Fatal Attraction? Russia's Soft Power in Its Neighbourhood

>> POLICY BRIEF ISSN: 1989-2667

Nº 181 - MAY 2014

Fatal attraction? Russia’s soft power in its neighbourhood

Eleonora Tafuro

Much current analysis of Russian influence in its >> neighbourhood focuses on its use of ‘hard power’ tools. However, analysing Russia’s soft power efforts is no less important for HIGHLIGHTS understanding the full nature of Moscow’s power strategy in its neighbourhood. When Harvard scholar Joseph Nye developed the • Russia has been trying to concept of ‘smart power’, he described it as the ability to combine the boost its power of attraction in tools of hard and soft power, that is, to use both sticks and carrots its neighbourhood, but with (coercion and payment) and the power of attraction (making others mixed results so far. want what you want). • Russian minorities in its To date, Russia appears to be more confident using hard power neighbours are the main target measures to pursue its neighbourhood interests, in particular trying to of Russia’s soft power dissuade neighbours from a closer relationship with the European activities, but they are also Union (EU). Ukraine is the most glaring example. First the Kremlin used by the Kremlin as a tried ‘carrots’ (such as large loans with few strings attached, gas price reason to interfere in other discounts etc.), then moved onto ‘sticks’ (trade embargoes, gas price states’ affairs. hikes, and eventually the annexation of Crimea and further destabilisation of the East). Most of the other five countries in the • Russia’s Kremlin-driven use EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, of soft power alongside hard Georgia and Moldova – have also experienced Russian hard power in power in the neighbourhood recent years. Plus, Russia has plenty of leverage to do so in many of undermines Russia’s attempts the five Central Asian republics. For example, Russia is the main to become a genuine pole of destination for their migrant workers, and according to the World attraction. Bank, remittances account for 48 per cent of Tajikistan’s GDP and 31 per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s. FATAL ATTRACTION? RUSSIA’S SOFT POWER IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD

>>>>>> Even so, Russia is not neglecting the use of soft European Union’, blasting human rights power. The Putin regime perceives Russia as an protection throughout the EU. In particular, the alternative geopolitical pole with an anti-liberal Russian report accuses the EU of conducting social outlook, a type of ‘Conservative ‘aggressive propaganda of homosexual love’ in International’ in opposition to the West. It offers other countries, by attempting to ‘enforce on its neighbours a path for regional integration other countries an alien view of homosexuality through the Customs Union, the Collective and same-sex marriages as a norm of life and Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the some kind of a natural social phenomenon that envisaged Eurasian Union, in competition with deserves support at the state level’. Homophobic that of the EU and NATO. Plus, Moscow funds sentiments are very common in the post-Soviet cultural programmes based on the idea of a space, and Russia is fomenting them as part of a common identity, language and history in the broader effort to counter the EU’s influence. For post-Soviet space, and tries to spread its instance, in Ukraine both the Russian Orthodox messages through well-resourced Kremlin-linked Church and the Russian Embassy have played a media outlets. role in pushing the ‘civilisation’ argument against integration with the EU. The group Ukrainian Choice, funded by Viktor CULTURE, VALUES AND THE Medvedchuk, a businessman close to Putin, and EURASIAN UNION Russian diplomats have distributed pamphlets warning that ‘association with the EU means Russia has a number of advantages for same-sex marriage’. implementing a soft power strategy in its neighbourhood: the presence of large Russian The Kremlin also tries to create a shared identity minorities; a shared history; cultural and linguistic in the post-Soviet space based on common proximity; a larger economy and energy resources. language, religion and history through several The Kremlin’s soft power tools include cultural and government organisations, the most important linguistic programmes, scholarships for foreign of which is Rossotrudnichestvo – the Federal students, well-equipped media outlets, Christian Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent Orthodoxy, and a visa-free regime with many States, Compatriots Living Abroad and neighbours that makes Russia’s labour market International Humanitarian Cooperation. The relatively accessible. The power of international Kremlin is worried that the use of the Russian attraction is based on political values, and the language is declining in the business and cultural Kremlin tries to offer an alternative narrative to the life of neighbouring countries, and some of West. This vision is not only based on multi- Rossotrudnichestvo ’s projects are devoted to its polarity, but also as a defender of conservative promotion. It also organises recurrent (anti-liberal) values – a world view that appeals to commemorations of crucial episodes of Russia’s many in the neighbours. During his presidential history, drawing upon the rhetoric of fraternity address to the Russian Federal Assembly in and the nostalgia for the ‘glorious past’ and December 2013, Putin outlined his conservative especially for the Soviet empire. However, a vision, presenting the EU and the West more member of the Belarusian United Civil Party generally as decadent places where traditions and told this author that this emphasis on values are ‘eroding’, accepting ‘without question celebrating a shared ‘glorious history’ would also the equality of good and evil’. explain why most of the attendees at these events tend to be the elderly. To counter annual EU reports on human rights abuses, last year the Russian Ministry of Foreign Apart from developing its values- and culture- Affairs published for the second time its own based narrative, Russia has also been promoting a ‘Report on the Human Rights Situation in the new model of regional economic and political POLICY BRIEF - Nº 181 - MAY 2014

integration to counter the EU’s, the Eurasian ties are not ready for it. Despite the planned signa - Union. So far it consists only of a customs union ture of the EEU treaty in Astana on 29 May, there - – meant to become a broader Eurasian Economic fore, the actual implementation of this project will Union (EEU) during 2015 and lead to a political likely continue to face political and economic union down the line. The project has obtained obstacles. mixed results so far. To date, only Kazakhstan and Belarus have become full-fledged members of the Customs Union with Russia. However, the initia - MEDIA OUTLETS AND DEVELOPMENT tive has increasingly garnered public attention in PROJECTS other neighbouring countries in recent years: in Moldova, for instance, only a slight majority The soft power tool par excellance is media. (44 per cent, it was 55 per cent in 2009) of Although their actual influence is different in the respondents of a January poll declared a pref - every country of the post-Soviet space, Russian erence to integrate with the EU over Russia news and entertainment networks are widely (40 per cent, 30 followed due to the widespread use of the percent in 2009). Russian language. As for new media, the so- Moscow's Armenia and Kyr - called Runet , the ensemble of all Russian- deployment of gyzstan had stated language-based Internet activities taking place in their interest to the world, is becoming increasingly relevant as both hard and soft join the Customs an influential platform for Russian soft power. Union before the Russian websites, including Kremlin-aligned power seems to Ukraine crisis broke online news services like Regnum , consistently suggest that out, while Tajikistan rank among the top most visited in all might also feel neighbouring countries, as shown by Internet Russia is trying obliged due to its traffic estimates from Alexa, Amazon’s analytical dependence on company. to balance its Moscow. power strategy in Russia’s mobilisation of media outlets includes However, it remains classic public relations methods (such as buying a ‘smart’ way to be seen what space in international media to publish impact recent events supplements like ‘Russia Beyond the in Ukraine may have Headlines’), and propaganda (as demonstrated on the further development of the Eurasian Union by the biased news coverage of the Ukrainian (see also FRIDE commentary no.6 The end of Rus - crisis from the English-language Russia Today sia’s Eurasian project ). Russia’s use of military force television station). In some cases, the Kremlin to assert its interests, together with questionable also resorts to ‘friendly’ local media to get its economic benefits and the vagueness of the politi - messages across. In the Baltic republics, Russia cal component of the Union, shows the asymmetry influences the media environment with the help of the relations among partners in favour of Russia. of the Russian language television station, First That may discourage potential new members from Baltic Channel (PBK), which re-broadcasts the joining, and fu rther exasperate differences among news from Russia’s publicly-funded Channel current partners. A meeting in Minsk in April, One . In 2012, the total audience of PBK in the where the three Customs Union partners were Baltics exceeded 4 million viewers. supposed to set up the definitive conditions for signing the EEU treaty, ended with no agreement. A 2014 report from the Center for International Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, quot - Media Assistance says that PBK is the second ed by local news agency BelTA , even suggested most watched channel in Latvia, which among postponing the formation of the EEU if the par - the three republics has the highest percentage of >>>>>> FATAL ATTRACTION? RUSSIA’S SOFT POWER IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD

>>>>>> ethnic Russians (more than a quarter of the Putin at the end of April. Moscow’s support population). According to the same report, if for and establishment of new Government- Georgia and Azerbaijan local media are more Organised Non-Governmental Organisations independent of Russian influence (if not of their (GONGOs) in the post-Soviet space, such as the own governments), in Armenia, Belarus and Estonian youth organisation Molodoje Slovo , Moldova they are much more vulnerable to inspired by the pro-Putin youth movement Nashi Russian propaganda. Russia probably has its in Russia, is also likely to continue. They strongest influence over the information space in represent another means to influence public the Central Asian republics, although the debates in the neighbours, although it is hard to situation has slightly improved thanks to cable assess their real impact. television packages offering programmes in Russian that originate outside of the Russian Federation, according to Martha Brill Olcott, RUSSIAN MINORITIES IN THE Co-Director of the Al-Farabi Carnegie NEIGHBOURHOOD: Programme on Central Asia. Whether more THE KREMLIN’S PASSE-PARTOUT? direct or more subtle, Russia’s media presence in the neighbouring countries is strong, and an ‘Compatriots’, meaning Russian minorities in important vehicle for the promotion of the other countries, are central to Russia’s soft power Kremlin’s foreign policy objectives. in the post-Soviet space, as they are the main target of Russian soft power organisations such as During 2013, along with its aforementioned Rossotrudnichestvo . According to the 1999 Russian cultural activities, the Kremlin also made Federation’s State Policy toward Compatriots the Rossotrudnichestvo agency responsible for Living Abroad, ‘compatriots’ are very broadly international development, as a way of promoting defined, including Russians living abroad, former Russian values in recipient countries. Until citizens of the Soviet Union, Russian immigrants, recently, Russia allocated funds to multilateral descendants of compatriots, and even foreign projects through international organisations like citizens who admire Russian culture and the World Bank, which distributed them among language. A 2011 report published by the Center developing countries. Russian officials announced for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), that Rossotrudnichestvo would be transformed into ‘Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century’ , an agency with a proactive and primarily bilateral estimated that this so-called Russkiy Mir (the approach to international development, with Russian world) outside Russia consists of roughly Putin pledging to increase its budget from the 35 million people, mainly concentrated in the current 0.03 per cent of Russia’s GDP to 0.1 per post-Soviet space. cent by 2020. This vast but politically constructed ‘diaspora’ is This new approach points to a Russian effort to institutionalised through several organisations, use international aid to project soft power around such as the Russkiy Dom (Russia House, a kind of the world, especially in the former Soviet Russian version of the British Council or Spanish republics where Rossotrudnichestvo is most Cervantes Institute) network or the Russkiy Mir active. In the official plan for developing Foundation, whose purpose is ‘reconnecting the Rossotrudnichestvo centres abroad between 2013 Russian diaspora with its homeland through and 2015, 9 out of the 11 planned centres are in cultural and social programs, exchanges and the neighbourhood. The focus on the post-Soviet assistance in relocation’. The Russian Orthodox republics as the main recipients of Russian aid was Church and its head, Patriarch Kirill, also play an reiterated in the new Foreign Policy Concept of important role in spreading the idea of a ‘Russian the Russian Federation in the field of world’ and in supporting the Kremlin’s policies. international development assistance, signed by Apart from cultural and language programmes, POLICY BRIEF - Nº 181 - MAY 2014

this network of organisations pursues policies CONCLUSION: IS RUSSIA A SMART against the ‘falsification of history’ or measures to POWER IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD? defend compatriots’ rights against national governments. Every three years, a World Congress Russia’s attempts to project soft power in its of Russian Compatriots is held, although the neighbourhood have in no way softened the number of participants appears to be steadily Kremlin’s willingness to use hard power to assert declining: according to the Russkiy Mir its influence, including military force. To counter Foundation website (www.russkiymir.ru), the last the prospect of its neighbours integrating more Congress in St. Petersburg in 2012 hosted nearly closely with the EU and defend its ‘legitimate 500 activists, half the number that attended the interests’ in the post-Soviet space, the Kremlin has previous edition in Moscow in 2009. used every instrument in its hard power toolbox. These include trade restrictions and bans, threats The defence of the interests of ‘compatriots’ has to expel from Russia immigrant workers from often served as an excuse for the Kremlin to neighbouring countries, and massive financial meddle in other states’ internal affairs in much and political support to breakaway regions in the harder ways. For example, Moscow’s issuing of neighbours. passports to citizens in neighbouring states represents an easy way to create or strengthen pro- Moscow’s deployment of both hard and soft Russian sectors of the population and influence power measures seems to suggest that Russia is local politics – despite the resolute opposition of trying to balance its power strategy in a ‘smart’ many neighbouring governments to this practice. way, to paraphrase Joseph Nye. However, there This ‘passportisation’ strategy created legal are several obstacles to this approach in Russia’s grounds – in Moscow’s eyes – to intervene case. Recent events in Crimea are a case in point. militarily in Crimea to protect Russian citizens. Russia had considerable soft power in Crimea, Similarly, prior to the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, based on historical ties and the large Russian many Russian passports were issued to citizens of minority there. However, by using military power Abkhazia and South Ossetia. in Crimea, the Kremlin sent a strong message to its neighbours that it is prepared to coercively Although it is hard to find exact figures, studies assert its authority – which in turn undermines its (such as ‘South Ossetia: The Burden of efforts to become a pole of attraction. Recognition’ published by the International Crisis Group in 2010) affirm that Russian Second, Russia’s concept of soft power is different passport holders include all active, non-ethnic from those in the West. Soft power in the US and Georgian adults in Abkhazia who applied and the EU is mainly produced by a pluralistic civil almost the entire population of South Ossetia. society, culture and the ‘way of life’ in general. According to Freedom House, in Transnistria This is not to say that Western governments do roughly a third of the population is believed to not seek to channel soft power through various hold Russian passports, while the Chief of the means, but that is (a small) part of a much wider Armenian National Migration Service declared set of factors that determine the attractiveness of that in Armenia the number is between 200- respective countries, from successful brands to 300,000 (10 per cent of the population). media icons or high living standards. Conversely, Furthermore, Putin recently signed a law in Russia the Kremlin is the main soft power relaxing the requirements for obtaining Russian actor, reinforcing the impression that Russia’s soft citizenship. Those who are fluent in Russian or power is largely Soviet-style propaganda in have lived in the Soviet Union are all eligible, support of Moscow’s foreign policy goals. which points to an increasing political exploitation of Russian minorities by the Lastly, due to its neo-imperialistic and polarising Kremlin. rhetoric and by targeting ‘compatriots’, Russia’s >>>>>> FATAL ATTRACTION? RUSSIA’S SOFT POWER IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD

>>>>>> soft power policies do not seem to have been very Soviet countries. But the vision of an alternative effective in promoting Russia’s image amongst geopolitical pole plays on anti-Western non-Russians. In fact, Russia’s soft power policies sentiments and nostalgia for the Soviet past are likely to deepen political cleavages within found in many neighbouring societies. Plus, neighbouring societies, mobilising people who are Russia’s deep economic and social ties with already pro-Russian but generating the opposite neighbours (including significant minorities) effect on those who are not. For example, despite and powerful media outlets, are other elements anti-EU state propaganda on official television, that might help the Kremlin achieve its short- positive public perceptions of the EU in Belarus – term foreign policy objectives. However, Russia’s perhaps the closest political neighbour to Moscow willingness to use hard power to impose its – have increased from 40 per cent in 2008 to 55 objectives, and lack of positive vision to attract per cent in 2013, according to a University of non-Russian populations in neighbouring Kent survey commissioned by the Office for countries, mean that its soft power is unlikely to Democratic Belarus. In other neighbours, such as endure in the long-term. Ukraine or Moldova, public opinion remains deeply divided between supporters of integration Eleonora Tafuro is junior researcher at FRIDE. with Russia or with the EU – but this is not only because of Russian soft power efforts.

It is not easy to assess the impact of Russia’s soft power in its neighbourhood, partly due to the e-mail: [email protected] profound differences that characterise the post- www.fride.org