Understanding Russian Smart Power: Perceptions and Ideology

МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК БАСҚАРУ ЖӘНЕ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК ҚЫЗМЕТ № 1(76) 2021 халықаралық ғылыми-талдау журналы

UNDERSTANDING RUSSIAN SMART POWER: PERCEPTIONS AND IDEOLOGY

Iskren senior lecturer in Sofia University «St. Kliment Ohridski», Sofia, Bulgaria, IVANOV* [email protected] https://doi.org/10.52123/1994-2370-2021-76-1-65 UDC 327 CICSTI 11.25.15

Abstract. Russian foreign policy today incarnates the double-headed eagle of smart power perceptions and Neo- Eurasian ideology. The main purpose of this article is to examine the emergence and development of Russian smart power by analyzing the foreign policy concepts of the Russian Federation after September 11. In this paper, I will argue that Moscow’s smart strategy is much similar to the American concept of smart power, but only in terms of its purpose. The article’s assertion rests on the assumption that smart power allowed Washington to sustain its global dominance after the terrorist attacks from September 11, and alternately – could help Russia to consolidate Eurasia. The Coronavirus Pandemic, of course, will have long-term consequences for the international security. Finally, I will conclude that if Moscow wants to maintain the Russia-dominated security system in Eurasia, it should develop its original concept of smart power. Keywords: Russia, Eurasia, smart, power, United States JEL codes: F50, H56, N40, F51, F52

Аннотация. Российская внешняя политика сегодня воплощает собой «двуглавого орла», состоящего из представлений о «smart power» и неоевразийской идеологии. Основная цель этой статьи - изучить возникновение и развитие умной силы России путем анализа внешнеполитических концепций Российской Федерации после 11 сентября. Основная гипотеза состоит в том, что внешнеполитическая стратегия Москвы во многом похожа на американскую концепцию умной силы, но только в части ее назначения. Главный тезис основывается на предположении, что умная сила позволила Вашингтону сохранить свое мировое господство после террористических атак 11 сентября и, в свою очередь, могла помочь России в консолидации Евразии. Пандемия коронавируса, безусловно, будет иметь долгосрочные последствия для международной безопасности. В итоге делается вывод, что если Москва хочет сохранить систему безопасности в Евразии, в которой доминирует Россия, ей следует разработать оригинальную концепцию умной силы. Ключевые слова: Россия, Евразия, умный, сила, США. JEL codes: F50, H56, N40, F51, F52

Аңдатпа. Ресейдің сыртқы саясаты бүгін «ақылды күш» және неоевразиялық идеология туралы түсініктерден тұратын «екі басты бүркітті» бейнелейді. Осы мақаланың негізгі мақсаты - 11 қыркүйектен кейінгі Ресей Федерациясының сыртқы саяси тұжырымдамаларын талдау арқылы Ресейдің ақылды күштің пайда болуы мен дамуын зерттеу. Негізгі ғылыми болжам - Мәскеудің сыртқы саясатының стратегиясы көп жағдайда американдық ақылды күш тұжырымдамасына ұқсас, бірақ оның мақсаты тұрғысынан ғана. Негізгі тезис - ақылды күш, Вашингтонға, 11 қыркүйекте болған террористік актілерінен кейін әлемдік үстемдігін сақтауға мүмкіндік берді және өз кезегінде Ресейдің Еуразияны шоғырландыруға көмектесе алады деген болжамға негізделген. Коронавирустық пандемия халықаралық қауіпсіздікке ұзақ мерзімді әсер ететіні сөзсіз. Нәтижесінде, егер Мәскеу Ресей үстемдік ететін Еуразиядағы қауіпсіздік жүйесін сақтағысы келсе, онда ақылды күштің өзіндік тұжырымдамасын жасау керек деген қорытындыға келеміз. Түйін сөздер: Ресей, Еуразия, ақылды, күш, АҚШ. JEL коды: F50, H56, N40, F51, F52

Introduction its strategy for a global dominance. The centerpiece of Russian United States, on the other hand, seeks foreign policy in the post-9/11 age is the to sustain the U.S.-led international presumption that consolidating Eurasia liberal order by confronting the Chinese would allow Russia to reclaim its status Grand Design. U.S. Foreign Policy of Great Power. However, the under President Donald Trump Coronavirus Pandemic tipped the seriously damaged the U.S.-led system balance of power in international of alliances, which allowed Beijing to relations, which enabled China to boost seize the opportunity and increase its

* Corresponding author: I. Ivanov, [email protected]

51 МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК БАСҚАРУ ЖӘНЕ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК ҚЫЗМЕТ №1 (76) 2021 халықаралық ғылыми-талдау журналы influence in Europe. Even the European interviews at the Russian Cultural countries abandoned their project for a Institute in Bulgaria. unified army of the European Union and Explaining Smart Power by relocating more financial resources to There is no single definition of fight the Pandemic. smart power. However, the explanation In this article, I argue that if Russia of this concept provides a logical starting wants to sustain its dominant position in point for the understanding of Russian Eurasia in the post-pandemic age, smart power. Despite following different Moscow has to design its own concept approaches, all smart strategies of smart power. Moreover, the new challenge hard and soft power on a Grand Design of Kremlin should rely on theoretical level. For example, special two essential pillars: Neo-Eurasianism operations in support of national security and multi-dimensional smart power. The combine use of force and dumb strikes. Eurasian philosophy would serve as In my article I assert that there three ideological cornerstone of the Russian basic definitions of smart power. smart strategy, while the multi- The strategic definition of Joseph dimensional approach will constitute the Nye explains smart power as a «set of geopolitical perceptions of Russian smart strategies that combines both the foreign policy. My claim rests on the tools of hard (use of coercion) and soft assertion that Eurasia is central to power (obtaining preferred outcomes Russian geopolitics (Clover, 1999). through attraction) (2009)». In other However, I assume that the pre- words, smart power comes to existence pandemic foreign policy strategy of when a state actor uses all its resources Moscow is not applicable to the post- to maximize the outcomes of its pandemic realities. Eurasia will remain strategy. For example, Nye stresses the the heartland of Russia, but it will also need of enhancing the U.S.-led alliance become a hot spot in the Sino – system through developing public American rivalry. For example, China diplomacy and technological innovations needs an open access to the Far East in (2008). In my paper, I support Nye’s order to deter the Japanese influence in assertion because U.S.-led international the region. In my article, I also challenge liberal order rests on a system of global the theory for the incorruptible nature of alliances and international organizations the Sino – Russian alliance (Korolev, that has lasted for almost 60 years. 2019). Moreover, U.S. Foreign Policy The research roadmap of this advocates alliance building as an paper has the following sections. The important precondition for the protection first reviews the basic definitions of of U.S. National Security. Nye reminds smart power. The second examines the us that America needs friends, not strategic perceptions of the Russia enemies. What is unique in his definition smart strategy. In the fourth section, I is that he considers smart power the analyze the ideological implications of most effective strategy that would allow Russian smart power. Finally, the study Washington to sustain its status of a introduces its own smart power global actor. approach that would benefit Moscow’s Ernest Wilson defines smart power foreign policy in Eurasia. The as «the capacity of an actor to combine methodological framework of employs elements of hard and soft power in ways two qualitative tools: comparative that are mutually enforcing such that the approach and case study analyzes. actor’s purposes advance effectively Empirical data is collected during my and efficiently (2008)» However, Wilson stay as visiting fellow in the United also argues that no actor in international States and through conducting relations has the capacity to apply smart

52 МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК БАСҚАРУ ЖӘНЕ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК ҚЫЗМЕТ №1 (76) 2021 халықаралық ғылыми-талдау журналы power for two reasons. First, no major that America should mobilize all its actor has the capacity to institutionalize resources to sustain its global smart power. Second, the author asserts leadership, he believes that Washington that no state or non-state actor can should focus on hard power. combine hard and soft power In the rest of this section, I will try mechanically (2008). Some would argue to give my own explanation of smart that Wilson’s theory is a methodological power. The definitions that I analyzed contradiction because it explains smart provide a plausible starting point for my power only on a theoretical level. This definition. Nye, Wilson and Gelb actually article does not support such negative define smart power in the context of claim. However, I do not fully uphold the U.S. Foreign Policy. Smart strategies validity of Wilson’s arguments because still occupy central place in both America and China, for example, Washington’s diplomacy as America have the economic and institutional successfully deters the counteraction of potential to combine hard with soft its adversaries. Smart politics turned out power. In the highly complex and to be quite essential for the U.S.-led dynamic system of the post-pandemic system of alliances that is one of the age, more and more actors such as preconditions for the American Russia will continue to develop their leadership. However, the Coronavirus smart capacity as part of their strategies. Pandemic challenges smart power on a Leslie Gelb rejects the concept of theoretical level by pressing decision- smart power by assuming that «smart makers to address foreign policy in a power is a mechanical combining rather less coordinated and rational matter than a genuine blending between two (Ivanov, 2020). Therefore, the pre- ideas (2009)». Moreover, he argues that pandemic understanding of smart power hard power is the most effective strategy provides a logical starting point for a in Great Powers politics. In other words, post-pandemic smart concept. In this Gelb’s approach integrates the military, paper, I define smart power as diplomatic and economic aspects of multidimensional strategy that combines U.S. Foreign Policy, emphasizing the the tools of hard and soft power and use of force as a primary source of seeks to achieve a realistic target, at a power and influence in the international reasonable cost under conditions that system. For example, the author depicts seem to be unavoidable, necessary, and international relations as pyramid that at the same time – attractive. This consists of three layers. United States is explanation does not pretend to have a alone on the top, having enough universal validity though it has five basic resources to lead, but without enough components that constitute the power to dominate (2009). America is theoretical core of my concept: hard “first among equals” and upholds the power, soft power, smart target, smart balance of power in the international strategy, and smart face. The first two system. Russia, China and Europe incorporates the pre-pandemic occupy the second level, struggling to understanding of smart power while the become global actors like Washington or others represent its post-pandemic even to overtop the United States as a implications. To conclude, this article global leader. Emerging influential joins the academic debate by giving a actors such as Canada and Saudi post-pandemic explanation of smart Arabia hold the third level, because they power and by rethinking the pre- do not have the potential to be global pandemic definitions that still influence actors. However, major powers could U.S. Foreign Policy. turn the scales in favor of Washington or Smart Power and Russian its adversaries. Although Gelb admits Foreign Policy: Strategic Perceptions

53 МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК БАСҚАРУ ЖӘНЕ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК ҚЫЗМЕТ №1 (76) 2021 халықаралық ғылыми-талдау журналы

In this section, I will test Russian consider the alternative assumption – foreign policy on empirical level by that hybrid warfare and hybrid strategies operationalizing my definition of smart are not exclusively a foreign policy power. Thus, this article moves beyond trademark of Russia. The assumption of theoretical discussions and assumption Bardy and Pavlov, on the contrary, to explanation how Russia could design provides a balanced understanding of its own concept of smart power. This the Russian-inspired smart power’s paper seeks to answer the question by nature. In other words, they explain sequentially employing the smart power smart power as cornerstone of Russian theories from the first section. foreign policy in regions of key The security dilemma of Russian importance to Moscow’s strategic smart power is quite debatable. Some influence. have argued that Moscow has the Another group of scholars claims potential to develop and apply its that Russia does not have the potential original smart approach. For example, to develop its own smart strategy. Van Roslycky assumes that Russia uses Herpen defines Russian smart power as smart power to deter democratization by a U.S. copy-based soft power that has anchoring the promotion of pro-Russian three components: mimesis, rollback, separatism in Crimea (2011). Carter invention (2016). Mimesis refers to the asserts that the Russian smart approach fact that Kremlin tries to copy the U.S. involves a set of strategies and actions approach of values promotion that are hybrid in terms of containing the worldwide. Rollback means ideologically Western influence and securing opposing and possibly forbidding the Moscow’s influence on Antarctica activities of Western academic and (2016). Bardy and Pavlov make the scientific institutes in Russia. Invention claim that the Russian smart strategy ranges from setting up spy rings, legally has several key aspects: maintaining financing political parties, and directly control over outer space and Polar buying people. Popescu rejects Van Regions, increasing Russian influencing Herpen’s theory by assuming that on the world markets, and investing in Moscow is rather investing in a new type cyber warfare technologies (2016). of soft power. It has two aspects: Finally, Strukov describes Russian working on the development of smart power as a manipulative strategy, sovereign democracy and investing in which supplies a combination of hard new weapons such as media outlets, and soft power tools, on one level, and youth movements, internet websites, on another, traverses the binary expert networks, regular conferences dynamic of power positive/negative, and even publishing houses (2009). external/internal, and vertical/horizontal Fiona Hill expands Popescu’s theory by and instead operates as a multi- discussing that Russia's new type of soft directional, ambiguous and often power includes not only Kremlin's contradictory, polyvalent and parasitic internal reforms, but also Moscow's system of influence (2016). Strukov’s attempts to increase its influence in the theory indicates the relation between Eurasian space with the help of the government-led and non-government Russian oil, Russian trust and Russian agents of influence, thus providing a friendship (2006). However, Hill is highly more nuanced, multi-agent skeptical of calling this approach consideration of soft power which is a “smart”. significant diversion from Nye’s top- This article joins the debate by down approach. Theories such of those arguing that has the capacity to act as Rozlycky and Strukov are one-sided and smart actor. Moreover, I assume that misleading, because they do not Moscow has already developed its own

54 МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК БАСҚАРУ ЖӘНЕ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК ҚЫЗМЕТ №1 (76) 2021 халықаралық ғылыми-талдау журналы smart approach. In the pages that inspired nuclear diplomacy by alliance follow, I will test my assumption by using building. Soviet Union used hard nuclear the theory of Wilson. Wilson assumes diplomacy to intimidate the West. Russia that a state or non-state actor must meet is using smart power to forge system of four conditions in order to have a smart alliances that will deter the Western power potential (2008). influence in the post-Soviet space. First, any actor who wants to apply In conclusion, I assume that the smart power needs a smart target. Russian smart approach rests on four Power cannot be smart if those who basic perceptions that are integral part wield it are ignorant. Eurasia is the of Russian foreign policy. The first starting point of the Russian Grand perception is the Russian smart target Design. Moscow’s geopolitical strategy that covers the post-soviet space. The divides this region into several sub- second perception embodies Russian regions that include not only Russia, but smart strategies that shape Russian also Central Asia, the Far East and foreign policy. The final perception other regions from the post-Soviet depicts the smart face of the Moscow’s space. The Eurasian doctrine also has a geopolitical strategies that represents global dimension – Russia seeks to Russian activities as inevitable, unite and dominate Eurasia in order to necessary and at the same time – regain its status of superpower. attractive to the Russian allies. Therefore, Moscow’s smart target is the Ideological Implications of post-soviet space (Entin, Entina, 2016). Russian Smart Power Second, smart actors need self- In the following section, I will test knowledge and smart understanding of Russian smart power on a theoretical their goals and capacities. Smart power level by analyzing the Neo-Eurasian requires state actors to calculate philosophy that dominates Russian outcomes and potential modes of failure. foreign policy after the end of the Cold Moscow's geopolitical strategy endorses War. I argue that Neo-Eurasianism the idea of building a stable multipolar shapes the theoretical core of Russian world in which Russia will be one of the smart power. My claim rests on the poles (Hill et al., 2017). However, assumption that the Neo-Eurasian Kremlin admits that the old Soviet theory of globalization moves beyond doctrines are inapplicable to the post- the post-Soviet space by integrating Cold War era. Following the events of smart power in the Russian Grand September 11, Russia focused on Design. designing smart strategies that are A central contention in the Neo- cheap, flexible and effective such as Eurasian philosophy is that globalization promoting common values in former is a dualistic process that explains the Soviet republics and strengthening international system. Dugin outlines two economic cooperation in Central Asia. scenarios for globalization. Under the Finally, smart power incorporates multipolar scenario people choose follow smart mechanism of combining hard their own patterns for political and and soft power. Wars cost human lives cultural development while under the and exhaust economy forcing it into unipolar scenario humanity follows recession. Soft power requires universal values. Moreover, Neo- innovation and creativity promote Eurasianism has a dichotomous vision values, diplomacy and dialogue. The on geopolitics. Dugin assumes there is a face of smart power depicts certain hard natural confrontation that exists between power action as inevitable, necessary "Land" and "Sea" civilizations (2000). and attractive (Ivanov, 2020). For Land civilizations expand by land by example, Moscow replaced the Soviet- establishing control over vast territories

55 МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК БАСҚАРУ ЖӘНЕ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК ҚЫЗМЕТ №1 (76) 2021 халықаралық ғылыми-талдау журналы and creating multinational and politically values as universal. Japan is an centralized empires. Sea civilizations American ally, bound to cooperate with expand by sea by establishing colonial Washington under Article 9 of the empires. Dugin argues that unlike Land Japanese Constitution. Therefore, Dugin Empires, Sea entities are far more asserts that resolving the dispute for the expansionist. Therefore, the clash Kuril Islands would help Russia to between the Russia-dominated Land motivate the Japanese emancipation and U.S.-dominated Sea. The end of the from America. The Middle Eastern Cold War is far from ending the dimension unites Moscow with Tehran. confrontation between the two countries, Dugin considers the Shia-dominated as the Sea-Land collision is imminent. Islamic Republic a distinctive traditional The Neo-Eurasian doctrine culture that is totally opposite to liberal considers any threat to Eurasia a threat democracy. Moreover, Shia Islam to Russia (Dunlop, 2004). Eurasian incorporates a religious cleavage culture is unique and belongs neither to between Iran and traditional American Europe nor to Asia. Dugin’s assumption allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. rests on the claim that a Russia- Finally yet importantly, Dugin argues dominated Eurasia would have the that Moscow should secure Russian potential to deter Western influence in military presence in Syria in order to the post-soviet space. Dugin’s recasting deter the American strategic influence in of Western liberalism provides the the region. theoretical foundations for Russian To sum up, the Neo-Eurasian smart power. Moreover, Neo- geopolitical concept applies a combined Eurasianism addresses three approach towards smart power by dimensions of Russian foreign policy defining its aspects. For example, that shape the doctrinal framework of Russia is the successor of the highly Russian smart strategies. centralized society of the Golden Horde The European dimension reunites and the Orthodox Byzantine Empire Moscow with Berlin. Neo-Eurasianism (Ivanov, 2018). Opponents of the Neo- advocates the statement that Eurasia Eurasianism would argue that this and Europe are both Land civilizations. philosophy is aggressive and offensive. Therefore, Russia and Germany are However, the doctrinal justification of both Land nations. The United Kingdom, Russian foreign policy does not on the contrary, is a Sea nation, and necessarily include the use of hard alternately – adversary of Continental power. Moscow’s smart strategy Europe. Dugin admits that the North advocates the Russian involvement in Atlantic Treaty Organization is one of the world affairs by promoting the the most successfully military alliances Eurasian concept of smart power. in the history, but it favors the United Understanding these implications is the States. The Eastern dimension reunites final step to the explanation of Russian Moscow with Tokyo. Asia has a smart power. historical significance for Russia not only What makes Russian power because of the Russo – Japanese War “smart”? of 1905, but also due to the U.S. – In the final section of this paper, I Japanese alliance, established after try to explain the nature of Russian World War II. Dugin considers India a smart power. I assume that the Russian potential ally for two reasons (2000). smart approach to the Eurasian region First, it is former British colony and has four dimensions: culture, values, potential adversary to the West. economy and military. The assumption Besides, Indian culture is a distinctive that Eurasia is central to Russian traditional culture that rejects Western geopolitics provides a plausible starting

56 МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК БАСҚАРУ ЖӘНЕ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК ҚЫЗМЕТ №1 (76) 2021 халықаралық ғылыми-талдау журналы point for this analysis. Dugin defines of national morality and national culture. Eurasia it as «the region that is separate Patriotism relies on the love for the from all others and combines both Land motherland and the desire to make it and Sea elements (2000)». For Dugin, great again, as it was in the past. Eurasia is political and cultural entity Economy stands at the boundary that gives Russia the power to control its between soft and hard power (Klare, natural resources. 2005). Following the failure of the Culture is integral part of soft Soviet-type planning, Russia tried to power (Otmazgin, 2011). Dugin argues build a functioning market economy. The that Russia generates Eurasian culture neo-Eurasian doctrine rejects the that unites the Eurasian peoples. This planned economy and incorporates the cultural paradigm has two pillars: right to property. Unlike Western Russian Orthodoxy and Neo-Eurasian Capitalism, that advocates free statehood as Dugin defines Eurasia as competition and high living standard, the the land of spirit (Dugin, 1997). The Eurasian economic model gives priority center of this land is Moscow, the Third to the political order (Dugin, 2000). The Rome, which has the transcendent Neo-Eurasian doctrine denies both mission to preserve the Eurasian capitalism and Marxism by defining a culture. Dugin admits that Russian third path of development. The Orthodoxy is able to unite Eurasia “Eurasian way” rests on placing because it is much closer to Islam and economic sectors under state control Far Eastern cultures than to Roman and promoting social protection to all Catholicism and Protestantism. In other citizens. words, it can serve as an ideological Weapons are the jewels of hard basis for the creation of a unified power (Campbell et al., 2006). Moscow Eurasian culture. Neo-Eurasian has always considered hard power statehood is a concept that describes essential part of Russian foreign policy. Eurasian political structure as a highly Russian Czars and Soviet leaders have centralized government in contrast to generated enormous resources to the Western type of liberal democracy sustain Russia's military might. The (Clover, 1999). Within this political Neo-Eurasian strategy advocates the system, citizens give their rights and adoption of space strategy in order to freedoms to the state in order to build a guarantee Russian national security. At collective Eurasian political the same time, the Neo-Eurasian project consciousness. encourages the development of more Values as part of soft power can intercontinental ballistic missiles to offset win battles that weapon cannot (Loboda U.S. air and sea superiority. Unlike the et al., 2017). Dugin argues that Soviet leadership, Neo-Eurasians liberalism is right-wing in economic include in their strategy another very terms, but left-wing in political terms. He important aspect – investing in emerging also finds liberal ideology aggressive technologies. However, a potential and militant, albeit in a figurative sense Eurasian military alliance would not – liberalism does not directly deal with mean a new Warsaw Pact, but rather a physical repression but culturally its common format for military cooperation opponents. Dugin’s concept of "social and coordination (Ivanov, Shalamanov, conservatism" enjoy great support from 2020). Kremlin in the face of political officials In conclusion, Russian smart like Boris Gryzlov. The Eurasian power today has three aspects: conservatism embodies three aspects of promoting Eurasian culture and values, the Russian political culture: the revival designing a functioning Eurasian of Russian patriotism, the preservation economy, enhancing security and

57 МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК БАСҚАРУ ЖӘНЕ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК ҚЫЗМЕТ №1 (76) 2021 халықаралық ғылыми-талдау журналы defense cooperation. Each of these generate more resource that will allow aspects corresponds to a different Kremlin to its foreign policy strategy and dimension of the Russian smart create a common ground in terms of approach. In this article, I assume that cultural, political and economic Moscow’s smart potential would allow integration of Eurasia. However, this Russia to unite Eurasia but only in strategy does not necessarily includes economic, cultural and political terms. confrontation with the United States and However, I do not support the European Union. Diplomacy and assumption that Kremlin should apply dialogue are essential for Russian smart power to act as global actor. foreign policy in sensitive regions such Russian smart power does not have a as Central Asia. Otherwise, Russian global nature, it is a soft-dominated power will not be smart. approach that revisits the old Soviet Although it is logically structured, strategies and seeks to restore Russian smart power should calculate Moscow’s influence in the post-soviet another important aspect of its Grand space. This approach, in long-term, Strategy: the multicultural nature of could evolve in a more developed Eurasia. The idea of Russian Orthodoxy strategy that would give Russia the as the pivot of Eurasian culture is opportunity to act as major regional strategically misleading. It could actor in Eurasia. generate a cultural gap between Russia Conclusion and its Eurasian allies. Moreover, if To conclude is Russian smart Moscow wants to succeed in its smart power similar to the U.S. smart strategy. scenario, it should create strategic In this study, I argue that Russian smart preconditions for the creation of a power follows the structure of the Russian-dominated system of alliances American smart approach, but differs in in the region. With regard to the military terms of strategic perceptions and aspect, with its recent actions, Moscow ideological implications. It was smart demonstrates that Russia has a clear power that allowed Washington promote vision on its allies and adversaries. U.S. global leadership and to build the However, constructive relations with the U.S.-led system of alliances. U.S. smart United States and Europe remain power has a clear purpose – defending essential to the foreign policy of the U.S. national interests, protecting U.S. other Eurasian countries. Finally, the national security, and promoting U.S. Coronavirus pandemic and China’s rise values overseas. Russian smart power will have its impact on the Russian incorporates Neo-Eurasian philosophy Grand Design. United Eurasia is an and the post-soviet heritage. Moscow’s attractive smart scenario for Russia, but smart strategy also sets up its purpose: also a long-term challenge to China, as reclaiming the global status of Russia by Beijing needs a better access to the Far reuniting Eurasia. Dugin revises the old East to deter the U.S. – Japanese – Soviet doctrines, by designing the South Korean alliance. Thus, Sino- Eurasian dream. American relations should serve as the In my research, I argue that next starting point for developing Russian will have the potential to reunite Russian smart power. Eurasia, after Moscow endorses a The paper was presented at the online seminar on «International Relations and Global proper smart face of its foreign policy. Security» of of Diplomacy of the Academy of Public Most of the Eurasian countries maintain Administration under the President of the Republic of good contacts with Russia, but few Kazakhstan in cooperation with Sofia University named after “St.Kliment Ohridski” (Bulgaria) on would agree to deteriorate their relations December 11-12, 2020. with the West. Therefore, Russia should

58 МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК БАСҚАРУ ЖӘНЕ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК ҚЫЗМЕТ №1 (76) 2021 халықаралық ғылыми-талдау журналы

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РЕСЕЙЛІК «АҚЫЛДЫ КҮШІН» ТҮСІНУ: ҚАБЫЛДАУ ЖӘНЕ ИДЕОЛОГИЯ Искрен ИВАНОВ, «Әулие Климент Охридски» атындағы София университетінің аға оқытушысы, София, Болгария, [email protected]

ПОНИМАНИЕ РОССИЙСКОЙ «УМНОЙ СИЛЫ»: ВОСПРИЯТИЕ И ИДЕОЛОГИЯ Искрен ИВАНОВ, старший преподаватель Софийского университета имени «Святого Климента Охридски», София, Болгария, [email protected]