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Policy Paper Nr. 8 the US Smart Power Approach E A G POLICY PAPER Number 8 / January 2010 The US Smart Power Approach: A Challenge for the Euro-Med Space? President Obama’s mandate has signaled a new era in US foreign policy. Coined “smart power”, the new American approach towards external relations combines the traditional hard power tools of armed force with soft power tools of diplomacy, aid, and the exter- nalization of liberal norms. Yet, how effective will this strategy be in managing the com- plex set of relations and intractable conflicts of the Euro-Med space? This Policy Paper is the outcome of the ninth workshop of the Expert Advisory Group (EAG) - European and South Mediterranean Actors - Partners in Conflict Prevention and Resolution, held in Washington DC, United States from October 16 - 19, 2009. Table of contents 1. Introduction Sarah Anne Rennick 2. Four Shortcomings in the United States’ Smart Power Approach Antje Nötzold and Alessandro Quarenghi 3. Smart Power and Maghreb Expectations Fouad M. Ammor 4. Is Smart Power Smart Enough? Negotiating with Iran On the Nuclear Issue Emily B. Landau 5. Smart Power and US-Turkish Relations Eleni Fotiou 6. Transatlantic Relations and the Obama Administration: Europe Missed an Opportunity (again!) Carlo Masala Introduction conflict but also the importance of promoting by Sarah Anne Rennick economic growth and the democratic transi- tion. Emily B. Landau, in her article, questions On June 4 th , 2009, President Obama smart power’s effectiveness in confronting the delivered an eloquent and powerful speech in Iran nuclear issue, concluding that multilateral Cairo with the intention of launching a new era diplomatic efforts are not the best approach. in US-Middle Eastern relations based on in- In her contribution, Eleni Fotiou explores US- creased cooperation and understanding. This Turkish relations and shows that although the event figured into the wider foreign policy ap- smart power approach corresponds to Turkey’s proach of the new administration, character- foreign policy vision, a strategic pursuit of ized by the use of “smart power”. This edition common interests is necessary in order to suc- of the EAG Policy Paper series evaluates the cessfully pursue peace in the region. In the smart power approach and its reception from final article, Carlo Masala looks at the EU’s re- various perspectives. In his paper on the ception of the new administration’s foreign pol- Maghreb, Fouad M. Ammor discusses the most icy approach, stating that the failure of the Un- pressing needs of the North Africa region in ion to clearly convey its own expectations and terms of US foreign policy and assistance, plac- potential zones of intervention to President ing emphasis on both the potential role of the Obama is partially responsible for the lacklus- US in the resolution of the Western Sahara ter nature of US-EU relations. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. | 2 POLICY PAPER Four Shortcomings in the own doorstep. While hard power tools are EXPERT ADVISORY GROUP United States’ Smart concentrated at the White House and the Power Approach Pentagon, many soft power instruments – NUMBER 8 | by Antje Nötzold and Alessandro development assistance, public diplomacy, JANUARY 2010 Quarenghi exchange programs, broadcasting, disaster relief, military-to-military and people-to-people www.eag-kas.com Although the concept of smart power contacts – are scattered across the whole US is a relatively recent addition to the diplomatic government. Furthermore, civil society is phrasebook, its content is nothing new. The essential to making soft power and images of smart power approach, which was first devel- the US effective instruments of foreign policy. oped by Joseph Nye and then accepted as the For a real and effective smart power approach, new policy framework for the US administra- an overarching policy is needed, in particular tion, would combine hard power tools –to co- one that integrates all governmental erce by military or other means – with soft instruments into a comprehensive and ones to convince and persuade through trade, coherent national strategy. diplomacy, aid, and the spread of liberal de- "The crux of the mat- Secondly, the very nature of smart mocratic (or American) values. According to ter is still, one year power – a combination of hard and soft power this approach, in order to accomplish its objec- after the presidential – brings us to another shortcoming: which tives US foreign policy should rely less on ide- elections, how will US combination? This needs to be judged sepa- ology, be more pragmatic, and pick from the foreign policy actually rately in every individual case; however, the full range of tools at its disposal – diplomatic, fulfill the promise of end result of such a “tailor-made approach” economic, military, political, legal, and cultural the slogan [smart can mean inconsistency overall. As a conse- – choosing the right tool, or combination of power]." quence, strategies can be judged only on their tools, for each situation. effectiveness – which appears to be a welcome At the moment, however, smart power return in US foreign policy. Yet, which effec- is nothing more than a catchphrase that has tiveness – today’s or tomorrow’s? The smart enabled the new administration to distance it- power approach seems to combine short-term self from the controversial foreign policies of realism with medium- and long-term liberal- the previous one. The crux of the matter is ism; however, these do not always mix well still, one year after the presidential elections, and in some cases do not mix at all. To give a how US foreign policy will actually fulfill the prime example: the liberal long-term objective promise of the slogan. It is disconcerting to of democratization in the Middle East versus realize that even in Washington, neither US the realist support of autocratic regimes in the institutions nor think tank representatives – or, pursuit of greater stability. at least, those consulted, 1 – are exactly sure Thirdly, smart power as a new ap- what the new smart power approach has proach can be understood as a simple change brought: the new administration raised expec- of tools: is smart power therefore just old wine tations by announcing this new strategic con- in new bottles? US foreign policy still pursues cept but has not yet delivered. In order to the same traditional objectives with regard to shed a bit of light on the uncertainties of the the Middle East and as such the US exposes actual content of smart power it is essential to itself to the criticism and non-cooperation of address some of the following shortcomings regional actors. The proposal of the long-term and difficulties. liberal ideal could raise excessively high expec- Firstly, before acting abroad, the US tations that could, if not confirmed by enough administration needs to start focusing on its success stories, destroy the administration’s, and particularly the president’s, credibility. At the time of writing, President Obama has, par- 1 Representatives of various US institutions and ticularly in the Middle East, delivered symbolic research centers were consulted on this issue dur- speeches and marked symbolic discontinuities, ing the EAG meeting held in Washington in Octo- ber 2009. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. | 3 POLICY PAPER but his policies have achieved mixed results at is the only actor with the ability to sort out EXPERT ADVISORY GROUP best. “impossible” issues in the region. Finally, in regard to multilateral coop- The Maghreb is facing urgent issues NUMBER 8 | eration and international institutions, the new where smart power could prove to be a more JANUARY 2010 administration wants US foreign policy to be active and operational approach. The increas- smarter by leading political processes while at- ing feeling among the region’s people is that www.eag-kas.com tempting to avoid exposure to international the project of a united Maghreb is merely a criticism. But acting within and through insti- dream. The sentiment is that, with the excep- tutions in order to shape their “bias system” tion of shared geography and some shared cul- means such international institutions and the tural components (language, religion, and cer- US have to share similar or at least compatible tain historical experiences), everything sepa- values. This is unlikely to always be the case. rates the region’s five countries from one an- Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to bring other. The Maghreb countries are currently all actors into the political process and it is facing four big challenges: a) economic back- very hard indeed to have everybody agree on wardness (poverty, slow international market policies. In other words, participating in US- integration, low levels of direct foreign invest- led multilateral processes or institutions could ment); b) identity ambivalence (modernism vs. be the best way for states that are unwilling to traditionalism); c) ghastly governance (corrup- cooperate to delay policies and results. tion, violation of human rights); and d) the en- during Western Sahara conflict between Algeria and Morocco. Smart Power and Maghreb Ex- pectations Because some US interests coincide by Fouad M. Ammor with these regional issues, there is a possibility "There is a general for the Obama administration’s approach to be belief that the US President Obama’s speech in Cairo effective. It is well known that the Algerian- is the only actor marked the political will to establish a new re- Moroccan border is an uncontrollable zone with the ability to lationship with the Arab and Muslim world through which many unidentified groups circu- sort out the “im- based on mutual respect and cooperation. To late without any institutional constraints. The possible” issues in a certain extent, the speech was an attempt to absence of cooperation between Algeria and the [Maghreb] re- curb anti-Americanism in the region, which Moroccan paves the way for these groups to gion.” reached its peak during George W.
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