Naval War College Review Volume 72 Article 10 Number 2 Spring 2019

2019 The in the Age of Austerity, 1919–22: Naval and Foreign Policy under Lloyd George John B. Hattendorf

G. H. Bennett

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Recommended Citation Hattendorf, John B. and Bennett, G. H. (2019) "The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity, 1919–22: Naval and Foreign Policy under Lloyd George," Naval War College Review: Vol. 72 : No. 2 , Article 10. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/10

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The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity, 1919–22: Naval and Foreign Policy under Lloyd George, by G. H. Bennett. : Bloomsbury, 2016. 296 pages. $120 (paperback $39.95, e-book $28.76).

Royal Navy captain Stephen Roskill’s navies in a watertight compartment and 1968 study Naval Policy between isolate it from “total history” and the the Wars (Naval Institute Press) has broader patterns of relevant linkages in dominated the historiographical scene political, military, economic, business, on this subject for half a century. G. H. social, gender, and labor history. Bennett’s volume now successfully adds The works of Volker Berghahn, Jon much depth and new understanding Sumida, and Samuel P. Huntington to the naval policies of Prime Minister have had an impact on Bennett’s focus. David Lloyd George’s government in the Significantly, Bennett’s approach reflects immediate aftermath of the First World the parallels he sees in the 1919–22 War. Bennett’s volume follows, but with period with the issues surrounding a much different focus, Erik Goldstein British naval policies in the second and John Maurer’s The Washington decade of the twenty-first century. Conference 1921–22 (Routledge, 1994) In opening his sensitive and innovative and Donald Lisio’s British Naval study of this three-year period, Bennett Supremacy and Anglo-American points out that Lloyd George’s govern- Antagonisms, 1914–1930 ( ment had a particularly tricky range of Univ. Press, 2014). Rather than fol- problems to balance after World War I. lowing the traditional approach to this While other recent historians have inter- period of concentrating on international preted the period as one of discontinuity diplomacy and external issues, Bennett in British naval and defense policies, demonstrates “a multifaceted approach Bennett sees continuity. The inability of rooted in political and naval history the government to “get it right” in the but opening up new and cutting-edge area of naval policy was a direct result debates in other areas of historical study of the size and complexity of the issues to transform traditional debates” (p. xiv). that it faced. The difficulty lay in the Laudably, Bennett seeks an approach interconnectedness of naval policy with to naval history that breaks down the government politics, the private sector, artificial barriers that place the study of

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and communities. As Samuel Hunting- the likelihood of war. The ministry’s ton would have put it, British naval institution in 1919 of the “ten-year rule” policy had been in a state of “disequilib- in defense planning effectively excluded rium” even before the beginning of the the possibility of thinking about war. First World War, and this continued into As Bennett points out, this was in one the postwar period. Britain’s economy sense a logical and pragmatic approach, was declining in comparison with but it forced the Royal Navy and the other national economies; changing other armed services to find alternative technology and weapons were render- explanations for keeping the service ing obsolete Britain’s investment in its in a state of preparedness to deal with fleet; and other countries, the future security of Britain and the notably Japan and the United States, had empire. While the service turned to the potential to build navies that would effective arguments such as showing that end British naval mastery. British leaders battleship construction helped reduce correctly saw these developments as unemployment, Bennett argues that significant threats to the security, stabil- this undermined a clear understanding ity, and future of the British Empire. of the purpose and value of the navy, In the immediate postwar era, Britain harming it in the long run. He goes faced massive war debts, along with a on to argue that the ten-year rule had range of severe social and political issues a pernicious and long-term effect by complicated by unemployment, labor establishing the precedent that leaders unrest, and the rise of socialism. These could make competent defense decisions issues combined to create challenges without an assessment of strategic needs to the existing social, economic, and and threats. Bennett underscores the political order. In trying to create naval lesson from this period that political policies in this complex environment, imperatives cannot compromise stra- the Lloyd George government made its tegic threat assessments and decisions. national security decisions on the basis “Dangers must be identified and noted, of what it might be able to afford rather even if the means to meet them are not than on preparing for the worst-case immediately at hand” (pp. 179–80). scenario. That worst-case situation, of Bennett’s book is a significant con- course, was the war that would occur tribution to naval history. Not only twenty years later, but that neither the does it provide a new interpretation government nor the British voter could of historical events, but it does so by contemplate so soon after the horrific placing the navy in a much broader events of World War I. Ministers were context. While other scholars may forced to balance naval preparedness for argue points of interpretation, his a future war against national bankruptcy vision in bringing about a broader and the fears of a socialist victory by understanding of the naval dimensions election or revolution. In this situation, of this period is a model for others to Lloyd George placed his ministry’s follow and apply. Equally important, priority solely on the financial con- his volume has much to say to current sideration and the reduction of public practitioners and strategic planners. spending rather than on a considered analysis of the strategic situation and JOHN B. HATTENDORF

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