Graham Thomas Clews

Churchill and the Phoney War

A Study in Folly and Frustration

Graham Thomas Clews

A thesis in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

UNSW Canberra

2016

The University of New South Wales Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Surname or Family name: Clews First names: Graham Thomas Degree: PhD Faculty: History School: School of Humanities and Social Science Title ofThesis: Churchill and the Phoney War: A Study in Folly and Frustration

Abstract

The Phoney War is a comparatively neglected period in studies of Churchill and war. Yet, this was a time of an extraordinary transformation in Churchill's fortunes: he returned from almost a decade in the political wilderness to take an active role in the strategic direction of the war and then became Prime Minister.

This study reassesses the nature and significance of Churchill's contribution to Britain's war effort during the Phoney War. The issues and events considered are those Churchill believed important and upon which he spent much time and energy but, nevertheless, are matters that have been inadequately explored, are misunderstood, or remain controversial in the scholarship. There is little here of the 'public' Churchill of the evocative speeches and 'bull dog' persona. This is a study of the Churchill the public did not see, the man of the Admiralty war rooms, of staff meetings, of the War Cabinet and its committees; all places in which he developed his priorities for victory.

The thesis is in two parts. The first deals with Churchill as First Lord and focuses on his supervision of the anti-U-boat war; his attempts to develop a naval offensive and his view of appropriate naval strategy; and his contribution to the building of the navy he considered necessary to fight his war. The second part addresses Churchill and the wider war: his attempt to animate Britain's war effort within the government; his pursuit of a more aggressive prosecution of the war; and his contribution the disastrous Norwegian Campaign.

The principal conclusion of this thesis is that, for Churchill, the Phoney War was a period of folly and frustration, a time during which he failed in many areas to show himself either a warrior of superior qualities or a potential war leader. His folly was to be found in flawed assumptions, excessive self confidence, dubious strategy and a penchant for risk; his frustration was driven by the strictures of government, the limitations of the Allied military position and the unique circumstances of the times, but it was also very much a product of his own faults and short-comings.

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I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstract International (this is applicable to Doctoral theses only).

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To Juliet, Marlene and Tom

Acknowledgements

It is impossible to complete any substantial piece of academic research without the assistance and support of many. The risk in acknowledging those who have contributed, supported, or suffered while I have completed this task is that I might over-look or omit. I, therefore, apologise in advance for any omission. First and foremost, I must express my thanks to my family, in particular my wife Juliet, my son Amery and my daughter Imogen. They have experienced too often my distraction, my frustration, my absence and occasional neglect but always remained positive and supportive. I would also like to thank my extended family for their interest and support.

I consider myself especially blessed to have had as my primary supervisor, Debbie Lackerstein of the ADFA School of Humanities and Social Sciences. In every respect her contribution to the completion of this thesis has been above and beyond the call of duty. Her patience and wisdom has been appreciated enormously. There is no doubt this work is the better for her contribution. My thanks, too, to my secondary supervisor, Robin Prior, who was able to find time within a busy schedule to offer important feed-back and advice.

I would also like to express more broadly my appreciation to the staff of the ADFA School of Humanities and Social Sciences and the staff of the ADFA Library for the support given me. In particular, I must thank Bernadette Mc Dermott, who came to my rescue on a number of occasions. Additionally, and in no particular order, I would like to thank Craig Stocking, David Lovell, Peter Dennis, Vera Bera and Marilyn Anderson-Smith and Jennifer Carmody.

This study has benefitted greatly from access to primary resources retained at a number of archives in England. These include British National Archives; Churchill Archive Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge; National Maritime Museum Archives, Greenwich; Cadbury Research Library (CRL) University of Birmingham, Nuffield College Archives (NCA), University of Oxford. One of the great joys of historical research is, of course, the ‘treasure hunt’ in the archives. My experience in these archives was made all the more enjoyable by the wonderful staff who, without exception, offered their time generously to smooth the path of my investigations. vii

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the assistance of the following at various stages during the completion of this work: Grace and Geoff Kempster, David Morgan- Owen, James Levy, Hans Houterman, (unithistories.com) and the staff at Deutsches U-Boot Museum.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements vii

Abbreviations and Code Words x

Chapter Page

Introduction 1

Part One: Churchill as First Lord 1 U-boats and the Protection of Trade 21

2 Catherine 54

3 New Construction and Churchill’s Inshore Squadron: A 79 New Perspective on Churchill and the Air/Sea Debate

Part Two: Churchill and the Wider War 4 Fighting the War 103 The War Cabinet and its Committees

5 Air Bombing Policy, the French and Royal Marine 135

6 Lines of Least Resistance: Narvik and the Finnish 169 Option

7 Norway 192 Part 1: A Failure of Pre-emption

8 Norway 218 Part 2: Fighting the Campaign

Conclusions 249

Bibliography 272

Abbreviations

ACAS Assistant Chief, Air Staff ACIGS Assistant Chief, Imperial General Staff ACNS Assistant Chief, Naval Staff ADGB Air Defence of Great Britain ADM Admiralty ASB Admiralty Statistical Branch ASDIC Anti-Submarine Detection Committee Advanced Strike Force (British light and medium ASF bombers based in France during the Phoney War) A/SWD Anti-Submarine Warfare Division DA/SWD Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare Division BNA British National Archives, Kew ‘C’ Occasional abbreviation for Operation ‘Catherine’ CCC Churchill College Cambridge CAB Cabinet (British) CAS Chief of Air Staff CIGS Chief of Imperial General Staff CNS Chief of Naval Staff COS Chiefs of Staff (Committee) CRL Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham CV Companion Volume of Churchill documents DNI Director of Naval Intelligence DCNS Deputy Chief of Naval Staff D of P Directory of Plans Division (Admiralty, RAF) JPS Joint Planning Staff HMS His Majesty’s Ship KGV King George V class battleships LFC Land Forces Committee MEW Ministry for Economic Warfare MCC Military Co-Ordination Committee NCA Nuffield College Archives, University of Oxford NID Naval Intelligence Division NMM National Maritime Museum MSF Main Striking Force (Heavy Bomber squadrons in UK) SSA Secretary of State for Air SSW Secretary of State for War SWC Supreme war Council U.P. ‘Upward Projectile’ weapon WO War Office WRU Weekly Return U-boats x

Codewords

Hammer Amphibious assault on Trondheim, Norway Maurice Amphibious landings in central Norway (Namsos) Scissor Amphibious landings in central Norway (Andalsnes, Molde) Royal Marine A plan for the mining of Germany’s inland waterways Weserubung German Invasion of Norway and Denmark Rupert Plan for landing of Allied forces in the event of a violent German response to Operation Wilfred Wilfred British plan to mine the Norwegian Leads

xii

Introduction

Winston S. Churchill is one of the most studied figures of the Twentieth Century. Historians have given considerable scrutiny to his entire life, although his involvement in the two great conflagrations of that century, the first and the second world wars, has gained most attention. In these conflicts lie his greatest successes and his most significant failures. However, studies of Churchill in war are uneven in their focus. To his role in the First World War, most attention is unsurprisingly given to his performance as First Lord of The Admiralty. For the Second World War, the period after Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940 is, also unsurprisingly, most studied. Yet, the ‘Phoney War’, from September 1939 to May, 1940, represents the most extraordinary transformation in Churchill’s fortunes. The period is bracketed by the end of his ‘wilderness’ years and, nine months later, his assumption of the premiership. With the last and, indeed, only work dedicated to Churchill and the Phoney War now over forty years old, this study is a timely reassessment of this important period in Churchill’s life.1

The aim of this thesis is to reassess Churchill’s contribution to the British war effort during the Phoney War. It explores how Churchill proposed to fight the war and, in particular, it considers his attempt to animate the Royal Navy, the British War Cabinet, and sometimes the French towards a more aggressive prosecution of the conflict. An important objective will be to understand why, despite his efforts, inaction and inertia prevailed. This study will address the strengths and weaknesses of Churchill’s strategic vision and consider the various obstacles to action that

1 This work is Patrick Cosgrave, Churchill at War: Alone 1939-1940, (London: Collins, 1974). 1

presented as the war progressed. This is the only study to offer an assessment of Churchill’s performance as First Lord and War Cabinet minister, roles that developed his potential as a future war leader.

The thesis is divided into two parts. Part one considers Churchill’s performance as First Lord of the Admiralty, with particular attention to his contribution to the anti-U-boat war, to his search for a naval offensive; and his attitude to, and the strategic rationale behind, the wartime naval construction programme of 1939-40. Also considered is Churchill’s view of the threat offered by aircraft to Britain’s traditional naval supremacy.

Part two considers Churchill’s contribution to the wider war effort: his efforts to animate the War Cabinet to a more aggressive prosecution of the war, his attitude to Allied air policy, the development and ultimate failure of his two key offensive plans, Narvik and Operation Royal Marine and, finally, his involvement in and influence upon the one great land battle of the Phoney War, the Norwegian Campaign.

This structure and these subjects facilitate a number of important themes within and across chapters. The most important of these is Churchill and strategy; specifically, the nature, calibre and wisdom of his strategic thinking and, more particularly, the risks – strategic, operational and political – he was prepared to accept in the fulfilment of his vision. This exploration provides insight into a number of attendant issues. His relationships with his naval staff and, in particular, his First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound are important considerations. Churchill and Pound did not necessarily see eye to eye on how, when, and where the substantial might of Britain’s fleet should be used. Nor was there much agreement on how best to address Britain’s imperial obligations against a potential German threat. Understanding the extent to which Churchill was able and willing to impose his vision and priorities on his naval staffs and the extent to which his naval staffs contained and constrained their First Lord is important to any assessment of Churchill as a potential war leader.

Another important theme is Churchill’s interaction with members of the War Cabinet and, most important, his relationship with Neville Chamberlain and Lord

Halifax. From the beginning, Churchill had definite views on how the war should be prepared for and fought, but so too did Chamberlain. For the most part Chamberlain’s view prevailed and Churchill’s did not. At its most polarised, this division has been explained as a conflict between an offensively minded First Lord denied an opportunity to take the war to the Germans by a timorous Prime Minister determined to be an obstacle to such aggression. The relationship is also oftentimes viewed in a political context as a conflict between a man determined to prevent Churchill’s ascendancy to the premiership and a man determined to ascend to it.

This study gives attention to the shared views of Churchill and Chamberlain, as well as their differences, and argues that their agreement represents and reflects more accurately the wartime relationship of the two.2 Although the differences in the strategic view of each at the start of the war were quite marked, these lessened as time progressed. Churchill’s ‘bulldog’ spirit had its limitations, as did Chamberlain’s passivity.3 Points of difference between them are better understood in the context of the challenges inherent in taking effective offensive action against Germany in this period rather than through fundamental differences in personality or strategic outlook.

Churchill generally accepted Britain’s ‘sit tight and re-arm’ approach to the war, a policy it must be emphasized, that was endorsed fully by Britain’s Chiefs of Staff. It was never Chamberlain’s policy alone. It was founded on the proposition that time was on the Allied side and that any hiatus offered by the enemy should be welcomed as an opportunity to prepare for the offensive. Churchill’s objection to sitting tight and re-arming was primarily at the margins of this policy. All plans for offensive action had to run the War Cabinet gauntlet of ‘real’ action that would make a ‘real’ difference versus ‘palliative’ measures that would be of limited efficacy, potentially hurt the Allies more than the enemy, and invite retaliation and escalation. Churchill’s two primary offensive initiatives, Narvik and Royal Marine failed to pass

2 An example of a work which takes a less polarised view of these issues is Nick Smart, When the Balloons Went Up, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003). 3 An example of an assessment of the view that Chamberlain maintained the same strategic posture throughout the Phoney War period can be found in Robert Self, Neville Chamberlain: A Biography, (Ashgate, 2006), 394-98. 3

this scrutiny, whether imposed by the War Cabinet or by the French and this was a source of bitterness and frustration on Churchill’s part.

The development of war strategy was never only about Churchill, Chamberlain and the British War Cabinet. Strategy was an Allied affair which, at all times, involved the French. The French increasingly showed an interest in the offensive but their priority was to keep the war as far from their borders as possible. Their strategy included plans that risked war with Russia but they were more than happy to accept this if it would deny Germany the capacity to fight an aggressive war in the West. This desire to redirect, at almost any cost, the war away from France became increasingly problematic for the British as the Phoney War progressed. A significant divergence in view developed over air bombing policy and, more particularly, the circumstances in which Britain would unleash its much vaunted strategic air weapon against Germany. The French determination to keep the war away from France for fear of retaliation and escalation became a serious obstacle for Churchill when he sought to garner support for his Operation Royal Marine. It created a personal dilemma for him because his support for Britain’s bombing policy was motivated by similar apprehensions over escalation and retaliation. A study of this episode and its implications for Churchill’s ‘bulldog’ image issue will be an important element in this work.

For the Allies, and especially for Churchill who led the Service that would be required to implement it, strategy was all about the periphery of Europe during this period. However, this brought with it many problems which, ultimately, proved intractable. On the matter of French proposals for peripheral action, especially in southern Europe, Churchill was oftentimes no more enamoured than Chamberlain and the wider War Cabinet. He was keen to keep Mussolini and Italy as non- belligerents and was fully aware of the potential problems if they were not. He accepted there would be no fighting in the West and was cautious about southern Europe. Given his support for bombing policy, this left only Northern Europe as a theatre for offensive operations and this is where much of the focus of this study will be. A northern strategy chimed with Churchill’s personal inclinations and he began investigations into a naval offensive immediately he became First Lord. From December, War Cabinet interest in Swedish iron ore placed Scandinavia at the centre 4

of strategic planning. Churchill’s Narvik ‘palliative’ to stop Germany’s winter supply of ore was replaced by the COS and Foreign Office ‘real’ initiative, the Finnish Option, a wish-filled plan to stop the flow of all Swedish ore to Germany. The Finnish Option failed and Narvik was implemented very much too late to make a difference. Churchill would attribute this failure and delay to a War Cabinet determined to take the ‘line of least resistance’. The merit of this explanation will be explored.

Another important focus of this thesis is the manner in which Churchill operated as leader and colleague within the Admiralty and the War Cabinet and its committees and how successful he was in achieving his aims. A lasting criticism of Churchill as First Lord is that he brow-beat his staff into submission to achieve what he wanted and that he was aided in this by a compliant First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound.4 Similar criticism is levelled at his performance within the Military Co- ordination Committee (MCC) most particularly when he became chairman in April 1940. Churchill’s own views of the decision-making process and the problems that developed within it were quite different. He believed the three way War Cabinet/MCC/Chiefs of Staff (COS) structure established by Chamberlain to be slow, cumbersome and ineffectual and he attributed to this much of the ‘phoney- ness’– or inaction – of this time. Power to act, he would argue after the war, should have been placed in the hands of one man and he was that man.5 The extent to which Churchill’s performance in the Phoney War justified such self-confidence is assessed here through an analysis of his contribution to the War Cabinet and two of its ministerial committees: the Land Force’s Committee (LFC) and the MCC. The LFC was the body that determined the size of the British Army that would fight the Second World War; the MCC was, from November 1939, primarily responsible for the development of strategy and the supervision of operations.

4 The primary and most influential advocate of this view has been Stephen Roskill. See, for example, Churchill and the Admirals, (London: Collins), 94-95 and Appendix: An Historical Controversy. 5 For Churchill’s contemporary criticisms of the decision making process, see FO 800/328 (also, CV At the Admiralty, 642) W. S. Churchill to Lord Halifax, 15 January 1940, FO 800/328 (also CV At the Admiralty, 883) and W. S. Churchill to Lord Halifax, 14 March 1940. For the views he expressed in The Gathering Storm, vol. 1 of The History of the Second World War, (London; Melbourne: Cassell, 1948) see 586-589 and 641-643. 5

The question of Churchill’s skills as strategist and tactician and the potential he showed as a war leader is further explored through his performance in the single great land and sea conflict between Germany and the Allies during the Phoney War: the Norwegian Campaign. During this conflict Churchill was both First Lord of the Admiralty and, briefly, chairman of the MCC, the body, along with the COS, primarily responsible for the conduct of the campaign. Churchill’s dual role imposed a hefty burden of responsibility. His successes and failures, and his strengths and weakness during this campaign must be balanced here against ‘extraneous’ factors to determine if he proved to be the warrior and war-leader he believed himself to be and if the considerable criticism of his performance is justified.

Another recurring theme in this study will be the influence Churchill’s First World War experiences had on the proposals and policies he pressed in this new war. His past experiences as First Lord bore heavily on matters of strategy and issues of ship construction while his role as Minister for Munitions later in that war were reflected in his approach to Britain’s war effort and his somewhat too optimistic hopes for the rapid escalation of this effort at the start of the Second World War.

Finally, in existing work, Churchill is often assessed or condemned by a single utterance or phrase cited to illustrate his point of view on complex issues or his culpability in a particular matter.6 This tendency has been particularly evident in assessments of his attitudes to issues such as convoy, air power and criticism of his somewhat wayward declarations in regard to the strength of the Allied positon at the start of the of the Norwegian campaign. This thesis will look beyond these summary

6For example, Churchill’s attitude to convoy, “We should secretly loosen up the convoy system …” has been represented as proof positive of the “First Lord’s prejudice against the convoy system” in Sir Peter Gretton, Former Naval Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy (London: Cassell,1968) On his attitude to the air threat to ships, Churchill’s comments on 16 October in a letter to Roosevelt that “We have not been at all impressed with the accuracy of the German air bombing of our warships’ as evidence of the fact that Churchill “blithely assumed that the Fleet, unprotected by fighter cover, could cope with German dive bombers” in Richard Lamb, Churchill as War Leader, Right or Wrong? (London: Bloomsbury, 1991): 24. Churchill’s comment in a March 1939 memorandum “An air attack upon British warships, armed and protected as they now are will not prevent full exercise of their superior sea power” has been inaccurately used to represent his war time view. However, within weeks of the outbreak of war, Churchill was displaying considerable anxiety over the capacity of ships to defend themselves: “it certainly is a very disquieting fact with which we cannot possibly rest content that the multiple pom-pom and AA guns failed to hit any of these aircraft. We must regard this as a major weakness to be repaired at the earliest possible moment.”(Note to Admiral Phillips, ADM 205/2). 6

judgements to determine more accurately Churchill’s views on a number of important issues, including the air/sea debate, and restore their complex context.

Despite the vast number of studies of Churchill, only one, Patrick Cosgrave, Churchill at War: Alone 1939-1940, has given its entire attention to his performance during the Phoney War. This work is now over forty years old and its author did not have access to many sources available to this study. This is a problem shared with many other works on Churchill and this period. A reassessment of his role in the Phoney War with a particular emphasis on primary sources now available is, therefore, timely.

Beyond the writing of Cosgrave, and for the convenience of this study, works that bear on this study of Churchill and the Phoney War can be divided into seven categories. The first is those works that focus primarily or entirely on Churchill as First Lord in both world wars. These include Roskill’s, Churchill and the Admirals, Gretton’s Former Naval Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy, Hough’s, Former Naval Person: Churchill and the Wars at Sea and Marder’s monograph, Winston is Back. All are now over thirty years ago, again well before many of the documents considered in the study were available.7 This limited access to documentary events has sometimes led to sweeping and broad-brushed judgments about Churchill’s attitude to such things as air power, convoy and the big-gunned battleship which this study hopes to correct. Marder’s and Roskill’s work are particularly relevant to this study for the oftentimes vituperative debate they initiated over Churchill’s performance as First Lord. Although a subject sometimes deemed too well worn to be worthy of further investigation, it will be revisited in this thesis, and additional light shed.8

The most recent of the works in the above category and one which has gone a long way to correct the historical record via the use of primary source is Churchill

7 Stephen Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals (London: Collins,1977); Richard Hough, Former Naval Person: Churchill and the Wars at Sea (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1985); Gretton’s, Former Naval Person; Arthur Marder, “Winston is Back: Churchill at the Admiralty 1939-40”, English Historical Review ( Supplement 5, London: Longman, 1972). 8 See, for example, comment made by Nicholas Brodhurst, Churchill’s Anchor: The Biography of Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound. (U.K.: Leo Cooper, 2000): 139. 7

and Sea Power by Christopher Bell.9 Given its focus on Churchill and sea-power in both world wars and the interwar period, this work is limited in the attention afforded to the period of Phoney War and, necessarily, gives the wider war beyond the issue of sea power little attention. Nevertheless, this volume draws a number of pertinent and important conclusions, in particular, on Churchill’s role in the Norwegian Campaign. This study hopes to build upon this analysis, including Bell’s insights into the Marder/Roskill debate by a further exploration of Churchill’s role in the key strategic and operational decisions of this campaign and the events leading up to it.

A second category of work is the more general studies of the Royal navy in the Second World War in which Churchill, as First Lord, inevitably receives some attention. Perhaps the most notable of these is Engage the Enemy More Closely by Corelli Barnett.10 This reviews Britain’s entire naval war in the Second World War and, although he makes significant and influential judgements about Churchill in this period, these are essentially incidental to his main objective. This study will challenge a number of Barnett’s criticisms of Churchill, most particularly the blame heaped upon him for the Norwegian campaign.

A third category of work is Churchill biography. These consider all aspects of Churchill’s life and, therefore, the attention given to the Phoney War is very limited.11 Of this body of work, Martin Gilbert’s various studies are influential. However, his writing is consistently sympathetic and rarely adopts an analytical or critical approach to Churchill’s life or professional performance and can be fairly described as partisan. Of much greater value are Gilbert’s companion volumes of Churchill’s documents which are an important first step to any investigation of Churchill’s life in any era. Nevertheless, because these volumes oftentimes provide excerpts only from the material provided, they must be used with caution. Moreover, on occasion, the portion quoted does not represent that which has the most historical import. Reference to the complete document is sometimes essential to achieve

9 Chris Bell, Churchill and Sea Power (Oxford University Press, UK, 2012). 10 Correlli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War (1st American ed. New York: Norton, 1991). 11 Martin. Gilbert, Churchill: A Life ( London: Simon and Schuster,1994), but also general biographies such as Norman Rose, Churchill: An Unruly Life,(U.K.: Simon & Schuster, 1994) 8

adequate context and understanding.12 Other biographies, Roy Jenkins, Churchill and John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory among the most notable, consider Churchill’s life through a primarily political prism.13 These works have also been important in defining the adversarial view of the Churchill/Chamberlain relationship which will be challenged in this study.

Churchill’s political role and contribution to War Cabinet business is also addressed in a fourth category of analysis in which Churchill is not the main or only focus but rather an important protagonist in the narrative. Graham Stewart, Burying Caesar and its focus on Churchill, Chamberlain and the Tory Party, is a good example of the former; and, inevitably, studies of Neville Chamberlain give considerable attention to Churchill and his relationship with Chamberlain in the years of Appeasement and the first year of the war. These volumes give almost no attention to Churchill in his capacity of First Lord but they are important because they explore how Churchill and Chamberlain viewed each other and this informs the analysis of the extent to which Churchill’s failure to exercise more influence during the Phoney War was a result of deliberate policy of containment by Chamberlain or a product of Churchill’s own personality and the dubious value of his proposals.14

A fifth scholarly category examines Churchill as a war leader. These are insightful studies of his ‘warrior’ attributes but their subject limits the focus on the Phoney War. Among these, Richard Lamb, Churchill as War Leader: Right or Wrong? is significant in dedicating two chapters to the Phoney War period but his analysis is compromised by the repetition of flawed assumptions and the use of suspect sources.15 Geoffrey Best, Churchill and War, produced a general volume but acknowledged the limitation of his work and concluded that detailed studies on

12 Martin Gilbert, Finest Hour: Winston S. Churchill, 1939-1941 (Minerva 1989). This volume necessarily spends a great deal of time on Churchill during the Phoney War period. However, the criticism remains that Gilbert is loath to analyse and pass judgements based on this analysis. 13 Roy Jenkins, Churchill, (London: MacMillan, 2001); John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory: A Political Biography, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993). 14 These volumes are many: Graham Stewart, Burying Caesar: Churchill, Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party (London: Phoenix, 2000); Charmley’s, Churchill: The End of Glory; William Manchester, The Caged Lion: William Spencer Churchill, 1932-1940 (London: Cardinal, 1988). 15 R Lamb, Churchill as War Leader (London: Bloomsbury, 1991). Lamb, for example, falls foul of the suspect editing of The Ironsides Diaries, to be discussed subsequently. 9

Churchill and war were still needed.16 Carlo D’Este, Warlord: A Life of Churchill at War 1874-1945, attempts to fill this gap but its scope ensures that it does not do full justice to the Phoney War period and many shibboleth go unchallenged and questionable assumptions repeated.17 An important, insightful, and more recent study that considers the ‘war lord’ Churchill in the broader context of the Phoney War and other protagonists, including Chamberlain and Ironside, is Nick Smart, Before the Balloon Went Up: British Strategy and Politics During the Phoney War.18 Churchill is by no means the primary focus here but, given the nature of his investigation, his role in the development of strategy in the political context of this time inevitably figures prominently. However, Smart’s purpose is more historiographical and for this reason, diaries apart, his references are mostly secondary. He effectively sifts through the mire of conflicting analyses of this period and makes important comment on the partisan nature of existing views; however, his intention is not so much to provide new evidence so much as to offer greater balance to the assessments of the key policy makers. His insight in regard to the important role of General Ironside in the development of strategy, show that Churchill was by no means the dominant personality in this respect. As important are his comments on the extent to which the mythology surrounding Churchill has been built on that surrounding Chamberlain.19 His observation that the ‘politicised’ view of the Churchill/Chamberlain relationship, “though fashionable, may be mistaken” identifies a line of investigation that will be developed further in this work.20

A sixth category of work related to this analysis is that which address particular aspects of the Phoney War in wider specialist studies. Of most relevance to this work are studies that have dealt with the anti-U-boat war or the war on British trade and analyses of the Norwegian Campaign and the importance of Scandinavia to Phoney War strategic thinking. Of those volumes considering the anti-U-boat war, the Phoney War period is given scant attention, not least because it is a comparatively low key period in this conflict. Further, Churchill himself is usually incidental to

16 Geoffrey Best, Churchill and War (Hambledon and London, 1995). See preface for his comments on the need for further studies on the subject. 17 Carlo D’Este, Warlord: A Life of Churchill at War 1874-1945,( Allen Lane, 2009). 18 Nick Smart, Before the Balloon Went Up: British Strategy and Politics During the Phoney War (Westport and London: Praeger Press, 2003). 19 Smart, Before the Balloon Went Up, 5. 20 Smart, 223-24. 10

these works. The essential ‘bible’ which must form the basis of any analysis of anti- U-boat war from an Allied perspective is The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-1945, a revised version of two naval staff histories edited by Eric Groves.21 Without reference to this volume, it is not possible to understand the complexities of the U-boat war, nor the particular challenges involved in fighting it. Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War, The Hunters, 1939-1942 provides an important summary of U-boat activity in its early stages.22 The best of the more recent studies that provide insight into how well the anti-U-boat war was fought in the Phoney War is Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, The Royal Navy and Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1917- 40, and George Franklin, Britain’s Anti-submarine Capability 1919-193923 These studies help provide context to the challenges Churchill and the Admiralty faced in fighting the U-boats and provide evidence that both Churchill and the Admiralty were less closed-minded and better prepared to fight this conflict than is supposed. In particular, Llewellyn-Jones makes important judgements about the anti-U-boat offensive that will be developed in this study. Surprisingly absent from any analysis of the U-boat war is an attempt to determine, through a comparative study of German and British sources, the accuracy of the contemporary Admiralty assessment of its success against the U-boat. This study makes a contribution to the closing of this gap in knowledge.

British/Allied air bombing policy is another important element of this study but there is remarkably little detailed analysis of Churchill’s attitude to it or of his reaction to the limitations this placed on offensive strategy. Churchill as a minister of the War Cabinet played an important part in developing and, more accurately, reaffirming British policy in regard to ‘taking the gloves off’ in the air war against Germany; that is, the circumstances under which Britain would begin unrestricted aerial warfare. An assessment of Churchill’s attitude to air bombing policy and the question of retaliation and reprisal is important to an understanding of the extent, and

21 Eric Groves, (ed), The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-1945 (Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore and Sydney: Ashgate, 1997). 22 Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War, The Hunters, 1939-1942 (New York: Modern Library Paperback, 2000). 23 Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, The Royal Navy and Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1917-49 (Routledge 2006); George Franklin, Britain’s Anti-submarine Capability 1919-1939, (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2004). 11

limitations of, his ‘offensive’ mindset. It also permits a more fine distinction to be made between his view of the offensive and that of Chamberlain.

Similarly neglected in studies of Churchill is his attitude towards British plans to bomb the Ruhr in response to a German attack of the Low Countries. This is an important omission for the fact that evidence suggests the War Cabinet’s determination to escalate the Air War may have influenced French military policy and strategy, including the fate-filled decision to move deeply into Belgium in response to German action in the West. Authoritative volumes such as Brian Bond’s Britain, France and Belgium 1939-1940 make little or no reference to the prolonged dispute between the British and French over the Ruhr policy and its potential influence on wider strategic considerations.24 Churchill has offered his own tendentious explanation for French military policy in the second volume of his history of the Second World War, Their Finest Hour. In Command of History, David Reynold’s challenged this and drew a link between French strategy, British anxieties over the Low Countries, and the air threat but it is not his purpose to do more than touch on the issue.25 There is, therefore, much more to be said on the subject. More generally, Their Finest Hour and its preceding volume The Gathering Storm are largely silent on British air bombing policy up to and including the first days of the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May, 1940. This study will explore these issues further, including an explanation as to why these important subjects receive so little attention from Churchill himself.

Among studies of the centrality of Scandinavia to Churchill’s strategic plans and those of the War Cabinet, the most important is Thomas Munch-Peterson, The Strategy of Phoney War: Britain, Sweden, and the iron ore question, 1939-194026. Munch-Peterson provides a remarkably detailed assessment of Churchill and the pursuit of Swedish ore via extensive use of Admiralty, War Cabinet and Foreign Office resources and, more important, extensive use of Scandinavian archival sources. This is important background to this study’s focus on Operation Catherine,

24 Brian Bond, Britain, France and Belgium 1939-1940 (UK: Brassey’s, 1990). 25 David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War, (London: Penguin, 2005), 165-166. 26 Thomas Munch-Peterson, The Strategy of Phoney War: Britain, Sweden, and the Iron Ore Question, 1939-1940, (Stockholm: Militarhistoriska Forlaget, 1981). 12

Churchill’s failure to sell his Narvik scheme, and the development of the Finnish Option. Articles and books by Patrick Salmon also afford insight into the political dimension and economic assumptions surrounding Allied Scandinavian strategy and the intractable problem of Swedish co-operation.27 The most important volume on Allied strategy towards Finland, and with a title that imputes the folly of this strategy, is Nivakiki’s The Appeal that was Never Made, the Allies, Scandinavia and the Finnish Winter War, 1939-1940.28 This gives insight into the thinking of the Scandinavians, the views of whom were often contrary to the assumptions being made by Britain and France in the formulation of their strategy. Another important recent volume on the Scandinavia issue is Craig Gerrard, The Foreign Office and Finland 1938-1940, which identifies the considerable influence of the Foreign Office Northern Department in British strategy and makes clear that strategy during the Phoney War was never only about, Churchill, Chamberlain and Halifax. 29

There are a large number of volumes on the Norwegian Campaign, a topic that must be addressed in any consideration of Churchill and the Phoney War because it has been a source of much criticism of him. This is one of the most studied of all campaigns and, in the past decade, the analysis has been more extensive than ever. Most studies, however, have a focus on the naval and military aspects of the campaign rather than the decision-making process or Churchill’s role in it. Nevertheless, many of these have made an important contribution to our understanding of Churchill’s part in this failed campaign. The best of the most recent have been Geir Haarr’s two volumes, The German Invasion of Norway, April 1940 and The Battle for Norway, April – June, 1940 and also, Henrik Lunde Hitler’s Pre- emptive War, The Battle for Norway, 1940.30 These studies have not, however, developed issues that are the focus of this study; the Royal Navy’s failure to pre-

27 Patrick Salmon’s work includes: Britain and Norway in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1995); “British Plans for Economic Warfare Against Germany, 1939-1939: The Problem of Swedish Ore”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 1: 53-72. 28 Julian Nivakiki, The Appeal that was Never Made, the Allies, Scandinavia and the Finnish Winter War, 1939-1940 (London: C Hurst, 1976). 29 Craig Gerrard, The Foreign Office and Finland 1938-1940: Diplomatic Sideshow, (London: Frank Cass, 2005). 30 Geir Haarr’s volumes: The German Invasion of Norway, April 1940 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006) and The Battle for Norway, April –June, 1940 (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2010). Also, Henrik O Lunde, Hitler’s Pre-emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (Philadelphia and Newbury: Casemate, 2008). 13

empt the Germans in Norway and Churchill’s interference at both a strategic and operational level in the campaign.

Diaries and letters are a seventh category of works important to an adequate understanding of the Phoney War. The published diaries of Neville Chamberlain, Alexander Cadogan, John Colville, Sir Ralph Edwards and General Edmund Ironside all have a place in this study for the insight offered into Churchill’s performance in his various roles and how his contribution was viewed by others.31 The diaries of Edward’s and Ironside are particularly important to this study because of their influence on the historical record and the inaccurate conclusions that have been drawn from them. Edwards was Deputy Director of Operations at the Admiralty at the start of the Norwegian Campaign and his diaries therefore are particularly germane to this study. They were first used extensively and somewhat inaccurately in the writing of Stephen Roskill and most notably in Churchill and the Admirals.32 Recently, in the work of Christopher Bell, has an important step been taken to correct the misapprehensions developed from the Edward’s diaries.33 Careless editing of the Ironside’s diaries by Macleod and Kelly has caused historians to draw inaccurate conclusions from them. A combination of the careless and unfortunate has, therefore, been instrumental in casting severe judgment on Churchill’s interference in the Norwegian Campaign. This reassessment of Churchill’s role in the Norwegian Campaign is based on a more accurate use of these sources.

The eighth and final category of secondary material relevant to this study is the writing of Churchill himself and, most notably, his multi-volumed histories of the world wars: The World Crisis, the history of the First World War; and The History of the Second World War, specifically, the volumes The Gathering Storm and Their Finest Hour. Churchill’s own writing bears on several important issues in this study. The first is the question of ‘destiny’ and the notion that Churchill, guided by superior deed and wisdom was ‘a man of destiny’. The second is the view that Churchill had

31 Robert Self, ed. The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Pub, 2000). David Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan (London: Cassell, 1972); John Colville, Downing Street Diaries: Volume 1, 1939-October 1941 (Great Britain: Sceptre, 1986). Edwards diaries are unpublished but can be found in the Edwards Papers at Churchill College Cambridge. 32 Stephen Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals (London: Collins, 1977). 33 For a valuable insight into Roskill’s use of the Edward’s diaries, see the epilogue of Bell, Churchill and Sea Power. 14

an eye to the Prime Ministership of Britain well before he attained it. In its assessment of the Churchill/Chamberlain relationship, this study will touch on the question of Churchill’s ambitions, and Chamberlain’s anxieties in regard to this, and determine if there is evidence to support this latter claim. A third issue is the ‘what might have been’ view of history that Churchill developed in his own work; that is, his inclination to identify moments in history where a failure to heed, or a delay in heeding, his guidance and advice led to misfortune. The extent to which Churchill’s view of himself is sustained by his performance in the Phoney War is another important element of this thesis. On this final matter, important insight has been offered by two works, the object of which has been to analyse Churchill’s writing on both world wars and to assess the veracity of Churchill recount of his role in them: Prior The World Crisis as History and Reynold’s In Command of History.34

In addition to secondary sources, this study has made extensive use of primary sources. These include Admiralty, War Cabinet and Foreign Office documents stored at the British National Archives; the Chartwell Papers, the papers of Stephen Roskill and the diary of Ralph Edwards at Churchill College Cambridge, the Lindemann Papers kept at Nuffield College Archives, Oxford, and the holdings of the Caird Library and Archive of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. 35 Significant conclusions and important insights have been drawn from newly or rarely sourced documents but also well-trodden paths of inquiry. In particular, sections on Churchill and the anti-U-boat war, Operation Catherine, Churchill’s wartime construction programme and the Norwegian Campaign are based heavily on a research of Admiralty documents in the British National Archives in Kew and also the Churchill collection at Churchill College Cambridge.

Chapter 1, U-boats and the Protection of Trade, is a study of how Churchill dealt with the U-boat threat and Germany’s war on Allied trade. The Phoney War was never ‘phoney’ for the Royal Navy which was, from the first day, fighting the U- boat threat. The core issue in this analysis is Churchill’s contribution to the strategy

34 Robin Prior, Churchill’s World Crisis as History (London: Croom Helm, 1983). 35 The archives investigated included, British National Archives (BNA) Churchill Archive Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge (CCC), National Maritime Museum Archives (NMM), Cadbury Research Library (CRL) University of Birmingham, Nuffield College Archives (NCA), University of Oxford. 15

adopted to fight it and his view of convoy versus a more offensive approach to the U- boat peril. Churchill has oftentimes been held to be anti-convoy and inordinately preoccupied with using offensive measures to deal with the U-boats and to protect Allied trade. He is viewed, therefore, as one of a number who had failed to learn the lessons of the First World War. This chapter offers a different interpretation of Churchill attitude to these issues. Further, it assesses the degree to which his views were influential in determining anti-U-boat policy and explores the extent to which errors of judgement were his own or part of a wider ignorance and misapprehension.

Chapter 2, Catherine, analyses Churchill’s plan to dominate the Baltic with a force of old battleships and take the war to the Germans. This operation is frequently mentioned in naval works on this period but it is rarely given more than a few pages.36 Despite being an operation that never took place, a study of Catherine, and the considerable planning and debate surrounding it, provides insight into Churchill’s wider strategic vision and his relationship with Admiralty staff and, most important, his First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound. Additionally, it permits an exploration of an important foundation of Churchill’s strategic thinking: his view that the successful prosecution of ‘this’ war – the war with Germany was the best way to avoid the fighting of the ‘next’ – a war which might include Italy and Japan. However, this strategic outlook brought him into conflict with Pound and other naval staff because it involved aggressive action which could, in the event of failure, compromise Britain’s capacity to deal with any and all of these future threats. It is, therefore, an important focus of this thesis.

Chapter 3, New Construction and Churchill’s Inshore Squadron, addresses the naval construction programmes introduced or amended by Churchill as First Lord. This chapter explores further Churchill’s strategic vision, the nature of the war he intended to fight, and the role he anticipated his navy would play in it. At the heart of his plans was a determination to build an ‘inshore squadron’ for offensive operations. This aspiration was not, as is often assumed, wholly related to Catherine.37The

36 For example, see, Corelli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, 92-96, Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals: 93-94; Carlo D’Este, Warlord: A Life of Churchill at War 1874-1945, 394-395. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran, 140-147, has provided the most detailed consideration of 7 pages. 37 Churchill’s Catherine plan conceived the use of old Royal Sovereign class (R class) battleships. Naval staff and, subsequently, Lord Cork made clear that ‘modernised’ battleships would have to be 16

priority he gave to the construction of his inshore squadron and to immediate, rather than longer term construction needed to deal with a threat from Japan, demonstrated a willingness to take risks to defeat Germany that was not shared by naval staff. Additionally, a study of the naval construction programme reveals Churchill’s unique attitude to the air threat to capital ships and tackles a great shibboleth of this period; that in building his strategic vision, he was dismissive of the dangers that modern air power offered to the freedom, mobility, and offensive power of the Royal Navy.

Chapter 4, Fighting the War: The War Cabinet and its Committees, is the first of four chapters to address Churchill’s contribution to the wider war effort. It analyses Churchill’s efforts to animate Britain’s war effort within the War Cabinet and through his contribution to two important committees: the Land Forces Committee [LFC] and the Military Co-ordination Committee [MCC]. The LFC was established in the first week of war to determine the size of the army Britain would need to fight the war and which could be sustained by its economy while also meeting the needs of the Air Force and the Navy. The MCC, which began its formal sitting on 13 November, was established to advise the War Cabinet on strategy, war preparation and the progress of military operations.38 A study of Churchill’s contribution to these committees adds significantly to understanding his strategic priorities and the holistic nature of his strategic outlook. It also provides insight into the role Churchill set for himself in regard to the wider war. Almost from his first day within the War Cabinet, Churchill did not hesitate to delve into all aspects of the war effort and to challenge the prerogatives of the other service ministers, indeed, any minister, in an effort to initiate and expedite matters he considered most important. A key objective of this chapter will be to judge the value of this meddling and how it impacted on the decision-making process itself. Another objective will be to determine why it was that Churchill had such limited success in meeting his private agenda, especially on matters of strategy. A number of explanations will be explored and questions asked: to what extent were instrumentalities such as the MCC used. Thus, while Catherine went ahead on the assumption that ships of the Warspite class would be used, Churchill continued to seek the reconstruction of some R class lest, should Catherine not take place, nothing be done at all to fulfil his need for an inshore squadron. 38 Although the MCC first sat in November, a committee of ministers had been operating throughout October. Presumably because the committees involved were similar and the issues discussed were within the domain of this new committee, the minutes of these meetings are included in the records of the MCC (see, Cab 83/1). 17

contributors to the inactivity of the Phoney War; to what extent was Churchill himself part of the problem; to what extent did other, extraneous factors deny him success? However, the most important element of this inquiry will be an exploration into the influence of Neville Chamberlain and the extent to which he blocked Churchill’s vision. An extension of this discussion will be to consider assumptions surrounding the importance of ‘action’ in the Phoney War and the degree to which this has helped define the perception of Churchill (and Chamberlain) during this period.

Chapter 5, Air Policy, the French, and ‘Royal Marine’, explores two seemingly disparate issues which are, in fact, intimately linked. The chapter explores Churchill’s attitude to Britain’s conservative air bombing policy. This policy, closely linked to the Allies wider ‘sit-tight and re-arm’ attitude to the war, was to avoid an escalation in the air war. It succeeded to the extent that, for the entire Phoney War, not a single bomb was dropped in anger on Germany. Churchill’s attitude to this air policy will be explored, as will his attitude to the use of Britain’s strategic bomber force and his views on ‘retaliation’ and ‘escalation’ in the air war. Royal Marine was Churchill’s plan to mine Germany’s inland water-ways from the land and from the air. In his post-war writing, Churchill expressed bitterness over French opposition to Royal Marine. Yet, it will be shown that fears of retaliation that drove French opposition were not greatly dissimilar to those of Churchill and which helped define his own views on the air weapon and the risks that should be taken in its use.

Chapter 6, Lines of Least Resistance: Narvik and the Finnish Option, addresses the two key offensive initiatives of the Phoney War. Narvik was Churchill’s plan to mine the Norwegian Leads in an attempt to deny Germany a winter supply of iron ore. The ‘Finnish Option’, which grew out of the Soviet invasion of Finland at the end of November 1940, was a British War Cabinet initiative designed to stop the flow of all Swedish ore to Germany and to draw Germany into a theatre of war where the War Cabinet believed the Germans could be fought to advantage. The latter scheme was never implemented, despite months of preparation. The former, Narvik, conceived at the end of September 1939, was not begun until early April, 1940, only to be pre-empted by the German invasion of Norway. This chapter will develop further the question of why such offensive plans were so long delayed and 18

why, ultimately, they failed to bear fruit. It will also assess Churchill’s particular contribution to this delay and failure.

Chapters 7 and 8 examine Churchill’s involvement in and contribution to the Norwegian Campaign that heralded the end of the Phoney War. This campaign stands alongside the Dardanelles campaign in the First World War as Churchill’s signal failure as a strategist and warlord. The paramount aim of these chapters is to establish the accuracy of this criticism. Until recently, Churchill’s responsibility for the failure of this campaign has been viewed as close to absolute. Although there has been some historical disagreement as to the precise nature of his interference, it is accepted, almost without reservation, that Churchill dominated strategy and interfered at the operational level to the serious detriment of the campaign.39 This chapter will reassess this view through a re-examination of sources and the erroneous conclusions that have been drawn from them.

Chapter 7, Norway: A Failure of Pre-emption, explores Churchill’s involvement in the preparation for the final incarnation of his Narvik scheme in late March and his contribution to the failure to anticipate and pre-empt Operation ‘Weserubung’, the German invasion of Norway. Churchill deemed such an operation impossible in the face of a well-prepared Royal Navy, yet, Weserubung succeeded in meeting all its objectives. An assessment of the failure of the Royal Navy to successfully interdict the German forces is critical to any assessment of Churchill’s performance as First Lord but a full understanding of Churchill’s culpability must include a close consideration of the political dimensions of the Narvik Operation and an appreciation that, by the beginning of March, Narvik was very much a War Cabinet plan and not Churchill’s alone.

39 The infamous feud between Stephen Roskill and Arthur Marder focused to a considerable extent on Churchill’s actions during the Norwegian Campaign. More recently, Bell has added a valuable further insight into this issue and, in particular, the questionable foundations of Roskill’s views. Although, Marder defends Churchill in his monograph, Winston is Back, he nevertheless accepts that “there can be no dispute about Churchill’s strong influence on the inept overall strategy of the campaign, including the constant change of plan, as well as upon the combined operations.” A. J. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran. ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 166; Barnett used the title “A Churchillian Disaster” to describe his chapter on Norway. Rod Paschall entitled his analysis, Scandinavian Twist: Churchill’s Fiasco in Norway, 1940. For another negative assessment, see, D’Este, Warlord, 418. 19

Chapter 8, Norway: Fighting the Campaign, focuses on the campaign itself, that is, the period after 9 April, by which time the Allies had been pre-empted at all the key ports in Norway from Oslo to Narvik. Thereafter, the Allies attempted to retake one or other of these ports as a first step to reclaiming Norway. An analysis of this campaign in its various phases reveals Churchill’s precise role in the formulation and development of strategy, and his interference at an operational level and therefore the extent to which he can be held responsible for the failures that occurred.

This consideration of Churchill and the Norwegian Campaign will bring together the central themes of this thesis and anticipate many of the conclusions contained therein: Churchill did some things well and some things poorly. He often did not have the influence attributed to him, nor was he responsible for certain policies and decisions as supposed. He could be profoundly persistent in pursuing his objectives in some instances and open to persuasion and sound argument in others. He was often not the key arbiter of a policy or programme but made decisions through consultation; he oftentimes listened to advice but did not always choose wise counsel; he was greatly influenced by the past, especially his experiences of the First World War but had insufficient knowledge and awareness of the present; he displayed occasional strategic insight but more often encouraged and pressed strategic and operational folly; he had a taste for risk which was not shared by his naval staff nor War Cabinet colleagues but found himself more in tune than is admitted with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Ironside. He knew that risks had to be taken in war, but not which risks to take. Perhaps most important of all was that Churchill and Chamberlain, two men purportedly in constant rivalry, worked much more closely and successfully than imagined and on important issues such as air policy there was little difference between them. Nevertheless, in drawing broad conclusions about Churchill and the Phoney War, this study will lead ineluctably to its principal theme that, for Churchill, the period was a time of folly and frustration and, too frequently, failure.

Chapter 1

Churchill, U-boats and the Protection of Trade.

In the First World War, and before the introduction of convoy in 1917, the German assault on trade almost brought Britain to its knees. Despite this, Britain learned few lessons from the experience and, in the Second World War, the U-boat again proved itself a potentially decisive weapon. Churchill would characterise the battle of the Atlantic as his single greatest anxiety of the war. This chapter will examine Churchill’s contribution to the anti-U-boat war and the defence of trade during his term as First Lord. The primary focus will be to understand why he allowed the great folly and failure of the First World War, offensive patrolling, to continue to function alongside, and sometimes at the expense of convoy, which had proven the salvation of Britain a quarter century before. While the early adoption of convoy in the Second World War suggested that the Royal Navy had learned some of the key lessons of the past, the continued pursuit of ‘offensive patrolling’ at a time when there was a great shortage of escort vessels suggested it had not. Churchill was at the centre of this issue and he has been viewed as anything from ambivalent to hostile towards convoy.1 Often in company with Chief of Naval Staff, Dudley Pound, Churchill is placed in an irresponsible, offensively minded, patrolling school

1 For examples assessments of Churchill’s attitude to convoy and the influence of his offensive mindedness, see: Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran:119-120; Gretton, Former Naval Person: 264-265; Robin Brodhurst, Churchill’s Anchor, 127-128; Richard Hough, Former Naval Person: 134- 135; John Terraine, Business in Great Waters: The U-Boat War, 1916-1945, (Mandarin, 1990), 244- 245; Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, 90; D’Este, Warlord: 388-390, 396. 21

of thought and is held responsible for delaying the full implementation of this life- giving strategy to adopt instead a largely fruitless practice of offensive patrolling.

This chapter will investigate the Admiralty’s preparations for, and response to, Germany’s war on trade. It will then compare and contrast Churchill’s views on the best way to fight the anti-U-boat campaign and to protect Britain’s lines of supply and consider the impact these views had on Admiralty policy. An important issue considered is why Churchill developed and routinely expressed inaccurate and inflated claims of Britain’s success against the U-boat during this period. Churchill’s contribution to the anti-U-boat war remains an important aspect of his legacy as a strategist and warlord.

Protecting Britain’s Lifeline: The Admiralty View Despite the resounding success of convoy in the closing months of the First World War, the lessons learned by the Admiralty were far from complete at the start of the second. Although immediately prior to the war it was Admiralty policy as outlined in the document, Protection of Shipping at Sea, “to make preparations in peace for putting the convoy system into force, wholly or in part, immediately on the outbreak of war”, this did not mean that convoy would be implemented at the start of war but only that the Admiralty be ready to do so if needed. 2 A final decision as to the implementation of convoy was to be made prior to the outbreak of war based on the “conditions prevailing, or likely to prevail in the trade routes.”3It was considered that it should be the Admiralty’s policy to institute convoy in any area or on any route as soon as there is reason to believe that attacks will be made on British shipping on that area or route in sufficient strength to cause serious losses comparable to the loss of carrying capacity to be anticipated.4

It was assumed these conditions would only occur during unrestricted U-boat warfare. Anything short of this could be satisfactorily dealt with by traditional methods of defence such as the patrolling of focal areas and the arming of merchant vessels.5 The foundations of this policy were seriously flawed. The time lost to convoy was not significantly greater than the time lost to the evasive routing of independent vessels. Conversely, the risk of independent sailing was considerably

2 Protection of Shipping at Sea: 69, ADM 239/40 3 Ibid., Chapter 4; Convoy, 69-70. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., part II 22

under-stated. The patrolling of focal areas could not do what was expected of it. Nevertheless, these misapprehensions, and their unfortunate consequences, would linger throughout the Phoney War and for some time thereafter.

Immediately prior to the war, the Admiralty made the decision to implement a limited programme of convoy based on these misapprehensions. What happened thereafter would await the action of the Germans. However, a decision regarding the extension of the convoy system was forced upon the Admiralty on the very first day of war when, against the strict rules of engagement outlined by Hitler, a U-boat sank the liner Athenia. This suggested the German’s had begun ‘unrestricted’ U-boat warfare and Churchill and his Board authorised the implementation of convoy, save for the slowest and fastest of merchant vessels. By the end of September, much of British shipping moved in convoy, albeit oftentimes with limited escort.

While convoy was being instituted, offensive patrolling and sweeps claimed numerous successful attacks against U-boats in what appeared to be a ringing endorsement of ASDIC enhanced offensive action.6 However, as the month progressed and more and more vessels were committed to convoy, the number available for patrolling operations diminished considerably. This led to some friction between the proponents of convoy and those who continued to believe offensive hunting operations were the best way to protect Allied shipping. By the end of September, the Commander in Chief, Western Approaches, and champion of offensive patrolling, Admiral Dunbar-Nasmith, found his command short of vessels for offensive sweeps and patrols.7 He had anticipated having a substantial force available for the hunting and killing of U-boats but the early introduction of convoy had robbed him of this. Frustrated, he wrote to the Admiralty seeking to use 12 of his destroyer force of 57 for “purely offensive operations” and to act as a dedicated A/S strike force.8 This request received a wide circulation which included Churchill and Sir Dudley Pound. The Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Phillips,

6 ASDIC was the Royal Navy’s submarine detection device. The origin of the acronym is obscure. In 1939, the Royal Navy asserted that it referred to Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee, but no such committee existed during the First World War. 7 Admiral Sir Martin Eric Dunbar-Nasmith, (1888-1965). Dunbar Nasmith was Commander, Western Approaches from 1939 to 1941. 8 Proposal by Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches to form Anti-Submarine Striking Force, 23 September 1939, and comments by DCNS Phillips, 25 September 1939, ADM 199/124. 23

contended that success against the U-boat would only be achieved when “any submarine that attacks a convoy has say a 60% chance of being destroyed” and this could only be achieved by having more escorts with convoys. Once all trade was in convoy, U-boats could only do harm by attacking them and this would expose them to escorts. This, he believed, would achieve much more success than “if they are wandering about the ocean as striking forces.”9 Phillips thought Nasmith’s request identified an important matter of principle which ought to be decided. All respondents, including Pound, agreed with Phillips, and Nasmith was informed that the Admiralty would only give consideration to the formation of anti-submarine hunting groups after the number of escorts with each convoy had been brought up to four.10

The Admiralty had powerfully reinforcement the Navy’s commitment to convoy and had thus begun the war by making the very best of decisions. The First Sea Lord and his deputy evidently understood one of the core virtues of the convoy system: that to sink ships under escort, the U-boat must place itself in harm’s way. Moreover, it is evident that each also appreciated that the only way to ensure the safety of the convoy and also provide an opportunity for offensive operations by the escorts, was to ensure convoys were accompanied in force. Additionally, the policy appeared to be an acknowledgement that, as far as the Admiralty was concerned, the protection of trade was more important than the killing of U-boats via offensive patrolling. Nevertheless, despite this, many craft, including destroyers operating in the vital Western Approaches, were routinely involved in largely fruitless offensive

9 ADM 199/124. Phillips’ comments reaffirmed the assessment made by Vice-Admiral Binney’s Committee a fortnight before. Gretton has noted that, despite Binney’s recommendation, “no guidance … was sent to the Commanders –in-Chief” in regard to the priority to be given to escort over offensive patrolling. At least in regard to the most important C in C in the anti-U-boat war, this is clearly incorrect. See, Gretton, Former Naval Person, 265. This recommendation challenges the claim that Pound was a strong advocate of offensive patrolling. For example, see, Marder, From Dardanelles to Oran, 119, 121; Terraine, Business in Great Waters, 245. It is correct that Pound, as Commander -in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet had been a pre-war advocate of this form of anti- submarine warfare. However, this likely had much to do with the fact that the Mediterranean was a closed sea within which offensive patrolling was likely to be more effective. This communication makes clear that, at least as far as the Western Approaches were concerned, he had no doubt that convoy must take absolute priority over alternative measures. It is as important that Churchill made no effort to intervene in this important matter of principle at a time he was promoting the concept of hunting U-boats. 10 ADM 199/124. At this time convoys were oftentimes accompanied by two vessels only. 24

patrols and sweeps even while convoys were inadequately protected. Destroyers were also available to respond to distress calls and U-boat sightings, but this only rarely resulted in a U-boat find. This division of resources most likely began within the naval stations themselves and was sustained by their respective Commanders - in - Chief. That Pound and Phillips did nothing to arrest this development, despite the September correspondence with Nasmith, can perhaps be explained by three factors. First, the Germans pulled back from unrestricted U-boat warfare, therefore giving the Admiralty reason to rethink their policy. Second, not all shipping was being convoyed by the end of September. Ships capable of sailing at 15 knots or more sailed independently and a great number of neutral ships trading with Britain and France refused to join convoys. All these vessels required some kind of support. Third, and very probably the most important, before the first two months of war were over, it was becoming accepted by the Admiralty that offensive patrolling was working wonders in the finding and killing of U-boats.

Protecting Britain’s Life Line: Churchill’s View It is difficult to judge how Churchill would have chosen to implement the Admiralty’s trade protection policy had he assumed the position of First Lord before the outbreak of war. The sinking of Athenia, prompted the Admiralty to implement a much broader programme of convoy than planned and to do so more quickly. Thus was this tragedy also a blessing for Britain. Churchill found himself presented with a fait accompli but there is no evidence that he disagreed with these decisions. Indeed, despite the continued uncertainty over Italy, he immediately acceded to the recommendation that destroyers be withdrawn from the Eastern and Mediterranean theatres “with the object of adding if possible twelve to the escorts for convoys” in the Western Approaches.11 Moreover, from the beginning of war, he made clear that he fully supported convoy as a vital part of the anti-U-Boat solution.

Nevertheless, Churchill soon made clear that he did not view convoy as the ‘complete’ answer to the U-boat problem and the protection of trade. In his first major speech to the House of Commons on 25 September, he presented his ‘three- pronged’ approached to the U-boat threat. His first ‘prong’ was the setting in motion

11 Winston S. Churchill: Notes of a Meeting, September 4,1939, ADM 205/2. 25

of the convoy system which “is a good and well-tried defence against U-boat attack” but he added “no one can pretend that it is a complete defence. Some degree of risk and a steady proportion of losses must be expected.”12 The second prong, as per the guidelines for Protection of Shipping at Sea, was the defensive arming of all merchant ships and fast liners against the U-boat and the aeroplane. His third was “the British attack upon the U-boats” using a rapidly expanding force of hunting craft.13

This ‘third prong’ was not part of the Admiralty policy guidelines but Churchill was undoubtedly impressed by the evidence that offensive patrolling, combined with the new ASDIC weapon, was achieving remarkable success. Churchill’s pre-war faith in ASDIC was as absolute as his understanding of it was incomplete. He, more than most, was captivated by this new tool and he had succumbed too readily and too uncritically to the potential it offered to solve the U-boat problem. In June, 1936, he had visited Portland with the then First Sea Lord, Sir Ernle Chatfield, to see a demonstration of ASDIC.14 He was taken with what he saw and never thereafter questioned its value as a decisive anti-U-boat weapon. In March, 1939, he ventured this bold assertion in regard to the development of this weapon: The submarine has been mastered, thanks very largely to Lord Chatfield’s long efforts at the Admiralty. It should be quite controllable in the outer seas, and certainly in the Mediterranean. There will be losses, but nothing to affect the scale of events.15

Here, then, was the expectation that, with the assistance of ASDIC, the U-boat would not pose the threat it had in the First World War. By the end of September, 1939, this ‘expectation’ had met with results that suggested these hopes were fully justified. From the beginning of war, Churchill was inundated with a veritable barrage of positive news on anti-U-boat operations. The First Lord’s Daily Update provided numerous reports of attacks on U-boats and, oftentimes, estimates as to damage or destruction.

12Winston S. Churchill speech, House of Commons, September 26, 1939, Martin Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers, Companion Vol. I: At the Admiralty, September 1939-May 1940, (London: Heinemann, 1993), 154-159. 13 Ibid., 156. 14 Admiral of the Fleet The Rt Hon. Alfred Ernle Montacute Chatfield, 1st Baron Chatfield, GCB, OM, KCMG, CVO, PC, DL. (1873-1967). 15 Winston S. Churchill: Memorandum on Sea-Power, 1939, 27 March 1939, Martin Gilbert, The Churchill papers, Companion Vol. 13, The Coming of War, 1936-1939, 1414-1417. 26

In his statement to the House on 26 September, Churchill spoke with great enthusiasm about ASDIC and the success it was reaping: whereas once, he declared, it had taken a flotilla of 15 or 20 vessels a whole day to track down a U-boat, the same task could now be achieved by two destroyers; it was “no exaggeration to say that the attacks upon the German U-boats [had] been five or six times as numerous as in any equal period in the Great War, in which, after all, they did not beat us.”16 As for the numbers of U-boats destroyed, he estimated these at six or seven, “that is one tenth of the total enemy submarine fleet as it existed at the declaration of war destroyed”17 This was just one of many positive messages Churchill gave over the following months to a variety of forums: in his speeches to the House of Commons and to the Nation, in his letters to President Roosevelt and in his correspondence with the French navy.18

Churchill did not express any doubt at this level of success and spoke even more effusively to the House of Commons in October: Nothing like this rate of destruction was attained at any moment in the last war. During the last week for which I can give figures…seven U-boats were sunk. If we look back over the whole period of six weeks since the war began we may estimate that 13 U- boats have been sunk, that five have been seriously damaged, and possibly sunk, and several others damaged. These figures are probably an understatement. Besides this, two-thirds of the U-boats which have been raiding have suffered attack from depth- charges....19

All these facts and figures, however, grossly exaggerated the true state of the anti-U-boat war. Historical analysis attributes this exaggeration to ‘wishfulness’ and, at worst, a ‘wilfulness’ by Churchill intended to sustain morale and boost his own standing with the British public.20 However, it is likely Churchill’s over-statement, at least in the first two months of war, were much less calculated and more inadvertent

16 W.S.Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons, September 26, 1939, Gilbert, CV, The Coming of War, 155. 17Speech, Winston S. Churchill, U-Boat Warfare, 26 September, 1939, CV, At the Admiralty, 154- 159. 18 Although in his speech of September 26th, Churchill acknowledged that there were many false contacts “…some even of a comical character” he clearly accepted that more were real than not. 19 Winston S. Churchill, Oral Answers, House of Commons, Hansard, columns 686-690; Gilbert, CV At the Admiralty, 255-257. 20 This is the position taken by DNI, Admiral Godfrey, in his post-war memoirs and has been accepted by such historians as Patrick Beesly Very Special Admiral, the Life of Admiral J.H Godfrey CB., (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980) and D. MacLachlan, Room 39 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968). These men, as was Godfrey himself, were all wartime intelligence specialists. This is important for the insight they offer into the Intelligence world. However, there is enough that is incorrect in their recollections that suggest they knew less of Churchill’s thinking and motivation than they thought they did. 27

than such views allow. For the greater part, the figures quoted by Churchill in these various forums were the all too optimistic ‘official’ figures provided by the Naval Intelligence Division [NID] under Admiral Godfrey and, from the beginning of October, by the Anti-Submarine Warfare Division under its new director, Captain Budgen.21

One of the earliest and most significant overstatements was drawn from assessment made by Godfrey himself. On 29 September, he circulated a tabulation entitled German Submarines: Estimated Numbers, Building Programme and Losses, in which he estimated the losses of U-boats at seven as at 26 September. However, within days this estimate was reduced to two, a figure which was, in fact, correct. Unfortunately, this correction occurred too late to avoid potential embarrassment for Churchill and Chamberlain, both of whom had referred to the figure of six or seven in the House of Commons.22 Godfrey’s tabulation included a warning that the figures be treated with caution and that they would be subject to amendment. This advice was given too late for Churchill and Chamberlain, although whether or not either would have exercised the requisite caution is a moot point, especially given the enormous volume of other positive news on the anti-U-boat war. At the end of September, NID provided the following figures for September in its first Monthly Anti-submarine Report. These suggested the U-boats were receiving a severe battering and would have entirely justified Churchill’s exuberance: Attacks by ships on U-boats 124 Attacks by aircraft on U-boats 14 U-boats: Known Sunk 2 Probably Sunk 6 Probably Seriously Damaged 5 Probably Slightly Damaged 323

21 Godfrey, Admiral John Henry (1888-1971). Godfrey was DNI from 1939 to 1942 Captain (later Rear-Admiral) Douglas Adams Bugden. 16 November 1889-?) Biographical details of Bugden are scarce. Bugden held the position of DA/SWD from 2 October to 15 November. 22 W. S. Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons, September 26, 1939, Gilbert, The Coming of War, 1936-1939: 155, Churchill referred to this figure on 26 September. However, he mentioned in this speech that Chamberlain had made mention of six or seven U-boats sunk in the previous week. 23 ADM 199/1790.These statistics are to be found in the September edition of the Monthly Anti- Submarine Report. It will be noted here that the total Known and Probably Sunk figure (eight) approximates that declared by Churchill and Chamberlain. Here is the source of much of the confusion that is to be discussed subsequently. There is something to be said for the lack of wisdom to be found in Godfrey’s failure to make this distinction more clearly in the information provided to Churchill. 28

This positive news did not abate and by the middle of December, the ASWD’s Weekly Returns U-boats or WRUs, the first of which was published in the middle of October, recorded the figures as: U-boats Known Sunk 8 Probably Sunk 18 Probably Seriously Damaged 5 Probably Slightly Damaged 10 Not Yet Classified` 424

Meanwhile, the Monthly Anti-submarine Report for October, November and December recorded the figures for the total number of attacks on U-boats, as 52, 31 and 35 respectively. These figures, one must emphasize, were those of the Anti- Submarine Warfare Division (A/SWD) assessment committee after it had sifted and separated attacks deemed to have been ‘obviously’ on non-U-boat targets.

Such were Admiralty estimates. The reality was quite different. While Admiralty staff had estimated the number of attacks on U-boats at the end of September, 1939, to have been 124, the U-boats themselves recorded a mere seven attacks against them.25 Rather than receiving the severe punishment from ASDIC assisted anti-submarine patrol craft, U-boats were rarely being found and rarely being attacked.26 By the time Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940, the U- boats had recorded fewer than 35 attacks upon their craft from any source and, of these, only a few had caused harm to the U-boat.27 At the end of 1939, the official figure of Known Sunk was eight, and the true figure was nine. Churchill had been

24 These figures were offered on the understanding that amendment might occur but surprisingly little amendment occurred until the great changes of April, 1940. At this time, those vessels in the ‘probably killed’ column were transferred into the ‘probably seriously damaged.’ Until December 1939, anti-U-boat figures were recorded in the Monthly Anti-Submarine Report. The provision of the figures quoted above coincided with a request by Churchill to have the circulation of the Weekly Return of U-boat Casualties seriously curtailed. This decision was linked to Churchill’s dispute with Godfrey over the number of U-boats destroyed. This is discussed hereunder. 25 This was in addition to the two U-boats actually destroyed. The Germans had 18 U-boats in the Western Approaches at the start of war. The Admiralty believed the figure closer to five or six at any one time. That the Admiralty was unaware of the number of U-boats at sea had much to do with the fact that the vast majority were never sighted by shipping, failed to sink a ship and did not use their radio communications. The fact that 18 U-boats found their way unobserved to the Western Approaches does not provide a ringing endorsement of the patrol strategy of defence. 26 Of the seven attacks recorded by the U-boats, most had been made by submarines and not ASDIC assisted hunting craft. 27 u-boat.net. This web-site includes details drawn from German archives of every U-boat including records kept by the respective captains of attacks on their vessels. Remarkably, there is a very poor correlation between the attacks recorded by the U-boats and those AS/WD believed to have caused damage. The figure of 35 does not include attacks which resulted in the destruction of the U-boat. 29

estimating 13 had been sunk as early as October. By January his estimate had risen to over thirty.

The answer to the great disparity between the official and more accurate figures of U-boat kills accepted by NID, and Churchill’s estimates lies in issues of confusion and computation. This problem very likely began with NID’s readjustment of September losses from six to two. The reason for the change was that, by this time, NID had become more precise in the evidence required to declare a U-boat sunk. The other four U-boats estimated to have been sunk were now being recorded as Probably Sunk. It was NID’s view that those U-boats recorded as Known Sunk had to be supported by incontrovertible evidence, such as wreckage, survivors or bodies or evidence gleaned from German sources, including death notices. The Probably Sunk category was defined as “incontrovertible evidence is not forthcoming but, after full investigation, the Committee believe that the U-boat has been destroyed.”28 There is evidence to show that, for at least the first two months of the war, Churchill was not aware of the distinction being made. However, even had Churchill known of the distinction, it is not clear this would have deterred him from making the statements he did. Churchill’s claim, made to the House of Commons in mid-October, of 13 U-boats sunk was referred to as an ‘estimate.’ This figure was a combination of known and probably sunk but, given the definition of ‘Probably Sunk’ above, he may well have felt entitled to present this estimate. Whatever the full story of these events, approximately two weeks after his statement to the House, Churchill was apparently surprised to discover that NID was unwilling to accept a figure higher than five as ‘sunk’.29

Lest the above be accepted as evidence of Churchill’s wilfulness rather than a reasonable belief, it must be noted that he was not alone in accepting the combined Known/Probable categories as more accurately representing the number of U-boats sunk. Pound was just as willing to bundle Known and Probably Sunk. On 28 October, a gathering of Dominion Ministers was told by the Chiefs of Staff, undoubtedly via information supplied by Pound or other naval staff that, up to that

28 ADM 199/138, Enquiry into Assessment of U-boat Losses (Dreyer Inquiry). 29 W.S. Churchill to the Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare, Captain Talbot, 1 Nov. 1939, Char 19/3; CV, At the Admiralty, 321. 30

date, it was estimated 14 U boats had been sunk.30 During January, 1940, Pound’s estimate of U-boat losses, although lower than Churchill’s, exceeded considerably that accepted by Godfrey. Further, it was the view of the A/SWD and, more important, that of its new director, Captain Talbot, that the ‘probably sunk’ were, indeed, sunk.31

If Churchill had not known before November that there existed a dispute over NID and AS/WD views of U-boats sunk, he did thereafter. This made him more cautious, but only marginally, in his statements on the anti-U-boat war.32 Within the Admiralty, however, he became even more emphatic that U-boat kills were being under-stated when intelligence of U-boat kills received in December approximated the existing estimate for Known, Probable and Probably Seriously Damaged. Churchill considered therefore that U-boats in the “Probably Seriously Damaged” should be bundled with Known/Probable figures. This involved him in a prolonged and oftentimes vituperative dispute with Godfrey and NID. In his post-war writing on the subject, Godfrey attributed his attitude to ‘Very Senior Officer Veneration’ which, to quote from Beesly’s biography of Godfrey, was “the tendency to accept that not only is the Senior Officer always right but that only the Senior Officer is

30 Visit of Dominion Ministers: Review of Strategic Situation, 28 October 1939, CAB 66/3/3. It was also mentioned that 12 had been damaged and six of these seriously. 31 Arthur George Talbot, (1892-1960). Talbot assumed the role of DA/SWD on 23 November. He was a Rear-Admiral when he retired in 1948. This conviction was expressed during his interview during the Dreyer Committee investigations into U-boat losses.(ADM 199/138) At another point during his interview, Talbot noted that during his time as Flotilla Captain, his flotilla was attributed with one ‘known’, three ‘probables,’ and one damaged. He stated that in April, 1940 (undoubtedly because of the information gained from U-49) that he withdrew most of these but expressed the conviction that three of the probably sunk were certainly seriously damaged but made their way back to port. It is certain he was wrong in this assessment. 32 Cab 65/56. At the War Cabinet meeting of 13 November, Churchill made reference to intelligence that a total of 30 German U-boats had been lost, were overdue, or had been badly damaged. He apparently explained that this intelligence came from a report submitted to Hitler that showed 24 German U-boats had been lost, 3 were not less than 5 days overdue and 3 not less than 8 days overdue and 3 badly damaged. It is not clear if this was the Danish sourced intelligence to be discussed subsequently. Clearly, however, Churchill was taking the intelligence very seriously. In fact, given the deductions then being made with AS/WD about attacks on U-boats, this is perhaps unsurprising. It very likely encouraged the conviction that ‘probably sunk’ and ‘probably seriously damaged’ could justifiably be regarded as sunk. It is probable that Churchill is not exercising due caution in the information provided to the War Cabinet, but it is difficult to imagine he was deliberately deceiving his colleagues. This would have been a potentially disastrous and wholly unnecessary path to follow. The author of these notes is not identified but I have assumed these were completed by War Cabinet Secretary, Sir Edward Bridges. Their purpose appears to have been to elaborate and amplify official minutes and conclusions. Oftentimes, as the above indicates, they involve personal comments and insights. 31

right.”33 This criticism most likely pertained to the fact that much of the optimism surrounding U-boat kills was sustained by officers such as C in C, Western Approaches, Admiral Nasmith, who was personally convinced that, by January 1940, ships in his command had destroyed over 20 U-boats. However, if Churchill’s behaviour over this matter can be deemed ‘wilful’, and if his attitude to ‘seriously damaged’ U-boats can be viewed as stretching credulity too far, it was, by and large, a wilful determination to accept figures he considered largely correct against the advice of NID and not a wilful refusal to reject figures he knew were wrong; this is a small but important distinction to make.

In March, the discovery of documents on board U-49 appeared to show categorically that the Allies had been much less successful than Churchill supposed and that NID’s insistence on concrete evidence was entirely justified.34 Churchill rejected even this information and it is here perhaps one might first begin to question the integrity of his position. However, even on this point, doubt must remain over Churchill’s motivation. When he became Prime Minister, he remained emphatic that the accepted estimates of U-boat kills were manifestly wrong and he sought a formal inquiry into the matter. This Inquiry, conducted under the auspices of Admiral Dreyer was completed by November and concluded that the Naval Intelligence Division’s assessment were correct.35 The records of the Inquiry, and in particular the interviews of Churchill’s principal scientific advisor, Professor Lindemann, suggest Churchill’s views, although based in seriously flawed deduction, cannot easily be described as wilful or wishful or as a product of ‘Very Senior Officer Veneration’.

There were a number of factors that appear to have contributed to Churchill’s inaccurate estimates and his conviction that NID and, after April, AS/WD figures were probably wrong. These included the suggestion of a ‘safe side’ mindset within the assessment committees, his belief in German subterfuge and deception, and the existence of evidence and examples which hinted at, or which he believed could only

33 Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 126 34 U-49 was sunk off the coast of Norway. Documents were recovered from the vessel which provided extensive details of all German U-boats detailed for the Norwegian Campaign. These proved invaluable in determining the size of the existing U-boat fleet. 35 Frederic Charles Dreyer, (1878-1956). 32

be explained by, greater U-boat losses. During his interviews, Lindemann contended that DNI and A/SWD were excessively, but not unnaturally, conservative in their assessment procedure and that they therefore inevitably underestimated the number of U-boats sunk.36 This view was influenced by misapprehensions surrounding the fact that, despite having neither ASDIC nor as many patrol craft for anti-submarine work, the Germans had suffered fewer U-boat losses than British losses to their own submarines. An influence on Churchill’s and Lindemann’s deductions was that official figures of U-boats sunk excluded any allowance for accidents or unknown events which they believed must have afflicted the Germans in the same way they had affected the British submarine fleet. Yet another influence on their thinking was the Danish sourced intelligence of December, 1939, of U-boats sunk to that time. By coincidence, this figure had matched almost precisely the then AS\WD assessment of Known Sunk, Probably Sunk and Probably Damaged U-boats.

Of particular interest to Churchill and Lindemann was the ‘mysterious’ curve to be found in graphs of U-boat activity and success that Lindemann had produced. This had led them to conclude that U-boats were operating in great ebbs and flows; that is there were times in which the vast majority of U-boats had gone to sea and then returned to port to rest.37 Lindemann estimated that during the ebb periods, some 10 to 12 were operating at any one time. If this represented the strongest force Germany routinely put to sea, and the growth of the U-boat fleet had been what was projected by NID, it must be deduced that more U-boats had been sunk. 38 Finally, Lindemann presented his conviction, long held by Churchill, that the Germans had been successfully concealing the greater number of losses through a process of substitution. That is, the re-using of a sunken U-boat’s number on hidden German

36 Lindemann used a shooting analogy to illustrate his point. “….if absolutely, definitely we know that a certain number had been sunk, the real number must be larger. Take it like this. I am shooting and I pick up 24 birds. I must have shot more than that; I cannot have shot less….the 24 I have picked up, and probably I have shot 28.” ADM 199/138 folio 7. 37 These views are to be found in Churchill’s speech to the House of Commons, 6 December, 1939. See Hansard, columns 689-96; also, CV At the Admiralty, 469-475. 38 Very early in the war, NID had supplied a projection of U-boat construction which proved very inaccurate. Many fewer U-boats were under construction at the start of the war than estimated. Construction capacity was also over-stated. However, if the projection was correct, one would expect to see an increase in U-boat activity overtime. The fact that this did not occur was interpreted by Churchill and Lindemann as indicating more U-boats had been sunk than NID accepted. 33

construction, or submarines acquired from the Russians, Norwegians, Danes or Poles.

In very short measure and with remarkably little disputation, nearly all of Lindemann’s assumptions, and those of Churchill, were challenged and then compromised. The chairman of the committee, Admiral Dreyer, questioned the notion that the assessment committee was acting conservatively. He had not heard of the committees making decisions “on the safe side” and he contended that the only safety was in accuracy.39 He also doubted the efficacy of a policy of underestimation, noting that this might lead to an unnecessary diversion of resources “which might otherwise be better occupied.”40 Moreover, he pointed out that, if a bias existed, it was more likely to be on the plus side with the AS/WD endeavouring to show they were “producing the goods’.

Discussion led to the comparative losses of the U-boats and British submarines and it was concluded that this could be adequately explained by the restricted and dangerous areas (such as the Heligoland Bight) in which British submarines worked. Moreover, the disparity in loss rate could not be offset by the advantages offered to the allies through ASDIC and a greater number of patrol craft. Against the Danish sourced intelligence, the committee was able to draw attention to the information gained from U-49 of which, remarkably, Lindemann indicated he had no knowledge. Lindemann was less willing to accept arguments against ‘substitution’ despite the absence of evidence to support it. Dreyer made a small impression on him when he asked whether it would be to the Germans advantage to under-state or over-state the size of their U-boat fleet or to make any effort to conceal their numbers. Lindemann thought the Germans would prefer the enemy believed they were sinking fewer U- boats but conceded that the opposite might have been just as possible.41

The discussion became quite extraordinary when the issue of the ‘mysterious curve’ was discussed. Lindemann was disabused of a number of keenly held

39 U-Boat Investigation (For Assessment of U-boat Losses and Improving Methods of Assessment), ADM 199/138 folio 7. 40 Godfrey was concerned about the opposite possibility: that an over-estimation of U-boat kills might lead to a relaxation of effort and it was for this reason he was critical of what he considered was Churchill’s deliberate exaggeration. 41 Ibid. 34

assumptions. First, with the exception of September, 1939, nothing like 10 or 12 U- boats had ever operated together in the Western Approaches. It was typically only a third of this and the number did not ebb and flow as Lindemann believed but was fairly constant. He did not understand that, to maintain even four U-boats in the Western Approaches, required there be four on the way to the operation zone and four returning from it. Additionally, it was explained that a considerable portion of the existing German fleet was unsuited to operate in this theatre. Finally, in addition to those U-boats in the operational zone or going to or returning from it, there must always be a portion at rest or under repair and refit. Thus was Lindemann required to recognise that even a modest number of 4 or 5 U-boats operating continuously in the Western Approaches signalled the existence of a much larger number to sustain them. If this were the case, however, and the Germans were not conducting an ‘all out’ ‘all back’ campaign how did one explain the ebb and flow of losses? To his credit, it was Lindemann himself proposed the answer to this question; the periods of great German success reflected the activity at sea of the ‘star-turn captains’. The ebb and flow of merchant losses was not a result of regular surges of U-boats at sea but the presence of the aces of the German U-boat fleet.

Lindemann’s interview revealed a remarkable ignorance from a key advisor on important, indeed basic, elements of the U-boat campaign. While Churchill had a wide understanding of a great number of things, his uncritical acceptance of Lindemann’s reasoning shows a disturbingly and surprisingly shallow grasp of the facts. Although Churchill had not been merely obtuse in his convictions, since he had relied on advice and analysis, he must take some responsibility for accepting it so uncritically. From the beginning of war, he had taken upon himself to seek external and independent advice through Lindemann and his own statistical section. This reflected his awareness of the great power of information, knowledge and statistics, especially when he alone was privy to it - or at least when he was the first to have access - and he applied this knowledge routinely within the War Cabinet to drive his own agenda. It also reflected a certain lack of trust in existing structures, including the Naval Intelligence Division, and an unwillingness to engage them. Throughout the war, Lindemann provided considerable, but not always reliable or accurate, service to Churchill. During the Phoney War period, his fledgling section was

occupied with all manner of business and was evidently incapable of providing Churchill adequate guidance on anti-U-boat policy. The Dreyer Committee quickly demolished many of the matters that confounded Lindemann and Churchill and showed how quickly such important issues might have been resolved many months before on Churchill’s initiative.

Nevertheless, despite the success of the Dreyer Committee in finally resolving the issue of U-boat kills, it failed to resolve what was arguably the more significant issue surrounding the anti-U-boat campaign: this was the assumption that, whether or not U-boats had been destroyed, the Allies had been remarkably successful in finding and hurting U-boats. Although it was now more readily accepted that many of those U-boats deemed ‘probably sunk’ in the first year of the war had almost certainly not been, this resulted only in these U-boats being placed in the seriously damaged or slightly damaged categories; the attacks themselves generally went unchallenged.

From the beginning of the war, the question of why the large estimate of contacts had failed to result in more ‘kills’ had raised eye-brows. Many attacks, of course, were accepted as false, including by Churchill, but a great number continued to be accepted as real. Churchill was among those who attributed the lack of fortune to the failings of the depth-charge and the method of attack. As early as September, 1939, he had explained the disparity between contacts and kills as unfamiliarity with the depth-charging. This misapprehension was, again, shared by others in high places, including Pound42 There is another important aspect to this overstatement of success against the U-boats. Up to February 1940, Coastal Command pilots claimed over 20 U-boat ‘kills’. Early in 1940, Talbot informed Coastal Command that all had been unsuccessful. The explanation offered for this failure was the inadequacy of the bombs being used. Again, failure in the anti-U-boat war was being found in the

42 Pound’s view at this time only varied slightly from Churchill’s. He suspected fewer U-boats had been sunk than did Churchill; however, the explanations of ‘false contacts’ was only one of five possibilities nominated by him in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet Admiral Forbes in mid-September. The others were “incorrect placing of depth charge patterns, depth charges being sent to the wrong depth, or insufficiently powerful depth-charges.” He also believed that bombing by aircraft had been “disappointing so far.” See letter from Pound to Admiral Forbes, 15 September 1939, ADM 205/3. It is interesting to note that while discussing the technical difficulties surrounding the depth-charge in the early stages of the war, John Keegan, in his book, The Price of Admiralty, The Evolution of Naval Warfare (Viking, 1988), 238, wrote, “The difficulties of the procedure, akin to those of precision bombing by aircraft on land, resulted in a low ratio of sinkings to attacks throughout 1939-40”. 36

‘killing’ and not in the ‘finding’. However, from September, 1939, to the end of May, 1940, the U-boats themselves recorded few attacks from the air. This had very considerable ramifications for the policy of offensive patrolling in which destroyer craft responded to U-boat sightings from the air. If pilots thought they were attacking U-boats when they were not, it seems reasonable to assume that they were just as often directing hunting craft to U-boats that did not exist.43

Thus, despite the fact that it was now concluded that fewer U-boats had been sunk than once believed, this did not mean, and would not mean, a more clinical assessment of ASDIC assisted (or air assisted) offensive patrolling. Admiral Dreyer would write a letter to the new First Lord, A.V. Alexander in October, 1940 that “we should have sunk 100 more U-boats by now if we had also developed depth finding tactics.” Thus, even after Churchill had left the Admiralty it had still to learn that the real problem the Royal Navy faced in the U-boat war was not in the method of ‘killing’ the enemy but that they were too often ‘finding’ and attacking U-boats that were not actually there.44 This was the strongest justification for a complete focus on convoy, which forced the U-boats to place themselves in harm’s way. However, such false trails help explain why Churchill maintained his enthusiasm for offensive patrolling; in the circumstances, it is unreasonable to hold him too severely to account. However, that he should have done more and acted earlier to arrive at a better understanding of the U-boat war is a reasonable criticism.

The Consequences of Offensive Patrolling The foregoing has established that Churchill and elements within the Admiralty misread the virtue of offensive patrolling during the Phoney War period and it has a presented a number of reasons why this was so. This section will discuss the actual consequences in terms of lost ships, materiel and personnel. For the war as a whole, the historical record stands out decidedly in favour of the convoy/escort school of thought over the offensive patrolling/independent sailing school and there can really

43 This issue could extend to any decision to send out patrol craft in response to U-boat sightings from any source, including merchant vessels. 44 Churchill’s first order of business upon receiving the Dreyer report was to enquire into improvements being made to the depth-charge. It must be noted here that this view of these issues does not reject the inadequacy of the ‘killing’ methods open to ships and aircraft against U-boats during this time. It does contend, however, that it was not the only, nor perhaps, the main reason for a lack of success. 37

be no dispute about this: the best place for anti-U-boat forces was with convoys and the more present the better. There was no substitution of offensive patrolling for convoy that would save ships. Another principle ignored, or forgotten, or not yet learned from the First World War was that there was no strong correlation between the number of U-boats at sea and the number of merchant ships sunk; killing U-boats was, therefore, not essential for the protection of trade. It was, of course, argued by critics of offensive patrolling that, by encouraging or permitting the siphoning of resources to offensive patrolling, Churchill and others denied convoy adequate protection and this led to an unnecessary loss. However, it is argued that the negative consequences of Churchill’s on-going support of offensive patrolling were much less than has been suggested. While it is possible that the energy applied to offensive patrolling occasionally denied convoys a full escort, it is questionable this lead to significant losses in merchant shipping. Further, although offensive patrolling led to few U-boat’s being destroyed, it is probable that patrolling contributed more positively to the anti-U-boat effort than is generally accepted. Finally, and most important, it will be argued that the decision to permit independent sailing of merchant ships – a practice which did cause unnecessary loss – had little to do with a shortage of escorts caused by an on-going practice of offensive patrolling. Each of these issues will be considered in turn.

It is open to question if applying all resources to convoy, as Pound and Phillips expressed their determination to do in September, would have saved ships, especially on the Western Approaches. As escorts became available, it was intended to add to the number of escorts per convoy, not necessarily to add to the number of convoys, nor to escort convoys for longer periods of time – something that might have proven efficacious – nor even to insist on all shipping being placed in convoy. However, if convoys were rarely being found and rarely being attacked during the Phoney War period – and they were almost entirely unscathed during this time – would there have been advantage in adding more escorts to a convoy? Extra escorts became a critical issue from the second half of 1940 onwards because the German U-boats, working from France and in growing numbers, had great success in finding convoys, while Britain, post Dunkirk and fearful of invasion, had many fewer escorts. However, during the Phoney War it was not the number of escorts that was saving

ships in convoy but the ‘empty ocean’ effect of convoy and the small number of U- boats available to attack convoys when found.45 Serendipitously for Churchill, therefore, any shortage of escorts due to offensive patrolling or striking forces, was not likely to have caused great loss. Conversely, the on-going existence of independently sailed vessels – primarily neutral – presented the Admiralty with a pressing need to do something to defend this shipping within the focal areas around Britain. It was, after all, these ships that were suffering most at the hand of the U- boats and their cargo was also important to Britain. Were they to be left entirely without protection?

It is also open to question if offensive patrolling and aggressive responses to U- boat sightings and the sinking of merchant vessels was quite as useless as assumed. Although Admiral Nasmith, Captain Talbot, and others exaggerated the success of offensive patrolling during the Phoney War, it is likely that post-war historical analysis has somewhat understated it and, in so doing, have contributed to somewhat unfairly to the criticism of Churchill’s interest in it. The sinking of two U-boats in the first two months of the war have been inaccurately or, at least, inappropriately, attributed to ‘escorts’ in some post-war assessments when they ought appropriately to have more been attributed to destroyers in offensive patrolling mode.46 Offensive patrolling did occasionally have its successes and more of these could have been expected as long as Hitler shied from unconditional U-boat warfare.

45 To these factors, we can add the problems the Germans were facing with their torpedoes. On at least one occasion when a convoy was found, torpedo failure saved the convoy considerable harm. 46 The two examples are the sinking of U 42 by HMS Ilex and Imogen on October 13th and U 45 by HMS Inglefield, Ivanhoe, Intrepid and Icarus on October 14th. In the first example, Ilex and Imogen had completed their escorting duties, had released their ships to independent sailing and had set off to meet another convoy when they received and responded to distress calls which ultimately resulted in the destruction of U42. A similar picture emerges in regard to the second episode involving Inglefield, Intrepid, Icarus and Ivanhoe. These four destroyers had been escorting a convoy but deserted this when instructed by Nasmith to seek out and destroy a U-boat that was reaping havoc on an unescorted group of four vessels. In this instance, as with Ilex and Imogen, the destroyers had travelled some distance to attack the enemy and to respond to the distress call. Thus, these examples fit fairly closely the scenario envisaged by Nasmith for his striking forces. Ilex and Imogen were attributed with a kill but Inglefield and its division were ultimately credited only with causing serious damage. U45 had, in fact, been sunk, with no survivors. There is an important addendum to this story. HMS Inglefield was captained by the future DA/SW, Captain Talbot, and it is likely it is this particular experience he referred to in his report to Churchill in November. Talbot’s forces were originally attributed with a “probably killed” but when he became DA/SW, Talbot down-graded the result to ‘probably seriously damaged’ as noted above. Talbot’s own department would eventually incorrectly attribute the loss of U-45 to a French destroyer in December. No French warship sank a U-boat before France capitulated in June, 1940. Such were the challenges of assessing the outcome of anti-U-boat warfare. 39

Additionally, the value of offensive patrolling must not be based entirely in terms of the number of U-boats sunk by patrolling craft. It must also be assessed in terms of its capacity to disrupt or disturb the activities of the U-boats whether or not a U-boat was found, attacked or destroyed. It might oftentimes be sufficient that patrol craft be seen by the U-boat to have a direct impact on its efficiency and its opportunity to catch and sink merchant ships.47 The presence of a patrol, or the probability, or possibility of this caused submariners considerable anxiety in meeting a variety of needs, including the recharging of batteries and the moving of stored torpedoes to firing compartments. A similar anxiety could be induced if U-boats learned to expect the arrival of patrol craft after sighting by aircraft. Without the constant and real threat of patrol craft in focal areas, convoy routes, and routes travelled by U-boats (to the extent these could be determined), these anxieties and risks would likely have disappeared. It is probable, therefore, that offensive patrolling, judiciously planned and undertaken, and closely linked to intelligence and supported from the air and operated in conjunction with convoy had virtue. The extent of this was and is, necessarily, very difficult to quantify.

Such issues highlight the unreasonable and inaccurate criticism levelled at Churchill over the use of carriers Courageous and Ark Royal in the opening weeks of the war. This is typically viewed as a dangerous and profligate use of these valuable vessels in the fruitless pursuit of U-boats. Tragically, Courageous was lost during the operations and Ark Royal almost shared the same fate. Llewellyn Jones has correctly addressed the unjust criticism of Churchill over this matter.48 It made much sense to use the aircraft from these ships in the early weeks of war to shepherd the very large number of un-convoyed ships present at the time and the carriers’ activities were never only about hunting and killing U-boats but keeping the U-boats beneath the waves and denying them their surface mobility. They need not have sunk nor even seen a single U-boat to have fulfilled a significant role in disrupting U-boat activities over a large area if they themselves were seen by a U-boat. The folly of these

47 The lesson learned from the First World War was that convoy saved ships. Another lesson was that offensive patrolling did not because they had failed to find and sink the enemy. However, it is difficult to find any assessment of the value of offensive patrolling in conjunction with a successful convoy system as existed during the Phoney War. There appears to have been no study, such as would be possible, of the ‘negative’ advantages of offensive patrolling, ie, the advantages patrolling offered to the protection of trade whether or not U-boats were sunk or seen by patrolling vessels. 48 Llewellyn-Jones, The Royal Navy and Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1917-49, 18. 40

operations lay in not maintaining an adequate screen around the carriers at all times, but Churchill cannot be blamed for this.49

More important is the supposed link between the use of potential escorts for offensive patrolling and the extent to which this forced ships into independent sailing. It is doubtful that a direct or close link ever existed between the on-going support of offensive patrolling in the Western Approaches and certain practices adopted during this time. The most relevant of these was the decision to permit the independent sailing of ships that could journey at 15 knots and over. This was not a decision based primarily on a shortage of escorts but on-going uncertainty surrounding the ‘risk versus time saved’ equation of independent sailing of fast vessels over the delays inherent in convoy. Ships continued to be sailed independently because it was thought this would be best for the national war effort in the longer term.

Churchill and Convoy It is to this vital question of the ‘risk versus time saved’ equation that one can trace the claims of Churchill’s ‘ambivalence’ to convoy and the suggestion he disliked convoy because it was ‘too defensive’. Such claims rest almost entirely on two minutes written to Pound and Phillips on 9 November and 20 November 1939. In the first, Churchill wrote of “secretly loosen[ing] the convoy system (while boasting about it publicly), especially on the outer routes.” In both minutes he referred to the idea of supporting this change with an independent flotilla force “sweeping the Western Approaches” and making this area untenable for U-boats and providing the Navy with more freedom.”50 However, while these minutes do reflect his misguided confidence in ASDIC assisted patrolling addressed earlier in this chapter, they do not sustain the claims above.

49 The typical criticism of Churchill over this matter claims that the War Cabinet recommended the operations be discontinued and not resumed. There is no evidence of this. Rather, the most likely reason why they were discontinued was because the exceptional need of September 1939 had disappeared. Another reason might well have been the significant call on destroyer craft made by such operations. As a result of the Loss of Courageous and the attack on Ark Royal, it was subsequently recommended that a minimum of seven destroyers take part in such operations, with four acting as a screen. 50 Winston S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, Admiral Phillips and others, 9 November 1939 and Winston S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, Admiral Phillips, and Sir Archibald Carter, 20 November, 1939, ADM 205/2. 41

Churchill’s suggestions were grounded entirely in the practical matter of how best to maintain an adequate level of wartime trade. A reduction in the rate of trade had always been expected with the introduction of convoy and, from the beginning of war, Churchill had gone out of his way to explain to the War Cabinet and to Parliament that this would occur but would not be a major problem and would diminish as the convoy system established its routine and became more efficient. However, by November, the rate of trade had dropped well-below his own expectations and he now had some doubts as to the risk/reward issues surrounding convoy and thought it possible that the problem could be ameliorated by the ‘loosening’ of the system. He explained to the War Cabinet that “delays resulting from the convoy system were, in a sense, equivalent in their effects on the flow of trade to the sinking of ships,” and he thought the Government should “overhaul the system and accept greater risks.”51 Thereafter, he organised a meeting with Admiralty staff at which he argued that “we shall have failed in our task if we merely substitute delays for sinkings” and sought an “intricate study of the restrictions now imposed.”52 Although Churchill’s reasoning was flawed, it had an entirely rational basis to it. It would be a mistake to assume Churchill’s recommendations were evidence that he did not understand convoy saved ships. He was, of course, fully aware of this. From very early in the war, it was abundantly clear that independently sailed vessels suffered the depredations of the U-Boats much more heavily than those in convoy and Churchill knew that what he was proposing would likely result in the loss of more ships; hence his reference to increased risk.53 What Churchill was seeking from his CNS and DCNS was a cold-blooded assessment of whether or not the additional losses to be expected from the ‘loosening’ of convoy would be offset by an increase in trade. The meeting of Admiralty staff, including Professor

51 Minutes of War Cabinet meeting, 9 November, 1939, CAB 65/2. 52 Letter to Admiral Pound, Admiral Phillips and others, 9 November, 1939, ADM 205/2. 53 On 15 October at the very time Churchill was writing and speaking so volubly about the success of anti-U-boat operations, he wrote to Pound to express his concern in regard to a very slow ship carrying coal that had been sunk that day and the unescorted fast group of five ships that had been attacked that morning. Of the former, he sought to know how many like vessels were sailing independently and asked “Would it not be well to collect them into a very slow convoy and loose them far out.” See, Char, 19/3, WSC to Admiral Pound and others, 15 October, 1939. It was to the remnants of the unescorted group of vessels mentioned above that Talbot’s force had rushed to rescue. It should be noted here that Clay Blair indicates that this group/convoy was, in fact, under the escort of the French submarine Surcouf, although he also appears to suggest that they were attacked (by two U-Boats) at the moment of, or just after, dispersal to their individual destinations. See Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939-1942, Vol. 1 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2011),112. 42

Lindemann, concluded that not all shipping delays were attributable to the convoy system. These included the requisitioning of merchant vessels for Admiralty purposes and the need to arm merchant ships. A number of recommendations were put forward to ameliorate the situation, including the division of convoy into fast and slow groups, a reduction in port restrictions; the introduction of daily convoys along the east coast, and the giving of permission to ships up to 2500 or 3000 tons to use the East Coast unescorted.54

Churchill so called ‘ambivalence’ surrounding convoy had little or nothing to do with ‘offensive-mindedness’ or a fundamental dislike for the system. His views and those of the naval staff had their origin in the lack of statistical certainty surrounding one simple equation: would time saved over ships lost result in an increased rate of trade? The Admiralty had already made this decision in regard to ships that could sail at 15 knots and over and it is difficult to find anyone who had gainsaid this policy and it continued for much of the war. In early November, Pound asked if the minimum speed for independent sailing should be reduced below 15 knots.55 In doing so he, like Churchill, was weighing the risk/reward scenario. His suggestion was rejected. Unfortunately, despite Churchill’s request that a broad investigation into trade be conducted, there appears to have been no concerted effort to initiate a statistical analysis of the risk/reward of the 15 knot benchmark itself, or to gather statistics of shipping losses at lesser speeds.56 One year later, amid even more desperate time, these issues was revisited by the Admiralty and War Cabinet and a change acceded to, much to the considerable future misfortune of many captains and their crew. Only then were investigations begun by the Trade and Plans Divisions of the Admiralty. It would not be until the middle of 1941 that it was finally and definitively concluded that the risk/reward of reducing the speed of

54ADM 205/4 Conclusions of a Meeting in the First Lord’s room to Consider How to Reduce the Slowing Down of Import and Export Trade caused by War, November When Churchill summarised to the War Cabinet the idea of releasing ships of certain weight from convoy on the East Coast he stated that permission was granted for ships up to 2000 tons. This, however, was apparently already occurring. It is not clear, therefore, if any further relaxation actually took place. See CAB 65/2 Minutes of meeting, 10 November 1939. 55 Ibid. 56 In the papers of Vice-Admiral Kenneth Dewar held at the National Maritime Museum, there is evidence that the question of the number of ships sailing over 15knots sunk in the First World War was referred to the Admiralty Historical Section either prior to the war or in September, 1939. No evidence was found as to the conclusions drawn if, indeed, an investigation was undertaken. See DEW 11-12, Caird Library and Archives, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. 43

independently sailed vessels to 13 knots did not stack up and a decision was made to return to the 15 knot and over policy. Unfortunately, in part because of the intervention of Lindemann, who insisted that convoy statistics include stragglers and ships sunk post-convoy, the risks to 15 knot plus independent sailing viz a viz convoy remained understated; thus did 15knot independent sailings continue.57 There is no doubt that the failure to insist on an early analysis of the risk/rewards of independent sailings at high speeds represented another great missed opportunity and an extraordinary oversight for which Churchill must take his share of responsibility.

The Magnetic Mine Unfortunately, the failure in November, 1939, to successfully explore the ramifications of independent sailing was simultaneously compounded by the Admiralty’s reaction to the German magnetic mine which threatened to compromise even further the existing faith in convoy. Churchill’s particular culpability in this is more obscure. It is evident in much of the fore-going that a core contention of this chapter is that any assessment of Churchill’s contribution to the resolution of the convoy/offensive patrolling debate and the successful prosecution of the anti-U-boat war, must be tempered the degree to which his own staff struggled with such matters. He was not an ardent and independent arbiter of Admiralty policy routinely rejecting the good advice of his advisors but, like his staff, sometimes groping in the dark, and also a victim of a wider systemic ignorance. The question is whether he did enough as First Lord to alleviate the ignorance. The manner in which Churchill and the Admiralty dealt with the magnetic mine threat will help us answer this question. For a period of time, the magnetic mine threatened to turn upside down the Admiralty’s

57 B.B. Schofield, “The Defeat of the U-boats During World War Two”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 16., No.1 (Jan. 1981): 121. Schofield succeeded Mansergh as the Director of the Trade Division. In February, 1941, Lindemann concluded that among inbound ships there did not seem to be much difference in risk between those that started in convoy (including the stragglers) and the fast larger ships sailing independently.” He thought that if the delays caused by convoys were all that they were said to be, he thought these statistics presented a prime face case for a reconsideration of the pros and cons of convoy, especially now German U-boats were being directed to convoys by aerial reconnaissance and radio. He acknowledged that slower independently sailed ships might experience much greater risk but he thought this might be offset by denying U-boats opportunities to attack convoys through their ‘browning’ method ( that is firing large numbers of torpedoes into convoys in the hope of hitting something). See, Lindemann Papers, H 96/1 Letter from Lindemann to Prime Minister, 20 Feb. 1941. For a summary of issues surrounding the convoy/independent sailing debate, see Eric Grove, The Defeat of the Enemy Attack upon Shipping, 1939-1945: A Revised Edition of the Naval Edition of the Naval Staff History (Navy Records Society Publications), U.K: Rutledge, 1997 appendix 6. 44

faith in convoy as the primary solution to the U-boat problem and provided a boost to the proponents of offensive patrolling; but Churchill did not drive the agenda.58 Magnetic mines were laid by aircraft, surface vessels, and on the west coast, by U- boats. By the end of November, 1939, the losses caused by them began to dominate the statistics and briefly surpassed losses due to the torpedo and the gun. 59 This threw the Admiralty and Churchill into something of a panic. The Admiralty ought to have been prepared to deal with this problem or, at the very least, to have anticipated such a problem might arise but they were not and they had not. A “perplexed” DCNS, Phillips, found himself asking in desperation “How we had dealt with unsweepable mines in the 1914-18 war?”60 No answer could be supplied beyond presenting him with large volumes of the mine-sweeping records. Thus, until the matter was analysed by the navy’s Historical Section, which was rapidly reformed as a result of this particular problem, Churchill and the Admiralty were required to ‘fly blind’.

To his credit, Churchill was extremely aggressive in finding the means by which to defeat this threat. The greater part of his efforts focused on ways to sweep the mines or to explode them before they could do harm. The navy had to undertake damage control; that is to find the ways and means to minimise the impact of these weapons while a permanent solution was found. Unfortunately, many of the measures adopted, all of which were endorsed by Churchill at board meetings, proved unwise and, indeed, some had the potential to make the problem very much worse. They also threatened to substantially delay shipping. The core decisions were several.61 Given that the Germans sought to lay mines in channels and along known shipping routes, a decision was made to extinguish lit buoys and require ships to anchor at night. This resulted in significant delay in trade. Potentially the most disastrous proposal, however, was to suspend convoys along the East coast and begin independent sailing. This, of course, went against all the lessons of the last war but such were the

58 The mining threat gave a significant boost to the notion of offensive patrolling because U-boats need not go anywhere near a convoy to cause serious harm to shipping. Escorts were, therefore, seen as little help in this situation. What was needed, it was believed, were hunting craft in large numbers. 59 When the magnetic mines were mixed in with the contact mines, it made sweeping of these fields particularly problematic. 60 The Defeat of the U-Boat Attack on Shipping, Introduction, p. X. 61 ADM 205/4, Steps to be Taken to Meet the Enemy Magnetic Mine, undated document (but probably 20 November, 1939). 45

losses to mines, this, briefly, seemed the best solution to the problem. Churchill expected that the delay caused by not sailing at night and the independent sailing would be offset by time saved in not waiting for convoys. Meanwhile, the escorts released from these convoys would hunt the mining craft but this proved an almost fruitless task. There appeared to be nothing that an escort could do to save an entire convoy blundering into a magnetic mine field. For a time, the whole dynamics of convoy was challenged and compromised. The rather panicked reaction to the mining threat had even more far-reaching consequences than these immediate measures. It provided a renewed emphasis on hunting and patrolling, and intensified the focus on ‘killing’ U-boats rather than the protection of convoys. Talbot, who had just become the new Director of the A/SWD was quickly convinced that this would be the new face of submarine warfare: Mine-laying from U-boats…can be carried out unseen and the U-boat can be well clear of the area before a ship is blown up; moreover, convoy escorts can provide no protection against mines. It therefore appears probable that the U-boat operations round the BRITISH ISLES will be devoted more and more to mine-laying.62

Talbot believed there were two solutions to this problem: more local patrolling and an intensive campaign to stop the U-boats breaking out of the North Sea; this meant a new emphasis on offensive patrolling and offensive mining and a policy of containment, the latter of which sat well with Churchill’s own inclinations.. However, there remained the matter of finding the necessary patrol craft. Surprisingly, given the support he had provided to Dunbar-Nasmith and his concept of an anti-U-boat striking force, Talbot proposed temporarily sourcing ten or twelve destroyers from the Western Approaches Command. This, he contended, could be achieved by reducing to one the number of escorts per convoy in the outer approaches.63

Talbot’s anxiety over the mining threat continued into 1940 and was at the centre of his lengthy paper, Review of methods of Dealing with the U-Boat Menace, in which he had declared “there was one way, and one way only [to] overcome the

62 Ibid. 63 ADM 199/124. It is probable his suggestion was based on the intelligence that only one or two U- boats were operation in the Atlantic at that time. The transfer of destroyers appears not to have taken place and the project had to await the arrival of strike force of A/S trawlers – part of the much vaunted hunting forces mentioned by Churchill in September - in February, 1940. These striking forces would never sink a U-boat, although three of their number were subsequently attacked and destroyed by this enemy. 46

U-boat menace, and that is to kill U-boats” To this end he wanted more minefields, more anti-submarine vessels, and fast striking forces to hurl at the U-boats. 64 Talbot’s efforts to promote an increased focus on offensive patrolling and a policy of containment only gained limited traction with those concerned with the protection of trade. They were loath to see escorts drawn from convoys to achieve this, especially before mine fields had been sufficiently developed to make such a policy remotely viable.65

Churchill contributed to two important decisions that were influenced by the panic surrounding the magnetic mining threat. He signed off on a substantial new programme of patrol and escort craft. In his draft submission to Pound, Director of Plans, Captain Danckwert’s proposed, in addition to 336 escort vessels, the construction of 100 whale catchers to be used strictly as striking forces. Among the reasons he gave for this new force was the enemy campaign of minelaying by submarines off our harbours. “Experience has shown that only a vast number of asdic fitted vessels will ever be able to cope with this menace.”66 Churchill accepted a reduced, but nevertheless substantial, number of vessels intended for this purpose. Thus would the slip-ways of the nation be filled with ships that would prove to be unsuited to future needs: a battle with the U-boat on the wide expanse of the Atlantic

64 Review of methods of Dealing with the U-Boat Menace by the Director, DA/SWD, A.G. Talbot. ADM 1/10468. 65 The plan was, of course, to block the exits to the Atlantic from the North Sea by mines. Patrol craft would patrol these fields and destroy any U-boat attempting to negotiate a way through them. The proposals were always of doubtful efficacy but were acceded to. However, the fields would require time to prepare and huge numbers of mines. The Northern Mine barrage – to be discussed – was particularly problematic. The other reasons nominated were: “1.The fact that, though the advent of Asdics has increased enormously the chances of “killing” submarines once found, the finding of them is almost as difficult as it was in the past. Moreover only numbers can achieve success. 2. The extended activities of U- boats necessitating increased convoy escort. 3. The probability of U-boats now making use of Russian ports thereby largely nullifying the deterrent effect of the Northern Barrage on U-boat activities. 4. The enemy campaign of air attacks on our convoys necessitating sufficient escorting convoys to afford air defence and the detachment of an Asdic striking force.” Pound felt the same way in regard to the need for an enormous new programme of patrolling vessels. In reply to the French Admiralty, which was seeking a loan of small craft at this time, he declined the request by explaining that all were needed in British waters because experience had shown that only numbers would make the difference. Danckwerts’ comments in regard to the challenges of finding U-boats and, on the above occasion, Pound’s comments are interesting for the fact they are quite inconsistent with the general view to be found in the higher reaches of the Admiralty who, as has been seen, believed an admirable job had been achieved in finding U-boats. The difference in view is difficult to explain, beyond the fact that the comment was made in regard to U-boats laying mines and that this activity provided no warnings at all as to their presence. It is also possible that even the success then being claimed in regard to finding U-boats was not considered sufficient to overcome the U-boat problem. 47

Ocean.67 Of course, the construction of these vessels would prove serendipitous in the future war on trade when the U-boat threat developed far beyond Churchill’s expectations but it is an inescapable fact that they were first conceived for operations that would likely have served little constructive purpose.

The escalation of the magnetic mining problem also coincided with, and was a significant influence upon, Churchill’s decision to support the North Sea Mining Barrage.68 Pound had been pressing the idea of this barrage since the beginning of the war but Churchill had been greatly disturbed by the projected cost of the scheme. He finally acceded to the request and presented the idea to the War Cabinet on 19 November. He explained the drain on resources, actual and potential, caused by raiders, U-boats and U-boat mine-layers operating outside the North Sea. The mine- barrage was intended to contain these threats and problems. Additionally, Churchill believed it would assist contraband control, provide added protection to Scandinavian convoys and reduce the loss by attrition of capital ships by U-boat activity.69 The efficacy of the entire project was doubtful in the extreme and was based on flimsy evidence from the First World War produced at short notice by

67 Andrew Lambert has argued correctly that Churchill should not be held responsible for not anticipating the consequences of the defeat of France on the naval war. German bases on the French west coast allowed U-boats to operate much further into the Atlantic and this transformed the U-boat war. The escorts being built were not suited to the broader Atlantic conditions. Nonetheless, it is argued here that, in building large numbers of corvettes and not doing enough to construct larger escorts, the Admiralty were always taking a calculated gamble as to future needs. Even in 1939, there was evidence the U-boats would operate further afield (as was evident in their emphasis on the Type VII design) and, the more they did so, the more important the sea-keeping qualities of the convoy escorts. Churchill and the Admiralty were gambling that the policy of containment, which became particularly popular at the time of the magnetic mining scare, would work. However, this was premised on a misplaced faith in defensive minefields (except in limited areas such as the channel) and the uncertain efficacy of offensive patrolling, neither of which proved a great success in the war. Churchill’s error was less his failure to anticipate the fall of France than his gamble on a combination of measures of dubious value. Further, although Churchill is closely linked to the ‘cheap and nasties’ of the whale-catcher design (subsequently referred to as corvettes) that are often seen as the salvation of British trade protection, his own preference was for a vessel some 300 tons lighter. It is fortunate his design specifications were rejected. It is unlikely such vessels could have been adapted to the role of escort in the wide Atlantic, something the corvettes were barely able to do. 68 Churchill Papers, 19/4. Churchill submitted his memorandum The Northern Barrage to the War Cabinet on November 19th. In the previous three days, 9 vessels had succumbed to the magnetic mine. 69 Winston S. Churchill, The Northern Barrage. Notes, 19 November, 1939, CV At The Admiralty, 283-387, also, Char 19/4. To support his arguments in favour of the barrage, Churchill made reference to the loss of some six U-boats in a very short space of time in the Northern Barrage laid during the First World War. Three others were said to have been damaged. That more were not harmed, he attributed to the fact that “American antennae mines laid…..were set to explode outside ‘killing’ range.” 48

Admiralty Historical Section. The whole concept became redundant when the Germans acquired bases on France’s Atlantic coast.70

Extraordinarily the real answer to the magnetic mining problem was already under Churchill’s nose and was to be found in the opposite direction to that he and the navy were taking. In a speech to the Nation in December, Churchill noted that the war at sea appeared to be targeting the more vulnerable neutrals.71 Not only had they, relatively, borne the brunt of losses caused by the torpedo and the gun but they were also suffering grievously from the mine. Unfortunately, he took the observation no further and neither he nor anyone else appeared to ask why this were so. The answer was just as it was for the wider war at sea: the neutrals were denying themselves the advantages of convoy and it was this that was saving British and French shipping. For both conventional and magnetic mines together, the administrative advantages of a convoy were enormous. Post-war analysis showed that had all trade been placed in convoy, especially on the East coast, the losses due to mines would have always remained within manageable levels.72 Certainly, the German mining campaign would not have caused the panic it did during the last months of 1939 and the first months of 1940. Perhaps most influential in the significant decline in losses in early 1940 was that the U-boats and surface craft lay fewer and fewer mines as time went on. Despite Talbot’s expectations, Donitz always wished to return to the Western Approaches, especially when a further relaxation of prize conditions by Hitler provided even more opportunities. The magnetic mining operation was suspended briefly on the west coast when Hitler recalled the U-boats to prepare for Norway.

70It is interesting to note that both Danckwerts and Talbot, two major participants in the emergence of the containment policy and the resurgence of offensive patrolling, were not convinced the barrage would work. One of the justifications Danckwerts had used for his enormous construction programme was his belief that Russian collusion with Germany (assumed by many after Russia’s invasion of Finland on November 30th, 1939) would “probably nullify[ing] the deterrent effect” of the barrage. Talbot described the likely “physical efficiency” of the barrage as low, although he thought its moral effect would be considerable. The northern barrage was being deemed a doubtful proposition before it had even begun. The irony here was that one folly was grounds for the introduction of another; that is the likely failure of the barrage demanded an even greater emphasis on patrol vessels, the efficacy and value of which was just as doubtful. 71 Winston S. Churchill speech, 9 December, 1939, Hansard, columns 689-96; also CV At the Admiralty, 472. 72 For the best summary on the value of convoy in the anti-mine campaign, see The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-1945, chapters 23 and 24. 49

Thereafter, the focus would be the Western Approaches and, after the fall of France, the even safer waters of the wider Atlantic.73

Churchill and his naval staff worked in earnest to solve the mining problem and many meetings were dedicated to the problem. Although he had unwittingly endorsed a rather counter-productive solution, the suspension of convoy, Churchill ultimately gained much misplaced kudos for the decline in losses to mines as a result of the ‘degaussing’ procedure. Degaussing eventually made an important contribution but, in the immediate term, losses to mines diminished more quickly than the number of degaussed vessels grew. He and the Admiralty were fortunate that the decision to suspend convoy on the east coast did not proceed. It would have made matters very much worse, not better. Again, however, it is difficult apportion blame to Churchill for the folly of these proposals. The recommendations were evidently a result of a system wide ignorance and there is no evidence that Churchill did anything other than support a consensus view.

Conclusions Churchill’s role in the offensive patrolling folly is much less than is generally supposed. Much of what occurred during the Phoney War period accorded with Churchill’s own inclinations, but it was not a driving force in, or a significant influence upon, policy and practice. The dual policy of convoy and offensive patrolling developed because it appeared to work and because it appeared to serve well the circumstances.

For all the criticism of Churchill, he was a strong and vigorous supporter of convoy. That he subsequently questioned its universal application and got caught up in the ‘killing’ of U-boats has been shown to be a rational and reasonable response to the challenges of the time. Moreover, he was not alone in asking the questions he did of convoy. He was a contributor to the errors subsequently made, not the primary cause of them. Decisions surrounding the ‘loosening’ of the convoy system and the misinformation that sustained ‘offensive’ patrolling had much more to do with interwar parsimony – which stifled historical inquiry – and a failure to learn the

73One reason for the declining interest in these operations is that the Germans had no way of knowing how successful their mine-laying operations had been. Inevitably, some intelligence found its way back to the Germans but, overall, the Germans did not learn the full extent of their success. 50

lessons of the previous war, than Churchill’s strong character and personal preferences during this new one. Conversely, the early successes against the U-boat appeared to show there was real advantage in offensive operations and the statistical record sustained this misperception for a very long period of time. There was never any doubt that convoy protected ships and the system did a remarkable job of this during the Phoney War; however, offensive patrolling appeared to be making its own significant contribution to the protection of trade, especially given the many independently sailed vessels which otherwise would have been left undefended. Moreover, offensive patrolling conducted appropriately and wisely was not without some virtue.

The most serious criticism that might be levelled at Churchill and other supporters of offensive patrolling was that it denied convoys the protection they vitally needed, but this is doubtful as is the link between offensive patrolling and number of ships forced to sail independently. The most significant influence on the decision to convoy was the assumptions surrounding two erroneous calculations: that the risk to faster vessels sailing independently would be offset by quicker turn- around in trade and that the separation of slower vessels – which constituted only a small percentage of overseas trade – from the main convoys would do the same. These were entirely rational influences. The lack of certainty surrounding these calculations tended to sustain the view that the killing of U-boats was an important element in the ‘safe and timely’ arrival of cargo. Churchill recognised the importance of convoy to the ‘safe’ arrival of ships; he was somewhat confused over the question of ‘timeliness’ and the risk/rewards of independent sailings and the virtue of offensive operations to keep down U-boat numbers. The issue of U-boat mining operations and the fact that U-boats need not go anywhere near escorts to destroy shipping added another dimension to the confusion over the best course of action. However, in making these errors of judgment Churchill was always in good company. In criticising Churchill’s inclinations towards the offensive it is also important to recognise that long after he left the Admiralty, disagreement continued over the importance of killing U-boats to the ‘safe and timely arrival’ of a convoy. In any given situation, the extent to which a convoy should be put at risk to facilitate the pursuit and destruction of an attacking U-boat was not always clear cut.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that, in regard to the convoy/offensive patrolling issue, a legacy of Churchill’s time as First Lord was the limited efforts to investigate the best way to combat the U-boat threat. One aspect of his tenure that stands out is how rarely, if at all, Churchill actively sought to learn the lessons of the First World War. He had always been a great lover of statistics, and the Admiralty Statistical Branch under Lindemann produced all manner of vital statistics of the Second World War, and it was expected lessons would be learned from them; yet he seemed very much less animated to seek out answers from the evidence of the earlier conflict. He sought statistics from 1917, a time when Britain was struggling mightily against the U-boat, but these inquiries seemed primarily intended to demonstrate how well, comparatively, the Navy was doing in 1939. The limited initiative in regards to the lessons of the First World War came primarily from the ACNS, Admiral Phillips, but it was not enough.

Although it has been argued that Churchill’s offensive spirit was not a significant influence in the convoy/patrolling debate, the suggestion can be put that matters misread and misunderstood might have been better understood or more accurately interpreted by someone less ‘offensively’ minded than Churchill. There was always evidence to be found that hinted at other and better paths: the attacks on and defence of Courageous and Ark Royal, which resulted in the destruction of one U-boat and damage to another, showed that U-boats could draw very close to ASDIC craft without detection and were not easily found until and unless they first exposed themselves in close proximity – an endorsement for convoy and escort. Yet, the lessons learned from this episode, apart from the need for more caution in the use of carriers, was that offensive patrolling by destroyers, even over great distances, worked. An analysis of most other ‘confirmed’ kills would have reaffirmed the fact that asdic helped kill U-boats but did little to find them except in situations where a U-boat had recently identified itself. A close analysis of the statistics kept by AS/WD would have shown that the greater part of the harm done to the U-boats was recorded as occurring in the frenetic opening weeks of the war and that the numbers of killed and damaged U-boats grew only modestly over time, thus hinting at the possibility that the successes proclaimed were just a little too hopeful and perhaps born of inexperience and optimism; a more enquiring mind might have grasped why it was

that that neutrals were suffering so uniquely in the German mine campaign. However, this criticism must be viewed in the context of a time when Churchill, as First Lord, was exposed to much more evidence to show his Admirals were doing very well just as they were and that the U-boat had resorted to mining for that reason.

For all the apparent success Churchill believed he had had in combatting the U- boat menace, it is unlikely the anti-U-boat campaign lived up to his expectations. He had begun the war with the belief that the U-boat would not prove a major factor in the war at sea and that this would free naval forces for other activities including plans to use Britain’s ‘surplus’ sea-power in a major offensive operation. It is likely that these hopes ebbed and flowed throughout the Phoney War. At the end of October, 1939, his hopes were high, only to be dragged down over the next several months by the mining threat, the dispute over U-boat kills and then, in January and February, by Doenitz’ renewed assault in the Western Approaches. They were buoyed again in March when he and others misread the hiatus in U-boat activity as a sign of German capitulation rather than preparation for Norway and it was then shattered when the real reason for this quiet time was realised and evidence produced via U-49 which suggested the navy had not been as successful in combatting the U-boat as he had thought. Although there were periods of high-optimism, he could not claim the threat had been defeated and he readily acknowledge that there would, in time, be a ‘recrudescence’ of the problem as Germany geared itself for a substantial U-boat construction programme. Thus was his wider strategic agenda compromised; for so long as the U-boat was undefeated or not contained, the ‘surplus’ flotilla forces needed to fulfil his offensive aspirations were not available. It is to Churchill’s wider plans for the use of the surplus forces of the Navy that we must turn.

Chapter 2

‘Catherine’

Operation Catherine was a plan proposed by Churchill in the opening fortnight of war to place a large British naval force into, and take command of, the Baltic sea. The aggressive use of sea-power was particularly attractive at the start of the Second World War when it became quickly apparent that Britain and France were ill- prepared and unwilling to take action in the air or on land and Churchill already had a strategy to hand. Of the three Services, the navy alone had a preponderance of forces over Germany and he wished to use some of this surplus force to take the war to the enemy. However, given existing strategic threats in Europe and Asia, the notion of ‘surplus’ sea-power for high risk operations was dubious at best and Churchill’s proposal was not welcomed by his naval staff. Nevertheless, Churchill was deeply wedded to the idea of an incursion into the Baltic. It had been with him since the First World War and his history of that war, The World Crisis, had characterised it as the great missed opportunity.1 Thus the stage was set for a vituperative conflict between naval staff and their new First Lord.

1 Graham Clews, Churchill’s Dilemma, The Real Story Behind the Origins of the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign, (California: Praeger, 2010), 310. 54

Despite being known to students of the period, Operation Catherine has not been studied in any detail and generally remains inadequately understood. A close study of the origins and development of Catherine can inform our understanding of Churchill’s strategic vision and, more particularly, provide insight into the risks he was prepared to run to see it fulfilled. In support of Catherine, Churchill would display a disturbing stubbornness and obtuseness in the pursuit of his vision despite mounting evidence of its unviability. It is important to understand why this was so. Additionally, a study of Catherine supports an understanding of Churchill’s relationship with Admiralty staff and the challenges this staff had in managing him and dealing with his more aberrant plans for offensive action against the Germans.

The Origins of ‘Catherine’ and Churchill’s Strategic Blueprint. Within three days of becoming First Lord, Churchill instructed his Plans Division to prepare an appreciation on the forcing of a passage into the Baltic by a British naval force. Churchill had placed the Baltic at the centre of his strategic thinking as far back as 1914/1915 when he had also been the First Lord; in 1936, he had suggested such an operation to curtail Germany’s aggressive resurgence; he did so again in his Memorandum on Seapower written in March 1939 and forwarded this to Chamberlain.2 The strategy outlined in this memorandum was a plan to use Britain’s ‘surplus’ naval might in the Baltic for offensive inshore operations against Germany. He believed command of the Baltic was a vital German interest. The loss of this command would threaten access to Scandinavian supplies, including Swedish ore, and would allow potential allies such as the Soviets to attack Germany along its undefended northern coast-line “in one place little more than 100 miles from Berlin”.3

For Churchill, entering and taking command of the Baltic was the “sole great offensive against Germany of British sea-power.”4 However, despite the Royal Navy’s considerable preponderance over the German navy, the notion of a ‘surplus’ of ships for high risk operations was not an idea easily entertained by anyone other than Churchill. Although Britain had the support of the French marine in the event of

2 Winston S Churchill, Memorandum on Sea-Power, 1939. 27 March 1939, Churchill Papers, 4/96; CV The Coming of War, 1415 Chatfield Papers, Box 6 4-5. National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 55

war with Germany, the formidable threat of the Italian and Japanese fleets and the possibility that war with one of these powers might involve war with all three would seem to have discounted altogether the proposition of ships surplus to likely needs. Britain’s existing policy was, in time of war, to send a substantial naval force to Singapore to protect Australia and New Zealand and to discourage Japan from taking advantage of any tensions in Europe. Actual war with Japan would possibly require Britain to send an even larger force to the East. The addition of either of these threats to that of Germany would be more than enough to consume the ‘surplus’ forces Churchill needed for the Baltic and it would be difficult to determine when and if these threats might develop; they were always, however, more likely to occur once Britain was embroiled in a war with Germany. Beyond these issues, there was the question of a potential U-boat campaign and the existing shortage of small craft, especially destroyers, needed to deal adequately with this threat. Finally, there was the question of German air-power which would undoubtedly pose a serious challenge to any forces attempting to enter the Baltic and remain there.

Churchill believed he could see a way through all such difficulties. He argued that in the event of war with Italy and Germany, the former could be dealt with in the Mediterranean within two months. As for the Japanese threat, he was almost uniquely sanguine. It would, he declared, be neither necessary nor desirable to send a fleet to East Asia in the early stages of conflict with Japan. As heavily occupied as it was in China, Japan was unlikely to do more than attack Britain’s “interests and possessions in the Yellow Sea.”5 He proposed that these possessions should be surrendered and retrieved in Britain’s own good time after the defeat of Italy. Until then, naval forces should not be sent to the East unless the United States entered the conflict. “On no account must anything which threatens in the Far East divert us” from “the main struggle with Germany.” “In war…one only has to compare one evil with another, and the lesser evil ranks as a blessing.”6 As for a wider threat to Australia and New Zealand, to the aid of which Britain had long promised to come, he dismissed this absolutely. Japan would have to take Singapore and he put this in

5 Ibid. In providing feed-back on his memorandum, Desmond Morton asked “Apart from Singapore, what after all, are our interests and possessions in the Yellow Sea.” Desmond Morton to Winston S. Churchill, 27 March, 1939. CV, The Coming of War, 1417. It is reasonable to assume that Churchill was expressing a willingness to surrender Hong Kong but not Singapore. 6 Ibid. 56

the realm of the impossible but, if “per impossible, they were to attempt it, a British victory in the Mediterranean might be followed a few months later by a decisive naval relief of Singapore.”7 Churchill was similarly dismissive towards the U-boat and air threat. He believed that the U-boat had been mastered. As far as the potential air threat to a fleet inside the Baltic, he expressed the view, “given with great humility (because things are very difficult to judge), an air attack upon British warships, armed and protected as they now are, will not prevent full exercise of their superior sea power.”8 This view of the air threat would quickly change once war broke out but, for the time being, this under-estimation helped sustain his Baltic vision.

If the Royal Navy, with the support of the French Navy, found itself in command of the Mediterranean, and at peace with Japan in the opening months of the war, it would have a surfeit of forces for offensive operations against Germany. These could be directed to the Baltic and he recommended that “Ardent officers” be set to work resolving the problem of “entering the Baltic and living there in indefinite ascendancy.”9 Left unaddressed in Churchill’s memorandum was what his view would be for his plan if Italy, along with Japan, were not at war, but merely hostile or “indeterminate”? Would he be content to await the unfolding of events before he began pressing for an operation in the Baltic which would quickly consume his ‘surplus’ forces and inevitably compromise the Navy’s ability to fight Italy or Japan or both at any point in the future? The outbreak of war would show that he would not.

Filled as it was with hypotheticals, Churchill’s March memorandum evinced little interest with either Chamberlain or the Minister for Coordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, the two men to whom it was sent.10 Churchill nevertheless remained resolutely committed to his plan and, two days after he became First Lord of the Admiralty, he set his “ardent” officers to work to explore the possibility of a naval

7 Ibid., Memorandum on Sea-Power, 1414. 8 Winston S. Churchill: Memorandum on Sea-Power, 1939, Chatfield Papers, Box 6 4-5. National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. Also, Churchill Papers 4/96; CV The Coming of War, 1414. 9 ibid. In the copy of this memorandum forwarded to Prime Minister Chamberlain, he added significantly, although in afterthought: “However by that time the entry would probably be fortified, and Denmark in German hands. Therefore the whole idea is purely hypothetical as well as remote.” 10 Notes by Lord Chatfield, 29 March, 1939, CHT 6/4-5, National Maritime Museum. 57

incursion into the Baltic. On 12 September, Churchill produced a new memorandum entitled Catherine, the ostensible purpose of which was to address the need for a ‘special’ force which he and the Director of Naval Construction, Stanley Goodall, had agreed a few days earlier would be needed to deal with the Luftwaffe if the operation took place.11 In this new memorandum, Churchill now acknowledged that the air threat demanded special preparations. He suggested the core of his naval force should be two or, preferably, three of the old R class battleships raised and protected by caissons against the mine and torpedo and strengthened by thick steel decking to “give exceptional protection against air bombing, which must be expected”.12 He also addressed the strategic objectives of the operation he had identified in his March memorandum, most notable of which was the isolation of Germany from Scandinavian supplies of ore and food and other trade. He now added in response to (or anticipation of) concerns over locking up a large force in the Baltic that its presence would hold “all enemy forces on the spot”.13 Also added was the assertion that success would cause the Germans to “arm the whole northern shore against bombardment” or, with bases in Scandinavia, “military descents” This latter suggestion reflected precisely his Baltic plans of the First World War.

Significantly and in contrast to his March proposal, there was no mention of Italy or Japan, presumably because neither was at war with the Allies. Churchill proposed beginning the operation the moment the ice began to melt in the Baltic at the beginning of March, a time-frame certainly much too early for any certainty to have developed in regard to these countries. The new Soviet threat was acknowledged only in the sense that this country might be positively influenced by the operation, although he noted, “we cannot count on this”.14 Unlike many within the Government, who viewed the Soviet Union as acting collusively with Germany, Churchill, at this point in the war, viewed its activity as primarily self-serving and

11 SIR Stanley Vernon Goodall, K.C.B., O.B.E., Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, (1883-1965). Naval architect who rose through the ranks of the Royal Corps of Naval Contructors to become the Director of Naval Construction in 1936. He remained in this post until 1944. 12 Memorandum Catherine by WSC Churchill, 11 September, 1939. ADM 205/4. The ‘R’ class or Revenge Class (sometimes also referred to as Royal Sovereign Class) was made up of His Majesty’s Ships: Revenge, Resolution, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign and Ramilles. They had received little or no reconstruction during the inter-war period with most attention being given to the reconstruction of the Queen Elizabeth class. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 58

defensive in nature and not a direct threat to the allies; indeed he saw it as a potential boon to the allied cause. He did not view The Soviet’s non-aggression pact as a veto for operations in the Baltic and this view did not change when they occupied eastern Poland in the middle of September. 15

Overall, Churchill’s effort at a strategic and operational outline of Catherine belonged to the ‘cigar-butt’ strategy of which he has oftentimes been accused.16 His reference to bombardments of, and military descents upon, Germany’s Baltic coastline was a fantasy, given the certainty of overwhelming German air power. Nor did he acknowledge the massive advantage the Germans would have via its internal lines of communications in countering such an assault. Just as fantastic as the notion of military descents, was his casual acceptance that his force would enter the Baltic and operate there for up to three months without the certainty of a secure base. Planning for this possibility was necessary because it was impossible to divulge plans to enter the Baltic to any other country until the attempt was made for fear of the loss of secrecy. Thereafter, it might take some time before Sweden – the most likely place of refuge – was prepared to end its neutrality and offer a fleet a safe harbour, if such an offer was made. Thus, Churchill’s intentions were to enter the Baltic and hope for the best and he blithely contended that if, after three months a secure base had not been found, the fleet could return the way it had come. A more naïve and hope-filled prospect surely was not conceived throughout the entire war.

The Admiralty Response The first formal Admiralty response to Churchill’s Baltic plans was completed by the Director of the Admiralty Plans Division, Captain V.H. Danckwerts. 17 This was submitted on the day Churchill circulated his Catherine memorandum but it is unlikely this was seen by Danckwerts before he had completed his appreciation. His assessment, nevertheless, addressed some of the more absurd proposals made by Churchill and this suggested they had already been canvassed in discussion.

15 WSC Cabinet Paper: Notes on the General Situation, 25 September, 1939. He viewed the Russian occupation of Eastern Poland in the middle of September strictly as a matter of self-interest. He contended it created a de facto eastern front that Germany would be compelled to defend with a large number of divisions. Cab 66/2/2; also, CV, At the Admiralty, 147-149; Churchill Papers, 20/15. 16 The expression, ‘cigar-butt’ is Barnett’s in Engage The Enemy More Closely, 93. 17 Victor Hilary Danckwerts, (1890-1944). He joined the Royal Navy in 1904, became the director of the Admiralty Plans Division in April, 1938 and remained in that position until April of 1940. He reached the rank of Rear Admiral before his death in 1944. 59

Danckwerts contended that the only “sound” object of the operation would be the stopping of Germany’s summer supply of iron ore via Sweden. He believed this would make an operation worthwhile so long as it did not prejudice Britain’s ability to maintain its world-wide sea communications and also that Britain was not at war with Italy and Japan and that there was no prospect it would be.18 Its viability thereafter would depend on two key issues: the first was access to a base, probably in Sweden or Finland, which was free from the German air threat. Danckwert’s warned that to secure a base would be highly problematic because neither country would welcome becoming embroiled in war with Germany. The second issue was the German air threat (estimated at 1400 bombers in the region) which he considered made the operation impracticable; it was a view, however, that he thought might be amended by experience. As for the force needed, he believed this must be built around 3 modernised battleships and not the old R class which were too slow to meet German ships in battle.19 Furthermore, because the operation would need to take place in the early spring, it would not be possible, in the time available, to make the necessary improvements to the R class.20

Two days later, the DCNS, Admiral Phillips, who, by this time, had seen Churchill’s paper and also Danckwerts' assessment, wrote his appreciation.21 He believed the operation, if successful, “should have a major effect on the war” and expressed the view that the Plans Division assessment showed, save for the air threat, which was an “unknown quantity”, a fleet could enter the Baltic. As for the air threat, he agreed with Danckwerts that, by the time the operation could take place, they would have “a good deal more information” as to how dangerous this might be.22 However, Phillips still assumed the R class battleships would be used in the operation and insisted these must be given exceptional protection to the upper deck

18 ‘Plan C’ by Director of Plans, September 12th, 1939, ADM 116/ 6289. 19 Although it is unlikely Danckwerts had seen Churchill’s Catherine memo, it is probable that Churchill had proposed the ‘R’ class battleships in his first discussion with naval staff. This would explain why Danckwerts addressed the issue of the Rs in his appreciation. 20 An early spring entry into the Baltic would take advantage of longer nights. Danckwerts nominated a substantial fleet: the 3 modernised capital ships, (Warspite, Valiant and Renown) 1 modern cruiser squadron with maximum anti-aircraft protection, 2 flotilla of modern large destroyers, 1 fast minesweeping flotilla and 2 anti-aircraft cruisers. The force would have to be self-supporting for four months. 21 ‘Plan C’ by DCNS Phillips, 14 September, 1939, ADM 116/ 6289. 22 He doubted Danckwerts suggestion that the operation would face a threat from 1400 aircraft but, nevertheless, he clearly saw it as a major threat. 60

and the “entire exposed superstructure”. This would take at least six months and, therefore, preparation would have to begin immediately if “the operation is to be undertaken next spring”. He posed the question whether or not it would be possible to “spare even the three R’s to be fitted out” and he expressed the personal opinion that they could not be spared “unless we can be sure that we shall not at a later date have Italy and Japan against us.” Just as Danckwerts, Phillips had two major concerns. The first was the need for a secure base inside the Baltic. He doubted any temporary base could be used for more than a week and he suggested the Government would have to accept that, should Finland or Sweden decline to provide a safe base, the fleet would be given permission to seize one. His second was that it must be certain that Russia would not enter the war.

Phillip’s appreciation prompted a supplementary assessment from Danckwerts and the Plans Division. Its salient point was the rejection of any proposal to use a “specially protected fleet of old battleships.” “A well-balanced force of modern ships, including 3 capital ships, appears essential.” Beyond this, the appreciation returned to the vital importance of Swedish co-operation without which the operation would not be viable. He repeated a cautionary note, also present in Phillip’s assessment, regarding the Soviet Union, which had only just invaded eastern Poland. If the Allies were at war with the Soviet Union, the latters naval and air forces would increase the risks of the operation to “unacceptable levels”23

With the exception of the disagreement over the use of R class battleships, the Plans Division appreciations and that of Phillips shared much in common. They viewed a naval excursion into the Baltic as possible but each had nominated preconditions that did not seem readily resolved. However, it was the support of his First Sea Lord that Churchill had to secure to have any hope of advancing the scheme. During the evening of 18 September, Churchill and Pound met and discussed Catherine. We do not know what transpired at this meeting, but the following day, Churchill proposed to Pound that all further investigation on Catherine be conducted by a ‘high officer’ and he nominated the fiery, offensively

23 Plan C. Part II: Operations in the Baltic, ADM 116/ 6289. 61

minded Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Cork and Orrery for the role.24 The ex officio and somewhat anomalous role he gave Cork replicated that which Churchill had given the former First Sea Lord, A.K. Wilson, in the early months of the First World War when he was seeking to implement a similar operation.25 Churchill suggested Cork could “work quietly in the Plans Division for some time until ready to make a report.”26 On 20 September, Pound forwarded a note to Churchill which was essentially a bare-bones summary of the conclusions made by Danckwerts’ paper and Phillips, with two observations of his own thrown in regarding the objectives of Catherine: its purpose being to cut Germany’s sea communications with Russia and influence the neutrals. His comments reflected little or no enthusiasm for the project and appeared to deliberately play down the single, albeit significant, virtue Danckwerts was able to find in the operation: the severance of Swedish ore trade to Germany through Lulea. Pound considered this “only of value from April to November owing to the Northern part of the Baltic being frozen up” and “likely to be of less value now that Germany and Russia have direct contact through Poland.”27 Nevertheless, he acknowledged that to be able to hold the Baltic for a considerable period of time would greatly enhance Britain’s prestige. He emphasized, however, that the fleet must be “assured of the active support of Sweden and the force sent into the Baltic must be such that we can with our Allies at that time win the war without it in spite of any probable combination against us.”28

Thus Pound left the door ajar for Catherine, while doing enough to dampen Churchill’s enthusiasm for it. More privately he had already passed definite judgment on the operation in a letter to the Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, Admiral Forbes in which he had declared that “I do not feel that we are justified in

24 Admiral of the Fleet William Henry Dudley Boyle, 12th Earl of Cork, 12th Earl of Orrery, (1873- 1967). Hereafter, referred to as Lord Cork or Cork. 25 A distinction should perhaps be made between Catherine and the 1915 plans of Churchill and Wilson. Catherine actually had more in common with the Baltic plans proposed by Lord Fisher in the first decade of the twentieth century. The key point here, however, was that in both wars, Churchill established an ad hoc committee to develop these ideas rather than using the existing planning structure. 26 Note, Churchill to Pound, 19 September, 1939, ADM 199/1939. 27 It is to be assumed that he meant by this that Germany could access Russian ore. It was subsequently contended that this was not likely to be the case in the short term. 28 Ibid. 62

risking our whole sea supremacy on what must after all be somewhat of a gamble.”29 Pound must have been fairly confident that, given his political and operational preconditions, the plan would advance no further. Churchill replied to Pound that he entirely agreed with his assessment: “At present the decision is only for exploration; and no question for action arises. But the search for a naval offensive must be incessant.”30 However, if Pound had concluded that Catherine was now a most unlikely prospect it was because he had yet to grasp the full nature of Churchill’s strategic vision and his determination to see it fulfilled.

Lord Cork: His Assessment and His Plan Despite Churchill’s reassurance that Lord Cork would work quietly in the background for some time on Catherine, it took the latter less than a week to complete a preliminary report.31 He stated his view that the operation was “perfectly feasible, hazardous no doubt but, for that very reason, containing the germ of a great triumph.”32 Cork believed the most serious potential problem of the operation was not getting into the Baltic, but the maintenance of the force thereafter and he therefore urged that all effort be made “to procure [through diplomatic measures] a sheltered anchorage in the very near future.” Cork also agreed that modernised battleships, already in an efficient state be used, in part because the need to begin the operation early in 1940 would not permit any significant work on the Rs.33

Thus, in the blink of an eye, Churchill’s rather ad hoc pre-war plan to put to work the redundant and ‘surplus to need’ ‘R’ class battleships of the Royal Navy in a bold offensive operation had taken on entirely new dimensions. The new proposals demanded the use of the best of the available ‘reconstructed’ battleships in what was likely to be a very near-term operation. Over the next two months, Catherine, under Cork, would achieve enormous proportions. In addition to his Baltic force, he

29 Letter, Churchill to Admiral Forbes. 15, September, 1939; also, letter Pound to Admiral Holland, 25 October, 1939. ADM 205/3. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Charles Morton Forbes, (1880–1960). 30 Note, Winston S Churchill to Admiral Pound, 20 September, 1939, ADM 205/4; CV, At the Admiralty, 127. 31 Cork’s report was submitted on 26 September under the heading of Catherine ADM 205/4. 32 Lord Cork prefaced his remarks by stating that his memorandum was ‘based upon a purely military study of the problem”. Outside the parameters of his study was any consideration of the international repercussions of the operation or whether it would be possible “under existing conditions to withdraw so many ships of various types form the active Fleet.” Cork memo, Catherine ADM 205/4. 33 Ibid. Cork settled on Warspite, Valiant and Malaya, all reconstructed battleships of the Queen Elizabeth Class. 63

anticipated having a substantial portion of the Home Fleet in support and the assistance of three aircraft carriers which, in addition to their contingent of Fleet Air Arm aircraft, would carry up to 150 spitfires to protect the Baltic Fleet through its passage to the Baltic. Nor did his plan stop there. He also recommended the greater part of Britain’s bomber force in the U.K. and France conduct continuous raids on aerodromes and other objectives in Northern Germany during the operation. Finally, he expected Allied Forces in France to carry out an offensive on the Western Front to coincide with the entrance of the fleet into the Baltic.34

Cork and his team were meticulous in their investigation and covered every potential aspect of the Baltic plan. The four large volumes of documents in the British National Archives reflect the enormous time and effort put into building a viable naval operation. However, there were all sorts of ramifications for an operation of the magnitude conceived by Cork. While the resources Cork wanted to commit to Catherine had provided Churchill’s conception with a modicum of operational viability, it made it much less likely it would ever take place, whatever Churchill and the Navy might recommend. This level of aggression against Germany during the Phoney War would have been the very antithesis of War Cabinet policy, much of it endorsed by Churchill. The Allies’ very conservative bombing policy, a mixture of humanitarianism and self-preservation, would have had to change, as would the view that the less fighting the better while they prepared and re-armed. Cork’s plan also demanded discussion with and the co-operation of the other two services. It is difficult to imagine the air force supporting a plan which would see 150 spitfires operating in the Skagerrak and then flying on to bases in Sweden; all this while simultaneously inviting a substantial backlash from the Luftwaffe in France and England. It is probably for this latter reason that, throughout the planning of Catherine, Churchill maintained a cloak of secrecy and only three or four people

34Undated memorandum by Cork entitled, The Entry: Co-operation of Other Forces. ADM 199/1928. Cork was keen to make the operation a ‘joint’ one and include French naval forces among those responsible for a diversion during the entry of the main fleet into the Baltic. Churchill would not allow for French involvement. The spitfires mentioned in Cork’s plan were intended to offer temporary cover to the fleet in stages and then fly on to Sweden. It is not clear how many of these craft he expected to remain there. This suggestion, however, indicates that this outline assumed that some kind of understanding with Sweden over Catherine had been achieved before the operation began. 64

were, officially, aware of it.35 No discussions were ever had with the Army or the Air Force. Until and unless he secured Pound’s full endorsement of the operation, he was not prepared to present Catherine to a wider forum. Try as he might in the following months, he was not able to gain the support he needed from his First Sea Lord.

Churchill’s Insistence and Pound’s Resistance Although Pound might reasonably have believed he had done enough to stop Catherine he instead found himself at the beginning of October in a much more serious predicament than he had faced a fortnight before. Catherine had been endorsed by Admiral of the Fleet and, because of the need to take advantage of optimum weather conditions, it had become very near term and, because it would now use modernised battleships, had become very high risk. At a meeting of 3 October, Pound sought to regain lost ground by explaining to Churchill and Cork that, although he had agreed the passage into the Baltic was a practicable military operation, his remarks had not covered the political situation which he obviously thought were prohibitive. This declaration fell on stony ground and was another rather unwise tactical move. After all, Cork had acknowledged certain political preconditions had to be met, most notably the support of Sweden, while Churchill had maintained he wished nothing more than to “prepare the gun for firing”. Each, therefore, wished only to be ready for circumstances in which the political situation had changed. Furthermore, it was not within Pound’s domain to make any judgments about the future political dimensions of the war in Europe.

The problem for Pound in this particular line of argument was that Churchill considered Catherine itself might be the solution to the political impediments Pound had put before it. In his March memorandum when he had written “In war…one only has to compare one evil with another, and the lesser evil ranks as a blessing.”36 Nine months later, he would write “We have to select from a host of dangers the one which can best be dealt with, and which, if dealt with, causes all others to fall away.”37 At the start of the Second World War, Britain’s enemy was Germany alone. Churchill held that if Britain could take the fight to Germany, defeat or compromise

35 These were Chamberlain, Halifax, Chatfield and John Simon, the latter of whom had to agree to the funding of the project. 36 Winston S Churchill, Memorandum on Sea-Power, 1939. 27 March 1939. 37 Char 19/3 Winston S. Churchill memorandum: A Note on the War in 1940, 25 December, 1939. 65

the enemy, all other threats would fall away. He also considered it was the Navy’s responsibility to address the operational issues of Catherine; political matters were beyond its remit.

The minutes of the 3 October Admiralty board meeting suggested that Pound was aware that by giving qualified support for the operation, he had made things very difficult for himself. He therefore resorted to what would eventually be his most successful weapon against Catherine when he claimed “it was not possible for any ships to be withdrawn from service in order to be prepared for the operation.” He declined to agree to a deadline for the operation and he rejected a formal programme of preparation. However, unwilling to tackle his First Lord ‘head on’, he agreed to permit work on vessels as they came in for general maintenance and repair; but only if the improvements assisted in the prosecution of normal duties and only if it did not produce undue delay.

Pound’s deliberate stalling tactics were a ‘double edged sword’. Believing he had secured Pound’s, albeit reluctant, acquiescence, Churchill set about securing the many millions of sterling necessary to advance the preparation for Catherine and this led to a great deal of wasted time, money and resources. Further, Cork was so committed to an early start that he was willing to forego a great deal of the structural preparations needed for his ships and he believed that, if the risk to the fleet was thereby increased, this could be compensated by an increase in the number of vessels used in the operation. In short, Pound’s obstruction threatened only to lead to a larger and less well-prepared force attempting to enter the Baltic.

Such a scenario became more real as the final months of 1939 progressed. By this time, the idea of separating Germany from Swedish iron ore had developed war- winning dimensions for Churchill and the British War Cabinet. Although Churchill had mentioned early that cutting off Germany’s supply of Swedish ore was a significant benefit of Operation Catherine, it was only in December that he began to view this as having ‘decisive’ potential. For Churchill, this enhanced considerably the risk/reward dynamics of Catherine and would cast Pound’s preconditions for the operation in a completely different light. Here was a risk worth taking because, “if dealt with [would cause] all others to fall away.”

Churchill continued to count on Italian neutrality and he continued to discount a serious threat from Japan. He was also keenly motivated during this time to minimise tensions with these countries and make these threats even more remote.38 Unfortunately for his plan, the issue of the USSR had become more problematic with its threatening behaviour towards, and subsequent invasion of, Finland at the end of November. In Pound’s mind, this new aggressive behaviour was an insurmountable obstacle for Catherine. Churchill and Cork viewed the Soviet threat as creating opportunity. Each believed (and this would become the War Cabinet view also) that fear of the Soviet Union made it more likely that Sweden would become involved in the war on the Allied side. Each also believed that such a prospect would be considerably enhanced if Britain could tell the Swedes that the Royal Navy was ready to come to its aid.39 Cork, who was increasingly frustrated at the slow progress of preparation, wrote another memo to Churchill and Pound on 17 November seeking a deadline for Catherine and reminding them why it was desirable to conduct the operation earlier rather than later. Moreover, he argued that “if we cannot promise her [Sweden] instant support by the presence of a strong British or Allied naval force in that sea, we shall miss our chance, and lose the alliance of a virile and determined people…”40

Churchill’s response to Cork’s request for a dead-line was an ill-considered compromise. He deferred the date of Catherine to 30 April but insisted that “every preparation must be made to work with certainty” to this new time-frame. He was remarkably unfazed by the potential consequences of delay. Just as remarkably, Cork accepted the postponement.41 Churchill’s solution to the increased risks of operating in “short darkness hours” was extraordinary. He thought the problem, which

38 During the Phoney War, a number of difficult political episodes arose with the Japanese. Churchill was uncharacteristically accommodating in meeting the Japanese requests. He was fully alive to the need not to antagonise Japan and to give a level of support to the more moderate elements in Japan. 39 Of course, Chamberlain, Halifax and Simon apart, no one was officially aware of the Catherine plan outside the Admiralty. 40 Memo, Lord Cork and Orrery to the First Lord, First Sea Lord, Controller, Fourth Sea Lord and DCNS, 17 November, 1939. ADM 1/205/4. 41 In early October he emphasized the importance of a spring start by declaring that “for an operation such as this SURPRISE IS EVERYTHING; the expedition is doomed to failure unless surprise is at least partial achieved.” (see ADM 199/1928, Untitled paper by Cork and Orrery dated 10 October, 1939). In November he had repeated “The disadvantages of postponing the Operation are so great as to make it questionable whether the Operation be proceeded with unless the Force could be got away before the end of March. (ADM 199/1928 Letter, Cork and Orrery to Churchill, 7 November, 1939) 67

markedly increased the risk of air attack, might be overcome by equipping the close action squadron with the Upward Projectile device.42 The UP weapon was a device of doubtful efficacy for which Churchill had developed, for no readily apparent reason, great faith. It would prove a complete failure when finally used. Churchill’s hope that this weapon might prove, in such a short space of time, the answer to the air threat for Catherine, represents another particularly disturbing delusion which is not easily explicated.

Pound’s views of the implications of the Soviet threat were appreciably more rational than Churchill’s or Cork’s and, on 3 December, his criticism of Catherine became markedly more aggressive. He argued that, after its invasion of Finland, Russia was now the “determining factor” in Catherine. He rejected Churchill’s new request to draw up a programme of preparation declaring that “Until the trade route has been cleared of raiders, and the U-boat menace, whether from torpedoes or mines, has been destroyed, it will be quite impossible to spare the force which will be required for ‘C’.” He thought the resolution of all these problems, which would undoubtedly take some time, would give adequate warning for the reconsideration of Catherine and recommended that, in the interim, Cork’s committee be disbanded.43

Churchill maintained quite the opposite view and was far from ready to surrender Catherine. The risks of a delayed start were being offset by his new awareness of the importance of Swedish ore to the German war machine.44 Success in Scandinavia could be decisive. Cork was of an even more aggressive mindset. On 5 December, he recommended that the Allies use the Soviet invasion of Finland to mobilise the anti-Bolshevik forces of the world, including Italy and Japan. In short, he foresaw an exchange of belligerents: Russia for Italy and Japan. Churchill subsequently noted in response that he hoped “that war with Russia may be

42 The UP weapon (or Upward Projectile) was Churchill’s pet solution to the air problem – and he had been working on it for a very long time under the encouragement of Professor Lindemann, whose initiative it was. It would never prove efficacious – and was an utterly inadequate solution to the substantially increased hours of daylight that would reduce any element of surprise to almost zero. 43 Most Secret Memorandum, Pound to Churchill, 3 December, 1939,ADM 199/1928. 44 The issue of iron ore and its importance to British strategy will be developed latter in this study. It suffices here to write that by the end of December, 1939, the importance of Swedish ore to Germany’s war effort had captured the attention all members of the War Cabinet. 68

avoided”45 In the War Cabinet on 6 December, he also cautioned that “it would be premature to anticipate a solid alliance between Germany and the USSR.”46 Nevertheless, he thought that, whatever material aid might be offered by the Soviet Union to Germany, this would “no doubt” be compensated for by a change in attitude from Italy, Japan and other countries.47 On 11 December, he rejected Pound’s argument that Soviet aggression against Finland was a veto on Catherine: No opinion can be formed on this at present … we may find ourselves at war with Russia, and Allies of Sweden, Norway, Finland and Italy. In this case the Baltic would assume capital importance. Bases would be forthcoming, and Air protection from England might be available…I should wish that both preparations for stores and ammunition for ‘C’ should be pressed in so far as they do not impede daily operations.48

Churchill was discovering all sorts of possibilities in the new political situation. Such accumulated wishful thinking made the risk/reward scenario of Catherine that much more attractive Catherine. Thus, despite Pound’s concerns, Churchill refused to relinquish his plan. Indeed, as December progressed Churchill’s views hardened on the subject. By the middle of December, the War Cabinet had conceived the Finnish Option. This plan is a subject for a subsequent chapter. It suffices here to say that the key to this plan was the co-operation of Sweden and, as far as Churchill was concerned, the key to this was Catherine.

By coincidence, on 25 December Churchill and Pound gave each other their strategic appreciations in personal and private letters. It is probable that neither read the correspondence of the other before sending his own but Catherine figured prominently in both. Pound did his best to discourage further pursuit of the operation by promoting the Finnish Option for which he believed a high-risk naval operation was entirely unnecessary. He returned to the Navy’s extensive responsibilities, which were now expected to grow; in the circumstances, he could not envisage the forces needed being available in 1940. Moreover, he maintained the risk would be too great unless the Fleet entered at the invitation of the Russians and, as a sop, he offered an

45 Letter from Cork to First Lord, 5 December, 1939. Churchill’s comments were added on 11 December, ADM 199/1929. 46 War Cabinet conclusions, 8 December, 1939, 11.30am, CAB 65/2/42. 47 Ibid. With such political realignment in mind, on 6 December he drew the War Cabinet’s attention to the “great importance from the point of view of naval strategy of continuing our present satisfactory relations with Italy” and he hoped efforts would be made to extend the purchase of material with Italy. See, Cab 65/2, 6 December, 1939, 11.30am. 48 Winston S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, Admiral Phillips and Sir Archibald Carter, 11 December, 1939, ADM 199/1928. 69

incursion into the Baltic by a submarine force, although he did his best to dampen this option.49

Churchill, in contrast, thought Catherine now had “a far greater measure of strategic relevance and urgency”.50 He wrote that recent political developments and War Cabinet initiatives might soon place Britain in a position of close friendship or alliance with Sweden and Norway, with all the attendant advantages for Catherine. However, Churchill’s continued emphasis on using ‘surplus’ naval force for Catherine was surely disingenuous. Given Britain’s actual and potential commitments and the number and the nature of the ships Cork intended to use in his operation, he must have known that Catherine had moved far beyond his original conception; but, if the risks of Catherine had grown, so too had the potential reward. Indeed, Catherine, political developments, and War Cabinet strategy were dove- tailing like never before. Through one decisive move, and by the use of a ‘superior’, if by no means ‘surplus’ force, Germany’s capacity to wage war might be severely compromised; thereafter, the lesser threats, the Soviet Union, Italy, Japan, would pose no serious concern. “The supreme strategy is to carry the war into a theatre where we can bring superior forces to bear, and where a decision can be obtained which rules all other theatres.”51

The great ‘decision’, of course, was Swedish ore. So enamoured was Churchill with the prospects of separating Germany from its ore supply, he was now prepared to accept war with Russia. Any threat from Russia, he argued, would be dwarfed by success in the Scandinavia. “If Germany is starved by want of iron ore, Russia could be no serious menace to the victorious Western Allies. All would stand or fall upon success in Scandinavia.”52 Thus, Churchill casually put to one side all the obligations made by Britain at this time. Over the previous several months, he and the War Cabinet had been spruiking Britain’s naval power with considerable largesse. A naval force was offered to Turkey if it was threatened by the Soviet Union. The early departure of the 2nd AIF from Australia had been secured by Churchill’s reaffirmation of a commitment to seal up the Mediterranean and send a fleet to

49 Letter from Admiral Pound to W. S. Churchill, 25 December, 1939, ADM 199/1929. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 70

Singapore if Australia was threatened by Japan. France had been offered significant naval support in the Mediterranean in the event of war with Italy. None of these potential commitments were compatible with the maintenance of a significant force within the Baltic but, if Catherine succeeded in its objective, it was unlikely Britain would be called upon to fulfil them. It was an extraordinarily ‘all or nothing’ approach to strategy. Catherine was not only a risk at an operational level but, if it failed, a great gamble at a grand strategic level because it would compromise Britain’s capacity to meet other commitments in the Mediterranean and the Far East.

Despite his continued promotion of Catherine in his 25 December letter, there was, for the first time, evidence of hesitation from Churchill. This, however, had more to do with an alternative presenting itself rather than a diminished view of Catherine’s efficacy. Like Pound, he saw promise in the War Cabinet’s Finnish Option and he did not wish to see this plan compromised by a dependence on an operation that might not prove possible.53 Nevertheless, he pressed upon Pound the mutual compatibility of Catherine and the burgeoning plans for action in Scandinavia. A willingness to enter the Baltic in March or April or later might be decisive in determining the attitude of Norway and Sweden. Conversely, should support from Sweden be forthcoming, many of the problems surrounding Catherine would disappear.54

The fortnight between Christmas and the end of the first week of January represented the most intense period of disagreement between Churchill and Pound over Catherine. For Churchill, by this time, the gravest threat to Catherine was Soviet and German airpower. Although he had acknowledged it would be wrong to go forward unless we can “see our way to maintaining [the fleet] under air attack”, on 29 December, he sent Cork a list of ‘hypotheticals’, copied to Pound, which he

53 Coincidentally, like Pound, he considered that, if Catherine was not possible, submarines (and mines) could be used instead to interdict or do serious harm to a German invasion which he assumed would be an inevitable response to the Allied occupation of the ore fields. 54 There is no evidence of a direct reply from Churchill to Pound, or vice versa on their Christmas Day correspondence. The day after receiving Pound’s memo, Churchill sent a brief note to Admiral Burrough regarding destroyers. “Pray let me have a report of all destroyers in Home Waters, where they are and what they are doing.” (CV At the Admiralty, 570). To Admiral Arbuthnot, he wrote, “Has the Warspite received its warming clothing yet? If not, on what date will it be provided? (CV At the Admiralty, 571). 71

hoped might ameliorate this and other problems.55 Among these were that the Soviet Union was hostile but ‘pretty rotten’ and “not actually at war with Britain and France and that Sweden and Norway were allies.”56 Even had Churchill’s hypothetical received any kind of positive response, and they did not, his on-going interest in Catherine beggared belief. He was no longer asking about a fully prepared inshore squadron ready to enter the Baltic in the longer nights of late winter and early Spring; he wished now to know if Cork would support an incompletely prepared force, with reduced destroyer support, attempting this extraordinary challenge as late as May at a time when Scandinavia and the Baltic was expected to be a major war zone.57

Pound’s reply to Churchill’s memo challenged one by one Churchill’s propositions. In presenting his argument, he sought to use the preparations that would need to be made for the COS Finnish Option as a block to Catherine.58 He pointed out that the Germans could use Russian aerodromes to attack the Fleet in the Gulf of Bothnia; the railway could not supply the fleet because it would be needed to supply the expeditionary force (which was then being mooted with the War Cabinet as part of the Finnish Option); only three air squadrons could be maintained near Lulea, well short of the numbers necessary to protect the Fleet; not even the two destroyer flotilla Churchill now proposed would be available for the operation for

55 W. S. Churchill to Lord Cork, 29 December, 1939, ADM 205/4. The quotation is from Churchill’s Christmas Day letter. Although he had acknowledgement the air threat and claimed it was a problem he “in no wise underrate[d]”, his hypotheticals tended to do just that. 56 The other hypotheticals in Churchill’s 29 December letter were: That we can have occupied in strong force the ore-field and hold the port of Lulea, and can also have the port of Gavle; That supplies of all kinds, including oil, can pass across Norway and Sweden to ports in the Gulf of Bothnia; That adequate aviation is available to protect Lulea and the northern part of the Gulf of Bothnia from a German counterstroke; That Finland still maintains its independence, and that the country is not an effective base for Russian or German aircraft. 57 To accommodate Pound’s and his own concerns over the number of destroyers (three flotilla) proposed for the operation, Churchill had asked Cork if two would be sufficient. 58 Admiral Pound to W.S. Churchill, 31 December, 1939. Most Secret. ADM 205/4; CV At the Admiralty, 589-591. On the same day he received Pound’s reply to his ‘hypotheticals’, Churchill’s also received the COS assessment entitled Military Implications of a Policy Aimed at Stopping the Export of Swedish Ore to Germany. Pound referred to this in his correspondence, (Cab 66/4/29, COS Report, 31 December 1939). Churchill was mortified that this report, almost certainly at Pound’s recommendation, had dismissed a naval solution (Catherine) to the northern strategy at a time when he still believed the matter was under discussion with Pound. Churchill’s response to the COS reports was published as W.P 3, Swedish Iron Ore, 31 December 1939. See Cab 66/4/33. 72

these would be needed to support amphibious landings elsewhere. “Catherine”, he concluded, was “a great gamble” that was “courting disaster”.59

Even then, Churchill refused to concede the arguments against Catherine and responded with a repudiation of many of the obstacles Pound had put before him.60 Some, however, he accepted were, for now at least, beyond contesting. He was particularly concerned at the number of destroyers required for the plan, whether it be two or three flotilla, an enormous commitment given the status of the U-boat war and the magnetic mining threat. However, if it were not possible to use two British flotilla in April or May, “perhaps at the end of 1940”61 Thus, he argued, there was “no reason why the study of the question should not continue” and he reminded Pound of one of the core virtues of his original proposal: “It must be remembered however that if a British Fleet were placed in the Baltic, it would act as a magnet to draw in German vessels from the outer seas and that very great relief would come thereby.”62

It was, belatedly, Cork who made the most significant contribution to the demise of Catherine. His appreciation of 3 January generally supported that of Pound, although in a display of moral fortitude and continuing operational insanity, Cork still clung to his plan. On 5 January, he argued that Russian forces “are not so formidable as previously represented” and that “if the object to be attained is of such great importance as to justify the possible loss of a considerable portion of the Fleet, then I consider that risk should be taken”63 This prompted Pound’s last and most powerful response. He wrote that he “would be in agreement with this last statement, if I thought it was conceivable that a surface force, such as proposed, could attain its object”64 He then outlined, step by step, the obstacles and challenges that would be faced by the fleet before concluding in a manner which clearly marked the distinction

59 He argued, for example that any Russian air bases used by the Germans, if Finland was not occupied, would be too distant to be of use; the railway was not likely to be taken up by supplying a large force before April or May and this would afford time to accumulate oil supplies in Sweden; more than 3 squadrons of aircraft could be maintained in the “wide expanses of Norway.” 60 Letter, W. S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, 1 January 1940, ADM 205/4; CV At the Admiralty, 592- 593. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Letter, First Sea Lord Pound to Winston S. Churchill, 10 January, 1940, ADM 199/1928. 64 Ibid. 73

between his own strategic view and that of Churchill and Cork: “Our first object must be to win this war, but it is important that we should, if possible, end the war with our sea supremacy unchallenged.”65 Finally, Churchill capitulated, but only conditionally: “I have come reluctantly but quite definitely to the conclusion that the operation we outlined in the autumn will be not practicable this year.”66Catherine was gone, but only for the year 1940. Despite all that had taken place, Churchill maintained his Baltic vision and insisted that all provisions accumulated for the operation should be stored for the future. Thoughts of using the modernised Warspites were given up; instead he would spend much of 1940 agitating for his pet project, the reconstruction of the R class.

Conclusions This study of Catherine has focused on two aspects of Churchill’s performance as First Lord. First, and most important, is the nature of Churchill’s strategic vision and the degree to which he was willing to take great risks to see it fulfilled. Second, is the challenge he presented to Pound and his Admiralty staff in managing his more aberrant offensive aspirations.

Catherine was born of Churchill’s long-standing pre-occupation with the Baltic and his belief that an incursion there represented the best offensive open to the Royal Navy if it were to have a decisive influence on Germany’s capacity to wage war. The attraction of Catherine for Churchill was that it was a low-risk gamble for high stakes. The battleships he proposed to use were slow, redundant, surplus to need vessels which, nevertheless carried 15 inch guns, larger than anything Germany had at the time. A successful incursion of these ships into the Baltic might secure the allegiance of Norway, Sweden, and perhaps even Soviet Russia and it would separate Germany from vital trade with Scandinavia and most particularly Swedish ore.

Although naval staff paid lip-service to the idea, there was little enthusiasm for it. The challenges such an operation faced were prodigious. The air threat, whether German or Soviet or both, appeared prohibitive. As or more important, however, naval staff did not consider that any of Britain’s capital ships, or smaller

65 Ibid. 66 Winston S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, 15 January, 1940, ADM 199/1928. 74

craft, were surplus to need and, therefore, available for such a speculative operation. The risks of Catherine were manifestly increased by Cork’s recommendation that Warspites be used and that they be accompanied by a substantial force of cruisers, destroyers and other vessels. This did not alter Churchill’s vision in the least, although it undoubtedly hardened the views of naval staff. Having received the imprimatur of an Admiral of the Fleet, Churchill insisted preparations be made. There would be no immediate decision to undertake the operation but the ‘gun was to be prepared for the firing.’

It was quite evident in Churchill’s behaviour that he considered none of the codicils put forward by his naval staff as insurmountable. He considered that time and circumstance might overcome most. Further, Cork had attested to the viability of the plan. Although it represented an enormous step away from his own modest aspirations, Churchill showed no hesitation towards Cork’s recommendations that the Warspites be used. These could not be considered ‘surplus to need’ by any measure. He showed no more anxiety when delay, obstruction, and other, miscellaneous, circumstances led to a postponement in the plan from February to May. With this postponement went all hope of a ‘surprise’ breakthrough into the Baltic and the other advantages attendant on a late winter passage.

Churchill was generally unmoved by these issues for, as the risks compounded, so too did the potential rewards of the enterprise. Moreover, he had always taken much less seriously the preconditions for Catherine than his naval staff. Churchill’s determination to compartmentalise the war into ‘this’ war, the war with Germany, and the ‘next’, a potential war with Japan was a particularly difficult mindset for naval staff to combat. This was particularly so when interwoven with his conviction that Britain could find in the Baltic “a decision can be obtained which rules all other theatres” and his view that, “In war…one only has to compare one evil with another, and the lesser evil ranks as a blessing.” By late December, separating German from its supply of Swedish ore offered the ‘decision’ he sought and was prepared to press on with it despite an exponential increase in the risk Catherine involved.

Inevitably, these issues led him into conflict with Pound. While Churchill’s vision was set on the potential of success, moreover Pound always grounded in the possibilities and consequences of failure; further, he always had a much stronger appreciation of how remote was the likelihood of success. Although he ill-judged the best way to deal with Churchill over Catherine, it is difficult to see what else he might have done beyond a more emphatic declaration early that on that the operational challenges facing the plan were insurmountable. Having once failed to do this, he was in a difficult situation. Churchill’s emphasis on ‘preparation’ to meet political circumstances which might yet arise was not a position easily tackled. Moreover, Churchill was loath to permit Pound, either as First Sea Lord, or as a member of COS, to trespass on political matters. His sole duty was to address the viability of an operation. He had not done enough to criticise this early and the subsequent support given Churchill by Cork made resistance to the plan even more problematic. Pound’s subtle blocking, interspersed with some strong and unequivocal representations as to Catherine’s unreasonable risks finally did the job, but it led to great expense along the way. However, Pound at all times did his best to ensure that money spent was productively used as possible. It is probable Cork made his own inadvertent contribution to the demise of Catherine. The immense array of resources, both naval and otherwise, he intended to call upon made an operation as bold as Catherine was highly challenging in the atmosphere of the Phoney War. This must have told on Churchill’s decision to not formally broach Catherine within the War Cabinet.

At the grand strategic level, Churchill’s determination to take risks on the winning of this war to avoid fighting the next, was not without merit. This was especially so given the assumptions surrounding Swedish ore that had emerged by the end of 1939. The real issue, however, lay not in the tolerance of risks at a grand strategic or strategic level but the operational risks and political realities such a plan had to overcome and this is where Churchill’s vision inevitably failed.67 The

67 This point has been noted elsewhere: Reynolds, “1940: The Worse and Finest Hour”: 245, in Robert Blake and Roger Louis, Churchill; and Tuvia Ben Moshe, Churchill: Strategy and History (Lynne Rienner, 1992):119-120. However, where this writer differs markedly from other commentators is the view that there is little to commend in a Grand Strategic vision that is unlikely, in any reasonable scenario, to be fulfilled. A true visionary is surely one who conceives a strategic path not foreseen by others and which is subsequently recognised as achievable. 76

operational risks were formidable and probably insurmountable and Churchill ought to have appreciated this much earlier than he did. The Fleet could not have entirely escaped the German air threat and any harm done to the ships could not have been readily repaired. A late winter/early spring pass, would have had to deal with ice, the worst in years; a late spring pass would have faced long hours of daylight and continuous attack from the air. Even with the support of the Swedes, a base secure from U-boats and German torpedo craft would not have been forthcoming. The Soviet Union, of course, also presented an insurmountable problem. It might have chosen not to react to a British fleet in the Baltic but it was surely a risk that could not have been taken.

In weighing Churchill’s Catherine operation and Pound’s resistance to it, one must consider what Pound, via the Chiefs of Staff help put in its place. Pound did not eschew the idea of Scandinavia becoming a major theatre of war. By late December, he was supporting the Finnish Option, a strategy of considerable and complicated dimensions and one which deliberately targeted the Soviet Union as an enemy via support for Finland. Although the plan did not present the risks of Catherine to the Royal Navy, it would nevertheless have demanded a prolonged drain on resources and exposed the navy to considerable attrition. The Finnish Option also demanded political conditions in regard to Sweden which were almost impossible to fulfil. Churchill was essentially correct in his belief that, by offering some kind of naval defence against a German invasion, Catherine represented a way by which to secure Swedish co-operation. The Finnish Option supported by Pound presented no answer to this threat to Sweden and therefore the pursuit of this strategy was always destined to be forlorn. Catherine might have been a more reasonable and more rational strategy than the Finnish Option.

Ultimately, however, such speculation is about two very poor options. While one might conjecture that Catherine offered the best prospect by which to secure Swedish co-operation, that was an extremely remote possibility and was complicated by the need for secrecy until a fleet had entered the Baltic. The Swedes would have rejected Catherine for the same reasons it rejected all Allied overtures, they would have been less secure, not more. Also, to present Catherine as a potentially viable option to the Swedish ore problem had it been pursued vigorously and implemented 77

as Cork recommended is to skate too lightly over the operational challenges of sustaining a fleet in the Baltic.

Although he believed his plan dove-tailed neatly with the policies and proposals before the War Cabinet, the conditions that might have made Catherine a remotely viable proposition – a late winter/early spring pass into the Baltic – would have long disappeared by the time the Catherine force was ready. Moreover, Catherine was, by this time, part of the ‘larger’ scheme that had the Soviet Union as its primary antagonist and not Germany. These factors reduced the viability of Catherine to zero. In the circumstances, Churchill’s on-going willingness to contemplate Catherine was fool-hardy in the extreme but is explained by the conviction that the objective sought – Swedish ore – justified extreme risk. The problem for Churchill and Cork was that each under-estimated the operational and political challenges to Catherine and over-stated its likely benefits. While the ever burgeoning resources of Catherine were offset in Churchill’s mind by the glowing prospects of Swedish ore, the ineluctable fact remained that the likelihood of Catherine ever achieving its objectives was very remote indeed.

Chapter 3

New Construction and Churchill’s Inshore

Squadron

A New Perspective on Churchill and the Air/Sea Debate.

The kind of naval war Churchill expected to fight as First Lord is evident in the naval programmes he supported in the early stages of World War Two. The priorities he set, most particularly in regards to capital ships, placed him in on-going conflict with Pound, Phillips, and other members of his naval staff. This chapter will focus on the two core elements of this conflict: the disagreement over the delay to the construction of the 16 inch gunned battleships of the 1938 and 1939 programmes (hereafter the ‘Lions’) and Churchill’s determination to convert a number of existing battleships into an inshore squadron. A study of these issues will further develop an understanding of Churchill’s wider strategic priorities and vision while shedding more light on the success he had in imposing these views on his naval staff. Additionally, this chapter will continue the consideration of the priority given by Churchill to the war with Germany over the longer term protection of Britain’s imperial interests and obligations; it will also consider the influence of Churchill’s previous wartime experience on the decisions he made and the directions he chose to

take at the start of the Second World War. A study of these matters will open an opportunity to assess Churchill’s view of threat of air power to the function and mobility of the Royal Navy, a subject upon which there exists much misunderstanding.

New Construction: The 1939 Emergency Construction Programme From his first days at the Admiralty, Churchill was determined to prepare for only the first two years of the war, a time during which he believed Britain would be at its most vulnerable. Despite having had no direct involvement in the Royal Navy for a quarter century, from his very first days as First Lord, Churchill set about amending many of the construction priorities then under discussion at the Admiralty in an effort to refocus the construction programme on securing warships for ‘this war’ with Germany.1 The needs of the ‘next war’, perhaps with Japan, were to take a distant second place. Among the most important changes introduced by Churchill, and the most relevant to this study, was his recommendation that, save the first three or four of the KGVs, all capital ship construction be suspended for a full year, with the decision to be reviewed every six months.2 On 10 September, Churchill explained his rationale to Chamberlain: “It is by this change that I get the spare capacity to help the Army in the heavy stuff. On the other hand I must make a great effort to bring forward the smaller anti-U-boat fleet. Numbers are vital in this sphere.”3 His impressive altruism towards the needs of the Army, not commonly found in a First Lord of the Admiralty, was based in his clear headed pragmatism that Britain must have a strong presence in France to help sustain French morale. Although Churchill had some apprehensions to the contrary, he generally held that the Western Front would not easily be broken by an assault and the Germans would be shy of

1 In late July 1939, a meeting chaired by the Admiralty Controller addressed the matter of battleship construction. It was proposed to advance the five King George V class battleships (hereafter KGV) and give the four battleships of the subsequent two programmes a low priority for the first few months of war. Churchill’s proposal, however, was evidently viewed as a step too far. 2 This particular recommendation was made on 11 September. Churchill first made known his intention to focus on short term construction on 6 September, when he rejected the Admiralty’s proposal for the additional construction of new cruisers “which cannot be finished for at least two years, even under war conditions.” However, he approved all proposals for smaller vessels, “as it all bears on U-boat hunting and ought to be ready within the year.” He noted that this matter could be reviewed during the next three months. See, minute, Churchill to Admiral Pound, Admiral Phillips and others. ADM 205/2; CV, At the Admiralty, 38. 3Letter W. S. Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, September 10, 1939, Chamberlain Papers, Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham. 80

attempting one, especially so late in the year. His determination to see the rapid growth of the British Army and the equally rapid transfer of divisions to France, was also his insurance policy against this possibility. He was determined that naval needs did not ‘entrench’ unduly on these objectives.

Another important influence on his altruism was a legacy of, not only his liberal roots, but the other positions he had held in Government: his former role as First Lord; his work as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and, more particularly, his duties as Minister for Munitions in the final year of the First World War. As First Lord in the earlier war, he had emphasized from the beginning the importance of ‘economy’. In August, 1914, he had announced to his Personal Secretary, Rear- Admiral Hood his intention to suspend all construction that could not be completed before the end of 1915, adding that: thrift & scrupulous attention to detail are the mark of efficient administration in war. After all these years the Admiralty is now on its trial as an organisation, & the First Lord is vy[sic] anxious that vigorous action shd [sic] be combined with strict economy…4

In his later wartime role as Minister for Munitions, he had endeavoured to rationalise the distribution of resources and he had faced the unreasoned resistance of the Navy to such efforts: “In the last war” he wrote in his letter to Chamberlain, “the Admiralty used their priority arbitrarily and selfishly, especially in the last year, when they were overwhelmingly strong, and had the American Navy added to them.”5 There is annoyance here that a bloated Royal Navy had sought more than was needed; there is also an evident frustration that it had done so little with what it already had. Churchill’s determination that this would not be repeated was at the heart of his capital ship construction policy.

Churchill’s proposals met with immediate resistance from the Admiralty. A preliminary appreciation warned that a delay of more than a few months would cause a deficiency in battleships over the combined forces of Germany and Japan.6 An

4 W. S. Churchill to Rear-Admiral Hood, 8 August, 1914, ADM 1/8388; Gilbert CV. 6, At the Admiralty, 21-22). 5 W. S. Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, 18 September, 1939. Chamberlain Papers. 6 Paper entitled, Suspension of Work on Capital Ships Not Completing Before the End of 1941 (ie. Beatty and 16 inch gunned ships), ADM 205/2. This paper was part of a preliminary assessment provided by naval staff before the meeting and in response to Churchill’s minute of 11 September to Admiral Pound and others (also to be found in ADM 205/2). 81

Admiralty Board meeting recommended that all five of the KGV class should be advanced as fast as possible and this would require bringing forward HMS Beatty and Jellicoe (later Howe and Anson to 1941).7 A final decision in regard the last two KGVs and the ‘Lions’ was put off until the board meeting of 28 September and this gave time to Pound to submit a paper disputing any long term suspension of new capital ships. “Once we have delayed these ships” he argued, “we cannot retrieve the situation.”8

Such arguments represented a further distinction between Churchill’s view of the war and that of Pound. Pound wanted to build for a future strength while fighting the present conflict. Churchill saw little virtue and much risk in such a view. Preparing for a future war, years ahead, could result in the loss of ‘this’ war.9 Despite Pound’s concerns, the question of the ‘Lions’ was resolved somewhat anti- climatically. Gun mounting and other issues meant the hulls could be postponed without any harm being done. Meanwhile the Controller, Admiral Fraser, had concluded that a postponement would relieve the “situation in all branches of naval shipbuilding work” and allow the laying down of 8 Intermediate Class destroyers.10

Less than a week later, however, Churchill revisited his proposal to focus on some and not all of the KGVs when he learned of the extensive delays to the completion of the battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers already in hand. He now took an even more vigorous stand in regard to construction priorities and his strategic time-frame: “It is far more important” he argued to Pound “to have some ships to fight with… than to squander effort upon remote construction which has no relation to dangers!” All skilled labour was to be shifted to vessels that could be completed during 1940: “Those finishing in 1941 “fall into the shade, and those of 1942 into the darkness. We must keep superiority in 1940.”11 He wanted two new battleships, four aircrafts carriers and a dozen cruisers “commissioned and at work before the end of

7 Ibid. 8 Untitled paper, circulated 22 September 1939, ADM 205/2. 9, Minutes of Admiralty Board Meeting and attendant documents, 28 September, 1939. The Controller’s paper was entitled New Construction Programme: Review in Light of War Conditions. ADM 167/105. 10 Admiral of the Fleet Bruce Fraser, (1888-1981). 11. Minute, Churchill to Admiral Pound and others entitled ‘New Construction’, 8 October, 1939, ADM 205/2; CV At the Admiralty, 223-224. 82

1940.”12 His focus was on one or two modern ships to take on the Bismarck and not a future Japanese threat.

The Inshore Squadron Also standing in the way of new construction was Churchill’s determination to build an ‘inshore squadron’ of battleships capable of operating within range of Germany’s land-based aircraft. On 18 September, Churchill wrote to Pound that “we must have all armour capacity, which can be spared, for strengthening HM ships against air attack”13 This statement was, initially, in support of Operation Catherine but Churchill would pursue his idea of a squadron of battleships for ‘inshore’ work quite independently of requirements for this operation. On 21 September, he expressed his concern to Pound that ships had been reconstructed to fight in the ‘line of battle’ when Germany had no line of battle with which to fight. Modernisation, he thought, should be reconsidered from the point of view of air attack.14

One month later in a letter to Pound of 21 October, Churchill repeated his determination to have a number of capital ships capable of withstanding the German air threat: I address this to you alone, because together we can do what is needful. We must have a certain number of capital ships that are not afraid of a chance air bomb…It is quite true that it may well be a hundred to one against a hit with a heavy air-torpedo upon a ship, but the chance is always there and the disproportion is grievous … I want four or five ships made into tortoises that we can put where we like and go to sleep content. There may be other types which will play their part in the outer oceans; but we cannot go on without a squadron of heavy ships that can stand up to the battery from the air …15

12 Ibid. Churchill got his way. See, In the ‘Supply and Production: Second Monthly Report Submitted by the First Lord Covering the Month of October 1939’ it was noted that special efforts were being made to bring forward the completion dates of the King George V and the Prince of Wales. ADM 167/107. 13W. S. Churchill to Admiral Pound and others, 18 September, 1939, Char 19/3; CV At the Admiralty, 113-114. Churchill’s proposal also included the suspension of the Fiji, or Southampton class, of large cruiser “until we can see more clearly the character of war”. 14 W. S. Churchill to Admiral Pound and others, 21 September, 1939, ADM 199/1928; CV At the Admiralty, 136-137. Churchill was referring to the HMS Queen Elizabeth which was then in the process of reconstruction. He evidently had QE in mind for Catherine at this time but it disappeared as an option as soon as Lord Cork proposed that the operation should be near term. 15W. S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, 1 October, 1939, ADM 205/2; CV At the Admiralty, 276. This correspondence occurred at the time of an Anglo-Turkish agreement and discussion of the possibility of putting a fleet in the Black Sea. Later in the letter, Churchill writes of “five or six” ships prepared to face the air threat. On 26 January, 1915, during a time in which Churchill was trying to secure Fisher’s support for the use of old battleships – deemed surplus to needs – for use in his inshore squadrons, Churchill wrote to Fisher, “There is no difference in principle between us. But when all your special claims are met, you must let the surplus be used for the general purpose … You and I are 83

Churchill insistence on an ‘inshore squadron’ had its antecedents in his experiences of the First World War.16 In 1917, he had argued that the vast preponderance of the combined British and US fleets would permit the establishment of two fleets: a ‘blue water fleet’ for maintaining the supremacy of the seas and oceans, and another, rendered comparatively torpedo proof, to discharge the functions of an ‘Inshore Aggressive Fleet’17

A quarter century later, Churchill had precisely the same mindset and made precisely the same distinction. When writing and speaking of the ‘battleship’ as the ultimate arbiter of sea power, he did so only in the context of ‘blue water’ strategy. He believed that, at ranges beyond the enemy air threat, the battleship would continue to reign supreme. His view on the role of Britain’s battle-fleet operating within range of land-based aircraft was a different story: almost none of his capital ships were ready to face the modern air threat. Only in exceptional circumstances, Catherine among them, would he risk the existing fleet of battleships within range of aircraft.18 Although he was determined to have ready a number of KGVs to deal with Germany’s large ships during 1940/41, what he really feared was a rerun of the First World War in which he believed the overwhelming power of the Royal Navy’s capital ships played so little role in the final defeat of Germany. No advantage could be gained from this preponderance unless and until some battleships were capable of resisting the threat from land-based aircraft. His ‘inshore squadron’ was the answer to fighting this war more aggressively.

so much stronger together.” Note, W.S. Churchill to First Sea Lord Fisher, 26 January 1915, CV At the Admiralty, 458. 16 His first efforts at building an inshore squadron revolved around some bulged cruisers and a force of big-gunned monitors. By 1917 and given the enormous combined force of the British and US fleet, he was thinking in terms of bulged battleships. 17 Memorandum, Naval Policy 1917, Char 8/104, (also. CV Vol.8: 81) This proposal was made at the height of the U-boat threat and before the introduction of convoy. The object of the force was to “Force him to recall many of his submarines for his own defence, to provoke him to engage in frequent action both with his flotillas and heavier vessels, and general to beat him into port; and thereafter to mine him in closely with minefields so dense as to be a serious obstruction to submarines, and to keep him mined in by fighting and sinking any vessels he may send to sweep a channel.” 18 Churchill made this view clear many time to his naval staff. He also explained this view at length to the House of Commons during his Naval Estimates speech of 27 February, 1940. See Churchill’s speech, House of Commons Feb 27 1940, Hansard Columns 1923-36; CV At the Admiralty, 812-813. 84

In the existing literature, Churchill is almost universally declared to have been dismissive of the air threat and its capacity to influence strategy and tactics. However, he was fully alive to this threat: indeed, it preoccupied him. His search for the ways and means by which to deal with this problem was at the heart of his strategic thinking. At the start of the Second World War, Churchill was far from the ‘gun and battleship sailor’ pre-occupied with fighting another Jutland. 19 Rather, he wanted the battle-fleet or, at least, part of it, put to work to help win the war on the continent: If we allow ourselves indefinitely to be confined to an absolute defensive by weaker forces, we shall simply be worried and worn down while making huge demands upon the national resources. I could never become responsible for a naval strategy which excluded the offensive principle and relegated us to keeping open lines of communication and maintaining the blockade.20

Churchill, the British War Cabinet, and the French Government, were all looking to the periphery of Europe for opportunities to hurt Germany and to influence friends and potential enemies. This made eminently desirable the provision of extra protection for the navy’s warships against land-based aircraft. Churchill hoped he had the Baltic covered by Operation Catherine. However, from the beginning of October, it was apparent that this operation would be undertaken by the Warspites, reconstructed vessels that, nevertheless, were ill-prepared to cope with the air threat; Churchill accepted that, in the instance of Catherine, this would make it a major strategic gamble for high stakes; but the substitution of the Warspites also meant he would be denied his ‘inshore squadron’ unless he addressed this matter independently. Other operational prospects existed that would require well-protected capital ships. His interest in an alliance with Turkey and the need to sustain Roumania had already convinced him of the importance of holding the Black Sea against a German or a Soviet threat and there was, of course, always the prospect of war in the Mediterranean against the Italians.

19 The expressions comes from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely: “… he believed as strongly as any ‘gun and battleship’ sailor that the fleet’s own anti-aircraft fire would be enough to protect it against aircraft.” For very similar assessments of Churchill’s mindset, see: Gretton, Former Naval Person, 248; Marder, From Dardanelles to Oran, 55; Richard Hough, Former Naval Person, 131-132, 141, 145; Richard Lamb, Churchill as War Leader, 24. 20 First Lord Personal Minute 55, 11 December, 1939 ADM 199/1928; CV At the Admiralty, 496-497. 85

Churchill also considered inshore operations within the North Sea to contain the German naval threat.21 He was acutely aware of the enormous drain that could be made on the Navy’s resources by even a single raider operating in the wider oceans and there was also the recrudescence of the U-boat problem he anticipated in 1940. One objective of Catherine was to contain the German naval threat to the Baltic. In this same vein, Churchill had supported Pound’s mine barrage because it would restrict or discourage German naval activity outside the North Sea but this policy would also increase the likelihood of naval operations within range of Germany’s aircraft.22 A policy of containment was also the shortest possible route to freeing capital ships for operations in the Far East.

In October, Pound authorised an inquiry to determine how Britain’s capital ships could be improved. His willingness to do this was somewhat surprising given his attitude to Catherine but it was possible that Pound expected such an investigation would counsel against improvements which would force the withdrawal of ships from service. He might also have believed that an inquiry would reinforce the need for new capital ships. He agreed with Churchill that “we are now entering on the contest between air power and sea power in the narrow seas” but he went one step further and instructed that the enquiry should establish how to make his fleet “inexpugnable[sic] except by their own class.”23

The inquiry found that all capital ships had room for improvement in one way or another but it was concluded that none then in service should undergo any significant structural change, including the addition of protection against aircraft. This included the Rs, Churchill’s candidates for the inshore squadron.24 The Rs were

21 This issue has been developed by Andrew Lambert in his article, “Seapower 1939-1940: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the Atlantic”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17:1: 86 -108. 22 On 24 October, Churchill had written to Admiral Fraser “These are ships to fight Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in North Sea or perhaps against Italy in the Mediterranean. They have no other purpose. Char 19/3; CV At the Admiralty, 288. 23 Admiral Pound to W.S. Churchill, October 22th, 1939, ADM 205/3. By some coincidence, in 1917, it had fallen to Pound to respond to Churchill’s request for an inshore squadron. While he had rejected the greater part of Churchill’s thesis, he showed some interest in his proposal for an inshore squadron: “The organisation of a an efficient inshore fighting force under British leadership should not prove an impossible task and until we have brought the combined Naval resources of the Allies to bear at the decisive point we cannot be said to have done all that is possible to ensure Victory.” See undated memorandum entitled, Mr Churchill’s Proposals, DUPO 5/2, Churchill College Cambridge. 24 Particular attention was given to the Queen Elizabeth, primarily because it still had 9 months left in its current refit. Pound contended that, if additional work was done to this ship, similar work should 86

considered “Valuable units in the event of the fleet going to the Far East, but no value as battleships if re-bulging and re-arming took place.” Moreover, they were currently needed for convoy duty.25 However, naval staff could not hold a consistent line on these ships. When seeking reasons not to reconstruct them, they would be described as valuable units for operation in the Far East in time of trouble; when providing reason why new battleships were needed, they were considered redundant and of little value and incapable of facing any enemy. In the circumstances, there was no doubt Churchill would revisit the reconstruction of the Rs.

The 1940/41 Construction Programme. The dimensions of Pound’s capital ship construction programme emerged in early January. He wished to bring forward Churchill’s time-frame and begin the Lion and Temeraire in July, 1940, and the Conquerer and Thunderer in September. Additionally, he adopted the idea, first broached with and endorsed by Churchill at the beginning of December, for a 15 inch battleship/battlecruiser type using four available spare turrets of the R class. This ship would be ordered in July 1940 and completed by December, 1943.26 However, Pound also wanted a second 15 inch gunned battleship to be ordered in 1940 but this would depend on decisions regarding other construction. It was anticipated that two 16inch gunned battleships and two 15 inch gunned battlecruisers would be laid down for the two years thereafter. Pound evidently had yet to grasp fully Churchill’s determination to contain naval spending.

There was not the slightest chance the cost of his naval staff programme would prove acceptable to Churchill. On 21 January, he wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon27, and committed himself to “sedulously” examining the entire naval construction programme “with a view to making sure that the Admiralty be considered for her sister ships, Valiant and Warspite.24 By November 11th, it had been concluded that, because of a variety of tactical and strategic disadvantages, “the proposed re-bulging of the three WARSPITES is not considered worth the sacrifice entailed. See, Memorandum, Effect of Re-bulging and Re-arming the Three Warspite, 11 November 1939, ADM 205/3. 25 Minutes of a Meeting in First Lord’s Room, 8 November, 1939, ADM 205/3. 26 It was anticipated that the Lion and Temeraire would be completed in March and September, 1944 and the Conquerer and Thunderer would be completed in January and June 1945. It was anticipated HMS Vanguard would be completed in December 1943. 27 John Allsebrook Simon, 1st Viscount Simon (1873-1954). Simon remained Chancellor of the Exchequer until the fall of Chamberlain. He was appointed Lord Chancellor in Churchill’s Government. 87

does not trench unduly upon the National War effort.”28 Pound’s proposals were problematic in many ways. None of the proposed construction, with the exception of the first 15inch gunned battleship, complied with Churchill’s expectation that all energy be put to the completion of ships for ‘this war’.29 Further, Danckwerts’ recommendation that a total of five 15 inch gunned battleships be built seemed designed to produce particular offence. These ships could only be constructed by using turrets taken from the existing R class battleships which, only a few weeks before, had been deemed too indispensable to be reconstructed for Churchill’s inshore squadron. To add insult to injury, to achieve this programme each R class battleship would be decommissioned a full three and a half years before the completion of its replacement.30 Churchill’s own recommendations for the Rs had two or three of them out of operation for nine to eighteen months.31 Thus, it appeared his naval staff was willing to do without these ships to produce ‘new’ vessels in the longer term but not to produce Churchill’s inshore squadron in a shorter term. His naval staff was focused on the possible needs of the next war. Churchill, in contrast, viewed the navy as already having a capital ship programme in excess of likely needs; rather than build more for a remote threat, he wished to focus on construction for an immediate one.

On 1 February, Churchill submitted his draft naval programme for 1940/41 for the Board’s consideration.32 It bore little resemblance to that which Pound and Phillips had in mind. He proposed that the Admiralty not ask for any new capital ships for 1940/41. Progress would be made on Lion and Temeraire “in due course” while Conqueror would be proceeded with but Thunderer would be held over until 1941. In the interest of economy and an appreciably earlier completion date, he proposed that Conqueror become the 15inch gunned battlecruiser instead of a 16

28 W. S. Churchill to Chancellor of Exchequer, 21 January, 1940, ADM 205/5. 29 The rather vague time-frame for ‘this’ war appeared to have been extended to late 1943 as a result of Churchill’s support for the Vanguard. 30 Memo Captain Danckwerts, DPD, War Construction Programme: Amendment, 10 January 1940, ADM 205/5 This would be required to facilitate work on the 15 inch guns and their turrets. 31 It had generally been anticipated that the re-armouring of these vessels would take nine months and the re-cocking of the guns another nine months. In an effort to make these vessels available in the shortest possible time, Churchill would eventually suggest that the cocking of the guns be dispensed with. This, of course, would have reduced their utility as inshore bombardment vessels but Churchill evidently viewed this as less important than armour. 32 W.S. Churchill, Draft Submission for the 1940/41 Construction Programme, 1 February, 1940, ADM 205/5. 88

inch gunned battleship and suggested this might be repeated with Thunderer the following year33 In other words, the last two 16 inch gunned battleships would disappear altogether and be replaced by two 15 inch gunned ships which would use the spare R class turrets and another set from one existing ship. The final element of this proposal was a recommendation to “give very strong additional deck armour” to the remaining four R class battleships to “make these old vessels effective units by the summer of 1941.”34

Churchill’s proposals represented another deft attempt to meet Pound’s demand for more ‘new’ construction and his own demand for economy and ships for ‘this war’. They also represented a calculated gamble that these ships could meet the Japanese 16 inch gunned ships successfully in battle. His proposal also reflected his conviction, that, if the Japanese threat developed during ‘this’ war, it would be better to have 15 inch gunned battleships sooner rather than 16 inch gunned battleships later. Churchill’s expectations in regard to the Rs and his inshore squadron remained the same, although he accepted that fewer of these would be re-armoured. Two weeks earlier, in announcing the suspension of Operation Catherine on 15 January, he had reaffirmed his determination to have a Close Action Squadron mounting thirty two 15 inch guns which, in the spring of 1941, “could be used with much confidence in the Baltic, if we decided to go there, or in the Heligoland approaches, or in the southern part of the North Sea, or of course in the Black Sea or Marmora.”35

The naval staffs’ shocked and quick response demonstrated further how little they understood Churchill’s motivation and strategic direction. Phillips unwisely made reference to the substantial building programme that had taken place during the First World War and he lamented that “it is not often realised how comparatively small the demands which the Navy makes upon the country’s efforts in war are compared to that of the other services.”36 Such sentiments, so naively expressed by

33 Ibid. 34 Draft submission, Naval Construction, 1940-1941, 1 February, 1940, ADM 205/5. His proposals by themselves would achieve substantial savings but this would be enhanced by not adding any new carriers. Additionally, he argued that the battlecruisers would prove a satisfactory substitute for a number of the 8 inch cruisers proposed. Other reductions were consistent with much of the Sea Lords’ recommendations. 35, W. S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, 15 January, 1939, ADM 199/1928. 36 Untitled letter by T. S. V. Phillips, 2 February 1940, ADM 205/5. “In the late war it will be recollected that not only did we go on and complete the battleships then building, i.e. five Queen 89

Phillips, were the antithesis of Churchill’s own convictions. The extra wartime construction, pressed upon Churchill by Fisher, and which played so little part in the defeat of Germany, was the issue against which Churchill was now reacting and to which he had drawn Chamberlain’s attention in the first week of war.

Churchill’s determination to limit new capital ship construction and focus on preparation for ‘this’ war ultimately withstood the challenge of the naval board. He had the sympathy of Admiral Fraser who had several times warned Pound that his capital ship programme was excessive, especially given the large merchant ship programme required. Although Fraser worked hard to find a way to meet Pound’s programme with regard to the Japanese threat by dropping other vessels, he did so with little conviction: “It seems to me that if Japan is going to take action at all her only chance is to do it during this war in which case the three battleships … would still be of no avail.”37 The Japanese threat continued to be pressed by Pound and Phillips but Churchill appeared only interested in Japanese construction to the extent to which it allowed him to justify even the modest programme he was seeking. By mid-February Churchill and his Sea Lords were finding more common ground. Although the rate and nature of progress on the capital ships was kept vague, the two sixteen inch gunned battleships, Temeraire and Lion, would go forward.38 Preliminary work would proceed on Conqueror and Thunderer but would not exceed ₤1 million in expenditure. Only one new ship, the 15 inch gunned battlecruiser, HMS Vanguard was to be sought.39 These proposals fell well short of the original aspirations of Pound and Phillips. That the Navy found common ground with Churchill on even this programme probably had much to do with the fact they had agreed to the reconstruction of two of the four Rs, although this commitment would never be fulfilled. On 7 February, Churchill had again made clear that he was “not prepared to agree to further programmes of battleships for the next war until

Elizabeths, five Royal Sovereigns, and three foreign ships taken over, but in 1915 we laid down five battle cruiser type ships (Renown, Repulse, Courageous, Glorious, Furious) and in 1917 we laid down the Hoods…” 37 Ibid., Memorandum, B. A. Fraser to the First Sea Lord, 2 February 1940. 38 Unnumbered WP, Naval Programme 1940-41, dated as 11 February. Char 19/6. 39 Curiously, Churchill defended this proposal by reference to the need for a fast ship to deal with “the super-pocket-battleships [German?] and the heavy 12 inch gunned cruisers now being built by Japan”, a sign perhaps that he was already thinking in terms of a limited response to a Japanese threat and thinking primarily in terms of trade protection rather than a large fleet for Singapore. It is also notable that he was also attempting to justify further construction via reference to the on-going German threat. 90

adequate provision of ships that can venture within range of the enemy’s shore-based aircraft has been made for the needs of this one.”40

In due course this modest capital ship programme was constricted further. The War Paper (40) 53 on the 1940/41 programme which was finally circulated to the War Cabinet had several important amendments. It was decided that no progress would be made on Conqueror and Thunderer, although the paper noted the Board’s insistence that this decision be reviewed before the end of the calendar year. Vanguard would proceed, as would the re-armouring of two R class battleships. No mention was made of a second 15 inch gunned battlecruiser.41

Although the programme was generally welcomed by the War Cabinet, primarily for the economy it was trying to achieve, former First Sea Lord Chatfield expressed his earnest concern at the limited nature of the capital ship programme as far as Japan was concerned.42 His preference, like Pound’s and Phillip’s, was the opposite of Churchill’s: larger gunned battleships completed later at greater expense to address the threat from Japan rather than 15 inch gunned battleships or battlecruisers finished sooner and with considerably more economy.

On this count, there is little doubt Churchill was taking the wiser course, although it must be recognised that Churchill’s and the Admiralty’s intense focus on battleships over carriers indicated a blindness to how a sea war against the Japanese would develop. The 16 inch gunned battleships would have been more expensive to build and would not likely have been completed in his ‘this war’ time-frame; moreover, they would have been a drain on the resources needed to fight successfully the war with Germany and it was here, for Churchill, the risk lay. Moreover, the utility of 16 inch gunned battleships was really at its best only in a situation in which Britain was determined to seek a decisive result in a battle with Japan’s main fleet.

40 First Lord’s Personal Minute 178 to Admiral Pound, Sir Archibald Carter and Admiral Fraser, Char 19/6; CV At the Admiralty, 724. 41 WP (40) 53 Naval Programme 1940-41, CAB 66/5/33. Also changed from the mid-February proposal was the dropping of two Fiji class cruisers, 10 whalers and, significantly, 12 escort destroyers. The number of escort destroyers had been 66 in Churchill 1 February proposal, 82 in the mid-February proposal and 70 in the final submission. 42 He wanted to see all the 16 inch gunned vessels progressed as rapidly as possible and was not convinced that Churchill’s substitution of the 15 inch gunned Vanguard was wise. In subsequent personal correspondence with him, he noted that Japan would eventually have six 16 inch gunned battleships to Britain’s two. 91

Churchill was building for a more likely scenario; that is one in which Japan entered ‘this war’ and one in which the Royal Navy would avoid a main fleet conflict with Japan except in a situation where it had the support of the United States. In presenting his argument for the construction of the Vanguard, Churchill referred to Japan’s programme of 12 inch gunned cruisers of the super-pocket battleship type. If Japan was building these vessels (and it was not) it would not have been for a main fleet action but for trade interdiction. Churchill viewed the fast, big-gunned Vanguard as the most economical way for Britain to deal with this threat.

Collectively, the various parts of Churchill’s strategic outlook, his ‘this war’ view, the construction of Vanguard and the delay of the Lions, and his plans for the R class battleships made a great deal more sense that the perspective offered by the Admiralty. The reality was that by 1940, Britain had already lost the capacity to deal unilaterally with the threat from Japan, whether or not it was at war with Germany. Even without a conflict with Germany or Italy, the Royal Navy as it was then constituted and would be constituted in the future, lacked the dominance over the Japanese fleet necessary to secure a decisive naval victory. Britain’s future as the dominant power in the Far East was inextricably linked to the fact that, in calculating its own strategic direction, Japan was compelled to consider the potential threat of the United States Navy in combination with a British Fleet. Whether or not Churchill entirely grasped this himself, his ‘this war’ approach was the best and perhaps the only way to prevent this de facto dependence on the United States becoming de jeure. The only way Britain could avoid the stark reality of its strategic position was not for Britain to try to build its way out of trouble or be averse to risk, but to do everything in its power to defeat Germany as soon as possible or, at the very least, to not show weakness. Britain must act in a way that would discourage Japan from ever chancing a war with Britain in which the United States would not become involved or, indeed, a war with the United States in which Britain appeared too weak to respond. Such aggressive and confident action would also prevent the Italian threat from developing.

Churchill’s agitation for an inshore squadron did not end with the War Cabinet’s acceptance of the 1940/41 programme in the middle of March. Before the invasion of Norway and the fall of France changed forever the strategic landscape in 92

Europe, the only offensive operations he could foresee were those in the Baltic and Black Sea. On 23 March, in a note to Pound he returned to these “two supreme strategic operations”.43 “I am anxious to know that you are with me in regarding the Baltic and the Black Sea as the two main objectives of Naval strategy so long as our prime duty is being thoroughly discharged.”44 With these objectives in mind, he sought to have the resources set aside for Catherine updated “and every effort compatible with our prime duty … made to prepare the special equipment and vessels” for the possibility of such operations in 1941 and even 1942.45 As for the air threat, he saw this might be remedied in the future by the reconstruction of the Rs or his UP weapons.46.

The timing of this correspondence should be linked directly to the discussions then taking place within the War Cabinet. The Finnish option had collapsed and the British and French governments were desperately exploring their strategic options. Scandinavia, the Baltic, the Middle East, most especially the prospect of securing Turkish allegiance, continued to be at the centre of discussion. The British remained preoccupied with northern Europe while the French sought a diversion in south- eastern Europe. Beyond such plans, there was little else on offer and this to some degree explains Churchill’s intense focus on an inshore squadron. Most of the strategic prospects being canvassed risked placing British naval forces within easy reach of enemy aircraft. To this extent, Churchill’s efforts to reconstruct some of British battleships against the air attack, made some sense and, similarly, it has made the reasons for Pound’s rejection of this effort more obscure and difficult to assess. We do know that Pound feared improvements would make these ships too slow for normal duties. If the Rs were slowed, it would slow all ships that accompanied them and this might prolong the period to which these vessels would be exposed to air attack; in any event, extra armour atop the Rs would not have made them proof against this threat and it would have done nothing to protect them from the torpedo.47 It might be, therefore, that Pound’s reservations were based primarily on a lack of

43 Letter, W. S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, 23 March 1940, Char 19/6. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 The other important impediment was the lack of destroyers. However, he thought this situation would improve markedly in the future. 47 It is likely, as was indicated earlier, that Churchill would have ‘bulged’ his Rs against the torpedo. This would have not made them proof against this threat, however. 93

utility. However, it might also have been that he feared an inshore squadron, if completed, would be recklessly used. However, the most likely explanation for his resistance was that he remained hopeful the Rs would be turned into his new force of 15 inch gunned battleships or battle cruisers. The invasion of France in May, 1940, temporarily drew such discussions to a close. Remarkably, despite the new strategic paradigm that emerged after the fall of France, the matter of new battleships versus an inshore squadron would be revisited and very similar battle lines drawn. The Royal Navy were now even more fearful that Japan would take advantage of Britain’s strategic dilemma while Churchill was determined as ever to find a way to take the war to Germany and, by this time, Italy.

Churchill and the Air Problem. It is evident from the foregoing, and in contrast to all the accepted wisdom on the subject, Churchill was very alive to the threat aircraft presented to the full function of his capital ships. In his letter to Pound of 23 March, he wrote: “The danger from the air is at the present time decisive against committing any of our ships to prolonged attack from shore-based enemy aircraft. But we must not assume that this danger cannot be overcome.”48 This admission, it should be noted, occurred less than three weeks before the outbreak of the Norwegian campaign, a conflict oftentimes attributed to Churchill’s underestimation of air power.49 Churchill was correct in arguing that the air threat could be overcome or, at least, ameliorated. Unfortunately, the solutions he was most determined to pursue, extra armour and his “UP weapon in its many variants” were weak and ineffectual.50 His view of the air threat was very

48 Churchill to Pound, 23 March, 1940, Char 19/6. 49 A typical quotation of the navy’s attitude to the air threat, which also included Churchill, is to be found in Hough’s Former Naval Person, 141: “nowhere on land or at sea did there appear to be a revisionist-realist like Herbert Richmond who recognised the deadly dangers from shore-based aircraft to a fleet with inadequate air cover and inadequate air power to strike back effectively.” 50 On 23 March, 1940, Churchill wrote to Pound that the Up weapons “may even before this year is out furnish HM Ships with the means of inflicting losses of an effectual deterring character upon hostile aircraft.” Despite suggestions to the contrary, he was not enamoured of his ships’ anti-aircraft defences, which had little success in shooting down enemy aircraft at this time. ( Memo, W. S. Churchill to First Sea Lord, 23 March, 1940, Char 19/6). Indeed, Churchill spent almost the entire period of the Phoney War worrying about the poor performance of the fleet’s anti-aircraft weaponry. On 27 September, after one attack on naval vessels, he expressed disquiet to Pound and Phillips at the fact that “the multiple pom-pom and AA guns failed to hit any of these aircraft. We must regard this as a major weakness to be repaired at the earliest possible moment.” See, W. S. Churchill, minute to Admiral Pound and Admiral Phillips, 27 September 1939, ADM 205/2. Churchill hoped to improve this situation through the use of high speed practice targets, but as late as March, 1940, he expressed 94

Eurocentric: there were no enemy carriers and enemy torpedo bombers operating in European waters.51 Almost entirely absent from Churchill’s thinking at this time was the possibility that the best counter to the German air threat against Britain’s own naval forces was the Fleet Air Arm [FAA]; this despite the fact that, at the start of the war, Britain was constructing a very large carrier force. Rather than grasping this fact and pursuing it relentlessly, Churchill would be responsible for virtually moth- balling Britain’s existing force of carriers during the Phoney War period. It was an aberrant, short-sighted and narrowly focused effort to meet a core element of his naval policy: that the FAA would not draw unduly from the common purse.

The Fleet Air Arm had suffered much pre-war neglect and indifference under the RAF and Churchill began the war determined to improve its station. He would soon learn, however, that the parlous state of the naval air service was such that a very large and a sustained injection of funds was needed. This was most disconcerting to him; he had already given his support to a number of ‘big ticket’ extraneous proposals for substantial expenditure, including the northern barrage and Operation Catherine. Additionally, there was the continuing staff pressure in regard to capital ship construction and an enormous demand for escorts and patrol craft. This additional, unexpected, expense was unwelcomed and he placed the FAA under a particularly close scrutiny to ensure ‘that the Fleet Air Arm makes a real contribution to the present war in killing and defeating Germans.”52 He quickly concluded that, for a variety of reasons, it was not doing this and would not do so any time soon. He believed the carrier based FAA fighters were obsolescent and incapable of facing the enemy’s land-based aircraft or offering adequate protection to their own carriers, let alone the fleet, in offensive operations near the enemy’s coast. This, he contended, left the Fleet Air Arm only with “the most important duties of reconnaissance in the ocean spaces, of spotting during an action with surface ships

great annoyance at the fact that this problem had not been addressed. See, W. S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, Admiral Phillips, Admiral Fraser, and Sir Archibald Carter, 17 March, 1940, Char 19/6. 51Neither Germany nor Italy had carriers. Germany was using high level bombing and dive-bombing against British shipping during in the early stages of the war but not torpedo bombers to any great extent; hence Churchill’s particular focus on deck-armour. Churchill (as did Chatfield) considered the torpedo plane threat much more formidable than the dive bomber and was relieved that the Germans had chosen not to develop or, at least, use such a weapon to this point in the war. See, CAB 65/6 War Cabinet Meeting, March 1940. 52 First Lord’s Personal Minute 147, W. S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, 12 January, 1940, Char 19/6. 95

and launching torpedo seaplane attacks upon them.”53 However, as he was so fond of saying during the Phoney War, the enemy fleet was only a small threat and could therefore not justify the expense involved in the maintenance of an extensive carrier force in constant readiness.54

Against this rather bleak assessment of the value of the FAA, Churchill pitted his other anxieties: “our Air Force has fallen far behind that of Germany and under present conditions the Air menace to this Island, its factories, its naval ports and shipping, as well as to the Fleet in harbour, must be considered as the only potentially mortal attack we have to fear and face.”55Thus, he expressed his intention to “liberate the RAF from all ordinary coastal duties in the narrow waters and the North Sea” and give the task to the FAA “which then, and then alone, would have a task proportioned to its cost and worthy of its quality.”56 In short, the aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm were to take over the responsibility for the protection of the fleet while in harbour and other coastal duties so that the RAF could concentrate on other matters.

To this end, he requested the establishment of six to eight Naval Squadrons of 100 to 150 FAA pilots, many of which were to be taken from the carriers, together with mechanics and administrative staff for land-based operations.57 More significantly, he proposed to seek fewer carrier-borne aircraft and to “ask in return to be given a supply of fighters or medium bombers, perhaps not at first of the latest

53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. Another potential role was, of course, anti-submarine warfare. However, after the sinking of Courageous in September, (addressed in chapter 1) such operations were curtailed. This decision, however, might have had something to do with the limited efficacy of such duties in the longer nights of winter. 55 Ibid. Churchill was addressing at this time a variety of additional stresses surrounding the protection of the fleet. These problems were compounded by the fact that resources were needed for three major bases at once: Scapa, Rosyth and the Clyde. There was extensive need for anti-aircraft guns to protect Britain’s naval bases and this was exacerbated by the fact that the anti-aircraft defences of the ships themselves were not having a great deal of success in shooting down aircraft. Additionally AA weapons could only be apportioned to the naval bases at the expense of ADGB defences. While he tried to juggle such priorities he also resisted the proposition that some 10000 soldiers would be needed for service in and around the bases. Given his desire to build a large army quickly, this was of considerable concern to him. 56 Ibid. It should be borne in mind that carrier aircraft were more expensive to build and to maintain. Moreover, they were particularly expensive in man-power because each aircraft had two crew- members. All such accounting had a bearing on Churchill’s plans. 57 First Lord’s Personal Minute 147, Char 19/6. As the minute points out, Churchill had already organised the formation of two land-based FAA squadrons for the Orkneys to protect Scapa and surrounds. This was an additional initiative. 96

type, but good enough for short-range action.”58 The C in C Home Fleet, Admiral Forbes was a major influence in this whole process. He had little faith in the value of FAA in winter months and his anxieties over the U-boat risks to the Fleet in harbour had already resulted in the redirection of certain FAA craft to land-based duties.59

Among traditional supporters of the FAA and within the Royal Navy Air Service, Churchill’s proposals were met with consternation. Acclaimed champion of the FAA, Sir Roger Keyes, hoped “the navy would not overdo the paying off of the carriers.”60 He defended the carriers and reminded Churchill that during the search for the Graf Spee, the Ark Royal had “carried out the work of a number of cruisers, which would otherwise have been required, but do not exist!” Portentously, he had added, “And I am confident that the carriers will justify their existence if more German raiders come out. The Bismarck and the new “Deutschland” will probably cause you much anxiety before this war ends!”61

Fifth Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Air Service, Vice-Admiral Royle expressed his reservation also, but Churchill responded forcefully on 26 February that the focus must be on protecting the Fleet when in harbour.62 “Our present battleships are not built to withstand heavy bombs from the Air … Meanwhile, hardly anything has been done … to improve the AA gunnery of the Fleet by firing at fast targets”63 As for Royle’s desire for a well-trained offensive force with which to attack the enemy’s large ships, Churchill was, as he had been throughout this period in a variety of forums, dismissive: Of course, it would be very nice for our torpedo seaplanes to attack the enemy battle- fleet. But it happens they have not got one. Should our Fleet go into the danger zone in the North Sea, they would not need the torpedo sea-planes to protect them from the attacks of the far weaker German battle-cruisers. They would, however, very much need

58 Ibid. 59 C.in C. Home Fleet to Vice-Admiral Commanding Orkneys, 6 January, 1940, ADM 1/10737. 60 Letter by Sir Roger Keyes to W. S. Churchill, 12 February 1940, ADM 205/6. It was the action of FAA torpedo bombers that led to the destruction of the Bismarck. Admiral of the Fleet, Roger John Brownlow Keyes, (1872-1945). 61 Ibid. 62 Vice-Admiral Guy Royle, (1885-1954). Royle was knighted in 1941 and was promoted to Admiral in 1942. 63 W. S. Churchill to Admiral Royle, 26 February, 1940, Char 19/6; CV At the Admiralty, 804. Churchill’s suggestion that it was not the Navy’s intention to operate within easy reach of land-based aircraft “except on some very important occasions” could reasonably be assumed to be a reference to a variety of Churchill’s plans, including Catherine. 97

a couple of squadrons of fighting aircraft, if these could be produced from an armoured carrier.64

This statement hinted at a limited vision of the tactical problems that might beset naval forces in the North Sea. He seemed not to have envisaged a variety of situations in which enemy ships would be more wisely attacked by carrier-borne bombers than Britain’s naval vessels or in which RN vessels would welcome, and be greatly assisted by, the existing force of FAA fighters. This lack of foresight was particularly surprising given Churchill’s on-going interest in amphibious operations in Norway and elsewhere. Should these take place, Britain would have to make do with the FAA forces it had.

Churchill reaffirmed his determination to arm the two armoured carriers with aircraft of the Spitfire type for the protection of the fleet when in harbour or at sea against land-based aircraft and he made clear that they were not to “concern themselves with torpedo attacks on surface vessels or (except incidentally) with reconnaissance.”65 Pound counselled caution. In early March he wrote that, while he accepted that the FAA must take a greater role in the protection of the Fleet when in harbour, he thought this should not “capsize the Fleet Air Arm to such an extent that it cannot be used in a legitimate manner should opportunity occur” and these included the need to attack the enemy’s large ships. He did not think it advisable to convert a “great offensive weapon into a purely defensive one.”66 Moreover, as desirable as was Churchill’s pursuit of single-seat modern fighters in the longer term, it was not at all efficacious at this time. The FAA still needed aircraft that had greater range and could fulfil multiple tasks, and which had the appropriate navigational facility for operations over water.

As a result of Churchill’s proposals, by early March 1940, the Fleet Air Arm in Home Waters had been more or less ‘moth-balled’. Fleet fighters had been removed from HMS Furious and put to work protecting the fleet in harbour and conducting

64 First Lord’s Personal Minute 222, W. S. Churchill to Admiral Royle, 20 February, 1940. Char 19/6. 65 W. S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, 11 March, 1940, Char 19/6. In a typically quixotic moment, he suggested that, as part of their new role, a carrier or two might sit permanently off-shore along the flight path of German bombers so that their force of fighters might more effectively attack the enemy before they reached the fleet base. Pound would subsequently point out that such a proposal would likely make the carriers themselves the object of air attack. 66 Ibid. 98

anti-submarine duties. The FAA torpedo bomber forces had been marginalised as expensive to maintain and unlikely to be used in offensive operations and they, too, were disembarked from Furious. Thus, despite being fully alert to the German air threat and its capacity to severely limit the activities of the Royal Navy, in the weeks and months prior to the Norwegian Campaign, a conflict in which Britain’s carrier forces played an often vital role, Churchill was instrumental in compromising Britain’s most effective weapon for operations of an ‘inshore’ nature within range of the enemy’s land-based aircraft: its carrier force of fighters and torpedo bombers. A major criticism of the navy’s handling of the early, critical stages of the Norwegian Campaign has been that HMS Furious only belatedly set sail for the North Sea from the Clyde and that it did so minus its complement of fighters, which then stood at Hatston airfield at 10 hours’ notice. This not only delayed the Home Fleet but might have contributed to the Commander-in-Chief’s subsequent reluctance to risk his forces within range of enemy aircraft at vital junctures in early operations. The proposition must be put that the explanation for many of the failings in the early stages of the Norwegian campaign is not to be found in an underestimation of the German air threat but in the underestimation of his FAA to deal with it and for which Churchill must bear his share of responsibility. Although FAA fighters were obsolescent, when pitted against aircraft other than the enemy’s modern fighters they were at much less disadvantage than assumed and they provided a service to the fleet during this campaign of which Churchill had deemed them not to be capable. Similarly, the FAA Swordfish torpedo aircraft, by most definitions an obsolescent aircraft, would prove a remarkably successful weapon.67

Conclusion Churchill’s attitude to new capital ship construction at the start of the Second World War and his determination to build an inshore squadron were manifestations of four important influences: his disillusionment with the Royal Navy of the First World

67 It must be noted, however, that Churchill was capable of being somewhat mercurial in his attitude to the FAA. Around the time he was expressing these unequivocal opinions and curtailing the function of his carrier forces, a brief panic occurred over the completion date of the Bismarck. In the absence of any KGVs, Churchill worried that it would be impossible to catch and kill this ship with the battleships to hand. He, therefore, immediately looked to a carrier and battleship combination to deal with this threat, although he was not enthusiastic about the prospect. Like most naval personal of this time (with the exception of the Naval Air Arm itself) Churchill accepted the capacity of FAA aircraft to slow large ships of war but doubted their capacity to sink them. This, he continued to believe, was best done by another battleship. 99

War for not doing more with what it had; a determination to spend the British public’s funds wisely, a conviction that the Royal Navy must make a decisive contribution to winning the war in Europe beyond the traditional role of protecting Britain’s lines of communication and destroying those of the enemy; and that aggressive naval action would help deter two potential enemies, Italy and Japan. When Pound and Phillips began to argue for a substantial programme of capital ship construction they were repeating the navy’s modus operandi of the First World War. Churchill believed Britain already had a considerable preponderance in capital ship strength and the construction programme then in progress would more than maintain that advantage in respect to its most likely enemies, especially with support from the French. Moreover, Churchill was quite certain that, to consume resources to prepare the navy for the next war, would necessarily compromise success in this one and leave Britain vulnerable on land (via its support of France) and in the air, two areas in which Churchill viewed Britain to be more exposed and vulnerable.

Churchill’s construction priorities represented the practical policy edge of his ‘this’ war and the ‘next’ war philosophy. It is difficult to fault his priorities and his prescience on these counts. The entry of Italy into the war only occurred when it became evident that France would be defeated. He was equally correct in regard to the impact German ascendancy in Europe would have on the Japanese. The Japanese decision to go to war with the United States and Britain in December 1941 was undoubtedly made easier by the defeat of France and the loss of its fleet, the apparently successful invasion of the USSR and the neutralisation of much of Britain’s fleet in its fight with the combined forces of Germany and Italy. Also, in 1939/40 Churchill could not have anticipated the extent to which the USA embargo on essential raw materials would motivate Japan to risk a suicidal war with the West to avoid the loss of China, a failure beyond contemplation. None of the limitations Churchill placed on capital ship construction had a negative impact on Britain’s war with Japan but they undoubtedly helped free resources for more vital construction, both inside and outside the Admiralty, for the war against Germany. His emphasis on celerity of construction over numbers of ships and size of guns was eminently wise. Apply maximum and timely force to achieve success against Germany, and the threat of Italy and Japan would not likely arise. If the threat from Japan developed, Britain

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would respond in a significant way only if Australia and New Zealand were threatened with invasion or the United States was also at war with Japan. If the war with Germany was won, or ascendancy maintained, Japan would take no independent action; if it were lost, the Empire was at great risk, save for US intervention. It is notable that, with the exception of the 15 inch gunned Vanguard, none of the capital ships to which Churchill reluctantly agreed were completed before the defeat of Germany or Japan.68

Churchill was far more realistic in his assessment of Britain’s ability to meet its Imperial obligations than his staff. He was fully aware that, while Britain was at war in Europe, its empire in South East Asia was entirely dependent on the combined threat of the USA and Britain and not Britain alone. Whether or not the Admiralty liked it, Britain was already dependent on the United States’ fleet. However, success in Europe was also the best way for Churchill to protect himself from the criticism that it was his policies that had contributed to the reality Britain now faced. Should Japan go to war, it would expose how incapable was Britain of independently dealing with this threat and how utterly dependent it was on the USA to take the fight to the Japanese. Perhaps more cuttingly, it would expose to ridicule the policies such as the ten year rule that Churchill had championed in the 1920s and 30s in the name of economy and also his frequently dismissive attitude towards the threat posed by Japan.

Just as with Catherine, it was at the tactical and operational level that Churchill’s strategic vision for the navy fell apart. His manic preoccupation with the reconstruction of the R class battleships, at a time when there was a pressing need for armour for British tanks, was based on the assumption that such improvements would allow him to use this ‘surplus’ force in some spectacular way to influence events on the continent. Apart from Catherine, these operations were never identified, although the theatres of war in which they would take place were: the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the North Sea and the Black Sea. It was not clear if Churchill intended amphibious operations or mere bombardment but the work done to these vessels would not have made them ‘proof’ against air attack. Nor would the

68 The Vanguard was launched before the defeat of Japan but took no part in the war. None of the four Lion Class battleships was ever completed. 101

re-armouring of two or three battleships have done anything to protect transports and the other vessels required for amphibious operations. It is true that the presence of such vessels might have offered some comfort to potential friends and allies, and this might have served a political or diplomatic purpose, but it is hard to see a practicable military application for them in any situation where they might have made a decisive difference.

The core problem was that Churchill had selected the wrong tools for the job. What was really needed if Britain’s superior sea-power was to make a contribution to the war on the continent was the development of a strong and modern FAA built around Britain’s force of armoured carriers to provide the necessary defensive umbrella against land-based aircraft. This might at least provide temporary local air superiority for amphibious operations. However, despite being aware of the FAA potential and cognisant of the obsolescent nature of its aircraft, he was neglectful of this service and, indeed, the FAA capacities deteriorated under his stewardship as he redirected its resources to static defence on the mainland. Had Churchill put the same energy into securing modern aircraft for his FAA as he did in attempting to secure the force of unsinkable battleships, the Royal Navy and British strategy would have been the better for it. Instead, his vision for the FAA was obscured by what he believed to be an absence of potential targets for carrier based aircraft, and by more immediate needs: the defence from air attack of Britain’s cities, harbours and factories. His proposals for the FAA helped reduce the burden on the RAF and Coastal Command in such duties, but only marginally. It remains surprising that his imagination did not extend to understanding that his own offensive ambitions demanded that the FAA acquire modern aircraft at the earliest opportunity or that the offensive operations he was so animated in promoting might require a highly-trained FAA using what they already had with the greatest efficiency possible. His myopia in this regard denied him any awareness that the FAA could be most useful in any situation where it would not have to face the modern fighters of the enemy. In due course, aircraft would be produced to fulfil even this role. These matters would become issues of particular importance when Britain went to war with Germany in Norway, a subject for later chapters

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Chapter 4

Fighting the War The War Cabinet and its Committees

When Churchill joined the British War Cabinet at the beginning of September 1939, his participation was met by much apprehension among his detractors and much satisfaction from his supporters, the latter of which included elements of the British public, pockets of the British Press and a small group of agitators within his own party. Well before the war, Churchill had made it known he wished to join Chamberlain’s Government and that he could “work amicably with the P.M. who had many admirable qualities some of which he did not have himself.”1 However, he believed also he had “great qualities and could do much to help the P.M. to bear his intolerable burden”.2 When, therefore, the invitation to join the War Cabinet finally came, Churchill accepted it with much appreciation and relief. He expressed a determination to be loyal and supportive to Chamberlain and he remained so for most of the Phoney War.

Churchill brought to his new role a mixed bag of well-known strength and weaknesses, all of which were exaggerated or understated by the disposition of those passing judgment. Chamberlain himself had long resisted extending an offer to

1 Chamberlain letter to Hilda, 15 April, 1939, Chamberlain Diary Letters, 407. 2 Ibid. 103

Churchill to join his Government primarily because he believed to do so would have destroyed whatever slim hopes existed for peace with Germany. Further, he wished not to subject himself to Churchill’s idiosyncrasies and the inconveniences he was certain he would bring with him: his loquacity, his badgering, and his constant but inevitable offers of advice.3 Nevertheless, Chamberlain was not oblivious to Churchill’s strengths, although he doubted these outweighed his weaknesses. He was aware of his energy and his knowledge of war; he had demonstrated skills of organisation and leadership in previous roles. Chamberlain hoped to maximise the positive Churchill could offer and contain the excesses and he would adopt a decision-making structure, not entirely of his own making, to achieve just that. The difficultly for the Churchill/Chamberlain relationship was that what Churchill viewed as his strengths were oftentimes those characteristics Chamberlain believed to be his weaknesses. As genuine as his determination was to work ‘amicably’ with his prime minister, this would be compromised by his determination to exercise what he believed to be his ‘great qualities’ and bring these to bear on fighting the war.

Within a fortnight of the outbreak of war, the role Churchill intended for himself could be readily identified. From the beginning, in actions and behaviour, he assumed the persona of a minister for war, a role he had long hoped Chamberlain would formalise and would not. He displayed a supreme self-confidence based in a considerable, if somewhat dated, experience in a variety of roles. He also began to press an offensive agenda using the only force he believed was immediately capable of taking the war to Germany, the Royal Navy. However, from the beginning he had the wider war in mind and not only the war at sea. He adopted and maintained a ‘big picture’ approach which included a clinical and non-partisan view of the needs of his own service relative to the needs of the other two to ensure Britain was readied as quickly as possible to fight a war against Germany on all fronts. The demands of his navy were always viewed in this wider context; where needs conflicted, he asserted, and acted upon, a willingness to accommodate and compromise. It was an attitude,

3 Ibid. In this letter to Hilda he wondered if Churchill would “help or hinder in Cabinet or in Council” or if he would “wear me out resisting rash suggestions?” In his letter to Ida (23 April, 1939) he wrote that “If there was any possibility of easing the tensions and getting back to normal relations with the dictators” he would not risk it having Churchill join Cabinet but he also admitted that ‘the nearer we get to war the better his chances and vice versa.” Chamberlain Diary Letters, 410. 104

no doubt, partly sustained by his conviction that the Royal Navy was, in many respects, already well-resourced.

However, his ‘big picture’ view extended well beyond merely accommodating the needs of the other Service departments. He challenged the practices and tackled the (perceived) shortcomings of any and all departments and, in due course, would employ and apply his own investigative section to do so. In short, everybody’s business was his business, including that of the Army and the Royal Air Force, the Exchequer, the Foreign Office and even the Prime Minister. Such an approach, however, was not designed to garner the support of his colleagues, nor necessarily his Prime Minister. It inevitably suggested a conviction that he knew better and the role he gave himself was, predictably and in very quick order, viewed as him reverting to type. Churchill was set on an expansive role; Chamberlain, in anticipation of this, had begun with plans to contain Churchill and these would be encouraged even more strongly by his advisors in the opening weeks of the war.

The aim of this chapter is to assess Churchill contribution as War Cabinet minister to the wider war effort with a focus on the success or otherwise of his ‘big picture’ approach to the British war effort. Particular attention will be given to his role in two ministerial committees: the Land Forces Committee [LFC] and the Military Co-ordination Committee [MCC]. It was within these committees that the full force of Churchill’s vision was felt. The LFC was established at the very beginning of war to: to report as quickly as possible on the size of the Land Forces at which we should aim in the present war, and the date of completion of equipment of the various contingents, as a basis for the production arrangements to be made by the Ministry of Supply.4

The LFC was short-lived but the controversy it generated was prolonged and was subsequently passed to the MCC to resolve. The MCC was the key advisory body to the War Cabinet in matters of strategy and the general conduct of the war. Churchill, the other two service ministers, and the Chiefs of Staff were the core members of this committee. Ernle Chatfield was its chairman in the on-going

4War Cabinet: Report by the Land Forces Committee, 8 September, 1939, CAB 66/1/14. 105

position of Minister for Co-ordination of Defence until he was replaced as chairman in early April by Churchill.5

Another important aim of this chapter is to explore and understand the nature of the decision-making structure and process instituted by Chamberlain and the limitations this imposed upon Churchill. This study of Churchill’s role in the War Cabinet and its committees will begin an investigation into the reasons why, in seeking to take the war to Germany during the Phoney War and animate the British war effort, he achieved so little. An objective will be to determine the extent to which ‘structure and process’ contributed to the wider inertia of this period, Churchill’s own explanation, or if other factors were at work, including issues surrounding Churchill himself.

The Land Forces Committee: What Size the Army? Unsurprisingly given the small size of the British Army at the start of the war, one of the first and most important tasks the War Cabinet set itself was to determine the size of the army with which Britain would fight. From the very beginning, Churchill was among the most adamant that Britain must aim at a substantial army and that, moreover, this could and should be achieved in relatively quick order. As desirable as this objective was, his interest in the British Army and its importance in sustaining French morale was a belated epiphany, and a pre-occupation largely absent before the war; he now placed too much store in his conviction that an army could be improvised in a manner similar to the raising of Kitchener’s armies in the First World War and he would expend a great deal of energy and effort, his own and others, attempting to prove this could be done.

The LFC was brought into being by the War Cabinet on 6 September with the Lord Privy Seal, Samuel Hoare, as chairman and it met for the first time on 10 September.6 It soon set a target of 55 divisions for the wartime army, with 20 Divisions to be ready within 12 month, although it recognised such targets would not

5 Churchill replaced Chatfield as chairman. He did not become the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, a role that had been long redundant and disappeared with Chatfield’s resignation. 6 Samuel John Gurney Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood (1880-1959). Hoare was a senior British Conservative politician who served in various Cabinet posts in the Conservative and National governments of the 1920s and 1930s. Hoare held the position of Lord Privy Seal from the outbreak of war until the fall of the Chamberlain Government. 106

be easily achieved.7 As recently as February 1939, Britain was contemplating a force of only 6 divisions. This had been raised to 32 Divisions in April but even this was well shy of the new targets and the proposed rate of growth.8 Another important target to be set was the number of divisions to be in France before Spring, 1940, the beginning of the campaigning season. The C.I.G.S., General Ironside, believed it would be possible to send overseas 11 Divisions within 6 months, a contribution well in excess of the two mobile divisions and 4 infantry divisions promised to the French in pre-war discussions9 Churchill hoped for much more.10

Churchill’s focus on the Army was not shared by Chamberlain. His priority was, and had long been, the Air Force and he believed the fighting in Poland demonstrated the importance of the air weapon. There was, Chamberlain argued, little point in building a large army if it could be quickly neutralised or defeated by the enemy’s superior air arm. Churchill’s view was that a 55 Division army was the bare minimum for which Britain and the Commonwealth should aim and he worked hard to persuade his PM. He doubted if “the French would acquiesce in a division of effort which gave us the sea and air and left them to pay almost the entire blood-tax on land.”11 This was sound reasoning but did not address the problems inherent in meeting his targets.

It is within such correspondence, one first sees the emergence of Churchill’s ‘big-picture’ thinking and the benchmarks he intended to use to sustain it: these benchmarks were often to be found in Britain’s efforts in, and his personal experiences of, the First World War. He believed that no Service or organisation should receive absolute priority and, to support his case, he referred in his letter to Chamberlain to the behaviour of the Admiralty which had used “their priority

7 Report of the Land Forces Committee, 10 September, 1939, Cab 66/1/21. It was hoped this would consist of a 32 Division British Army, 14 Divisions from the Dominions, 4 Divisions from India and 5 Divisions for assistance to allies, etc. 8 Ibid. Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Ironside noted that “up till recently we had based our plans on scales of supply for an eastern theatre of war.” This was somewhat less than needed on the Western Front. 9 Cab 66/1/21. Field Marshal William Edmund Ironside, 1st Baron Ironside (1880–1959). 10 War Cabinet: Land Forces Committee minutes, 7 September, 1939, Cab 92/111; CV At the Admiralty, 43-45. Churchill sought have 20 Divisions within six months and 40 Divisions within 12 months, with a grand total of some 50 to 60 Divisions. 11, W. S. Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, 10 September, 1939, Chamberlain Papers; At the Admiralty, 60-65. 107

arbitrarily and selfishly, especially in the last year, when they were overwhelmingly strong.”12 He added, “I am everyday restraining such tendencies” but he evidently believed the Air Force was not doing the same.13 He felt an Army of 55 Division would not compromise the Air programme and noted that, at the end of the last war, Britain “had about ninety divisions in all theatres … we were producing aircraft at the rate of 2000 a month … [and] maintaining a navy very much larger than was needed, and far larger than our present plans contemplate.”14

It was Churchill’s implicit view that, if his targets for the British army could not be met, it would not be because of the fundamentals of Britain’s industrial capacity but the pessimistic estimates and dubious assumptions of the Exchequer and such ministries as Labour, Supply, and Shipping and the excessive requirements of the Air Force.15 He also felt that the War Office were making inflated and “unreal demands” and was attempting to supply the BEF beyond that which was reasonable or necessary and this would delay sending divisions to France. Thus, in a space of weeks, Churchill set for himself the overview of the entire war effort. With the assistance of his technical advisor, Professor Lindemann, he challenged just about every aspect of British war preparation.16 Lindemann’s personal papers make clear that his assessments – or those of his committee – were routinely repeated in the memoranda Churchill submitted to the War Cabinet in criticism of, and comment upon, the work of other departments. The greater part of the correspondence was directed at proving that Britain could, after all, build and supply a 55 Division Army and do so more quickly than the government was inclined to believe possible.17

12 Chamberlain Papers, W.S. Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, 18 September, 1939; CV At the Admiralty, 111) 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 To this list of criticisms, he would subsequently add concern over the excessive sums being spent on welfare, at least for the duration of the war, and the extent to which this would adequate financial resource being allocated to fighting the war. See, CAB 66/5 W.S. Churchill War Paper, 8 February, 1940; CV At the Admiralty, 730. 16 For a summary of Lindemann’s brief, see, Winston S. Churchill to Sir Archibald Carter, 9 October, 1939, Char 19/3; CV At the Admiralty, 227-228. 17 It was Churchill’s belief (and that of Lindemann and his committee) that Britain ought to be able to at least match its war effort of the First World War and the French effort in this one and do so much more quickly than was being proposed. At least one memorandum focused on the war effort in the First World War to demonstrate to tardiness of the effort and the inadequacy of the targets in the Second World War, (see, for example, Churchill’s untitled War Cabinet Paper, 39, 8 February, 1940, Cab 65/5; CV At the Admiralty, 727-730). However, it is probable Churchill’s comparisons, and the 108

A major criticism of the Chamberlain Government’s war effort was that it was ‘hand-cuffed’, or chose to be ‘hand-cuffed’ by the Exchequer and matters of finance in building its war effort. In time, and certainly when Churchill was prime-minister, this influenced diminished. However, during the Phoney War it is difficult to find evidence of the Exchequer refusing to sign off on programmes vital to the war effort. Moreover, in reducing the blockages that did exist in this regard, Churchill showed no leadership. His focus was always on finding savings, and monitoring revenue and spending, rather than challenging the need to live within means. Little evidence is to be found to show that Churchill was in the vanguard of those who recognise Britain must break free from the conservative view of the ‘fourth arm’ of Britain’s war effort.

A persistent problem facing Churchill and Lindemann in their efforts to animate the war effort was that, while their objective was to show that things could be done better within the existing financial and man-power constraints, they found themselves criticising ‘pessimistic’ departmental projections and calculations which would, in time, prove very much too optimistic.18 Their own assessments were particularly hopeful and were sometimes based on their own dubious assumptions.19 For example, in defending his conviction the 55 division army was a viable assumptions behind them, were of little relevance to Britain’s capacity to meet the targets he sought. W K. Gowing has written in British War Economy that to meet a target of 55 Divisions in two years, “the British war economy would have to achieve in two years of war an expansion three times as great as that which was achieved in the four years of 1914-1918.” W. K Hancock and M. M. Gowing. British War Economy. History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series, edited by W. C. Hancock (London: HMSO, 1949), 242. 18 He argued that the estimated gap of ₤390,000,000 between income and expenditure in the first year of the war was ‘inexcusable’ and that it would fall nearer ₤150,000,000. The figure for 1939 would prove to be over ₤400,000,000 and the figure for 1940, over ₤700,000,000. (Stamps estimates appear to have been from September’39 to September ’40. Those estimates given above and sourced from the chart on external trade in Statistical Digest of the War, (His Majesty’s Stationery Office and Longmans Green and Co, 1951), 162-163, were from March to March each year. Churchill’s (and Lindemann’s) concerns were addressed at the War Cabinet on 13 February when it was explained that several of his concerns were based on misunderstanding and miscalculation. See CAB 65/4/40. 19 An issue which the statistics suggest Lindemann was justifiably concerned was the matter of ships entering and departing British waters in ballast. To Lindemann’s mind, this was egregious misuse of cargo space. The Statistical Digest indicates that this problem diminished markedly in the years 1941- 1943. (see Statistical Digest of the War, 182) However, this failed to alter the fact that, over time, Britain was unable to import all that it was needed. In 1940, Lindemann’s focus on the ‘shipping bogey’ was to show that Britain’s capacity to import and export would not be greatly diminished by the war and that, therefore, the 55 Division programme could be met. The maintenance of exports would also serve to ameliorate the financial problems facing Britain. On these matters, he and Churchill were wrong. Imports, and income earned from exports, dropped dramatically. It was, however, man-power issues that were the core limitation to a 55 Division Army and the wider war effort. 109

proposition, Churchill argued that the man-power needs of the Royal Navy would not exceed, and would probably be very much less than, that of the last war.”20 He would be one hundred percent wrong.21

Perhaps the most significant example of Churchill’s misplaced optimism in regard to what Britain could do and how quickly it could do it, was his attitude to Britain’s import programme. On 23 February, and following on from on-going anxieties over the decline in trade, the Lord Privy Seal submitted a review of the shipping situation which contended that British and neutral shipping would only be sufficient for between 41.7 and 44.7 million ton in the first year of the war.22 Estimates since the beginning of the war had been that a target of 47 million tons could be met. The Lord Privy Seal therefore argued that action to rationalise the import programme should be taken because, with: the passage of every day the likelihood grows that some of the imports that are arriving are imports which in the last resort we could do without, with the result that at the end of the first year of war we may find that we have failed to obtain imports which are absolutely vital to our war effort.23

He was certain matters would only get worse and that, moreover, a variety of problems could make the fulfilment of his own estimates difficult to achieve. Not only should the decline in certain stocks be arrested but an effort needed to be made to build against future calamity. Churchill and Lindemann however were confident that Britain would meet its 47 million tons of imports in the first year of war. Each was loath to impose rationing and restrictions on the British people any earlier than necessary. They acknowledged that sacrifice would be necessary at some point but that it was a question of “to what extent and when?”24 Churchill was also very keen

20 Ibid. 21 Churchill’s assessment undoubtedly had much to do with the fact the navy had many fewer capital ships. At the end of the Second World War, the Royal Navy employed over 800,000 personnel. During the First World War, the figure was approximately half this figure. See, Hancock, Statistical Digest of the War, 9. The strength of the Navy in June 1945 was 783,000 plus 72000 Women’s Royal Naval Auxiliary Service. According to the First Lord’s Explanation of the Naval Estimates for 1919- 1920, the size of the Royal Navy at the Armistice, including the Royal Naval Division was 415,162. 22 Report by Lord Privy Seal, The Extent to which Shipping Considerations Call for a Review of Our Import Programme, 23 February, 1940, Cab 66/5/44. 23 Ibid. 24 Winston S. Churchill, War Paper, Note on the Lord Privy Seal’s Memorandum, 29 February, 1940, Cab 66/6. 110

to ensure that the British public and the House of Commons recognised that any restrictions imposed were not a result of the Navy failing to do its job.25

In late February, Churchill presented his case, a product of Lindemann’s committee, that despite poor imports earlier in the war, there were no reasons why the 47 million ton target could not be redeemed during the remainder of the year. He presented a number of reasons why this should be so: not least the improved import statistics for the most recent months and some miscalculations of the Lord Privy Seal which he believed were a result of flawed assumptions. Churchill’s paper went one step significant step further than reaffirming the 47 million ton target and contended it could even be possible to achieve 51 million ton.26

There is evidence to suggest that Churchill was justified in questioning the pessimism of the Lord Privy Seal’s assessment. While the figure of 51 million was highly improbable unless access to neutral shipping had improved dramatically, it was likely that the Ministry of Shipping’s original estimate of 47 million tons could have been fulfilled with the resources available had it not been for the German invasion of France.27 In the event, imports for the first year of the war would be approximately 44 million.28 Churchill’s folly, and that of Lindemann, was their failure to support adequately the caution that the Lord Privy Seal and the Ministry of Shipping were seeking. While the arrival of Spring and Summer was, as they argued, likely to boost imports in the normal course, it was equally likely to bring forth a German offensive and this was certain to interrupt British trade and draw shipping away from it. Unlike the Lord Privy Seal, neither Churchill nor Lindemann had

25 See, Winston S. Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons, 27 February, 1940: Navy Estimates, 1940; Navy Supplementary Estimate, 1939, Mr Churchill’s Statement, Hansard, columns 1923-36; CV At the Admiralty, 815-16. 26 See Churchill’s War Paper: Note on the Lord Privy Seal’s Memorandum, and Cab 65/5, War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 29 February, 1940. Churchill drew on the Ministry of Shipping estimates of November to January: 10.5 million tons; February to April: 12.5 million and May to August, 19 million tons. His estimate of a 51 million ton potential was based on the November to January estimate being exceeded. However, Feb-March was 11,661,000 and May to August, only 15,556,000 27 C.B.A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, (London and Nendeln, 1978), 51. footnote 5. 28 Imports into the United Kingdom, Statistical Digest, 198, table 161. That this figure was achieved was a result of British shipping operation more efficiently than it had at any time before the war. 111

seemed particularly inclined to factor such a prospect into their calculations and they were again proven unreasonably hopeful.29

Churchill’s somewhat irresponsible attitude to Britain’s import programme was reflected further in his on-going pursuit of his Narvik scheme which, by coincidence was reaching a point of decision while the above discussion were taking place. Action against Norway threatened to compromise one of the more immediate avenues by which Britain’s shipping prospects might be improved: the completion of Norwegian shipping and trade agreement. In finally coming down against Narvik, Chamberlain nominated among the reasons for not advancing the scheme his anxieties over Britain’s shipping problems and the need to protect the Anglo- Norwegian relationship.

Not only was the advice given by Lindemann, and represented by Churchill, sometimes inaccurate, it could also be gratuitous (and sometimes both) for the fact that it failed to reflect the challenges inherent in its implementation. Manpower was a particularly intractable issue during the Phoney War, in particular the need to move labour to where it was needed, a process not easily expedited. Churchill and Lindemann were generally unsympathetic to the cautious approach being adopted by the Chamberlain Government. During War Cabinet discussions on the matter, Churchill proposed a version of Lindemann’s idea of conscripting people up to 40 or 50 years of age and ‘only exempt[ing] on condition they carried out approved work at an approved place.”30 Churchill acknowledged that his suggestion would “meet with great hostility on the part of Labour” a view which received the full endorsement of the Minister for Labour, but it was evident he believed much more

29 The caution to be found in the Lord Privy Seal’s document was, of course, entirely justified by the drop of imports in the next several years of war. 30 Cherwell Papers, H 107/3, Paper dated 1 February, 1940. For Churchill’s comments to the War Cabinet, see, CAB 65/5/40, Minutes of War Cabinet meeting, 13 Feb. 1940. To do full justice to Lindemann, elsewhere he seemed to believe that no cajolery of the British public would be necessary. He believed that because of “the fears of a Blitzkrieg and the general knowledge that Germany was fighting a totalitarian war, there was a far greater willingness by people to do what they are told and make the necessary sacrifices more quickly than in 1914, when it took some time for the war to be taken seriously by all classes.” Of course, he nowhere provides evidence to support his argument that this was the frame of mind of the average Englishman in early 1940; however, such a view allowed him to attack the usual suspects, government departments: “If the present scheme fails it will not be from lack of willingness of people to do what they are told but from administrative inefficiency.” See, Cherwell Papers, H107/4, notes dated 1 February, 1940. 112

could and should be done.31 In due course, such severe measures were, indeed, introduced but they occurred after the fall of France at a time when the general public’s view of the conflict was quite different to that of the early months of the war. These changes were also achieved in co-operation with the Labor Party and Trade Unions and not in opposition to them. It is undoubtedly true that Chamberlain’s Government was never likely to have gained the best from the trade union movement but they did make progress, albeit slowly.

It is open to question, however, if Churchill was better disposed to resolving these issues more judiciously or successfully before he became Prime Minister. The best and certainly the quickest solution to man-power problems was always the National Government that emerged in May 1940 and which would have secured the Labour Party’s full co-operation. Churchill might well have proposed such a course much earlier, but not a word on this was spoken by him. Several times in speeches, Churchill did his best to calm public concerns over a number of government measures, including the employment of females. Elsewhere there are indications he recognised that labour matters needed an element of delicacy and patience.32 However, within the War Cabinet, he was also critical of the degree to which social welfare expenditure was compromising the war effort and our earlier discussion has reflected a willingness to be heavy handed if needed.33 How well, therefore, Churchill might have performed in the matter of labour, had it been his own responsibility, will likely remain a moot point.

If Chamberlain was too pedestrian, then Churchill was often too zealous in seeking to drive the war effort. Manpower issues were but one part of the ‘efficiency’ equation. Factories must be built, training undertaken, machine tools must be available, as did raw materials for the best use of the available man power to be achieved. Moreover, the urgency Churchill displayed over ramping up the war effort coincided with a simultaneous determination to put as many men in uniform as

31 Minutes of War Cabinet meeting, 13 Feb. 1940, Cab 65/5/40. 32For example, his speech, 27 January, 1940, W. S. Churchill, CV At the Admiralty, 695. As for ‘delicacy’, see correspondence with Geoffrey Shakespeare, 11 March and 22 March, 1940, CV At the Admiralty, 865, 910. 33 Churchill War Paper, 8 February, 1940, Cab 66/5; CV At the Admiralty, 730. Of the British war effort in comparison to the French, he wrote: “It will be said we are making ourselves comfortable at Home, improving our Old Age Pension, and our Workman’s Compensation scales; paying our men, civilians and soldiers alike, far above the French scale …” 113

quickly as possible. Chamberlain justifiably took a cautious approach towards conscription, limiting it to 60000 men per month.34 In pushing the growth of the Army, Churchill’s benchmark was to do as much as the French in this war and as much as Britain had done in the last. The French, however, had been over zealous themselves and found their own productive capacity decline as a result of mobilisation process. While Churchill was pushing the growth of the Armed Forces, the French were reducing theirs and sending men back to the factories.35 Churchill’s attitude would remain stubborn on this issue and, upon becoming Prime Minister, he continued to draw in recruits well before there were resources available to arm them and British production would paid its own price.36

Even before the assault on the general economy, Churchill’s and Lindemann had begun their inquisition into the excesses of the Air Force, the Army and the Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) in an effort, again, to demonstrate there would be resources enough to expedite the growth of the Army.37 At one time or another, Churchill is found challenging the RAF’s estimate of small arms ammunition [saa] consumption and its estimates of wastage, arguing that it was unnecessarily high and did not reflect genuine war-time need or likely operational circumstances. He also challenged the Army’s equipment levels for the BEF, contending that, as the French could do well enough with much less, the BEF could and should do the same. Elsewhere, he challenged the RAF’s policies in regard to front line squadrons, training squadrons, and reserves. He found it difficult to understand why there were so few new squadrons to show for the vast sums spent on the air force. He was reluctant to accept the issues surrounding the replacement of obsolescent aircraft with modern and also seemed unwilling to acknowledge the importance of reserves or the need to allocate substantial numbers of aircraft for training purposes.

34 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 185. 35 Julian Jackson, The Fall of France: the Nazi Invasion of 1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 59. Jackson notes that the French returned 100 000 mobilized troops to industry during the Phoney War. 36 Ibid. For a comment on Churchill’s pre-occupation with ‘raw numbers’ rather than the “military utility of plans”, see Martin S. Alexander, “Fighting to the Last Frenchman’? Reflections on the BEF’s Deployment to France and the Strains in the Franco-British Alliance, 1939-40”, Historical Reflections, Vol.22 No 1(Winter 1996): 243. 37 One of the earliest tasks set for Lindemann and his Statistical Unit was not a naval matter but the matter of aircraft delivery. See Cherwell Papers, F.88-F108. 114

Churchill showed a penchant for wanting to put ‘everything in the shop window’ when he expressed his concern that, despite a large body of men in France there were so few British divisions in the front line. As far as front line soldiers were concerned, he somewhat dubiously asserted that, “It is upon the forces actually brought to bear upon the enemy that eyes must be fixed”, an observation that suggests he was still very much fighting the previous war.38 All these matters hinted at his anxiety, despite his confidence in the French Army, to withstand the first blasts of German aggression before Britain was able to make a substantial contribution to the armies in France. However, his focus on raw numbers in the Air Force and the Army was misplaced, especially when the price paid would have been fewer reserves in the air force and delays to training and, for the army, less mobility, lower standards of equipment (with an army already suffering shortages) and a probable drop in its efficiency and support.39

The RAF’s message to Churchill was that it was becoming more formidable every day and this it was. Much of Churchill’s anxiety was based on flawed assumptions about the strength and growth of the Luftwaffe. Britain would match German production rates by the middle of 1940 and surpass it soon thereafter. The Army’s response was to explain that the BEF was, after all, an expeditionary force and was compelled by circumstance to take everything with it. The modern British Army was different in all respects to that which went to war in 1914. Moreover, owing to the air threat, the Army’s depots and organisation was dispersed over 16 ports up to 500 miles distant from the front-lines.40 Churchill’s frustrations over the small head and enormous tail of Britain’s fighting forces continued for long after the Phoney War, particularly when it became apparent that 55 fully equipped infantry

38 W.S. Churchill, War Cabinet Paper, 39/40. War Cabinet Meeting 13 February, Cab 66/5/40. At this meeting, he expressed the view he “would rather more men in the line with smaller scales of equipment than smaller forces with an ideal scale”. For a comment on Churchill’s pre-occupation with ‘raw numbers’ rather than the “military utility of plans”, see Martin S. Alexander, “‘Fighting to the Last Frenchman’? Reflections on the BEF’s Deployment to France and the Strains in the Franco- British Alliance, 1939-40”, Historical Reflections, Vol.22 No 1. (Winter 1996): 243. 39 There is evidence to show that his desire to send men to France as quickly as possible was not welcomed by the BEF itself. See for example, Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman eds., War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, (London: Phoenix, 2002): 20, entries for 26 and 28 November. 40 Minutes of the MCC meeting, 18 March, 1940, Cab 83/3. 115

and armoured divisions could not be fulfilled.41 In 1941 he was still arguing there was “too much fluff and flummery behind the front-line troops” and this complaint undoubtedly led to more problems and anxiety than was necessary.42 Similarly, almost the moment he became prime minister, he initiated an investigation into what he perceived as an inadequate number of established squadrons for the number of aircraft being produced.43

Churchill’s ‘big picture’ view of his role and rigorous oversight of the under- achievement of departments and the excesses of his sister services extended to the performance of his own service. From the beginning of the war, he highlighted the unique non-partisan nature of his leadership of the Royal Navy and emphasized his willingness to contain naval spending for the sake of the wider war effort.44 Although he was genuinely determined to pursue economy and was willing to upset his Admirals to do so, he ultimately fell well short of achieving it.45 Moreover, Admiralty programmes were never submitted to the scrutiny that Churchill imposed on the other Services.46 He failed to subject his ‘big ticket’ expenses to the ‘due diligence’ he expected of the SSA and the SSW. He took particular liberty on behalf

41 Throughout the war, Britain established a large number of formations, indeed many more than the 55 Divisions Churchill strived for. However, these formations never existed at the same time; many were disbanded as others were established and many more were under-strength and inadequately equipped. For a study of these issues, see French, Raising Churchill’s Army, chapter 6: The Reformation of the Army, Home Forces, 1940-1943. 42 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 186. 43 Appendix A, Minute, Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production, 24 May, 1940, Churchill, The Finest Hour, 635-644. 44Note, for example, Churchill’s previously cited 10 September letter to Chamberlain. Rather showily, although no doubt earnestly, at the end of September, Churchill instructed his Naval Secretary, Sir Archibald Carter, to draw up a memorandum of savings within the Admiralty: “I am anxious”, he wrote, “to make up a hamper for the War Cabinet showing our desire to assist the common cause from our departmental resources. ” The ‘hamper’, as completed, ranged from the trivial to the substantial; the substantial being the cancellation of two Fiji class cruisers and the postponement of the hulls of the 16 inch battleships. This offer was not quite the concession Churchill made it out to be. Construction of these ships could be conveniently delayed for a variety of reasons and many of these had nothing to do with meeting the needs of the Army. Indeed, on 18 September, he had explained the suspension to Pound as necessary to make available armour to protect existing ships against air attack; in other words, to meet his plans for the R class battleships. See, Char 19/3 Churchill to Admiral Pound and others, 18 September, 1939. 45 Royal Naval expenses grew exponentially for a variety of reasons, all of which were, of course, beyond Churchill’s control. The sinking of Royal Oak resulted in the temporary abandonment of Scapa Flow and substantial resources being extended to Rosyth and the Clyde as alternative naval bases. The U-boat mining threat encouraged a blow-out on spending on small craft. Nevertheless, that such things came as a surprise to Churchill had much to do with his all too ‘rosy’ view of the navy’s capacity to deal with the U-boat threat. 46 For Ironside’s comments on this issue but also Churchill’s unrealistic expectation for the growth of the Army, see diary entry 24 October in Macleod and Kelly, The Ironside Diaries, 134. 116

of the Admiralty to meet the needs of his own strategic preferences and projects and he was willing to circumvent appropriate procedure in doing so. It had been under a protective cloak of secrecy that Churchill had gone directly to the Prime Minister and then the Chancellor to secure the funding for Catherine. In support of Pound, he took the matter of the northern mine barrage directly to the War Cabinet but it cannot be said that he gave adequate scrutiny to the efficacy of the project before doing so.47 On a much smaller, but nevertheless significant scale, Churchill was content to recommend spending one million sterling to manufacture 100,000 of his aerial mines – ten times the number proposed by the Air Force – at a time when the efficacy of this weapon remained very much in doubt.48 It was this particular defensive weapon which was integral to his plans for the offensive use of the navy and his haste and lack of caution, no doubt, can be attributed to this. It is, nevertheless, an example of the extent to which he was prepared to make himself an exception to his own rules of scrupulous economy, especially where this conflicted with his offensive aspirations and his own notions of what was good for the war effort.49

There is no doubt Churchill justified the liberty he gave himself in terms of his wider strategic vision as it existed at the time. His spending, as did his pursuit of economy elsewhere, had a purpose and was intended to lead to future savings.

47 The proposal of a mine barrage that might act as an effective barrier, as distinct from a deterrent, never had the universal support of the naval staff and arguably, it was only as a ‘barrier’ that its enormous expense could ever be justified. Churchill attempted to reduce the expense of the minefield through the selection of mines and mine-layers. He also endeavoured to make compensatory savings elsewhere. For example, he reduced the number of mine-sweepers to be built based on the logical assumption that, if mine barriers were successful, there would be less need for mine-sweepers. 48 Air 19/20, Letter from Winston S. Churchill to Sir Kingsley Wood, 30 October, 1939. Wood replied suggesting that such an order should await “a little more practical experience”. Also see reply, Wood to Churchill, 8 November, 1939. 49 Churchill’s failure to deliver on promises of economy did not go unnoticed nor did the fact that the Admiralty had not been as open to the level of scrutiny imposed on the other services. During the deliberations of the Land Force Committee, all three services were asked to submit summaries of their production programmes to aid the deliberations on the size of the Army. None was forthcoming from the Admiralty. Much later, on 20 January 1940, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was then expressing grave concern over a very large body of new Admiralty orders - to the tune of some £100 million - pointed out to Churchill that, while the War Cabinet had been kept fully informed of the Army and Air Force programmes, “in the case of the Navy, no estimate had been before the War Cabinet “since the outbreak of war…” Moreover, he explained that the Land Forces Committee had made its original recommendations in regard to the Army programme on the basis that the Admiralty programme (via a commitment undoubtedly made by Churchill) was “not being expanded to any degree” a position “we have now moved far from.” See Papers of the First Sea Lord: Naval Construction Programme 1940/41, Letter to W. S. Churchill from John Simon, 20 January, 1940, Papers of the First Sea Lord: Naval Construction Programme 1940/41; Letter to W. S. Churchill from John Simon, 20 January, 1940, ADM 205/5. 117

Broadly, for him, it was about balance. The Navy was strong, the Air Force would soon be, it was the Army that was lagging and this was where the attention had to be. More specifically, he could contend his spending would have a material and precisely targeted impact on the war. Catherine was a plan of potentially decisive dimensions; not only would it constrict the Scandinavia ore trade with Germany, it would compel Germany to retain its forces in the Baltic. If the operation did not take place, the improvements made to his ships would generally be efficacious for other duties. The mine barrage, as expensive as it would be, was intended to address all manner of ill; if the German fleet and U-boats could not be contained in the Baltic, then the North Sea would do. Such a success would free resources for other potential problems, the Mediterranean and the Far East among them. Rather than trying to be strong everywhere, Britain could concentrate its resources where they were most needed. It was important, however, to secure the bulwark on the Western Front and this needed a substantial British contribution as quickly as possible.50

Unfortunately, the three examples identified above, two of which involved very substantial spending, were either complete failures or produced no material advantage for the war effort. There was, for example, much more spending involved in Catherine than that applied to the improvement to ships; little of this would have achieved value. As far as Churchill’s efforts to ‘muscle’ along the British War effort were concerned it is equally difficult to identify the value of his inquisition. As it existed at the time, Lindemann’s committee was a rather blunt ‘scatter-gun’ instrument through which to attempt to oversee the war effort. Given Churchill’s determination to analyse and criticise just about everything, it is unsurprising that, on occasion, his criticism made a positive contribution and drew attention to a failing or inefficiency that might have been overlooked. However, it is questionable if these successes justified the price paid in time and effort to the departments under scrutiny or compensated for his errors of judgment.

50 Of course, over time, Churchill’s strategic priorities changed with the circumstances he was facing. In the second half of 1940, his priority turned, first, to the rapid production of fighters to meet the invasion threat and then in 1941 to the development of a large bomber force which he viewed, along with blockade, as one of the few ways in which Britain could hurt Germany. For an assessment of his 1941-42 strategic view, see French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 184-185. 118

Strategy and the MCC The Military Co-ordination Committee came into being in late October, 1939, with the following brief: To keep under constant review, on behalf of the War Cabinet, the main factors in the strategical situation and the progress of operations, and to make recommendations from time to time to the War Cabinet as to the general conduct of the war.51

This body gave Churchill much frustration and his role as chairman from April 1940 has had a significant impact on his reputation as a warrior and potential war- leader. Churchill had much cause to be frustrated with the decision-making apparatus employed by Chamberlain. However, he was always part of the committee’s problems and he was a significant impediment to the achievement of his own initiatives.

The MCC’s origins shed considerable light on the Churchill/Chamberlain relationship. At the start of the War, Chamberlain considered Hankey’s recommendation that he adopt a small War Cabinet of ministers without portfolio to conduct the war. Churchill was to be a member but not the service ministers.52 According to Hankey’s diary, the members were to be Churchill, Chamberlain, Halifax, and Hankey himself, presumably authority enough to gain the best that Churchill had to offer while also keeping him in check.53 It was a threat of resignation from the service ministers, Kingsley Wood and Leslie Hore-Belisha that caused Chamberlain to form a larger War Cabinet of 9 men and Churchill became First Lord rather than a minister without portfolio.54 It had been suggested, by whom is unclear, that giving Churchill a portfolio would keep him fully occupied and prevent him from interfering in the business of others.55 The containment of Churchill was always an all too hopeful aspiration and, although Chamberlain counselled him on one or two occasions, there is little overt evidence that, as the war progressed, he tried too hard to rein in his First Lord. Indeed, always more remarkable was the extra-ordinary lee-way Chamberlain gave Churchill. This

51 Prem 1/404. These words were drafted by Chatfield in his letter to Chamberlain of 19 October and used commonly thereafter. 52 See, Stephen Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets Vol. 3, 1931-1963 (London: Collins, 1963), 413; William Manchester, The Caged Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill, 1932-1940 (Cardinal, 1989), 519. 53 Roskill, Hankey, Vol. 3, 413. 54 Stewart, Burying Caesar, 385. 55 Paul Addison, Churchill: the Unexpected Hero (USA: Oxford University Press, 2006), 156. 119

included the freedom given to him to broadcast to the Nation and a willingness to allow Churchill to communicate directly with President Roosevelt and oftentimes on behalf of the Government. No doubt, Chamberlain was aware that, given Churchill’s popularity in some quarters, such lee-way was generally to the advantage of his Government. Similarly, Churchill’s claim to a special relationship with Roosevelt, seems to have been considered a considerable boon and nothing was done to hinder it.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that, in the early weeks of the war, Chamberlain had the containment of Churchill in mind. Whether or not Churchill realised it, he had played a part in determining the nature of the decision-making structure that Chamberlain would use to fight the war and which Churchill himself would so volubly criticise in the following months. It is likely that even the particular composition of Chamberlain’s nine-man War Cabinet had the containment of Churchill in mind. Lord Chatfield retained the anomalous position of Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, despite having no executive authority over the service ministers he would supervise. This would not prove an especially successful concept. Equally anomalously, although unsurprising given his experience, Hankey was added to the War Cabinet as the lone minister without portfolio. He viewed his role as “keeping an eye on Winston” and this he attempted to do even after being excluded from the MCC.56

However, Chamberlain’s decision to opt for a nine man War Cabinet presented its own problems. This body was too large for the discussion and development of strategy and the service ministers, in particular Churchill and Hore-Belisha, sought a forum in which such matters could be discussed independently of non-service ministers, the COS and other advisors.57 At the same time, and in view of Chamberlain’s role as Prime Minister and, therefore, the main co-ordinator of defence within the War Cabinet, Chatfield considered his former role as Minister for

56 Hankey’s letter to his wife, 3 September, 1939, Roskill, Hankey, 419. In the first months of the war, Hankey was always a member of the ad hoc committees of the service ministers and COS. In April, Hankey would take it upon himself to criticise Churchill’s influence on operational decisions during the Norwegian Campaign. 57 Letter, W.S. Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, 21 September, 1939, Char 19/2; CV, At the Admiralty,132. 120

Co-ordination of Defence redundant and he offered his resignation.58Apparently unwilling to take on the personal responsibility for the “development and adjustment of strategy” and loath to lose Chatfield’s counsel, Chamberlain began exploring the establishment of a committee which would resolve both problems. He discussed the issues with his private secretary who, after consulting Cabinet Secretary Edward Bridges and Deputy Secretary, General Lionel ‘Pug’ Ismay, concluded that the COS must be included in such a committee.59 The service ministers, however, continued to resist the inclusion of the COS. The matter was finally resolved at a meeting between the ministers and Chatfield on 25 October, 1939, where it was decided the COS would attend the MCC meetings only as expert advisors to their own ministers.60 The most important factor in all these discussions was that Chamberlain had divorced himself from the formulation of strategy, at least in its early stages, but still retained the primary responsibility for it. This did not make for timely and efficient decision-making.

58Letter from Ernle Chatfield to Prime Minister Chamberlain, October 12, 1939, Premier 1/404. Chatfield wrote to Chamberlain expressing his belief that since a War Cabinet had been created with the Prime Minister as chairman and main co-ordinator and “to which the Defence ministers belong and which has the daily personal contact with the Chiefs of Staff” his role as Minister for the Co- ordination of Defence had “inevitably become a sinecure.” Chatfield went on to write that he thought it “incorrect” and, indeed, “somewhat embarrassing not to say dangerous, to continue to hold a title which conveys to Parliament and the Public mind that I have powers and responsibilities which actually I do not possess and which makes me in name responsible for decisions and actions over which I have no personal contact.” He noted, thereafter, that he had been written to by members of Parliament in terms that suggested they believed him to be “a kind of ‘Defence Minister’”. 59 Letter from Sir Henry Wilson to Neville Chamberlain, 13 October, 1939, Prem 1/404. It is evident from this letter that, subsequent to Chatfield’s letter, discussions between Wilson and Chamberlain had focused on a committee which excluded the COS. Sir Horace Wilson was Head of Home Civil Service and had been seconded to Downing Street for special service. For a period of time, he had a permanent room there and worked intimately with Chamberlain during this time-period. Also, see letter from Chatfield to the Prime Minister, 19 October, 1939. Edward Ettingdene Bridges, 1st Baron Bridges, (1892-1969) British Public Servant and Cabinet Secretary 1938-1946. General Lionel Pug’ Ismay, (1887-1965). Subsequently, Ismay would become the Chief Military Assistant and Staff Officer in Churchill’s wartime government. 60 Despite this decision, Hore-Belisha continued to have reservations about the COS inclusion and he wrote to Chamberlain in regard to this on 26 October, Letter from Leslie Hore Belisha to the Prime Minister, 26 October, 1939, Prem 1/404. It is not clear if Churchill shared his concerns at this time although there is evidence that Churchill continued to worry over the influence wielded by the COS. See, for example, Winston S. Churchill, 2 January, 1940, ADM 116/4471. Another point of disagreement was the precise nature of the MCCs role. Hore-Belisha considered it appropriate that the committee should be able to call in professional advisors from all fields as and when required. In response to Hore-Belisha’s concerns, Chatfield expressed the view that, given the nature of the Committee, which was to deal primarily with war planning and strategy, there would not be a need for this. See, letter from Ernle Chatfield to Neville Chamberlain, 27 October, 1939, Prem 1/404. Yet, earlier (letter Ernle Chatfield to Neville Chamberlain, 19 October, 1939, Prem 1/404) Chatfield had suggested that the committee have the “power to co-opt other Ministers and officials according to the nature of the business under discussion. 121

The MCC began functioning formally at the beginning of November but it proved an unsuccessful element of an unnecessarily cumbersome process of decision-making which did not really satisfy anyone.61 Despite his initial interest in such a forum, it would increasingly become Churchill’s conviction that, in the absence of some degree of executive guidance, strategy built around the disparate concerns and interests of three service ministers was difficult to achieve. Service ministers were inevitably influenced by the need to meet the core responsibilities of their own service - something they believed at this time they were well short of doing - and this was not necessarily compatible with the development of aggressive strategy. The inclusion of the COS in MCC deliberations as advisors to their own ministers was only likely to compound this problem and create a conflict of interest, especially where advice given conflicted with the conclusions of their own committee. Churchill, in particular, continued to be frustrated by the excessive influence of the COS in the policy process.62 The anomaly of Chatfield’s role also remained; his position and authority as chairman was dependent on the goodwill of the service ministers and this was not always forthcoming, especially from Churchill. Additionally, Chatfield’s own recommendation that the MCC deliberations be limited to the service ministers and the COS proved unwise and did not last long; it soon became evident that the discussion of strategic policy that extended beyond the accepted War Council policy of ‘sitting tight and re-arming’ was dependent on input from other authorities, most particularly the Foreign Office.63 Another significant omission from the MCC and the War Cabinet was the Minister for the Dominions, Anthony Eden. Under the existing structure, input from the Dominions most often came at the end of the process; yet, their influence was sufficient to alter or defeat policies that had been days or weeks in making. Moreover the Dominions would

61 On a number of occasions during October, ad hoc ministerial committees, which also included the COS, were established to discuss specified issues. Among the issues considered by these committees was air bombing policy. 62 W. S. Churchill note, 2 January 1940, ADM 116/4471. In CAB 65/56, Churchill’s frustration with JPS and COS interference in policy is referred to twice. On 19 January, Bridges records “Churchill showed great anger at procedure whereby plans are in the first instance sent to the JPS to work out. On 21 January, he wrote: “The First Lord again demonstrates his extreme susceptibility to any business being transacted by the Chiefs of Staff. He regards their responsibility as in some ways interfering with the due responsibility of Ministers.” 63 Advisors called to the MCC deliberations included the Minister for Labour, Foreign Office representatives, Admiral Godfrey from NID, representatives from the Treasury and, in due course, Professor Lindemann. 122

demand more and more influence as the war progressed.64 Another issue facing the committee and its effectiveness was that it quickly found itself addressing many matters other than strategy, in part because the War Cabinet was not selective in referring matters to it and because the MCC brief was ill-defined. The first two issues discussed by the committee on 11 November were ‘prisoners of war’ and ‘publicity for the exploits of Dominion forces’, hardly within the ambit of its responsibilities.65

The MCC was never likely to have been the right structure through which to conceive strategy. Always needed was clear executive authority guiding its deliberation. Chamberlain had to delegate or participate and he chose to do neither. At the time of its conception, the short-comings might not have been evident. Given the almost universal acceptance of the ‘sit tight and re-arm’ strategy, there was not much strategy to discuss. However, from December onwards, Churchill began developing his ideas for offensive naval operations, all of which involved action against neutrals. The French, too, would become more animated in regard to strategy. It made little sense to have the Prime Minister as party to Supreme War Council discussion and not directly involved in the MCC. Inevitably, the latent limitations of decision making structure and process came into play to create discord, delay and frustration.

During the Norwegian Campaign, the MCC would prove an even more problematic vehicle for the guidance and conduct of operations. Chamberlain would accede to a request from Churchill and from other members of the MCC to sit in on proceedings and take over the chair. The evidence is that, on these occasions, business ran much more smoothly.66 Chamberlain and his supporters attributed this to his skills as chairman.67 Although it is probable that he was an effective and efficient chairman, his success undoubtedly had a great deal to do with his executive authority. Of some importance for any assessment of the Churchill/Chamberlain relationship is that, as chairman, Chamberlain endorsed nearly all of Churchill

64This was an impediment to action which caused Churchill particular frustration in mid-January. See, W.S. Churchill to Lord Halifax, 15 January, 1940, FO 800/328. 65 Military Co-ordination Committee, Memoranda, Cab 83/1. 66 Ironside’s view was that the PM was “forced to sit on the Committee himself to prevent Winston from running of the rails.” See, Macleod and Kelly, The Ironside Diaries, 282, entry 25April. 67 For John Colville’s partisan view, see The Fringes of Power, vol. 1, entry 17 April, 1940. For Chamberlain’s confident assessment of his skills as chairman see, Chamberlain Diary Letters, 520, letter to sister, Hilda, 20 April, 1940. 123

recommendations and initiatives. Churchill was correct in believing that the service chiefs would take from Chamberlain what they would not from him.68 The relative ease with which Chamberlain gained support for Churchill’s initiatives reflects poorly on the service chiefs and suggests Churchill’s proposals were being rejected primarily because they were emanating from him rather than the Prime Minister. When confronted with Chamberlain’s support of Churchill, their objections typically disappeared.

Nevertheless, it is certain that, in his manner, attitude and contribution, Churchill exacerbated the failings of this body. He was the main reason why, in its early days, this committee became immersed in the frustrating minutiae of the war effort rather than being a ‘big picture’ body seeking to offer guidance to the War Cabinet on broad issues of strategy and the general conduct of the war.69 The greater part of its business was generated by Churchill’s relentless pursuit of detail in regard to the army and air force. This was cause for much annoyance from his colleagues, as was recorded by the Secretary to the War Cabinet, Sir Edward Bridges: This Committee is becoming a positive menace. Everything is referred to it which the First Lord would like to discuss for further detail and this includes a great many matters affecting both the Air Ministry and the War Office. The Secretary of State for Air remarked in a caressing tone (which did not disguise the possible existence of claws) that when the MCC had finished discussing the War Office and the Air Ministry, no doubt it would be pleasant to have a discussion in that Committee, into how the Admiralty was managing their affairs70

Additionally, Churchill was less than co-operative when it came to matters of strategy. It was expected that the MCC would produce consensus on all matters under discussion and that this would be conveyed by Chatfield, as chairman, to the War Cabinet for a final decision. This he was able to do until discussion turned to Churchill’s plans. When Churchill did not share the consensus view, neither the ‘pre- digestion’ of COS reports nor the lengthy discussion within the MCC prevented the full reconsideration of matters at the War Cabinet. This situation arose in the middle of December when his proposal to stop the flow of Norwegian ore via Narvik became the core business of both forums. It was Chatfield’s responsibility to convey

68 Neville Chamberlain letter to sister, Hilda, 20 April, 1940, Chamberlain Diary Letters, 520. 69 It must be acknowledge that one of the duties of the MCC was to review such issues but that it became such an onerous and prolonged task taking many months and producing so few tangible results can largely be put down to Churchill’s inquisition. 70 Further Notes on Meeting, 15 January, 1940, Cab 65/56. 124

the consensus view of the MCC meeting of 20 December to the War Cabinet on 22 December but he found it ‘high-jacked’ from the beginning by Churchill and, again of some considerable importance to development of the Churchill/Chamberlain theme, this ‘high-jacking’ occurred with the willing support of Chamberlain.71

It was also the series of meetings during December and January that illustrated the folly of expecting this body to make recommendations in regard to strategy without a regular ‘political’ input of the Foreign Office. It was the appearance of Northern Department official, Orme Sergeant, at the MCC meeting acting on behalf of Halifax and the Foreign Office, that set-up the first of many political road-blocks to Churchill’s Narvik scheme which, in a strictly naval sense, would have been an easy operation to undertake. The introduction of a political dimension into MCC discussions was to have a decisive influence on strategy going forward and this begs the question if the MCC should ever have attempted to exist without it.

However, although the structural issues surrounding the MCC were considerable, and surely prolonged the decision-making process, it was not the reason why Churchill’s plans failed to bear fruit. The real problem for Churchill was the nature of his proposal and the fact that these, as were all the core strategic proposals set before the War Cabinet at this time, were targeting vulnerable neutrals and not Germany. This brought with it a variety of intractable political, diplomatic, ethical and military problems that will be explored in more detail when the plans themselves are addressed in a subsequent chapter.

For all Churchill’s frustration at process, the MCC’s foray into strategy was comparatively brief. The consolidation of the Foreign Office/Ironside Finnish Option occurred primarily at War Cabinet level. Instead, the MCC became absorbed again in more discussion of supply matters under Churchill’s relentless inquisition of the Army and Air Force. From the middle of February until early March, the MCC met rarely. Its rejuvenation coincided with the failure of the Finnish Option and the

71 Minutes of meeting of the MCC, 20 December, 1939, CAB 83/1; Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 22 December, 1939, CAB 65/4/29. Churchill used recent intelligence from the German industrialist Hans Thyssen which Churchill characterised as a view that argued “victory would accrue to the side which obtained mastery of the iron ore and magnetic irons in Northern Sweden.” Thyssen’s views offered little more than that already offered by the Ministry of Economic Warfare. The consensus view of the MCC was not that there was a possibility of stopping all ore and that, in taking action against Narvik, this path would be compromised. 125

ascendancy of Churchill and his pet offensive schemes: Narvik and Royal Marine. By this time these were the only offensive options available to the Allies to salve the humiliation of Finland’s capitulation.

A Question of Executive Authority With the rebirth of Narvik and the War Cabinet support for Royal Marine in early March, 1940, Churchill’s influence grew within the War Cabinet and the MCC. From March onwards he also became a regular presence at the Supreme War Council meetings.72 Given his significant new role in the development of strategy, there was even less need for a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. At the end of March 1940, Chatfield again offered Chamberlain his resignation and this time it was accepted. This change coincided with others within the War Cabinet, including the demise of Kingsley Wood as Secretary of State for Air. Churchill remained First Lord and was elevated to the chairmanship of the Military Co-ordination Committee.73 In a note to Chamberlain, he thanked him for the confidence being shown in him and indicated he would “try his best to deserve it”74

At its most cynical, Churchill promotion to chairman of the MCC has been characterised as a political move by Chamberlain intended to ensure that, should the Norway strategy or Royal Marine come unstuck, Churchill would be held responsible.75 This is a too bleak perspective and fails to acknowledge the circumstances of the time. It made eminent sense to give Churchill a supervisory role over the two impending Allied initiatives which, although Churchill’s conceptions, had been adopted by the War Cabinet quite independently of his agitation. Given the other ministerial changes made, it also provided an element of continuity. However, it is also probable that, in offering him the chairmanship, Chamberlain was seeking to link Churchill more directly to the recommendation and decisions that emanated

72 Churchill would attend his first Supreme War Council meeting on 5 February but would remain silent throughout. He attended in the company of the other service chiefs. It would be the last meeting at which he remained silent and his participation would increase over time, although, in all instances, Chamberlain was the dominant contributor. On 22 April, Churchill was the only service chief to accompany Chamberlain to France. At the meeting of 23 April he was joined by the new SSA, Sir Samuel Hoare. 73 In an interview with W.P. Crozier, Samuel Hoare stated that Churchill had been offered Chatfield’s job without portfolio but had chosen to stay at the Admiralty. See, Crozier, W.P., Off the Record. (Hutchison, 1973), 159. 74 W. S. Churchill to the Prime Minister, Chamberlain Papers (also, CV At the Admiralty, 948). 75 Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory, 381. See the promotion as a “tactical success”. 126

from the MCC.76 Chamberlain was not banking on the prospect of failure or the hope that Churchill might be shown up for the policies he had promoted; rather he was hoping Churchill’s new role would promote more caution and less excess. Churchill’s new position might have proven a great boon for him had it not been for the fact that, under his chairmanship, the MCC would be required to undertake the most challenging element of its brief: the guidance of military operations during the Norwegian Campaign, which began on 9 April. In the absence of executive authority, his chairmanship would be a matter of considerable personal misfortune.

With few exceptions, the historical assessment of Churchill’s performance as chairman of the MCC is negative and he is blamed for much of the folly of the Norwegian campaign. Churchill gave his own assessment of his role as chairman, in The Gathering Storm where he wrote that he had “an exceptional measure of responsibility, but no power of effective direction” and that matters were complicated by the fact that “many important and able men had a right and duty to express their views on the swiftly-changing phases of the battle”77 Although a somewhat self-serving assessment of the limitations of the MCC, these observations nevertheless accurately reflect the problems inherent in its structure, all of which were indeed seriously exacerbated the moment Britain began fighting a ‘hot’ war. While the recommendations emanating from the MCC were generally accepted without demur by the War Cabinet in the first few days of the campaign, this situation changed within days when Chamberlain and Halifax, much as they had done over Narvik months before, added an ultimately decisive political dimension to the discussion of strategy. The pressure brought to bear on Churchill to shift the focus of Allied action from Narvik to Trondheim placed Churchill in a situation in which he would more likely be supervising failure than success in Norway and his reputation has suffered ever since. However, although Churchill was justified in identifying in the Gathering Storm the serious flaws inherent in the MCC, he is much

76 Neville Chamberlain: Remarks to Lord Camrose, CV At the Admiralty, 968. In a letter to his sister Hilda, written 4 May, Chamberlain related an incident in which Churchill pressed a course of action which neither Chamberlain nor the COS supported. Chamberlain noted that he decided to leave the decision to Churchill: “Thus the responsibility was laid squarely on his shoulders and as I expected he wouldn’t take it.” It was likely incidents such as these that were, at least in part, behind Chamberlain’s decision to appoint Churchill chairman. More accountability would make Churchill more responsible. See, Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, 528. 77 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 463. 127

less persuasive in inviting us to extrapolate that, had more executive control been vested in him, all would have been better for it. It was likely nothing could have saved the Allies in Norway and Churchill played his own part in extinguishing what little hope there was.

Nevertheless, Churchill’s failure as chairman has been much overstated and unfairly related. The manner in which he conducted business as the new chairman is the explanation most often given for this crisis. However, while there is some truth to the criticism, this explanation does not satisfactorily acknowledge the enormous pressures placed upon him by the inadequate decision-making structure, conflicting views of strategy within the War Cabinet, and the rapidly changing course of events.

Churchill’s efforts to accommodate the political dimensions of the campaign led to the key crises of the early weeks of the campaign: the decision to take Trondheim and then the decision to abandon it. In late April, Churchill attributed this debacle to his lack of authority and he wished not to return to the chairmanship of the MCC unless this matter was addressed.78 Chamberlain viewed the issue of Trondheim quite differently. In a letter to his sister, Hilda, he noted that Churchill had changed his mind four times over Trondheim but had, in the end, conceded that it was best they had not persisted with the attempt to take it.79 Chamberlain was concerned that Churchill’s ambiguous role within the MCC allowed him to disassociate himself from recommendations emanating from it as and when it suited. Of Churchill’s indecisiveness over Trondheim, Chamberlain wrote that he did not “blame W.C. for these natural alternations”; rather he was frustrated that this episode did not “square with the picture the gutter press and W.C.’s friends” try to paint of the supreme War Lord”. 80

78 W. S. Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, unsent letter, 24 April, 1940. Char 19/2. 79 Letter from Neville Chamberlain to sister, Hilda, 4 May, 1940, The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters. Colville’s diary, The Fringes of Power, entries of 24 and 25 April, 1940, indicate that Churchill had made known to Chamberlain that he wanted more control in the decision-making process and that he was unwilling to any longer accept responsibility without authority. This was undoubtedly the nature of the discussion between Churchill and Chamberlain at a private meeting in the evening of 24 April. Colville feared such a decision would “cause chaos among the Chiefs of Staff and planning experts” because of his “verbosity and restlessness” and “prevent any real practical planning from being done and generally cause friction … But if the PM refuses to acquiesce, Winston threatens to go down to the House and say he can take responsibility for what is happening.” 80 Ibid. 128

If Churchill’s view on Trondheim was self-serving, so too was the view of Chamberlain. It was he, Halifax, and the Foreign Office that had been most insistent on the switch from Narvik to Trondheim. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of truth in his comments on Churchill’s selective recollection of events. Churchill had agreed to, or had been influential in, all the changes in strategy and he subsequently wished he had not. The Trondheim affair, therefore, produced a situation in which Churchill wanted more authority and Chamberlain was keen to give it, but the motivation of each was very different. Churchill was no longer willing to accept responsibility for decisions that he believed were not his. Chamberlain was, just as at the beginning of April, continuing to seek a solution which would tie Churchill more closely to MCC recommendations and which would compel him to accept responsibility for them. This, he undoubtedly continued to hope, would make Churchill a more effective contributor to the war effort and make him less likely to press unwise or foolish proposals. His personal challenge was to find a way to give Churchill more authority without making this absolute. He accepted Churchill’s central role in the formulation of strategy and the conduct of operations, but “could not accept a proposal which would make him [Churchill] sole director of military policy without safeguards which would ensure the Cabinet getting the independent advice of the Chiefs of Staff before taking decisions.”81 If Chamberlain had a mindset at the end of April 1940, it was that he was very keen to find a war leader who could take the burden of fighting the war from him. This might have been Churchill. In denying him this role, Chamberlain was being driven less by personal animus than a lack of belief that Churchill could do the job. This had as much or more to do with Churchill’s all too regular lapses in judgment than Chamberlain’s purported prejudices.

At the end of April and with some reluctance, Chamberlain gave Churchill another significant accretion of power. He was to be “responsible on behalf of the Committee for giving guidance and directions to the Chiefs of Staff Committee” and could summon that committee or members of it at any time he considered necessary.82 Thus was executive control of sorts given him. He recognised the

81 Letter from Neville Chamberlain to sister, Ida, 27 April, 1940, The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters. 82 Draft of Defence Organisation, circulated as WP 9 (40) 120 on 30 April, 1940, Prem 1/404. 129

limitations of the proposal but was personally confident the system could work. Such, however, was the brief period between Churchill’s promotion within the MCC and becoming Prime Minister, it is not possible to assess the merit of the new system or to deduce how well Churchill might have exercised his increased influence.

When Churchill became Prime Minister some days later, he revamped the decision-making process and the MCC disappeared. Churchill made himself Minister for Defence and operated in direct consultation and discussion with the Chiefs of Staff, although he still took all or, at least, most proposals to the wider War Cabinet for confirmation. Thereafter, the decision-making process improved markedly and, in due course even Colville, now as Churchill’s secretary, was converted by Churchill’s ‘ceaseless energy’ and the fact that he was always full of fight and “thrive[d] on crises and adversity”.83 Tellingly, however, he would subsequently comment on Churchill’s newly found caution: “Winston answered that our hands were too full elsewhere to enable us to embark on adventures; such is the change high office can work in a man’s inherent love of rash and spectacular action.”84

While Churchill’s administrative changes worked wonders from May, 1940, it is far from certain that, had such a change occurred any earlier, the British war effort would have been better for it. Churchill was a benefactor of circumstances that made his role as war leader somewhat clearer than those that had been faced by Chamberlain. As cataclysmic as the invasion of France and the Low Lands was, it simplified matters strategically. Britain was now fighting the principal enemy on the principal front; neither he nor his Government were required to devise and prosecute dubious plans to fight Germany through vulnerable neutrals, a problem which had been at the heart of Phoney War politics and strategy. Moreover, it is difficult to contend that Churchill ought to have acquired more influence earlier and that this would have been to the Allies advantage. Churchill was a more responsible leader than he had been a follower and that, once invested with the power he had long sought, he displayed an unexpected wisdom in its application. The problem for both Churchill and Chamberlain during the Phoney War was that it was always far from apparent that Churchill was capable of exercising this authority successfully. It is

83 Colville, The Fringes of Power, diary entry, 18 May, 1940. 84 ibid. 130

interesting to record how relieved, and not a little surprised, Chamberlain was to discover Churchill was more responsible as prime minister than he ever thought he would be or could be: I must say that Winston has shown up well so far…He does take the opinions of the staff and doesn’t attempt to force different views upon them or to shoulder off his colleagues.85

Conclusions This study of Churchill as War Cabinet minister and, in particular, his contribution to the LFC and the MCC identified his ‘big picture’ view of the war and his determination to adopt a broad oversight of Britain’s war effort. He sought to maximise the potential of all three services while avoiding absolute priority to any, a legacy of his experiences of the First World War. His focus was nevertheless first and foremost on the rapid growth of the Army, for here was the greatest deficiency and need. He believed Britain must do its bit in France lest French morale or French forces collapse before Germany’s propaganda and armies. He argued that a 55 Division Army was the minimum at which Britain should aim and believed it was within Britain’s capacity to fulfil this. As important, he believed that many more divisions could be put in the field within the first year of war. The requirements of the other services need not encroach on this expectation. As far as the navy was concerned, its requirements would not be as great as those of the First World War; indeed, in terms of capital ships, and much to the chagrin of his Sea Lords, he contended that Britain already had forces in excess of likely needs. When it appeared Britain might fail to meet his chosen benchmarks, Churchill’s agitation transmuted into a relentless determination to prove otherwise.

To this end, with the assistance of Professor Lindemann, he challenged every time frame, every need, any perceived indulgence or excess, any failure, of his sister services. Additionally, he challenged the principles and practices which were the foundations of the RAF and War Office war effort: the levels of mechanisation and motorisation of the Army; the training and reserve practices of the Air Force; even the financial calculations of the Exchequer were open to criticism and comment in an effort to find a few dollars more or to put more forces in the front line more quickly.

85 Neville Chamberlain letter to his sister, Hilda, 17 May, 1940, The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters. 131

Indeed no area of policy was immune from his inquisition and this was a heady burden of self-imposed responsibility.

While Churchill’s purpose might have been sound, his manner and method were not. The positive consequences of these inquiries were negligible.86 This is not to suggest that the war economy was working to capacity or that things could not improve or be better done. Rather, it is to contend that Churchill’s and Lindemann’s criticism often missed its mark. Given limited resources available to the Lindemann committee and the short time-frames often imposed on its investigations, this was not surprising. What was surprising was Churchill’s willingness to place great store in the conclusions drawn and recommendations made by Lindemann when he must have been fully cognisant of their short-comings and limitations of his assessments at this juncture of the war. With only the imprimatur of the First Lord to support him, it was not likely that Lindemann would secure access to the departmental resources needed to give his appreciations the depth and accuracy needed.87 Churchill’s strong personal views and preconceptions combined with Lindemann’s sometimes dubious appreciations to produce a mixture of under and over estimation on many subjects. Most typically, his attitude was about hurrying things on, doing more with less, and doing so in shorter time. Lindemann’s assessments almost invariably reinforced these views.88 Churchill’s desire to ‘hurry’ the war was to be expected, given Britain’s challenging strategic situation and evidence to suggest that things could, indeed, be done better. It is certain he erred on this side as much as others erred on the side of complacency. Remarkably, Churchill on occasion was also guilty of this sin of complacency himself. His conviction that the merchant marine, supported by the Royal Navy had British trade sufficiently under control to justify a relaxation of

86 G. D. A. MacDougall, “The Prime Minister’s Statistical Section” D.N. Chester, ed. Lessons of The British War Economy, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1951), 61. MacDougall noted that the breadth of the responsibilities, especially in the early period of Churchill’s statistical section, resulted in some ‘amateurish dabbling’. This fairly aptly represents the conclusions of this chapter. 87 For a interesting comment on this particular challenge, see Adrian Fort’s Prof, The Life of Frederick Lindemann (London: Pimlico, 2004), 190. 88 This case must not be overstated but this chapter has identified a number of examples of Churchill pursuing agendas and arguing cases based on assumption and misplaced conviction that, in the end, did not make a lot of sense. There were occasions, of course, when Lindemann’s advice was sound. His support of convoy, noted in an earlier chapter, was an example of this. Conversely, his contribution to the U-boat loss debacle was an example of the consequences of Lindemann proffering guidance and advice beyond his areas of expertise. For a less critical view of Lindemann’s contribution see Fort, Prof, chapter 10. 132

certain elements of Government import and export policy, as well as rationing, proved unsound.

Although Churchill was undoubtedly genuine in seeking and maintaining economy, he proved incapable of imposing and maintaining this at the Admiralty. This had much to do with an excessively optimistic outlook in regard to the growth of the Navy, his all too hopeful views on the anti-U-boat war and his failure to satisfactorily anticipate expenditure ‘blow-outs’ caused by enemy action (such as impact and consequences of the temporary abandonment of Scapa Flow). Less forgivable was the waste in time, money and effort in meeting a number of his personal ventures and schemes and in accommodating his wider strategic vision. Too often in these instances the due diligence expected of others was absent.

Churchill’s frustration with the structure and nature of the decision-making process during this time was justified. As an instrument intended to formulate and guide the War Cabinet in matters of strategy, the MCC was seriously flawed. It was born of a ‘hotch-potch’ of ideas and aspirations, and very probably certain apprehension in regard to Churchill, and then transformed into something it was not meant to be, and was never what it should have been. It was an even less successful body when attempting to address the fast-flowing demands of the Norwegian Campaign. Nevertheless, Churchill contributed significantly to the MCC failure to fulfil what little potential it had. This was not least because he filled so many of its hours with the minutiae of supply issues but also because Churchill was so reluctant to take no for an answer on any issue that conflicted with his own view of the war and which failed to meet with his strategic aspirations. Its deliberations rarely saved time and contributed to delay and duplication and, through this, produced frustration from all quarters.

At the heart of many of these problems was the absence of a consistent executive influence in the formulation of strategy; this might have prevented much of the duplication and time-wasting that frustrated Churchill. Chamberlain can be held responsible for not filling this void; it is much less clear that he can be blamed for not allowing Churchill to do so. The absence of executive authority within the MCC had more desperate consequence during the Norwegian Campaign. Without such

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authority it was certain to seriously complicate the timely conduct of any campaign. That it was most efficient when Chamberlain chaired its meetings owed much less to Chamberlain the man, than the executive authority he held as Prime Minister. It was an injustice to Churchill to blame him for the failure of this body during the Norwegian Campaign when it so clearly had a great deal to do with the instrument itself. Nevertheless, Churchill’s own performance limited the influence he was able to wield and the confidence he was able to instil. This was a problem for Churchill and for Chamberlain; the latter was looking for a warrior in whom he could place complete trust but Churchill had too often demonstrated he was not quite the man for the job.

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Chapter 5

Air Policy, the French, and Royal Marine

There were always four avenues by which Churchill could encourage Britain to take the war to Germany: on land, at sea, amphibious operations, and via the new and, in the views of some, the potentially decisive air weapon, the strategic bomber. However, action on land was constrained by French determination to assume the defensive in the west and Britain had long accepted that the Western Front was the French domain. Land operations in the southern Europe were compromised by a variety of political issues but, most particularly, the Italian threat in the air and at sea. The war at sea began almost immediately and Churchill prosecuted it with vigour. Churchill’s own efforts to hurt Germany by the application of superior sea-power for amphibious operations (Catherine) were constrained by a great number of operational and practical difficulties. Two other important initiatives, Churchill’s Narvik scheme and the War Cabinet’s Finnish Option were compromised by another set of factors which will be the subject of the next chapter.

The final avenue of attack, the strategic use of British air power, faced its own challenges: the first was British (and Allied) bombing policy, the essence of which was to avoid doing indiscriminate harm to civilians. The second, intimately linked to 135

the first, was that the enemy had a much larger air force and this invited fears of retaliation and escalation, two issues which will be central to the following discussion. A third factor was that, contrary to expectations, the Germans declined at the start of the war to conduct an unrestricted air war against Britain and France and neither country was disposed to disturb this situation while re-arming. A fourth factor was inter-Allied disagreement over the circumstances that would justify ‘taking the gloves off’ in the air war and begin the bombing of Germany.1 As a result of all these issues, and despite bombs being dropped on Norwegian and Danish territory, not a single Allied bomb was dropped in anger on Germany for the entire period of the Phoney War, a fact that is used to emphasize the fundamental pusillanimity of the Chamberlain wartime government.

The aim of this chapter is to understand Churchill’s view of the air weapon and the issues surrounding its use during the Phoney War, and the extent to which, together, these matters restricted options for the aggressive prosecution of the war. Such an understanding is important to any assessment of Churchill’s attitude to the offensive and to any suggestion he was a uniquely determined warrior during this time. For the most part, and in contradiction to some views, Churchill was a strong, if occasionally frustrated, supporter of Britain’s conservative air policy.2 He supported this policy as part of the wider ‘long war’ view adopted by the Allies because he accepted the almost universally held conviction that it was to the Allies’ advantage that an escalation in the war be delayed as long as possible.

Any assessment of Churchill and the air war must recognise that there were two core elements to his thinking. The first pertained to the manner in which Britain should respond to the German ‘pin-prick’ attacks of the enemy that characterised most of the Phoney War. This was German action which was not considered ‘decisive’ under War Cabinet guidelines and which would not justify ‘taking the gloves off’; that is unrestricted aerial warfare save for the deliberate bombing of civilians or targets which were neither military or industrial in nature. The War

1 The expression ‘taking the gloves off’ was used routinely within War Cabinet discussions in reference to unrestricted aerial warfare. Thus, the use of the expression here. 2 For examples, see: William Manchester, The Caged Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill, 1932-1940: 584-585; Robin Prior, When Britain Saved the West (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015) Chapter One: Half Hearted War. 136

Cabinet policy (heavily influenced by the COS and the Air Force, the latter of which would necessarily be responsible for retaliatory measures) was not to respond in kind to all provocation but only in circumstances that would demonstrably be to Britain’s advantage. Nor was it intended to precede the Germans in bombing targets beyond ‘like for like’ even if it were militarily desirable to do so. Although generally in agreement with this principle, Churchill became increasingly uncomfortable with the restrictions this policy imposed on action. This frustration first manifested itself in response to the limitations policy placed on his efforts to stem the enemy’s magnetic mining programme and it was compounded by the Air Force’s initial response to Royal Marine and then by the resistance of the French. His attitude to air bombing policy in these instances, perhaps unsurprisingly given it was his service suffering most from the magnetic mine, was more ‘bullish’ than most of his colleagues.

The second element in Churchill’s thinking pertained to the important question of the potentially ‘decisive’ enemy action that would justify ‘taking the gloves off’. On this issue he would prove remarkably conservative. While the Government accepted that a large-scale land or air attack on Britain and/or France or Britain’s maritime trade would justify ‘taking the gloves off’, it was uncertain how it should and would react to a German invasion of Belgium and/or Holland. From the earliest days of the war, the Chiefs of Staff would argue an attack on either country should be viewed as ‘decisive’ and be followed by the bombing of the Ruhr by Britain’s main air striking force of heavy bombers. By the middle of October, the War Cabinet was in agreement with this principle, although there remained the issue of timing.

The French, however, proved extremely reluctant to view an invasion of the Low Countries as decisive and were ardently opposed to Britain’s proposed response for fear it would lead directly to the bombing of France. For the entire period of the Phoney War, these issues were a major point of contention between the Allies. Churchill shared his Prime Minister’s anxieties and those of the French over the escalation of the air war and, in the final analysis, he hesitated to accept that an attack on the Low Countries was cause enough to “take the gloves off”.

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Air Bombing Policy: the Early Months The essentials of Allied war strategy and air bombing policy were established well before the invasion of Poland and before Churchill joined the War Cabinet.3 When he acquainted himself with these matters, he did not dissent. Allied strategy was to be defensive at the outset, while executing the greatest measure of economic pressure and the building of military strength to a point where the war effort could become offensive. A conservative air policy suited this approach because it would limit the likelihood of escalation. Only after the Germans initiated unrestricted air warfare would objectives considered most vital to the German war effort be attacked. Until then, the British air force would bomb the fleet at Wilhelmshaven, German ships at sea, and drop leaflets, but otherwise conserve its resources. As for Poland, it was accepted that nothing in the air or land could be done to save it; the salvation of Poland was to be achieved through the ultimate victory of the Allies.4

However, it was always the British Governments intention to support French, and subsequently, BEF, forces in France in the event of any kind of land offensive.5 The Air Force had 10 squadrons of light and medium bombers allocated for tactical operations on the Western Front.6 Fighters, too, were allocated. The heavy bombers, or Main Striking Force numbering approximately 300 aircraft and reserves, would conduct their operations from England. How and when this ‘strategic’ weapon would be used was more uncertain. The British Air Force and, indeed, the British War Cabinet believed that, in this force, they had a special and potentially decisive weapon. They considered, therefore, that the force should be saved for ‘decisive’ operations, implemented at the ‘decisive’ moment, and not frittered away on incidental action. In the interim, the action of this force would be limited to benign activities which would not risk civilian casualties. Support for this policy was pervasive within the War Cabinet and was strongly advocated by the COS, but also

3 War Cabinet, 3 September, 1939, CAB 66/1/19. 4 This principle was establish in July 1939 (see, Cab 65/1/19 War Cabinet, Confidential Annex ,11 September, 1939). Also note the views of Gamelin explained at War Cabinet of 5 September, Cab 65/3/1 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 5 September, 1939. 5 It was concluded at the 4 September War Cabinet meeting that Gamelin should be reassured that the French would receive air support for coordinated military operations but that Britain did not intend to ‘undertake sporadic bombing which would lead to no permanent military result, but would cause unnecessary loss of aircraft.” See Cab 65/1/2 Conclusions, 4 September, 1939. 6 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 5 September, Cab 65/3/1. 138

by the Air Force, the Royal Navy, which did not wish to invite an escalation of air attack against shipping, and by Churchill himself.

Just how long this bombing policy would continue depended, for the most part, on the enemy. However, this essentially reactive policy was temporarily threatened in the earliest hours of the war when the War Cabinet received a request from mistakenly apprehended that the French might bomb targets in Germany immediately they began hostilities.7 There was never the slightest possibility this would occur; nevertheless, the War Cabinet sought reassurances that the French would take no action in the air that would incur civilian casualties. Confusion continued into 4 September. Poland was under attack and nothing was being done to help. Churchill wanted action to relieve pressure on the Poles and he suggested operations against the Siegfried Line, which was then thinly held by the enemy.8 The suggestion was generally accepted by the War Cabinet. Its members thought that a combined plan to relieve pressure on Poland was a vital necessity and they instructed the COS to make immediate contact with Gamelin. This contact would also allow the Government to “discover the French Army Plan and the best means by which our Air Striking Force could collaborate could then be devised.”9 It was apparent, nevertheless, that the War Cabinet intended only to use the air weapon as part of a serious combined operation with the French. Otherwise, procedure would conform to existing policy.

By 5 September, the War Cabinet was more fully apprised of French intentions. Gamelin intended a slow and methodical movement up to the Maginot Line and then a reconnaissance in force to test the strength of the Siegfried Line. Thereafter, Gamelin’s forces would begin “leaning against the Siegfried Line”.10 The French move was to be supported, much as Churchill had wished, by 10 squadrons of

7 Conclusions of War Cabinet meeting 3 September, 1939, Cab 65/1/1. Maurice Gustav Gamelin, (1872-1958) Commander-in-Chief, French Army. 8 Conclusions of War Cabinet Meeting, 4 September, 1939, CAB 65/1/2. 9 Ibid. It is shocking that no precise guidelines existed for the use of the British Air Force in France at the start of the War. This is explained, however, by a conclusion of discussions in July 1939, that it would be impossible for “His Majesty’s Government to decide, in advance of events, the precise manner in which our air forces should be employed.” (see, Report by COS Committee, Air Policy, 11 September, 1939, CAB 66/1/19) This explains why the War Cabinet was at pains early to inform the French that air support would be forthcoming for military operations if needed. 10 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 5 September, 1939, 3pm CAB 65/3/1. 139

the Advanced Striking Force. As for the Main Striking Force, the policy remained not to ‘fritter away on unremunerative [sic] tasks” or those that risked civilian casualties.11 The meeting of British and French staff also concluded that there should be no attack on German oil supplies for the present to avoid possible retaliation to Britain’s own oil stocks, especially on the Thames.12 The Chief of the Air Staff emphasized that his policy was not merely to hold back the Air Force for retaliatory measures but to await a time when a project presented itself which offered prospects of having a decisive effect on the war. These included the Oil Plan, the Ruhr Plan and the Aircraft Industry Plan.13

It was evident in the discussion that fear of retaliation and concerns for civilian casualties were governing influences in this policy. Other members, Churchill and Chatfield among them, thought Germany had already indicated its intentions to ignore the rules of war through such action as the sinking of the Athenia and they believed Britain should act accordingly.14 Even Chamberlain asked if, rather than doing nothing, the British Air Force could act in a way that would invite retaliation and therefore permit the Air Force to take action against its nominated targets.15 It was Ironside who put an end to all such speculation by bringing discussion back to Gamelin’s plan which he thought would be interrupted by an escalation in the air war. He hoped that Gamelin’s activities might draw German forces to the Siegfried Line which could subsequently be isolated by air power and then crushed. This might then permit a serious offensive. In the circumstances, extraneous action in the air for the time being was to be avoided. If Gamelin was not permitted to carry out his plan, it would, Ironside argued, “mean to all intents and purposes, the end of the Western Front as a theatre of War.”16 The meeting concluded that the air force should take no further action and reserve the use of its forces to assist the French on or after X Day,

11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Newell was not convinced that the Athenia represented a deliberate German policy. He was correct in his estimation. See War Cabinet Meeting 5 September, 1939, 3pm, Confidential Annex, Cab 65/3/1. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 140

the undisclosed day upon which Gamelin would move into the Saar.17 Ironsides’ recommendations assumed a serious land operation from Gamelin. It was soon apparent he intended no such thing and by early October French forces had withdrawn from the Saar.

Britain’s conservative bombing policy was challenged a second time on 9 September. Evidence from Poland suggested the Germans had begun unrestricted bombing and that this had led to heavy civilian casualties. This caused CAS Newell, without having first discussed the matter with the other COS, to suggest that Britain now had sufficient justification to undertake similar large scale attacks against Germany and he put this proposal to the War Cabinet.18 He also did this with the expectation that action in the air would be combined with a concerted effort on land. However, on 11 September, the COS and War Cabinet reaffirmed the essential principles of air policy and the decision to prepare to support Gamelin’s offensive.19 No air action would take place in support of Poland.20

In all the above, there was little or no dissent from Churchill. Indeed, he had given his views on air policy to Chamberlain in a wide-ranging letter on 10 September. He believed the Allies should not take the initiative in the bombing war “except in the immediate zone in which the French armies are operating, where of course we must help.”21 A number of the reasons Churchill gave for this view were those routinely expressed within the War Cabinet and via COS appreciations at this time and for months to come. He thought that it was in Britain’s interest the war should “be conducted in accordance with the more humane conceptions and that we

17 Ibid. It was agreed that the Air Force could act against targets if special opportunities arose. Such was the concern for secrecy, the War Cabinet decided that the date itself should not be recorded and be referred to as X day. 18 Minute 14 British Air Action: Possible Extension of Scope, CAB 65/3/2. 19 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, minute 6, Air Policy, 11 September, 1939, CAB 65/3/4. Over the next several days some doubt emerged over whether or not the Germans had in fact begun unrestricted aerial warfare in Poland. The COS recommended that the USA be asked to establish the true state of affairs in Poland. War Paper 26: Report by Chiefs of Staff Committee on German Observance of International Law, 13 September, CAB 66/1/26. In due course, the COS would accept that international law had been breached but this was not used as grounds for ‘taking the gloves off’. The inclination of the War Cabinet was to wait for the Germans to do this in the West. Indeed, the matter became somewhat irrelevant. Policy was guided more by the consequences of retaliation. 20 It was concluded by the COS in their deliberations between 9 and 11 September that “nothing we can do in the Western theatre would have any effect of relieving pressure on Poland.” See, Confidential Annex, 11 September, CAB 66/1/19. 21, Letter from W. S. Churchill to Neville Chamberlain titled Bombing Policy, 10 September, 1939, Chamberlain Papers; CV At the Admiralty, 60. 141

should follow and not precede the Germans in the process.” Further, he believed Britain needed time to prepare air defence for its cities and he thought it not “in our interests” to provoke the interruption of munitions production. He was also reluctant to upset neutral opinion and he had in mind Roosevelt’s recent plea to the combatants in regard to the air war. Finally, he considered it “idle” to believe that anything that could be done in the air could save Poland.22

Churchill was not suggesting Britain do nothing, but then, neither was anyone else.23 At the 14 September War Cabinet meeting, he asked if it would be possible, “without going beyond our current policy”, to find strategic military objectives that were away from civilian populations and attack these even if it invited retaliation.24 In response to his question, the SSW counselled caution that action “did not invite that which they wished to avoid.”25 He believed that targets should be worth attacking and that they must not be too expensive to attack and that it was important to keep “our small and inferior air force ‘in being’ against a time when it would be vital”.26 No member of Cabinet, Churchill included, saw virtue in frittering away Britain’s bomber forces on indecisive bombing operations. That they all over- estimated the likely harm that could be done to Britain as a result of German air retaliation at this time and, conversely, under-estimated the punishment that might have been metered out to the Germans by British fighters over England is very likely. Just as likely is that the War Cabinet placed too much store in the value of keeping Britain’s heavy bomber force for the ‘decisive’ moment in the belief it could make a ‘decisive’ difference, but it was a compelling justification for doing little at the time. It was also not possible to ignore the threat posed by the Luftwaffe to France in the event of aggressive air activity and this had to be factored into British air policy to some degree. Churchill took the issue no further.

22 CAB 66/1/19. On 11 September, the Chiefs of Staff addressed the question of whether or not the Air Bombing policy should be adhered to and concluded that it should. 23 The War Cabinet had agreed that certain operations could be undertaken. Presumably, Churchill wished to explore what these might be. It must be borne in mind that Churchill is a late comer to the War Cabinet, so a great deal of Government policy and planning would have been unknown to him. Hence, his question. The real problem was that the precondition of avoiding civilian casualties made finding targets highly problematic. 24 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex,14 September, 1939, CAB 65/3/6. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid Almost precisely the same view had been presented by the CAS at the 4 September War Cabinet meeting. 142

The collapse of Poland and the French withdrawal from the Saar removed any immediate motivation to act aggressively against Germany in the air. Contrary to expectation, no significant German air threat developed and the view of the War Cabinet was that full advantage should be taken of this hiatus. Churchill remained conservative in his own approach to bombing and the wider policy of sitting tight and re-arming. In late September, he wrote his appreciation of the strategic situation in the shadow of the German and Soviet occupation of Poland. He suggested that it would be best to allow Hitler to “stew in his own juices during the winter while speeding forward our armaments and weaving-up our alliances”27 Thereafter, his view changed little. In a speech in November, he declared that “I do not doubt myself that time is on our side” and in another in January he declared that, in regard to Britain’s decision to avoid fighting while re-arming as quickly as possible that “I am quite clear that our policy has been right.”28 He added his conviction that if the Germans did not escalate its war effort, the Allies would have won the first campaign of the war.29 Also in January, in a personal reply to Lord Trenchard, Britain’s most ardent advocate of strategic bombing, who had written to him selling the virtue of an air offensive. Churchill replied, “I am still of opinion that the time has not yet come when it is in our interest to initiate general and unlimited air war.”30

Although Churchill had endorsed the policy upon which a great deal of the inertia of the war was based, he did chaff at the manner in which it constrained action and he expressed occasional dissatisfaction with the ‘sit tight and re-arm’ policy, especially where it prevented reasonable defensive action or stopped an offensive measure that he did not consider likely to escalate the air war. As far as the air element of government policy was concerned, two episodes stand out. Each pertained to the War Cabinet’s responses to the German magnetic mining threat which

27 War Paper, Note on the General Situation, 25 September, 1939, Char 20/15, W.S.Churchill; CV At the Admiralty, 149. 28BBC Written Archives, Broadcast,12 November, 1939; CV At the Admiralty, 357-362; and Speech given by W. S. Churchill at the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, 27 January, 1940, Into Battle: The Speeches of Winston Churchill, (Cassell, 1941), 63-169; CV At the Admiralty, 694. The sentiments expressed in these speeches were almost identical. 29 Speech, 27 January, 1940, CV At the Admiralty, 695. The full statement was “if we reached the spring without any interruption of our sea-borne trade, and without anything happening on land or in the air, we should…have gained the opening campaign of the war.” 30, W. S. Churchill to Lord Trenchard, 5 January, 1940. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Montague Trenchard, 1st Viscount Trenchard, (1873-1956). Trenchard Papers; CV At the Admiralty, 613. 143

emerged in November. Churchill wanted to attack the air bases used by aircraft responsible for the some of the mining. This fell outside bombing guidelines and the Air Force could offer only more thorough standing patrols. Churchill also sought to initiate retaliatory measures for the German mining activity. The first was to begin the interception of Germany’s export trade in neutral shipping. This policy was adopted by the War Cabinet in quick order. The other measure was Operation Royal Marine, but this plan was soon caught up in, and challenged by, existing air bombing policy, issues of international law, and, most important, French fear of retaliation. Churchill found himself in an extraordinary position. A pet scheme for taking the war to the enemy would be compromised by a policy he supported. The French rejected Royal Marine for the same reasons Churchill and the British War Cabinet declined over many months to bomb Germany: a fear of retaliation and escalation.

Royal Marine The Admiralty began investigating the idea of laying mines in Germany’s waterways in the first weeks of the war.31 At some point in November, naval staff put to Churchill the idea of using such fluvial (floating) mines as a proportionate retaliation for the German magnetic mining programme which was then developing menacing proportions. Churchill had discussions with Pound and Phillips and authorised further development.32 He also instructed them to explore the juridical justification for such a scheme, his own initial suggestion being the losses that had occurred in the Thames through magnetic mines.33 He proposed that, as soon as the appliances were ready in large numbers, a continuous discharge into the Rhine would take place and he set naval staff to devising the appropriate weapon.34 Churchill also ensured that General Gamelin was acquainted with the plan during regular staff talks and the latter expressed considerable interest in the project.35

Churchill intended to introduce Royal Marine to the War Cabinet at the same time as he introduced his proposal to stop German exports. However, he discovered

31 The Gathering Storm, 508. Churchill wrote that he first raised the idea of fluvial mines in September. Presumably, therefore, this investigation had been prompted by Churchill. 32 W.S. Churchill to Admiral Pound and Admiral Phillips, 19 November, 1939, ADM 205/2. 33 Ibid. 34 W. S. Churchill to Admiral Fraser and Captain Boyd, 19 November, 1939, ADM 205/2. Denis William Boyd, (1891-1965). At this time, Boyd was Captain, HMS Vernon torpedo, School. 35 Churchill to Admiral Fraser and Captain Boyd, 19 November, 1939, ADM 205/2. 144

the Air Force, via the work of Major Jefferis, was working on a similar scheme with mines to be delivered by aircraft.36 Thereafter, Churchill thought in terms of an expanded plan which involved mining from land and from the air into estuaries, canals and rivers. On 24 November, he gave his delayed presentation to the War Cabinet. He explained that 10000 mines could be ready to place in the Rhine by the end of January as a “retaliatory measure”. He sought and received approval for the project on the understanding that the final decision would be made once the mines were ready.37 Thereafter, Churchill had another meeting with Gamelin and General Georges and they again endorsed the concept. However, his plan would soon run into obstacles.

The first obstacle to Royal Marine developed from within the Royal Air Force. In early December, two negative papers were produced. The first was by the RAF Deputy Director of Plans, Air Commodore Collier.38 This was written along the lines of Government and Air Force policy.39 The memorandum addressed not only the mining plans but also calls, primarily from Churchill, to bomb the air bases on the island of Sylt. Collier was particularly concerned that action did not invite a much larger German attack against naval and air bases, shipping, and possibly shipbuilding yards, and aircraft factories. In short, it repeated the accepted thesis that Britain had more to lose than to gain in an escalated air war.40 This paper was

36 Millis Rowland Jefferis, (1899-1963). Jefferis designed bombs, mines, mortars and anti-tank rockets. He would subsequently work directly under Churchill as prime minister from 1940 to 1945 at an experimental establishment at Whitchurch. A meeting was organized with Jefferis on 23 November where his designs were discussed. Notes on a Meeting. 23 November, 1939, ADM 205/2. 37 Meeting of the War Cabinet, Confidential Annex, 11.30 am, 24 November, 1939, CAB 65/4/20 Hankey asked that Churchill consider using the mines in the Danube. Hankey’s focus was on interrupting Germany’s oil supply from Roumania, if such be needed. 38 The paper was entitled, Considerations Affecting Air Counter-Measures Against the German Attack on British Sea-Borne Trade. Alfred Conrad Collier, (1895-1986). Collier retired as an Air Vice- Marshal. He was knighted in 1947. 39The Director of Plans noted that the RAF was fully aware of the need to act against the mines but said that policy should be guided by two things: it must be really effective and not merely a “temporary palliative” and it must accord with Government policy and “take into account the strategic situation as a whole”. He also nominated a third factor: that action must be economical; that is, it should not result in a heavy loss in bombing force without commensurate results. It is probable that the Air Force attitude had hardened in regard to bombing policy because of the losses that had occurred since the war. The bombing of the German fleet, for example, had been more costly than expected. 40 Considerations Affecting Air Counter-Measures Against the German Attack on British Sea-Borne Trade, written by Director of Plans, 9 December 1939, AIR 19/20. In response to the suggestion that sea-plane base at Sylt be bombed, he argued that this would serve little purpose if land-based planes elsewhere could also deliver these mines. 145

accompanied by an appreciation by Sir William Malkin on the legal aspect of Royal Marine.41 Malkin had concluded “the mining of inland waterways in Germany other than the Kiel Canal is illegal and cannot be undertaken at the present time as retaliation.”42 Churchill exploded with indignation when he read Malkin’s paper and crossed out the title of the paper and wrote instead: “Some funkstick in the Air Ministry running for shelter under Malkin’s petticoats.”43 He wrote to the SSA, Kingsley Wood, in the hope that this did not reflect his views on the matter.44 As it turned out, it did not. The War Cabinet of 10 December agreed that, given Germany’s complete disregard for international law, retaliation should be based on the expediency of options open to Britain rather than strictly legal matters.45 While this did little to alter Britain’s policy towards bombing German island bases, it left the door open to Royal Marine.

Of the Air Force’s Director of Plans’ memorandum and the principles upon which the Air Force were determined to operate, Churchill wrote to Kingsley Wood: We are agreed upon the principle that our interests are served during the next few months by the enemy not making mass attacks upon our factories and harbours. We are also anxious to avoid being the first to throw a bomb, albeit at a military objective, which may kill civilians. I could not claim that the attacks by mine and aircraft upon our shipping are so serious as to require a departure from this policy at the present time … I do not therefore press you to make any attack upon the German island fortresses or Naval building yards at the present moment. I do not however believe that the Germans have refrained from attacking us from any scruples of humanity or that they will not do so whether provoked or not whenever they judge the action advantageous … Previous provocation is not an indispensable condition to them nor should it be to us.46

Churchill was endorsing existing policy, although he was clearly frustrated by it. He had changed his mind since September when he had written to Chamberlain that Allied action should follow and not precede German aggression. Churchill was

41 Malkin’s paper was titled, Mining the Rhine: The Legal Aspect, 7 December 1939. ADM 116/4239; CV At the Admiralty, 482-486. Sir Herbert William Malkin, (1883-1945). Malkin was legal advisor to the Foreign Office, 1929-1945. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 W. S. Churchill to Sir Kingsley Wood, 9 December 1939, ADM 116/4239. 45 Conclusions of War Cabinet meeting, 10 December, 1939, CAB 65/2/44. Churchill wrote to Wood on 11 December expressing the great encouragement he had gained from learning that he, the Chief of the Air Staff, and Air Vice-Marshal Pierse were not committed to the views set forth in Malkin’s legal note. 46W. S. Churchill to Sir Kingsley Wood, 16 January, 1940, ADM 116/4239. The copy of this letter has ‘hold’ written on it, so it is doubtful if it was ever sent. Moreover, the date of 16 January, 1940, written in free-hand on the latter, makes little sense. I would argue this is a clerical error (or the date upon which it was added to Churchill’s files) and that the note was written much closer to the date of events recorded above, early December. No context for it being written in mid-January could be established. 146

far from ready to ‘take the gloves off’ in the air war but was obviously chaffing at the severe limitations existing policy placed on retaliation and, indeed, reasonable defensive measures. He could, at least, be relieved that the 10 December War Cabinet, or rather, Kingsley Wood, supported a less rigid interpretation of the ‘like for like’ rules for retaliation.47

Perhaps prompted by the War Cabinet support and guided by the DP’s criticism and that of Malkin, Churchill wrote a persuasive justification for Royal Marine, concluding with an argument designed to minimise the fear of retaliation and also to address concerns for the loss of civilian life: while Royal Marine would inflict “damage on the enemy … which will … be substantial” it would be achieved with “the minimum effusion of blood”.48 It was, therefore, neither a mere ‘palliative’ so disliked by the Air Force nor an unlawful response to German aggression as feared more generally by the War Cabinet. Over the following months he repeated these principles in his communications with the French. With great vigour and commitment, Churchill, in unison with the Air Force, pressed forward with preparations for Royal Marine. On 6 March, he received the full endorsement of the War Cabinet. This decision coincided with the imminent collapse of the War Cabinet’s Finnish Option. Whether or not this strong support would have been forthcoming except for this failure is a moot point; nevertheless, permission was given and this represented yet another significant step away from the War Cabinet passivity of early months.

Churchill now had only to bring on board the French. He seemed hopeful in this regard; after all, Gamelin had several times expressed support for the idea. He was to be profoundly disappointed. Immediately after the 6 March War Cabinet meeting, he sent his emissary, Rear Admiral John Fitzgerald, to France with a letter

47Conclusions of War Cabinet meeting, 10 December 1939, Cab 65/2/44. Although recorded as a meeting of the War Cabinet, Churchill and Wood were the only two ministers present. Neither Chamberlain nor Halifax were present. There is no evidence that either challenged the conclusion of the meeting. Indeed, the War Cabinet subsequently endorsed the Royal Marine proposal. 48 Memorandum by W. S. Churchill, 12 December, 1939, ADM 116/4239; CV At the Admiralty, 500- 502. Among the critical design features of the mines was a mechanism by which the mine would explode before it left German waters. A great deal of effort was being made to make the weapon as targeted as possible. Moreover, the nature of the explosion, while being sufficient to sink barges and other ships, was not considered likely to hurt many people, most of whom, it was expected would safely reach shore. 147

to inform Gamelin that the operation awaited his signal.49 Gamelin, responded that, while he agreed in principle with the project “he was doubtful whether the French were prepared for possible reprisals and wondered if it should not be delayed until it could be combined with some unspecified other operation.”50

For Churchill, this was deeply frustrating news, but there had long been portentous signs that the French would hesitate at implementing the project according to a British time-table. Churchill had envisaged a constant and on-going campaign of mining, begun at a moment most propitious for the Allies, which would produce long-term disruption to German inland trade and industry.51 For him, Royal Marine represented an appropriate retaliation for the German misdeeds already done. The delay in its implementation had only been a matter of preparation. Quite early, however, Gamelin had indicated that he did not think of Royal Marine as an ‘independent’ operation but one which would coincide with major land operations in the West.52 Unless the Germans attacked in the West, it was evident he did not intend that Royal Marine operations to take place for some time.

On 16 March, Churchill attempted to persuade Gamelin to support Royal Marine with a sophisticated line of argument that contended France had little to fear from the plan. He wrote that the British Government “did not consider that the fluvial mines, whether naval or aerial, would logically entail reprisals against the French Air factories.”53 He pointed out that the fluvial mines had been conceived as an “exact measure of retaliation for the illegal and inhumane methods of warfare directed against the coasts and harbours, [and] shipping of this island.”54 He thought that, while the Germans might naturally reply with attacks on French and British inland waterways, they would need some time to prepare such a reprisal which, in any

49 Letter from W. S. Churchill to General Gamelin, 6 March 1940, ADM 116/4239. Recently promoted to Rear Admiral, John U. P. Fitzgerald, (1888-1940) was Director of Torpedoes and Mining until February 1940, whereupon he became Admiralty President and it was apparently in this role, he travelled to France to see Gamelin. See www.unithistories.com 50 Undated telegram from Admiral Royle to W.S. Churchill (but probably 6 or 7 March), ADM 116/4239. 51 It is probable that his focus on the long term nature of the project was a response to the Air Force plans division’s concerns that action be not a ‘temporary palliative’. 52 ADM 116/4239. Churchill had mentioned this himself at a meeting of 23 February, 1940, but the point had been noted much earlier. 53 Letter, W. S. Churchill to General Gamelin, 16 March, 1940, ADM 116/4240. 54 Ibid. 148

event, would not be as advantageous to them as the attack on the Rhine would be for the Allies. If the Germans attacked French or British air factories, they would invite attack on targets that had long been studied. Churchill also repeated the argument offered to Kingsley Wood several months before when he noted that the Germans would not need a ‘pretext’ such as ‘retaliation’ to escalate the war: they would do so when it suited. In these circumstances, it made no sense to hold back, for fear of retaliation, on an aggressive action that was capable of doing the Germans considerable harm.55

These arguments failed to appreciate how vulnerable the French felt to air attack and also tended to overlook how recently Britain had been converted to a more aggressive stance. Moreover, his argument regarding ‘pretext’ was a double edged sword for Churchill. By claiming Hitler was not constrained by law, he was also making a strong case for not provoking him to do something unlawful and it was certainly this that animated the French. They were simply not open to risk and there was abundant evidence to demonstrate this in the on-going disagreement over the appropriate use of Britain’s heavy bombers should the Germans invade Belgium or Holland. Inevitably, France’s proximity to Germany, combined with its limited strength in the air, ensured that the French view of the right time to risk escalating the air war was markedly different to its ally.

For all the apparent rationality of his justification for Royal Marine, which he trumpeted loudly in The Gathering Storm, Churchill maintained a double standard in his post-war criticism of the French unwillingness to support his plan. Churchill had accepted from the earliest days of the war the advantages of the ‘sit tight and re-arm policy’. He had, as a service minister, also been an important contributor to the pressure brought to bear on the French to accept Britain’s policy that, should Belgium and Holland be attacked, Britain would bomb the Ruhr. This policy was based on the fear that German occupation of these countries would expose Britain to German air power; in other words, it was a matter of self-preservation. The French were merely exhibiting the same anxiety over Royal Marine. Furthermore, when the time came to implement British bombing policy and finally ‘take the gloves off’

55 Ibid. 149

against Germany in response to its invasion of the Low Countries, Churchill would hesitate to act, in part for fear of inviting retaliation against Britain.

Air Policy and the Western Front: Britain and France in Conflict The British War Cabinet’s very limited knowledge of how the French proposed to fight the war has been visibly demonstrated by its ignorance of Gamelin’s intentions at the start of the war. The French retreat to the Maginot Line and the hiatus offered to the Allies by Germany in the post-Poland period provided an opportunity for discussion of several important issues, the most important of which was whether or not the Allies’ should add an invasion of Belgium and Holland to the list of German action deemed ‘decisive’ enough to warrant ‘taking the gloves off’ in the air war. This issue was encouraged by Belgian resistance to staff discussions and uncertainty surrounding French land operations following such an invasion. On the 13 October, a meeting of service ministers, Churchill among them, were tasked with reviewing the COS recommendation that a German invasion of Holland and/or Belgium should be considered ‘decisive’ to Britain’s interests and be met by bombing Germany, in particular specified targets in the Ruhr.56 Concomitant with this question was what the French army would do to arrest a German invasion of either country.57 Gamelin had long maintained a determination to enter Belgium but just how far, and when, remained unclear. British General Staff initially rejected a deep incursion into Belgium for fear of an ‘encounter’ battle; by October 1939 the CIGS, the SSW and the War Cabinet more generally, had accepted that such a move would be highly desirable if Britain’s best interests were to be met; this was to keep the German air threat at a distance.

56 Also in attendance at this meeting was Chatfield, as chairman, Hankey, and the COS. One month later (14 November), the ministers met again with the COS as the MCC to discuss the latest developments in Air Policy. Chatfield remained part of this committee. Hankey was not. The fear existed that German control of Belgian and Dutch territory would give them access to airfields much closer to Britain and to east coast trade and allow a substantial escalation in air attacks. Moreover, the use of such air fields would allow German fighters to support Germany’s medium bombers. On one or two occasions it was pointed out that this enhanced threat was probably over-rated; nevertheless, this anxiety guided policy. See, DCAS comments at meeting of 6 November, Confidential Annex, Cab 65/4/5 57 It was understood that there was militarily very little the French could do to help the Dutch. Nevertheless, two questions pre-occupied the British War Cabinet at this time and later. Would the French army move into Belgium in response to an attack on Holland if the Belgians invited them and, second, would the French army move if no invitation was received? 150

On 14 October, Chatfield presented to the War Cabinet the ministerial committee’s assessment that, should evidence be forthcoming that a German invasion of the Low Countries had resulted in a large number of civilian casualties, Britain’s heavy bombers should respond by bombing the Ruhr.58 Despite the strength of these views, there was some equivocation within the War Cabinet, especially from Chamberlain and Halifax who hesitated at the proposition an attack on Belgium should be cause enough to bomb the Ruhr.59 Chamberlain was concerned the proposal was not consistent with existing policy. Churchill, as did its other members, defended the committee’s new position.60 He challenged Halifax’s anxiety over the Ruhr issue, and his fear that it would escalate the air war, by commenting that he would prefer to bomb Germans in Germany than risk bombing Belgians in Belgium.61

Chamberlain and Halifax reluctantly conformed to COS recommendations and those of the ministerial committee and these were, several days later, conveyed to Gamelin. His response was disturbing and, for the first time, identified the great void between British and French thinking on bombing policy. 62 Under no circumstances did he or the French High Command wish to see Germany bombed in response to a German attack on the Low Countries, at the very least, not until the Spring. Gamelin argued that, “even if Belgium were invaded “totally or partially” we would be advised to play for time.”63 The British War Cabinet drew from this that the fate of Belgium or Holland was not material to Gamelin’s master-plan and they were left

58 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 14 October, 1939, Cab 65/3/26. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 ibid. 62 There had already been hints of French ambivalence towards the importance of the Low Countries to Allied Strategy. During the War Cabinet discussion of 7 October, the CAS recalled that Gamelin had made a “rather interesting suggestion that the Germans would perhaps attack and occupy the Low Countries this Autumn and would not attempt to advance into France.” The import of this, albeit obscure reference, was the suggestion that the French viewed the Low Countries as incidental to the security of France. Certainly, thereafter it became increasing evident to the British that some elements in the French High Command held that the longer France was left alone, the better, and this was regardless of what happen to Belgium and Holland. 63 Air Policy, Note by the COS, 13 November 1939, CAB 66/3/18. This document includes a copy of Gamelin’s communication and an assessment of it. At the War Cabinet meeting of 14 November, the CAS commented with some concern that the French “appeared to contemplate with comparative equanimity a German invasion of Belgium.” (See, Minutes of War Cabinet meeting, 14 November 1939, Cab 66/3/22). 151

uncertain just how committed he was to the deep movement into Belgium which the British now accepted was critical to allied policy.

The matter of the Low Countries and the Ruhr were revisited in November amid renewed anxiety over German intentions. On 6 November, Churchill expressed the opinion that, should the Germans make even a limited attack on Holland, Britain should be prepared, “if necessary, to retaliate immediately by attacking the Ruhr.”64 The matter was discussed again by the War Cabinet on 7 November where there was strong support from a number of members for the Ruhr Plan but more hesitation from Halifax. The Lord Privy Seal was deeply critical of the French attitude to the Ruhr plan, arguing that it would result in the loss of ‘fleeting’ opportunities to hurt the Germans. Pound thought that Britain’s medium bombers should be used to slow up the German advance and that the heavy bombers should attack the Ruhr. He thought it was a matter of “gravest concern” to prevent the Germans from gaining a position from which the enemy’s medium bombers could operate against Britain with fighter support. The SSA thought Britain would be entirely justified in attacking the Ruhr in response to a German invasion. Halifax argued that due weight should be given to neutral opinion if such an operation was undertaken but he was cut short by Pound who pointed out that the COS had considered the moral position and noted that the German action in Poland already justified such a response.

Churchill was generally supportive of the COS view but he also displayed an element of pragmatism, and this attitude would be recurring. He accepted the French should be pressed on the matter of the Ruhr but reasoned that, if they refused to alter their views, the Government must defer. However, later in the discussion, perhaps as a way of diffusing the issue with the French, the SSA suggested that it might be better to encourage the Germans to attack Britain and permit fighters to take a heavy toll of the enemy. Meanwhile, Britain could keep its own bombing force intact. Although Churchill would subsequently endorse this view, on this occasion he demurred. He argued that an occupation of Belgium and Holland would permit the bombing of Britain’s “great centres of industry” and permit the Germans to increase the depth of defences between Britain and Ruhr. Chamberlain was absent from the

64 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 6 November, 1939, CAB 65/4/5. 152

meeting but those present resolved to tell the Prime Minister that the French must be persuaded to accept the Ruhr plan.65

The COS continued to press their case for the Ruhr plan on 11 November. They were concerned that the pre-conditions for initiating the Ruhr plan, which included confirmation from the War Cabinet and also consultation with the French, would cause delay and they sought permission to begin the bombing as soon as the Germans attacked Belgium, Holland or both.66 They requested Chamberlain secure French support for this policy at the next SWC meeting.

The MCC reviewed the COS recommendations in the evening of 13 November and supported them. At the 14 November Chatfield put the case to the War Cabinet. Chamberlain hesitated again at the ‘automatic’ nature of the COS proposed course. He questioned the COS interpretation of the ‘decisive’ nature of German action. Should an attack on Belgium precipitate an immediate attack on the Ruhr or should this await evidence that the battle for Belgium or Holland was developing in a ‘decisive’ manner? Ironside subsequently explained that this, also, was Gamelin’s view. He wanted any decision to bomb the Ruhr decided jointly by the Allied governments.

Churchill’s main contribution was to contend that the arguments for and against taking action in the Ruhr were ‘finely balanced’. The Ruhr Plan would result in a loss of bombers and would invite retaliation but, given the concentration of industry, an attack on the Ruhr would make the attack worth the retaliation. Nevertheless, he and Hankey concluded it was really not possible to make a decision on this issue until the situation arose. Chamberlain shared this caution. Until the great battle for Belgium developed decisively, he would not wish to embark on the Ruhr Plan. If it were necessary, however, he would not shrink from it.67

Unsurprisingly, Chamberlain took this equivocal War Cabinet position with him to the SWC on 16 November. He put the British case for the Ruhr plan strongly

65 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 9 November, 1939, CAB 65/4/8. 66 Air Policy, Report by COS, 11 November, CAB 66/3/18. The existing policy including the need to establish that the Germans had caused large numbers of civilian casualties during their attacks. The COS argued that German action in Poland had already provided justification enough. Further, they wished to have it accepted that the invasion itself was sufficient cause to implement the Ruhr plan. 67 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 14 November, 1939, CAB 65/4/13. 153

but wilted before Daladier’s resistance to it. The SWC decision was to hold the Ruhr Plan in abeyance, a decision which was made easier now invasion no longer looked imminent. However, it was clear from Chamberlain’s statement that a precondition for suspending a decision on an ‘automatic’ Ruhr offensive was that the French would attempt to occupy as much of Belgium as possible and that thereafter the battle for these countries did not develop decisively. Daladier understood this clearly and pointed out that, if the French plan was fulfilled and the Allies reached their preferred lines of defence “German aviation would not have gained an appreciable advantage and the general strategic situation of Britain and France would not have been substantially changed.”68 In other words there would be no need to ‘take the gloves off’ in the air war and bomb the Ruhr.

The decision to place on hold the question of bombing the Ruhr was weak. It compromised the COS’ unified conviction that delay would mean opportunities lost and danger increased, and would mean also that, in the decisive battle in the West, Britain’s heavy bombers, or the greater part of them, would be left idle. Nevertheless, despite the weakness of the decision, it reflected War Cabinet discussion. It also reflected Churchill’s view that arguments over the Ruhr plan were ‘finely balanced’ and his acceptance that, should the French object, their views must be respected. The issue of bombing policy would be revisited again in the month prior to the invasion of France and the Low Countries. Churchill would propose some important amendments to it. However, for the most part, Churchill’s views would continue to have much more in common with Chamberlain and the French than they would the COS and the Royal Air Force. Moreover, he would conform to the essentials of Chamberlain’s policy when he became Prime Minister.

Air Policy Revisited, April/May, 1940 The discussions of 17-18 November were the last discussion on air policy on the Western Front within the SWC, the British War Cabinet, or the MCC until early April. For all his interest in strategic matters, Churchill paid no more attention to this matter until 7 April when, as chair of the MCC, he recommended that bombing policy be revisited. He was prompted to do so by his belated appreciation that the

68, SWC Meeting, 17 November 1939, Cab 99/3. 154

French reaction to Royal Marine, which was to hesitate and delay, would likely be duplicated in their reaction to ‘taking the gloves off’ in the air war if Belgium or Holland were invaded.69 However, at the MCC meeting of 8 April, he identified his motivation as concern over the potential losses to be incurred in attacking the Ruhr and his belief that it would not be possible to ignore the land battle.70 Lest Britain’s strategic bomber force sit idle awaiting a change in policy, he now sought to have Britain’s heavy bombers involved more intimately in the ‘great land-battle’.71 An objective of his review was to involve the French High Command more closely in the selection of heavy bomber targets and to ensure that the process was completed with expedition. Among his requirements was to establish the number of heavy bombers that the Air Force would be prepared to use in support of the main battle.

His review of policy was welcomed by the SSW and CIGS and the VCIGS, the latter of whom were determined to have marshalling yards bombed intensely.72 It was not welcomed by Air Staff who maintained that the heavy bombers role was strategic and that it would be folly to have these valuable aircraft working in operational areas heavily protected by AA weapons and fighters. On 12 April, Churchill completed a summary of the conclusions of MCC meetings of 8 and 9 April. This was a significant shift in the use of the heavy bombers. It was recommended that “in the event of a major attack on the Western Front, the primary task of the heavy bombers will be to intervene in the land battle, which may be decisive.” The French High Command would select the targets and their priority. The Air Staff would determine the number of aircraft allocated to these tasks. In the event of a conflict of needs or too great a demand being made on these forces, it would be for Churchill, as chairman of the MCC, and in consultation with the SSA, to decide

69, Royal Marine, Memorandum by W. S. Churchill for the MCC, 7 April, 1940, CAB 83/5. Churchill had just returned from France where the French had requested a delay in Royal Marine until 1 July. He noted that the French ‘do not wish to be responsible for seeming to provoke reprisals.” He went on to explain that the veto “also seems to govern the general action of the RAF in the intervening period and points to a continuance of the policy, hitherto adopted by both sides of not causing civilian casualties to any serious extent on land.” 70 Proceedings of MCC, 8 April 1940, CAB 83/3. 71 One reason Churchill gave for reconsidering policy was that it would not be possible to ignore land battle and direct all energy to objectives which could only have a longer term impact. This was curious reasoning. The heavy bombers were always likely to suffer more casualties closer to the heart of the land battle. Attacks on the Ruhr were to take place at night, reducing the risk of these considerably. Finally, it was never intended to apply ‘all’ energies elsewhere. Medium bombers were allocated to assist in the main battle. 72 The new Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff was Lieutenant-General, Sir John Dill. 155

what proportion of the bomber force would be allocated. If agreement could not be established, the matter would be referred to the War Cabinet.73 Thus did Churchill inveigle himself, at least temporarily, into a decision-making process over air policy for which he had little expertise. There is no doubt these changes initiated by Churchill were, in most respects, resented by the SSA and CAS and they almost immediately sought an amendment to conclusions to diminish Churchill’s role in the decision-making process.74 Churchill’s intervention led to a very limited use of heavy bombers on targets in the Ruhr west of the Rhine in the first days after the invasion in the West but these produced limited results; meanwhile, he quickly began to rue the heavy loss of medium bombers nearer the battle, a matter that had long caused the air force anxiety.

From 10 April, the day after the German invasion of Norway and amid rumours of an imminent assault on Holland, these matters were subsumed by the COS concerns that no understanding yet existed with the French over the action to be taken if the Germans invaded Holland and left Belgium alone. It was thought possible that, if Holland alone was attacked, Belgium might seek to maintain its neutrality; in this circumstance France might decline to enter Belgium. Just as possible, should the Germans occupy only the Dutch islands in the Scheldt, as was then thought possible, the French would be even less inclined to take action. There were a number of potential ramifications for British and Allied strategy if either scenario occurred. The first, of course, was that the Germans would secure air bases from which to attack Britain. A second was that, German forces in Holland would subsequently be able to outflank Allied forces that entered Belgium. Further, British action in the air was linked to the movement of armies; if France did not act, nor would Britain’s bombers. In such circumstances nothing might be done in response to a German attack against Holland and this was expected to have serious moral and political repercussions abroad. A French movement into Belgium was important for another reason. A major land battle, or the imminent prospect of one, would be

73 MCC Meeting, 9 April, 1940, CAB 83/5. This sets guidelines for the decision-making process in certain instances. 74 Letter to First Lord from General H. L. Ismay, 11 April, 1940, ADM 199/1929. Accompanying this letter was a note identifying the amendments requested by the CAS. These ensured that Churchill was no longer the final judge in the use of heavy bombers in certain instances but would make these decisions in consultation with the SSA. 156

needed to help justify ‘taking the gloves off’.75 If the French moved into Belgium, the Germans would be unlikely to limit their action and the requisite land battle would ensue, thus justifying aggressive action in the air.

Given these issues, the COS wanted reassurance the French would enter Belgium should German invade Holland. Further, the COS now reasserted their view that the Air Force be permitted to attack nominated targets without further reference to either government. Thus, instead of Churchill’s more accommodating policy towards the French and a more tactical use of the heavy bombers in support of the land-battle, core business was again to reassert Britain’s right to independent action and to press the French on an advance, invited or uninvited, into Belgium.76 Churchill supported these proposals, although he again noted the challenge of securing French support. He noted also, with undoubted reference to his own initiatives, that the new military objectives of the British bomber force would greatly aid a French advance.77 Chamberlain was also supportive of this latest COS proposal and accepted the French must be pressed to support the Ruhr plan and to confirm its determination to enter Belgium. However, he drew the line at the COS suggestion that oil installations in Germany be included in the list of targets to be attacked in the early stages of a battle. Unlike the other targets proposed, it was expected these would invite unrestricted aerial warfare he and others had long feared. Over forthcoming weeks, this would remain a ‘sticking point’ between Chamberlain and the COS. Chamberlain would be fully supported by Churchill.

British preoccupation with the Norwegian Campaign delayed discussion of these matters with the French. On 21 April, the War Cabinet met to confirm policy on the ‘Holland’ question for the upcoming SWC meetings.78 British views had now

75 Another reason for entering Belgium would be that it would force the Germans to attack Belgium and force it into the War on the Allied side. 76 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 12 April, CAB 65/12/22. The COS had gone one step further and recommended that the Allies anticipate the Germans and, when it appeared an invasion was imminent, they enter Belgium, with or without permission, and begin bombing German forces west of the Rhine. The proposal was rejected because it was believed there was no possibility the French would agree to it and also because of concern over the international ramifications if the Germans did not subsequently advance. 77 Ibid. 78Proceedings of MCC, 19 April, 10 pm, CAB 83/3. This followed prompting by SSA, Sam Hoare, who urged that the differences in views between the Allies regarding the invasion of the Low Countries be resolved. 157

hardened on a number of issues concerning existing Western Front bombing policy.79 The War Cabinet agreed with the COS that Britain should be able to act unilaterally in the air and considered it appropriate to do so if Germany attacked Belgium, or Holland or both. They still saw in French strategy a desire to somehow compartmentalise the war in the Low Countries.80 Throughout this meeting, Churchill said nothing, despite the discussion being on an issue as fundamentally aggressive as ‘taking the gloves off’ in the air war. The War Cabinet, Chamberlain included, at last decided that Britain’s heavy bombers could bomb the Ruhr, if the COS saw fit to do so, without further consultation, or so it seemed. Churchill and Chamberlain remained uncertain as to the targets to be attacked and the precise nature of the circumstances that would begin the bombing.

It was during the subsequent SWC meeting that there is found the most significant indication of French willingness to compromise Britain’s preferred strategy, and perhaps even their own self-interest, to keep the air war out of France.81 At this time, the French were placing great hopes in success in Norway.82 In an episode which appeared to sustain COS anxieties, Reynaud made the extraordinary suggestion that the Allies should concentrate on Scandinavia and ‘resist the temptation to intervene in Belgium, a course which, he admitted, had certain advantages, but which also presented dangers arising from Allied inferiority in arms and aviation.”83 This was a repetition of Gamelin’s ambit claim in late October that the Low Countries were not sufficiently vital to French strategy to expose it to retaliation in the air as a result of Britain’s decision to bomb the Ruhr. Such views were entirely counter to the British War Cabinet’s determination to occupy as much of Belgium and Holland as possible to keep the German air threat away from Britain

79 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 21 April 1940, CAB 65/12/30. 80 Ibid. The SSA noted that the French "obviously wished to keep the war out of France for as long as possible, but nothing could be more dangerous to this country than to allow the Germans to establish themselves in Holland” 81 A judicious French movement into Belgium was always in the best interest of the French themselves. It would provide a buffer against German forces, help keep the fighting out of France and would help them secure the support of the Belgian army. That Reynaud was willing to canvass a policy under which France would surrender the greater part of Belgium and Holland to avoid an escalation in the air war is symptomatic of how powerful this, hitherto under-explored, fear of the air threat was at the highest levels of French decision-making. 82 On 18 April, Reynaud had penned a letter declaring Allied progress in Scandinavia as vital to the development of the war. Letter from Reynaud, 18 April, 1940, CAB 83/3. 83 SWC Meeting, 23 April, 1940, CAB 93/3. 158

and to inflict maximal damage on the Ruhr at a time most propitious for the British Air Force. Chamberlain was determined to gain French support for the Ruhr policy but also to gain a guarantee to advance into Belgium to support Holland and to do so as aggressively and as quickly as possible. Reynaud wanted the Ruhr plan referred to the French Government before a decision was made but, pressed by Chamberlain, he finally conceded that no further reference would be required. The concession applied to an invasion of Holland alone or to both Belgium and Holland.84

The French, at last, had been forced to meet British expectations and a decision to attack the Ruhr was vested with the British War Cabinet. This did not mean, however, that the Air Force was at liberty to act as it saw fit for Churchill and Chamberlain remained unconvinced that an invasion in the West should ‘automatically’ initiate the Ruhr plan. Churchill’s compunction was based on two issues, a fear of unnecessarily inviting retaliation and concern that British action in the air be fully justified in the eyes of the world. If an invasion did not develop ‘decisively’ it would be unwise to precipitate ‘unrestricted’ air warfare by bombing east of the Ruhr. If the ‘great’ battle did not develop, it would be difficult to justify ‘taking the gloves off’.

All these concerns and the debate that surrounded them re-emerged in early May when it was considered possible the Germans would conduct a ‘limited’ advance into Holland from which to escalate the air war against Britain but no great battle develop. Germany, thereafter, might gain command of the air over Britain and invasion might follow. Churchill took the invasion threat very seriously and initiated the recall of elements of the 5 Division then in France; this was an extraordinary decision given his past pre-occupation with moving forces to France as quickly as possible. Discussion of the action to be taken in response to this limited attack on Holland took place on 7 May following a COS assessment.85 Equivocation was again the order of the day. The COS report supported the Ruhr option. A new and compelling reason for ‘taking the gloves off’ sooner rather than later was the need for adequate moonlight for targets other than ‘self-illuminating’ ones and this

84 Ibid. 85 The title of the COS report was Allied Naval, military and air action in event of a German attack on the Netherland Islands. The War Cabinet thought the likely target would be the island of Texel. 159

demanded operations begin immediately if German aggression occurred within the next several days.86 Churchill and Chamberlain continued to demur. Chamberlain feared that the Germans might take the Dutch islands but do no more than this in the short to medium term. If Britain bombed the Ruhr in response, the Germans would be compelled to respond. In short, Britain would have unnecessarily escalated the air war before the ‘decisive’ battle. Churchill took a similar attitude. He doubted a limited German operation would warrant or justify immediately ‘taking the gloves off’: He thought it would be undesirable to take the initiative in opening unrestricted warfare at a time when we possessed only a quarter of the striking power of the German air force. Even a limited initiative on our part might result in the wholesale indiscriminate bombing of this country.87

Thus Churchill and Chamberlain continued to equivocate over the nature of the targets the Air Force should be permitted to attack. Each maintained that an attack on oil installations was a step too far. The SSA was adamant that the targets included oil installations and thought it unwise to imagine that attacking marshalling yards would not precipitate unrestricted air bombing as certainly as would bombing oil installations. Rather than bombing the Ruhr, Churchill thought a better counter to a German attack on Holland would be the “land battle which would be joined by British and French forces.” However, it was pointed out that, while invading Holland, the Germans might only advance to the Albert Canal. If the Allies advanced only to the Dyle, battle would not be joined. In these circumstances, the bombers might not respond at all to a German attack on Holland.

Overall, Churchill’s argument was that a limited attack on Holland, and more broadly, any German action in the West, did not justify ‘immediate’ resort to a Ruhr offensive. His views were now being built on assumptions that were entirely at odds with his long held conviction that Hitler would do what he liked, when he liked, and

86 The War Cabinet was discovering the complications of night bombing. While it made bombing very much safer at this point in the war, it made the bombing itself highly problematic. Accurate bombing, let alone actually finding the target, was a great challenge. Self-illuminating targets were heavy industry with furnaces and so-on which were (more) easily found at night. It was the challenge of finding suitable targets at night that undoubtedly encouraged the Air Force to expand the options open to them. The obverse problem for the Air Force, of course, was that bombing at night manifestly increased the likelihood of civilian casualties. 87 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 7 May. Minute 1, CAB 65/13. At the 7 November 1939 meeting Churchill had supported the Ruhr plan in response to a limited attack on Holland. Now he hesitated. 160

would not need provocation. With opinions divided over the issue of oil installations, Chamberlain deferred a decision and the entire matter was thrashed out the following day. Again Churchill argued in support of Chamberlain for a conservative policy. Indeed, he would take Chamberlain’s conservatism one step further. While Chamberlain had concluded attacks on marshalling yards could occur if troops were on the move forward, Churchill argued that neither an attack on oil facilities nor marshalling yards in the Ruhr should occur “until the great battle on land had begun.”88 Given the ongoing anxiety over what the French would do, his concern was that, if an attack on the Ruhr occurred before there was evidence of a great land battle, and ‘even though we might know … the German armies were on the move forward, our action would be very much criticised.” To help clarify the matter he intended to travel to France.

Despite many months of discussion, war broke out in the West with a pall of uncertainty hanging over air operations and, in particular, the use of Britain’s heavy bombers.89 Chamberlain is condemned for a pusillanimous air policy; yet in the final few days before the invasion of the Low Countries, Churchill was taking the lead in a ‘wait and see’ response to German aggression based on fear of retaliation and concern for neutral and, more specifically, US, public opinion. A third, but less important influence was a belief the heavy bombers might be able to more directly influence to land battle. He held these views against the strongly held convictions of the COS and other members of the War Cabinet that hesitation would be to the great disadvantage of Britain.

Perhaps the most telling commentary on Churchill can be made by assessing his actions following the German invasion of the Low Countries. On 10 May, the last day of Chamberlain’s premiership, the bombing policy was considered again and, again, put in abeyance. British bombers could bomb west of the Rhine but not east. Churchill’s contribution was to argue, as he had done several times, that the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of operations against the Ruhr were finely balanced. Moreover, deceived by German movements, he claimed he was not convinced that what was then taking

88 This discussion was in the context of an attack on the Dutch islands. Churchill wanted to be sure that the main land battle would start thereafter. Churchill noted that the War Cabinet did not know what the French would do if the Germans attacked the Dutch islands only. 89 War Cabinet Minutes, May/June 1940, CAB 65/7. 161

place was the ‘decisive’ battle.90 The consensus view of the War Cabinet, was that a decision should await information on the nature of German air activity before doing more.

On 11 May, Churchill’s first day as Prime Minister, Air Policy was not discussed. On 12 May, Newell referred to the most recent COS report and the heavy losses that had occurred amongst the tactical bomber force. Moreover, he introduced a new argument for the Ruhr plan. Presumably, seeking to minimise further bomber losses in the area of the advances, the argument was put that, if the Ruhr was bombed, Germany might retaliate and this would draw off German bombers from the land battle to England where they could be fought to advantage by Britain’s fighters. By this time, even CIGS Ironside supported this. If the bombers could not attack difficult targets near the battle, he would prefer to see the Ruhr plan implemented. Pound also agreed. Churchill accepted they were no longer bound by ‘previously held scruples’ and returned to his old position that Germany would attack Britain when and where it suited. Nevertheless, he concluded again that arguments for and against action were finely balanced and he recommended putting off the decision for three or four days in order to make sure the decisive battle had started. He also asked that, before a decision was made, his new ministers, Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood had been apprised of issues at stake.91

With Attlee and Greenwood present at the War Cabinet meeting the following day, Churchill summarised the arguments for and against the Ruhr plan. Greenwood thought the arguments ‘for’ compelling. Chamberlain did not. He asked, in contradistinction from the reasoning of the SSA of the day before, if it would be wise to attract bombers to Britain and thereby make it impossible to send more fighters to France. Halifax wished to weigh the value of seizing the advantage against waiting to see how things developed. He thought, on balance, the army in France had more to

90 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 13 May, 1940, CAB 65/13. Churchill, as were many, was confused by the deep armoured incursions and assumed that, without support of infantry, these would be defeated or forced to retreat. His focus was with the movement of the main armies. It was the movement of these that would, for him, decide if the battles then taking place would be ‘decisive’ and thereby justify ‘taking the gloves off” in the air war. Thus was his decision to unleash the heavy bombers delayed. 91 Clement Attlee, (1883-1967) Leader of the Labour Party. Attlee was appointed Lord Privy Seal. Arthur Greenwood, (1880-1954) Deputy Leader of the Labour Party. Greenwood was appointed Minister without Portfolio. 162

lose than gain by an attack on the Ruhr. Attlee, although believing it might be the right psychological moment to attack the Ruhr, worried that German bombing might affect the supply line to France. The Army proposed that the heavy bombers give their full attention to marshalling yards “on to which we could not direct too great a scale of attack.” By this time, Churchill was already thinking beyond the battle for France. He believed it was not possible to fritter away fighters or bombers on the battle at hand. Moreover, he still remained unconvinced the great battle was developing. He proposed the Ruhr decision be put off for three or four days, although it would be reviewed daily. He made this decision despite the CAS warning that the heavy bombers must take advantage of the waxing moon and such a wait would be a great disadvantage.

It was not until 15 May that Churchill agreed to the Ruhr plan.92 By this time support for this plan had combined with a determination to avoid sending more aircraft to France to produce a rationale that contradicted the policy that had motivated British air policy throughout the Phoney War. Moreover, contradicted to an air policy that very likely had had a material influence on France’s disastrous military dispositions. Having built an air and land policy around a determination not to expose Britain to an air threat via a German lodgement in the Low Countries, the War Cabinet was now accepting enthusiastically the SSA suggestion that the best way to aid the French would be to draw a German bombing attack onto Britain itself through an attack on the Ruhr. This policy was driven by heavy losses in medium bombers and fighters. Moreover, the air force was now resistant to sending more fighters to France. The SSA sought to have the Ruhr plan extended beyond marshalling yards and oil facilities to other targets in the Ruhr east of the Rhine. Churchill, at last, was amenable. He could already see it would fulfil a dual need: “The attraction of German bombers to this country … would have the advantage of relieving pressure on France.” The First Sea Lord more clinically, and more honestly, assessed the advantage of the proposal by noting that it would provide a conclusive reason for refusing the request of the French” for more fighters. Nevertheless, Churchill asked one more time if the US would accept it as a ‘reasonable and

92 The precise use of the heavy bombers was left in abeyance during 14 May although, the SSA and CAS continued to push the Ruhr plan and remind the War Cabinet of the value of the waxing moon. 163

justifiable retaliation.” Remarkably, it was Halifax who put his mind at rest on this point when he declared that the operations were ‘fully justifiable” provided they were directed at military objectives.93 Chamberlain, too, argued that it would ‘be wrong to stay our hands any longer.” The die was cast, but Churchill had hesitated until the end.

Conclusions For the entire period of the Phoney War, Churchill’s view of the air threat and the limitations this should place on Britain’s use of its own air weapon differed little from many of his colleagues and his Prime Minister. Despite the historical view of Churchill’s determination to take the war to the enemy, this did not extend to the war in the air. His views oftentimes differed from other members of the War Cabinet only to the extent that they were less ‘hawkish’. This chapter has explored Churchill’s attitude to the aggressive use of Air Power in the opening months of the war. It then considered Churchill’s Operation Royal Marine and his frustration over the French refusal to proceed with it. Finally, it considered Churchill’s contribution to British policy on the Western Front in the event of a German invasion of the Low Countries. An important conclusion to be drawn was that, in most respects, Churchill’s view of the Air threat differed little from that which the French used to delay Royal Marine.

All these matters were well hidden in Churchill’s own writing on the Second World War. Indeed, the discussions that occurred over Belgium and Holland and when and where Britain should use its heavy bomber force is almost entirely absent from The Gathering Storm and Their Finest Hour, the two volumes that address the Phoney War and the first few days of Germany’s invasion of the Low Countries. In reference to Royal Marine, Churchill argued that Daladier contrived a ‘special’ excuse to avoid its implementation and thereafter Churchill chastised the French for their ‘don’t hurt them dear’ attitude. 94The French are cast as pusillanimous.95 However, the criticism levelled at the French over Royal Marine could be levelled at Churchill for the views

93 Halifax noted that they had already attacked Aachen and Munchen-Gladbach without a response from the USA. 94 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 574. 95 Ibid. Of some interest and importance, the expression ‘don’t hurt them dear’ Churchill used to condemn the French was first used by Churchill himself to criticise Malkin’s pedantic rejection of Royal Marine, an issue ignored in The Gathering Storm. Despite this, Churchill claimed that it was “a method of refusal which I had never met before or since.” 164

he held on the air war and bombing policy and which continued right up to the early days of his premiership when, rather than acting decisively in the use of Britain’s strategic bomber force and attacking targets deemed most important to the Allied war effort, he hesitated. He did so for reasons similar to those the French had used in the preceding eight months, among them, fear of retaliation.

There are a number of rather obvious reasons why Allied bombing policy in regard to Belgium and Holland received as little attention in Churchill’s writing as did the motivation behind, and treatment of, Allied Scandinavian strategy, a subject of the next chapter. Beyond British concern that it would be undesirable to see more small neutrals succumb to the Germans unopposed, Allied strategy was almost entirely a matter of self-interest. The British, and Churchill among them, saw the territorial integrity of the Low Countries as important primarily because its loss to the Germans would expose Britain to German air power. The French did not view the threat to these countries as reason enough to escalate the air war. They were undoubtedly motivated to enter Belgium for a variety of sound strategic reasons but, given British efforts to impress upon them the consequences of not doing so, it is difficult to imagine that a desire to avoid Britain’s Ruhr plan was not influential, to some degree, in the development of their strategy.

This was ‘real politics’ of the first order. It is well known that the Belgians, in their refusal to co-operate with the Allies, were architects of their own tragedy. However, in the post-war period during which Churchill wrote his history, knowledge of this political pragmatism would have made British and French policy towards the Low Countries much less palatable to the public, had its nature been honestly rendered. Churchill’s own writing ensured it would not be fully understood. His writing also obscured the limitations of his own offensive spirit. As far as the ‘sit-tight and re-arm’ view of the war was concerned, Churchill was much more in tune with his Prime Minister’s and the War Cabinet air bombing policy than is generally supposed. He certainly chaffed at the restrictions it imposed upon aggressive action but, it would not be the British War Cabinet that would obstruct Royal Marine but the French and the French objected to Royal Marine for the reasons Churchill hesitated to ‘take the gloves off’: the threat of retaliation. What Churchill appeared unwilling to acknowledge in his own writing was that the French 165

always had more reason to be anxious in regard to the air threat than did Britain. As weak as Gamelin and Daladier’s reasons were for objecting to Royal Marine, each was driven by a conviction that France was much more exposed to the consequences of such action than Britain and much less capable of responding to it. If Royal Marine failed to get off the ground until it was too late to make a difference, Churchill could not justifiably call the French to account. He, after all, would delay the Ruhr plan for five days to save Britain from the threat of retaliation that had so animated the French. He did so against the strongest advice of the COS who had long argued that celerity was the key to success in these operations.

Churchill’s support for Allied air policy helped contribute to a significant failing in Western Front policy. It has been suggested elsewhere that French decision to commit themselves to an incursion deep into Belgium represented an important example of Allied co-operation and that it was intended to accommodate British anxieties over heightened air threat to Britain that the German occupation of Belgium would cause.96 The evidence adduced here suggests this decision was more likely a symbol of a great divide. If the fate-filled Dyle plan (and other variations) was influenced in any way by air policy, it was influence based less in a desire to protect Britain from the German air threat than a desire to protect France. It could not have escaped the French, for Chamberlain had made it very plain, that the more of Belgium and Holland lost to the enemy, the less cause Britain would have to bomb the Ruhr and precipitate the unrestricted aerial warfare that Gamelin, Daladier and Reynaud feared.

As one of three service ministers, Churchill played his part in pressing the aggressive Ruhr policy on the French in support of the strong views of the Chiefs of Staff. However, he shared many of Chamberlain’s doubts that this was the correct path to follow. Nevertheless, under constant pressure of the COS and Air Staff and supported by the secretaries of state and Churchill as First Lord, Chamberlain secured permission to act unilaterally against the Ruhr. Denied still was permission to ‘take the gloves off, without further reference to the War Cabinet. Churchill and

96 David Reynolds, In Command of History (Penguin Books, 2005), 165-166. This study shares Reynold’s view of Churchill tendentious assessment of Allied strategy on the Western Front. It does not share his assessment of French motivation in regard to the Dyle plan. 166

Chamberlain each demanded the unequivocal evidence that German action in the West was ‘decisive’ and that it fully justified ‘taking the gloves off’ in the air war; an unprovoked assault on the Low Countries, let alone Germany’s brutal air action in Poland, apparently remained insufficient justification for action against large industrial targets that might result in German civilian casualties. This hesitation occurred despite the repeated COS warnings that the Ruhr must be attacked as soon as it was possible lest opportunities be lost.

It is certain this hesitation had no significant impact on the battle for France; it is also probable that it made little or no difference to the Ruhr operations, the value of which was much over-rated, as were the heavy bombers at this time. However, Churchill did not know how ineffectual these operations would be any more than anyone else; yet, before this weapon was unleashed he adhered rigidly to the policies enunciated over many months by Chamberlain and, indeed, he proved more conservative. His determination to have the heavy bombers adopt a tactical role in the early battle, although having some merit, reaped few rewards. His refusal to endorse an attack on the Ruhr meant that the greater number of Britain’s heavy bombers sat idle for the first five days following the German invasion.97 If Chamberlain’s reluctance to ‘take the gloves off’ against Germany in the air war is to be judged a weakness, it was a weakness shared in full measure by Churchill.

The common element in the foregoing is the determination displayed by Britain and France to fight the war with as little harm as possible being done to their

97 The heavy bomber operations conducted in the first three days against cross-roads and bridges and other lines of communications were notable only for their modest and ineffectual nature. In the night of 11/12 May, 37 heavy bombers attack the town of Munchen-Gladbach, killing four people, including an English women who was living there. See, Martin Middlebrook, Chris Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries: An Operational Reference Book, 1939-1945 (England: Midland Publishing, 1996), 42. It is difficult to fully understand War Cabinet and Air Force policy at this time. A decision to bomb a town was a major step. It was justified, of course, by it being in a military zone and also the presence of armed forces. However, it must surely have invited civilian casualties more so than some of the industrial targets further into Germany then denied as objectives. One must wonder further at Churchill’s motivation, therefore. This situation would seem to confirm the assessment that he rejected the attack on industrial targets for fear that the Germans would respond in kind; that is, against industrial targets in Britain. The probability of civilian casualties was essentially irrelevant. The first large-scale use of heavy bombers (99 aircraft) on industrial targets in Germany west of the Ruhr occurred in the night of 15/16 May (Bomber Command War Diaries: 43). The contrast between the numbers of heavy bombers used in the attacks on military targets as per Churchill’s recommendation and the first attack on industry is marked and indicate that the Air Force largely had its way in the use of its heavy bomber force.

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own countries. This, after all, was the essence of the ‘sit tight and re-arm’ long war view with which Churchill was in agreement. This approach to the war also manifested itself in the development of two other key strategic developments: Churchill’s Narvik scheme and the War Cabinet’s own Finnish Option. Churchill would subsequently lament the passing over of Narvik for the Finnish Option as a result of the War Cabinet always taking ‘the line of least resistance’. It will be argued, however, that to the extent of Churchill’s willingness to fight the war via friendly neutrals, the difference between him and the War Cabinet was only a matter of degrees.

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Chapter 6

Lines of Least Resistance Narvik and the Finnish Option

For much of the Phoney War period, two offensive plans were at the centre of War Cabinet discussions: Churchill’s Narvik operation and the Finnish Option, the War Cabinet’s convoluted plan to secure Swedish ore by helping Sweden and Finland fight the Soviet Union.1 Narvik, like Royal Marine, would not take place until April, 1940, and much too late to do the German’s harm. The Finnish Option would collapse in early March. In January 1940, a frustrated Churchill attributed the failure to implement Narvik to the “immense walls of prevention” put in place by the Government which made it impossible to ‘gain the initiative’.2 In March, he was still blaming a Government which had “never done anything but follow the line of least resistance”.3 His primary interlocutor in such matters was Lord Halifax who took a different view. He expressed dismay at taking a ‘different line’ over Narvik but believed “one can but do one’s best to form a judgment, and reach a decision, to the best of one’s capacity as the problem presents itself.”4 In March he declined to

1 Royal Marine was, of course, Churchill’s other initiative but it was rarely discussed within the War Cabinet once it received conditional support in December. 2 W. S. Churchill to Lord Halifax, 15 January 1940, FO 800/328; CV At the Admiralty, 642. 3 W. S. Churchill to Lord Halifax, 14 March 1940. FO 800/328; CV At the Admiralty, 883. 4 Lord Halifax to W. S. Churchill, 13 January, 1940, Char 19/2; CV At the Admiralty, 638. 169

accept Churchill’s apportionment of blame for the inertia of the period and responded that “the events have followed naturally and inevitably from circumstances that no Government resolution or energy could have surmounted.”5

The aim of this chapter is to explore the merits of these points of view through a study of Churchill’s pursuit of his Narvik plan and the development of the War Cabinet’s preferred Finnish Option.6 This chapter has four objectives. The first is to explore the origins of the Narvik plan and the level of Churchill’s commitment to it. The second is to understand how and why this plan became enmeshed in, and was then compromised by the Finnish Option, A third is to understand why the War Cabinet failed to prosecute Narvik or its own Finnish Option before the German invasion of Norway in April 1940. Addressing these objectives will continue the study of the extent to which Churchill’s frustration was a result of a pusillanimous Government determined to take the line of least resistance as he supposed or other factors including Churchill himself, Britain’s French ally, or the practical difficulties to be found in the proposals themselves. The fourth objective is to consider as a whole the value of Churchill’s Scandinavian pre-occupation. It was one thing to have a strategic ‘vision’ and quite another for this to be viable and likely to achieve the outcomes set for it.

Narvik and Swedish Ore At the beginning of the Second World War, most of Germany’s ore supply was drawn from Sweden. During the ice free months in the Baltic, approximately May through until December, most of the ore to Germany was shipped through the port of Lulea deep in the Gulf of Bothnia. For the rest of the year, when the Baltic was frozen, the ore moved through the Norwegian port of Narvik and down the Norwegian Leads and, except for British scruples towards entering Norwegian territorial waters, this left it eminently exposed to interception. Churchill drew the War Cabinet’s attention to the issue of Narvik ore in September, 1939, but it was not until April, 1940, that the Royal Navy acted against the Narvik trade by laying a minefield.

5 Lord Halifax to W. S. Churchill, 15 March, 1940, FO 800/328; CV At the Admiralty, 884. 6 For an existing view of Churchill’s criticism, see, David Dilks, ‘Great Britain and Scandinavia in the Phony War’, Scandinavia Jounal of History, 2: (1977), 29-51. 170

It is not uncommon to explain the delay in the prosecution of this operation to Churchill being resisted at every point by a Prime Minister unreasonably set on avoiding conflict at all cost. A similar view is often also taken of Lord Halifax.7 These views, however, are open to amendment. There is no doubt that Chamberlain was determined to avoid escalating the war but this was primarily about taking action which might unite the Germans more firmly behind Hitler and which would therefore make the avoidance of war impossible.8 This meant avoiding a direct assault against Germany on land or in the air. His attitude did not exclude action that might help compromise Germany’s capacity to wage war and which might, indeed, improve his chances for a successful peace initiative. Thus, when, in December, circumstances presented a situation in which the German war effort might be hurt by an ‘indirect’ approach, which did not engage the Germans directly in or over its territory, it was received with interest by Chamberlain, and more generally by members of the British and the French governments. The problem was that the indirect approach, of which Narvik and the Finnish Option were representative, was essentially an Allied effort to fight the war by proxy through three friendly neutrals: Norway, Sweden and Finland and each of these countries wished no part in it. Try as the Allies might, they were neither able to cajole nor compel these countries to accommodate their strategic needs. It is here, rather than the deliberate obstruction by Chamberlain and Halifax, one will find the best explanation for the failure of these offensives. Churchill would play his own role in ensuring this were so.

As far as Churchill’s Narvik plan was concerned, there was a second factor at work in denying success. This was an extension of the issues addressed in the previous chapter: the War Cabinet consensus view, shared, at least in regard to the air, by Churchill, that action must be something more than a mere ‘palliative’ and be

7D’Este, Warlord: 410 and Lamb, Churchill as War Leader: 27 are two who imply a constancy in Churchill’s advocacy regarding Narvik and an unwelcomed and unnecessary resistance from the War Cabinet. This ignores Churchill’s own uncertainty and his acknowledgement that, between September and the end of November, Narvik was not really worth pursuing. One can also note Talbot Imlay’s view of Chamberlain’s and Halifax subsequent attempts to avoid doing anything at all by “exploiting differences” between Narvik and the Finnish Option. (Talbot Imlay, A Reassessment of Anglo-French Strategy During the Phony War, 1939-1940 The English Historical Review 119 (481), 361) 8 Letter Neville Chamberlain to sister Ida, 8 October, 1939, Chamberlain Letters, 456. Chamberlain’s hopefulness in regard to Hitler’s demise diminished over time. In late October, he wrote that it “is difficult to see how we can expect the Nazi can beat a retreat when the necessity was not apparent.” Neville Chamberlain letter to Ida, 22 October, 1939, Chamberlain Diary Letters, 462. 171

certain of hurting the enemy more than its consequences might hurt the Allies themselves. If action were to be supported, it must offer a real opportunity of hurting the enemy. This view was a persistent element of COS deliberations throughout the Phoney War. When put to the test, Churchill’s Narvik operation did not ‘stack up’. The folly was that the Finnish Option somehow did, despite fairly obvious reasons why it was never likely to succeed.

It is also this general resistance to ‘palliative’ action rather than any deep- seated anxiety over the escalation of the war from Chamberlain or Halifax that helps explain why the Narvik ore issue, first mentioned by Churchill in September, was not acted upon until December. To this one can add Churchill’s own reservations and matters of plain common sense. First, there were few ore ships leaving Narvik during this time.9 Second, Britain was negotiating access to Norway’s tanker fleet and neither Churchill nor the Government wished to put these negotiations at risk. Third, action against the ore trade would risk Britain’s own supply of ore and other metals via Narvik and this weighed against action. Fourth, was the Admiralty’s uncertainty over the value of the operation. Naval staff was not convinced it was worth stopping this source of ore to Germany. Once Lulea re-opened, the trade would be resumed and the Germans would presumably do everything possible to make-up any short-fall in their supplies. Fifth, the War Cabinet was justifiably cautious over acting against a friendly neutral. The potential political ramifications of such action were a considerable pre-occupation.10

The catalyst for Churchill resuming his interest in Narvik was intelligence acquired in mid-November that showed the Narvik ore trade had resumed.11 Nevertheless, he remained cautious in regard to any precipitous action and viewed

9 The Germans had anticipated the British would take immediate action against the trade and therefore had kept it to a minimum; instead, they endeavoured to move as much ore through Lulea as possible before the Baltic freeze at the end of the year. 10 A number of these issues were canvassed at the War Cabinet meeting of 30 November, when Churchill revisited the matter for the first time in several months. Churchill had flagged his intention at the War Cabinet of 22 November to discuss the ore problem again but waited another 8 days to do so. Presumably he was awaiting the MEW report discussed below. 11 First Lord’s Personal Minute 15: W. S. Churchill to Admiral Godfrey and Captain Mansergh, 21 November, 1939. Char 19/3; CV At the Admiralty, 404. 172

the Norwegian charter agreement as a priority.12 It was only at the end of November, when the Ministry for Economic Warfare [MEW] provided him with an explosive appreciation of the ore situation, that Churchill began pressing in earnest for action against Narvik. The MEW report asserted that, “a complete stoppage of Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany now would, barring unpredictable developments, end the war in a few months.”13 The memo concluded with similar force: “the future course of the war might well be deeply affected by the defeat of supply of Swedish ore between now and next May.”14

The MEW report was an extraordinary document and, because of its grandiose claims, also extraordinarily irresponsible. Its import was that the German economy could be seriously compromised, as would its capacity to wage war, by nothing more significant than denying Germany a single winter’s supply of ore via the southern Swedish port of Oxelosund and the Norwegian port of Narvik. Although stopping the supply via Oxelosund was more problematic, the severance of supply via Narvik was well within the capacity of Royal Navy to achieve.15 The report, however, was a grossly exaggerated assessment of the likely harm that would be done to the German economy. The Germans were never desperately short of ore and had taken steps to minimise risks by importing more ore in the pre-war period.16 Additionally, they

12 ibid. For his comments on priority given to the charter agreement see, also, First Lord’s Personal Minute 30, Winston S. Churchill to Admiral Pound, Admiral Phillips, and others, 27 November, 1939, Char 19/3; CV At the Admiralty, 432. 13 Scandinavian Affairs: Tactical and Strategical Policy to be Adopted. Memo 27 November, 1939 entitled Germany: Supplies of Swedish Iron Ore, ADM 116/4471. The memorandum explained that Germany must import 9 to 12 million tons of Swedish ore in the first year of war to avoid industrial breakdown. It contended that so little ore had been received in Germany since the outbreak of the war that, if the winter supply could also be cut, the reduced amount available to the Germans might not be sufficient to “stave off a crisis” even with the re-opening of Lulea in May. It is not clear that historians are aware of this memo. Munch-Peterson, for example, makes no mention of it and refers only to the subsequent MEW assessment. 14 Ibid. 15 Oxelosund was a southern Swedish port, from which the flow of ore to Germany was not open to interdiction by the Royal Navy. The only way in which this problem could be solved, short of Swedish co-operation, was by sabotage. From early in the war, plans were being discussed to block the port or damage its loading facilities and to blame the Soviets for this. The proposal ended with a ‘key-stone cops’ episode in early April, when the saboteurs were arrested almost immediately after being given the ‘green light’ by the War Cabinet to take action. The irony in this episode is that the severe Baltic winter had resulted in very little ore moving through the port. For insight into these plans see the HS/2 Files at British National Archives, especially, HS2/263. 16 The issue of German and its iron ore needs remains a matter of much past debate. However, for an emphatic assessment of the degree to which German military production was independent of Swedish ore, especially in the short-term, see, Jager Jorg-Johannes, ‘Sweden’s Iron Ore Exports to Germany, 173

were mining and using their own low-grade sources; this was undoubtedly an expensive and inefficient process but it helped meet their immediate needs.17 They had more than enough ore available to wait out the winter and begin importing ore via Lulea from mid-Spring.

Unsurprisingly, the memorandum captured Churchill’s attention, and this was very probably what was intended.18 He wrote to Pound insisting that the Admiralty must “arrive at a clear policy” in regard to Swedish ore. He noted naval staff had cast doubt on the value of stopping the ore trade but the MEW had informed him “nothing could be more deadly to the German war-making capacity … than to stop for three or even six months this import.”19 Churchill immediately began exploring ways in which the Navy could stop the flow of ore via Narvik and prevent the other German efforts to mitigate the early freeze in the Baltic. The most important of these was his proposal to mine the Norwegian waters at critical points to force the trade into open waters and facilitate its interception.20

Churchill was now willing to put into second place the obstacles to action at Narvik. The tanker agreement with Norway had yet to be sealed but he now wrote “It

1933-1944: A Reply to Rolf Karlborn’s Article on the Same Subject’, Scandinavia Economic History Review, 15, 1-2. (1967): 139-147. Karlborn’s article was published in the same volume of the Review. 17 For views on these matters and for another important assessment of Swedish ore and Germany, see, Martin Fritz, ‘Swedish Iron Ore and German Steel 1939-40’, Scandinavia Economic History Review, 21:2, (1973): 133-144 18 Munch-Peterson, The Strategy of Phoney War, 77, sites comments by MEW staff member, Harry Sporborg, that indicated the MEW was not backward in providing the maximum gloss on their proposals. In submitting the 10 December report on the same subject, Sporborg informed Desmond Moreton, Principal Assistant Secretary of MEW that he had given as much emphasis as possible to the positive effects of their proposals to help overcome the objections of other departments. The departments Sporborg had in mind were Supply and Trade whose pre-occupations were quite different to those of the MEW. 19 First Lord’s Personal Minute 30 to Pound, Admiral Phillips and others, 27 November, 1939, Char 19/3. The others were the ACNS, Admiral Burrough, the Director of the Economic Division, Admiral Taylor, The DDOD (Deputy Director of Operations Division, Mining), Captain, R.H.F. de Salis, the DNI, Admiral Godfrey and the Military Branch. Churchill’s memo pointed out that it would not only be ore that would be prevented from reaching Germany by naval action but other material as well. 20 Ibid. Naval staff suggested to him that, immediately Lulea traffic ceased, Norwegian neutrality be violated and a force be landed at Narvik or that naval forces be stationed in territorial waters in this region. Churchill was opposed to these options, subsequently arguing that his proposal would reduce the likelihood of direct conflict with Norwegian naval forces. Churchill also sought to stop the Germans mitigating the early Baltic freeze by the use of a Russian ice-breaker in the Gulf of Bothnia and by preventing trade via the southern Swedish port of Oxelosund. The Russian ice-breaker was never destined for Lulea and, as it turned out because of the severe winter, little or no trade occurred via Oxelosund. 174

may not … be possible to wait”.21 Given the importance of Norwegian ships to Britain’s survival, and the navy’s responsibility for maritime trade, this was a remarkable choice of priority for a First Lord. It was also an important indication of the degree to which, in naval matters, he was prepared to put offensive action ahead of actions designed, first and foremost, to secure Britain’s own capacity to wage war. Others were more cautious in this regard. He put his mind to the issue of a satisfactory casus beli for action in Norwegian waters, a vital issue if the War Cabinet was to agree to the proposal, and saw promise in the recent action by the Germans to challenge Sweden’s territorial limits.22

Churchill brought up the issue of the Norwegian ore trade to the War Cabinet of 28 November but there is no evidence he drew attention to the MEW report in his possession.23 His Narvik proposal was met with reservations. Halifax considered important the Government investigate the economic ramifications of the proposal for Germany and for Britain. The possibility and consequences of German retaliation also had to be considered.24 Nevertheless, the War Cabinet requested a detailed assessment of the proposal from the MEW and the Chiefs of Staff. Thus, in early December, Narvik hung in the balance.

The Finnish Option On 30 November, the Soviet Union invaded Finland. This would soon have a decisive impact on War Cabinet war policy. It would also bear heavily on Churchill’s Narvik aspirations, although he initially saw it as a positive for one or other of his offensive plans. He thought the Soviets threat might, for example, solve the most intractable problem facing any operation in Scandinavia, including Catherine: Swedish co-operation. He also thought Swedish fear of the Soviet Union might cause the Swedes to seek Allied protection and he made reference to these possibilities on 11 December when he told the War Cabinet that it would be to the Allies advantage

21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. However, because the Allies themselves were unprepared to acknowledge the 4 mile limit, this issue was not pressed. 23 Conclusions of War Cabinet Meeting, 30 November, 1939, CAB 65/2/33. There is no evidence within the minutes that the MEW report was known to the War Cabinet or that Churchill introduced it. Rather, the request for a detailed MEW report on the subject suggests he had not presented it or even referred to it. One can only speculate at the machinations behind this. 24 Ibid. 175

“if … Norway and Sweden became involved in war against Russia.”25 The Allies could gain a foothold in Scandinavia without necessarily going to war with Russia and this “would open up prospects in the Naval war which might be most fruitful.”26 However, rather than aiding Narvik, the Soviet threat would quickly become one of two insurmountable obstacles for Churchill’s proposal.

Things began to unravel for Narvik with the new MEW report, a draft of which was ready by 12 December. This backed away from the more grand claims regarding the stopping of Narvik ore that had been provided to Churchill and which had prompted his renewed interest. It was now contended that, while stopping this source of ore would cause the Germans “acute industrial embarrassment”, a “decisive advantage” could only be achieved if it were followed by the stoppage of the ore via Lulea.27 If, therefore, no way could be found to stop this latter trade, it was likely the War Cabinet would conclude that taking action against Narvik would not be worth the potential consequences.28 Churchill recognised this problem and therefore argued in his 16 December memorandum that Narvik was merely a first step to the stopping of all ore to Germany.29 However, his position was difficult for the fact that he offered no answer to the ‘next step’, the stopping of ore via Lulea, beyond declaring that, after Narvik, “the prevention of the reopening of Lulea may become a principle Naval objective.”30 Such vague propositions did little to advance Narvik and, on 20 December, Halifax got to the nub of Churchill’s problem when he noted the MEW equivocation over the value of Narvik. It was evident that the future

25 Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 11 December, 1939, CAB 65/2/45. 26 Ibid. 27 Minutes of War Cabinet meeting, 3 January, 1940, CAB 5/11/2. The degree to which the MEW eventually ‘pulled the rug from under the feet’ of Churchill is illustrated by the comments of the Minister of Economic Warfare’s comments to the War Cabinet on 3 January when he declared that “The game would only be worth the candle if we succeeded in stopping of all the ore supplies from the North Swedish mines.” This comment followed a discussion of the impact of Narvik on Britain’s own trade, especially if Germany invaded southern Norway. 28 Indeed, when next discussed, the proposal met with the usual resistance for the usual reasons: its potential impact on neutral opinion, the risks surrounding the Norwegian charter agreement, the loss to Britain of its own supply of Scandinavian material, and so on. 29 War Cabinet Paper by W. S. Churchill, 16 December, 1939, CAB 66/4. He thought three immediate actions should be taken: deal with the Russian ice-breaker which it was thought would be used by the Germans to keep Lulea open, stop the Narvik trade and stop the supply via Oxelosund by “methods neither diplomatic nor military” (sabotage). He also rejected any concerns about German retaliation, believing the Allies had more to gain than lose by a German attack in Scandinavia. As for Norway, he believed it would still proceed with the tanker charter agreement because, to do otherwise, would lead to its economic ruin. 30 Ibid. 176

of the plan hinged on finding a way to also stop the flow from Lulea in the summer.31 The COS were also arguing that a decision on Narvik be based on the precise effect of this project on Germany against the value of stopping all ore.32 If a way could be found to follow Narvik with successful operations against the Gallivare ore fields and Lulea, then Narvik might yet proceed. If it could not, it was likely to be deemed of doubtful efficacy. However, if a solution to the entire ore problem could be found and if this solution would be compromised by the prosecution of Narvik, then it was equally likely the latter would be sacrificed to the former.

Halifax thought that the only way to stop all ore to Germany would be to “involve Sweden in war, either against Germany, or against Russia over Finland.”33 The solution nominated to solve this problem would prove the decisive obstacle to Narvik. This was the French, British Foreign Office, and COS initiative which soon developed to offer Sweden assistance should it be threatened by the Soviet Union for the help it was giving Finland and which, for convenience, this study has referred to as the Finnish Option. If an offer of assistance were accepted, it would draw the Swedes to the allied side, possibly result in a request for military assistance, and thereafter facilitate the control of the Swedish ore fields by British or Allied forces. The proposal was premised on the view that the Swedes and Norwegians feared the Soviet Union above all, including Germany. However, the plan was also driven by a number of other, extraneous strategic and political influences: assistance to Finland and Sweden would help the Allies keep the Soviet Union embroiled in its war with Finland and this would limit the economic support it was assumed it was giving Germany. This would restrict the ability of both countries to wage war in the Balkans where the British War Cabinet, if not the French, believed the Allies were more exposed and less capable of taking action.34

Given the Foreign Office’ hopefulness surrounding Swedish fear of the Soviet Union as a catalyst for action in Scandinavia, the COS preliminary support for the

31 WP 168, Memorandum SSFA, Lord Halifax, The German Iron Ore Traffic, December 20, 1939, CAB 66/4/18 32 COS Report, 20 December 1939, CAB 83/2; also CAB 66/4/19. 33 Ibid. 34 An attraction of the Finnish Option for the War Cabinet was that it would deflect French from their evident keenness for action in the Mediterranean. The British COS remained unequivocal in arguing that, unless and until Italian neutrality was assured, operations in the Mediterranean should be avoided. 177

idea, and the other perceived advantages of the Finnish Option, there was really no contest between it and Churchill’s Narvik plan when these proposals were discussed at the 20 December MCC meeting and the War Cabinet meeting of 22 December. Churchill supported the proposal to offer assistance to Sweden but he argued this be accompanied with action against the flow of ore via Narvik and Oxelosund.35 Thereafter, however, he could offer nothing but uncertainty. He believed the Government should ‘advance with our eyes fully open to the fact that we could not possibly precisely know what would be the next step we should have to take” but none of the possible disadvantages would outweigh the value of stopping the supply of ore to Germany.36 This included the possibility of war with the Soviet Union which, he believed, “was a risk we should have to run.” Churchill’s attempts to make a virtue of the uncertainty that would follow the Narvik operation could not have been convincing. The consequences of action against Narvik were eminently foreseeable: the potential alienation of Norway and Sweden and this, it was expected, would make impossible the stopping of all ore.

At the end of December, it appeared inevitable that Churchill’s Narvik would be subsumed by the Finnish Option. Remarkably, and in contrast to the accepted view of his resistance to action, Chamberlain several times breathed life into Churchill’s plan.37 He was interested in the idea of separating Germany from its supply of ore and receptive to the view expressed by several members of the War Cabinet on 26 December that it was better to do something now to hurt Germany than to wait and possibly lose the opportunity.38 Thus Chamberlain sought to test the

35 Meeting of MCC 20 December, 1939. CAB 83/1; War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 22 December, 1939, CAB 65/4/29. 36 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 22 December 1939, CAB 65/4/29. Left unexplained here was why Germany would react violently towards Sweden if, as summer approached, the Swedes showed no intention to block the supply of ore from Lulea. It was, in short, an unconvincing scenario. 37 Of the discussions around this time, it has been remarked “Churchill was finding himself in the position of being able to change military strategy but unable to initiate action, because Chamberlain and his pre-war appeasement colleagues were opposed to anything which might escalate the cold war into a shooting war” (Lamb: Churchill as War Leader: 29) As will be seen, however, elements of Chamberlain’s actions at this time do not fit this mould. For an insightful perspective on such issues, see Smart, Before the Balloons Went Up, 137-140. 38 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 22 December, 1939, Cab 65/4/29. Chatfield suggested that the war in Finland might go slowly and the Swedes and Norwegians might therefore take their time in responding to an Allied demarche: “If no action was taken in the meantime, we should lose an opportunity to inflict a major embarrassment on Germany.” The Minister for Economic Warfare also argued that, if the supply from Oxelosund and Narvik could be severed, the embarrassment would be serious.” 178

proposition that Narvik and the Finnish Option were indeed as incompatible as was being argued. He suggested that the Swedish fear of the Soviet Union was so great that it would override the negative impact of the Narvik operation if this accompanied the Allied offer of assistance. It would also stop Norway and Sweden ‘temporising’.39 This view was challenged by the COS who by late December were concerned that Finnish resistance had been so successful that Norway and Sweden were now less fearful of the Soviet Union and would, therefore, be less inclined to accept any threat accompanying the demarche.40 At the 27 December War Cabinet Churchill and Chamberlain attempted to get around this particular obstacle by arguing that the Finns’ success would be temporary and that the Soviet threat would return in the Spring and so, thereafter, would Swedish anxiety.41 They believed that the Swedes would “protest” but would not be permanently alienated by Narvik. This was a particularly dangerous line of argument for Churchill for, in making this case, he was simultaneously endorsing the Finnish Option and the ‘Soviet threat’ scenario that were compromising Narvik. His endorsement would prove just enough to encourage the War Cabinet to persist with the Finnish Option and not enough to persuade it to go ahead with Narvik.

During these last days of December and into January, Churchill adopted two other lines of argument in his efforts to activate his preferred scheme. He argued that, far from compromising the Finnish Option, Narvik would be the essential catalyst. The moment Britain acted against the Narvik ore, Germany would act in southern Sweden and this would force Norway and Sweden into the war.42 It was, however, not wise to argue that Narvik would precipitate a violent German response against Sweden and Norway when the War Cabinet was attempting to build a strategy based on Scandinavian co-operation. Again, Churchill recognised his dilemma but his solution was far from effective. Over the following weeks, he would brazenly interchange between two mutually exclusive arguments in support of Narvik, as and when it suited. When the situation warranted it, he would push Narvik as the

39 This concern over temporising was based on Hankey’s concern that Norway and Sweden might take so long to respond to the demarche that all advantage in stopping the winter supply of ore would be lost. 40 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 27 December, 1939, CAB 65/4/30. 41 The view was that the Soviet advance was being impeded by the Finnish winter. The spring thaw was expected to make their attacks much more formidable. 42 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 27 December, 1939, CAB 65/4/30. 179

‘essential catalyst’ to Lulea because it would prompt German aggression. When it appeared that Narvik might yet proceed, despite concerns over its impact on the Finnish option, he would argue that the Germans would take no action because it would not be in their interests to do so. Such flexible but inconsistent lines of reasoning would have done little for his credibility as strategist.

Another, more aggressive line of argument put repeatedly by Churchill was that the Allies should take action against Norway and Sweden to secure the Gallivare ore fields whether or not they co-operated. He believed, and argued, that it would be possible for the Allies to develop sufficient force to occupy the ore fields in the face of Norwegian and Swedish resistance. This was an assertion entirely without foundation and would, again, have done little to demonstrate Churchill’s credentials as strategist. As Ironside and the COS would several times explain, control of Narvik was not the ticket to Gallivare, but Swedish co-operation was.43

The COS decided the question of the combined demarche and Narvik warning via two important papers on 31 December.44 In each, the emphasis was on Swedish co-operation and they concluded that the Finnish Option was the best way forward; to proceed with Narvik would compromise this larger scheme. The COS were particularly concerned that the Army needed time to prepare forces for operations in Scandinavia, whether needed to resist the Soviets or the Germans and, as Churchill had unwisely but correctly pointed out, an immediate naval operation against the Narvik trade risked precipitating a German response in Scandinavia and for this the allies were ill-prepared.

Churchill despaired when he read the memoranda condemning Narvik and he wrote a compelling memo in response to them. While he agreed with elements of the COS report, he concluded that its effects: will lead to a purely negative conclusion…The self-contained project of stopping the ore from Narvik and Oxelosund must not be tried because it would jeopardise the larger programme. The larger programme must not be attempted unless Sweden and Norway co-operate…But is there any prospect of Sweden and Norway actively co-operating of their own free will to bring about a series of operations which…will: a. Ruin the trade of their ironfield and the shipping which carries it.

43 Ibid. 44 These were WP (39) 179 (COS 181) Military Implications of a Policy Aimed at Stopping the Export of Iron Ore to Germany, CAB 66/4/29 and WP (39) 140 (COS 182), Stoppage of the Export of Iron Ore to Germany: Balance of Advantage of the Minor and Major Projects, CAB 66/4/30. 180

b. Involve them in war with Germany c. Expose the whole southern part of both countries to German invasion and occupation45

Nothing written by Churchill during this time more clearly represents his frustration than this note. However, his comments, while accurate in many ways, did not quite represent the tenor of War Cabinet discussions, nor his own views. No one expected the Swedes or Norwegians to co-operate of “their own free will”. They would need to be coerced to take the risks Churchill had outlined and this coercion was expected to be generated by the Soviet threat. This was the view of Chamberlain, Halifax and, most particularly the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, but Churchill had also endorsed it as a path to success. He had, therefore, contributed to the impasse he was now facing.

In early January, it was not Churchill but Chamberlain and, to a lesser extent, Halifax, who kept Narvik alive. Intelligence was received to show that, while Narvik would upset the Norwegians, it would not offend the Swedes. It was claimed the Swedes had expected, even hoped, the Allies would take action against the Narvik ore trade because this would help them justify rationing the Germans during the summer.46 Additionally, another COS’ investigation had concluded that, if the German’s took action in southern Norway in response to Narvik, it would be satisfactorily contained and would not, therefore, harm the Finnish Option. Although he still sought reassurance that Narvik would not compromise the larger plan, Halifax was receptive to the COS conclusions at the War Cabinet of 3 January. Churchill seized on Halifax’ softening attitude and attempted to ameliorate his anxieties further with his first guile-filled volte face in regard to the likely German response.47 Germany would not, after all, attack Norway or Sweden because this would be against its best interests. By implication, Norway had nothing to fear and, therefore, would have no cause to object too strenuously to the Narvik plan. Once it was confirmed that a threat to Norway, if it occurred, could be contained, the last

45 W.S. Churchill War Cabinet Paper, Swedish Iron Ore, 31 December 1939, CAB 66/4; CV At the Admiralty, 387-388. 46This was likely erroneous. The Swedes had assumed that the ore could be stopped without entering Norwegian territorial waters but they would quickly learn this was not the case and expressed their strongest opposition to any such action There is some evidence to suggest the Swedes were fully aware that the stoppage of the Narvik trade required entering Norwegian territorial waters and that they feigned ignorance of this fact to explain what appeared to be a volte face in attitude when they learned of the Narvik plan. 47 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 3 January, 1940, CAB 65/11/2. 181

impediment to issuing a formal warning of an intention to block the Narvik ore trade was overcome. The warnings of imminent action in Norwegian territorial waters were duly sent, although the action itself would await the Scandinavian response. This particular delusion regarding Swedish co-operation was shattered within days when the Swedes responded in the strongest terms.

It is important to emphasize that Narvik remained a possibility during the first week of January not because of Churchill’s claims that it would only do good but because Chamberlain, Halifax and the COS had accepted it would do no serious political or military harm. Despite Churchill’s efforts to make Narvik the essential ‘catalyst’ in a successful Scandinavia strategy Finnish Option, the thinking of the War Cabinet remained that the latter hinged on the Soviet threat and the Scandinavian reaction to it. So long as the Narvik operation could go ahead and not affect this plan, it made sense to begin compromising the German ore supply at the earliest opportunity even if, as Chamberlain concluded on 3 January, it was not possible to make any decision in regard to Oxelosund. This situation is inconsistent with the view of an evasive and war shy Chamberlain blocking Churchill’s offensive initiatives at every turn. Through the intervention of Chamberlain, Narvik had been drawn back from the brink several times. Churchill’s efforts to do as much had done the opposite.

The War Cabinet’s delusion that Sweden would somehow be indifferent to any plan that might bring the war to Scandinavia was shattered almost immediately. The Norwegians objected strenuously but, more important, so did the Swedes. Remarkably, this was not the end of Narvik. Chamberlain and Halifax were sufficiently influenced by comments made by the Swedish Minister in London, Bjorn Prytz, to believe that the official Swedish response might be mere bluster and bluff.48 Over the next several days, a number of alternative solutions were discussed, but Narvik remained a possibility, albeit remote. It was thought that, instead of aggressive action by the Allies to deal with the iron ore, the mere threat of Narvik might be enough for the Norwegians and Swedes to act to curtail flow of ore to Germany.

48 Bjorn Prytz, (1887-1976), Swedish Envoy to London, 1937-1947. 182

Halifax reviewed the Narvik problem at the Foreign Office on 9 January but, unsurprisingly, this meeting reaffirmed the Foreign Office conviction that the Soviet threat would ultimately determine Norwegian and Swedish action.49 By 11 January, the decision on Narvik had, again, been reduced to Sweden’s likely response to it. A final decision awaited Halifax’s discussion with Markus Wallenberg, a Swedish banker and representative of the Swedish Trade Commission, who was due in London.50 The discussions of this meeting, along with opinions offered by Dominion representatives, and also Ironsides’ reaffirmation of the Finnish Option, would prove decisive to burying the Narvik plan. Halifax concluded it was not possible to retain the good-will of the Swedes if Narvik went ahead and, without this support, it was impossible to stop all ore.51

During these decisive few days, Churchill’s primary contribution was to argue vociferously that it was only by force or threats that the Allies could hope to move the Norwegian and Swedes and that they must be made to make a choice of two evils: “We should have to make them more frightened of us than they were of Germany.” 52 Here was the key to the entire problem. It had been the German threat to Sweden that had compromised all discussions from the beginning. The tragedy of the discussions within the War Cabinet and the folly of Churchill’s relentless pursuit of the Swedish ore problem was that this objective was beyond fulfilment short of invading Sweden, which was not possible, or getting the Germans to do so; but the Germans did not want to, and the Swedes were determined to give them every reason not to. No contrivance of the British War Cabinet, or Churchill’s own plans, had ever been likely to change this situation. Churchill, of course, long argued that Narvik would be the catalyst for German action against Scandinavia and this would provide the necessary ‘foot in the door’. However, this strategy would only work, if the Germans attacked Sweden. Instead, they would successfully attack and occupy Norway – always a more likely option – and thereby destroy the foundations of Churchill’s own solution to the Scandinavian problem.

49 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 9 January, 1940, CAB 65/11/7 50 Markus Wallenberg (1899-1982), Swedish banker and industrialist. 51 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 13 January, 1940, CAB 65/11/10. 52 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 10 January, 1940, Cab 65/11/8. 183

Despite Churchill’s occasional efforts to initiate Narvik during February and March, the War Cabinet, through the Foreign Office, remained stubbornly supportive of the Finnish Option. However, in early February, it belatedly recognised that something more would be needed to animate Sweden than fear of the Soviet Union. Maintaining its almost unbroken record for foolish ideas, the War Cabinet adopted the idea put forward by the Lord Privy Seal that the Allies should offer direct military assistance to Finland itself.53 The Finn’s would be asked to make a formal request for military assistance to which the Allies would immediately respond. Lest they earn the acrimony of world opinion, it was expected the Swedes would be compelled to permit the passage of these Allied armies through their territory. It was recognised, at least, that the Swedes would only comply with this demand if the Allies could protect them from a German invasion. Thus did the Finnish Option evolve, inexorably, into a substantial military undertaking. Forces would be needed to occupy at least three Norwegian ports, to support the Swedes in southern Sweden, to occupy the Gallivare ore fields, and to help fight the Soviets in Finland. Only a small portion of this force, however, was destined for Finland itself, an important factor in the Finn’s decision not to accommodate this dubious Allied strategy. Churchill was most often on the fringe of these decisions, always preferring his Narvik solution. Nevertheless, it is impossible to separate him from the plan. While he doubted it would succeed, he did not eschew the essential principles upon which the Finnish Option was based, including the conviction that war in Scandinavia would be good for the Allied cause and that the opportunities to secure the Swedish ore would be worth the risk of war with the Soviet Union. He showed no greater capacity than other members of the War Cabinet to recognise the inevitable fruitlessness of the entire northern strategy. It is disturbing to read the War Cabinet minutes of this time and discover how often the fairly obvious and essentially insurmountable obstacles to a successful northern strategy were canvassed within the War Cabinet and, as often, how these were overlooked, discarded, or forgotten in the policy finally reached. There had, for example, always been much to suggest that the Soviets’s were not colluding with the Germans but acting entirely in self-interest in its action in Finland, much as were the allies in conceiving a strategy which would

53 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 2 February, 1940, CAB 65/11/23. 184

place the war in the very middle of Scandinavia, embroil three neutrals, and keep the war some distance from the French frontier. This awareness alone should have caused the War Cabinet to question the wisdom of adding the Soviets to the list of enemies.

The Finnish Option also hinged on the Foreign Office’ dubious conviction that, after Finland, the Soviets would move into Sweden or, at least, that the Swedes believed they would. That this was considered possible despite the German need to protect its supply of ore, or that, in the circumstances, it was ever thought the Soviets would consider such a move, is difficult to understand. This expectation was all the more questionable when considered alongside the existing conviction that the Soviet Union was militarily weak and, therefore, not worth the worry. It made no sense to imagine that the Soviet Union would risk war with Germany to acquire Swedish ore; nor did it make sense to believe the two countries had some kind of agreement that would place Swedish ore in the Soviet orbit. This reasoning is all the more inexplicable when one notes the Allies’ awareness that the Germans, at least initially did little, if anything, to discourage or prevent Swedish assistance to the Finns against their supposed ally, nor to prevent the movement of allied materiel through Sweden.

Churchill had oftentimes displayed a certain perspicuity towards Russia’s motives and actions but this insight was ultimately sacrificed to his hopes in regards to Swedish ore. Certainly, he had always believed that war with the Soviet Union could be avoided under the strategy of the Finnish Option but this risk had grown exponentially with the plan to send Allied forces to Finland and grew even more in the desperate days of late February and early March.

It was fortunate for the Allies that the Finnish appeal for aid never came; that Churchill and the War Cabinet ever thought it would is the extraordinary element of this period. The Finns grasped early the realities of their predicament and the weakness of the Allies. They could not possibly offer enough support, and in sufficient time, to make a difference. Further, they could not see how this help could be rendered without Swedish co-operation and they knew this would not be forthcoming. The Finns also saw no virtue in encouraging the Germans into

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Scandinavia. This would not help them in their war against the Soviets, while any threat from Germany would ensure that the assistance they were receiving from Sweden would be reduced to a trickle. As for the Swedes themselves, they were more animated by the German warning that, should Allied soldiers set foot in Sweden, the Germans would retaliate. Allied policy continued to be guided by the naive belief that they could compete with this. Always more likely than a successful Finnish venture, was what actually came to pass. The Finns wisely used the threat of Allied intervention in Scandinavia to their advantage. The Soviets did not want conflict with the Allies and were prompted to negotiate with the Finns. The Finns were required to make serious concessions but the result was always better for them and for the Swedes, who encouraged them to make peace, than would have occurred had Allied assistance been sought.

In the final run-down of the Finnish Option in early March, Churchill baulked at failure and sought to bully Britain’s way into Sweden, much as he had suggested several times in previous months.54 Against type, Chamberlain endorsed the idea, arguing that it would be “fatal to abandon the expedition altogether merely because we had received a diplomatic refusal from the Scandinavians to our demand for passage.”55 Action would show the sincerity of Allied efforts; its failure could then be laid at the feet of the Norwegians and Swedes. The Finnish capitulation arrived just in time to avoid this folly. Churchill tried a last time to force a landing in Norway and take advantage of the accumulated forces for this purpose.56 However, without the ‘cover’ of assistance to Finland, this was a step too far for the War Cabinet. Moreover, such action would not do what Churchill claimed; it would not give the Allies access to Gallivare.57 These early days of March were the low point for British strategy and Churchill’s own strategic aspirations and it was this that prompted Churchill’s letter to Halifax with which this chapter began. Churchill had

54 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 8 March, 1940, CAB 65/12/8. Churchill was absent from this meeting and his message was conveyed to the War Cabinet by Pound. 55 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 11 March, 1940, CAB 65/12/10. 56 Naval Staff Memorandum: Effect of the Russo-Finnish Treaty on Our Naval Situation, 14 March, 1940, CAB 66/6/26; War Cabinet, Confidential Annex, 14 March, 1940, CAB 65/12/12. 57 Chamberlain and Halifax justifiably pointed out that, without the Finnish call for assistance with which to cloak their aggression, both Norway and Sweden would be certain to resist Allied aggression. See, War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 14 March, 1940. 186

suffered a second and almost simultaneous blow. Several days earlier, the French had vetoed Operation Royal Marine. It would, however, be a turning point.

Churchill Ascendant: the resurrection of Narvik and Royal Marine. The collapse of the Finnish Option left the British and French Governments in fear of a strong political back-lash, both at home and abroad. Almost immediately they set about finding a replacement for the Finnish Option. The only two viable strategies available were Churchill’s Narvik scheme and Royal Marine. Churchill, therefore, suddenly found his strategies at the centre of Allied strategic planning. The difficulty was that the British wanted Royal Marine and doubted the efficacy of Narvik while the French had the very opposite view. The French priority remained for action in Scandinavia and to keep the war as far away from France as possible. Daladier, desperate to retain his leadership after the collapse of the Finnish Option, pressed for an operation against the Narvik ore trade and a forceful occupation of key ports in Norway. Additionally, the French returned to their old proposals for action in southern Europe, including against the Russians. As for Royal Marine, they had already sought a two month delay.

The British War Cabinet was now shy of action that might incite the Russians and were more interested in establishing a trade relationship with them. They had moved beyond Narvik, believing that action was necessary to ‘save face’ and assuage neutral anxieties and public opinion and this could not be achieved at the expense of a neutral. The great hopes for the stopping of Swedish ore and, therefore, hopes of seriously hurting the German war effort had been surrendered. There was no way of getting to Gallivare, and the Baltic would soon be free of ice. Narvik, therefore, was even less worthwhile than it had ever been. Much more attractive to the War Cabinet was for Royal Marine which struck directly at the enemy and would therefore impress the neutrals but would not unduly escalate the war or lead to violent retaliation. Palliatives were now the order of the day.

On 19 March the War Cabinet decided to confront Daladier over Royal Marine but before being able to do so, Daladier was replaced by Reynaud. On 26 March, and following receipt of Reynaud’s own analysis of the strategic situation, the War Cabinet conceived a quid pro quo approach: the British Government would

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undertake Narvik, minus the forced landings recommended by the French, if the French would do Royal Marine.58 The War Cabinet considered it essential that action against Norway be offset by direct action against Germany via this plan.59 The proposal was agreed to by Reynaud at the Supreme War Council meeting of 27 March, but, several days later and under pressure from Daladier, the French reneged.60 On 1 April, Chamberlain, with Churchill’s support, decided to call their bluff: “No Royal Marine, no Narvik”.61 Churchill was subsequently sent to France to persuade the French to undertake Royal Marine but, after discussions, he recommended instead that Royal Marine be postponed and that Narvik proceed on its own. Lest nothing at all occur as a result of French stubbornness, Chamberlain and the War Cabinet decided to proceed with the mining operation.

Such were the extraordinary political dimensions behind the final resurrection of Churchill’s Narvik operation. It was no longer his plan but that of the French and a reluctant War Cabinet. It took place not because it would cause major harm to the Germans but because a show of force was needed and this would help the Government out of a fix with the French, who wanted much more drastic measures and continued to entertain potential conflict with the Soviet Union. The operation could not be justified by the possibility the Germans would react violently to it and take action in Scandinavia, although this remained a possibility. Churchill, however, now doubted that the Germans would respond forcefully. Since the surrender of Finland, it had been dangerously assumed that Germany no longer had cause to be anxious over its supply of Swedish ore and, instead, Germany and the Soviet Union might redirect their aggression elsewhere. It was hoped that the Narvik operation would at least draw German attention back to Scandinavia. Neither Narvik nor Royal Marine signified the War Cabinet’s determination to escalate the war. It certainly did not represent the British War Cabinet’s surrender of its long war strategy. Three memoranda, one by Hankey another by the COS, and a third by Halifax were written at this time recommending that Britain return to its pre Finnish Option posture: time

58 French Government’s Views on the Future Conduct of the War, CAB 66/6/39. There was little common ground between the French view and that entertained by the War Cabinet at this juncture. Supporting the Narvik scheme was the most the War Cabinet was prepared to do to in support of the French proposals. 59 Conclusions of War Cabinet Meeting, 26 April 1940, CAB 65/6/21. 60 SWC, 28 March, 1940, CAB 69/3. 61 Conclusions of War Cabinet Meeting, 1 April 1940, CAB 65/6/23. 188

was still on the Allies side, direct confrontation with Germany was to be avoided; action in Southern Europe, a proposal of the French, was also to be avoided, and economic measure increased.62 Royal Marine was popular because it would hurt the Germans but was not likely to cause retaliation. The implementation of Narvik, as late as it was, would do little to hurt the Germans and was also considered unlikely to invite a violent German reaction. It would proceed primarily as a sop to the French, although there were some residual hopes in regard to Gallivare, in particular from Churchill. In early April, the ‘green light’ would be given to Oxelosund on the understanding that such action could not be traced to the Allies. There would be no more proactivity beyond these measures. The focus was now on the spring campaigning season and a possible assault in the West. The best case scenario was that Narvik and Royal Marine might distract the Germans from such action or, if the Germans launched a major attack against Sweden and Norway, make an invasion in the West much more difficult and ultimate victory even moreso.

Churchill and the War Cabinet were completely misreading German intentions, and the Soviet. The Soviets were keen on rapprochement, while Hitler’s attitude to action in Scandinavia was hardening, not softening. The activities of the Allies over the preceding three months had convinced him and his advisors that Allied respect for Scandinavian neutrality could not be guaranteed and that, in the circumstances, Norway should be occupied.63 The arrival of spring and the freeing from ice of the entrance to the Baltic would make a decisive German operation possible. Moreover, the Germans had hit on that which was never satisfactorily grasped by Churchill, the COS, or the British War Cabinet: that successful action against Norway would make a much larger campaign against Sweden unnecessary. Unfortunately, when the time came, and despite months of focus on Scandinavia, Churchill and the War Cabinet were ill-prepared for the clinical, meticulously planned, and brilliantly executed German invasion of Norway.

62 Note by the Minister Without Portfolio, The Grand Strategy of the Allies, 23 March 1940, CAB 66/6/33.(Hankey had begun this on 19 March and amended it on 23 March); Memorandum South- Eastern Europe by SSFA, 26 March, 1940 CAB 66/4/40; Memorandum by Chiefs of Staff, Certain Aspects of the Present Situation, 26 March 1940. CAB 66/4/41. 63 It is commonly accepted that the catalyst for a German move in Scandinavia was British action over the Altmark. (see, for example, Dilks, Great Britain and Scandinavia in the Phoney War, 43.) 189

Conclusions Despite developing an interest in Narvik very early in the War, it would take until April 1940 for this comparatively minor operation to be implemented. This chapter has sought to understand why Churchill had so little fortune in advancing this offensive scheme beyond the reason most commonly presented: the passive obstruction of Chamberlain and Halifax. An extension of this enquiry was why no offensive plan succeeded before the German invasion of Norway heralded the end of the Phoney War. The explanations given were several. The core reason for the failure of Churchill’s Narvik operation was that the War Cabinet could not be persuaded the operation was worth doing as a ‘stand-alone’. This reflected the basic foundations of War Cabinet strategy during this time: operations must be worth doing and must be certain to do more harm to the enemy than the Allies themselves. In the context of Narvik, there were both economic and political issues at stake that discounted Narvik as a ‘stand-alone’. Thereafter, the War Cabinet conceived the Finnish Option which offered the prospect of stopping all ore. This need not, in the first instance, have compromised Narvik; combining the two operations would have compounded the harm done to the Germans and achieved this more quickly. Unfortunately for Churchill, the Finnish Option required the co-operation and friendship of Sweden and Norway and this could only be undermined by Narvik. Churchill proved unsuccessful in his efforts to sell Narvik as an essential catalyst to successful action in Scandinavia. His arguments were not persuasive and he was not able to break through the consensus view that the Finnish Option was the best strategy to pursue. Particularly unsatisfactory and unconvincing from the point of view of the War Cabinet and COS was his repeatedly expressed determination to use force against Norway and Sweden if all else failed.

Churchill believed that the obstacles to action reflected a lack of will and a determination to ‘take the line of least resistance’. However, Halifax was justified in contending that many of the problems experienced were inherent to the situation the War Cabinet faced and, indeed, the strategies themselves. The historical view has primarily been that Chamberlain and Halifax were deliberately and calculatedly obstructionist. This chapter has challenged this. Each, although Chamberlain more than Halifax, made real attempts to advance Narvik but they ultimately spoke out

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against the risk/reward prospects of the operation. Moreover, it was never these two men alone who condemned Narvik and this is often ignored in attributing responsibility to them. It was the COS, the MEW, and, in particular, Ironside’s preference for the Finnish Option, and that of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, that were most influential in sustaining the Finnish Option. Churchill also made his own contribution to the undermining of Narvik through his endorsement of the ‘Soviet threat’ scenario.

The Finnish Option was from beginning to end, complete folly. It hinged on assumptions that were never likely to be fulfilled; yet there always appeared a genuine conviction within the War Cabinet, and especially the Foreign Office Northern Department, that they might be. The German threat was decisive throughout and there was never a serious possibility the Swedes would accommodate Allied aspirations, especially when the Allies were offering so little for the risks they wished Sweden to take. The only slim hope for the scheme was further Soviet aggression but there were many reasons why this prospect was remote. The collapse of the strategy was as timely as it was predictable and undoubtedly saved the Allies from a much greater disaster than that which subsequently befell them in Norway.

The re-emergence of Narvik in the aftermath of the Finnish Option failure had little to do with Churchill himself. After four months of advocacy, Narvik finally met the needs of War Cabinet policy, but not at all in the manner he had hoped. Britain was in desperate need of a comparatively benign ‘palliative’ operation which would help them secure their preferred option, Churchill’s Royal Marine. Together, the development of these plans would make March a seminal month for Churchill and placed him at the very centre of Allied strategy; it would not, however, prove a period of vindication. His opportunity to bask in the light of success was cut short by French intransigence over Royal Marine and then by the German invasion of Norway on 9 April. This would be the greatest disaster of the Phoney War and one to which Churchill would make his own unfortunate contribution. Moreover, his long-held conviction that war in Scandinavia would be to the advantage of the Allies would be proved without foundation.

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Chapter 6

Norway Part 1: A Failure of Pre-Emption

In the early hours of 9 April, the Germans did what Churchill had declared would be a welcome consequence of his Narvik scheme: they invaded Norway. He had long believed that such an invasion would be a great advantage to the Allies because it would provide a gateway to the Gallivare ore fields and give Britain naval bases along the Norwegian coastline. Instead, the invasion proved a disaster for the Allies and a disaster for Norway and shattered in an instant many of Churchill’s cherished and long-held assumptions that had been the foundations of his offensive plans.

With the exception of the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915, no episode in Churchill’s career has been a greater source of criticism than this failure to pre-empt the Germans and his prosecution of the Norwegian Campaign. It has had a significant impact on his reputation. Although the British Government had made preparations, albeit perfunctory and limited, to deal with a German response to 'Wilfred’ (the mining of the Leads) and had warnings of imminent German action, the Royal Navy failed to prevent the Germans occupying all the important west coast ports of Norway as far north as Narvik. This chapter will assess Churchill’s 192

contribution to the failure to pre-empt the Germans in Norway with a particular focus on the period of ‘missed opportunity’ of 7 and 8 April, 1940, during which Churchill and the Royal Navy had within their reach a decisive victory. This chapter will analyse the reasons why they failed to grasp it.

Churchill’s assumptions about likely German action against Norway were reflected in his preparations for a campaign in Norway and in his response to intelligence of imminent German aggression. This chapter will assess the impact these assumptions on Churchill’s actions and assess these against the contribution made by others in the decision-making process and, in particular, his First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound. Flawed decisions and faulty naval dispositions followed the first overt German moves against Norway during 7 and 8 April and they have weighed heavily on Churchill’s performance as First Lord.

Churchill and Pound each made significant and unfortunate contributions to failure of these days but this analysis will show these errors of judgment were made in circumstances very different to the existing historical record. A number of important issues require examination, including the misunderstanding surrounding a break out of Germany’s capital ships and the controversial decision to disembark the landing forces for Operation R.4.1 This latter episode was not the decisive error of judgment it is generally painted. Nor were Churchill and Pound solely responsible for failure. The ‘vagaries’ of war, the good luck and bad luck, the unforeseen and the unpredictable elements that form part of any battle or campaign also played a part. Nevertheless, Churchill bears the heaviest burden of responsibility for lost opportunities of those vital two days.

Flawed Assumptions and Poor Preparation The preparation for Narvik operation, which began in the last days of March, 1940, coincided with ever more frequent intelligence suggesting imminent German action in Scandinavia. Despite this, Churchill and the War Cabinet doubted the Germans would react to the mine-laying operation, nor did Churchill consider it likely they would take action independently of it. Lulea would soon open and it was

1 Codename R4 was, essentially Rupert 4, ie. the 4th variation of Operation Rupert, first mooted many months before. 193

believed that the end of the Russo-Finnish war had probably removed Germany’s anxiety in regard to its ore supply. It was also accepted that operations in Scandinavia would not be to the Germans advantage and their attention was more likely to be directed at the Western Front. Nevertheless, intelligence continued to suggest that action somewhere in Scandinavia, and most likely against Norway, was imminent and there were good reasons to take this more seriously. The coming of Spring, which would open Lulea would, several weeks before this, also free the Great Belt from ice and leave Norway much more exposed to a German invasion through the Skagerrak and Kattegat. In fact, early April would be ideal for a German attack. The days were still comparatively short and the nights relatively long and the lunar cycle ideal for offensive operations.

On 26 March, information came in via the British minister in Stockholm regarding impending German moves. Swedish Intelligence believed the Germans were concentrating aircraft and shipping for operations against Norwegian aerodromes and ports: “Pretext being disclosure of allied plans of occupation of Norwegian territory …”2 Admiral Phillips wrote to Churchill on 28 March that this information was consistent with other intelligence and that “the conclusion to be drawn … is that the Germans are all ready for some operations against Southern Scandinavia and that they may be planning to carry out one in the future.”3 He argued that, whether or not German action was taken independently or as a result of Britain’s action against Norway, this would provide “a last opportunity to try to get to the Swedish ore fields via Narvik before the ice breaks up.” It was this communication that finally prompted Churchill to raise the matter of troops for Norway at the War Cabinet of 29 March. He drew attention to the possibility that the Germans might take forcible action in Norway and that it was important “we should continue in a state of readiness to despatch a light force to Narvik, and possibly also the force that had been planned for Stavanger.”4 Churchill’s recommendations bore the hallmarks of ‘afterthought’ and also suggested a general lack of conviction that the German threat would arise and an extraordinary complacency as to how serious

2 Letter, T.S.V Phillips to First Lord, 28 April 1940, ADM 116/4471. Phillips letter was prompted by an NID minute concerning a German request for cessation of ore deliveries to Narvik on 26 April and other intelligence received on 27 April regarding German movements. 3 ibid 4 Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 29 April, 1940, Cab 65/12/14. 194

this threat might be. Furthermore it identified a complete lack of interest in Norway itself and the possibility that Allied troops might be required to support the Norwegians in the defence of their country. Not a word was mentioned of the importance of Bergen or Trondheim, despite the fact these ports had routinely been nominated as objectives of considerable strategic importance.

Churchill was not alone in his complacency; it was pervasive and extended to the JPS and the COS and this must temper any criticism of him. On the 31 March, the COS circulated a memorandum which outlined their thoughts on the likely German response to Wilfred.5 It explored a variety of possibilities ranging from an intensive German propaganda campaign, and demands that the Norwegians take their own action against the minefields, through to a German attempt to establish naval and air bases in southern Norway, an invasion of Sweden (although this was considered remote) and the possibility they would initiate fighting in the West to secure a quick decision. The possibility of a full-scale German invasion to secure all of Norway was not canvassed, despite the on-going intelligence of impending action in Scandinavia. Thus, although the COS took the issue of invasion more seriously than Churchill, their plans to combat this threat were only marginally more impressive. As had always been acknowledged, they accepted that nothing could be done at Oslo, but proposed that two battalions be readied to be sent to Bergen and, assuming the Germans were pre-empted there, two battalions at Stavanger. A single battalion would be sent to Trondheim as a second echelon. Just as Churchill had done, they gave priority to Narvik, despite the fact that no one seriously believed this port was under threat from the Germans. They recommended that three British battalions be sent there, plus a French contingent, the purpose of which would be to move into Sweden should the opportunity arise. Although these limited dispositions assumed assistance from the Norwegians, they also suggest that several other assumptions were at work: first, that a German reaction was unlikely; second, that a German reaction would be limited to southern Norway; third, that if the German reaction escalated, the Royal Navy would facilitate the requisite movement of troops as and when required. Certainly, the COS counselled against preparations for major operations in Norway and Sweden to combat a German invasion; they preferred

5 Report by COS, Certain Operations in Territorial Waters, 31 March 1940, Cab 66/6/45. 195

instead to be ready for operations in France which they considered more likely and imminent. There was perhaps a fourth assumption at work in the COS recommendations: that whatever the Germans might do, Norway would be defended only in so much as it helped secure Narvik.

Of enormous importance to all the planning for a German response to Wilfred was timely and accurate intelligence and it was the assumptions in regard to this that were the critical flaws in the entire project. The matter was not ignored but measures taken to react appropriately to intelligence of German action were wholly inadequate. As a result of Phillips agitation, the COS put special arrangements into place to acquire “the earliest possible authentic information of a German move against Norway or Sweden.”6 In an effort to estimate the reliability of information, it was decided that the source of the information provided would be included in these reports.7 However, no guidance was offered as to how one was to subsequently view or interpret information that was deemed less than absolutely reliable. Were responses to be guided by the risks of inaction towards a particular piece of intelligence, or entirely by doubts over the reliability of the source? The COS warned of the need for celerity in the despatch of the expeditionary forces and, rather portentously, observed that “The first news received of a German move against Scandinavia will very possibly be vague and unconfirmed, and many hours may elapse before full confirmation can be obtained”; no guidance was offered as to what should be done in the interim.8 Any delay in ‘confirmation’ would be critical to the navy’s capacity to pre-empt a German move on the Norwegian coast. Timing was everything, especially in southern and central Norway where it had to be expected the Germans might dominate the air in a matter of days.

The Admiralty response to the available intelligence at the Admiralty was a woeful, sustained bungling, save for some judicious decisions made by Admiral Forbes. The Germans pre-empted the Allies at all key ports at the start of the Norwegian campaign. There were a number of reasons for this. There was ample and remarkably accurate intelligence available, but it was not ignored so much for its

6 Machinery for Setting in Motion R4, 4 April, 1940, CAB 66/7/2. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 196

source but because it did not conform to existing expectations, Churchill’s among them. At the War Cabinet meeting of 3 April, Oliver Stanley explained to the War Cabinet that he had been given a somewhat garbled account that the Germans were collecting “a strong force of troops” at the Baltic port of Rostock with the avowed intention of taking Scandinavia.9 Halifax noted that the most recent telegrams from Stockholm tended to confirm this and that substantial numbers of Germans were already aboard ship in Stettin and Swindemunde harbours.”10 However, he added that the source did not believe the Germans would invade Sweden or Norway in response to the mining operation. Instead, it was thought they would respond in a “tit for tat” method. Churchill agreed with this assessment but noted that all necessary preparation had been made for the landings “should they prove necessary.” At the COS meeting of the following day, Ironside expressed the view that the Germans were entirely focused on Western Europe and “Any diversion to Scandinavia would be to their serious disadvantage and was therefore in his opinion unlikely.”11 For this reason he demurred from any premature withdrawal of regular forces from France to address such threat, and recommended only preparations for small reinforcements as and when required.

At the Admiralty, news of German activities against Norway or Sweden also continued to meet a wall of doubt. On 4 April, news was received that the Germans were targeting Narvik with a date for landings set for 8 April. The Deputy Director Operations Division (Home), Captain Ralph Edwards, noted in his diary that “In the opinion of the Intelligence and the High Command, the German High Command would never allow such a ‘mad expedition to sail.’”12 His concerns were receiving no more interest two days later when he recorded “Some indications of a German move in the not too distant future against Norway. My own personal point of view is that it is only a matter of hours … but I am in the minority.”13

The doubt surrounding German action was, therefore, pervasive: Churchill, Ironside, the higher echelons of the naval staff, including naval intelligence, military

9 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 3 April, 1940, CAB 65/12/15. 10 Ibid. 11 Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 4 April, 1940, CAB 79/85. 12 Excerpts from Diary of Ralph Edwards, 4 April 1940, Rosk 4/75. This was an elaboration on his original diary. 13, Original Diary of Ralph Edwards, entry, 6 April. Redw 1/1. 197

intelligence, the Foreign Office all failed to place adequate store in intelligence of impending German action in Norway. Ironically, Churchill, more than most, could be forgiven for his on-going blindness to events. Invariably overlooked in studies of this time is the fact that from the morning of 4 April until the evening of 6 April, Churchill was in France trying to persuade the French to adopt Royal Marine. It is not clear how up-to-date he was kept in regard to intelligence reports but it is certain his absence from the Admiralty would have denied him the awareness needed to adopt a more cautious attitude to Norway. Pound was away from the Admiralty on a fishing trip for most of 7 April and did not return until around 8 pm in the evening. It is probable, therefore, that Churchill and Pound did not discuss developments in regards to Scandinavia for the three days leading up to the invasion of Norway and this ought to be kept in mind in to any assessment of Churchill’s subsequent failures. Certainly, it makes more explicable Churchill’s apparent indifference to the German threat to Norway.

Nevertheless, Churchill’s culpability remains considerable. More than anyone he was in a position to see both the political and operational aspects of the Norwegian problem and this ought to have caused him to act more cautiously towards the available intelligence. He, after all, had spent many months arguing a case for the decisive importance of Swedish ore to the Germans. If he understood this, why should not the Germans? Given his own willingness to risk a great deal to deny the Germans Swedish ore, it is quite remarkable that he failed to consider the Germans might also take risks to secure this vital commodity. There is something unforgivable, therefore, in Churchill maintaining his hopes in regard to Narvik and Swedish ore on the one hand, and his failure to exercise sufficient caution against the possibility of a German action on the other.

German pre-emption was a shocking turn of events which shattered several of Churchill’s long held illusions in regard to the Narvik scheme. He had maintained that Britain’s overwhelming naval power would allow it to fight a war in Scandinavia to advantage and that, should the Germans attack Norway, southern Norway alone would fall to the Germans and this would make little difference to Allied plans. Churchill’s tune quickly changed in the aftermath of the successful German invasion. He stood in Parliament and lashed out at the Norwegians with a desperate apologia 198

for Allied incompetence. Of the information pertaining to German preparations known to the Allies, he declared: “no one could tell when they would be used or against what peaceful country they would be used.”14 At the War Cabinet meeting of mid-day of 9 April, he told his War Cabinet colleagues that “We could not have prevented these landings without maintaining large patrols continuously off the Norwegian coast, which would have been wasteful of our naval strength”.15 Thus he ignored his long held contention that it would be impossible for the Germans to gain control of anything other than the southern regions of Norway and, perhaps because of this, they would never try.16

The most common explanation put forward for Allied failure to heed the available intelligence was poor co-ordination between the various intelligence departments but this is an insufficient explanation for the tardy response to German activity.17 It was more a question of not believing the evidence that was available and not taking appropriate measures on the possibility that it was correct. On 6 April, information came forward that Hitler had given “definite orders to send one division in ten ships to land at Narvik on 8 April, occupying Jutland on the same day but leaving Sweden”. A subsequent telegram stated that these troops had been embarked on 4 April.”18 By the time this information was circulated by the Admiralty to, among others, Admiral Forbes, who received the warning only in the afternoon of 7 April, this information had added to it, “All these reports are of doubtful value and may well be only a further move in the war of nerves.”19 These final comments represented the intelligence system at work. DCNS Phillips saw the telegram and signed off on it. This was surprising given Phillips role in preparing the military and

14 Speech to House of Commons by WS Churchill, 3.48pm, 11 April, 1940,Hansard, columns 733- 749; CV At The Admiralty, 1014. 15 War Cabinet Minutes, 9 April, 12 noon, CAB 65/9. 16 It is worthwhile noting that Churchill had expressed these views when he believed that the invading soldiers, at least in the case of Narvik, had made their way surreptitiously in merchant vessels to their destination. This might explain his frustration. One can only speculate as to his thoughts when he came to realise they had been successfully conveyed in ships of war, eminently more visible targets than merchant ships and vessels which ought to have rapidly fallen victims to the Royal Navy. 17 See Haar’s observations which are based heavily on the assessment of Harry Hinsley, Intelligence historian and former cryptanalyst at Bletchley Park during WW2. The German Invasion of Norway: April 1940, 50. 18 Haar, The German Invasion of Norway, April, 1940, 49. 19 REDW 2/19. A copy of the telegram in the Roskill papers indicated that the telegram with the additional information was generated by NID but was approved by Phillips. Phillips approval is somewhat surprising given his comments to Churchill at the end of March regarding German activities. 199

naval response to German action. However, it was probably not his prerogative to do other than he did. A decision to circulate this message with the qualification begs the question as to the nature of intelligence that would have been deemed “of value” and which would have caused Churchill and the Admiralty to act more proactively. Certainly, the telegram was not designed to engender a heightened alertness in the Commander in Chief. Fortunately, and as will be seen, despite this extra brick in the ‘wall of doubt’, Admiral Forbes took more judicious action in response to this action than is assumed.

For all the foregoing criticism of Churchill and the Admiralty and the ‘wall of doubt’ leading up to the German invasion, Churchill’s Operation Wilfred, and plan R4, had serendipitously placed the Royal Navy, in a better position than it would otherwise have been to respond to a German invasion which had been decided upon quite independently of Allied plans. Thus, despite the extraordinary complaisance of Churchill and the Admiralty up to 7 April, all was by no means lost in regard to Norway, for the main German forces had yet to move and would be highly exposed when they did. The preparation for and the prosecution of Wilfred and the subsequent landings (Operation Rupert) ought to have been enough to destroy the German invasion effort at Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. The Royal Navy was well-placed to destroy the German invasion of central and northern Norway. Yet these opportunities were lost. Again, Churchill must bear some but not all the responsibility for these failures.

Flawed Decisions and Faulty Dispositions The activities that occurred in the Admiralty War Room during 7 and 8 April are important to an accurate assessment of Churchill’s contribution to the failure to pre- empt the Germans in central and Northern Norway. The most important and influential source available of this time is the diary, and its elaborations, of the ADOD, Ralph Edwards, who saw first-hand, and was sometimes directly involved in, the decision-making process. 20 This source has not been used with adequate

20 During the war, Edwards wrote his thoughts and description of events in a contemporary, rough diary. Subsequently, and periodically, he built on these diary entries with additional information and detail. The Churchill College archives now hold Edward’s contemporary diary. Additionally, however, Roskill’s papers in the archives contain copies of at least two versions of what can be referred to as ‘expanded’ diary entries for the period of the Norwegian Campaign. These include two 200

caution - in part, no doubt, because historians have been unaware of its various versions - and this has led to error in the historical record and to an unnecessarily jaundiced assessment of Churchill’s role at important junctures in the Norwegian Campaign. There are at least three versions of Edward’s diary: the original and two other expanded versions; additionally, there is a third version of several pages in Roskill’s hand-writing.21 The versions, especially those relating the early days of the Norwegian campaign, are often in conflict. Careful reading of all versions is required if one is to draw clear and accurate conclusions from them.

The historical consensus, heavily influenced by Stephen Roskill official history, The War at Sea and his subsequent volume, Churchill and the Admirals is that the Navy misread the invasion of Norway in the critical days of 7 and 8 April as an attempted break-out into the Atlantic by Germany’s ships and that this was primarily a result of intervention by Churchill.22 Thereafter, all naval dispositions had as their primary focus the prevention of the break-out and, subsequently, the or three pages, in Roskill’s challenging hand-writing, detailing the events of 7 April to 10 April entitled Transcript of RAB Edward’s Contemporary Notes on Norway. The pages provide additional insight into these vital days, but it is information that generally corroborates the diaries and subsequent elaborations found elsewhere. The particular title of the above quoted paper, plus evidence of interpolation from Roskill (via bracketed questions and comments) suggest that Roskill was transcribing original hand-written notes supplied to him by Edwards and was having some trouble deciphering the writing. The notes themselves appear to have been war-time expansions of the original diary entries. Cumulatively, the various versions of Edwards’ diaries represent a valuable, indeed, vital source. However, they must be treated with caution. On several occasions Edwards has made careless, sometimes inexplicably obvious errors in regard to dates and events, and it is probable that, as far as the matters to be discussed here are concerned, they have contributed to an inaccurate historical record. 21 The original is to be found in REDW 2/19. The other versions are to be found in Rosk 4/75. 22 Chris Bell in his recent book, Churchill & Sea Power has taken several important steps towards correcting this assessment but there is more to be said. Bell’s criticism of Roskill’s misuse of Edwards’ diaries is justified. It is very difficult to understand how Roskill drew the conclusions he did from the Edwards’ diaries in his possession. More than this misuse of Edward’s diary, Roskill’s first volume of his official history, The War at Sea ( London: HMSO, 1954-61) made two other unfortunate contributions to the view that the Admiralty was focused almost entirely on the break-out of capital ships. Roskill’s description of the relevant events in The War at Sea makes almost no mention of the movements of the Second Cruiser Squadron (CS2) during the 7 and 8 April (see chapter 9 of the volume). As will be understood from the following, the instructions given to the Commander CS2, and the initiatives of the Commander himself, indicate that Forbes took precautions against a threat to Norway much earlier than Roskill contended. Roskill is also in error in believing that Forbes was not aware of the movement of the German ships until the late morning of 7th. The view that the sighting information from Coastal Command aircraft was delayed two and a half hours is generally accepted but this is incorrect. It is certain that Forbes knew of this threat at the same time as CS 2 and his destroyer flotilla (8.48 am). For the latter, see ADM 199/427, Home Fleet Destroyer Command Diaries, 7 April. He delayed reacting to the information pending news of an air attack, but he may have had other reasons for doing so. Roskill’s erroneous deductions in his official history also extended to his miss-timing of the disembarkation orders for R4.

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interception of any ships that might seek to return to Germany. It is accepted that one early consequence of this misunderstanding was the disembarkation of all the forces destined for Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik under the plan R.4 in the evening of 7 April. This is considered a pivotal moment in the early days of the campaign and Churchill is routinely blamed. However, the episode was by no means pivotal, did not occur in the evening of 7 April, and was a judgment made by Dudley Pound, not Churchill.

Ralph Edwards’ diaries reveal that Dudley Pound returned to the Admiralty from a fishing trip around 8pm in the evening and that it was he and not Churchill who was the key decision-maker during that evening and the following day. Churchill certainly offered opinions but where these conflicted with his staff, he deferred to them. The evidence drawn from the diaries also suggests that it was Pound, more than Churchill, Forbes, or Phillips, who was preoccupied with the battle-cruiser break-out and that it was he who made the controversial decision to disembark the R4 land forces.

In the elaborations of his diary - although not in his original diary - where fewer judgments were made, Edwards consistently maintains that it was Pound’s action after he returned from a fishing trip in the evening of 7 April that contributed most to the missed opportunities that would follow. In contrast, he shows Churchill as being receptive to the possibility that the battle-cruiser threat was a mask for an operation against Norway rather than the other way around. He was also receptive to the possibility that a ‘break-out’ was occurring in conjunction with an invasion. That Churchill was willing to contemplate these possibilities, despite the doubt he had entertained, was not surprising. Given his personal investment in Norway and Narvik, it is difficult to imagine him redirecting all his attention from this operation to the prospects of a decisive naval battle as has been argued in a variety of sources.23 In contrast, Pound was very much predisposed to assume that German activity in the North Sea represented a ‘break-out’ and that the available intelligence regarding Norway had been a ruse to conceal this. Undoubtedly influential in moulding his assumptions was Pound instinctive belief that it was the first objective

23 Rhys Jones, Churchill and the Norwegian Campaign, 33; Reynolds, In Command of History, 123; Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, 109, are examples of this view. 202

of the Home Fleet to protect Britain’s sea-lanes and to come to grips with the enemy’s fleet at any opportunity. Two important sources support these views. The first is an assessment made at the beginning of the War by Admiral Binney’s Committee, the task of which was to anticipate a variety of strategic and operational scenarios. Binney’s committee concluded the following: The main aim of C.in C. Home Fleet is to prevent ships escaping into the Atlantic. Any action by the German forces in the South Part of the North Ocean is likely to have for its object a diversion during which other forces may endeavour to escape. Any movement in the southern part of the North Sea should, therefore, be a signal to C in C Home Fleet that enemy units may be endeavouring to escape.24

A second source is Pound’s response to what he had perceived as a ‘break-out’ at the start of the war. He had written to Admiral Forbes after the event: I must say I was obsessed by the idea that, if the Germans wished to make the heaviest attack on our trade, they must send out practically every available ship instead of keeping them or some of them in the North Sea…25

The parallels to the events of 7 and 8 April and Pound’s response to them are evident. Edwards recorded that, after Pound’s return on 7 April, and upon learning that he (Edwards) had been putting forward the proposition an invasion of Norway was imminent, Pound “went for me like a pick-pocket for – as he put it – trying to lead the Naval staff away from the main objective which was the defence of the Atlantic trade routes.”26 Churchill, in contrast, is several times recorded as being receptive to the possibility that there was more afoot than a ‘break out’: In the early part of the evening [of 7 April] D.C.N.S. and the 1st Lord agree with me that this might well be part of the heralded attack on Norway, but when the Commander-in- Chief finally went to sea, 1st Sea Lord and D.C.N.S. strongly advised against ordering the Commander - in - Chief into the middle of the North Sea, which would have been the correct strategic position if our first care was Norway.”27

Another entry (also referring to the evening of 7 April but probably prior to the return of Pound) has Churchill supporting Edwards’ warnings about Norway with the declaration, “I believe the boy is right”. He records that “for a short while plans for dispositions to meet the possible Norwegian attack were in process of preparation.”28 This is supported by another, apparently overlooked source. Roskill’s hand-written

24 Admiral Binney’s, Committee for Investigation of War Problems, Report 6 October, 1939, ADM 205/1. 25 Letter, Admiral Pound to Admiral Forbes, 6 September, 1939, ADM 205/3. 26 Copy of Edwards’ diary, Roskill 4/75. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 203

Transcript of RAB Edwards’ Contemporary Notes on Norway records the following of Churchill’s reaction to Edwards’ concerns over the movements of the Home Fleet during the evening of the 7th and morning of the 8th: WSC while still worried about Wilfred agreed (?) both CNS & DCNS were obsessed by the BC menace… Then meetings and discussions went on all night. WSC disagreeing with C in Cs movements (to the North) & I confess I agree with WSC. C in C has gone off with (his fleet?) up North leaving the Norwegian menace uncovered. However they decide to leave the C in C to act as he thinks fit. Why we always interfere when we shouldn’t and leave C in C alone when we ought to guide. They were all worn out...29

From the evidence of Edwards’ diary, it is clear one must conclude that Pound was the key decision maker and that Churchill, apparently against his better judgement, deferred to him on the vital issue of the battle cruiser breakout versus an invasion of Norway. This is not a picture of Churchill dominating proceedings, but of Churchill wanting to undertake some kind of precautionary measures with the Home Fleet in regard to Norway which were rejected by his staff.

The timing of the order for disembarkation of the R.4 forces has also been wrongly related. The misapprehension over timing has helped sustain the historical view that Churchill and Pound made a premature and precipitate decision to discard Operation Rupert for the bigger prize of the German battlecruiser.30 As inaccurately, Churchill has been criticised for making this decision without consultation with the MCC or the War Cabinet in a further demonstration of high-handedness.31 Given the import of the criticism of Churchill, it is appropriate to consider the decisions that compromised the prosecution of Rupert 4 (R4) in some detail.

The first point to make is that there were two significant orders given in relation to Rupert forces, but only one involved disembarkation of troops. The first

29Transcript of RAB Edwards’ Contemporary Notes on Norway, Roskill 4/75. 30 Roskill’s writing on the timing is a little obscure. In his official history, The War at Sea, Vol. 1, 161-2, he contends the instructions were given in the evening of 7 April by Pound. In his book, Churchill and the Admirals he is vague and does not pin-point the decision to the evening of the 7th. His notes beside some of Edward’s diary entries indicate he believed the decision was made in the evening of the 7th. See Roskill 4/75. 31 The guidelines for the implementation for R4 placed the decision in the hand of the Navy to proceed with the operation, once a threat to Norway was identified. It is a moot point, therefore, if disembarkation of the soldiers was something that really required the prior approval of the War Cabinet. There is no doubt that, had Churchill and Pound explained their reasons for the disembarkation before giving the order, it would have been acceded to. No member of the War Cabinet would likely have challenged Churchill and Pound over operational issues. The criticism of Churchill on this count, therefore, is somewhat over-stated. 204

occurred to meet the needs of the 2nd Cruiser squadron in evening of 7 April. Earlier on that day, following a warning (AT 0808/7) of German battle-cruiser force heading north, Commander of the Second Cruiser Squadron (CS2), Rear-Admiral Edward- Collins, raised steam in his force of light cruisers, Galatea and Arethusa, and three Polish destroyers and informed Forbes he would be ready by mid-day if needed.32 Forbes, however, had decided that no movement would occur in response to the enemy sightings until he had received reports of a bombing attack on the German force. However, whatever the results of this attack, Forbes did not intend to use CS2 to pursue the enemy because, at 11.59, he tasked Edwards-Collins to act as ‘strike force R’ as per the guidelines of Plan R4, and “deal with any Seaborne expedition the Germans may send against Norway" and instructed they be ready at 2 hours’ notice from 0400, 8 April.33 These instructions quickly changed when, at 14.20, 7 April, Forbes belatedly received the infamous AT 1259/7 which warned of an attack on Narvik and Jutland but which had been amended to suggest the intelligence was of doubtful value. It has been generally assumed that Forbes accepted the qualification and did not act on the telegram and this has helped skew the story of 7 April – including Churchill’s involvement in it – towards the misunderstanding that all were preoccupied with the battle-cruiser threat alone.

Forbes, however, acted quite decisively to the possibility that the intelligence might be correct. His first move was to reinforce the Edwards Collins’ CS2 Strike Force substantially. His second was to bring forward the departure of this force. At 1607/7, Forbes instructed Edwards-Collins to prepare to leave port immediately the four destroyers of D6, then supporting a convoy, were ready to join him and to sail to 58° 30N 03° 30E to arrive there at 0700/8. This disposition would place him about 60 miles from Stavanger on the south-western tip of Norway. 34 Forbes added to the CS2 force another light cruiser, HMS Sheffield, and four large Tribal class

32 Edward-Collins, Sir George Frederick Basset (1883-1958). In 1940, he was Rear-Admiral Commanding Second Cruiser Squadron. 33 Air 15/205. The requirement for a Strike Force to be based at Rosyth for R4 is outlined in Secret Cypher Message number 59. 34 ADM 199/2202. These were HMS Somali, Matabele, Mashima and Tartar. 205

destroyers.35 This gave Edwards-Collins a strike force of three light cruisers and eleven destroyers.

Within one and a half hours, however, Forbes would be forced to make some difficult decisions. At 17.35, he received AT 1720/7 which belatedly updated news on the German battle-cruiser force heading north.36 It was now reported as 2 cruisers, one Scharnhorst class (battle-cruiser) and ten destroyers. This was a much larger force than originally reported and Forbes now considered it would require a larger response from the Home Fleet. He immediately ordered that all available destroyers be ready to depart and gave numerous instructions for preparations. It was at this point that the Admiralty, specifically the DCNS, Phillips, sent Forbes AT 1808 (received by Forbes at 6.20pm) that “forces detailed for Plan R4 may be used as convenient to bring enemy surface forces to action.”37 Over the next hour, Forbes then made a number of new dispositions. He rescinded his orders regarding the Sheffield and the Tribals; these ships would no longer join Edwards-Collins off Norway but would join Forbes in the pursuit of the German battle-cruiser force.38 This left Edwards-Collins seriously short of the substantial force Forbes intended for him to deal with possible threat against Norway. At this point, CS2 was reduced to 2 light cruisers, three lesser Polish destroyers and the four destroyers of D6 which, having arrived at Rosyth, required several hours to refuel. Moreover, there was now no possibility CS2 could be at the nominated position by 7am the next morning.

However, presumably as a substitute for the Sheffield and the four Tribals, at 19.15, Forbes gave instructions for the eight destroyers of D4, which were in Rosyth in support of the cruisers of CS1 and their embarked forces, to raise steam to depart with CS2.39 It is these decisions and dispositions that Edwards referred to in his original diary entry of 7 April when he wrote “Plan R4 to go ‘by the board’ in many

35 ADM 199/2202. These were HMS Eskimo, Pujabi, Kimberly and Bedouin. 36 The failed bombing attack had occurred several hours before, but the aircraft involved maintained radio silence until they returned. 37 ADM 199/2202. The telegram was sent by Pound at 6.08pm. Edwards (DOD (H)) rang through the same message at about 6.30pm. 38 The decision regarding the Sheffield is referred to in the Home Fleet diary but the Tribals are not mentioned. There is no doubt, however, that these went north with Forbes, as did the Sheffield which was, in fact, instructed to precede the Home Fleet in its movements north. 39 4th Destroyer Flotilla consisted of Afridi, Gurkha, Sikh, Mohawk, Zulu, Cossack, Kashmir, Kelvin. 206

cases in order to supply enough destroyers to meet other requirements.”40 This entry, coupled with a number of serious inconsistencies and contradictions in Edwards’ post-war elaborations have led historians, beginning with Roskill, to conclude that the disembarkation of R4 forces occurred in the evening of 7 April as a result of Churchill’s and Pound’s narrow-minded focus on the battle-cruiser problem. This interpretation is evidently incorrect. Rather, it is apparent that one of the consequences of Phillips 1808/7 was to facilitate the reinforcement of CS2, destined for the southern tip of Norway in response to AT 1259/7 regarding the possible threat to this country. As for Pound, he had yet to return from his fishing trip and had no role in these decisions.

Where, then, did Churchill fit into these decisions? As noted, Edwards claimed he had been making some progress with Churchill and Phillips in regard to Norway. The disposition of CS2 and its reinforcement is probably further evidence of this. It seems that Churchill, Phillips and Forbes were at least taking precautionary action against a threat to Norway. It is difficult to assess the consequences of the decision to deny CS1 its destroyer escort on the subsequent prosecution of the R4 plan. Had CS1 and its landing forces been subsequently directed to Stavanger and Bergen, they would have had to cross the North Sea alone and this would have left them more exposed to enemy forces. However, given that CS2 was already in the region to act in support, it would not seem to have represented an undue risk had the Admiralty decided to proceed with the R4 plan. The dispositions made in the evening of 7 April cannot be viewed as terminal to R4.

While Admiral Forbes and the Home Fleet had set off to intercept the German battle-cruisers along their last known bearing, he had, with the support or, at least, the acquiescence of Churchill and Phillips, ensured that a powerful ‘strike force’ had been disposed against possible action in Norway. It is important to note that Forbes had left alone the four large cruisers and their embarked forces and also the other R4 forces then in the Clyde, including the destroyer escorts. Had he been entirely preoccupied with the battle-cruiser threat, as was supposed by Ralph Edwards, it is unlikely he would have done so. A similar observation can be made in regard to

40 Roskill 4/75, copies of Edwards’ Diary. 207

Churchill and Phillips. As earlier discussion pointed out, this acknowledgement of the Norwegian threat stalled with the arrival of Pound at around 8 pm in the evening. Thereafter, we are told in Edwards’ diary, Churchill continued to express anxiety over the northerly movement of Forbes’ fleet but Pound was unwilling to direct him otherwise; his focus remained firmly on the possibility of a ‘break-out’. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Pound did nothing at this point to alter Forbes’ instructions to CS2 which was still destined for southern Norway. Presumably, he too deemed it an appropriate precautionary measure, although he might also have viewed CS2 disposition as a potential blocking force against the German forces already at sea should they attempt to return home.

This explanation of events shares little in common with current assessments. The evidence suggests that, during the afternoon and into the evening of 7 April, Churchill became increasingly alert to the possibility of a threat to Norway and acquiesced in a number of disposition that reflected this; most notably, Forbes decision to direct a strong force of cruisers and destroyers to the southern tip of Norway to act in the capacity of a ‘strike force’. His anxiety continued into the evening when Forbes set off to the northward but, against his better judgment, he deferred to his First Sea Lord’s supervision of operational matters. Nowhere to be found in this picture is the big gun and battleship man dominating discussion and transfixed by the prospect of a second Jutland.

The second decision regarding the R4 force: the disembarkation orders for Rosyth and the Clyde were more significant. The CS 1 War Diary makes clear that these were made verbally by the C. in C. Rosyth, to Vie-Admiral Cunningham (Commander CS 1) at approximately 11.30 am on 8 April and that this was confirmed later in Admiralty telegram 1216/8.41 At around the same time, instructions were given to the cruisers and destroyers then in the Clyde and destined for Narvik to abandon their transports and head to Scapa Flow. 42 Despite Roskill’s assertions to the contrary, it is almost certain that it was Edwards who made the call to C.in C Rosyth and that he was instructed to do so by Pound. Edwards recorded in

41 War Diary of First Cruiser Squadron, ADM 199/388. 42 The 746th Infantry Brigade disembarked and HMS York and HMS Berwick put to sea at 1pm and 1.15 pm respectively.42 The 148th Infantry Brigade disembarked from HMS Glascow and HMS Devonshire at 12.30 pm. A number of the ships in the Clyde were directed to Scapa. 208

his diary that “we needs go and remove all the soldiers from the R.4 plan ships, or rather I was told to call up Rosyth and tell them to instruct C.S.I. to do so in the morning.” Edwards spoke out against the decision but, for a second time in as many days, he was reprimanded by Pound, “I protested but received a curt answer from the 1st Sea Lord and also a “bottle” for trying to suborn the staff away from their proper objective – the Battlecruiser.”43 Churchill’s involvement in the decision is unclear, but it is likely he was aware of it and agreed to it. However, the view that the decision was made while he was in denial about a German threat to Norway is incorrect. The decision to disembark the R4 forces and to abandon the Clyde transports coincided almost precisely with an Admiralty telegram to Forbes and others that warned the German threat to Narvik noted in AT 1259/7 might be true.44 This coincidence presents a new and critically important historical question. What possessed Churchill to acquiesce in a decision that neutralised the landing forces of R4 at almost precisely the time he was presented with the conditions and circumstances for which R4 had been conceived?

There were three influences at work. The first is the German battle-cruiser force itself. Churchill would not have been keen to have soldiers and transports on the high seas while this was about. Second, the cruisers at Rosyth no longer had a destroyer force in support and this might have caused extra anxiety. Third, and most important, Churchill had concluded that, by the late morning of 8 April, he had been presented with a scenario which did not require the R4 forces and which was potentially better than that for which he had planned. This was because he had foolishly convinced himself that the sole target of German aggression along Norway’s western coastline was Narvik.45 The intelligence conveyed to the

43 Roskill 4/75. Inexplicably, Roskill unreasonably claimed the order to disembark was given by Churchill. This was based on his correspondence with General Sir Ian Jacob, who was Military Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet 1939-46. Jacob had written to Roskill relating what Churchill had said within the War Cabinet at 11.30am 8 April. Jacobs described a ‘sheepish’ look on Churchill’s face regarding the disembarkation of R4 and Roskill was sufficiently impressed by this to categorically conclude that the decision was made by Churchill. See, Churchill and the Admirals, 98- 99. 44 Gloworm engaged destroyers on the lag end of those forces heading for Narvik. The Hipper, which finally sank Gloworm, was in the vicinity marking time before entering Trondheim. 45 In a post-war letter to Roskill, Forbes speculated as much when he wrote, “I think that by 1100/8 the Admiralty must have made up their minds that all the Germans intended to do was send an expedition to Narvik and nothing else.” See, Roskill 4/76, letter from Forbes to Roskill, dated 30 July, 1949. 209

Admiralty on 6 April and repeated to the C.in. C. Home Fleet on the 7 April had stated the Germans intended to occupy Narvik and Jutland. No other objectives were mentioned. Churchill now took this at face value. At the War Cabinet of 11.30am of 8 April, at which Churchill related the latest naval dispositions, including the decision to disembark the R4 forces, there was no mention made to a possible threat to southern or central Norway. When discussion occurred as to the German objective, the only suggestions recorded were that the German Narvik assault might presage their occupation of Lulea once the ice melted and that the Gneisenau might head for the trade routes after the forces had been landed. The disembarkation order for the R4 forces came at a time when the Admiralty mistakenly believed they were dealing with these prospects alone. This is the best explanations for the fact that, despite knowledge of the threat to Narvik, the disembarkation continued uninterruptedly. While Churchill spoke at the War Cabinet, the disembarkation order was eminently reversible had any member of the War Cabinet questioned the Admiralty’s assumptions, but none did. The disembarkation order was made at a time when Churchill believed British forces were already well placed for a number of great successes. Of Churchill’s demeanour at this time, Ironside recorded, “He was like a boy this morning describing what he had done to meet the Germans.”46

Churchill’s assessment of the situation was not unreasonable given his understanding of the existing naval dispositions. At mid-day of 8 April, he believed the Royal Navy had substantial forces, including a battleship, between Narvik and the German forces converging on it; courtesy of the forward thinking of Forbes, they would soon have CS2 and 15 destroyers operating as a strike force at the southern tip of Norway against any further threats from the south and as a bar to a retreat of the German forces from the North. Further south were British submarines, recently reinforced as a precautionary measure. Additionally, there were the substantial forces of the Home Fleet. The freeing of the large cruisers of CS1 was intended to ensure the destruction of as much as possible of the German forces then at sea.47 However, circumstances were not as they seemed and Churchill was destined not to meet the

46 Diary entry, 8 April, 1940, The Ironside Diaries, 248. 47 The Admiralty instructed CS1 and a French force to go North unless and until directed by Forbes. It would seem it wished this force to join the search for the battlecruisers. In due course, Forbes would direct this force to join the CS2 further east suggesting that each had slightly different priorities. See, Home Fleet Diaries, 8 April, ADM 199/361. 210

Germans as he expected. The catalyst for failure was not the disembarkation of the R4 forces but that Churchill persisted in his belief that the only threat to Norway was at Narvik. This misreading of events combined with three great operational misfortunes would produce the irredeemable disaster of Norwegian Campaign.

One misfortune was minor but ultimately tragic; a communication error denied the Navy the opportunity to intercept the forces believed to be heading for Narvik. Barely one half hour before it warned that Narvik was a possible target for the German forces, the Admiralty had instructed all the mine-laying forces in the Vestfjord to join the battle-ship HMS Renown which had been acting in support. The order was almost certainly given because of the large German force then assumed to be bearing down on Narvik, but it has baffled historians because Renown was, by this time, some distance from Vestfjord going to the rescue of the Gloworm.48 In joining the Renown, therefore, the mining forces would leave Narvik entirely open to the Germans. The instruction has been seen as utterly foolish and Churchill and Pound have received much criticism for it.49 The answer to this mystery is that neither Churchill nor anyone at the Admiralty, nor even Forbes with the High Fleet, was aware that Renown was no longer standing by at Vestfjord.50 This was because Admiral Whitworth had either not sent a communication regarding his intentions to go to the assistance of the Gloworm or it had not been received.51 Ignorant of this, Churchill was more than hopeful that the German forces would be intercepted and destroyed. At the War Cabinet meeting of 8 April, he declared of the German forces heading to Narvik that “It was calculated that if they were unopposed, they would reach there about 10 p.m.; but they would no doubt be engaged by His Majesty’s ships Renown and Birmingham, and the Destroyers which had been laying the minefield, and an action might take place very shortly.”52 He added, cautiously, that

48 Haarr, The German Invasion of Norway, April, 1940, 105, notes that this episode has “never been adequately explained”. 49 Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, 110, for example, directly attributes this decision on Churchill and Pound, (“as inseparable in naval command as Rodgers and Hammerstein in music”) and describes it as the “first of its direct interventions in the campaign”. 50 The Home Fleet War Diary shows that, at 10am, 8 April, Forbes messaged his forces the disposition of supporting forces about the North Sea. He placed the Renown in the Vestfjord alongside the destroyers of the mining force. By this time, the Renown had long set off to assist Gloworm. 51 There is no evidence of any communication regarding his movement south towards Gloworm to be found in the Home Fleet War diary or the Battle-cruiser Squadron Diary, ADM 199/379. 52 War Cabinet Minutes, Meeting 11.30 am, 8 April, 1940 CAB 65/6. 211

“such an action should not be on terms unfavourable to us.” He evidently had no idea that the Renown did not know where Birmingham was and that they were no longer in the likely path of German forces heading to Narvik and soon neither would be the mine-laying force.

Another operational misfortune was the complete miss-reading of the German forces waiting to occupy Trondheim. When this force was discovered by aircraft, it was assumed to be an independent force which had somehow found its way into the North Sea.53 The Admiralty should have deduced its origin and its real objective but, unfortunately, when sighted, elements of this force were moving in a westerly direction and this was sufficient to lead Forbes and the Admiralty to assume it was also heading to the Atlantic.54 There was another important consequence of this miss-reading. Had it been recognised that these ships, then west of Trondheim, had once been part of the larger force still heading north, it would have given Churchill cause to consider if ports other than Narvik were the target of German activity.

The third, and most important failure, was that the German force heading for Bergen (Group 3) was never discovered; this, despite the fact that Forbes’ instructions in the evening of 7 April had brought CS2 within fifty miles of Group 3 sometime in the mid-afternoon of 8 April and many hours before it occupied Bergen. This failure, as had the miss-reading of Group 2 off Trondheim, denied Churchill and Pound the appreciation that the entire western coast was under threat and not merely Narvik. The implications of this would become even more serious in the late afternoon. By this time, Churchill had finally accepted that a full-scale invasion of Norway might be in train. Pound concurred but he had not surrendered the possibility that the activities in the south might also herald another break-out. Tragically, and fatally, Churchill, nor Pound, nor Forbes gave thought to the possibility that German forces might already have slipped by earlier in the day as, indeed, they had.55

53 Indeed, the precise interpretation placed on the detection of this force is quite obscure. 54 It would have been possible, by mid-afternoon of 8 April to have deduced that the force off Trondheim was part of the force that Churchill had accepted was heading for Narvik. When this latter force was subsequently located, it had diminished in size to almost precisely the force portended in the 6 April; that is a force of ten ships (ten destroyers) taking a force to Narvik, although the original force was said to be a division, much too large to be carried in 10 destroyers. 55 During the afternoon, in response to an Admiralty telegram, Forbes set as one of the tasks of CS2 the interception of any advance from the south on the possibility that these might be heading for 212

Such operational failures were in part due to the ‘vagaries’ of war, upon which success and failure are often finely balanced and which defy the apportionment of blame and responsibility. Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that for many hours during 8 April Churchill had the fate of central Norway in his hands. He had the means and the opportunity to have altered the outcome of the Norwegian campaign. Had he masked access to Stavanger and Bergen and had adequate air reconnaissance been authorised, this action might have made all the difference.56 It made no real sense to assume that Narvik alone was under threat, whatever the intelligence had suggested. Without control of central Norway, the Germans would not have been able to hold Narvik. Reinforcement would have been highly problematic, if not impossible.

The discussion above has explained the circumstances that helped sustained this misperception over Narvik during much of 8 April and why, if it were ever considered, the need to mask these ports might have been deemed unnecessary. Nevertheless, to not have taken precautions at these ports once the threat to Narvik was recognised was foolish; to not to have taken action immediately it was acknowledged that German movements in the south represented further possible moves against Norway was, surely, unforgivable neglect. These were moments of missed opportunity. In particular, Forbes decision to direct the CS2 to the southern tip of Norway in the evening of 7 April had placed significant forces in the vicinity of Bergen and Stavanger where, for many hours, they offered the prospect of success at these vital points.

Churchill does not deserve blame for the disembarkation of the R4 forces. By the time this decision was made, soldiers were more likely to be a burden than a boon. What was needed the moment it was acknowledged Narvik was under threat was for naval forces to be directed to the other key objectives. Given the advanced movements of Germans by mid-day 8 April, naval forces freed of the anxiety

Stavanger or Bergen. See Naval Operations of Campaign in Norway,16. AT.1842/8. This work does not indicate the precise wording of the telegram. It only records Forbes interpretation of his responsibilities in response to it. 56 Of course, the Germans did not take Stavanger via the sea. However, presumably there would have been a variety of courses open to the naval forces had the forces off Bergen been discovered earlier as, presumably, would have been the case. Action off Bergen would surely have alerted the Norwegians and this would have made a material difference all along the coast and at Oslo. 213

surrounding their landing forces would, no doubt, have proven more successful and more aggressive than naval forces still responsible for them. 57

The CS 1 large cruisers, unencumbered by their landing forces, might also have contributed to the interception and destruction of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. This issue draws attention to one of the core criticisms of Churchill and Pound at this time: the priority they purportedly gave to the ‘break-out’ of the German capital ships. This is usually condemned as utter folly when compared to the opportunities offered in Norway but the advantages to be gained by the destruction of the German force are not to be under-estimated. Conversely, a successful break-out would have been an enormous drain on British resources and would certainly have made the subsequent conduct of the Norwegian campaign much more difficult. In making his judgements during 7 and 8 April, Churchill was never presented with a situation where he could focus on one prospect over the other and this also applied to Pound. He never had the luxury of a choice between fighting an invasion of Norway or addressing a capital ship ’break-out’; he faced a potential invasion and a capital ship breakout. There were resources and opportunities enough to have faced both threats but he achieved success against neither and this is where the focus of our analysis and criticism must be. The German use of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in conjunction with the invasion of Norway was an effective strategy; these ships kept much of the Home Fleet away from the Norwegian coast before the landings and, thereafter, the landings drew the Home Fleet to Norway to facilitate their remarkably easy return after an earlier brush with the Royal Navy. The escape of these ships has skewed the historical record towards a condemnation of the attention given to this threat and the concomitant neglect of Norway. Success, however, would have certainly muted this. Churchill and Pound could not have anticipated the intelligence advantage the Germans had at the time and which very likely contributed to the survival of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Churchill’s responsibility lies more in the assumptions made about threat to Norway at critical junctures.

57 The Admiralty would also have had to consider that, given preparation evident in the German moves, U-boats would have been placed strategically off all their objectives. This would not have encouraged the transportation of soldiers at this juncture. 214

There is one more element to the disaster of 7 and 8 April which must be addressed in any assessment of culpability and responsibility of these vital two days. This is the appallingly inept handling of the crisis by the Norwegians themselves. Haar records that, within an hour or so of the 11.30am 8 April War Cabinet meeting, the British Admiralty had requested a meeting with a Norwegian envoy ‘regarding a matter of utmost importance”.58 The Norwegian Vice-Consul was subsequently informed that German operations against Narvik were suspected and that German forces could arrive before mid-night on the 8 April.59 This information was conveyed to Foreign Minister Koht by phone from London at 3pm but he did not act on it because he believed “the British Navy would take care of it” and that, in any event, there were Norwegian naval forces and army units at Narvik that could deal with the threat.60 A subsequent British Admiralty telegram arrived at the Norwegian Foreign Office at 1800 and was copied to Norwegian Admiralty staff where it arrived at 19.05. Despite these communications, the Norwegians did little. Nevertheless, the British Admiralty’s response was also inadequate. That they did not do more to ensure a more aggressive Norwegian response, perhaps via Churchill himself or the Foreign Office is difficult to understand, although such communications would have been problematic given the mine-laying operations that had taken place earlier in the day. More could have been done to ensure the defence of Narvik, even if no other more general warnings were given. That stronger warnings were not given is perhaps best explained by Churchill’s conviction the Royal Navy would intercept the German force.

Conclusions Churchill’s performance as First Lord in the days immediately preceding the German landings in Norway leaves much to be desired. Despite repeated warnings of German action, he dismissed the threat. Although he was by no means alone in this attitude, it lay almost entirely with his Service to secure the necessary lodgements on the Norwegian coast to sustain a campaign against a German invasion. It was especially incumbent on him to ensure all was done to address the threat, should it arise. Because he did not take the threat seriously, it was left to others to take the initiative.

58 Haarr, The German Invasion of Norway, April 1940, 108-109. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 215

In particular, DCNS Phillips worked earnestly and to ensure both ships and soldiers were ready to pre-empt a German invasion. Yet, despite this preparation, the German forces were able to secure landings at Stavanger and Bergen and, more remarkably, at Trondheim and Narvik, a feat considered impossible in the face of a vastly superior Navy.

This chapter has sought to reconsider the events of 7 and 8 April which are critical to understanding this failure. These two days provided real opportunities for British sea-power to have made the decisive difference Churchill always believed it could. The failure to take advantage of these opportunities has most commonly been attributed to Churchill’s and Pound’s belief that the Germans were attempting a break-out of one or more of Germany’s capital ships. This analysis has shown that, despite his earlier reluctance to accept German designs on Norway, Churchill became increasingly receptive to the possibility that Norway was a potential target of German activity in the afternoon and early evening of 7 April and that, during this time, Admiral Forbes took constructive action against this possibility. Thereafter, it was Admiral Pound, upon his return to the Admiralty in evening of 7 April, who decisively drew the War Room’s attention back to the break-out threat. Churchill and Pound’s decision to disembark the forces of R4 and to send the heavy cruisers to sea did not reflect an indifference to a threat to Norway as much as Churchill’s misapprehension that Narvik alone was under threat. Each believed Royal Navy could meet this threat and also destroy a substantial portion of the German navy. That Narvik was left unprotected, that the objective of the forces off Trondheim were misunderstood and the forces for Bergen went undetected were failures due in part to the vagaries of war. The import of the last two misfortunes was that they concealed the wider threat to Norway and helped sustained Churchill’s view that Narvik alone was under attack.

These misfortunes help explain the lost opportunities of 8 April, they do not excuse Churchill’ failure to seize the opportunities presented him. The moment it was acknowledged that Narvik was under threat, the only appropriate and ‘reasonable’ action was to send naval forces to Bergen and Stavanger as a precautionary measure. The foresight of Admiral Forbes, perhaps supported by Churchill and Phillips in the early stages, had placed sufficient forces available in 216

close proximity to either port to have made this possible. The potential reward for this move clearly outweighed the risks involved. The Admiralty did, at least, make some effort to warn the Norwegians of the threat to Narvik although this can be viewed as almost as inadequate as the Norwegians response to it, and hints at an extraordinary complacency.

Churchill’s failure was one of imagination, of deduction and analysis, and of a misplaced single-mindedness; it was not a product of bombast and bullying and domination of the decision-making process that is central to the existing assessment of events. In the immediate aftermath of the German invasion of Norway on 9 April, 1940, Churchill attributed failure to a variety of reasons, but most particularly the Norwegians themselves. It is difficult to know when, if ever, he grasped that he had been a major contributor.

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Chapter 7

Norway Part 2: Fighting the Campaign

With the failure to prevent the German occupation of all the key points along the Norwegian coast, the second chapter of the Norwegian campaign began with the Allies’ efforts to retake key points. This involved action against Narvik in northern Norway and the city-port of Trondheim on the central coast. Within three weeks, however, Allied forces had abandoned central Norway. Narvik was finally captured in early June but promptly evacuated as the fighting in France reached its climax.

Churchill is accused of imposing his strategic vision, interfering at an operational level, and generally making an unfortunate contribution to an indecisive, opportunistic and chaotic campaign. The indecision over the order in which the ports taken by the German should be retrieved is the focal point of most criticism of Churchill’s role. Narvik was initially given priority but within several days the focus of Allied operations was redirected to the capture of Trondheim. It is generally contended that the focus on Narvik was a result of Churchill’s preoccupation with Swedish ore and that he entirely ignored the wider strategic requirements of a

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campaign to save Norway.1 When the decision was made to switch to Trondheim, this served only to divide Allied resources and make impossible the achievement of either objective.

This chapter will consider the merit of these criticisms and assess Churchill’s contribution to the failures of the Norwegian campaign. Churchill’s role will be considered alongside that of other key players and in the context of a challenging and rapidly changing strategic, political, and operational environment. This context, generally neglected, is essential to an accurate assessment of Churchill’s performance and will be analysed here through five phases of the campaign.

Which Port First? The first decision facing the Allies on 9 April, 1940, was which port to retake first? There is no doubt that Churchill’s primary interest in Norway was the capture of Narvik but it was an interest shared with most other members of the War Cabinet, who recognised its importance in the ore trade and also its value as a possible route to the Gallivare ore fields. It is not clear, however, that this was the determining influence in the War Cabinet’s decision to make Narvik its first strategic objective. Although the War Cabinet had, hitherto, shown little interest in Norway itself, once the extent of the German operations was understood, the British Government’s intentions were to do as much as it possible could. From the beginning, the War Cabinet declared its intention to take back as much of Norway as possible; moreover, there was never any doubt that a southern objective was highly desirable if this were to be achieved.2 Whether this should be Bergen or Trondheim (or perhaps, initially, even Stavanger) was of some dispute. There were also the views of the French to be considered. They believed Narvik should receive priority but would eventually redirect their attention to Trondheim in unison with the British Government.

1 For example, see Barnett comments in Engage the Enemy More Closely, 120. 2 Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, 121, claims that Churchill only belatedly “stumbled on the strategic truth” that “the Trondheim area…was the key to control of the whole country to the northwards, including Narvik.” There was little consensus on this at the time, however. The COS thought Trondheim the best ‘military’ and Bergen the best ‘political’ objective. (see, Cab 79/3 Conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff meeting, 11am, April 9th, 1940. For Pound’s initial recommendation was Bergen (see an undated note probably written during 9April, ADM 116/4471 Scandinavian Affairs). In his private diary, Ralph Edwards recorded his preference for a “quick dart at Trondheim which is much more the key to the situation than Bergen.” See, Roskill 4/75, Edwards’ diary entry 9 April 1940. 219

Ultimately, in these very early days of the campaign, the decision to focus on Narvik would be determined not by what was desirable but by what was believed possible with the resources available.

At the War Cabinet meeting of 10 April, Chamberlain explained that Narvik would receive priority because no other objective seemed immediately viable.3 A number of factors had led to this conclusion. First, the Allies had only light and limited forces available. Second, it was difficult to know the size of the German forces in each port. However, assumptions about numbers led to the conviction that one port only could be immediately retaken.4 Third, and most important at this time, it was very difficult to establish the level of resistance the Norwegians would mount against the Germans and it had to be assumed that the German forces in Bergen and Trondheim would be reinforced from further south before successful action could be taken. A fourth influence was concern the Norwegians might choose capitulation over resistance; in this case, it was probable that no attempt would have been made to retake any of southern or central Norway and all effort concentrated on Narvik. A final influence was that Narvik was less exposed to German air power. Nevertheless, despite these eminently sound reasons for concentrating on Narvik and, of course, its value in regard to Swedish ore, Trondheim and Bergen were not ignored in these initial deliberations. Plans were prepared to secure lodgements further south with a second echelon of troops but there was no intention to use these in major operations against Trondheim or Bergen until Narvik had been retaken.5

3 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 10 April, 1940, CAB 65/12/19. Churchill shared Chamberlain’s views on this. Important, however, was the fact that it was Ironside who first nominated Narvik for priority. Churchill noted the following in regard to Trondheim on 11 April: “Now that the Germans have control of the Oslo-Trondhjem railway (unless cut it may well be that twenty thousand men will be required to turn them out of Trondhjem, and if they are to march from Namsos heavy transport requirements will be entailed and the whole business will become far bigger than Narvik, which, if executed promptly, appears a manageable proposition.” Letter to Admiral Pound, Admiral Phillips and Sir Archibald Carter, Char 19/6,. 4 It was estimated 3000 to 4000 Germans were in Narvik. This was based on the number of merchant ships in the harbour. It was believed the soldiers had arrived in these when, in fact, most had arrived in destroyers. This particular fact does not necessarily explain why Narvik was the port chosen. It does help explain the decision to concentrate on one port only in the first instance. 5 As early as 10 April, the COS meeting had recommended that if, during the preparation of forces for Narvik it was concluded that, if all the available forces were not needed at Narvik, consideration should be given to using forces to establish footholds at other points not yet occupied by the Germans such as Namsos and Andalsnes as preparation to future action. See Minutes of COS Meeting, 10 April, 1940, CAB 79/3. 220

Churchill offered another reason why Narvik should be retaken first and he was supported in this by Pound. He believed it was critical for Britain to secure a naval base in Norway to match the advantages gained by the Germans further south. Churchill’s public statements regarding success in Norway were sometimes extremely optimistic and suggested an unrealistic appreciation of the military realities facing him. However, his private communication to Pound displayed an awareness of the challenges ahead and a certain perspicacity that only in the north could the Germans be fought to advantage:6 It is immediately necessary to obtain one or two fuelling bases on the Norwegian coast … now that the enemy have bases we cannot carry on without them … Unless we have this quite soon we cannot compete with the Germans in their new position … Narvik must be fought for. Although we have been completely outwitted, there is no reason to suppose that prolonged and serious fighting in this area will not impose a greater drain on the enemy than on ourselves.7

Thus, for Churchill, Narvik was more than a route to Gallivare and, in arguing its priority, his voice was only one among many. The War Cabinet gave Narvik priority for rational and sound operational reasons. Nevertheless, there was an inescapable tension in the ‘Narvik first’ rationale which would eat away at its viability and make it increasingly indefensible. Whatever the advantages of a base and whatever the immediate challenges were to action further south, the longer southern and central Norway were left alone, the greater the effort that would be needed to dislodge the German forces there. Furthermore, the ‘Narvik first’ approach would mean the Norwegians would bear the full burden of battle further south without Allied assistance. As soon as it became obvious the Norwegians would fight the Narvik strategy became an untenable political and moral proposition, to say nothing of the questionable military wisdom of allowing the Norwegian forces to face the Germans alone.

6Churchill’s misplaced optimism was demonstrated at the mid-day War Cabinet meeting of April 9 (Cab 63/6). It can also be found in a telegram to Forbes of the same day: “I consider the Germans have made strategic error in incurring commitments on Norwegian coasts which we can probably wipe out in a short time.” (Telegram, W.S. Churchill to Admiral Forbes, 9 April, 1939,Char 19/2). There would be fewer such statements as the campaign progressed but they continued to be made. Always to be found, however, were more cautious assessments of likely events. 7 Churchill repeated these convictions to the War Cabinet on the morning of the 10th. The capture of Narvik and the establishment of adequate fuelling bases “could offset the effects of the extended facilities for air warfare which the Germans would enjoy through the possession of Southern Norway.” 221

Churchill, the MCC and the War Cabinet deliberated these dilemmas over the next several days. It was far from clear if the immediate recapture of Trondheim was militarily viable, but the British War Cabinet and the MCC under the chairmanship of Churchill, were compelled to consider the needs of the Norwegian people in their wider strategic objectives, something that had never figured in discussions of a northern strategy. German pre-emption had forced a choice between Narvik and Norway.

Trondheim On 14 April, four days after the War Cabinet had given Narvik priority, this priority shifted to Trondheim. The sudden change and its attendant consequences have been attributed to a considerable degree to Churchill’s indecisive leadership and bullying nature.8 However, the dominant players in this change of strategy were Chamberlain and Halifax.9 Churchill’s role was that of facilitator, albeit a not entirely effective one. It was an unenviable role in which successful outcomes were much less likely than failure. Although there is no doubt he ought to have acted more cautiously in supporting the switch and less precipitately in proposing a plan to retake Trondheim, it is doubtful if the need to recapture this port could have been resisted. Moreover, it was not Churchill alone who supported the change in strategy. The move from Narvik to Trondheim had the support of Admiral Phillips and the CIGS, General Ironside.

The first tentative step away from Narvik to Trondheim had been made by Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Phillips at an Admiralty Staff meeting in the evening of 11 April. He questioned the wisdom of the War Cabinet’s decision to send all available troops to Narvik and noted that this decision had been taken when it was thought the Norwegians might come to terms with the Germans.10 Now that

8 For examples of this view, see Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, 120. Barnett attributes the confusion over priorities “not least…because the mind of the First Lord…was puffed this way and that by the shifting breeze of opportunity.” Also Lamb, Churchill as War Leader, 36-37; and Rhys- Jones, Churchill and the Norwegian Campaign, 198. Rhys-Jones is particularly hard on Churchill in regard to Trondheim. 9 See also the views of Bell, Churchill and Sea Power, 333. 10 ADM 1/12467, Battle Summary 17: The Conjunct Expedition to Norway, April – June 1940. Chapter VII. Chair of the Air staff, Cyril Newell had broached the idea of preparation for action against Bergen or Trondheim at the MCC meeting earlier in the afternoon. Churchill had given the code-name for such action “Maurice” but had made clear that no action should take place until it was known what would be required to secure Narvik. CAB 83/3, Meeting of MCC. 11 April, 1940. 222

this was no longer likely, he thought it essential to get a footing in the Namsos area in preparation for action against Trondheim. This was an eminently sensible idea if one wished to avoid an opposed landing in the future and it had first been considered by the COS on 9 April. The proposal resulted in a meeting later that evening between Churchill, naval and air staff and Ironside.11 Churchill suggested the diversion of part of the force destined for Narvik but Ironside feared this would herald a division of effort between two objectives and that it would deny success at either and so nothing came of the suggestion.12

However, whether Churchill or Ironside liked it, the days of the ‘Narvik first’ strategy were numbered. Over the next several days, the decision would be taken from their hands by the growing political, moral, and military need to help the Norwegians via Trondheim. These inexorable forces were buttressed by the War Cabinet’s hope that control of Trondheim would give the Swedes the confidence to join the allies or, at the very least, it would prevent Sweden surrendering to German demands. The champions of these views were Chamberlain, Halifax and Alexander Cadogan and it would be they who would dominate the decision-making process. Churchill was less than enamoured with this point of view. He knew Trondheim was important if the Allies intended to help the Swedes. This had been part of the Finnish Option but now it was possible the Allies might gain access to Gallivare via Narvik, he viewed large scale assistance to Sweden via Trondheim as a price too high to pay for the control of Swedish ore. If assistance was to be offered to Sweden, it should be via Narvik. He was prepared to sacrifice much of Sweden to the Germans so long as the Allies controlled Gallivare and he did not want situation to develop in which the Allies would have to sustain the Swedes “as long as the war lasts.”13

11 Reference is made to the heated discussion in both Ironside’s and Ralph Edward’s diaries. This meeting has sometimes been confused with another in the morning of 14 April. See, for example, Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, 102, footnote. It is likely that Ironside, in his post-war recollections, also confused the two meetings. 12It is probable that Churchill intended to replace the diverted force with a second echelon force destined to go to Namsos some days later. In due course, the diversion would prove a blessing, despite causing some issues with equipment. There was congestion and confusion enough with the arrival of the single brigade. Had the two brigades arrived together the confusion and delay would have been compounded considerably. 13 Premier Papers 1/419, W. S. Churchill to Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. 223

On 12 April, Churchill informed the War Cabinet of his discussion with Ironside the previous evening and he expressed their collective view that nothing be done to interfere with Narvik. Chamberlain explained that he had also given thought to a landing at Namsos and noted that the Swedes had been emphasizing the importance of the port of Trondheim.14 Churchill explained that retaking Trondheim would be a substantial undertaking since it would “no doubt” be reinforced by the Germans from Oslo, a point of view Chamberlain had held a mere two days earlier and which had helped determine the ‘Narvik first’ policy. However, Churchill was not blind to the pressing need to succour the Norwegians and Swedes and he made an important concession, which would soon have significant ramifications: it might, he suggested, be possible to use the Chasseurs Alpins at Trondheim if Narvik was captured quickly. These French alpine troops had been destined for the Swedish border after the occupation of Narvik in the hope they might eventually occupy Gallivare but, as Churchill now acknowledged, if Sweden was hostile they could not be used, if Sweden was friendly, they need not be used.15 It was probable, therefore, that the Chasseurs would be surplus to need at Narvik, or quickly become so.

The pressure for Churchill to redirect his energies to Trondheim continued at a second War Cabinet meeting later in the day when Halifax argued that, while Narvik was of military importance, its capture would have less political effect than action further south. He warned that “The enemy was thrusting to the southward from Trondheim and northward from Oslo” and, if the forces joined, they would control all of southern Norway.16 Here was the dilemma of the ‘Narvik first’ strategy but Churchill was shy of the only action by which Trondheim could be recaptured before it was relieved from Oslo: a rapid, direct and dangerous amphibious assault. He warned of a ‘bloody repulse’ at Trondheim and noted that a British landing at Narvik might occur in a matter of days, presumably hoping, therefore, to defer a decision on Trondheim. In a further effort to deflect Chamberlain and Halifax, he reminded the War Cabinet that plans for Trondheim continued to be studied as did plans for small landings at Molde and Namsos.

14. War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, Minute 3, 13 April, 1940 CAB 65/12/21. 15 Notes by the Chairman of the Military Co-ordination Committee for the Joint Planning Staff, 12 April, 1940, Premier Papers 1/419. 16 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, Minute 5, 13 April, 1940, CAB 65/12/22. 224

Churchill’s reference to the idea of a series of small landings now set in train a new set of events. The COS and JPS plans for these landings were to be implemented as forces not needed at Narvik became available. However, Churchill’s reference to them now ensured the plans would be brought forward to help sustain Norwegian and Swedish morale. Later in the afternoon, Churchill took his proposal to the MCC meeting where it was agreed that plans should be drawn up under the operational code-name “Maurice”. Churchill wrote a rationale for Maurice for discussion with the Secretary of State for War and Ironside and, subsequently, the War Cabinet: the landings would encourage the Norwegians in their defence and provide “evidences of the Allied intention to throw substantial forces into Norway” and this, he hoped, might also influence the Swedes.17 The landings would prepare jumping off points for future operations against Trondheim; others could be withdrawn as necessary after drawing the enemy to them. In the meantime, they would “baffle” and confuse the Germans.18 In the immediate term, therefore, the action to the south would be a demonstration, a diversion, a bluff; preparation for significant future action rather than significant action itself.19

The rationale bore the hallmarks of Churchill’s faith in the flexibility of sea- power but, unless the landings served a distinct tactical purpose, either to provide direct help to the Norwegians or to directly threaten the Germans, they were likely to cause less anxiety and fewer problems to the enemy than they would cause the Allies in executing them. This was particularly so when the main enemy response would most probably come from German air power, which had a mobility and economy of effort against which the navy could not hope to compete. Despite the hopefulness of his proposal, Churchill was aware of the ramifications of his proposals and would later write that “We are irresistibly drawn into all kinds of improvised operations

17 CAB 83/3 Minutes of MCC meeting, 12 April, 1940, 5.30pm and Prem 1/419, Notes by the Chairman of the Miliitary Co-ordination Committee for the Joint Planning Staff, 12 April 1940. 18 The note cited above mentioned a discussion was supposed to take place in the evening of the 12th with SSW and CIGS. Ironsides diary makes no mention of the meeting or its conclusions. 19 Ironside had his discussion with Churchill in the evening of the 12th. He wrote in his diary entry of the 13 April that according to Churchill’s chat, action at Trondheim would be a “diversion” and he (Ironside) was worried that the War Cabinet saw it as the ‘main operation’ “all because of a wire that has come in from the Military Attache at Stockholm.” As a result of this meeting with Churchill he sent word to Mackesy to “curtail his wings after taking Narvik and to Carton de Wiart to open his wings a bit at Namsos.” MacLeod and Kelly, Ironside Diaries, 255, entry, 13 April, 1940. 225

with raw, half-trained troops”.20 However, at this stage, he could see no other way to bolster the Norwegian war effort while avoiding a deleterious over-commitment in the south that neither he nor Ironside wanted until after Narvik had been secured.21 Moreover, there is no evidence that the idea of these landings were challenged by naval or military staff. Unfortunately for Churchill, his proposal not only failed to deflect the War Cabinet from a southern front but contributed to the very problem he had hoped to avoid.

Churchill put his diversionary ‘stop-gap’ measures to the War Cabinet the following morning but Chamberlain and Halifax continued to maintain that Trondheim should be attacked as soon as possible and they hoped the French Chasseur Alpins might be used there. Churchill and Ironside again demurred: Narvik was imminent while Trondheim would necessarily be a “more speculative affair.”22 Neither wished to seek the diversion of the Chasseur Alpins until definitely established at Narvik, lest they “be committed to a number of ineffectual operations along the coast.”23 Nevertheless, Churchill’s resistance to Chamberlain and Halifax continued to erode and he somewhat off-handedly suggested that the German forces might be invested at Narvik so that more immediate action could take place at Trondheim.24 After much debate, Churchill and Ironside secured a delay in the decision over Trondheim which was conditional on explaining to the Swedes that “while the importance of Trondheim as a focal centre was recognised, it was considered Narvik was vital as a naval base” and must, therefore, take priority.25

However, the political and military pressure for immediate large scale action in central and southern Norway was unrelenting. During 13 April, a telegram from Otto Ruge, the Commander in Chief, Norwegian Forces, warned that if he did not receive

20 Winston S. Churchill to Oliver Stanley, 13 April, 1940 7.30pm, Char 19/2. 21 To limit the risk of these landings, Churchill asked if the forces available might be “stiffened by one or two regular regiments of mechanised cavalry.” Unhelpfully, Ironside declined to offer such a force and recommended only a few bren-carriers be sent. 22 MCC Meeting, 13 April 1940, 5.30pm, CAB 83/3. 23 Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 11.30 am 13 April, 1940, CAB 65/12/23. 24 Ibid. 25 It was considered desirable to explain that the Allied forces had no intention of advancing towards the Swedish border, something which was now indeed the case. The point here was, to alleviate Scandinavian concerns that Narvik was only about Swedish ore and to indicate that the substantial forces destined for Narvik would be immediately used elsewhere upon its capture. 226

‘“assistance at once, ie. today or tomorrow’ the war would be ended in a few days.”26 While Ironside appeared inclined to view such communications as exaggerating the Norwegian need, they could not be ignored.27 Unless the British War Cabinet was prepared to surrender Norway, and surrender its hopes for Sweden, a change of policy towards Trondheim was irresistible. To this point, Churchill had identified two circumstances in which action against Trondheim might be brought forward: the first was a successful coup de main against Narvik would free a substantial force immediately. The second was that, if the capture of Narvik was long delayed, it might be decided to invest Narvik and concentrate on Trondheim. In the meantime, he and the COS would proceed with plans to land some 4000 infantry of the second echelon of forces “at suitable points on the coast to secure a lodgement from which large forces would be directed against Trondheim” at a later date.28 Churchill was required to make one more concession to the War Cabinet on 13 April; he agreed to ask the French to allow the use of the Chasseur Alpins other than at Narvik.

The intensity of political pressure being brought to bear on Churchill and Ironside for a change in strategy against their better judgment is evident in Cadogan’s diary: “P.M., J.S., Sam H and H[alifax] impressed by message showing that Narvik alone is no good and we must attack Trondhjem (easier to do now than in a few days when it will be reinforced). Winston against … But we got something out of him … reluctantly sent telegram to Paris asking … to divert Chasseurs Alpins from Narvik to elsewhere.”29 The challenges these circumstances presented for Churchill were considerable. Politics and diplomacy were now dominating strategy in a manner which had not been anticipated. In the criticism of the decisions Churchill would subsequently make, this is often overlooked.

Pace, Audacity, Speed: Operation Hammer The dilemma that dominated all considerations for operations in central Norway was how to recapture Trondheim with the forces available before it was reinforced by the Germans. There appeared to be no answer to this problem, save for the two

26 Minutes of MCC, 5pm, 13 April, 1940, CAB 83/3. Otto Ruge, (1882-1961), Supreme Commander of the Norwegian Forces, April, 1940. 27 MacLeod and Kelly, The Ironside Diaries, entry 14 April, 1940, 28 This outline was put to the French Minister of Defence by Churchill that day. 29 Cadogan Diaries, 270, entry 13 April. 227

propositions Churchill had put forward in regard to Narvik. In the evening of 13 April, it now appeared that the first of these might be possible. The Admiralty received news of a resounding naval success at Narvik. News also came forward from Vice-Admiral Whitworth, Commander, 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron, that the Germans at Narvik were thoroughly frightened and he proposed a landing be made as soon as possible.30 Churchill and the naval staff, most likely Phillips, believed they now saw a way to deal with the question of Trondheim. Narvik might, after all, be taken by a coup de main with a relatively small force and that, therefore, resources could be more rapidly switched to central Norway.31 More than this, it was suggested to Churchill by his staff that naval action at Trondheim might also provide the conditions for a coup de main there. Soon, this proposal for an amphibious assault would be given the code name Hammer. These matters were discussed at a specially convened MCC meeting at 10.30pm, whereupon it was agreed that if, in Churchill’s opinion, information suggested Narvik could be taken quickly, the “W.O. and Admiralty in consultation, should without further reference to Committee, make arrangements for diverting the 2nd Brigade of Narvik forces to Namsos.”32 The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee were to consider a plan for a direct assault on Trondheim, “bearing in mind the need to effect a landing at Trondheim as soon as possible.”33

Most historical analysis contends that, later in the evening of 13 April, or very early in the following morning, Churchill, in his capacity as chairman of the MCC, unilaterally demanded the diversion of the 146 Brigade to Namsos against Ironside’s vehement objections.34 This version of events is based on the post-war recollections of Ironside in The Ironside Diaries and is an important pillar of the view that Churchill exercised an unconscionable and aggressive influence on strategy during the campaign. There is, however, no evidence beyond Ironside’s recollections to

30 Admiral Sir William Jock Whitworth KCB DSO (1884-1973) was a senior Royal Navy officer who went on to be Second Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Personnel. 31, War Cabinet meeting of 14 April, 1940, CAB 65/12/24; CV At the Admiralty, 1059. 32 It was always recognised that the diversion would cause problems – much discussed by historians. The diverted force would temporarily be without a brigadier and he would be without appropriate maps, but, after discussion in the MCC and COS meetings, it was considered these problems could be overcome and preparations were made to do so. 33 Minutes of MCC, 13 April, 10.30pm, Cab 83/3 34 The Ironside Diaries, 255. For examples of how this meeting has been interpreted see Rhys-Jones, Churchill and the Norwegian Campaign, 75; Lamb, Churchill as War Leader, 37; Kersaudy, Norway: 1940, 97. For an alternative view, see Bell, Churchill and Sea Power, 331-332. 228

suggest this meeting took place. Rather, there is evidence that Ironside confused and conflated the events of the evening of 13 April with the late night/early morning meeting of 11/12 April discussed earlier.35 This error has been compounded by the editors of Ironside’s diaries (and perhaps by Ironside himself) who erroneously record the following as an entry for 1am, 13 April, when it was an entry for 1am, 14 April: The Navy have had a very fine effort in Narvik, redeeming completely their mistake … the enemy appears to have evacuated the town … there should not be so much difficulty in mopping up the remains of the force … the Navy now wish to repeat the process at Trondheim. They have put up a completely new plan – which has the disadvantage of taking some time to execute. I said we must go on with our Namsos landing which can now be increased by one of the brigades.36

This entry is largely consistent with the tone of the decisions made at the 10.30 pm MCC meeting. Moreover, the decision to divert the 146 Brigade was not made unilaterally by Churchill in the late night of 13/14 April as claimed in The Ironside Diaries but through consensus during the afternoon of 14 April and only after two COS meetings, a War Cabinet meeting and a meeting of the MCC. At this last meeting, it was recorded that “The Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that owing to the necessity of getting to the Trondhjem area as soon as possible, it was better to divert one of the Narvik brigades there immediately.”37

There is no doubt that, by the evening of 13 April, Ironside was as aware as Churchill that preparation for action at Trondheim must begin in earnest. Furthermore, not only did he co-operate with the diversion, he was willing to take a

35 This was the meeting at which Churchill had first broached the idea of diverting some of the forces for Narvik to Namsos. Together, these meetings have caused much confusion to historians, including Roskill. Roskill assumed, for example, that only one meeting of this nature took place, but the first and not the second. 36 The Ironside Diaries, 255-256. It is my contention that all the entries made under the heading of 13 April were actually diary entries made on 14 April. The entries made under 13 April were details of events of 14 April or reflections on the day before. This makes highly problematic much of the post facto elaboration (bottom of page 256 to end of 259) by Ironside, and in which the editors place so much store. The editors fail to appreciate that, cumulatively; these pages present conflicting versions of the same events. Further, it is, as noted above, my belief that Ironside’s recollections include a mixture of discussion that occurred at the first late night meeting with Churchill in the late evening of 11/12 April describe earlier in this chapter. It is to be noted that Ironside refers to losing his temper at this meeting in his recollection. We know he did so in this meeting of 11/12 April but there is no evidence of ‘heat’ in the representation put to him by Churchill early in the morning of the 14 April. The diary entries quoted above indicated that he accepted with relative equanimity the need to divert forces to Namsos. It is likely he did not like the change in strategy but, like Churchill, accepted there was no choice. 37 Discussion recorded in the minutes of the MCC meeting of 4.30pm, 14 April, 1940, CAB 83/3. 229

gamble on Hammer as well.38 The main reason Ironside was willing to accept the move away from Narvik and to accept the change in Maurice from a series of minor operations to something much more substantial was because these changes included the prospect of a direct and rapid assault on Trondheim. In a continuation of the 14 April entry, Ironside wrote, in what can only have been a reference to the future Hammer: “Anyway, the thing is pace, audacity, and speed. We must take a chance. Any scheme which means delay must be rejected.”39

Throughout this time, the pressure being brought to bear on Churchill had continued unabated. Cadogan again recorded the significant influence that he and Halifax were having on strategy and policy: “I hope we have liquidated N[arvik] and – still more – purged Winston of the Narvik obsession. Let’s now leave that alone, and get on with Trondheim, which is the only thing that matters in the Scandinavian eyes.”40

The evidence of the foregoing demonstrates the extent to which Churchill was being led by events rather than leading them. It was his staff, rather than he that conceived the assault on Trondheim. Ironsides’ support for the plan, although perhaps given reluctantly, was not forced by Churchill. Together, they had accepted that a military effort in central Norway was essential and both accepted that the best, if not the only way to deal with the problem, was a direct thrust at Trondheim via Hammer. Four episodes over the next three days, 15 to 17 April, provide further evidence that Churchill was by no means alone in pushing Hammer or, indeed, the general strategic agenda. Ironside made a substantial contribution to this new strategic direction, but the most significant force in its advancement was Prime Minister Chamberlain.41 These episodes have typically been used to illustrate a very different view: that Churchill was at the centre of all major decisions. It will be shown this was much less the case than has been assumed.

The first episode pertains to the pressure Churchill purportedly brought to bear on the COS to ensure Hammer took place. The evidence points not to Churchill but

38 Hammer was the code-word given by Churchill to the direct amphibious assault on Trondheim. 39 The Ironside Diaries, 260. 40 Cadogan Diary, 270, entry 14 April. 41 Also see the views of Bell, Churchill and Sea Power, chapter 6, esp. 187-194. 230

Ironside, who dominated COS discussions on the subject and marginalised the Joint Planning Staff report which counselled against a direct assault at Trondheim. The JPS believed this too risky and recommended, instead, the development of the Maurice landings north and south of Trondheim. Despite this, when the Chiefs of Staff considered the report in the afternoon of 15 April, they requested that plans be made for a direct attack on Trondheim either in conjunction with or independently of forces operating from Namsos and Andalsnes.42 Ironside’s diary is peppered with evidence to show that it was he who was most insistent that Hammer take place and that he believed that this might be done successfully despite German air power. His diary recorded criticism of JPS member, John Slessor, who had “produced a theory that if we took the place [Trondheim] it would be no good to us because we couldn’t use it…Owing to the air”. Ironside pointedly noted that after these comments were made, a report came in about the destroyer, Somali, off Namsos which had been attacked by the Luftwaffe. They had “dropped eighty-eight bombs in two hours and had never had a bomb within two hundred yard”:43 We then went on to make a plan…I was pretty forceful in what I said and I forced the Committee to continue planning. We are now at a critical moment of the war from a moral point of view and we must expect to suffer casualties.44

Churchill’s support for Hammer was also being influenced by the limited success German aircraft were then experiencing against Allied forces. On 17 April, when Churchill wrote to Forbes to encourage him to undertake Hammer, he declared: All that has happened makes me sure that Hitler has made a grave strategic blunder in giving us the right, as we have always had the power, to take what we like on the Norwegian coast” but later, “All yesterday, the 16th, he was bombing our transports and our landed men at Lillesjonas and Haugesand and off Namsos, yet so far as I know not one man has been killed or one ship struck.” 45

On 15 April, Churchill had been much more cautious at the War Cabinet: The First Lord impressed upon the War Cabinet the very hazardous nature of this Operation, not only on account of the terrain and of the exposure of the landing forces to air attack, but also owing to the fact that the majority of the troops to be employed were not highly trained.46

42 Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Confidential Annex, 16 April 1940, CAB 79/85. 43 Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Cotesworth (Jack) Slessor, (1897-1979). 44 The Ironside Diaries, 262-63. 45 Letter, W. S. Churchill to Admiral Forbes, 17 April, 1940, ADM 199/1929. They were writing of different days but, nevertheless, they were clearly taking heart from the fact that so little had been achieved by the German air attacks to foil the landings. It is difficult to understand why this was considered so important, given that the landings had generally taken place in darkness. 46 War Cabinet Meeting: Confidential Annex, 15 April, 1940, CAB 65/12/25. 231

Unfortunately, the good fortune the Allies had hitherto experienced at the hands of the Luftwaffe was not to last and efforts to sustain operations on land became highly problematic due to the relentless German air presence.

Despite the foregoing evidence of Ironside’s very strong support for Hammer, the view developed among some members of the War Cabinet that Churchill was manipulating COS support for Hammer and this brings us to the second episode used to demonstrate Churchill’s disastrous domination of events. In the evening of 15 April or the morning of 16 April, Churchill informed the Secretary to the MCC, General Ismay, that he strongly disagreed with the views of the COS regarding the attack on Trondheim.47 Ismay was worried that a “first-class row” would break out if Churchill chaired the meeting at which the plan for Hammer was to be discussed and he consulted Chamberlain’s secretary, Sir Horace Wilson, who consulted Chamberlain and it was decided that the latter would take the chair. However, it transpired that Ismay’s anxiety was largely unjustified and that Churchill was in general agreement with the Hammer plan conceived by the COS and the crisis did not really exist.48 The single point of dispute between Churchill and the COS was the former’s concern that neither the number nor quality of the forces available was adequate for the central thrust of Hammer and, on this point, Churchill was very likely correct. He was particularly concerned that Ironside did not intend to employ the Chasseur Alpins, the force diverted from the Narvik operation at the request of Chamberlain and Halifax. Ironside had decided to use them as part of the northern pincer via Namsos, in part because the French had requested the Chasseurs not be used in an opposed landing.49

Churchill’s anxieties were compounded by another issue, this time much more of his own making. In conceiving his proposal for a move from Narvik to Hammer on 14 April, he had hoped for a seamless transition which would allow him to transfer the regular 24th Guards Brigade from Narvik for the assault at Trondheim. However, by the next day, he was forced to acknowledge that “Narvik would have to

47 Sir Edward Bridges, Recollection, 25 April 1940, Prem 1/404; CV At the Admiralty, 1071-1072. 48 All the foregoing is drawn from Bridges recollection, Prem 1/404 cited above. 49 However, there were other reasons for the decision. Ironside wished to use these highly trained alpine troops where their skills would best serve. When it was subsequently suggested the 2nd demi brigade could be used in the central thrust, he demurred on these grounds but the principle undoubtedly applied to the 1st demi-brigade. 232

be fought for” and that the Guards Brigade would probably not be available.50 Moreover, by the 16 April, Major-General P.J. Mackesy was making clear that nothing could be expected at Narvik without reinforcements but his only source of reinforcement was the Chasseur Alpins, now destined for Namsos. Thus, rather than rapid success at Narvik followed by more rapid success at Trondheim, Churchill feared both operations would be stalled for wont of adequate forces at either place: the Guards brigade would languish at Narvik while Hammer would be denied the Chasseur Alpins. The foregoing makes clear that the issue at stake was never a matter of Churchill trying to force Hammer on the COS; what he had attempted to do was ensure that sufficient experienced soldiers were committed to the decisive thrust.51 It must be recognised, however, that the problem Churchill now faced was partly of his own making.52

The dispute over forces for the direct assault led to an intervention for which Churchill has been roundly condemned and this leads to our third episode.53 Churchill put forward a proposal to Chamberlain in which Mackesy would be pressed to make a direct assault at Narvik at the earliest opportunity so that the Guards Brigade might yet be used in Hammer.54 The pressure brought against Mackesy was certainly unpleasant and has reflected poorly on Churchill. However,

50 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 15 April, 1940, CAB 65/12/25. After the MCC meeting of that day, Churchill composed a note in which he recommended most strongly that “the force to be landed [at Trondheim] should not be less than 7000 or 8000 men composed of the best fighting men available.” See, Military Coordination Committee. Note by the Chairman ADM 199/1929; CV, At the Admiralty, 1076-77) Ironside was intending to use far fewer and his proposal of the following day included only 1 Regular brigade from France and 1000 Canadians in the initial assault with a modest floating reserve. Churchill hoped yet to have the Chasseurs join the assault and also possibly the 142nd brigade still at Narvik. Ironside was required to reconsider the use of the Chasseurs but argued most earnestly that his proposals stand.Cab 65/12, War Cabinet Meeting: Confidential Annex, 15 April, 1940. 51 MCC meeting. Note by the Chairman. 16 April, 1940, ADM 199/1929. 52. At the MCC meeting of 14 April the question was wisely put as to what would happen at Narvik if the forces sent there were not able to do the job. The COS said they could then be reinforced by the Chasseurs. Presumably this replied to the second echelon that were to follow the first. 53 See for example, Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, 106. 54 John Colville was instructed by Chamberlain to organise an early morning MCC meeting the following day. He recorded in his diary “I gather our forces at Narvik under Lord Cork are rather loth to make an attack because of the snow, but Winston feels that a long delay would be disastrous both for military and psychological reasons.” See, Colville, Fringes of Power, 16 April, 1940. There was no doubt Churchill was worried that unless an attack occurred quickly, the Germans at Narvik would have time to consolidate. However, it is also evident he hoped to use the forces there at Trondheim although how he imagined this would be possible is difficult to understand. 233

Churchill alone was not responsible.55 The telegram sent to Mackesy and Cork by Churchill decrying the “damaging dead lock and the neutralisation of one of our best brigades” was drafted by Churchill but it was discussed by the COS and the MCC and, after a minor amendment, endorsed by everyone, including Chamberlain.56 Moreover, an equally objectionable joint Admiralty/War Office telegram of 18 April, which informed Mackesy that his actions, still expected to be aggressive and immediate, should be based upon “having no more troops than you have at present” was sent at the suggestion of Ironside, not Churchill.57 Even Churchill’s subsequent belligerent attitude to Mackesy was paralleled in every way by Ironside. Further, while Churchill was instrumental in having Mackesy subordinated to Cork in an effort to ensure more aggressive action at Narvik, Ironside had contemplated replacing him altogether as early as 18 April.58 The behaviour of Churchill and Ironside towards Mackesy was unfair: they had halved his force and denied him any hope of reinforcements. Now Churchill required him to perform miracles at Narvik to ensure success at Trondheim with Hammer. However, it is also important to appreciate that Chamberlain and Halifax were placing enormous pressure upon military strategy and that Chamberlain fully supported Churchill’s actions. Chamberlain and Halifax were also responding to political imperatives that could not be addressed other than by the aggressive methods proposed.

One can now turn to the fourth episode of 15 to 17 April. This further undermines the argument that Churchill bullied the COS to support Hammer and reinforces the central role of Chamberlain in the development of the operation. After the brief War Cabinet meeting of the 16 April, several members of the War Cabinet expressed concerns that they were being asked to endorse policy, most particularly

55 Nevertheless, Churchill’s use of The Gathering Storm to attribute the failure at Narvik to Mackesy’s dilatoriness, while ignoring his own contribution to it, is demanding of special censure. 56 Roskill attempts to score points off A.J. Marder in their long running dispute by reference to this telegram in his book Churchill and the Admirals, 292, noting that it was the first Private and Personal telegram sent to Cork and Mackesy by Churchill. He appears not to have been aware of the considerable vetting of the communication. It is somewhat strange, however, that given its support and endorsement, it was sent as a Private and Personal when it was so clearly not. 57 COS meeting 18 April, CAB 78/95. The COS, presumably at the behest of Ironside, recommended he be told to act on telegram 1350/17, as recommended by Churchill. For a copy of the telegram, see Minutes of MCC, 18 April, 1940, CAB 83/3. 58 The Ironside Diaries, 268, entry 18 April. These observations are not intended to pass judgment on Mackesy’s inertia. Rather, it is intended to show that Churchill was not alone in the unfortunate behaviour he sometimes displayed. 234

Hammer, without being apprised of the views of the JPS and COS. Among the most animated of these men was Hankey, who saw parallels to the process that led to the abortive Dardanelles Campaign of 1915.59 Chamberlain had chaired the MCC meeting regarding this plan the day before and must have been aware that, if the COS were responding unwisely to pressure, it was the political pressure being applied by him and by Halifax. Nevertheless, he organised a private meeting with the Chairman of the COS Committee, Sir Cyril Newell, and asked if the COS had been providing their honest and open views. Newell confirmed they had. At the next day’s War Cabinet meeting, Hankey made a point of asking Newall if the COS were in agreement with the MCC’s Hammer plan. Newell said they were, noting that: The operation was of course attendant by considerable risks; but the risks were not out of proportion to the value of success if achieved. The Military value of success should not be rated too highly, but it was clear that the political and moral advantages that would result from the capture of Trondheim, would be very great.60

This was not a strong endorsement of Hammer and it reinforces the fact that the COS were making a judgement based on the political and moral imperatives emphasized by Chamberlain in previous days. The pressure Churchill had brought to bear had been primarily to ensure that, if it were to be done, it be done properly, and there was much to be said for this as a wise cause of action.

Shifting Breeze of Opportunity or Relentless March of Events? In the afternoon of 19 April, British strategy underwent another transformation. Hammer was cancelled and replaced by Operation Maurice, a plan to capture Trondheim in a pincer movement. The change occurred with extraordinary rapidity. Operation Hammer was affirmed at a MCC meeting chaired by Chamberlain at 10am on 19 April, and rubber stamped by the War Cabinet at 11.30. At 1pm a note was circulated by Pound requesting a meeting of the COS at 2pm to discuss his proposal to replace Hammer for an envelopment strategy.61 The Chiefs of Staff met and were unanimous in their support. The records show that Churchill was present at the COS

59 Premier Papers, 1/404, Note by Sir Horace Wilson, 25 April, 1940; CV At the Admiralty, 1073. For a copy of a letter written by Hankey to Chamberlain on 17 April, see CAB 63/160. For Colville’s view of these events, see his diary, entry, 17 April. (also CV At the Admiralty,1086). 60 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 17 April, 1940, Cab 65/12/26. 61 The request for a review of Hammer appears not to have come from the War Office. Ironside recorded in his diary that he received a note at 1pm, 19 April, for a COS meeting at 2pm to discuss the matter. The Ironside Diaries, 269. 235

meeting for some of the time, although there is no record of his contribution to it.62 After the meeting, he immediately consulted Chamberlain about the change of plan and he agreed to it. The new strategy was then set before a late evening MCC meeting chaired by Chamberlain where it was also endorsed unanimously. The following day it was accepted by the War Cabinet.

Pound’s reasoning for a switch to an envelopment strategy was the success of the landings at Namsos and Molde, north and south of Trondheim, although this was probably a foil for his on-going concerns over the risks the operation presented for the Navy. Pound believed it made sense to exploit these landings rather than continue with the direct assault which had always been recognised as extremely hazardous. He expressed grave reservations over the risk to his ships during the long approach to Trondheim, especially given German superiority in the air. Subsequent discussion identified a number of advantages of the new plan: it would avoid the direct bombardment of Trondheim and the certainty of Norwegian deaths and it would avoid the embarrassment of a failure of the direct assault. Perhaps more important, although it would delay the capture of Trondheim, it would bring forward direct contact with Norwegian forces in the south.63 Finally, the cancellation of Hammer would free naval and military forces which “seemed to open the possibility of earlier and more direct operations for the capture of Narvik itself.”64

In The Gathering Storm, Churchill’s claimed he disapproved of the Chiefs of Staff’s sudden change in strategy but there is no contemporary evidence to show this.65 The notes he composed for discussion at the late evening MCC meeting indicated no particular objection to the proposal and he expressed the view that “we

62 Minutes of COS Meeting, 2 pm, 19 April, CAB 79/3. 63 Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, Confidential Annex, 2 pm, 19 April CAB 79/85; Untitled memorandum by T.S.V Phillips 25 April, 1940, ADM 199/129. It is interesting to note that in his memorandum, Phillips suggests that this was one of the most important influences in making the move away from Hammer. Curiously, he makes no reference to the naval risks of the operation, which are most commonly high-lighted as the main reasons for the switch. 64 Minutes of MCC meeting 10.00pm 19 April, 1940, CAB 83/3. John Colville recorded another reason for the move away from Hammer was the “dangerously truthful prognostications in the press”. The Fringe of Power, 120, entry 22 April, 1940. 65 I believe the conclusion one is invited to draw from his comments in The Gathering Storm, 628-629 is that, had Hammer gone ahead, it would have succeeded and all would have been well and that, the fact that it did not go ahead, was not of his making. This would seem to be a most convenient assessment for Churchill to make. 236

move from a more hazardous to a less hazardous operation”.66 He, too, was concerned by the possible consequences involved in delaying the implementation of Hammer would have on the Norwegians and he continued to have reservations regarding the limited forces committed to it. However, that his response was so muted after being such a determined advocate of Hammer is best explained by the fact that the changed offered a solution to the deadlock he and Ironside had created at Narvik. As a result of the pressure brought to bear on Cork and Mackesy, there was a possibility of action at Narvik. A difficulty was that Cork wanted HMS Warspite for a bombardment there but this ship had been withdrawn for use at Trondheim in the direct assault.67 Immediately Hammer was dropped, and before the MCC in the evening of 19 April, Churchill sent a telegram to Cork explaining “We have altered the emphasis of operations against Trondheim in such a way as to place Warspite and her escorting destroyers at your disposal.”68 He also suggested that the Canadian forces ear-marked for Trondheim be redirected to Narvik where they might “enable the Commander to undertake the necessary offensive steps.”69 Churchill had not yet given up on central Norway although he was now emphasizing the challenges of remaining there. On 20 April, he wrote a note intended to draw the War Cabinet’s attention to Narvik.70 He spoke out even more strongly in the War Cabinet itself, contending that ‘it was of the utmost importance not to have our attention diverted by operations elsewhere from our principal objective, which had always from the very start been the control of the Gallivare ore fields.”71

Whatever Churchill’s true motivation in accepting the end of Hammer, it was always a decision beyond his power to resist and it is difficult to hold him

66 This includes copies of Churchill’s Notes, Operations in Norway and the COS Aide de Memoire, CAB 66/7/13. 67 Although other battleships could have been called upon, Warspite was preferred by Lord Cork because of its secondary armament, which he believed offered much greater value in bombardment operations. It is interesting to note that Pound had argued at the 19 April MCC meeting that Cork had sufficient fire-power to do without Warspite and it was decided that Cork’s operation could go ahead without it. Indeed, the Committee concluded emphatically that Operation Maurice should take precedent over Rupert and that there must be no interference with the forces allocated to it by the Admiralty. Quite evidently, Pound had a very significant and very rapid change of heart at some point after the 11.30am in regard to Rupert and Maurice. See, Minutes of the MCC meeting, 19 April, 1940 68 Churchill sent a telegram to Lord Cork at 7.26pm on the 19th. The idea had, however, first been proposed in Pound’s presentation to the COS. 69 MCC meeting, 19 April, 1940, CAB 83/3. 70 Note by W. S. Churchill, Operation Rupert, 20 April, 1940, CAB 83/5. 71 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, War 20 April, 1940, CAB 65/12/29. 237

responsible for the farce that followed. Almost as soon as the decision was made, grave doubts about the efficacy of the new strategy began to emerge from the very people who had endorsed it. The argument emerged that success in central Norway would depend not so much on the ability to land troops, but the capacity of the ports to sustain and supply them thereafter.72 The concept of a ‘pincer’ movement was also challenged. The Secretary of State for War explained to the War Cabinet on 20 April that the new plan could not really be considered a ‘pincer’ movement because, until the threat further south was dealt with, it could be a month or more before the southern pincer could begin its northward drive towards Trondheim.

The northern pincer movement was also declared highly problematic. Major- General Carton de Wiart, tasked with moving on Trondheim via Namsos, telegraphed that “further disembarkation of men and materiel at Namsos is impossible unless enemy air activity is restricted.”73 This was a problem that Ironside had discounted only two days earlier when he stated to the MCC meeting that “there was no need to feel undue anxiety in regarding the position of the troops both in the course of disembarkation and subsequent land operations.”74 On 21 April, General Ismay noted considerable difficulties with facilities for unloading military stores and poor communications with the interior which “even if we were not hampered in other ways [such as air attack] would present considerable difficulty”75 The difference between these views expressed on 20 and 21 April and those presented by Pound on 19 April and endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff, Churchill and Chamberlain the same day are extraordinarily marked and best explained by German air success.76 That a decision taken one day could become almost redundant the next reinforces the forlorn nature of the campaign and illustrates the challenges faced by the decision- makers. The devastating effect of German air attack in central Norway was

72 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 20 April 1940, CAB 65/12/29. 73 Aide de Memoire for Prime Minister, prepared by W.O. for Supreme War Council, 21 April, 1940, ADM 116/4471. Major General Adrian Carton de Wiart, (1880-1963). Served in the Boer War, First World War and Second World War. He reached the rank of Lieutenant General. 74 MCC meeting, 19April 1940, 10pm, Cab 83/3. 75 Paper prepared by General Ismay, 21 April 1940, entitled The Scandinavian Campaign, General Conception. Cab 83/3. 76 It is possible that a reason why doubts about the ‘pincer’ alternatives to Hammer developed almost immediately the decision to abandon Hammer was made was because the COS decision was based more on Pound’s concerns about the risks of Hammer than the inherent value they saw in the pincer movement. 238

eminently foreseeable; it is unlikely however that this would have caused the Allies not to have taken action there. For all the criticism of Churchill and the ad hoc nature of the Norwegian campaign, it must be borne in mind that Britain and France were locked into the enterprise whether they wished it or not. From the beginning, improvisation would always be the order of the day.

In a further illustration of the particular challenge Churchill faced in striking the ideal strategic and operational line during this time, Pound’s efforts to protect the fleet by a movement away from Hammer on 19 April were followed several days later by Admiral Phillips’ proposal, also with the fleet in mind, to return to it. He, as most members of the War Cabinet, had grave concerns about Italian activity at this time and believed that a prolonged campaign in central Norway was incompatible with meeting the threat in the Mediterranean. He preferred, instead to return the focus to Narvik. At the COS meeting of 23 April he flagged the possibility of a return to Hammer, or a modified version of it, as the only way to deal quickly with the problems in central and southern Norway.77 He expanded on these views in a lengthy memorandum on the matter two days later, the sentiments of which were essentially a more emphatic version of the War Office paper of 21 April quoted above.78 Phillips’ memo was a significant value judgment. Narvik was important, the rest of Norway was not, or at least, not as important as the Mediterranean, and the navy could not do both. Instead of a return to Hammer, a decision would be made to abandon central Norway altogether.

The Surrender of Central Norway By the fourth week of April there was a growing consensus that fighting in central Norway was probably unsustainable and that preparations should be made for evacuation and Allied energy turned to Narvik. Churchill’s mind had already turned in that direction. A decision, however, was neither his nor even the British Government’s alone to make. Despite the priority the French had originally given to Narvik, they were now convinced that Trondheim was the key to everything, including to the Swedish ore and Swedish co-operation in the war. Intelligence was

77 Minutes of COS meeting, 23 April, 1940, 10.30am, CAB 79/85. Pound and Ironside were absent. They were still in attendance at the Supreme War Council in France. 78 Minutes of COS Meeting, 22 April, 1940 and Minutes of COS Meeting 23 April, 1940, CAB 79/3; Untitled memorandum by T. S. V. Phillips 25 April, 1940, ADM 199/129. 239

leading the French to believe that Sweden might soon be invaded by the Germans. It was their firm conviction that Norway was just the German’s first step to this. Much as Chamberlain and Halifax had argued a week before, they believed Allied control of Trondheim would somehow influence the Swedes or, just as desirably, encourage the Germans to take action against them. The capture of Trondheim represented the best way to get to Gallivare. However, the minutes of the Supreme War Council meeting of 22 April indicate that Churchill, Chamberlain and Ironside were already less than keen to continue the effort in central Norway and that they worked hard to downplay the prospects for success. Instead, they promoted a renewed focus on Narvik.79 The French, supported by the F.O. carried the day and, despite British misgivings and warnings, the meeting accepted that Trondheim and Narvik remained joint priorities.80

However, it was one thing to desire the capture of Trondheim; it was another to achieve it and, inevitably, it fell to Churchill to help find a way. It was becoming abundantly clear the Allies would not secure Trondheim before it was reinforced from the south by the Germans; indeed, reinforcement at Trondheim was already occurring on a daily basis via air transports. The only solution open to the Allies was to revisit Hammer or a version of it, just as Phillips had flagged.81 In what is considered yet another example of Churchill’s whimsy, he broached the issue with Pound on the 24 April, arguing that “Without Trondheim it is difficult to believe the Norwegian Southern Front can be held.”82 Pound thereafter took the matter to the Chiefs of Staff on 25 April where it was concluded that a modified Hammer was not

79 Minutes of Supreme War Council, April 22, 1940, CAB 99/3. 80 The French desire to continue in central Norway was, unsurprisingly, aided and abetted by the Foreign Office. It was put to the War Cabinet meeting (Cab 65/12/33) in the evening of 24 April by person/s unknown, but almost certainly by Halifax via the influence of Cadogan, who was at this time espousing these very sentiments, that: “Our only chance of moving up from Narvik to Gallivare would be if Sweden was brought into the war. The surest way of compelling the Germans to infringe the neutrality of Sweden, would be to block their direct line of approach to Trondheim from Oslo…They might then be forced to send troops through Sweden.” 81 Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, 130, is a keen supporter of the view of the whimsical nature of Churchill’s decision-making and has Churchill ‘peddling’ the new version of Hammer. 82 It is worthwhile noting that General Massy was then conceiving a plan which involved a small landing inside the Trondheim Fjord which would require support of the Navy. Pound baulked at the prospect and asked to be “assured that the object of the operation was clearly recognised and worthwhile.” Minutes of COS Meeting, 24 April 10am, CAB 79/85. 240

worth the risk as it would demand more of the Allies than the enemy.83 At the War Cabinet the following day, reference was made to the fact that the naval effort required to sustain the fight in central Norway would prevent Britain taking the requisite action should the Italian threat develop.

There is no evidence that Churchill “quite improperly” applied pressure to the COS to attempt another Hammer; moreover, the proposal is generally inconsistent with his attitude to the fighting in central Norway.84 From the beginning, Churchill had been shy of a situation in which the Allies might be caught up aiding Sweden via Trondheim.85 He had always thought the best route to Gallivare and the Swedish ore, and the route which would limit Allied obligations to Sweden, was via Narvik. He had only succumbed to Trondheim when it had been politically impossible to do otherwise and had promoted Hammer as the best military solution. Now, neither Churchill nor Chamberlain demurred from the COS recommendations at the 24 April MCC meeting that central Norway be evacuated. Rather, Churchill argued that nothing had really been lost by Allied efforts in central Norway and that the important thing was to secure Narvik as a base for land or air operations against Lulea.86 Later in the morning, the War Cabinet decided, with virtual unanimity and much relief to get out of central Norway.

Thus, in a space of some ten days, Allied strategy had moved from Narvik to Trondheim via Hammer, to Trondheim via Maurice, and then back to a modified Hammer and Narvik and finally to evacuation and a concentration on Narvik alone. The characterisation of Churchill’s mind being “puffed this way and that by the shifting breeze of opportunity” does not do justice to the problems faced nor accurately reflect by whom the decisions were being made.87 Throughout, Churchill

83 Minutes of COS meeting, 25 April, 9pm CAB 79/85. It was also during this day that Phillips sent Churchill the appreciation discussed earlier. At the COS meeting, 25 April, Newell summarised the reasons as stopping Swedish collapse and denying, thereby, German access to Swedish ore and to deter Italy from joining the war. As for the practicability, they had to weigh the fact that it would take some 10 to 14 days to execute during which time it was expected the Germans would gain a link from Oslo to Trondheim and that the operation itself would demand a great deal from the army, navy and airforce. See Minutes of COS meeting 9pm, 26 April, CAB 79/85. 84 Rhys Jones, Churchill and the Norwegian Campaign, 121, cites Ironside on this but I can find no evidence in Ironside’s diary to support this claim. 85 W. S. Churchill to Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, 11 April, 1940, Prem 1/419. 86 Minutes of MCC Meeting, 24 April, 1940, CAB 83/3. 87 Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, 120. 241

was being led by events and influenced by advisors who were also struggling to hold a consistent line. There is no evidence Churchill was dominating discussion or commanding strategy or that it was this that was fuelling the disaster the Allied forces were facing. He was being repeatedly defeated by the pace of German movements and their superior position and, in particular, their command of the air. In the circumstances, the challenges for Churchill were considerable.

It is symptomatic of the dilemma Churchill faced in fighting the Norwegian campaign that he has been criticised for not attempting to capture Trondheim and then criticised for promoting the one plan that might have made this possible, Hammer.88 In this campaign, there were no easy options. As to the matter of Churchill’s whimsy, it is important to note that, despite his declaration that the new envelopment plan was less hazardous, he was very much aware of the challenges the new strategy imposed. At the War Cabinet of 20 April he, along with the Secretary of State for War, warned of the threat of air attack and the need of an adequate base and secure lines of communication if operations in the south were to be successful. In the event, these requirements were unattainable and the air threat too great.

Although the British War Cabinet was now convinced evacuation of central Norway was essential, the French instinct was to stay. At the Supreme War Council of 27 April, the French Ambassador, Charles Corbin, warned that they would lose altogether the influence they had over Sweden and also the best chance they had to solve the ore problem89 So entrenched were the French hopes for economic warfare to provide them with salvation from another conflagration on the Western Front that surrendering the idea of capturing Trondheim, as remote and as valueless as that was likely to be, was a deeply disturbing prospect. The decision to evacuate went ahead. In nearly all the discussion with the French, the dominant player was not Churchill but Chamberlain. Chamberlain’s sense of obligation to the Norwegians by this time had largely dissipated. The Allies had done what they could and two days later he declared that he “had little sympathy for the Norwegians”, noting rather cruelly and

88 He has also been criticised for not focusing on and persisting with Narvik. See for example, Lamb, Churchill as War Leader, 37. 89 SWC Meeting, 26 April 1940, Cab 99/3. Charles Corbin (1882–1970) served as ambassador to Britain before and during the early part of the Second World War, from 1933 to 27 June 1940 242

inaccurately that they had put up little resistance.90 Although Churchill showed a little more compunction by suggesting the dispersion of some of the Allied forces into the wilds of Norway, he was largely a like-minded and earnest deputy when it came to withdrawal. This was entirely unsurprising given his earlier opposition to the central Norwegian strategy.

To Stay or Not to Stay? Exiting Norway More militarily questionable than the decision to evacuate central Norway was the decision to continue the battle for Narvik. With the Germans in control of central and southern Norway, it was surely only a matter of time before Narvik would be lost to the Germans.91 Churchill was certain the Allies should remain in Norway but there was little or no dissent on the matter. Indeed, there was no particular discussion on the subject; it tended to be assumed that, for number of important political reasons, Britain must stay. The entire War Cabinet understood there would be a political price to pay, both at home and abroad, for surrendering central Norway. On 27 April, following the line of argument Churchill had adopted at the MCC of 24 April, Chamberlain suggested that they justify the withdrawal to the Nation by arguing the fighting in central Norway had only been a temporary diversion to help secure Narvik.92 There could, therefore, be no thought given to surrendering Narvik, at least in the immediate term. Another reason for persisting in northern Norway was the hope it would be secured as the seat of power for the Norwegian Government.93 This semblance of concern for the Norwegians was linked to fear over the consequences of withdrawal; after all, an objective of this last incarnation of Narvik had been to

90 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 29 April, 1940, Cab 65/12/38. To be entirely fair to Chamberlain, this view was not his alone. At the MCC meeting of 26 April, the committee conceived the foundations of their exit strategy: “It would be open to us that the Trondhjem operation had been carried out partly to divert German attention from Narvik and partly also out of loyalty to the Norwegians, in spite of the fact that they had failed entirely to take proper precautions for their own safety before the German invasion.” See minutes of MCC meeting, 26 April, 1940, Cab 83/3. 91 This, of course, is why historians are critical of the decision to focus on Narvik over Trondheim. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the contemporary view was that Narvik could not be held with Trondheim in German control. 92 War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 26 April 1940, CAB 65/12/35. 93 ADM 116/4471. In a memorandum entitled Scandinavia, dated 25 April, Hankey argued most strongly that a foothold be retain in Northern Norway to provide a capital from which King Haakon and his Government could function. Additionally, like Phillips, he wished to keep a military presence on Swedish frontier via Narvik. More hopefully, it wanted to retain footholds to act as bases from which to harass German U-boats. Churchill was not, therefore, alone in his hopes for Northern Norway. 243

impress upon neutrals and warn potential belligerents that the Allies were capable of taking effective action against Germany. An evacuation would hardly meet this objective. Additionally, there were concerns over the potential consequences for Allied efforts to secure Norwegian tankers of the abandonment of the fight in Norway. That the Norwegians would deny Britain this resource was unlikely but it did cause much anxiety for a time.94

Narvik was also sustained by continued hopes in regard to Sweden and Swedish ore. It was Churchill who most commonly propagated these hopes but they were not his alone.95 He believed the Germans would not be content to accept the surrender of its Narvik contingent and would insist on sending forces via Sweden to help them. This, he expected, would open up opportunities to deal with Gallivare and Lulea.96 If Germany left Sweden alone, Churchill intended to secure an on-going supply of ore for Britain. As late as 31 May, Hugh Dalton of the MEW was arguing that, so long as Narvik was open, the Germans would be faced with a dilemma; either “allow us to draw supplies…or carry out their threats and invade Sweden”, a win/win situation for Britain.97 Dalton gave no thought to the improbability of trade via Narvik with the Germans in command of the rest of Norway.98 If Britain could not secure its own ore supply, then Narvik would be used as a base from which to launch land and air attacks against Gallivare and Lulea to compromise the ore trade with Germany. In the death-throws of the Norwegian campaign the land attacks would again be recognised as nonsense, but Churchill placed the air operations among his

94 Minutes of MCC meeting, 26 April, 1940, Cab 83/3. Lest one think that the Allies would be willing to allow the Norwegians to make up their own minds in this regard, Churchill had long ago put into place a committee to organise the seizure of Norwegian shipping if the Norwegians acted negatively to Operation Rupert. The German invasion, of course, made such deliberations largely irrelevant. This matter reminds one that Allied activities in Norway were never really about Norway.. 95 In a memorandum composed by on 27 April, Admiral Phillips proposed that, once Narvik was captured, the Swedes be told that the Allies intended to press on to Gallivare and Lulea whether they liked it or not. He believed the Germans would occupy Lulea immediately the ice melted. He had not yet grasped that a German threat of force alone was all that was needed to ensure the Swedes would protect their borders against any Allied incursion. The German command of southern Norway made this fact even more certain. In the circumstances, there was no need at all for the Germans to invade Sweden. See, ADM 116/4471. 96Minutes of the War Cabinet Meeting, Confidential Annex, 26 April 1940, CAB 65/12/35. 97 Letter to W. S. Churchill from Hugh Dalton, 31 May 1940, ADM 116/4471. 98 In May the idea appeared to develop that ore and timber might come through Kirkenes even further North. So it is not entirely clear that it was expected that Narvik would operate as a port so much as outpost protecting Kirkenes. 244

highest priorities and this required an air base at Narvik.99 It was, however, foolish to imagine that an airstrip, not yet in existence in April 1940, could be built to accommodate enough bombers to satisfactorily achieve its objective, while also being home to the desperately needed fighter force required to protect Narvik and the airstrip itself against the German air forces further south. The action would also lead to serious conflict with Sweden.

It was folly for Churchill and others to have thought it possible to retain Narvik as a useful operational port or air facility or to consider the advantages to be gained thereby would make the effort required worthwhile. Narvik would have been subjected to constant attack from the German air forces and constant siege from German forces moving northward; lines of supply and communications would have been exposed to aircraft, U-boats, and surface craft working from Trondheim. Estimates of the resources required to keep Narvik were substantial. Churchill projected a force of some 35000 men and the requirements for the number of anti- aircraft guns would have cut deeply into the needs of ADGB. Nevertheless, it is quite remarkable that, until the middle of May, hardly a voice was raised to question the effort required to retain Narvik and northern Norway.100 The recommendation of the COS and the Joint Planning Staff around 6 and 7 May was, as much as we can draw from the documents available, to persist with the attempt.101 It was not until around the 20 May and after a second JPS report argued “The security of France and the United Kingdom is essential, the retention of Northern Norway is not” that plans for evacuation were authorised. Even then, a final decision was postponed.102 If not for the enormous demands of the war in France, it is very much open to question if

99 Churchill had presented an idea of sending bombers from carriers off Narvik to bomb Gallivare and Lulea. The Secretary of State for Air questioned the efficacy of this and suggested that an air presence at Narvik itself was desirable. Churchill was not alone in the propagation of this particular nonsense. 100 To the last, there were those other than Churchill who would weigh the advantages and disadvantages of remaining in Northern Norway in equal measure when the scales were surely entirely in the debit side. The new First Lord, A.V. Cunningham, would attempt to balance the pros and cons to Churchill. On the one hand he thought that, given the situation in Europe, the “loss of prestige in Norway is small moment at first sight” but on the other he argued the Germans would be gifted the iron ore. Also, he posed the question as to what would “happen if the tide of battle…turned in France and we deserted Norway.” See Memo First Lord to Prime Minister, ADM 116/4471. Pound maintained a more detached view and focused on the impact the continuing conflict would have on the navy and recommended an immediate evacuation. See, Appreciation written by Pound to First Lord, 26 May, 1940, ADM 116/4471. 101 Around this time the JPS and the COS apparently provided assessments but they would appear to be lost to the historical record. 102 JPS report, Military Implications of a Complete Withdrawal from Norway, Cab 80/11. 245

Churchill would not have continued the effort in northern Norway, despite the overwhelming German forces in the south, the certainty of defeat, and dubious merit of staying.103 Churchill was again, however, only one among many who were reluctant to surrender the hopes in regard to Swedish ore. The collapse of France provided Germany with access to French iron ore and only then did the last hopes for a short war via the cessation of Swedish ore supplies finally die.

Conclusions and a Question of Sea-power Churchill, as First Lord and a member of the MCC, was always an important participant in the decision-making process during the Norwegian Campaign, but he was less influential in determining the direction of Allied strategy than is generally supposed. Churchill was most often only one among many in the strategic decision- making process and often not the most important. His interference in operational matters, particularly at Narvik via Cork, was undoubtedly wrong, but the facts were that the most significant of these interventions received the full endorsement of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for War and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Furthermore, criticism of his interference in naval matters fails to address the fact that Churchill’s role as First Lord and Chairman of the MCC produced a unique dynamic in the operational decision-making process that blurred the lines of responsibility. Chamberlain was aware of several of the more egregious examples of Churchill’s interference but did nothing to stop them. Indeed, on several occasions, he gave Churchill his full support.

Any assessment of Churchill’s performance in the Norwegian campaign must recognise that Chamberlain’s and Halifax’ insistence on operations in central Norway produced a strategic situation in which the likelihood of success was remote and attended by great risk. This placed Churchill, as chairman of the MCC, in a profoundly difficult situation. At the heart of Churchill’s problems was that from the early hours of 9 April, German success had irretrievably altered the risk/reward scenario of the entire northern strategy in a way that made the campaign of doubtful efficacy. From the beginning, operations in Norway, and possibly Sweden, had been based on the dubious assumption that fighting in this theatre would impose a greater

103 Minutes of War Cabinet, 20 May, 1940, Cab 69/1.

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burden on the Germans than the Allies while also offering the prospect of denying Germany access to Swedish ore. Churchill championed the view, also accepted by the COS, that sea-power would allow the Allies to match or exceed the effort needed by the Germans to capture and control Norway via the long and limited lines of land communications. However, all this presupposed Allied control of Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik and possibly Stavanger as well. Churchill had never expected that these objectives would have to be fought for from a position of significant disadvantage. Despite Churchill’s initial and more public optimism, 9 April gave the advantage to the Germans and presented the Allies with a conflict they were not likely to win, except at considerable cost, but had to fight. The anxieties exhibited by Forbes, then Pound, Phillips and finally Churchill from the middle of April reflected their separate appreciation that the risks were not justified by the potential rewards. In due course, a similar and belated conclusion would be drawn over Narvik.

Churchill’s conception for Norway must be judged not only by the campaign that was fought but by the campaign he had expected to fight. Had the Allies secured Bergen and Trondheim, as they might have done but for the confusion of 7 and 8 April, could the Allies have fought the Germans to advantage in Norway? Had the Norwegians not been taken so completely by surprise, could they not have made a prolonged fight of it? It seems likely that Allied control of the limited internal lines of communications to Trondheim, combined with an air presence there, would have ensured the Germans paid a much higher price for success and this might have been enough to change the dynamics of the operations in Hitler’s eyes. However, had Hitler persisted in Norway it seems equally likely that, in time, the Germans would prevail. Although one must consider the advantages that would have been offered to the Allies by control of a major port, it is doubtful they could have matched the German build-up via southern Norway, especially given Germany’s rather bloodless coup in Denmark and the advantages this offered for its lines of communication. Britain’s much longer lines of supply and communication were subject to interdiction in a way that the German lines were not. British submarines suffered grievously in the Skagerrak and the longer days of summer would make operations there almost impossible. The Allies were, therefore, not able to interrupt German communications to the extent it was hoped. British aircraft could do even less. In contrast, the Royal

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Navy would have been exposed to U-boats, and a constant attrition from German aircraft as would all the men and materiel landed. In time, the risk to the Navy must have tallied significantly in any decision to persist in Norway and, Trondheim or not, this would have told on any decision to stay in Norway.

In their attempts to ameliorate the defeat in Norway, Churchill and Chamberlain referred to the substantial naval losses incurred by the Germans. It was, however, only the problems the Germans faced with their magnetic torpedo mechanism during the early days of the campaign that saved British naval forces from similarly shocking losses. One might speculate on the impact these losses could have had on Churchill’s career had they occurred. Fate would ordain that he would not be held culpable for Norway; this failure would be placed at the feet of Chamberlain. Such good fortune might well have deserted Churchill had German torpedoes worked as expected.

For Churchill, Norway was always about using sea-power to wrest the initiative from Germany; if Germany responded to the Allied threat to its ore supply, it would draw German forces away from France and deny them a decision there. However, the diversion of effort and the threat to its ore supply did not prevent Germany attacking in the West. Thus, was Churchill’s bluff called, and that of Ironside, not Hitler’s. Rather than deflecting Germany from a decision in France, the already over-burdened Royal Navy was faced with an even greater responsibility: the supply and perhaps the rescue of the BEF, a situation which, at any time might have been, and eventually was, compounded by Italian action in the Mediterranean. The Norwegian scheme had, as expected, drawn a much larger German force to Norway than sent by the Allies. The misjudgement made by Churchill and others was that the Germans could not afford to do so. Moreover, the logistical effort needed to sustain the fighting Norway was much less for the Germans than that demanded of the Allies and the Royal Navy. In the circumstances, it was Churchill and the members of the British War Cabinet, and not Hitler, who were called upon to make stark choices in Norway. However, it had taken the prospect of defeat in France before Churchill finally grasped that the Royal Navy did not have resources enough at this time for extraneous ventures.

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Conclusion

In September, 1939, when Churchill returned from the political wilderness to resume a role as First Lord of the Admiralty lost to him 24 years earlier after the Dardanelles debacle, he had much to prove. Churchill’s political career to this point had been a mixture of success and failure but the latter had always been more visible. It was accepted he had a brilliant mind but poor judgment and this had limited his rise through the political ranks. In the years prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the foresight he had shown in regard to Hitler, and his condemnation, repeatedly vindicated, of appeasement had helped raise his stocks and ensured an invitation to join the British War Cabinet after Germany invaded Poland on 3 September. Nevertheless, for his party and for his Prime Minister doubts remained as to the value he could bring to the War Cabinet. Churchill, however, had no doubts about the contribution he could and would make in fighting this new war. The job now was for Churchill to justify the support given him and to prove his doubters wrong. This thesis has examined how effectively Churchill used his position as First Lord of the Admiralty and member of the War Cabinet to take the war to Germany.

Churchill of the Phoney War met neither the negative expectations of his detractors nor the great hopes of his more ardent supporters. He neither showed himself to be the saviour of the British war effort, as some had hoped, nor the disaster that others had expected. His performance was decidedly mixed. He brought enormous energy to his dual roles but it was often not well-directed and this diminished the value of his contribution. He had a well-formed and, in many respects, a sound strategic vision but he had great difficulty in squaring aspiration

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and practicability. Overall, the Phoney War was not a period in which Churchill distinguished himself as a warlord or, indeed, as a man with superior insight or strategic vision. This was not for wont of brilliance; Churchill could be eminently wise and insightful. Rather, it was because the glimpses of potential were so often tarnished by his excesses and idiosyncrasies and undermined by abundant examples of poor judgment and erratic and inconsistent argumentation.

In studying Churchill and this period, one must work hard to sift the good that Churchill had to offer from the bad and there was insufficient evidence to show that, during the Phoney War, he was capable of doing this himself. It was undoubtedly his own view that the failure to heed his advice and counsel, offered in good measure and often to his naval staff and his War Cabinet colleagues, was wisdom ignored and this caused him much frustration. This study has shown that his advice was often folly that courted disaster.

In arriving at these conclusions, this study has focused on a variety of issues and developed a number of themes through a consideration of Churchill’s performance as First Lord of the Admiralty and his contribution to the wider war effort within the War Cabinet and, most particularly, the LFC and the MCC. The study of Churchill’s performance as First Lord focused on three core subjects: his contribution to the anti-U-boat war and to the protection of trade; his search for a naval offensive and, finally, the fundamentals of his strategic vision for the Second World War as demonstrated by his 1939/40 construction programmes. The study of Churchill and the wider war focused on the decision-making process and Churchill’s view of his role in it, his efforts to instil an offensive vigour in the War Cabinet, his attitude to Allied air policy and his contribution to the single significant military operation of the Phoney War, the Norwegian Campaign. The over-riding conclusion of this study was that for Churchill, the Phoney War was a period of folly and frustration and that, for the most part, he failed to achieve his core strategic objectives and to bring to the war effort the influence he had hoped.

An important objective of this study was always to understand why this was so? As with all parts of this thesis, the answer was a mixture of influences and factors which pointed to no single explanation but which held Churchill as accountable for

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his short-comings as it did the extraneous. The conclusions drawn were, first, that Churchill was oftentimes a poor and ineffective advocate for his offensive plans; second that, nevertheless, the decision-making structure was flawed and not conducive to the aggressive prosecution of the war; third, that Chamberlain, although always determined to contain Churchill’s excesses was much less the obstruction to his plans and schemes than is supposed; moreover, on many important issues, Allied air policy among them, Churchill and Chamberlain shared views in common; fourth, that much of Churchill’s frustration and folly, as deeply intermixed as they were, was an unavoidable result of the war that he and the War Cabinet sought to fight; and fifth and intimately linked to the former, the frustrations he faced were very much, as Halifax, noted a product of the nature of the times. These, indeed, were not a time in which Churchill was ever likely to shine. Rather, it was a time when frustration rather than fulfilment was the likely order of the day and, when frustrated, Churchill was at his worst.

Of course, to describe Churchill’s performance as a mixture of good and bad is to apply a profile which describes most members of the Government, but that, perhaps, is the point. Chamberlain’s performance too, and even that of Halifax, might easily be described in such a manner. The differences lay in their respective strengths and weakness and not in the fact that one was necessarily wiser or more insightful in the best way to fight the war than the other, although this has been the direction taken in most studies of this period. Churchill’s reputation during this time has been built less on deeds than juxtaposition; that is through a comparison with those around him and judgments about the personal characteristics that were most needed during the Phoney War and also the perceived consequences of the inertia that defined the period. Moreover, the particularly polarised nature of studies of this time has tended to go one step further and juxtapose only Churchill’s strengths against the weaknesses of others. A conclusion of this study is that this is not and has not been a satisfactory platform for an assessment of Churchill in the Phoney War. For while Churchill’s vigour and aggression were admirable qualities; his questionable judgment, his recklessness, his inconsistent and erratic thinking were not. Similarly, Chamberlain’s continued hopefulness for an internal collapse of Germany and his on-going under-estimation of Hitler were weaknesses; but his

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caution much less a weakness, especially when resisting Churchill’s more aberrant proposals. Moreover, a key contention of this thesis is that the Government policy, to which Churchill’s bull-dog spirit is compared, was much less supine than contended.

A deeper analysis of Churchill’s performance has also identified more than hitherto precisely where Churchill’s strengths and weaknesses lay, and what he did better or worse than the historical records tells us. To this end, it has challenged the accepted version of events and shibboleths surrounding Churchill and his key protagonists, including Pound at the Admiralty and Chamberlain and Halifax within the War Cabinet. The view of the British Bulldog versus the dithering appeaser does not satisfactorily describe the dynamics that existed during this time.

This study began with the role Churchill played in the anti-U-boat war and showed that his performance on a number of important fronts, although in error, was based on rational appreciations that were often shared by members of his naval staff. His support for the largely futile and ineffective practice of offensive patrolling and his focus on the killing of U-boats was much less inspired by a wayward ‘offensive’ spirit than the strong evidence he was constantly provided that such practices worked. This support for aggressive action against the U-boats did not, however, represent ambivalence to convoy. He was a strong and successful advocate of convoy. Similarly, his gross over-estimation of Britain’s success in the anti-U-boat war is better attributed to a systemic ignorance and confusion than a calculated and wilful determination to garner kudos and popularity.

In making the errors he did, Churchill was usually in the company of many, a conclusion to which this study returned several times. The best means by which to fight the U-boat war was not as apparent as Churchill’s critics have contended and he cannot be accused of obtusely taking the wrong path against the wisdom and advice of the majority. The policies chosen by Churchill, while chiming with his inclinations, were not necessarily sustained by them. Had Churchill been persuaded that aggressive anti-U-boat warfare through such measures as aggressive offensive patrolling would not help Britain maintain the requisite rate of trade, he would have discarded the practice.

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Nevertheless, these codicils apart, it must be acknowledged Churchill’s failure to come to grips with the true nature of the anti-U-boat war was influenced to a considerable degree by his choice of counsel and his failure to adequately question his own assumptions, in particular in regard to the value of Britain’s ASDIC weapon. He did not do enough to gain insight into the lessons of the anti-U-boat conflict in the First World War and, instead, he was destined to relearn these the hard way. Despite the circumstances that served to obscure ‘best practice’, there were always better paths for Churchill to follow and he did not do enough to find them. The only significant inquiry into the true state of the anti-U-boat war was instigated after Churchill left the Admiralty and it began in the expectation it would prove Churchill right. Instead, it proved him wrong. Even then, the conclusions drawn were incorrect and still tended to disguise the navy’s very limited success in finding U-boats. However, that such confusion remained after the inquiry was completed illustrates the challenges the Navy faced in establishing ‘best practice’ long after Churchill had left the Admiralty. We cannot, therefore, condemn Churchill too harshly for his own misapprehensions as First Lord. Nor, finally, can it be argued that these misapprehensions in practice caused great harm during this time. Operational circumstances were such that the Germans were unable to inflict great hurt upon the British merchant marine during the Phoney War. It is perhaps fair to say, however, that good fortune rather than good practice saved Britain from worse.

The skills Churchill displayed as strategist was a particular theme of this study. The conclusion, again, was that they were of a decidedly mixed quality. Chapters 2 and 3 considered Churchill’s strategic vision, the rationale behind it, and the role he expected the navy to play in winning this war. Also important was a consideration of the risks he was prepared to take to see his vision fulfilled. His view of the best way to fight the war against Germany was, in most respects, similar to that of Chamberlain; sit tight and re-arm. He did not demur from the notion that time was on the side of the Allies. Where he parted company with Chamberlain and, indeed, with his naval staff, was his belief that the Royal Navy had such preponderance over the enemy that it could and should be used at the earliest opportunity to attack the weaknesses of the enemy or to help and encourage potential allies and friendly or wavering neutrals. Just as possible, this naval power could be used against these

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same wavering neutrals for the greater good of the Allied war effort. As far as Britain’s imperial obligations were concerned, Churchill had a clear strategic rationale to explain and justify his vision: this was a determination to ignore all the threat from Italy and Japan and focus attention on Germany alone. He believed the best way to ensure that Germany remained the lone enemy was to assume and maintain the ascendency. While the Allies prepared, at some undefined time in the future, to take the Germans head on, it was desirable to tackle Germany at the periphery, where it was believed it could be fought to advantage. This would secure allies, deter potential belligerents and, most important of all, deny Germany the resources needed to wage war and Germany. If such could be achieved, Germany would not be joined by the other Axis powers. Churchill’s determination to focus on Germany alone offered him the considerable bonus of a ‘surplus’ of naval forces with which to conduct aggressive naval offensives. By ignoring or discounting the Japanese threat and by contending that aggressive action would diminish the threat even more, Churchill could argue that Britain had naval forces – at least in terms of capital ships – were surplus to probable needs.

This was Churchill’s 1915 mindset all over again; the core difference was that in 1915 he had a force of battleships that were in excess of needs and he added to this his fleet of ‘unsinkable’ monitors; in 1939, he had neither. This might have deterred a man more averse to risk but Churchill’s vision and the risks he was prepared to take to fulfil it were always calculated against the perceived reward of aggressive action. The greater the potential reward, the greater the risk he was willing to take. Churchill became so enamoured of the opportunities offered to the Allied war effort by the successful interdiction of Swedish ore, that the absence of any real ‘surplus’ over potential needs failed to deter him from pressing risky adventures. Thus, his naval staff spent the greater part of the Phoney War trying to deflect him from his chosen path; but his mindset also explains why this proved such a difficult task. Churchill operated on an entirely different risk/reward paradigm to his naval staff who were much more risk averse and much more focused on core business. While Churchill wished to use a portion of his navy in some spectacular way to help defeat Germany, Pound and his staff were focused on ensuring that Britain and its empire were not themselves defeated.

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Churchill’s focus on Germany was astute in a grand strategic sense. His determination to concentrate Britain’s energies on the completion of ships for ‘this war’ in opposition to Pound and Phillips’ desire to build against the possibility of the ‘next war’, or an enlargement of this one, was vindicated by the course of events. Britain proved incapable of constructing additional battleships within reasonable time-frames while also addressing immediate needs. Additionally, his views on construction priorities reflected a more realistic appreciation of Britain’s imperial position than that of his Sea Lords. Implicitly, Churchill had recognised that, in the event of Japanese aggression, especially if combined with that of Italy, the baton must be passed to the United States for the protection and salvation of Britain’s interests in the East. Churchill’s decision to focus on the defeat of Germany offered the prospect that the exposure of Britain’s weakness might not yet be realised in full. If naval ascendancy over Germany could be maintained, if Germany’s capacity to defeat Britain and France on land and in the air could be kept in doubt, Japan would not go to war. The R class used aggressively in the Baltic, or the Black Sea, or the Mediterranean could play an important role in the war; no such role was open to it if Japan took the path to war. The R class as they existed could not be sent to the East to deter or to fight the Japanese; nor could they act as acceptable substitutes at home so that other, more modern, ships could be sent.1

While Churchill’s vision had merit at a conceptual level, it foundered at the technical, tactical and operational level, especially when it manifested itself via his R class inshore squadron and the influence these vessels could wield. Although there might have been some limited advantage to be gained by re-armouring these ships against the air threat, they were never likely to be a weapon that would contribute in a decisive, or even significant, way to the war on land against Germany; yet so much of his strategic vision hinged this. In passing judgement on the fact that Churchill’s

1 The attitude of Churchill and the Admiralty were not always consistent. While pushing for the construction of the 16 inch gunned class, Pound had argued the Rs could not be used in the Far East. However, in 1941, with war increasingly probable, Pound suggested that some R class be sent to the Indian Ocean to support convoys. His rationale was that, while these ships would struggle to defend themselves against the Japanese main fleet, their presents would compel the Japanese to send substantial forces into the Indian Ocean if they chose to attack convoys there. This, it was hoped, they would not be inclined to do. As for Churchill, after the attack on Singapore and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, he would lament the fact that the decision not to armour the Rs had prevented them being sent to the East and that had they been sent, it would have made all the difference. It was a typical ‘after the fact’ rationalisation. 255

otherwise sound strategy oftentimes foundered on the shoals of operational challenges, historical analysis has probably been too kind. Strategy that does not have its foundations firmly in operational practicability really has little to commend it. Too much time was wasted on Churchill’s plans to establish that which was self- evident to many.

Churchill’s focus on Catherine is said to have reflected an element of ‘mental rigidity’ in his strategic thought, a throw-back to his Baltic strategies of the First World War.2 However, while it is not an assertion that can be proved definitively, there is room to argue that the dominant influence in his thinking was a need for vindication rather than an inability to conceive alternatives. In The World Crisis, Churchill argued that the failure to implement a Baltic strategy in 1915 was an opportunity missed to avoid the bitter conflagration that subsequently took place on the Western Front. It was a conviction with which he began the Second World War. However, his hope for a Baltic incursion was even less sustainable than it had been in the previous war because of the new threat from the air; nevertheless, he refused to surrender this vision. The opportunities offered by the cessation of the Swedish ore trade combined with his simple ‘mechanical’ remedies to meet the air threat helped revitalise this forlorn strategic aspiration.

If ‘mental rigidity’ characterised Churchill’s thinking, it was a rigidity found less in his Baltic conception than in the tools he sought to fulfil it; Churchill’s hopes for his battleships were not sustained by an ignorance of the air threat but by his conviction it could be remedied via comparatively simple solutions. In contrast to accepted wisdom, it was shown that Churchill was very much alive to the threat the air bomb offered to the vast majority of his fleet which he knew had not been built or reconstructed with the modern air bomb in mind. Nor was he consoled, as some have claimed, by the existing anti-aircraft weaponry of his ships; there was ample evidence in the Phoney War to show that, while aircraft were not sinking ships, anti- aircraft weapons were not hitting aircraft. During this time, he was loath to see his capital ships operate in areas where they might be exposed to land-based aircraft. Where he erred was in his belief that simple measures could be taken with ships he

2 Ben Moshe, Churchill: Strategy and History, 118. 256

considered unfit for a line of battle or that otherwise could not face the modern forces of the German navy or land-based aircraft. This mindset mirrored his vision for the monitor in 1915 and subsequently his bulged battleships (and inshore squadron) of 1917/18. These vessels, and their special construction, were in that war his answer to the mine and the torpedo and the re-establishment of offensive via blockade and inshore operations. In The World Crisis, Churchill explained his belief that “the mechanical danger must be overcome by a mechanical remedy” and that, once done, the strongest fleet “would regain [its] normal offensive right.”3 The parallel in thinking in 1939/40 is obvious. Five or six inches atop the deck of a few R class battleships and the employment of his much vaunted UP weapons would restore the power of the offensive to his capital ships. Locked into this First World War mindset, he showed a curious lack of awareness of the potential of the aircraft carrier to resolve many or most of the problems that would be presented in meeting his inshore aspirations. His failure to adequately appreciate the potential of the air power to secure the offensive capabilities of his navy can perhaps also be explained by his Eurocentric view of the war: the relatively small German navy, the very limited use by the enemy of torpedo aircraft, and the fact that the Germans had yet to complete a carrier (and never would). All helped deny him an appreciation of just how vulnerable his battleships were, whatever he might do in regard to the air bomb, and to distract him from the fact that, half a world away, there were developments in naval warfare that needed to be heeded.

The Churchill/Pound relationship was an important element in the study of Catherine and Churchill’s naval construction programme. There exists the long- standing contention that Churchill routinely brow-beat his naval staff into a frustrated silence and reluctant compliance against their better judgment.4 Also influential is the view that Pound was a compliant, even servile commissioner of Churchill’s bidding on many issues and that Pound’s performance over Catherine is an example of this. Both views were challenged in this study as failing to accurately represent Churchill’s modus operandi or the strength of Pounds opposition toward things with which he did not agree. From the beginning, Pound was definite in his opposition to

3 Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. 2, 465-466. 4 This criticism, it has been noted, also extended to his handling of the COS. 257

Catherine but Churchill was at his most insistent and most difficult. Unfortunately, the nature of Pound’s opposition, at least initially, was not such that would deter Churchill, and Pound was repeatedly wrong-footed. He failed to grasp early enough the high risk nature of Churchill’s mind-set. Further, Churchill’s insistence that he was only ‘preparing the gun for the firing’ made direct opposition particularly problematic. This latter tactic, perhaps calculatedly intended to do so by Churchill, reduced the risk of direct confrontation and, in an historical sense, limited the prospect of a repeat of 1915 when Lord Fisher resigned rather than proceed with a policy he did not support. In 1939, Churchill also had the authoritative figure of Lord Cork to support him, and this made resistance to his proposals even more challenging.

Although each worked hard to avoid a fatal falling out, Churchill and Pound nevertheless wrote plainly and firmly to each other throughout this time but Churchill’s insistence on Cork withdrawing his implied criticism of Pound in December 1939 is an example of him drawing a line in the sand.5 He would press his First Sea Lord only so far, but as far as he could. In the circumstances, it was probably inevitable that the demise of Catherine would be painful and prolonged. It remains unclear if Churchill’s decision not to press on with Catherine was because he had finally grasped the folly of his scheme, or because it no longer met his immediate strategic needs, or because he was ultimately unwilling to take the risks of such a venture without the definitive endorsement of his First Sea Lord. Disconcertingly, Churchill’s and Cork’s reference to a ‘postponement’ of Catherine in January 1940, suggest that the answer lies with the latter two possibilities rather than any appreciation from Churchill that his strategy was fundamentally unsound.

The reality for Churchill was that, rather than getting his own way with Pound, he was oftentimes unsuccessful, especially where his demands conflicted with the strong views of his First Seal Lord. Churchill failed to secure Pound’s support for Narvik over the Finnish Option, although on this occasion Pound was acting in his capacity as a member of the COS committee. Later still, it was Pound’s resistance that was instrumental in the demise of Hammer, although, on this point, it is again far

5 W. S. Churchill to Lord Cork, 12 December 1939, ADM 199/1928 258

from clear how opposed Churchill was about the change in strategy. In regard to their preferences in matters of construction, each had to be content with a compromise; Churchill gained concessions over the re-armouring of the Rs and Pound secured certain commitments regarding new battleships; in the end, the exigencies of war ensured neither got what they wanted. Finally, Pound’s intervention in the evening of 7 April and during the day of the 8 April at the beginning of the Norwegian Campaign made clear that Churchill would give way when Pound stood his ground, and the latter would do so when he believed he was right. Indeed, this generally appears to have been the pattern of their relationship, at least at this time. Churchill would pursue an agenda only to a certain point with Pound; if the resistance was too great, he would capitulate or give ground. Similarly, Pound was capable of resisting considerable pressure from Churchill; if and when he gave ground, it was likely to be because he did not consider the issue grave enough to resist. It would be wrong to assume that Pound’s support of Churchill’s exaggerated U-boat figures constituted an unconscionable compliance on Pound’s part. The support existed because he shared many of Churchill’s misapprehensions and perhaps even some of his prejudices.

However, there was evidence elsewhere to show that Churchill was capable of being ruthless in the treatment of staff he deemed not to be doing their job, but even here the historical record is inaccurate and lacks balance. Captain Danckwerts was removed from the Plans Division in April 1940. Churchill believed he lacked the drive for the role but, it is probable this was correct. Danckwerts was not a well man and would die at the age of 54 in 1944.6 However, he was not cast into the wilderness but sent to America in December 1940 as part of a delegation for Anglo- American staff talks. Similarly, the demise of Captain Talbot is inaccurately told. It

6 Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, 94, attributed his dismissal from the position of D of P in April to his vigorous criticism of Catherine. I have not found evidence of criticism of Catherine by Danckwerts beyond what is found in this study (it is possible, however, that Pound’s criticism were being composed by him). However, there is no doubt that in 1940, Churchill was less than impressed by the performance of the Plans Division and, in a note to Pound in February, 1940, he expressed his belief that while he recognised the ‘high character of this officer” his “abilities and bent seem to be of a legal or clerical character, and I have not met anyone less qualified to fill a position where robustness of outlook, resource and ingenuity, creative capacity, and an aptitude for strategems and devices, should be conjoined with a natural spontaneous desire to come to grips with the enemy.” At the time of Churchill’s criticism, Danckwerts’ more recent sins had been to provide estimates of the size of foreign navies, in particular that of Japan, and an estimate of U-boats sunk to that point in the war that Churchill regarded as “unduly pessimistic”. 259

is true that, as a result of his unwillingness to concur with Churchill’s estimates of U- boat kills, Churchill recommended he surrender his job as the D/ASWD and be returned to sea. Churchill was ‘venting his spleen’ in a most unseemly manner on this occasion, but there is no evidence to show to show that Pound acted on the advice or that Churchill pressed him to. When Talbot departed the AS/WD, it was certainly far from the summary dismissal it has been painted. He retained his position for most of 1940 and would finally be given command of the carrier, Furious, late in the year. Thus, while there is evidence to show that Churchill could be extraordinarily demanding in the search for an offensive, there is much less to support the existence of a vindictive streak as developed in the work of Roskill.7

Churchill’s strategic mindset and his relationships with others – this time with his War Cabinet colleagues – were developed further in part two of this study, as was the question of the potential he displayed as a war leader. An over-arching objective of this part of the study was to understand why his search for the offensive failed to bear fruit, just as it had done within the Admiralty, and to assess the quality of his contribution as War Cabinet minister.

Churchill’s ‘big picture’ view of the war was bold and compelling. It manifested itself within the Admiralty via his construction priorities and his focus on economy; within the War Cabinet the focus was on achieving an appropriate balance of all three services and the apportionment of resources where they were most needed. In this early stage of the war, this meant an emphasis on building the Army. The antecedence to Churchill’s ‘big picture’ mindset were primarily First World War experiences and, in particular, his role as Minister for Munitions. However, his September letters to Chamberlain provided another reason why this was his priority: the loss of the French Army, the shield behind which Britain could rebuild its own war machine, would be cataclysmic, although on this point he was more concerned about French morale than the French army itself. As far as Churchill was concerned, the Air Force was adequately resourced, if inefficiently run, and, in terms of battleships, the Royal Navy was also strong enough to deal with the likely needs of

7 For Roskill’s assessment of both episodes, see, Churchill and the Admirals, 94-95. 260

‘this’ war. Always in his mind, however, was to provide resources enough for his ‘inshore squadron’, an integral element in his war philosophy.

It was in the prosecution and outcomes of his ‘big picture’ view that Churchill was found wanting. It was evident early that, whether others liked it or not, he viewed his role as something more than just the First Lord. His approach was akin to a minister for war or defence and he drew to himself many of the responsibilities of such a role. He was at the forefront of most, if not all, the significant strategic initiatives; he adopted, indeed, revelled in a non-partisan approach to defence, an admirable mindset for someone who wished to show he had a broader view of the war in mind; he did not hesitate to offer guidance and advice to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and his Service colleagues when and where he thought it needed; he conducted intensive investigation into the needs and the excesses of his sister services and was aided in this by his own intelligence apparatus. This study found that, despite his good intentions, there was little evidence of great advantage offered to the war effort by this oversight. It was certainly not conducive to building strong relationships with his War Cabinet colleagues. Lindemann’s organisation was, at this juncture at least, a blunt instrument which offered occasional value at considerable cost in time and effort to all those concerned. One prescribed objective of his statistical section was to analyse the papers put forward from other departments. Although this was intended to test and challenge assumptions and ensure efficiency, it also reflected suspicion of established procedure and hinted at Churchill’s conviction that departments were not doing their job. On a number of important occasions, Churchill was shown to be wrong on this latter point. Overall, Churchill’s determination to oversee the entire war effort with his own supervisory structure oftentimes contributed to the very inefficiency he sought to avoid.

Churchill’s involvement in strategic planning was another important element in the second part of this study. It was best viewed through a consideration of the MCC The MCC grew out of Chamberlain’s failure to proceed with his ‘small Cabinet’ at the start of the war, Chatfield’s belief that his role was redundant, the Service Chiefs’ request for their own forum for the discussion and development of strategy and, finally, certain apprehensions regarding Churchill, although the latter was more the concern of Chamberlain’s advisor’s than his own. The MCC was intended to smooth 261

the path of the decision-making process by the pre-digestion of ideas that would subsequently be brought before the War Cabinet. In practice, it invited repetition and duplication. This was for three reasons. First was the absence of either Chamberlain or Halifax in this stage of the process. These men were the most influential in the War Cabinet although, of the two, it was to Chamberlain whom most deferred. It made little sense to invest time developing strategy that he or Halifax might subsequently veto. Second, was the involvement of the service ministers who, in protecting their own ‘patch’ and viewing the war from their own unique angle, were perhaps not as receptive as they ought to combined strategy. Third, and significantly, was Churchill himself. It was never likely he would bow to consensus views of strategy where it conflicted with his own, and especially when it was his service that was at the centre of most proposals under discussion. These issues ensured that matters discussed would likely be revisited, almost in their entirety, within the War Cabinet. This led to inefficiency and time wasted. Every key decision had to go through three and sometimes four stages: War Cabinet, MCC, COS committee, JPS and sometimes backwards and forwards through these. One question might lead to another and the process begun again. This was certainly the process experienced by Churchill’s Narvik initiative. There is little doubt, therefore, that Churchill’s frustration with the process of government was, to a considerable extent, justified. However, he contributed significantly to clogging the arteries of progress. He generated a great deal of the MCC work to meet his own conviction that Britain could put more men in the field more quickly and more aircraft in the front lines.

Churchill’s relationship with Chamberlain was also an important aspect of part two of this study because the latter is often viewed as an obstructive influence to Churchill’s strategic ambitions during the Phoney War. Surprisingly, given the mutual apprehensions at the start of the war, the relationship generally proved a positive one. Although the decision-making process constructed by Chamberlain was an impediment to effective and timely decision-making, Churchill’s efforts to develop the offensive were less often obstructed by Chamberlain himself than is commonly held. The adversarial view of the Churchill/Chamberlain relationship was challenged and evidence adduced to show that there was a considerable commonality of views on many issues, including Narvik. The differences in their respective

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strategic mindset were less fundamental than matters of degree; nevertheless, the difference was sufficient to compromise the Narvik plan. Narvik was an element in Churchill’s ‘this war’ approach which sought to apply constant pressure to Germany via the superior might of the Royal Navy; unfortunately for Churchill, it conflicted with one aspect of the ‘sit-tight and re-arm’ War Cabinet view of the war that, in most respects, Churchill supported. The essence of the War Cabinet objection to Narvik was that it was in the nature of a ‘palliative’ operation that it had long concluded, with support of the COS, were better avoided; it would cause the Germans no long term harm but, for a variety of reasons could harm Britain: it could compromise the outstanding Norwegian shipping agreement and thereby further aggravate Britain’s straitened shipping situation; it posed a threat to Britain’s own trade in ore; it would invite international criticism which Britain was very keen to avoid. Such obstacles were a frustration for Churchill because it was otherwise a very simple naval operations not easily challenged by the Germans.

Narvik was substituted by another strategic initiative, the Finnish Option, which it was hoped would cause Germany considerable long-term harm and was not, therefore, considered to be of the palliative nature of Narvik. The plan offered a variety of incidental advantages that were also important and with which Narvik could not compete: support for the Finn’s would drain the resources of the Russians and reduce the aid offered by them to the Germans.8 It would also prevent or discourage Soviet incursion into the middle-east. Additionally, support for the scheme would deflect the French from schemes which the British were unwilling support.

Despite being a legitimate and major strategic initiative, the Finnish Option is often viewed as a policy designed with the deliberate delay or obstruction of Churchill’s Narvik plan in mind. Given the many rather self-evident obstacles in way of its fulfilment, this view has not been without merit. However, this study has contended that Chamberlain, Halifax, the Foreign Office and the COS were genuinely earnest in the pursuit of this new plan even as it became increasingly obvious to all that their chosen path was probably unwise. As far as Chamberlain’s

8 This was much less than supposed. 263

attitude was concerned, it was noted that, rather than obstruct Narvik, Chamberlain several times attempted to reconcile the schemes. He recognised that the prosecution of both plans would restrict Germany’s capacity to wage war and it would do so more quickly than attempting only one or the other. Moreover, his support for Narvik was largely compatible with his evolving view of the war: Narvik and the Finnish Option would undermine the German war machine but would do so indirectly and in a manner that would not unduly antagonise the German people (as opposed to the Nazi regime) and lead to an irretrievable escalation in the conflict.9 These latter fears were consistent guiding influences in Chamberlain’s oftentimes hesitant approach to the offensive.

The failure of Narvik is to be found much less in the obstruction of Chamberlain than in Churchill’s failure to provide persuasive reasons for advancing with it. For several days in late December 1939, Churchill worked hard alongside Chamberlain to prove that the two schemes were not incompatible and he presented

9 Talbot Imlay’s"A Reassessment of Anglo-French Strategy during the Phony War, 1939-1940." The English Historical Review 119, no. 481 (2004): 333-372, has provided a very different interpretation of the development of strategy (including the Finnish Option) during the Phoney War. It includes a focus on French influence on British strategy. However, for all his assertions, evidence of a strong French influence on British strategy in the manner he describes and evidence of a shift away from the ‘long war’ view to a ‘short-war’ view is thin. It is asserted that Britain was “increasingly convinced that time was an enemy” (362) and that this even became a “mounting desperation” (362) but no evidence is provided to support this. Ultimately, his thesis attempts to provide a layer of explanation on the War Cabinet’s December policy shift that is not really needed. It ignores the momentum of the Finnish strategy as it developed in Britain; once begun it was difficult to stop and, always, there was the allure of Swedish ore, the chimera of which over-ruled all else and drove it on. It was matters such as these rather than anxiety over a ‘long war’ strategy that propelled the folly of northern strategy. It should not be forgotten that the failure of the Finnish Option was met with relief (for it had grown beyond that which most thought worthwhile) as much as disappointment and thereafter the War Cabinet reverted to the essentials of its sit tight and re-arm view of the war. Royal Marine and Narvik were temporary variations from this theme, nothing more; they were attempts to help this policy along. The Finnish Option was uniquely attractive because in appeared to combine a low risk way of increasing the economic blockade and, potentially, decisively undermining Germans capacity to be successful via aggression (and it was always thought war with Russia might be avoided). Further, it promised to make it less and not more likely the Germans would escalate the war in the West in the short term. The COS staff argued the German’s would be loath to launch a westward invasion while its supply of ore was not secure (a similar attitude existed in regard to the issue of oil, but this was more problematic for the Allies). Talbot is correct in noting that the plan might have precipitated the ‘short war’ Britain and France hoped to avoid; that is, presumably, an attack in the West. The consensus view, however, was that it would not. There was never anything in the French posture during this time that hinted that they were in any way ready to take the ‘fight’ to the Germans. French resistance to an escalation in the air war – an issue addressed briefly in this study – is proof enough of this. I would suggest that British strategy and that of Churchill in particular, is better characterized as a desire to avoid the loss of a short war rather than representing a transition away from a long war philosophy. This is a subtle but important difference. Narvik and the Finnish Option complemented a long war attitude, they were not in opposition to it. 264

his own view that, far from this, Narvik was the essential catalyst for the Finnish Option. However, he was never able to mount a successful defence against the notion that Narvik was not worth doing as a ‘stand-alone’. The arguments presented were neither convincing nor consistent and frequently counter-productive. He was unable to offer a satisfactory solution to the problem of Germany’s summer ore supply, nor the issue of Swedish co-operation. He sabotage what little hope he had for his case by endorsing the Finnish Option while at the same time arguing that Narvik was the essential catalyst to the Finnish Option because it would invite violent German retaliation against Scandinavia. The consensus view was that this was a very good reason not to proceed with Narvik, not least because Britain must be ready to meet a German reaction, and this would require time.

To explain the failure of Narvik simply in terms of an aggressive, forward thinking Churchill failing to break through the resistance of a passive Chamberlain has, therefore, been viewed as unreasonable. Other evidence supported this contention. First, Narvik survived as a possibility for as long as it did primarily through the intervention of Chamberlain and Halifax, not Churchill. Second, Churchill’s failure to bring Narvik to fruition was a result of the resistance of the COS, the JPS and the MEW. It was they who ultimately decided the matter, not Chamberlain of Halifax. The great irony in this entire episode, and one that conflicts with the notion of Churchill being the central ‘offensive’ spirit of the period was that the War Cabinet Finnish Option was the major strategic initiative of the Phoney War, not Narvik which was, in comparison, minor. There are no accolades to be distributed here, however. In terms of an ‘unconscionable folly’ the Finnish Option parallels and probably surpasses Churchill’s Catherine. The consequences of Narvik alone might well have been comparatively benign. Unfortunately for Churchill’s reputation, he made his own significant contribution to the supersession of Narvik with the Finnish Option. It was not his first preference but he nevertheless gave it his support and was, in its final days, prepared to take extraordinarily unwise measures to see it fulfilled.

The study of these matters was important not only because it offered a new perspective on Churchill’s offensive spirit vis a vis Chamberlain and the War Cabinet but because it identified the broader challenges of finding a worthwhile and suitable 265

offensive during the Phoney War period once it was decided not to attack Germany proper. Churchill tried and failed in regard to Narvik. The War Cabinet failed in regard to the Finnish Option. Despite Churchill’s anguished accusation that the War Cabinet only ever sought the line of least resistance, this was the essence of his own peripheral strategy. This strategy failed because the challenge of fighting the war via friendly neutrals was much more problematic than any imagined. Critics have argued that Churchill was essentially correct in recognising the need for action. However, these same critics have failed to nominate genuinely purposeful and realistic options for the offensive open to the Allies during this time.10 Moreover, in emphasizing Churchill’s offensive spirit or hinting at it being exceptional, they understate the support he received and Churchill’s own limitations in this regard. Arguably, the sum contribution of Churchill’s ‘bull dog’ attitude to the war was to help move the Cabinet from one weak position (sit-tight and re-arm) to another weak position (fighting the war through friendly neutrals). There is no doubt Churchill was among the most aggressive members of the War Cabinet. However, perhaps greater concession is in order for those who were more cautious.

As far as Churchill’s second offensive initiative, Royal Marine, failure was to not to be found in the British War Cabinet but in the challenges of animating an ally very much closer to the German threat than was Britain itself. The issue of the French and Royal Marine brought into focus the other important point of analysis in regard to ‘bull dog’ Churchill. This was the inconsistencies in, and limitations of, Churchill’s own offensive spirit. One element of the ‘commonality of interests’ between Churchill, Chamberlain and the War Cabinet was a reluctance to escalate the war in the air. This was, inevitably, a major stop to offensive action because it was only via Britain’s strategic bomber force that Britain would be able to strike directly at Germany, its industry and its people. Churchill endorsed Britain’s conservative air policy – even as he expressed frustration with it – and, indeed, in the

10 David Reynolds, “1940: The Worst and Finest Hour”, 245-246, in Robert Blake and Wm R. Louis, eds., Churchill: A Major New Assessment of His Life in Peace and War (U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1993). Reynolds hints at Churchill’s exceptional awareness of the importance of the offensive. Further, he nominates several offensive plans that might have been undertaken: mining Norwegian waters, probing the Saar and blockading Italy. The issues of the mining have been discussed in this study. The paucity of these suggestions highlights the challenges of the offensive in 1939-1940. Probes into the Saar would have done little to advance Britain’s war effort and there were many good reasons not to antagonize Italy. Moreover, Churchill was one of those very keen to avoid this. Such arguments, therefore, do little to separate Churchill from his peers. 266

days leading up to the battle for France he became one of the strongest supporters of Chamberlain’s determination to delay “taking the gloves off”. He adopted this attitude for the same reasons as had his War Cabinet colleagues: the hope that Britain might delay or avoid the consequences of unrestricted aerial warfare and the belief this would be to the great advantage of Britain’s war effort. Churchill’s subsequent criticism of the French for failing to support Royal Marine was unjust for the fact that their hesitation was motivated by the same anxiety that caused him to hesitate in beginning the bombing of Germany in the days immediately following the invasion of France in May, 1940.

Another important theme in this study of Churchill and the wider war was the question of Churchill’s superior skills as war leader, warrior, and tactician. These matters were appropriately addressed via Churchill’s involvement in and contribution to the Norwegian Campaign. Churchill had two significant roles; as First Lord he over-saw the enormously important naval operations and, as the chairman of the MCC, he was first among equals in the body primarily responsible for the supervision of the campaign. The campaign was, therefore, an opportunity for Churchill to demonstrate superior qualities of leadership in a very testing military drama. Analyses of the failure in Norway have been steeped in the language of blame and culpability and Churchill has been given more than his share of this. Nevertheless, Churchill performance was, on many levels, poor, although for reasons oftentimes other than those usually given.

In the days leading up to the German invasion, Churchill was a substantial contributor to the ‘wall of doubt’ that helped the German’s achieve their successful lodgement along the Norwegian coast-line in the early hours of 9 April. However, during the vital days of 7 and 8 April, he was not a man dominating events and imposing his will; rather, sometimes against his better judgment, he deferred to the others with operational authority. Pound was the dominant personality in the vital days of 8 and 9 April, not Churchill. Although on most occasions Churchill was consulted before important decisions were made, the evidence suggests he typically acceded to the judgment of his Sea Lords.

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Also considered in this reassessment of Churchill’s culpability was the decisive role the ‘fog of war’ played in German success which was, after all, a very finely run thing. Among the most significant ‘misfortunes’ was the accidental unmasking of Narvik at a critical juncture. Another was the failure to correctly interpret the intentions of the forces found west of Trondheim. This was compounded by the failure to discover the force heading for Bergen. Together, these misfortunes combined to reaffirm the intelligence that pointed to the occupation of Narvik alone. However, this study considered quite extraordinary Churchill’s assumption that Narvik alone was under threat and it is to this particular folly that much of the subsequent misfortune of the campaign can be attributed.

In several other important respects, Churchill has been inaccurately or unjustly criticised for his role in these vital days immediately prior to the German landings in Norway. His attention was never focused solely on the German battlecruiser break- out and the concern he did showed in regard to these ships was certainly not motivated by a desperate desire for a second ‘Jutland’.11 Another ‘shibboleth’ addressed was the decision to suspend the R4 activities and Churchill’s role in it. This did not have the decisive impact on the subsequent land campaign usually given it. Moreover, it was shown that the decisions surrounding R4 were not taken in ignorance of the threat to Norway; nor were they decisions taken unilaterally by Churchill. Nevertheless, these corrections observed, one must conclude that Churchill made a significant and unfortunate personal contribution to the missed opportunities of 7 and 8 April, little of which hinted at superior warrior-like wisdom.

The second part of the study of the campaign addressed Churchill’s role in the fighting following 9 April. This was a further test of Churchill the warrior and it was, again, a flawed performance. However, it was, at all times, a matter of Churchill being required to function with one hand tied behind his back and in a situation in which success was only a remote possibility. The decision-making structure within which he had to work was inefficient and ineffective and his critics have not done enough to acknowledge this.

11 Nor, for that matter, were the battlecruisers ever the only focus of the Commander in Chief; from the very beginning he had an eye to the German threat against Norway. 268

Nor have critics satisfactorily acknowledged the immense challenges facing him as chairman of the MCC. Having lost the initiative on 9 April, he was always likely to be fighting a battle that could not be redeemed. The challenges were manifestly increased by the need to help the Norwegians in central Norway, an agenda pressed first and foremost by Chamberlain and Halifax. Again, this chapter challenged many of the existing criticisms of Churchill’s performance. It was shown conclusively that Churchill did not dominate the decision-making process and almost never acted unilaterally. That there were many significant changes in strategy during the Norwegian campaign is undeniable; that it was a result of Churchill ‘flip- flopping’ is much more questionable. He at no time wielded sufficient power and influence for the changes to be put down to him alone. The decisions taken and the changes made were all responses to external demands and influences, some avoidable, many not. Most of his recommendations had a sound purpose and were broadly supported, even if they gravely stretched British resources.

Churchill’s unique folly, particularly in terms of his post-war reputation, was his tendency to adopt a strategy with great enthusiasm and conviction once this had been identified as desirable or necessary and to do so even if it contradicted his previous arguments. It is a moot point if this reflected indecision or ‘flip-flopping’ so much as a determination to prevent equivocation and hesitation once a potential solution to an otherwise insoluble problem presented itself. Having presented very strong arguments for persisting with Narvik over Trondheim, he subsequently presented a strong case for the viability of a switch to Trondheim; he gave strong support to Hammer, especially in his communications with the Commander-in-Chief, yet he had hitherto expressed apprehensions in regard to the air threat. Subsequently, he wrote a persuasive paper in support of the COS move away from Hammer for the meeting of the MCC. These changes were all based on assumptions about operational conditions, the realities of which proved fleeting or hopelessly optimistic and misguided. The switch to Trondheim was influenced by the success of the naval operation at Narvik; the move away from Hammer was based on the success of the landings in the face of German air attack. All these errors of judgment were shared by others: Ironside supported the switch to Trondheim, Pound pressed the move away from Hammer and Phillips, a possible return to it, while Chamberlain was

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consistently supportive of any recommendation made by Churchill. However, Churchill’s oftentimes optimistic and effusive support for these various changes tied him so closely to them that, when they failed, it was primarily his judgment that was cast in doubt. The legacy of this has carried into the historiography of these events and the excessive blame heaped upon Churchill.

From 9 April onwards, the short-comings of the Allied operations were very much a collective failure and not Churchill’s alone. The most significant influence at play was always the need to help the Norwegians in central Norway. This compelled a switch from Narvik to Trondheim and Churchill took it upon himself to find a way. It was always a forlorn prospect for which he has received more than his fair share of the blame. Similarly, he has received too much criticism for the War Cabinet’s decision to focus on Narvik in the early stages. This decision was not Churchill’s view alone and had its foundations in practical operational matters as much or more than a pre-occupation with Swedish ore. Churchill’s responsibility lies more broadly in his under-estimation of German motivation and capacities well in advance of the campaign but these failings were shared in equal measure by the Chiefs of Staff, including Pound and Ironside both of whom had much more reason to know better.

***

The Phoney War was a time of great uncertainty for Britain, when its preparedness and capacity to wage war were limited, and the overall historical judgment of Britain’s war effort is that of inertia and inadequacy. This study has shown that Churchill was found wanting on many occasions but that he has also been unfairly blamed for some of the shortcomings and mistakes of this period. It has also shown that, while he was animated by a desire to take the war to the Germans, he was more cautious than he or his reputation has admitted. It is in his desire to engage the enemy that much of his extraordinary potential as a war leader after May 1940 is found. Nevertheless, during the Phoney War, his many other war leadership qualities were not obvious. Churchill did not show himself to be in possession of superior qualities of wisdom, insight, or military acumen. Many aspects of his performance were marred by his own folly and poor judgment and he must bear responsibility for several significant failures. How and why Churchill became Prime Minister in May

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1940, despite these short-comings is outside the scope of this thesis, but it must be remembered that Churchill was by no means alone in the errors he made. Moreover, his errors can reasonably be put down to his exceptional proactivity; he was much more exposed to making mistakes than those taking a more passive path and, given the threat to Britain’s existence in 1940, these errors were and remain more easily forgiven. Churchill did not undergo any great metamorphosis after becoming Prime Minister: he continued to be a complicated mix of strengths and failings. As Prime Minister he was, however, freed from the shackles of another man’s government. He also benefitted from strong and wise counsel and, if he had learned anything from the Phoney War, it was the importance of sound advice and strong advisors and a willingness to be more receptive to advice when it was given. In May 1940 Churchill was also freed from the frustrating politico-military straight-jacket of the Phoney War: his path was clear; his task was simpler, if more formidable. The man met the moment and this would give him his finest hour.

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Admiralty Papers ADM 1/10021 Attacks by U-boats ADM 1/10086 Mining Enemy Rivers ADM 1/10468 U-boat Menace ADM 53/10468 HMS Furious Log. ADM 116/3863 Naval Policy in Event of Far Eastern War ADM 116/3889 War Dispositions of Destroyers and Smaller Ships ADM 116/4251 Operation Wilfred and Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Agreement ADM 116/4049 Control of British Merchant Shipping in Time of Emergency ADM 116/4239 Royal Marine ADM 116/4305 Narvik Committee ADM 116/4757 Japanese Naval Strength ADM 116/5289 Mining of Skagerrak ADM 116/5455 Northern Mine Barrage ADM 116/5536 Naval Strength of Japan ADM 116/6289-6292 Operation Catherine ADM 167/105-110 Admiralty Board Minutes and Agenda ADM 199/1 War History Case: Introduction of Convoy System ADM 199/2 Convoy Escorts 1939-1940 ADM 199/125 Anti-U-boat Warfare: Policy and General, 1940 ADM 199/126 Attacks on U-boats, Sept. 1939- Jan. 1940 ADM 199/133 Attacks on U-boats Sept. 1939 – Nov. 1940 ADM 199/138 Enquiry into the Assessment of U-boat Losses. Sept-Nov 1940 (The Dreyer Committee) ADM 199/361 Home Fleet War Diaries ADM 199/379 Battlecruiser Squadron War Diaries ADM 199/371 War Diaries: Western Approaches, Feb.- July, 1940 ADM 199/1781 U-boat Assessments 1940-41, Attacks on

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ADM 199/1790 U-boats: attacks on, 1940 ADM 199/1928-1929 Miscellaneous First Lord’s Papers ADM 199/1939-1940 First Lord Updates, 1939-1940 ADM 199/2057 Monthly Anti-submarine Reports ADM 199/2527 Northern Mine Barrage: history of ADM 199/2057 Anti-U-boat Warfare: Policy ADM 199/2529 Draft Notes: The Organisation Necessary for the Protection of Merchant Shipping in Wartime ADM 205/1-7 First Sea Lord’s Papers ADM 223/320 Notes and extracts of papers by J.H. Godfrey ADM 223/344 Trade Div. Statistical Section: British, Allied, Neutral losses up to 25 Jan. 1945 ADM 223/619 The Navy and Naval Intelligence, 1939-1942: ‘Afterthoughts’ by J.H. Godfrey ADM 229/12,13,14 Controller Papers 1939-40 ADM 239/246 Anti-submarine Warfare: Vol. 1: Development of the U- boat Campaign Papers of the Royal Air Force AIR 19/20 - 21 Correspondence with Admiralty, 1939-1940 AIR 9 36 ADGB AIR 8/289 Bomber Command ops AIR 8/292 Bomber Policy War Cabinet Papers CAB 63 Lord Hankey Papers CAB 65 War Cabinet: Conclusions and Confidential Annex CAB 66 War Cabinet Memoranda 1939-1945 CAB 79/1-4 Chiefs of Staff: Meetings, Minutes and Memoranda CAB 79/85 Chiefs of Staff Committee: Confidential Annex, Feb.-May 1940 CAB 83/1-5 Military Co-ordination Committee: Meetings, Minutes and Memoranda, 1939-1940 CAB 99/3 Supreme War Council Meetings: Records of Meeting, 1939-1940 Foreign Office Papers FO 188/322 Finland: Supply of Material Aids. FO 188/324 Finland: Supply of Aid by Swedish Govt. FO 188/326 Iron Ore: Export to Germany, 1940 FO 188/334 Swedish/Soviet Relations

273

FO 188/335 Foreign Relations: Scandinavia, 1940 FO 188/353 Foreign Relations: Swedish, 1940 FO 371/23651 Scandinavian Neutrality Laws FO 371/23826 Norway: War Trade Agreement, 1940 FO 371/23643 Finland FO 371/23644 Supply of War Materials to Finland, 1939 FO 371/23645 Supply of War Materials to Finland, 1939 FO 371/23646 Finland FO 371/23648 Finland Trade FO 371/23653 German Aims and Influences in Northern Europe FO 371/23654 Germany and Finland FO 371/23658 Germany and Finland FO 371/23659 Germany and Finland FO 371/23667 Europe and Russia (including proposal to offer assistance to Sweden t aid Finland against Russia) FO 371/23678 Anglo-Soviet Relations FO 371/23689 Soviet Union (including attitude to Norwegian Neutrality) FO 371/23692 Soviet Trade Delegation/ Invasion of Finland FO 371/23693 Soviet Invasion of Finland FO 371/23694 Soviet Invasion of Finland/ Possibility of Swedish Assistance FO 371/23694 Soviet Union (including Invasion of Finland and possible Swedish Assistance to Finland) FO 371/ 23697 Soviet Union (including oil resources) FO 371/24820 Iron Ore: 1940 FO 371/24821 Scandinavia: Iron Ore FO 371/24824 Scandinavia (incl. Anglo-Scandinavian trade 1940) FO 371/24827 Norway (incl. Economic Conditions and Trade with Germany FO 371/24828 Norway (incl. Shipping, Industrial Prod.) FO 371/24830 Norway: Operations in, 1940 FO 371/24831 Norway: Operations in, 1940 FO 371/24832 Norway: Operations in, 1940 FO 371/24833 Norway: Operations in, 1940 FO 371/24836 Norway (including German invasion of)

274

Papers of the Prime Minister PREM 1/296 Army Matters PREM 1/308 Defence 1939 PREM 1/314 Far East PREM 1/315 Far East 1939 PREM 1/337 Min. of Shipping PREM 1/404 MCC Organisation PREM 1/408 Finland PREM 1/410 1940: France PREM 1/419 Norway PREM 1/423 Priorities Committee (Production) Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham

Neville Chamberlain Papers NC 8/31/20 Hore-Belisha NC 8/35/13 Norway and Norwegian Debate NC 8/35/31-51 Norway and Norwegian Debate NC 8/35/52-69 Norway and Norwegian Debate Churchill Archive Centre, Churchill College Cambridge

Churchill Papers CHAR 19/1-7 Papers of Sir Winston Churchill CHAR 23 Papers of Sir Winston Churchill CHAR 25 Papers of Sir Winston Churchill Papers of Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett Ernle Erle Drax DRAX 9/8 Papers Pertaining to Sir Dudley Pound DUPO 5/1,2,7 Biographical Material Gathered by Donald McLachlan related to Sir Dudley Pound The Papers of The Diary of Sir Ralph Edwards REDW 1 Papers of Sir Ralph Edwards, including Diary Copies of the Papers of 1st Earl of Halifax (Edward F. L. Wood) HLFX Papers of Sir Thomas Inskip INKP 2 Diary of Sir Thomas Inskip, 1939-1940 Private Papers of Stephen Roskill. ROSK 4,6,7 Various papers including copies of the diaries of Ralph Edwards. 275

Nuffield College Archives, University of Oxford

Papers of Frederick, Alexander Lindermann, C.H., F.R.S., Viscount Cherwell of Oxford CHERWELL F88 to F108. Minutes exchanged between Lindemann and W.S. Churchill, 1939-1945 CHERWELL F229 to F240. Minutes exchanged between Lindemann and W.S. Churchill, 1939-1945 CHERWELL F287 to F292, Charts prepared by the Statistical Section CHERWELL F306 to F321 (U-boats sunk) CHERWELL F395 to F407 Miscellaneous minutes and correspondence 1939-1951. CHERWELL G 104 to 105 19 U-boats losses CHERWELL G 101 to G114 (Dreyer Committee Investigation) CHERWELL G 510 to G 520 Armaments Requirements and Production, including size of Army. CHERWELL H 96/1-24 (including efficacy of convoy)

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