"Triple P" Judiciary

734 ALBERTA LAW REvlEW VOL. 38(3) 2000 REDUCING IBE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT: 1 REPRESENTATION, DIVERSITY AND THE CANADIAN JUDICIARY, OR TOWARDS A "TRIPLE P" JUDICIARY RICHARD DEVLIN,• A. WAYNE MACKAY.. AND NATASHA KIM••• The authors review the current structures for Les auteurs examinent la structure actuelle des judicial appointments in Canada and provide nominations a la magistrature au Canada. Jls statistical information about the results of these donnent aussi des statistiques sur /es resultats de mechanisms in respect to diversity of representation ces mecanismes en ce qui concerne la diversile de on the courts. They are also critical of the fairness la representation dans /es tribunaux. De plus, ils and openness of judicial appointments processes. questionnent I equite et l 'ouverture d 'esprit des After examining several variants of the dominant processus de nomination des juges. liberal view of law and of judges, the authors Apres avoir examine plusieurs variantes de la proffer and articulate a neo-realist theory of law vision liberale dominante du droit et de la and what they term a "bungee cord theory of magistrature, /es auteurs presentent et enoncent une judging. " According to the former, law is inevitably theorie neorealiste du droit et de ce qu 'ils appellenl a form of politics; according to the latter, judges «une theorie de I 'elastique d 'appoint de la are unavoidably political actors. In consequence, magistrature ». D 'une part le droit est the judiciary is properly subject to democratic inevitablement une forme de politique, et d'autre norms, including especially the norms of part /es juges sont inevitablement des acteurs representation and of diversity. The authors then politiques. Ainsi le systeme judiciaire est dument argue that, judged against those democratic norms, regi par /es normes democratiques, particulierement the present systems of judicial appointment (and the /es normes de representation et de diversite. Les judiciary which ii has put in place) suffers from auteurs ajoutent, qua la lumiere de ces normes what they term "a democratic deficit." democratiques, Jes systemes actuels de nomination After a detailed examination of past attempts to des juges (et le systeme qui I 'a mis en place) soujfre reform this system, of arguments for and against a de ce qu 'ils appellent «un deficit democratique ». more democratic and representational approach to Apres un examen detaille d'essais de reforme du judicial selection, and possible models of judicial systeme, des arguments en faveur et contre une selection, the authors propose their own reform: the demarche de selection plus democratique et establishment by statute of Judicial Appointments representative et quelques modeles eventuels de Commissions. Such an approach might help cure selection, les auteurs proposent leur propre reforme, the democratic deficit and produce what they dub a soil /'etablissement par la loi d'une commission de Triple-P judiciary, that is, one that is politically nomination judiciaire. Une telle demarche aiderait accountable, professionally qualified, and a pa/lier un deficit democratique et produirait ce proportionally representative. qu 'i/s appellent un systeme a trois P, c 'est-a-dire politiquement responsable, professionnellement qualifie et proportionne/lement representatif TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION . • . 736 II. LEGAL THEORY AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE: FROM IDEALISM TO NEO-REALISM (OR FROM HARNESSES TO BUNGEE CORDS) . • . 737 Professor, Dalhousie Law School. Professor, Dalhousie Law School, former Director Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission. Third year law student, Dalhousie Law School. We would like to thank Dr. Alexandra Dobrowolskyfor suggesting this title to us. REDUCING TI-IE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 735 A. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT . 737 B. THE CONTEXT OF LEGAL THEORY •................... 740 C. THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF TIIE JUDICIAL ROLE: AN EMERGENT JUDGOCRACY? ..............•... 752 III. THE CURRENT SITUATION: A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT . • . 758 A. INTRODUCTION ......... :· ....•.•................ 758 B. METHODOLOGY . • . • . 759 C. REsULTS . • . • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • . • • • . • . 759 D. COMPARISONS .................................• 781 E. SUMMARY . • . • . 788 IV. BEING THERE AND SPEAKING UP: NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A PROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTATIVE JUDICIARY . 788 A. ARGUMENTS FOR A MORE PROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTATIVE JUDICIARY ..............•......... 789 B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST GROUP REPRESENTATION . 798 C. SUMMARY . • . 811 V. FROM THEORY TO INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: OPTIONS FOR JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESSES . 812 A. INTRODUCTION . 812 B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK . • . 814 C. OPTIONS . • . 816 VI. TowARDS A "TRIPLE P" JUDICIARY: JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT COMMISSIONS . • . • . 827 A. STATUTORY STATUS ...................•......... 828 B. COMPOSITION . • . • . • . 830 C. PROCESS . • . • . 837 D. CRITERIA . • • . • • . • • • . • • • . • . • . 841 E. SUMMARY . • . 845 VII. CONCLUSION . 845 APPENDIX I: JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE ......... 847 APPENDIX II: CRITERIA . 851 APPENDIX III: CONT ACTS . • • . • 862 APPENDIX IV: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT REFORM PROPOSALS . 864 ...there is no such thing as a 'neutral' system of representation. In practice all institutions of representation will have the effect of favoring some groups over others or of disadvantaging some groups more than others.2 M. Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) at 54 (emphasis added]. 736 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW VOL. 38(3) 2000 Justice is a continualbalancing of competingvisions, plural viewpoints,shifting histories, interests, and allegiances.To acknowledgethat level of complexityis to require, to seek, and to value a multiplicity of knowledgesystems, in pursuit of a more completesense of the world in which we all Iive.3 [F]or too many lawyers and judges, judging is still not regarded as the provision of a basic social service but the exercise of a private professionalcraft. 4 I. INTRODUCTION On January 11, 2000, Beverley McLachlin, on the day of her swearing in as the Chief Justice of Canada, "welcomed" a public debate on the way judges are appointed in Canada.5 This article is a response to that invitation. For more than three decades there have been many calls for reform of judicial appointment systems in Canada. In some cases, for example the Supreme Court of Canada, these calls have fallen on deaf ears. In other cases, in particular the appointment of provincial court judges, there has been quite significant reform. In our opinion, however, more needs to be done. Canada is a heterogeneous democratic society characterized by widespread diversity and pluralism. However, one of the most powerful institutions in Canadian society, the judiciary, is relatively homogeneous. In this article, we submit that this apparent contradiction is indefensible. Building on John Stuart Mill's proposition that ''the first principle of democracy is representation in proportion to numbers," 6 we will propose that the judiciary needs to encompass a more proportional representation of the various communities that constitute Canadian society. In particular, we will argue that judging is an exercise of power, and that it is important in a democracy that the citizenry have a real opportunity to "be there" when power is exercised. Law is a terrain of social struggle in which contested social values representing diverse perspectives and communities are articulated and enforced. Our goal is to replace a relatively monopolized judiciary with a power-sharing judiciary, a judiciary that achieves a more equitable distribution of the scarce social good of judicial office. 7 Our argument will proceed through five stages. Part II will argue that any discussion of judicial appointments is contingent upon an underlying conception of law and a theory of the judicial role. Part III is an empirical study which surveys the current appointment processes and the demographic profile of the Canadian judiciary: federally, provincially, and territorially. Part IV provides a theoretical consideration of the arguments for and against a proportionally representative judiciary. Part V maps out a series of institutional options, and Part VI makes some concrete suggestions for the P.J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 121. P. Russell,"Judicial Power in Canada's PoliticalCulture" in M. Friedland,ed., Courts and Trials: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach (Toronto: Universityof Toronto Press, 1975) 75 at 88. Interviewwith M. Enright, CBC Radio (11 January 2000). As quoted in M. Williams,supra note 2 at 46. Our goal is a proportional sharing of power, not a veto power. As will become apparent later, when we discuss proportionality,we are not advocating absolute or direct proportionality,but rather approximateproportionality. REDUCING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 737 creation of democratically constituted Judicial Appointment Commissions. Part VII, a brief conclusion, is followed by a series of appendices. The "golden thread" uniting the argument is that, while the recent emphasis on increased judicial professionalism is an improvement over the historical tradition of vulgar political partisanship, politics cannot (and should not) be eradicated from the appointments systems. Professionalism, therefore, needs to be supplemented by the democratic principle of proportionality. In short, we are calling for a "Triple P"

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