan, they announced that they had charged Roubaud fils and Fabré with the execution of this decree in the different communes of Draguignan and . Ibid.

48 Decreed 23 July 1793. Ibid.

49 Ibid, doc. 20 (plaquette 1147).

47 districts had accepted it.50 Though Fréron and Barras had to admit that Brunet’s solution was the most expedient way to deal with the situation, the general’s involvement only served to further embitter them towards him.51 With all of these measures implemented, Fréron and Barras projected an air of confidence to the Convention and boasted that Marseilles would soon be reduced and they would be able to take Toulon within a month. 52 However, they believed that the success of their measures rested in their ability to secure some level of cooperation from Brunet in dispatching forces against the rebels of the Midi. Brunet remained obstinate. On 24 July, Fréron and Barras ordered Brunet to detach three battalions to aid Carteaux, at Avignon, preparing to march against the Marseillais. Defiantly, Brunet refused to comply and suggested that the representatives meet in conference with the leaders of the sections of Marseilles. He attempted to justify this defiance by questioning the legitimacy of the powers of Barras and, especially, Fréron.53 By the beginning of August, Brunet received some news that he believed would enable him to rid himself of Fréron and limit Barras’ meddling once and for all. On 15 July the Committee of Public Safety had decreed that there would be four representatives attached to each army and a list of assignments was released on 19 July. Those not named were to return at once to the Convention. The representatives named for the Army of Italy were: Barras, Pierre Baille, Charles Nicolas Beauvais and . Fréron’s name was not on this, or any other, list.54 But, fortunately for Fréron, events provided him, yet again, with a legitimate excuse

50 Decreed 25 July 1793. One of the three districts that refused to accept the new Constitution was Brignoles, the district of Pignans. Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 26 July 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, V, 383-391. For Brunet’s struggle with the representatives over the new Constitution see: Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic, II, 88-89 and Wallon, Les Répresentants, III, 27.

51 See Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic, III, 88-89.

52 Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 26 July 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, V, 383-91. They wrote to the National Convention asking that their measures be approved and to consider the fact that since they had not been receiving any news dispatches from Paris (suspected they were being intercepted), they had had to take these measures in anticipation of approval from Paris.

53 Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 5 August 1793, Ibid, V, 484.

48 to remain. The arrest of Baille and Beauvais and the delayed arrival of Augustin Robespierre momentarily left Barras as the sole representative to the Army of Italy. Fréron wrote to the Committee informing them of the situation and of the necessity that he remain with the army.55 But Brunet had one last card to play. By a decree of 30 April, the National Convention had stated that representatives could only deliberate if two were present.56 Thus, when Barras and Fréron ordered him once again, on 5 August, to dispatch troops to Carteaux, Brunet responded that since Fréron was not officially appointed to the Army of Italy, Barras was alone and therefore could not issue orders.57 Moreover, he threatened to denounce the two representatives as rebels for defying the Convention’s decrees of 30 April, 15 and 19 July.58 But this was too little too late. Fréron and Barras had gained the support of the other representatives in the region and the popular society in Nice who denounced Brunet as a traitor. 59 Brunet, outraged, wrote to the

54 Decree of the National Convention, 19 July 1793, Ibid, V, 300-01. Later, on 21 July, the Convention decreed that Pierre Baille would be replaced by Jean Ricord. See Aulard, V, 325- 26.

55 On 26 July Fréron wrote: “We find ourselves in an extraordinary position. Barras, one of us, remains the sole representative to the Army of Italy and the circumstance of the flight of Despinassy and the arrest of Pierre Baille and Beauvais has paralyzed the commission.” Then he and Barras appealed to the Convention to move as quickly as possible to make his position official. Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 26 July 1793, Ibid, V, 391.

56 National Convention decree of 30 April 1793, Ibid, III, 533-41.

57 Barras and Fréron had asked that four battalions be sent to Carteaux. Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 6 August 1793, Ibid, V, 495.

58 Brunet to Barras (Nice), 8 August 1793. Martial Sicard, Les Officiers généraux bas- alpins de terre et de mer depuis l’année 1700 jusqu’a nos jours, (Forcalquier, 1905), I, 246.

59 See Barras and Fréron’s decree of 8 August 1793, Archives Nationales, AF II 44, doc. 4. Augustin Robespierre and Ricord wrote to the Committee of Public Safety, 6 August 1793,“We believe that Brunet is the very soul of counter-revolution in the Midi. Manosque, his country, is populated with rebels, at the head of which is Brunet’s son.” And later on 21 August 1793, “Our suspicions against Brunet are confirmed every day. You may satisfy yourselves through the dispatches of our colleagues Barras and Fréron.” In addition, the representatives Rovère and Poultier wrote to the Committee of Public Safety on 21 August 1793, “The perfidious conspiracy of Brunet and Trogoff continues.” See the letter of the representatives Rovère, Poultier, Saliceti, Gasparin and Escudier to the Committee of Public Safety, 21 August

49 National Convention demanding justice against the conduct of “citizen Barras, and more particularly that of citizen Fréron.”60 Fréron and Barras reacted quickly to Brunet’s attack. On 8 August, they issued a proclamation in Nice suspending Brunet and temporarily replacing him with General Pierre Jadart Dumerbion. In the proclamation, they charged Brunet with obstructing their operations by both refusing to recognize their powers and formally disobeying their orders. 61 Brunet was sent to Paris under escort to stand trial. In their official correspondence, it is clear that the representatives viewed Brunet as another “Dumouriez.” By early September, they would blame him for their failures against the Toulonnais rebels and for the extended duration of the war in the Midi. Fréron asserted that, if Brunet had obeyed their orders, “all would have been saved.” 62 In reality, one can only speculate on whether additional forces sent by Brunet would have accelerated the fall of Marseilles, for near the end of August, Carteaux was managing quite well on his own against the rebels. By 21 August his army had defeated the Marseilles forces and entered Aix. From Aix, Carteaux attacked his opponent until his army captured Marseilles on 25 August.63 The defeat of this great city significantly weakened the federalist uprising in the Midi, but the flight of many of Marseilles’ leaders to neighboring Toulon ensured that the representatives’ struggle with counter-revolution was not at an end.

1793, in which they welcome Brunet’s dismissal as good news. Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VI, 12; 55-57.

60 Brunet to the National Convention, 8 August 1793, Sicard, Officiers, I, 252.

61 Archives Nationales, AF II 44, doc. 4. Barras and Fréron’s decree of 8 August 1793. Barras and Fréron also ordered Dumerbion to seize all of Brunet’s personal papers as well as those of his aides de camp. Dumerbion had served in the ancien regime army during the Seven Years War and by the beginning of the Revolution he had achieved the rank of Captain of Grenadiers. The campaigns in the Midi had helped to elevate him rapidly to the rank of General of Division. Old and gouty, he was without ambitions and was able to posses the confidence of the representatives. Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic, 97.

62 Fréron to Botot, 13 November 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 44.

63 Operations against the city of Avignon, which refused to join the sectionary movement, had slowed the progress of Marseilles army. See John Burton Cameron, The Director Paul Barras as representative of the People on Mission in Provence, 1793-94, M.A. Thesis (Chapel Hill, NC, 1966), 71.

50 On 29 August Fréron and Barras were north of Toulon in the town of . There, they wrote to the Committee of Public Safety to announce the terrible news that Toulon had opened its ports to the British and Spanish fleets. While declaring that they had tried to prevent this, they were certain that Brunet had been involved in the “cowardly plot.” They strongly advised that Brunet be sent immediately before the Revolutionary Tribunal so that it could strike off his guilty head. Fréron and Barras would continue, as far as into November, to inquire into the progress of Brunet’s trail and would even find the time to dig up additional evidence against him which they sent on to Paris.64 And even after Brunet perished on the scaffold on 14 November, Fréron would continue to declare that the general’s perfidious influence reached beyond the grave through the calumnies which continued to be heaped upon La Poype, Barras and himself by the “partisans of Brunet.”65 Barras and Fréron were more than anxious to begin the assault against Toulon; they planned to meet with their fellow representatives in Marseilles to discuss the necessary steps to be taken. It is clear from their letters that they had already made up their minds on how best to deal with the situation: “We go to summon Toulon to open its ports; if it will not, we will besiege it with the army of Carteaux, we will bombard it, we will raze it to its foundations, with the exceptions of its arsenals and forts; it is the least punishment that this infamous city deserves.”66 Nevertheless, before they could exact their vengeance upon Toulon, it was necessary to help their colleagues establish republican, and more particularly Montagnard, authority throughout the departments of the Bouches du Rhône and Var, and especially in Marseilles. “Save Marseilles and raze Toulon”67 would become their new motto in the next stage of their mission in the Midi, goals which they would work feverishly to achieve.

64 See Fréron to Botot, 3 November 1793 and 13 November, 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 37 and 45. See also Archives Nationales, AF II 44, doc. 9 (letter of Barras and Fréron, 29 August, 1793).

65 See Fréron to Bayle, 13 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 82.

66 Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 29 August 1793. Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VI, 183.

67 Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 13 November, 1793, Ibid, VII, 404.

51 In the end, though Fréron and Barras had not contributed all that they might have wished to Marseilles’ defeat, their resolute measures implemented in Nice had preserved that city and the surrounding areas for the Republic. Moreover, their removal of Brunet was a significant step in assuring their control over the Army of Italy and its cooperation in the siege of Toulon. For Fréron, the first six months of his mission had presented him with many challenges. He had seen his duties as a representative evolve from the recruitment of troops and enforcement of the Republic’s laws to the mobilization of resources and manpower to combat the new specter of counter-revolution. Assessing Fréron’s individual role as a representative during this period is difficult; it appears that he was always with Barras and they acted in concert on all measures. Since only Barras was officially assigned to the Army of Italy, it must be assumed that he exercised senior authority. But, without Fréron’s presence and the support in the face of Brunet’s defiance, Barras’ position might have been even more tenuous. Barras himself readily acknowledged the importance of Fréron’s support in his letters to the Committee of Public Safety.68 Even though he remained at Barras’ side for much of the duration of their mission, the next few months would enable Fréron to distinguish himself by his ferocious activities in defense of the Republic.

68 See Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 6 September 1793, Ibid, VI, 322. “Fréron alone supported my proposition to march with three to four battalions on Marseilles since the beginning of the rebellion.”

52 CHAPTER 3

FRÉRON IN MARSEILLES

During the months of September through early December 1793, Fréron and Barras’ time and attentions were divided between the affairs of Marseilles and the conduct of the siege of Toulon. In those months, they spent 3 to 6 September, 12 October to 3 November, and 19 November to 13 December in Marseilles using its resources to support the siege of Toulon, as well as working to stifle what they perceived to be the persistent “federalist spirit” of that city. While in Marseilles, Fréron and Barras confronted a new struggle for legitimacy and authority with the city’s leaders. Resulting conditions in Marseilles threatened not only Fréron and Barras’ ability to participate in operations against Toulon, but would occupy their energies for the remainder of their mission in the Midi. Barras and Fréron were not with Carteaux’s victorious army when it entered Marseilles on 25 August, but it was accompanied by a substantial number of representatives on mission. There was Antoine-Louis Albitte1, Barras and Fréron’s colleague with the Army of Italy, as well as Christophe Saliceti, Thomas Gasparin, Jean-François Escudier2 and Pierre-Claude

1 Antoine-Louis Albitte was born in Dieppe on 30 December, 1761. He was a lawyer and a député from the Seine-Inférieure to the Legislative Assembly and to the National Convention. During the periods of the Directory, Consulate and Empire, Albitte held minor posts. He died during the retreat from Russia on 25 December 1812. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Antoine- Louis Albitte, 2-4.

2 Jean-François Escudier was born in Soillès-Toucas (Var) on 16 December 1759. A cloth merchant in Toulon, he was named as the justice of the peace of that city in 1791. In 1792 he became the President of the Electoral Assembly of the Var and was subsequently elected to the National Convention where he sat with the Mountain. On 9 August 1793 he was sent on mission to the departments of the Var and Bouches du Rhône and participated in both the conquest of Marseilles and the siege of Toulon until his recall on 11 October 1793. He would later denounce Barras and Fréron for cruelties and embezzlement in the Midi. After 1795, a victim of denunciations, he retired from political life. In 1816 he was proscribed and sought asylum in Tunisia where he remained until allowed to reenter France in December of 1818. He would die in Toulon on 14 April of the following year. Ibid, see Jean-François Escudier, 245.

53 Nioche3, all on mission in the departments of the Midi.4 With the news of Toulon’s alliance with the English and Allied armies fresh in their minds, the representatives knew that time was crucial. If they were to focus their energies against this new threat, Marseilles had to be secured from the risk of further revolt or possible invasion. Therefore, they moved quickly to bring the city under republican control. The Jacobin Club was reopened, the former municipal government of the city was reestablished and a general disarmament was ordered. Hundreds of “patriots,” imprisoned by the counter-revolutionaries, were set free. A forced contribution of four million livres, to be paid within twenty-four hours, was levied on Marseilles’ merchants (whom they held responsible for the city’s treason). All those involved in the city’s leadership during the Federalist revolt were outlawed, regardless of evidence, and their goods confiscated. A new revolutionary tribunal was established to try suspects, though many had fled to Toulon upon the arrival of Carteaux’s forces.5 With these measures implemented, the representatives intended that Marseilles would serve as a headquarters for the siege of Toulon and that it would supply the besieging army. 6 While their colleagues implemented measures for the pacification of Marseilles and the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône, Fréron and Barras took similar steps in the department of the Var. Marseilles’ defeat disheartened remaining Federalist elements in both departments, yet, it also drove Toulon to the desperate act of alliance with the British and their allies. Therefore, Barras and Fréron were determined to stifle the Federalists in the Var, so that Toulon might be dealt with as quickly as possible. They closed the sections and reestablished popular societies;

3 Pierre-Claude Nioche was born in Azoy-le-Ferron (Indre) on 26 January 1751. He was a lawyer, deputy of the 3rd Estates of the Bailliage of Tours to the . He served as a député of the Indre-et-Loire to the National Convention, and later as a member of the Council of Ancients during the Directory. He was proscribed in 1816, returned to France in 1818 and died in Paris in 1828. Ibid, see Pierre-Claude Nioche, 467-68.

4 Albitte, Saliceti, Escudier, Nioche & Gasparin to the Committee of Public Safety, 25 August 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VI, 112.

5 Ibid, VI, 160.

6 Wallon, Les réprésentants, III, 37. See also Leonard Macaluso, “The Political Lives of Antione-Christophe Saliceti, 1789-1809” (Ph.D. diss., University of Kentucky, 1972), 82-84.

54 they conscripted both resources and manpower from those areas that had accepted the Constitution of 1793; they decreed the arrest of all bourgeois suspected of conspiring with the sections of Toulon as well as all traitorous functionaries, whose real and personal property were to be confiscated. More than willing to resort to terror tactics, they even suggested to the Committee of Public Safety that the wives and families of the “two thousand or so seduced and mislead peasants” now inside Toulon should be held as hostages to bring these men to their senses.7 To insure swift justice, Fréron and Barras wanted to follow the example set by their colleagues in Marseilles through the establishment of a revolutionary tribunal. Since the criminal tribunal of the department of the Var had been located in Toulon and its leaders arrested by the Federalist sections there, it was now necessary to create a new one. On 8 September, Barras, Fréron, Augustin Robespierre and Ricord issued a decree creating a new criminal tribunal in Grasse.8 In its original form, the tribunal had only possessed jurisdiction over cases of common law criminals, not over cases of those charged with the crime of counter-revolution. When the tribunal’s new public prosecutor, Jean-Baptiste Vachier, informed Fréron and Barras that no law had arrived from the Convention which might give them the authority to deal with cases of counter-revolution, Fréron and Barras decided to change the nature of the tribunal.9 Declaring that the Var was in need of immediate justice against its numerous enemies, they issued a decree on 14 November instructing the tribunal to judge those accused of counter-revolution in the same manner as the revolutionary tribunal in Marseilles.10 To set the tribunal in motion, on 22 November Fréron and Barras promptly sent eighty-seven Varois to Grasse to be tried for participating in Marseilles’ uprising.11 With the tribunal and its jurisdictional parameters now

7 Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 29 August 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VI, 184.

8 Edmond Poupé, Le tribunal révolutionnaire du Var, (Draguignan, 1911), 193-95.

9 Ibid, 197-98.

10 Ibid, 198-99. In his thesis on Barras, Cameron points out that while five representatives signed the decree authorizing the tribunal, it was Barras and Fréron alone who were responsible for changing its nature. Cameron, The Director Paul Barras, 90.

55 established, it was now necessary to erect a guillotine. As early as 10 October, Fréron and Barras had lamented their lack of a guillotine in a letter to the Committee of Public Safety. “We are very embarrassed,” they complained, “we will probably be reduced to having to shoot the condemned.”12 But by 29 October they reported that they had ordered a guillotine to be made in Marseilles, though it did not arrive in Grasse until early December.13 Not only were Fréron and Barras determined to bring all suspects in the Var to justice, but to also see that traitorous colleagues were punished as well. On 2 September they joined with the representatives in Marseilles to decree the arrest Antoine Despinassy, formerly attached to Barras’ mission to the Army of Italy.14 Barras and Fréron penned a lengthy letter to the Committee of Public Safety in which they condemned Despinassy’s conduct. They accused him of abandoning his post at the moment that Barras needed him to second his decisions in Nice in the face of Brunet’s defiance. In truth, Despinassy had gone to Signes, on the pretext of visiting his mother, five days prior to the arrest of Baille and Beauvais in Toulon. It was in the town of Signes, Fréron and Barras claimed, that he had made a speech in favor of the Federalist sections. Furthermore, they accused him of working, like Brunet, to impede the operations of republican forces against Marseilles and of making statements in favor of clemency for the rebels.15 Through such acts, in their opinion, he had contributed to the establishment of Federalist control in Marseilles and Toulon. Despinassy protested the accusations of Fréron and Barras, vowing to

11 Poupé, Tribunal, 199-200. The Tribunal in Grasse would remain in operation until 27 April 1794, when all remaining accused were sent to Paris to be tried. For the actual decrees, see Archives Nationales, AFII 90 #2 (Extracts of the decrees of the Representatives of the Army of Italy, relative to the Criminal Tribunal of the Department of the Var situated in Grasse).

12 Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 10 October 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VII, 354.

13 Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 29 October, 1793, Ibid, VIII, 115. They had also ordered one for Nice, which, they complained, had not “acted with the least promptness to procure one.” The guillotine for Grasse did not arrive (and was of poor quality, in constant need of repair) until around 4 December. Poupé, Tribunal, 16-17.

14 Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VI, 268 (fn.1). Despinassy had originally been attached to the Army of Italy (along with Baille, Beauvais and Barras) by the Convention on 30 April 1793.

15 Barras, Albitte, Gasparin, Saliceti, Fréron, Pomme & Roubaud to the Committee of Public Safety, 3 September 1793, Ibid, 268-70.

56 return to the Convention to defend himself. But his conduct was made further suspect when he subsequently fled Marseilles for Signes where he found refuge for the duration of the Terror. On 11 September the National Convention approved the representatives decree against him.16 By mid-September, Saliceti,17 Gasparin18 and Escudier departed Marseilles for the army before Toulon in order to oversee the siege. Only Albitte remained at Marseilles where, around 12 October, he was joined by Fréron and Barras. Though they may have wished it, neither Fréron had yet been assigned to the siege and so they had to be content with contributing to its success by working behind the scenes. Since Marseilles was to serve as the base of operations against

Despinassy’s desire for leniency toward the rebels of the Midi is understandable when one considers his background. Born in Marseilles on 13 August 1757, Antoine-Joseph-Marie d’Espinassy came from a noble family of that region. After a career in the army in which he achieved the rank of captain, Despinassy was elected as a representative to the Estates General in 1789 and reelected to the National Convention in 1792. On 9 March 1793 he had been sent to supervise recruitment in the departments of the Var and Alpes-Maritimes and was later attached to the Army of Italy along with Barras. After Thermidor, he appears to have been exonerated for he was sent out once again as a representative on mission and sat in the Council of 500 until 20 May 1797. On 28 April 1797 he had achieved the rank of general of brigade. Under the Consulate he was discharged with a salary and retired on 6 July 1811. After the Restoration he was exiled, never to return to France. He died in Lausanne on 27 May 1829. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Antoine-Joseph-Marie Despinassy, 204.

16 Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VI, 422.

17 Antoine Christophe Saliceti was born in Saliceto, on 26 August 1757. He was a lawyer, elected deputy of the 3rd Estate from Corsica to the Estates General and to the National Convention. Under the Directory he was placed in charge of preparations for the reconquest of Corsica. Napoleon sent him on several missions to Italy. In 1806 he became minister of general police in under . He died in Naples on 23 December 1809. Ibid, see Antoine Christophe Saliceti, 554-55.

18 Thomas-Augustin Gasparin was born in Orange (Vaulcuse) on 27 February 1754. His career began in the army where, from 1774 to 1784, he served in the regiments of Picardy and Provence, attaining the rank of captain. Elected as a député of the Bouches-du-Rhône to the Legislative Assembly, he served as one of the most active members of the military committee. In July of 1792, he was charged with Carnot to organize the camp at Soissons. Throughout 1792, he was constantly on mission, primarily in the department of the Nord. On 12 June 1793 he became a member of the Committee of Public Safety. In this capacity he was sent to the Armée des côtes de la Rochelle to observe positions and report back to Committee. On 9 August 1793 he was appointed, with Escudier, as representative on mission to the Armies of the Alpes and Italy. During the siege of Toulon, he fell ill and died in Orange on 11 November 1793. Ibid, see Thomas-Augustin Gasparin, 284.

57 Toulon, Barras and Fréron quickly implemented measures to furnish money, supplies and manpower for the army. In fact, that army was in a pitiful state, suffering from a dearth of weapons, munitions and uniforms. As early as 6 September, Barras wrote to the Committee complaining: “We do not have either the men or the artillery with which to attack Toulon”19 The winter was fast approaching and many new conscripts that arrived at Toulon remained without either arms or uniforms through the months of September and October.20 Yet more critical, was the lack of subsistence, especially wheat, in the departments of the Bouches-du-Rhône and Var. To alleviate the food shortage for both the army and for Marseilles, Barras and Fréron made provisions to purchase grain from Genoa, a friendly neutral. Construction was also begun on two that would serve to protect the neutral ships that supplied Marseilles. 21 As for artillery and manpower, it was expected that reinforcements would be sent from Lyons once the siege there was ended,22 but, for the time being, Barras and Fréron took what measures they could to alleviate the situation. Regarding manpower, on 13 November they wrote to inform the Committee of Public Safety that they had imposed a levée en masse in Marseilles.23 Marseilles was transformed into a “vast arsenal”24 and arms workshops were established in the public places; churches and chateaux furnished copper and searches were made for muskets in all the old forts.25 Furthermore, they required the city to furnish 20,000 yards of blue cloth for the Army

19 Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 6 September 1793. Ibid, VI, 322.

20Macaluso, Political Lives, 91.

21 Barras to Moyse Bayle, 24 November 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 51-53. See also: Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 6 September 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VI, 321.

22 Wallon, Les réprésentants, III, 49.

23 Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 13 November 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VII, 404.

24 Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 23 October 1793, Archives Parlementaires, LXXVIII, 645.

25 Barras to Moyse Bayle, 18 October 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 31-33. See also: Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 23 October 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VII, 596. Similar workshops had been established in Brignoles, Draguignan and Barjols, which, along with

58 of Italy.26 When the production of this cloth was delayed, they published a decree on 30 October inviting the Republicans of Marseilles to donate shirts for the army. The names of all citizens who donated shirts, as well as of those who did not, were to be published and placarded in the city streets.27 While in the process of transforming Marseilles into a supply depot for the army, Fréron and Barras also sought to transform it into a truly Montagnard city by more destructive means. In accordance with a decree issued by the Convention, on 22 September, Fréron and Barras, ordered the destruction of chateaux, convents, abbeys and other symbols of feudalism in the Departments of the Var, Bouches-du-Rhône, Basses Alpes and Alpes-Maritimes. Anything of value contained in these structures, such as wood, iron, lead or tile, was to be salvaged. 28 In Marseilles, there were few limits to their enthusiasm for destruction. Within the city, aristocratic tombs were razed and the bodies of Marseilles’ ancient nobility cast into communal graves. Donjons and other “monuments to feudalism,” such as the old basilica of Accoules, the Church of Saint-Ferréol, the concert hall, and all the edifices where the Federalist sections had met were likewise demolished. Plans were also made to destroy the historic and beautifully ornamented Hotel de Ville.29 The only structures they appear to have been interested in sparing were the monuments from ancient times such as old temples and Roman aqueducts.30

the ones at Marseilles, were making and/or repairing old muskets at the rate of 400 per day as well as producing cannons, mortars and munitions. Archives Parlementaires, LXXVIII, 644.

26 Barras and Fréron to Nouet (commissioner of the Executive Council), 28 September 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 29-30.

27 When this decree was read to the Convention of 9 November, the deputies became so excited that they decided to invite all communes to donate shirts, stockings, and shoes to the army and to publish the names of those who made donations. However, Moyse Bayle and another député named Julien argued against the latter, saying that there might be many patriots who wished to donate, but due to their poverty, were unable. Therefore, it was not just to publish such lists. As a result, the motion for publication was defeated. Archives Parlementaires, LXXVIII, 649.

28 Ibid, LXXVIII, 648-49.

29 This Hotel de Ville was noted for its beautiful architectural ornamentation by Puget. Barras and Fréron had already succeeded in having its balcony torn off when an appeal by the city leaders was made to Saliceti, Augustin Robespierre and Ricord to save it. As a result, the

59 On 3 November, Barras left Marseilles with a detachment of dragoons to pursue counter- revolutionaries in the mountains of the Var.31 Since Albitte had departed for a new mission near the end of October, Fréron was left alone to continue with the measures that he and Barras had initiated. “I am often inside many days without going out, occupied, in my bathrobe, with writing and working; and when I go out, it is always at 7:30 in the evening to take a little air and exercise…There is my life!” he wrote to Moyse Bayle.32 During this short period on his own, Fréron passed several decrees. Two dealt with the subject of subsistence for both Marseilles and the army. Through these decrees, Fréron provided for the collection of accurate information on the quantities of grains in the storehouses of the city and he tried to halt communal interference in the passage of transports carrying supplies to the army, forbidding anyone to delay or loot these transports.33 He also dealt with the subject of counter-revolutionary property, now declared the property of the nation; he declared that items such as furniture were not to be taken by citizens for their personal use under pain of being accused as “accomplices of counter- revolution.” 34 This decree was made more interesting when, a few months later, Fréron and Barras faced accusations of sending several carts, laden with furniture, to Barras’ estate at Fox- Amphoux. Finally, Fréron appears to have focused on the subject of national fêtes. In a decree published on 18 November, he ordered that a national fête be celebrated on the décade, throughout the department. He meticulously outlined the order of the procession, people, and

demolition was suspended. Lourde, Histoire de la Révolution à Marseilles et en Provence (Marseilles, 1974), III, 342-43.

30 Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, (no date), Poupé, Lettres, 38-40. See also Archives Parlementaires, LXXVIII, 644-646.

31 Fréron mentions this in his letter to Saliceti, 12 November 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 40.

32 Fréron to Moyse Bayle, 12 December 1793, Ibid, 64-65.

33 Archives Nationales, AFII 90, documents 38 and 44. Fréron’s decrees made (in Marseilles) both on 16 November 1793.

34 Archives Nationlaes AFII 90, Fréron’s decree (made in Marseilles 17 November 1793).

60 props, such as busts of Marat and models of the Bastille. In Marseilles, he ordered artists and 35 musicians be consulted in order to give the event the “clarity and solemnity” he felt it required. In the middle of his administrative work, Fréron found time to maintain correspondence with his closest friends, especially Camille and Lucile Desmoulins. Fréron spent much time at the Desmoulins’ home and even lived with them for a short period of time. The three became were so close that they soon developed nicknames for one another, Fréron’s being that of “Lapin” because of his fond attachment to the rabbits owned by Lucille’s mother, Madame Duplessis.36 While he wrote to both Camille and Lucille, it is his letters to Lucille that, perhaps, more than any of his other writings, provide some insight into Fréron’s personal character and feelings. Fréron has often been referred to as a “ladies’ man”37 and it appears that this unscrupulous representative could be quite seductive and charming. “You know that I love your wife to distraction,” he wrote Camille.38 While Fréron may have possessed a genuine romantic interest in Lucille, there is no indication that the two ever shared more than a platonic relationship. This did not stop him, however, from writing flirtatious letters in which he chided Lucille for her coquettishness and for her failure to write him as often as he wished.39 “Lapin is desolate;” he wrote her later from the ramparts of Toulon, “he thinks of you constantly, he thinks there in the middle of the bullets as a knight of old: Ah! If only my lady could see me!”40 But these letters reveal more about Fréron than just his romantic sensibilities. He provided Lucille with accounts of his mission as well as revealed his deepest fears for the well-being of his sister and niece,

35 Archives Nationales AFII 90, doc. 41 Fréron's decree on Fêtes Nationales (Marseilles, 18 November 1793).

36 He was so fond of Lucille and Camille that he named his children after them.

37 See Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron; Aronson, The Golden Bees; and Fleischmann, Pauline Bonaparte and Her Lovers.

38 Fréron to Camille Desmoulins, 18 October, 1793, M. Matton, Correspondance inédite de Camille Desmoulins, (Paris, 1836), 182.

39 In one letter he ends by saying, “Prepare yourself Lucille, you were meant for me.” Fréron to Lucile Desmoulins, 11 September 1793, Ibid, 194.

40 Fréron to Lucile Desmoulins, 16 nivose 1793, Ibid, 208.

61 imprisoned in Toulon.41 He also requested the latest news of friends in Paris and relied upon Lucille to influence her husband to continue to act on his, and often La Poype’s, behalf. In fact, it was his desire to protect his brother-in-law’s interests that appears to have occupied a great deal of his energies. While Fréron focused on affairs in Marseilles, he remained abreast of the siege of Toulon. Judging from his letters, Fréron does not seem to have been particularly interested in matters of strategy; in truth, he was ill-equipped to judge in such matters. But he was very concerned with the interests of La Poype, whose role in that affair was prominent. On 7 September, Carteaux’s force moved east from Marseilles and occupied the town of , northwest of Toulon where he established headquarters. Meanwhile, at Nice, General Dumerbion detached some 3,000 men from the Army of Italy. This force, known as the Armée Révolutionaire or the Armée auxiliaire, was placed under the command of La Poype. On 6 September it occupied a position to the east of Toulon around the towns of Hyères and Sollies.42 At first these two armies acted independently; the Faron Mountains divided them and complicated communications. Operations were also hampered by the intense competition that arose between Carteaux and La Poype, who despised one another.43 Carteaux disliked La Poype because of his aristocratic heritage and La Poype found Carteaux an uncouth braggart. Fréron clearly shared, and no doubt encouraged, his brother-in-law’s disgust for this general. But in the beginning stages of the siege, in September, Fréron’s opinion was obviously in the minority, for on 4 September, his fellow representatives nominated Carteaux as commander-in-chief of the forces besieging Toulon. This was a situation that, as his actions were to show, La Poype chose to ignore as much as possible.

41 Fréron wrote “My heart is torn…My sister and my niece, little Fanny, are trapped in Toulon in the hospital like some unfortunates; I am not able to send them any aid and they perhaps lack everything.” Fréron to Lucile Desmoulins, 18 October 1793, Ibid, 185.

42 Wallon, Les réprésentants, III, 47; Phipps, Armies, III, 110-12; and Lourde, Histoire de la revolution à Marseilles, III, 318.

43 Barras writes to Moyse Bayle telling him of “the distressing dissension that exists between La Poype and Carteaux.” Barras to Moyse Bayle, 18 October 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 32.

62 Both Carteaux and La Poype believed that Toulon could be taken by a direct assault, but it was La Poype who decided to act first without informing his superior. On 30 September he launched an assault with a force of some 1200 to 1500 men against Mount Faron, whose summit rose high above and north of Toulon. Though he succeeded in seizing the English redoubt there, lack of reinforcements made it impossible to hold the position and soon a British counter-attack drove his forces back down the mountain. If La Poype had been able to hold this position, it is possible that the town would have fallen.44 This failure of what might have been La Poype’s finest hour, prompted Fréron to place the blame upon Carteaux. In many letters to friends back in Paris, Fréron claimed that La Poype had asked Carteaux for reinforcements, only to be refused.45 Carteaux , Fréron declared, had made a colossal reputation for himself through the help of the representative Albitte, and “was no more capable of taking Toulon than the Moon.” He further asserted that Carteaux was motivated by jealously. Fearful of La Poype’s Republican spirit, he wished to discredit him. “Carteaux would rather that the defeat of Toulon be delayed and lost eight times over than to consent to another [general] getting the glory,” he wrote to Camille Desmoulins.46 While Fréron’s colleagues, Saliceti and Gasparin, confirmed that La Poype had informed Carteaux in a written message of the redoubt’s capture,47 there is no indication in their letter to the Committee of Public Safety of 4 October that they placed blame for La Poype’s failure directly upon Carteaux.48 La Poype simply did not have the resources, especially artillery,

44 Phipps, Armies, III, 112-14.

45 Fréron to Moyse Bayle and Granet, 13 November 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 48. See also Fréron to Lucile Desmoulins, 18 October 1793, Matton, Correspondance inedite, 186. Fréron wrote to Lucille: “…he (La Poype) would have taken the city in eight hours if Carteaux had sent him the reinforcements he asked for in vain.”

46 Fréron to Camille Desmoulins, 18 October 1793, Matton, Correspondance inedite, 181.

47 Saliceti and Gasparin to the Committee of Public Safety, 1 October 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VII, 180.

48 Saliceti and Gasparin to the Committee of Public Safety, 4 October 1793, Ibid, 225.

63 needed to retain his position. Some of his men did not even have muskets. Therefore, his failure was not entirely Carteaux’s fault, but rather a lack of arms and munitions.49 On 15 October La Poype led another assault, this time against the promontory of Cape Brun, but was again driven back. Carteaux now used La Poype’s two defeats as an excuse to relieve him of command. But Saliceti and Gasparin, who felt that Carteaux’s decision was to excuse his own delayed operations, arranged for La Poype to be sent to Lyons to supervise the movement of reinforcements from the Army of the Alps. La Poype did not return to the siege until 23 October.50 Although there can be little doubt that personal feelings played a role in Carteaux’s treatment of La Poype, it was Fréron’s opinion that Carteaux’s actions were all part of larger plot devised by the general and his supporters to destroy his brother-in-law’s career. “You have no idea how Carteaux has ridden roughshod over him…” Fréron wrote to Camille. In his letters to both Bayle and Desmoulins; he urged them to use their influence to speak on La Poype’s behalf in the National Convention. Meanwhile, Fréron’s defense of La Poype, among other things, soon made him the target of denunciations. In both the Paris Jacobin Club and the National Convention, Fréron had enemies who were out to discredit him by achieving his recall or perhaps even his execution. Such enemies were willing to exploit any news or rumors that they received of Fréron’s activities in the Midi, whether it concerned his lifestyle or his constant pleading for La Poype. The first significant attack launched against Fréron came on 8 November in the Jacobin Club when Jacques Hébert, énragé and editor of the radical Père Duchesne, denounced Fréron as “nothing more than an aristocrat (and a) .” Claiming that Fréron had once merited his esteem, Hébert now declared that power “had intoxicated him,” and that he had come to abuse it. It was rumored that in Nice, Fréron had placed himself in the company of aristocratic women, had ran up personal debts and had refused to associate with true patriots. Hébert also went on to

49 Wallon, Les réprésentants, III, 49.

50 Phipps, Armies, III, 114. See also Saliceti and Gasparin’s letter to the Committee of Public Safety, 13 October 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VI, 406. They write of the problems between La Poype and Carteaux. They say that were it not for the fact that he had against him his birth and the fact that part of the army did not have faith in him because his wife was inside Toulon, then they might have placed La Poype in command instead of Carteaux. They say that they are going to send La Poype temporarily to Lyons so that they might “take away from Carteaux all excuses to be able to do vigorous things.”

64 denounce La Poype, asserting that the “ci-devant marquis” had continuously been placed in prominent positions by Fréron. He concluded, announcing that a plot existed to place La Poype at the head of the Army of Italy.51 When news of this denunciation reached Fréron, he attempted to defend himself and La Poype in letters to his friends. Though he said nothing of the life he had led while in Nice, he declared that he (and Barras) lived a very Spartan lifestyle in Marseilles. He claimed they only ate one meal a day and that, once a week, they invited some arsenal workers to join them. The only clothes he possessed were those of his representative’s uniform and, as to women, while he did not deny his passion for them, he claimed he had no time for them since he worked morning to night. 52 As for La Poype, Fréron claimed that rather than place his brother-in-law in command, he had always worked to do the opposite in order that he might not be accused of favoritism53 Furthermore, he claimed that Hébert and an aide-de-camp of Carteaux, named Dupas, bore only ill-will toward La Poype. “You know they lie against La Poype, these partisans of Carteaux,” he wrote to a friend54 While Hébert may not have been a partisan of Carteaux, it is possible that his attack on Fréron was partially motivated by his political differences with Fréron’s friends, Danton and Desmoulins.

51 Aulard, La société des Jacobins, V, 499-500.

52 Fréron to Moyse Bayle, 12 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 64-65. Fréron’s biographer, Arnaud, seems to support Hébert’s accusations. He says that when Barras and Fréron were in Nice they did go to parties where they mixed with married, aristocratic women as well as courtesans and attended “libertine suppers.” To support this information, he cites the diary of Charlotte Robespierre (Maximilien’s sister). But this author has been unable to find any specific references to Fréron’s conduct in either that diary or any other source. See Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 200-01.

53 La Poype also wrote a letter to the Paris Jacobin Club in which he defended both himself and Fréron. “While Dupas denounces me at your tribune, I respond by risking my life twenty times over for the triumph of the republic and to reduce to ashes Toulon and its infamous inhabitants, even if my entire family perish there…” Copy of letter written by General la Poype to the citizens composing the Society of Friends of Liberty and Equality, read in the Jacobins on 20 November 1793. Poupé, Lettres, 179.

54 Fréron to Moyse Bayle, 13 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 82. He also wrote of this in a letter to Lucille Desmoulins commenting: “They lie against him, they hinder him, they paralyze his efforts, they leave him devoid of arms, they cast doubts upon his civism…” Fréron to Lucile Desmoulins, 18 October 1793, Matton, Correspondance inedite, 185.

65 Fortunately for Fréron, it was those friends and political allies who quickly defended him following Hébert’s denunciation. Camille Desmoulins strongly supported him by attacking Hébert in his journal the Vieux Cordelier.55 Fréron’s civism was further proclaimed by the Marseilles Jacobin Club.56As a result, Fréron eventually survived this attack, but Hébert’s was only the first of many denunciations that Fréron (and Barras) would face before their mission as representatives in the Midi came to an end. Several other important events occurred while Fréron served alone in Marseilles. On 12 November, Saliceti wrote informing him that their colleague, Gasparin, had died at his home in Orange.57 Along with this news, he sent a copy of the National Convention’s decree of 29 October which named Fréron and Barras as representatives to the army before Toulon.58 With Gasparin’s death and this new appointment, Fréron, Barras, and Saliceti were now the only representatives with authority at the siege.59 Fréron quickly assumed the new powers affirmed by

55 Desmoulins attacked Hébert and Dupas in Numero V (published on 5 January 1794) of his publication . He pointed out that for two months, Hébert had not ceased to defame Fréron and Barras (though in his speech of 8 November, Hébert had said nothing of Barras) and had asked the Committee of Public Safety that they be recalled. He also echoed the assertions, that Fréron had made to him in his letters, that Carteaux had deliberately deprived La Poype of a victory at Fort Faron. See Camille Desmoulins, Le Vieux Cordelier (Paris: 1936), 144-47. Desmoulins also accused Hébert, of taking a bribe of 120,000 livres from the Minister of War, Bouchotte, to lie about him, Danton, Fréron, Barras, etc. Ibid, 153. Hébert would respond to these attacks in a brochure entitled J.R. Hébert, auteur du Père Duchesne, à Camille Desmoulins et compagnie (Bib. nat. Lb41 3165).

56 Also, on 9 November Ricord fils (a mutual friend of Desmoulins and Fréron, and a Marseilles patriot) sent a letter that was read in the Jacobin Club in which he praised the efforts of both Fréron and Barras, commending their fixing of bread prices at low rates and their levying of troops in the Var. As a result of this letter and the debate that it generated, a commission was named to study in detail Hébert’s denunciation. Aulard, Société des Jacobins, V, 501-02

57 Fréron issued a decree on 16 November providing for the distributing and public reading of flyers containing the eulogy given at Gaparin’s funeral by Milie fils. See Archives Nationales AFII 90, doc. 45.

58 National Convention, decree relative to the mission of the Army at Toulon and to the mission of the Army of Italy, 29 October 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VIII, 95.

59 The other representatives, such as Servière, Pomme and Charbonnier, had departed for Paris and Augustin Robespierre and Ricord appear to have been still tied up with matters in Nice.

66 his appointment.60 He expressed his opinion that the Committee of Public Safety be persuaded that additional representatives were not needed at the siege. Fréron’s reasons for this attitude can only be assumed. It is likely that he had witnessed, as had many other representatives, the disagreements and competition created when too many representatives were assigned to a particular mission. In such an environment decisions were not easily arrived at.61 But is also clear that both Fréron and Barras wanted to play a significant role in the capture of Toulon. Fréron certainly did not want to share in the glory with others. Whatever his reasons, there is no indication, at least from his letters, that Barras was as concerned about this issue, and Saliceti certainly did not share Fréron’s assessment of the situation. On 7 December, tired of waiting for Barras and Fréron to take their leave of Marseilles, Saliceti wrote to the Committee of Public Safety asking them to send another representative to help him since his two colleagues had not yet arrived.62 The Committee of Public Safety responded by urging Fréron and Barras to assume their new duties expeditiously.63 Despite their great desire to participate in the siege, the political situation in Marseilles had become so critical by early December that Fréron and Barras were hesitant to leave.64 In reality, the pacification of Marseilles was proving to be a more difficult task than expected. Despite the expedient measures that they and their colleagues had taken over a period of three months, Fréron and Barras had remained unconvinced that the city had been purged of its independent, Federalist spirit. As early as 6 September, Barras had complained to the Committee of Public Safety, “if this city is abandoned to itself, it will soon be delivered to new evils and

60 To his colleague Botot, Fréron wrote: “If they want to ensure success then they…should not send another representative to replace Gasparin.” Fréron to Botot, 13 November, 1793. See also his letter to Herault des Sechelles, 13 November, 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 45 & 50.

61 For a good discussion of the problems created by the presence of too many representatives in one region, see Wallon, Les réprésentants, III, 411-12.

62 Saliceti to the Committee of Public Safety, 17 November 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VIII, 516.

63 Aulard, Récueil des Actes, IX, 241.

64 Cameron, The Director Paul Barras, 105.

67 perhaps to the English.”65 Always willing to cast the blame upon others, Fréron and Barras had written to Maximilien Robespierre to reveal the “truth” concerning the conduct of their colleague Albitte at Marseilles.66 While in the city in September and October, Albitte had shown reluctance for terrorist measures. On 12 September he had written to the Committee of Public Safety “ I am certainly of the opinion that we should punish traitors, rebels, and the guilty, but under these difficult circumstances it is necessary to consider their number and their degree of crime. It is a truth: if we punish all the guilty in Marseilles and the Bouches-du-Rhône, three quarters of the population would be wiped out.” Therefore, he suggested to the Committee that it was not necessary or useful that all the guilty be punished.67 Albitte’s assessment of the situation was obviously in direct contrast to that of Fréron and Barras who continued to believe that only stringent measures would bring Marseilles under control and they were not about to tolerate anyone who called for moderation. “Albitte has paralyzed everything here; he has shown the most invincible repugnance for grand measures,” they wrote to Robespierre. They accused Albitte of associating with the rich merchants of the city and refusing to enforce loans upon them for the Republic. Moreover, they claimed that he had done nothing but interfere with their requisition of blue cloth and that he had opposed their establishment of arms workshops in Marseilles.68 It was because of Albitte’s mistakes, they asserted, that the Marseilles’ pacification and Toulon’s fall had been delayed. “If Barras and I had [initially] entered Marseilles,” Fréron declared confidently, “we would have executed the decree the Convention made against Lyons. The houses of the rich would have been razed immediately and Toulon taken.”69 He went on to vow that, unlike Albitte, they would waste no

65 Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 6 September 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VI, 320.

66 Fréron (and Barras) to Maximilien Robespierre, 20 October 1793, Ibid, VII, 532-536.

67 Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Antoine-Louis Albitte, 2-4.

68 See Barras and Fréron’s letter to the National Convention published in the Archives Parlementaires, LXXVIII, 645.

69 Ibid, 534.

68 time in bringing Toulon complete subjugation.70 But the tension between Fréron, Barras and Albitte was born out of more than just differing views on Marseilles fate. There was naturally a degree of rivalry, for Fréron and Barras wanted to be in exclusive control in Marseilles. Moreover, Fréron’s interests may have been even more personal, for Albitte was a strong supporter of Carteaux. For Fréron, this made him view Albitte not only as his enemy, but also as the enemy of his brother in law. Eventually, the Committee of Public Safety stopped this infighting by sending Albitte on another mission to Lyon to arrange for reinforcements for the siege of Toulon.71 However, Fréron and Barras soon found that competition with Albitte for authority had been nothing when compared to the challenge that was to come from certain elements of the city’s leadership, namely, the Marseilles Jacobin Club and the City Council (Municipality). When Fréron and Barras arrived at Marseilles, their efforts were very popular with the Marseilles Jacobin Club as well as the General Assembly of Popular Societies, an organization created soon after the capture of Marseilles; it consisted of delegates of four hundred popular societies of the Midi. Barras and Fréron had attended and assisted in the sessions of both bodies72 and sometimes they employed their members to carry out important measures.73 Later, the Marseilles Club had been quick to defend Fréron against the denunciations of Hébert. Fréron

70 Fréron to Moyse Bayle and Granet, 13 November 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 47. After the siege of Toulon, Fréron had commented to Bayle: “If we had only shot eight hundred conspirators in Marseilles, as we did here, when the troops entered the city, and then created a military commission to condemn the rest of the villains, we would not be to the point that we are now.” Fréron to Bayle, 8 January 1794, Ibid, 133.

71 Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Louis-Antoine Albitte, 3. The Committee decreed his transfer to Lyon on 18 October. By 26 October he was there.

72 Fréron to Moyse Bayle, 12 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 62.

73 For example, when the representatives were in the process of organizing the gendarmerie in Marseilles, they sent their nominations to the Club to review and attest to the civism of those nominated. The representatives of the Armies of the Alps and Italy to the Committee of Public Safety, 17 September 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VII, 551. Another example can be seen when Barras and Fréron made their decree for donation of shirts, they asked the town council of Marseilles to create a commission of six men, taken from the popular societies, which would be in charge of receiving the shirts and recording the number donated and the names of those who donated. Archives Parlementaires, LXXVIII, 648.

69 may no doubt have been grateful for this support, but he and Barras quickly discovered that both the Marseilles Club and the General Assembly regarded themselves not as the instruments of the representatives, but rather as co-decision makers who had the right to question and debate the decrees of the representatives and, at times, even those of the Convention. For Fréron and Barras, this threat to their authority as representatives could not be tolerated and merely proved that Marseilles’ independent spirit had not been crushed. “They only see Marseilles,” Fréron would later comment, “Marseilles is their nation. France is nothing.”74 Both the Marseilles Club and the General Assembly were dominated by men who could be classified more as meddlers and troublemakers, more ultra-revolutionaries than counter- revolutionaries. Such men had used their previous incarceration by the Federalist sections as leverage for their popularity and influence. Since the clubs had been reopened, many of them had personal scores to settle, even if at the expense of law and order in the city. It was these “ringleaders,”75 Fréron and Barras asserted, who were leading the good men of the clubs astray, meddling in the Convention’s business and turning the clubs into potential centers of counter- revolution.76 At one point, Fréron suggested to Moyse Bayle, député of the Bouches du Rhône, that he [Bayle] make up some pretense to remove these troublemakers from the city. Problems for Fréron and Barras first began with the General Assembly, which had its headquarters in Marseilles. After its formation, this Assembly began to usurp their authority. For example, the Assembly had decided to send out its own commissioners; they were soon interfering with the normal operations of the army and meddling in the affairs of both the departmental government of the Bouches du Rhône and the municipal government of Marseilles. In addition, the Assembly attempted to appropriate the representatives’ authority to levy troops; it created an armée revolutionaire of 2,200 men, on its own authority, which it called the Legion de la Montagne. Naturally, this created friction with Fréron and Barras, who withheld their

74 Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 2 January, 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 157.

75 Among those whom Barras and Fréron considered as the ringleaders were: Louis Isoard, J. B. Loys, Réquier, Guillaume Carle and the two leaders of the Revolutionary Tribunal, Augustin Maillet and Joseph Giraud.

76 Michael Kennedy, The Jacobin Club of Marseilles, (New York, 1973), 135-36.

70 official authorization. They became even more suspicious of the Assembly’s motives, when it neglected to publish its process-verbal and began requesting funds for ambiguous projects.77 Matters only seemed to deteriorate when they learned that that the General Assembly in Marseilles was forming a similar association in the town of Gap which was to be composed of deputies from the popular societies of the Hautes and Basses Alpes, which in Fréron’s opinion, were “the two most detestable [departments] in the Republic.”78 While contending with the audacity of the General Assemblies, Barras and Fréron were confronted by the Marseilles Club. Perhaps following the lead of the General Assembly, the Marseilles Club began to require that all administrative officials meet with them; they also proposed to assume the task of recruiting troops from the representatives on mission.79 Like the General Assembly, the Club refused to publish the records of their meetings. Consequently, Fréron and Barras became even more suspicious as to what was transpiring behind closed doors. Barras wrote to Bayle condemning what he called the “incendiary motions” of the Marseilles Club, which, he claimed, had always struggled with the representatives for power in the city.80 Fréron and Barras were not alone in their opinions. Several of their colleagues, including Saliceti, had written to the Committee of Public Safety expressing their concerns.81 It was clear that something had to be done to curb the activities of the popular societies, but this was not a problem that could be easily or quickly solved. Fréron and Barras clearly assessed their delicate position in dealing with the popular societies. “We are placed between the popular societies…and the loss of the state. There is the

77 Fréron to Botot, 13 November 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 45.

78 Ibid.

79 Scott, Terror and Repression, 56.

80 Barras to Moyse Bayle, 4 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 56.

81 Their colleague, Pomme (a representative to Montpellier) had written saying that in Marseilles, innocent patriots were being arrested. He warned that the General Assembly was being “menaced by intriguers.” Pomme l’Americain to the Committee of Public Safety, 14 October 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VII, 419. Saliceti and Gasparin also wrote expressing their fears that some intriguers might use the General Assembly for their own interests. Saliceti and Gasparin to the Committee of Public Safety, 27 October 1793. Ibid, VIII, 73.

71 trap.”82 If they acquiesced in the situation, he explained, then they would certainly lose complete control of the political situation in Marseilles and perhaps the entire Midi, but if they launched an outright offensive against the clubs, denying them their right of assembly, then he and Barras risked being labeled as aristocrats and enemies of the popular societies.83 But one thing was certain, something had to be done. “If this society is allowed to infringe upon powers not delegated to it and to make the most rebellious propositions, in the name of freedom of opinion,” Fréron wrote, “the state is lost, anarchy will lead to counter-revolution.”84 In the end, as far as the General Assembly was concerned, Fréron and Barras applied practical measures. While they accused some of being “intriguers,” they paid “ten thousand livres” to send the majority of “good citizens” in the Assembly back to their homes. These men accepted the bribes because many had run up debts in the hopes of receiving patriotic indemnities.85 Barras and Fréron officially signed the dissolution order for the General Assembly by 22 November 1793, successfully ending this threat to their power.86 The Marseilles Club, however, would not be bought off so easily. With the Committee of Public Safety urging them to depart as soon as possible for the army before Toulon, Barras and Fréron had to take what measures they could, no matter how provisional, to ensure that they did not leave a disloyal city behind them. Therefore, on 28 November, Barras, Fréron and their colleagues Saliceti, Augustin Robespierre and Ricord signed a decree placing Marseilles under martial law.87 On 12 December

82 Fréron to Moyse Bayle, 12 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 62.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Barras to Bayle, 24 November 1793, Ibid, 52.

86 Ibid.

87 They felt themselves justified in this decree because on 4 November, the Committee of Public safety had decreed the establishment of a republican garrison in Marseilles under La Poype’s command. They also ordered the representatives to prevent aristocrats, hiding under the guise of the popular societies, from usurping the powers of the Convention and reviving federalism. Scott, Terror and Repression,132. See the Committee of Public Safety’s decree of 4 November 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VIII, 222.

72 1793, the National Convention approved the decree to reinforce its control through its representatives over public order in the city. Defiantly, the city’s leaders refused to accept the representatives’ decree. When Nicholas-Benoit Montmeau, the army commandant of the city, proceeded to carry out the representatives’ order without first notifying the City Council or the Club, the members of the Club88 reacted by declaring that they were in permanent session; violence erupted in the city. The City Council also declared itself in permanent session. Montmeau was ordered to justify his actions before the Club or face arrest. Then, on the night of 3 December, a deputation of the City Council, visited Barras’ residence apparently making threats and demanding to know the representatives’ reasons for placing Marseilles under martial law.89 When Barras refused to satisfy them, the City Council openly defied the representatives by ordering the recall of two Marseilles battalions of sans-culottes that Barras and Fréron had sent to Toulon.90 Moreover, they tried to arouse the people of Marseilles against the representatives by reducing the price of bread.91 These agitators in Marseilles may also have tried another, more underhanded means of retaliating against Fréron and Barras. On 9 December an apocryphal letter arrived at the Committee of Public Safety. This letter, dated 1 December, was supposedly that of Fréron and Barras. In it, the two representatives advocated postponement of the siege of Toulon, and the abandonment of several departments in Provence to the English. With the return of summer and the harvests, the army would return to Toulon to drive their enemies into the sea.92 According to

88 The Marseilles Club was presided over by Maillet cadet, the president of the criminal tribunal of Marseilles.

89 According to Fréron, this deputation was led by Maillet, the president of the Revolutionary Tribunal of Marseilles. See Fréron’s letter to Maximilien Robespierre, 1 March 1794, Georges Michon, Correspondance de Maximilien et Augustin Robespierre, (Paris, 1926), 263.

90 See Barras letter to Bayle, 4 December 1793 as well as that of Fréron to Bayle, 12 December 1793 for details on these events. Poupé, Lettres, 56 & 66. Barras and Fréron were eventually able to send the sans-culottes battalion to the siege.

91 This especially angered the representatives because food supplies in Marseilles were under the jurisdiction of the military authorities, not the City Council. Archives Nationales, AFII 90/663, Arrêté de Barras, Fréron, A. Robespierre and Ricord, 5 December, 1793.

73 Bayle, the Committee considered this letter treasonous and were preparing to have the two representatives declared traitors to the nation. Fortunately, Moyse Bayle examined the letter and, after comparing the signatures with other letters from Barras and Fréron, he realized it was a forgery.93 Though Bayle believed this letter to be the work of their “enemies,” Barras and Fréron has reason to suspect that it was the work of the Marseilles Club.94 Although Fréron and Barras wanted to use force against Marseilles, such a plan was not feasible. All available troops that might have been used against the city were committed to the siege of Toulon. Therefore, they could only take limited actions and to try to at least stabilize Marseilles until Toulon was captured.95 On 4 December, Fréron and Barras replaced the City Council and Surveillance Committee. Through a decree of 9 December, they replaced the City Council with a Municipal Commission, whose members were patriots who were not native to Marseilles.96 To help maintain order in the city, they named La Poype the new commandant of Marseilles, in accordance with a National Convention decree, and a garrison was brought in from Valenciennes (Drome) to Marseilles. Realistically, Fréron and Barras could do no more for the moment. Their desire to teach Marseilles a lesson in obedience to the Convention and to their representatives would have to be delayed for the present. They knew that until the siege of Toulon was brought to a successful conclusion, they would not be able to focus their full attentions upon Marseilles. On 9 December Barras departed the city for army headquarters at Ollioules. Fréron would remain in the city until around 13 December, when he too departed for Ollioules.97

92 For a transcript of this letter, see the appendix to: Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, during the Reign of Napoleon I (London, 1823), I, 312.

93 Moyse Bayle to Barras and Fréron, 10 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 182.

94 Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 20 December, 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, IX, 558.

95 Scott, Terror and Repression, 134.

96 Barras to Bayle, 10 December, 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 59.

97 Fréron’s last letter to Bayle, written from Marseilles is dated 13 December 1793. His next letter to Bayle is dated 17 December 1793 from Ollioules. See Poupé, Lettres, 82-84.

74 It was clear that the struggle with the Marseilles Club and the City Council had undermined Fréron’s personal opinion about Marseilles. Though he and Barras would be occupied at Toulon until around 12 January 1794, it was evident from their letters that they were committed to returning and completing the unfinished business in Marseilles;98 they were certain that only the harshest measures would remedy the situation. “Marseilles has never suffered a superior authority,” Fréron wrote to Bayle, “ She is inclined to degrade the representatives of the people. You recall what happened to you and Boisset. This spirit reigns still. It is only through fear and the display of armed force which can obtain obedience to the laws and make them respect the National Convention.”99 But for now, Fréron would have to satisfy himself with punishing Toulon. The fate of that city and the opportunity to further distinguish himself in its conquest awaited him. He was determined, he said, to aid in the capture of Toulon, or die in the attempt. “We will earn either laurels or willows” he wrote to Lucile.100 Fréron had vowed that Toulon would not be treated as leniently as Marseilles had been, and on this vow he would deliver. During their time spent in Marseilles, Fréron and Barras had occupied themselves with matters that, in retrospect, can be judged as both practical and impractical. In the practical sense, they worked diligently to procure weapons, munitions, clothing, food and other supplies for the siege of Toulon; and they had done this in the face of opposition from the local inhabitants, their fellow representatives, and even the local popular societies. They had responded to these challenges with a strong conviction in their supreme authority as representatives of the nation and in their insistence that loyalty to the Republic took precedence over any feelings local pride or identity. Fréron and Barras had well understood that “unity of command” under their authority in Marseilles was crucial if the city was to cooperate fully and effectively with the Republic’s military efforts in the Midi

98 Even while at the siege of Toulon, Barras would write “Marseilles awaits us; we will arrest all the conspirators covered in the mantel of patriotism.” Barras to Moyse Bayle, 25 December, 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 92.

99 Fréron to Bayle, 12 December 1793, Ibid, 61.

100 Fréron to Lucille Desmoulins, 11 September, 1793, Matton, Correspondance inedite, 194.

75 And yet, impractically, Fréron and Barras had allowed personal motivations to cloud their judgments. They were driven by their personal desires to promote their own careers over those of their colleagues. And, in Fréron’s case, there was the additional care he gave to the promotion of La Poype’s career as well. They had also wasted much of their time and energies with superfluous measures such as organizing national fêtes, tearing down monuments, disinterring dead nobles and other such things all in an effort to transform Marseilles into a thoroughly Montagnard city. While Barras and Fréron may have seen in these measures a means to bring Marseilles closer to the bosom of the Republic, in the end, they succeeded only in stirring up feelings of both resentment and staunch local pride, among even the most Jacobin of Marseilles’ inhabitants. In essence, they had only added to the problems that would face them when they returned to Marseilles in January 1794.

76 CHAPTER 4

FRÉRON AND THE SIEGE OF TOULON

“You can count on our energy; before the month is up, the sans-culottes of Marseilles will have a patriotic banquet on the place where Toulon once stood.” Fréron to Moyse Bayle and François Granet, 13 November 17931

If Stanislas Fréron’s name is remembered at all today, it is primarily because of his involvement in the siege of Toulon. Unlike other representatives assigned to the besieging army, Fréron played little role in strategic planning. Due to the opposition they faced in Marseilles, neither Fréron nor Barras arrived before Toulon until four days before the assault of 17 December that delivered Toulon into the hands of the Republic. Nevertheless, at Toulon, Fréron contributed significantly by leading republican forces to victory and by punishing the unfortunate inhabitants of the conquered city. For Fréron, the conquest of Toulon was a personal as well as a political goal. Not only did he want to free his incarcerated sister and niece, but also to punish the insurgent Toulonnais who had insulted him and flouted the Republic’s authority. Along with Barras, he was determined to fulfill their promise that Toulon would not be treated as leniently as Marseilles. At the time, Fréron looked on his actions as those of a dedicated Montagnard and instrument of the Convention. Yet his bloody reprisals would taint the remainder of his political career and placed his name among the most infamous representatives of the Terror. The capture of Toulon was vital for the Republic. The city was home to one of France’s most important naval arsenals, and subsequently, it was key to a strong French presence in the Mediterranean. When the citizens of Toulon rebelled against the National Convention and opened its ports to the British and Spanish fleets at the end of August 1793, they created a serious strategic threat to the security of the fledgling Republic.2 Therefore, the work of the army and of the representatives there was crucial not only for the capture of the city, but to reaffirm the authority of the Convention. From the moment he learned of Toulon’s alliance with the Allied Coalition, Fréron wanted to play a major role in this important siege. While their colleagues Christophe Saliceti

1 Fréron to Moyse Bayle and François Granet, 13 November 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 47.

2 David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York, 1960), 20.

77 and Thomas Gasparin supervised the army before Toulon, Fréron and Barras worked to establish Marseilles as a base of operations. Because the army before Toulon was plagued with a constant lack of arms, munitions and other supplies,3 Fréron and Barras worked diligently throughout October and November in both Marseilles and the surrounding areas to establish workshops for the production of arms as well as to procure additional manpower and other supplies to support operations before Toulon. This proved to be a difficult task. Not only did they have to compete for the local resources of the Midi with other republican armies4 who also operated in that region, but they also faced problems with the local inhabitants. Supplies intended for the army before Toulon were being seized en route by the poor and starving inhabitants of the region. Finally, Fréron and Barras faced opposition from the rich merchants of Marseilles and from the city’s political leaders who struggled with them for the authority to levy and send troops to the front. 5 As a result of these difficulties, from September to November the army before Toulon struggled to sustain its efforts. The lévee ordered by the representatives for the region on 30 August provided approximately 13,000 conscripts; yet, these men were, on the whole, raw and undisciplined. Desertion became such a problem, that on 1 November 1793 the representatives ordered the imprisonment of all prostitutes in Marseilles to help curb the problem.6 Moreover, there were never enough military supplies for the new troops.7 The new soldiers remained without arms and proper uniforms throughout September and October.

3 Macaluso, “Political Lives,” 93.

4 These were the armies of the Alps, Italy and Pyrenees.

5 Ricord to the Committee of Public Safety, 8 October 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VII, 319. Barras and Fréron’s colleague, Ricord, commented on the condition of the Army before Toulon on 8 October: “ There exists in this army the greatest disorder, and…at this moment no one knows the reality or the state of its sustenance, of its artillery and munitions, nor its means of survival.”

6 Charbonnier and Servière to the Committee of Public Safety, 1 November 1793, Ibid, VIII, 173.

7 Charles Fox, Napoleon Bonaparte and the Siege of Toulon, (Washington DC, 1902), 27-28; Henri Wallon, Les réprésentants, III, 48-49.

78 In the middle of these continual problems, the representatives held out hope for a successful end to the Republic’s siege of the city of Lyon, north of Toulon. They knew that a Republican victory there would free up much needed artillery, supplies and, most important, experienced troops. Yet even when republican forces did reduce Lyon on 9 October, it took almost a month for sufficient relief to reach the Army of Toulon. As troubling as the lack of provisions and munitions were, the military leadership in the Army of Toulon was more critical. Jealousies and incompetence reigned among the commanding officers. Saliceti, the senior representative at the siege, found little positive to say about the quality of the officers, especially the commander-in-chief, Jean-Baptiste Carteaux.8 Tensions between Carteaux and his second in command, La Poype, had slowed the progress of the siege.9 Carteaux also resented the willingness of the representatives to listen to the advice of a young artillery officer, Napoleon Bonaparte, whom they had provisionally appointed to command the artillery at Toulon. 10 When Carteaux began to openly dispute the authority of the representatives,11 they demanded his recall as a result of his incompetence and eventually, their request was answered. The Convention replaced him with General François Amédée Doppet12,

8 Saliceti to the Committee of Public Safety, 26 September 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VII, 79-80.

9 Bonnal de Ganges, Les réprésentants du peuple, II, 135.

10 Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic, III, 127. Saliceti, always eager to place his fellow Corsicans in positions of responsibility, soon recognized Bonaparte’s prodigious capabilities and he soon became the favorite of the representatives, who readily defended him from the complaints of Carteaux, whom they were beginning to detest. Judging from their correspondence, Bonaparte and Fréron seem to have interacted very little, but this would only be the first of many times that their paths would cross, especially after Fréron set his sights on the conquest of Napoleon’s young sister, Pauline.

11 Wallon, Les réprésentants, III, 50-51.

12 François-Amédée Doppet was born at Chambéry (Savoy) on 18 March 1753, the son of a wax maker. He joined the Commissaire Général regiment of cavalry in 1770 and the Gardes Françaises in 1771. Discharged in 1773, he became a doctor of medicine at the University of . When the Revolution began he became an ardent Jacobin and a grenadier in the National Guard. After becoming a general of brigade in August 1793, he was placed in command of the Army of the Pyrénées-Orientales. After asking to be relieved of his command at Toulon, he went on temporary leave due to illness. During the Directory he served as a recruiting agent in

79 who had just completed the conquest of Lyon. Until Doppet’s arrival, provisional command of the Army of Toulon was given to La Poype.13 This temporary change of command must have pleased Fréron, since he had continually claimed that his brother-in-law’s talents had suffered under Carteaux’ envy and persecution. When Doppet arrived at Toulon on 9 November, it appeared that both La Poype and Fréron instantly approved of him. Still at Marseilles, Fréron wrote to a colleague declaring that Doppet had the “confidence of the army” and that he worked well with La Poype.14 Nevertheless, Doppet quickly proved to be an even worse commander than his predecessor. Though he had led the successful siege of Lyon, he was not ready for the rebels of Toulon who had aid from foreign powers. Doppet, a former doctor, was honest enough to admit that he was not up to the task and asked to be replaced.15 The War Ministry then named General Jean- Coquillz Dugommier16 the new commander of the Army of Toulon. Until his arrival, Doppet was to remain in command. Fréron, however, did not agree with Doppet’s decision. If the National Convention wanted to ensure success at Toulon, he suggested, then it must keep Doppet at Toulon and leave

the departments of the Moselle, Meurthe and Vosges. He was elected as a député of the department of Mont-Blanc to the Council of 500 in 1798, but his election was annulled. He died at Chambéry on 26 April 1799. Georges Six, Dictionnaire Biographique, 366-67.

13 Bonaparte liked La Poype and said in his memoirs that, during the short time that he commanded, La Poype merited the esteem of the army. But it is obvious that Carteaux had friends back in Paris, for after he was dismissed from the Army of Toulon in 23 October, he was temporarily compensated with the Command of the Army of Italy in Nice. Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic, III, 116.

14 Fréron to Botot, 13 November 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 44-45.

15 Bonnal de Ganges, Les réprésentants du peuple, II, 137.

16 Jean-Coquillz Dugommier was born at Basse-Terre () on the 1st August 1738. After a long, distinguished career of military service (both artillery and infantry) in the French colonies, he left the service in 1782. He was elected in 1789 as a representative to the National Assembly gathered in Guadeloupe and in 1790 became the governor of that island, where he defended the patriots there from wealthy planters and their supporters. In 1791 he left for Paris to sit in the Legislative Assembly as a député extraordinaire of the îles du Vent. In that same year, the revolutionary government solicited his return to the service, after which he served as a general of division. He was killed in battle on 17 November 1794, at Bellegarde. Today his name is inscribed on the Arc de Triumph in Paris. Six, Dictionnaire Biographique, I, 386.

80 Dugommier with the Army of the Pyrénées.17 Fréron, who was not in the least capable of judging a commander’s abilities, was apparently unconcerned with Doppet’s shortcomings, as long as he respected La Poype. Perhaps Fréron hoped that Doppet’s weaknesses would allow La Poype greater opportunities to distinguish himself.18 While Fréron praised Doppet in his correspondence, he maintained that Dugommier had only attained this new command due to the scheming of the representative Ricord. Fréron later claimed that, under the pretext of traveling to Lyon to request troops and artillery, Ricord had really traveled to Paris to intrigue against La Poype. In Fréron’s opinion, it was Ricord who was responsible for the Convention’s decree of 4 November that named La Poype commandant of Marseilles. Fréron believed that Ricord wanted to remove La Poype from the siege so that Dugommier might take command of the Army of Toulon. It was fortunate, Fréron claimed, that Saliceti valued La Poype enough to retain him in Toulon until the siege’s end.19 Fréron’s colleagues do not seem to have shared his objections to Dugommier. Barras, for example, wrote that, although he did not personally know Dugommier, he felt that the general’s correspondence had shown him to be a man of war who had great military insight.20 In the end, the choice of Dugommier proved decisive for the siege. Dugommier arrived at Toulon on 17 November. He quickly won the confidence of the representatives there through his energy, patriotism, and most important the value he placed in

17 Fréron to Botot, 13 November 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 44-45. See also his letter to Saliceti, 12 November 1793 and to Bayle and Granet, 13 November 1793, Ibid, 40-42 and 46-49. On 17 November 1793, Saliceti wrote to the Committee of Public Safety commenting that: “the National Convention must have received a petition from Marseilles to keep Doppet in Toulon.” It is possible that he refers to Fréron here. Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VIII, 516.

18 Fréron had wanted La Poype to be given command of the Army of Toulon yet, his colleagues had felt that, though he was a good general, the fact that La Poype’s wife and daughter were prisoners inside Toulon and that he was a former aristocrat damaged him in the eyes of the army.

19 See Fréron to Bayle, 5 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 122.

20 Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 21 November 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VIII, 614-17. See also Augustin Robespierre to the Committee of Public Safety, 23 October 1793, Ibid, VII, 599. Augustin Robespierre says: “ Dugommier is a true republican…active, courageous, loved by his subordinates…”

81 the advice of Bonaparte.21 Not only did Dugommier’s presence improve conditions at Toulon, but by early November experienced troops and munitions began to arrive from Lyon.22 By 9 November, Saliceti reported that almost all necessary troops and materials had been assembled at Toulon.23 On 25 November Dugommier summoned a council of war. Based on Bonaparte’s suggestions, an attack on the enemy forts surrounding Toulon was developed.24 However, an Allied sortie against French positions four days later delayed their assault. Another council of war was summoned on 12 December. There the representatives Saliceti, Robespierre, Ricord and Barras pushed Dugommier to proceed with Bonaparte’s plan. The assault was set for 17 December. Fréron, who did not leave Marseilles until 13 December, was not present at this council of war; however, he did arrive in time to play a significant role in the assault. Rather than observe the battle safe behind the lines, Fréron and his colleagues intended to place themselves at the head of the columns to rally the men and serve as a source of inspiration. Unlike his friend Barras, Fréron had no military or combat experience. Barras described Fréron as an “effeminate litterateur to whom a military career was a superhuman effort.” As result, Fréron often used “spirituous liquors” and the over-excitement produced by them to supply him with “daring and intrepidity.”25 Yet, Fréron’s actions during the assault on Toulon

21 Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic, III, 116-18.

22 Saliceti to the Committee of Public Safety, 9 November 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VIII, 322. See also Bonnal de Ganges, Les réprésentants du peuple, II, 33 & 38; Fox, Siege of Toulon, 38.

23 Saliceti to the Committee of Public Safety, 9 November 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, VIII, 322-23.

24 Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 26. There Saliceti and the other representatives gave their support to plans drawn up by Bonaparte for the capture of Toulon. This plan called for a massive artillery bombardment of the city’s defenses, followed by a dawn attack against Fort Mulgrave supported by a feint attack against Mount Faron. Finally a battery was erected on Point l’Eguillette to rake the British fleet with red-hot shot.

25 Barras, Memoirs, I, 119-20.

82 were not those of a coward. Even if he did find his courage through alcohol, Fréron was at the head of a column, risking his life to lead the soldiers of the Republic on to victory.26 The assault began on the night of 17 December in the middle of a terrible sleet storm. Fréron accompanied Saliceti, Ricord, and Dugommier who led 6,000 republican soldiers, in four columns, in an assault on Fort Mulgrave, which dominated two smaller redoubts, l’Eguillette and Balaguier. These forts were defended by three thousand British and Allied troops, twenty canon and many mortars.27 Meanwhile, Barras joined La Poype in an assault on the Allied redoubts on Mount Faron. Fréron later claimed that he deliberately chose not to go with his brother-in-law so as not to arouse suspicions of favoritism.28 Under heavy fire, the representatives and soldiers of the Republic pressed toward their objectives. The fighting was intense. At one point in the attack Fréron’s horse was shot out from under him.29 While Saliceti and Augustin Robespierre led the first column, Fréron and Ricord attempted to rally the disorganized second column. There was panic within the ranks and, according to Fréron, more than three hundred men had thrown down their arms. Fréron and Ricord quickly threw “themselves into the midst of the bayonets” and attempted to make a speech to rally the demoralized men. It was dark, raining and, according to Fréron, most of the men could not see their representative’s uniform. When he told the soldiers that he was a representative of the people, an officer refused to believe him and threatened to shoot him. Fortunately for Fréron, the battalion commander, Hardouin, recognized him and attested to his identity.30 The column then rallied and Fréron and Ricord marched at its head.31

26 Fréron’s biographer, Raoul Arnaud, commented: “Despite the natural spineless character of Stanislas [Fréron]…he had proved strong, swept away by his élan, excited by the struggle, he threw himself into the middle of the bullets, facing danger and even seeking it.” Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 237.

27 Ricord, Fréron and Augustin Robespierre to the Committee of Public Safety, 18 December 1793, Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, IX, 505.

28 Fréron to Bayle, 17 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 87-89. 29 Barras to the National Convention and the Committee of Public Safety, 18 December 1793, Archives Parlementaires, LXXXII, 261.

83

Figure 4

When they eventually reached the fort, Saliceti and Fréron, led the Republican forces over the entrenchments. They fought hand to hand with bayonets. The Spanish and English were eventually repulsed and Fort Mulgrave was in the hands of the Republic. “To our voices, to the name of liberty and the name of the Republic, all flew to victory, and the English redoubt and the forts of l’Eguillette and Balaguier were carried with great force,” they wrote.32 The capture of

30 Fréron was later responsible for encouraging his fellow representatives to elevate Hardouin to the rank of adjutant general, making him a chef de brigade as a reward for his actions. Fréron to Moyse Bayle, 6 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 127.

31 See Fréron to Bayle, 17 December 1793, Ibid, 88.

32 Ricord, Fréron and Augustin Robespierre to the Committee of Public Safety, 18 December 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, IX, 505.

84 Mulgrave enabled them to take possession of the smaller fortifications nearby. Meanwhile, on Mount Faron, Barras and La Poype, were supported by recently arrived units from the Army of Italy, achieving a similar success. With these forts in republican hands, they now had the ability to fire upon the city and the Allied fleet in the harbor. They had barely opened fire, when the Allied forces began their evacuation. For Fréron and his colleagues, the capitulation of Toulon must have been an amazing sight. He wrote that “The infamous city offered at that moment a hideous spectacle.”33 Prior to the entrance of republican forces, panic and riots swept the streets. As republican batteries shelled the city, a great number of inhabitants, between 6,000 and 12,000, fled to the harbor to escape aboard the English and Spanish ships. In the harbor, the Allies burned the ships and in the city the arsenal was also ablaze. 34 Many of the inhabitants, unable to flee, quickly donned revolutionary . Some patriots in the city, who had been in hiding during the rebellion, now sought vengeance upon those citizens who had supported the Federalist sections. Blood was shed in the streets between rival factions.35 Following the hasty departure of the Allied forces, the representatives sent a patrol into the city led by Adjutant General Jean-Baptiste Cervoni. Fréron, who was especially anxious to get into the city as soon as possible to find his sister and niece, questioned Cervoni upon his return. Cervoni told him that all appeared quiet, but that he could decide for himself when to enter. Fréron was the first of the representatives to enter the city. He went in on horseback accompanied by General Charles-François Dugua, adjutant-general Nicholas Montmeau and two

33 Fréron, Robespierre, Ricord and Saliceti to the Committee of Public Safety, 19 December 1793, Ibid, 537.

34 Ibid. See also Malcolm Crook, Toulon in War and Revolution: From the Ancien Regime to the Restoration, 1750-1820. (Manchester, 1991),148. Unfortunately, there are no accuate records of exactly how many Toulonnais escaped aboard the Allied ships. Crook says that most historians consider Fréron’s claims, that 12,000 Toulonnais escaped, to be an exaggeration and therefore, place the estimate somewhere around 7,500. See Poupé, Lettres, 96. Fréron to LaCroix, 25 December, 1793. Other works on the siege, such as Fox’s Siege of Toulon, estimate anywhere from 6,000 to 7,500 persons. In a letter, the commander of the British fleet, Lord Hood, estimated that they “brought off a number near 8,000.” Hood to H. Dundas, 20 December 1793, as cited in J. Holland Rose, Lord Hood and the Siege of Toulon, (Cambridge, 1922), 159.

35 Fox, Siege of Toulon, 52-55.

85 aides de camp. According to Fréron, they found the city “as silent as the tomb.” The streets were deserted and they met no opposition. Reaching the house where his sister had been quartered, Fréron questioned the landlord who informed him that she had fled with her daughter across the harbor for Seyne. Fréron was greatly distressed when Bonaparte then informed him that one of the Republic’s batteries had sunk four boats, carrying women and children, bound for Seyne. But his fears were alleviated with news that his sister and niece had taken a different route making their way to the advance posts of La Poype’s forces. Though he only saw her for an instant, Fréron’s sister promised that she would give him the details later of the events in the city that she had witnessed from her window.36 Republican forces officially took possession of Toulon at 9:00 a.m. on 19 December. Due to the abundance of wealth and provisions they found in the city, the representatives took immediate and prudent measures to establish and maintain order in the ranks.37 They declared that rebel possessions were the property of the victors. To ensure the soldiers that they would get their fair share, they required that all plunder be collected and deposited in a designated place where it was to be sold and the profits to be distributed in an orderly manner among the soldiers. In addition, the representatives promised an extra million francs to the army as a reward for their efforts.38 Fréron later wrote that they paid the army as much as three million francs; they intended that each soldier, regardless of rank, would receive at least one hundred francs.39 This appears to have greatly satisfied the soldiers and it proved a sufficient way to curb the problem of pillaging.

36 Fréron to LaCroix, 25 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 97-100.

37 Even more loot was seized from ships coming into the harbor many days later thinking that the city was still in English hands. Foreigners on these ships were imprisoned, while all French aboard were shot for treason. See Ricord, Barras and Saliceti to the National Convention, 28 December 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, IX, 739.

38 Fréron, Saliceti, Robespierre, Ricord and Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 3 January 1794, Ibid, IX, 557. Because the Revolutionary government refused to establish medals for the soldiers, rewards were often given either in the form of money, in kind or through collective congratulations. The representatives on mission often rewarded military men with money. Bertaud, Army of the French Revolution, 203.

39 Fréron to La Croix, 25 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 100.

86 The capture of Toulon was followed by nationwide festivities.40 While Fréron and his colleagues gave overwhelming credit to the troops, they also made sure that the National Convention was aware of their contribution. In many letters to the Committee of Public Safety, they praised themselves and their two colleagues, the representatives Baille and Beauvais, who lost their lives due to their incarceration in Toulon’s prisons.41 In the National Convention, their efforts were extolled. Bertrand Barère made a report in which he recounted how the representatives “marched at the head of the republican columns. Saliceti, Ricord, Fréron, Barras and Augustin Robespierre, swords bared, were the first to show the troops the path to victory.” 42 Declarations of praise were given in the Jacobin Clubs and plays were written that recounted the bravery and contributions of Fréron and his colleagues to the capture of Toulon. In fact, playwrights used the representatives’ accounts as inspiration for their works and even made them the main characters. One playwright, Auguste-Louis Bertin d’Antilly, glorified Fréron’s actions, as well as those of his colleagues, in his play Le Prise de Toulon. Bertin d’Antilly was, no doubt, aware of Fréron’s personal account of his activities during the assault, for his letter to Bayle was read in the National Convention.43 Though he made the mistake of placing Fréron with La Poype and Barras in the assault on Fort Faron, Bertin d’Antilly’s second act emphasized Fréron’s struggle to rally the disorganized column. Fréron is heroically portrayed, offering his life to the soldiers if they would only return to the fight. Later, he is the first of the representatives to mount the enemy fortifications during the assault.44

40 See Barras letter to Moyse Bayle, 8 January 1794, Ibid, 132. “Public fêtes have taken place in the departments of the Var, Basses Alpes and Vaucluse, and in Aix. Everywhere they celebrate the conquest of Toulon.” See also Saliceti, Barras, Fréron, Ricord and Robespierre to the Committee of Public Safety, 5 January 1794, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, X, 79. “All the communes, the Popular Societies and the constituted authorities of the Var have sent deputies to the army to congratulate it in its victory. All the department resounds with songs of joy. Marseilles alone remains silent.”

41 Baille had committed suicide in prison. Beauvais was liberated, but his health was irrevocably damaged and he died a few months later.

42 Rapport du Citoyen Barère sur la Reprise de Toulon, 24 December 1793, Archives Parlementaires, LXXXII, 263-64.

43 Archives Parlementaires, LXXXII, 262-63.

87 Therefore, it is evident that, while historians later accredited the capture of Toulon to Bonaparte’s genius, at the time, France regarded the representatives as the heroes of the siege. But they made sure that Bonaparte’s contribution did not go un-rewarded. On 22 December, Fréron and his fellow representatives promoted Bonaparte to the rank of general of brigade in recognition for his services.45 While the rest of republican France celebrated the capture of Toulon, terror became the order of the day. Both the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention called for the destruction of the infamous city. In the Convention’s session of 24 December, it was decreed that Toulon was to be razed and its name forever changed to Port-de-la Montagne.46 The inhabitants of Toulon were held responsible for crimes against the nation; and the representatives were charged with meting out punishment. This was a responsibility Fréron seemed to relish.47 The representatives wanted to punish all those responsible for Toulon’s treason immediately. However, the majority of those most responsible for the insurrection had embarked upon the British and Spanish ships or fled into the surrounding areas. 48 In his letters Fréron conveyed his disappointment that only the “insignificant” remained to be punished, but he was determined that the national vengeance would not be cheated.49 The unfortunate Toulonnais who remained, some guilty of only passive support, could only expect harsh reprisals.

44 Bertin d’Antilly, Auguste-Louis, La Prise de Toulon par les français. Opera in three acts. (Paris, 1793), 81-85.

45 The Committee of Public Safety confirmed this appointment on 16 February 1794.

46 Decree of the National Convention, 24 December 1793. Archives Parlementaires, LXXXII, 259. See articles 5 and 6.

47 Barras appropriately described Fréron as “an excellent revolutionary, a man capable of employing all extraordinary but indispensable means to save the independence and existence of the fatherland.” Barras, Memoirs, I, 120.

48 On 8 January 1794 Barras wrote to Bayle claiming that 6,000 to 7,000 had left Toulon as a result of emigration, but that he and his fellow representatives had decreed that all Toulonnnais found in the surrounding departments were to be arrested. Poupé, Lettres, 130-31.

49 Fréron to La Croix, 25 December 1793, Ibid, 99.

88 Within the first two days, the representatives established a military commission composed primarily of Parisian sans-culottes. 50 Without trial, this commission sentenced approximately three hundred army and naval officers as well as civilian leaders to death by firing squad. A revolutionary tribunal later replaced the military commission; it remained in operation for the next three months.51 On 20 December, Fréron and his colleagues wrote: “The national vengeance is deployed; we shoot them in force. Already all of the naval officers are exterminated. The Republic has avenged herself in a manner dignified of her.”52 In addition to the military commission, Fréron and Barras also utilized a “jury” of “oppressed” Toulonnais patriots to help them uncover guilty civilians. These jurymen had spent the last three months in the harbor aboard the Themosticles, imprisoned by the Federalist sections of Toulon. A few days after the city was taken, Fréron and Barras published a proclamation calling for all “good citizens” of Toulon to present themselves outside the city walls on pain of death. It is estimated that there were possibly some 3,000 citizens who answered this summons and assembled there. According to a supposed eyewitness account, Fréron was there “on a horse, surrounded by cannons, troops and a hundred insane adulators of their god Marat.” The “patriots” from the Themosticles, were instructed by Fréron to go throughout the crowd, pick out the “guilty” and assemble them along the wall.53 Out of the crowd they selected around two

50 Ricord, Barras, Fréron and Saliceti to the Committee of Public Safety, 5 January 1794, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, X, 79.

51 The tribunal operated from 31 December 1793 to the end of March 1794.

52 Fréron, Saliceti, Robespierre, Ricord and Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 20 December 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, IX, 557. See also Ricord, Barras and Saliceti’s letter to the Committee of Public Safety, 23 December 1793, Ibid, IX, 617. “The national justice is carried out daily…all those found inside Toulon who worked for the navy, in the rebel army and in the civil and military administrations, have been shot to the cries, a thousand times repeated, by the army of Vive la République!”

53 Henri-, Isnard à Fréron (Paris, 1796), 17. In this pamphlet, Isnard’s eyewitness is an anonymous old man. While Isnard never revealed his name, he insisted that he was a real person and that he had also recounted his story to the former representative Despinassy. See also Pierre-Toussaint Durand-Maillane, Réponse de Durand-Maillane au Mémoire de Fréron sur le Midi, (Paris, 1794), 7-8. Though Isnard and Durand-Maillane recounted these incidents in incendiary pamphlets they wrote to discredit Fréron after Thermidor,

89 hundred persons. There is a possibility that these “patriots” deliberately selected men against whom they had personal grudges, such as rivals or creditors, or that they may have chosen people out at random.54 Moyse Bayle later criticized Fréron’s methods. He asked how, if those “patriots” had spent three months of the revolt in the hold of the Themsoticles, could they truly have known who had participated in treasonous acts?55 According to the account related by Henri Isnard, when those selected were lined up, Fréron gave the order to fire. After the first volley, those still alive were told to stand up. Thinking that the worst was over and that they would be spared, or would receive medical treatment, many struggled to their feet, only to be shot second time. The bodies were left for the birds. Some, still alive, managed to drag themselves away in the middle of the night.56

this event is partially corroborated in the letter of Ricord, Barras, Fréron and Saliceti to the Committee of Public Safety, 5 January 1794, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, X, 78-79. The representatives wrote: “ In the first days of our entrance, the patriots imprisoned on the vessel Themistocles pointed out to us the most guilty of the rebels, and we ordered them shot immediately.”

54 Isnard, Isnard à Fréron, 19-21.

55 Moyse Bayle, Moyse Bayle, au peuple souverain et à la Convention nationale, (Paris, 1795), 2. Of course, it is possible that these patriots might have observed treasonous acts in September, before their imprisonment.

56 Isnard, Isnard à Fréron, 19-21. There is no doubt that this execution took place, since the representatives wrote of it to the Committee of Public Safety. However, Isnard’s portrayal of Fréron as the chief coordinator of this event is not above suspicion. Isnard and Fréron were bitter political enemies when this pamphlet was published. Moreover, it appears that Fréron was not the only one blamed for this incident. It is interesting that British Commodore Sir William Sidney-Smith attempted to place the responsibility of this execution squarely upon the shoulders of young artillery captain Bonaparte: “Bonaparte…fired upon the people, and mowed them down like grass.” Smith claimed that Napoleon then told the wounded they could go home, only to fire upon them a second time. But, Smith’s account, much like Isnard’s has to be used cautiously, since he desired nothing more than to tarnish Napoleon’s reputation. Smith’s account is presented, with a strong disclaimer, in Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 27-28. It is possible that Fréron was the commanding representative at this massacre and that Napoleon may have been to officer who carried out his orders, but this can never be established without doubt.

90 Many more bloody episodes followed. By 30 December, Barras had written to Bayle, informing him that five to six hundred Toulonnais had been shot. On 5 January, Fréron claimed that the number had reached eight hundred.57 Defending his actions over a year later, Fréron declared that it was necessary to shoot so many people because they had no guillotine. This defense alone illustrates that in Fréron’s mind, the “guilt” of these individuals was never in question. Barras summed up their opinion that “in truth, all are [traitors] because they have all carried the white and preached an oath to the odious pretender Louis XVII.”58 Therefore, it was, rather, simply a question of what the most efficient method was to dispose of these traitors. To await the arrival of a guillotine, would have deprived them of the initiative they had claimed was lost in Marseilles. Fréron especially wanted to ensure that the Committee of Public Safety and the Convention were aware of his dedication to destroying the Republic’s enemies. In his correspondence, Fréron boasted that they were “killing everything that moves” and boldly declared that the shootings would continue “until there are no more traitors.” 59 Not only did Fréron want to punish Toulon’s inhabitants, but he wanted to destroy the city itself. The National Convention had ordered that “the houses in the interior of the city were to be razed.” It was only necessary to conserve those establishments necessary for the servicing the army and the navy.60 Fréron, it appears, was the representative most anxious to act on this decree. In his personal correspondence, he humorously referred to Toulon as “Ville plate” (“Flat city”); he preferred this name over “Port de la Montagne.”61 Fréron claimed that, initially, “we

57 Barras to Bayle, 30 December, 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 119. Fréron to Bayle, 5 January, 1794, Ibid, 120. The number of executions has never been confirmed. Crook estimates the number to be around 1,000 persons condemned to death by jury or commission. He takes some of his information from L. Mongin’s Toulon ancien et ses rues, (Draguignan, 1901). Crook, Toulon in War, 150-51.

58 Barras to Bayle, 8 January 1794, Ibid, 130.

59 Fréron to Nouet and Lambert, 26 December 1793, Ibid, 101.

60 National Convention, Decree of 24 December 1793. See Article 6. Archives Parlementaires, LXXXII, 259.

61 Fréron to La Croix, 23 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 90.

91 were of the opinion to destroy the city with mines, but we were unable to do so without risking destroying the arsenal and the immense magazines of the navy. So, it was decided that all the masons from the surrounding departments would be gathered with their tools for a prompt demolition.” He boldly announced that as many as 12,000 masons had been summoned and they hoped that Toulon “would be razed in 15 days.”62 Despite Fréron’s enthusiasm to fulfill the Convention’s orders to raze the city, eventually only the houses of the most illustrious federalist leaders of Toulon were designated for destruction.63 After a week of reprisals, it seemed that his fellow representatives were growing weary of Toulon. Augustin Robespierre departed for Paris three days after the capture of the city. Saliceti showed little enthusiasm beyond what was necessary to pacify the Committee; he was anxious to leave with an expedition to Corsica. 64 By 25 December Barras wrote to Bayle complaining of ill-health due to extreme fatigue.65 Only Fréron remained energetic. “Barras is very sick with fatigue,” he wrote later, “As for me, I am able to withstand everything.”66 Fréron was willing to remain on mission, but it is clear that he would only do so if Barras remained. Since this was not what Barras wanted, both men wrote to the Committee of Public Safety on 26 December and requested to be relieved of their duties.67 In the meantime, Fréron and Barras found the time to intrigue against their fellow representatives. In letters to friends, they complained of the activities and personal character of Ricord and Augustin Robespierre. Apparently, Fréron and Barras were concerned that these two

62 Fréron to la Croix, 25 December 1793, Ibid, 98.

63 Saliceti to the Committee of Public Safety, 18 January 1794, Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 314.

64 See Saliceti’s letter to the Committee of Public Safety, 28 December 1793, Aulard, Ibid, IX, 741.

65 Barras to Bayle, 25 December 1793, Poupé, Lettres, 92-93. See also Barras to Bayle, 8 January 1794, Ibid, 131-32. Barras tells Bayle that he is worn out and physically he cannot hold out much longer.

66 Fréron to Bayle, 25 January 1794, Ibid, 149.

67 Barras and Fréron to the Committee of Public Safety, 26 December 1793, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, IX, 688.

92 men might be sent as representatives on a new mission with the Army of Italy. They were quite perturbed that both Ricord and Robespierre had left Toulon without informing them and they suspected that the latter had returned to Paris in order to obtain a new mission. 68 In their opinion, neither man was suitable for a future assignment. Fréron, in fact vowed he would never serve with them again.69 Ricord, they asserted, was “cunning, dissimulating, working underneath to satisfy his own ambitions.”70 As for Augustin Robespierre, they did not doubt his fidelity to the Republic, but his stubbornness and aloofness made him unsuitable to serve as a representative. “He finds everything evil, except what he says or does,” they wrote to Bayle. 71 This hostility towards Ricord and Robespierre was apparent only in the letters written after the siege by Fréron and Barras. It is possible that their great dislike for their colleagues was born from their belief that Ricord and Robespierre had received too much praise for their participation in Toulon’s capture, while they had received too little.72 Not surprisingly, while Fréron denounced his colleagues, he praised his brother-in-law. “You will not find a general more sans-culotte, more Jacobin, more enterprising and more pure,”73 he wrote. La Poype had left Toulon on the 28 December to take up his new post as commandant in Marseilles. Fréron asked Bayle to use his influence in Paris to see that La Poype

68 Fréron to Bayle, 5 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 122.

69 Fréron and Barras to Bayle, 26 December 1793, Poupé, Ibid, 109. See also Fréron’s letter to Bayle, dated the same day, Ibid, 103.

70 They commented that Ricord belonged in Grasse, where as the old saying goes, one could always find a good dog or a scoundrel. They also claimed that, in Nice, he had displaced public functionaries to give their jobs to his relatives and that he forged Barras and Fréron’s signatures for the nomination of his brother-in-law to the position of Inspector general of the army commissariat. Ibid.

71 On 8 January 1794, Fréron wrote a letter to Bayle in which he recanted some of his “unfair remarks” about Augustin Robespierre. Ibid, 135.

72 See, for example, their letter to the Committee of Public Safety, 5 January 1794, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, X, 80. Fréron and Barras are later distressed because they believe that Barère’s report to the Convention did not mention them. Since they are obviously mistaken, it is not clear where they got such an idea. See also Fréron to Bayle, 5 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 122.

73 Fréron to Bayle, 26 December 1793, Ibid, 104.

93 did not remain there long.74 “We all think La Poype is a man well-suited for the expedition to Italy. Present these ideas on a day you think most convenient.”75 Fréron’s obsession with the success of his brother-in-law’s career would continue to dominate his mission. On 13 January, Bayle wrote to inform Fréron and Barras that he had not yet been able to use his influence to obtain their recall. He did inform them, however, that the Committee was sending Etienne Maignet, “an excellent Montagnard” as representative to Marseilles to aid them in their work there.76 Yet, even before they received Bayle’s letter, Fréron and Barras had resolved to return to Marseilles to complete their unfinished business. They were to discover, however, that when they attempted to apply the heavy-handed measures they had used in Toulon, they would face opposition from their colleagues in Paris. Fréron had both distinguished and, in the long run, damned himself at Toulon. During the assault, he had shown the courage and leadership that the Republic expected of its representatives. He had won the praise of his colleagues, the Convention and patriots throughout France. Yet, that same ardor and determination that had carried him through the battle had also driven him in his bloody actions afterwards. There is no doubt that Fréron believed that the reprisals which he, and his colleagues, instigated in Toulon were justified and proof of their dedication to the orders of the National Convention. However, his actions were also driven by personal considerations. Since the incident in Pignans months earlier, when he and Barras had been threatened with arrest and his sister taken prisoner, Fréron had awaited the day when he could punish Toulon. His recent experiences in Marseilles, moreover, had convinced him that it was important to make a clear statement; from the moment the city was taken defiance of the Convention and its representatives would not be tolerated. More than any other representative in Toulon, Fréron boasted, in his correspondence, of the harsh measures he had employed against the inhabitants there. What he could not realize was that these same actions of which he was so proud would damage his political career after Thermidor. Time and again, his political enemies would recall, in speeches and pamphlets, his

74 Fréron to Bayle, 6 January 1794, Ibid, 127.

75 Fréron to Bayle, 26 December 1793, Ibid, 104.

76 Moyse Bayle to Barras and Fréron, 13 January 1794, Ibid, 189.

94 actions in Toulon, and history would characterize him as one of the most extreme representatives of the Terror.

95 CHAPTER 5

THE LONG ROAD FROM MARSEILLES TO PARIS

“Marseilles, on her own, has presented us with more difficulties than Toulon, and it was under the power of the English.”----Fréron to Bayle, 8 January 17941

The year 1794 brought about new, and perhaps even greater, challenges than Fréron had experienced in the past. With his colleagues, he had helped bring the siege of Toulon to a successful conclusion. Now, he and Barras were prepared to turn their attentions once again to Marseilles, which they had left in a state of martial law in early December 1793. Evidence uncovered in Toulon convinced them not only that Marseilles had negotiated with the Allied Coalition, but also that the infamous city was the sole cause of the uprising of the entire Midi. Therefore, it would not suffice to make examples of just a few of Marseilles’ leaders; the entire city must be punished. But while the National Convention and Committee of Public Safety agreed that there were several key troublemakers in Marseilles who deserved punishment, they would not support Fréron and Barras’ attempts to punish the city as a whole. In the end, Marseilles’ fate would be determined in Paris, where Fréron and Barras faced mounting opposition to their measures. Not only would their actions in Marseilles eventually bring the disfavor of the Committee of Public Safety upon them, but it would also lead to a widening rift with their colleagues of the deputation of the Bouches-du Rhône. Upon his return to Paris, Fréron would not only have to confront his detractors, but he would struggle to survive in the middle of factional conflict within the Convention. The months following his return would be a dangerous time for Fréron. Not only would he witness the arrest and execution of his friends, but he would face the possibility of losing his own head as well. In order to pave the way for their return to Marseilles, Fréron and Barras issued a decree on 6 January against the city.2 This decree levied many punishments, yet the most controversial

1 Fréron to Bayle, 8 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 133.

2 6 January 1794, Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 400, fn.2

96 was the revocation of Marseilles’ name itself. Marseilles’ name had been, since 1789, closely associated with ideals of republicanism and patriotism.3 But, Fréron and Barras believed that the people of Marseilles had forfeited their right to bear such an illustrious name as a result of both the federalist uprising of August 1793 and the “new revolt” of December 1793 led by the City Council against the representatives. Marseilles was, they said, a treasonous city that had “sounded the tocsin of rebellion in the Midi.” Moreover, with the capture of Admiral Hood’s correspondence in Toulon, they had proof that Marseilles had treated with the enemy squadron of the Allied Coalition.4 They asked why Marseilles should be allowed to keep her name if the treason of cities such as Toulon and Lyons had cost them their names. Not only would the revocation of its name make Marseilles’ punishment clear to the inhabitants, but also, Fréron hoped it would help undermine the inhabitants’ strong municipal and regional identity. Ever since he had first set foot in Marseilles months earlier, Fréron had been convinced that the people there showed more of an allegiance to their city and particular region than to France as a whole. This, in Fréron’s opinion, was indicative of the city’s federalist spirit.5 Indeed, Fréron believed that Marseilles was so rotten that the only true remedy would be to replace all of its inhabitants with French citizens from the North.6 With all of these reasons taken into consideration then, it was decreed that, until the Convention could come up with a new name, Marseilles would be referred to as the commune “Sans Nom.”7

3 Marseilles’ loyalty to the Revolution had been memorably demonstrated in July 1792 when the city’s fédérés had marched to Paris singing the battle hymn that now bears their name.

4 See Fréron and Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 2 February 1794, Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 158. “Toulon had barely opened her sections when Marseilles sent negotiators to the enemy fleet to solicit passage of grains which they were accorded.” See also Fréron’s letter to Bayle, 16 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 138.

5 In a letter to Bayle, he commented: “There is not a patriot, they say, in Marseilles, who does not prefer death to the loss of his commune’s name…. It is justly for this reason that it must be changed. Can one express an idea more federalist? They should, rather, fear the loss of the name of France.” Fréron and Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 2 February 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 159.

6 Fréron to Bayle, 8 January 1794, Ibid, 134.

97 Not only was Marseilles’ name to be eliminated, but also Fréron and Barras intended to complete the destruction, that they had begun in September 1793, of important monuments and civic buildings.8 Only Section 11 of the city was to be spared as a reward for its loyalty to the Republic during the federalist uprising of August 1793. Chief among the buildings slated for destruction was the Maison Commune (Bourse). Fréron obviously wanted to destroy Marseilles’ economy, for he even went so far as to propose that they fill in the city’s seaport with rubble. Fortunately for Marseilles and for France, this proposal was never acted upon and the city’s commercial life was spared. Fréron and Barras forwarded these orders to General La Poype, who had gone ahead to Marseilles to take up his new post as commandant there. By the time that Fréron and Barras arrived around 16 January, the demolition of the city was underway. In the meantime, other precautions were taken. In order to free both the departmental administration and the criminal tribunal from the atmosphere and influence of Marseilles, Fréron and Barras transferred them to Aix.9 To bring the city further under their control, on 14 January they ordered a general disarmament, intending that confiscated weapons would go to the newly drafted troops of the Republic. To procure hidden weapons, house-to-house searches were ordered and these eventually served the representatives by uncovering refractory priests, counter- revolutionaries and young men attempting to escape conscription. In addition, native Marseilles battalions still within the city were now ordered to depart for the front.10 When they returned to the city Fréron and Barras wasted no time in letting the Marseilles’ leaders and inhabitants know that they were in charge. They seem determined to

7 It is important to note that this decree was signed, not only by Barras and Fréron, but also by their fellow representatives, Saliceti and Ricord. For a full text of this decree see Lourdes, Histoire de la Revolution à Marseilles, 356-59.

8 This included the parishes, convents and churches where the sections of the city had assembled during the Federalist revolt of August 1793.

9 Barras to Bayle, 18 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 141.

10 See Barras’ letters to Bayle, 6 January and 16 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 127 & 138. See also Fréron and Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 24 January 1794, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, X, 428.

98 make a grand statement about their recent victory against Toulon. On 20 January they ordered that a national fête be celebrated in the city in honor of the victory. 11 The National Convention had given them the authority to punish all those who disobeyed their orders. Fréron and Barras were eager now to exercise this decree to the full extent of the law.12 Immediately they set to work dismantling those groups that had previously posed a threat to their authority. Arrest warrants were issued for the leaders of these bodies. They began with the revolutionary tribunal of Marseilles and those who held its highest positions: Augustin Maillet, its president, and Joseph Giraud, the public prosecutor. This tribunal, Fréron and Barras claimed, had taken bribes and favored the wealthy, federalist merchants of the city with acquittal, while sending poor civilians to their deaths.13 The tribunal, Fréron said, had also used their positions to satisfy their own personal grudges.14 What was more significant, however, was that Maillet and Giraud had also served, respectively, as the president and vice-president of the Marseilles Jacobin Club. On the night of the riots of 4 December, it had been Maillet who had led demonstrators to Barras’ residence. Thus, Fréron and Barras considered these two men to be leading agitators in the city and instigators of the defiance that had been shown against their personal authority. As result, on 20 January, Maillet and Giraud were arrested and promptly sent to Paris to stand trial.15

11 They had previously ordered a fête on 24 December, but this had not been celebrated in the city. Barras and Fréron to the National Convention, 20 January 1794, Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 349-50. See also Barras to Bayle, 8 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 128-29.

12 See their decree of 23 January 1794. Archives Nationales, AFII 44, doc. 33.

13 As an example, Fréron and Barras cited that the tribunal had permitted the wealthy merchants Payan and Samatan to go free. Fréron and Barras had accused Payan and Samatan of having raised money to support a sectionary army. Fréron to Bayle, 5 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 125. Ricord concurs with this in his letter to the Committee of Public Safety, 20 January 1794, Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 350-52.

14 Fréron to Bayle, 5 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 125

15 They would arrive in Paris on 5 February 1794. They were charged with neglect of duty and complicity in the riots of 2-3 December 1793. Wallon, Les réprésentants, III, 76-77. On 25 January, Fréron and Barras sent a letter to the public prosecutor of the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris in which they gave long details of the crimes of Maillet and Giraud. They also sent a copy of this letter to the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention on 7 February 1794. See Archives Nationales, AFII 90, document #33.

99 In place of the revolutionary tribunal, Fréron and Barras established a military commission. It was staffed by non-Marseillais, such as its president Emmanuelle Leroy, who often went by the name of “Brutus.”16 This new tribunal judged without a public prosecutor and without normal judicial forms, but merely asked the accused a set of questions, sent them back to prison, made its decision, and then sent its sans-culottes to the prison with a list of those condemned to death.17 In Fréron’s opinion, this was much more efficient. “In eight days,” he wrote, “the military commission, composed of brave Parisians, will have accomplished more than the tribunal did in four months.”18 By 25 January, he wrote that this commission had sent fourteen Marseillais to their deaths and that as many as sixteen more awaited execution the following day.19 Many of those executed were wealthy merchants, whose goods were confiscated. Several months later, Fréron and Barras would face accusations of having kept many of these goods for themselves. The stringent measures taken by Fréron and Barras quickly provoked a response from the Marseilles Jacobin Club. In defiance, on 21 January, the Jacobin Club condemned the representatives’ actions. It then elected Louis Isoard, ex-procurer of the commune, as its president. Fréron and Barras had been searching for Isoard since they arrived in Marseilles.20 They considered Isoard, as well as the lawyer J. B. Loys, to be among the most dangerous

16 Its other members were Lefebvre, Thiberge, Lespine and Vaucher. Lourde, Histoire de la Révolution à Marseilles, III, 352.

17 Archives Nationales BB3 7 (Certain documents pertaining to the judgments of the Military Commission in the Department of the Bouches-du-Rhône).

18 Fréron to Bayle, 25 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 147. In all, the Military Commission judged 218 people (123 were sentenced to death, 1 imprisoned and 93 were fined). 22 of those sentenced to death were merchants. Scott, Terror and Repression, 158.

19 Fréron to Bayle, 25 January 1794, Poupé, 144. This number included former military/civilian leaders of the city as well as rich merchants. Barras and Fréron believed that these merchants were responsible for hoarding and sabotaging food supplies, of throwing men out of work, and of using their money to finance counter-revolution. Among the merchants were Payan and Samatan. This time, Fréron and Barras succeeded in having them executed. Fréron and Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 24 January 1794, Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 429. 20 On 18 January 1794, Barras had written to Bayle telling him that Isoard had disappeared. Poupé, Lettres, 140.

100 ringleaders of the resistance to their authority in Marseilles. 21 They even believed that these two men had been involved in a plot to kill them.22 As a result, on 24 January, Fréron and Barras placed Isoard and Loys and many other members of the Jacobin Club23 under an arrest decree. Although more than eighty Jacobins were eventually arrested, Isoard and Loys managed to escape.24 Fréron and Barras were convinced that these men were headed to Paris, to make contact with allies in the National Convention and perhaps to support their most outspoken detractor, Jacques Hébert. Fréron wrote to his friend Bayle urging him, as a member of the Committee of General Security, to have Isoard and Loys arrested the minute they were found.25 Despite this setback, by 24 January, Fréron and Barras felt confident that their task was finished and that their measures had brought Marseilles back under the Convention’s control. They even found time to entertain visiting from Denmark, Sweden, Genoa and the United States, assuring them of the French Republic’s goodwill and the desire to maintain favorable relations with them.26 They wrote informing Moyse Bayle and the Committee of

21 See Fréron and Barras’ letter to the Committee of Public Safety, 24 January 1794, for their comments on Isoard. Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 428.

22 Fréron to Bayle, 25 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 146. Fréron and Barras claimed that Maillet, Giraud and the Marseilles Jacobin Club had attempted to extort 100,000 livres from innocent prisoners in Marseilles, and threatened to kill the representatives if they intervened to protect these prisoners. The representative Ricord says, in a letter of 20 January to the Committee of Public Safety, that the Jacobin Club had made a motion to arrest the representatives. He does not mention that there was actually a plot to kill them, but Ricord did support many of the other allegations, which Barras and Fréron had made against the leaders of Marseilles. Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 353.

23 These included Riquier, Guillaume Carle and Lamiscare, three of the Jacobin Club’s leaders.

24 Barras to Bayle, 18 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 40

25 Fréron to Bayle, 25 January 1794, Ibid, 146 & 149. See also Fréron and Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 24 January 1794, Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 430.

26 Fréron and Barras to the Committee of Public Safety, 24 January 1794, Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 428. Although these consuls asked to be included in the general disarmament and domiciliary visits, Fréron and Barras exempted them as a gesture of goodwill.

101 Public Safety that all “true patriots” in Marseilles understood and approved of their measures and that a “profound calm” was now felt in the commune.27 It now only remained for them to await the approval of the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention. In the meantime, Barras, still complaining of ill health and exhaustion, retired to his nearby estate at Fox- Amphoux, where he remained until he and Fréron returned to Paris. Fréron, however, remained in Marseilles to await a response from Paris. When the response arrived, it was not what they expected. In a letter of 23 January, the Committee of Public Safety wrote to Fréron and Barras to express its disapproval with some of the steps they had taken. First they criticized them for changing Marseilles’ name to Sans-Nom. Although it agreed (in spirit) with their aims, the Committee still believed that Marseilles’ past services to the Republic could not be ignored. “The name of Marseilles recalls to mind free men of immortal memory,” wrote Billaud Varennes and Collot d’Herbois. The Committee added that, although some leaders of Marseilles were guilty, the ordinary inhabitants were true patriots. Therefore, they did not share Fréron and Barras’ opinion that the entire city must bear punishment. “The national vengeance must be rigorous, but justice must have the character of fairness. Why treat Marseilles like Toulon, [which was] delivered to the English by the unanimous voice of its inhabitants?” they asked.28 Second, the Committee objected to their transference of the criminal tribunal and departmental administration to Aix, which they considered one of the most treacherous, anti- republican cities of the Midi. They suggested to Fréron and Barras that they place these bodies in neighboring instead. Having voiced its criticisms, the Committee ended by informing Fréron and Barras that they were now relieved of their mission and were to return to Paris. 29 They were to be replaced by the representative Étienne Maignet. 30

27 Ibid.

28 Committee of Public Safety to Barras and Fréron, 23 January 1794, Ibid, X, 400-03.

29 “Come, therefore, and rejoin your friends; there is not one who is not anxious to embrace you,” they wrote to Barras and Fréron. Ibid.

30 Committee of Public Safety to Maignet, 29 January 1794, Ibid, 517. Etienne Christophe Maignet was born, the son of a notary, in Ambert (Pay-de-Dôme) on 9 July 1758. He served as a parliamentary advocate until the Revolution, when he was elected and served in both

102 The Committee of Public Safety was lenient enough with Fréron and Barras to give them the opportunity to rectify their hasty decisions. And yet, the two men stubbornly remained convinced that they, and not individuals in Paris, had the clearer view of the situation in Marseilles and the best means to deal with it. Instead of immediately making the changes, Fréron wrote a letter to the Committee hoping to convince them of the reasons behind their measures and the rightness of them. He told the Committee that he and Barras had waited for fifteen days for a confirmation of their decrees, and as they had heard nothing from Paris, they took this silence as a tacit approval. Instead of backing down from their decree, they continued to press Marseilles’ guilt, and they warned the Committee that the guilty in Marseilles were pleased that it had not approved their measures. If anything, Fréron said, Marseilles should be taxed ten million livres for its crimes and damage in the Bouches-du-Rhône. Furthermore, an unforgiving Fréron was determined to ensure that Marseilles receive some name change. He rejected the Committee’s reference to the greatness attached to the city’s name.31 He suggested that if the Committee and National Convention did not like Sans-Nom, then perhaps Phocée would be an appropriate name for Marseilles.32 For some time after, Fréron would date his correspondence from: “Sans-Nom, Phocée, or whatever the Committee prefers,” stubbornly refusing to use the name of Marseilles.33

the Legislative Assembly and the National Convention. He served first as a representative on mission to the Army of the Moselle and then to the Army of the Alps where he participated in the siege of Lyons. After replacing Fréron and Barras in Marseilles, his most memorable act was the creation of the Commission of Orange. During the Directory, he refused a seat in the and returned to his former profession as an advocate in Ambert. During the he was elected deputé of Puy-de-Dôme. His years during the Restoration were spent in exile, but he returned to Ambert after the July Revolution and died there on 22 October 1834. Kuscinzski, Dictionnaire, see Étienne C. Maignet, 421-23.

31 Fréron makes a good argument when he asks why Marseilles name is so great: “Is it for having taken Avignon? Is it for having massacred all of its loyal inhabitants? Is it for having sacked the city of Lille, having burned it, and having reduced the good Lillois to the most frightening misery? You speak of services Marseilles rendered during the siege of Toulon. But has the Committee already forgotten the revolt which occurred here last December?” Fréron (and Barras) to the Committee of Public Safety, 2 February 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 157.

32 Here Fréron refers to the city’s ancient ties to the Phoenicians. He recommends the name of “Phocée” also to Bayle. Fréron to Bayle, 3 February 1794, Ibid, 164.

103 Fréron was convinced that any resistance in Paris, to their measures, was the result of false reports and the machinations of their enemies from Marseilles. In many ways, he was right. Word of their actions in Marseilles had spread quickly and the city had found many defenders and sympathizers due, in part, to the efforts of their detractors in both Marseilles and Paris. On 6 February 1794, Loys appeared in the Paris Jacobin Club and lodged complaints about the representatives’ conduct.34 Not only had Fréron and Barras arrested patriots, but their measures against Marseilles, he asserted, had been guided only by their desire for personal vengeance. He asked, therefore, that the Committee of Public Safety recall them to Paris so they could justify their measures.35 Acting upon a motion made by Maximilien Robespierre, the Jacobins decided to postpone the matter until further investigation of Loys’ accusations could be made.36 Not only had Loys brought Fréron and Barras to the attention of the Paris Jacobin Club, but also, as word of their actions spread throughout Paris, the question of Marseilles’ fate would be brought to the podium time and again in the National Convention. As a result, it was not long before Fréron and Barras began to lose the support of their trusted and valued friends of the deputation of the Bouches-du-Rhône, primarily Moyse Bayle and François-Omer Granet. Granet was, like Moyse Bayle, a member of the deputation of the Bouches-du-Rhône to the National Convention, with whom Fréron had also shared a correspondence. In light of the recent events, Granet had written to his brother, Laurent, who lived in Marseilles, criticizing Fréron and Barras. Copies of this letter had been circulated from house to house in Marseilles and, according to Fréron, it had done much to damage their efforts there.37 Fréron wrote to Bayle

33 Fréron (and Barras) to the Committee of Public Safety, 2 February 1794, Ibid, 153-62. See also Archives Nationales, AFII 90, doc. 33.

34 Loys also denounced the representative Antoine Albitte. Aulard, Société des Jacobins, V, 641-42.

35 Loys was apparently unaware that the Committee of Public Safety had already recalled them.

36 Aulard, Société des Jacobins, V, 641-42.

37 Maignet also mentions this in his letter to Fréron, 6 February 1794, Aulard, Réceuil des Actes, X, 763 fn. Actually, Maignet mentions that Granet had written two letters, but Fréron only mentions the one. Fréron to Bayle, 25 January 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 148.

104 and complained of the “native prejudice” of men, such as Granet, who identified more with their native city than with the French nation. 38 Little was Fréron aware, however, that Bayle shared Granet’s view of the situation. Although he agreed with some of the measures Fréron and Barras had taken in Marseilles, Bayle did not agree with the name change or the fact that they branded all Marseillais as traitors. In Marseilles’ defense, on 30 January, he published a pamphlet entitled Lettre de Moyse Bayle, réprésentant du peuple, à son collegue Barère. In it, he recalled the services rendered by Marseilles to the Revolution as well as its glorious past.39 Bayle’s opposition stunned Fréron and Barras.40 Barras wrote denouncing Bayle for his support of Marseilles.41 Barras also expressed his shock at Bayle’s attitude considering the fact that, while on mission to Marseilles just the previous summer, Bayle had been threatened and forced to flee the city. How, Barras further asked, could people far away in Paris clearly judge the situation in Marseilles? In his letters to Bayle, Fréron reiterated Barras’ points and even attempted a ruse to sway Bayle to see things his way. He warned Bayle that the Marseillais were attempting to have him (Bayle) removed from the National Convention by spreading a rumor that he was not native to that city, but that he came from Geneva instead.42 Nevertheless, Fréron and Barras’ letters show that they still considered Bayle a friend and hoped that, once in Paris, they could convert him to their views.

38 Fréron to Bayle, 25 January 1794, Ibid, 148.

39 This pamphlet was dated 30 January 1794 and co-signed by Granet and others. Ibid, 25.

40 Their surprise is understandable considering that as early as 13 January, Bayle had written them openly encouraging them to strike down the “royalist merchants and Pittiens” of Marseilles complaining that the tribunal was sparing those that were truly guilty. He had reassured Fréron and Barras, telling them “the deputation of the Bouches du Rhône is counting on you.” Bayle to Barras and Fréron, 13 January 1794, Ibid, 189.

41 Barras writes: “You have said that you speak without prejudice; but it stands out in your letters and does not become you.” Barras to Bayle, 3 February 1794, Ibid, 164.

42 In reality, Bayle’s family was not from Geneva, but rather from Carla (comté de Foix). See Fréron’s letter to Bayle, (no date), Ibid, 168.

105 As the debate over Marseilles’ fate heated up in Paris, around 6 February, Maignet arrived at Marseilles. There, he located Fréron and informed him that he and Barras were to comply with the orders of the Committee of Public Safety regarding Marseilles, or explain why they persisted in disregarding them. But Fréron, apparently, did not want to acknowledge Maignet’s authority and he merely informed him that he (and Barras) had written to the Committee of Public Safety and were awaiting an official response.43 Maignet assured Fréron that the Committee had not changed its opinions and again advised him to comply. Moreover, he informed Fréron that the deputation of the Bouches-du-Rhône had complained about the demolitions going on in the city and advised him that he should stop the demolition, especially of the Maison Commune, unless he wanted to rebuild later.44 In his report on the situation to the Committee of Public Safety, Maignet echoed its opinions. Although he did agree with Fréron and Barras that the Town Council was guilty of attempting to usurp their authority, he did not feel that the entire city should be punished. Maignet told the Committee that Fréron and Barras were treating all the inhabitants of Marseilles as guilty. He reported that the people of Marseilles were upset with the representatives’ measures and that they demanded justice. Apparently, they were most upset at the loss of their city’s name. “Its suppression appears to them as a proscription pronounced against all citizens.” 45 Finally, on 12 February, Fréron received the official response from Paris that he had been waiting for, though not the one he expected. The National Convention had decreed that Marseilles would be allowed to keep its name. This was, no doubt, the end result of the relentless efforts on the behalf of Marseilles by the deputation of the Bouches-du-Rhône in the National Convention. Granet, for one, made an impassioned speech in the Convention on the subject of retaining Marseilles name.46 He appealed for the name of Marseilles to be spared on the basis of

43 Maignet to the Committee of Public Safety, 7 February 1794, Aulard, Récueil des Actes, X, 762-69.

44 Maignet to Fréron, 6 February 1794, Ibid, X, 762, fn.

45 Maignet to the Committee of Public Safety, 7 February 1794, Ibid, 762-69.

46 Granet’s speech of 12 February 1794, Archives Parlementaires, LXXXIV, 621-22.

106 its historic reputation and the many clothes and supplies Marseilles had given the forces of the Republic. The Conventions’ decision to spare Marseilles’ name was a significant political defeat for Fréron and Barras. The people of Marseilles, on the other hand, were overjoyed at the news and celebrated through a civic fête.47 For Fréron and Barras, it seemed there was nothing left now but to return to Paris and face their detractors. On 16 February, they wrote to inform the Committee of Public Safety that they were making preparations for their return to Paris. On 19 February, they issued a decree, moving both the departmental administration and the criminal tribunal from Aix to Salon. They left the implementation of this decree to Maignet.48 Perhaps to smooth things over with the Committee of Public Safety before their return to Paris, Fréron penned a lengthy letter, on 1 March, to Maximilien Robespierre. In it, he attempted to sway Robespierre to see matters as he and Barras did. He reiterated, for example, the “crimes” of Maillet and Giraud. It was for these crimes that he and Barras sent them to the revolutionary tribunal in Paris. But, he declared, “the deputies of Marseilles embrace their cause and have turned against us.” He further warned Robespierre to be on guard against the deputation of the Bouches-du-Rhône, which had thus far deceived the Convention into supporting a guilty city. Granet, he said, had especially “allowed himself to be carried away by his native attachment” to Marseilles. But Fréron promised that he and Barras would clear up all these matters and make sure that Robespierre was apprised of the truth as soon as they arrived in Paris.49

47 V. Vidal of Marseilles to Merle d’Aubigné, 20 February 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 200. Vidal writes: “The decrees made by Barras, Fréron, Saliceti and Ricord have been annulled. Marseilles has recovered her name and has been decreed to have merited the nation. The Bourse is to be repaired and restored to what it was.”

48 Though Maignet moved the criminal tribunal to Salon, he did not move the departmental administration there due to the fact that (like Barras and Fréron) he did not feel that Salon was secure enough. Maignet did, however, attempt to smooth things over between the national representation and the Marseilles Jacobins. For example, he began to consult with them again. Only in the last month of his administration did he reject the Club’s demands and was, in turn, criticized by them. See Scott, Terror and Repression, 140-42.

49 Fréron to Maximilien Robespierre, 1 March 1794, Michon, Correspondance de Maximilien et Augustin Robespierre, 263-65.

107 But it was Fréron who was deceived if he thought that Robespierre would be influenced merely by this letter, or by any past association he might have shared with Fréron at Louis-le- Grand. Moreover, the fate of Maillet and Giraud would be resolved even before they could return to Paris. On 22 February relatives of Maillet and Giraud came before the Convention with a petition requesting that the Convention urge the Revolutionary Tribunal to call them for trial as quickly as possible. They claimed there was great illness in the prison where Maillet and Giraud were held and they feared that they might die before they even had a chance to defend themselves.50 Fréron, however, was convinced that this was merely a ruse to hold the trial before he and Barras could make it back to Paris to testify against them.51 Nevertheless, the Convention ordered that Maillet and Giraud’s case would be brought before the tribunal “without delay.” In the end, Fréron’s suspicions were confirmed. On 23 February, the Revolutionary Tribunal acquitted Maillet and Giraud.52 Several days later, the two men appeared before the Convention to thank them for speeding up their trial and announced that the tribunal happily had recognized their innocence. They were received with applause. Maillet and Giraud then asked that the representatives’ decree, that had stripped them of their positions, be annulled and that they be allowed to return to their offices in Marseilles with the tribunal.53 They found their most outspoken supporter in Granet, who reiterated their request and further asked that the Convention place an honorable mention for them in its bulletin. The Convention granted both requests.54 Once again, Fréron and Barras had suffered defeat in the Convention.

50 Archives Parlementaires, LXXXV, 342.

51 Fréron to Maximilien Robespierre, 1 March 1794, Michon, Correspondance de Robespierre, 263-65.

52 They were acquitted along with several others that Barras and Fréron had arrested. It was the testimony of several members of the deputation of the Bouches-du-Rhône that secured Maillet and Giraud’s acquittal. These were Granet, Bayle, Escudier, Le Blanc, Servière and Laurens. Scott, Terror and Repression, 145.

53 When Maillet and Giraud returned to Marseilles, the sans-culottes there welcomed them and carried them in triumph to the Jacobin Club were young republicans crowned them with laurels and sang couplets in their honor. Lourde, Histoire de la Révolution à Marseilles, 359.

108 It was now apparent that Granet had become one of Fréron and Barras’ most outspoken enemies, and he next attempted to strike at Fréron by attacking La Poype. Complaints had already surfaced in Marseilles against La Poype for his failure to control the insulting behavior of his men toward the people of the city.55 It is likely that Granet had heard of this matter from his brother, Laurent, who also informed him that La Poype was planning to repair the old fortifications of Marseilles. On 25 February, Granet informed the Convention that La Poype wanted to repair the very “” which originally had been erected by Louis XIV to” terrorize” the inhabitants of Marseilles. And now, Granet asserted, these “Bastilles” could be used by La Poype (and, the inference here being, by Fréron) to terrorize the patriots of Marseilles.56 Because this proposal had been made on La Poype’s behalf by Napoleon Bonaparte, the chief of artillery,57 Granet demanded that both La Poype and Bonaparte appear before the National Convention to give a full account of their activities. The Convention decreed that the two men had twenty days to appear before them.58 Sometime during the first week of March, Fréron and Barras returned to Paris. Despite the controversy over Marseilles, Barras said that he and Fréron still expected to be received by

54 National Convention, séance of 26 February 1794, Archives Parlementaires, LXXXV, 513. Another member of the Convention, Charlier, asked that Granet’s request be extended and that all who were honorably acquitted by the revolutionary tribunal be free to return to their former public functions. This might be the only way, he said, to stop the intrigues that send such patriots to the tribunal.

55 Apparently, some of the men of La Poype’s garrison had been indecently harassing the women of Marseilles, possibly, as one citizen believed, to anger the men in the city to the point of insurrection. V. Vidal of Marseilles to Merle d’Aubigné, 20 February 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 200. Sometime in late March/early April Maignet would dismiss La Poype from his position as commandant.

56 Fréron had said that a rumor had been circulating in Marseilles that it was he who had originally named La Poype as commandant of Marseilles so that the two of them could exercise a dictatorship there. Granet is, no doubt, attempting to capitalize on that rumor here. Fréron to Bayle, 5 January 1794, Ibid, 125.

57 After the , Napoleon Bonaparte served for a brief period as inspector of coastal fortifications along the Riviera. He then moved to Nice to take up an appointment as senior gunner to the Army of Italy.

58 Archives Parlementaires, LXXXV, 470. It is interesting to note that Moyse Bayle verbally lent his support to Granet during this motion.

109 the Committee of Public Safety as returning heroes, primarily because of their services in the capture of Toulon. But, when Barras appeared before the Committee to make a report on the state of affairs in the Midi, he received a cool reception. The Committee members spoke hardly a word to him, heard his report and then abruptly dismissed him.59 While the Committee was certainly displeased over the situation in Marseilles, there was something more to the disdain they showed Barras. According to one member, Prieur de la Côte d’Or, there were many among them who considered Fréron and Barras to be members of a faction within the Convention who were opposed to the Committee.60 It is likely that they interpreted the resistance Fréron and Barras had shown to their opinions regarding Marseilles as evidence of this opposition. To fully understand the situation Fréron and Barras now faced, it is necessary to look at the political events that had taken place in Paris during their absence. In the months in which Fréron and Barras had been away on mission in the Midi, much had transpired within the National Convention and the Jacobin Club. At the same time Fréron and Barras were busying themselves in bringing the full force of the Terror to bear against Toulon and Marseilles, their colleagues in Paris were engaged in a long debate over the purpose, duration and extent of the Terror. Out of this debate, two major feuding factions had arisen within the Convention. On one side, to the extreme left, were the Hébertists, led by Jacques Hébert. The Hébertists were radicals, ultra-revolutionaries some had called them, who drew their power and support from the sans-culottes of Paris. They believed wholeheartedly in the Terror as a means to protect the Republic from its enemies, both foreign and domestic and, therefore, argued in favor of its continuation and escalation. On the opposing side was a faction often labeled as the Indulgents who strongly opposed the extremism of the Hébertists and instead favored a reduction of the Terror. By late 1793, Fréron’s friends, Danton and Desmoulins, had become the leaders of the Indulgent faction. In this capacity they called for moderation, criticized the Committee’s policies and even managed for a short time to have a “committee of clemency” established to review the cases of suspects recently thrown into prison.

59 Barras, Memoirs, I, 162-63. Barras claimed that Billaud Varennes said to him, dryly: “That will suffice, citizen colleague. The Committee has heard you. We will let you know if we want to ask you anything else. You may retire.”

60 Kusczinski, Dictionnaire, s.v. Paul Barras, 30.

110 Though he shared a strong friendship with Danton and Desmoulins, Fréron did not share their opinion that the Terror should be reined in. In fact, while on mission, he had written Desmoulins urging him to “bridle his imagination” on the committees of clemency. Such committees would be “a triumph for the counter-revolutionaries” he warned. 61 And yet, Fréron’s faith in the Terror certainly did not lead him to sympathize with Hébert, who had attacked him personally in the Jacobins and cast suspicion upon his conduct as a representative on mission. But despite their personal views on the Terror, the well-known friendship Fréron and Barras shared with Danton and Desmoulins placed them squarely in the Indulgents’ camp in the eyes of many. Moreover, Fréron and Barras did little to dispel that assumption as they quickly took Danton’s side against Hébert upon their return. By the beginning of March, the struggle between the Hébertists and the Indulgents had escalated. The Hébertists openly questioned the Indulgents’ loyalty to the Republic and even went so far as to declare that only an insurrection of the sans-culottes of Paris would cleanse the Convention of such a disloyal faction. This infighting in the Convention and the threat of insurrection made for a politically unstable situation, which was of great concern to the Committee. Of the Committee of Public Safety, none was more concerned than Maximilien Robespierre. Robespierre trusted neither the Indulgents nor the Hébertists for, as he saw it, both were a threat to the authority of the Committee of Public Safety. On the one hand, he deplored the extremism of the Hébertists. The influence they enjoyed over the sans-culottes was something that the Committee both coveted and feared. On the other hand, Robespierre was no more impressed by the Indulgents’ advocacy of clemency and opposition to a Terrorist government. More to the point, he was growing increasingly intolerant and distrustful of Danton. Danton had criticized the Committee on more than one occasion. This entire situation, no doubt, affected Robespierre’s opinions concerning Fréron and Barras. It appears, however, that Fréron was initially unaware that Robespierre’s opinion toward him had been undermined. Fréron, said Barras, “bore much affection towards Robespierre” and

61 Fréron to Lucille Desmoulins, 5 January 1794. Camille responded to Fréron ‘s opinions in no. 6 of the Vieux Cordelier (published 30 December 1793): “Fréron and Ricord feel that clemency is out of season in Toulon. But revolutionary laws, like all laws in general, are necessary medicine subject to the climate and temperament of the illness, and even the best, if administered out of season are able to kill it.” Matton, Correspondance inedité, 97 and 210.

111 “believed himself beloved by him.” When Barras displayed uneasiness over the Committee’s attitude, Fréron advised that it would be prudent for them to pay a call on Robespierre at his home. “Fréron placed great importance, regarding our safety, on this visit,” Barras explained. 62 When they arrived at Robespierre’s apartment the housekeeper told them he was not home. Unconvinced, Fréron bounded up the stairs to Robespierre’s private quarters where he found “the Incorruptible” putting on his and dressing for the day. Fréron introduced Barras and attempted to explain that they were the victims of the slanders of their enemies. But Robespierre chose to ignore them with a coldness bordering on contempt. “I cannot call it a conversation,” Barras noted, “ for his lips never parted.” 63 In the end, they left Robespierre’s house defeated and embarrassed. Barras said he almost blamed Fréron for inducing him to make such a fool of himself and therefore he resolved to speak on their behalf before the National Convention. Nevertheless, it was Fréron who spoke first. On 9 March, Fréron attempted to win sympathy from the Convention: “Barras and I have returned from our mission…[and] we believe that we have proved worthy of the nation and the Army of Italy…. [But] Lies have pursued us all the way back to the Convention.” He asked that he might speak on 21 March when he and Barras could explain their reasons for the measures they had taken.64 Five days later, Fréron made a similar statement in the Jacobin Club, promising that he would give the details later if they would hear him.65 In the meantime, on 13 March, La Poype appeared before the National Convention.66 He immediately claimed his innocence, stating that it was Bonaparte alone who had suggested rebuilding the fortifications of Marseilles. As Bonaparte had held the post of “inspector of fortifications,” for Granet to suggest that there were sinister motives behind this suggestion was

62 Barras, Memoirs, I, 166.

63 Ibid, I, 171.

64 Archives Parlementaires, LXXXVI, 251.

65 Aulard, Société des Jacobins, V, 689.

66 Bonaparte did not appear with La Poype in the Convention that day. It is likely that the popularity and protection he enjoyed at that moment among the representatives to the Army of Italy (namely Saliceti and Augustin Robespierre) saved him the trip. Bonaparte’s knowledge and planning skills were needed at that time for the invasion of Italy.

112 preposterous. Barras immediately spoke in La Poype’s defense. Fréron’s silence is a mystery, but given his personal connection with la Poype, he may have thought it best to let Barras speak. Barras contended that the National Convention had been deceived and dismissed Granet’s accusations as unfounded and asked, instead, that honorable mention be made of La Poype in the bulletin. Despite Granet’s objections, the Convention agreed with Barras.67 Later, on 26 March, Fréron attempted to follow up on their success against Granet by launching an offensive against Loys in the Paris Jacobin Club. It appears that Loys was asking for membership in the Paris Jacobins. Fréron attempted to block his membership on the grounds that he had many pieces of evidence relative to Loys’ conduct in Marseilles that he wished to present to the Club. His request was overturned when several members attested to Loys’ patriotism. Moreover, they criticized Fréron asking why, if he had all of this evidence, had he not yet presented it.68 Having no excuse, Fréron conceded defeat in silence. While their enemies were, no doubt, determined to make matters difficult for them, Fréron and Barras had not exactly moved with great haste upon their return to present much evidence either against their enemies or in their own defense. They seem to have believed that their reputation as the “Saviors of the Midi” (due to their efforts at Toulon) would suffice, in time, to vindicate them. Their detractors, on the other hand, said that they simply did not dare to place their conduct under scrutiny.69 Whatever the reason, Fréron would never get the chance to make the speech he promised the Convention for 21 March. The issue of Marseilles would soon be overshadowed by other events, events that were to eventually place Fréron at the risk of losing far more than simply his political reputation. They would place him at the risk of losing his life. By mid-March, Robespierre, pursuing a centrist position, had decided to eliminate the Committee’s enemies on the left and then on the right. While he did not approve of Danton’s

67 Archives Parlementaires, LXXXVI, 433-34.

68 One member, Levasseur, told Fréron that if he had the information on Loys, he should already have made it known. Otherwise, he said, it was Fréron who was guilty of having let fifteen days pass without punishing a criminal. Séance of 26 March 1794. Aulard, Société des Jacobins, VI, 16.

69 See Citizen Moirau to the Paris Jacobins, 2 May 1794, Archives Nationales, DIII 356 (select documents against Saliceti, Barras and Fréron).

113 views, he deemed the Hébertists, who had called for an insurrection against the Convention, as the greater threat. Therefore, Robespierre lent his support to Danton, in the Convention, to bring down Hébert. On 13 March, Hébert and his supporters were accused of attempting to foment insurrection in Paris.70 On 14 March Fréron added his voice to the denunciations against Hébert and his allies in a speech in the Jacobin Club.71 As a result of their efforts, Hébert and thirteen of his followers were arrested and guillotined on 24 March. Fréron was, no doubt, satisfied that he had helped his friends bring down a major political opponent. He may also have hoped that his support for both Danton and Robespierre would convince the Committee of his loyalty to the Republic and perhaps deflect some of the suspicion thrown upon him by the deputation of the Bouches-du-Rhône. But Fréron, like his friends, little realized that the elimination of the Hébertists was merely the first step in Robespierre’s plan to eliminate all those deemed a threat to the Committee. By the end of March, with Hébert’s faction eliminated, Robespierre now made up his mind to destroy Danton and his followers. On the night of 30 March, on the Committee of Public Safety’s orders, Danton, Desmoulins and several others were suddenly arrested. Before the Convention’s session opened the following day, Fréron discussed the matter with friends and they vowed to speak in Danton’s defense.72 However, their courage quickly faded when Robespierre took the podium and skillfully defended the Committee’s decision to arrest Danton. Only the “friends of the accused,” Robespierre warned, “now trembled.” Like so many others in the Convention on that fateful day, Fréron’s fears for his personal safety robbed him of the courage needed to speak on behalf of his friends. Robespierre’s colleague, Louis-Antoine de St. Just, then denounced Danton, Desmoulins and several of their supporters for treason and called for an indictment against them73 In the end,

70 Hébert and his supporters were calling among the sans-culottes for an uprising against those who opposed them. They wished to purge the Convention once again as they had purged the Girondins a year before.

71 He also denounced Hébert’s allies Antoine Momoro and François Vincent. Séance of 14 March 1794. Aulard, Société des Jacobins, V, 689.

72 See Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 276. In the end, only dared to speak, at first, in Danton’s defense.

114 forsaking old friendships, Fréron joined with the rest the Convention to unanimously approve the indictment. Outside the Convention, only Lucile Desmoulins and Danton’s young wife, Louise, had the courage to try to plead with Robespierre and others on behalf of the accused. Yet, in the end, their pleas were in vain. In the days that followed, Fréron must have lived in fear that he, too, might be denounced as Danton’s accomplice.74 Sitting silently in the Convention, he must have been shocked when the Committee of Public Safety attempted to speed up Danton’s trial before the revolutionary tribunal. In the Convention, on 4 April, St. Just read a letter from the tribunal to the Committee of Public Safety. In this letter, the tribunal claimed that Danton and the others were demanding that witnesses be called on their behalf. The letter included a list of potential witnesses.75 Not surprisingly, Fréron’s name was on this list. On the basis of this letter, St. Just asserted that this demand for witnesses proved that a plot was developing against the revolutionary tribunal between Danton and his supporters outside of prison. The plotters, St. Just claimed, were being organized by Lucile Desmoulins with the goal to rescue the accused and murder the entire tribunal. As a result of these charges, Danton and his friends were now forbidden to plead their case and were quickly convicted. The next day, on 5 April, Danton, Desmoulins and sixteen others went to the guillotine.76 Over the next week, several more of Fréron’s close friends were condemned to death. On 13 April, Fréron’s beloved Lucile followed her husband to the guillotine. Despite the great affection he bore her, Fréron had decided that she was not worth his life and, therefore, he spoke no word in her defense. In fact, it appears that the only thing he could offer Lucille were his sympathies. On the day of her execution, one author has claimed, Fréron was at the home of

73 Barras, Memoirs, I, 184. Barras appropriately remarked: “Danton had made a mistake both as to friends and enemies. The daring of the latter was only equaled by the cowardice of the former.”

74 It is somewhat ironic that while Fréron cowered in fear of arrest, the play, Le Prise de Toulon, which showcased his bravery at the siege of Toulon, was showing at the theater on the rue Feydeau. See Le Moniteur Universel 1794 (see editions for the months of March and April).

75 Archives Parlementaires, LXXXVIII, 152 and 159 (Annexe #4).

76 Le Moniteur, 17 (6 April) 1794, no. 197, 797.

115 Lucille’s mother, weeping.77 To Fréron’s credit, however, he did attempt to provide what support he could for Camille and Lucile’s now orphaned son, Horace.78 Just three days after Lucile’s execution, on 16 April, Fréron’s close friend from Marseilles, the journalist Sébastien LaCroix,79 was guillotined in Paris. It was Fréron’s old enemy, Maillet, who had sent him before the revolutionary tribunal in Paris.80 If events in Paris had not given Fréron enough to worry about, Marseilles continued to be an ever-present threat. On the same day that Danton and Desmoulins were executed, Fréron sat in the Convention listening to a speech on Marseilles, given by Bertrand Barérè in the name of the Committee of Public Safety. Officially, the purpose of Barérè’s speech was to eulogize the patriots of Section 11 of Marseilles.81 But, Barérè also used the speech to express the Committee’s opinion that justice had been served in Marseilles and that the city had been rehabilitated. Although he credited the representatives for their contribution in saving Marseilles for the Republic, he made no specific mention of Fréron or Barras save to say that they, too, had recognized the patriotism of Section 11.82 It was clear that Barérè’s speech was to be the Committee’s final word on the question of Marseilles’ guilt. It must have been equally clear to Fréron and Barras that they need not bother now, as they had initially planned, to try to defend

77 Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 281. See also le Moniteur, 23 Germinal (12 April) 1794, no. 203, 824.

78 After Thermidor, Camille Desmoulins was posthumously rehabilitated. Fréron promised Lucille’s mother that he would be a friend to Horace and that he would approach the committees on his behalf in an attempt to reclaim for him the confiscated books and papers of his father. See General Brune’s letter to Madame Duplessis, 13 pluviose (1 February) 1795, reproduced in Claretie, Camille Desmoulins, Lucille Desmoulins, 376-77.

79 Not to be confused with Jean François de La Croix, the conventional who was guillotined with Danton on 5 April, 1794.

80 LaCroix had been arrested as early as 13 March 1794 and sent to Paris. See letter of V. Vidal of Marseilles to Merle d’Aubigné, 13 March 1794, Poupé, Lettres, 202.

81 He asked that the Convention decree an indemnity for these patriots and their families.

82 National Convention, séance of 5 April 1794. Archives Parlementaires, LXXXVIII, 95-98.

116 their decrees against Marseilles. And yet, their conduct in Marseilles and the Midi continued to be called into question. In the weeks following Danton’s execution, Fréron and Barras were again denounced for their conduct as representatives in the Midi. These denunciations came in the form of letters sent by individuals from the Department of the Alpes-Maritimes to the Paris Jacobin Club. In these letters, they were accused of the misappropriation of national property. Their accusers demanded that Fréron and Barras be asked to account for goods and monies that had been confiscated from the wealthy merchants they had executed. They accused Fréron and Barras of having taken as much as 600,000 livres worth in gold and goods for their own personal use, some of which, they claimed, had been conveyed to Barras’ country residence in covered carriages.83 As a result of these denunciations, the Finance Committee placed Fréron and Barras under investigation. Considering the present situation in Paris, this investigation could not have come at a worse time. In the aftermath of the execution of the Dantonists, there were many men in the Convention who, like Fréron, feared the growing power of the Committee and especially of Robespierre, whose behavior now became such that they suspected that he was on his way to creating a personal dictatorship. In the weeks that followed Danton’s death, Robespierre and his close supporters set out to transform France into a “Republic of Virtue.” The idea of virtue was most important to Robespierre who had a moral repugnance for anyone he regarded as tainted or frivolous. As part of his plan, on 7 May, Robespierre introduced the Cult of the Supreme Being, a Rousseauean civic religion to teach virtue and patriotism.84 Many found Robespierre’s actions and ideas both strange and disturbing. Some believed that he might be aspiring to a personal dictatorship. These suspicions grew deeper when the Law of 22 (10 June), establishing the Great Terror, was introduced in order to increase the efficiency of the revolutionary tribunal.

83 Letters of Citizen Fontaine (13 April 1794) and Citizen Moirau (2 May 1794) to the Paris Jacobins. Archives Nationales, DIII 356 (select documents against Saliceti, Barras and Fréron). Citizen Fontaine also denounced the representative Saliceti along with Fréron and Barras.

84 The Law of 18 Floréal (7 May) 1794 had declared that: “The French people recognize the Supreme Being and the Immortality of the soul.” On 8 June, Robespierre presided over the first official celebration in honor of the Supreme Being. Many in the Convention interpreted this as a sign that he was on the road to establishing a dictatorship. See , Précis d’histoire de la Révolution française, (Paris, 1972), 331.

117 Accused persons were now deprived of their right to witnesses or counsel. Real evidence was no longer necessary, as a person’s guilt could now be based on things as intangible as “moral proofs,” hearsay or pretext. The only penalty the tribunal could now impose was death. As a result of this law, the prisons in Paris became more crowded than ever and executions were soon on the rise.85 Even more significant was the fact that members of the Convention no longer enjoyed special immunity from this law. Like Danton, they too could be arrested. Many were now afraid to voice their opinions in the Convention, especially if these opinions ran contrary to those of the Committee, or more important, Robespierre.86 Others, such as Fréron and Barras, who had much to account for from their previous missions, were now fearful of investigation of their conduct. What if they were found to be lacking in the “virtue” that Robespierre so prized? The outcome did not look good for Fréron or Barras when the Finance Committee’s investigation claimed to have uncovered a discrepancy of some 800,000 livres in their accounts. They asked Fréron and Barras to account for this sum and demanded its restitution. Fréron and Barras must have been caught unprepared; for they immediately attempted to delay the investigation with a ridiculous story that their carriage had overturned in a pond and that some of this money, in , had been lost. When the Committee of Public Safety then asked to see the record of their accounts, Barras and Fréron attempted to stall again by requesting a delay in the proceedings to give them enough time to produce more pieces of evidence to justify themselves.87

85 As a result of the , more people were executed in Paris in these seven weeks than had been executed in the preceding fourteen months. R.R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled, (Princeton, 1941), 366.

86 This escalation of the Terror came as a surprise to many. By June of 1794, the people of France had many reasons to believe that the Terror was on its was to being reduced or even ended. Not only had the executions of Hébert and Danton seemingly brought an end to the factionalism within the Convention, but in the spring of 1794 France had also enjoyed many military victories that had secured her from enemies both foreign and domestic. For many, the Terror had been an emergency expedient in a time of crisis. Now that the crisis appeared to be over, many asked why, now, was the Terror being escalated? Because this law had been introduced to the Convention by , one of Robespierre’s strongest supporters, it was suspected that this would be used by Robespierre as a tool to silence his opponents.

87 Kuscinzski, Dictionnaire, see Stanislas Fréron, 274. See also , Les Hommes de le Révolution (Paris, 1928), 292.

118 Fortunately for Fréron and Barras, they did have some friends who were still willing to defend them. Throughout the month of April and into May, a great number of popular societies of the Midi presented petitions or sent delegations to the Convention on behalf of Fréron and Barras. 88 All of these societies praised the work that Fréron and Barras had done in the Midi and expressed their belief that the two representatives had saved them from federalism.89 They expressed their horror and indignation at hearing of the calumnies that had been spread concerning Fréron and Barras, declaring that these lies were no doubt the work of men driven by jealously or a desire to destroy the Republic and slander the good name of its best representatives. Some societies even petitioned the National Convention to allow Fréron and Barras to return to their areas to continue to serve as their representatives. All of these petitions were forwarded to the Committee of Public Safety and the Convention decreed that honorable mention would be made in their bulletin for Fréron and Barras.90 It is likely that these petitions did help assuage some of the suspicion surrounding their conduct, if only temporarily. Were Fréron and Barras truly guilty of embezzlement, or were the accusations against them, as their supporters claimed, simply the intrigues of their enemies from Marseilles and the Midi? This was a question that was not to be answered by Robespierre’s government, for opposition was quickly developing within the Convention against him and his supporters. It

88 As early as 17 February 1794, the popular society of Draguignan (Var) had drafted an address to the Committee of Public Safety in which they defended the actions of Fréron and Barras and hailed them as the “Saviors of the Midi.” The society had then urged other societies in the region to follow their example, and they did. These were the popular societies and the dates on which they spoke or their petitions were read in the National Convention: Roque-Brune (1 April), Commune de Figanières (6 April), Commune of (6 April), Barjols (7 April), Luc (8 April), Council-general of the Commune of Pontevès (Barjols) (20 April), Commune of Quinson (23 April), Serres (23 April), Tavernes (Var) (28 April), Sisteron (28 April) and Barjols (2 May). Archives Parlementaires, LXXXIV, 7 & 98; LXXXVII, 664; LXXXVIII, 224, 232, 260, 323; LXXXIX, 91, 185, 189, 442, 549. Many of these petitions can also be found in the Archives Nationales, DIII 343 (folio on Barras).

89 These societies went further to credit Fréron and Barras with halting the spread of federalism in their communes as well as contributing to the fall of Marseilles and Toulon. Ibid.

90 Ibid, LXXXVIII, 224, 232, 260. See these pages for “honorable mention” given to Fréron and Barras in the Bulletin of the National Convention.

119 comes then as no surprise that Fréron and Barras, who had everything to gain from Robespierre’s demise, would join with these conspirators. By mid summer 1794, opposition to Robespierre had begun to form not only within the Convention, but also within the Committee of Public Safety and General Security. Within all of these governmental bodies, men of various political persuasions now formed a common cause in their desire to eliminate Robespierre before he could eliminate them. Therefore, Fréron and Barras forged a conspiratorial alliance with such men as Billaud Varennes, Collot d’Herbois and Joseph Fouché. They began to meet in secret to discuss all that was taking place and to plot. In the evenings, Fréron gathered with his co-conspirators either at Barras’ home or the home of their colleague, Jean Tallien. Sometimes they met in a private room at the café Corazza.91 All agreed that Robespierre, as well as his supporters, had to be ousted from power. The question was, however, when to act? In the end it was Robespierre who provided them with the impetus. On 26 July, Robespierre appeared in the Convention and made a two-hour speech in which he discussed his views and denounced the “hordes of cheats and traitors” that, he claimed, were responsible for all the nation’s ills. Although he did not name these men, he characterized them in such a way that their identity could be guessed.92 Some members of the Convention, who were certain that Robespierre had been speaking of them, were so provoked that they openly challenged him. Fréron, normally so quiet in the Convention, now defied Robespierre’s censorship of speech and press, declaring: “The time has come to resuscitate liberty and to reestablish freedom of opinions.” Then, making reference to the fact that the Committee had the right to arrest Convention members, he asked: “Who can speak freely when he fears he will be arrested?”93 Many members in the Convention applauded and supported Fréron’s observations. Robespierre had expected that his speech would be published, but when several deputies

91 Barras, Memoirs, I, 204-13.

92 A full text of Robespierre’s speech, translated into English can be found in Richard Bienvenu, editor, The Ninth Thermidor: the Fall of Robespierre, (London, 1968),143-74. See also Le Moniteur Universel, XXI, 329-31. It is interesting to note that in this speech, Robespierre attacked the Finance department, especially one of its members, Pierre Cambon. Cambon was the leader of the Finance Committee that headed up the investigation into the denunciations of Fréron and Barras.

93 Archives Parlementaires, XCIII, 534.

120 objected on the grounds that his accusations needed to be thoroughly examined, Robespierre arrogantly asked how his speech could be examined by the very men he had accused.94 For those who opposed Robespierre it was clear that they must act now to stop him, or he would soon have them arrested. That night and the next morning Fréron, Barras and their fellow conspirators quickly made preparations, gathering all those who would support them and making deals with those who were afraid or who had not yet decided on a course of action.95 The following day, 27 July (9 Thermidor), when both St. Just and Robespierre attempted to speak in the Convention, they were shouted down. Many députés rose that day to denounce them. For months now Fréron had lived in fear and with personal guilt over the deaths of his friends. Perhaps it was these feelings now that gave him the courage to speak once more along with his colleagues. Demands were made for the arrest of Robespierre and his brother, Augustin. Fréron seconded this demand and accused Robespierre, St. Just and Couthon of planning to form a to rule France. Fréron further moved for an arrest decree against St. Just, Georges Couthon and Philippe Le Bas. This proposition was decreed in the middle of applause in the Convention. That evening Fréron moved for the arrest of two more supporters of Robespierre: Jean-Baptiste Fleuriot-Lescot, the mayor of Paris, and Claude François de Payan, an official in the Paris Commune. 96 As a result of this coup, Robespierre and his supporters were placed under arrest and immediately conducted to prison. However, due to the confusion that now reigned in Paris, they were released by the Paris Commune and taken to the Hôtel de Ville. With the help of Fleuriot-

94 National Convention, séance of 8 Thermidor, Le Moniteur (26 July) XXI, 329-31. See also Bienvenu, The Ninth Thermidor, 180. Robespierre responded “…you would send my speech to be examined by the members whom I accuse!”

95 Joseph Fouché, Memoirs of Fouché, (Paris, 1903), 14-17.

96 After the arrest of Maximilien and Augustin Robespierre was decreed, Fréron’s spoke: “Citizen colleagues, on this day the fatherland and liberty shall emerge from their ruins. They meant to form a Triumvirate which recalls the bloody proscriptions of Sulla; they meant to raise themselves on the ruins of the Republic, and the men who tried it are Robespierre, Couthon and Saint-Just. Couthon is a tiger thirsting for the blood of the national representation….and he wanted to make of our corpses so many steps toward the throne. I move the decree of arrest also against Saint-Just, Le Bas and Couthon.” Le Moniteur, XXI, 331-43, editions of 11 and 12 Thermidor. See also Bienvenu, The Ninth of Thermidor: the Fall of Robespierre, 200 and 209.

121 Lescot, Robespierre drafted a decree outlawing Billaud Varennes, Collot d’Herbois, Fréron, Tallien and others. He then called for aid from among his supporters in the National Guard and the sections of Paris.97 But, the response to his call proved more limited than he expected. He hoped, however, that many more would arrive over the next few hours. These new developments shocked the Convention and it was clear that they had to take new steps quickly. They immediately voted to send regular troops against Robespierre and his companions, who were outlawed. When asked his opinion on who should lead the Convention’s forces, Fréron responded: “Barras will accept, he is the only man who has the courage.”98 Thus, Barras was chosen to lead the troops and Fréron, Beaupré, Jean Féraud, Leonard Bourdon, Stanislas Rovère and a few other députés were chosen to go with him.99 Before their departure, Fréron rallied the Convention:“ Moments are precious,” he warned them, “ we must act…we must march against the rebels. In the name of the Convention, we shall call upon those perhaps misled men who may be in the Town Hall to deliver the traitors over to us; and if they refuse we shall reduce the building to powder.” Fréron’s speech was greeted by cries of “Yes! Yes!” and lively applause.100 In the early morning hours of 28 July, two columns of soldiers and National Guardsmen, one commanded by Barras and Fréron and the other by Léonard Bourdon, marched on the Hôtel de Ville. Fortunately, they met little opposition. It had begun to rain heavily and most of Robespierre’s defenders, discouraged by news that the sections of Paris had decided to support the Convention and tired of waiting in the rain, had dispersed. As a result, Convention forces easily entered the Hôtel de Ville and took Robespierre and his friends prisoner. On 28 July Robespierre and eighty-three of his supporters were guillotined.101

97 Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXIV, 59 ff.

98 Rapport de Courtois as cited in Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXIV, 59 ff.

99 Archives Parlementaires, XCIII, 564; 590-91.

100 Ibid.

101 Barras, Memoirs, I, 236-48; Le Moniteur. XXI, 331-43; Bienvenu, The Ninth Thermidor, 227-28. Bienvenu includes the report of the Revolutionary Tribunal ( 28 July, 1794)

122 With his participation in the coup of 9 Thermidor, Fréron had avenged the deaths of his friends and had saved his own head in the process. Now, with Barras, Tallien and their fellow conspirators, Fréron would emerge as one of the leaders in the Thermidorian Reaction that followed. The threat that Robespierre had posed was gone, but Fréron’s struggle with other enemies and political opponents was far from over. His conflict with the leaders of Marseilles as well as the deputation of the Bouches du Rhône would continue for many months to come. Granet, for one, would make sure that the denunciations made against Fréron and Barras would not be laid to rest after 9 Thermidor. For his part, Fréron would be prepared to use his skills as a journalist and any other means in his power to destroy Granet, Bayle, Maillet, Giraud and others who had stood against him. He would now have his revenge, even if it meant his future political career.

announcing the conviction and execution of Robespierre and his associates. See also Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXIV, 60-77.

123 CHAPTER 6

FRÉRON AND THE THERMIDORIAN REACTION

In the months that followed the dramatic events of 9 Thermidor, a rift occurred between those who had joined forces to bring down Robespierre. Soon, Committee members and députés of the National Convention had to choose between the Thermidorians who wished to dismantle the Terror, and the loyal Montagnards who did not. It was at the beginning of this struggle that Stanislas Fréron decided to reinvent himself. Joining the side of the Thermidorians, he returned to his career as a journalist and established himself as an avid spokesman for the Reaction. In the National Convention and through the printed word, he directed an offensive that was both personal and political against those who remained loyal to the Mountain, especially those men for whom he had long nursed personal grudges. He persecuted patriots with the same enthusiasm he had shown the previous year against the Republic’s enemies in the Midi. To achieve his goals, Fréron was willing to use any methods at his disposal. But in his zeal to destroy political opponents, Fréron compromised his own reputation as a dedicated republican and seriously damaged his future political career. The news of Robespierre’s downfall had received a positive reception from the French public. And yet, some believed the Convention had not gone far enough. In the minds of many French citizens the bloodshed, injustices and hardships resulting from the Terror had not been fully repaid. In Paris, the prisons were still teeming with “suspects” and in the streets more and more demands were being voiced each day for justice and further reprisals against those who had worked closely with the “.” Just days after 9 Thermidor, a pamphlet was circulated through the streets of Paris, entitled “Robespierre’s Tail.” Its author, Jean-Claude Méhée, wrote that even though Robespierre had paid for his crimes, there were still many Robespierrists in positions of power within the government, especially on the Committees of Public Safety and General

124 Security. “It was not possible for Robespierre to have done all that evil alone,” Méhée asserted.1 It was under the pressure of public opinion, therefore, that the men of 9 Thermidor now faced the challenge of determining the future course of the Revolution. Was the defeat of Robespierre merely a temporary disturbance2 that, otherwise, left the current system of government unaffected? Or, was it to be the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the Revolution? In the days that followed, the actions taken by the National Convention clearly indicated that a majority of the députés shared in the public’s desire for the Terror’s reduction.3 Many believed that the rejection and destruction of Robespierre had been a rejection of the Terror itself and a desire for a new type of government in France. As a result, on 1 August, the Convention voted to abolish the Law of 22 Prairial, which had established the Great Terror, and decreed the arrest of the revolutionary tribunal’s notorious prosecutor, Antoine Fouquier-Tinville. Fréron, who recently had seen his close friends condemned by the tribunal, lobbied aggressively for Fouquier’s arrest: “All Paris demands from you the justly deserved punishment of Fouquier-Tinville,” he told the Convention. “I demand that he goes to expiate in Hell the blood he has spilt!”4 Fréron quickly joined with Barras, Jean Tallien and others in the Convention to pass additional reforms that placed limits on the Terror. As a result of their efforts, on 10 August, the Convention decreed that the cases of imprisoned persons would be reviewed. Many people were released from prison and executions were temporarily suspended.5 On 24 August, the number of surveillance committees was reduced to

1 Felhémési (Jean-Claude Méhée), La Queue de Robespierre ou la dangers de la liberté de la presse, (Paris: 1794). Archives Nationales AF II 57/417. Of these “Robespierrists,” Méhee specifically named: Bertrand Barérè, Billaud Varennes and Collot d’Herbois (all prominent members of the Committee of Public Safety).

2 It was Bertrand Barérè who had tried to write off 9 Thermidor as “a disturbance, which leaves the government unaffected.” National Convention, séance of 29 July (11 Thermidor) 1794, Le Moniteur, no. 312, 1283.

3 The majority of the députés that made up the ranks of the National Convention were the moderates of . These men now broke the silence they had maintained under Robespierre and began to reassert their authority and opinions.

4 See le Moniteur (1794), no. 315, 1290. The tribunal itself would not be definitively suppressed until 31 May 1795.

125 one per district, and their members were ordered to rotate every month. Finally, instead of simply replacing the three executed members of the Committee of Public Safety, the Convention decreed that one-fourth of that Committee would retire every month, not be immediately eligible for reelection.6 The Convention’s decisions were received positively by a great number of Parisians. However, there were those who were not pleased that the coup of 9 Thermidor had evolved into a reaction against the Terror. In the minds of some of the most powerful Montagnards, such as Billaud-Varennes and Collot d’Herbois, the chief goal of 9 Thermidor had been to remove the threat of Robespierre, not to dismantle the entire system of the Terror or change the government. They were not interested in releasing suspects, freeing public opinion or relaxing the grip of the Committees on the nation. Such actions, they feared, would weaken the revolutionary government and leave it vulnerable to its enemies.7 As a result of their commitment to the Terror system, battle lines were soon drawn between these Montagnards and their more moderate colleagues in the National Convention. Not only would their attitude lead to their growing unpopularity within the halls of the Convention, but also in the court of public opinion. Billaud, Collot and Bertrand Barérè had all been mentioned by name in Méhee’s pamphlet as part of “Robespierre’s tail.”8 Their commitment to continue the Terror only served to justify this accusation. Until 9 Thermidor, Fréron had been a strong advocate for the Terror and had served zealously as its agent in the Midi. But, he was perceptive enough to see that the tide of public opinion was turning decisively against it. Like so many of his colleagues, he was faced with an important choice. He could remain loyal to the Montagnard cause and risk association with

5 Between 18 and 23 Thermidor (5-10 August), for example, 478 prisoners were released in Paris.

6 This soon applied to all the government’s committees. National Convention, séance of 11 Thermidor (29 July), Le Moniteur, XXI, 358-63.

7 See, for example, discussions in the Jacobin Club on 3 September and 5 September 1794. Aulard, Société des Jacobins, VI, 410-11 and 419-21.

8 Felhémési (Jean-Claude Méhée), La Queue de Robespierre. Archives Nationales AF II/417.

126 “Robespierre’s tail,” or he could cast his lot with the Thermidorians and perhaps carve out a niche for himself in a new order. For Fréron, the choice was obvious. For the sake of their future survival, it was vital for Fréron and his fellow Thermidorians to disavow their Montagnard colleagues and, more important, to distance themselves from their own involvement in the Terror. There can be no doubt that the majority of Fréron’s actions and choices throughout the Thermidorian Reaction were self-motivated. While seeking to enhance his own political power and to cloak his past as a terrorist, he portrayed himself as a man completely devoted to the dismantling of the Terror for the public good. And, what better way to reveal his opinions and paint a pleasing picture of himself than through the printed word? It is, therefore, not surprising that one of the first things Fréron did in the month of August was to lobby for the reinstatement of unlimited freedom of the press. Although Robespierre’s government had never enacted official legislation to curb freedom of the press, they had subjected the press to severe censorship. On 26 August, Fréron made a memorable speech in which he asked that the Convention pass a law guaranteeing unlimited freedom of the press. Anyone, he said, who attempted to restrain press freedom should be declared a conspirator against the Republic and the Rights of Man. Such a law, he asserted, could only aid in “destroying tyranny.” 9 Although Fréron’s speech was met with lively applause, the Convention remained reluctant to pass a law that might open up the floodgates to public opinion.10 Fréron’s speech prompted debate not only in the Convention, but within the Jacobin Club as well. Many Montagnards rejected Fréron’s call for what they saw as “undefined” freedom of the press. They feared that such unlimited freedom might give aristocrats, royalists and other counter-

9 See his speech in the National Convention, séance of 26 August 1794, Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXVI, 46-48. A complete copy can also be found in the pamphlet Acte d’Accusation Contre Tallien et Fréron, (Paris, 1794), 9-28 as well as in le Moniteur (1794), no.342, 1401-02.

10 As before the Terror, the National Convention was perplexed over how to establish freedom of the press, while still setting limits on abuses such as libel and preventing their enemies from publishing. The Jacobins rejected the idea of “undefined freedom.” They believed that Tallien, Le Cointre and Fréron only wanted press freedom so that they could camouflage their intrigues and give aristocrats, royalists, Vendeans, etc. the right to speak. See Aulard, Société des Jacobins, séance of 3 September, VI, 415.

127 revolutionaries the opportunity to openly attack the revolutionary government. This, they said, would lead to nothing but “discord and civil war.” 11 The government’s reluctance to legislate unlimited press freedom did not dissuade Fréron, for the Convention was as equally unwilling to place specific restrictions on the press. As a result, a free press was already developing, uninhibited, after 9 Thermidor. Fréron was well aware, from his past career as a journalist, of the immense power the press could wield over popular opinion and actions. His speech of 9 (26 August) revealed far more than a humanitarian desire to “destroy tyranny.” He intended to resume his career as a journalist and renew the publication of the Orateur du peuple. But, in its new incarnation, the Orateur du peuple spoke as the voice of the Reaction against the Terror. Through it, Fréron was able to turn public opinion against the Jacobins. He denounced and intimidated Jacobin leaders while simultaneously directing public attention away from his own guilty past as an agent of the Terror. Through the press, he and his colleagues worked to demolish the patriotic and republican reputations of the members of the old committees and all those who stood against them. While Fréron worked on his plans to publish the Orateur du peuple, he and his colleagues moved against their Jacobin opponents in the Convention. On 24 August, in an attempt to regain control, the Convention abolished the concentrated powers of the Committees of Public Safety and General Security by dispersing their responsibilities among sixteen new committees. But for Fréron and the leading Thermidorians, this was not enough. They wanted to ensure that certain Montagnards would never be able to hold Committee positions again. Therefore, on 28 August, Fréron’s colleague, Laurent Le Cointre, denounced seven members of the original committees: Billaud Varennes, Collot D’Herbois and Bertrand Barérè of the Committee of Public Safety and Marc-Guillaume Vadier, André Amar, Jean Henri Voulland and Jacques-Louis David of the Committee of General Security.12 Although Fréron later denied it, many suspected that he and Tallien had encouraged LeCointre to make this accusation.13 Fréron and his friends may have

11 Aulard, Société des Jacobins, VI, 410, 3 September 1794. See the speech of Joseph Fayau. See also the Jacobins’ discussion of freedom of the press on 5 September 1795, Ibid, VI, 419-21.

12 Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 48. Le Cointre demanded that these men be held accountable for their involvement in the Terror.

13 See discussions on this issue in the Jacobins. Aulard, Société des Jacobins, VI, 398.

128 thought that it was the perfect time to strike at the Jacobin leadership, but for the majority of Convention members, most of whom were moderates, this was too much, too soon. Some députés even attacked Le Cointre for having dared to make such a denunciation. They feared this might set a dangerous precedent through which no one would be safe from accusation. Le Cointre’s proposal and denunciation sparked a colossal debate in the Convention and, in the end, was rejected. Nevertheless, it proved to have important consequences.14 Within a week’s time, Fréron’s enemies in the Paris Jacobin Club retaliated. On 30 August, one of the Thermidorians’ most outspoken opponents, Pierre Joseph Duhem, openly accused Tallien and Fréron of encouraging Le Cointre to make his accusation. Tallien and Fréron said nothing, and many interpreted their silence as guilt.15 Four days later, on 3 September, the issue was brought up again for debate. This time, Fréron openly denied that he was behind Le Cointre’s denunciation and reminded the Club that he had been one of its members since its founding. Few were convinced of his loyalty, however, and one member, Jean-Baptiste Carrier, used this opportunity to express his opinions on the nature and intentions of the Thermidorians: “Today this faction of cheats and embezzlers…want to elevate themselves on the ruins of Robespierre’s tyranny…[and to] place the Revolution on trial…. It is necessary that the patriots reunite to erase and reduce them to nothingness!” There can be little doubt that Carrier’s words were a declaration of war against the Thermidorians. What followed next must have made the threat even more clear. After two hours of debate, Fréron and Tallien were stripped of their membership in the Jacobin Club.16 Had their expulsion occurred prior to Thermidor, they would most likely have faced proscription or even death. But the overthrow of Robespierre had weakened the power and influence of the Club and expulsion no longer carried such risks. This is evidenced by their immediate reaction. As soon as their membership was revoked, Fréron and Tallien, laughing,

14 Le Moniteur, (1794), no. 344, 1410-12.

15 Aulard, Société des Jacobins, VI, 398.

16 Le Cointre was also stripped of his membership. Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 68-69. See also Aulard, Société des Jacobins, VI, 409-17. Fayau said that Fréron’s call for unlimited press freedom had only encouraged aristocrats to speak out in favor of the monarchy.

129 walked lightly to the door where they embraced one another as if in congratulations. Someone in the galleries shouted “See how conspirators console one other!” while another more aptly observed: “They don’t give a damn!” 17 Not only was it obvious that Fréron did not care that he had been thrown out of the Jacobin Club, it is highly likely that he welcomed it. If he was to make war upon the Jacobins, it was necessary to disassociate himself from them. More important, now he could present himself and Tallien as innocent victims of the Club’s arbitrary actions. When the first issue of the Orateur du peuple appeared around a week later on 11 September (25 Fructidor), Fréron explained to his readers that he and Tallien were expelled from the Club simply because they had “defended the principles of the National Convention.” In order to obtain even more sympathy, he told of how, just two days after their expulsion, Tallien had left his mother’s house on the rue Quatre Fils where he was attacked by an assassin and wounded by pistol fire.18 Fréron declared that the wounded Tallien was a “martyr of liberty” and a “pure and intrepid” defender of the people.19 Fréron vowed to his readers that he would work tirelessly to “crush the machaivellianism” of the members of the old Committees and expose their crimes. To have destroyed Robespierre was not enough. They must destroy “Robespierrism.”20 From this point on, it is clear that Fréron’s primary political goal, and that of his Thermidorian colleagues, was the elimination of his Jacobin opponents and the destruction of their bases of support. This meant the eradication of the Paris Jacobin Club and the destruction of the influence of their sans-culottes supporters. In this quest, the Orateur du peuple was not Fréron’s only instrument of intimidation. Real power over the sans-culottes and the Jacobin Club could only be gained in the streets. For this task, Fréron turned to the jeunesse dorée.

17 Ibid.

18 In the Orateur du peuple, Fréron accused Moyse Bayle, Granet and the “intriguers of Marseilles” of being behind the attempt on Tallien’s life. Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, 22 September (2 Vendémaire), no.6, 1794.

19 On 14 September, in the Convention, Fréron made a report on the state of Tallien’s health and asked that such reports be made daily until he recovered. Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 72-74.

20 Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, 11 September (25 Fructidor), no.1, 1794.

130 Although they would later carry such names as the jeunesse fréronnière and the armée de Fréron, the jeunesse dorée (“Gilded Youth”) were not Fréron’s creation. Instead, these roving bands of armed, angry, young bourgeois emerged out of the Thermidorian Reaction and the loosening of the legal and societal restraints of the Terror. The young men who made up the ranks of the jeunesse dorée came from a variety of backgrounds and ideologies. Some were newly released from the prisons of the Terror. Others were absentee conscripts who had managed to avoid the draft. Still others had served in the army, but had deserted in the middle of the administrative disorder occasioned by 9 Thermidor. In regards to political sentiment, many of these jeunesse were republican bourgeois, but some were constitutional monarchists, and still others were royalists.21 But, they all shared one initial goal: to revenge themselves upon the Jacobins and to reduce the sans-culottes to a state of submission. Armed with clubs and canes, they roamed the streets of Paris, brawling in street-fights with the sans-culottes and harassing anyone who even looked like a Jacobin.22 Fréron must have been drawn immediately to their potential as an instrument to achieve the Thermidorians' goals. It is possible that Fréron had already made the acquaintance of some of these young men at certain public events and fêtes, such as the famous Victims Balls.23 But, the primary way he introduced himself to them was through the Orateur du peuple. In the bourgeois districts of Paris, the jeunesse dorée frequently gathered in cafés, such as the Café des Chartes and the Café de Foy at the Palais Egalité. There they would read and discuss the latest articles of the press. Fréron’s polemic against the Jacobins and their leaders appealed strongly to the jeunesse dorée. Moreover, through the Orateur du peuple, Fréron often praised the jeune gens’ activities and encouraged them in their anti-Jacobin campaigns. As a result, it was not long before the jeunesse adopted Fréron as their unspoken leader.24 They looked to him for direction and, more important, to use his growing influence in the Thermidorian government to protect them from

21 Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 214.

22 Ibid, XXXVI, 214-15.

23 It is believed that Fréron may have personally organized some of these Victims Balls. Ibid. 24 They also considered the conventionals Tallien, Merlin de Thionville and Goupilleau de Fontenay as their leaders. George Duval, Souvenirs Thermidoriens, (Paris, 1844), II, 11.

131 prosecution for their vigilante activities. Fréron soon became an active participant in both their recruitment and in coordinating their activities. Particularly in the Lepelletier section of Paris, Fréron recruited young men from coffee houses and cafés, from among domestics, shop clerks, newsstand boys, clerks, notaries, avocats and merchants.25 The Café des Chartes was soon designated as their headquarters and sometimes Fréron, or his agents,26 met and dined there with the leaders of the jeunesse. Together they decided on the themes of their campaigns. It was not long before they developed a sophisticated system of communication through which they could quickly summon their comrades throughout Paris to act. Fréron also arranged to send his auxiliaries to meet with them two to three times a week to train and drill them.27 Thus, while the jeunesse dorée did not originate with him, it was Fréron who helped transform them from bands of undisciplined street-brawlers into a highly coordinated and trained “army.” With such an army, Fréron and his Thermidorian colleagues hoped to intimidate not only the Jacobins, but also anyone who stood in the way of their plans for the future of the revolutionary government. With the jeunesse dorée at his disposal, Fréron and his colleagues in the Convention now proceeded with their campaign against the Jacobin Club. In the Thermidorian press and in the Convention, Fréron and his allies insisted that the Jacobin Club was attempting to establish itself as a rival government in Paris. 28 On 10 September 1794, in the Convention, Fréron’s ally,

25 The Lepelletier section had once been named the section of Filles-St. Thomas and, until 10 August 1792, was previously a royalist section. On 31 May 1793, the section had taken up arms for the Girondins. Though this section marched with Fréron against the insurgents of the journée of Prairial, it would later be the heart of the royalist sentiment that helped fuel the journée of Vendemairie (1795). Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 122.

26 One of Fréron’s “lieutenants” in the jeunesse dorée was Louis Jullien. See, for example, his appearance in the Convention on 1 Germinal (21 March) when he informs them that the jeunesse dorée are on their guard to protect the Convention from insurgents. Le Moniteur, (1795) no. 185, 755.

27 , The Thermidorians and the Directory, (New York, 1964), 49. One member of the jeunesse, Georges Duval, recalled: “Acting on a proposal made by Fréron and Barras, the regenerated Committees of Public Safety and General Security had given us some auxiliary leaders who brought us together two to three times a week, on the waterside terrace of the Tuileries, the Garden, the Champs Elysées and other places and trained us (to use rifles and to drill).” Duval, Souvenirs Thermidoriens, II, 11-12.

132 Merlin de Thionville, openly denounced the Jacobin Club as a “nest of brigands.”29 Two weeks later, in no. 5 of the Orateur du Peuple, Fréron claimed that “an insidious placard” had been discovered on the door of the Convention hall, which urged the people of Paris to save themselves from enslavement by the National Convention. Fréron now warned that this was the signal for a popular insurrection against the Convention, an insurrection that was being planned in the Jacobin Club. He even went so far as to say that, as part of this insurrection, the Jacobins were planning to assassinate him, as well as Tallien and Le Cointre.30 Not only did he attack the Jacobin Club as a whole, but Fréron also used the Orateur du peuple to undermine the reputations of his opponents through continued slander and accusation. The Jacobins and their supporters, “recognizable by the stains of blood and plunder on their hands,” were nothing like the loyal men of the Convention, Fréron asserted. On Billaud Varennes, he heaped the responsibility for the . Collot d’Herbois, he said, was an actor who “had played the role of valet in Robespierre’s conspiracy.” Carrier was the “Noyade31 de Nantes,” guilty of atrocities while a representative on mission, and Leonard Bourdon was “Carrier’s friend and precursor.”32 In its new form, the Orateur du peuple was immensely popular, perhaps more so than it had been in its first incarnation. In the cafés, salons and in the streets everyone now asked:

28 In the Orateur du peuple, Fréron admonished the Jacobin Club: “Audacious rivals of the National Convention, renounce your criminal intentions and purify yourselves!” Fréron, Orateur du peuple, 7 October (16 Vendémaire), no. 13, 99.

29 Le Moniteur, 24 Fructidor (10 September) 1794, no. 356, 1463. Thionville echoed Fréron’s opinions: “People, if you want to conserve your liberty, if you want to preserve the Convention (the sole center of power)…it is not through discourse that you will knock down your enemies. Arm yourselves in your power, and with the law in your hand, and pounce on this den of brigands.”

30 Fréron, l’Orateur du Peuple, no. 5, 3rd sans-culottides, 1794, 38.

31 Noyade means “drowner.” While serving as representative on mission western France, Carrier had carried out a vicious repression of the inhabitants there, many of whom he suspected of supporting counter-revolution. When the guillotine could not sufficiently dispose of the great numbers of condemned, Carrier had resorted to collective drownings in barges in the Loire. See Jean-Joel Brégon, Carrier et la Terreur Nantaise (Paris, 1987).

32 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, no. 16, 14 October (23 Vendémaire) 1794.

133 “Have you read Fréron?”33 Other Thermidorian journals joined the Orateur du peuple in denouncing the Jacobins. Not long after the first edition of the Orateur du peuple appeared, Fréron’s colleague Jean Tallien also renewed the publication of his old newspaper, L’Ami des citoyens. Fréron and Tallien were joined by other Thermidorian journalists, such as Joannes- Joseph Dussault, who worked with Fréron as an editor for the Orateur du Peuple. These journalists began to meet regularly at a restaurant on the Place de to discuss daily political issues. Through their meetings, they came to agreements on “what specific opinions they would disseminate to the general public” on specific issues. Their work was to be a carefully planned and executed propaganda.34 In the streets the headlines rang out accusing the Jacobins of being everything from assassins to counter-revolutionaries.35 The lengths to which the Jacobins went in an attempt to suppress Fréron’s newspaper reveal their fears of its influence. One journal observed in September of 1794: “That devil Fréron does not give his enemies a minute’s breathing space!”36 The Jacobins attempted to remind the Convention of a law passed on 9 March 1793, which had stated that one could not be a journalist and a member of the Convention at the same time. This attempt had failed, however, when the Convention decided to dispense with this law.37 Then, the Jacobins attempted to have Fréron’s newspaper vendors arrested, but Fréron, who had friends and supporters on many of the important Committees simply had them released. Fréron specifically used his growing influence with the Committee of General Security to free his persecuted vendors and his jeunesse. The Jacobins might have successfully confronted Fréron with their own press, but many of their most vitriolic journalists were either dead or had defected to the Thermidorian side.

33 Messager du soir, 19 &21 September 1794 as quoted in Aulard, la Reaction Thermidorienne, I, 115; 122-23.

34 Charles Lacretelle, Dix années d’épreuve pendant la Révolution, (Paris, 1842), 203-06. Lacretelle was one of Fréron’s journalist colleagues.

35 Aulard, Reaction Thermidorienne, I, 130.

36 Ibid, I, 128. Quote taken from the Messager du Soir, 23 September 1794.

37 National Convention, séance of 18 Brumaire (8 November) 1794, Le Moniteur, XXII, 459-60.

134 Other radical journalists, such as Gracchus Babeuf, angered over the Jacobin’s recent annihilation of the Hébertists, made a temporary alliance with the Thermidorians. 38 Thanks to the propaganda of Fréron and his journalist allies, the word “Jacobin” soon became one of contempt rather than admiration.39 Some Jacobins tried, usually in vain, to defend their reputations in the National Convention only to be shouted down by the Thermidorians and their supporters.40 Alienated in the Convention, loyal Jacobins vented their frustrations to one another within the Club. There, several members complained of Fréron, often protesting passages written against them in the Orateur du peuple. At least one Jacobin, however, decided on a different course of action against Fréron. In late September, 1794, Alexandre Chateauneuf- Randon, whom Fréron had maligned in his newspaper, approached Fréron during an official ceremony and41 challenged him to a duel. Fréron accepted the challenge and, the following day, the two met in the Bois de Boulogne. Barras accompanied Fréron as his second. Before the duel could commence, however, gendarmes sent by the Committee of General Security arrived and

38 Though more of an Hébertist-type radical than a Thermidorian, Babeuf used his own newspaper, Journal de la Liberté de la Presse, to support Fréron’s campaign. For a time, Babeuf referred to Fréron as “mon compagnon d’armes.” Political differences however, especially Babeuf’s opposition to the Thermidorians' economic and social policies, later created a rift between the two journalists. Journal de la Liberté de la Presse, 5 Vendémaire, Year III as quoted in Ian Germani, Jean-Paul Marat: Hero and Anti-Hero of the French Revolution (London, 1992), 193

39 Fréron later wrote in the Orateur du peuple: “The name of Jacobin, once so dear to patriot hearts and now so frightening for zealous defenders of liberty, has been erased from the dictionary of the Republic.” Fréron, Orateur du Peuple, 11 November (21 Brumaire) no. 29, 231.

40 Take, for example, the case of Leonard Bourdon whom Fréron labeled, in the Orateur du peuple, as a “Jacobin, an atrocious liar and a buveur du sang.” L’Orateur du peuple, 9 November (19 Brumaire), no. 28, 1794. Bourdon first tried to respond through his own pamphlet. But, he was no match for Fréron’s polemics. When he attempted to protest Fréron’s attacks in the Convention on 15 October and the days that followed, Bourdon was constantly interrupted from speaking. In the end, the only place he could find sympathetic ears was in the Jacobin Club. See M. J. Sydenham, Leonard Bourdon: the Career of a Revolutionary (Ontario, 1999), 253.

41 On the day of the fête given for Marat, Chateauneuf-Randon said to Fréron during the ceremony: “You have insulted me in your journal. You will give me satisfaction.” Taken from Correspondance de Paris et des departments, 25 September 1794 as cited in Arnaud, Fils de Fréron, 315. See also Aulard, Réaction Thermidorienne, I, 125.

135 put and end to the affair.42 It is likely that Fréron, or his friends on the Committee of General Security, were responsible for the timely arrival of the gendarmes. Whatever the reason, Chateauneuf-Randon appears to have delivered no further challenges. Of all the Montagnards he now attacked in the Orateur du peuple, perhaps none had known Fréron better or were more equipped to expose his hypocrisy than his two former friends and confidants: Moyse Bayle and François Granet. Their past conflict with Fréron over the issue of Marseilles coupled with the fact that Bayle and Granet had remained faithful to the Montagnard cause after Thermidor, gave Fréron both a personal and political reason to desire their demise. Moreover, the subject of Marseilles, the events that transpired there, and problems that arose there after Thermidor continued to be a point of conflict between these men. After Thermidor, Granet had been among the first Jacobin députés to challenge Fréron. On 4 August 1794, in the Convention, Fréron made a proposal that the Hôtel de Ville should be razed to the ground due to its association with Robespierre. In response, Granet objected and made reference to Fréron’s recent conduct in Marseilles, saying: “The stones of Paris are no more guilty than those of Marseilles; punish individuals criminals, but demolish nothing!” Fréron’s ridiculous proposal was dismissed.43 Just days later, on 10 August, Granet again attempted to thwart the plans of the Thermidorians by protesting the release of “suspects.” He was silenced when Tallien and Fréron induced the Convention to pass a decree to publish the names of all who opposed the freeing of prisoners. 44 Ironically, events were concurrently unfolding in Marseilles that were to provide Fréron with the means to launch a major offensive against Granet and Bayle. In the early weeks of the Thermidorian Reaction, leaders of the Marseilles Jacobin Club had grown alarmed by the struggle taking place within the Paris Jacobin Club between Thermidorians and loyal Jacobins. These Marseillais, Fréron’s old enemies, were no doubt also disturbed by the prominent role Fréron was playing in this movement. In some sense, Fréron’s new conflict with the Paris Jacobin Club actually mirrored the conflict he had experienced previously with the Marseilles

42 Ibid.

43 Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXVI, 28.

44 Tallien, more so than Fréron, took this as a personal attack because he had just had his mistress, Thérèse Cabarrus, released from prison.

136 Club. Fréron viewed both situations as a struggle for power between the popular societies and the national representation,45 and he was about to be presented with the opportunity to strike at both Clubs simultaneously. The Marseilles Club had been in communication with Bayle and Granet and had even sent a commission of supplicants to Paris to petition against any efforts to dismantle the Terror.46 This commission met with Fréron’s old nemesis, Loys, who presented them to the Jacobin Club where they made many complaints against the Thermidorian Reaction, especially concerning the release of prisoners. They presented an address, drafted by Isoard, Maillet and Giraud, asking the Convention to retain the revolutionary government in all its aspects.47 Fréron saw this as the perfect opportunity to break the influence of the Marseilles Jacobin Club and the deputation of the Bouches-du-Rhône. In his 23 September edition of the Orateur du Peuple, he announced that a conspiracy was afoot in Marseilles led by “counter-revolutionaries” bent on spreading revolt against the Convention throughout the Midi and separating Marseilles from the Republic.48 More important, he denounced Bayle and Granet as the leaders of this conspiracy. “Is it not evident,” he asked his readers, “that the signal for this new revolt has been given in Paris [by] Moyse Bayle and Granet, députés of the Bouches-du-Rhône, the “Robespierres” of Marseilles?”49 The actions of the Marseilles Club were depicted as the result of a larger plot instigated by the Paris Jacobin Club, which sought to use all municipal clubs as their “tools”.50

45 Michael Kennedy, Jacobin Club of Marseilles, 144. Sydenham seemed to agree. In his work, he asserted that the Jacobin Club of Paris had always been “a shadow parliament, and the potential rival of any government.” Sydenham, Leonard Bourdon, 262.

46 Michael Kennedy, The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution, 1793-1795. (New York, 2000), 239-47.

47 Kennedy, Jacobin Club of Marseilles, 142.

48 Louis Legendre had supported this notion in his speech of 23 September 1794 in the National Convention. Legendre had concluded that the troubles in Marseilles had been organized in Paris. Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXVI, 118.

49 Fréron, L’Orateur du Peuple, 22 September (1 Vendémaire), no.6, 1794.

137 As a result of the suspicions raised by Fréron, the Convention ordered its representatives on mission in Marseilles, Pierre Auguis and Jean-Jacques Serres, to close the Marseilles Jacobin Club and place seals on its papers.51 On 23 September Loys was arrested following a denunciation in the Orateur du peuple.52 However, Bayle and Granet did not intend to submit to Fréron’s accusations. In the Convention on 24 September, they seized the opportunity to strike against Fréron. They renewed the pre-Thermidor accusations of embezzlement and misappropriation of national property against Fréron and Barras and claimed that they had the evidence to prove these charges.53 Fréron and Barras first responded by demanding that all evidence pertaining to this matter be sent to the government’s committees for review and an official verdict. This was not enough for Fréron who restated the accusations he had made against Bayle and Granet in his newspaper. He further denounced them by reading a letter, signed by his two adversaries, in which they had attacked Marat.54 Fréron was, of course, playing to the sympathies of many in the Convention, for Marat’s ashes had just been transferred to the Pantheon two days earlier.55 Bayle

50 Fréron’s friends in the National Convention also pressed this accusation. On 21 September, Merlin de Thionville had warned the Convention that the Paris Jacobin Club had formed a union with the Marseilles Club to “sustain their weakening and execrable authority.” Le Moniteur, XXII, no.4, 32-33.

51 Like Fréron, Auguis and Serres had also had to struggle with the Marseilles Jacobin Club for authority in the city. As a result of the Convention’s orders, they closed the Marseilles Club and purged thirty-five of its members. On 2 October 1794, they re-opened the Club, but it was now filled with moderates from Section 11 of the city. Scott, Terror and Repression, 330- 32.

52 Gendron, Gilded Youth, 87.

53 See Le Moniteur, 27 September 1794, no. 6, 29-30. A similar attack had been successfully used by Billaud Varennes to silence the député Le Cointre.

54 Ibid. This letter is also reproduced in L’Orateur du Peuple, 24 September (3 Vendémaire), no. 7, 1794.

55 See the “fête for Marat” on 3 sans-culottides, 1794. Le Moniteur, no.363, 1434. The Thermidorians were obsessed with the name and memory of Marat. Fréron continued to emphasize in the Orateur du peuple that he had been Marat’s journalist colleague and his “dear disciple.” Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 112-13.

138 attempted to respond to Fréron’s accusations, but was impeded by all of the noise in the Convention hall. Ultimately, the charges made by Bayle and Granet against Fréron and Barras were submitted to three committees for review.56 Much of the evidence against Fréron and Barras was gathered and submitted by Granet and Jean-François Escudier, another representative on mission to the Bouches-du-Rhône.57 In the meantime, Fréron lost no time in attempting to sway public opinion to his side by launching further attacks against Bayle and Granet. In no. 7 of the Orateur du Peuple, he gave his own account of what had happened the previous day in the Convention. He wrote of being denounced by the “vile intriguers” Bayle and Granet, whose intention was to renew the September Massacres in the Midi. Confidently, Fréron defied his accusers “to uncover a single stain on my revolutionary life; or the commission that Barras and myself have fulfilled in the Midi.”58 Fréron’s confidence was understandable considering that, by early October, the last of the original members of the Committees of Public Safety and General Security had been rotated off and replaced by Fréron’s Thermidorian allies.59 Thus, it came as no surprise that, after the Committees reviewed all of the evidence pertaining to the issue, Fréron and Barras were declared innocent of all charges. In a report to the Convention, Jean-Baptiste Treilhard declared that, after having reviewed the evidence, only two

56 These were the Committee of Public Safety, the Committee of General Security and the Committee on Legislation.

57 Later, in the séance of 23 Vendemairie, Barras openly accused Escudier of having traveled to the Midi with the intention of gathering pieces of evidence against he and Fréron. Le Moniteur, 17 October (1795) no.26, 119. See also Archives Nationales, AF II 44, doc. 50 for Granet’s letter explaining his evidence to the three committees, 24 September 1794.

58 Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, 24 September (3 Vendémaire), no. 7, 1794.

59 Fréron had especially lobbied to drive from the Committee of Public Safety. Throughout November of 1794, he attacked him in the Orateur du peuple. Carnot caught Fréron off guard one day and threatened to beat him with a stick if he persisted in his attacks. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Lazare Carnot, 112. One biography of Carnot, states that Carnot threatened Fréron with his épée. See Marcel Reinhard, Le Grand Carnot: L’Organisateur de la Victoire, 1742-1823 (Paris, 1952). In the Jacobin Club, on 7 November, Billaud Varennes asserted that Fréron had turned against Carnot because he had refused to give a position to La Poype. Aulard, Société des Jacobins, VI, 642.

139 pieces of which were even considered,60 they concluded that Fréron and Barras had carried out their missions with dignity. 61 Barras later claimed, in his memoirs, that after the verdict, Granet made a formal apology and withdrew his accusation.62 Whether this is true or not, Granet does not appear to have troubled either Fréron or Barras further. But for Bayle, this was not to be the end of his conflict with Fréron. Fréron later said that Bayle was humiliated and that, desiring new means, he “searched through all his boxes, consulted all his papers, and drew out some tattered rags which he presented to the people.”63 These “tattered rags” were nothing less than the letters that Fréron had written to Bayle while on mission. In these letters, Fréron had expressed violent thoughts and even boasted of his most bloodthirsty acts in both Toulon and Marseilles. It was Bayle’s intention that these letters would be the means through which he would publicly expose Fréron as a former terrorist and a hypocrite. It was many months, however, before Bayle launched his offensive. Throughout the autumn of 1794, all attentions were focused on the arrest and trial of Jean-Baptiste Carrier, the

60 These were the two pieces of evidence considered. The first was a declaration made by Joseph Martel to the Revolutionary Tribunal of Marseilles (i.e. Maillet and Giraud) prior to his execution. In this statement, Martel said that, while in Toulon, Fréron and Barras had sent him, along with two gendarmes, to take a carriage laden with trunks, furniture and other effects to Barras’ house in Fox Amphoux. He said he delivered these goods to Barras’ wife there. Martel added further that General La Poype had instructed him that if he were stopped and questioned he was to say that his name was Destaborat and that he was an aide de camp of General La Poype. The second piece of evidence was a letter written by the representative Thomas Gasparin to Granet that accused Barras of having attempted to encourage an uprising in Marseilles and of having suggested abandoning the territory of Nice. Archives Nationales, AF II 44, docs. 47 & 48. Pieces remués au Comité du Salut Public dans l’affaire de Barras, Fréron, Granet, etc.

61 Jean-Baptiste Treilhard, Rapport sur quelques pieces relatives à Barras et Fréron (Paris, 1795), 8. Fréron related the news of his exoneration to his readers. In doing so, he vowed to them that he would continue to deal with internal enemies in Paris as he had dealt with enemies at Toulon. But, this time, Fréron intended to use the pen rather than the sword. Fréron, Orateur du peuple, 7 October (16 Vendémaire), no.13, 98.

62 Barras, Memoirs, I, 173.

63 Stanislas Fréron, Réponse de Fréron, réprésentant du peuple, aux Diffamations de Moyse Bayle (Paris, 1795), 2. Later produced in pamphlet form, this piece was originally produced over three issues (nos. 81-83) of the Orateur du Peuple.

140 representative on mission most notorious for his aggressive use of the Terror in Nantes. Carrier’s trial brought renewed support for the Thermidorians and gave Fréron and his colleagues more ammunition against the Jacobin Club, of which Carrier was a loyal and outspoken member. Fréron used the Orateur du peuple to relate stories and eyewitness accounts to his readers of Carrier’s “crimes.”64 When Billaud, Collot and others sought to defend their colleague, Fréron presented their defense of Carrier as a defense of the Terror and warned his readers of their desire to destroy the Convention and restore the Terror government.65 Meanwhile, Fréron encouraged the jeunesse dorée to carry on a campaign against the Jacobins and sans-culottes in the streets of Paris. He continued to insist that the Jacobin Club and the sans-culottes were preparing to attack the Convention, under arms, and slaughter all the members who wished to end the Terror.66 On 3 November (13 Brumaire) Billaud -Varennes made a speech in the Jacobins Club in which made it clear to their enemies that the Club would not submit without a fight. “The lion is not dead when it sleeps,” Billaud warned, “and on its awakening, it exterminates all its enemies. The trench is open; the patriots will stir themselves and urge the people to awaken.”67 But Billaud’s brave words merely seemed to corroborate Fréron’s accusations. In addition to the Orateur du peuple, there were other Thermidorian journals that warned the Convention and the people of Paris that the Jacobin Club was planning to save Carrier.68 As public opinion in Paris was turning more and more against the Jacobins, the Thermidorians saw this as the perfect time to bring about the Club’s closure.

64 See for examples Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, no. 18 (19 October/28 Vendémaire) and nos. 20-21 (24-27 October/3-6 Brumaire).

65 See for example his article: “Grand efforts of Doctor Duhem to save his friend Carrier,” in L’Orateur du peuple, 5 November (15 Brumaire), no. 26, 1794.

66 Ibid, no. 15 (12 October/21 Vendémaire), no. 18 (19 October/28 Vendémaire) and no. 20-21 (24-27 October/3-6 Brumaire), 1794.

67 Aulard, Sociétè des Jacobins, VI, 633.

68 Not only had Fréron warned the Convention that the Jacobins were planning to save Carrier, but his warnings were echoed in other Thermidorian journals of the time. See, for example, the Journal de Perlet, no. 783 as well as the Journal de Paris, no. 47. The Jacobin Club had only increased suspicions by their denunciations of these journals as well as by their

141 On 6 November, Fréron’s colleague, Marie Joseph Lequino, proposed a decree that députés of the Convention should be forbidden from belonging to popular societies for the duration of their term of office. This proposal was met by violent murmurs and Duhem charged Tallien and Fréron of putting Lequino up to this with the goal of destroying the Jacobin Club.69 Duhem was shouted down and his accusation was dismissed. On the evening of 9 November, around two to three hundred jeunesse dorée surrounded the Jacobin Club, threw stones through its windows and tried to force open its doors. They were held off by counterattacks made against them by members of the Club. Only after two hours had passed, did the Committee of General Security send a force to put an end to the brawl. Over the next two days, a furious debate ensued in the Convention over the fate of the Club. When Duhem attempted to relate the details of the jeunesse’s attack on the Club, he was met with laughter in the Convention.70 The Jacobin Club, once respected and feared, was now nothing more than an object of ridicule. On 11 November, further debate over the fate of the Jacobin Club was postponed. That evening, violence erupted. Troubles began when a huge crowd of jeunesse dorée assembled at the Palais Egalité. Around 9:00 to 10:00 in the evening, Fréron and Tallien appeared, and Fréron rallied his jeunesse dorée to action: “Let us go and surprise the wild beast in its den…Good young men…let us be on our way!”71 Led from a distance by Fréron and Tallien, around two to three thousand jeunesse dorée stormed the Jacobin Club and, this time, they successfully infiltrated the hall. With canes and

insinuations that “ the people will rise up if it does not hand Carrier over to them.” Aulard, Société des Jacobins, VI, 629ff.

69 Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 149. Days later, on 10 November, Duhem attacked Fréron ad Tallien for being “men of a faction bought by aristocrats” and accused them of being the driving force behind the attacks on the Jacobin Club. Ibid, XXXVI, 164. 70 Angered by the laughter in the Convention, Billaud jumped to his feet, shouting: “You laugh at massacres?!” Le Moniteur (1794), no. 52 and no. 53, 225-28.

71 Duval, Souvenir Thermidoriens, II, 15-16. In the Orateur du peuple, Fréron’s account ran: “In the Tuileries and in the garden of the Palais Egalité there were cries “Vivent la Convention”. The people awoke from their lethargy and in one voice raised themselves “Lets march on the Jacobins!” and off they went. The villains trembled in their cavern; clouds weighed on their criminal souls,…they were lost, they were assailed by the national vengeance.” Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, 11 November (21 Brumaire), no. 29, 1794.

142 clubs, they drove out the members as well as the people in the galleries. Men were beaten and women flogged. After this, in the name of public safety, the Convention voted to close the Club. Its destruction undercut the Montagnards support base and their links with the sans-culottes.72 It is possible that Fréron was present, the following day, when the doors of the Jacobin Club were officially locked and the keys confiscated73 In issue no. 29, and following editions, of the Orateur du peuple, Fréron portrayed the closing of the Jacobin Club as a great triumph for the National Convention that had saved all of France. By closing the Jacobins, he argued, the Convention had merely given sanction to the “voice of the people and the work of public opinion.” He said that throughout Paris, people were rejoicing: “It is a truly touching spectacle to see the joy of the people since the extinction of the Jacobins…Many French citizens have put lights in their windows…some want an official celebration…Amiable French gaiety is finally reborn under the most happy auspices.”74 With their opponents silenced, the Thermidorians now forged ahead with more anti- Terror reforms. On 24 December 1794, the Convention revoked the Law of the Maximum, which had originally established wage and price controls. But while the restoration of freedom of trade and prices sounded quite appealing on paper, the immediate results were an economic disaster of runaway inflation and a continued depreciation of the .75 To make matters

72 Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXVI, 164. For detailed accounts of these events see: Lefebvre, Thermidorians, 51-52; Sydenham, Leonard Bourdon, 262; Duval, Souvenirs Thermidoriens, II, 17ff.

73 Arnaud cites a letter written by Mme. Tallien, stating that Fréron went to the Jacobin Club, along with Madame Tallien and Merlin de Thionville to lock the Club’s doors and take its keys. Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 314. However, another account states that it was the Butte des Moulins police commissioner (under the orders of the Committee of General Security) that went sent to seize the keys and place a padlock on the main door opening to the rue St. Honoré. Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXVI, 164ff. It is possible, however, that Fréron, Merlin and Mme. Tallien could have been present at this event.

74 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, 13-23 November (23 Brumaire-3 ), nos. 29-34, 1794. Police reports from the time suggest that there was indeed a general approval in Paris for the closure of the Jacobin Club. Aulard, Réaction thermidorienne, I, 242.

75 Furet, The French Revolution,158. Tax money came in only slowly and sporadically and so the government met its obligations by printing more and more assignats, driving their value even further down. See also le Moniteur, no. 97, 7 nivôse (27 December) 1794.

143 worse, this crisis coincided with the onset of what was to be the worst winter of the century in France. Rivers froze, roads were covered in ice, and already scarce supplies, such as firewood and coal, were exhausted.76 For the poor of Paris, especially the sans-culottes, this was a terrible time. Not only did they have to face hunger and cold, but their most intrepid defenders in the Convention had been all but silenced. Meanwhile, the anti-Jacobin campaign, far from abating since the Club’s closure, continued. Even though the Jacobin Club was closed, the Thermidorians continued to warn against “Jacobin plots” throughout January of 1795. Carrier had been convicted and executed on 16 December 1794, and Fréron now insisted on the necessity for prompt judgment “against the conspirators Billaud-Varennes, Collot d’Herbois, and Barérè, for whom Carrier was merely a subaltern agent.”77 In the meantime, Fréron encouraged “all true friends of liberty to watch and denounce all enemies of the people.”78 Police reports of the time revealed that many journals, especially Fréron’s publications, were doing more to alarm the citizens of Paris rather than to calm their fears in such trying times. Moreover, as the Jacobins had predicted, the press freedom that Fréron had helped unleash had done nothing but “feed discord and increase dissension.”79 Fréron helped make the situation in Paris even worse when, on 12 January, in no. 59 of the Orateur du peuple, he summoned his jeunesse dorée to action. He called on them to “wake from their lethargic sleep and avenge the deaths of old men, women and children by exterminating the killers and cut throats.” He went further: “…the safety of the country still craves your intrepidity and that audacious impetuousness unintimidated by any peril. Will you still allow yourselves to be slaughtered like sheep? Will you allow them to cut the throats of your

76 Lefebvre, Thermidorians, 85-87; 109-15.

77 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, 25 November (5 Frimaire), no. 35, 1794.

78 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, (29 Frimaire/19 December), no. 47, 1794. It is also interesting to note that he attempted, by this time, to portray the dismantling of the Terror as the original goal of 9 Thermidor. He speaks of the “path” set by the Convention “through the revolution of 9 Thermidor to exterminate all the enemies of the people.” Ibid, 27 nivose (16 January), no. 61, 1795.

79 Aulard, Réaction Thermidorienne, I, 361-62. Report of 2 January 1795 on Public Spirit (Groups and Cafés).

144 old fathers, your wives, and your children? No, the vow is already in your hearts…you have already closed the Jacobins, strike again and you will annihilate them.”80 Fréron later claimed that his intentions, in no. 59, were merely to call on his jeunesse to be vigilant and to report traitors and their activities to the Committee of General Security. This defense was questionable, considering that the article was an open invitation to violence and murder. Soon Fréron would have reason to regret that he had encouraged the jeunesse to such extremes. The jeunesse responded to Fréron’s call through a pamphlet, which they placarded on the walls throughout Paris. In this publication, they vowed that to prove themselves worthy of a leader like Fréron.81 Immediately, they took to the streets, undeterred, and with no fear of the authorities. But in their new offensive, the jeunesse did not limit themselves to Jacobins or Jacobin images, but soon unleashed their vengeance on all revolutionary symbols, even those sanctioned by the Convention. Of all the revolutionary symbols they attacked, their most popular target was the image of Jean-Paul Marat. When, on 8 January, Marat’s bust was removed from the Convention hall82, the jeunesse took this as a signal to busts of Marat throughout Paris. Fréron, who had long built a reputation as the friend and heir of Marat, was suddenly shocked at the behavior of the jeunesse. By attacking the memory of a man he had idolized, they threatened to compromise his position and reputation. Moreover, he considered their attack on Marat as anti-revolutionary, rather than anti-Jacobin. Therefore, he implored the jeunesse to respect Marat’s image. In the Orateur du peuple, he warned them that their attacks on Marat’s image only served the interests of the

80 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, 12 January (23 nivose), no. 59, 1795, 473-77.

81 Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 214. In the Orateur du peuple Fréron thanked “his jeunesse republicaine for its courage, it patriotism and its magnanimity” and he exhorted them to persevere. Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, 20 January (1 pluviôse), no. 63, 1795, 405-406.

82 Ever since his ashes had been placed in the Pantheon, Marat had remained a controversial figure in the minds of many in the Convention. While some praised him, others saw him as a man responsible for the violence and bloodshed of the Terror. Thus, not everyone had been happy with the decision to place him in the Pantheon and his pantheonization had been decreed in the face of some opposition. The decision to remove his bust from the Convention Hall indicated how much the anti-Marat sentiment had grown by early 1795. Germani, Jean- Paul Marat, 192.

145 aristocratic enemies of the Revolution and that, more important, they were attacking the authority of the National Convention, which had placed Marat’s ashes in the Pantheon. “You have made child’s play of this Revolution,” he scolded, “…The National Convention has placed Marat in the Pantheon, you must respect its decree.” 83 The jeunesse was not impressed by Fréron’s attempt to restrain them. On 16 January, to lively applause, they publicly burned issue no. 59 of Fréron’s newspaper.84 Three weeks later, on 31 January, they overturned a bust of Marat in the Feydeau theatre and even threw one into a sewer, which set off the smashing of busts of Marat in public places all over France.85 Instead of condemning this violence, the Convention bowed to the pressure of the jeunesse and decreed that Marat’s ashes would be removed from the Pantheon.86 When the jeunesse heard of this news, they celebrated by breaking even more images of Marat as well as attacking other revolutionary images throughout Paris. They intimidated or physically attacked anyone wearing a bonnet rouge or a revolutionary cockade. They cut down liberty trees. They policed theaters, intimidated actors and patrons, and disrupted performances by singing their battle anthem “The Awakening of the People.” On 4 February, after committing acts of vandalism, a mob of about six hundred jeunesse invaded the hall of the Convention during its evening session shouting: “Down with the cursed buveurs de sang! Down with all the damned rogues! Into the sewer with the whole, bloody lot!”87

83 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, 3 February (15 pluviôse), no. 70, 1795.

84 Aulard, Reaction Thermidorienne, I, 397.

85 Le Moniteur, no. 136, 16 pluviose (4 February) 1795. Such violent reactions against the pantheonization of Marat had actually come much later in Paris compared with the rest of France. Even before his ashes had been moved into the Pantheon, in other parts of France (especially those where the counter-revolution was strong) busts of Marat had already been smashed and portraits of Marat and Lepeletier were being torn from the buttonholes and necks of citizens. See Germani, Jean-Paul Marat, 190.

86 Marat’s ashes were moved to the cemetery of the Church of St. Etienne du Mont, just behind the Pantheon. The Convention then decreed that no citizen could be placed in the Pantheon until ten years after his death. See le Moniteur, 22 Pluviôse (10 February 1795), no. 145, 594.

87 Le Moniteur, no. 143, 23 pluviose (11 February) 1795, 585-86. See also Gendron, Gilded Youth, 60.

146 It was not long before the Convention received reports of similar activities from areas outside of Paris, especially in the southeast where the counter-revolutionary spirit had never been completely eradicated. Royalists and other enemies of the Republic, emboldened by the Thermidorian Reaction’s rapid progress, had infiltrated the ranks of the local contingents of the jeunesse, or had simply formed their own vigilante groups. Stories reached the Convention of the destruction of revolutionary emblems and of the beating, lynching and even murdering of former Jacobins and their sympathizers. The local authorities in these areas, much like the Convention in Paris, had done little to curb the violence. It was clear that the Thermidorian Reaction was getting out of hand and that, in many parts of France, a White Terror was on the rise. This rampage of destruction and intimidation only served to increase tensions more than ever in Paris between the jeunesse and the sans-culottes.88 For many sans-culottes, the activities of the jeunesse dorée were nothing less than a “provocation to civil war.”89 But the sans-culottes were not the only people in Paris who were angered and threatened by the jeunesse’s behavior. The jeunesse had not simply attacked Jacobins, but the revolutionary symbols of republican France and, in essence, the ideology of liberty. As a result, the jeunesse alienated many bourgeois and ordinary republicans who had previously supported them. Such unpopularity did not bode well for Fréron, who had built a reputation as their leader. Many people now blamed him for the jeunesse’s anti-republican activities. Moreover, the disrespect the jeunesse had shown for the Convention’s authority, together with the fact that the Convention had allowed itself to be intimidated by them, was doing nothing to increase the confidence of ordinary citizens in the Thermidorian regime. This entire situation threatened to give the Jacobins a cause to rally support once again. And the Convention, persisting in their belief that the Jacobins were still their greatest threat, could not, or would not, restrain the jeunesse. Was this situation what Fréron had intended when he had called the jeunesse to action? From his reaction, it is clear that Fréron did not yet fully comprehend the dangers of what he had set into motion. Thinking that perhaps the jeunesse’s actions had been the result of the work of

88 In the section of Gravilliers, for example, the citizens there drove out the jeunesse. In the Faubourg St. Antione, the sans-culottes responded to the actions of the jeunesse by parading Marat’s bust through the streets as they sang Revolutionary hymns. Germani, Jean-Paul Marat, 201.

89 Aulard, Reaction Thermidorienne, I, 455.

147 merely a few counter-revolutionary agitators within their ranks, Fréron sent his lieutenant, Louis Jullien, to the Palais Egaltié to urge them to remain calm. Jullien warned the jeunesse to beware of troublemakers among them who did not have the best interests of the country at heart. He implored them to limit themselves to “forceful moderation;” to devote themselves to acting as a surveillance on behalf of the Committee of General Security.90 Simultaneously, in the Orateur du peuple, Fréron advised the jeunesse to devote themselves to uncovering real threats to the nation, instead of wasting their time and energies attacking bits of clothing or the images of dead people.91 In the end, however, Fréron only succeeded in earning the jeunesse’s disdain. Fréron and his fellow Thermidorians were discovering that, in their zealous haste to sweep away all vestiges of the Terror, they had unleashed forces that they were not entirely capable of controlling. Like the Convention, Fréron was in a precarious situation. Regardless of his position, it seemed that his political reputation stood the risk of being compromised. To his Left, his former Jacobin colleagues saw him as nothing more than a hypocrite who had turned his back on the ideas he had once championed. They knew, and he knew, that he had been as much a terrorist as any of the colleagues whom he had condemned. To his Right stood the jeunesse, whose activities had led many to suspect that they were becoming an instrument of the enemies of the Revolution. Fréron could no longer afford to build his Thermidorian reputation as their leader. His relationship with them now threatened to compromise his reputation as a republican among colleagues within the Convention. But, try as he might, Fréron would never be able to completely disassociate his name from that of the jeunesse, which continued to be known as “Fréron’s Youth” or “Fréron’s Army.”92 Perhaps sensing Fréron’s vulnerability and reacting to the growing instability in Paris and the rest of the country, his enemies suddenly went on the offensive. Moyse Bayle, silent since their confrontation the previous September, was one of the first to challenge Fréron. Sometime around 20 February, he placed a placard on the walls throughout Paris in which he denounced Fréron. This placard, entitled Moyse Bayle au peuple souverain et à la Convention Nationale, no

90 Jullien’s memoirs cited in Gendron, Gilded Youth, 60.

91 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, 3 February (15 pluviôse), no. 70, 1795.

92 Ibid, 82.

148 longer exists, but reports on it from the time reveal that it included excerpts from Fréron’s correspondence from the Midi.93 This placard succeeded in focusing the public’s attention and prompted many to question Fréron’s nature and motives. Fréron had condemned Carrier and others for their actions as representatives on mission, but Bayle intended to prove that Fréron had been even more vicious than Carrier.94 Moreover, Bayle asserted that Fréron was still a terrorist and that he was now searching for a way to provoke a civil war in France. 95 Fréron responded to Bayle through his own pamphlet that he published over the course of three issues of the Orateur du peuple.96 Projecting a confident façade, Fréron declared that public opinion was on his side.97 Moreover, he attempted to explain that his aggressive, bloodthirsty correspondence from Marseilles and Toulon had been mere exaggeration, overplayed for the satisfaction of Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety. His hypocritical excuses appeared futile, however, when Bayle released a second pamphlet that contained even more damning excerpts from Fréron’s correspondence.98 Before Fréron had a chance to respond, he suddenly faced a deluge of published attacks. These were pamphlets written by men who, like Bayle, had been attacked by Fréron in both the Convention and the Orateur du Peuple, or by those who were simply opposed to Fréron’s politics. Some carried amusing titles such as: Grande Leçon Donnée a Fréron (Grand Lesson Given to Fréron), Fréron Demasque (Fréron Unmasked), and Le Dernier Coup de Tocsin de Fréron (Fréron Strikes the Tocsin for the Last Time). Many borrowed from Bayle and attacked Fréron by repeatedly republishing his correspondence. Others sought to turn Fréron’s own words

93 Aulard, Reaction Thermidorienne, I, 499.

94 Moyse Bayle, Moyse Bayle, au peuple souverain et à la Convention nationale (Paris, 1795), 26.

95 Aulard, Reaction Thermidorienne, I, 495-96; 499. Taken from the report made to the Convention on the subject of “Public Spirit” and from an article from the Gazette Française.

96 This was his Réponse de Fréron, Réprésentant du peuple, aux diffamations de Moyse Bayle. For a full text, see L’Orateur du peuple, nos. 81-83.

97 Fréron, L’Orateur du peuple, 11 Ventôse (1 March), no. 84, 1795.

98 Information taken from a report of 3 Ventôse on Public Spirit. Aulard, Réaction Thermidorienne, I, 495. This pamphlet carried the same name as Bayle’s original placard.

149 in the Orateur du Peuple against him. Several pamphlets denounced Fréron for his past terrorist activities in the Midi, while others condemned him for his “ferocious desire to destroy the people”99 and justifiably blamed him for much of the current instability in Paris.100 “Fréron disgraces himself every day with some new infamy,” wrote one author.101 Fréron was accused of having turned against his own principles, of turning his back on the people and violating their rights.102 Another author accused him of invoking freedom of the press merely to serve his own ends.103 “I accuse you,” wrote the author of Le Dernier Coup de Tocsin de Fréron, “of having prostituted your pen to pervert public opinion, torment the people and destroy those of your colleagues who stood against you.”104 He was even accused of being the voice of counter-revolution.105 Most of these pamphlets were attributed to pseudonyms, and so the identity of their true authors could only be guessed. When Fréron accused one member of the Convention, Pierre Châles, of being the author of Le Dernier Coup de Tocsin de Fréron, Châles wrote a scathing response, warning Fréron that the time would come when the people would demand “a rigorous account of our opinions, the things we have written and of our conduct.” Prophetically, Châles asked Fréron: “Is it in your power to erase what you have written?”106

99L’Ombre de Marat aux Parisians (France, 1795) and Philodème, Le Dernier coup de tocsin de Fréron, (France, 1794).

100 S. Maurice, Fréron Demasque, denoncé et mis en jugement par le peuple, (France, 1795), 2. Maurice writes: “Villain! You say that the people are degraded? If the people are ill- clothed, undernourished and miserable, is this not the result of your work?”

101 Ombre de Marat.

102 “O, Fréron, you have cowardly deserted the cause of the people! You have sold them to their enemies.” Maurice, Fréron Demasque, 10 .

103 Philippe, Le grand rappel à l’ordre de Fréron, (France, 1795), 2.

104 Philodème, Le Dernier coup de tocsin de Fréron, 4.

105 Maurice, Fréron Demasque, 13.

106 Pierre Châles, Châles, représentant du peuple, à son collègue Fréron, (France: 1795), 2 and 7.

150 There can be little doubt that these pamphlets gave Fréron cause for concern. His anxiety was made clear in a lengthy speech he made in the Convention on 1 March (11 Ventôse). In this speech, Fréron not only responded to the attacks he had suffered in the press, but he also sought to rehabilitate his image in the eyes of his moderate republican colleagues by proclaiming his strong desire to restore stability to France.107 To ensure stability, Fréron, voicing the opinions of his fellow Thermidorians, insisted that France needed a constitution. A Constitution had already been drafted in 1793, but owing to the crises that had faced the nation that year, its provisions, officially, had never been put in to effect. Fréron proposed now that the Constitution of 1793 be examined and that a commission be created to complete the drafting of its organic provisions. As a result, his proposal was sent to the committees for review.108 It has been suggested that by bringing the 1793 Constitution to the Convention’s attention, Fréron and his Thermidorian colleagues were attempting to set the Convention on the path to destroying the document altogether.109 This seems reasonable considering that as early as 3 February, Fréron had argued the necessity of replacing the revolutionary government with one that guaranteed the French people the security of persons and properties.110 In other words, the Thermidorians desired the creation of a government that catered more to the interests of the bourgeoisie. In contrast, the Constitution of 1793 was an extremely democratic document that allowed for universal manhood suffrage, job and welfare entitlements, and even recognized the right of the people to rise against a tyrannical government. As such, it was highly regarded by the sans-

107 Fréron complained of the accusations his opponents had made against him and declared his innocence. His explanation of his conduct in the Midi echoed the hypocritical response he had made in the Orateur du peuple to Moyse Bayle: “I shared with many of my colleagues in the honor of having retaken Toulon; (but) they printed some rags of letters which I wrote in the fear of my recall…. I had not disturbed a stone, but they paint me as a grand demolisher. I have dealt carefully with French blood and they represent me as a cutthroat like Carrier and a mitraillant like Collot. They cast on me their lies and their furor.” Motion d’Ordre faite par Fréron, 1 March (11 Ventôse) 1795. For the complete speech, see Le Moniteur, (1795) nos. 163, 164, 667-68.

108 Ibid.

109 See Lefebvre, Thermidorians, 68.

110 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, 3 February (19 Pluviose), no. 70, 1795.

151 culottes who would have rejoiced to see it inaugurated and their full rights as citizens secured. Given the antipathy and suspicion with which the Thermidorians now regarded the sans-culottes, it seemed highly unlikely that the Convention would ever inaugurate such a document. Events were about to unfold in Paris that would eventually seal the fate of the sans-culottes and their constitution. By the end of March 1795, the poor of Paris were driven to desperate measures. The economic policies of the Thermidorians, their arrest and persecution of the Jacobin leaders, as well as the hardships of the winter, all culminated in an uprising. On 1 April (12 Germinal) rebellious crowds of working class poor burst into the Convention hall demanding bread and an implementation of the 1793 Constitution. For several hours, petitions were read from the floor of the assembly. Barras moved that the Convention declare Paris to be under siege and the National Guard was called out to restore order. While Guardsmen were able to disperse the crowds from the Convention hall without incident, Fréron and Barras marched with a force of National Guard and jeunesse against the working class district of the Faubourg St. Antoine, a focal point for the uprising. The insurrection dissolved almost as quickly as it had started. Order was restored and all those associated with the uprising were disarmed. In the end, more than 1,600 Parisians had their weapons confiscated.111 For Fréron, the events of 12 Germinal were merely the culmination of the Jacobin plots he had warned the Convention of time and again. “It is incontestable,” he declared in the Convention, “ that there is a committee of insurrection in Paris.”112 Fréron’s accusation seems highly unlikely, however, considering the insurgents’ complete lack of organization and hasty surrender. Nonetheless, he and his colleagues now fully used this incident to their advantage and Fréron took a leading role that day in denouncing their Jacobin opponents. “It is time that the good citizens of Paris declare themselves; it is time that the majority of the Convention give them an example of its energy,” Fréron told his colleagues. “I ask that those whom the Convention has placed under a decree of arrest113 and deportation not be allowed to remain one

111 Le Moniteur, no. 195: 793-96.

112 See Lefebvre, Thermidorians, 119-20.

152 instant longer within the walls of Paris.” His proposal was decreed to lively applause.114 Immediately, the Convention decreed that Billaud Varennes, Collot d’Herbois, Vadier and Barérè were to be deported to Guiana.115 Fréron went further to call for the arrest of Leonard Bourdon and also Duhem116 and in the days that followed, many other leading Jacobins were implicated for having sympathized with the insurgents. On 5 April, the arrest of Bayle, Granet, Etienne Maignet and Pierre Cambon was decreed by the Convention.117 In some ways, it could be said that the uprising of 12 Germinal had been a fortuitous event for the Thermidorians, and even more for Fréron. In one fell swoop, it had enabled him to annihilate many of his greatest opponents, both personal and political. But the Convention’s victory over the insurgents of Germinal proved to be only a temporary solution to the discontent in Paris. Several weeks following the Germinal uprising came the incident of 1st Prairial (20 May). The insurgents were the same desperate and hungry men and women of Germinal. They were frustrated and once more rose in revolt against the

113 The Convention had previously voted the indictment of Billaud-Varennes, Collot d’Herbois, Barérè and Vadier on 2 March (11 Ventôse) 1795.

114 Le Moniteur, no. 195, 793-96. See also Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 291-92. 1 April 1795. Fréron accused Leonard Bourdon of being one of the principle instigators of the insurrection. Duhem was accused of being involved in a plot to assassinate seventeen députés (among them Tallien and Fréron). In his work on the jeunesse, François Gendron indicates that Fréron and the Convention were bowing to the pressure of the jeunesse who had demanded the deportation of the Jacobin leaders. They had threatened the Convention that the public would hold them accountable if they failed to do so. See Gendron, Gilded Youth, 109.

115 Le Moniteur, no. 195, 796. In the end, only Collot d’Herbois and Billaud-Varennes were deported. Vadier went into hiding and Barérè escaped from prison.

116 Thanks to Fréron, Duhem had already been placed under house arrest as early as 30 January, 1795. Le Moniteur, no. 131, 11 pluviôse, Year III. Pierre Châles was also arrested on 1 April and sent to the Fortress of Ham. His arrest had not been at Fréron’s request, but Fréron was most likely pleased with it. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Pierre Châles, 126.

117 Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVII, 296-97; 301. Fréron had never ceased to link Bayle and Granet to the troubles in Marseilles. See, for example, l’Orateur du peuple, 9 February (21 Pluviôse), no. 73, 1795. In the séance of 24 March (3 Germinal), Bayle had attempted to defend himself before the Convention. He had declared that, as a member of the old Committee of General Security, he could not separate his cause from those who now opposed and accused him (i.e. Fréron and Tallien). See Le Moniteur, no. 187, 763.

153 Convention. But, this time, events took a more bloody turn. As before, the insurgents, primarily from the working class districts, marched into the Convention and again invaded the Hall. This time they had an official list of demands, their chief demand still being: “Bread and the Constitution of 1793.” When one député, Jean Feraud, attempted to block their path, he was seized by the crowd and beheaded. His head was then placed upon a pike and presented to the Convention’s president, Boissy d’Anglas. Some sources from the time claim that the crowd mistook Feraud for Fréron.118 Fréron related this story in the Orateur du peuple, saying that the insurgents, believing that they had his head on the pike, spread the news of his death through the streets of Paris.119 This story is corroborated by reports that the sans-culottes, convinced that Fréron was dead, were rejoicing and dancing around bakeries.120 Yet, other sources from the time give no indication that the crowd initially thought Feraud was Fréron.121 Whatever the truth, Fréron quickly exploited Feraud’s death as propaganda. In the Orateur du peuple, Fréron voiced his regret that he had been the indirect cause of Feraud’s death. “It should have been me!” he lamented, as if truly disappointed. But he was happy, he said, that he had still been able to share in Feraud’s glory. He joined his colleagues to lobby for the “prompt punishment” of those responsible for Feraud’s death.122

118 According to the story, when someone shouted “It’s Feraud!,” some insurgents believed they said “It’s Fréron!”

119 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, (17 Prairial) 5 June, no. 124, 795. Barras also supports this version of the events. Barras, Memoirs, I, 270.

120 Gendron, Gilded Youth, 132. Unfortunately, Gendron does not provide his source for these accounts, though he does give the names of the eyewitnesses.

121 Both Arnaud, in his biography of Fréron, and Kuscinski, in his Dictionnaire des Conventionnels, state that the crowd did think that Feraud was Fréron. Kuscinski takes his information from Antoine Thibaudeau’s eyewitness account in his Memoires. Arnaud, Fils de Fréron, 317; and Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, s.v. Jean Feraud, 256. See also, Antoine Thibaudeau, Mémoiers sur la Convention et le Directoire, (Paris, 1824), I, 166. However, Buchez and Roux, and more important, the record of this day, as recorded in Le Moniteur, say nothing of the crowd mentioning Fréron or mistaking Feraud for him. Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 339ff and Le Moniteur, nos. 244 & 245: 985-90.

122 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, (17 Prairial) 5 June, no. 124, 1795.

154 For several days, the Convention was engaged in putting down the insurrection. On 23 May (4 Prairial), a force of around 1,200 jeunesse dorée marched on the Faubourg St. Antoine, only to be repulsed by the insurgents there. 123 Once again, the Convention called the National Guard to defend it and Fréron was sent, along with General François Menou, with forces to the Faubourg St. Antoine. Upon their arrival, they encountered some insurgents with several primed and ready to fire. But, Fréron’s orders from the Convention were, if possible, to negotiate a peaceful settlement. He carried a decree offering vague promises of the Constitution of 1793 and the release of some arrested patriots. If they would not negotiate, then, he was to warn them that he had three thousand men, under arms, poised to attack. To Fréron’s relief, the insurgents relented and sent a representative to negotiate. The Faubourg was taken without incident. The crowd was then dispersed and the cannons were given up.124 In the end, any promises the Convention had made to the sans-culottes proved to be of little substance. In the days that followed the uprising of Prairial, the sans-culottes were stripped of their political rights and the Convention carried out a swift repression. Fréron had demanded the punishment of all those involved in Feraud’s murder. As a result, Jean Quinet, who carried Feraud’s head on the pike, and several others were executed.125 In addition, seven Montagnard députés of the Convention, who had openly sympathized with the insurgents, were handed over to a military commission and sentenced to death. 126

123 Lefebvre, Thermidorians, 130.

124 See le Moniteur, séance of 23 May 1795 (4 Prairial), no. 248. On 23 May, Fréron made a report to the National Convention on the events of that day. He revealed that the insurrectionists put down their cannon and that twenty-six gendarmes among them were arrested. As part of the negotiations, the insurgents also agreed to hand over some of the leaders of the revolt. Many of these were taken into custody. He also said that the sectionnaries denied that there were any outlawed députés among them and none were found. See also Buchez & Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVII, 379.

125 Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXVI, 374.

126 Le Moniteur, séance of 29 May (10 Prairial) 1795, no. 255, 1028. It is surprising that Fréron joined with some of his colleagues to ask for clemency for these condemned men. His reasons were unclear and seem a strange contradiction to his normal behavior. So, too, was the speech he made on 6 April, in which he called on the Convention to rescind the death penalty for all revolutionary acts, with the exception of those involving foreign plots or agents. One can only

155 The uprisings of Germinal and Prairial had instilled such fears, within the Convention, of the lower classes and everything associated with the radical, democratic phase of the Revolution. The Thermidorians now moved to assure their position in power. They restored freedom of worship in France and as a result, many churches were reopened. They granted amnesty to a great number of Girondin députés, outlawed since the summer of 1793. And, by the end of May, they closed down the revolutionary tribunal permanently.127 Of all their decisions, one of the greatest concerned the fate of the Constitution of 1793. By early June 1795, in the Orateur du Peuple, Fréron argued that it was now impossible to establish a purely democratic constitution in France.128 The two sans-culottes uprisings had convinced the Convention of this impossibility and they soon created a commission to write a new constitution for France. But, in their haste to capitalize on their defeat of the sans-culottes, the Thermidorians had ignored the growing threat from the Right. The Convention’s acceleration of the Thermidorian Reaction, throughout the summer of 1795, resulted inadvertently in raising the hopes of counter- revolutionary elements within the country. Some even dared to hope that the Thermidorian Reaction might eventually go so far as to grant an amnesty for émigrés and a restoration of their properties. Still others dreamed of a restoration of the monarchy in France. Even within the Convention there was a small group of right-wing députés who considered the possibility of proclaiming Louis XVI’s young son, still imprisoned in the Temple, as king.129 Restoration of the monarchy, however, was clearly not the intention of the Thermidorians, for, as Fréron had declared: “the Convention did not want a throne any more than it wanted scaffolds.”130 It was not long before the Convention came to realize just how serious the counter- revolutionary threat had become. Outside of Paris, the uprisings in Paris had given further momentum to the White Terror. From southern cities, such as Aix and Marseilles, there were

speculate that he may have been attempting to deflect accusations that he was still a Terrorist. See Le Moniteur, séance of 6 April (17 Germinal) 1795, no. 200: 815.

127 Le Moniteur, no. 256, 16 prairial (4 June), 1795.

128 Fréron, l’Orateur du peuple, 13 June (25 Prairial), no. 128, 1795.

129 Madelin, Hommes de la Révolution, 328-31.

130 National Convention, séance of 31 December (11 nivôse), 1794. Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 205.

156 continual reports of massacres and other terrible atrocities. To make matters worse, the Convention also began to receive news of émigrés returning to France in large numbers. The seriousness of this new wave of counter-revolution was clear when, on 28 June, an émigré force of some 3,000 embarked, in British ships, for the French coast. These émigrés landed on the Quiberon peninsula in Brittany, hoping to join with royalist forces in Western France. Fortunately for the Convention, on 3 July, this force was defeated and captured by a republican army under the command of General .131 With the very future of the Republic and even the Revolution now at stake, it is not surprising that Fréron and many other leading Thermidorians suddenly experienced a revival of their old republican spirit. As a representative on mission, Fréron had been a staunch foe of counter-revolution in the Midi. How could he now condone the White Terror or the threat that royalists now posed to the nation? And yet, as a Thermidorian, Fréron had persecuted his fellow republicans and had even indirectly contributed to this resurgence of counter-revolution. It would not be that easy for him to ignore his deeds during the past year and convince the public that he was, once more, the republican he had been in 1792 and 1793. In vain, Fréron sought the means to rehabilitate his image. During the month of June, he abandoned the editorship of the Orateur du peuple to his colleague, J.J. Dussault.132 With his colleagues in the Convention, he now worked to secure the future of the Republic. By August, the Thermidorians completed their work on the Constitution of Year III. It provided for the creation of a new republican government consisting of a bi-cameral legislature and a five-member executive Directory. Universal manhood suffrage was abandoned and the ability to vote was now determined on the basis of wealth, placing the government under the control of the bourgeoisie. This provision, however, made the Thermidorians fearful that upcoming elections for the new legislature might be hijacked by anti-republican elements. In Paris, especially, many sectional assemblies, once controlled by sans-culottes, had fallen under the control of men who had actively participated in the jeunesse. The Convention was determined, therefore, to ensure the continuation of a moderate republican regime in France. More important, the Thermidorians wanted to ensure that they remained in office. As a result, on

131 Le Moniteur, no. 299, 29 (17 July) 1795.

132 Gallois, Histoire des journaux, II, 291-92. Dussault would cease the Orateur du peuple’s publication at no. 157 on 13 August 1795.

157 22 August (5 Fructidor), they passed what came to be known as the Law of Two-Thirds. According to this law, when the corps legislatif of the new government was formed, two-thirds of those elected had to come from the ranks of the National Convention. This law was immensely unpopular in France, especially in areas where counter-revolutionary sentiment was strong.133 When the Constitution and the Law of Two-Thirds were submitted to a popular referendum, Parisian voters overwhelmingly rejected it. Despite this fact, on 23 September, the Convention declared that both documents had been approved. Discontent spread throughout Paris. In many bourgeois sections, royalists and their agents now appealed to the jeunesse and others, spreading rumors of voter fraud and of a return to the Terror. For the royalists, the time seemed right to strike at the Convention. The heart of the resistance soon gathered strength in the Lepelletier section, where Fréron had once recruited his jeunesse. Here the royalists organized an insurrectionary committee and prepared to march on the Convention.134 In the face of this new threat, on the evening of 4 October, the Convention named Barras as commander of a force to deal with these insurgents. On hand, the Convention possessed around 5,000 to 6,000 regular troops of the line against the insurgents estimated 20,000 to 25,000.135 To aid him in commanding these forces, Barras also enlisted the help of several generals loyal to the Convention. Most important of these was Napoleon Bonaparte, whose talents Barras and Fréron had acknowledged earlier in Toulon.136 Seeking additional aid, the Convention, ironically, solicited the help of the very sans- culottes they had persecuted. Arms were issued to all citizens “faithful to the revolution.” It was in this moment of crisis that Fréron “became again the man of 1792.”137 He was sent, along with

133 National Convention, séance of 5 Fructidor (22 August) 1795. Le Moniteur, no. 340, 10 Fructidor (27 August) 1795.

134 Lefebvre, Thermidorians, 200 ff.

135 The insurgents’ force included a great number of National Guard from the bourgeois sections of Paris.

136 The other generals who aided the Convention were: Carteaux, Brune, Loison and Dupont. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 39; Lefebvre, Thermidorians, 207.

137 Arnaud, Fils de Fréron, 322.

158 the representative Perrin (des Voges), to the Faubourg St. Antoine “to call up the good citizens in defense of the nation.138 Arriving there, he informed the inhabitants of the dangers facing the Convention. Though many of these sans-culottes certainly had every reason to despise Fréron and the Convention, they despised royalists and the jeunesse even more. Incredibly, the inhabitants answered the Convention’s summons and swore to exterminate the cowards and enemies of the Republic. A battalion was formed at once and Fréron went with it to the Convention’s aid. This would be one of three battalions of sans-culottes sent by the sections of Quinz-Vingts, de Popincourt and of Montreuil to aid the Convention. 139 With loyal forces at the Convention’s disposal and Bonaparte’s quick thinking, the rebels were dispersed with a “whiff of grapeshot” on the quai Voltaire and before the steps of the Church of St. Roch. Once again, the Convention had been saved. The same could not be said, however, of Fréron’s political reputation. Despite Fréron’s contribution to the Convention’s victory, it was simply too late for him to erase the negative image he had earned through his actions over the past year. Many now saw him as a man who, solely for the sake of saving himself and preserving his political position, had unleashed reactionary forces and feelings that had placed the Republic in jeopardy and France on the brink of civil war. His actions as a Thermidorian had earned him the spite of the sans-culottes that he had once championed. And even if he had ever regained their favor, it would have meant little since the Thermidorians had crushed their political influence. On the other hand, memories of Fréron’s pre-Thermidorian days as a radical and terrorist now lost him the support of the average enfranchised bourgeois, who preferred to vote for more moderate candidates. In the streets and in cafés, Fréron and some of his closest colleagues were now “designated as assassins of the people and accomplices of the massacres of the first days of September 1792.”140 As a result, Fréron was not elected to sit in either legislative body of the new Directory government.

138 Le Moniteur, séance of (4 October) 13 Vendémaire 1795, no. 15, 60.

139 Ibid. See also Barras, Memoirs, I, 320. Barras took his account from that of M. Réal’s Essai sur les Journées des 13 et 14 Vendémaire: “Fréron made these men of the 14th July and 10 August hearken once more to the voice of the former Orateur du peuple and the men of the Faubourg, forgetting recent grievances, once more armed those bands ever so fatal to the friends of kings.”

159 Fréron’s political career might have ended at that moment had it not been for his friendship with Barras, soon to be one of the members of the new executive Directory. Barras would use his influence to procure another mission for Fréron. In the last days of its existence, the Convention launched an offensive throughout France to stem the tide of counter-revolution. On 9 October, Fréron was named to serve as special representative on mission to the Department of the Bouches-du-Rhône, to aid in the suppression of the White Terror in that region.141 Fréron might have hoped that this new assignment would help alleviate the damage done to his political reputation. However, by choosing to return to the very place where he had once been responsible for his own atrocities, this new mission would only serve to call his conduct further into question. While it is easy to condemn Fréron for the role he played in the Thermidorian Reaction, there are a few positive observations that can be made. As a Thermidorian, Fréron had worked initially with his colleagues to pass many beneficial reforms that had dismantled the Terror system and restored at least some sense of normalcy to the lives of the citizens. His combined use of propaganda and influence with the jeunesse dorée contributed to the defeat of the Jacobin Club and the sans-culottes, and swiftly ended the Terror. Fréron might also be credited with temporarily helping to restore freedom of the press to France, for good or ill, and of having set the Convention, in 1795, on the road to creating a new constitution and government for France. And yet, in the pursuit of these goals, Fréron had acted both selfishly and recklessly. Concerned more for his own personal safety and political future, he had moved swiftly against his Jacobin enemies, with little thought for the future consequences of his actions. As before, in 1792, he had shamelessly abused freedom of the press, using the Orateur du peuple as a weapon with which to slander and threaten opponents and to incite violence in the streets of Paris. Just as

140 Aulard, Réaction Thermidorienne, II, 261. Report on cafés and public places, 21 September 1795. Along with Fréron, this report named Dubois-Crancé, Legendre and Tallien.

141 Le Moniteur, séance of 9 October (18 Vendémaire) 1795, no. 23, 89-91. Fréron’s appointment was that he be sent on mission to the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône, there to “conform himself to the instructions which will be given to him via the Committees of Public Safety and General Security. He will act in concert with the representative of the people, Girod- Pouzolles, on mission in the departments of the Drôme and Vaucluse.” It is an unusual coincidence that, on the same day, the Convention approved the appointment of Napoleon Bonaparte to the position of “general en second” of the .

160 he had once encouraged the sans-culottes to acts of violence and intimidation, during the Thermidorian Reaction, he repeated the process with the jeunesse dorée. But, in freeing the Convention from the rule of one “mob” he had placed it at the mercy of another. So irresponsibly did he unleash the jeunesse in January of 1795, that he soon lost control over it and, in the end, helped to open a path for the resurgence of counter-revolution. It was in vain, afterwards, that he tried to redeem his reputation. After years of Terror, political uprisings and social violence, France was, at last, tiring of radical politicians and fanatical journalists. Fréron’s aggressive methods had made him a leader of the Thermidorian movement and enabled him eliminate his greatest political opponents, but they had also cost him his future political career.

161 CHAPTER 7

TWILIGHT OF A POLITICAL CAREER

“May you know a torment more frightening than the scaffold: that of living bowed under the weight of your crimes, of shame, of execration and disgrace.” Isnard to Fréron.1

At the end of October 1795, Fréron left Paris to begin his second mission to the Midi. Having failed to be reelected to the legislative bodies of the new Directory government, Fréron was determined to regain his place in revolutionary politics. And yet, of all the challenges Fréron faced in his life, perhaps none was more difficult to overcome than that of trying to resurrect his failing political career. Despite the role he had played as a Thermidorian, his past as a radical journalist and dedicated representative of the Terror followed him for the remainder of his life. In an effort to redeem his reputation, during his second mission to the Midi, Fréron acted with great moderation and refrained from abusing his powers. He also appeared to be on the verge of forging a potentially useful political connection through his courtship of Napoleon’s sister, Pauline. Sadly for Fréron, both his personal and political ambitions were shattered quickly. Hounded by his political enemies, he never regained his seat in the legislature. And, after falling out of favor with the Bonaparte clan, he never fulfilled his ambition to marry Pauline. Instead, Fréron spent the final years of his life debt-ridden, clutching at any employment, however meager and unimportant. It was these grim circumstances that led him to eagerly accept an appointment as sous-préfet to the French colony of Saint-Domingue (Haiti) in 1802. This mission proved to be his last and Fréron was destined to end his days there penniless, alone and forgotten. Prior to Fréron’s arrival there, the Midi had been the scene of royalist resurgence and terrible massacres, especially in the wake of the uprising of Prairial. Throughout the southern departments, particularly the Bouches-du-Rhône, émigrés and other anti-republican elements, emulating the jeunesse dorée in Paris, organized themselves effectively under the banners of the

1 Isnard, Isnard à Fréron, 24.

162 Companies of Jesus and the Sun. These roving vigilante bands employed intimidation and violence against republicans, especially those who had been involved in the Terror. Some of the bloodiest acts of the White Terror in the Midi involved the wholesale massacre of republican prisoners in several prisons in the region. Two of the worst massacres occurred in the prisons of Tarascon and Fort St. Jean. On 6 Prairial (25 May) 1795, hundreds of masked men invaded the prison in Tarascon, killed the prisoners and hurled their bodies onto the rocks below.2 Almost two weeks later, on 17 Prairial (5 June), 127 Jacobin prisoners in Marseilles at the Fort St. Jean were killed by a crazed mob.3 These activities were either ignored or openly encouraged by a number of reactionary representatives on mission. Among these were Henri Isnard,4 Paul Cadroy,5 Jean Chambon-

2 Another such attack occurred on 20 June and then another was attempted on 10 August.

3 More people probably would have been murdered if some of the inmates had not barricaded themselves in their cells. For more information on these massacres and the role played by the representatives in these events, see: Stanislas Fréron, Mémoire Historique sur la Réaction Royale, et sur les Massacres du Midi. Fréron provides extensive primary documents, especially eyewitness accounts of these events. Bouchez and Roux have reproduced many of these documents with commentary in their Histoire Parlementaire, XXXVI, 409-471. See also Lefebvre, Thermidorians, 79-80.

4 Henri Isnard was born in Grasse (Alpes-Maritimes) on 24 February 1758. The son of a merchant, he succeeded his father in the family business. After the Revolution began, he was first elected to represent the department of Var in the Legislative Assembly, and then was re- elected to the National Convention. In 1792, he served as representative on mission to the Pyrenees-Orientales. As a member of the Committee on General Defense in early 1793, he played a role in the creation of the Committee of Public Safety. Placed under house arrest during the Terror, he escaped his guards and sought asylum in the house of a friend, while spreading rumors of his death. During the Thermidorian Reaction, he reentered the Convention on 26 February 1795. In May of 1795, he was sent as a representative on mission to the departments of the Bouches-du-Rhône and the Basses Alpes, where he ordered persecutions and massacres of republicans. Re-elected, he sat in the Council of 500 until 20 May 1797. In 1804 he took up a position as receveur particulier in the Var. In 1810 he retired to life as a merchant and man of letters. In October of 1813 he was made a baron of the Empire. He spent his last years in Grasse, where he died on 12 March 1825. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Henri-Maximin Isnard, 337-39.

5 Paul Cadroy was born in Aire (Landes) on 26 December 1751. He had been a lawyer before the Revolution and, in 1792 was elected to represent Landes in the National Convention, where he could be counted among the Marais. After 9 Thermidor, he emerged as a strong advocate for the suppression of the committees and the popular societies. Sent to the Bouches- du-Rhône and Var, by the decree of 29 Brumaire year III, he earned a notorious reputation as a

163 Latour,6 Jean-Baptiste Jourdan and Pierre Durand-Maillane. Under their authority, hundreds of suspected “terrorists” had been imprisoned and émigrés had been encouraged to return to the region to assume leadership roles. Some of these representatives, especially Isnard and Cadroy, had even created their own companies of jeunesse, providing them with weapons, offering them protection and encouraging them to acts of violence.7 Though Isnard, Cadroy and others had been recalled from their missions by the time of Fréron’s appointment, the situation in the Midi was still extremely unstable. At the end of October 1795, Fréron left Paris to begin his second mission to the Midi. His instructions from the Convention were clear. He was to suppress the White Terror in those departments, particularly in the Bouches-du-Rhône.8 Accompanying him were a dozen or so auxiliaries and secretaries. Among these were Louis Jullien and Alexandre Méchin, both of

Reactionary in that region. While he denounced royalists in the Convention, in the Midi he offered them his protection. He organized his Company of Jesus, which terrorized and pursued republicans throughout the Midi, and he played a leading role in organizing many of the prison massacres in the region (especially the massacre at Fort St. Jean). Afterwards, he returned to Paris where he faced several denunciations for his actions in the Midi, particularly after he was elected to serve in the Council of 500. Having earned a detestable reputation in Paris, he became part of the Clichy Club. Sentenced to deportation in September 1796, he escaped abroad and returned to France at the end of 1799. During the Empire, he served as mayor of Saint-Server, where he died on 9 October 1813. Ibid, see Paul Cadroy, 98-99.

6 Jean-Michel Chambon (La Tour) was born in Uzés (Gard) on 22 August 1739. He was serving as mayor of Uzés when, in 1789, he was elected as a representative to the Estates General. In 1792 he was elected to represent the department of Gard in the National Convention where he took his seat among the Montagnards. He also served as a member of the Committee of General Security. After 9 Thermidor he was sent as a representative on mission to the Bouches- du-Rhône and Var where he joined with his colleague Cadroy in the acts of the White Terror in that region. In 1795 he was elected to sit in the Council of Ancients, where he soon faced accusations of royalist activities. After 1798, he retired to a private life in Uzés, where he died on 6 April 1815. Ibid, see Jean-Michel Chambon (La Tour), 127-28.

7 In Marseilles, Both Chambon and Cadroy had provided for the distribution of arms to the Company of the Sun. In Brignoles, Isnard and Durand Maillane created and protected a local Company of the Sun. In Aix, Isnard encouraged these reactionary forces to violence, telling them: “If you do not have arms, if you do not have guns, well! Dig up the bones of your fathers, they will help you exterminate these brigands!” Fréron, Mémoire, 43, fn.1. See also, Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXVI, 409-471.

8 Archives Nationales. AF III/14.

164 whom had formerly served Fréron as his lieutenants in the jeunesse dorée, as well as his old friend General Guillaume Brune. Also accompanying them was Lucien Bonaparte, who had been appointed as Fréron’s temporary assistant by his brother, Napoleon, the new general en second of the Army of the Interior.9 On 29 October, Fréron arrived in Aix, with some three hundred infantry and cavalry, two cannon and a howitzer. There he wasted no time in carrying out his orders. He immediately dissolved the town council on the grounds that it had allowed massacres of republicans to take place, especially in the prisons of nearby Lambesc. The following day, he left a detachment of troops in Aix to maintain order and domiciliary visits were made to search for weapons.10 That same day, in Lambesc, Fréron ordered the dissolution of the town council and the arrest of two of the suspected ringleaders of the White Terror.11 On 31 October, Fréron arrived in Marseilles and there he implemented the same measures he had taken in Aix. He issued a proclamation to the people explaining that he had come there to “bridle anarchy and to take the daggers from the hands of brigands.”12 Upon his appearance in the city, the Marseilles city council, recalling his former activities in the Terror, quickly launched a protest expressing their doubts as to “the purity of his intentions.” They questioned his authority and expressed their concern that he had come with troops to their commune. Fréron, who considered the city council guilty of complicity in the White Terror, bluntly responded: “From the moment of my arrival, I could see the blood in your eyes…it is necessary for me to use active force to contain crimes.” He described his authority as “an impenetrable shield…placed between the assassins and the victims.”13

9 Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, 11 October 1795. Napoleon writes: “Lucien accompanies Fréron who leaves this evening for Marseilles.” Napoleon I, Correspondance de Napoleon I, (Paris, 1858), I, 102.

10 Archives Nationales. AF III/14.

11 These two citizens were Tronc and Matheron. Council of 500, report of Simeon, séance of 19 Brumaire (9 November) 1795, Le Moniteur, no. 52 (22 Brumaire, Year 4), 207-208.

12 Report of the Executive Directory, 12 Frimaire (2 December) 1795. Le Moniteur, no. 79 (19 Frimaire, year 4),

13 Ibid.

165 Marseilles was placed under martial law and Brune was made commandant of the city. On 13 November, Fréron ordered Brune to take all proper measures to prevent disorders. On the 14th he issued a decree to dismantle and replace the city council for its failure to suppress the murders that had taken place “right in front of its eyes.” He also dismantled the district administration for similar reasons and on the grounds that many of its members were known émigrés.14 This action elicited a formal complaint by the members of the district administration to the Council of 500. But, Fréron gave little heed to these complaints, confident that his actions were legal and well within the limits of his authority. Throughout the Bouches-du-Rhône and surrounding departments, Fréron purged from office all those officials who had failed to take measures to stop assassinations and theft. His decisions appear to have been based on the letters and reports that he received from eyewitnesses, local prosecutors, justices of the peace, as well as the procés verbaux of various municipal administrations.15 However, Fréron did not always make wise decisions when it came to the men he selected to replace those he deposed. While the Directory approved many of his new appointments16, it nullified many others after calling into question the character of some of his new appointees.17

14 See Minutes des arêtes de Directoire. Archives Nationales AF III/330, 1390. The Directory approved Fréron’s measures against the Municipality and the district administration. See also AFIII/14.

15 These letters and reports are all complied into a thorough collection of pièces justificatives in Fréron’s account. See Fréron, Mémoire Historique.

16 See, for example, the meetings of the Directory on: 2 December 1794, 4 December 1795, 3 February 1796, and 4 April 1796. Archives Nationales AFIII/330, 1390; AFIII/331, 1398; AF III/ 344, 1553; AF III/359, 1705; AFIII/330, 1390.

17 Most of Fréron’s appointments which were nullified by the Directory were done so on the grounds that those appointed were still on the list of émigrés or that they were men who commanded little public support as a result of their ineptitude or past crimes during the Revolution. The Ministry of Justice does not appear to have blamed Fréron for having sinister intentions, but rather, they believed that in choosing these men, he had “been deceived by unfaithful information.” Directory, séance of 25 June 1796. AFIII/381, 1941. See also: AFIII/374, 1859 (31 May 1796); AFIII/374, 1863 (1 June 1796); AFIII/377, 1901 (12 June 1796); and AFIII/403, 2191 (12 August 1796).

166 Not only did Fréron replace anti-republican elements within the local governments, but he also took steps to suppress the local bands of jeunesse who had been responsible for so many of the massacres that had taken place in that region. In Marseilles, where the National Guard was known to have, within its ranks, many members of the Companies of Jesus and of the Sun, Fréron ordered the disarmament of the Guard’s grenadiers and chasseurs.18 He then led a force of infantry and cavalry into the departments of the Vaucluse and Drôme to restore stability and bring these areas under the control of the Directory government. In the town of Montélimart, for example, there had been a revolt against the decrees of the Convention relative to the Law of Two-Thirds. Opposition, primarily royalist, had formed under the leadership of an émigré, the Marquis de Lestang. Due to Fréron’s efforts, this rebellion was crushed and Lestang was taken, arms in hand, and was handed over to a military tribunal and shot.19 Fréron also encouraged the pursuit and suppression émigrés and their activities in Toulon. He was especially anxious to bring to justice all those émigrés who had been involved in Toulon’s rebellion against the Convention in 1793 and who now defied the Directory.20 Fréron realized, that if he wanted to restore the public confidence in the new government as well as in his own authority, he had to go beyond just the use of armed force. So he imposed a policy that would enable him to gain the trust of those inhabitants of the region who remembered the negative aspects of his first mission there in 1793. As a result, Fréron freed many patriots who had been unjustly imprisoned during the White Terror. He also organized societies for public aid and service and he ordered that bread be distributed to the poor. In Marseilles especially, he worked to gain the trust of the middle class by protecting property rights and encouraging commerce. 21 In all things, it seems that Fréron

18 Archives Nationales, AF III/14.

19 Fréron, Mémoire Historique, 71. See also Lourdes, Histoire de la Révolution à Marseilles, III, 413.

20 Fréron, Mémoire Historique, 87.

21 Ibid, 87-88. Fréron later bragged to Méchin that all of the widows and poor of Marseilles were on their knees extending their arms to him in gratitude and hoped that his mission would be extended there. Fréron to Alexandre Méchin (22 Pluviose) 10 February 1796. Louis Jullien and Alexandre Méchin, Mémoire sur le Midi, (Paris: 1796).

167 proved to be a capable and prudent administrator. In stark contrast to his behavior during his previous mission, Fréron managed to show great moderation. He was careful that in pursuing his goals, he did not enflame the desires of the local patriots to seek revenge upon their oppressors. 22 Many republicans had, no doubt, held high hopes that he would bring them the revenge they desired.23 However, contrary to the accusations later made against him by his political enemies, there is no proof that Fréron attempted or intended to revive the Terror in the Midi.24 In fact, Fréron’s second mission to the Midi stands in sharp contrast to his previous one in 1793. This time there were no indiscriminate executions, demolitions, or military commissions composed of patriots bent on vigilante justice. Fréron’s assistant Méchin later commended him for his ability to establish stability in the Midi “without violence and without arbitrary measures.”25 On 8 December, the commune of Marseilles sent an official letter to the Council of 500 in which they praised the work that Fréron had done: “We are happy to tell you of the changes we have undergone, occasioned by the arrival of citizen Fréron. Thanks to his energy and your laws, the provisory authorities, which organized and protected crimes, are replaced. Fréron…has only preached there the love of the laws, forgiving offenses and [encouraging] the happiness of all. A strict observer of principles; he has refrained from using all the powers he possesses.”26 Despite Fréron’s success in the Midi, there were those within the new legislative assemblies, primarily the Council of 500, who criticized and questioned the legality of Fréron’s

22 Fréron, Mémoire historique, 87. See also Lourdes, Histoire de la Révolution à Marseilles, 411-12. The Directory had encouraged Fréron to reaffirm the Republican system in the Bouches- du-Rhône and to “march with strength between anarchy and royalism.” Directory, séance of 27 January 1796, AFIII/343, 1538.

23 It is clear from some of their letters that many local republicans were thrilled that Fréron had returned to the region and hoped that he would pursue émigrés and others with the same zeal he had shown on his earlier mission. See, for example, the letter written by Citizen Icard to Fréron: “Glory! Your courage comes to save Toulon a second time!” Fréron, Mémoire historique, 323. See additional letters on pages 282, 299 and 302.

24 See the attacks made on Fréron in the Council of 500 on 20 March 1796. Le Moniteur, no. 185, 5 Germinal (25 March) 1796.

25 Alexandre Méchin to Fréron, 10 February 1796. Fréron, Mémoire historique, 82-83.

26 Letter of Marseilles to the Council of 500, 17 Frimaire (8 December) 1795. Bouchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVII, 124-25.

168 actions. Fréron had been appointed, as a representative on mission by the National Convention, a government that no longer existed. Moreover, Fréron had not been elected as a member of the new Legislative Corps. Therefore, on what authority, his critics asked, did Fréron base his actions? As early as 9 November, the Directory was criticized openly for the continued presence of the representatives on mission in the departments. According to a decree of 20 Vendémaire, all representatives on mission were to be recalled by the Directory upon its assumption of the executive power. On that day, in the Council of 500, the député Siméon argued that the continued activities of representatives, like Fréron, had not helped cure civil discord, but instead threatened to increase tensions between factions. He accused Fréron of antagonizing the inhabitants of the Midi through his show of force. He further accused him of having created armed gangs of republicans newly freed from prison. Fréron’s actions, he said, had only made the inhabitants of the Midi fear a renewal of the Terror. Consequently, he asked that the Directory recall Fréron and all representatives from the departments.27 Fortunately for Fréron, he had friends in the Directory and in the Council of 50028 to defend him. Barras used his power and influence as a Director to give legality to Fréron’s mission.29 Fréron also benefited from the fact that his former Thermidorian comrade, Merlin de Thionville, was Minister of Justice. On 2 December, the Directory made a report to the Council of 500 concerning their opinions on Fréron’s actions. They ruled that, according to the law of 29 Vendémaire, the representatives on mission had been ordered to immediately destroy all constituted authorities “who had failed to denounce assassinations committed by diverse royalist

27 Council of 500, séance of 9 November 1795, Le Moniteur, 22 Brumaire (12 November), 1795.

28 Following Siméon’s speech, the député, Colombel, spoke in Fréron’s defense. He first asserted that the National Convention had had only good intentions when it sent representatives to the departments after the Vendémaire uprising. He told Siméon that if he had any real idea of the situation in the Midi (particularly in the Bouches-du-Rhône) and how truly dangerous it was there; he would not be so quick to judge the measures recently taken by Fréron. “His task is a difficult one, but he has up to this point performed it with success,” he told Siméon. Ibid.

29 Archives Nationales AFIII/341, 1517. If the newspaper Messager du Soir (22 April 1796) is to be believed, then it is obvious that Fréron knew just how much he owed to his friend and how much he relied upon him for his authority. It was said that whenever petitioners approached Fréron, he would always reply: “I will write to Barras; I will speak to Barras.” See Aulard, Réaction Thermidorienne, II, 139.

169 associations.” They said that Fréron did this “without compromising the state and without violating his mandate.” Not only had he dismissed those who condoned massacres, but also those men in power in the Midi who were known émigrés. Fréron, they asserted, had done a great service to the nation by ousting these men from power.30 In light of these opinions, the Directory ruled that Fréron’s decrees of 24 Brumaire31 were approved and that the formal complaints made by the administration of the Bouches-du-Rhône were null and void.32 Moreover, the Directory would not officially recall Fréron for almost another two months. Thus, with the help of his friends, Fréron weathered these initial attacks and continued in his mission. He took up residence in Marseilles, where he managed to live comfortably in a large and rather luxurious home. When he traveled throughout the city and surrounding areas, he was always followed by a large entourage and protected by a guard of troops of the line. He hosted his own fêtes and accepted many invitations to the parties and to the private salons of the provincial ladies.33 One place in which Fréron spent much of his free time was the home of the Clary family. The Clary’s daughter, Julie, was the wife of Joseph Bonaparte. Fréron had made their acquaintance through his growing friendship with both Napoleon and Lucien Bonaparte.34 It was

30 The Directory countered the arguments put forth by the administration of the Bouches- du-Rhône as well as by Fréron’s opponents in the Council of 500. The latter had argued that Fréron’s decrees were not legal because the Constitution had gone into effect and that the decrees of 5 Fructidor and 29 Vendémaire had said that officials were to continue in their functions until their replacement according to forms proscribed by the constitution. But, the Directory pointed out that the decree of 29 Vendémaire stated that the constitution was not in force until the installation of the Executive Directory. Therefore, all representatives on mission, re-elected or not, were to continue in their missions until they were officially notified of the Directory’s establishment. Report of the Executive Directory on the operations of the commissioner of the government in the Department of the Bouches-du-Rhône, 12 Frimaire (2 December) 1795. Le Moniteur, no. 79, 19 Frimaire (9 December) 1795.

31 These were Fréron’s decrees for the destitution of the municipality and the administration of the Bouches-du-Rhône. Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Messager du soir, 22 April 1796. As quoted in Aulard, Réaction Thermidorienne, II, 139.

170 also through Lucien and the Clarys that Fréron came to know the remaining members of the Bonaparte family. Napoleon’s mother, Letizia Bonaparte, and his three young sisters: Elisa, Caroline and Pauline were also residing in Marseilles.35 It appears that Fréron was smitten immediately with the lovely and vivacious, sixteen- year old Pauline. Fréron was almost twenty-five years her senior, but he was handsome, well dressed and possessed an irresistible charm. Moreover, he was a man with power and prestige in Marseilles. It is not surprising, then that the precocious Pauline was equally attracted to him. Soon, the two were exchanging love letters, locks of hair and personal portraits.36 Though he had a reputation as a roué, Fréron’s intentions this time appear to have been honorable. He had reached an age when the idea of settling down with a beautiful, young bride greatly appealed to him. He may also have been thinking of his future political career. A marriage to Pauline would attach him to the rising fortunes of her brother, Napoleon.37 It is surprising that neither Letizia nor Napoleon initially opposed this match. As late as 9 March 1796, Pauline wrote to Fréron assuring him that neither her mother nor any other person would refuse him her hand.38 Fréron, therefore, had every reason to hope for the successful

34 Napoleon had written to Madame Clary: “Fréron, who is going on a mission to Marseilles, will hand you this letter…You will find him a man very ready to oblige, loyal and of a good sort…. I have told him of the friendly feelings I have for your family, so he will look out for opportunities to make himself useful to you.” Napoleon Bonaparte to Madame Clary, 11 October 1795. Letter excerpt taken from G. La Caille, Amateur d’autographes (Paris, 1901), 147-48, as cited in Hector Fleischmann, Pauline Bonaparte and her Lovers (New York, 1914), 36.

35 Some authors have speculated that Fréron may have made the acquaintance of Letizia Bonaparte and her children much earlier, during his first mission in 1793, when they were residing outside of Toulon in the town of Beausset. Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 333; Fleischmann, Pauline Bonaparte, 35-36.

36 Pauline Bonaparte to Stanislas Fréron, 19 Ventôse, 1796; 30 Floreal, 1796. Revue Retrospective, ou bibliothèque historique contenant des mémoires et documents authentiques (Paris, 1834), III, 100-02.

37 Fleischmann, Pauline Bonaparte, 37-40.

38 Pauline Bonaparte to Fréron, 9 March 1795, as cited in Theodore Iung, Lucien Bonaparte et ses mémoires, (Paris, 1882), I, 144-45.

171 outcome of his suit. However, the happy days he spent in courtship with Pauline were disrupted when, at the end of January, he received disappointing news from Paris. On 26 January 1796, the Directory officially recalled Fréron from his mission. On the 27th they wrote to him, asking that he return to Paris as soon as possible.39 When Fréron learned of his recall, he tried every means at his disposal to renew his mission. He attempted to delay his return to Paris, writing numerous letters to the Directory, and petitioning citizens of the Midi to write letters on his behalf to the Council of 500.40 While he awaited an official response to his petitions, he continued to pass the weeks with Pauline and her family, oblivious to his recall. By 9 March, however, the Directory was growing impatient and instructed the commissioners of the central administrations of the departments of the Drôme, Vaucluse, Var and Basses Alpes to notify Fréron once more of his recall.41 The Directory’s impatience with Fréron undoubtedly stemmed from a renewal of complaints and accusations that were made against him in the Legislative Corps. On 20 March, in the Council of 500, Jean-Baptiste Jourdan42 and Henri Isnard, two former representatives on mission to the Bouches-du-Rhône, violently attacked Fréron for his activities in the Midi. Like

39 The Directory wrote that they desired “to profit from the details that he could give them in the situation in those areas into which he has been sent.” Archives Nationales AFIII/343, 1538.

40 Arnaud cites a letter written by the patriots of Manosque and of Sisteron, 6 Germinal (26 April) 1796 as cited in L’Observateur du Midi de la Républic, year III and divers other articles in this journal. Arnaud, Le Fils de Fréron, 341.

41 Directory, séance of 9 March 1796. Archives Nationales AFIII/353, 1640.

42 Born in Lormes (Nièvre) on 19 December 1757, Jourdan was a lawyer by profession. During the Revolution, he was elected as député to the National Convention and served there as a member of the Committee to examine accounts. In 1794, he was sent to the Midi, where he played a leading role in the organization and protection of local companies of Jesus and the Sun. Elected to the new Corps legislative of the Directory after Vendémaire 1795 and again in Germinal of 1796, Jourdan only reluctantly accepted his seat and spent most of his time on a leave of absence. After the (1799) he was elected to the new of the Corps legislative, but refused the seat and retired to his native department of Nièvre where he died, at Saint Aubin-des-Chaumes, on 16 November 1829. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Jean Baptiste Jourdan, 352.

172 Simeon, Jourdan accused Fréron of attempting to renew the Terror in the Midi. He falsely asserted that Fréron had replaced all those men he had purged from administrative positions in the Midi with former Jacobins and Maratists. Fréron had done nothing there, Jourdan asserted, but “stir up memories and images of the frightening regime of Year III.” Jourdan and Isnard furthered these complaints by accusing Fréron of having embezzled the funds entrusted to him for his mission. “Recalled for a month by the Directory and for four months by the constitution,” Jourdan complained, “Fréron continues to reign over this chaos; that is to say he relishes his work. Fréron the most insane and guilty of men, pursues his bizarre mission, despite the Directory itself.”43 There is no evidence to substantiate these accusations that Fréron was attempting to create a “Jacobin Vendée” in the Midi. Indeed, such claims held even less validity considering that Jourdan and Isnard had only recently disgraced themselves by their reactionary activities in the Midi. Isnard, along with Cadroy, had already faced denunciations in the Council of 500 for their activities as representatives on mission.44 Fréron’s continued presence in the region threatened perhaps to uncover even more information concerning their involvement in the White Terror. It is ironic, then, that their attack only encouraged Fréron to accumulate as many documents and personal accounts possible with which to counter their accusations.45 With no recourse now but to return to Paris and face the Directory and his detractors, Fréron hurried to obtain permission to marry Pauline. But, Letizia withheld her consent. In an attempt to overcome this obstacle, Fréron wrote to Napoleon begging him to intervene on his behalf.46 And yet, Napoleon also hesitated.47 Certainly, the denunciations made against him in

43 Séance of 20 March 1796. Le Moniteur, no. 185, 5 Germinal (25 March) 1796.

44 In the Council of 500, 8 December 1795, Isnard, Cadroy and others were denounced through a letter sent from the Marseillais to the Council of 500. This letter, which was read aloud in the Council, gave an account of their activities, attested to by eyewitnesses. See Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXVI, 116-26.

45 Ibid, XXXVI, 416.

46 Fréron to Napoleon, 24 March 1796. Revue Rétrospective, III, 100-01.

173 the Council of 500 had lessened Fréron’s attractiveness as an ideal husband for Pauline. Yet, it is also likely that the Bonaparte family had, by this time, learned that Fréron had a secret back in Paris: a mistress and two illegitimate children. The identity of Fréron’s mistress remains a mystery, for little is known of her, not even her name.48 But, she had, no doubt, learned of Fréron’s plans to wed Pauline and had wasted no time in making herself known to the Bonaparte family.49 Soon, Pauline was forced to renounce Fréron, though her personal feelings toward him appear to have remained unchanged, even by the knowledge of his mistress.50 And yet, with the exception of Lucien,51 the entire Bonaparte family was now aligned against the union. Even Napoleon’s wife, Josephine who had never met Pauline, added her objections.52 Though both Pauline and Fréron continued for some time to hold out hope, Napoleon’s decision was final. Just before the Battle of Lodi, he wrote to his brother, Joseph: “I pray you to arrange the affairs of Pauline. It is not my intention that she shall marry Fréron. Tell her and make it clear to him.”53

47 In his memoirs, Barras defended Fréron by insisting that Napoleon’s objections stemmed from his desire to reserve Pauline “for some distinguished general or some Italian prince.” Barras, Memoirs, II, 129.

48 One source has suggested that she may have been a dancer at the Opera. But most sources assert that nothing at all is known of her. Arnaud, Fils de Fréron, 350-51, fn.1 and Fleischmann, Pauline Bonaparte, 46.

49 We know this from what Pauline said of Fréron’s mistress in her letters. “I am not going to say anything more about your mistress. I know the uprightness of your heart, and approve of the arrangements you are making in regard to her.” Pauline to Fréron, 14 Messidor (2 July) 1796. Revue Retrospective, III, 104.

50 She wrote later to Napoleon: “I feel that it is impossible for me to renounce Fréron after all the promises that I have made never to love any but him.” Pauline to Napoleon, (no date). Revue Retrospective, III, 108-09.

51 Lucien wrote to Fréron assuring him that Pauline still possessed the most “lively love and most pure sentiment” for him. Lucien attempted to speak to Napoleon, but said that his brother had been so occupied with other duties that he would not concern himself with family matters. Lucien Bonaparte to Fréron, 15 June 1796. As quoted in Iung, Lucien Bonaparte, 144.

52 Pauline wrote to Fréron: “My love, all the world is against us. I see by your letter that your friends are ingrates, as much as Napoleon’s wife whom you believe is on your side. She has written to her husband that I will be dishonored if I marry you….” Pauline Bonaparte to Fréron, 10 July 1796. Ibid, I, 147.

174 With the dreams of his future happiness shattered, Fréron turned to the challenge of salvaging what was left of his failing political career. When he retuned to Paris around 14 April, the Directory immediately informed him that he had ten days in which to render an account of his mission.54 Since he stood accused of embezzlement, in the Council of 500, they especially wanted to see the records of his expenditures relating to the near two million livres with which he had been entrusted for the cost of his mission.55 Records of Fréron’s expenditures were submitted to the Finance Minister for review. Although the Finance Ministry criticized some of Fréron’s unnecessary expenditures, they officially declared that his “dispenses…did not appear exceptional.” 56 On this charge, at least, Fréron triumphed over his accusers. However, he did not enjoy a similar success when he attempted to defend to his political reputation. In order to counter the accusations of Jourdan and Isnard, Fréron took up his pen, his favorite weapon, and published his Mémoire Historique sur la Réaction Royale, et sur les Massacres du Midi. This memoir was not a detailed, personal account of Fréron’s second mission to the Midi, but only a minimal, yet highly romanticized, discussion of his own actions. So, Fréron assumed the role of historian and provided his readers with a lengthy account of the events that occurred prior to his arrival there. He wanted to inundate his readers with evidence to prove the complicity of Isnard, Cadroy, Jourdan and others in the horrific events of the White Terror in that region. As a result, he included an exhaustive collection of primary source material including many eyewitness accounts as well as the official procés verbaux of magistrates of Marseilles and the surrounding areas attesting to the massacres in places like Ft. St. Jean, Tarascon and the prison at Aix.57 Although this work provided scholars with a wealth of

53 Ibid, I, 146. Napoleon must have written this letter sometime prior 10 May 1796.

54 Directory, séance of 31 May 1796. Archives Nationales AFIII/376, 1859.

55 He had been given 1,948,846 livres in assignats and 35,243 livres in cash. Taken from a report made by the Minister of Finance to the Directory, 9 June 1796. Archives Nationales AF III/377, 1893.

56 They pointed out that the large retinue of assistants, which Fréron had surrounded himself with and paid regularly at Marseilles, had not been necessary. Ibid.

175 information on these events, it is unfortunate that the second volume,58 in which Fréron planned to thoroughly discuss his second mission and perhaps even to defend his first mission of 1793- 94, was never completed. The publication of Fréron’s Memoire sparked a vicious reaction from his opponents. Isnard, Cadroy, Durand-Maillane,59 and others who stood accused by Fréron, published pamphlets in which they attempted to divert attention away from their own crimes by attacking Fréron. Some attempted to respond piecemeal to Fréron’s accusations, while others chose to attack Fréron in turn for his past actions as an agent of the Terror in the Midi as well as for his activities during the Thermidorian Reaction. In retrospect, the majority of these pamphlets only proved that their authors were men who were just as guilty as Fréron for past excesses and just as desperate to declare their innocence while pointing an accusatory finger at others.60 It only remained to be seen, just which of them had the power to win over public opinion.

57 Buchez and Roux say that they know for a fact that some of these pieces are indeed authentic and that they conform to the originals. Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire, XXXVI, 416.

58 Fréron, Mémoire historique, 80. In a footnote on this page, the editors of the 1824 edition of Fréron’s Mémoire state that this second volume never appeared. In his pamphlet, Isnard had told Fréron: “I await the publication of the second volume of this monstrous work…to respond to all the inculpations against me!” Isnard à Fréron, 3.

59 Pierre Durand-Maillane was born in Saint-Remy (Bouches-du-Rhône) on 1 November 1729. An avocat of cannon law, he was elected as a member of the Estates General in 1789. He played a great role in the editing of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and soon became a member of the Jacobin Club. He was elected to represent the Bouches-du-Rhône in the National Convention, where he chose to sit among the moderates of the Plain. During the Thermidorian Reaction he was a strong advocate for the dissolution of the Jacobin Clubs; he was appointed to serve on the committee which drew up the Constitution of 1795 that created the Directory. In July of 1795 he was sent as a representative to the Bouches-du-Rhône, where he encouraged the White Terror in that region by offering his protection and support to the Companies of Jesus and of the Sun. Recalled at the end of Fructidor 1795, he was elected to sit in the Council of Ancients where he remained, defending royalist interests, until 20 May 1797. In 1798 he was convicted of spying for enemies of the Republic and imprisoned in the Temple. When he was taken before the criminal tribunal of the Seine, several députés (among them Jourdan) spoke in his defense and he was acquitted. Afterwards, he returned to his place of birth where he died on 14 August 1814. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, s.v. Pierre-Toussaint Durand-Maillane, 233-34.

60 Among the pamphlets written in response to Fréron’s Mémoire were:

176 Initially, the battle between Fréron and his enemies drew little attention from the Parisian public, whose attentions were focused on more immediate issues such as finances and peace.61 However, this quickly changed with the appearance of Isnard’s pamphlet entitled simply Isnard à Fréron. Having failed in attempts to attack Fréron for his conduct on his second mission to the Midi, Isnard launched a vicious attack on Fréron’s actions during his first mission of 1793-94.62 In this pamphlet, Isnard recalled the executions and demolitions ordered in Marseilles by Fréron and presented his readers with yet another reprinting of Fréron’s letters, particularly those to Moyse Bayle, in which he had boasted of his actions. Isnard said nothing of his own contribution to the bloodshed in the Midi. Instead he argued, and not unconvincingly, that Fréron’s organization of the jeunesse dorée, which was copied in areas outside of Paris, had contributed to the Thermidorian Reaction in that region. “Do you believe that you can make us forget your crimes by recounting the acts of vengeance that followed? Insane! These stories accuse you: it is your criminal actions, which gave birth to those unfortunate reactions.”63 Isnard’s pamphlet “written with force and energy,” was said to have “electrified the people,”64 while Fréron’s Memoirs had far fewer admirers. Had the “People’s Orator” finally lost

Paul Cadroy, Cadroy, Membre du Conseil des Cinq-Cents, à ses collègues, sur le Mémoire de Fréron, (Paris, 1796). Pierre Durand-Maillane, Réponse de Durand-Maillane, au Mémoire de Fréron sur le Midi, (Paris, 1796). Jean Rouyer, Rouyer, depute du department de l’Herault, member du Conseil des Cinq- Cents, au Citizen ***, au sujet de l’ex-député, Fréron, (Paris, 1796).

61 Report on Public Spirit. Aulard, Reaction Thermidorienne, III, 361.

62 Isnard begins: “Oh Fréron! I congratulate myself for having merited your hatred…You have vilified me in your eulogies; but it is you, the devastator and the butcher of my country, who has the audacity to charge me?…You do not believe that I will reveal the unprecedented assassinations of your first mission…Are you more afraid that I dare to publish them, or that they will be believed? Yes, I will horrify France, I will surprise the centuries, by the narratives of your hideous crimes; yourself, looking in your faithful mirror, will draw back in fear.” Isnard, Isnard à Fréron, 3-4.

63 Ibid, 4.

64 A report on Public Spirit, 7 August 1796, recalled: “They admire the style, and they tremble to hear of the horrors attributed to Fréron.” Aulard, Réaction Thermidorienne, III, 374- 75. By 12 August, in the streets and cafés of Paris, people discussed Fréron’s actions as a

177 his ability to influence the masses? Perhaps, but Fréron’s growing notoriety was the result of far more than these vicious pamphlets. Fréron’s political reputation also suffered from a series of rumors that had spread throughout Paris since his return. In the streets and cafés, it was said that Fréron was bitter at not having been reelected to the legislature, that he was jealous of the Directors and that, by 30 June, he was no longer even received at the Directory. 65 Moreover, his name was continually associated with numerous, radical plots to overthrow the government.66 Someone had even denounced him to the Minister of Police (along with his old colleague Tallien) for being the leader of a new Terrorist movement.67 Although, there was no evidence to substantiate these accusations,68 it must have been clear to Fréron that he would be haunted forever by his past as a radical proponent of the Terror. Barras saw this clearly, concluding in his memoirs that: “it was the spite felt toward him [Fréron] in connection with his mission of Year II which nowadays caused the missionary of Year IV to be persecuted.”69

Terrorist in Marseilles and some believed that “the atrocities committed in the Midi have not yet been punished.” Ibid, 388.

65 Messager du soir, as cited in Aulard, Réaction Thermidorienne, III, 285.

66 One of the most ridiculous rumors linked Fréron with the Babeuf Plot. Though Babeuf had allied himself with Fréron and other Thermidorian journalists in the weeks following 9 Thermidor, he and Fréron had later parted company over differences in political opinion. Fréron had then attacked Babeuf numerous times in the Orateur du peuple and Babeuf even attributed his arrest in 1795 to Fréron’s attacks on him. Buchez and Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, XXXVII, 140. Fréron was also accused of having been involved in the “Grenelle plot.” After the failure of the Babeuf plot in May 1796, some ex-patriots and Terrorists hatched a plot to seize control of the military camp at Grenelle. After gaining the support of the troops, they planned to start an insurrection against the Directory. Their goal was to purge the Council of 500 and form a new Assembly. Unfortunately for Fréron, his name had been listed, among others, by these conspirators as one of the men they hoped to place in this new assembly. This plot had failed, however, when the authorities, learning of the plot ahead of time, set a trap for the conspirators. Fréron’s involvement in this plot was never proven. For more information on this plot, see Barras, Memoirs, II, 215-18.

67 See the “Report on Public Spirit,” 6 June 1796 in Aulard, Reaction Thermidorienne, III, 233. See also Barras, Memoirs, II, 187; III, 481.

68 Barras said that he had “begged that there be an end to vague accusations and that facts and documents inculpating these citizens may be produced.” Barras, Memoirs, II, 370-71.

178 To make matters worse, Fréron had made a powerful enemy of an important member of the Directory, Lazare Carnot. According to Barras, Carnot had grown preoccupied with the belief that Fréron was still out to ruin him.70 Carnot’s paranoia is somewhat understandable considering the fact that just months before, during the Reaction, Fréron had mercilessly attacked him in the Orateur du Peuple. Though, realistically, without the influence he once enjoyed through his newspaper, it was unlikely that Fréron was capable of harming Carnot. Nevertheless, Carnot soon proved to be one of many obstacles to Fréron’s future political career. Yet, despite rumors, pamphlets and political opponents, Fréron still held out hopes to be elected into the Council of 500. He appeared close to achieving his goal when, on 8-9 November 1796, news arrived from San Domingue that he had been officially elected, along with several others, to represent Guyana in the Council of 500.71 But, almost immediately, suspicions were raised over the legality of his election. Barras claimed that on the day the news arrived at the Directory, Carnot and Étienne Letourner questioned who had influenced this decision.72 Carnot protested Fréron’s election and declared that it would be cancelled.73 If Barras is to be believed, then it comes as no surprise that just days later in the Council of 500, a proposal was made that before any newly elected member of the legislature could take their seat, it was necessary to validate the credentials of their nomination and election. Then, one member pointed out what he believed were certain “irregularities” in the procés verbaux of the

69 Ibid, II, 12.

70 Barras goes on to comment on Carnot, saying that he had built up a personal spite for Fréron. Carnot continually insisted, for example, that “Fréron, Tallien, Poultier and Louvet were conspiring against him.” Barras added that he was tired of having to hear at every sitting (of the Directory) “a discharge of passion hurled against estimable Republicans who, being absent, are powerless to defend themselves.” Ibid, II, 370-71.

71 He had been elected on 8 June 1796.

72 Barras says that when Truget, the Minister of Marine, brought the news of Fréron’s election to the Directory, Carnot and Letourner immediately questioned him as to who had made this decision. Truget, perplexed by their question, told them that it had been the electors of Guyana who had selected the new députés. Attempting to defend Fréron, Barras then told Carnot and Letourner that the matter did not concern them. Barras, Memoirs, II, 266-67.

73 Ibid, II, 199-200.

179 Guyana elections. Fréron, who was present that day in the legislative hall, could only sit in silence as the Council of 500 appointed a Commission of Five to investigate and verify the powers of the newly elected députés of Guyana.74 Two weeks later, on 23 November, the commission made its report. Speaking for the commission, Jean-François Izoard,75 declared that the Guyana elections were invalid. In what amounted to accusing Fréron (and those elected with him) of election tampering, Izoard revealed the activities of a certain Citizen Jeannet, whom they believed had helped influence the outcome of the elections. Rather than wait for the electors of Guyana to receive the official summons, Jeannet had recruited electors there and, through his efforts, Fréron and others had obtained a majority of 14 out of 16 votes. To justify their decision to invalidate the election, Izoard claimed that most of the men elected to represent Guyana,76 such as Fréron’s colleague Antoine Garnier,77 were from the department of the Aube, as was Jeannet. Furthermore, Izoard’s

74 Council of 500, séance of 12 November 1796. Le Moniteur, no. 56, 25 Brumaire (16 November) 1796.

75 Jean-François-Auguste Izoard was born near Embrun (Hautes-Alpes) on 2 November 1765. Before the Revolution, he had served as a royal prosecutor in his hometown. In 1791 he was elected to the Legislative Assembly by the department of the Hautes-Alpes. Reelected to the National Convention, he became a member if the Committee of Finances. It was as a result of his report, on 3 February 1795, that the Convention repealed its rigorous laws against the city of Lyons. Sent on mission to the Hautes and Basses Pyrenees and Lozère, he purged the authorities and the popular societies in these areas conforming to a sense of moderate republicanism. Reelected to the Corps Legislatif in October 1795, he took his seat in the Council of 500 where he served until 20 May 1797. Afterward, he served in numerous positions, such as Counsel to Cagliari (1798), and Inspector of the Public Finances during the Consulate and the Empire. He died in Embrun on 13 July 1840. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Jean-François Izoard, 340-41.

76 Besides Fréron and Garnier, Joseph Sévestre, Alexandre-Edme David, Charles Blutel, Pierre-François Bounel and Marie-François Moreau were also elected. See Stanislas Fréron and Garnier (de l’Aube), Faussetés Avancées par Isoard, dans son rapport sur les elections de Cayenne. Par Fréron et Garnier (de l’Aube), députés de la Guyane française, au corps legislative, (Paris, 1796), 4.

77 Antoine-Marie-Charles Garnier (de l’Aube) was born in on 7 September 1742. He was a lawyer and had served as procurer of the commune of Troyes when he was elected, in 1792, to represent the department of Aube in the National Convention. There he became a Dantonist. On 9 March 1793, he was sent on mission, charged with surveillance and recruitment, in the departments of Aube and Yonne. On 18 June he was sent to the departments of Ain , Côte

180 commission also raised questions over Guyana’s status as a department, and whether it had been properly districted for electoral purposes at the time of Fréron’s election.78 Astounded by the Council of 500’s refusal to validate their elections, Fréron and Garnier immediately attempted to defend themselves in a pamphlet entitled Faussetés Avancées par Isoard, dans son rapport sur les elections de Cayenne. Labeling Izoard’s accusations as “demented,” Fréron protested by reprinting the procés verbaux of the electoral assembly in Guyana which had chosen the electors who had voted for him and the others. Fréron effectively argued that Guyana was a department of France and that his election was not in violation of the electoral procedures initially instituted by the Convention or by the Directory.79 Unfortunately for Fréron, this protest had little effect. He refused, however, to accept the Council’s decision, and over the course of the following year, he and Garnier persisted in their demands to be admitted to the legislature. Eventually, on 10 October 1797, the Council of 500 voted to dismiss their renewed demands.80 Fréron was fighting a losing battle, especially when one considers that elections in April 1797 to the Legislative Corps yielded mostly conservative deputies who had promised to continue to purge politicians who had been involved in the radical phase of the Revolution. In such an environment, Fréron must have realized finally that he stood no chance of sitting in the legislature.

d’Or, Doubs and Jura, to suppress a federalist insurrection. Returning to the Convention at the end of 1793, he later took part in the coup of 9 Thermidor in which he is best remembered for his admonishment of Robespierre: “The blood of Danton chokes him!” From November 1794 to March 1795 he served as a member of the Committee of General Security and in April 1795 he left for the departments of Doubs, Haute-Saòne, Jura, Mont Blanc, Bas Rhin and Meurthe to serve as inspector of salt works. He did not return to the Convention. After his election to the Council of 500, as député of Guyana, was annulled, he retired to private life in the department of Aube, where he died in Blaincourt on 9 September 1805. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Antoine- Marie-Charles Garnier (de l’Aube), 279.

78 Séance of 3 Frimaire (23 November) 1796. Le Moniteur, no. 66, 6 Frimaire (26 November) 1796.

79 Fréron argued that, according to the law of 1 Vendémaire (1795), the National Convention had convened elections in all and that, any agent of the Directory (i.e. Jeannet) had the right to invoke a meeting of electors to cast votes for representatives. Fréron and Garnier (de l’Aube), Faussetés Avancées par Isoard, 23-24.

80 Report of Sainthorent to the Council of 500, 10 October 1797. Le Moniteur, no. 22, 22 Vendémaire (13 October), 1797.

181 Fréron was condemned to spend the final years of the Directory relegated to a pitiable existence, grasping at almost any position that might be offered to him, and dependent entirely on the kindness of his friends who had faired much better than he in the end. But, many of these friends, no doubt, now regarded Fréron as both an embarrassment and a liability. Even Barras, in his memoirs, has little to say of their relationship during these years. In August of 1798, Fréron managed to secure a meager position as a state agent of octroi in Paris,81 but always, he held out hope that the Directory might appoint him to some new and important assignment. Twice, he received promises of appointments from the Directory, only to have them revoked at the last minute. For example, almost one year after the Council of 500 dismissed his demands concerning his election, the Directory appointed Fréron to succeed Jean Izoard as consul to Cagliari (in Sardinia).82 But this appointment, for some unknown reason, was revoked as quickly as it had been promised. A year later, on 16 Fructidor (2 September), 1799, Fréron was nominated to serve as commissioner of the Directory to Saint-Domingue.83 But he appears never to have taken up this post. Pitifully, Fréron now lived a meager existence, riddled with debts. Rigid press laws84 imposed by the Directory inhibited him from renewing his career as a journalist. And, even if he had been able, he lacked the money needed to even commence the publication of such a journal. Like his father before him, he now found himself hounded by his creditors and the bailiffs soon came to seize his furniture on account of his debts.85 Reduced to poverty, he sought out his old

81 Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, 275, see Stanislas Fréron.

82 12 October 1798. Archives Nationales, AFIII/471, 2886. In the end, Izoard was succeeded by Coffin.

83 Le Moniteur, 16 Fructidor (2 September), 1798.

84 On (25 germinal) 14 April 1796, the Directory had imposed laws that muzzled freedom of the press. Séance of the Corps Legislatif, 24 germinal (14 April) 1796. Le Monietur, no. 209, 29 germinal (18 April) 1796, 834-36.

85 In a letter written to a friend on 29 Thermidor, 1799, Fréron sought advice on how to shelter himself from the pursuit of the bailiffs. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Stanislas Fréron, 275.

182 friends whom he begged for loans.86 Desperate and alone, he returned to the arms of his mistress, whom he married, probably not long after he learned of Pauline’s marriage to General Victor Leclerc in June of 1797. His wife and children were undoubtedly a source of comfort, but they also placed an additional burden on Fréron to provide for their well being as well as his own. Consigned to political oblivion, it is not surprising that Fréron played no role whatsoever in the Coup of Brumaire which overturned the Directory in November 1799 and catapulted Napoleon Bonaparte to power. This event, however, promised to open new doors to Fréron, who still counted Lucien Bonaparte among his closest friends. Lucien had once written to Fréron: “I am attached to you, not because I must be grateful to you,87 but because of your character, your heart and the superiority of your talents have forever won for you my esteem and my friendship.”88 After 18 Brumaire, when Lucien became the Minister of the Interior for his brother’s government, he nominated Fréron as managing director of the Paris hospitals. Only a single report on the organization of the hospitals of Paris and of Monts-de piété89 attests to the three months, in 1800, that he remained at this post. It was not a very prestigious position, but Fréron was, no doubt, grateful for it. In 1801, Napoleon, First Consul of France, decided to send an expeditionary force of some 25,000 men, under the command of General Leclerc, to Saint-Domingue to crush Toussaint l’Ouverture’s slave revolt and restore French control over the colony. As plans were made for this expedition, it is likely that Lucien intervened once more on Fréron’s behalf. On 6 November

86 On 15 Floreal (4 May) 1798, for example, Fréron had written to Joseph Bonaparte asking for a loan. Catalogue Charavay, as cited in Arnaud, Fils de Fréron, 354.

87 Here, Lucien, no doubt, refers to his imprisonment on 20 July 1795. He had been released only when Fréron and Barras had intervened to obtain his freedom. Fréron had also shown devotion to Lucien and protected his interests during his second mission to the Midi. Iung, Lucien Bonaparte, II, 121.

88 Lucien Bonaparte to Stanislas Fréron, 3 January 1797, as quoted in Iung, Lucien Bonaparte, I, 149. Lucien especially admired Fréron for his literary talents, and had often asked Fréron to proofread his manuscripts. Ibid, II, 144-45.

89 Réflexions sur les hôpitaux et particulièrement sur ceux de Paris et l’établissement d’un Mont-de-Piété, 1800. Bibliothèque Nationale, L 3.4-A.

183 1801 Fréron received an appointment from the Chief Administrator of the Colonies to serve as sous-préfet to Cayes in Saint-Domingue.90 Ordered to report to the port of Brest to prepare for embarkation to Saint-Domingue, Fréron arrived there on the evening of 26 November with passports for himself and for his secretary, Guery, who would travel with him.91 And yet, mysteriously, on 13 December the ship, l’Ocean, set sail without him. Fréron later claimed that, due to the large number of officials who were also traveling to Saint-Domingue, there was not enough room for him aboard the ship.92 This seems to be a rather spurious excuse on his part, and it is likely that his reluctance to travel aboard l’Ocean was a result of his discovery that he would be sharing this transport with General Leclerc and his young bride, Pauline Bonaparte. What motivated Fréron’s decisions? Was it jealousy of Pauline’s marriage? Or was Fréron too embarrassed to see her? He was now only a shadow of the charming and powerful representative on mission he had been years before in Marseilles. If it was his pride that had kept Fréron from taking that ship, then he would pay dearly for it, for it would be several weeks before another ship left for Saint-Domingue. Fréron’s extended stay in Brest, with the cost in food and lodgings, placed a great strain on his limited assets. Initially, he had received an indemnity of 15,000 francs for his travel expenses and the cost of his voyage. And yet, by the end of December he wrote to Colonial Minister asking for an advance of three months of his salary. “I am embarrassed by my situation,” he wrote. 93 An inquiry was ordered to determine his financial needs and situation and, just a few days before he left Brest, his request was granted.94 Fréron sailed for San Domingue at the end of January on the ship le Zélé. Due to storms at sea; the voyage took almost two and a half months. Fréron did not arrive in Cayes until the

90 Chief Administrator of the Colonies to Citizen Fréron. 15 Brumaire (6 November) 1801. Archives des Outre-Mer, Aix-En-Provence, Dossier Fréron, EE 933.

91 Fréron had written to request passports for himself and Guery. Fréron to the Minister of Marine for the colonies. (No date) 1801. Ibid.

92 Fréron to the Minister of Marine for the colonies. 9 Nivose (30 December) 1801. Ibid.

93 Fréron to the Minister of Marine of the colonies. 9 Nivose (30 December) 1801. Ibid.

94 See the Rapport made to the Minister of Marine of the Colonies, 19 Nivose (9 January) 1802. See also the Minister’s response, 20 Nivose (10 January) 1802. Ibid.

184 month of April. Not long after his arrival, he wrote to the Colonial Minister expressing his concern over his wife and two children he had left behind in France. “Without me, they have nothing to exist on,” he explained, and he asked that a portion of his salary be sent to his wife twice a month. He hoped that she and his children would soon be joining him in Cayes.95 Back in France, Lucien wrote to the Colonial Minister and to his brother, the First Consul, to request that Madame Fréron and the children be allowed to travel on the next warship bound for Saint- Domingue. But, Napoleon denied his request, on the grounds that women and children were not permitted to travel on warships.96 Without the comfort of his wife and children, and thousands of miles from his homeland, Fréron must have felt isolated in this beautiful but savage land. The climate of Saint-Domingue was a brutal one for Europeans who were not accustomed to the heat. Just weeks after having taken up his post as sous-préfet, Fréron fell victim to the epidemic of yellow fever and dysentery that raged throughout the ranks of Leclerc’s army. He lived only a few days after becoming ill and died at 4:00 in the afternoon on 15 July 1802.97 He was given all the funeral honors that befitted his rank and was buried in a cemetery on the Cape. He was 48 years old.98 Fréron had had little time to demonstrate is abilities or talents on Saint-Domingue. Nevertheless, his superiors praised him for his enthusiasm and dedication to his duties and acknowledged that Fréron was “loved and esteemed by his colleagues in that department.”99 It is

95 Fréron had given his wife power of attorney until that time when she could join him in Saint-Domingue. Fréron to the Minister of Marine and of the Colonies, (no date) 1802. Ibid.

96 Lucien Bonaparte to the Minister of Marine and the Colonies, 6 Priarial (26 May) 1802. Ibid. Pauline was allowed to accompany her husband to Saint-Domingue, but that was a family matter.

97 Fouyere (sous-commissaire of Marine) to the Colonial Préfet, 29 Messidor (18 July) 1802. See also: The Colonial Préfet to the Minister of Marine and the Colonies, 15 Thermidor (3 August) 1802. Ibid. The news of Fréron’s death is announced in both of these letters.

98 Three and a half months later, Pauline would lose her husband to the same malady that killed her former lover. Fleischmann, Pauline Bonaparte, 85-86.

99 Fouyere (sous-commissaire of Marine) to the Colonial Préfet, 29 Messidor (18 July) 1802. See also: The Colonial Préfet to the Minister of Marine and the Colonies, 15 Thermidor (3 August) 1802. Archives des Outre-Mer, Dossier Fréron, EE 933.

185 rather ironic that, in the end, it was the husband of his beloved Pauline, who had the kindest words to say about Fréron. Leclerc, who had known Fréron briefly before in 1793,100 wrote: “There has been a lot said against him, but I will say that in his conduct as a representative of the people to the Army of Italy, he was always good and affable and that he went out of his way to assist me during the time of his power.” Since Fréron had died poor, Leclerc expressed his sincerest hopes that the state would provide for his widow and children.101 Back in France, only a brief line in a newspaper announced his death.102 Fréron, the man who had once commanded the masses with a stroke of his pen, who had once sat in the company of the Revolution’s greatest leaders, had been forgotten. Fréron’s post-Thermidorian years began with ambitions to restore his political career and to marry well. It would have been interesting to see what Fréron’s future might have been had he succeeded in marrying Pauline Bonaparte. His relationship with the Bonaparte family is perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of Fréron’s life during this period. In his memoirs, Barras maintains that Napoleon once sought Fréron’s favor and solicited his protection.103 Fréron had been partially responsible for Napoleon’s elevation to the rank of general after Toulon. Napoleon had worked closely with Fréron and Barras again during the Vendémaire uprising in 1795, and later he had placed Lucien under Fréron’s patronage. But as Fréron’s career and fortunes faded, Napoleon quickly came to realize that he did not wish to welcome into his family a man with so tarnished a political and personal reputation. But, Fréron’s friendship with Lucien endured, and it

100 Leclerc had served as aide-de-camp to Fréron’s brother-in-law, La Poype and had met Fréron at Toulon in 1793.

101 Leclerc to the General in Chief of the Minister of Marine, 2 August 1802. Paul Roussier, editor, Lettres de Général Leclerc, Commandant en chef de l’armée de Sainte- Domingue (Paris: 1937), 196-99. Historians appear to agree that nothing is known of the eventual fate of Fréron’s wife and children, who had been reduced to poverty by his death. See Arnaud, Fils de Fréron, 352 and Kuscinski, Dictionnaire, see Stanislas Fréron, 275.

102 The Journal des Débats reported on 4 November 1802: “It is certain that the ex- conventional Fréron, sous-prefét of Sainte-Domingue, is dead, after a malady of six days…” Journal des Débats, Paris: 1789-1893 (Daily).

103 Barras, Memoirs, II, 128-29.

186 was due perhaps primarily to Lucien that Fréron was able to attain any employment at all during the Consulate. While he had hoped to attach himself to the rising fortunes of the Bonaparte family, Fréron had also hoped to redeem his political reputation and regain a place for himself in the Directory government. He had hoped that the restraint and moderation he displayed in his second mission to the Midi would help him rehabilitate his image. In the end, Fréron simply could not conquer his past. His reputation as an agent of the Terror automatically raised suspicions and accusations, voiced by his detractors, as to the intentions of his mission. It also opened the door to additional rumor and accusation that further hampered his career once he had returned to Paris. Moreover, the negative press and the enemies he had made during the period of the Thermidorian Reaction also haunted Fréron. Facing all these factors combined, Fréron found it impossible to rejuvenate his failing career. With few options available, he accepted a final mission in a hostile land, where, like an exile, he died alone, bereft of his family and his country.

187 CONCLUSION

Stanislas Fréron, “Journalist, sans-culotte and Thermidorian”1

As with so many men of his generation, the Revolution was the definitive event in Stanislas Fréron’s life. It plucked him from a dissolute and meaningless existence, and presented him with countless opportunities to advance his career in the realm of both politics and journalism. Through his roles as a republican journalist, conventionnel and representative on mission, Fréron made important contributions to the establishment of a republic, the pacification of the Midi, and the dismantling of the Terror. It might even be said that he contributed, in a small way, to the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. And yet, in the pages of history, Fréron’s contributions to the Revolution have been overshadowed by the ruthless and often reckless methods he employed in the pursuit of his personal and political goals. As a journalist and representative on mission, Fréron exercised considerable power and influence over the lives and fortunes of others. But, he did not always use these powers moderately or wisely. His methods were oftentimes imprudent and excessive, and Fréron seldom perceived the negative consequences of his actions. In the end, Fréron was responsible for many actions and decisions that earned him a notorious reputation that deprived him of the respect and support of both his colleagues and his constituents. Consequently, Fréron cannot be praised as one of the great heroes of the Revolution, but it is equally unfair to characterize him as simply as a demagogue or bloodthirsty Terrorist. Fréron was a man of many contradictions, and historians have tended to ignore the complexities of his character. A thorough summation of his career requires that the positive results of his achievements must be weighed with the negative consequences of his actions. Although Fréron was born into a highly conservative and privileged family, he quickly embraced the ideals of the Revolution. Of those Revolutionary ideals, perhaps none had appealed

1 Taken from the title of Raoul Arnaud’s biography on Fréron: Le Fils de Fréron: Journaliste, sans-culotte et Thermidorien.

188 so much to him as freedom of the press. As a young man, Fréron saw how his father was victimized by the old regime system of patronage and privilege. Like his father, Fréron was also persecuted for criticizing those with powerful patrons. When the Année litteraire’s privilege was granted to the Royous, Fréron was stripped of his father’s legacy. In the world of ancien regime France, he faced very little chances of ever becoming a successful journalist. But in the Revolution, Fréron found opportunity, a political cause, and the means to realize his ambitions. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen paved the way for the establishment of a free press in France. But, the royal police and courts were reluctant to relinquish their powers of censorship. In the face of this opposition, Fréron used the Orateur du peuple as a means to confront the police authority in Paris as well as the National Assembly whenever they attempted to place restrictions upon the press. He defended his newspaper vendors, printers, fellow journalists and even himself in the face of persecution and arrest. Later, as a member of the National Convention, Fréron continued to speak in favor of a free press. Prior to 9 Thermidor he condemned Robespierre for the censorship of the Terror and became a catalyst for the reestablishment of freedom of the press during the Thermidorian Reaction. While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Fréron’s convictions, it is equally apparent that the press became a means to an end for him. He quickly recognized that it was a powerful weapon to be used against all those who opposed or stood in the way of his ambitions and so he shamelessly abused his newfound liberty. Fréron also utilized his newspaper to support and promote the Jacobin’s goals to topple the monarchy and establish a republic. Like his idol Marat, Fréron presented an image of himself as a friend to the sans-culottes and all republicans. He portrayed himself as a “missionary of liberty” and a champion of the people, someone whom they could trust to warn them of “aristocratic plots” and to announce the “truth” concerning the political situation in France. Fréron was quick to employ threats, slander, sensationalism and outright demagoguery in an effort to win the support of the Parisian populace and to direct its actions against his political enemies. More than once, his words incited popular violence, ruined careers and reputations and threatened lives. It is ironic that, in the end, Fréron’s despicable methods succeeded in influencing many French citizens to despise and mistrust a free press. It was, perhaps, because of men like Fréron that both the Directory and Napoleon’s government reinstated press censorship.

189 As a representative on mission, Fréron proved to be as equally controversial and contradictory. Many of his actions as a representative had positive results for the Republic. During his first mission to the Midi, he worked closely with Barras and his fellow representatives to take decisive steps to ensure the pacification of that region. When Fréron and Barras arrived in the Midi in the spring of 1793, they faced the difficult assignment of imposing the Convention’s authority in an area where regional identity was defiant of the Jacobin’s goal to centralize power from Paris. When the Midi erupted in counter-revolution, Fréron had the opportunity to return to Paris, but instead chose to remain with Barras, to second his decisions, and give him the valuable support that he needed in face of the defiance of General Brunet. Their decision to remove Brunet from his command was decisive, enabling the Republic to utilize the Army of Italy more effectively against the rebels of the Midi. Likewise, the expeditious measures Fréron and Barras employed in Nice in July 1793 helped to prevent the further spread of counter-revolution in that city and its environs. In Marseilles, Fréron and Barras worked tirelessly to keep the besieging army before Toulon manned and supplied while facing the defiance of the local Jacobin leaders and popular societies. Their ultimate decision to place Marseilles under martial law enabled them to secure the city from further revolt and made it possible for them to focus their energies upon the subjugation of Toulon. Fréron’s correspondence reveals his firm dedication to the Convention’s cause, his nationalist principles and his conviction in the supremacy of his authority as a representative of the “nation.” But as dedicated as Fréron was to the Convention’s cause, he was equally motivated by his own personal considerations and ambitions. Some of Fréron’s more unwise and impetuous decisions as a representative were a result of these personal interests. Not only did he seek, by any means, to promote his career above that of his colleagues, but he also sought to promote the career of his brother-in-law, General La Poype. To undercut and discredit those men he perceived as their rivals or enemies, Fréron employed the same methods he had used as a journalist in Paris. In his letters to the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention, Fréron used his poison pen to alert Paris to the “plots” of Carteaux and the “scheming” of Albitte and others. He accused them of everything from attempting to undermine La Poype’s reputation, to impeding the Republic’s efforts against its enemies in the Midi. Meanwhile, he connived to place La Poype at the head of the Army of Italy and to secure another mission for Barras and himself. Fréron later stood accused of embezzling the funds entrusted to him as part of his

190 mission and of seizing the goods of the condemned in Marseilles for personal gain. These accusations were never proven, but they helped cast a negative image over Fréron’s positive accomplishments. Perhaps the greatest contradictions in Fréron’s career as a representative can be seen in his conduct at Toulon. During the siege, Fréron bravely joined with his fellow representatives in leading republican troops in the assault that ultimately carried the city. He saw his courageous efforts lauded by his colleagues in the National Convention and by patriots throughout France. His heroic actions were even immortalized through drama. But Fréron followed up his moment of glory with actions that forever disgraced him. He exacted arbitrary punishments on the city’s inhabitants and boasted of his cruelties. Of all the representatives at Toulon, Fréron appeared the most eager to bring destruction and punishment upon the city. If Fréron’s intentions were to draw attention to himself and prove his devotion to the Terror, then he succeeded. His words and deeds of 1793 would forever stand in the way of his career after Thermidor. Fréron could not have known, at the time, just how unpopular his actions would become. As a strong proponent of the Terror, Fréron took great pride in meting out the Republic’s justice to “traitors,” depriving them of their liberties and even their lives. How shocked he must have been when his own conduct was suddenly called into question and the threat of the Terror was turned against him and his friends. The unfavorable reaction of the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention to their actions in Marseilles, and their subsequent recall, gave Fréron and Barras cause for great distress. Accusations of embezzlement and abuse of their powers also brought them dangerously close to the scaffold. Their fears only escalated with the arrest and execution of Danton and Desmoulins. With his life in peril, it is not surprising that Fréron, like Barras, boldly took part in the coup of 9 Thermidor. Like most of his colleagues who participated in the coup, Fréron acted out of a sense of self-preservation. There is also the possibility that he was motivated to avenge the execution of his friends. In the weeks that followed 9 Thermidor, public opinion turned against the Terror so Fréron quickly joined the Thermidorian faction. This decision was completely motivated by self- interest and not, as he would later claim, out of some noble crusade against “Robespierre’s tail” or because of some moral repugnance for the Terror. Fréron was, of course, as much a part of “Robespierre’s tail” as any of the men he later denounced. So, for the sake of his own political survival, he moved quickly to renounce his Jacobinism and to divert attention from his own

191 Terrorist past by denouncing the crimes of others. Once again he took up the pen of the Orateur du peuple to slander and threaten his political opponents and to incite the jeunesse dorée to acts of violence against Jacobins in the streets of Paris. In many ways, the Thermidorian Reaction marks a turning point in Fréron’s political career. Fréron’s efforts to break the power and influence of the Jacobin Club and the sans- culottes contributed greatly to undermine the Terror, but the methods he employed only served to further damage his own political reputation. By attacking the sans-culottes, and replacing them with the jeunesse, Fréron placed the Convention at the mercy of a mob whose loyalty to the Republic and to the Revolution grew more questionable by the day. When the jeunesse became a counter-revolutionary threat, Fréron’s association with them led some to question his own loyalty to the Republic and to even blame him for being indirectly responsible for the escalation of the White Terror in France. Moreover, Fréron’s outspoken and vicious attacks on his colleagues within the Convention exposed his hypocrisy and invited public denunciation of his conduct. Fréron succeeded in having many of his opponents silenced, but others whom he had attacked would go on to serve in the Directory government and would later stand in the way of his ambitions for reelection. As a result, during the Directory, Fréron repeatedly failed to obtain a seat in the Council of 500. It did not help matters that, in the fall of 1795, he was sent for a second time on mission to the Midi. Even though Fréron appears to have exercised his authority with great moderation, his efforts to rehabilitate his image went relatively unacknowledged. Moreover, his very presence in the Midi provided his enemies with the means to resurrect memories of his Terrorist past. Fréron returned to Paris to face rumor, accusation and rejection. His final years were filled with disappointment and desperation. With few options, Fréron was eager to accept any offer of a position, even one thousands of miles from his home, in a hostile land. Fréron could not have known that his mission to San Domingue would be his last. Fréron’s friend, Georges Danton, once observed: “Like Saturn, the revolution devours its children.” Unlike Danton, Fréron did not perish on the scaffold, but he did live long enough to taste the bitterness of political obscurity. Fréron rose to great heights during the Revolution only to witness the end to his political power and influence, primarily as a result of his own rash actions and political choices. Perhaps Fréron might have survived the Thermidorian Reaction to sit among his colleagues in the Council of 500, had he been content to play a more moderate role

192 in the Reaction. His friend Barras, who became one of the Directors, was much less vocal, content to contribute to the Thermidorian Reaction from behind the scenes. Fréron, on the other hand, believed that only the most outspoken and ruthless actions would suffice to convince the public of his renunciation of the Terror and to perpetuate his political career. However, when looking at Fréron the Thermidorian, the French public saw only that same radical, dangerous man of 1791-92. Fréron’s cause may have changed, but his methods had remained the same and ultimately doomed him to obscurity.

193

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201 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Karen Leigh Greene was born in Rutherfordton, North Carolina on 29 August 1970. From 1988 to 1992, she attended Gardner-Webb University in Boiling Springs, N.C. While there, she was awarded the J.O. Terrell History Award in 1990 and 1992. In May of 1992 she received her Bachelor of Arts in History, graduating magna cum laude. In August 1992 she entered the graduate program at Appalachian State University in Boone, N.C. In December 1994 she graduated with a Master of Arts in History. From 1995 to the fall of 1996, she remained at Appalachian State University, working as an adjunct instructor for World Civilizations. In the fall of 1996 Karen was accepted into the Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution at Florida State University where she began her Ph.D. coursework under the direction of Dr. Donald Horward. While working on the requirements for her degree, she held a University Fellowship in Napoleonic Studies and, as a teaching assistant, taught World Civilizations and the American history survey courses. In the summer of 2001, she was selected to attend the Summer Seminar program in Military History at the United States Military Academy at West Point. In 2003 she was nominated for a University-wide Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award and was awarded the History Department’s Thomas Campbell Award for Excellence in Teaching. In the spring of 2004, she completed the requirements for her degree, defending her dissertation on 6 April 2004. Karen has attended various conferences where she has presented papers relating to a variety of topics including Stanislas Fréron, the representatives on mission, and the British Army during the . Several of her articles have been published in the Selected Papers of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe. She currently holds a temporary position as adjunct instructor for Western Civilization at Brevard Community College in Melbourne, Florida. For two years she has also served as an adjunct instructor on Strategy and Policy for the United States Naval War College.

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