A Rage for Glory: the Life and Times of Commodorestephen Decatur, USN, Wade G
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December 2017.Pdf
MILITARY SEA SERVICES MUSEUM, INC. SEA SERVICES SCUTTLEBUTT December 2017 A message from the President Greetings, The year 2017 was another good year for the Museum. Thanks to our Member's dues, a substantial contribution from our most generous member and contributions from a couple of local patriotic organizations, we will end the year financially sound and feeling confident that we will be able to make any emergency repairs and continue to make improvements to the Museum. As reported in previous Scuttlebutts, most of our major projects have been completed. Our upgraded security system with motion activated cameras inside the Museum and outside the shed John Cecil should be completed this month. The construction of a concrete structure for the mid-1600s British Admiralty Cannon should be completed early next year. I hope everyone has a Merry Christmas and a New Year that is happy, healthy and prosperous. On this Christmas day let's all say a prayer for our troops that can't be home with families and loved ones. They are doing a great job of preventing the spread of terrorism and protecting our freedoms. Please say a prayer for their safe return home. John Military Sea Services entry in Sebring's 2017 Veteran's Day Parade The construction on Fred Carino's boat was done by Fred and his brother Chris. The replica of the bow ornament was done by Mary Anne Lamorte and her granddaughter Dominique Juliano. Military Sea Services Museum Hours of Operation 1402 Roseland Avenue, Sebring, Open: Thursday through Saturday Florida, 33870 Phone: (863) 385-0992 Noon to 4:00 p.m. -
1 Overview of USS Constitution Re-Builds & Restorations USS
Overview of USS Constitution Re-builds & Restorations USS Constitution has undergone numerous “re-builds”, “re-fits”, “over hauls”, or “restorations” throughout her more than 218-year career. As early as 1801, she received repairs after her first sortie to the Caribbean during the Quasi-War with France. In 1803, six years after her launch, she was hove-down in Boston at May’s Wharf to have her underwater copper sheathing replaced prior to sailing to the Mediterranean as Commodore Edward Preble’s flagship in the Barbary War. In 1819, Isaac Hull, who had served aboard USS Constitution as a young lieutenant during the Quasi-War and then as her first War of 1812 captain, wrote to Stephen Decatur: “…[Constitution had received] a thorough repair…about eight years after she was built – every beam in her was new, and all the ceilings under the orlops were found rotten, and her plank outside from the water’s edge to the Gunwale were taken off and new put on.”1 Storms, battle, and accidents all contributed to the general deterioration of the ship, alongside the natural decay of her wooden structure, hemp rigging, and flax sails. The damage that she received after her War of 1812 battles with HMS Guerriere and HMS Java, to her masts and yards, rigging and sails, and her hull was repaired in the Charlestown Navy Yard. Details of the repair work can be found in RG 217, “4th Auditor’s Settled Accounts, National Archives”. Constitution’s overhaul of 1820-1821, just prior to her return to the Mediterranean, saw the Charlestown Navy Yard carpenters digging shot out of her hull, remnants left over from her dramatic 1815 battle against HMS Cyane and HMS Levant. -
Thomas Wilkey Journal on Board the U.S.S. Delaware LCP.Wilkey
Thomas Wilkey journal on board the U.S.S. Delaware LCP.Wilkey This finding aid was produced using the Archivists' Toolkit September 22, 2014 Describing Archives: A Content Standard Library Company of Philadelphia 2012 March 10 Thomas Wilkey journal on board the U.S.S. Delaware LCP.Wilkey Table of Contents Summary Information ................................................................................................................................. 3 Biographical/Historical note.......................................................................................................................... 4 Scope and Contents note............................................................................................................................... 4 Administrative Information .........................................................................................................................5 Related Materials ........................................................................................................................................ 5 Controlled Access Headings..........................................................................................................................5 Collection Inventory...................................................................................................................................... 7 - Page 2 - Thomas Wilkey journal on board the U.S.S. Delaware LCP.Wilkey Summary Information Repository Library Company of Philadelphia Creator Wilkey, Thomas Title Thomas Wilkey journal -
An Ambiguous Partnership: Great Britain and the Free French Navy, 1940-19421
An Ambiguous Partnership: Great Britain and the Free French Navy, 1940-19421 Hugues Canuel On se souvient aujourd’hui des forces de la France libre en raison de faits d’armes tels que leur courageuse résistance à Bir Hakeim en 1942 et la participation du général Leclerc à la libération de Paris en 1944. Par contre, la contribution antérieure de la marine de la France libre est moins bien connue : elle a donné à de Gaulle, dont l’espoir était alors bien mince, les moyens de mobiliser des appuis politiques au sein de l’empire colonial français et d’apporter une contribution militaire précoce à la cause des Alliés. Cette capacité s’est développée à la suite de l’appui modeste mais tout de même essentiel du Royaume-Uni, un allié qui se méfiait de fournir les ressources absolument nécessaires à une flotte qu’il ne contrôlait pas complètement mais dont les actions pourraient aider la Grande- Bretagne qui se trouvait alors presque seule contre les puissances de l’Axe. Friday 27 November 1942 marked the nadir of French sea power in the twentieth century. Forewarned that German troops arrayed around the Mediterranean base of Toulon were intent on seizing the fleet at dawn, Admiral Jean de Laborde – Commander of the Force de Haute Mer, the High Seas Force – and the local Maritime Prefect, Vice Admiral André Marquis, ordered the immediate scuttling of all ships and submarines at their berths. Some 248,800 tons of capital ships, escorts, auxiliaries and submarines was scuttled as the Wehrmacht closed in on the dockyard.2 The French “Vichy navy” virtually ceased to exist that day. -
The Need for a New Naval History of the First World War James Goldrick
Corbett Paper No 7 The need for a New Naval History of The First World War James Goldrick The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies November 2011 The need for a New Naval History of the First World War James Goldrick Key Points . The history of naval operations in the First World War urgently requires re- examination. With the fast approaching centenary, it will be important that the story of the war at sea be recognised as profoundly significant for the course and outcome of the conflict. There is a risk that popular fascination for the bloody campaign on the Western Front will conceal the reality that the Great War was also a maritime and global conflict. We understand less of 1914-1918 at sea than we do of the war on land. Ironically, we also understand less about the period than we do for the naval wars of 1793-1815. Research over the last few decades has completely revised our understanding of many aspects of naval operations. That work needs to be synthesized and applied to the conduct of the naval war as a whole. There are important parallels with the present day for modern maritime strategy and operations in the challenges that navies faced in exercising sea power effectively within a globalised world. Gaining a much better understanding of the issues of 1914-1918 may help cast light on some of the complex problems that navies must now master. James Goldrick is a Rear Admiral in the Royal Australian Navy and currently serving as Commander of the Australian Defence College. -
The 1812 Streets of Cambridgeport
The 1812 Streets of Cambridgeport The Last Battle of the Revolution Less than a quarter of a century after the close of the American Revolution, Great Britain and the United States were again in conflict. Britain and her allies were engaged in a long war with Napoleonic France. The shipping-related industries of the neutral United States benefited hugely, conducting trade with both sides. Hundreds of ships, built in yards on America’s Atlantic coast and manned by American sailors, carried goods, including foodstuffs and raw materials, to Europe and the West Indies. Merchants and farmers alike reaped the profits. In Cambridge, men made plans to profit from this brisk trade. “[T]he soaring hopes of expansionist-minded promoters and speculators in Cambridge were based solidly on the assumption that the economic future of Cambridge rested on its potential as a shipping center.” The very name, Cambridgeport, reflected “the expectation that several miles of waterfront could be developed into a port with an intricate system of canals.” In January 1805, Congress designated Cambridge as a “port of delivery” and “canal dredging began [and] prices of dock lots soared." [1] Judge Francis Dana, a lawyer, diplomat, and Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, was one of the primary investors in the development of Cambridgeport. He and his large family lived in a handsome mansion on what is now Dana Hill. Dana lost heavily when Jefferson declared an embargo in 1807. Britain and France objected to America’s commercial relationship with their respective enemies and took steps to curtail trade with the United States. -
The Chesapeake Affair Nick Mann
58 Western Illinois Historical Review © 2011 Vol. III, Spring 2011 ISSN 2153-1714 Sailors Board Me Now: The Chesapeake Affair Nick Mann In exploring the origins of the War of 1812, many historians view the 1811 Battle of Tippecanoe as the final breaking point in diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain. While the clash at Tippecanoe was a serious blow to peace between the two nations, Anglo-American relations had already been ruptured well before the presidency of James Madison. Indian affairs certainly played a role in starting the war, but it was at sea where the core problems lay. I will argue in this essay that rather than the Battle of Tippecanoe, it was the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair of 1807 that set Great Britain and the United States on the path towards war. The affair signified two of the festering issues facing the British and Americans: impressment and neutral rights. Though President Jefferson was able to prevent war in 1807, his administration‟s inept diplomacy widened the existing gap between Britain and America. On both sides of the Atlantic, the inability of leaders such as Secretary of State Madison and the British foreign minister, George Canning to resolve the affair poisoned diplomatic relations for years afterward. To understand the origin of the War of 1812, one must consider how the Chesapeake affair deteriorated Anglo-American relations to a degree that the Battle of Tippecanoe was less important that some have imagined. The clash at Tippecanoe between Governor William Henry Harrison and the forces of the Shawnee Prophet has usually been seen as the direct catalyst for the war in much of the historiography dealing with the War of 1812. -
March 2009 ICS Ad-8.5X11-Alabama 3/10/09 1:24 PM Page 1
THE OFFICIAL MAGAZINE A L A B A M A OF THE ALABAMA STATE PORT AUTHORITY SEAPORT MarCH 2009 ICS ad-8.5x11-Alabama 3/10/09 1:24 PM Page 1 Alabama Seaport PuBlishED continuOuSly since 1927 • marCh 2009 On The Cover: an aerial view of the progress of the Pinto Island Steel Terminal shot march 2. governor Bob riley and representatives from Thyssenkrupp Steel toured the facility in February. 4 8 Alabama State Port Authority P.O. Box 1588, Mobile, Alabama 36633, USA Contents P: 251.441.7200 • F: 251.441.7216 • asdd.com alabama governor Surveys Progress at new Pinto Island Terminal ........4 James K. Lyons, Director, CEO Larry R. Downs, Secretary-Treasurer/CFO Flanagan Steps up as Interim Port Police Chief .........................................7 EXECutiVE a global Investment in mobile and the Port: PErsonnEl Charles F. Sleeman, Manager P: 251.441.7209 Introducing global Stainless Steel Corporation ............................................8 FinanCial SerVICes hispanic-american association Seeks to Strengthen Community .........10 Larry Downs, Secretary/Treasurer 251.441.7050 Linda K. Paaymans, Vice President 251.441.7036 Port Calls: alabama Coastal Birding Trail ................................................. 12 COmptrOllEr Pete Dranka 251.441.7057 Information TechnOlOgy Stan Hurston, Manager 251.441.7017 at the helm: austal uSa ................................................................................16 human Resources Danny Barnett, Manager 251.441.7004 made in alabama: alabama river Pulp marks 30 years of Operation ......18 Risk -
MARITIME STRATEGY and the NUCLEAR AGE by the Same Author
MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE NUCLEAR AGE By the same author AIR POWER AND THE ROYAL NAVY Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age Geoffrey Till with contributions from John Hattendorf, Richard Hill, Barry Hunt, Peter Nailor, Bryan Ranft, Stephen Roskill and Craig Symonds © Geoffrey Till 1982 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1982 978-0-333-26109-5 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission First published 1982 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Companies and representatives throughout the world ISBN 978-1-349-04502-0 ISBN 978-1-349-04500-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-04500-6 Contents Notes on the Contributors vii ~re b 1 An Introduction 1 (a) The influence of sea power on history 1 (b) The influence of history on sea power 5 (c) The principles of maritime strategy 8 (d) An anatomy of sea power 11 (e) Constituents of a maritime strategy 14 2 A Review of the Literature 19 (a) Maritime strategy in the age of the galley 19 (b) Maritime strategy in the age of sail 20 (c) The Colomb brothers 24 (d) Alfred Thayer Mahan (by Craig Symonds) 28 (e) The Jeune Ecole 34 (f) Sir Julian Corbett (by Bryan Ranft) 39 (g) Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (by Barry Hunt) 43 (h) Continental maritime strategy 1918-39 49 (i) Reactions to the Second World War 54 (j) American thinking on naval strategy 1945-80 (by John Hattendorf) 58 (k) Admiral of the Fleet S. -
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21 Those Pirates and Muslim Barbarians: The American Public View of the Barbary Nations and the United States Participation in the Barbary War Kate_ Page Although the Marine Anthem is sung quite often throughout the country, relatively few know the extent of its history or the meaning of the phrase, "from the Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli." In the early 1800s the United States was at war with the Barbary Nations in what would come to be known as the Barbary Wars. The American public glorified the United States and made the Barbary nations into an evil enemy. The historiography of the Barbary Wars tends to be written from a diplomatic or military approach, and understandably so. The fight against these North African pirates afforded some of the earliest and most celebrated actions of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. This combat also began a long and ongoing U.S. military presence in the Middle East, and the American public's interest in the greater Islamic world. Little has been written, though, on the new nation's reaction to the war. This article will address the American people's reaction to the United States dealing with the Barbary Nations. 1 From the beginning of the 11 h century, the Barbary Nations were the crippling controllers of the Mediterranean Sea. Their piratical practices was felt thorough much of the Atlantic World, along the Mediterranean, up to Iceland, and down the Western African Atlantic coast. The four· Barbary Nations were Morocco, Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, and were the scourge of trade and commerce for many of the nations of the time. -
Few Americans in the 1790S Would Have Predicted That the Subject Of
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY IN AN AGE OF ATLANTIC WARFARE: A CONSENSUS BROKEN AND REFORGED, 1783-1816 Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jeffrey J. Seiken, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2007 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor John Guilmartin, Jr., Advisor Professor Margaret Newell _______________________ Professor Mark Grimsley Advisor History Graduate Program ABSTRACT In the 1780s, there was broad agreement among American revolutionaries like Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton about the need for a strong national navy. This consensus, however, collapsed as a result of the partisan strife of the 1790s. The Federalist Party embraced the strategic rationale laid out by naval boosters in the previous decade, namely that only a powerful, seagoing battle fleet offered a viable means of defending the nation's vulnerable ports and harbors. Federalists also believed a navy was necessary to protect America's burgeoning trade with overseas markets. Republicans did not dispute the desirability of the Federalist goals, but they disagreed sharply with their political opponents about the wisdom of depending on a navy to achieve these ends. In place of a navy, the Republicans with Jefferson and Madison at the lead championed an altogether different prescription for national security and commercial growth: economic coercion. The Federalists won most of the legislative confrontations of the 1790s. But their very success contributed to the party's decisive defeat in the election of 1800 and the abandonment of their plans to create a strong blue water navy. -
A Friendship Under Fire
Volume 3, Issue 6 I A Newsletter for the Supporters of the Hampton Roads Naval Museum A Friendship Under Fire The Confrontation Between Stephen Decatur and James Barron, Part 1 by Joe Mosier n March 22, 1820, two of the Tragically, the meeting could have been former friends. They had first served senior officers of the United avoided except for the manipulations of together in the wardroom of United States OStates Navy met on "the field of two other officers who acted as seconds. in 1798. Their later correspondence honor" at Bladensburg, Maryland. This The meeting between James Barron shows Third Lieutenant Barron acted as duel was the result of a long-standing and Stephen Decatur was in some a mentor to the new midshipman. Their feud based on an insult to a lady and respects not typical. Christopher McKee paths had crossed frequently in the small a naval battle that was not fought. pointed this out in his landmark study of navy of that era. In 1804, Decatur the early U.S. Navy, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession. "In spite of the misleading impression created by the Barron-Decatur duel, the practice of dueling was all but entirely confmed to the younger members of the officer corps." At the time of their confrontation, Barron was 51 years old and Decatur 41. By contrast, twelve of eighteen officers killed in duels before 1815 were midshipmen. This trend had worried Decatur, who was himself probably the most experienced in dueling among naval officers of his day. In 1809, while While respected by all in Hampton Roads, the Decatur commanded the frigate United One of the greatest heroes of the U.S.