Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States Competition and Cooperation in the CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Developing World A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative editor 1800 K Street | Washington, DC 20006 Carola McGiffert Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org project coordinator Jeffrey D. Bean contributors Jon B. Alterman Katherine E. Bliss Edward C. Chow Jennifer G. Cooke Stephen J. Flanagan Bonnie S. Glaser Brian Harding Jesse Kaplan Andrew C. Kuchins Roy Levy Johanna Mendelson Forman Derek J. Mitchell Susana Moreira Melissa E. Murphy Julianne Smith Denise E. Zheng March 2009 ISBN 978-0-89206-558-5 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & Ë|xHSKITCy065585zv*:+:!:+:! CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative editor Carola McGiffert project coordinator Jeffrey D. Bean contributors Jon B. Alterman Katherine E. Bliss Edward C. Chow Jennifer G. Cooke Stephen J. Flanagan Bonnie S. Glaser Brian Harding Jesse Kaplan Andrew C. Kuchins Roy Levy Johanna Mendelson Forman Derek J. Mitchell Susana Moreira Melissa E. Murphy Julianne Smith Denise E. Zheng March 2009 About CSIS In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmak- ers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent public policy institutions. Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world’s regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed in this publica- tion should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Photo credits: China map © Fotosearch, center; Mountain High Maps® copyright © 1993 Digital Wisdom, Inc., top and bottom left corners; © NASA/JPL/NIMA, top and bottom right corners. © 2009 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Chinese soft power and its implications for the United States : competition and cooperation in the developing world, a report of the CSIS smart power initiative / edited by Carola McGiffert. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-89206-558-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-89206-559-2 1. United States—Rela- tions—China. 2. China—Relations—United States. 3. China—Relations—Foreign countries. I. McGiffert, Carola. II. Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.) E183.8.C5C5387 2008 327.73051—dc22 2008048944 Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel: (202) 775-3119 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org 2 contents Executive Summary v 1. China’s Use of Soft Power in the Developing World: Strategic Intentions and Implications for the United States 1 Denise E. Zheng 2. Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: The Ongoing Debate 10 Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy Regional Studies 3. China’s Soft Power in Africa 27 Jennifer G. Cooke 4. China’s Projection of Soft Power in the Americas 45 Katherine E. Bliss 5. China’s Soft Power in the Middle East 63 Jon B. Alterman 6. China and Southeast Asia 77 Derek J. Mitchell and Brian Harding Case Studies 7. China’s Soft Power in Developing Regions: New Major Player in the International Oil Patch 91 Edward C. Chow 8. Taiwan-China Balancing Act in Latin America 97 Johanna Mendelson Forman and Susana Moreira 9. The Faulty Narrative: Fact, Fiction, and China’s Efforts to Combat Climate Change 102 Julianne Smith and Jesse Kaplan 10. Releveraging U.S. Power amid Sino-Russian Rapprochement 115 Andrew C. Kuchins 11. Conclusion 126 About the Contributors 127 | iii executive summary China in recent years has been pursuing its national interests through its exercise internationally of soft power and economic power as it projects a nonconfrontational, friendly diplomacy to states in developing regions. China is using its soft-power projection to promote its own national inter- ests, not as a direct challenge to the United States. It is China’s rapid economic expansion that is driving its state development forward, and the country’s need for natural resources, viable export markets, and political influence has led China to step up its engagement with developing countries. The measurable benefit to China of its economic and soft-power initiatives in the developing world has yet to be assessed or realized, primarily because of the future orientation of many of its programs. Southeast Asia is the area of the world where China’s use of soft power has been most signifi- cant, especially in the mainland Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. China’s concern for maintaining a peaceful, stable periphery drives this effort. The focus of Chinese initiatives in many states is ensuring access to viable energy sources, and soft power plays a significant role in solidifying energy relationships in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. In Latin America, China has actively leveraged soft power and economic power to maintain access to energy resources and markets as well as to gain support for its one-China policy. In China extensive debate is ongoing regarding the source of the country’s soft power and its reasons for utilizing it. China currently lacks a coordinated national soft-power strategy and views its soft power as defensive and largely reactive, a point of view intended to allay fears in other states of a China threat. Engaging China on critical global issues such as climate change, energy, and security requires an accurate assessment of Chinese policy, exigencies, and progress in these issue areas. Thus, in the United States, also, debate is taking place about whether China’s soft-power projection represents healthy competition or a strategic threat. Viewing Chinese successes or failures in the developing world through a zero-sum framework is not an effective way for the United States to shape its policy, and such a point of view will only contribute to an adversarial relationship. China has not sought to replace or supplant the United States in its role of security provider in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or Latin America. Thus, U.S. policymakers must recognize China’s objectives of maintaining its own internal stability and economic growth as they craft poli- cies to ensure that the United States promotes its own policies effectively. | v The United States can do more to collaborate with China in the developing world, particularly in the areas of energy, health, agriculture, and peacekeeping. If such collaboration were to take place, the United States and China would find themselves working toward a greater global public good. vi | chinese soft power and its implications for the united states china’s use of soft power in the developing world 1 strategic intentions and implications for the united states Denise E. Zheng China’s approach to foreign policy underwent a tremendous transformation during the past half century, shifting from the war-and-revolution period under the rule of Mao Zedong to an era of peace and development under more recent leadership. Two decades ago, China was viewed as an austere and monolithic communist country that threatened the development of democracy in Asia and elsewhere in the world—an image that was exacerbated by the callous response of the Chinese Communist Party, and thus the state, to the 1989 student protests, quashing a nascent democracy movement in China. Today China is increasingly capitalist, modern, and globalized. Economic reforms, initiated in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, have transformed China into one of the world’s largest destinations for foreign direct investment and a vital link in global supply chains. Beijing’s “go global” strategy—an incentive-driven program promoting Chinese firms to pursue rigorous investments abroad—is exemplary of China’s transformation: prosperity from years of double-digit economic growth has not only made China attractive to foreign investors but has also endowed China with the capital to be a major consumer in the global marketplace. As the world watches China transform, there is increasing anxiety that, after 25 years of remarkable economic growth, Beijing has significantly elevated its capacity to influence world affairs and that it will use this newfound strength coercively. Some experts believe that China poses a serious challenge to the United States for the role of the world’s leading superpower—the first credible threat since the existence of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Conscious of the apprehension surrounding its rise and worried that such sentiments could impede continued economic growth, Beijing has sought to attach itself to the slogan “peaceful development” in an effort to reassure others that its newfound strength is benign. Indeed, compared with the years of Mao, China today appears much more “charming”—a transformation that can at least be partially credited to its growing soft power, arguably Beijing’s most valuable foreign policy tool.