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Russia's Defence Reform

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Russia's Defence Reform RUSSIa’S 126 DEFENCE REFORM ASSESSING THE REAL ‘SERDYUKOV HERITAGE’ Katri Pynnöniemi FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 126 • March 2013 ULKOPOLIITTINEN INSTITUUTTI UTRIKESPOLITISKA INSTITUTET THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS RUSSIA’S DEFENCE REFORM ASSESSING THE REAL ‘SERDYUKOV HERITAGE’ Katri Pynnöniemi Researcher FIIA Briefing Paper 126 The Finnish Institute of International Affairs March 2013 • The Russian Armed Forces are undergoing a long and expensive reform, which aims at preparing the country to new security threats. The reforms were initiated during the term of the former minister of defence, Anatoly Serdyukov. His dismissal in November 2012 initiated a debate on the future of the reforms. • As of yet, the changes made by the new minister of defence Sergei Shoigu are corrections to the existing plan, and not an overall revision of its contours. The most pronounced difference is a shift in favour of domestic military industry. • In its current condition, Russia’s defence industry is not able to absorb the major increase in military spending in an efficient manner. From the technological and managerial perspectives, most of the military-industrial enterprises function far below the international average. The EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia research programme The Finnish Institute of International Affairs ULKOPOLIITTINEN INSTITUUTTI UTRIKESPOLITISKA INSTITUTET THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Introduction The main components of the reform, summarized in the Swedish Defence Agency report, include: down- The reform of Russia’s Armed Forces has been por- sizing of the officer corps, dismantling of empty trayed as one of the success stories realized by the cadre units, and the introduction of a new command country’s current leadership in the last ten-year system as well as a new arms branch. In addition, period. The reform was also thought to be irrevers- 70 per cent of the weaponry and equipments of the ible. The dismissal of Defence Minister Anatoly Armed Forces should qualify as modern by 2020. Serdyukov on November 6, 2012, and his replace- What made the difference to previous attempts at ment with army general Sergei Shoigu, the former reform was an idea to “simultaneously change the Minister of Emergency Situations and governor organization, introduce modern command and of the Moscow region, has undermined previous control technology, and improve procedures and certainty. For better or worse, it has also sparked a the competence of officers”.1 debate on the future of the defence reform. According to an announcement made by Minis- Indeed, the debate in Russia over the real ‘Serdyukov ter Serdyukov in November 2011, the ‘New Look’ heritage’ has brought to the fore the inherent weak- reform of the Armed Forces had been fulfilled. nesses of the current political system and its limited Indeed, far-reaching changes have taken place. capacity to steer such a major transformation. But Yet, for external analysts this conclusion seems more than anything, the ‘Serdyukov heritage’ is premature as far as the implementation of the a reminder of the fact that any reform – however ‘permanent readiness’ objective and the transi- essential it may be – is subject to incompleteness tion to a ‘non-mobilization’ army are concerned. and the recurrence of all things old in a new form. The critics, among them military analyst Roger N. McDermott, say that the new elements introduced The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the real in the course of the reform process are blended contours of the defence reform, and thus to point with “the old army and its manifold problems”, out the key factors that aid in understanding its and the outcome of the reform is incomplete at incompleteness. The paper will also participate in best.2 It is this incompleteness characterizing the the debate on Russia’s military procurement, insofar reform that makes it vulnerable to calls to reverse as it pays attention to some recent changes in the the whole process. political significance of this colossal task. Questions relating to Russia’s evolving security landscape and However, President Putin’s message to new Defence strategic thinking remain, however, outside the Minister Shoigu has been unambiguous in this scope of this paper. regard. “The future leader of this vitally important ministry,” Putin declared to him at their first meet- ing on November 6, 2012, “must be able to continue The defence reform will be polished not reversed all the positive initiatives that have been carried out in recent years and guarantee the dynamic The implementation of the ‘New Look’ (Novyi Oblik) reform has been regarded as an essential step that needs to be taken in order to prepare Russia for 21st 1 C Vendil Pallin, Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year century warfare. The change was outlined by Presi- Perspective, FOI, 2012, p. 15; See also A Arbatov & V Dvorkin, dent Vladimir Putin back in 2006, but the reform Novaja Voennaja Reforma Rossii, Working Paper 2, Carnegie process was not activated until after the August Moscow Center, 2011. URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/ 2008 war with Georgia. Although Russia gained files/WP2-2011_military_rus.pdf, retrieved on April 5, 2012. what it was fighting for in that conflict, the opera- 2 M Carlsson and J Norberg, ‘The Armed Forces’, in C Vendil tion of Russia’s Armed Forces during the war was Palin, opus cited, p. 100. R N McDermott, The Reform of far from satisfactory. The reform plan was formally Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces. Problems, Challenges launched in October 2008 under President Dmitry and Policy Implications, The Jamestown Foundation, Wash- Medvedev’s supervision, and was set to prepare ington, 2011, p. 400. A similar argument was also made by Russia’s Armed Forces for the needs of local and Russian military analysts in a report published in early 2011. regional conflicts, as opposed to large-scale mobi- A Arbatov et al., Novaya Voennaya Reforma Rossii, Carnegie lization à la Cold War. Moscow Center. THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3 development of the nation’s Armed Forces”. He concludes.3 This latter factor may imply, at least emphasized “matters that had not been addressed in theory, that the new minister has significant for years”, such as a pay increase for servicemen administrative leverage over the reform process. and solving the housing problem. Later, at the However, with hindsight, it is safe to say that the expanded meeting of the MoD Board on 27 February methods chosen to implement the objectives of 2013, Putin acknowledged the major changes made the ‘New Look’ reform have created a new set of to command systems at the tactical and operational problems. It is this part of the ‘Serdyukov heritage’ levels, and underlined that the reform process that is most difficult, if not impossible, to address in general was on the right track. The subsequent under the current political system. In the following, changes would not imply the reversal of the earlier the three main components of this heritage will be decision but would be about “polishing and fine- scrutinized. tuning”, Putin stated. But where will this ‘fine-tuning’ lead the reform? The ‘Serdyukov heritage’ under review Can the steps taken so far by Shoigu bring about more comprehensive adjustments to Putin’s plan Outsourcing as a partial fix than were perhaps originally intended? And finally, for a fundamental challenge how deeply will the real ‘Serdyukov heritage’ – the set of arrangements used in implementing the For the Russian Armed Forces, the main defence reform – be re-adjusted? Not all of these questions reform issue has been the planned cuts in the num- can be answered directly at the moment. This paper ber of officers and the shift from a large mobiliza- focuses on the last question since it certainly sheds tion army to a more compact but allegedly more light on some of the main problems of the reform mobile structure. According to the initial scheme, process, as well as the overall political constraints over 90 per cent of army units and almost half of of the reform. the air force and navy units were to be abolished. In early 2011 the original plan to reduce the number of The three spheres that are critical for understanding officers from 320,000 to 150,000 was reversed and what the ‘Serdyukov heritage’ is all about include the current objective is to have 220,000 officers in outsourcing, the management of MoD property, and the Armed Forces.4 The steps away from the mass- the implementation of the military procurement mobilization army towards the ‘New Look’ were programme. The first two spheres are at the core of deemed necessary given Russia’s changing security the defence reform as far as the reorganization of landscape and the actual scarcity of resources to the army units and reduction in personnel are con- maintain the military in its previous form. cerned. However, the third sphere touches on the conflict between the MoD and the domestic military Consequently, the most significant structural fac- industry over military procurement. tor behind the defence reform is the demographic crisis and the poor state of public health, which both The changes introduced by Serdyukov were aimed undermine the purported goal of having a million at ‘optimization’ of the existing resources, includ- strong army. Between 2011 and 2020, the annual ing minimizing corruption and maximizing the number of men reaching the age of 18 will be only use of scarce human resources within the Armed 600,000 to 700,000. This is at approximately the Forces. Interestingly enough, both outsourcing and same level as the annual recruitment rate required property management were handled through the to reach the numerical strength of one million men. state-run defence ministry company, Oboronservis.
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