View from the Ground: Gujarat Elections Defy Easy Predictions
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ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 View from the Ground: Gujarat Elections Defy Easy Predictions RADHIKA RAMASESHAN Vol. 52, Issue No. 49, 09 Dec, 2017 Radhika Ramaseshan ([email protected]) is consulting editor, Business Standard. The results of the Gujarat assembly elections are definitely not a foregone conclusion, especially for the Bharatiya Janata Party. This article takes a nuanced look at the factors that will affect the final outcome on 18 December even as it carries voices at the ground level in the state in the run-up to the polls on 9 and 14 December. Weeks before Gujarat voted, Kamlesh Patel was weighed down with worries, clueless about seeking a resolution to the problems before him. He was tasked to execute the fiats issued by Gandhinagar and Delhi and not take initiatives. Kamlesh is the former Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) president of the Lakhtar division in Surendranagar district, the gateway to the Saurashtra region. Lakhtar town is part of the Dasada reserved Scheduled Caste (SC) seat that the BJP has won since 1990. Just once in 2002 the seat had gone to the Congress. Dasada has 30,000 Patel voters but Kamlesh was directed to keep off his community which, he admitted, had become so hostile to the BJP that he felt unwanted in its company. This was so, he says, even after he visited every Patel home in the neighbourhood following the violent stir for reservation, spearheaded by the Patidar Anamat Andolan Samiti (PAAS) in August 2015. The community was hurt and angry after 13 persons were killed by the police, homes were searched and PAAS activists were rounded up. The Peril of Ignoring Patels In the prelude to the assembly polls, the BJP asked Kamlesh to concentrate on coaxing the support of the other communities such as the backward caste Koli–Patels, the Kshatriyas and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), the upper-caste Darbaris and the Dalits. However, he quoted an old political truism that said one Patel vote had the power of three votes because a Patel influenced at least one or more of his farm hands, cast a second “bogus” vote and topped off the charade by exercising his own franchise. Therefore, Kamlesh’s argument was that “ignoring” the Patels would be akin to nearly losing the election or facing a vastly ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 reduced mandate. Kamlesh conceded that reaching out to the second variegated grouping was “futile” because historically, they were “mostly” affiliated with the Congress, barring the non-Kshatriya OBCs. This time, even the non-Kshatriyas, “swayed” by Alpesh Thakor, the founder of the OBCs, SCs and Scheduled Tribes (STs) Ekta Manch and the Gujarat Kshatriya Thakor Sena, were gravitating towards the Congress, he said. Thakor has joined the Congress and is contesting from Radhanpura in north Gujarat. Kamlesh was beset with more concerns. The Patels throughout Gujarat were the largest users of Android phones and the principal consumers of social media apps because they could afford to download these, unlike the OBCs and Dalits. He wondered aloud if Prime Minister Narendra Modi had thought of how Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp would recoil on the BJP when he turned generous with talktime and the use of 3 GB (gigabit) data as part of the Digital India Programme. Modi’s tech sops became an instant bestseller in Gujarat because he had deployed social media successfully in the 2012 assembly and the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, raising an independent office to conceptualise and execute his ideas on the Internet. Modi’s success story spawned imitators across the political spectrum. Among them was Hardik Patel, the young founder of PAAS. After the PAAS’s uprising, the young Patels in the villages banded themselves in groups of 10 or 12 to dedicate themselves full-time to “waging a war” against the BJP government and canvassing support for the Congress on the net. So, even while the farmers were busy supervising agricultural operations, they took time off to connect long distance with one another on the social media and gave traction to the “movement” against the BJP establishment. “We have lost the battle on the net,” rued Kamlesh. The BJP was worried about the infusion of populism in the elections by the Congress, something that was anathema to Modi. In the 2012 Uttar Pradesh election, wherein the Samajwadi Party had unrolled a packet of goodies such as free laptops for students and a monthly unemployment dole, Modi reportedly scoffed at them, saying such moves would hurt the “self-respect” of the targeted recipients. The Congress has promised to waive off farmers’ loans and offered unemployment monthly doles of ₹3,000 for undergraduates, ₹3,500 for graduates and ₹4,000 for postgraduates. In an ambience of economic slack and agrarian despair, the BJP feared there were enough and more takers for the Congress’s “lollipops,” “self-respect” or not. The Congress’s use of “soft Hindutva” in its campaign bothered Kamlesh and the BJP for a deeper political reason. In the past, the BJP leveraged phrases like maut ka saudagar (merchant of death) used by the Congress President Sonia Gandhi to decry Modi in her election campaign to its advantage, suggesting that by using these the Congress had deliberately revived memories of the 2002 communal carnage in the Muslims to polarise and swing their votes. This time, the BJP noted with dismay that the Congress had avoided biting the Hindu–Muslim bait. So far Rahul Gandhi had steered clear of the Congress’s de rigueur interactions with the Muslim clergy and the residents of the minority areas. ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 The BJP’s exertions to cast the discourse in the Hindu–Muslim polemics of the past with the insinuations about Rahul’s religious antecedent (he had allegedly signed in as a “non-Hindu” while visiting the Somnath temple), the resolve to bring in a bill outlawing the practice of “triple talaq” in Parliament and rekindling remembrances of communal conflicts and curfews in Ahmedabad in the pre-Modi era have been supplanted by the caste fault lines that are out in the open. Kamlesh’s statements and admissions reflected his dilemma arising from a sense of alienation in his community of Patels and the compulsion of being a member of a larger “Hindutva” family. To him, the quandary seemed irreconcilable despite the BJP and Modi’s attempts to invoke the old shibboleths of “Gujarati pride” (or asmita) and pan- nationalism and foreground the “Hindutva” trope in their discourse. A senior national office- bearer said, What is Gujarati pride? It is nationalism manifest in the visuals we saw from Manila (where Modi attended the India–ASEAN and East Asia summits in early November). See how intently (Donald) Trump (US President) and (Shinzo) Abe (Japan’s Prime Minister) listened to our PM. Casteism can be overcome by nationalism because we are living in a New India created by Modi. If conflating a state election with the “nationalist” metaphor and exaggerating its scale and importance to the size of a national referendum was one facet of the BJP’s strategy, the other aspect was availing an organisational edifice raised on a solid foundation. Agrarian Crisis and GST To begin with, the BJP’s foot soldiers, characteristically on the move from the word go before an election, were unusually low-key and passive this time. Before Diwali, they were privy to reports that the advent of the goods and services tax (GST) regime, coupled with the aftermath of demonetisation, had detracted from the celebratory mood that ushers in the new year in Gujarat. “There was no sparkle,” a worker said. Dampening the ambience was the acute agrarian crisis that the villagers were confronted with. The crisis was exacerbated with a below-par minimum statutory price for cash crops —₹800 for a kg of cotton as compared with ₹1,300 given by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government (Langa 2017a)—the closure of small and medium units impacted by the GST pressures, the poor trade in wholesale spice “mandis” that resulted in low pickups of produces from farmers Ramaseshan (2017) damage to crops from flooding, and the non-payment of insurance to farmers, although the premiums were taken away from their accounts in the nationalised banks. In mid-November, the BJP’s central minders specially deployed from Delhi by the President Amit Shah figured out that the workers would have to be galvanised. The members of Parliament (MPs) and the state leaders marshalled from outside Gujarat, were ordered to give pep talks, focused on the centre’s “achievements” built around Modi so that he was ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 again elevated to the stature of a demigod on home turf. Interestingly, although Shah had long ago declared the incumbent Chief Minister Vijay Rupani as the “leader” of the elections, the inconspicuous Rupani was perceived as a Shah proxy in Gujarat without an independent standing. This was unlike his predecessor Anandiben Patel who came across as a no-nonsense administrator although she too derived her position from being a Modi protégé. The BJP changed track and projected Rupani and the Deputy Chief Minister Nitin Patel in equal measure, ostensibly to try and placate the Patels. However, it was clear that Modi would be the lead star. Ranjanben Dhananjay Bhatt, the Vadodara MP, detailed the BJP’s organisational methodology in a conversation with this author. She said that Shah’s penchant for micromanagement had three vital components in a vistaar yojana (blueprint for a constituency): the shakti kendra (locus of strength), the panna pramukh (page chief) and jan sampark (popular contact). The shakti kendra was made up of centres that integrated three to seven booths and each booth had 15–20 panna pramukhs.