Doctor of Philosophy in POLITICAL SCIENCE

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BACKWARD CASTE MOVEMENT IN UTTAR PRADESH: STUDY OF SAMAJWADI PARTY

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY RAJMOHAN SHARMA

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF PROF. NIGAR ZUBERI

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH-202002 (INDIA) 2016

Prof. Nigar Zuberi Extension :( 0571) 2701720 Department of Political Science, Internal: 1560 Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh - 20 2002 (U.P.) India. Dated …………………

Certificate

This is to certify that Mr. Rajmohan Sharma, Research Scholar, Department of Political Science, A.M.U., Aligarh has completed his Ph.D. thesis entitled “Backward Caste Movement in Uttar Pradesh: Study of Samajwadi Party ” under my supervision. The data materials, incorporated in the thesis have been collected from various sources. The researcher used and analyzed the aforesaid data and material systematically and presented the same with pragmatism.

To the best of knowledge and understanding a faithful record of original research work has been carried out. This work has not been submitted partially or fully for any degree or diploma in Aligarh Muslim University or any other university. He is permitted to submit the thesis.

I wish him all success in life.

(Prof. Nigar Zuberi) Acknowledgement

I thank to the Almighty for His great mercifulness and choicest blessings generously bestowed on me without which I could have never seen this work through.

First of all, I would like to express the most sincere thanks and profound sense of gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Nigar Zuberi for her continuous support, valuable suggestions and constant encouragement in my Ph.D. work. I am deeply obliged for her motivation, enthusiasm and inspiration during the course of Ph.D. Her guidance assisted me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. Her immense patience to bear with all my shortcomings and enthusiastically correcting me whenever I went wrong, has been of great help. I could not have imagined having a better supervisor and mentor for my Ph.D.

I express my gratitude to Prof. Asmer Beg Chairman, Department of Political Science, AMU, Aligarh for his formal and informal cooperation, moral support and inspiring words at every stage of this work.

There are a number of people without whom this thesis might not have been completed. I am also very thankful and greatly indebted to all the faculties of department of Political Science specially Prof. Arif Hameed, Prof. Mohd Nafees Ahmad Ansari, Prof. Mohd. Abid and Dr. Irfan ul Haque.

I am greatful to my father Shri S.C. Gautam for his kind support at every step. He provided me the conducive environment and consistent motivational force for pursuing higher studies and finally shaping me in the present state.

I am also thankful from deep core of my heart to my friends- Dr. Amir Mahmood, Dr. Mushtaq Ahmad, Dr. Sartaz Alam Ansari, Dr. Wazid Rasheed Khan, Dr. Ali Imam and Dr. Shavez Ansari, Dr. Nadeem Akhtar, Dr. Sarfaraz Javed, Mr. Sudhir Kumar and Mr. Sanjay Sharan for their precious company in all the fronts for the completion of this work. They provided me motivation and remarkable advice for this work.

I want to thank all my family members and relatives- Mr. Vikash Gautam, Mrs. Lakshmi Gautam, Mr. R.K. Gautam, Mrs. Mamta Gautam, Mrs. Beena Sharma, Mr.

R.K. Sharma, Mr. Shalabh Sharma, Mr. Ritik Sharma, Yuvraj Gautam, Moksha Gautam, Lakshya Gautam, Preetika Gautam, Princy Gautam, Ansh Sharma, Mr. N.S. Maurya, Mrs. Ramwati Maurya, Mr. Alan Robert, Mrs. Rajani Maurya, Miss Ratika Maurya, Baby Alria Robert and Baby Reuben Sharma and specially those who believe in my credentials and stand by me every time whenever I need. I am especially thankful to my wife Rashmi Maurya, who is actually the guiding force, source of inspiration, helping me to achieve all that is the best in my life.

I would like to express my sincere thanks to Mr. Hammad Ahamd, Mr. Moquitur Rehman, Mr. Mohammad Asaf, Mr. Sulaiman Khan, Mr. Afzal Khan, Mohd. Atif (Aftab Hall) and other staff members of Department of Political Science, AMU Aligarh.

I am also thankful to the staffs of Maulana Azad Library, AMU and Central Library, JNU New Delhi.

Despite all efforts to make the thesis free from error, there may be errors still left unnoticed for what the Researcher takes all the responsibilities personally.

Rajmohan Sharma

ABSTRACT

Background of the Study:

The assertion of the Backward Castes/Classes has had an uneven, and sometimes uneasy, presence in the public domain in India over the years and their impact varied profoundly in different regions of the country. At the same time this assertion has had manifold expressions it has taken overt religious as well as anti- religious forms; informed the intermittent peasant movements in the country; assumed numerous egalitarian stances and a complex nexus with the overall thrust of democratic inclusion in India. While the category, Backward Castes/Classes had found widespread usage in the political vocabulary of Modern India, its substantive meaning and appeal to hearts and minds, has remained deeply contested over time and in manifold.

Backward Caste/ class is a category that denotes an array of disadvantage social groups that precipitated during the national movement and found ardent votaries in the Constituent Assembly and in the subsequent political developments in India. The disadvantage did not necessarily proceed from relative marginality or deprivation, but was closely related to the specificity of India' social formation. While the Back ward classes were closely bound up with the idea of the Nation, they, in turn, demanded a differential understanding of the same. In other words, while the Backward classes were internal to shared bond, they also called upon the Nation to be deferential to their disadvantage, as well as legacies of distinct cultural traditions and sometimes, even ways of life. Their movement sought a redefinition of the Nation of which its existing articulations were little sensitive of The 'backwardness' implied in the term was not merely economic but social as well. Often the concerned groups did not see the concept of class adequate to encompass the specific deprivations and exclusions that they were caught in and strove against. In several ways the rise of the Backward Caste/ Class movement is also a statement on the nature of class-based movements in India demonstrating the inability of the latter to reach out to the multiple forms of exploitation and domination embedded in the social relations in India.

The Backward Castes/ classes have been an inclusive as well as an exclusive term. As an inclusive term, it connoted all social strata that were not part of the

1 dominant forward castes, although terms such as 'dominant' and 'forward' did not have the same connotations, particularly given the complexity and diversity of India's social formation. As an exclusivist term, it is used to denote social groups other than the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Historically, this distinction became prominent from early 1920s as the Schedule Caste Leaders became emphatic on the features of exclusion, exploitation and dominance specific to their communities across the country. The Adivasi movement in India brought of the fore issues of autonomy and cultural difference that marked them off from the central concerns of the backward Caste/class movement. The attempt of draw a legal and administrative line of separation between the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on one hand, and the Backward classes on the other affected the lower rungs of the latter deleteriously as there was no marked differentiation between the kind of marginality and cultural domination that they were subjected to, in relation to the former. Socially, the Backward classed hailed from the peasant and service castes, low in the social hierarchy. These social constituencies have been in the throes of change both during the national movement and subsequently, although, often the advocacy and legal platforms attempted to arrest such processes and attempted to essentialise a specific kind of Backwardness.

Backward Classes, therefore, remained a relational category in India. It denoted a set of social relations that assigned dominance, status, exclusion, and specific modes of recognition. As social relations came to be deeply contested in the course of the national movement and the class-based movement, the social relation called backward classes came to be reformulated in several respects. Similarly, the backward class movement was to exercise a profound impact on the National movement and the kind of Democracy, it bequeathed to India, and on the class-based movements, before and after independence.

The constituent assembly while registering the existence of socially and economically backward Castes/classes in India and demarcating them from the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes refused to spell out who these backward classes were and what specific measures were called for to remove the concerned backwardness. We find a series of reasons being mounted in this regard: given the unevenness of the existence of backward castes in India it was felt that any specification in this regard would not be fair to the situation. While constitutionalists

2 such as Ambedkar admitted the Backward Classes would necessarily include 'a basket of castes', they were not prepared to confine the term to a specific number of castes or merely to a caste bloc as such. In fact, Ambedkar argued that this task must be left to the dynamics of the democratic process in India and the reflectivity and deliberation of democracy should lead to the identification of not merely who the backward Classes were but also to the institution of measures for their emancipation. Otherwise, they constitutionally legal structure of India is going to arrest a process and begin to dictate terms to democratic reasoning in India. It was also felt that given the uneven presence of Backward Classes in India the grievances that they suffered from can be attended to at the appropriate levels rather than inundate the agenda of political authority at the central level.

The march of Indian democracy after independence has impacted the Backward Caste/class movement and the issues that it raised very differently over the years. Often a backward caste or a coalition of backward castes has emerged as a prominent player at the regional level. Such developments at the regional level have also reflected on the political equations at the Union level. Overall, we find that the backward castes have registered an appreciable advance with regard to political representation after mid-1970s with certain setbacks in the early eighties. However, such political advance may not have necessarily reflected in influence they wield in the economic, social and cultural life of the Nation as a whole. The deeply embedded hierarchies at various levels have succeeded in confining and even co-opting the egalitarian thrust of the social advances of the backward castes. Further the political advance of the backward classes and particularly to those who are lowest in the social rung even among the more numerous backward castes. The benefits have accrued basically to a certain strata, rather than a majority of members of social group. Party- based competition revolving around caste and communities has also not facilitated the coming together of various castes and communities on a common platform to fight against agreed issues of backwardness. In the context of the coalition politics of the 1990s and the regionalization of Indian polity, the clout wielded by backward caste leaders has increased, given their significance in the regions, but the necessity of keeping the national unity intact has also made them deferential to modes of hierarchy and dominance. The culturally amorphous nature of the Backward Class constituency while making it a protagonist of certain forms of egalitarianism may also harbour

3 very strong antagonism towards the egalitarian thrust of other sections of the society including women. Therefore, the democratic thrust of the Backward Caste/Class Movement may not always be appreciative of freedoms and egalitarian consideration of other member of society. In recent years, certain minority communities in India, particularly, the Muslims have registered backwards strata within themselves but there is little agreement so far whether such backwardness has to be attended to as part of the overall process of democratic empowerment or by registering the community as a priority consideration in this regard. Legally and administratively these issued can lean to a great deal of complex demands such as compartmentalization of castes within backward classes, and compartmentalization of backward sections across backward classes and across society as a whole.

The state has not been a neutral, agency in India with regard to the backward caste/class movement. It has intervened in the movement both to define what backward classes are and to visit class with caste, and sometimes caste with class. While sometimes the rationale advanced for such interventions has been shared citizenship, this did not seem to be the most important reason always. Often is has been to balance a set of demands against another and maintain modes of dominance and unity of the social formation as a whole. In the process thee has not been a coherent ideology that the state has mounted in response to the backward class movement. Such ambiguity is manifested not merely in major authoritative pronouncements but also in numerous Court judgments over the years. At the same time it is important to point out that the democratic process has not necessarily expanded the reach and depth of the Backward Class movement in India or thrown up foundational agreements regarding appropriate ways of engaging with the issued that it has given to. Sometimes, the politics that it has spawned has been a cloistered kin, sub-serving partisan ends.

Given the complexity in which the Backward Caste/ Class movement in India and especially in Uttar Pradesh is caught, a scholarly judgment on this issue is extremely difficult to formulate particularly at the all India level. This is in spite of the impressive advance that empirical studies have registered in this regard. An investigation bearing on some of the central concerns raised by the Backward class movement, pursued unproblematically by neglecting other consideration, has the danger of becoming partisan and advocacy-prone. On the other hand, there could be

4 several social analyses which have tended to neglect the specific concerns that Backward Class movements have raised in India. In many ways this study attempts to stay clear from partisanship and cheap advocacy and at the same time its impartiality is not tinged with lack of commitment to the central concerns raised by the Backward Caste/Class movement in India and U.P. in particular. Backward Caste/class movement’s concerns needs to take overboard other voices in the democratic arena.

Uttar Pradesh has had a tradition of Backward Caste politics since independence. The back ward caste movement grew in U.P., despite its late arrival in North-Indian states, at the end of 1960s. However, India has a long history of backward caste movements in the south. Backward caste politics in U.P. is currently at a cross-road and the party of the backwards, the Samajwadi party (SP), is steadily losing its identity by becoming more inclusionary, urban-based and capitalist in character. The Constitution of India talks about the backward classes of citizens and not about backward castes. Article 15 of Indian Constitution provides for positive discrimination for them. It authorizes special preferential treatment not only for Scheduled Castes (SC’s) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) but also for “Other Socially and Educationally Backward Classes” (OBCs). In view of the recent upsurge of interest in OBCs, it is necessary to reflect on how this term became a category for public policy in India, especially in Uttar Pradesh, Backward classes, first, acquired a technical meaning in the princely state of Mysore when in 1918, the Mysore government appointed a committee to enquire into the question of encouraging members of the Backward communities in Public service. At the time of independence, the term backward classes had a less fixed and definite reference. The term had been around for some time and had variety of referents i.e. it had shifted rapidly in meaning and had come to mean differently in different places e.g. In 1917, the Maharaja of Kolhapur recounted to Montague that he had been taking keen interest in uplifting the backward classes and especially the untouchables. While South borough committee did not mention any such groups other than depressed classes, the Hartog Committee (1928) defined backward classes in their glossary as- “Caste or Classes which are educationally backward. they include the depressed classes aboriginals, hill tribes and criminal tribes.” Thus, the term had never acquired a definite meaning at all-India level.

5 By the time of the Constituent Assembly the usage of the term “Backward Classes” refers to some larger or smaller portion of the population deserving of special treatment was familiar in many parts of the country. However, this term was debated very much in the assembly as the delegates from the northern part of India expressed puzzlement. ChandrikaRam from Bihar, who had the most active backward class movement in the North explained that- “Backward classes were a section of society between the highest castes and the scheduled castes: the third section occupying the middle position, no doubt, they are not treated as untouchables.” K.M. Munshi assured the house that it signifies people- touchable or untouchable belonging to this or that community, who are so backward that special protection, is required in the services. Although, T.T. Krishnamachari pointed out that classes were not necessarily castes and the literacy might be the test of backwardness, it was generally envisioned that the backward classes would be communities. When asked what is a backward community, Ambedkar defending the draft explained- “We have left it be determined by each local government. A backward community is a community, which is backward in the opinion of the government.”

However, the matter was not as clear as this suggests. The most prophetic statement was T.T. Krishnamachari’s prediction that the clause would be “a paradise for lawyers”. It was anticipated then, that the backward classes (other than SCs/STs) were to be designated at local level. In the meantime, the Objective resolution of the constituent Assembly moved by Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru on Dec. 13, 1946 had resolved to provide adequate safeguards for “minorities, backward and tribal areas, depressed and other backward classes”. The delegation to local authorities undoubtedly reflected an acceptance of the divergence of the existing practices, a desire to preserve flexibility and awareness to the difficulties of prescribing universally applicable tests of backwardness in view of the varying local conditions.

It may also have been presumed that backward classes were sufficiently potent enough politically to look out for their interests on a local level and unlike SCs/STs central control of their designation was not required to ensure the inclusion of deserving. However, central government was not entirely excluded from the process. The President is instructed to appoint a backward classes commission.

6 After the listing of SCs, the usage of OBC as a synonym for untouchables and depressed classes withered away. Two major species of Usage emerged then- 1) as the more inclusive group of all those who need special treatment and 2) as a stratum higher than the untouchables but nonetheless depressed. This double usage continues today. The former in the usage of backward classes in the wide sense (including SCs and STs); the latter in the usage as equivalent to other backward classes. It is with the latter that we are now concerned in this research.

Problem of the Study:

Since the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s backward caste politics has dominated the political scene in U.P. It had aroused the hopes and aspirations of the backwards for political identity, empowerment and a share and role in government. But the period from the 1980s onwards shows that the backwards are not only badly divided but are also leaderless. A strong upsurge among the backward castes in the late 1980s, coinciding with the collapse of the Congress party provided space for the backwards to unite under the Samajwadi Party (SP).However, the attempt failed. The SP remains a party of the Yadavs and the Ahirs, who have cornered the benefits provided to the backwards, thus alienating other sections like MRBCs (More Backward Caste) and MBCs (Most Backward Castes) which have gravitated towards the BSP (Bahujan Samaj party) and the BJP (Bhartiya Janta Party). The SP leadership has become opportunistic and corrupt. Unable to capture power alone, the party is now trying to gain the support of the upper castes and Muslims who have somewhat drifted away from SP since 2007 assembly elections in U.P.

The backwards are drifting away from the defined socialist ideology of the SP. Hence, losing the drive and energy so vital to make the entire backward caste/class movement vibrant, cohesive, purposive and productive. However, the leadership of the backward caste politics has let the community down. It brought about backward caste mobilization but failed in sharpening the backward caste/class cleavages and also in bringing homogenization and consolidation of “Backward Identity” as a whole.

The rise of Identity politics has transformed the political process in the state of U.P. quite significantly. At the time of independence, the dominant single party Congress System prevailed. The Congress had not become dominant by undemocratic

7 means. It became dominant-firstly, because it was the prime platform of a cause, the independence which had the support of all sections of the people. Secondly, since everyone supported the cause, the Congress was able to just bring about everyone under its flag, whatever his/her religion, caste, language, community or economic status was. Thirdly, it had the inestimable advantage of the leadership of two most remarkable personalities- Mahatma Gandhi and Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru. Consequently, until the late 1980s politics in U.P. had a stable and predictable character. Although change had been taking place, it was slow and gradual. Parties did not promote social conflict and religious strife by their activities.

From the 1980s onwards, the ongoing process of democratization underway since independence accelerated in northern plain especially in the state of U.P. Thus, creating greater consciousness of caste and communal identities accompanied by increased politicization. These rapid changes ushered in the rise of primordial identities and decline and de-institutionalization of the party system. The rise of primeval identities, in turn, made the single party system no longer workable and the latter created the room for the mobilization of narrow sectarian parties. The Congress system was replaced by a fluid and fragmented multi-party system with three poles- the BJP, the SP, the BSP. Prof. Pai remarks that these cannot be described as clear-cut parties rather they are identity-based movements operating in electoral arena mobilizing people along social divisions, thus, creating conflict, violence and political instability. However, Caste-based mobilization created social antagonism, it also challenged upper caste dominance and played a positive role by contributing to the social deepening of democracy.

In the second half of 1990s caste and community based mobilization reached to its zenith and then started to decline. Today, parties are attempting to widen their social bases and build broad social alignments owing to the compulsions of electoral politics. While BSP has entered into “Social Engineering formula” with maxims of `Sarvajan Hitay, Sarvajan Sukhay’, the SP is trying to woo upper caste people and to somewhat extent Muslims who have deserted the party in 2007 assembly and 2009 and 2014 parliamentary elections in U.P., though they voted S.P. to power in 2012. Yet if we see at the ground level, voters can no longer be enticed into party’s fold purely by appealing to caste and religious orientations.

8 Following a strong wave of mobilization on ascriptive identities, there has been a move towards the increasing secularization of the caste and communal politics, thus opening up the possibility of a more politically stable system based on more normative and secular polities. For instance- historical victory of BSP in 2007 assembly elections garnering 30.43% of votes and getting absolute majority ensuring a stop to hung assemblies and coalition politics in the state. Thus, we see throughout the 1990s parties in U.P. have engaged in construction and reconstruction of identities (BJP-Hindutva, SP-Backward caste, BSP- Dalit) and constantly shifted their strategies moving from narrow sectarian formations to broader aggregative combines in response to the swiftly changing political situation.

Our concern, here, is the Samajwadi Party (SP) which emerged as an offshoot of the backward caste/class mobilization and claiming to be the true representative of the backward castes in U.P. We will trace the rise and evolution of SP, situating it within the overall matrix of the backward caste movement and politics in U.P Further, an attempt would be made to pick out the possible reasons for why SP is falling apart in U.P. despite having good electoral records since its inception in 1992. There are certain problems relating to SP which need to be focused upon so far as to fully understand its socialist orientation, electoral process and the political environment in which it works. These are -

1. Mulayam Singh Yadav and his Samajwadi Party (SP) epitomize the relic of a great socialist tradition, one which is fast withering away in Uttar Pradesh. Mulayam entered active state politics in 1967 when he was first elected to U.P. Legislative Assembly. Samajwadi party was born in October 1992. So before the birth of SP he was in the company of India’s leading Socialists & thus, can legitimately claim to be their progeny. Yet, in almost 24 years of its existence, Can SP show any linkages & continuity with the traditions of Ram Manohar Lohiya, J.P. Narayan and Madhu Limaye? Can it demonstrate that its evolution (ideological, organizational and as a party of government) has been in consonance with ideals & expectations of Socialists mentors. The general belief regarding these questions is in negative. Party’s Symbol, Bicycle reflects it to be the party of common man but even the ordinary worker of the party ride in big & expansive cars. So the question arises-How much Samajwad is left with the Samajwadi party?”

9 2. Ever since Samajwadis first came to power in U.P. in 1989 (JD) under the leadership of Mulayam, SP has been firmly committed to secularism & protection of minorities especially the Muslims & the Mosques. This induced Muslims to drift away from Congress and to associate themselves with the “psychological security” of SP. Excessive posturing about the need to defend Muslims through secularism by SP leaders led to an equation of “secularism with minoritism”. It also seemed to put Hindus on defensive. Such over enthusiastic rhetoric has bred disaffection against Muslims & unnecessarily sharpened the communal divide. 3. The Samajwadi party often claims to be the champion of kisans. But it hasn’t lived up to their expectations, despite being in power 4 times 1989 (JD), 1993 & 2003 & 2012 the SP failed to initiate any land reform measures in U.P. for the benefit of the marginal farmers. Notwithstanding the abysmal conditions of kisans in some sub-regions of U.P., Agrarian reform is nowhere on SP’s agenda. Furthermore, Reliance land acquisition controversy for Dadri power project reflected that the interests of farmers were subordinated to a corporatization of agriculture. 4. For Lohiya, Caste was a stumbling block to India’s progress. But these so called Lohiyaites have consistently deployed caste as an effective tool to sharpen the social & electoral cleavages on the support of backward castes. In current times, SP has started “inclusionary politics”. The manner in which it has opened up for Thakurs, Baniyas, Brahmins & non-chamar dalits speaks volumes about this shift. 5. M.S. Yadav remains the unopposed president of SP. There is a dearth of good second rung leaders as he has been promoting his son, brothers & nephews to Leadership positions. This makes Samajwadi party vulnerable in the event of departure of top leadership from the political scene. 6. The Party’s image as associated with 3Cs- Crime, Capitalism & Corruption has done an incalculable damage to the party. Party’s criminal elements have become a liability on the party. 7. Samajwadi party leaders played an active role in Mandalization of state politics leading to a second democratic upsurge. But the party is not equally concerned with the problems of More Backward Castes (MRBCs) & Most Backward

10 Castes (MBCs).Yadav are the dominant & prosperous group among them & the SP is negligent towards all other backward castes except Yadavs. 8. No doubt, electoral graph of party has shown steady improvement since its inception but it remains difficult to defend the governance style of M.S. Yadav and of his son Akhilesh Yadav. It is erratic with little focus on rational decision making. Decisions are changed overnight. Arbitrary transfers & postings have become lucrative industry for him & his cabinet. The same is true of policies also.

The biggest question is whether the SP’s Political leadership especially Mulayam Singh Yadav & his son Akhilesh Yadav has the skills to live up to the new hopes and to manage the contradictions that conflicting priorities are bound to throw up.

There are certain central questions on which this work revolves around. I would try to trace their answers during the course of my research. These ares-

1. What happened to the Samajwad of the Samajwadi Party? Is the claim of SP to be the torch bearer of socialist tradition valid?

2. Why SP does not pay heed to MRBCs & MBCs even after playing active role in Mandalization of state politics & claiming itself to be a Backward Caste Party?

3. What prompted Muslims to have associated themselves with a party having socialist orientation?

4. Why SP is falling apart in U.P. itself even after showing improvement in electoral records since its inception in 1992 and even after attaining absolute majority in 2012 in U.P.?

5. What could be the future implications of SP and it’s so called Samajwad on regional & national politics?

The Objectives of this Study:

The present study will have following objectives: 1 To study Backward Caste/class movement in Northern India in general and in U.P. in particular and its resultant premise.

11 2 To study the voting patterns of Backward Castes/Backward classes.

3 To explore the political environment that made SP to focus upon “Corporate Samajwad” as against “Lohiyaite Samajwad”.

4 To study why SP is unable to stop widening cracks in its Muslim vote bank after 2012 assembly elections in which Muslims voted all out to SP(to a full majority). In Lok Sabha elections 2014 Muslims voted for Narendra Modi (BJP), thus, question arises what happened to Samajwadi Party? Why it could not be able to garner support of its core support base. i.e. Muslims and Yadavs.

5 To study about the governance style of Samajwadi Leaders.

6 To explore the political insights regarding future of Samajwadi party.

Hypotheses:

H1: Without either a well defined socialist agenda or a clear socialist ideology and with the handicap of soiled image among electorates, S.P. faces an uncertain future.

H2: Samajwadi Party is responsible for the decline of Backward Caste movement in Uttar Pradesh since it is losing its identity as progeny of the Backward Caste movement by becoming more inclusionary, urban based and capitalist in character.

Research Methodology:

This study has taken resort to many ways to gather the needed data, reflections and perceptions. I have consulted reports of colonial social explorers as published in different literatures. The Constituent assembly debates and reports of Backward Classes Commissions have been of immense importance. I have gone through statistical reports of the Election Commission of India for comparative data of different elections held at state as well as national level. I have also gathered available pamphlets, booklets brought out by different caste associations. Certain govt. orders/circulars have also been ascertained.

The proposed research would rely on descriptive design and comparative analysis. Comparative analysis would be focused on Lok Sabha & Assembly elections since Samajwadi Party’s inception in 1992 till 2014 Lok Sabha Elections. Opinion

12 Survey has been taken among different Caste groups using stratified Sampling on the questions of reverse osmosis voting for SP. Structured interviews of Political leaders of different political parties and S.P. Leaders has been taken in regard to its drifts in Ideological planks.

Review of the existing Literature:

The works so far on the related topics appreciate the way under which Samajwadi party emerged out in the backdrop of Backward Caste movement and Mandalization of state politics. None of the Script has tried to explore the possible reasons that why SP has been able to garner the support of Muslims since its inception in 1992. Similarly no one talks about why SP has shed Democratic Socialism in favour of corporate socialism. Except 2007 assembly elections SP has emerged out to be a single largest party in UP even then, the party is falling apart. Dr. Shafuzzaman talks about the social basis, Ideology and programme of Samajwadi Party. Anil Kumar Verma in Seminar special issue March 2007-UP Battleground puts his focus regarding the elusive Samajwad of SP. Prof.Sudha pai in her book-Agrarian change & Electoral politics is concerned about unavailability of land reforms measures in UP. Vivek Kumar in his book “India’s roaring revolutions: Dalit assertion and New Horizons comments that SP failed to directly forge an alliance with caste & communities, thereby getting defeat in 2007 assembly elections.

Hence the proposed research would try to focus on the root cause of Samajwadi Party’s degradation even after being the single largest and ruling party in U.P.

Significance of the Study:

The Backward Class as a collective entity, in spite of some ups and downs, has emerged as a major political player especially after 1960. Being numerically large compared to other social groups such as forward caste, dalits or minorities, the Backward Class possess significant political prospects across many states in India and specifically in U.P. The Backward Class as a whole suffers many forms of oppression and is subject to numerous forms of domination.

One of the major failures of the Indian State has been its inability to devise an effective policy with respect to the Backward Class in India. This failure is not merely

13 administrative and political, i.e., with respect to the execution and devising appropriate policy for Backward Classes, but conceptual as well.

Striving for political power is imperative for the Backward Class. Often such striving has been caught in the vortex of the hegemony of other classes and state or is merely a symbolic enablement. This study goes into the political strategies that have led to the real enablement of the Backward Castes against the hegemonic and symbolic ones. Issues confronting the Backward Classes may be significantly different from those confronting others, but the Backward Classes also shared concerns with other parties of a democratic polity. This study elicits the perceptions of other social groups and trends of thought and marks the areas of shared concerns and those where strong differences exist. Such a Classification definitely helps in searching for amicable solutions to issues where shared concerns co-exist with significant differences.

The Backward Classes in the course of making a political constituency for themselves have thrown up various socio-political organisations playing a significant role in state politics and civil society. A study of these developments is of utmost importance to understand the state-civil society nexus in India.

Further, different political and ideological blocs have their own definitions and explanations of Backward Classes and programmes for their emancipation. Divisions of various kinds and levels of intensity came to be built around such positions. This study helps to explore the possible ideological and political alliances that could further the backward class interest

An attempt to demarcate Backward Classes in one of the important pursuits in this study. Social groups Classes over the period has been formulated and understood differently. The various organised interests in society have their distinctive conception about these classes. The scope of the term too has varied from time to time due to various historical and sociological reasons. The present study brings to the fore this discursive context in which the term is located and explicates the spectrum of meaning in which it is deployed.

14 Backward Classes. U.P however has been a late starter to this movement. The researcher chosen this state because he is a resident of U.P. and Samajwadi Party claims to be the offshoot of this very movement. We cannot treat the rise of Backward Classes as an event that took place in isolation. This study therefore, attempts to look into the development that took place in U.P vis-a-vis those that occurred elsewhere in northern part of the country.

The state in India both at the State and Union levels has intervened in the socio-economic realm in a big way after independence. In the formulation of public policy, welfare of the Backward Classes has remained an important objective of the state. We have attempted to assess the extent of benefits the state is dispensing to the Backward Classes and the mobilization and organisation they had to resort to in obtaining the same.

The policy of positive discrimination envisaged by the state has brought to the fore many issue deeply contested between the Backward Classes and forward caste on one hand, and among the Backward Classes themselves, on the other. They include the criteria for determining backwardness, the issue of creamy layer, subdivision of the Backward Classes on the basis of relative backwardness, nature and extent of benefits over and above equal treatment, inclusion and exclusion of caste groups, etc. Although we have situated this discussion in the context of Uttar Pradesh, these issue are the shared and the recurrent concerns across the country.

A social constituency is not something readily given. It is a product of history. The carving out of a social constituency is informed by the perception of other social segments particularly by those who are affected by its presence. The present study makes an attempt to register the perceptions of those social segments having a direct bearing on the Backward Class Constituency.

15 enjoy. This study goes into the social and political conditions that can enhance or retard the expression of this agency.

This study suggest the ways by which Samajwadi Party can shift its focus from identity based contestation to the development and governance paradigm so as to transform itself from caste oriented to inclusive subaltern class oriented politics.

Chapterization:

The present work is divided into 5 sharply focused chapters. Chapter-one is devoted to introduction to OBCs which is an elusive category. In this chapter the researcher has tried to trace out certain problems owing to which the SP is losing ground in the state even after having a good electoral record. It further puts central questions around which this whole work revolves. These questions need to be answered as far as the role and overall performance of the Samajwadi party is concerned in the Backward caste/class movement in U.P., of which it is an offshoot. An attempt has also been made to have a glance at Approaches needed to study political mobilization in comparative mode.

Chapter two presents forth the background to the process and understanding of the backward caste mobilization which eventually led to the formation of the present day Samajwadi Party (SP). Apparently, it puts a light on the rise of the OBCs in Northern India especially in the state of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.).

Chapter three deals with factors and forces which provided the needed platform to the emergence and consolidation of the Samajwadi Party on the political scene of U.P. in 1992. It talks about the organizational networks, the leadership of the party. Further, it focuses light on the splits of Janta Dal (JD) and Samajwadi Janta party (SJP) which, in turn, led Mulayam Singh Yadav to decide his own alternative course i.e. the launching of SP.

Chapter four discusses the electoral politics of Samajwadi Party (SP) and its visible trends in the recently held elections in U.P. The party has been a single largest party in U.P. for quite a sometime (except in 2007 assembly elections). Yet its social base is eroding away. Why it is falling apart? A critical appraisal of SP has been made against its declared policies and programmes.

16 The final chapter contains the broad conclusions formulated on the basis of data analyzed in previous chapters. It concludes that SP is on declining trend and with it, there is a halt to backward caste mobilization in U.P. Development and good governance has superceded the era of identity politics. Caste mobilization has given its place to wider subaltern class politics in northern India. This is a phase of transition from Caste politics to Class politics.

Findings:

1. Transition from Caste to Class Politics:

Caste relations in India are governed by relative caste superiority-inferiority in caste hierarchy. Each caste is in conflictual relationship with its immediate caste either in the ascending or descending order. The dominance of castes in political contestations in India had always been an enigmatic point baffling scholars. The rise of backward caste politics in north Indian states in early nineties was accompanied by two more very important developments-beginning of the era of globalization and sharpening of the communal-secular divide. In UP, religion tried to overtake caste but for a short time. The people of UP defeated BJP and there was a steady decline in party's performance during nineties and thereafter. Development and good governance may work as a catalyst to create awareness among deprived sections of all castes and religions about their common plight, and hence may work as a facilitator to create 'new subaltern classes'. Thus, 'classes' may soon overtake everything else in the domain of political contestation in UP. This shows that electoral politics in UP has travelled a long way from religion to class through intermediary variables of caste, inclusion and development.

2. Pragmatism of Indian Parties: Political parties in India have played an important role in democratic consolidation. They have done so through a politics of accommodation and consensus that binds the political class together despite their different party affiliations .They have facilitated the inclusion of varied groups in the political system, by giving voice to historically excluded groups, and helping them to gain access to the political system. At the same time, it is increasingly difficult to reconcile the absence of intra-

17 party democracy within parties with the robustness and resilience of the democratic polity. 3. Decline of Backward Caste Politics in Northern India

The backward caste movement in northern India, especially in UP and Bihar, seem to have suffered decline by end of twentieth century and beginning of twenty- first century. An indication of this is the fact that SP-a party espousing cause of backwards in UP led by Mulayam Singh Yadav-lost power in UP in 2007 and RJD led by Lalu Prasad Yadav lost power in Bihar a little earlier in 2005. Loss of power itself may not indicate decline of a party; the same is provided by (a) steady decline in overall vote share of a party, and (b) loss of support among traditional voters of the- party. Suggestions and Recommendations:

1. Ideology based political contestation should take place during elections.

2. Inner party democracy is to be established and institutionalized in the party.

3. Stop Yadavisation of the Political and Administrative system with immediate effect. This would help in attaining lost confidence of electorates in U.P.

4. Decision making must take a note of promises made in election manifesto.

5. Leader worship/ leader centricism to wither away.

6. Strict monitoring of electioneering process has to be done by State election commission during the election at grass root level.

7. To break down the corporate political nexus, a regulatory body should be framed.

8. Inclusive Politics /Subaltern class category.

Direction for future Research:

This is a new experiment in Indian politics and many ramifications of the same need be studied seriously by future researchers. But in all fairness, one may say that the third-tier democracy in northern India has completely changed nature of political contestations at grass-roots level and has not only pushed politics away from caste but has also signalled beginning of its class orientation. One may hypothesize

18 about a linkage between consolidation of grass-roots democracy and the beginning of subaltern class politics in India.

The implications of subaltern class politics can only be positive for democratic politics in India. The subalterns have suffered most due to social humiliation, discrimination, and economic deprivation. The rigidities of caste system and its consequent strong hold over political process have almost left everyone convinced that Indian electoral and political processes are permanently showcased in the framework of caste politics. One would not be ready to believe that this could be changed in near future. But as caste parties in UP and Bihar have shown, compulsions of democratic politics have forced them to take new initiatives in twenty-first century; instead of caste-based exclusive politics, they had to turn to class-based inclusive politics. And the most convenient inclusion can be of those segments of society who come from the lower/lowest strata and marginalized sections of society.

There are many issues that may arise. Can inclusive politics really banish caste politics? Will social structure contingent upon the hierarchical caste arrangement collapse? Will the 'economic' overtake the 'social' and lead to formation of a 'new subaltern class'? How will this happen? What ideological innovations may be required for taking such an initiative? Can that be done without strong mobilization of farmers, agricultural workers, industrial labours, Dalits, women, students, and so on? How the mobilization will come about and by whom?

These and several interrogatories may not be addressed here, but surely our future researchers may like to concentrate on some of them. However, the entire dynamics of transition from caste to class in northern India may shift focus in academic discourse from identity and empowerment to governance and development, and may also substitute social cleavages and conflicts by sharpened political and ideological competitions.

The researcher’s hypothesis is further substantiated by ABP News opinion poll survey covering a large sample among electorates since BSP is carving out a new social class constituency of Dalits and Muslims OBCs together for campaigning ahead of 2017 Assembly election.

19 Summary:

This study has been aimed at the Backward Caste Movement in Uttar Pradesh. The Samajwadi Party Claims to be its offshoot/brain child. The study has been conducted with the sole objective of knowing the reality of Backward Caste Movement and Performance of Samajwadi Party in actual practice in Northern part of India and particularly in Uttar Pradesh. To find out the consequences primary and secondary data along with empirical method has been used. The study has provided valuable results and further scope for more improvements. We may conclude our argument by saying that without either a well-defined socialist agenda or a clear socialist ideology and with the handicap of soiled image among electorates SP faces a uncertain future.

20 Contents

Page No.

Dedication Certificate Acknowledgement i-ii Abbreviation iii-iv List of Tables v

Chapter I Introduction 1-43 1.1 Problem of the study 1.2 Objective of the study 1.3 Hypothesis 1.4 Source of the study 1.4.1 Research Methodology 1.4.2. Method of Data Collection 1.4.3. Research Design 1.4.4. Sample Design 1.5 Significance of the Study 1.6 Review of Literature 1.7 Chapter Scheme 1.8 Approaches to Study Political Mobilisation in India 1.8.1 Political mobilisation and comparative politics 1.8.2 Anti hegemonic and Sandwich alliances 1.8.3 Cleavage Structure in Indian Political Mobilisation 1.8.4 Cleavage, Alliance type and Indian Political Mobilisation 1.9. Critiquing the new State Bosses

Chapter II The Rise of OBCs in North India: The Case of Uttar Pradesh 44-89 2.1 Features of Backward Caste Mobilisation in Uttar Pradesh 2.2 Different phases of Backward Caste Mobilisation in Uttar Pradesh 2.3 Constitutional understanding of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) 2.4 Peasant and Backward Castes 2.5 The reservation policy for Other Backward Classes in Uttar Pradesh 2.6 Backward Caste Mobilisation: Movement in North India 2.7 Janta Party and the confluence of Kisan and Quota Politics 2.8 The Janta Dal (JD) and the empowerment of lower castes 2.8.1. Caste Polarisation and the Mandal recommendation 2.8.2. Genuine mobilisation v/s Yadav Manipulation 2.8.3. Yadav Politics in Uttar Pradesh 2.9 Conclusion

Chapter III Emergence of Samajwadi Party: Factors and Forces 90-154 3.1 Introduction 3.2 General Political Background of the U.P post Independence and Antecedents of S.P. 3.3 Emergence of the S.P party on the political scene of the U.P 3.4 Social base of the S.P. 3.5 Ideological moorings 3.6 Leadership and organisation 3.7 Communalisation policy: Polarize or perish 3.8 Samajwadi parties: Policies and programmes 3.9 The text of constitution of Samajwadi party 3.10 Strategy of S.P 3.10.1 BJP and S.P- Win-win Situation 3.10.2 BJP, RSS and communalisation of politics 3.10.3 Yadavisation strategy of S.P relating to electoral politics 3.10.4 Yadavisation of U.P cops behind anarchy 3.11 Conclusion

Chapter IV Electoral Politics of Samajwadi Party: Visible Trends 155-205 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Region-wise breakup of Geo-political Situation in U.P. 4.3 The Samajwadi Party’s Political Alliance making Strategy 4.4 The Samajwadi Party’s political Approach to Muslims 4.5 Development and governances trump caste identities in U.P. 4.5.1 Electoral backdrop 4.5.2 Electoral outcome 4.5.3 Features of the verdict 4.5.4 Pointers for the future 4.6 Samajwadi Party becomes largest political family in U.P. 4.7 Minority report: Is Muslim voting behaviour changing? 4.8 A saffron sweep in U.P. 4.9 U.P. Politics: Agenda ahead 4.10 Conclusion

Chapter V Conclusion, Suggestions and Recommendation 206-246

Bibliography 247-253

Abbreviations

MGNREGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act SCs Schedule Caste STs Schedule Tribes OBCs Other Backward Classes SP Samajwadi Party BSP Bahujan Samaj Party BJP Bhartiya Janta Party INC Indian National Congress JD Janta Dal LD Lok Dal BKD Bhartiya Kranti Dal JP Janta Party U.P. Uttar Pradesh AJGAR Ahirs, Jats,Gujars and Rajputs SVD Samyukta Vidhayak Dal RJD Rashtriya Janta Dal SJP Samajwadi Janta Party UPA United Progressive Alliance NDA National Democratic Alliance MLA Member of Legislative Assembly MP Member of Parliament BLD Bhartiya Lok Dal CSP Congress Socialist Party CPI Communist Party of India MBC Most Backward Castes MRBCs Most Backward Castes AIBCF All India Backward Classes Federation PSP Praja Socialist Party SSP Samyukta Socialist Party BAMCEF All India Backward and Minority Community Employees Federation

iii

VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad KHAM Kshtriya, Harijan , Adivasis and Muslim CSDS Centre for the Study of Developing Societies NES National Election Studies AAP Aam Admi Party CAG Citizens for Accountable Governance NGO Non-Governmental Organization PAC Provincial Armed Constabulary RKP Rashtriya Kranti Party USA United States of America LJP Lok Janshakti Party 3Cs Crime, Capitalism & Corruption AIDMK All India Dravida Munnetra Kazagham DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazagham AKD Akali Dal AGP Asom Gana Parishad SHO Station House officers TDP Telugu Desam Party TMC Trinamool Congress BJD Biju Janata Dal

List of Tables

Table No. Title Page No. 2.1 Caste and Composition of the UP Assembly, 1974-02 (Per cent) 61 2.2 Shift of OBCs voters in Percentage (1996-99) 63 2.3 OBCs' share in Population and Government Job 66 2.4 OBCs- Nomenclature of their Castes in Uttar Pradesh 67-68 3.1 Social base of Samajwadi party 108 Region-wise performance of the Samajwadi Party in the Lok 4.1 161 Sabha and Assembly elections (1989- 2004): Recruitment in the PAC and the U.P. Police during SP's Rule 4.2 165 (June-July 1994): Pattern of Muslim Voting and Muslims Elected to the UP 4.3 168 Assembly Performance of Political Parties in UP Lok Sabha Election 4.4 171 (2014) BJP Gains across All Castes and Communities, 2009 and 2014 4.5 176 Lok Sabha Elections Compared Performance of Various Parties in Constituencies with Different 4.6 178 Muslim Population Percentages in 2014 Lok Sabha Elections 4.7 Party Preference by Class, UttarPradesh2014 179 4.8 Party Preference by Education, Uttar Pradesh 2014 179 4.9 Party preference by Gender, Uttar Pradesh 2014 180 Regional Variation in Lok Sabha Election Result, Uttar Pradesh 4.10 181 (2014) Summary Results: Seats Contested, Won and Votes Secured by 4.11 Major Parties in Alliances, Compared to the Assembly Election 185 (2007) Region-wise and District-wise Analysis: Turnout and 4.12 187-189 Performance of Major Alliances and Parties 2012 Social Basis of Voting: Survey-based Estimates of Vote for Major Alliances/Parties by Gender, Age, Education, Locality, 4.13 193-194 Class and Caste/Community in Assembly Elections (2007 and 2012) ABP News comparative voting % prior to 2017 State Assembly 5.1 242 elections 5.2 Region-wise break-up below 243

Chapter I

Introduction

CHAPTER-1

Introduction:

The assertion of the backward classes has had an uneven, and sometimes uneasy, presence in the public domain in India over the years and their impact varied profoundly in different regions of the country. At the same time this assertion has had manifold expressions it has taken overt religious as well as anti-religious forms: informed the intermittent peasant movements in the country; assumed numerous egalitarian stance and a complex nexus with the overall thrust of democratic inclusion in India. While the category, Backward classes had found widespread usage in the political vocabulary of Modern India, its substantive meaning and appeal to hearts and minds, has remained deeply contested over time and in manifold.

Backward classes is a category that denotes an array of disadvantage social groups that precipitated during the national movement and found ardent votaries in the Constituent Assembly and in the subsequent political developments in India. The disadvantage did not necessarily proceed from relative marginality or deprivation, but was closely related to the specificity of India' social formation. While the Back ward classes were closely bound up with the idea of the Nation, they, in turn, demanded a differential understanding of the same. In other worlds, while the Backward classes were internal to s shared bound, they also called upon the Nation to be deferential to their disadvantage, as well as legacies of distinct cultural traditions and sometimes, even ways of life. Their movement sought a redefinition of the Nation of which its existing articulations were little sensitive of the 'backwardness' implied in the term was not merely economic but social as well. Often the concerned groups did not see the concept of class adequate to encompass the specific deprivations and exclusions that they were caught in and strove against. In several ways the rise of the Backward Class movement is also a statement on the nature of class-based movements in India demonstrating the inability of the latter to reach out to the multiple forms of exploitation and domination embedded in the social relations in India.

The Backward classes have been an inclusive as well as an exclusive term. As an inclusive term, it connoted all social strata that were not part of the dominant forward castes, although terms such as 'dominant' and 'forward' did not have the same connotations, particularly given the complexity and diversity of India's social

1 formation. As an exclusivist term, it is used to denote social groups other than the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Historically, this distinction became prominent from early 1920s as the Schedule Caste Leaders became emphatic on the features of exclusion, exploitation and dominance specific to their communities across the country. The Adivasi movement in India brought of the fore issues of autonomy and cultural difference that marked them off from the central concerns of the backward class movement. The attempt of draw a legal and administrative line of separation between the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on one hand, and the Backward classes on the other affected the lower rungs of the latter deleteriously as there was no marked differentiation between the kind of marginality and cultural domination that they were subjected to, in relation to the former. Socially, the Backward classed hailed from the peasant and service castes, low in the social hierarchy. These social constituencies have been in the throes of change both during the national movement and subsequently, although, often the advocacy and legal platforms attempted to arrest such processes and attempted to essentialise specific kind of Backwardness.

Backward Classes, therefore, remained a relational category in India. It denoted a set of social relations that assigned dominance, status, exclusion, and specific modes of recognition. As social relations came to be deeply contested in the course of the national movement and the class-based movement, the social relation called backward classes came to be reformulated in several respects. Similarly, the Backward class movement was to exercise a profound impact on the National movement and the kind of Democracy the it bequeathed to India, and on the class- based movements, before and after independence.

The constituent assembly while registering the existence of socially and economically backward classes in India and demarcating them from the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes refused to spell out who these backward classed were and what specific measures were called for to remove the concerned backwardness. We find a series of reasons being mounted in this regard: give the unevenness of the existence of backward castes in India it was felt that any specification in this regard would not be fair to the situation. While constitutionalists such as Ambedkar admitted the Backward Classes would necessarily include 'a basket of castes', they were not prepared to confine the term to a specific number of castes or merely to a caste bloc as

2 such. In fact, Ambedkar argued that this task must be left to the dynamic of the democratic process in India and the reflectivity and deliberation of democracy should lead to the identification of not merely who the backward Classes were but also to the institution of measures for their emancipation. Otherwise, they constitutionally legal structure of India is going to arrest a process and begin to dictate terms to democratic reasoning in India. It was also felt that given the uneven presence of Backward Classes in India the grievances that they suffered from can be attended to at the appropriate levels rather than inundate the agenda of political authority at the central level.

The march of India democracy after independence has impacted the Backward class movement and the issues that it raised very differently over the years. Often a backward caste or a coalition of backward castes has emerged as a prominent player at the regional level. Such developments at the regional level have also reflected on the political equations at the Union level. Overall, we find that the backward castes have registered an appreciable advance with regard to political representation after mid-970s with certain setbacks in the early eighties. However, such political advance may not have necessarily reflected in influence they wield in the economic, social and cultural life of the Nation as a whole. The deeply embedded hierarchies at various levels have succeeded in confining and even co-opting the egalitarian thrust of the social advance of the backward castes. Further the political advance of the backward classes and particularly to those who are lowest in the social rung even among the more numerous backward castes. The benefits have accrued basically to a certain strata, rather than a majority of members of social group. Party-based competition revolving around caste and communities has also not facilitated the coming together of various castes and communities on a common platform to fight against agreed issues of backwardness. In the context of the coalition politicos of the 1990s and the regionalization of India polity, the clout wielded by backward caste leaders has increased, given their significance in the regions, but the necessity of keeping the national unity intact has also made them deferential to modes of hierarchy and dominance. The culturally amorphous nature of the Backward Class constituency while making it a protagonist of certain forms of egalitarianism may also harbor every strong antagonism towards the egalitarian thrust of other sections of the society including women. Therefore, the democratic thrust of the Backward Class Movement

3 may not always be appreciative of freedoms and egalitarian consideration of other member of society. In recent years, certain minority communities in India, particularly, the Muslims have registered backwards strata within themselves but there is little agreement so far whether such backwardness has to be attended to as part of the overall process of democratic empowerment or by registering the community as a priority consideration in this regard. Legally and administratively these issued can lean to a great deal of complex demands such as compartmentalization of castes within backward classes, and compartmentalization of backward sections across backward classes and across society as a whole.

The state has not been a neutral, agency in India with regard to the backward class movement. It has intervened in the movement both to define what backward classes are and to visit class with caste, and sometimes caste with class. While sometimes the rationale advanced for such interventions has been shared citizenship, this did not seem to be the most important reason always. Often is has been to balance a set of demands against another and maintain modes of dominance and unity of the social formation as a whole. In the process thee has not been a coherent ideology that the state has mounted in response to the backward class movement. Such ambiguity is manifested not merely in major authoritative pronouncements but also in numerous Court judgments over the years. At the same time it is important to point out that the democratic process has not necessarily expanded the reach and depth of the Backward Class movement in India or thrown up foundational agreements regarding appropriate ways of engaging with the issued that it has given to. Sometimes, the politics that it has spawned has been a cloistered kin, sub-serving partisan ends.

Given the complexity in which the Backward Class movement in India is caught in a scholarly judgment on this issue is extremely difficult to formulate particularly at the all India level. This is in spite of the impressive advance that empirical studies have registered in this regard. An investigation bearing on some of the central concerns raised by the Backward class movement, pursued unproblematic ally by neglecting other consideration, has the danger of becoming partisan and advocacy-prone. On the other hand, there could be several social analyses which in the name of university and impartial considerations have tended to neglect the specific concerns that Backward Class movements have raised in India. In many ways this study attempts to stay clear from partisanship and cheap advocacy and at the same

4 time its impartiality and cheap advocacy and at the same time its impartiality is not tinged with lack of commitment to the central concerns raised by the Backward Class movement in India. While it is justifiably sympathetic to the concern needs to take overboard other voices in the democratic arena.

The rise of democratic institutions and egalitarian values in the twentieth century had to face lot of challenges and contradictions in India due to the unique features of the society based on principles that were in deep conflict with the egalitarian values. The disparities between superior social "groups and a large majority of the population living in conditions of disadvantage and disabilities were historically pervasive in Indian society. A major reason for the disadvantageous position of these groups was the status ascribed to them by birth in certain castes, creeds, and tribal groups. Indian society was made of a multitude of relatively closed status groups, with unequal ranks, each with its own privileges and disabilities supported by traditional sanction.

The colonial approach to the caste system was ambivalent. The introduction of a uniform legal and judicial system under the British Raj radically redefined social relations expressed in the caste system in spite of the avowed policy of non- interference in social issues. At the same time through the development of Anglo- Hindu legal system, the fixation of certain roles in religious rituals in general and within the temple practices in particular and the census enumerations that led to defining and redefining caste categories, the colonial state attempted to uphold caste system and its privileges and deprivations. In spite of such ambivalence the scope for individual and collective mobility increased and identities came to be significantly recast. The new sources of secular education, modern employment and opportunities that came to be delinked from caste affiliations and the participation of the masses in the political arena slowly undermined traditional sources of legitimacy which upheld hierarchical values of caste system and patriarchal authority.

These developments created in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a social atmosphere in which certain sections of the Backward Classes of society became aware of their basic civic rights and felt that they too should protest against then-conditions of disabilities and deprivations. Their voices of protest came to be heard in different parts of the country and in politically effective ways first appeared in the Bombay and Madras provinces of the British Domain and in the

5 Princely State of Mysore. Conflicting relationship between Brahmins and non- Brahmins began to develop in these regions, as the Brahmins were the first to exploit modern educational and employment opportunities. The non-Brahmin elite" began to organise themselves in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and demanded positions in political parties legislative bodies, the cabinet", and public institutions. At the same time they pressurised the government for reservation in-Government jobs and educational institutions. Later this awakening spread to other lower ranks and depressed classes too. Consequently, the second quarter of the twentieth century saw both the government and the Indian National Congress constantly engaged in negotiating with these social strata on issues of enlargement of opportunities in public life for the latter.

At the time of independence there were three broad divisions among the Backward Classes: Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes. Among them the Scheduled Castes have a distinct history of preferential treatment under the British Raj with provisions which later came to be incorporated in the Constitution of the Republic of India with appropriate modifications intensely debated and even combated in the Constituent Assembly. The tribes lid not explicitly form a part of the strategy of statutory safeguards and benefits during the British Raj as the latter followed a policy of isolation towards the former. The Raj paternalistically claimed them as its charge. Following independence some special provisions were extended to them. However, the Constitution of free India treated the Tribes on par with the Scheduled Castes as far as the considerations of disadvantage was concerned and listed them for providing various safeguards and benefits. Further, their cultural identity was ensured through other constitutional provisions. The third component, the Other Backward Classes, in spite of their prolonged movement for certain safeguards and preferences, was not spelt out in the Constitution although the state was enjoined upon to be 'additionally considerate'-towards the category as a whole. The absence of specific provisions for determinate groups in this category made the operationalisation of such considerations largely ad-hoc and arbitrary. The Other Backward Classes was still a nebulous category and could not be wielded together under a single platform, a situation which continues in several respects even today.

The non-Brahmin movement lost its edge when the upper classes gained direct control overstate power with independence. The lower strata of Other Backward

6 Classes were very much comparable to the Scheduled Castes and lacked education and resources to wade through the demands of social existence or to even fight for a decent reproduction of it. For more than three decades after independence, the Other Backward Classes hardly made their presence felt. They could assert their presence significantly at the national level only during the late 1980s on the eve of the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report. But by that time, in some of the states the Other Backward Classes were successful in making themselves a socio- political constituency of great significance with all its tips and downs.

1.1. Problem of the Study

The Constitution of India talks about the backward classes of citizens and not about backward castes. Article 15 of Indian Constitution provides for positive discrimination for them. It authorises special preferential treatment not only for Scheduled Castes (SC’s) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) but also for “Other Socially and Educationally Backward Classes” (OBCs). In view of the recent upsurge of interest in OBCs, it is necessary to reflect on how this term became a category for public policy in India, especially in Uttar Pradesh, Backward classes, first, acquired a technical meaning in the princely state of Mysore when in 1918, the Mysore government appointed a committee to enquire into the question of encouraging members of the Backward communities in Public service. At the time of independence, the term backward classes had a less fixed and definite reference. The term had been around for some time and had variety of referents i.e. it had shifted rapidly in meaning and had come to mean differently in different places e.g. In 1917, the Maharaja of Kolhapur recounted to Montague that he had been taking keen interest in uplifting the backward classes and especially the untouchables. While South borough committee did not mention any such groups other than depressed classes, the Hartog Committee (1928)2 defined backward classes in their glossary as- “Caste or Classes which are

7 educationally backward. They include the depressed classes aboriginals, hill tribes and criminal tribes.” Thus, the term had never acquired a definite meaning at all-India level.

By the time of the Constituent Assembly the usage of the term “Backward Classes” refers to some larger or smaller portion of the population deserving of special treatment was familiar in many parts of the country. However, this term was debated very much in the assembly as the delegates from the northern part of India expressed puzzlement. Chandrika Ram from Bihar,3 who had the most active backward class movement in the North explained that- “Backward classes were a section of society between the highest castes and the scheduled castes: the third section occupying the middle position, no doubt, they are not treated as untouchables.” K.M. Munshi assured the house that it signifies people- touchable or untouchable belonging to this or that community, who are so backward that special protection, is required in the services. Although, T.T. Krishnamachari pointed out that classes were not necessarily castes and the literacy might be the test of backwardness, it was generally envisioned that the backward classes would be communities. When asked what is a backward community, Ambedkar defending the draft explained- “We have left it be determined by each local government. A backward community is a community, which is backward in the opinion of the government.”

8 deserving. However, central government was not entirely excluded from the process. The President is instructed to appoint a backward classes commission.

After the listing of SCs, the usage of OBC as a synonym for untouchables and depressed classes withered away. Two major species of Usage emerged then- 1) as the more inclusive group of all those who need special treatment and 2) as a stratum higher than the untouchables but nonetheless depressed. This double usage continues today. The former in the usage of backward classes in the wide sense (including SCs and STs); the latter in the usage as equivalent to other backward classes. It is with the latter that we are now concerned in this research.

Since the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s backward caste politics has dominated the political scene in U.P. It had aroused the hopes and aspirations of the backwards for political identity, empowerment and a share and role in government. But the period from the 1980s onwards shows that the backwards are not only badly divided but are also leaderless. A strong upsurge among the backward castes in the late 1980s, coinciding with the collapse of the Congress party provided space for the backwards to unite under the Samajwadi Party (SP). However, the attempt failed.4 The SP remains a party of the Yadavs and the Ahirs, who have cornered the benefits provided to the backwards, thus alienating other sections like MRBCs (More Backward Caste) and MBCs (Most Backward Castes) which have gravitated towards the BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party) and the BJP (Bhartiya Janta Party). The SP leadership has become opportunistic and corrupt. Unable to capture power alone, the party is now trying to gain the support of the upper castes and Muslims who have somewhat drifted away from SP since 2007 assembly elections in U.P.

The backwards are drifting away from the defined socialist ideology of the SP. Hence, losing the drive and energy so vital to make the entire backward caste/class movement vibrant, cohesive, purposive and productive (Verma : 2007). However, the leadership of the backward caste politics has let the community down. it brought about backward caste mobilization but failed in sharpening the backward caste/class cleavages and also in bringing homogenization and consolidation of “Backward Identity” as a whole.

The rise of Identity politics has transformed the political process in the state of U.P. quite significantly. At the time of independence, the dominant single party

9 Congress System prevailed. The Congress had not become dominant by undemocratic means. It became dominant-firstly, because it was the prime platform of a cause, the independence which had the support of all sections of the people. Secondly, since everyone supported the cause, the Congress was able to just bring about everyone under its flag, whatever his/her religion, caste, language, community or economic status was. Thirdly, it had the inestimable advantage of the leadership of two most remarkable personalities- Mahatma Gandhi and Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru. Consequently, until the late 1980s politics in U.P. had a stable and predictable character. Although change had been taking place, it was slow and gradual. Parties did not promote social conflict and religious strife by their activities.

From the 1980s onwards, the ongoing process of democratization underway since independence accelerated in northern plain especially in the state of U.P. Thus, creating greater consciousness of caste and communal identities accompanied by increased politicization. These rapid changes ushered in the rise of primordial identities and decline and de-institutionalization of the party system.5 The rise of primeval identities, in turn, made the single party system no longer workable and the latter created the room for the mobilization of narrow sectarian parties. The Congress system was replaced by a fluid and fragmented multi-party system with three poles- the BJP, the SP, the BSP. Prof. Pai remarks that these cannot be described as clear-cut parties rather they are identity-based movements operating in electoral arena mobilizing people along social divisions, thus, creating conflict, violence and political instability. However, Caste-based mobilization created social antagonism, it also challenged upper caste dominance and played a positive role by contributing to the social deepening of democracy (Prof. Pai: 2002).

In the second half of 1990s caste and community based mobilization reached to its zenith and then started to decline. Today, parties are attempting to widen their social bases and build broad social alignments owing to the compulsions of electoral politics. While BSP has entered into “Social Engineering formula” with maxims of `Sarvajan Hitay, Sarvajan Sukhay’, the SP is trying to woo upper caste people and to somewhat extent Muslims who have deserted the party in 2007 assembly and 2009 parliamentary elections in U.P., though they voted S.P. to power in 2012. Yet if we see at the ground level, voters can no longer be enticed into party’s fold purely by appealing to caste and religious orientations.

10 Following a strong wave of mobilization on ascriptive identities, there has been a move towards the increasing secularization of the caste and communal politics, thus opening up the possibility of a more politically stable system based on more normative and secular polities. For instance- historical victory of BSP in 2007 assembly elections garnering 30.43% of votes and getting absolute majority ensuring a stop to hung assemblies and coalition politics in the state. Thus, we see throughout the 1990s parties in U.P. have engaged in construction and reconstruction of identities (BJP-Hindutva, SP-Backward caste, BSP- Dalit) and constantly shifted their strategies moving from narrow sectarian formations to broader aggregative combines in response to the swiftly changing political situation.

1. Mulayam Singh Yadav and his Samajwadi Party (SP) epitomize the relic of a great socialist tradition,6 one which is fast withering away in Uttar Pradesh. Mulayam entered active state politics in 1967 when he was first elected to U.P. Legislative Assembly. Samajwadi party was born in October 1992. So before the birth of SP he was in the company of India’s leading Socialists & thus, can legitimately claim to be their progeny. Yet, in almost 24 years of its existence, Can SP show any linkages & continuity with the traditions of Ram Manohar Lohiya, J.P. Narayan and Madhu Limaye? Can it demonstrate that its evolution (ideological, organizational and as a party of government) has been in consonance with ideals & expectations of Socialists mentors. The general belief regarding these questions is in negative. Party’s Symbol, Bicycle reflects it to be the party of common man but even the ordinary worker of the party ride in big & expansive cars. So the question arises-How much Samajwad is left with the Samajwadi party?”7

11 2. Ever since Samajwadis first came to power in U.P. in 1989 (JD) under the leadership of Mulayam, SP has been firmly committed to secularism & protection of minorities especially the Muslims & the Mosques. This induced Muslims to drift away from Congress and to associate themselves with the “psychological security” of SP. Excessive posturing about the need to defend Muslims through secularism by SP leaders led to an equation of “secularism with minoritism. It also seemed to put Hindus on defensive. Such over enthusiastic rhetoric has bred disaffection against Muslims & unnecessarily sharpened the communal divide.

3. The Samajwadi party often claims to be the champion of kisans. But it hasn’t lived up to their expectations, despite being in power 4 times 1989 (JD), 1993 & 2003 & 2012 the SP failed to initiate any land reform measures in U.P. for the benefit of the marginal farmers. Notwithstanding the abysmal conditions of kisans in some sub-regions of U.P., Agrarian reform8 is nowhere on SP’s agenda. Furthermore, Reliance land acquisition controversy for Dadri power project reflected that the interests of farmers were subordinated to a corporatization of agriculture.

4. For Lohiya, Caste was a stumbling block to India’s progress. But these so called Lohiyaites have consistently deployed caste as an effective tool to sharpen the social & electoral cleavages on the support of backward castes. In current times, SP has started “inclusionary politics”. The manner in which it has opened up for Thakurs, Baniyas, Brahmins & non-chamar dalits speaks volumes about this shift.

5. M.S. Yadav remains the unopposed president of SP. There is a dearth of good second rung leaders as he has been promoting his son, brothers & nephews to Leadership positions. This makes Samajwadi party vulnerable in the event of departure of top leadership from the political scene.

6. The Party’s image as associated with 3Cs- Crime, Capitalism & Corruption has done an incalculable damage to the party. Party’s criminal elements have become a liability on the party.

7. Samajwadi party leaders played an active role in Mandalization of state politics leading to a second democratic upsurge. But the party is not equally concerned

12 with the problems of More Backward Castes (MRBCs) & Most Backward Castes (MBCs).Yadav are the dominant9 & prosperous group among them & the SP is negligent towards all other backward castes except Yadavs.

8. No doubt, electoral graph of party has shown steady improvement since its inception but it remains difficult to defend the governance style of M.S. Yadav and of his son Akhilesh Yadav. It is erratic with little focus on rational decision making. Decisions are changed over night. Arbitrary transfers & postings have become lucrative industry for him & his cabinet. The same is true of policies also.

1.2. Objectives of the Study:

The objectives of this study would be-

1. To study Backward caste/class movement is Northern India and its resultant premise.

2. To study the voting patterns of Backward Castes/Backward classes.

3. To explore the political environment that made SP to focus upon “Corporate Samajwad” as against “Lohiyaite Samajwad”.

3. To study why SP is unable to stop widening cracks in its Muslim vote bank after 2012 assembly elections in which Muslims voted all out to SP.( to a full majority). In Lok Sabha elections 2014 Muslims also voted for Narendra Modi (BJP), thus, question arises what happened to Samajwadi Party? Why it could not be able to garner support of its core support base. i.e. Muslims

4. To study about the governance style of Samajwadi Leaders.

5. To explore the political insights regarding future of Samajwadi party.

There are certain central questions on which this work revolves around. I would try to trace their answers during the course of my research. These are.

13 1. What happened to the samajwad of the Samajwadi Party? Is the claim of SP to be the torch bearer of socialist tradition valid?

2. Why SP does not pay heed to MRBCs & MBCs even after playing active role in Mandalization of state politics & claiming itself to be a Backward Caste Party?

3. What prompted Muslims to have associated themselves with a party having socialist orientation?

4. Why SP is falling apart in U.P. itself even after showing improvement in electoral records since its inception in 1992 and even after attaining absolute majority in 2012 in U.P.?

5. What could be the future implications of SP and its so called Samajwad on regional & national politics?

1.3. Hypothesis

H1: Without either a well defined socialist agenda or a clear socialist ideology and with the handicap of soiled image among electorates, S.P. faces an uncertain future.

1.4. Source of the Study:

1.4.1. Research Methodology:

14 The proposed research would rely on descriptive design and comparative analysis. Comparative analysis would be focused on Lok Sabha & Assembly elections since Samajwadi Party’s inception in 1992 till 2014 Lok Sabha Elections. Opinion Survey has been taken among different Caste groups using stratified Sampling on the questions of reverse osmosis voting for SP. Structured interviews of Political leaders of different political parties and S.P. Leaders has been taken in regard to its drifts in Ideological planks.

1.5. Significance of the Study:

The Backward Classes as a collective entity, in spite of some ups and downs, has emerged as a major political player especially after 1960. Being numerically large compared to other social groups such as forward caste, dalits or minorities, the Backward Classes possess significant political prospects across many states in India.

The Backward Classes as a whole suffer many forms of oppression and are subject to numerous forms of domination. The establishment of a faired social order cannot but engage with this collective, aware of its articulation overtime. As a whole it shares a common situation vis-a-vis other dominant groups in society, a situation which in many respects is akin to that of the Dalits. It can be argued that certain other categories such as classes are more appropriate to denote a social phenomenon termed Backward Classes today. But historically it is the latter category that has been socially and politically precipitated and the social agency for large-scale social transformation is borne by it.

One of the major failures of the Indian State has been its inability to devise an effective policy with respect to the Backward Classes in India. This failure is not merely administrative and political, i.e., with respect to the execution and devising appropriate policy for Backward Classes, but conceptual as well.

Striving for political power is imperative for the Backward Classes. Often such striving has been caught in the vortex of the hegemony of other classes and state or is merely a symbolic enablement. This study goes into the political strategies that have led to the real enablement of the Backward Classes against the hegemonic and symbolic ones. Issues confronting the Backward Classes may be significantly different from those confronting others, but the Backward Classes also shared concerns with other members of a democratic polity. This study elicits the perceptions

15 of other social groups and trends of thought and marks the areas of shared concerns and those where strong differences exist. Such a Classification definitely helps in searching for amicable solutions to issues where shared concerns co-exist with significant differences.

This study intends to locate the process of the formation of the Backward Class Constituency in state context. The erstwhile State of Mysore, later Karnataka, prides itself as one of the first states to witness a well-organised movement of the Backward Classes. U.P however has been a late starter to this movement. The researcher has chosen this state because I am a resident of U.P. and Samajwadi Party claims to be the offshoot of this very movement. We cannot treat the rise of Backward Classes as an event that took place in isolation. This study therefore, attempts to look into the development that took place in U.P vis-a-vis those that occurred elsewhere in northern part of the country.

16 state. We have attempted to assess the extent of benefits the state is dispensing to the Backward Classes and the mobilization and organisation they had to resort to in obtaining the same.

The special provisions extended to the Backward Classes on one hand, and social dynamics on the other, call for and result in specific political responses. The Backward Classes have sometimes as effective political across directing state policies to their advantage while at other times they are caught in the hegemonic designs of the dominant castes. The electoral system based on universal adult franchise has it impact on the nature of political agency that the Backward Classes can enjoy. This study goes into the social and political conditions that can enhance or retard the expression of this agency. This study suggest the ways by which Samajwadi Party can shift its focus from identity based contestation to the development and governance paradigm so as to transform itself from caste oriented to inclusive subaltern class oriented politics.

1.6. Review of Literature

The historical and discursive of the making of a relatively stable political constituency termed Backward Classes at the level of a state (of U.P.) in India is not comprehensively explored in any of the existing studies. Backward class mobilisation occurred at first and primarily at the state level in India and so far it continues to be

17 the reality by and large. In an era of coalition polities at the centre, however such political formations at the state level tend to become major players in shaping the central power. However, even in such cases their locus of reference lies in the states.

With the emergence of Backward Classes into political prominence there has emerged ample literature on the subject. We can broadly divide it into two types- general literature on Backward Classes and literature pertaining to them with respect to U.P. Further, keeping in view its content it can even be divided into normative and descriptive literature. Of course, the former variant often demands the latter.

The general descriptive literature explains the factors that led to the mobilisation of Backward Classes, formation of backward class organisations, various states of Backward Class protests, etc. The works of M.N. Srinivas, Caste in Modern India (1962), Social Change in Modern India (1972), Dominant Castes and Other Essays (1987), Religion and Society Among Congress of South India (1952), etc. fall within this framework. They are really useful for our study on Backward Classes. However, his theory of 'sanskritisation, to encompass the protest movement among the Backward Classes has always been contested on grounds of its authenticity. Similarly, two important works of another prominent sociologist. M.S.A. Rao, Social Movements in India (1979) and Social Movement and Social Transformation-A Study of Tow Backward Class Movements in India (1987) are worth mentioning.

If the former explains various subaltern and tribal movements, the latter deals with movements among backward caste groups in India like the Yadavas of the North (U.P) and Izhavas of Kerala. However, most of his studies are preeminently empirical in character and refuse to take up a normative stance. Andre Beteille is another important theoretician in this regard with such works as Backward Classes and New Social Order (1981), etc. But Beteille is too caught in liberal approach towards the Backward Classes and the principle of equal rights often ignoring considerations for preferential treatment.

The early works of Rudolph L. and Rudolph S.H., especially their Modernity of Tradition – Political Development in India (1969), are significant as they suggest that pursuit of modernity may not necessarily require rejection of traditional belonging as a whole, and traditional sites of belonging too may overhaul themselves to be conducive to modernity. However, they do not raise the concerns of equality and

18 domination centrally in their works. In this vein too is the work of Dipankar Gupta especially his publication, Interrogating Caste – Understanding Hierarchy and Difference in Indian Society (2000). His principle writings, however, do not touch the central concerns of this study

A number of scholars have studied the non-Brahmin movement and the ideologies that shaped it very closely. Notable mentions could be made of the works of Robert L. Hardgrave's, The Dravidian Movement (1965), Eugenc F. Irshick's, Politics and Social conflict in South India : The non-Brahmin Movement and Tamil Separatism, 1911929 (1969), and T. K. Ravindrans' Vaikkam Satyagraha and Gandhi (1975), and V. Geetha and S.V. Rajadurai's Towards a Non-Brahmin Millennium – From Jyothee Thas to Periyar (1998). The writings of Kancha Ilaiah such as Why I am Not a Hindu: A Shudra Critique of Hindutva Philosophy and Political Economy (1969), Buffalo Nationalism: A Critique of Spiritual Fascist (2004), Post-Hindu India: A Discourse on Dalit- Bahujan Socio-Spiritual and Scientific Revolution (2009) etc. provide strong ideological inputs to the Backward Class Movement in India.

The Backward Class Movement in the erstwhile Bombay Province has been ably dealt in such works as Gail Omvedt's, Cultural Revolt in a Colonial Society-Non- Brahmin Movement in Western India 1850-1935 (1976), Eleanor Zelliot's From Untouchable to Dalit-Essays on the Ambedkar Movement (1992), and Rosalind O' Hanlon's Caste Conflict and Ideology-Mahatma Joti Rao Phule and Low Caste Protest in Nineteenth century Western In lie (1985). One of the early commentators on the Backward Class Movement in Maharastra is Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, whose comments on the movement are scattered all across his writings, Babasaheb Ambedkar's Writing and Speeches, brought out by the Department of Education, Government of Maharastra. The best of his writings on social and political issues are highlighted in Valerian Rodrigues ed., The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar (2002).We can get an outline of the early phases of Backward Class Movement in Northern India of Mark Juergensmeyer, , Religion as Social Vision – The Movement Against Untouchability in 20th Century Punjab (1992) and Peter Robb, ed., Dalit Movements and Meanings of Labour India (1993).An overview of the Backward Class Movement in India could be obtained from S. Nataraj's What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables (1945), Barbara Joshi's Democracy in Search of Equality (1989), and Michael Mahar ed., Untouchable in Contemporary India (1972).

19 The Writings of scholars such as Ghanashyam Shah, I.P. Desai and P. Radhakrishnan are of great importance to any serious study of the backward class problem in India as a whole. Mention may be made of Ghanashyam. Shah's 'Middle' Class Politics: Case of Anti-Reservation Agitation in Gujarat' (1987) and 'Caste Class and Reservation' (1985), I.P. Desai's 'Should Caste be the basis of Recognising Backwardness?' (1989), 'Caste Class Conflict and Reservations' (1985) and P. Radhakrishnan's 'Ambasankar Commission and Backward Classes' (1989), ' Tamil Nadu Backward Classes' (1989), etc. These papers reflect critically on a mass of data, suggest tendencies at work in the Backward Class Constituency and propose appropriate concepts to handle the task at hand.

Recently there has been a growing realization that majoritarian communalism in part derivers its strength from the popular projection of minorities especially the Muslim community as a 'collective communal monolithic entity'. Against this trend there have been attempts to highlight the heterogeneous nature of the community. l As a part of this there appeared a series of research articles on the Muslim OBCs by scholars like Irfan Ahmad, Seik Rahim Mondal, Sayyad Zainuddin, C.G. Hussain Khan, Answer Alam, S.A.H. Moinuddin, and S.S.A. Saheb published in the Economic and Political Weekly in 2003. Likewise when the issue of reservation in higher education came up in 2006, the Economic and Political Weekly brought out a series of articles on the subject by renowned scholars like Satish Deshpande, Yogendra Yadav, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Kancha Ilaiah, Sukhadeo Thorat and others. Hani Babu M.T.'s article 'The Curious Case of OBC Reservation's is a recent addition to this series. All these and other related studies, however, while providing information and reflection on the background setting did not contribute much byway of focusing on Karnataka on the specific subject matter to the study, undertaken here.

One of the ambitious works on preferential treatment to Backward Classes in Marc Galanter's Competing Equalities: Law and Backward Classes in India (1984). This work has strong normative underpinnings as well. It is a product of log and painstaking research on the question of positive discrimination coward the oppressed classes in India. The book deals with a wide array of preferential policies and considerations, their background. Their designs and operations and judicial intervention on these issues. However, his approach remains legalistic in nature and much less informed historically and sociologically. His study lacks information from

20 below, which he himself admits. Besides, this work remains dated today as the developments taken into account are only up to the end of 1970s Further, among the three categories of the Backward Classes SCs, ST, and OBCs. The OBCs find relatively lesser mention in his study compared to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

There are several works that give an account of and assess preferential policies: Paramanand Singh's Equality, Reservation and Discrimination in India (1985) and Ishwari Prasad's Reservation: Action for Social Justice (1986) are important in this respect where a strong case for the policy of positive discrimination has been made. Their scope, however, is different from the present study.

When the Union Government decided to implement the Mandal Commission Report in 1990 a series of studies came up on the Backward Classes. Important among them are Anirudh Prasad's Reservation Policy and Practice in India: A Means to an End: A Critique (1991) and Hiranmay Karleka's In the Mirror of Manadal: Social Justice.

Caste, Class and the Individual (1992). However, the main thrust of these studies was directed against the main provisions of the Mandal Report and blaming it for the developments that took place after its implementation. Soon writings on the defense of the Mandal Report were to be produced by other. The recommendations of the report were stoutly defended by K.C. Yadav in his work Indi's Unequal Citizens – A Study of the Backward Classes (1994); Anirudh Prasad's Reservation Justice and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) Theoretical and Practical Issues (1997); and O.P. Ralhan, ed., Non-Brahmin Movement (1998) are important interventions on this debate. We have drawn extensively from these works while at the same time, focusing on the specific subject matter of this study.

We need to identify the diversity and pluralism of the Indian electorate and how it gets reflected in the social profile of Indian Legislative bodies. The greater presence of Backward Classes has also resulted in the reformulation of the concerns that were central to these bodies. These aspects are well discussed by B.L. Shanker and Valerian Rodrigues in their work on The Indian Parliament- A Democracy at Work (2011). The contributions of the Fresh scholar Christophe Jaffrelot need special mention in this regard. In his book India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of Low Castes

21 in North Indian Politics (2003), he makes an analysis of the process through which there has been a steady shift of political power from the hands of the upper caste elite to the subaltern classes over the period. Though the study focuses on the low caste politics of the North it provides us an account of the Non-Brahmin Movements of the Southern and Western states to enable us to make a comparison across regions. A recent publication. Rise of Plebeians? The Changing Phase of Indian Legislative Assemblies (2009) edited by Christophe Jaffrelot and Sanjay Kumar has been a major contribution in this regard. It is an attempt to study the broad tread in the rise of OBC groups in the parliamentary politics in the background of social profile of representative from sixteen states across the country. Though the emphasis is more on the empirical profiling than the theoretical reflection the extensive data presented in these works are of great help for any research in this area. H.S. Verma ed., The OBCs and Dynamics of Social Exclusions in India (2005) which deals with multiple issues centred around this constituency falls in this line of thought.

The implementation of economic policies based on neo-liberalism has reduced the overall space for Backward Classes and dalits in India. In this background a new debate on reservation in the private sector has come up and a voluminous literature has appeared in academic journals and newspapers. Important among then have found a place in Sukhadeo Thorat, Aryama and Prashant Negi eds. reservation and Private Sector-Quest for Equal Opportunity and Growth (2005). These papers cover all shades of concerns and also address some of the critical issue that has appeared in the recent debate on reservation. When the issue of caste enumeration in 2011 census came up recently, Japhet and Chandan Gowda Brought out a book entitled Caste Cesus towards an Inclusive India (2010), which contains a series of articles both in favour and against this measure. So far as literature on U.P. is concerned, the works so far on the related topics appreciate the way under which Samajwadi party emerged out in the backdrop of Backward Caste movement and Mandalization of state politics. None of the Script has tried to explore the possible reasons that why SP has been able to garner the support of Muslims since its inception in 1992. Similarly no one talks about why SP has shed Democratic Socialism in favour of corporate socialism. Except 2007 assembly elections SP has emerged out to be a single largest party in UP even then, the party is falling apart. Dr. Shafiuzzaman talks about the social basis, Ideology and programmes of Samajwadi Party. Anil Kumar Verma in Seminar special

22 issue March 2007-UP Battleground puts his focus regarding the elusive Samajwad of SP. He also talks about caste to class transition in politics of Uttar Pradesh. Prof.Sudha pai in her book-Agrarian change & Electoral politics is concerned about unavailability of land reforms measures in UP. Her recently edited volume-Handbook of Politics in Indian States is an attempt to provide a set of well researched some significant aspects of state politics in India which have been responsible for shaping the progress of democratic politics in the post-independence period. The broad areas on which this volume focuses are democratization, regions and regionalism, political parties and electoral politics and economic reforms.

Vivek Kumar in his book “India’s roaring revolutions: Dalit assertion and New Horizons comments that SP failed to directly forge an alliance with caste & communities, thereby getting defeat in 2007 assembly elections. A scholar like M. Dinesh Hegde presents an overview of Backward Class movement in India. He sympathises with the movement’s pressing demand for reservation.

Hence the proposed research would try to focus on the root cause of Samajwadi Party’s decline, and status of Backward caste/class movement of which SP claims itself to be progeny, .even after being the single largest and ruling party in UP.

1.7. Chapter Scheme:

The present work is divided into five sharply focused chapters. Chapter one is devoted to introduction of the OBCs which is an elusive category. In this chapter the researcher has tried to trace out certain problems owing to which the SP is losing ground in the State even after having a good electoral record. It further puts central questions around which this whole work revolves. These questions need to be answered as far as the role and overall performance of the Samajwadi Party is concern in the Backward Caste Movement in U.P., of which it is an offshoot.

Chapter two presents forth the background to the process and understanding of the backward caste mobilisation which eventually led to the formation of the present day Samajwadi Party. Apparently, it puts a light on the rise of the OBCs in Northern India specially in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

23 Chapter three deals with the factors and forces which provided the needed platform to the emergence and consolidation of the S.P. on the political scene of U.P. in 1992.

Chapter four discusses the electoral politics of S.P. and its visible trends in the recently held elections in U.P. The Party has been ruling currently and has been a single largest party in U.P. for quite a sometime (except in 2007 Assembly and 2014 Lok Sabha election). Yet its social base is eroding away. Why it is falling apart? A critical appraisal of S.P. has been made against its declared policies and programmes.

Chapter five contains the broad conclusions formulated on the basis of data analyzed in pervious chapters. It conclude that S. P. is on declining trend and with it, there is a halt to backward caste, class mobilsation in U.P.

1.8. Approaches to Study Political Mobilization in India:10

The word Mobilization suggests the setting in motion of previously inert entities. In purely top-down views of mobilization, this is achieved by elites- broadly understood to include political elites-who stir up the rabble or capture alienated individuals for their own purposes. In bottom-up views, mobilization is self- generated, as like-minded individuals band together around natural sources of solidarity. In either view, mobilization carries the imminent threat of upheaval.

In the view presented above, elites do not necessarily cause political action to occur but they do help to define which potential lines of divisions are more Salient than others. They do so by providing the means for the expression of grievance, shaping the manner in which interests and grievances are expressed and defining the context in which mobilization occurs through the introduction of policies and institutions that create new opportunities or grievances. This strategic channelling of political activity is especially important in understanding electoral behavior, which raises the question of whether electoral participation counts as Political mobilization. It is assumed that winning ‘mass support’ for a party at election time is among the most important form of political mobilization that can take place. This is especially true for India, where continued electoral politics remain the central arena for political mobilization, even to the extent that non-electoral forms of mobilization typically aim to influence or enter electoral politics. While the fundamental driver of Indian politics, over the last century, has been the successive emergence of new groups and interests

24 available for political mobilization, the nature and outcome of this mobilization has been shaped by the inter-play between two strategies of alliance-building. The first, ANTI-HEGEMONIC ALLIANCE, unites intermediate powers against one that exercises or seeks to exercise hegemony. The second, SANDWICH ALLIANCE, by contrast, unites the extremes of a power hierarchy against those in the middle.

The study of political mobilization is such a vast topic that only the most cursory of reviews can be attempted here. The brief survey of approaches in comparative politics undertaken below highlights two kinds of analyses, which have been largely missing from the study of Indian politics. One is the study of how political strategies influence whether a potential cleavage become an active source of conflict. The other is the systematic comparison of the way cleavage structures emerge across Indian states. a) Political Mobilization and Comparative Politics

For the sake of efficiency, adapting from Harold Lasswell's famous definition of politics, that the study of political mobilization can be divided into four questions: who is mobilized, for what purpose when, and how. Many approaches to the analysis of political mobilization centre around one or two of these questions. Different scholars also vary according to whether they adopt a broadly structural or macro analytic approach or a micro analytic one that focuses on explaining the actions of elites or even individuals. Additionally, answers to each question can range from broadly structural or macro-analytic approaches, to those that focus more on elite activity or individual motives and strategies.3

The question of who is being mobilized is typically answered in one of two ways. Structurally inclined analysts focus on identifying some collectivity- economic classes, cultural communities, or other kinds of social groups—on whose behalf a demand is made. There can often be many possible answers, and accordingly analysts will differ over which collectivity is being mobilized. To cite one famous Indian example, the Chipko movement against logging, undertaken by hill women in what is now Uttaranchal state, was variously viewed as a peasant movement to preserve access to forest resources, an environmental movement to prevent deforestation, a women struggle against the impact of logging on domestic labour, or even a regional movement against plains domination.

25 Micro analytic approaches avoid this kind of ambiguity by adopting a narrower approach to the 'who' question by asking which individuals are actually participating in collective political action. Here, the answers are often tied to 'how' mobilization is effected, since quite different kinds of people participate in electoral politics than, say, in direct action or revolutionary activity. A weakness of this approach is that scholars often focus excessively on the self-interest of politically active individuals. At the same time, this kind of focus often shows that politically active individuals are better educated or better-off than the group they seek to represent, forcing analysts to inquire whether issues activists focus on are salient for the larger constituency.2As we will see, this question is very relevant for the present essay.

For obvious reasons, the second question analysts ask about political mobilization 'what' interests and grievances motivate political action is central to understanding its consequences. Macro analytic approaches to this question tend to examine how a set of policy issues, such as the role of agriculture in the economy or the cultural policy of the state, create more persistent divisions or 'cleavages' in society. Often scholars working in this vein treat the 'who' and 'what' questions together through a systematic analysis of the social divisions or 'cleavage structures' arising out of fundamental policy conflicts in a given society or set of societies. In the best-known effort along these lines, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that the party systems of Western Europe were shaped by the varying intensities of four basic cleavages—centrevs periphery, secular vs religious, rural vs. urban, and owner vs. worker—and that these sandwich alliances, are generic forms that can be adapted to many contexts, allowing for comparison. b) Anti-hegemonic and Sandwich Alliances

Anti-hegemonic and sandwich alliances are general categories that include the styles of populist mobilization that have earlier been termed empowerment and protection populism, respectively (Swamy 1996; 1998). These terms drew attention to rhetorical styles that united upwardly mobile social groups against established elites, or appealed to vulnerable and marginalized groups respectively. By contrast, the terms 'anti-hegemonic strategy' and 'sandwich tactic' emphasize the more generic modes of alliance-Building that frequently result in these distinctive modes of populism. They allow us to incorporate into a single framework calculated tactical

26 alliances and diffuse populist appeals, and to compare alliances that operate on a spatial or temporal plane with those whose building blocks are strata in a social hierarchy. Indeed, both alliance patterns have their correlates in international relations and these analogies provide important clues to their functioning.

The common feature to those two alliance types is that the elements of each coalition are drawn to it not so much by shared substantive concerns (at least not of a permanent variety) as by their shared relationship to a third party. That is, they are united by a shared foe rather than by shared interests. Consequently, in a dynamic social situation such as that characterizing a developing country, the relative situation of particular groups can change rapidly, and with it, so will their interests and the alliance they are drawn to.

In the most general terms, an anti-hegemonic alliance is one that unites powerful actors against a greater power that exerts or seeks to exert hegemony over them. The analogy here is with international alliances among powerful states that feel threatened by a rising superpower. In domestic politics, a very dose analogue is provided by conflicts over the centralization of power between national governments on one hand, and advocates of states' rights on the other. In disputes over socio- economic policy, anti-hegemonic alliances tend to favour policies that broaden the elite, adopting redistributive policies that identify broad groups of beneficiaries over the most needy, or promote upward mobility among disadvantaged sectors.

From the perspective of their social composition, anti-hegemonic alliances in domestic politics unite out-groups or counter-elites across diverse social domains against core elite. These counter-elites might be the ' elite segments of upwardly mobile social strata, or the established elites of relatively peripheral regions who find common cause in opposing the core group. In, India, anti-hegemonic alliance-building strategies can be detected among the Extremists within the Congress in the early twentieth century, among representatives of minority groups outside Congress in the 1930s, among the various 'national' opposition parties in the 1960s, and among regional parties in the 1990s. Notably, the last three alliances were directed against the Congress, and only the last was successful.5

The sandwich alliance, by contrast, unites the extremes of a power hierarchy against powerful mid-level actors. In international relations, sandwich alliances occur

27 when superpowers champion small states against 'regional bullies', or wealthy countries respond to challenges from newly industrializing countries by championing the interests of very poor countries. In domestic politics, there is a 'sandwich' corollary to the conflict between central authority and states 'rights mentioned above in centralization is frequently supported by the local minorities, who feel threatened try the power that local elites or majorities enjoy in a decentralized polity.

As sandwich alliances are commonly put together by defensive elites against counter-elites, their policies often do demonstrate an ad hoc tactical character rather than a consistent strategic vision. It is therefore easier to specify which of the two policies prefer a sandwich alliance than to spell out a consistent policy agenda.6In social and economic policy, their redistributive proposals are often reactive rather than proactive, and may take their specific form from the proposals of the anti- hegemonic alliances that they are seeking to defeat. Subject to this qualification, sandwich alliances are likely to favour means tested distributive measure that target benefits more narrowly to the most needy over broad entitlements; the provision of social insurance over structural measures that redistribute social and economic power; direct spending on public goods such as primary education over statutory measures aimed at guaranteeing upward mobility; and anti-inflationary macroeconomic policies, as inflation is more likely to hurt the poor.

What is consistent about sandwich alliances is the way they construct their policies to unite the ends of a power hierarchy against the middle (Swamy 1998, 2003). Sandwich' responses commonly fall into two categories—proposals to target benefits demanded by counter-elites more narrowly than they would like, and proposals to substitute alternate policies that are more likely to appeal the least privileged groups. The targeting approach seeks to create fissures between weak and strong elements of the anti-hegemonic alliance while the substitution approach outflanks it by appealing to vulnerable groups directly. As with the anti-hegemonic alliances, this approach can, and has to be, adapted to incorporate new interests as older ones become more ambitious and join the anti-hegemonic alliance. In India, sandwich alliances were attempted by British authorities against the Congress; by the Congress in turn against the elites of minority groups in the 1930s; and by the Congress against alliances of regional, farmers', and backward-caste parties from the 1960s to the 1980s.

28 The advantage of focusing on alliance-building strategies rather than on concrete alliances of specific groups is that the former approach can accommodate the shifting position of social groups over time. For example, it is difficult to apply a structural approach, which tends to attribute relatively fixed interests to particular classes, to the political behaviour of property-owning peasant castes in India over the last seventy years. When they were first enfranchised by the Government of India Act of 1935, 'middle peasants' effectively occupied the lowest socio-economic rung among the politically relevant segments of society. By the 1960s, they were clearly in the middle sectors of society, and by the 1990s, arguably at the top/This matches their position in different alliances, as these groups formed the bottom of the Congress sandwich alliance in the 1930s, led the anti-hegemonic challenge to Congress in the 1960s, and moved towards the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 1990s. As this example makes clear, I do not suggest that alliance strategies can reshape society as they choose. An effective analysis of alliance-building strategies requires an understanding of the coalitional possibilities offered by the available and emerging cleavage structures.

c) Cleavage Structures in Indian Political Mobilization

As suggested above, a second type of research that would benefit the study of political mobilization in India is the systematic comparative analysis of cleavage structures. This is not to suggest that students of Indian politics should seek to replicate the particular cleavages that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) discovered for Western Europe, but rather that they should identify relevant cleavages for India that vary in intensity across Indian states.

One potential application of this approach would be the study of how peasant and 'backward' castes have been formed across states. Two important sets of edited volumes in the 1980s-Omvedt (1982) and Frankel and Rao (198971990)-attempted something along these lines. However, these volumes did not systematically explore the links between variations in cleavage structures across states and party politics. In particular, the Frankel and Rao volumes did not examine why the 'backward caste' cluster was stronger in some states than in others. A second, obvious area where cleavage structures vary across states and require explanation has to do with religious cleavages. There has been almost no systematic work done on this.

29 At the same time, though, as we have already noted, the study of cleavage structures cannot explain why particular cleavages become salient at a particular point in time. Especially in Indian politics, characterized as it is by a large variety of cross-cutting cleavages, the study of political mobilization necessarily involves understanding the strategic uses of cleavage structures and not merely their existence, and an understanding of policy details is often crucial to this.

The example of Other Backward Class (OBC) reservations illustrates this well while it is clear that the OBC/middle peasant coalition-which many scholars in the 1980s foresaw and which the Janata Dal tried to give expression to-has now fractured in a number of ways, it is not clear that this outcome was inevitable. This fracture happened because the effects of reservations for the OBCs on the principal cultivator castes varied tremendously across states. Supreme Court rulings limiting all categories to reservations to 50 per cent of the available seats led the 1979 Mandal Commission to adopt a methodology tor identifying backward castes that effectively sought to ensure that the sum of all reserved categories did not exceed fifty per cent of the state's population. As we will discuss in greater detail below, this, combined with pre-existing variations across states in the status of peasant groups,7 ensured that the principal peasant groups would be included in the OBC category in some states, but not others. V.P. Singh's decision in 1990 to implement the Mandal Commissions recommendations nationally then divided the 'backward' from the 'forward' segments of the middle-peasant/backward-caste coalition pitting peasant castes from different regions against each other in a way that state-specific reservations had not. Subsequently, 'forward' peasant castes gravitated towards the BJP, and the 'all-or- nothing' character of reservations created further opportunities for the BJP to woo 'more backward' segments of the OBC cluster away from Yadav-dominated OBC parties in Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar. ,

This vignette suggests that what is required for understanding political mobilization is not just an identification of cleavages, but a dynamic focus on their emergence over time, and the role of strategy in shaping this emergence. In what follows, I will tell the story of Indian political mobilization principally from the perspective of the national arena, incorporating discussions of rural class cleavages, urban class cleavages, rural/urban cleavages, centre-periphery cleavages between the Union and states as well as within states, and caste, linguistic, and religious cleavages

30 as they seem relevant. The role of policies and political entrepreneurship in creating or superseding cleavages, and bringing together or breaking apart various kinds of social coalitions will be evident throughout. d) Cleavage, Alliance Type, and Indian Political Mobilization

Most accounts of Indian politics point to the accommodative character of the Indian National Congress as the central explanation of Indian democracy. Between1930 and 1965, the Congress was said to have met challenges from newly politicized groups by expanding its social base to incorporate them and, in Weiners (l967) characterization, using the local organization to mediate among them. Mirrorin Weiner view on the ideological plane, Kothari's (1989) conceptualization of India as a dominant-party system' pictured the Congress as a'party of consensus' that mediated between the views of various smaller 'parties of pressure'. Taken together, these descriptions constituted the 'Congress system' For most scholars, the emergence of serious electoral challenges to the Congress in the 1960s was followed by the 'erosion' of the Congress organization under Indira Gandhi and the 'deinstitutionalization' of Indian politics in general, leading in turn to increasing fiscal indiscipline and social violence.

Not all scholars applauded the accommodative tendencies of Indian politics, or of the Congress. Indeed, many ascribed India's slow rate of economic growth in the first three decades following Independence to the accommodation of rival interests in policymaking.10 However, even these scholars had few kind words for the character of Indian politics following the 1969 Congress split, after accommodative politics was generally viewed as having come to an end. Rather, the view that a shift to 'populist' appeals by all parties was undermining development was widely shared among scholars who held very different views about the direction that development should take.

In retrospect, what is remarkable about this analysis is its static and undifferentiated approach towards the relationship between social cleavages and institutions. For example, many scholars blamed Indira Gandhi for destroying the Congress party's ability to mediate between rival social groups in the manner described by Weiner, but ignored the fact that the type of institution represented by Nehru's Congress-which, at the local levels, was a classic patronage machine—can only exist when the general level of social mobilization is low, or when the resources

31 available for patronage are high. The sharp reversals suffered by the Congress in the 1967 elections suggest that the Congress 'system' was in any event on its last legs. What has been remarkable about Indian democracy since then is the survival of the electoral principle through several decades of increasingly competitive mobilization of new political interests.

The sixth general election held in 1977 after the eighteen-month Emergency is a watershed in post-Independence Indian history. Within days of being released from prison, the leaders of three major non-Communist opposition parties and two dissident factions of Mrs Gandhi's Congress (R) merged to form the Janata Party, which swept the elections in north India and came to power with a majority of two-thirds in the Lok Sabha.

Following the 1977 election, Indian politics changed in three significant and related ways. First, and most obviously, even after the Congress returned to power in 1980, electoral politics was always predicated on the possibility that the incumbent party could lose. This did not mean, however, that agitational politics ceased to be important. Quite the contrary; the second major change was in the ways that movement and protest politics became almost institutionalized, forming part of a continuum of interest representation, with movements frequently transforming themselves into parties. This, in turn, reflected the broadening social profile of active political mobilization, most obviously represented by the coming of age of two important social groups, the middle peasantry and the backward classes or OBCs.

The emergence of the middle peasantry as an important 'demand group', as they were termed by Rudolph and Rudolph, was directly related to the Green Revolution strategy of the 1960s. The decision to subsidize the spread of chemical fertilizers, HYV seeds, and irrigation in areas where farmers seemed willing to adopt them had resulted in improved yields, and created a new class of small and medium farmers who produced for the market. With Charan Singh's BLD now a principal constituent of the Janata Party, farmers' interests were placed at the forefront of the Janata Party's agenda. The avowed aim of the Janata Party was to introduce a more Gandhian model of economic development that put the countryside first, and for Charan Singh in particular, this meant not only reducing the share of investment going to industry, but also opening up opportunities for new agrarian classes to invest in small-scale industry. Thus, the influence of the middle peasantry was seen not only in

32 policies concerning the farm sector, but also in industrial policy, and particularly in the expansion of the policy of reserving certain lines of manufacture for the small industry sector (Tyabji 1989). In short, the interests of the upper peasantry did not lie simply in preserving their status, but lay also in the opportunities to transform themselves into something other than farmers.

A similar logic can be found in the other major social group that came into its own in the Janata period. This was the OBCs, whose cause had been championed by the Lohia socialists, who eventually merged into the BKD, as well as by the DMK in Tamil Nadu. The OBCs are, of course, a highly elastic social category, whose existence stems from a constitutional provision that permits states to identify disadvantaged groups 'other' than the constitutionally protected categories of

Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs); and to provide for educational and employment preferences for such groups. This open-ended provision meant that both the questions of who was backward and the question of what preferences they would receive became the subject of state politics. In the event, the only states that made serious use of these provisions were the southern states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, both of which had a history of reservations for OBCs even before Independence. The Janata government appointed the Mandal Commission to carry out a nation-wide survey of castes and communities and recommend a single nation-wide list of OBCs. This single act not only defined a new social coalition, but also created a rift in another.

Beginning with the merger of the Lohiaite socialists with Charan Singh's farmer party, there has been an effort in India to create a grand coalition of the middle and poorer peasants classified as OBCs. This social cluster was even celebrated in the 1980s by numerous authors as an emerging hegemonic social coalition that would transform Indian politics by moving social power decisively downwards. However, there were significant contradictions between the interests of the middle peasantry and the OBCs. Much of the griddle peasantry came from land-controlling 'dominant' peasant communities in northwest or peninsular India—Jats, Patidars, Marathas, Kammas, Reddis, Lingayatas, and Vokkalingas—whose members were not easily classified as 'backward.17

The Mandal Commission carried out its task through state-by state surveys that attempted to identify which castes existed—itself not a simple act, as the unit

33 'caste' could be taken to mean small local fis(castes) or large clusters of jatis—and then determine whether these 'castes' were relatively 'backward' according to a long list of criteria, which included comparing the caste's average measures of economic well-being to the state average. When the Commission was done, the list varied tremendously across states. It included the bulk of the cultivating peasantry in some regions, notably eastern UP and Bihar, but excluded the Jats of Haryana, Rajasthan, and western UP, the Patidars of Gujarat, Maratha/Kunbis of Maharashtra, Reddis and Kammas in Andhra Pradesh, and Vokkaligas and Lingayats in Karnataka. This did reflect a certain social reality—not only did 'backward' peasant castes like Yadavs come from poorer regions, but their relative social status in those regions was often lower. Partly due to ecological reasons and partly due to historical ones—British land revenue settlements in the peninsula and northwest tended to be with the village-level cultivator, and in the east and northeast with revenue farmers—regions where peasants were described as 'backward' typically had a more hierarchical social structure. Paradoxically, the middle peasant/OBC coalition was rescued temporarily by the collapse of the Janata government in 1979 and the return of Mrs Gandhis Congress (I) to power in 1980. The Congress (I) indefinitely shelved the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report. Not until the Janata Dal government of 1989/90 was the Mandal Commission Report brought back to the political agenda.

Between 1980 and 1990, both middle peasant and backward-caste issues were active sources of mobilization, but on a state-by-state basis and not necessarily in tandem. Beginning with the Tamil Nadu Agriculturalist Association's (TNAA) agitation over the cost of power to pumpsets in 1978, farmer's organizations became prominent in a number of regions, where they used direct action tactics that included blocking roads and occasionally engaging in violence against government property in order to focus attention on the basic economic issues of procurement price and input cost.18 They succeeded in gradually increasing the effective subsidy to agriculture, but did not succeed in enabling the shift in sectoral priorities called for by the more ambitious farmers' representatives or in institutionalizing farmer power indecision- making, in part because they were divided by both economic and cultural considerations.19 However, appeals to farmer interests were successful in Haryana, where, in 1987, Devi Lal led the Lok Dal, once the party of Charan Singh, to victory.

34 Similarly, while the Congress government at the Centre shelved the Mandal Commission Report, individual state Congress governments introduced backward- class reservations. However, in accordance with the logic of the sandwich alliance, they did so in states where dominant peasant castes had been excluded from the OBC label, such as Karnataka and Gujarat, but not in UP and Bihar where the large Yadav caste cluster was identified as OBC. In Gujarat, where violent middle-class riots against the reservations policy eventually forced the resignation of Chief Minister Madhav Singh Solanki and the withdrawal of reservations, Congress had built its famous 'KHAM' coalition—composed of 'Kshatriyas' (principally composed of an upwardly mobile OBC group), Harijans (Dalits), Adivasis, and Muslims—which pointedly excluded Patidars, the peasant proprietor caste who had come to dominate the state's professional and political life, and which was not included in the OBC category. Conversely, in Karnataka, where the backward caste lists drawn up by the Congress government of Devraj Urs had excluded the two dominant peasant castes, the subsequent Janata Party government of Ramakrishna Hegde in Karnataka found itself in a continuous tussle over the efforts of these castes, which formed the backbone of the state Janata Party, to be included in the backward caste lists.

During the election of 1989, opposition forces sought again to unite middle- class peasants and OBCs into a single anti-hegemonic alliance. This was done in three stages: first, the various agrarian and socialist factions of the erstwhile Janata Party merged into the Janata Dal (JD) under the leadership of Congress rebel leader V.P. Singh; second, they formed an alliance called the National Front with like-minded regional parties; and third, the National Front agreed on seat adjustments with both the BJP and the Communist Party of India—Marxist (CPI[M]) in order to minimize the division of the Congress vote. At least in the Hindi states, the JD's 1989 election campaign wove a single populist tapestry out of promises to farmers to write off their debts and increase investment in agriculture, promises of reservations for the backward classes, and charges of corruption against Rajiv Gandhi. However, once in power, as a minority government existing on 'outside support' from the Left and the Right, the JD government found it difficult to hold its various constituencies together, leave alone satisfy outside supporters. At that time V.P. Singh's unilateral decision to implement the Mandal Commission recommendations brought about the demise of not only his government and his party, but also the middle peasant OBC coalition.20

35 After 1990, the available evidence suggests that the support of middle peasant groups swung decisively towards the BJP in many states including Gujarat and northern Karnataka or towards regional parties allied with it.

The BJP itself, of course, was the other pole of all-India political mobilization in the 1980s. Formed after the Janata experiment had broken down, it drew members of both the erstwhile Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties into a new right-wing party that initially sought to break its association with the militant Hindu nationalism of the Jana Sangh. However, the party's disastrous performance in the 1984 elections, when it won only two seats, led to a new strategy, which Jaffrelot (1996) has termed 'ethnonationalist mobilization! The centrepiece of this strategy was of course the movement to replace the Babri mosque in Ayodhya with a temple dedicated to Ram. Launched in 1987, the movement may well have benefited from the broadcast of Hindu epics by the Rajiv Gandhi government (Rajagopal 2001), and it is credited with creating a mass base for the BJP, which won 86 seats in the 1989 elections. Yet, the BJP's vote share was not much higher than the range of the erstwhile Jana Sangh. This does not suggest that the initial Babri Masjid movement had greatly widened the BJP's base prior to 1989. Rather, it was only after the BJP revived the movement in 1990, immediately after V.P. Singh's ill-fated decision to implement Mandal, that we see a major shift in votes for the BJP, much of it at the expense of the JD, in states like Gujarat, Rajasthan, and UP, where the Dal had received the support of dominant peasant castes.

The two agitations, over the Mandal recommendations and the Babri Masjid/Ram Mandir controversy, merged, as many scholars (for example, Parikh 1998) have pointed out and so did the underlying cleavages they represented. The Mandir agitation was viewed by many as a way to undermine OBC reservations and was supported by groups opposed to reservations; conversely, the two JD chief ministers of UP and Bihar, both OBCs from the Yadav caste cluster, became the champions of minority rights and secularism, taking police action against the provocative march led by BJP president Advani to Ayodhya. Thereafter, politics in many states began to lean towards an upper caste versus lower caste pattern, with dominant peasant castes giving the former a mass base they had never had.

Other cleavages, too, opened up in the 1980s and 1990s. There were dramatic increases in separatist and other ethnic violence in Punjab, Assam, and Kashmir (in

36 addition to the long-standing separatist war in Nagaland). These conflicts demonstrated the limits and possible pitfalls of electoral mobilization. However, in Punjab and Assam the incorporation of separatist sentiments through regional parties was an important part of the solution to these conflicts, and in Kashmir, too, if a solution is to be found, it will have to involve the revitalization of electoral processes.

The 1990s also saw the emergence of more militant forms of mobilization among the Dalits or SCs. This was most notable in north India with the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which completed the decimation of the Congress in UP by mobilizing their Dalit voters away from them. However, and importantly, although the BSP's rhetoric emphasizes a cleavage between Dalits and the upper castes, it is with the OBCs that the BSP has found it most difficult to work carrying on a feud with the OBC-dominated Samajwadi Party as late as the 2009 elections. In UP, this initially enabled the BJP to create its own sandwich alliance by allying with the BSR

The BJP's expansion in the 1990s was due to sandwich tactics used in other, less obvious ways. The two most important were first, the effort to split the OBC category in UP and Bihar by courting the less prosperous castes among the OBC groups, who had come to resent Yadav dominance in the OBC coalition. Second, the BJP very adroitly challenged centre-periphery cleavages in a number of states by supporting the creation of new states in the disaffected regions of existing ones. In particular, the BJP's support for the formation of the state of Jharkhand in Bihar represented an effort to undercut the seemingly impregnable electoral fortress of Lalu Prasad Yadav’s Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD).

In the final analysis, however, the most successful use of sandwich tactics continue to be practiced by the Congress, which survived as a viable contender for power between 1996 and 2004 by emphasizing issues of poverty and championing the rights of religious minorities. Even when the party appeared to have been virtually wiped out in the two largest states, UP and Bihar, it retained a base in much of the country, primarily among the poor, allowing it to remain the largest party in terms of votes.

The use of sandwich tactics also explains the Congress party's return to power in 2004 at the head of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and, even more, its stunning victory in 2009, when it became the horst full-term government to be re-

37 elected in twenty-five years and the first party in eighteen years to cross 200 seats, increased its vote share and revived in UP winning a quarter of the seats while contesting without allies there. These victories make clear that the party's ability to retain a substantial base during the 1990s, especially among the poor, received far less notice at the time than it deserved. There is certainly no space to provide an explanation here, but a hypothesis consistent with the argument of this chapter can be offered. A good part of the explanation, lies in the large poverty alleviation programmes initiated by the Congress government in the 1980s and 1990s.

As is already indicated, sandwich alliances have relative policy preferences not absolute ones, so no exhaustive list of policies that supported Congress' pro-poor image can be given. Some important measures, though, can be mentioned. All had a social insurance thrust rather than seeking to alter the structural condition of poverty. First, the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) launched by Charan Singh was transformed by Mrs Gandhi from a plan to give local governments development funds to a micro-loan programme, which was widely criticized for creating no enduring assets and for not reaching the poorest members of rural society. However, it did distribute substantial funds to the nearly poor. Second, and more importantly, rural employment schemes modelled on the successful employment guarantee scheme (EGS) of Maharashtra were launched in the 1980s, and gradually, in the 1990s, displaced the IRDP as the principal source of Central government social welfare funds. Finally, school lunch programmes, used successfully by the AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, became popular in several Congress states, notably Madhya Pradesh, and a part of the Congress national manifestos from the 1990s onwards.

Finally, of course, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of 2005, which guarantees a hundred days of work a year on public work projects to every poor rural household, was the centerpiece of the 2004-9 UPA government's social programmes. The history of Congress-initiated rural social insurance programmes reminds us that the NREGA was a logical extension of twenty-five years of Congress policy, not merely a policy grafted on by the UPA's allies in the Left front, as some have suggested.

The 2009 elections have provided important pieces of evidence in support of the main argument of this chapter. To reprise, the argument is that Indian political mobilization revolves around two strategies of alliance building—anti-hegemonial

38 alliances and sandwich alliances; that the advantage has historically been with sandwich alliances owing to the internal contradictions within anti-hegemonic alliances; and that the Congress party's long survival is due to its repeated reinvention of the sandwich alliance in different periods. While the rise of the BJP in the 1990s made this interpretation seem dated, four outcomes of the 2009 elections provide support to it.

First, and most importantly, the early evidence from exit polls and election reports suggests strongly that the NREGA was a major, and perhaps the most important reason for the Congress' victory in 2009, providing strong evidence for the continued relevance of sandwich alliances in Indian politics.

A second notable outcome is the success of the Janata Dal (United), or JD(U). in Bihar, where the RJD's longstanding coalition of OBCs and Dalits collapsed this time around. Analyses of Bihar politics suggest two reasons for this-Chief Minister Nitish Kumar's successful record on development in such areas as building infrastructure, and his ability to woo the less privileged segments among both OBCs and Dalits (Sharma 2009). Nitish Kumar, in other words, built a sandwich alliance of his own.

Third is the marked decline in the overall in the BJP's national vote share, which went down from 22 per cent in 2004 to 18 per cent in 2009, despite the BJP contesting many more seats, which reflected the loss of key allies in West Bengal, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh. By contrast the Congress remains steady at about 26 percent to 28 per cent over the last three elections, with relatively few allies. This suggests strongly that the idea that a bipolar contest between the Congress and the BJP was emerging was overstated.23

Finally, however, the various constituents of the erstwhile JD, formed as an anti-hegemonic alliance in the 1980s remained viable.

1.9. Critiquing the 'new' state bosses

The rise to the national level of provincial leaders like Nitish Kumar and Mulayam Singh Yadav, much talked about prime ministerial candidates-in-waiting, draws attention towards a critical need to explore the nature and forms of leadership at the state level. Leadership as a subject, unlike in the West, has largely been neglected in India by political scientists, with the scant literature available being more often than

39 not in the form of political biographies or worse, hagiographies.

Also, for a long time the focus of study has been on the 'national' leaders; 'lesser' ones from the states continue to be neglected. This despite the fact that even during the 'Congress era' preceding Indira Gandhi, India witnessed a host of powerful state level leaders playing a significant role in giving concrete shape to the policies shaping the polity and economy of a nascent democracy, many of them like G.B. Pant (1887- 1961) and K. Kamaraj (1903- 1975) actually moving to the national stage. Congress chief ministers like C.B. Gupta, B.C. Roy, Pratap Singh Kairon, S.K. Sinha, S. Nijalingappa, D.P. Mishra, Y.S. Parmar, M.L. Sukhadia and Ravi Shanker Shukla wielded long-term power and influence. Some of them did not even hesitate to take up cudgels with Nehru, playing the role of kingmakers as members of the 'Syndicate' for a brief period after his demise.

Besides these state party bosses, Congress also had powerful factional leaders at the local level within the party organizations, both keeping the social coalitional support intact and playing an important role in party nominations. One could say the same about non-Congress parties having regional leaders with a national presence like E.M.S. Namboodiripad, C.N. Annadurai and much later, Jyoti Basu. A fixation with national leaders could be attributed to the perception about state politics being too narrow and unimportant, besides merely being a 'carbon copy' of national politics, given Congress dominance. It is only in recent times with the newly exalted position of the states and state parties, that the considerable autonomy being wielded by states and state leaders is drawing attention. There is a realization that a study of the actions, policies, idioms 2nd values of state leadership can go a long way in a better understanding of the distinctive nature of change and development in the concerned state.

Since this new set of powerful state leaders draw their power and influence from state parties they consider their 'own', it is useful to explore their rise. The state parties, most 'ethnic' in nature, have benefited from the fact that political articulation and mobilization in the electoral arena increasingly veers around identity politics based on caste, language, dialect and kinship which are regionally located. Also, the fragmented nature of the party system under a single plurality electoral system is advantageous for state parties as they originated and continue to thrive on the support of a 'core' social constituency consisting of a single numerically and economically

40 significant caste/community, or alternatively a cluster of them. The narrow victories of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Samajwadi Party (SP) in the last two assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, or the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) victories in the 1990s in Bihar, demonstrate the effectiveness of such a strategy of nurturing a caste based coalition by promising patronage and protection. To their disadvantage, polity-wide parties like Congress and BJP, perforce have to play the ethnic card in a stealth form, whether in selection of candidates or in distribution of patronage.

Significantly, the ascendance of a patrimonial model of electoral democracy also enables the state party leader to ensure personal loyalties of kinsmen who cling to their 'own' leader, irrespective of the party, in the realistic hope of being favoured as clients. States like Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar routinely witness a marked surge in a particular caste members' share in public employment, government contracts, lucrative postings, service delivery and police protection, if a leader belonging to that particular caste succeeds in becoming the chief minister. Wary of facing a challenge from within the party, these leaders have deliberately kept their parties institutionally weak. Even the much older, cadre based and ideologically rooted parties like the Akali Dal, Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK) and National Conference (NC) have fallen victim to dynastic politics, with all levers of power remaining within the 'ruling family'. Among the newer parties, mainly offshoots of the Congress or socialist parties, one finds leaders like Lalu Yadav, Sharad Pawar, Naveen Patnaik, Ramvilas Paswan, Ajit Singh, Jayalalithaa or Mayawati, who as founder-presidents or 'natural heirs' have astutely cultivated their personalized rather than party based support base.

Depending more on their personal charisma and sphere of influence, these leaders are quite capable of making and unmaking the parties on their own terms. What helps them also is their complete control over party funds, critical for financing elections and running the party. Parties act as channels through which personal wealth and party funds are accumulated, almost like personal property, that needs to pass on to family members for safe custody as also to run the 'family business'. Lording over the states, most of them comparable in size to European countries, these leaders, when in power, automatically gain access to huge political resources, organization, money and the official machinery. This partly explains the reluctant:: of leaders like Nitish Kumar, despite their ambition, to move to the national stage, as they may well be recalling the dismal fate of H.D. Deve Gowda, the powerful Vokkaliga chief minister

41 of Karnataka. Come elections, the 'national' leaders ensconced in Delhi, even belonging to the polity-wide parties, depend on the goodwill of pow6rful state leaders to secure 'safer' constituencies for themselves and their kin.

So how do these 'new' state leaders differ from the 'old' ones? Though the 'old' party 'satraps' of Congress also partly drew their support from the powerful landed peasant castes and communities, the difference lay in terms of the hierarchical positioning of the castes. Earlier it was always the upper forward castes; now newly mobilized middle and upper backward castes have also joined in, thereby expanding the social base of leadership. However, the old generation state leaders' politics was not governed so starkly by narrow considerations of caste and community as is the case with the newly emergent state party bosses, who are comparable to factional leaders of the Congress of yore. The 'old' state party bosses' active participation and ideological grounding in the secular modern idioms/ values that informed the nationalist movement, in part enabled them to rise over and above the partisan interests and to recognize and accommodate the differences that would arise due to the heterogeneous support base of the Congress.

In contrast, the new crop of state leaders and the parties they lead, have come up in the backdrop of an assertion of narrow identity based politics, devoid of ideological content or activism, in the wake of Congress decline. They continue to thrive electorally on patronage based sectarian politics, even as they sprout the modern language of development and governance. Their proclivity to resort to neo- patrimonial political practices make them susceptible to regional and parochial interests even when they undertake the responsibility of being lawmakers or running the government at the Centre. Aspiring to a 'national' status, these leaders must believe and work for compromises and conciliation rather than accentuating them when dealing with conflicting regional or identity based group interests. Stitching together an opportunistic electoral alliance by the state party bosses for the purpose of building a 'power bloc' capable of capturing power at the Centre, as being attempted by Mulayam Singh Yadav, has ominous portents for a federal polity which is already under considerable strain.

42 References:

1. Verma, A.K. 2007 “Backward Caste Politics in Uttar Pradesh” in Sudha Pai (ed.) Political Process in Uttar Pradesh: Identity, Economic reforms and Governance. New Delhi: Pearson Longman. p. 157.

2. As quoted in Marc Galanter, 1978. “Who are the other Backward Classes? : An introduction to a Constitutional Puzzle”. Economic and Political weekly XIII, No. 43/44. 28 Oct. p 1813.

3. Ibid. p-1814

4. Op.cit. Verma 2007, p 157

5. Pai S. 2007. Political process in Uttar Pradesh: Identity, Economic Reforms and Governance, New Delhi: Pearson Longman. p XXX.

6. Verma A.K. 2007. Elusive Samajwad. Seminar special issue U.P. battele Ground, March 15-28, p 1010.

7. Ibid. p 1012

8. Pai S. 2007. Uttar Pradesh –Agrarian Change and Electoral Politics. Delhi. Shipra Publication, p 6.

9. Op.cit. Verma 2007. P 186

10. Swamy Arun R. 2013. Politcal Moblisation in Nirja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds., The oxford Companion to politics in India. New Delhi: OUP.

Chapter II

The Rise of OBCs in North India: The Case of Uttar Pradesh

Chapter II

The Rise of Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in North India: The Case of Uttar Pradesh

This Chapter presents the background to the process and understanding of Backward Caste/class Mobilization which eventually led to the formation of the present day Samajwadi Party. First, an attempt has been made to understand certain characteristics features related to advent of Backward Caste Mobilization in Uttar Pradesh. Further, this article presents forth the Constitutional understanding of OBCs and simultaneously the routes of Kisan and Quota politics through which lower Caste people got mobilized and started to press their demands for representation in politics and administration in North India. For this, it is pertinent to trace the growth of political consciousness among the Backward Classes in India (especially in Uttar Pradesh) under the British rule and since independence to delineate the context of the OBC-linked parties and politics during the period 1960s to late 1980s. The Samajwadi Party is merely an offshoot of this Backward Caste/class movement which gained a foothold after the gradual disintegration of the savarna-dominated Indian National Congress support base among the OBCs ever since the fourth general elections held in 1967.1

2.1 Features of Backward Caste Mobilisation in Uttar Pradesh:

This chapter presents the background to the process and understanding of Backward Caste/class Mobilization which eventually led to the formation of the present day Samajwadi Party. It is under the backdrop of certain characteristics features that we would understand the formation of Samajwadi Party. These are:-

It was rather late:

The Backward Caste Movement in Uttar Pradesh as against the general Backward Caste Movement in India is, rather, a late-comer. On the one hand, the southern part of India experienced Backward Caste Mobilization as early as in 1920s. With the advent of Justice Party, which came to the power in erstwhile Madras Presidency in 1920, the reservation in government services started. Though it was not a balanced one, the reservation to some backward section of the people in Tamil Nadu had given an impetus to the agitation /movement by Backward Classes. In Mysore

state also the same story was repeated. On representation by ‘Prajati Mandal’ in 1921, the Maharaja of Travancore had given the eligibility to the people of the backward sections to be represented in the services. Proclamation to this effect was made in 1935. While, on the other hand, U.P. saw its arrival in late 1960s.

It took a different trajectory:

U.P accentuated this movement different trajectory, charting a middle course between the Bihar Model on the one hand and the Rajasthan/Madhya Pradesh model on the other. While, Bihar represents one end of the continuum, Rajasthan/ M.P appear at the other. The mobilization of the Backward Castes in Bihar intertwined with the peasant movement in the state which dates back to the pre-independence period. It started at a time when the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha led a movement for land reforms under the leadership of Swami Sahajanand Saraswati. The various measures of land reforms, rural development and green revolution benefitted the upper backward castes in rural Bihar. These upper castes consolidated their economic power and emerged as a politically conscious force in Bihar. The role of “Bhoodan Movement” and “J P Movement” further strengthened their resolve. This allowed the politics of Bihar to be totally dominated by the Backward Castes in the days to come, a process in which the upper Castes were completely marginalized. The rise of such aggressively dominant backward castes taking the form of KULAKS, was typically a Bihari phenomenon and was completely missing in Uttar Pradesh.

M.P. and Rajasthan offer entirely different models of Backward Caste Mobilization vis-à-vis Bihar. Despite a very strong presence of SCs/ STs and a substantial number of OBCs (48%) in M.P.2, there is nothing like a backward caste/ class movement in the state. It is not that the backward caste/ classes do not face any difficulty in M.P., but somehow these communities have been so well accommodated in the political structures by the two National Parties- BhartiyaJanta Party(BJP) and Indian National Congress (INC)- that they have perhaps never felt neglected politically. These two national parties have given sufficient space to both the Dalits and the Backwards so that no fragmentation of the electorate has been possible along Caste lines. Rajasthan, too, has had no history of political mobilization of the backward castes. Although, the Jats of the state trace their movement to the one that was started by Sir Chhotu Ram in Punjab during 1920s-1930s to create awareness among Jat peasantry for realizing its collective strength. In Rajasthan3 OBCs

constitute 42% (Jats-10%, Gujjars & Yadavs-10% & Other OBCs-22%); SC-16%, ST-13% of total population. But despite this numerical preponderance, there is neither a backward leadership nor any separate backward political identity in the state. All the lower Castes, including the OBCs and SCs/STs, are either with the Congress or with the BJP. However, as the Jats of Rajasthan were given the OBC status as late as 1999, it is difficult to say that whether they are part and parcel of mainstream OBC movement. The other major component of OBC, the Gujjars started a violent movement under the leadership of Col. Kirori Singh Bainsla demanding their shifting from OBC to ST category in2010, although Meenas vehemently oppose such a move.

No Homogenization of Backward Classes:

In U.P., we do not see any homogenization of Backward classes unlike what happened in Bihar. The OBCs and Dalits could not join hands here, which led to their heterogeneity. Both these communities mobilized masses in their own respective paraphernalia. For example, Chaudhary Charan Singh, former Prime-Minister of India, who is considered as the architect of KISAN POLITICS in U.P., was a Jat politician. He mobilized Jats from Western U.P., especially from the district of Meerut (His area of operation is currently district Baghpat, the then sub-division of district Meerut). Yadav community initially looked towards Charan Singh, but , after the arrival of Mulayam Singh Yadav on the political scene of U.P., it shifted its locus of focus towards him absolutely which culminated in the formation of the Samajwadi Party in November 1992. Similarly, Kanshiram led Dalit Movement through BAMCEF (All India Backward and Minority Community Employees Federation) and DS-4 (Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti) which resulted in formation of present day Bahujan Samaj Party (B.S.P.). His initial modus operandi was focusing upon entire backward classes along with minorities. But , this didn’t pay off. BSP’s leadership was seen as specifically Dalit-oriented. In the year 2007, BSP secured historic mandate (206 seats, 30.43% votes)4 and absolute majority using the formula of Social engineering, though it received a huge setback in 2012 assembly elections (80 seats and 25.9% votes)5 and slumped in 2014 Loksabha elections (seats-nil, 19.6% votes)6 to zero seats. The non-homogenization of backward classes was not only due to social conflict but also for economic contestation. The OBCs usually represented dominant peasantry that forced Dalits for manual labour without paying them adequate compensation. They also succeeded in coercing Dalits for Forced/

Bonded labour. Additionally, absence of charismatic backward Caste leader, unlike Laloo Prasad Yadav in Bihar, also ensured that Dalits and OBCs do not come together. There was a ray of hope in early 1990s when the Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) entered into a pre-poll alliance for Nov. 1993 assembly elections. But Myopic policies of Mulayam Singh Yadav leading to Guest House incident7 at Lucknow sealed the fate of any joint agreement or coming together of SP and BSP i.e. OBCs and Dalits.

Inspired by the Kisan/Peasant Politics of Chaudhary Charan Singh:

The mobilization of peasant classes/castes in U.P., picked up pace in the wake of the decline of the Congress after the fourth general elections and Charan Singh’s break with the Congress. His purpose in forming the BKD (Bhartiya Kranti Dal) was mainly to protect the interests of rich peasantry, particularly, the Jats and Yadavs of western U.P. (Even though, it was projected as aiming to protect the general interests of the peasants as such). Chaudhary Charan Singh held many Kisan rallies. When he was senior Deputy Prime Minister in charge of finance in 1979 (Janta Party govt.), he presented KULAK BUDGET, which helped many big farmers.

Critiquing Charan Singh’s attitude towards small peasants and landless labourers, Prof. S. Pai observes8- “Charan Singh never offered anything to the marginal peasants and the landless; he never advocated a rigorous land ceilings and re-distribution of land. While in his writings, he made much of his concern for the Kisans and the rural poor, he does not even mention landless labourers anywhere in his writings, speeches or political programmes. Chaudhary Charan Singh was mainly concerned with the peasants holding more than two hectares of land and supported the rich peasants (beneficiaries of Green Revolution) from the middle and backward cultivating castes.” The BKD capitalized on this to win their support. It also claimed proportional representation for them in politics along with furthering their interests. Initially BKD looked to be a party spearheading a caste movement, but in few years, it was able to unite sections of the lower and middle peasantry to give the organization the shape of a class movement. But inspite of having Charan Singh/ BKD and Backward class mobilization in U.P., we could not notice any robust land reforms. Moreover, the social constituency represented by the Communists seem to have dwindled with the rise of such mobilization. After the death of Chaudhry Charan

Singh in May 1987, this strand of Backward Caste mobilization received a heavy blow.

Containing the seeds of Lohiyaite Samajwad:

In U.P., Mulayam Singh Yadav epitomized the oscillation of Backward Caste leaders between Lohiya’s Socialism and Charan Singh’s Kisan Politics. The final victory is attributed to Quota politics over Kisan Politics. Mulayam Singh Yadav was born in 1939 at a village Safai in district Etawah, U.P. and brought up in an early Socialist stronghold. Arjun Singh Bhadauria, a veteran leader and Freedom Fighter was elected M.P. from this constituency in 1957 as independent with Socialist leanings. This local connection oriented him towards Socialist School of thought. Yadav was initiated in to politics by Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya, (the propounder of Lohiyaite version of Socialism) when he came to his village for a “Jati Todo” i.e. Break Caste meeting in 1954. Yadav, thereafter, took a keen interest in the Canal Rate Agitation launched by Lohiya in 1954 in 13 districts of U.P. to protest against hike in the irrigation fee introduced by state government. He demonstrated and courted arrest even though he was just 15 years of age at that juncture. Yadav was first elected to the U.P. assembly in 1967 on the ticket of Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) of Dr. Lohiya. After the Death of Lohiya in 1967, he joined the BhartiyaKranti Dal (BKD) OF Chaudhary Charan Singh. He was re-elected on the ticket of BKD in 1974. The BKD and SSP merged the same year to form the Bhartiy aLok Dal (BLD). This BLD became the constituent of Janta Party (JP) IN 1977. Yadav became the state cabinet minister in U.P.in JP Govt. Chaudhary Charan Singh pulled out of JP in 1979 and formed Lok Dal (LD). Mulayam Singh Yadav stayed with him. When Chaudhary Charan Singh died in May 1987, the LD split into LD(A) led by his son Ajit Singh and LD (B) led by Mulayam Singh Yadav in U.P. Yadav, subsequently, merged his faction with the Janta Dal ( JD), a party which amalgamated two currents of Indian Politics- the Socialists of Lohiya school of thought and Chaudhary Charan Singh’s follower of Kisan Politics. Janta Dal formed its government in U.P. in 1989 and Mulayam Singh Yadav was elected as Chief Minister of U.P. for the first time. The JD split in 1990. Yadav remained with the faction led by Chandra Shekhar. This faction came to be known as Samajwadi Janta Party (SJP). Ultimately, Yadav left SJP and formed his own Party on 4-5 September 1992 and named it as Samajwadi Party

(SP)9. In this way, we see that seeds of Lohiyaite Samajwad passed on to one or the other organization. This, in turn, led to the mobilization of Backward Caste in U.P.

Substantial Mobilization of the Backwards by the instrument of Political Parties:

The strategy of mobilization of the lower and backward Castes through the instrument of Political Parties started as a new phenomenon in the Post-Congress polity. The space vacated by Congress was open for acquiring political legitimacy. At least, three contenders appeared on the political scene in U.P. IN 1990s- the Samajwadi Party (SP), the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP). The BSP’s game plan was very clear; it wanted to exercise the complete sway over the Bahujan Samaj but ended up consolidating its hold over the Dalits, especially the Chamars and Jatavas. The lower Dalits (like Parsi and Bhangi/Valmiki) known as Anti-Dalits went with BJP or Congress. The BJP also castled Brahmins and Baniyas. Now the battle was for OBCs.

The Second Democratic Upsurge10 in 1989 had left OBCs disillusioned with the existing parties- the BJP and the Congress. They began to look for the third space. This was provided by the Janta Dal (JD). JD made its government in Uttar Pradesh in 1989 under the leadership of Mulayam Singh Yadav. The electoral history of U.P. since 1989 is characterized by the rise of the backwards. Their presence in U.P. Politics sharply increased when the JD won 208 seats with 30% votes and formed the government. The SP had been formed largely on the social support base derived from the JD, which had emerged as a new political platform giving space to the newly energized marginalized sections of the society- largely the Dalits and the Backwards- in the wake of the second democratic upsurge. Since then, the JD and its later offshoot, the Samajwadi Party (SP) claim to be the true representative of the Backwards. Moreover, Manipulative Politics played by Political leaders for the benefit of their caste provided an ignition point for the backwards to vote in the favour of their leader/caste party.

However, as no community is totally cohesive and homogenous, it is not possible for any political formation to have a monopolistic control over it. The existence of Caste sub-divisions leading to factional fighting always allows space for the division of the voters of a caste group into more than one political party.

2.2 Different phases of Backward Caste Mobilisation in Uttar Pradesh

First Phase: British Rule from 1857 to 1930s:

Uttar Pradesh was one of the strongholds of the Congress Party during the Nationalist Period and in the early years of independence. There was no Anti- Brahmin Movement in the Colonial period. Brahmins dominated all walks of life. Even Congress leadership also came from the upper Castes. Myron Weiner’s thesis about the “Open Elite System” of the Congress Party in 1960s does not fit with the situation prevailing in North India. This analysis was based on case studies from South and West India, but the Congress System was very different in the Hindi belt. In the four main states- Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Bihar- the party remained dominated by elite groups from the upper Castes, either professional politicians from the intelligentsia, businessmen and landlords.

Paul Brass11 suggests that Congress Party before independence and throughout the colonial period was a mass movement, rather than a political party, which combined in itself a wide diversity of political beliefs and social cohesion. Therefore, he identifies “faction” as the basic political unit in the state Congress Party. During the colonial period initially the Congress was able to gain the support of the landlords as well as the tenants and the smaller peasants. This was because it was a broad based party containing the conservative swarajists, socialists and others who were active in the Kisan Sabhas. The Base and support structure of the party was broader than its leadership. As the party which had led the National Movement and due to its secular image, it could gain the support of lower castes/classes, Muslims and prosperous peasant classes

From 1871 onwards, the British enumerated castes ( like the religious groups). This process of Census provided castes with an opportunity to petition the government for a higher place in the order of precedence and for being recorded under new, Sanskritised names. In Northern India, Sixteen Castes did so in 1911 and twenty in 1921 including Kurmis, Gadariyas, Kachhis, Lodhs and Ahirs, who all wanted to be recognized as Kshtriyas.12 This move was in keeping with the logic of Sanskritization since the objective was not to opt out from the Varna system , rather, to rise within it according to its own rules and values.

The period between the Mutiny of 1857 and the First Congress Non- Cooperation Movement of 1921 is of extraordinary importance in Modern Indian History. It was during this period that – 1) English Education began to flourish in Indian Universities. 2) Movements of Social Reform and Religious Revival developed. 3) New Political Institutions were introduced and 4) The Indian National Congress was formed in 1885. The Cultural, Intellectual and Political life of North India in this period was neglected by Historians of Modern India because North India occupied a secondary role in intellectual and political life of the late19th and early 20th centuries compared to Bengal and Bombay (now Mumbai). Yet the root to many developments of 20th century in Indian Politics was provided by U.P.’s BANARAS (Hindu Tradition), ALIGARH (Muslim Tradition) and ALLAHABAD (Secular Tradition). The Non-Cooperation Movement of 1921 brought to Indian Politics a brief moment of unity which was never recaptured again. It appealed to the growing Hindu reaction against the dominance of western civilization and to Muslim resentment against the British because of the war against Turkey. In U.P., this movement had an economic content. In 1918, P.D.Tandon had begun to organize the peasants in Oudh to fight for their rights against Taluqdars. The Peasant Movement merged with the Congress Movement in U.P. when there were serious agrarian riots in the Oudh districts of Rai Bareilly and Faizabad. In 1923 full scale rioting broke out in northern U.P. This led to the resurgence of communal politics of Hindu Mahasabha in 1923 and re-emergence of Muslim League in 1924. Then, Congress Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930-31 was followed by terrible Kanpur riot of 1931. However, by independence, Congress emerged as a party supported primarily by the smaller zamindars and the bigger tenants in North India, particularly in U.P. In 1920s and 1930s we can discern two patterns of agrarian mobilization by Congress - 1) The poorer peasantry were mobilized not by the Congress led movements but by the Kisan Sabha agitations. 2) Its interest coincided with the smaller zamindars and bigger tenants who were the groups which had taken to commercialization of agriculture and prospered in the well-irrigated tracts of western U.P. and supported Congress during No Rent Campaigns/Civil Disobedience Movement. Hence, the Zamindari abolition of 1952 removed big zamindars and passed over Bhumidhari rights to intermediate peasant elite, who were based largely in western U.P.

Another new political development in this period was the growth of ideological politics within the Congress. Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was formed within the Congress in 1934. Though, it was led by Acharya Narendra Dev in U.P., CSP was the beginning of Lohiyaite politics in India.

Second Phase: Evolution of Paracommunities from 1930s to 1960s

The period from 1930s to early 1960s is characterized for the evolution of various Caste associations which were formed to improve the ranks of their castes in the Census so as to drain caste hierarchy and to demand reservation in education/administration. These associations or Paracommunities13 were simply the vehicles for Sanskritization-oriented demands to be put to the state initially but acted as pressure-groups and mutual aid structures vis-à-vis the state later on. For example- Snskritization remained the doctrine of the All India Yadav Mahasabha formed by Kithal Krishna Khedekar in the late 19th century. The propensity of Yadavs towards this basic kind of sanskritization is evident from their attempt at “Aryanising” their history. The first history of Yadavs were written by K.K. Khedekar. This work was taken up by his son R.V. Khedekar and published in 1959 under the title “The Divine Heritage of Yadavs”.This book situates the Origin of Yadavs in ABHIRAS, who were immigrants from Central Asia and established kingdoms in North India. The most recent of such kingdoms was built in Rewari, Haryana in the 17th century. The scion of the dynasty, Rao Bahadur Balbir Singh established the Ahir-Yadav Kshtriya Mahasabha in 1910. This association claimed that the Ahirs descended from the Yadu dynasty, hence, the term Yadav, to which Lord Krishna belonged and that the Ahir’s real name was Yadav and that they were Kshtriyas. To promote a warrior ethos and caste unity, Association leaders could rely on the caste history since Ahirs have been deemed by the British ethnography as coming from the same ABHIRAS. and were known for their martial valour. The prince of Rewari took part in revolt of 1857, for instance. This is probably why M.S.A. Rao considers that the term Yadav refers to both an ethnic category and an ideology. Yadav leaders succeeded in their social fusion project since they persuaded their fellow caste members to downplay the endogamous units. This social fusion was made easier from the 1930s onwards when North Indian Yadavs migrated from their villages to urban areas and especially to Delhi.

Similarly, other major component of OBCs Kurmis formed All India Kurmi Mahasabha which was officially registered in Patna in 1910. But it gained momentum in late 1920s and early 1930s. “Ramanandi Sampraday” presented Kurmis as descending from Lord Ram’s two sons-Luv and Kush. The Kushwahas (Kories, Kachhis and Murao) also claim that their ancestor was Kush. In Bihar, Kurmis, Kories and Yadavs formed TRIVENI SANGH14 in 1934. However, its leaders co-opted with Congress in 1935, when it formed Backward Class Federation to counter such movements.

We see a series of Backward Caste Associations mushrooming in North India during second phase of backward caste mobilization like-All India Jat Mahasabha whose president was Chaudhary Charan Singh in 1937, U.P. Backward Classes Federation in 1929, Bihar State Backward Classes Federation in 1947. All India Backward Classes Federation (AIBCF) was formed on 26th January 1950, the day Indian Constitution came in force, under the presidentship of Punjab Rao Deshmukh who had thoroughly supported Backward Castes during the Constituent Assembly debates. Marc Galanter in his book- “Competing Equalities” suggests that in 1954 there were 88 organizations working for the backward classes in 15 states out of which 74 represented individual communities, 14 backward classes in general on a local or state basis. AIBCF split in 1957 due to Deshmukh’s reluctance to emancipate himself from Congress and Gandhian discourse. Then, R.L.Chandapuri created Indian National Backward Classes Federation. This faction merged itself later with Socialist Party in 1957 itself. Moreover, the first Backward Classes Commission was formed on 29 January 1953 under the Chairmanship of Kakasahab Kalelkar in this second phase of political mobilization of Backwards.

However, One should admit that these caste federations or fronts were not strong because of their differing ideologies and weak organizational machineries. Scholars like Jefferlot are doubtful about the transformational potentialities, especially of lower caste associations since they acted as both– the pressure group and vehicles for sanskritization against the same state. He holds that colonial ethnography was largely responsible for equating the “Aryans” with the upper Castes and Dravidians with the lower orders of Indian Society. This perception prepared the ground for interpretation of the Castes in ethnic terms, especially in Western and Southern India. In the Northern region, or the Aryavrata, the Brahminical pattern was supposed to

have taken root. Apart from forming caste associations and federations, the lower castes took to yet another strategy to secure and safeguard their interests by establishing common fronts first at regional level and later covering the entire country.

Third Phase: Politics of Agrarian Mobilization or Kisan Politics from 1960s to 1980s

We can trace the third phase of backward caste/class mobilization from 1960s onwards till the formation of Lok Dal in 1980s. This period was totally devoted to the Politics and policies favouring farmers and agrarian classes. The term Politics of Agrarian Mobilization15 means mobilization of agrarian classes into politics by political parties, groups and individual leaders. Since the mid-1960s, there has been a growing nexus between the nature of agrarian development, the rise of a rich peasant class and political alignments in North India in general and in U.P. in particular. This process became most visible in U.P. due to the formation of BKD (Bhartiya Kranti Dal) under the leadership of Chaudhary Charan Singh in 1967. This was exclusively a peasant based party. Moreover, one of the most important characteristics of U.P. is that its politics remain closely tied to rural and agrarian plank rather than urban and industrial. Thus, state politics in U.P. in this phase could be described as the “Politics of Agrarian Mobilization”. The introduction of new agrarian technology in the mid- 1960s had a major impact on the levels of agricultural productivity and the agrarian sector in various parts of U.P. The resultant Green Revolution created in some areas a class of rich peasants who benefitted substantially from early adoption of new technology. Having gained economic power and prowess, this rich peasant class made an attempt to gain political power at both- state and national level- in order to equip it with control over public policy towards agriculture. By this phase, we can discern two major changes in agrarian structure of U.P. due to a number of Community Development Programmes and Panchayati Raj Schemes as well as more particularly through Green Revolution. These are - 1) Increasing Class Differentiation 2) Regional Inequalities While in the 1950s and 1960s issues such as land reform, taxation of agriculture, state trading of food grains etc. were important, in the 1970s and 1980s remuneration for farm products and terms of trade with industry had been the central issues. This trend was visible through 1969 elections in which BKD gained 21% of votes and the formation of BLD in 1974. By the mid-1970s, due to the spread of

Green Revolution in to more areas and large scale mobilization of the backward and middle castes, Janta Party got victorious in 1977 assembly elections. The formation of Janta Dal in due course of time, brought together for the first time important agrarian issues to the front and succeeded in capturing political power.

Fourth Phase: Empowerment of Backwards from 1980s to 2000s (Till the formation of Samajwadi Party Governments)

The 1980s were a period of fluidity in U.P. Politics. Following the 1980 elections and the return of Congress to power, opposition parties lost importance. This phase saw the substantial mobilization of the backwards and their subsequent empowerment. The beginning of 1980s reflected the confluence of socialist legacies and peasant politics (by Lok Dal) under the leadership of Chaudhary Charan Singh. This party fought exclusively for the disclosure and implementation of the Mandal Commission Report. But the demise of Chaudhary Sahab led to internal fractions and serious crisis in the party in mid-1980s. In 1980 and 1985 assembly elections, Congress was able to come back to power. This is because of the reason that in these elections national rather than local issues gained momentum. Due to this, agrarian issues were relegated temporarily in the background. Moreover, this double bonanza of victory of Congress in U.P. was part of the sympathy wave which ran in the mind and hearts of electorates due to assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The late 1980s represents the “Second Wave” of Backward Caste Mobilization in post-independence era. By the end of late 1980s, the vast mass of OBC (Ahirs, Kurmis and Kories) besides Jats and Yadavs, who remained outside politics, also got mobilized and entered in politics.

With the formation of Janta Dal in October 1988, OBC became a relevant category for the lower castes, as it concentrated more on caste and less on class. Janta Dal formed its government at the centre under the leadership of V.P. Singh and Mulayam Singh Yadav led Janta Dal government in Uttar Pradesh in 1989.The Prime- Minister V.P. Singh’s politics of reservation or affirmative/positive discrimination reminds us of return to Lohiyaite Principles in Indian Government and politics in general. On date 7th August 1990, he proclaimed the implementation of 27% reservation for OBCs as per the report of Mandal Commission in education and government service. This reflects the empowerment of the backwards “from the below”. After the resignation of V.P. Singh, Janta Dal broke down and split. Mulayam

Singh Yadav remained with the faction of Chandra Shekhar, called the Samajwadi Janta Party (SJP). In the wake of Chandra Shekhar’s reluctance towards Mandal card (since Rajputs were his mainstay in eastern U.P.) Mulayam Singh Yadav launched his own party i.e. Samajwadi Party (SP) in Lucknow in November 1992. Since then, SP considers itself to be the true representative of the backwards in Uttar Pradesh. November 1993 assembly elections in U.P. were fought by SP-BSP Alliance. Mulayam Singh became Chief Minister on 5th December 1993.After that, he assumed charge of Chief Ministership of U.P. in 2003.He has become C.M. of U.P. thrice. Again he got a chance in 2012 when SP secured absolute majority in assembly elections, but owing to youth-orientation, he introduced his son Akhilesh Yadav as Chief Ministerial candidate. Thus, we see OBCs, as social and political category, have taken access to power so many times and have influenced public policy in their favour by forming government.

Fifth Phase: From Identity Politics and Empowerment to Good Governance and Development (2007 onwards till Date)

The landslide victory of the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) in Lok Sabha elections 2014 surprised not only its rivals and political observers, but even its own leaders. Winning 71 seats out of 80 with voting percentage of 42.3% in U.P., BJP secured absolute majority in Lok Sabha on its own. It is significant to note that the party made electoral gains across all castes and communities and across all regions in the state. Similarly, in 2012 state assembly elections, SP secured absolute majority with 224 seats and voting percentage of 29.27%. Voters of U.P. sent 21 Congressmen to parliament in 2009 when everybody thought that it must be a terminal decline of Congress party in U.P. BSP, too, in 2007 assembly elections with the help of Savarna politics or Social Engineering formula won 206 seats with voting percentage of 30.43%. What does this picture figure out in U.P. Politics. These examples have signalled a paradigm shift in voter behavior. After about 25 odd years people of state refused to go along with caste-based parties and preferred to vote for “Good Governance and Development.” This has pushed out the identity politics of caste and community to the backstage.

Now the question arises as to why and how did voters of U.P. think so? The possible answer could be that the voters have well-understood the difference between National and State elections. Since caste politics have become redundant in National

politics, it was futile to vote for a party that does not have development and accountable governance on its agenda. Moreover, the people of state had seen two models of governance in the form of SP-BSP at the state level and UPA-NDA at National level. In 2014 parliamentary elections, people voted for developmental model of Gujrat as enunciated by Narendra Modi. They found in Modi an effective instrument of change. Therefore, they voted for Modi’s vision of development and good governance as juxtaposed to SP’s incompetence, lack of vision, blatant casteism, freebee politics, Muslim Appeasement and an environment of deteriorating law and order conditions. Whereas UPA’s regime is marked by scams, political corruption, rising prices and misuse of power. It must be made crystal clear here that “Modi Wave” has surprised all, and not BJP.

Prof. Mirza Asmer Beg in his essay entitled “Ebb and Flow of Party support”(2014)16 opines that BJP registered accretions in vote share in 2014 Lok sabha elections among all social groups, cutting across caste and community lines, including Muslims. However, we must remember that this happened with BSP in 2007 and with Congress, too, in 2009. Therefore, BJP could not easily sit quite for assembly elections to be held in 2017. The Muslim vote is often thought of as tactical voting to defeat BJP, but that behavior seems to be changing in Uttar Pradesh. The traditional beneficiary of Muslim vote in U.P. the Samajwadi Party has fallen grace post-Muzzaffar Nagar riots. While Congress, SP, BSP, RLD and AAP, vie with each other for Muslim Votes, BJP has complicated the scenario by trying to access them too. Its efforts got impetus via Muslim clerics or Dharma Gurus, who warned non- BJP parties not to instill fear among Muslims in the name of BJP. It seems that in current times, Muslims are re-thinking now and their re-thought is driven by sociological and political considerations. Recent CSDS (Centre for the study of Developing Societies) studies substantiate this projection. While, 3% Muslims voted for BJP in 2007 assembly elections 7% in 2012 respectively, their support may go up to 11% in next elections if Modi government come true and supportive in their stance towards Muslims. Thus, we see, this phase reflects that entire dynamics of transition may shift focus in academic discourse from identity and empowerment to governance and development.

2.3 Constitutional understanding of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs)

The Constitution of India talks about the backward classes of citizen only and not about backward castes. Article 1517 of the Indian Constitution states about positive discrimination for them. The Constitutional understanding of the backward classes means socially and educationally backward classes. It also includes Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) under this category. For the purpose of clarity, it would be helpful to distinguish between Backward Classes and Backward Castes. The OBCs were mentioned in the Constitution in most general terms and there were no all- India list18 drawn up for them. The question of who constituted the SCs/STs was debated and roughly settled before independence. It was the first Backward Classes Commission (appointed under Article 340 of Indian Constitution) headed by Kaka Sahab Kalelkar that made use of caste as a criterion for determining social backwardness. This Commission was formed on 29 Jan.1953 and was consisted of 11 members mainly belonging to low castes except its Chairman, who was a Brahmin. It identified 2399 backward castes, which included 837 “Most Backward Castes”. The recommendation of this Commission was rejected, by the then government, due to the fact that it disagreed with the selection of caste as a criterion of determining social backwardness. In the absence of a central law or directive the states arbitrarily enlarged the benefits for backward classes. The second Backward Classes Commission was appointed on 1 Jan.1979. It was headed by B.P. Mandal and could do no better. Popularly known as Mandal Commission, it submitted its report on 31 Dec.1980. The Commission had recommended 27% reservation for the OBCs. The Mandal Commission recommendations were accepted and implemented in 1989 by V.P. Singh government at the centre.

It could do no better in the sense that it also made caste based social backwardness, a crucial element in the determination of the “backwardness” of Hindus, though it also used educational backwardness as a linked element and economic backwardness as a derived element. Thus, by the end of 1980s castes had become an accepted criterion for the determination of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens.

Since, the SCs and STs were the constitutionally recognized backward Classes, the other castes that qualified for the status of the “socially and educationally backward classes of citizens” were referred to as the Other Backward Classes

(OBCs). Now in common parlance and even in academic discourse the OBCs are referred to as the backwards while the SCs/STs are known as Dalits. Thus, OBC became a relevant unit and low castes started to rally around this administrative category in order to defend their reservations/quotas at the disposal of the state. It is with this segment of the society called the OBCs that we are going to address in this research.

The Other Backward Castes (OBCs) are castes in the Indian Social system that are situated above the untouchables but below the forward castes. These mainly consist of peasant castes of various descriptions, which usually occupy low positions in the Varna hierarchy. These castes lack the traditions of literacy and western education. They are often poorly represented in government jobs and in White-Collar occupations. Yet they usually occupy a dominant position in the economic and political system of village life. Hence, M.N. Srinivas has termed them as Dominant Castes. Scholars like Nomita Yadav puts that when they are numerically preponderant, they control a village, a district and even a state.

In pursuance of the directives of the Supreme Court, given in Writ Petition Civil no. 930 of 1990 of Indira Sawhney and others V/S Union of India and others ( Judgement pronounced on 16.11.1992), Government of India enacted the National Commission for Backward Classes Act 1993 and set up the same at centre. This commission drew up a detailed list of backward castes in different states.19

2.4. Peasant and Backward Castes

The new agrarianism had an explosive effect on Indian politics following the official sponsored Green Revolution in the mid of 1960s. The effect of new agrarian was to led both the anti Congress parties (including the Hindu supremacist Jan Sangh and its allies) and the reborn Congress led by Indira Gandhi. Jati and varna themes received much emphasis in this pronouncement. The term KHAM, was an acronym for Kshatriyas, Harijan, Adivasis ('tribal') and Muslim. The Congress leaders in the key agricultural regions- most notably in the Hindi heartland states of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Haryana- could no longer appeal to voters. They began to target their electoral appeal towards the two extremes of the economic and social spectrum.20

The Muslim, Harijans and Adivasis or 'Tribals', the 'HAM' voters, continued to be thought of as natural congress voters because Congress was the party of

'secularism' and so-called protective discrimination for the deprived. Kshatriyas refer to the elite landowners who in the Gangetic north were typically of Rajput or Bhumihar origin. They won over as Congress voters when the party signaled to them that its ruling state ministries were willing to favour their economic interest by suspending or relaxing the land ceiling laws. These Nehruvian quasi-socialist enactments of the early post-independence era had supposedly paved the way for the large scale transfers of the land to the rural poor by setting limits on the size of individual land holdings (Bayly 1999: 285). Mrs. Gandhi's 22 month period of dictatorship (emergency 1975-77). In the political spectrum the voters were being told to see caste bonds both as an asset and as a means by which others had hitherto been able to advance themselves unfairly.21

The state power played an important role in the linking of caste with the phenomenon of mass 'kisan' (peasant) mobilization. In 1970s, Indira Gandhi successfully alliance with the Communist Party of India and campaign with a slogan 'garibi hatao' (eradicate poverty). Mrs Gandhi projected herself as land reformer and pro-poor so that she could appeal the masses. It immediately affected the election scenario in 1971s general election and Congress Party captured the power in the Centre. The party got the support of tribals and untouchables. In the era of 'garibi hatao' politicians came to treat educational and employment quotas as electoral assets and raising the stakes at election times by promising larger quota allocations to important group of voters (Brass 1990).22 There were central policy makers of this giant new category called "Other Backward Classes (OBCs)". These communities were neither 'tribals' nor 'untouchables' but it was difficult to identify such communities.

In Uttar Pradesh, as a result of agrarian reform and quota politics, caste identities have not receded but evolved under the influence of political parties. The relationship between the political and the social spheres has passed through caste from the 1950s onwards. After getting independence from British, parties were looking for mobilization of masses. As ideological politics withered away and no new ideological orientations were offered. Caste provided with an easy-to use mobilization social basis.23

The relations between social groups and the polity were bi-dimensional and reciprocal in democratic societies. The parties influenced and shape the society as

society shapes political parties. There was restructuring of political parties on the basis of social, caste based dynamics both regional as well as national levels. Uttar Pradesh has evolved from having a political system which is dominated by upper castes over the whole period considered (1952-2002). Muslim were 18 per cent of population, but no Muslim leadership has emerged in the state. Hindu marginalized groups have followed the social change to assert themselves but no such change occurred in Muslim communities.

In the post independence era (from 1952 to 1967), there was the dominance of upper caste in the assembly. During the period of 1967 to 1989, there was the increase in OBC members in the assembly. The number of upper caste MLAs in the assembly went from 58 per cent in 1952 to 45 per cent in 1967 and 1969.24 In 1969, Jana Sangha party had 47 per cent upper caste party MLAs. But there was also 10 per cent MLAs from backward caste in the Jana Sangha Party. The Socialist Parties had more than'25 per cent belonged from backward castes middle tenants.

Table - 1

Caste and Composition of the UP Assembly, 1974-02 (Per cent)24

Caste and 1974 1977 1980 1983 1989 1991 1993 1996 2002 Communities Upper castes 37.80 35.18 41.31 39.70 35.68 39.05 26.05 34.55 35.38 Intermediary 1.41 1.16 1.17 2.10 2.58 3.09 3.05 3.71 4.67 Caste (Jat) OBC 18.30 16.78 13.36 19.60 24.14 32.39 32.39 24.83 27.52 Scheduled 21.35 21.42 21.58 21.94 22.02 22.14 22.30 22.07 21.87 Castes Scheduled 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 __ Tribes Muslim 9.38 11.66 11.97 12.15 9.62 5.48 7.51 8.82 10.57

Source : Jaffrelot (2007).

The above data show that different social group's representation in the assembly election h m 1974 to 2002 onwards. In 1974, the upper castes representation the assembly was 37.80 percent which reached 35.38 per cent in 2002 has been decreased by around 2 per cent. The intermediary castes (Jat) representation was 1.41 per cent in 1974 which reached 4.67 per cent in 2002. The OBC MLAs representation

61 was 18.30 per cent in 1974 which reached 27.52 in 2002 in the state. There was no such improvement in the representation of Scheduled Castes MLAs between 1974 to 2002. The Muslim representation increased by nominal 1 per cent between 1 974 to 2002. We see that OBCs MLAs increased more than any other community during this period. It is important to know that the representation upper caste MLAs has decreased during this period in the state legislature.

The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) launched by Kanshi Ram in 1984, was a party of Dalits aiming at forming alliances of Dalits, Minorities and OBCs.26 implementation of Mandal Commission in 1990, the political scenario of the state has changed. The electoral success of Samajwadi Party (SP)- Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) alliance in 1993 had some record number of elected OBCs MLAs comparatively more than Upper Castes MLAs in the state legislature. After Mandal, whichever party came into power the OBCs MLAs remained in high number. Mandal opened the power sharingera. In 1993, the SP and BSP were the main contributors to the introduction of a new political personnel with more than 40 per cent of OBC MLAs in the state legislature. In 1993 election both the parties SP and BSP shows the specific trends. The SP and BSP both nominate more OBCs and SCs candidate respectively. Even BSP did not nominate any upper caste candidate due to anti-Brahmin strategy. But SP manage to win 10 per cent upper caste MLAs. In the same year, Yadavs with 35 per cent MLAs, were more than SCs and upper caste MLAs put together.26

Both the parties changed their strategy and introduced upper caste candidates in the election. At a result the share of OBCs and SCs candidate went down in 1996 compare to 1993. The dilution of the BSP's anti-Brahmin discourse was a result of the alliance entered with the Congress in which 15 per cent MLAs of Congress belonged to upper castes. The Congress party had 65 per cent' MLAs belonged to upper castes, 15 per cent OBCs and 9 per cent SCs. Bhartiya Janta Party (BP) which perceived as an upper caste party nevertheless had over 21 per cent of its MLAs corning from the backward castes27 in terms of political representation, the OBCs MLAs increased since 1960s in the state.

We observe that OBCs vote was shifted to one party to another party during 1996, and 1999 election.

Table-2

Shift of OBCs voters in Percentage (1996-99)28

PARTY 1996 1997 1999 CONGRESS 5.9 7.6 16.4 BJP 39.9 44.9 24.7 SP 38.0 33.1 18.2 BSP 11.7 10.9 10.8 Source : National Election Studies, New Delhi.

This table shows the OBC voters shift in four important parties like Congress, Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), Samajwadi Party (SP), Bahujan Simaj Party (BSP). If we 1999 OBCs voters shifted towards 'congress Party by 16.4 per cent. The BJP and SP voters decrease by 24.7 and 18.2 per cent respectively. Only in BSP the OBC voters struck in this party with 10.8 per cent from 1997 onwards.

Mayawati has announced to give the ticket to so-called upper caste. She extended her friendship towards Brahmin and criticized political parties to not doing enough for them. Even she questioned Prime Minister Atal Bihari Bajpayee for not doing anything to Brahmin at that time.

The Yadav, Thakur/ Rajput, Muslim supporters of Mulayam Singh have to oppose by Dalit, Brahmin and Muslim supporters of BSP. The BSP leadership has launched Brahmin mobilization rallies in various districts. She gave the slogan during the election that Yeh haathi (election symbol of BSP) nahi, (Janesh haiti, Brahnia, Vishnu, Mahesh haiti.29 in 2007 election; Mayawati got the majority and became the Chief Minister with the support of upper castes in the state.

2.5 The reservation policy for Other Backward Classes in Uttar Pradesh

After the 61 years of independence the reservation policy for backward classes could not play important role in social and economic aspects of the people. There may be various reasons for that. Some important factors could be negligence of political parties, government officials, the mind set of the people regarding the caste system or insensitiveness towards the implementation of the Government policies and competition at the higher level. There is also shocking news which revealed by the Arjun Sen Gupta Committee report that more than 75 percent of the people in the

country living at Rs. 13 per day. They show that after the growth of GDP, it could not improve the conditions of the people at the grass-root level.

The last caste based population available in 1931 census in India. After that population census on the basis is not available. The two Sociologists enumerated the population of Uttar Pradesh based on caste. They divided the population in Upper Castes, Lower Castes (Upper status) Most Backward Castes, Dalit Castes and Muslim.

Chhedilal Sathi Commission:

The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna established three members Commission to find out the Backward Classes in the State, on 31 October 1975. Chhedilal Sathi was the president of the Commission and Ma]khan Singh Saini and Sita Rain Nishad was the member of it. The Commission has submitted its report on 17th May 1977.

The Commission found 41 most backward castes, which were 26 per cent of the total, population of the State. It recommended 17 per cent reservation for them in Government jobs. In his report, he also shows that 12 castes were Upper Backward Castes, which were the 20 per cent of the total population and recommended 10 per cent reservation for them in jobs. He also suggested 2.5 per cent reservation for Muslim Backward Castes, which is 6 per cent of the total population in the State. The Commission also recommended free education, hostel facilities, scholarship, reservation in educational institutions and government support to establish the small- scale’ industries as well as reservation in Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, Vidhan Sabha and Vidhan Parisad and also representation in Government Commissions.

Social Justice Committee:

The Uttar Pradesh government formed a Social Justice Committee on June 28, 2001 beaded by Hukum Singh, Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and two other members were Rampati Shastri Health Minister and Daya Ram Pal member of UP Legislative Council. The Committee was formed to look into the existing government schemes, programs and facilities for the welfare of SCs, STs and OBCs to achieve the social justice in the state. A ‘Social Justice Week’ was organized from 30th July to 6th August in the state.30 It registered the family of 53,000 village panchayats in the state. The committee received and considered 3,233 representations from various

interested groups in the state. It also analyzed SCs, STs and OBCs groups in the 11,27,311 government posts in UP.31 The committee submitted 200 pages Report on 31 August 2001. The Uttar Pradesh cabinet accepted the report on 13th September and in 15th September the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (Reservation for SCs, STs and OBCs (Amendment Ordinance 2001) was accepted by the Governor.

There were 66 SCs groups and 79 OBCs groups in Uttar Pradesh. The spirit of reservation was to benefit for the all section of society in equitable manner. Then only sprit of social justice could be achieved here. The Social Justice. Committee found the share of jobs of SCs and OBCs. The data suggested that Chamars/Jatava among SCs and Yadava among OBCs occupied maximum share of government jobs.

In the higher education among SCs Jatava occupied 49.54 per cent of reserved seats followed by Koris (12.04 per cent), Pasis (10.04 per cent) and Dhobis (10.04 per cent), Among the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), Yadav occupied 32.37 per cent followed by Kurmis of 11.24 per cent. The Chamars and the Yadavs also took the advantage of land holdings and other benefits. Due to that SCs have been divided into Chamars versus 65 per cent sub caste of non Chamars. Among 21 per cent government jobs for SCs 10 per cent has reserved for SCs and 11 percent for non- Chamars.

At the same time OBCs group divided into three groups like A, B and C. The Yadavs/ Ahirs were placed into group A, Sonar, Jat, Kurmi, Gin, (3ujar, Gossain, Lodh and Kamboj in Group B, and the remaining 70 castes (viz, Kahar, Kevat, Koexi, Kumhar, Gaderia, Tell, Lohar etc.) included in group C.32 According to social justice committee, the reservation for OBCs raised by 27 to 28 per cent in government jobs. The 5 percent reserved for group A, 9 per cent for group B and 9 per cent for group C.

Table - 3

OBCs' share in Population and Government Job33

Caste Caste Population in Percentage in Percentage in Category Lakhs OBC Jobs Population Yadav/Ahirs A 146.77 19.40 33.00 Kurmi B 56.46 7.46 12.49 Lodhi B 37.06 4.90 4.16 Jat B 27.26 3.60 6.85 Gujjar B 4.12 0.50 1.70 Gadaria/PalC C 33.50 3.43 3.78 Kewat/Mallah C 32.74 4.33 1.36 Momin/Ansar C 31.40 4.15 2.28 Teli/Sahu C 30.47 4.30 2.82 Kumhar C 25.84 3.42 2.34 Kahar C 25.04 3.31 2.63 Kachchi C 24.56 3.25 2.97 Nai C 22.79 3.01 2.92 Source : Government in Uttar Pradesh (2001), Social Justice Committee Report, 2001.

In 1975 the Chhedilal Sathi Commission of Uttar Pradesh had found wide differences in socio-economic status of various castes of backward classes. Kaipoori Thakur suggested 8 per cent quota for intermediary OBCs and 12 per cent for the Most Backward Classes (MBCs). The Supreme Court gave its verdict to uphold the 27 per cent reservations for the OBCs and suggested the exclusion of ‘creamy layer’ or economically well-off from reserve seats.

According to new law 21 per cent government jobs were reserved for SCs, 2 per cent for STs and 27 per cent for OBCs. Now total 50 per cent government jobs are reserved which followed the Supreme Court decision of November 1992 to strict the reservation upto 50 per cent.

The Uttar Pradesh Public Service (Reservation for SCs, STs and OBCs) Act 1994, has been amended to insert a separate Scheduled III in new law. It enumerated 66 Scheduled Castes in UP and divided them into two parts. In part A the Chamars also known as Dhusia, Jhusia and Jatava and remaining 65 castes come under part B.

In part A constitutes 55.70 per cent of the total SC population. It has retained 11.5 per cent of the 21 per cent jobs reserved for all SCs.

Estimated Reservation for Other Backward Classes:

The Hukurn Singh Committee estimated that the population of OBCs in UP increased from 41.13 per cent in 1991 to 54.05 percent in 2001. It shows 12.92 per cent increased in a decade. The number of backward caste also increased from 55 in 1991 to 79 in 2001. The 24 new castes have included in the list of backward caste.

Table - 4

OBCs- Nomenclature of their Castes in Uttar Pradesh34

Part of Categories Name of castes No. of Scheduled Castes Part-A Other Backward Ahir/Yadav/GwalafYaduvashiya 1 Classes (OBCs) Part-B More Backward Sonar/Sunar/Swarnkar, Jat, Kurzni/ 8 Classes Chanau/Patel/Patnanwar/KurmiMai;/kurmi- (MRBCs) Seinthwar, Giri, Gujar, Gosain, Lodh/ Lodha/Lodbi/Lot/Lodhi-Rajput, Kamboj. Part-C Most Backward Arakh/Arakvanshiya, Kachclii-Kushwalia/ Classes (MBCs) Shakya, Kahar/ Kashyap, Kewat/Mallah/ Nishad, Kishan, Koen, Kimihii-/Prajapati, Kasgar, Kunjra or Raeen, Gareria/ Pal Vaghel, Gaddi/Ghoshi, Chikwa/Qassab, Qureshri/Chak, Chhippi, Chipa, Jogi, Jhoja, Dhafali, Tomali/Barai/Chaurasia, Teli/ samani /Rogangar/ Sahu/ Rauniar/ Gandhi / arrak Darji/drisi/Kakutstha, Dhiver, Naqqai, Nat(those not included in SC), Naik, Lohar/ Lahar-Saifi, Lonia/ Nonia/ Gole-Thakur/ Lonia-Chauhan, Rangrez/ Rangwa, Marchcha, Halwai/ Modanwal, Hajjam/Nai/ Salmain/ Savita/ Sriwas, Rai, Sikb, Sakka-Bhisti/Bhisti-Abbasi, Dhobi (those not included in SC/ST), Kasera/ Thathera/Tainrakar, Nanbai, Mirshikar, Shekh/ Sarwari (Pirai)/Peerahi, Mev/ Mewari, Koshta/ Koshti, Ror, Khumra/ Sangatarash/ Hansiri, Mochi, Khagi, Tanwar Singharia, Fakir, Banjara/ Ranki/Mukeri/Mukerani, Barhai/ Saifi/ Vishwakarma/Panchaal, Ramgadhiya/ Jangir/Dhiman, Bari, Beragi, Bind, Biyar,

Bhar/Raj-Bhar, Bhurji/Bharbhunia/ Bhooj/ Kandu/ Kashaudhan, Bhathiara, Mali/Saini, Sweeper (those not included in SC)/ Halalkhor, Kathura, Maheegeer, Dangi, Dhakar, Gada, Tantawa, Joria, Patwa/ Patahara/Patechara/Deovanshi, Kalal/ Kalwar/Kalar, Manihar/Kacher/Lakhara, Murao/Murai/maurya, Monia(Ansar), Muslim Kayastha, Mirasi, Naddaf (Dhuniya)/Kandere/Kadere/Karean (Karn). Source: UP Gazette Extraordinary, Sept15, 2001. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2001), Social Justice Committee Report, Lucknow.

The OBCs are categorized into three parts. The Yadavs which are also known as Ahirs, Gwalas and Yaduvanshiyas kept in Part A to know their socio-economic conditions and shares in public services and posts. In Part B, there are eight intermediary castes belonging to More Backward Classes (MBCs). There were 70 castes recognized in Part C as MBC categories (above in the table no 4). Significantly, there are 22 Muslim OBCs castes included in the MBC category for their inclusion in government jobs.

2.6 Backward Caste Mobilisation: Movement in North India

When we look at the backward caste movement in Uttar Pradesh in relation to general backward caste movement in India, we find that the movement came to U.P. quite late, at the end of 1960s. India has a long history of backward caste movements in the south. The first regions to experience the political organization of the lower castes were the small princely states of Kolhapur, the state of Mysore & the province of Madras. Caste based reservations were implemented in these areas during the first quarter of the twentieth century.

Historically, the backward castes mobilization in North India in the post independence period dates back to the late 1950s & 1960s under the leadership of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya, Kanshi Ram & Chaudhary Charan Singh Prior to it in North India two of the largest mobilization institutions were the U.P. Backward class Federation (1929) & Bihar State backward Classes Federation (1947). The All India Backward Classes Federation emerged from these two state organizations. The AIBCF was created on 26 January 1950 to protest against the scant attention paid to the OBCs. Its architect & president Punjabrao Deshmukh thoroughly supported the backward castes during the constituent assembly debates. Christophe Jaffrelot in this

regard mentions two kinds of approaches. The first one concentrated on their mobilization as peasants (Kisan politics). This approach was initiated by members of cultivating castes such as Chhotu Ram (a jat from Punjab) between the 1920s & the 1940s, Swami Sahajanand (a bhumihar) who became a leading figure of the Bihar Kisan Sabha in the 1930s. The second one relied more on caste identities (Quota politics) & was primarily articulated by Socialist leaders such as Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya, who regarded caste as the main obstacles towards an equalitarian society. While the Kisan school endeavored to gather all those engaged in cultivating work on the basis of socio-economic demands, the caste-oriented socialists attempted to form an alliance of the non-elite group mainly on the basis of affirmative action techniques. They asked for caste-based quotas, especially in the administration.

The first Backward Classes Commission was appointed on January 29,1953 under the chairmanship of Kaka sahib Kalelkar, a former disciple of Gandhiji. Its report relied heavily on the concept of caste for defining the OBCs. Caste was not the only criterion but it was a key element. The commission drew up a list of 2,399 castes, representing about 32% of the Indian population, as forming the bulk of the “socially & Educationally Backward Classes” that needed affirmative action programs. The report was rejected by Nehru’ government Home minster G.B. Pant on the grounds of:

1) establishment of society on socialistic pattern which disapproves of social & other distinctions

2) disapproval of use of caste as the most prominent criterion for identifying the backward classes.

The report was tabled before the parliament accompanied by a memorandum by pant on September 3, 1956 but was not even discussed. In May 1961 Nehru’s government eventually decided that there was no need for an all-India list of the OBCs & consequently there would be no reservation policy at the centre. Even though they were responsible for article 340 of the constitution, Congressmen were obviously reluctant to cater to the needs of the lower castes, either because of sheer conservation or Socialist ideas. Although the report of the first backward classes commission was shelved, it was a milestone for the low caste movement in North India.

The Quota Politics & the Socialists:

The “rising star” of the Indian Socialist Movement, Dr. Ram Manaohar Lohiya, a Baniya by caste, was probably the first who really incorporated caste in the movement ideology. The Socialists began to focus on the peasant’s condition at a time when the congress leadership was still rather urban-oriented. The founding conference of Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was held in Patna in May 1934. It advocated the organization of the peasants in Kisan Sanghs. CSP broke away from Congress in 1948, forming Socialist Party (SP). Then SP merged with Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) of Acharya Kripalani forming Praja Socialist Party (PSP) in 1953. PSP has done a lot for mobilization of lower caste peasants & workers in Travancore-Cochin state the PSP was in power in that state, but when his own government fired upon a group of agitating Estate workers, Lohiya criticized the government & asked for its resignation. He even advocated 60% reservation for minorities, backward castes, & SCs/STs in government service. Disagreeing with most PSP leaders who were inclined to collaborate with Congress, Lohiya launched his own Socialist Party in 1956. a laborious re-unification process led to the foundation of Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) in 1964. Lohiya remained at the helm of the SSP till his death in 1967. By this time, it had become the largest socialist force in India.

Lohiya was of the view that “caste is the most overwhelming factor in Indian life”. He therefore, became the staunchest supporter of Positive Discrimination-what he called “Unequal Opportunities” and not only in the favour of the scheduled castes but also that of backward castes. Lohiya did not entertain any romantic idea of the Indian plebe- “the Shudra too has his shortcomings”. He had an even narrow sectarian outlook but in spite of this he maintained that Shudra deserved special treatment. This special treatment consists in pushing them to positions of power & leadership. Lohiya did not regard affirmative action in the education system as desirable but emphasized the need for quotas in administration & for the electoral candidates. Obviously, reservations were intended to give a share of power to the lower castes, it was an empowerment scheme. In 1959 the third National Conference of SP expressed the wish that at least 60% of the posts in the administration be reserved for OBCs. This demand was reiterated time & again in fifth annual session of the party in 1961 & in the first conference of SSP in April 1966.

Lohiya’s strategy bore its most significant fruits in Bihar, the birthplace & cradle of Socialism in India since the foundation of the Congress Socialist Party in Patna in 1934. In. 1967, SSP, Jan Sangha & the Communists formed a majority coalition called the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD) in Bihar. However, the socialist leaders were in a way, victims of their own strategy of promotion & mobilization of lower castes. Though SVD got success by increasing the number of lower caste MLAs especially Yadavs (14.8%) but this group didn’t show commitment to the SSP. Soon after the elections B.P. Mandal, a yadav defected & formed Shoshi Dal with 40 lower castes dissident MLAs coming from different sides, including the SSP. I. after on. he became the first OBC Chief Minister of Bihar (to topple the SVD government) in February 1968 with the support of Congress.

Kisan Politics and the Mobilization of Jat Farmers:

Kisan politics made its impact in Uttar Pradesh under the aegis of a Jat leader. Chaudhary Charan Singh, at the same time as the Socialists were rising to power in Bihar in the late 1960s.Jat farmers had long been the crucible of Kisan politics because they embodied the independent-minded peasant proprietor, not only in U.P. but also in Punjab, its real birthplace. Actually, Sir Chhotu Ram was the architect of Kisan politics. Born in 1881 Sir Chhotu Ram was the son of small jat peasant in a village of Rohatak district. He was the first jat peasant to become the part of intelligentsia by studying in Delhi & practising in Agra as a layer in 1912. As early as in 1907 he wrote in The Imperial Fortnightly an article entitled “The Improvement of India Village Life”. This article established the mainstays of the ideology of the Kisan. He propagated the idea of Biradari (peasant’s brotherhood) among the AHJRS, JA TS, GUJARS & RAJPUTS-hence, the acronym AJGAR. Sir Chhotu Ram joined Congress in 1917 but soon left it due to its urbanized culture to form National Unionist Party (NUP) with Mian Faz-i-Husain. After the 1923 electoral success of NUP, he became the Agriculture Minister of Punjab. Chhotu Rant used two entwined languages- one was of jat cultural assertion & the other was that of a homogenous rural community embodying elements of Kisan culture. Logically enough, another jat Charan Singh articulated this ideology after independence.

Charan Singh and Kisan Politics:

Charan Singh’s discourse is replete with his lowly origins. He always identified himself with the interests of peasants. For him, Nehru epitomized elitist, urban- oriented attitude in Indian society. According to Charan Singh priority has to be given to agriculture & not to industry for development. To implement a rural- oriented economic policy, the administration had to be staffed by the sons of farmers because only arm official who understand & thought like a peasant could effectively solve his problems. Charan Singh’s view of affirmative action is, therefore, very different from that of Lohiya. For him, it is a way of making an agriculture based peasant proprietor more efficient while for others, it was a way of empowering the lower castes. In I 939, before the executive committee of the Congress Parliamentary Group, in Uttar Pradesh assembly (where he had been elected for the first time in 1937) he proposed a 50% quota in public administration in favour of the sons of farmers. He framed his project in terms of a “Urban India v/s Rural India” conflict. The All India Jat Mahasabha supported his proposal but he was less wedded to caste affiliations as such. He rather, tried to subsume caste identities into a feeling of class or at least into one of a peasant movement.

This approach was partly dictated by his own Caste background as jats occupy an intermediary position; though technically they have to be classified as Shudras. Their dominant caste status is often the root-cause of conflicts with lower castes. In addition, their number is comparatively small in Uttar Pradesh only 1.2% of the population. Therefore, he had good reasons to forge a Kisan identity that jats would be leading & for promoting an identity opposing the Kisans to town-dwellers in order to transcend caste divisions in to a new group feeling of peasant solidarity. Even though OBC leaders rallied around Chaudhary Charan Singh, his scheme was not designed for their group’s emancipation rather it was for the promotion of the interests of those who owned some land. In fact it was likely to reinforce the jat’s hegemony over the lower castes.

As revenue minister in-charged of Land reforms in Uttar Pradesh after independence, he promoted the interests of what he called the middle peasantry by abolishing the Zamindari system. The hulk of this class was to come from the intermediary castes, including his own caste-jats. Such an approach largely explains the selective character of UP, land reform & his later conflicts with Nehru. In 1959,

he vigorously opposed the project of agricultural co-operatives announced by Nehru as Prime Minister in the Nagpur session of Congress. He immediately published a book called- “joint Farming X-rayed: The Problem & its solution” in which he proposed a strategy of global development radically opposed to that of Nehru. In some ways this hook is the first manifesto of Kisan politics in post-independence India. The Congress displayed shortsightedness in marginalizing Charan Singh in UP. politics because in the 1960s the social basis of his Kisan politics had mushroomed. The jats of Western U.P. & Haryana grew wealthy thanks to the increase in sugarcane production resulting from extensive programmes in the framework of Green Revolution. The assertion of these middle farmers, among ‘whom the jats were over- represented largely explains the growing success of Charan Singh’s Kisan politics in U.P. in 1960s.

Charan Singh’s Kisan politics enabled him gradually to build a coalition encompassing the cultivating castes ranging from OBCs to intermediate castes. This coalition .in fact was the old AJGAR grouping that Chhotu Ram had already developed in Punjab except the Raiputs. Mulayam Singh Yadav was among the Yadav followers whom Charan Singh attracted in the 1960s.He was first elected MLA in 1967. He was introduced to Charan Singh by another OBC JairamVerma, a kurmi. Thus, Kisan politics gradually found its constituency in other leaders ton in Uttar Pradesh. Charan Singh left Congress in 1967 & toppled C.B. Gupta’s government in U.P. to become Chief Minister with the help of 16 non-upper caste MLAs out of which 9 were Yadavs

The comparison of Charan Singh’s modus operandi in U.P. and the situation in Bihar suggest that two means of mobilizing and empowering the non-elite groups have been used more or less successfully in the 1960s through Kisan and quota politics respectively. Both trends converged in 1 970s through the emergence of new political parties.

Movement By Kanshi Ram: BAMCEF

Even Kanshi Ram’s initial focus was on mobilizing the entire backward classes, including OBCs, SCs/STs & Muslims. He founded a new movement on October 14.1971 through the SCs/STs. OBCs, Minority Communities Employees Association in Poona. On 6 December 1978, he officially founded the All India

Backward (SC, ST, OBC & Minority Communities Employees Federation (BAMCEF). Its aim was to organize the elite of the Bahujan Samaj that is, essentially wage earners with educational qualifications who had benefitted from quotas. Thus, the mobilization of the backward classes through the efforts of BAMCEF prepared the ground for the backward class movement to take off. Its activities inculcated a sense of identity among the backward class government employee all over the country. This led to considerable politicization of the lower & backward castes in the bureaucracy which, in turn, passed on the newly acquired consciousness to the people of their castes in their villages &towns. The movement started by Kanshi Ram included all the middle& lower castes except Brahmins, Thakurs & Baniyas. It was unfortunate for the backward class movement in North India that BAMCEF degenerated into a movement for Dalits (SC/ST) mobilization. It ended as a political instrument in the hands of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) later on & allowing the OBCs to follow a different trajectory, which later on found its political expression in the Janta DaI (JD) & the Samajwadi Party (SP) of Mulayam Singh Yadav in 1990s. The political offshoots of BAMCEF- first the DS-4 & later the BSP-did try to bring the OBCs into their fold, but the 3SP has been regarded as a hardcore party of SCs. The BSP has allotted a good number of tickets to the OBCs in elections but the leadership of the Party, especially Kanshi Ram and Mayawati, exercised a tremendous sway only over dalit voters.

From the BKD to BLD; The emergence of new political force-

Paul Brass’ argues that in contrast to the many people who left the Congress and rejoined it. After its coming hack to power, Charan Singh did nothing of sort & even remained deaf to the calls of Indira Gandhi. Two days before becoming Chief Minister in April 1967, lie created his own party-the” Jana Congress”. This party soon merged with Bhartiya Kranti Dal (BKD) which was founded on the initiatives of Congress dissidents like Humayun Kabir. BKD’s inaugural convention took place in Indore in 1967 but the largest delegation came from U.P., Bihar & West Bengal. This delegation consisted of CMs of non-Congress governments & other leaders. In April 1969 Charan Singh became the President of BKD. During this period BKD emerged as a regional party. 1968-69 election results show that BKD won 2 1.3% of votes in UP as against 1.5% in Haryana, 2.15 in Bihar & 1.7% in Punjab. In U.P. party’s primary source of support were the jats from the western U.P. In this election BKD

74 fielded 115 candidates from OBCs. This strategy certainly helped BKD to become the second largest party in the state assembly with 98 seats, as against 211 for the Congress. This electoral breakthrough of BKD & then of its successor, The BLD (Bhartiya Lok Dal) which won 106 seats in 1974, explains the rise of OBCs among the U.P. MLAs from 13% in 1962 to 28% in 1974.

The BKD under Charan Singh’s leadership was successful in building a base in the western UP as see in its performance in the 1969 elections. Writing in the early 197O, Craig Baxter described it as “a flesh phenomenon”, an offshoot of the fractional politics & crisis in the Congress party in the l960s. However, studying electoral politics in this period. Baxter did recognize the importance of the party as a rural force in UP., but visualized its decline to less than a major competitor’. Lewis P. Fickett while describing the BKD as a regional political group held that it could in future play an important role. The party survived & reflected itself as an important political force in UP politics. Two inter-related factors seem to underline the success of the BKD- l) The mobilization of certain caste groups which so far had not been politically active

2) Class based changes in the rural agrarian economy which have affected politics.

In the 1950s the middle & backward castes were politically not mobilized and were dominated by the upper castes in all walks of life. There had been no anti- Brahmin movement in North India during the colonial period. By the 1960s however, the backward& middle castes emerged as an important political force in North India and began to oppose domination by the forward castes, middle & backward castes had traditionally supported the opposition parties rather than the Congress & Charan Singh was able to use caste as an important tool of political mobilization. The HKD mobilized the backward castes by emphasizing their position in the caste hierarchy. Their distinct economic interests and hence, claiming proportional representation in politics. It tried to identify the Congress party with the government that served the interests of the upper castes & industrialists. Hence, it appealed the backwards to counter upper caste dominance. Paul has described the BKD as a party primarily of the middle peasants & backward cultivating castes which has been involved since 1967 in a continuous struggle with the congress representing the rich peasantry,

former landlords, the upper & lower castes. While, he does not deny the importance of 4agrarian interests’ arising out of the Green Revolution in U.P.. Yet he describes it as a struggle between the old proprietory upper castes & the rising middle castes in North India. He holds that the success of BKD lies in the fact that it used caste rather than class as a basis of political mobilization. Brass has studied the BKD & its role in politics through the network of caste factions because he argues that economic appeals based on class are limited due to the imperfect congruence of caste & class in U.P. However, while caste is an important mobilizational tool in the hands of the political parties, class- based changes occurring in the countryside are equally & in fact, of primary importance. They form the underlying factors which made large scale caste-based mobilization possible (cit. Pai. l993, p-5l). The BKI)/LD represents the emergence of the rich peasantry from among the middle & backward castes in UP. They were the sections who were able to take advantage of the new agrarian technology & prospered. In fact, the mobilization of the prosperous peasants as a class was reinforced by the simultaneous mobilization as a status order of the backward castes.

In 1967, the middle & backward castes were merely a rising class due to economic gains by the end of 1970s they had begun to acquire the characteristics of a class for Else!! The peasants mobilized by BKD belonged to the Jat & Rajput castes who had earlier enjoyed Zamindari rights under the British and dominated the politics and leadership of most political parties in the western districts of V.P. Hence, in class terms, the BKD and later BLD represented the rich peasants & big landowners & in caste terms, Rajputs, Jats and other backwards in V.P. Thus the party sought to combine horizontal & vertical mobilization. After the Green Revolution.it began to rely increasingly on the horizontal mobilization of rich peasants & capitalist farmers. The party‘s success lay in combining skillfully caste & class mobilization in a manner which appealed to certain groups. The backward castes were interested in social and economic advancement and hence both aspects appealed to them.

The BKD participated in the three coalition governments (SVDs) formed after the 1967 elections. In these for the first time the backward castes were able to handle political power for a brief period. In the first SVD government headed by Charan Singh formed in April 1967 30% of the ministers from the backward castes, 11% from SC & Brahmins each & 14.82% were Kshtriyas. Agrarian issues, for example

compulsory procurement of food grains, lowering of land ceilings & price of sugarcane & abolition of land revenue on small landholdings etc. were important & affected the various coalition governments due to the differing stands of the constituent parties. The BKD managed to survive as a distinct party till 1974 despite of Congress coming to power both in UP. & at the centre in 1971 unlike many small anti-Congress groups which came up during this period of fluid & unstable politics in V.P. & became unimportant vis-a-vis Congress.

In the late 1960s & the early 1970s the Socialists were in disarray. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya died in 1967 & his lieutenants fought each other, The faction of Raj Narain, a stalwart of SSP. which was strong in V.P. merged with BKD of Charan Singh to form BLD (Bhartiya Lok Dal) in 1974. This BLD was a joint venture of 7 parties. It consisted mainly of the BKD. The Swatantra Party. The Utkal Congress, & the socialist faction of Raj Narain. The formation of dalits had important political consequences. The BLD represented even more clearly than the BKD the rich capitalist farmers in the northern states. In contrast to the policies of Nehru & Congress.it tried to project the Gandhian image which, according to Charan Singh. required“ are-orientation of the entire set up”. This was seen in the Manifestoes of the party earlier in 1969 and particularly in 1974/1980. The party wanted to pursue “a middle path” avoiding the evils of Private and State capitalism by setting up an economy in which agriculture cottage and other labour intensive industries would have primacy. The BLD justified its demand for cheaper inputs and lower taxes as beneficial to the whole peasantry. From the mid-1970s and as part of Janata combine, it adopted a multi-class agrarian strategy together with caste appeals. As a result of this.it was able to gain the support of the middle & small peasant proprietors as a whole.

2.7 Janta Party and the confluence of Kisan and Quota Politics

The Janta Party was formed in 1977 resulting from the merger of 5 parties- the BLD. the Jan Sangh., the Socialist Party, the Congress (O) Morarji Desai & Congress for Democracy, a faction of Congress led by Babu Jagjivan Ram. Charan Singh could not dominate it largely because other leaders like Moraii Desai. the Prime Minister were weary of his personal ambitions, But the party further promoted the combination of quota & kisan politics I card initiated by the BLD.

Both of these strategies persisted during the JP Movement & in the subsequent Janata phase. It is evident from the discourse promoted by Madhu Limaye (Convenor of the JP Movement programme committee) and Charan Singh who become Deputy Prime Minister & Home Minister in 1977 respectively. Lirnaye emphasized the empowerment dimension of affirmative action schemes in the same way as his mentor Lohiya did. While Charan Singh regarded the “three decades of Congress rule in post- independence India as essentially elitist & urban-oriented”. Therefore .he asked the Janta party to maintain-’its live links with the villages, with agriculture, with cottage & village industries & generally with the uplift of our kisans”. The Janata party was formed when the growing authoritarianism of Congress culminating into Emergency led the opposition parties to take a united stand against it. The Janata Party unlike other parties had no organizational structure & depended on the support base of its constituent parties. The overwhelming victory of Janata party in March 197 Lok sabha elections in the northern states gave the party a new confidence. This also gained majority in 1977 U.P. Assembly elections. The Janata Party came to power at the centre & in the U.P. on two broad platforms- 1) To change the focus of economic activities from urban to rural & 2) To rid the Indian polity of excessive degrees of centralism & authoritarianism.

Dismissed by Desai on the grounds of indiscipline, Charan Singh organized a huge peasant rally of about one million people in December 1978 and then rejoined the government as Senior Deputy Prime Minister in charge of finance. He presented ‘kulak budget” in 1979 which gave primacy to Kisan and agriculture. For ex. it reduced several indirect taxes on- mechanical tillers, diesel for electric water pumps, chemical fertilizers. It also lowered interest rates for rural loans, increased subsidy of minor irrigation & earmarked funds for rural electrification & grain storage facilities. The Janta government did not last long enough to implement all these measures but Charan Singh had raised the peasant’s issues in such a way that they became central to political debates so much so that they were taken up by farmer’s movement in most of the states, amongst which the BKU (Bhartiya Kisan Union) of Chaudhry Mahendra Singh Tikait of District Baghpat, U.P. deserves special mention for projecting its apolitical character.

The Janta government was too heterogeneous a coalition to have a consistent affirmative action policy. One of its constituent the Jana Sangh, which was

78 representative of the urban & upper caste middle class, was reluctant to move in the direction of affirmative action. The differences showed clearly at the state level when socialist Chief Ministers of U.P.(Ram Naresh Yadav) & Bihar(Karpoori Thakur) tried to introduce quotas in state administration. Yet Desai yielded to OBC pressures & appointed the second Backward Classes Commission on 20 December 1978 under the chairmanship of B.P. Mandal. Its terms of reference were close to earlier one as it had to determine the criteria defining the OBCs & to examine the desirability of measures such as reservations in the administration. The Commission concluded from its survey that the OBCs were coterminous with low castes, representing 52% of the population. It recommended that their backwardness justified a quota of 27% of the posts being reserved for them in the Bureaucracy & the public sector. The tension between the BLD & the Socialists on the one hand & the Congress (0) & the Jana Sangha on the other led to the schism of June 1979 when Charan Singh founded the Janta Party(S) & receiving Indira Gandhi’s support to become the Prime Minister. It was for the first time that a non-upper caste rural leader occupied the post. The appointment of Charan Singh as Prime Minister generated a great deal of excitement among the Kisans & the OBCs. This enthusiasm was short-lived since the Congress withdrew its support even before the vote of confidence & the Loksabha was dissolved. The 1980 elections brought Indira Gandhi back to power. The Mandal Commission report was submitted in late 1980, more than a year after the fall of Janta government and tabled in Loksabha on 30 April 1982. The Congress was not interested in implementing measures that might affect the upper caste supporter of the Congress or at least damage its image of a ‘catch-all party’. The report was finally made public by the Janta Dal when it took power from the Congress in 1989.

The Lok Dal (LD):

In the meantime Charan Singh had launched a new political party-the Lok Dal, soon before the 1980 elections. Its aims & objects were to establish “a socialist society, consistent with individual freedom”. In fact, the 1980 election manifesto of the party combined the socialist Legacy & the kisan politics. The Lok Dal leaders included Raj Narain, Madhu Limaye, H.N. Bahuguna, George Fernandes, Karpoori Thakur, Satpal Malik, Devi Lal, B.P. Chaudhary, Chandrajeet Yadav & SharadYadav, Mulayam Singh Yadav, Ram Vilas Paswan etc. These leaders exerted pressure on Congress government to table Mandal Commission report in the Parliament and to

extend positive discrimination not only to OBCs but also to Kisan communities. This party got split as its many leaders were expelled on the grounds of discipline. After the death of Charan Singh on 29 March 1987, a new split ensued with acting president Bahuguna founding Lok Dal (B) whose leader in U.P. was Mulayam Singh Yadav and his son Ajit Singh founding Lok Dal (A). In fact, the 1987 split of the party resulted also from the desire of Yadav leaders-such as Mulayam Singh Yadav-to emancipate themselves from the jat tutelage &underlying social & economic changes like entry of vast mass of OBCs into politics in 1980s.

2.8 The Janta Dal (JD) and the empowerment of lower castes

The Janata Dal, which was officially founded on 11 October 1988, amalgamated the legacies of Lohiya & Charan Singh. Lok Dal (A) of Ajit Singh & Lok Dal (B) of Devi Lal another Jat leader of Haryana) & Mulayam Singh Yadav (U.P.) merged in the Janata Dal. Many Socialist veterans such as Madhu Dandvate, George Ferandes, Surendra Mohan took active part in it. This amalgamation had its inner problems. For ex-until the last minute the party was to be called Sarnajwadi Janata Dal but Devi lal strongly objected to the term Samajwadi & it was to be removed.

Yet the party’s discourse on social justice remained heavily loaded with socialist references &most of its affirmative action programs drew its inspiration from Lohiya’s modus operandi. The party’s president V.P. Singh, was a late convert to this brand of socialism. Descending from a Rajput lineage which had been a ruling family of a small princely state near Allahabad. He was known as Raja of Manda. He had shown some early interest in Sarvodaya movement. He rose to power as Chief Minister of U.P. in 1980-82 & was then appointed as finance minister by Rajiv Gandhi but was expelled from the Congress in July 1987 on the grounds of accusing top Congress leaders as corrupt. The party, he then, formed was Jan Morcha. It was a small party but played a pivotal role in the foundation of Janta Dal & became a centre host of other opposition parties with which it formed the “National Front”. V.P. Singh sworn in as Prime Minister on 3December 1989. He, in his first address to the nation, sought Lohiya & Jai Prakash Narayan as his guides.

This shift from Congress to a mixed brand of socialist politics reflected his old commitment to Sarvodaya but also his dependence on socialist leaders. The Janata

Dal, indeed, tended to adopt the socialist program for social justice. It concentrated its attention more on caste and less on class and turned towards positive discrimination as its main social remedy. The program adopted by the party in its inaugural session promised that “Keeping in view special needs of socially and educationally backward classes, the party shall implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission”.

The party was prepared to show the way & promised to allot 60% of the tickets in the general elections to “the weaker sections of the society”. Prior to that V.P. Singh had promised to apply this 60% reservations to the party apparatus. However, it could not be implemented due to opposition of Devi Lal. The JD, indeed, represented the aspirations of proponents of kisan politics as well. The National front government’s Deputy Prime Minister with the agriculture portfolio Devi Lal waived the co-operative loans up to Rs.l0,000 of small, marginal & landless cultivators & artisans. Even though, the promise of land reform which directly concerned the agriculture & landless kisan remained unimplemented.

We can cite two reasons for the question-Why V.P. Singh’s government preferred quota politics over kisan politics? From a pragmatic point of view, V.P. Singh was more eager to cater to the needs of lower castes than to those of middle peasants. Moreover, kisan politics was won over by Ajit Singh, son of Chaudhary Charan Singh & Devi Lal in Haryana. Therefore, he was more interested in broadening his base among OBCs. From a more ideological point of view, likewise most socialist leaders, he behave less in economic & financial support than in the reform of the power structure within the society, for which affirmative action appeared to be the most relevant method. V.P. Singh’s government implemented the Mandal Commission reports recommendations. He announced this decision in Parliament on 7 August 1990. He justified it in his Independence Day Address on 15 August by proclaiming the need to give a share to the poor in running the government.

However, this approach could not please the proponents of kisan politics. For ex- Devi Lal, who was appointed by V.P. Singh as the chairman of the committee for the implementation of the Mandal Commission report recommendations did not take much interest in it. Devi Lal had strong reservations concerning the report because the jars had not been included among the OBC’s. Finally, Ram Vilas Paswan, a dalit leader did the job. Devi lal resigned from the cabinet seeking social potential of V.P. Singh reforms as posing a threat to jat interests insofar as it could promote the

81 assertiveness of tenants & agricultural labourers from the low castes, Devi Lal’s resignation signaled the breakdown of Charan Singh’s coalition. For the partisans of quota politics, it was good because kisan politics merely served the economic interests of the peasant proprietors & maintained the social status-quo in the villages. Thus, the old socialist and Ambedkar approach based on an anti-caste discourse & affirmative action was considered as more promising by V.P. Singh & Janta Dal.

2.8.1. Caste Polarisation and the Mandal recommendation

The main achievement of V.P. Singh was to make a broad range of castes gathering under the label of OBC. In fact, OBC became a relevant category for the lower castes as per the quotas recommended by Mandal Commission Many of those who was earlier known as shudra internalized this administrative definition of their identity in the early 1990s.The cleavage between upper castes & lower castes was suddenly reinforced.

Soon after the announcement of implementation of Mandal recommendations, upper caste students formed organizations like Arakshan Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti & Mandal Ayog Virodhi Sangharsh Samiti in U.P, These student organizations wanted to abolish all reservations even including reservations for SCs. The student agitation started in Delhi University where it turned violent. Rajiv Goswami, A Delhi University Student Union activist attempted self-immolation on 19 September 1990. He was the first of 152 people-mostly students-who tried to immolate themselves, of whom 63 succeeded. Immediately leaders from Janta Dal organized counter mobilization. Thus, the early 1990s were marked by the hostility & cleavage between upper castes & lower castes. At that time OBC as a social category turned out to be an emotional category. The new unity helped the OBC to organize as an interest group. Its aim was to benefit from its main asset 52% of the Indian population at the time of elections. Indeed, the share of OBC MPs increased in Hindi belt because lower caste people became more aware of their common interests & decided not to vote for upper caste candidates. In U.P. the share of OBC MPs rose from 11% in 1984 to 20.8% in 1998, while in Indian Parliament the share of OC MPs doubled from 11.4% in 14 1.020.9% in 1989. In U.P. state assembly the share of upper caste MLAs decreased from 58% in 1962 to 37.7% in 1996, whereas the proportion of OBCs grew from 9% to 30% in 1993.

The OBC rise to power, in conjunction with the increasing electoral participation of the lower castes has been called as a “Second Democratic Upsurge” by Prof. Yogendra Yadav. He further considers that the expression OBC has travelled a long way from a rather careless bureaucratic nomenclature in the document of Constitution to a vibrant & subjectively experienced political community”. En similar vein, Christophe Jaffrelot considers the transfer of power from upper castes to lower castes as “Silent Revolution” in India.

In 1996, one member of the UP. Backward Classes Commission observed that ‘Political change is leading to Social change. The OBC, which was a constitutional category, has now become a social category.” While, low caste solidarity increased during the Mandal affairs then caste polarization was acute, it was much less prevalent from the mid-1990s onwards and the very notion of OBCs has lost some of its relevance in understanding political behavior. The capacity of OBCs to sustain the kind of unity that is needed in forming a ‘Political Community” remains very doubtful.

2.8.2. Genuine mobilisation v/s Yadav Manipulation

The general OBC category was, in fact, often used by a Yadav elite to promote its interests. Such an elite manipulation was not uncommon in the past since the kisan identity promoted by Charan Singh was also perceived by many jats as a means to mobilize a large social base & Lohiya had already deplored it in the 1960s. The rise of OBCs is first of all the rise of the Yadavs & Kurmis. Together, they represent about 15% of North Indian MPs in the 1990s. Jaffrelot suggests that while the Yadavs & Kurmis alone had representatives in Loksabha until the 1970s, new castes joined the political arena in the 1980s (Lodhis, Kories, Gujars, Malis) and in 1990s (Jaiswals, Telis, Kachhis). However, the share of Yadavs and Kurmis amounts to around 65- 70% OBC MPs of North India since 1989.

Even though, the Kurmis organized themselves as early as Yadavs through caste associations. Yadavs have been at the forefront of the OBC mobilization since the very beginning. The leader of the All India Backward Castes Federation in the 1960s & 1970s, Brahm Prakash Chaudhary, as a Yadav. B.P. Mandal, the chairman of the Second Backward Classes Commission, was also a Yadav. It is for this very reason that Yadav leaders have consistently paid greater heed to his report. After the

Janta Dal took over in 1989, they mobilized masses in favour of the implementation of the Mandal Commission report. In the wake of the Supreme Courts decision regarding the exclusion of the Creamy Layer of OBCs from quotas-the Janta Dal’s Yadav leaders lobbied for excluding the well-off peasants from the “Creamy layer”. In doing that, they were obviously defending the interests of their caste since many Yadavs had become relatively rich, thanks to the increased milk production & related business.

Eventually, the pressure exerted by Yadavs and other OBC leaders proved effective & the Creamy Layer” was defined in a rather loose sense of the term. It comprises only the OBC applicants from establishment families, or those whose fathers owned land beyond 85°/o of the acreage permitted by ceiling Laws. When the 27% reservation was eventually implemented at the Center after the Supreme Court’s verdict of November 1992, the upper castes did not resist it any more .They resigned themselves to the rule of numbers. Moreover, the liberalization of the economy also began to make attractive careers with high salaries in the private sector. It as liked overwhelmingly by upper castes because affirmative action laws did not apply here & only efficiency & talent is looked upon by private recruiters.

Simultaneously, after having won the battle over quotas. the lower castes did not feel an acute need for solidarity any more. The very notion of OBCs. therefore, in the 1990s started to lose its edge.

2.8.3. Yadav Politics in Uttar Pradesh

The way Yadav leaders used the Janta Dal reservation policy, fir promoting their caste interests. is evident from the strategies of Mulayam Singh Yadav who became the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in November 1989 & also, from neighborhood state Bihar where LalooPrasad Yadav took on power in March 1990. Of Course, the Yadavs were likely to be among the first beneficiaries of the quotas because they are more numerous & relatively more educated than the other OBCs in U.P. & other Hindi belt states. but they were also favoured by Mulayam Singh’s government in U.P. for ex.-in U.P. out of 900 teachers appointed by his second government,720 were Yadavs. Moreover, in the police force, out of 3,151 newly selected candidates,1223 were Yadavs.

Even before V.P. Singh’s reservation policy was announced, Mulayam Singh Yadav (as Chief Minister) had promulgated an ordinance providing the OBCs with a quota of 15% in the state administration (Hasan, 149).Though he came from the Lok Dal (Charan Singh’s party). Mulayam Singh Yadav decided to place a far greater emphasis on the collective identity of the Backward classes than the Lok Dal had ever done. It was well in tune with what Lohiya had taught him in his early career. At this point of time, he had become an experienced campaigner in UP. politics, in fact, Mulayam Singh Yadav was initiated into politics by Lohiya when he came to his village-Safai, District-Etawah, UP) for a “jat itodo” i.e. Break Caste meeting. He then took an active part in the Canal Rate Agitation launched by Lohiya in 1954. He left Janta Dal in 1990 along with Chandra Shekhar and remained with his faction Known as Samajwadi Janta Party.

After breaking away from the Samajwadi Janta Party ( a faction of Janta Dal led by former Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar Yadav had launched the new “SAMAJWADI PARTY”(SP with ‘BICYCLE” as its symbol in a bid to attract old socialists of the Lohiya school of thought. This was done in order to give his party a broad based national character. However, it emerged as a strong regional force in later years. The Samajwadi Party was formally launched at the two day National Convention at Lucknow 4-5 November, 1992. Since then Samajwadi Party has usurped power in the state thrice.

All of the above-Listed parties & organizations& their various strands, (of backward castes movement) thus, have led to the formation of the Samajwadi Party, for which, this research is focused upon I will discuss at length in next chapters about SP’s electoral performance, social base, ideology, programmes and functioning in UP. politics. This will also include its development as an offshoot of backward castes/class movement & gradual uprise & decline in recent years.

2.9 Conclusion

The Backward Class Movement in Uttar Pradesh took a different trajectory. This movement in UP led to a very substantial mobilization of the backward community and also to their empowerment. It did not take off along class lines and got stuck at the caste level, unlike what happened in neighborhood state Bihar. The OBCs and Dalits could not join hands in UP. Hence, there was no homogenization of

85 the backward classes in U.P. All of these features of backward class movement continued in 1990s.

The backward-class mobilization in U.P. acquired a definite character in the late 1960s & during the past four decades, it has travelled a long way. It took different routes in UP First, through the mobilization of the peasant classes/castes by Chaudhary Charan Singh; second, through the mobilization of the Lohiyaite Socialist forces by Mulayarn Singh Yadav and third, through the mobilization of the lower & middle castes by political parties. Fourth, through the rnobilization of lower middle class consisting of government servants i.e. BAMCEF led by Kanshi Ram. There is no evidence to suggest that these movements took on an independent & ‘autonomous character rather, there was a lot of overlapping & interconnection among these forms of mobilization or movements. However, it becomes crystal clear that Samajwadi Party, the later offshoot of Lok Dal (LD) and Janta Dal (JD) brings with it, the constituent elements or legacies of backward caste)class mobilization in Uttar Pradesh.

REFERENCES

1. Shafiuzzaman, 2003. The Samajwadi Party: A Study of its social base, ideology and programme. New Delhi: APH Publication.

2. Shankar, Ram.2004. Consolidating Bi-partism in Madhya Pradesh. Paper presented at a seminar on state politics at Pune, under joint auspices of ISPE Pune and CSDS Delhi January.

3. Lodha, Sanjay.2004 ‘Rajasthan: India shines as BJP trounces Congress’ EPW, 18 Dec.

4. Statistical Reports of the Election Commission of India 2007.

5. Statistical Reports of the Election Commission of India 2012.

6. Ibid.

7. BSP leader Mayawati was attacked with BSP MLAs at State Guest House, Lucknow on 2nd June 1995 when she withdrew support to Mulayam Singh Govt.

8. Pai, S. 1993. Uttar Pradesh: Agrarian Change and Electoral Politics. New Delhi. Shipra, p. 48.

9. Vema, A.K. 2004.Uttar Pradesh: Caste and Political Mobilization. EPW. 18 Dec.

10. This term is cited in Yadav, Yogendra. 1996. “Reconfigurations in Indian Politics: State Assembly Elections 1993-1995” EPW 13-20 Jan, 95-104.

11. Brass, Paul.1966. The Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh.

12. Blunt, E.A.H. 1969. ‘The Caste System of Northern India’ S. Chand Publication, p. 227.

13. Rudolphs and Rudolphs: Modernity of Tradition.

14. Ibid., p. 196

15. Pai, S. 1993. ‘Uttar Pradesh: Agrarian Change and Electoral Politics’. New Delhi. Shipra, p. 9.

16. Mirza Asmer Beg, Sudhir Kumar and A.K. Verma. 2014.”Ebb and Flow of Party Support” in Suhas Palshikar, K.C.Suri and YogendraYadav (eds.) Party Competitions in India: Electoral Politics in Post-Congress Polity. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

17. Article 15 of the Indian Constitution states that- Nothing in this article or clause (2) of the Article29 shall prevent the state from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of

citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

18. Yadav, Nomita.2002. “Other Backward Classes: Then and Now”, EPW.2-9 Nov.

19. See the website of National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC) for the complete list of OBCs in India, http:// ncbc.nic.in visited on 20/05/2015

20. Bayly, Susan, (1999), The New Cambridge History of India : Caste, society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age, New Delhi : Cambridge University Press, Reprint-2005, p. 284.

21. Ibid. p 284

22. Ibid. p 286

23. Christophe Jaffrelot and Sanjay Kumar (2008), Rise of the Plebeians?: The Changing face of Indian Legislative Assembly. London: Rutledge Taylor & Francis Group. p. 27.

24. Ibid. p 33

25. Ibid. p 33-37

26. Shah, Ghanshyam (eds.) (2002), Caste and Democratic Politics in India, New Delhi: Permanent Black. p. 21.

27. Ibid., p.44

28. National Election Studies, New Delhi.

29. Bhambhri, C.P. (2006), Sonia in Power, UPA Government: 2004-2006,, Delhi : Shipra Publications. p. 124

30. Verma, A.K. UP : BJP's Caste Card, Economic and Political Weekly, 1st Dec. 2001. p. 4451

31. Ibid. p. 4452

32. Ibid. p. 4452

33. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2001), Social Justice Committee Report Lucknow : 2001. Ibid

34. Ibid. p. 27

Chapter III

Emergence of Samajwadi Party: Factors and Forces

Chapter: III

Emergence of Samajwadi Party: Factors and Forces

3.1. Introduction

This chapter deals with the emergence and consolidation of the Samajwadi Party in the state of Uttar Pradesh as an offshoot of the Backward Class movement. It provides us with the first hand knowledge about the social base, the ideological moorings, the organizational structures and leadership networks of the Samajwadi Party.

The emergence of the Samajwadi party on the political scene of Uttar Pradesh was an accidental phenomenon. It was an offshoot of the backward class movement for regeneration and justice. The main factors that went into the making of new party were - 1) the growth and sharpening of political consciousness among the OBCs in the wake of the decline of the Congress party dominance since 1967, 2) assumption of leadership of these forces by some stalwarts of the Congress party like Ch. Charan Singh and Devi Lal, 3) growing political clout of Yadav caste in Uttar Pradesh which is attributed to its entrenched position in the countryside, and finally,4) the personality factor-the emergence of Mulayam Singh Yadav as a seasoned and well-tempered politician with close experience of politics at the grassroots. His success in building his own ship and charting his own course was a decisive factor. The ambitious Mulayam Singh had realized very early the tenuous nature of his support base among the Yadav community in U.P and therefore visualized a party composed of the backward classes with the Yadavs at the core and appealing to the dalits and minorities. His appeal was further enhanced by his so called dedication to socialist ideals.1

From the 1980s onwards, the ongoing process of democratization underway since independence in Northern plains, particularly in U.P., accelerated thus creating greater consciousness of caste and communal identities accompanied by increased politicization. These rapid changes ushered in two developments that fed each other: 1) the rise of primordial identities in the political arena that made the single party system no longer tenable, and 2) the decline and de-institutionalization of the single

party system, in turn, created room for the mobilization of narrower sectarian parties. The Congress system was replaced by a fluid and fragmented multiparty system with three poles, consisting of BJP, BSP and the SP. These cannot be described as clear-cut parties as is indicated by the constant re-alignments, splits and defections that characterize them. They have been Identity based movements operating in the electoral arena, mobilizing along social divisions, thus creating conflict, violence and political instability. However, while caste-based mobilization created social antagonism, it also challenged upper caste dominance and played a positive role by contributing to the social deepening of democracy.3

In recent years, the state of U.P. has experienced a strong wave of identity assertions based on caste and community, which has had a significant impact on the entire country. The single dominant party system has declined, and narrower parties such as the BJP, BSP, SP have emerged. These shifts have generated much debate on both the reasons for these profound changes and the nature of impact they have had on the state. Political parties have both created and exploited awareness of lower caste identities, leading to “an upsurge from below” that has brought new social groups into the political mainstream. They have both introduced and pushed demands for ‘self- respect, dignity and social justice for these groups. They are also responsible for the resulting fragmented multi party system, hung assemblies and political instability in U.P. For ex. Parties such as the BJP have used the strategy of communal mobilization based on the ideology of Hindutva for electoral gain. Thus, the major vehicles of social change based on identity assertion in the case of U.P. have been political parties. The Samajwadi Party is one of them. By the second half of 1990s, caste and community based mobilization had reached a high point, and then began to decline .U.P. Politics entered a phase of moderation as the ideology of Hindutva experienced exhaustion and caste based mobilization reached a plateau. Today, parties are attempting to widen their social bases and build broad social alignments due to the compulsions of electoral politics.eg-BSP has launched the slogans of ‘’sarva samaj”, ‘’sarvajana hitay, sarvajana sukhay” and “social engineering”. This has paid off rich dividends to BSP immensely during 2007 assembly elections. While, Samajwadi Party is engaged into employing new strategies to build broad aggregative parties like “Third front” in the centre or Fourth front alongwith Rashtriya Janta Dal of Laloo Prasad Yadav. 91

Evolution of S.P. ( Phase-1, 1980-1992)

The evolution of the Samajwadi party can be divided into two periods. The first phase was from 1980-1992, when the party was in making as a part of the peasant parties LD, LD(B), the third front called the Janta Dal (JD) and the Samajwadi Janta Party (SJP) floated by Chandrashekhar.

Phase-2 (1992-till date):

The second phase began on 4th October 1992, when the SP was born in Lucknow. Throughout this long period the one man who has completely identified himself with the backward movement and the SP in U.P. has been Mulayam Singh Yadav. The Samajwadi Party was formed by Mulayam Singh Yadav .He considers Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya as his political guru and in this sense, the SP represents the socialist tradition in U.P. Mulayam Singh entered the U.P. legislative Assembly on the ticket of Samyukta Socialist Party(SSP) in 1967 assembly elections and since then, has played a significant role in shaping the future of the socialist movement, at least, in U.P. Mulayam Singh joined the Bhartiya Kranti Dal (BKD) after the death of Lohiya in 1968. That was the time the first signs of threat to the ‘Congress System’ had appeared as it lost in several states (Bihar, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, U.P., West Bengal) in the fourth general elections held in February 1967. The Congress was a catch-all party and represented a rainbow coalition of socially differentiated groups cutting across caste and communal lines. This was responsible for the formation of a national political constituency and did not permit the consolidation of social cleavages on that basis. Hence, marginalized groups remained unrepresented in the leadership structure although its upper class and upper caste leadership claimed to be representative of the entire society.( Yadav and Palshikar 2003:12).

3.2. General Political Background of the U.P. post Independence and Antecedents of S.P.

It also had shifted ideological posture to court the votes of the Hindu majority across North India by making appeals on Hindu Chauvinism and the notion that India's unity was in jeopardy; As an instrument of popular mobilization the Ayodhya issue [Ramjanam boomi - Babri Masjid] was revived in 1985, the issue which was

forgotten since 1950. The BJP had capitalized from this issue. According to BJP India was culturally a Hindu Nation. The Muslims should have accepted this as a straightforward historical fact and had maintained that many of the communal tensions the bedeviled the nation would disappear if they did so. The party was immensely benefited from its ideology of Hindutva and thus during 1990 it had assumed the status as that of Congress by becoming the single largest party at the centre.

As a result, the progressive rise and consolidation of the Hindu wave from 1989 onwards had significant and far-reaching implications for the party system in the country. It was the Congress, which had started the politics of caste, creed, religion, sect and region in India, and Uttar Pradesh was no exception to it. ''

The consolidation of Hindu wave from 1989 onwards soared BJP's political stock. Following the 1989 General Elections, a coalition government (National Front) was set-up with V.P. Singh as the Prime Minister. The BJP being partner of the coalition had decided to support it from out [National Front was formed earlier on September 17, 1988 by seven parties namely the Janata Party, Lok Dal, Jan Morcha, DMK, Congress (S), Telegu Desam and Assam Gana Parishad. BJP and Left Parties [CPI and CPI (M)] were not in this front but part of the opposition unity.

Whereas in Uttar Pradesh Janata Dal had decided to contest 355 seats out of 425 Assembly seats in the 1989 Assembly Elections. The Congress party was routed out both in the Lok Sabha and the Assembly Elections (1989). In the Lok Sabha, the Congress got only 14 seats out of 85 seats. Janata Dal got 54 and the BJP 08 seats only in the Uttar Pradesh.

Due to division of votes on caste and religion bases no party was able to gain absolute majority in the UP Assembly. However the Janata Dal gained 208 seats and was able to form a government. The Janata Party had won 1 seat, Congress 94, BJP 57, Lok Dal (B) 2, CPI-6, CPI (M) 2, BSP 13, Independents 40 and others 2. Thus in 1989 Mulayam Singh Yadav of Janata Dal was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State.

In 1990, V.P. Singh government had decided to implement the decade old Mandal Commission Report to provide reservation in jobs to the other backward

classes. BJP intensified the Ramjanam bhoomi Movement so that all Hindus were united for the construction of the Ram Temple at Ayodhya. Moreover in order to counter the political threat, in August 1990, L.K. Advani decided to launch his so called Ram Rath Yatra a march from Somnath to Ayodhya. But on way to Ayodhya L.K. Advani was arrested in Bihar. In protest of his arrest the BJP withdrew its support from the V.P. Singh government-causing fall of his government on November 16, 1990.

Since the formation of National Front there was resentment within it because to a significant section of the Janata Party, Chandra Shekar was the natural choice for the leadership for his relentless crusade against the authoritarianism of Indira Gandhi during the 1975-77 Emergency. V.P. Singh was then in the Congress and was closely associated with the Congress. He was identified with those who were instrumental in imposing a dictatorial regime in the country. So, the Front seemed to have begun its first innings with an internal feud over leadership that gradually became the Achilles heel for the National Front government.

As a result Chandra Shekhar was bent upon election for the post of leadership of the National Front Parliamentary Party, a sleight of hand was planned to tackle this issue. Devi Lal's name was proposed and seconded for leadership and Prime Ministership. Devi La1 got up and announced that persons of his age in Haryana were known as 'Tau' (elderly uncle) and generally people seek their advice. He would retain the status for himself and offered the leadership of the Janata Dal and National Front parliamentary party to V.P. Singh. However, the status of Tau did not prevent him from accepting the chair of deputy Prime Minister. This angered Chandra Shekhar.

The unsatisfied leadership desires within the Janata Dal led to its disintegration. What added fuel to this fire and altered the fate of National Front government rose from the Political camp of Devi Lal, the then deputy Prime Minster whose son, the then Haryana Chief Minister Om Prakash Chautala, was forced to resign on May 2, 1990 for his alleged involvement in violence and rigging in his own election from the Meham Legislative Assembly constituency in Haryana. Unable to swallow this, Devi Lal, resigned from the cabinet on March 16, 1990, but on persuasion took back his resignation three days later Chautala had to quit as Chief Minister despite being elected to the Assembly. Stung by this 'personal' affront to him

and his family Chautala struck back by forwarding a forged letter to the President, allegedly written by V.P. Singh in 1987 implicating Arun Nehru in the Bofors deal and made accusations of financial misdemeanour against Arun Nehru and Arif Mohammad Khan and also made derogatory remarks against the Prime Minister. He was dropped from the cabinet on August 1, 1990. He stayed in the Janata Dal till Chandra Shekhar and Devi Lal along with 25 members were expelled from the party and declared unattached by the speaker. This was a serious blow to the government.

Later, Chandra Shekhar and Devi Lal formed Samajwadi Janata Party in 1990. After V.P. Singh's resignation (his government failed on the motion of non- confidence) Chandra Shekhar with the help of Congress (1) became the Prime Minister. He was totally dependent on Rajiv Gandhi for his government survival. In March 1991, Chandra Shekhar resigned citing inability to function as Prime Minister and advised the President to call fresh elections. In the elections to the tenth Lok Sabha held in May-June 1991, the Janata Dal was reduced to 52 seats and SJP got 5 seats only. The Mandal card and the inner tussle within the party on leadership crisis led to Janata Dal's disintegration at the centre and in Uttar Mesh.

The Mandal upsurge also helped BJP to strengthen it in Uttar Pradesh in the relatively short period of time between 1989 and 1991. While the growth of the Party, in this period was linked to communal agenda and the Ramjanamabhoomi Movement. The Mandal controversy was also instrumental in establishing its base especially among the upper castes.

Moreover the Mandal controversy was also instrumental in the formation and growth of the caste based political parties in the State. e.g. Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party [BSP was founded on April 14, 1984 by Kanshi Ram but, it rose to prominence during 1990s in the State]. The growth of these parties symbolized the process of exclusivist political formations, catering respectively to the Dalits and Yadavs.

The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh represented one of the most socially mobile and politically articulate Dalit group: the Jatavs, part of the scheduled caste elites. Mayawati (its chairperson) had come to symbolize Jatav Pride, as a counterpoint to the social identities of other caste groupings.22

In Uttar Pradesh, the OBC mobilization of the 1990's was spearheaded by the Yadavs. The rise to power of Mulayam Singh Yadav from 1989 onwards was largely due to the support of the Yadav community. His reservation policy in the administration also favoured Yadavs over other castes. This policy alienated other OBC's particularly the Kurmis from the Samajwadi

This imbalance provided the BJP with an opportunity to bring within its fold through its policy of social-engineering-other OBC's particularly those who resented the position of the Yadavs. The BJP had taken care to give tickets to Kurmis as well as to Lodhis. Hence it was able to build a support base among groups that did not form a large part of any other party's base.

The BJP promoted non-Yadav OBC leaders most notably a Lodh, Kalyan Singh in order to broaden its base particularly in the immediate post Mandal period, when lower caste mobilization was at its peak. Kalyan Singh became the architect of the BJP's Mandalisation strategy in Uttar Pradesh. This was due to the fact that the political parties had found caste based selection of candidates and appealed to the caste based interests of the Indian electorate to be an effective way to win popular support. The backward classes were such a substantial constituency that almost all parties vie for their support.

In the 1991 Assembly Elections, the BJP with the help of Mandir-Mandal card formed its government in Uttar Pradesh. Kalyan Singh was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State. The Elections were held for 404 seats out of 425 for the State Assembly. The Janata Dal and Samajwadi Janata Dal in sharp contrast were able to win only 92 and 34 seats respectively. The BJP was able to win 211 seats, gained clear but slender majority. The Congress fared badly and got only 46 seats. The BSP won 12 seats. The Left Parties gained 5 seats2'.

There was hardly any doubt that the gain to the BJP was because of the Ram Temple Movement. Following 1991 General and State Assembly (U.P.) Elections the Congress government at the centre was headed by Narasimha Rao and subsequently in Uttar Pradesh, government was installed by its rival party the BJP with Kalyan Singh as the Chief Minister. During Kalyan Singh reign the Babri Masjid was demolished on December 6. 1992 by a mob belonging to the Hindutva Parivar.

As a result, the Kalyan Singh government was dismissed in the wake of Babri Masjid demolition. The Election to the new Assembly was held in 1993. The demolition had helped the BJP to better its electoral ground. In the State the BJP had emerged as the largest party but lacked majority support. As a result the government was formed by a coalition of Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party. Congress gave an external support to this coalition. The total strength of the House was 425, BJP had secured 177, SP 109, BSP 67, Congress 28, Janata Dal 27, BKKD 0, Lefi 4, IhlC (T) 0, Samata 0, and Others 10. The Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party were the real gainers in the aftermath of the demolition of mosque in the State. Communal flare of BJP had given such a blow to the Congress that it lost grounds ever to come to power in Uttar Pradesh.

The SP-BSP coalition collapsed when the BSP withdrew its support from the Samajwadi Party in June 1995. The coalition collapsed because the SP had cornered the BSP by taking credit for reservation in schools, appointment of Urdu teachers inducting the backwards especially the Yadavs in the State Police Force and by many more lucrative schemes for the backwards. The deteriorating relations between the SP-BSP culminated in the form of an ugly and infamous incident that took place in a circuit house in June 1995, in which the SP legislators physically assaulted the BSP legislators when the BSP withdrew its support from the SP. The BJP was successful in bringing down the Mulayam Singh Yadav's government by subverting the SP-BSP alliance forged in the 1993 Legislative Assembly Elections between the SP and BSP. BJP had then helped Mayawati in becoming the Chief Minister of the State. This BSP-BJP alliance too had collapsed in 1997. Reason for the collapse was that Mayawati had refused to step down in rotational arrangement, which was initially agreed, between the two. Kalyan Singh with the support of BSP dissidents and others took the reign of the State who continued as Chief Minister of State till 1999. Kalyan Singh was expelled from primary membership of the party for the anti-party activities and was then replaced by Ram Prakash Gupta. Due to Gupta's inability to govern, he too was replaced by Rajnath Singh who continued in power till 2002 Legislative Assembly Elections. Inspite of back stabbing by the BJP in 1997 Mayawati after the 2002 Legislative Assembly Elections once again had allied with the BJP.

In 2002 Assembly Elections no party had gained an absolute majority in the State. BSP didn't want to ally with the SP and as a result the BSP allied with the BJP. Mayawati was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State. The BSP-BJP alliance too broke down in the wake of Taj Heritage Project. Moreover, many BJP leaders in the State were dead against Mayawati's autocratic style of functioning. The breaking down of BSP-BJP alliance gave an opportunity to the SP to form government in the State with the help of BJP. On February 2003, Mulayam Singh Yadav was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State and continued in power till 2007 Assembly Elections.

The coalition era came to an end in 2007 Assembly Elections when BSP secured an absolute majority in the State. The BSP secured 207 seats out of 403 Assembly seats, Congress 22, BJP 50, SP 97 and others 9.

Thus the party system in Uttar Pradesh from 1993 onwards was characterized as a highly polarized and fragmented. With the exception of the period between 1991 and 1992 all governments were either coalitions or minority governments. No government in Uttar Pradesh lasted its full term. All political alliances between major political parties since 1993, were formed primarily to prevent one of the contending parties to achieve a dominant position in the party system. In this regard all these alliances had surprisingly proved successful in spite of their short durations.

During three years span from 1996-98 even at the centre India had witnessed three General Elections showing political instability of coalition governments as well as frequency of defection by legislators. The decline of the highly centralized Congress party resulted in the decentring of politics and had shifted its centre of gravity from New Delhi to the State. The collapse of Congress party and its disintegration attributed to the growth of oppositional politics of farmers, other backward classes and Hindutva.

With the fall of the Congress in the States the BJP was immensely benefited. The party had done very well during the 1996-98 General Elections, when it captured 52-57 Lok Sabha seats respectively from the State. However the party had a downslide from 1999 onwards due to internal infighting between the pro-OBC Kalyan Singh led faction and other faction led by Kalraj Mishra, Rajnath Singh and Lalji Tandon who all belonged to Upper castes. In the Late 1999 these conflicts culminated 98

in the expulsion of Kalyan Singh from the BJP. He was replaced by Ram Prakash Gupta as the Chief Minister of the State.

Factional infighting that continued unabated even afterwards was attributed to the Brahmin- Thakur rivalry. This caused the voters turning away from the BJP in the February, 2002 Assembly Elections. The party had come third with only 88 sears, after the Samajwadi Party's 143 seats and the Bahujan Sarnaj Party's 98 sears. The BJP could return to office only because of its alliance with the BSP. The BJP-BSP alliance had collapsed in September 2003. The Samajwadi Party formed its government with Mulayam Singh Yadav as the Chief Minister of the State. Out of total strength of the House of 403 members, the breakup of the party position was Samajwadi Party 152 seats, Loktantrik Bahujan Dal 33, Congress 15, RLD 15, UP Loktantrik Congress 2, CPI (M) I, Akhil Bhartiya Congress 1, Independents 16, Unattached 6, BJP 83, BSP 67, Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Mahasabha 1, members without voting rights 9, vacant 2.

In order to revive the sinking fortune of the Party in the State in 2004, Kalyan Singh's expulsion was revoked. The infighting within the RJP was attributed to its collapse in the State during 2004 General Elections. The party could secure only 10 seats out of 80 Lok Sabha seats, the Congress could manage 10 seats and SP 38, BSP 19, seats respectively. After BJP's debacle in the 2004 General Elections the party was firmly back on the Hindutva platform. In a National Council Session in Lucknow on December 24, 2006. Kalyan Singh had asked delegates to use "Hindutva to help create a volcano that would bum and kill Muslim's appeasement forever. Let us not be shy of saying that all terrorists who had attacked the Akshardham Temple, Raghunath Mandir and Parliament were all Muslims. The BJP should not be ashamed of what happened in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 when the Masjid was brought down by the Hindu Parivar".

Describing "all talks or measures to help Muslims develop educationally, socially and economically as "vote bank politics" the resolution said this would give "special citizenship" status to Muslims that would "pave the way for a second partition". The party would resist all attempts to give religion based benefitsv2'.

The Bhartiya Janata Party once again had decided to return to the politics of Ram Temple. Being the homeland of Lord Ram (Ayodhya) it was believed that the 99

promise to construct the Ram Temple would generate enough religious sentiments to catapult the BJP to power in Uttar Pradesh.

When the BKD led by Charan Singh in 1967 challenged the Congress, there was a possibility that it would work to consolidate social cleavages on the basis of its rural, middle peasantry base consisting of middle castes, since it claimed to represent the interests of the rural peasantry. But a review of the political tradition from the BKD through the Bhartiya Lok Dal( BLD)- Lok Dal (LD)- Janta Dal ( JD) to the SP, reveals a story of failed attempts at defining the caste-class cleavages on the basis of rural peasantry. The more prosperous Jat peasants of Western U.P. and the more numerous but “Poor Kisans” of Eastern U.P. could not constitute a common political platform. Once the Mandal factor entered the politics of U.P., the BLD-LD could not sustain their position in the politics of the state. The Lok Dal split( after the death of Charan Singh in 1987) into LD(A)led by Ajit Singh and LD(B) led by Mulayam Singh. The present Rashtriya Lok Dal( RLD) and the SP are the latest incarnations of the LD(A) and LD(B) respectively. The former retaining the loyalty of the Western prosperous Jats and the latter capturing the middle and lower peasantry and the backward castes. As opposed to this, the opportunity to create a common political constituency on the basis of the peasant and backward classes was capitalized by Laloo Prasad Yadav in Bihar. Some Scholars feel that the social cleavages in Bihar are so deep that they are almost irreversibl. (Yadav 1999). There was a possibility of the emergence of a similar political formation inU.P.in 1989, for the Lok sabha and assembly elections which were held simultaneously in the state. Mulayam Singh’s LD(B) had merged with the JD before the 1989 elections. The JD stunned everyone by its performance in both the Lok sabha and the assembly elections in U.P..It got 54 Lok sabha seats with 35.9% votes, and 208 assembly seats with 29.71% votes. That was a very massive show of the possible consolidation of the peasants and backward classes. Some opine that it represented the coming together of the rich and middle peasantry in the medium and semi-medium land size holding areas due to the green revolution.(Pai 1993:11-12) but others challenge the thesis by pointing to the disintegration and decimation of JD in less than 18 months when in the assembly and Lok sabha elections, JD was reduced to half of its size.

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The issue of the inadequacy of the political mobilization of backward castes and classes could also be linked to the evolving paradigm of the party system in India, especially in the backdrop of the demise of the Congress system. The strong presence of the JD (to which Mulayam belonged) in the 1989 elections in U.P. had raised the possibility of a bipolar party system model in U.P. but even the coming of Mulayam Singh as the Chief Minister of U.P. did not help and he too became a casualty of the factional fight of the JD led by V.P. Singh and Chandrashekhar. By the time Mulayam could extricate himself from the imbroglio and form his own party in U.P. it was too late.

When the JD split at all- India level in 1990, Mulayam Singh Yadav chose to part ways with V.P.singh and joined the faction led by Chandrashekhar, the Samajwadi Janta Party (SJP). Mulayam Singh also established cordial relations with Kanshi Ram during the campaign for the 1991 assembly elections. An understanding was reached between the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Mulayam Singh Yadav which led to two major development- one, the departure of Mulayam Singh from the SJP and the formation of SP, and, -two, the alliance between the BSP and SP in the 1993 elections. That was perhaps the last attempt by Mulayam Singh to bring the backwards and the dalits together and forge a backward class constituency in U.P. The SP was attempting a difficult proposition because the peasant OBCs had always exploited the dalits. Besides, the inherent contradiction in their alliance was that both the parties were trying to woo the same set of voters- the backwards, the dalits, and the Muslims.

3.3. Emergence of the S.P party on the political scene of the U.P

Ever since the Samajwadi Janta Party (SJP) was trounced in the elections, the party had been cracking up under the weight of its own contradictions in much the same way as its progenitor, the Janta Dal, did. Its eventual fate had been the same as of Janta Dal. With the SJP splitting, Mulayam Singh Yadav decided to go his own way. He has severed his ties with the Party leader Chandrashekhar, by floating a new party christened the Samajwadi Party. In the process he added to the fragmentation of the opposition camp. Under the surface lies the familiar tale of men with big ambitions of self-advancement, uncrystallized ideologies, drawing sustenance mainly from caste allegiances, intrigues and manipulations.3 The relationship between

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Mulayam Singh Yadav and Chandrashekhar has always been an uneasy one .Irascible and egoistical, Yadav can never see himself as a second rung leader. Although a follower of Charan Singh, he was bent on making the going rough for the Ch. Charan Singh’s heir Ajit Singh when the latter donned his father’s legacy. Yadav was also instrumental in forcing a split in Lok Dal.

When in 1991V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister and Yadav was the Chief Minister of U.P. under the Janta Dal dispensation the latter invariably disregarded Singh’s directives on handling the Ayodhya crisis. Janta Dal insiders still recall that Singh has advocated the adoption of a “soft line” towards the BJP-VHP combine, but Yadav would brook no interference. Reputedly vindictive, Yadav never forgave V.P. Singh for allegedly harassing him and his men. Mulayam Singh Yadav raised a furor in the state assembly over both the Dahiya Trust and the infamous fake encounter issues. It was foretold that Yadav and V.P. Singh would ultimately part ways.

The first manifestation of a similar tension between Yadav and Chandrasekhar surfaced in 1991, when the latter resigned and mid term polls were called. Yadav was expected to follow suit and step down, but he conveyed his resentment publicly in an official function organized on the occasion of the 81st anniversary of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya. He chided Chandrasekhar for leaning on the Congress. “Taking the support of a political party is okay, but going on bended knees for their help is like going with a begging bowl”, remarked Yadav in his speech.

The rhetoric and the apparent commitment to the most important issues in U.P. notwithstanding, the fact was that the Samajwadi Janta Party in U.P. was synonymous with Yadav. The step to launch a new political party was taken when he had assured himself and his partymen that his political base was intact , never mind the infamy he suffered in the last elections, through his three main displays of strength- His twin victories in Tilhar and Jaswantnagar constituency in Nov.1991 By-elections ,a spectacular rally staged in Lucknow’s Begum Hazrat Mahal Park and equally successful Jail Bharo Andolan.

He was able to demonstrate the strength of his Organization and infrastructure when he could galvanize his workers within just a couple of weeks before the Andolan. On the other hand, the distinct caste orientation of the Party in U.P. had been a source of discomfiture to Chandrashekhar. He could not play the mandal card 102

because his mainstays in his Ballia constituency were the Rajputs. In contrast to Yadav, for Chandrashekhar and his associates, the split marked a return to square one: Building a fresh organization and mobilizing resources, tasks rendered more difficult because the wily Yadav had nominated own men to most of the District Committees.4

Astutely Yadav took the strategic decision at this juncture because the Samajwadi Janta Party had already been divided in Legislative Council and was functioning as two separate entities. Rather, than be expelled by Chandrashekhar and invite a host of legislative complications like Ajit Singh, Yadav floated a new party which commanded the support of more than two-third legislators and smoothened the passage for himself.

The launching of Samajwadi Party was a novel phenomenon in Indian Politics. It was formally launched at the two days National Convention at Lucknow on November 4-5, 1992 with delegates from 17 states. A new Constitution was also adopted which declared its commitment to the socialist ideology as advocated by Lohiya. Mulayam Singh Yadav was unanimously elected the president of the new party. After breaking away from the Samajwadi Janta Party (SJP) of Chandrashekhar, Yadav had launched the new Samajwadi Party (SP) in a bid to attract old socialists of Lohiya school of thought to give his party a broad based national character.

Affirming its full faith in the Constitution of India, the Samajwadi Party’s Constitution pledged to create a socialist society and to work for secular and democratic goals. Decentralization of power both political and economic would be another objective of the party. Also the party was against any political organization based on religion and would not admit to its fold any individual from such organizations. Apart from this, the party pledged itself for the upliftments of the Dalits, Women, Minorities and the backward classes in the society.

Under the backdrop of life-size portrait of Lohiya, Yadav declared that his party would oppose the dangerous designs of the Bhartiya Janta Party, which is trying to divide the nation along communal lines. He also branded the Congress party as an anti-national party. Eighteen years ago when Ch.Charan Singh dismissed Mulayam Singh as “Chhote kad ka Aadmi”, he would have never imagined that this diminutive figure would prove to be a tenacious fighter. He could have also never thought that the “little socialist” would one day grow tall enough to head the government of the 103

most populous state of the Indian state and virtually edge out his son (Ajit Singh) from the politics of his own state.

Nobody, infact, took Mulayam Singh seriously when he first became the chief minister and his government was thought to be a passing phase. He just proved to be an anti-thesis of his first name Mulayam (soft) and proved to be a tough leader. He almost performed a feat by saving the Babri Mosque from demolition by the so called Kar sevaks while later the Narsimha Rao government in the centre with all its might had failed to protect the mosque at Ayodhya. His bold and constitutional stand cost Mulayam Singh his government in 1991 and brought the BJP government in power in the politically sensitive state. The tough Mulayam did not compromise and carried on a relentless fight against the BJP. The same Babri Mosque brought him back to power in December 1993.The down and out Mulayam Singh returned to centre-stage in a couple of years. However, all attempts of the BJP to invoke the name of Ram was a desperate act that could hardly appeal to the people for a second time. The temple agenda did not hold much of a promise for the BJP.

The Ram Temple agenda failed to gamer votes for BJP in the 2007 Assembly Elections in the State. The BJP recorded its worst performance since 1991. From 1999 onwards it had been one long downwards journey for the Hindutva Party whether in the Lok Sabha or in the State Assembly. In the 2007 Assembly Elections the BJP had secured 50 seats only.

Throughout the campaign and much before it, the BJP deliberately had resorted to test water with its 'aggressive Hindutva' platform. It had attempted to raise the communal temperature through recourse to inflammatory campaign material including the poisonous compact disc (the disc content contained ill feeling towards the Muslims). The BJP leaders had made sectarian speeches focusing on issues - terrorism, Mohd Afzal's hanging, the Rajendra Sachar committee report. They thought all these would polarize vote on communal lines. The strategy backfired. Hindus and Muslims alike refused to swallow the bait, which ultimately resulted in the debacle of BJP in the State.

The Congress Party too failed badly in the Assembly Elections of 2007. Even after fielding Rahul Gandhi as Star Campaigner the Congress couldn't attract votes. The Congress had hoped that Rahul Gandhi would somehow bring in votes, enabling 104

the Congress once again to become the catch all party that ruled imperiously for decades. However, he managed to breathe new life into the moribund State unit. The party leaders had belief that his entry would help the party in securing more seats in the State Assembly Elections. Those dreams came to an end on May 11, 2007 when BSP got an absolute majority in the State. The Congress had to be contended with only 22 seats in a house of 403.

The BJP got its severe setback in the 2007 Assembly Elections when Mayawati wooed Brahmins for electoral benefits. Mayawati had realized that electoral arithmetic was against BSP if support to it remained restricted to Dalits, who constituted about 2 1 percent of UP'S population. So she wooed the Brahmins who though at the other end of the caste spectrum had been consistently marginalized in L.P. politics over the last two decades. This was a clever exploitation of caste politics and an inversion of caste logic.

Mayawati's strategy of sewing up a rainbow coalition, particularly wooing Brahmins and other upper castes paid rich dividends to BSP in the UP Assembly Elections, 2007. The BSP aligned with upper castes, against whom her party had in the past carried out a consistent campaign. The BSP steered to a spectacular victory in the Uttar Pradesh and secured an absolute majority in the 403 seats Assembly. It was the first time since 1991 that any party had won a majority in Uttar Pradesh. The BSP had secured 207 seats out of 403, SP 98, BJP +50, Congress +22, and others 25. Mayawati was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State.

Thus what happened politically in Uttar Pradesh had a direct bearing on its past politics. The Congress was considered responsible for the prevailing socioeconomic political stalemate in the State. The caste based political parties of the State i.e. the BSP and SP which had a foothold in the State were considered to be indebted to the Congress for creating the green pastures for them to grow. The sad irony was Congress had yet refused to accept its blunder.

Moreover the agrarian and caste-class issues played an important role in changing the political scenario of the State. Democracy was steadily getting trampled by 'might is right' in Uttar Pradesh. The politics of the State in recent time had been overshadowed by criminals turned politicians called 'bahubalis'.

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"Uttar Pradesh is the Chief locate for the transition to a post-Congress polity and is the pivotal site of contest between non Congress groups. Inter caste conflicts, assertive lower castes and Hindutva politics all manifest themselves in Uttar Pradesh. Potentially the most radical challenge to upper caste hegemony. The outcome of which would affect the overall structure of social inequality is manifest in Uttar Pradesh. The way in which conflicts between castes and communities take place in the State would certainly influence the course of democratic politics in South India and would alter the ways of wresting and sustaining political power at the National level"".

Thus, potent brew of religion, politics, agriculture and crimes marked Uttar- Pradesh a gripping theatre of political experiments. His confrontation with the Saffron league had earned him the esteem and gratitude of Muslims. That’s why he is used to be known as Maulana Mulayam. In the process he had struck a heavy blow to the vote bank of Congress, weaning away both the Muslims and the backwards from it so much so that the century old party had to politically depend on him for existence in the state.

He was blamed for letting loose a virtual caste-war in the land of Agra and Avadh and fomenting confrontation between the upper castes and the lower castes. The charge of casteism had tarnished his socialist image. He had also not lived up to the ideals of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya whom he regards as his political guru. Administratively Uttar Pradesh was in a chaotic state, no better than under the previous governments.5

3.4. Social base of the S.P.

Critics and opponents of the Samajwadi party would point out that it is a Yadav party. More uncharitable criticisms of Mulayam Singh Yadav used to mention him as Mulla Mulayam owing an oblique reference to his ‘pro-muslim’ policy. On his part, Mulayam Singh has also been responsible for creating such an image. The latest in this regard was his decision to declare Fridays as holidays for Muslim students. Although , the decision was withdrawn, it shows that the Samajwadi party has to locate itself at the junction of some or the other social cleavage. It has been pointed out that SP had a two- pronged strategy for winning a social base. On the one hand, it attempted to build a solid bloc of Muslim votes and for that purpose visualizes an 106

undifferentiated Muslim community. It then, juxtaposes this section of the society in terms of the threat emanating from the BJP. On the other hand, the SP seeks to classify Hindu society into two sections- the forward and the backward classes. It hopes to be the sole representative and protector of the backward community.6

The real politik forces it to concede the support of the Dalits to the BSP and in its imagination the backward classes consist mostly of the OBCs. Although it is true that the Yadavs constitute the rock foundation of the base of the SP, the party claims that it has support among various sections of the OBCs. Of late, the party has also been alleged of wooing the Rajputs. The decision of Mulayam Singh government to drop cases against Raja Bhaiya is often cited in this connection. Also till recently, growing clout of Amar Singh in the affairs of SP. However, along with the expansion of SP, there has been an effort to produce conciliation between the forward and the backward classes. These only became significant in the 1998 elections but it existed even in 1996 (Chandra 1999:80). The S.P. recorded its electoral presence in all the regions of U.P., though its performance has not been uniform in the different areas. In Western U.P., the party failed to make inroads into the jat land, despite its effort to evolve a Yadav-Gujar-Muslim combine. The SP’s performance did not improve in western U.P. despite an electoral alliance with the BSP in the 1993 assembly elections.

Even in terms of caste homogenization, the SP could not work for the consolidation of the entire backward community. The party claimed to be representing the rural peasantry and the backwards but the fact remained that the party could not even get the middle and lower castes among the backwards integrated into the party. It was due owing to the domination of the upper crust, represented by Yadavs and Ahirs. Many a middle and lower castes (i.e. MRBCs) among the backwards continued to support the BJP. It got 39.9%, 44.9% and 24.7% OBC vote in U.P. in 1996,1998 and 1999 Lok sabha elections respectively while the tally for SP for the same stopped at 28.8%, 18.1% and 19.9%.(See table 3.1)

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Table- 3.1

Social base of Samajwadi party

1996 1998 2002 Social 1999 Lok 2004 Lok Lok Lok Assembly characteristics sabha sabha sabha sabha elections Female 20.5 28.2 16.8 24.5 14 Male 21.0 29.2 19.3 24.9 18 Urban 23.1 35.8 19.3 25.7 18 Rural 20.0 26.4 17.9 24.6 27 Upper Caste 2.7 3.7 3.3 8.3 9 Yadavs 73.5 76.0 77.4 70.8 73 Other OBCs 28.8 18.1 19.9 17.4 23 SCs 5.3 9.3 4.9 6.8 11 Muslims 54.3 71.7 34.5 51.2 47 Non-literate 21.5 28.5 19.1 26.0 28 Upto primary 23.5 27.3 23.9 27.7 - Upto matric 21.3 31.8 16.8 21.0 - College and 13.5 29.3 12.7 15.8 22 above Very poor 19.8 _ 17.3 19.4 24 Poor 18.2 _ 21.5 30.0 27 24 Middle 23.8 _ 21.2 22.5

Rich 22.3 _ 13.5 13.5 28 Source: Verma 2003: 272-275 and Verma (2004)

Even in the assembly elections held in Feb. 2002, while only 7.6% Yadavs voted for BJP, 51.5% of the More Backwards (MRBCs) and 31.6% Most Backwards (MBCs) voted for the BJP.i That shows SP could not even capitalize on the possibility of a backward castes homogenization which was limited and partial.

This table gives details of the support of SP among different social sections. The survey data clearly shows the dominant pockets of the SP social bases are the 108

Muslims and the OBCs. The data shows that after the less than a impressive performance in 1999, the base of the party increased among various sections in the 2002 assembly elections. The SP has been gradually developing a more balanced social base. This is paradoxical since the party functions in a framework of cleavage politics. The SP gained ground among the upper castes in 2002 but incurred losses among Muslims and the more backward OBCs. It also seemed to have improved its standing among the Non-Jatav Dalits. This trend is also visible in the 2004 Lok sabha elections. Loss among Muslims appears in the currently concluded election to the parliamentary seat of Firozabad where muslims openly voted for Raj Babbar, an ex. Member of Parliament from Agra on SP ticket, but now contested election as Congress candidate and won by a huge margin in the Fort constituency of SP i.e. Firozabad and defeated Mulayam’s daughter- in-law Dimple Yadav, wife of Akhilesh Yadav .

In many ways, the SP has been able to consolidate its base during the assembly elections. The electoral graph shows that it has been successful in retaining the support of Muslims and the forward OBCs. What it lacks is the support of Dalits. With the BSP in competition and the historical feat it performed during 2007 assembly elections by winning absolute majority in the house, the SP does not stand any chance of support from Dalit voters. Moreover the social engineering formula of BSP in 2007 assembly elections put a huge blow on upper castes supporters of SP as the formidable no. of voters for BSP in this election wee the Brahmins. Another area of concern for the party is the weak support among the More Backward castes. A party which came into being on the basis of caste-class cleavages, it is indeed intriguing that only the forward among the backwards( among the OBCs) tend to support it while the More backward sections choose to vote for BJP.

Another paradox for the SP is the tensions between the Social justice policy of the party and the Charan Singh’s legacy of upholding the interests of rural peasantry. It has been observed that the party has resolved this paradox by continuing “quota politics” and abandoning “kisan politics”7. However , this again means that the support base of the party would be narrower than what it expects.

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3.5. Ideological Moorings

Since political parties originate in a particular milieu that is conditioned by historical, economic, cultural and other factors, it will therefore be incumbent on each political party to identify the interests of its constituents in the first place, to set before itself certain objectives with a view to sub serving interests and to embark upon a programme of action to attain these objectives. In doing so, each political party will articulate its over-all perception of its environment and the role it envisages for itself in the same. In other words, each party will spell out its distinct ideology.

Ideology is related to problem-solving; it has to offer not merely a theoretical perspective or framework of analysis, but also a programme of action whereby concepts can be worked out in practice. When a political party formulates its ideology, it declares how it proposes to enable society to perform the triple functions of pattern - maintenance, goal-attainment and environmental adjustment. A political party articulates and aggregates their interests in the light of its ideology. It has therefore, a crucial role to play in party politics.

The Samajwadi party’s ideology of socialism comprises the the ideals of democracy, personal freedom, nationalism, social equality, radical economic change, decentralization of political and economic power, introduction of small unit technology to prevent alienation of man that modern industrial civilization has caused and espousal of methods of civil disobedience and satyagraha. The party like its predecessors holds that without a radical transformation of the existing social order and bringing about redistributive justice, social order, peace and prosperity shall be impossible to realize. The Samajwadi party is no doubt a legatee of the ideas and shibboliths of the Indian Socialist Movement of the bygone era. However, no coherent statement of these aims and objectives can be made. Dedication to these ideals is merely symbolic and devotional. Diverse ideological strands have been woven into what constitutes Indian Socialist thinking. There is a Gandhian conception of a decentralized political economy founded on village republic and involving grassroot participation by the people through non-violent mass movements including peaceful civil disobedience where necessary. There is a Marxian conception of a society free from class exploitation. And finally, there is the influence of the British Fabian

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version of Democratic Socialism. Elements of all these persuations have gone into the colouring of Indian Socialist Ideology.

Taking an overview of the Samajwadi Party’s programme, it may be said that it is addressed to both- the working and the middle classes that constitute the bulk of the Indian Society. Industrial and rural labour, small peasants, artisans and small entrepreneurs constitute the principal audience of the Samajwadi party. The Samajwadi programme, like the Communists, is oriented to the Left in that it advocates decisive state intervention in favour of the little men and less privileged sections of the society. As the party manifesto puts it, the party will plan for the interests of the little men and ‘Planning should include not merely organization and development’ as now, but also should serve human interests.

The Samajwadi party holds that political and economic power should not be alienated from the people. The human and material resources of the community should be developed in harmony with the environment through the process of planning and participation from the grassroots upwards. Large-scale industries must likewise be undertaken only where absolutely indispensable for the common welfare. Small and medium scale industries should be preferred as a rule. The Samajwadi party’s labour policy would form an integral part of its industrial policy. Both in the public and private sectors worker’s participation in management would be assured, along with their right to strike or to engage in collective bargaining. The workers would have a right to share in profits of industries in the private sector and to the surpluses of industries in the public sector. It would oppose the intensification of work-loads in the name of rationalization or the introduction of costly labour saving devices which might reduce employment potential.

In accordance with its vision of just and egalitarian socio-economic order, the Samajwadi party pledges to work for a rational policy of incomes, taxes and prices. It will take measures to narrow down existing differences of incomes, aiming at a ratio of 1:10. The affluent will be heavily taxed and a ceiling on property and expenditure enforced. A proper balance will be maintained between agricultural and industrial prices in the country as also between the prices of agricultural exports and those of industrial imports. The Samajwadi party also calls for the curbing of powers

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of the public officials and of the police in order to stop encroachment of citizen’s rights by ubiquitous bureaucracy.

The Samajwadi party hopes that by effecting radical changes in the Indian political economy, the nation will be in a stronger and more enlightened position to contribute to international peace, welfare and justice. It will oppose war and promote disarmament so that funds saved from arms-building may be channelized to the poorer section of the mankind to help emancipate them from poverty and exploitation. The socialists would envisage a socially reconstructed world order in which disparities between rich and poor as among nations and within them would be progressively eliminated. The Samajwadi party also considers itself as a secular face of U.P.

According to Rajni Kothari- “Leaders like Mulayam Singh have emerged as an inspiration to go beyond the socialist politics of the past to form a socialist political action plan of new kind. This action plan does not involve only mobilization of backwards but clearly shows a courageous and skillful attempt to successfully unite backwards and other downtrodden with the minorities for the first time. This is the Lohiya and Ambedkar style of politics.”8

So far as we conclude from the prism of application of these ideological edifices, we would find that at the broadest level the party has espoused and preached the principles and ideals of liberty, equality, justice, democracy, rule of law and good governance. However, in the arena of Indian politics it is not easy for any ideological or semi-ideological party to adhere absolutely to its declared principles. Sometimes principles are sacrificed at the altar of real interests and more often than not power political games are justified by ideological formulations. In sum, a theoretical statement of Samajwadi Party’s aims and objectives are superb and exemplary but like other politician and parties, Mulayam and the party he heads, veer between tradition and modernity, oscillate between saintly idealism and earthly realism. Innumerable instances may be cited when the party and its supreme authority sacrificed the larger interests of the downtrodden sections at the altar of selfish ambitions. For ex.-His betrayal of BSP, attack on BSP Leader Mayawati in circuit house, mishandling of the popular agitation for the creation of a separate hill-state composed of hill-districts of U.P. i.e. Uttarakhand, his crude denial of party ticket to

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strong Muslim candidates on the plea of avoiding polarization of voters on communal lines but motivated actually by the desire to prevent a strong Muslim lobby in the echelons of the Samajwadi Party are some cases in point. The party never imparted the kind of political training to workers and supporters that could give them a solid and clear orientation in the ideology of the party. Mulayam’s Muslim appeasement line also exposed the de-ideologised political perspective of the party.ii Notwithstanding his claim to represent the secular face of U.P. politics, the lack of ideological training to party cadres results in ignorance about the raison d’eter of the party’s existence and opposition to the BJP. The Samajwadi Party has emerged out of the legacy of social justice and survives on the forward-backward cleavages. It claims to be the secular force in U.P., which protects the Muslim Minority. This is done not by charity but as a matter of conscious policy. While the party appeals to the Hindus also, it wants to defeat the political Hindutva of the BJP. In this background, the party has failed to impress upon its followers and in particular, active members the significance of these ideological positions. In day-to-day activities, the party operates only at the level of cynical politics and manipulation in order to keep its activists satisfied. Farther is the relevance of socialism to the party’s programme and functioning. Mulayam’s continued association (up till Amar Singh’s resignation) with industrial magnets like Anil Ambani, Subrato Roy Sahara etc. is viewed with suspicion. Yadav defends that by saying that the capitalists are really assets, their cooperation should be taken for overall development of the state. In this bid he (while in power) ordered land acquisition of huge area of land for power project being installed by Reliance group in Dhaulana, Ghaziabad which invited a lot of criticism.

The ideological position of the SP seems to have adjusted itself to the broad socio-economic policy paradigm of the national government- the acceptance of the policy of Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization (LPG). Thus, the emphasis is on big projects, industrialization and urban development- though the party continues to retain the agenda of the rural, agricultural and the poor citizens of the state.

3.6. Leadership and organisation

Like many other state level parties, the SP too, does not take the issue of organization very seriously. It is centred on the leader and supremo Mulayam Singh Yadav. It is unthinkable to imagine the Samajwadi party without him. Since the

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formation of SP in 1992, the party has never really discussed and debated the issue of leadership. Mulayam Singh continues to be the party’s undisputed leader. This has not allowed any second line of leadership to emerge in the party, and hence inner party working has been based not on any collective leadership and decision making but on the whims and the fancies of the leader. Besides that, there are two others from the Yadav family-Shivpal Singh Yadav (Mulayam’s brother) and Akhilesh Yadav (Mulayam’s son) who may in due course, vie with each other for that position. It is very likely that after having been made the state President of SP and Chief Minister of U.P. Akhilesh may soon be accepted as the natural heir as far as the party leadership is concerned. Another cousin Prof. Ram Gopal Yadav is considered as think-tank of the SP and he is no way near that spot.

Amar Singh and Beni Prasad Verma Episode:

In the course of the evolution of the party, Amar Singh was roped in by the party. He was elected to Rajya sabha on the ticket of SP 1996 and since then, the rapport between Mulayam and Amar Singh had been excellent up till when he resignated while he was almost expelled from the party. Amar Singh with his business links and five star cultures proved to be a good compliment to the otherwise rural and rustic face of the SP.

Senior Samajwadi Party (SP) leader Amar Singh’s decision to quit from various positions in his organisation appeared to be impulsive and taken in a fit of pique while he was in Dubai. Had it been a considered move, there would have been no need to fax his resignation letter from a foreign country. He could have easily waited and handed it in personally to party supremo Mulayam Singh Yadav who is his close friend. The casual manner in which Yadav dismissed reports of Amar Singh quitting the party also indicates that the boss is confident that he will get his friend to reconsider the decision But everything was in vain and no one wanted to see and talk to each other .

The relationship between Amar Singh and Mulayam Singh has been in the limelight for many years because the former was able to manage a lot of things for the SP chief. He introduced an element of glamour to the party by bringing in filmstars. His friendship with Amitabh Bachchan helped in consolidating his position. He persuaded Sanjay Dutt to campaign for the SP in the 2009 polls even though the Dutts 114

have been Congress supporters. His close association with Anil Ambani also brought corporate support for Yadav who was earlier known for his caste-based politics.

There is no denying that Amar Singh’s emergence also alienated many important SP functionaries like Beni Prasad Verma who is the topmost Kurmi leader in the state and whose role in the 2009 parliamentary polls helped the Congress get a large number of votes from his community. The list of disillusioned SP leaders included Azam Khan, the Muslim face of the party who publicly opposed the party’s decision to give the Rampur Lok Sabha ticket to Jayaprada. The actress won the seat but in the bargain, Yadav lost one of his most trusted lieutenants. Similarly, the suave Salim Sherwani also parted company with Yadav and Amar Singh was said to be the reason.

One factor that had contributed to the cooling of ties between Amar Singh and Yadav was the result of the Firozabad election where the SP strongman’s daughter-in- law Dimple was humbled by actor Raj Babbar, a one-time close associate who contested against her on a Congress ticket. Amar Singh was quick to distance himself from the defeat by claiming that the party should have taken this election seriously. The seat had been vacated by Akhilesh Yadav to enable his wife to contest from there and it is a Yadav family stronghold. It appeared that the local Yadavs and Muslims chose to stay away from the SP for the first time. Many in the SP blamed Kalyan Singh’s association with the SP for the loss, indirectly hitting out at Amar Singh who had brought the former Uttar Pradesh chief minister close to Yadav.

Though many have held Amar Singh responsible for the downfall of Yadav, others believe that it was only because of the wily Rajput’s support that the SP boss has been able to survive the uncertainties of politics. No one can dispute the fact that Yadav on his own is a mass leader and Amar Singh is a perfect foil to him. He is his principal negotiator and has both the finesse and crudity to deal with people. He knows how the system works and is the perfect political man today. He is also the custodian of the Yadav clan’s secrets. He was considered a dependable friend for Mulayam and an equally ruthless adversary for others.

What is to be seen is whether Yadav will remove the irritants that have led to Amar Singh’s resignation or take the SP back to its original style of functioning. Though Amar Singh had hinted that he could join some other party, something which 115

contradicts his “more time for family’’ explanation, he could thrive only in the Samajwadi Party. Amar Singh chapter has accentuated a huge loss to the party in the eyes of electorates. Therefore, after a long period of un proclaimed exile, on date 17 may 2016, Amar Singh has made a stunning comeback by securing a Rajya Sabha nomination from Mulayam Singh Yadav despite strong resistance from party big-wigs like Azam Khan and Ram gopal Yadav. Singh’s return to SP makes for a dramatic tale of fluid personal equations as well as shifting political allegiances which can upset the power balance within Samajwadi Party and re-establish him as Mulayam Singh’s regent in the capital. In his hey-days, Singh was the all powerful representative of the SP boss, who leveraged his connections across political spectrum to help Mulayam grab his second stint as Chief Minister and introduced to the world of business and showbiz. However, the “Wily Thakur”, who could even get Mulayam to reverse himself on the Nuclear Deal with U.S.- a crucial reason why the civil nuclear agreement became a reality- had a rancorous falling out with the SP chief under circumstances which remain the stuff of political chatter and finally got expelled. His exit saw his rivals Azam Khan and Ram Gopal Yadav acquire a profile they lacked when he was around. Ram Gopal is now the leader of SP in Rajya Sabha and it will be interesting to see how the equations between them pan out, especially because Singh has the support of Mulayam’s powerful sibling Shivpal Singh Yadav. Even UP Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav is not hostile to him either.

Jaya Bachchan will be another interesting dimension of Rajya Sabha equation. It was Amar Singh who brought her into the SP and upper house but got they estranged after the actor refused to follow him out of the party. Singh’s rehabilitation could also be the precursor to the return of actress Jaya Prada to the SP fold. In an interview after the RS nomination, Shivpal Singh Yadav said-“ Amar Singh dal me nahin toh dil mein toh hain”, after a question of his not joining the party and being sent to Rajya Sabha.

Beni Prasad Verma, another Samajwadi Party renegade or one of the founding father, has also been nominated to RS along with party veteran Reoti Raman Singh and Lucknow realtor Sanjay Seth. Beni Prasad left the SP prior to 2007 assembly elections and joined Indian National Congress. He has been brought back home (to the SP) now on 13.05.2016 in order to woo Kurmi community prior to 2017 assembly

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elections. Mulayam Singh told at the time of his re-association with the party – “When we established SP, Beni Prasad was the person who suggested to nomenclature the new party as Samajwadi Party, which we all accepted. With the coming back of Beni Prasad Verma and Kiranpal Singh, a leader of Western U.P., SP has stood once again and our social support would rise by leaps and bounds and I am happy that he has come back; I was sad when he left. His reunion with party would send message even outside of U.P.” Whereas, Akhilesh Yadav was of the view that old books, old friends and old wine can’t be forgotten. His association would give new direction to the party in coming 2017 elections. If we analyze this, Beni came back for his rehabilitation after losing in 2014 Lok sabha election on Congress ticket and for searching political ground for his son Rakesh Verma who lost assembly election in 2012. Beni Prasad Verma is a kind of firebrand leader of Kurmi community. When he stepped out of SP, he proclaimed that he would not return to SP’s fold until his death and Mulayam Singh is a goon or gunda who may get me murdered. Mulayam is the only person who has given birth to Indian Mujahideen, a terrorist outfit working in India. Not only this, Beni has spread polemic against Mulayam on various forums. Even he did not consider famous poet Bashir Badra- “Dushmani jamkar karo lekin yeh gunzaish rahe, jab kabhi hum dost ho jayein toh sharminda na ho”. The Chart shows that the Organization coincides with administrative units of the government. The smallest unit is a primary committee for each polling centre. But the formal organizational set up of a party does not present the true picture of the actual hierarchy and functioning of a party. The informal organization rarely conforms with the constitutional façade and procedures. Therefore, the written constitution must be judged against the prevailing practice to unravel the hidden authority structure of the party and its functioning.

Robert Michels has argued that all parties follow an “Iron Law of Oligarchy” in their inner functioning. Maurice Duverger also agrees with Michels when he says that leadership of political parties present dual characteristics: it is democratic in appearance and Oligarchic in reality. The Chart and discussion of the Organizational structure gives an impression that the Oligarchic model of Michels is applicable in the case of Samajwadi Party. The decision-making system and authority is concentrated in the highest units of Hierarchy.

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The Nature of party organization is also revealed through a study of the selection of candidates for election. According to the constitution of Samajwadi party, the National President shall appoint an Election officer to settle any disputes regarding election of the National President, the National Executive and the Office- bearers and members of the National Conference. The party chief makes the final selection and in actual practice the freedom of the Election Officer is limited. The selection is influenced by factional considerations at all levels.

Apart from leadership, the other issue that the SP faces is that of Organizational network. Over the years, the SP has developed a party cadre and multiple party affiliates, more than a dozen in number. The Samajwadi Party has the following 15 affiliated organizations:

1) Samajwadi Yuvjan Sabha 2) Samajwadi Chhatra Sabha 3) Samajwadi Lohiya Wahini 4) Samajwadi Mahila Sabha 5) Samajwadi Vyapar Sabha 6) Samajwadi Alpsankhyak Sabha 7) Samajwadi Adhivakta Sabha 8) Samajwadi SC/ST Sabha 9) Samajwadi Party Pichhda Warg Sangharsh Samiti 10) Mulayam Singh Youth Brigade 11) Samajwadi Shikshak Sabha 12) Samajwadi Sainik Prakosth 13) Samajwadi khel Prakosth 14) Samajwadi Sanskritik Prakosth 15) Samajwadi Sahkarita Prakosth.

In tune with modern technology, the party has a website also (www.samajwadiparty.org). But the one man show has always thwarted the development of the collective leadership in the party. It is well known fact that Mulayam Singh Yadav has all-India political ambitions but the party, since its inception has not been able to muster enough strength in any of other states. Abu Kazmi is the sole face of the party in Maharashtra. It is a regional party in U.P. The survival politics forces the party to confine its organizational networks to U.P. alone.

3.7 Communalisation policy: Polarize or perish

Once again, the communal cauldron in Uttar Pradesh was on the boil. It’s an old story: the state has been polarized by the identity politics that marked Indian politics in the late eighties and through the nineties, the demolition of the 16th century Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992, being a shocking inflection point in fact, it was the build-up to the demolition that catapulted both the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Samajwadi Party to the forefront, marginalizing the congress,

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which had ruled the state for four long decades.

The BJP grew on the strength of Hindutva politics. The Samajwadi Party’s Mulayam Singh Yadav, too, was not slow to realise the increasing influence of religion on voters. Though his initial rise in Uttar Pradesh can be attributed to the need for change—breaking the shackles of a prolonged and discredited congress raj— it was the support of the Muslim vote that took him to new heights.

Ahead of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, Mulayam was all set to play his Muslim card—even if that means setting up an excellent opportunity for the sir’ to exaggerate the emotive spirit of Hindutva. Recent events in the state—the Dalit Muslim fights and the recent Jat-Muslim rioting—are reinforcing the perception that what the BJP and the Samajwadi Party are doing is consolidating their vote banks.

While pollsters predicted a hung Parliament, Mulayam saw it as one big, and perhaps, the last opportunity to fulfil his long-cherished dream of being the prime minister. And he knew it wasn’t possible without the blanket support of the state’s 21 per cent Muslim population. It was also important for him to keep Rampur MLA Azam Khan on his side. A sulking Khan chose to keep himself out of the party’s national executive meet in Agra, and the mixed signals were only muddying the already charged climate of the state.

After all, faced with caste- and religion-oriented voting, Muslim votes alone could help the Samajwadi Party win around half of Uttar Pradesh's 80 parliamentary seats, thereby enabling Mulayam to bargain for the top position a Third Front scenario. This dream, however, remained elusive if Muslims were to be weaned away by the congress, whose political fortunes was also heavily dependent on the support of Muslims. A desperation to be Prime minister is showing all the talk was about the old wrestler fixing 'noora khushti' matches with sworn rivals of the past from the saffron brigade, such as Ashok Singhal of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. (Remember his brief, stillborn dalliance with Kalyan Singh?) And the BJP's interest in allowing Mulayam to consolidate the Muslim vote stems from the fact that this will take away Muslim vote stems from the fact that this will take away Muslim votes from the Congress, Weakening it in the race for New Delhi.

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This posturing was recently exposed when batle-lines were apparently drawn between the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Samajwadi Party on the chaurasi kosi parikrama around Ayodhya organized August 25 onwards, a march the VHP neither had the intention nor the capability to undertake. The Samajwadi Party, which banned the march, was actually keen to see the sangh parivar push the plan aggressively. Wry observers were quick to call it a case of match-fixing: in fact, Mulayam, his chief minister son Akhilesh and VHP chief Singhal had remained closeted for two hours before the call for the parikarama and the ban.

While Uttar Pradesh has witnessed more than 30 major and minor incidents of communal violence since Akhilesh assumed power in March 2012, the latest—which began in Muzaffarnagar district but spread to Saharanpur, Meerut, Baghpat and Shamli districts—has attained serious proportions. The official toll is 38, but some 50 are claimed to have died in no more than two days. Mulayam had no qualms about praising his son for “controlling the situation in just two days”. Evidently, action by the state government came only after a prolonged spell of passive ‘wait and watch’. It all began when two young Jats confronted a Muslim youth over the alleged harassment of their sister. Au three were killed in the fighting that followed, even as police looked the other way from their outpost about a kilometre away. Scores were settled the Wild West way. But the one-sided manner in which action was initiated by the local authorities, who chose to book a large number of Jats alone, allowed ti.e asp to perpetrate its politics of hatred. What followed the same evening was the transfer of both the district magistrate and senior superintendent of police in charge of the district.

And before the new incumbents could get hold of their beatings, the Jats rose up in arms to convene a ‘maha panchayat’ in protest on August 31. This failed to draw large crowds. Therefore, another call was given for a bigger show of strength on September 7. Other than clamping Section 144 of the CrPC, which bars assembly of four or more than four persons in any public place, the state administration did nothing to douse the embers. In fact, no effort was made to prevent the assembly of thousands of people at the venue

The BJP found this an ideal occasion to start projecting itself as being with the Jats. A huge band of asp leaders, led by veteran Hukum Singh, a Jar himself,

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converged at the event “Statements issued by local authorities explicitly said that there was no restriction on anyone attending the mahapanchayat. None of the police officials at pickets en route to the venue stopped me or even cared to question me while I was on my way to the panchayat,” Hukum Singh told Outlook, after being charged with violating the ban orders.

It was rather late in the day, after some 36 innocent human lives were lost and the communal virus had spread to four other neighbouring districts, that the government woke up from its complacence. A major shake-up was carried out in the police administration of the affected districts and licences o nearly 1,900 firearm owners were cancelled. A crackdown led to 700 arrests overnight, whereas less than 200 arrests were made in the 12 preceding days.

While blaming all the violence on the BJP, the chief minister said, “A minor scuffle between a few individuals has been blown up into a riot simply because it is being fuelled by asp leaders. These small incidents are being used to serve the communal ends of political parties like the ass’, which have nothing else to bank upon at a time when general elections are not far away. The BJP has used this incident to communalise the atmosphere so that it could win the votes of Jats in the region."

Akhilesh also sought to pass the buck to the Bahujan Samaj Party (BJP), whose leaders Swami Prasad Maurya and Naseemuddin Siddiqui sought dismissal of the Akhilesh government on account of what they termed as “complete breakdown of law and order”. Maurya and Siddiqui also urged state governor B.L. Joshi to recommend imposition of President’s rule in the state. That hasn’t happened so far.

Meanwhile, in his report sent to the Union government, the governor had squarely blamed the Akhilesh government. According to a highly placed source, “the governor has said that the state government failed to take stern and timely action when the issue was simply limited to an isolated incident of eve-teasing.” The governor’s report is learnt to have also said that “the large-scale violence could have been avoided”. This is damning to the Akhilesh government.

However, political analysts were of the view that the governors report too was aimed at serving the Congress party’s interest by keeping Mulayam on tenterhooks, particularly since the congress has begun to view the Samajwadi Party as a major

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threat to its own designs on the Muslim vote.

3.8. Samajwadi parties: Policies and programmes

The declared programme enriched is electoral Manifesto of the S.P. are as under-

(i) Economic policy : Economic policy: Samajwadi Party is of opinion that new economic policy has developed luxury corruption and unemployment in the country and pane the way of exploitation of country’s natural resources.

Samajwadi party shall replace the new economic policy implementing a policy on the basis of Indian context and environment.

(ii) Foreign Loan: The party shall boycott foreign loan and capital in the field of consumer and try with all effort to get the country rid of within five years from foreign loan. To stop the money inflation a scheme would be devised.

(iii) World Trade Organization: (Dunkel proposals) from the very beginning Samajwadi party has been against of Dankal proposal and see it as a adversary to farmers. Samajwadi Party will take up the matter to refrain India from this proposal.

(iv) Industry: Unemployment is on progress in our country. A large number of people are unemployed. The party shall give a distinctive preference the cottage, small and handicrafts industries to strengthen the grass-root level industries. The party shall extend protection to spare traditional business from large industries done by potters, carpenters, Blacksmiths, weavers, shoe makers, Barbars, and sailors. Large industries would be confineded to product only infrastructure and elementary things. Agriculture based small industries and indigenous industries would be given distinctive concession. The party shall follow the principle job to everybody.

(v) Unemployment: Samajwadi Party believe that unemployment cause impoverishment not the poverty cause unemployment, that’s why, first of all the party shall provide job to unemployed. The party shall make all-out effort to provide job a member of a family atleast.

(vi) Weavers: Weavers in the country, particularly, Ansari and Kori are facing much problem to their business. Weavers represent bottom-class of the

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society. Availability of cotton and its always increasing rate is most difficult for them. There is no proper statute to sell their production Export-import policy has turned problematic. Samajwadi Party shall remove all these problems at first. vii) Policy for Agriculture or irrigation. The party believe agriculture as an industry so far this industry all the facilities given to industries, would also be provided. Soil able to be cultivated shall be irrigated within five years. The soil able to be cultivated shall be made fertile within five years. The party is determined to evaluate proper rate to the farmer’s production. So simultaneously give 100% compensation to the farming damaged by natural disaster. The party is staunch believers of the principle that, soil should be of that person who ploughs it. The party supposes the farmers a potential pillar of to the development and progress of the country. To make them effective the party would provide all the facilities as agricultural instrument and tractors shall be exempted from stamp

(viii) With the help of these committed unfertile soil shall be made fertile and after being fertilized at shall be given to the farmers with complete possession. The committee would also do the work of making all the people literate. Samajwadi Party shall make the rules to follow the principle of “Each one teach one”.

(ix) Labour policy: The party shall make rule of payment to the labours to make balance between rise in price and labours shall be extended protection and pension policy shall be framed with the opinion of labours.

Party is determined to stop wickedness, injustice and cruelty on to the children. Party shall take significant steps to restrain exploitation of children and make strict rule to stop injustice and cruelty over children.

(x) Housing policy: Samajwadi party shall try to arrange house for everybody the people living in cottage and slaver areas should be given residence having essential facilities. To retain impossession for the people living in villages, towns and cities the party shall frame rules and they would be given house either theirs situated place or another where. The party shall make significant

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move scheduled tribes, tribes, farmers, backward class and general class people shall be given priority in house distribution.

(xi) Policy for Education: The party shall give preference equal education for everybody. The higher class shall be restricted to spread highly expensive education. To attain the aim of equal education same syllabus shall be prescribed for Junior High School.

(xii) Language policy: The party shall devise a scheme to erase out English language domination from the country and rule out use of English language from state affairs. Principle profounded by Lohia shall be implemented and make means of state affair Urdu, Hindi etc Indian language. All out efforts would be made on national level to make Urdu as mean of earning.

(xiii) Protection for Dalits, Backwards and Minorities: To the protection of above mentioned classes an appropriated rule would be framed and try to law of untouchability very strictly. Tyranny preventive rule, Horizon act, to schedule tribe and tribe shall be implemented very strictly and its violation would not be endured at any last. For the preservation of holy places and for all the classes of society strick shall be taken and legal action shall be applied against violator. All the holy places under preservation of archeology department where pray is prohibited shall be allowed to pray. Legal action shall be taken against culprits of Babri Mosque and 1984 riot against Sikhs. Sufferers of these incidents shall be compensated.

To restrain riot in Uttar Pradesh a peace protection force would be recruited on national level in which people fro all the cast would be given place. Either the Krishna Commission shall be reinstated or with the consent of centre new commission setup suffered of riot shall be given expedient compensation. There would be flourished an impartial inquiry pertaining to TADA. Reservation for scheduled castes, Scheduled tribes, and backward class shall be given on their right and the officer who does not keep it would be accused off.

(xiv) A Policy for the Women: Appropriate arrangement shall be made to protect the women’s prestige and cruelty. Rules shall be made for the participation of

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women in every Field.

(xv) Relations between the Centre and States: Relations between the centre and states shall be restructured on the basis of the Sarkaria Commission report. New rules shall be incorporated in the constitution so that the Centre cannot dismiss a duly elected state government.

(xvi) Decentralization of Power: Power shall be decentralized in accordance of four pillar policy propounded by Lohia to close the people with administration. The party would bestow rights to local body. Gram panchayat, zila panchayatas well as Development Committee, and there financial position shall be made strong.

(xvii) Pension for the Farmers: The party shall implement pension policy as has been implemented in Uttar Pradesh. The life insurance and pension plan shall be chalked-out for the farmers.

(xviii) Regional Disparity: Regional inequality shall be removed out and budget distribute in accordance of law.

(xviii) Small States: The party shall reinstate commission, and on the recommendation of commission the matter shall be considered.

(xx) Foreign Policy: The Party shall support the movement going on against injustice and corruption. A new relationship shall be developed with neighbouring countries. A confederation of the India-Pakistan- Bangladesh shall be setup. The Kashmir dispute has been created by the Congress government. The Samajwadi Party believes that all these disputes and frontier problems can be solved within the framework of an India-Pakistan- Bangladesh confederation. Party would strive for terminating the veto power of the big five nations in the United Nations Security Council and establishing a regime of voting-equality.

(xxi) Fair Administration: The party shall instate fair and corruption less administration. An appropriate limitation shall be imposed an expenditure of representatives, government official and employ.

(xxii) Welfare Plans: (a) The party is determined to get availed drinkable water to all the people in five years, (b) party shall arrange medical services, house, 125

education and living to all the people, (c) pension shall be given to the helpless widows, aged and handicapped. (d) Toilet shall be made in all the villages, (e) Party would make effort to compensate do damaged by natural disasters.

(xxiii) Interest Exemption: A scheme shall be devised to spare the poor people from deficit caused by Bank interest, in local interest and official interest shall be imposed ristiition.8

(xxiv) Price Policy: According to the well considered price- policy of the Samajwadi Party.

(a) The price of the goods manufactured in the mill, workshops will not exceed the cost of production by more than fifty per cent.

(b) A proportionate balance will establish between the prices of agricultural and mill products.

(xxv) Muslim Personal Law: The party is opposed to any kind of external interference and alteration in Muslim personal law.

(xxvi) Establishment of Educational Institutions in Muslim dominated areas: The party assumes that there is lack of educational institutions in Muslim dominated areas due to which Muslim children specially the girls are deprived of the benefit of education the party will make proper arrangements to open educational institutions from primary level schools to intermediate colleges and technical institutions in Muslim abundant areas.

(xxvii) The Mosque-Temple Dispute: The party is a supporter of resolving the Mosque-Temple dispute through the court of law. Muslims have affirmed their faith on the court of law but BJP and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) have pronounced it as a matter of religious allegiance. Samajwadi Party considers BJP and VHP as anti-national.

(xxviii) Article 370: The party is strong opposed to the abolition of article 370 of the Indian constitution and will Firmly oppose any step taken to delete it.

(xxix) Article 356: The party is opposed to the abuse and misuse of article 356 but 126

strongly supports the continuance of this Article as it is, in the Constitution. The people who talk of its abolition should sense that still the divisive and destructive force exist in the country which will prove to be hazardous for its unity in the absence of Article 356 in the constitution.

(xxx) Reservation for High- Caste Poor: The party will arrange ten per cent reservation in the government services for the higher-caste poor.

(xxxi) Taxation Policy: Because of the faulty taxation policy as it is followed the poorer sections are put to great disadvantage. The ratio between direct taxes and indirect taxes is stately not fair. Direct taxes are continuously reduced while indirect taxes were hiked. The party would reduce indirect taxes to bring it to the level of direct taxes.

(xxxii) Sports Policy: The Government will initiate a sports policy by which the sportsmen will be encouraged and their talent will not be affected by politics and nepotism. Arrangements will be made for the reservation of sportspersons in the public and private sector services. Sports complex will be constructed in the rural areas. To encourage artists, writers, sportspersons and scientists the party will honour extraordinary talents and will make separate policy for them.

(xxxiii) Administrative Machinery: The effort of the party will be to reduce the non- developmental expenditure of the government.

The party will resolve the stagnant state of provincial civil services and other state services and will provide promotion opportunities to the officer of provincial services on the higher posts of the administration, After heeling the despair, anger and frustration of official of provincial services, their skill and experience will be utilized on the policy-formation level. Keeping in view the problems of the students and youth in the rural areas, the maximum age limit will be increased in the entrance examination of All-India Administrative Services.

(xxxiv) Separate pay Commissions for Para Military and Militaiy Forces: The party believes that the personnel of Army, Air Force and Navy perform the most risky task, therefore, their pay and allowances should not be determined in parallel to other services. The party favours a separate pay commission for the

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purpose of determining the pay of military and para-military forces so that justice is done to them.

(xxxv) Empowerment of Human Rights Commission. Considering the increasing incidents of violation of human rights, the effort of the Samajwadi Party will be to endow the Commission with the power of awarding punishment so that the elements violating human rights can be dealt with effectively.9

(xxxvi) Secularism : The party is founded on the plank of strengthening secularism and democracy. It reiterates that secularism means that separation of religion form the state. Secularism has been defined as a basic feature for the Indian constitution by the Supreme Court. The efforts by communal forces to undermine the multi ethnic, multi-religious and multi-linguistic character of our society will be strongly rebuffed.

The party will strictly implement the protection of places of worship act. It will actively combat all efforts by the communal forces to create fresh disputes in Kashi and Mathura. The Babri Masjid-RamJanmabhoomi dispute at Ayodhya will be resolved with reference to the Supreme Court or on the basis of a consensus.

The right to freedom of religion contained in the constitution will be fully respected and protected. The personal codes of different religious communities will not be altered unless and until a consensus emerges for bringing about such a change. The Samajwadi Party will make all efforts to bring together different sections of our society to build a strong, modern forward looking secular democratic society.°

(xxxvii) Social Justice : The party is committed to the empowerment of the underprivileged, deprived sections and communities, particularly the SCs,STs and OBCs the policy of reservation for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and other Backward Classes shall be strictly enforced. Stringent action will be taken against those perpetrating atrocities on scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Special courts will be set up under the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes (prevention of atrocities act) to ensure quick justice to victims of atrocities. The scheduled tribes are found in many parts of the country and

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dwell in the most difficult and inhospitable terrains. The consequent lack of security, alienation of their lands, exploitation of the mineral wealth, deprivation of their rights to forest produce and wealth, destruction of their environment have all combined to cause a growing disaffection amongst the tribal population. The Samajwacli Party will consider providing regional autonomy to compact and contiguous areas inhabited by tribal population with a thrust on speedy development. Apart from restoring tribal land illegally occupied, the Samajwadi Party will make legislation for conferring ownership rights in respect of minor forest produce including tendu patta on scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, other backward classes and other weaker sections who work in the forests. A large number of scheduled castes and other backward classes are dependent on their traditional occupations. On the one hand, .the door of access to other occupations has been barred to them while, on the other hand, there is a sharp dwindling of opportunities and incomes in their traditional occupations. Despite reservations, there is still a long way to go before these sections achieve true equality of opportunity. The Samajwadi Party will make all efforts to attain this objective.

During its short tenure, the Samajwadi Party government had taken many measures in this direction. It initiated the process for the following.

• A single window development agency called scheduled caste and scheduled tribe development authority. • To liberate all safai karmacharis and honourably rehabilitate them by the year 2000. • The safai karmachari commission has been reappointed and a Finance and Development Corporation established. • Grain Bank scheme to prevent starvation deaths amongst tribals started with a provision of Rs. 2 crore. • Earmarked Rs. 50 crore for setting up residential schools, exclusively for tribal children. • A new Central Sponsored Scheme for special Education Development Programme for SC girls in low literacy pockets. • Activised the working of Ambedkar foundation by increasing the corpus

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fund.

The Samajwadi party reiterates its commitment to implement the salient recommendations of the Dalit Manifesto formulated by the National Action Forum for Social Justice.”

Advancing People’s Welfare: The Samajwadi Party is committed to launching a frontal attack against poverty. However, the untimely fall of the Government prevented the implementation of the long term measures it had initiated towards this end. The prime objective of the Samajwadi Party would be to ensure:

• food grain in every home

• every Indian, healthy and literate;

• every child in school.

(xxviii) Food Security: The Party has promised a scheme of providing ten kilograms of foodgrains in each person below the poverty line at one half of the issue prices. To ensure food security of the nation and to meet the requirements of the entire population, it is necessary to preserve and strengthen the statutory Public Distribution System and to bring into its ambit more essential commodities. The unfinished commitments of the United Front include those with regard to education, health care and housing. The party is committed to ensure that:

(a) Every habitation has access to potable drinking water;

(b) a primary health centre is established for population of every 5,000 people; and

(c) the very poor have access to houses build under the Public Housing Programme or to credit that can be utilized to build their houses so that the goal of providing a shelter to every family..

Some other concerns that found mention in Samajwadi Party Manifesto9 are as under:

- Environment & Climate change

- MNREGA, MIDDAY MEAL and NUTRITION

- Naxalism

- Approach towards Muslims- Sachchar Committee Report would be implemented to 130

improve conditions of Muslim.

- Special status to Poorvanchal and Bundelkhand.

- Advocate Welfare / Journalist welfare

- Constitution of Savarana Commission

- Reservation

-Retirement age 65 years.

3.9. The Text of the Constitution of the Samajwadi Party10

Article 1: The name of the Party shall be the Samajwadi Party.

Article 2: Aims and Objectives

Samajwadi Party holds the Constitution of India in high esteem and believes in its sanctity. Getting inspiration from the ideals of Gandhi and Lobia, the Samjwadi Party believes in democracy, secularism and socialism. The Samajwadi Party believes in a political system in which decentralization of economic and political power must be in real form. The Party recognizes the rights of protest by democratic and peaceful means including satyagraha and non-violence.

The Samajwadi Party is opposed to religion-based state. No person who is member of an organization that believes in a religious state shall be admitted to the Samajwadi Party. The party believes in the principle of special opportunities for women, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, minorities and the backward classes. Samajwadi Party will maintain true love and honour to the Constitution of India established by law and committed to principles of the socialism, secularism and democracy. Samajwadi Party will maintain the sovereignty, unity and Integrity of India.

Article 3 : Party organization

Party organization shall consist of:

(1) National Organization : (a) National Conference

(b) National Executive

(2) State Level Organization: (a) State conference

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(b) State Executive

(3) District Level Organizaton : (a) District Conference

(b) District Executive

(4) City Organization: (a) Municipal corporation conference and municipal corporation executive.

(b) Municipality conference and municipality executive

(5) Vidhan Sabha Kshetra Level Organization:

(a) Vidhan Sabha Kshetra conference

(b) Vidhan Sabha Kshetra Executive.

(6) Primary Committees

Note

(a) The area of a primary committee shall be a polling station.

(b) The expression “the state” mentioned in this constitution, shall also include Union Territories.

Article 4: Area of State’s Units

(1) The state units of the Samajwadi Party shall be organized in accordance with the States and Union Territories inscribed in the first schedule of the Indian Constitution.

(2) The headquarter of the state units shall be situated in the capital of concerned State/Union Territories.

(3) The form of the units of metropolitan city of Mumbai and Kalkota-Hawrah shall be similar to the State-level units.

Article 5: Membership

(a) Any person, of the age of eighteen years or more, who accepts Section two of the Constitution of the Samajwadi Party, may become the primary member of 132

the party by donating five rupees bienn1ally. Provided that he is not a member of any political communal group which has separate membership, separate constitution and its own programme.

(b) The primary member who would admit 50 primary members and collect from them Five Hundred rupees as membership fees will become the active member of the party.

(c) The membership tenure would be of three years that will start from 1st of July and will end on 30th June of the third year.

(d) The membership fee will be distributed among several units like this.

• National Executive 25%

• 25% to State Executive.

• 25% to district/municipal corporation/municipal executive

• 25% to Vidhan Sabha panchayat executive.

(e) It is compulsory for the members of the National Executive, State Executive, Municipal Corporation Executive District Executive/Municipal Executive and Vidhan Sabhad Executive to deposit Rs. 10,000, Rs. 5,000, Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 500 in the form of annual donation. The members who will not deposit the stipulated donation in the stipulated duration shall be deprived of the membership of concerned working committee.

Article 6 : Tenure

The tenure of every conference, every executive, every committee and office bearer shall be three years.

Article 7 : List of Members

(1) At the district level, the list of members primary as well as active will be prepared in separate registers under the supervision of the District President. The list of active members will be sent to the State Executive with the signatures of the District President and the District General Secretary.

(2) If any written complaint about fraudulent membership with proof is lodged with the District President or State President or National President then the

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District President will send the report to the State President after inquiring about from his level or the State President either himself or in accordance with the instructions of National President, as deemed fit, will set up an inquiry in this matter. If this has been proved by the inquiry that membership is bogus, then that member shall be deemed unqualified for any office. The person can appeal to the National President against the decision of the State President. The National President either himself or through any other person or persons can hear the appeal. The decision of the National President shall be final and binding. Any membership-related dispute cannot be taken to any court of law.

(3) Member’s name, permanent address, date of admission and serial number of membership form shall be mentioned in the membership list.

(4) Membership shall be terminated if the member has died, resigned, expelled from the Party or failed to deposit membership fee.

Article 8: Primary Committee

The Primary Committee shall be organized only at a place where 25 primary members and at least one active member are available at one polling station. The President of primary committee shall be elected by its members from the list of active members.

(1) The primary committee shall consist of 7 members including the President if the membership strength is 50. If members are more than 50 it shall be all member body.

(2) Every ward of the nagar panchayat shall have primary committee.

Article 9 : Vidhansabha Kshetra Conference and Vidhan Sabha Kshetra Executive

(1) Every active member shall be the Vidhan Sabha Kshetra conference member within the jurisdiction of Vidhan Sabha Kshetra in which the Nagar panchayat is also included.

(2) Active members of the Party, Party MLA’s residing within the area of kshetra panchayat, MP’s, President of District panchayat, President of Vidhan Sabha Kshetra. President of District Cooperative Bank, President of D.C.F, member of District Panchayat, Director of District Cooperative Bank and President of

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top-most cooperative societies and Director will be the ex-officio members of Vidhan Sabha Executive. It is necessary for ex-officer members to be active member of the pa.

(3) The Vidhan Sabha Kshetra conference shall not be organized until 40% primary committees are constituted.

(4) A twenty-one member Executive Council including the President and 20% representatives of the District Conference, 10% of State Conference and 5% of National Conference of the total active members of the region will be elected.

The President shall nominate one Vice President, one Chief Secretary, three Secretaries and one Treasurer from the members of the Executive Council.

(5) The President Vidhan Sabha Kshetra executive shall summon the meeting of the Executive Council at least once in a month.

Article 10: District Conference and District Executive

The members of the District Conference shall be the following:

(1) The representatives of district conference elected by kshetra panchayat conference falling within the District area and the Municipal Conferences, having population less than three lakhs.

(2) All the party MP’s, MLA’s, President and members of Zila panchayat, President of Zila Cooperative Bank, President of Zila Cooperative Union, President of kshetra panchayat and President and Director of top most cooperative committees of the State will be the ex-officio members of District Conference provided that they are active members of the Samajwadi Party.

(3) The District Conference will elect fifty member District Executive including the President. The President shall nominate one Vice-President, one Chief Secretary, one Treasurer and five Secretaries from these members,

(4) The District Conference, and District Executive shall not be constituted until 50 % kshetra committees are organized.

Article 11: Municipal Corporation /Municipality Conference and Executive

(1) All the active members of the wards shall be represented in the conference of

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every ward of municipal corporation/ municipality (3 lakh population). Out of the total active members they shall elect 20% representatives for the Municipal Corporation / Municipality Conference 10% for state conference and 5% for National Conference

(2) All the active members of the municipality (less than 3 lakh) will be the members of Municipality Conference. They shall elect 10% active members for the District Conference 10% for the State Conference and 5% for the National Conference as representatives.

(3) Elected representatives of the ward conference in the conference of Municipal Corporation/Municipality (3 lakh population).

(4) MLA’s, MP’s, Municipal corporation Presidents, Corporation’ Mayor, Municipality President and Members, shall be the officio members of Corporation’s executive or the municipality executive provided that they belong to the Samajwadi Party.

Article 11A Municipal Corporation / Municipality Executive

(1) Municipal Corporation Conference shall elect 31 member including the President of Corporation’s executive and nominate one as Vice-President, one as Chief Secretary, one as Treasure and 5 Secretaries from them (members of the executive body).

(2) The Municipality Conference shall elect 21-member executive body. From the members of executive. President will nominate one as Vice-President, one as Chief Secretary, one as Treasurer and three, as Secretaries.

(3) The units of the Sanijwadi Party shall be constituted at the assembly level also In Municipal Corporation Municipality.

(4) Assembly committee shall be organized only when there are five active members In the Municipal Corporation and at least 10 active members present from every ward. The primary members of the ward shall elect the President and 20 members of the ward executive body. The President shall nominate one as Vice-President, one as Chief Secretary, three as Secretaries from these members. Only active members shall be able to become O1ce-bearers.

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(5) The Municipality Working Committee and the Municipal Corporation Executive body shall be organized only when at least 50% of ward committees would have been constituted.

Article 12: State Conference and State Executive

(1) Following shall be the delegates of the state conference:

(a) The delegates of the State Conference shall be elected by Vidhan Sabhad Kshetra ward conference of Municipal corporation Municipality (3 lakh population) and conferences of municipalities (less than 3 lakh) under the supervision of an election officer nominated by the State President.

. (b) A group of 15 wards of Mumbai and Calcutta, Hawarah Metropolitan city (received the status of state) shall be considered as similar to one district. The National President shall decide about the District unit on the recommendation of Presidents in the Metropolis.

3 (c) All the active members, representatives of the ward shall be present in the conference of every ward. Election shall be held like the Kshetra panchayat. Out of the total membership 20% members of district conference 10% of Metropolitan conference and 5% of active members shall be elected by them as representatives of National conference.

(d) In Maharashtra and West Bengal conferences, party’s Mayors in corporations and officials of Metropolitan State Executive Body shall the delegates.

(e) All the MP’s of Samajwadi Party, MLA’s, President of Zila panchayat. President of Municipality Council President of Municipal Corporation, President of District Cooperative Banks, President of District Cooperative Union, former MP’s, former MLA’s, former Presidents of State Executive, all the Presidents of District Executive, all the Mayors of Municipal Corporations, Presidents of apex cooperative societies will also be the members of State Conference provided that they are active members of the Samajwadi Party.

(f) District and State level Presidents of the concerned organization of the Samajwadi Party.

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Art. 12A State Executive

1. The State Conference shall elect, for the State Executive, 51 members including the President for UP, Bihar, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and 31 members including the Presidents for the rest of the states. The President shall nominate, from the members of the executive, one as Vice-President, one as Chief Secretary General, one as Treasurer and 12 Chief Secretaries.

2. The leaders of the Party MLA’s in the State Legislative ,Council and the State Legislative Assembly shall be ex-officio members of the State Executive.

3. The members of the National Executive shall be the ex-officio members of the State Executive of the states they belong to. The State Presidents of concerned organizations and apex cooperative societies shall be the ex-officio members of the State Executive.

4. The President of the State Executive shall summon the meeting of the executive body at least once in two months.

5. On the demand of 50% members of state executive or 50% members of state conference, the President shall be obliged to summon the meeting of state executive and state conference.

6. The State Conference shall be held at least once three in years.

Article 13: State Parliamentary Board

(1) Every State Parliamentary Board of the Samajwadi Party shall consist of nine members including the President. The President of the State Executive shal1preside over the Board. The State President shall nominate eight persons at the maximum including the Leader of the Legislative Assembly Party as the members of the Parliamentary Board.

(2) The State Parliamentary Board shall act as a guide for the members of the Samajwadi Party in the State Legislature constituencies & Local Govt.

(3) The State Parliamentary Board shall send a panel of names of the candidates from their respective states to the Central Parliamentary Board at the time of the Lok Sabha, Legislative Assembly and Local elections.

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Article 14: The National Conference

1. (a) The National Conference shall be composed of: delegates elected by each state unit.

(b) All the MP’s, MLAs and all ex-MP’s and all the district panchayat Presidents of the Samajwadi Party.

(c) All the State Presidents of Samajwadi Party, and all the State and National Presidents of the associated organizations.

(d) All the members and office bearers of the National Executive.

(e) The former-National Presidents of the Samajwadi Party, if an active members of the Party.

(f) Ten per cent delegates of sub section 1(a) from 1(e) may be nominated to the National conference by the National President.

2. on the resolution of the National Executive or the request of 40% members of the National conference a special session of National executive can be called by the National President.

3. At least one session of the National Conference must be called within three years by the National Executive on prescribed dates and times.

4. A complaint can be lodged before the National President by any member concerned about the composition of the National Conference. Decision of the National President shall be final and binding. Decision of the National President cannot be challenged in any court of law.

Article 15: The National Executive

(1) There shall be 51 members including the President in National Executive, The National Conference shall elect 26 members including the President. The National President shall nominate 25 members of the National Executive such members must be active members of the Party. The National President shall nominate a Vice-President, 6 Chief General Secretary, a Treasurer and six Secretaries from among the members of the National Executive.

(2) The National Executive shall be responsible for implementing the decisions of

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the National Conference or special session of the Samajwadi Party.

(3) The explanation of different Articles of the Constitution of the Samajwadi Party and the right of the National Executive in the matters regarding these shall be final and conclusive.

(4) The National Executive shall present (produce) the report of the proceedings of the last session of the Conference before every session of the National Conference of the Samajwadi Party and the subject list of that session.

(5) If any member of the National Conference wishes to bring any kind of proposal he would be sending the same to the National Executive atleast 15 days earlier. In case of the National Executive concurrence with the proposal, the same may be brought for discussion to the Conference.

(6) The National Executive for the sake of examining all the recorded documents, papers and diaries of all the units of the Samajwadi Party can appoint an Audit Officer (Lekha Parikchhak) and others. It would give instructions about the Audit Officer and others.,

(7) In case of necessity and smooth functioning of the Party the National Executive shall hold the right of framing Rules and its implementation. The rules thus framed by the National Executive shall be forwarded for approval to the next National Conference. This kind of rules framed by the National Executive shall be implemented immediately even though it would be approved later on.

(8) The different units under the Party Constitution shall be directed by the National Executive.

(9) It is the National Executive which shall decide the date for the completing the formation work of the National Conference and the same shall be followed by the district and state units.

(10) It shall be binding upon the President to convene the meeting of the National Executive at least once within two months time.

(11) The leader of the Parliamentary Party shall be from the ex-officio members of the National Executive, The President of the State Executive and the Leader of

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the Legislative Assembly Party shall be the ex-officio members of the National Executive. The National President of the associated organizations shall be ex-officio members of the National Executive.

Article 16: President

(a) The President shall preside over the National Executive, the National Conference and special sessions of the Party Conference.

(b) In order to bring out best discipline in regard to the National Executive the President shall hold the maximum power. If the President is fully satisfied with the fact that the behaviour of any office-holder or member is anti-party then he can get the office-bearers, the post-holders or members suspended or expelled from the Party. This action of the Party President can not be challenged in any court of law.

(c) The National President shall be able to use the powers of the National Executive when there is no meeting of the same.

(d) The President shall hold the right of convening the meeting of the Executive. On demands of the 50% members of the Executive the National President shall be ‘bound to call the meeting of the National Executive.

(e) The President shall fill up the post, through nomination fallen vacant due to resignation, death or expulsion of any party member for the rest of the duration.

(f) the National President shall hold the right to nominate the National President, office bearers and the members of the executives related to the associated organizations of the Samajwadi Party. The state President shall form the State Executive of the associated organizations with the prior approval of the National President.

Article 17: Vice-President

In the absence of the President, the Vice-President shall preside over the National Executive Body or National Conference. At times under the authority delegates to him by the President, the Vice-President shall perform all the functions for which he has been authorized.

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Article 18: Treasurer

The Party Treasurer shall be the manager of the funds of the Samajwadi Party. He shall maintain all accounts of income, expenses and over all capital assets of the Party.

Article 19: Chief General Secretary

The Chief General Secretary shall function under the general control of the President. According to the responsibilities bestowed on the Chief Secretary General by the President he shall be accountable for the preparation and publication of the Proceedings of the Party’s session/special session. It shall also be the responsibility of the Chief Secretary-General to prepare a detailed report of the performance of the National Conference and National Executive Body and to present it in the next meeting.

Article 20: The Central Parliamentary Board

There shall be a Central Parliamentary Board of the Samajwadi Party which shall consist of seven members. The Party National President shall act as its President, The National President shall nominate eight members at the maximum including the Leader of the Samajwadi Party Parliamentary Group for the Central Parliamentary Board. The decision of the Central Parliamentary Board shall be final regarding the selection of candidates for the parliamentary and state legislature elections. The distribution of election symbols shall be done only through the signatures of the National President of the Party.

Article 22. The Subjects Committee

(1) Whenever the National Executive Body of the Samajwadi Party shall meet, before the National Conference or the special session of the Party, for the purpose of selecting various proposals, it shall be named as the Subjects Committee.

(2) Proposals for the National Conference/Special session: All the proposals sent to the Subjects Committee either by the National Executive or those, sent to the National Executive by the state conferences at least 15 days before the session, and on which the National Executive is agreed, shall be placed before it. The Subjects Committee shall fix the time for discussion on the proposals. 142

Any proposal having been rejected earlier may be discussed if at least 100 delegates demand in writing for the discussion on the proposed draft before the meeting of the session then the President shall fix the time for discussion on that particular proposal.

Article 23: The Special Session

(1) The National Conference of the Samajwadi Party shall be held once in years on the date and place as fixed by the National Executive. But a Special Session may be summoned anytime by the National President on a prior notice of one month on the demand of 50% members of the National Conference or as decided by the National Executive.

(2) Only the delegates of the National Conference shall be deemed as the delegates of the session. The session shall be presided over by the National President.

(3) The Executive Body of the State in which the session is being held shall act as the Reception Committee. It shall make all the arrangements for this purpose including the collection of money as well as the maintenance of its accounts.

Article 24 Quorum

The Quorum to constitute a meeting of all the conferences and special sessions of the Samajwadi Party shall be 20% of the total membership. To constitute the meetings of Working Committees, the quorum shall be 1/3rd of the total membership.

Article 25

In a conference of each level there shall be provision for the representatives of the audience who shall be able to participate in the discussions. But they shall not have the right to vote It shall be the power of the President of the concerned level to nominate the audience representatives.

Article 25: The Bank Account

(1) The Bank Account of Vidhansabha Kshetra Executive, District Executive, Municipality Executive, Municipal Corporation Executive, State Executive and National Executive shall be opened in the name of the concerned units of the party, and shall be managed jointly by the President and Treasurer of that

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concerned unit.

(2) The bank accounts can also be opened in the name of the National President which shall be managed through his signature.

Article 26: Convening of Meetings

The meeting of the Executive Body of Vidhan Sabha Kshetra Municipality, Municipal Corporation on a prior notice of one week; the meeting of the State Executive on a prior notice of 15 days; and the meeting of the National Executive on a prior notice of 20 days can be summoned by the concerned President. The meeings can be summoned on a very short notice in the unusual circumstances.

Article 27: Election Procedure

(1) The election of the President and the National Executive

(a) The National President shall appoint a person as an Electoral officer. The National President can also appoint two Assistant Election Officers so that the Electoral Officer may conduct the election smoothly.

(b) All the members of National Conference shall be informed about the elections by the Election Officer either through the post or by notification published in the newspapers.

(c) For the post of President, ten members of National conference shall propose the name of any such person who is a member of the National Conference. For the National Executive any member of the National Conference may propose the name of any other member who is the member of National Conference.

(d) After the withdrawal of nominations if election becomes necessary then within the pre-decided time-limit and at the fixed place. the election of the President and the Executive shall be held next day only.

(e) Just after the polling has been completed counting of votes shall take place and shall continue until its completion.

(f) Every member of the National Conference is entitled to cast one vote. The candidate who gets maximum number of votes among others 144

contesting for the President and the first 25 candidates getting maximum votes in the election of the Executive Body shall be declared elected.

(2) Election of the President of State Units and the members of the State Executive Body:

(a) The Election Officer appointed by the National President shall complete the election process within the time limit as fixed by the National Executive.

(b) For contesting the election for the membership of the State Executive, it is necessary for the candidate to be a member of the State conference and his name to be proposed by any other member of the Conference.

(c) For contesting the election for the office of the President any member whose name has been proposed by ten members of the State Conference may become a candidate.

(d) The individual members of the State Conference may propose only one name in the election of state Executive membership.

(e) After the withdrawal of nominations, scrutiny shall be held the next day if election is required. After the completion of polling, the counting of votes shall take place and the President shall declare the names of winning candidates.

(f) For the election of Vidhan Sabha, Municipal Corporation and Municipality Executive, the election of the District Executive, Municipal Corporation Executive, Municipality Executive, representatives of the National Conference, representatives of state conference and the representatives of kshetra panchayat, city Executives and district conference shall be held within the predecided time limit. Elections will be conducted in accordance with section 28(2).

Article 29 : Election Disputes

Generally the election disputes at lower levels shall be resolved by the District

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and State Executive. In cases of disputes concerning the elections of state bodies, the National Executive shall appoint an officer to conduct an inquiry and after that it shall give its final decision. The decision taken by the officer appointed by the National Working Committee shall be final and binding. This decision cannot be challenged in any court of law.

Article 30 : The Discipline Committee

In matters of indiscipline the National President shall be empowered to set up a three-member Jnquiiy Committee and to take disciplinazy action on the basis of recommendations made in the report within the fixed time limit.

Article 31: Amendment in the Constitution

On the recommendation of the National Executive, any part of the Constitution, save Section (2), may be amended by the majority of the total members of the Special Session and by a majority of 2j3rd of the members present and voting. On being authorized by the National Conference or by the Special Session, the National Executive may effect any amendment in the Constitution.

Article 32: The Associated Organization

Under the Constitution of the Samajwadi Party there shall be auxiliary organizations by the name of Samajwadi Yuvajan Sabha, Lohia Vahini, Mulayarn Singh Yadav Youth Brigade, Samajwadi Kshetra Sabha, Saniajwadi Shikshak Sabha, Samajwadi Mazdoor Sabha, Samajwadi Bayapar Sabha, Samajwadi Mahila Sabha, Samajwadi Alpsankhyak Sabha, Samajwadi Anusuchitjati Janjati Prakoshth, Samajwadi Sahkanta Prakoshth. Samajwadli Adhiwakta Sabha and Samajwadi Sainik Prakoshth. In all these organizations at every level there shall one Vice-President, One Secretary-General, five Secretaries, one Treasurer and twenty-two members. The Presidents of all the organizations at their level shall be the special invited members of the Samajwadi Party Executive Body. Only active members of the Samajwadi Party may become officers and executive members of these organizations.

The nomination of district-level auxiliary organizations snail be made by the Presidents of State-level auxiliary organization only with the prior consent of the President of the Samajwadi Party of that State. The nomination of the State Presidents and National President of the concerned organizations shall be made by the National 146

President of the Samajwadi Party. The district President of the auxiliaiy organizations may select the District Working Committee of these organizations with the consent of the District President and with the approval of the State President. If the National President is satisfied that any member is not working in the interest of the Samajwadi Party then such organization may be dissolved by him or he may remove any such person from his office.

Article 33

The Samajwadi Party shall adjust women, minorities, SC and OBC’s on 60- 70% seats in all its organizations from the level of the Vidhan Sabha Kshetra Executive to the National Executive Body level.

Article 34

The flag of the Samajwadi Party shall be rectangular in shape in which the ratio of length and width shall be 3: 2. The upper two-third part of the flag shall be dark red colour and lower one third shall be of dark green. In the red colour part there shall be a symbol of Bicycle in white colour.

Article 35

It is compulsory for all the members of the Samajwadi party to wear clothes made of Khadi handloom.

3.10. Strategy of S.P.

Uttar Pradesh has seen a spurt in communal riots incidents 2012-13 Data from IB reports for the first eight months of the year till August 31 pages the figure at 80. So it's no coincidence that the politics of projecting Modi as future prime minister by the RSS and BJP also gained momentum during this period. That matters were moving in such a direction became obvious on August 25 itself, during the VHP's aborted chaurasi kosi parikrama (CKP) yatra. Around 10 days before the CKP, senior VHP leaders had a two-hour-long closed door meeting with Mulayam Singh Yadav. No one knows exactly what transpired, but it can be safely speculated that there was consensus on some enacted rivalry between the two. The events thereafter prove the theory, one could say. The effect of that strategy was evident in the happenings in Muzaffarnagar and the small communal clashes in other parts of eastern and western Uttar Pradesh. 147

The political ramifications of the CKP are much larger, a double-pronged approach polarising the rights Hindutva vote bank while also helping the 'minority politics' card of the Samajwadi Party (SP). As Hindu votes unite, its opposite number, the Muslims, too will come together. The posturing of the Hindutva forces is bound to see a counter, triggering a fear psychosis all around. Echoes of this are already reverberating across the state.

3.10.1 BJP and S.P- Win-win Situation

In all this, two political parties, the BJP and the SP, stand to gain the most. As chaos prevails, both get a chance to fish in troubled waters, a win-win situation- 'match-fixing' if you will. For the BJP, the dynamics of the communal rage being whipped up by fringe saffron outfits will bring the party centre stage after a long political oblivion. As a natural corollary, Muslims will rally around Mulayam who they see as their protector in UP. Apparently, both parties have a common political enemy here, the Congress.

The BJP's favourite exhibit – Modi's 'development plus' image- is even now fairly blunt in UP and Bihar. People here still see him more as Gujarat's saviour rather than that of the nation. The party also knows that while Modi is their main strength in many places, he is also their "terrible weakness". Their fear is that as a reaction to Modi, Muslim votes will shift to the Congress en bloc. At whatever cost, this they have to stop. For them, the SP is a "lesser evil". Meanwhile, the SP is afraid of losing its vote bank to the Congress, given its record of bad governance in UP. But with the communal polarization, the Muslim vote bank has nowhere else to go.

It may not seem as if the two parties are colluding, but was never so till now. A mutually dependent, yin-yang relationship at best, ties between the two soured soon after the Ayodhya movement started spilling over during Mulayam's first short stint as UP chief minister for the Janata Dal (189-91). Mulayam's strong stand against the "communalization of the issue" led to the BJP pulling the plug. From then on, the two parties have kept each other at arm's length, the only aberration being Mulayam inviting Babri demolition accused and estranged ex-BJP man Kalyan Singh over to the SP just before the 2009 Lok Sabha polls.

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The 2012 assembly polls, though, undid most of the damage with the Muslims flocking back. But within months, the saffron parties were crying themselves hoarse over Muslim appeasement and the alleged heavy-handed dealings of some of the SP's minority leaders. That aside, the fact that the communal cauldron was on the boil was plain for everyone to see. The social fabric in UP today is extremely fragile. Even small skirmishes are taking the shape of ugly communal clashes. Recently Dallipur, under Kandhai police station in Allahabad district, witnessed such a case. It was a small incident, a youth having a small argument at an electronics shop belonging to a member of the minority community. Soon, the two communities were baring fangs at each other. A small error and another ugly clash might have erupted. Similarly, backstreet fights and alley clashes are taking a communal colour all over UP. One reflection of such contesting fractures was seen in the Muzaffarnagar riots.

3.10.2. BJP, RSS and communalization of politics

The RSS, which had been lying low 2009, has become very active, even issuing a whip to the shakes to mobilize the cadre. It all went into high gear after Nrendra Modi was declared chief of the BJP election committee. Saffron hardliners like VHP leader Ashok Singhal have already started cranking up the war machine, setting up camp in Ayodhya. Meanwhile, the BJP's Uttar Pradesh in charge and Modi's No. 2 man, Amit Shah, tilak-chandan in place, is all over the newspaper inside pages. Now he's camping in Ayodhya, declaring Ramjanmabhoomi will be a major issue in 2014 then he's in Mathura and western UP spreading the message that Modi will begin his campaign from Mathura, the god Krishna's birthplace, thus emphasising the mythic link between Mathura and Dwaraka in Gujarat. Linking the Kanpahata Yogis of Gorakhnath with Hindu politics is another strategy. The mahant there is Avaidyanath and his young successor and MP is Mahant Adityanath- the due represent a strong pillar of Hindutva in the region. Their controversial Hindu Yuva Vahini is very strong in eastern UP and the areas bondering Nepal. It's to be seen what the will make out of the NaMo yug of the BJP.

The RSS has decided it will start 40 shakhas in every district. The idea villages as a centre of Hindutva activities also gaining currency. Sarsanghchal Mohan Bhagwat recently said there were need to search for a "Nayak" (hero in every village. A Hindutva awareness programme is also on, with collect centres in the villages for

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old iron ments to be later used to construct world's tallest statue of Sardar Patel seems the politics of Shilanyas still something going for the Shilanyas still something going for the saffronite the vitiated air in the stage.

3.10.3. Yadavisation strategy of S.P relating to electoral politics

It has been reported by Daily Bhaskar Newspaper that If you are a resident of Uttar Pradesh, have you ever thought what stops your son or daughter from becoming a district magistrate (DM) or a police chief? A Headlines Today investigation exposes why your ward has not been able to crack the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (UPPSC) examinations.

The sting operation entitled 'Operation Sarkar' reveals that recommendations have become the easy route for becoming a DM or SP in UP. It unmasks the UP government and unearths how vacant posts in the state administration are being filled with Yadav candidates. It is caste over merit in the civil services merit list. Shockingly, marks are suitably altered to suit a particular caste. If your surname is Yadav, you son or daughter has better chances of cracking the civil service examination.

Now, several questions arise: Is 'Yadavisation' of the UP administration mere a co-incident or a conspiracy? Is it Uttar Pradesh Service Commission or Uttar Pradesh Yadav Service Commission?

The ruling Samajwadi Party is more or less equivalent to its chief Mulayam Singh Yadav's clan. The Yadav's family rules all the way. Those who crack UPPSC exams and go on to become a DM, SP, Commissioner, DIG and IG in the future, they will have one thing in common – their surname as Yadav surnames dominates in the UPPSC examination merit list.

Members of a particular community are being selected for UPPSC interviews. And it is smoothly sailing even before the interview panel. That is how Yadav surnames dominate UPPSC merit list.

"Yadavization campaign of Samajwadi Party could be best understood from a local folk proverb amongst Yadavs-

"Kamdev Kalpit Rahe Brahma, Bhaye Adheer Sab hi Jat tarsat rahi Hum na Bhaye Aheer” Meaning thereby God of love (cupid) has imagined, Brahma (the 150

creator) has been restless & all Castes are in deep agony to the fact that why they have not been born as Aheer or Yadav. It is such a strategy that Yadav caste vows for unity.

3.10.4. Yadavisation of U.P cops behind anarchy

If Uttar Pradesh has plunged into unprecedented lawlessness in the last two years, an overriding reason -based on empirical evidence as well as home department sources - is the state police's refusal to book cases against criminals. And where cases are filed, these aren't investigated. These two factors make for ideal condition for lawlessness to thrive, which is what is being witnessed in UP under Samajwadi Party's rule.

The reason behind police slackness is the politicization of the police force under SP rule, a party which owes its power to a large OBC support base, around 35% of UP's population. Then, among the OBCs, it's the Yadavs who claim political leadership as one of the single largest caste groups among the OBCs at 9.6%. In its bid to appease its vote-base, the SP leadership has followed the politics of largesse and patronage, and rewarded its Yadav clansmen with key posts in UP's police machinery.

According to UP home department sources, in major districts of UP particularly those under the influence of the ruling Yadav family, nearly 60% police stations are headed by Yadav officers. In Badaun, where two minor girls were raped and hanged. 16 out of22 police stations are headed by Yadav officers. Badaun is represented by chief minister Akhilesh Yadav's cousin Dharmendra Yadav in the Lok Sabha. Also, all five men accused of rape and murders of the two teenagers are Yadav.

As a matter of fact, the demographic profile of UP's 1,527 police stations and outposts has changed in the past two years, since the SP came to power. In Kanpur, for instance, Yadavs head as many as 25 police stations out of 36. In Lucknow, more than 50% station officers are Yadavs.

In Kannauj, represented by SP chief Mulayam Singh Yadav's daughter-in-law Dimple, there are five Yadav station officers at nine police stations. Similarly,

151

Farrukhabad has seven Yadav SHOs in 14 police stations and Etawah has nine Yadav SHOs in 20 police stations.

"Most district police chiefs post a Yadav officer in key positions to earn brownie points from the 'first family' and there is an unwritten decree that 50% of inspectors and SI-10s have to be Yadavs," said a former IPS officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Also, many IPS officers close to the Yadav family have been brought to UP from outside the state. After Akhilesh became CM. he brought back officers like Yashaswi Yadav and Pradip Yadav from other state cadres.

While it would constitute a leap of faith to establish a direct correlation between posting of Yadav cops and rise in crime, it stands to reason that when caste, and not merit, is behind their appointment, then it would reduce the premium on policing. If the accused are of the same caste as law enforcers, and the law enforcers have got their jobs because of their caste, then there is a good chance that the investigations could be influenced.

Yashaswi of the Maharashtra cadre became Kanpur police chief. He was removed after the Allahabad high court intervened in a doctors strike trigged allegedly by the officers high handedness. When Pradip Yadav was brought in from Punjab, a sting operation by a TV channel showed him drunk inside a hotel. He was removed during elections on EC orders.

During SP's rule between 2004-07, the UP government had recruited 21,000 constables but the entire recruitment was riddled with scan], irregularities and favouritism.

The BSP government that followed cancelled the appointments and took the matter up to the Supreme Court. However, when SP returned to power in March 2012, it withdrew the government SLP from the apex court giving relief to tainted recruits and nearly 30 IPS and PPS officers involved in the recruitment process.

Akhilesh government also over-turned a decision by the Mayawati government to not allow postings in home districts for policemen. In the last two years. many have got "home" postings. It has taken enormous outcry for Akhilesh to back track on his own decision to again disallow home postings to cops. This was 152

after Badaun incident, where two Yadav policemen dismissed by the state government for "connivance" with the accused were from adjoining Bareilly and Etah districts. And all five alleged rapists and killers are Yadav.

3.11. Conclusion

Prof. Anil Kumar Verma in his article- Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh puts forth the dilemmas that Samajwadi Party is facing in current socio-political environment. He is of the view that Samajwadi Party has been facing the dilemma of carrying forward its anti-BJP politics even while it must avoid becoming part of a Congress led coalition. It is an important example of a party engaged in consolidating social cleavages and simultaneously, in overcoming them. In its multi-pronged strategy, it seeks to consolidate the caste cleavage by uniting OBCs and also appealing to upper caste voters in the name of development and globalization.

The achievements of SP should be analysed in the light of the appearance of the party at a particular intersection in the current political history of the country, especially Uttar Pradesh. The founding of SP came at a time when the triple issues of 3Ms i.e. MANDAL, MANDIR and MARKET dominated Indian politics. The first ( Mandal) required the party to address itself to the issue of social justice; the second (Mandir) forced it to undergo the acid test of proving its commitment to the principle of secularism; and the third (Market) required it to face the challenges of Liberalization, Privatization, Globalization( LPG), which went against its declared policies of socialism, ruralism and equalitarianism.11

It is in the light of the foregoing discussion, we have an apprehension that the backward movement led by SP is fastly withering away as it has been loosing its support base among Backwards and Muslims. The irrelevance of SP in national politics have diverted Muslims towards the Congress. This is extremely ponderable situation for SP leaders.

153

References

1. Shafiuzzaman.2003. ‘The Samajwadi Party: A Study of its Social base, Ideology and Programme’, APH Publication, New Delhi,pp.62.

2. Pai, S. (2002): ‘Dalit assertion and the unfinished democratic revolution: the BSP in U.P. , New Delhi: Sage.

3. Quoted in Gupta D. 1997. Economic and political weekly, August p 1971.

4. The pioneer, New Delhi, 1st January 1993.

5. Singh M. (nd). Socialist Movement in India Lucknow: Nelko Printers and Publishers.

6. Chandra, Kanchan (1999): ‘Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh: Ethnification of the Party System and its Consequences’, Roy Ramashray and Paul Wallace (eds.), Indian Politics and the 1998 Election, Sage, New Delhi, pp 77-78.

7. Jaffrelot, Christophe (2003): ‘India’s Silent Revolution: Rise of lower Castes In North India , Permanent Black, New Delhi.pp.368-378.

8. Tripathi, R.P. 1996, Mulayam Singh Yadav: Rachna Aur Sangharsh (Hindi) Lucknow, RML Trust Pub.

9. The Samajwadi Party Manifesto: 2014 Lok Sabha Election ( Central Office).

10. As amended by National Convention of the Party, Aug 2011,Agra.(Latest).

11. Verma, A.K.(2007): Backward Caste Politics In Uttar Pradesh: in Sudha Pai (ed.) ‘Political Process In Uttar Pradesh: Identities, Economic Reforms and Governance’. New Delhi. Pearson Longman. p.179.

154

155

Chapter IV

Electoral Politics of Samajwadi Party: Visible Trends

Chapter IV

Electoral Politics of Samajwadi Party: Visible Trends

4.1. Introduction

This chapter talks about the electoral history of Uttar Pradesh in general and of the Samajwadi Party in particular. It would give us a fair idea about the Party's performance in all the regions of U.P. and also the Party's standings in various elections. Further, it would be suggesting about SP's coalition trends and its resultant premise.

The electoral history of U.P. since 1980s is characterized by the rise of the backwards. The presence of the backwards in U.P. politics increased sharply in the 1989 Assembly ii, the Janta Dal (JD) won 208 seats with 30% votes and formed a government. The Samajwadi party has been formed largely on the social support base derived from the Janta Dal. It had emerged as a new political platform giving space to the newly energized marginalized sections of society-largely the Dalits and backwards-in the wake of "Second Democratic Upsurge" in 1989.But the sudden disintegration of the JD in 1990 banned the backward movement in U.P. in several ways-

1) It not only put the brakes on the backward movement in U.P. but also did irreparable damage to the same. Until date, the SP has not been able to scale those heights despite its continuously improving performance both in the Assembly and Lok sabha elections except in 2007 assembly elections where its graph dipped immensely owing to Social Engineering of BSP. Though SP has attained absolute majority with224 seats in 2012 assembly election, it has not been able to pick a place in the hearts and minds of electorates of U.P. due to worsening of law and order situation and its communalization strategy in the U.P.

2) It exposed those marginalized groups to at least three players-the BJP, the BSP, and the SP. In the following decade, political mobilization in U.P. saw intense social polarization but, unlike Bihar, this did not result in an alternative social coalition that succeeded in capturing political power.

155 One of the beneficiaries and carriers of the Mandal upsurge in North India has been the Samajwadi party. A major player in the politics of the largest state of the Indian union, the SP is a classic case of the rise and fall of Other Backward Caste (OBC) politics.' The Samajwadi Party has been at the centre of controversy ever since it formed a coalition ministry in U.P. During the last 25 years the SP and its earlier incarnations( the LD in 1980 and the JD in 1989) has on the one hand, led the mobilization of OBCs which helped the party in forming the government several times in U.P.( 1989,1993,2002) with steadily improving performance in the assembly elections.( except 2007). But on the Other, the party has failed in defining, sharpening and consolidating the backward caste cleavages. Despite their claims of representing the socialist ideology of Dr. Lohiya, the policies and programmes pursued by the JD and the SP-both inside and outside the Government-do not substantiate their words. Madhu Limaye in this context has argued that- " the backward caste politics followed Lohiya's policy of anti-Congressism, which destroyed the Congress monopoly in power, but it has also bred opportunities and a lust for power." He is of the view that this has led to the contamination of the ideal of self-sacrifice and idealism on which the edifice of the socialist movement had been raised.

Further, the electoral history of U.P. in 1990s is marked by hung assemblies, horse-trading, short-lived Coalitions and endemic instability. The reasons may be attributed to poor governance and the disillusionment of the electorates. With the absence of flow of information within parties and close relationship between the leadership and the cadres, parties have lost their ability to absorb new social groups and proved of representation of voter's interests. Having polarized the electorate along caste and community lines they are now unable to overcome their narrow sectarian bases and become parties of principle and put forward any ideology or programme of development, creating widespread apathy and dissatisfaction among the public. It is only in 2007 that BSP's Social Engineering could prove fruitful and put a stop to what had been the endemic instability and breakdown of the governance.

The performance of the SP throughout the 1990s both in the Lok Sabha, and the Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh has been quite impressive. The party showed a steady increase in the number of Lok Sabha seats won during the period (1991-4, 1996-16, 1998-20, 1999-26, 2004-35) and 2009, 2014-5 doubled its support base. Only 2009 has been an exception when it has lost 13 seats since what it has had five

156 years back. Similarly in Assembly elections, the SP showed a steady increase in the no. of seats (1989-34, 1993-109, 1996-109, 2002-143,) and the no. of votes polled. In assembly elections held in 2007 the party suffered a serious setback as its tally drastically came down to 97 seats and it lost 46 previously held seats. Yet we can not take the credit away from the SP as when all other parties were fighting for their survival in U.P.(except of course BSP), it seems quite credible for a regional party to climb to the number one spot in the state politics.

As has been suggested in the earlier chapter, the Samajwadi Party since 1998 is facing the dilemma of carrying forward its anti-BJP politics and at the same time avoiding joining a coalition led by the Congress party, though it supported UPA government from outside. The SP failed to capitalize on the historic opportunity presented for consolidating the backward classes in U.P. However, it did make an effort to form a social coalition by entering into a pre-poll alliance with the BSP during the 1993 assembly elections, but the experiment proved short-lived. The SP was attempting a difficult task because the peasant OBCs had exploited the Dalits. Besides, the SP-BSP alliance was hobbled by an inner contradiction in that both the parties were trying to woo the same set of voters- the backwards, the Dalits and the Muslims (Wright 1995: 22).

The electoral politics of U.P. were in a volatile situation throughout the 1980s; it was the time when Mulayam Singh was building his constituency in the state. Janta Dal was able to project itself as a party that cared for minorities, a legacy that Mulayam Singh later exploited to his advantage. Once the Samajwadi party came into being Mulayam Singh was able to get the support of the sections of OBCs and the Muslim community. This has produced a more or less stable voter base for the SP voting between 20-25% in each election. However, there was no uniformity in the success of the party in different regions of the state. The party graph was declining particularly in western U.P. which clearly showed that the SP had not been successful in making inroads to "Jatland", despite its effort to evolve a Yadav-Gujar-Muslim combine. Even when the SP entered into an electoral alliance with the BSP in 1993 assembly elections, the performance of the party did not improve. That explains the success of Rashtriya Lok Dal ( RLD) in western U.P. where Ajit Singh continues to enjoy the legacy of his father Ch. Charan Singh and dominates the scene.

157 4.2. Region-wise breakup of Geo-political Situation in U.P.

To assess the SP's gains and losses both in terms of seats as well as the geographical spread of its performance in electoral politics, a region-wise break-up of U.P. is essential to be acquainted off.

Uttarakhand Region:

In the North-West, are the hill districts of Garhwal and Kumaon, which account for four Lok Sabha constituencies - Pauri Garhwal, Tehri Garhwal, Nainital and Almora. Although these districts are not in U.P. now and are a part of the state of Uttarakhand, we need to see SP's performance in this region prior to 2001. Here, it is a direct contest between the BJP and the Congress because it is a upper caste dominated region. Neither the BSP or SP have much of a stake here except in the plain areas which have a sizeable population of OBCs, Dalits and Muslims.

Ruhelkhand Region:

The hills give way to Ruhelkhand which starts in Bareilly at the foothills of the Kumaon range and stretches to Lakhimpur Kheri, formerly part of Avadh Kingdom. It covers the areas of Bareilly, Rampur, Aonla, Amroha, Sambhal, Muradabad, Pilibhit, Badaun, Shahjahanpur and Kheri. Ruhelkhand consists of 10 Lok Sabha and 50 Assembly seats. The SP's gains here have been uneven.

Western Uttar Pradesh:

Western U.P. is considered to be the Jatland in common parlance. It can be further divided into three areas, dominated by three important communities- the Jats, the Lodhi- Rajputs and the Yadavs. If the areas comprising of Ghaziabad, Meerut, Baghpat, Muzzaffarnagar, Kairana and Saharanpur are dominated by the intermediate peasant caste of Jats, the region containing Hathras, Aligarh, Khurja, Bulandshahr is the fielddom of upwardly mobile Lodhi-Rajputs. And there is Brijbhoomi It is also known as "Mulayam Singh's Country" which stretches from Mathura, Agra, Firozabad and right from Etah, Maipuri, Etawah up to Farrukhabad. This is totally Yadav belt. But in recent times Mathura is developing into a stronghold of Rashtriya Lok Dal where Jayant Chaudhary, son of Ajit Singh contest elections and is involved with local population. The region of Western U.P. has 13 Lok Sabha and 65 Assembly seats.

158 Avadh or Central U.P.:

From the borders of Farrukhabad and Kheri begins the erstwhile kingdom of Avadh, which covers the prestigious constituencies of Kanpur, Lucknow, Raebareilly, Pratapgarh, Sultanpur, Amethi and Faizabad. In current political classification this region is known as Avadh or Central U.P. It holds 21 Loksabha and 105 Assembly seats.

Eastern U.P. (Purvanchal /Bundelkhand ):

Finally, the Eastern U.P. which accounts for 19 Lok Sabha and 95 Assembly seats along with 4 Lok Sabha and 20 Assembly seats from Bundelkhand, is politically very crucial. Bundelkhand is a further sub-division of eastern U.P. comprising of Jhansi, Banda and Hamirpur. While Purvanchal ranges from Gorakhpur, Deoria, Salempur, Ballia, Ghosi, Azamgarh, Jaunpur, Ghazipur, Varanasi, Robertsganj, Mirzapur and Allahabad.

The party has to worry about Bundelkhand where its seatwise performance in assembly elections had been constantly poor (1989-4, 1991-1, 1993-1, 1996-3, 2002-4). The BJP and BSP have been doing better. These parties got an almost identical share of votes in the 1999 Lok sabha elections (BJP-24.76%, BSP-28.89%) but in the previous assembly elections the SP, with 23.1% of votes was not far behind the BJP (24%) and the BSP (28%). So we cannot write off the SP from Bundelkhand. The SP has improved its position there, rising from a poor 3.68% vote share in the 1993 assembly elections to 24.13% votes in 1999 Loksabha elections and 23.1% votes in the 2002 assembly elections (Verma 2002:1977). Though, the SP has been able to evolve a base among the OBCs of Bundelkhand. The results of the 2004 Lok sabha elections are a testimony to this; the SP made almost a clean sweep by winning three of the four seats and capturing 32.2% votes. In other regions, i.e. Ruhelkhand, Doab, Avadh and Purvanchal, the SP continues to perform well. In the erstwhile, Uttarakhand region, the SP was an insignificant force. It never went beyond 6% votes there.

This has a major implication as far as the relationship between demographic composition of the electorate and the mobilization strategy adopted by the party is concerned. Even limited and partial backward caste mobilization could not be an all- U.P. phenomenon owing to differences in social stratification, production relations

159 and power structures in different parts of the state (Hasan 1989: 133). Western and Eastern U.P., the Bundelkhand, and Uttarakhand (now a separate state) are especially different. That is why the party could not even attempt limited caste homogenization in the entire state, and hence, could not strengthen itself in all areas especially in Bundelkhand and Uttarakhand.

However, 2007 assembly elections proved to be an eye-opener for the SP. It is due to the fact that out of 393 candidates having been fielded by the party, only 97 came out winning. In this way the party suffered huge loss of 46 seats, owing to the spectacular and astonishing success of BSP which captured 206 seats out of contesting at all seats. This is due to the reason that most of the Brahmins are not keen on joining the SP as they regard it as a party dominated by the aggressive Yadavs and Thakurs in which their position would be weak. Rather, they feel they would be in a better situation within the BSP to safeguard their position and attain posts of importance. The Brahmin-Dalit Combination, they also believe, can meet the challenge posed by the Yadav-Muslim bloc. Thus, Mayawati's tactics have added a new dimension to caste politics in U.P.as Brahmins are "feeling wanted" after a long time (Pai 2007:235).

As far as the tally of SP's seats are concerned in the 15th Lok Sabha elections held in 2009, the party held on to 23 seats out of 80 constituencies. The Samajwadi Party contested the election by forming "Fourth Front" including the SP, the RJD of Laloo Prasad Yadav and LJP of Ramvilas Paswan. The Fourth Front scrapped 27 seats together out of which 23 were scalped by the SP and rest of the 4 seats by RLD while the LJP did not trouble the scorers and came out for a duck.

As we have already discussed in the previous chapter, the Samajwadi party could not have been able to work for the consolidation of the entire backward community. It claimed to represent rural peasantry and the backwards but the fact remains that the party could not get even the votes of MRBCs and MBCs. In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, even Muslims/Dalits voted in the favour of Congress, thanks to the energy supplied to the Congress Organization by its Gen. Secy. Rahul Gandhi. Congress raised its tally to 21 and superseded BSP to grab the second spot in the state just after the SP (see table). The most striking fact here is that SP lost its ground in U.P. as it came down to 23 seats in comparison to previously held 36 seats. Moreover, its voting % decreased from 26.07 in 2007 assembly election to 23.26 in 2009 Lok

160 Sabha Elections. This makes it crystal clear that SP's support base is rapidly declining. The factors which may be accounted for this decline are Party's- elusive Samajwad, non-ideological protests, secularism with minorityism, non-performance as a strong opposition, futility in national politics and moreover party's image associated with 3Cs- Crime, Capitalism and Corruption.

Table 4.1

Region-wise performance of the Samajwadi Party in the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections (1989- 2004)

Year/ Lok Sabha/ 1989 1991 1993 1996 1998 1999 2002 2004 Region Assembly JD JNP SP SP SP SP SP SP seats

WESTERN L.S(13) 12(54.5) 0(9.72) - 1(18.40) 0(22.73) 1(13.96) - 2(10.8) U.P. ASSEM(65) 47(42.28) 2(5.97) 5(8.67) 10(14.14) - - 7(20.8) -

RUHEL L.S.(IO) 6(35.19) 0(2.58) - 4(25.46) 4(32.62) 3(23.73) - 4(23.8) KHAND ASSEM(SO) 21(27.6) 3(11.80) 16(22.62) 15(23.83) - - 22(25.6) -

DOAB L.S(14) 11(43.7) 1(12.08) - 3(20.89) 5(33.69) 8(30.44) - 9(35.0)

ASSEM(70) 47(36.2) 12(20.2) 25(25.3) 22(28.19) - - 27(23.1) -

BUNDEL L.S(4) 2(18.78) 2(18.0) - 0(17.27) 0(27.72) 0(24.13) - 3(32.2) HAND ASSEM(20) 5(13.18) 0(8.94) 1(3.68) 3(16.71) - - 4(23.1) -

AVADH L.S(21) 10(28.9) 0(7.83) - 3(22.15) 7(30.77) 8(24.9) - 4(26.1)

ASSEM(IOS) 34(22.98) 10(15.8) 41(27.20) 35(25.52) - - 29(18.17) -

PURV L.S.(19) 11(30.99) 1(9.74) - 5(21.38) 4(29.03) 6(25.59) - 13(28) ANCHAL ASSEM.(95) 52(27.71) 7(11.56) 20(12.89) 25(22.03) - - 57(26.7) -

Source: Verma 2007:176.

While assessing the electoral performance of the SP, we must also keep in mind the fragmented nature of the U.P. electorate5 and the multi-polar competition in the state. This puts certain limitations on the electoral performance of all parties. For instance, this has meant that the SP has very few constituencies that it can call "safe" as there is a tendency of constituencies changing hands frequently. Thus, there are only four constituencies that the SP has won continuously from 1996: Badaun, Kaisarganj, Phulpur and Mainpuri. Among the seats it won in 1998 and 1999, six seats were common and in five other constituencies, it won in 1996, lost in 1998 and won in 1999 again. If we add the two seats, it had won in both 1996 and 1998 but lost

161 in 1999 i.e Bijnor and Muradabad, then we may claim that these 17 constituencies are the stronghold of the SP. In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the SP lost its vote share by almost five percent from the last election, yet it gained six seats. It has been conjectured that this may have happened, not only because of the first-past -the-post system but also due to a conscious tactical voting against the BJP to ensure the defeat of its candidates (Frontline, Nov. 19, 1999:41).

A similar consideration seems to have prevailed over the electorate in the assembly election of 2002 as well. In that election, both SP and BSP improved their respective positions in the legislature. However, as we shall see later, the performance of the SP in 2002 had much to do with its appeal to different sections of the society, including the upper castes. What is noteworthy, however, is that the SP has been able to retain its vote share and in fact improve upon it, in comparison to its vote share in the 1999 elections from 24% to 25%.

This data clearly denotes that BJP is the biggest loser in U.P. since 2002 assembly elections. Its graph came down from 31.25% of votes to 17.50% of votes. The Bahujan Samaj Party has shown drastic development from 23.19 in 2002 to 30.43% of votes in 2007, though it has declined upto 3% in two years of BSP governance. Although, the Samajwadi party has held on to its solid Yadav Vote bank round about 26% of votes from 2002 to 2007, we see a steep decline in its no. of seats. Lok Sabha elections 2009 also suggest the deviation of Muslim vote base in favour of Congress as its vote% came down by 3%. However, INC-is increasing its support base in U.P. gradually and steadily from 9.0% of votes polled in 2002 to 12.0% in 2004 and 18.25% in 2009 Lok Sabha Elections alongwith 21 (+1) seats.

4.3. The Samajwadi Party’s Political Alliance making Strategy

Electoral politics has become so complex in the 1990s that no consistency can be predicted in the alliance making pattern adopted by various parties. Sate based parties have shown a tendency to be flexible in opting for choices that would maximize electoral gains and chances of sharing power. The Samajwadi Party, however, underwent a long period during which its alliance making strategy was apparently guided more by ideological considerations than as much as electoral calculations. The anti-BJPism of the party emanates from its ideological commitment

162 to secularism, while Mulayam Singh's own history of political growth and evolution inhibits his party from entering into an alliance with the Congress.

The party was in the forefront of anti-BJP political combinations all through the 1990s and particularly after 1996. Mulayam Singh was, in fact, seen as the main leader of 'secular' forces in the country. This had two difficulties though. One was the political history from which Mulayam Singh has evolved and the politics of anti- Congressism. For someone like Yadav, it has been very difficult to cooperate with the Congress party and this issue came to the forefront in 1999 after the fall of the BJP- led NDA government. The position of the SP at that time was desperate to form non- BJP government. Later, SP has been very cautious in accepting the support of the Congress Party in running its ministry in U.P. So, this anti-Congress position, which is a remnant of the previous era of Indian politics, restricts the alliance making choices of the SP. Thus, we see that the SP's political alliance making strategy at the national level has been influenced by its non-CONGRESSism and anti-BJPism.

The second was even at the state level, the social relations between the OBCs and the Dalits, and among the OBCs have influenced the alliance making priorities of the SP. The possibility of an alliance with the BSP is restricted because of the structure of social relations in which the influential among the OBCs have in no way been less exploitative of the Dalits than the upper castes. These factors mean that the SP cannot have a longstanding alliance with the BSP and simultaneously, cannot have durable alliances with parties of smaller castes.

Even the social relations among the OBCs have been such that the dominant Yadavs and Ahirs have been seen as monopolizing the entire share allocated for the OBCs, hence causing consternation among the more backwards and the most backwards. This has forced SP to proceed on its own or to enter into alliances with only pretty parties in Uttar Pradesh, viz. the Rashtriya Kranti Party (RKP), the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM), the Samajwadi Janta Party (SJP), the National Loktantrik Party (NLP). The alliance of the SP with the left and secular parties also seems to be influenced by the desire of Mulayam Singh to become the Prime Minister. However, the Congress seemed to have settled scores with him on that issue when, despite the splendid performance of the SP in U.P. in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections, his party was totally marginalized in national politics.vi

163 In this background during the last decade, it is being noticed that at least three shifts have occurred in the alliance making strategy of SP. These are:

1) In the earlier stages, the party worked for a non-Congress, non-BJP- THIRD FRONT coalition which included the Janta Dal and other left and secular parties. The coalition succeeded in forming a government in U.P. with Mulayam Singh Yadav as Chief Minister in 1989. It also succeeded in forming a national government in 1996 with H.D. Devegowda as Prime Minister, in which the Congress was not included but was allowed to support the coalition from the outside.

2) The SP diluted its anti-Congressism and was prepare to enter into a coalition of left and secular parties, which included the Congress in 1998-1999 but was very rigid about not accepting the leadership of Soniya Gandhi, on the ground that she was a foreigner (as she hails from Italy).

3) Of late, the SP has dropped its opposition to Soniya Gandhi becoming Prime Minister and has been prepared to go in for an alliance with all left and secular parties including the Congress under her leadership. This has become evident when SP supported UPA's Nuclear Deal with U.S.A. on the floor of the house (Lok Sabha).

This record shows the Consistent dilution in the coalition making strategies of the Samajwadi party (Verma 2004b: 1511). But the SP has been hesitant to go in for any pre-poll alliance with the Congress owing to certain considerations. First, owing to the desertion of the Lower OBCs or the MBCs, the SP is now pursuing inclusionary politics and also cultivating the support of the upper castes. An alliance with the Congress at the national level would mean that both the Muslims and the upper caste votes would probably go to Congress rather than to SP. This makes the alliance untenable, at least as a pre-election strategy. Second, an alliance with the Congress does not ensure the pre-eminence of the SP in the post-election scenario and nor does it further the national ambition of the party to make its president the prime-minister. All these factors force the SP to have limited and unreal choices even at the all-India level.

At the state level, the SP entered into an alliance with the BSP, a party with a solid dalit base, as far back as 1993 in the U.P. assembly elections. The SP-BSP

164 alliance did form a government but their relations were not harmonious and the experiment was short-lived (1993-1995). The SP was emerging as a dominant partner in the SP-BSP coalition. By June 1995, the SP had cornered the BSP by taking credit for reservations in schools, appointment of Urdu teachers, inducting the backwards especially Yadavs in the state police force and in the PAC(see table) and swept the panchayat polls.

Table- 4.2

Recruitment in the PAC and the U.P. Police during SP's Rule( June-July 1994):

District Selected SCs STs OBCs OBCs Muslim General Others candidates (Yadavs) (Non- Yadavs)

Mainpuri 300 68 4 161 1 21 39 6

Ghazipur 351 87 8 168 8 15 53 12

Azamgarh 477 113 6 210 5 38 101 4

Saharan pur 345 83 6 142 8 27 66 13

Fateh garh 189 42 3 50 6 18 65 5

Badaun 190 44 3 78 3 16 41 5

Rampur 168 46 1 63 5 11 41 1

Sitapur 345 84 12 122 10 13 104 -

Nainital 66 15 - 12 7 - 29 3

Dehradun 65 14 - 24 - 1 26 -

Jalaun 150 41 2 58 4 14 31 -

Fatehpur 200 50 2 80 5 14 49 -

Gonda 305 61 65 130 2 21 81 4

Total 3181 778 53 1298 64 209 726 53 Source: Shafiuzzaman 2003:52.

The deteriorating relations between them culminated in the form of an ugly an infamous "Circuit House Incident". In this incident, Mayawati alleged that the goons of tried to kill her. Soon, the SP-BSP alliance came to an end. It was like an end of the possibility of developing a social cleavage on the basis of the backward classes and consequently, the consolidation of the same as a political constituency in U.P.

165 The above table clearly denotes the Yadavization procedure adopted by Mulayam Singh Yadav during postings of police personnel. It was considered as Yadavization campaign of Mulayam Singh Yadav. Besides, the government was accused of attempting to "Yadavize" the state police and Provincial Armed Constabulary. About 70% of the 3500 odd constables inducted into PAC were Yadavs. For the first time, DIG's and SSP's, most of them known to be close to Mulayam, were made Chairman of the recruitment boards. In fact, nowhere was Mulayam's strategy to divide and rule along caste lines more evident than the state Police. Yadavization also continued in administration in transfers to lucrative spots. This Shows SP's corrupt and opportunistic face.

In the 2002 Assembly elections in the state, the SP tried to form a post-poll alliance of like-minded parties but did not succeed. However, when Mayawati Government fell, Mulayam Singh formed the government in August 2003 by putting together a coalition comprising of the Congress, SP, RLD, Rashtriya Kranti Party(RKP), CPM, NLP. The RLD was originally in the BJP-led coalition and it was only when it decided to withdraw from it in May2003 that the RLD joined SP-led coalition. This was the first time that the Congress, SP and the RLD had come together.

For the Lok Sabha election of 2004, the SP has been quick to enter into an electoral alliance with the RLD in Western U.P., though its declared stand was not to enter into any pre-poll alliance but to seek and extend support to other parties or issues after the polls. Hence, the pre-poll alliance with RLD is a reversal of its earlier stand and appeared to be influenced by the need to avoid any division of votes in rural peasantry. It cannot be denied that the RLD and the SP are the two most natural allies so far as professed ideological position is concerned; both represent the rural peasantry, though belonging to different classes and hence, can be quite complimentary to each other.

4.4. The Samajwadi Party’s political Approach to Muslims

Mulayam Singh had established his credentials as a friend of the Muslims when as U.P. Chief Minister he had forestalled the refarious plan of the Fascist forces to demolish the historic Babri Mosque on 30th October and 2nd Novemberl990. The demolition of the Mosque on 6th December 1992, when a BJP government with

166 Kalyan Singh as Chief Minister was in power, made the Muslim Community more appreciative of Mulayam's steadfastness and loyalty to the Indian Constitution. Moreover, the Central government's failure to protect the mosque alienated the Muslims from the Congress Party as well. Once he was in power, Mulayam left no stone unturned to establish his support base among the minority community. He created greater employment opportunities by instituting over 6000 posts of Urdu teachers in the state's schools. He further announced that Urdu would be the second language of the state and would be used on all sign-boards and name-plates in every government office of the state. Further, as against 17% Muslim population in the state, their representation in the assembly from 1952 to 2002 remained only 8.5%. During the first assembly polls in 1952, the Indian National Congress (INC) nominated 41 Muslims, of whom 40 were elected; this figure came down to four in 2002. The post-Ayodhya scenario brought Muslims much closer to other socially excluded communities such as the yadavs and the dalits to strengthen the base of political parties like the SP and the BSP. The 1996 poll witnessed the emergence of many Muslim leaders from the SP platform. Of the total of 33 Muslim members elected, 19 were from SP, followed by eight from the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). The BSP worked on the strategy of dalit-Muslim combination, particularly appealing to the lower sects (caste) amongst the Muslims. On its part, the Congress, sensing the disenchantment of the community, gradually reduced the number of Muslim contestants from 11% in 1980 to just 3% in 1996, though it made a U-turn in 2002 sharply increasing the number. At present The Samaj wadi Party has been able to send 21 Muslim legislators to Assembly out of its total 97 candidates.

Muslims as formidable electoral group have a contribution, for out of the 403 assembly segments. The Muslims constitute 25% of the electorate at least in 170 segments. A comparison of 1996 and 2002 assembly elections in the state vindicate the argument that the Congress witnessed a sharp decline in terms of percentage of Muslim votes polled by the party, though the number of Muslim legislators elected on the party ticket remained virtually unchanged. In contrast, the SP improved its share of Muslim votes from 48% in 1996 to 53% in 2002 while the BSP maintained a status quo in terms of votes, even though the number of Muslims elected on the BSP platform rose from eight in 1996 to 14 in 2002. As a matter of fact the Congress witnessed a steep drop in Muslim vote from 54% of the total votes it polled in 1980

167 (Lok Sabha) to 14% in 2004 (Lok Sabha) whereas the SP share of Muslim votes shot up from 49% in 1991 (Lok Sabha) to 61% in 2004 (Lok Sabha); the BSP improved its share from 4% in 1991 (Lok Sabha) to 10% in 2004 (Lok Sabha).

Table-4.3

Pattern of Muslim Voting and Muslims Elected to the UP Assembly

Elections Congress Samajwadi Party Bahujan party Samaj 1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 Votes polled 8.10 8.96 22.41 25.37 20.12 23.86 % of Muslim 12 10 48 53 12 10 votes Muslims elected 3 4 19 23 8 14 Muslims 13 61 46 47 46 82 contested Source: CSDS Data Unit.

In recently held Lok Sabha Elections, Muslims reverted back to Congress owing to the fact of Mulayam Singh tried to befriend Kalyan Singh and his party and the SP has paid the price off in the way of loss of 3% votes and 13 seats. To be associated with Kalyan Singh has brought a dilemma in the minds of Muslim Intelligentsia that Muslims are just being befooled by the party and it does not take into consideration the emotions of such a large electorate just for the greed of power.

In a very recent press statement, Mulayam Singh has tendered a public apology to the country in general and Muslims in particular for taking support of Kalyan Singh who is considered as responsible for the demolition of the Babri Mosque. This atonement for his mistake underscored his concern for rediscovering his muslim support base, which deserted SP in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections in the wake of his alliance with Kalyan Singh. The trend continued in subsequent bye-elections.

With assembly polls due in 2017, the support of Muslims is considered crucial for the Samajwadi Party's survival in U.P. Already the Minority community appears to have found an alternative in the Congress and BSP. U.P. Mayawati is also sparing no effort to woo Muslims through the "Brotherhood Committees." And New social engineering formula part-2 by combining Dalits and Muslims together.

168 4.5. Development and governances trump caste identities in U.P.

The 2014 Lok Sabha elections result in Uttar Pradesh (UP) surprised all, not

because it went in favour of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), but because of the reach and sweep of the party, both in terms of geography and demography. On the eve of

the poll, it was widely acknowledged that there was a Narendra Modi wave in UP. But

even a generous assessment was that the BJP could at best replicate its 1998 performance - when it won 57 of the 82 seats, and secured 36.5% of the votes (Verma 2014). However, the voters thought otherwise. In the last seven years (2007-14), we

see that UP voters have been regularly springing surprises. They surprised all in 2007

by giving an absolute majority to the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) when many had thought that a fractured mandate was inevitable in the caste-ridden state. They

surprised all in 2009 by electing 21 Congressmen as Members of Parliament (MPS)

when many thought that the Congress was in terminal decline in UP (Beg and Kumar 2009). They again surprised all in 2012 by giving an absolute majority to the

Samajwadi Party (SP) when political observers expected that the work done by Rahul Gandhi would enable the Congress to sustain its performance of the 2009 Lok Sabha elections (Verma 2012). The saffron sweep of 2014 appears to be yet another surprise.

For about a quarter of a century, political competition in UP centred around

regionally dominant, caste-based parties, mainly the BSP and SP, while national

parties, especially the Congress and BJP, were marginalised. Caste-based identity

politics became the fulcrum of electoral politics in the state, with both the SP and BSP developing caste-centred suppon bases, which provided 20% or more of their votes:

The SP was based on the support of the Other Backward Classes (OBCS), mainly

Yadavs, and the BSP on dalit support. After the second democratic upsurge, from

1989 onwards (Yadav 1999), only the SP and BSP have formed governments in UP, 1 except for intermittent BJP governments on four different occasions. The BJP'S share of seats had been declining in assembly elections, from 221 in 1991 to 47 in 2012. This was accompanied by a fall in its vote share, from 31.5% in 1991 to 15% in 2012. In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, the party won only 10 seats and secured 17.5% of the vote. It was a risky proposition for scholars and commentators to predict that the

BJP would sweep the poll this time, even though there were strong indications of voters' preference for the party and its prime ministerial candidate Modi.2 Thus, the

2014 Lok Sabha elections signalled a paradigm shift in voters' behaviour in UP, with

169 good governance and development being preferred over the identity politics of caste and community.

4.5.1. Electoral backdrop

The Lok Sabha elections was preceded by at least three significant issues in

UP. One, the Muzaffarnagar communal conflagration, which affected the social climate of the state, greatly dented the image of the Akhilesh Yadav government and the SP. The management of the riots and the post-riot relief camps angered both Hindus and Muslims. Hindus accused the government of blatantly siding with Muslims, and Muslims accused the government of not paying attention to riot victims. Various tracker polls conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies

(CSDS) during 2013-14 showed that despite the government's attempt to blame the BJP, the people saw the government as being culpable, not the party.

Two, the impressive debut of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and its government in Delhi under the chief ministership of Arvind Kejriwal prompted people to see it as an alternative to both the Congress and BJP. When AAP came to power in Delhi in

December 2013, the Modi campaign seemed to suddenly lose much of its sheen in UP, and many wondered if AAP would be the top performer in the state in the Lok Sabha poll. But, the resignation of the Kejriwal government was met with strong public disapproval, which was canalised in favour of Modi, who never let go the opportunity.

Finally, that opportunity was put to the best use when Modi decided to make Varanasi his parliamentary constituency, giving the people hope of development based on the Gujarat model. A combination of these issues created an electoral turf favourable to the BJP in UP, making the task of Amit Shah, its leader-in-charge of the state, a little easier.

4.5.2. Electoral outcome

In UP'S 80 Lok Sabha constituencies, 8.1 crore voters (out of 13.88 crore registered voters) voted, taking the turnout to 58.4%-8% less than the national average (66.5%), but still an increase of 10.6% over the 2009 turnout in the state. In all, 1,368 candidates belonging to more than 30 political parties and independents contested. The state had a six-phase poll schedule that lasted just over a month (10 April-12

May). The BJP swept the poll, winning 71 of the 78 seats it contested. Its ally, the

Apna Dal (AD), won two seats (Mirzapur and Pratapgarh). Thus, the National

170 Democratic Alliance (NDA) won 73 seats. The remaining seven were shared by the

Congress (Raebareli and Amethi) and the SP (Azamgarh, Mainpuri, Kannauj, Badaun, and Firozabad). Both parties were reduced to a family coterie - the Congress to a mother-son duo (Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi), and the SP to Mulayam Singh Yadav, his daughter-in-law Dimple, and nephews Dharmendra and Akshay.3 All others, including the BSP, drew a blank.

In terms of votes, all parties, except the BJP and AD, lost. Compared to 2009, the Congress lost 10.8% of its votes, the BSP 7.8%, the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD)

2.4%, the SP 1.1%, and other parties 3% (Table 1). Together, they lost 25%, and this chunk was transferred to the BJP, which got 43.3% of the votes, a huge increase over its 2009 figure of 17.5%. Significantly, the SP lost the least - just 1% of the vote (from

23.3% in 2009 to 22.2% in 2014). But, the BJP secured 42.3% of the vote, almost double the SP'S share. Thus, the electoral outcome was a massive BJP wave, a wave that swept away all other parties though the SP largely held its fort in terms of vote share.

Table 4.4

Performance of Political Parties in UP Lok Sabha Election (2014)

Party Seats Contested Won Change from 2009 Vote(%) Change from 2009 (%)

Congress 67 2 -19 7.5 -10.8

BJP 78 71 +61 42.3 +24.8

BSP 80 0 -20 19.6 -7.8

SP 78 5 -18 22.2 -1.1

RLD 8 0 -S 0.9 -2.4

AD 2 2 2 1.0 + 0.2 Source: CSDS Data Unit.

4.5.3. Features of the verdict

After about 25 years, the people of the state refused to go along with caste- based parties and preferred to vote for development and good governance, the twin planks on which the BJP'S prime ministerial candidate, Modi, sought a mandate. Most people had little idea about what the Gujarat model of development was; yet they were convinced that Modi, who had developed his state, should be given a chance.

171 Why did UP voters think so? The people of the state had seen two models of governance and development. One was the Manmohan Singh-Sonia Gandhi national model of governance and development for 10 years - full of scams, political corruption, rising prices, and misuse of power. The second was the Mulayam Singh Yadav- Akhilesh Yadav model of governance that smacked of incompetence, lack of vision, blatant casteism, freebee politics, Muslim appeasement, and a deteriorating security environment.4 The people were disenchanted with the United Progressive Alliance

(UFA) government at the centre and the SP government in the state. When these two models were juxtaposed with the Gujarat model of development, voters thought betting on Modi was a good idea.

In addition, voters may have believed that caste parties such as the SP and BSP had become irrelevant in national governments. The two parties were not part of either UFA or UPA n, and looking at the scenario, many knew that there was no possibility of a UFA in. Hence, even without disconnecting themselves from their caste parties, many voters had made up their minds to vote for Modi in the Lok Sabha poll.

They were actually voting for Modi, not the BJP. Two, they well understood the difference between national and state elections, and there was no commitment to vote for the BJP in the assembly election in 2017. Three, they have retained ties with their caste parties, and the possibility of shifting towards them when it comes to the state elections, exists - a warning to the BJP. That may give Shah a few headaches. The focus was on development, and voters saw Modi as an effective instrument of development and change.

A second feature of this election was the clinical organisation of all election- related activities, which were centred on branding Modi and marketing "brand Modi" to the UP electorate. Modi had already established himself as a prime ministerial brand through his development work in Gujarat, and through his "connect with the people" programmes in UP. People knew brand Modi well. Shah did his job efficiently and embarked on making the product - brand Modi - accessible in even the remotest rural parts of UP using hi-tech and innovative methods.

Among the prime ministerial brands in the political market (Modi, Rahul Gandhi, Mulayam Singh Yadav, Nitish Kumar Mamata Banerjee, and so on), Modi was the only legitimate one because his party had already declared him as its prime

172 ministerial candidate. Other brands lacked this legitimacy, and also the clarity on how they would get to the magic number of 272 seats required to form a government. Thai almost made Modi the only reliable prime ministerial brand, compelling people to

vote for BJP candidates to make him the prime minister of India.

Though Shah was an outsider to UP, he earned a name for doing his job with surgical precision - from candidate selection to conducting hi-tech election campaigns, and arranging funds to election booth management. He gave importance

to local BJP leaders who had been visible in party activities in their constituencies in the past couple of years. He gave detailed guidelines on how to conduct election campaigns; what the focus had to be; and how resources had to be pooled by adjacent constituencies. The 80 Lok Sabha seats were divided into 21 clusters of three to five seats. These clusters were grouped into eight zones, and all zones were under the state unit. A separate strategy for mobilisation was devised for each cluster, and that included drawing people from a radius of 175 kilometres for Modi meetings.5

Shah has to be given credit for the pre-poll alliance with the AD, which appeared to be an insignificant player but proved to be a potent political factor. The

AD'S former president Sone Lal Patel was in the BSP before he broke away to form his

own party. So, the AD had links among both the most backward classes and dalits. By the pre-poll alliance, Shah ensured that about 2,00,000 Patel voters in Varanasi voted

for Modi. This strong social group supported and voted for the BJP-AD combine in all

constituencies, giving the impression that the BJP was an OBC-oriented party. While it

was a great bargain for the AD, which won two seats as a BJP ally, the alliance gave the

BJP a subaltern orientation that might have encouraged not only OBCS, but also dalits to vote for it.

In doing his job, Shah was assisted by the Citizens for Accountable 6 Governance (CAG), a non-profit, non-governmental organisation (NGO). It employed about 200 to 400 full-time paid people, 800 paid interns, and 1,00,000 volunteers

from Indian Institutes of Technology (IITS), Indian Institutes of Management (IIMS), Brown University, Columbia University, California Institute of Technology, and

London School of Economics, and former employees of financial firms such as JP

Morgan and Goldman Sachs, and some start-ups. The GAG worked as full-time consultant to the Modi campaign. It did an in-depth data analysis of the 4so-odd

173 constituencies contested by the BJP, and looked at winning seats as project management challenges.

Shah got the CAG to design special campaigns for UP such as Modi Aane Wale Hain (Modi's arrival is imminent), using about 400 video vans to take Modi to thousands of villages, and the Bharat Vijay rallies during which Modi spoke at three or four places but was projected as a 30 holographic image to 100 locations simultaneously (Sruthijith 2014). This projection had a magical effect and the effect

was reflected in the outcome -for the first time, the BJP got more votes in rural UP

(43.4%) than urban centres (40.6%), according to CSDS data. That draws the curtain on

the theory that the BJP is an urban-centric party with no rural base. It also dented the

social base of the BSP and SP, which mainly had a rural support base.

A third feature of this election was the all-out support and campaigning for the

BJP by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which claims to be a cultural and

non-political organisation. But the RSS is the parent organisation of the BJP. It looked

as if the RSS had taken upon itself the invisible part of the campaign, which included rural mobilisation by swayam sevaks, leaving the visible campaign to Modi. It was very surprising that no important BJP leader accompanied Modi at the 45O-odd meetings addressed by him. It was a one-man show, and there was apprehension

among BJP sympathisers about sabotage by local BJP leaders. But the strategy worked,

and the BJP made deep inroads into rural areas.

Modi Wave?

One feature of the 2014 election is the controversy over whether there was a

Modi wave. All the parties opposed to the BJP denied its existence, and ridiculed the idea, saying that it was only in the media, not on the ground. But, looking at the crowds pulled by Modi, one was inclined to believe that, the people who gathered in the scorching heat at his rallies were curious about him and his development model.

However, the big question before the BJP and Modi was whether the crowds would be

converted into votes for the BJP.

Two things helped with the conversion. One was voter awareness and mobilisation campaigns. Such campaigns were launched by the Election Commission

of India, several NCOS, various media outfits, several educational institutions in collaboration with district administrations, and political parties. That resulted in

174 nearly a 10% higher voter turnout. These voters, many conjectured, were either development-minded first-timers, or upper- and middle-class voters who were gen-

erally BJP sympathisers, but looked out for themselves.

Two, Modi established an early rapport with the people through his rallies and

oratorial skills. He was appointed the chief of the BJP campaign committee in early June and made the party's prime ministerial candidate on 13 September 2013. He began a dialogue with people all over, and, as the campaign progressed, his ability to reach out to them became more marked through the use of sophisticated

communication technology. For the UP electorate, fed up with the national and state governments and experiencing double anti-incumbency, Modi became the obvious choice. Considering that his party (with the AD) won 73 of the 80 seats, an accretion

of 63 seats over 2009, one feels convinced that there was a strong Modi wave in UP, which the other parties either failed to discern or ignored deliberately.

SP- BSP LOSS

Why did the SP lose all seats except the five fought by Mulayam Singh

Yadav's family members, and why did the BSP not win a single seat? The SP supremo had nursed prime ministerial ambitions. During the election campaign, he repeatedly exhorted his cadre to fetch him 70 Lok Sabha seats as a gift to fulfil his ambition.7 Instead, the electorate gave him five seats. Given the Akhilesh Yadav government's growing unpopularity, and its loss of control over administration, people had been

drifting away from the SP, though its core constituency of Yadavs and Muslims

continued with it. But Mayawati of the BSP was set on torpedoing Mulayam Singh Yadav's ambition. She conducted a low-profile election campaign, and, perhaps

surreptitiously, ensured the transfer of dalit votes to the BJP, especially in

constituencies where it was in direct fight with the SP (Verma 2014). According to the

National Election Studies (NES) data, the BSP lost 16% Jatav and 35% non-Jatav dalit

votes compared to 2009; and the BJP virtually got them en bloc, registering a 14% rise in Jatav and 37% rise in non-Jatav dalit votes (Table 4.5).

175 Table 4.5. BJP Gains across All Castes and Communities, 2009 and 2014 Lok Sabha Elections Compared Caste/Community Congress BJP BSP SP

2009 2014 +/- 2009 2014 +/- 2009 2014 +/- 2009 2014 +/-

Brahmin 31 11 -20 53 72 +19 9 5 -4 5 5 0

Rajput 6 7 +1 53 77 +24 7 5 -2 12 8 -4

Vaish 18 12 -6 57 71 +14 14 4 -10 11 10 -1

Other upper castes 31 3 -28 54 79 +25 10 1 -9 6 4 -2

Jat 13 13 0 31 77 +46 41 6 -35 10 8 -2

Yadav 11 8 -3 6 27 +21 5 3 -2 73 53 -20

Kurmi/Koeri 28 16 -12 20 53 +33 18 4 -14 18 17 -1

OtherOBC 17 8 -9 29 60 +31 19 11 -8 25 13 -12

Jatav 4 2 -2 5 18 +13 84 68 -16 5 4 -1

Other SCs 16 4 -12 8 45 +37 64 29 -35 10 10 0

Muslims 25 11 -14 6 10 +4 18 18 0 30 58 +28

Others 17 8 -9 24 51 +27 27 20 -7 23 17 -6

Source: National Election Studies 2014, CSDS Data Unit.

BJP Gains All-round

The election saw a phenomenal rise in support for the BJP, from a meagre 15% of the vote in the 2012 assembly election to 42.3% in 2014, a rise of 27.3% in two years. Even if we take changes in its vote share between 2009 and 2014, we see an increase of 24.8%. That was very significant for two reasons. One, the increased vote share was reflected in every social denomination, and two, it was evenly spread across all the seven sub-regions of the state - west UP, Rohilkhand, Doab, Bundelkhand,

Avadh, east UP, and north-east UP. The fundamental question is why UP'S voters did not favour caste parties in 2014 and voted so overwhelmingly for the BJP.

As Table 4.5 shows, the upper castes went with the BJP (more than 70%) and that was understandable because they were traditionally the party's supporters. But

OBC support, including Yadavs, for the BJP was a new phenomenon in UP: Among its voters were 27% Yadavs, 53% Kurmis/Koeris, and 60% OBCS (mainly more backward and most backward). Communal polarisation in west UP resulted in 77% Jats voting

176 for the BJP though they had been traditional supporters of Ajit Singh's RLD. Modi's

most backward caste (Teli) identity was probably responsible for a huge OBC shift

towards the BJP. Mulayam Singh Yadav's monopoly of OBC and Yadav votes was very

effectively challenged by Modi. Though OBCS in general showed divided loyalties, they appeared to favour Modi for national politics, while retaining loyalty for Mulayam Singh Yadav in state politics.

Interestingly, Modi neither made his OBC status an issue during the campaign nor indulged in caste politics. His inclusive development model approach attracted all. But, one mus; admit that without being casteist, Modi very forcefully intervened in the OBC discourse and gave many OBCS cause for pride and elation. Similarly, 18%

Jatavs and 45% ati-dalits voted for the BJP. While the Congress was trying to rope in

dalits through the initiatives of Rahul Gandhi, the BJP turned out to be the real beneficiary. The OBCS and dalits had to choose between the identity politics pursued

by the SP and BSP on one hand, and the development politics promised by Modi on the other. Most of the subaltern castes felt that their day-today life remained unchanged, and identity politics had not been able to deliver the fruits of development to them. They were ready to set aside caste politics and experiment with the promised development of their own clan leader, Modi of the BJP.

Muslim Vote

The 2014 election did not show any marked change in Muslim voting

behaviour despite uncertainty till the end. They largely voted for SP and BSP. Also,

about 10% of the Muslims voted for the BJP, indicating a rise in the community's support by 4% over 2009. That was really very significant given the Modi-bashing indulged in by all parties. Rahul Gandhi even gave a casualty figure at a rally in Solan (Himachal Pradesh) when he reportedly said that 22,000 people would be massacred 8 if Modi became the prime minister. The BJP registered accretions in vote share among all social groups, including Muslims. However, we must remember that this happened

in 2007 with the BSP and in 2009 with the Congress (Beg, Kumar and Verma 2014).

The Congress lost votes in all social groups in 2014, even its Muslim support was reduced to less than half (11%) that of 2009. The same trend was discernible in

the case of the BSP and SP. The BSP lost votes in all social groups, including Jatavs (by 16 percentage points) and ati-dalits (by 35 percentage points), its core

177 constituency. It also lost heavily among brahmins and all upper castes, prompting many to wonder if Mayawati's sarvjan samaj was a thing of the past. As Mayawati had a game plan of "teaching Mulayam a lesson", even at the cost of substantial losses to her party, drawing such a conclusion would be wrong.

We see depletion in the SP'S core support base of Yadavs. Their support (53%) declined by 20 percentage points from 2009. However, contrary to expectations,

Muslim support for the SP increased by a massive 28 percentage points (to 58% since 2009) despite resentment against the government's handling of the Muzaffarnagar

riots. Except among Muslims, the SP lost votes in all social groups. Mayawati's charge that Muslims did not vote for the BSP is not proved by NES 2014 data, which shows

Muslim support for the BSP remained unchanged at 18%

An intriguing part of Muslim voting behaviour was that irrespective of the

density of Muslim population in constituencies, the vote share of both the BJP and SP remained very close to their average aggregate. But the interesting part of the story

was that the BJP'S vote share increased in constituencies with more Muslims. The same

was true of the SP, though its vote share declined in four constituencies with more than

40% Muslims (Table 3). Significantly, the BJP (10%) was almost equal to the

Congress (11%) in attracting Muslim votes, though the SP still remained the first

choice of Muslims (58%), way ahead of the BSP (18%) (Table 4.5).

Table 4.6

Performance of Various Parties in Constituencies with Different Muslim Population Percentages in 2014 Lok Sabha Elections

Percentage of Muslims Total Seats Congress + BJP + BSP SP

Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote

Less than 10 15 1 9.9 13 42.1 0 20.3 1 20.7

10-20 37 1 7.7 33 43.1 0- 20.8 3 21.2

20-40 24 0 7.5 23 44.2 0 17.9 1 24.7

40 and above 4 0 13.6 4 44.9 0 16.6 0 21.6

Total 80 2 8.4 73 43.3 0 19.6 5 22.2

Source: CSDS Data Unit.

178 The 2014 Lok Sabha elections in UP will be remembered for the BJP demolishing many myths about itself. As Tables 4, 5, and 6 suggest, the party received massive support not only from all social groups, but also from all classes. It equalled the BSP (32%) in getting the support of the poor (31%), while it overtook both the BSP and SP in getting the support of lower- (BJP 46%, SP 22%, BSP 19%) and middle-class voters (BJP 41%, SP 22%, BSP 19%) (Table 4). The same was seen in the support of illiterates and the uneducated. Right from non-literates to the highest educated, the BJP remained the first choice, though the support grew with rising educational levels (Table 5). There was no gender involved in choosing the BJP. It was the first choice of both men (44%) and women (42%) (Table 6). Thus, the BJP excelled in garnering support from all social groups cutting across caste and class lines.

Table 4.7

Party Preference by Class, UttarPradesh2014

Class Congress + BJP BSP SP Others NOTA RLD Poor 6 31 32 24 5 2 Lower 8 46 19 22 4 1 Middle 10 41 19 22 7 1 Upper 9 51 12 20 7 1

Source: CSDS Data Unit.

Table 4.8

Party Preference by Education, Uttar Pradesh 2014

Education Congress BJP+ BSP SP OTHER + Non-literate 6 34 29 25 6 Up to primary 11 39 22 24 4 Uptomatric 9 45 18 22 6 College and above 8 51 13 19 7

Source: CSDS Data Unit.

179 Table 4.9

Party preference by Gender, Uttar Pradesh 2014

Gender Congress+ BJP+ AD BSP SP Others RLD Male 8 44 17 23 6.4 Female 8 42 23 21 5.1 Source: CSDS Data Unit.

During the election, two issues occupied attention. One, would the BJP benefit in west UP from a polarisation of Hindu-Muslim votes after the Muzaffarnagar riots?

Two, would Modi contesting from Varanasi in eastern UP (purvanchal, which includes both east UP and north-east UP) help the BJP revive its fortunes in that region? The party won just four Lok Sabha seats in 2009 and three in 2004 of the 29 seats there.

The BJP had also done poorly in Avadh (central UP) and Doab (between West UP and Avadh), winning just one of the 14 Lok Sabha seats each in 2004 and 2009. In

Bundelkhand, the BJP drew a blank in 2009. So, there was curiosity about whether

Modi's candidature would give the BJP an edge in all the sub regions.

Judging from the people's enthusiasm about Modi and their expectations of him, the only question was how much of an impact he would have in UP. Many tracker polls conducted by Lokniti-CSDS during January-March 2014 projected the BJP'S vote share at 38%, which was 1.5% higher than the party's highest ever of 36.5% in 1998 (Verma 2014).

Table 7 gives region-wise votes and seats obtained by political parties in 2014.

It is interesting to note that the BJP secured its highest vote share in west UP (50.2%) confirming Hindu-Muslim polarisation there. Jats, who had been voting with Muslims for the RLD, voted for the BJP this time. Even dalits and many Congress supporters voted for the BJP in this region. The result was that the BJP swept all seven seats in west UP. The BSP with 18.5% and the SP with 17.8% of the votes in west UP were way behind the BJP. The same trend was discernible in other

180 Table 4.10 Regional Variation in Lok Sabha Election Result, Uttar Pradesh (2014)

Region Total Turnout Congres BJ BS SP Seats Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote

Rohilkhand 10 61.7 0 4.1 9 42.6 0 17.7 1 31.4 Avadh 14 58.1 2 17.4 11 37.6 0 20.8 0 15.9 East 17 54.8 0 4.8 15 37.9 0 21.7 1 21.4 West 9 64.9 0 6.6 9 50.2 0 18.5 0 17.8 Doab 14 59.4 0 4.3 11 46.1 0 18.0 3 25.2 Bundelkhand 4 59.4 0 6.6 4 45.0 0 20.6 0 22.1 North-east 12 54.9 0 7.0 12 41.5 0 19.7 0 23.0 Total 80 58.4 2 7.5 71 42.3 0 19.6 S 22.2

Source: CSDS Data Unit.

Regions - In Bundelkhand, the BJP won all four seats with 45% of the vote; in Avadh, it won 11 out of 14 seats with 37.6% of the vote, and in Doab it won 11 out of 14 seats with 46.1%.

The Modi sweep was almost total in east UP. Of the 29 Lok Sabha seats in the region, the BJP won 27, and its vote share was very high (40%); almost double of what it got in 2009. East UP has a high concentration of OBCS, and Modi's OBC origin seemed to have worked in the region. Mulayam Singh Yadav and Akhilesh Yadav had neglected the more backward and the most backward sections while indulging in their myopic politics of favouring Yadavs, and these people saw Modi as an alternative

OBC leader who could better their fortunes. When the BJP prospered in UP during the 19905, it was under backward-class leaders such as Kalyan Singh, Vinay Katiyar, and

Uma Bharati. Though the party's resurgence in UP is again being credited to OBC leaders, the BJP strangely had no real leaders with any grass-roots support in UP and had to import leaders from Gujarat. One can surely infer that Modi's candidature had a lot to do with the BJP'S electoral fortunes, not only in west UP but in all the subregions.

Though the SP lost seats in all the subregions, its vote share tells a different story. Regional analysis of its vote share indicates that it lost support only in three subregions (Avadh, Bun-delkhand, and east UP); that its vote share remained almost unchanged in Doab and west UP; and that it gained votes in north-east UP (23%, up

181 from 17.2% in 2009) and Rohilkhand (31.4%, up from 24.7% in 2009). The regional spread of SP votes indicates that the party did badly not because any serious erosion in its support base, but because the BJP'S vote share expanded substantially. The BSP and Congress lost votes in every subregion of the state (Table 4.10). Another party that lost its social base in western UP (3.2% in 2014, down from 11.2% in 2009) and

Rohilkhand (0.1% in 2014, down from 6.2% in 2009) was the RLD.

4.5.4. Pointers for the future

The 2014 election outcome offers some crucial pointers to politics in UP in the coming years. One, the BJP has aroused great optimism for the assembly election in 2017. But, much will depend on the performance of the Modi government. People may be inclined to believe that BJP governments at the centre and the state may speed up development. That would threaten the SP. However, it would be a mistake to take this for granted. One, because the people voted for Modi, not the BJP in the Lok Sabha election; and two, because there is hardly any state-level BJP leader who can inspire confidence in voters and can be seen as a "development man". So, notwithstanding

Shah, the assembly election will not be a cakewalk for the BJP.

Two, the result points to the decline of caste politics. The only possibility of caste politics returning to UP depends on how the state government competes with the Modi government in development. If development becomes a common denominator for both, voters may look to caste as a deciding factor. Even then, the inclusive orientation of most parties is diluting exclusionary and casteist approaches. The way the BJP left all other parties behind by pursuing inclusive politics is a warning not only to the SP but also the Congress and BSP especially to Mayawati's social engineering (Verma 2007). Mayawati may hope to retrieve her dalit voters in the next assembly election, but much will depend on how soon the Modi government delivers its inclusive policies, and whether they give dalits a ray of hope.

Three, Muslim thinking about the BJP and the community's voting behaviour may also change. If Modi pursues an inclusive development model, more Muslims might vote for the BJP. That will not only make BJP more inclusive, but also have a positive effect on the secularism-communalism discourse in the country.

182 Finally, Modi may change the OBC discourse in UP and India. So far, hardly anybody had taken him to be an OBC leader, but he is now firmly entrenched in the

OBC psyche. The Modi government's inclusive political orientation is likely to benefit

OBCS and dalits, who together constitute 62% of the population in UP. So, the

possibility of the BJP benefitting from the Modi factor in UP for a long time to come is definitely there.

4.6. Samajwadi Party becomes largest political family in U.P.

Interestingly, Samajwadi Party chief Mulayam Singh Yadav has been opposing nepotism and feudalism in politics. Mulayam Singh-led Samajwadi Party has become the largest political family in the Hindi heartland of Uttar Pradesh with three more members from the family entering the political realm. The latest political entrants from the Yadav family are Mulayam's nephew Abhishek Yadav alias Anshul. niece Sandhya Yadav and another relative Vandana Yadav. who have been elected in the recently concluded panchayat polls. While Abhishek has been elected as the Chairman of Etawah Zila Panchayat body, Yadav's niece Sandhya is the Chairman of Mainpuri Zila Panchayat. Vandana Yadav, on the other hand, has been elected as Chairman of HamirpurZila Panchayat. With this, the total number of elected representatives from the SP chiefs family has gone up to 11. Abhishek Yadav is the son of Mulayam's brother Abhay Ram Yadav while Sandhya is the party supremo's niece and sister of Badaun MP Dharmendra Yadav. Both were elected unopposed. The third member to enter politics is Vandana Yadav, the sister-in-law of Badaun MP Dharmendra Yadav. Interestingly, Mulayam has been opposing nepotism and feudalism in politics. Earlier Mridula Yadav. mother of Mulayam's nephew and Mainpuri MP Tej Pratap Yadav as well as Ajant Singh Yadav, brother-in-law of Mulayam, got elected as members of Block Development Council from Saifai and Chaubiya respectively. Mridula and Ajant Singh are further expected to be elected as Chairpersons of the Block Development Councils, which are yet to take place. While Mulayam himself is an MP from Azamgarh, his son Akhilesh Yadav is an MLC and the Chief Minister of UP. Akhilesh's wife Dimple is a two-time Lok Sabha MP from Kannauj. Mulayam's nephew Dharmendra Yadav is an MP from Badaun, while his cousin Ram Gopal Yadav is a Rajya Sabha MP. Ram Gopal Yadav's son Akshay Pratap is an MP from Firozabad. The SP supremo's younger brother Shivpal Yadav is an MLA and a senior minister in the UP government holding important portfolios like

183 PWD, Irrigation and Cooperatives. The youngest member of the family Tej Pratap Yadav is an MP from Mainpuri. Tej Pratap is married to Bihar RJD chief Lain Prasad Yadav's daughter Rajlaxmi.

A seven-phased election for 403 assembly seats in Uttar Pradesh was held on 8, 11, 15, 19, 23 and 28 of February 2012, and 3 March 2012. At 60%, the voters' turnout was the highest ever in the state, and 14 percentage points higher than the previous assembly election. The increase in voters compared to 2007 was 45%, indicating that the rise in turnout was not a mere statistical correction. The turnout of women was higher than that of men and went up by 18 percentage points compared to 2007. The number of contestants increased to 6,839, an increase of 12 percentage points over the last assembly election.

Most of the major parties in the state, namely, the incumbent Bahujan Samaj

Party (BSP), Samajwadi Party (SP), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) went into the election on their own. The Indian National Congress (INC/Congress) however contested in an alliance with the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD). While the Congress fielded candidates in 355 seats, the RLD contested 46 seats.

The final outcome, a clear mandate for the SP and a substantial decline of the

BSP, was widely seen to be a surprise. SP recorded its best-ever performance winning a total of 224 seats, 127 more than the 2007 assembly elections, and secured 29.15% of the vote, a gain of nearly 4 percentage points since 2007 (in terms of seats, this was the best performance by any party since the Congress' victory in 1985 when it won 269 of the 425 seats of undivided Uttar Pradesh). On the other hand, its main rival, the incumbent BSP performed poorly. From the 2007 high of 206 seats, the BSP crashed to just 80 seats, a massive drop of 126. The party secured almost 26% of the vote, down 4.5 percentage points since 2007. The gap' between the SP and the BSP in terms of vote share however was that of just 3 percentage points indicating a high seats-vote disproportionality in SP'S favour. (Over the years, UP has seen multi-cornered contests where the leading party has benefited from the seat-vote disproportionality, as the

BSP did in 2007. This time in the case of the SP it was even higher.) The BJP finished third with 47 seats and 15% of the vote, a decline of four seats and 2% votes respectively since 2007. The Congress managed to win 28 seats, a marginal increase of six seats since 2007 and garnered nearly 12% of the vote, up 3 percentage points.

Its alliance partner the RLD won nine seats with 2% of the total vote, a drop of one

184 seat and 1% vote, respectively. Among the smaller parties, the Peace Party was the best performer winning four seats (all gains, since it was contesting for the first time) and securing 2% of the vote (Table 1B).

Table 4.11

Summary Results: Seats Contested, Won and Votes Secured by Major Parties in Alliances, Compared to the Assembly Election (2007)

Seats Contested Seats Gain/Loss of Vote Vote% Per Vote Swing Won Seats since 2007 Share Seat Contested Since 2007 (%) (% Points)

Indian National Congress+ (INC+) 401 37 +5 13.96 14.01 +1.65

Indian National Congress (INC) 355 28 +6 11.63 13.22 +3.02

Rashtriya Lok Dal(RLD) 46 9 -1 2.33 20.01 -1.37

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 398 47 -4 15 15.19 -1.97

Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 403 80 -126 25.91 25.91 -4.S2

Samajwadi Party (SP) 401 224 +127 29.15 29.27 +3.72

Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) 127 1 +1 0.33 1.05 +0.23

Peace Party (PP) 208 4 +4 2.35 4.53 +2.35

Quami Ekta Dal(QED) 43 2 +2 0.55 5.31 +0.55

Apna Dal (AD) 76 1 +1 0.90 4.86 -0.16

Communist Party of India (CPI) 51 0 0 0.13 1.06 +0.04

Communist Party of India 17 0 0 0.09 2.13 -0.21 (Marxist) - CPI(M)

All India Trinamool Congress 145 0 0 0.36 0.99 +0.36 (AITC)

Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)) 219 0 -1 0.36 066 -0.06

Lok Janshakti Party 212 0 0 0.23 0.43 +0.07

Others 2,449 1 -6 7.45 - +1.71

Independents 1,689 6 -3 3.21 - -3.76

Total 6,839 403 0 100 _ 0

If we analyse the result in terms of victory margins, we find that the number of seats that were won by a margin of over 10,000 votes went up from 139 in the previous election to 222 this time and two-thirds of such seats were won by the SP.

Moreover, SP won a majority of its seats by huge margins. Sixty-five per cent of the seats won by the SP were won by margins of over 10,000 votes. In 2007, the BSP had won only 38% of its total 206 seats by such huge margins. Both the Congress-RLD

185 alliance and the BJP also won most of their seats this time by huge margins. Contrary to popular impression, the seats which were decided by very small margins (up to

1,000 votes) were shared in the same proportion as the rest. The SP did not benefit from smaller margins (Table 4.11).

Out of the seven regions of Uttar Pradesh as classified by Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), the SP was ahead of its rivals in five (Rohilkhand, Awadh, east, Doab and north-east) both in terms of votes and seats. It was only in west and Bundelkhand that the BSP managed to gain an upper hand, but here too the party had to suffer losses compared to 2007 and this was largely due to some impressive gains made by SP. Of the five regions where SP was ahead, the party registered its best performance in the region of Awadh winning 55 to the 73 seats on offer and accumulating a total vote share of 33%. Within Awadh, the party did particularly well in Faizabad wining all the four seats in the district. In Lucknow district the party ended up with seven of the nine seats, whereas in Unnao it won five of the six seats. In Rae Bareli and Sultanpur, pocket-boroughs of the Nehru-Gandhi family, the SP won 12 of the 15 seats and the Congress managed to win just two. In east, the SP won 52 out of the 81 seats in the region with a vote share of 32%. sp's performance in Ambedkar Nagar where it won all five seats and in Azamgarh where it won nine of the 10 seats was particularly impressive. In north-east (southern Terai region bordering Nepal), SP won 32 of the 61 seats with a vote share of 28%. In terms of seats, the BJP finished second in this region winning 10 seats, half of which came from Gorakhpur and Bahraich districts. In Doab, with 73 seats, the main contest was between the SP and the BSP with the former emerging ahead with 41 seats. Within this region, the SP swept the districts of Etawah, Kannuaj, Etah, Mainpuri, Farrukhabad,

Auraiya and Kanpur Dehat. The BSP performed best in Agra, and in Mathura district it was the RLD-Congress alliance which emerged on top. In Rohilkhand with 52 seats, the main contest was between the SP, BSP and the BJP. Here the SP won 29 seats giving its best performance in the districts of Moradabad, Budaun and Pilibhit.

In west where the BSP finished ahead of the rest, the party won most of its seats in the districts of Saharanpur, Baghpat, Gautam Buddha Nagar and Ghaziabad. The BJP did well in the district of Meerut winning four of the seven seats, the rest going to SP. For the Congress-RLD alliance which was expected to do well in this region, the victories were few and far between. In fact the only region where the Congress seems to have

186 put up a good fight is Bundelkhand, where the party won four of the 19 seats on offer and finished third behind the BSP and the SP . Of all the 70 districts in the State, Lalitpur district in Bundelkhand recorded the highest voter turnout at 74%. If we compare the turnout across regions, it was the highest in Rohilkhand at 65% and lowest in north-east at 56%.

The electoral trend in favour of SP was quite strong and pushed the BSP to the margins in the reserved scheduled caste (sc) constituencies (which tend to only marginally have a higher proportion of SCS). SP won 58 of the 85 sc seats on offer, leaving the BSP, which is considered to have an advantage in such seats, with only 15. This is a significant turnaround considering that in 2007 (pre-delimitation), the BSP had won 61 of 89 reserved SC seats and the SP had managed to win just 13. If we analyse in terms of locality, then it was in the rural and semi-urban areas where the SP performed the best. The party won 183 of the 308 almost entirely rural seats (59%) and 32 of the 60 semi-urban seats (53%). However in almost entirely urban areas of

Uttar Pradesh, it was the BJP that retained its dominance winning 20 of the total 35 seats. The Congress-RLD alliance too did reasonably well here in terms of votes.

Table 4.12

Region-wise and District-wise Analysis: Turnout and Performance of Major Alliances and Parties 2012

Regions/Districts Total Turnout Congress + RLD Won BJP SP BSP Independents Others Seats (%) Vote (%) Won Vote I Won Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote (%) Vote (%; (%) (%) (%)

Rohilkhand 52 6S.O 2 12.8 8 18.9 29 28.9 11 22.7 0 1.9 2 14.7

Bijnor 8 65.1 0 14.5 2 20.4 2 20.8 4 30.0 0 1.3 0 13.0

Moradabad 9 65.5 0 10.8 1 24.1 7 29.9 0 19.2 0 1.7 1 14.3

Rampur 5 60.7 2 23.4 0 14.9 2 30.5 1 17.0 0 1.6 0 12.6

Jyotiba Phule 4 70.4 0 10.5 0 15.7 4 33.3 0 24.3 0 1.1 0 15.1 Nagar

Budaun 7 61.4 0 16.2 0 8.2 5 35.8 2 24.6 0 1.7 0 13.4

Bareilly 9 65.5 0 4.5 3 23.2 3 26.1 2 20.2 0 2.9 1 23.2

Pilibhit 4 68.6 0 13.1 1 111 3 25.3 0 17.6 0 2.3 0 13.9

Shahjahanpur 6 65.7 0 14.9 1 14.2 3 31.7 2 27.5 0 2.4 0 9.3

Awadh 73 61.0 4 14.4 3 10.8 55 32.9 8 25.7 2 4.7 1 11.5

Kheri 8 65.0 0 13.3 1 13.0 4 32.1 3 25.7 0 4.5 0 11.5

Sitapur 9 65.6 0 17.3 0 6.4 7 34.3 2 32.0 0 2.1 0 7.9

187

Hardoi 8 61.7 0 8.0 0 4.6 6 37.2 2 33.0 0 2.8 0 14.4

Unnao 6 60.3 0 10.9 0 17.4 5 33.2 1 27.3 0 4.0 0 7.1

Lucknow 9 57.9 1 16.5 1 16.7 7 29.7 0 21.4 0 1.6 0 14.1

Rae Bareli 7 60.7 1 24.2 0 5.4 5 32.2 0 17.8 0 3.0 1 17.4

Sultanpur 8 58.4 1 14.9 0 10.0 7 35.8 0 24.3 0 5.5 0 9.6

Pratapgarh 7 54.2 1 • 12.5 0 10.9 4 20.5 0 23.5 2 18.9 0 13.7

Barabanki 7 65.2 0 14.6 1 12.6 6 35.2 0 24.5 0 3.4 0 9.6

Faizabad 4 60.5 0 9.1 0 13.0 4 39.4 0 24.4 0 4.9 0 9.2

East 81 57.3 4 8.1 6 10.5 52 32.4 13 27.9 3 5.0 3 16.1

Kaushambi 3 58.8 0 8.9 1 11.5 0 29.8 2 33.5 0 6.4 0 • 9.9

Allahabad 12 56.0 1 9.1 0 8.8 8 28.7 3 28.6 0 7.4 0 17.4

Ambedkar Nagar 5 63.0 0 5.9 0 4.3 5 46.9 0 34.2 0 2.4 0 6.4

Azamgarh 10 55.0 0 6.9 0 10.2 9 39.0 1 30.0 0 2.0 0 11.9

Mau 4 56.6 0 7.5 0 4.8 2 28.9 1 28.0 0 1.8 1 29.1

Ballia 7 54.0 0 6.6 1 15.5 5 29.3 1 23.1 0 4.0 0 21.5

Jaunpur 9 55.6 1 7.5 1 14.4 7 33.8 0 27.3 0 6.0 0 11.2

Ghazipur 7 57.6 0 3.9 0 6.0 6 36.1 0 27.6 0 2.0 1 24.4

Chandauli 4 61.4 0 3.6 0 9.2 1 28.4 1 29.8 2 16.4 0 12.7

Varanasi 8 58.2 1 18.1 3 16.1 1 20.4 2 21.1 0 2.0 1 22.5

Sant Ravidas 3 56.3 0 2.8 0 7.2 3 45.1 0 31.7 0 1.7 0 11.5 Nagar

Mirzapur 5 62.4 1 13.3 0 10.9 3 32.8 1 28.1 0 2.1 0 12.8

Sonbhadra 4 58.7 0 6.5 0 12.7 2 27.6 1 26.1 1 17.3 0 9.9

West 44 62.8 8 23.7 9 17.3 10 20.5 17 29.2 0 2.8 0 6.4

Saharanpur 7 71.6 1 30.2 1 11.2 1 21.1 4 30.6 0 4.3 0 2.6

Muzaffarnagar 9 61.2 2 22.3 2 20.0 2 22.1 3 27.8 0 3.0 0 4.9

Meerut 7 65.4 0 20.2 4 24.0 3 25.0 0 23.3 0 1.8 0 5.7

Baghpat 3 58.8 1 37.3 0 3.9 0 15.5 2 35.5 0 1.2 0 6.6

Ghaziabad 8 59.7 2 22.8 0 20.0 2 18.0 4 32.3 0 2.2 0 4.7

Gautam Buddha Nagar 3 56.5 0 20.6 1 21.7 0 17.1 2 33.7 0 2.3 0 4.5

Bulandshahar 7 62.2 2 20.0 1 13.5 2 19.6 2 27.4 0 3.7 0 15.7

Doab 73 61.1 8 14.5 8 16.5 41 29.4 15 26.8 1 3.7 0 9.1

Aligarh 7 63.0 3 26.3 0 12.8 4 19.9 0 24.6 0 3.2 0 13.2

Mahamaya Nagar 3 62.2 0 14.6 0 10.2 1 33.9 2 35.4 0 2.6 0 3.2

Mathura 5 65.2 4 36.2 0 14.6 0 8.3 1 25.7 0 4.1 0 11.0

Agra 9 62.1 0 12.8 2 18.2 1 25.0 6 33.1 0 5.6 0 5.3

Firozabad 5 64.7 0 2.9 1 15.2 3 41.8 1 29.3 0 6.4 0 4.4

Etah 7 61.7 0 9.7 0 9.1 6 32.5 1 22.7 0 2.6 0 23.4

Mainpuri 4 60.0 0 9.1 0 10.7 4 42.7 0 26.7 0 2.3 0 8.5

Farrukhabad 4 58.9 0 11.2 0 17.8 3 26.4 0 14.9 1 9.8 0 20.0

Kannauj 3 58.4 0 4.3 0 22.0 3 39.5 0 26.5 0 2.6 0 5.1

188 Etawah 3 61.2 0 4.3 0 12.3 3 47.1 0 30.2 0 0.4 0 5.8

Auraiya 3 60.4 0 5.6 0 21.4 3 38.6 0 28.7 0 1.0 0 4.7

KanpurDehat 4 63.7 0 11.5 0 14.5 3 32.7 1 30.7 0 5.2 0 5.6

Kanpur Nagar 10 55.9 1 19.6 4 25.8 5 26.9 0 22.3 0 2.0 0 3.3

Fatehpur 6 60.7 0 14.9 1 19.7 2 24.5 3 26.4 0 2.7 0 11.8

Bundelkhand 19 62.8 4 18.6 3 18.9 5 25.3 7 26.2 0 4.1 0 7.0

Contd…

Regions/Districts Total Turnout Congress + RLD Won BJP SP BSP Independents Others Seats (%) Vote(%)

Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote (%} (%) (%) (%) (%)

Jalaun 3 61.5 1 18.9 0 14.9 1 23.9 1 26.6 0 1.3 0 14.5

Jhansi 4 64.6 0 16.1 1 20.9 2 27.9 1 28.4 0 3.0 0 3.7

Lalitpur 2 73.6 0 12.9 0 22.5 0 24.8 2 27.S 0 6.9 0 5.3

Hamirpur 2 59.9 1 26.7 i 17.0 0 22.7 0 22.1 0 5.0 0 6.5

Mahoba 2 62.9 0 17.2 1 26.5 0 23.2 1 23.3 0 4.3 0 5.5

Banda 4 57.5 2 24.8 0 15.1 1 24.2 1 26.0 0 3.3 0 6.6

Chitrakoot 2 61.7 0 12.0 0 18.0 1 30.2 1 26.7 0 7.9 0 5.2

North-east 61 55.9 7 12.2 10 17.7 32 28.1 9 22.7 0 5.9 3 13.4

Bahraich 7 59.9 2 21.1 2 20.0 2 21.5 1 21.0 0 6.6 0 9.9

Shrawasti 2 61.7 0 17.9 0 20.2 2 33.0 0 19.5 0 5.0 0 4.5

Balrampur 4 50.1 0 12.4 0 15.5 4 31.6 0 20.1 0 5.4 0 15.0

Gonda 7 57.3 0 7.0 1 17.4 6 35.4 0 25.2 0 6.7 0 8.2

Siddharthnagar 5 53.0 0 10.1 1 17.3 3 30.9 0 21.2 0 4.7 1 15.9

Basti 5 58.3 1 17.9 0 9.0 2 30.2 2 31.5 0 2.6 0 8.7

SantKabir Nagar 3 54.4 0 6.5 0 19.1 2 25.0 0 22.5 0 2.8 1 24.1

Maharajganj S 61.5 1 16.3 1 18.6 2 26.9 1 18.9 0 1.9 0 17.4

Gorakhpur 9 53.1 0 4.4 3 21.4 1 24.9 4 25.6 0 7.6 1 16.1

Kushinagar 7 57.4 2 14.6 1 15.8 3 25.0 1 20.0 0 7.6 0 17.0

Deoria 7 52.2 1 10.3 1 18.8 5 30.3 0 21.3 0 9.1 0 10.2

Total 403 60.3 37 13.9 47 15.0 224 29.2 80 25.9 6 4.1 9 11.9

An analysis of the results by proportion of Muslim population in constituencies reveals that contrary to popular impression, the SP'S performance in terms of votes was much better in constituencies without any significant Muslim population than in constituencies where Muslims are present in high numbers. For instance, while the SP secured around 31% of the total vote in the 260 seats where Muslims constitute below 20% of the population, it could manage lesser votes in seats with a larger con-

189 centration of Muslims. In constituencies where Muslims are over 20% of the total population, the SP faced some stiff competition in terms of votes from the BSP, the

BJP and other parties like the Peace Party and the Quami Ekta Dal. But here too it ended up winning many more seats.

Survey-based estimates of vote by social background reveal that while both the SP and the BSP continue to get an overwhelming proportion of their total votes from Yadavs and Jatavs, respectively (their core voters), they were unable to retain their 2007 dominance among these sections. While the SP saw a 6 percentage point vote drop among Yadavs and Muslims, the BSP'S decline among Jatavs was even bigger. The extraordinary polarisation of Jatav votes that was witnessed in favour of

BSP in 2007 came down this time, with 62% of Jatavs voting for Mayawati's party, a drop of 24 percentage points. While these figures may surprise many, it must be pointed out that this is a trend which was already noticed by a CSDS survey conducted in Uttar Pradesh in July 2011 when 66% of Jatavs had said they will vote for the BSP in the event of an immediate election. Among other dalit categories too

(except the Pasis) the BSP lost votes this time compared to 2007.

The party's votes declined by 29 percentage points among Balmikis, and 19 percentage points among Dhobis. The BSP'S loss of votes among dalits seems to have benefited SP the most. In fact, SP'S gains were most impressive among communities that are not considered as its core supporters. Among brahmins for instance the sp secured 19% of the votes, up 9 percentage points since 2007. Among Rajputs its vote share went up by 6% and among Kurmi and Koeris its votes more than doubled. Not just that, SP gained across categories of age, education, gender, class and locality.

Among men, women, poor, rich, rural and urban voters, SP'S gains were in the range of 3 to 5 percentage points since 2007. While the BSP lost a significant chunk of its core, it seems to have held on to some of its gains among upper castes and Muslims in

2007. However among lower OBCS who had also given BSP an advantage in 2007, the party lost 11% votes. It's not just the BSP, but the BJP too which lost its grip over its traditional voters, namely, the brahmins, Rajputs and other upper castes. While the party came down 6 percentage points among brahmins, the losses among Rajputs and other upper castes were much bigger at 17 and 24 percentage points, respectively.

Economically well off voters and college educated voters, core supporters of the BJP

190 for a long time, also seem to have moved away from the party. In urban areas however, where the BJP has done well in the past, the party suffered only marginal losses. As for the Congress, while its performance was way below expectation, it did improve its performance among some sections. The party made gains among dalits, Kurmis and Koeris, Muslims, Poor, Young (18-25 years) and the college educated compared to 2007. That said, it had done much better among these sections in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections and was simply unable to retain that same level of support.

While age was not much of a factor this time, Gender certainly was with the BSP losing the edge it had among women in 2007. While 32% of the women had voted for

BSP in 2007, this time only 25% voted for the party. In terms of locality, most of

BSP'S losses came among rural voters. The SP, on the other hand, gained among both rural and urban voters in equal measure. In terms of class, the BSP improved in. the upper and middle sections but lost substantially among the lower sections and the poor. The SP gained across classes, whereas the BJP saw its support drop among the upper and middle classes. The Congress which did well mostly among the upper class in 2007, read some gains among the lower economic sections this time.

The CSDS post poll survey findings show that the satisfaction of people with the BSP government was exactly the same as the satisfaction expressed by voters with the SP government in 2007 when a similar survey was conducted Even on issues of governance, there was very little difference on how people assessed the performance of the BSP government and the SP government in 2007..While on the issue of controlling corruption and maintaining peace and security, the BSP government was rated better than what the SP government had been rated in 2007, but it was seen to have performed much worse as far as the condition of roads was concerned (Table 4.12).

The Mayawati-led BSP government it seems was also as unpopular as the previous SP government led by Mulayam Singh Yadav. When voters were asked whether the government should get another chance to rule, nearly half of them (48%) said no and only 27% were willing to give it another chance. When the same question was asked during a similar survey in 2007, 47% had wanted the then Mulayam Singh government to go and 37% had said it should get another chance. However when respondents were specifically asked to compare the two governments in the post-poll

191 survey this time, nearly half of them (46%) said that the previous SP government had been better and only 25% said the BSP government was better.

The survey reveals that the most popular leader in Uttar Pradesh at present is Mulayam Singh Yadav and by a wide margin. While 33% wanted him to be the next chief minister of the state, 24% wanted Mayawati to continue as chief minister. Rajnath Singh and Rahul Gandhi were the choice of 8% and 7% voters respectively. Akhilesh Yadav was the choice of 2% of the respondents (Table 4E, p 84). When respondents were asked who they would prefer as chief minister if the SP came to power, Mulayam Singh or his son Akhilesh, nearly half of them opted for father.

Among SP voters, two-thirds preferred Mulayam Singh.

The survey revealed that price rise was the most important issue for voters (36%) during the election. Condition of roads emerged as the second most important issue (26%), followed by farmers' problems (14%). Corruption was an issue for 7% of the voters.

On the issue of dividing Uttar Pradesh into smaller states, there is greater support for division today than it was seven months ago. While 37% of the respondents agreed with the statement that "Uttar Pradesh should be divided into smaller states", a slightly lesser proportion 35% disagreed. When the same question was asked during a survey conducted by CSDS in July 2011 (before the proposal by the Mayawati government to divide Uttar Pradesh into four smaller states), those in favour of dividing UP were marginally lesser than those against it, across regions. The 2012 post-poll survey reveals that while most people in Poorvanchal and Awadh oppose the idea of division, in Bundelkhand and Paschim there are more people who are in support of the idea than those who are against it (Table 4.12, p 84).

Nearly half the respondents were of the view that the Election Commission did the right thing by ordering the covering of the statues of Mayawati and the Elephant during the elections. Only 16% said it was a .wrong decision. Even among dalits most felt the EC did no wrong. Majority of the respondents (51%) were also of the view that the BSP government had wasted money on building statues and parks. Less than half the respondents had heard of the recent announcement by the central government

192 of giving reservation to minorities within the OBC quota. However many of those who had heard about the move supported it (48%).

The Congress Party may have performed below expectations but appears to have created some potential for itself for the future by emerging as the second preference party among voters. When people were asked which party would they vote for if the party of their first choice put up a bad candidate, most (18%) said Congress.

Another reason for hope for the Congress is that more people have faith in Rahul Gandhi as a future leader compared to Akhilesh Yadav, Jayant Chaudhury and Varun Gandhi. When asked who among the four would make the best leader in the future, 38% said Rahul Gandhi and 20% opted for Akhilesh Yadav. Even among SP voters, Rahul Gandhi did rather well on this question.

Table 4.13 Social Basis of Voting: Survey-based Estimates of Vote for Major Alliances/Parties by Gender, Age, Education, Locality, Class and Caste/Community in Assembly Elections (2007 and 2012)

Congress BJP BSP SP RIO Others N for 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012

Age groups Up to 25 years 10 15 19 15 28 23 27 30 4 1 13 16 1,167

26-35 years 8 11 19 16 30 26 26 29 4 3 13 14 1,879

36-45 years 8 11 18 13 32 29 24 27 3 2 14 18 1,661

46-55 years 8 11 18 16 31 24 25 30 5 2 13 17 844

56 years and above 9 11 18 15 30 26 24 31 3 3 15 15 1,061

Gender Men 9 11 19 16 30 27 25 28 4 3 13 16 3,940

Women 8 12 18 14 32 25 26 31 3 2 13 16 2,673

Level of education Non-literate 7 10 13 10 37 33 25 30 4 2 15 16 2,217

Up to primary 9 10 17 15 30 26 27 34 4 2 13 13 1,025

Up to Metric 9 10 20 16 28 26 27 28 4 3 12 18 1,665

College and above 11 17 27 21 22 17 23 27 4 3 12 15 1,693

Locality Rural 8 10 18 14 32 27 26 29 4 3 13 16 5,438

Urban 16 18 21 18 21 20 23 29 2 1 18 14 1,174

Class Upper 12 16 30 17 14 21 25 27 6 5 14 15 1,487

Middle 10 9 24 15 24 26 28 33 5 1 10 16 2,086

Lower 10 12 15 15 33 26 25 28 2 2 15 18 1,916

Poor 5 10 12 12 41 33 23 28 4 2 15 15 1,123

193 Caste community Brahmin 19 13 44 38 16 19 10 19 3 1 8 11 522

Rajput 9 13 46 29 12 14 20 26 5 2 9 16 565

Vaishya 10 21 52 42 14 15 12 12 0 0 12 10 67*

Other Upper Caste 12 13 41 17 15 17 17 15 1 4 14 34 450

Jats 2 11 18 7 10 16 8 7 61 45 2 15 132

Yadav 4 4 5 9 7 11 72 66 1 1 10 10 657

Kurmi/Koeri 6 13 42 20 16 19 17 35 4 1 16 12 389

OtherOBC 9 12 17 17 30 19 20 26 6 3 19 23 768

Jatav 2 5 3 5 86 62 4 15 1 2 4 12 817

Balmiki 4 12 11 3 71 42 2 9 4 0 9 34 59*

Pasi/Pano 7 7 12 4 53 57 16 24 0 0 11 9 178

Other SC 4 17 9 11 58 45 16 18 1 1 13 8 344

Muslim 14 18 3 7 17 20 45 39 8 1 13 15 1,105

Others 12 9 14 16 30 23 23 31 3 0 18 21 559

4.7. Minority report: Is Muslim voting behaviour changing?

The "Muslim vote" is often thought of as tactical voting to defeat the BJP. But that behaviour seems to be changing in UP. The traditional beneficiary of Muslim votes in the state, Samajwadi Party (SP), has fallen from grace post-Muzaffarnagar. While Congress, BSP, SP, RLD and AAP vie with each other for Muslim votes, the BJP has complicated the scenario by trying to access them too. Its efforts got some impetus via Muslim clerics who warned non-BJP parties not to instill fear among Muslims in the name of the BJP.

Muslims are rethinking. And their rethink is driven by sociological, economic and political considerations.

The sociological expression-" Muslim voting behaviour"-is based on questionable logic that seems to suggest en bloc voting on the premise of Muslims being a homogenised community. But that subsumes poor, exploited and marginalised Muslims under the rubric of "Muslim identity".

When concerns of azlaf (backward) and arzal (dalit) Muslims are different from those of ashraf (upper caste/class), how long will they vote alike? The upsurge of pasmanda Muslims is redefining Muslim identity and giving it a class-orientation. Their grouse is that despite the 85% share of backwards, like ansari, ghosi, dhobi, idris, etc, among Muslims, the political leadership is grabbed by upper-caste Muslims

194 like Salman Khurshid (Congress), Naseemuddin (BSP) and Azam Khan (SP). Their ire is also directed against ulemaand Muslim organisations that ignore their concerns.

Backward Muslims are better placed vis-a-vis ashrafs to win. In 2009, the BSP gave tickets to 17 Muslims in UP; three to backwards, out of which two won, and 14 to ashraf Muslims, out of which, again, two won. So, if non-BJP parties refuse to provide them due space, they may turn to the BJP. The plight of Muslims may not, actually, apply to all Muslims, especially ashrafs, many of whom are landlords, educated, employed and politically empowered. But a large section of pasmanda Muslims may be really deprived.

The "Muslim picture" is changing at the grassroots: Muslim representation has gone up in assembly and municipal bodies in Uttar Pradesh. Muslim representation in the assembly may be 17.1%, close to the Muslim population (18.5%), but at the district level, we find a Muslim upsurge. In 13 out of 70 districts, the share of Muslim MLAs is 10-25%; in 21 districts, it is 25-50%; and in five districts (Moradabad, Rampur, Amroha, Balrampur and Shrawasti), there are 50-70% Muslim MLAs. In municipal bodies, there are 3,681 Muslims elected out of a total of 11,816 members, pushing their representation to 31.5%.

Political empowerment of Muslims is a result of neo-liberalism that has created a neo-rich middle class of Muslims. As the political space in Congress, BSP, SP or established regional parties is occupied by uppercase Muslims, the BJP may become an attractive destination for them.

Backward Muslims may also look at the secular-communal discourse differently. Their experience in BJP-ruled states like Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Bihar (in coalition with Nitish Kumar) made them realise that life there was no different from non-BJP-ruled states. On the contrary, in some such states, better governance may have brought some prosperity. Gujarat 2002 riots and the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue are usually raised during elections. But are Muslims still interested? Using these issues, non-BJP parties try to create fear among Muslims. But insecurity among Muslims, if any, may be akin to that faced by Hindus, though the latter's insecurity does not figure in the secular-communal discourse due to their greater numbers. Muslims, including pasmanda Muslims, may still vote tactically to defeat the BJP, but a small section may vote differently. Such voters may

195 renounce the "marriage model" of relationship with a party that warrants voters to be wedded to a party. Instead, they may go for a "stock exchange model" that permits voting for a party that promises better returns. Modi’s backward caste status may play a key role in this.

Recent CSDS studies substantiate this. While 3% and 7% Muslims voted BJP in 2007 and 2012 respectively, their support may go up to 11% in this election. This signals a paradigm shift, making the BJP more inclusive and Muslims more autonomous in their voting behaviour.

4.8. A saffron sweep in U.P.

"The Bharatiya Janata Party seems to have succeeded in evolving a grand Hindu coalition, while the Muslim vote by and large went to non-BJP parties

The 2014 election results in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) indicate a complete saffron sweep. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won 71 seats and its ally Apna Dal (AD) won two seats: Mirzapur and Pratapgarh. Thus, the BJP-AD combine won 73 out of 80 seats, completely decimating all their opponents. The Congress barely retained the seats of its president Sonia Gandhi and vice-president Rahul Gandhi from Rae Bareli and Amethi respectively. The Samajwadi Party (SP) won only five seats which were contested by Mulayam Singh Yadav's family-Mulayam from Mainpuri and Azamgarh, Dimple Yadav from Kannauj, Akshay Yadav from Firozabad and Dharmendra Yadav from Badaun — whereas the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)and other parties could not open their accounts.

Caste politics

What actually happened in U.P.? How did the Modi wave work in all regions of the State? Three things simultaneously took place. One, the traditional caste and community-based model of politics was redefined. Two, development became the focal point for voters' aspirational upsurge. And three, regional variations practically disappeared. Our post-poll survey will help us in understanding how these factors shaped the outcome of the polls. Not only caste, but class too lost its relevance in this election. Voters of all ages, educational backgrounds, economic statuses and genders supported the BJP and its prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi. The highest support (47 per cent) came from the first time voters (18-22 years). Even though caste

196 politics took a back seat in this election in U.P., it would be hasty to say that caste politics has ended in the State.

In 2014, the BJP improved upon its previous best performance in 1998 when it won 52 seats and 36 per cent votes (this data does not include the Uttarakhand portion of U.P.). The SP managed a mere 22 per cent then and the BSP got 20 per cent of the vote share. While a high vote share for the BJP is important, it is the difference between the winner and the runners-up which helped the party virtually sweep the State.

Dissatisfaction

Why did this happen? The survey data suggests that the voters were dissatisfied with the SP-led government in the State and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UFA) government at the Centre. Both governments were seen as inept, ineffective and unresponsive to popular expectations. Mr. Modi focused his campaign on the Gujarat model of governance and development. He offered voters a platform where they could channelise their anger against both the incumbent governments. In his campaigns, Mr. Modi was critical of both "Maa-bete ki sarkaar" (the government by the mother and son duo) and the "baap-bete ki sarkaar" (government of the father and son). These evidently resonated with the voters. Mr. Modi ran a highly individual-centred campaign in which he targeted Rahul Gandhi. His high-voltage campaign virtually settled the matter in favour of his party.

Though the BJP got support from all sections of society, there are three critical aspects to its support base in U.P. First, the BJP regained the support of lower Other Backward Classes (more than half of the Kurmi community and Most Backward Classes voted the BJP). Second, the party garnered a substantial proportion of Dalit votes, mainly among the non-Jatavs. And third, there was an unprecedented level of polarisation among the upper caste voters in favour of the party. Since the 903, the BJP in U.P. has had two main support groups: the upper castes and the lower OBCs. Mr. Modi's repeated emphasis on his caste background in his campaign speeches seems to have helped the BJP improve its vote share among OBC voters.

However, the larger puzzle pertains to the dismal performance of the SP and the BSP. The BSP won the 2007 Assembly election single-handedly, while the SP won the 2012 Assembly election with a much larger seat share. While the Congress'

197 decimation is all-round, it is not as if the traditional support groups of the SP and the BSP have altogether deserted them. The 2014 election verdict in U.P. rather suggests a story of failed social engineering on their part. The SP continues to receive support from Yadavs and Muslims; however, its support among Yadavs has decreased. It has also failed to get support from any other social section. In the case of the BSP, its Jatav support remained more or less intact but it did not receive support from either the lower OBCs or the Muslims. This has left the BSP to shrink to its Jatav vote base alone. With a limited support base, the capacity of both these parties to post any victories was seriously restricted.

The BJP seems to have succeeded in evolving a grand Hindu coalition, while the Muslim vote by and large went to non-BJP parties. Thus, the saffron sweep has created an imbalance in minority representation as there is no Muslim MP elected from U.P. One thing is clear: the rhetoric and the success of the BJP have posed a serious challenge to politics based merely on caste or community identities. Whether this will usher in a new era in the State's politics, where the paradigm of performance and development will shape electoral destinies in the future, is an open question.

4.9. U.P. Politics: Agenda ahead

The 2017 Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh may be around 09 months away. But, strategies are being made and knives sharpened, so to speak, with each passing day. What lies in store for the contesting parties?

The next Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh (UP) in 2017 are about 20 months away, but the electoral battle lines are being drawn.

People are becoming increasingly analytical about the possible outcome of the election. Questions are being asked.

Will the Samajvvadi Party (SP) regain power, or will it be thrown out of office? Will the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) replicate its 2014 Lok Sabha (LS) performance in UP? What about the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)? Is Mayawati still relevant in UP and a serious bidder for power? Will the Congress manage to regain its previous low or will it slip further? Or, does the party have any chance of revival at all? How about the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM), which might give sleepless nights to some self-proclaimed secular parties in UP?

198 The electoral politics in UP is complex because of multi-corner contests and the role of the caste factor. However, some parties have made new moves by attempting social engineering, shifting the public discourse from caste to class, or running electoral campaign primarily on development.

Samajwadi Party's Prospects

The Samajwadi Party won 224 seats and 29.1% votes in the 2012 Assembly elections. That was the lowest vote share with which any government had been elected in the UP since the independence. Earlier, the Mayawati government in 2007 had been elected with 30% votes. But, the Akhilesh Yadav-led government earned a bad reputation soon. Yadav's initial years were touted as the government of many chief ministers (Akhilesh Yadav, Mulayam Singh Yadav, Ram Gopal Yadav, Shivpal Yadav and Azam Khan). There was constant focus on his inability to provide leadership to government and bureaucracy. His government also earned a bad name for Muslim appeasement, promoting Yadavs in jobs and plum postings, and, failing on the law and order front. That resulted in the Samajwadi Party's humiliating defeat in LS elections 2014. The Akhilesh government has done a few things on the development front, most importantly on Lucknow metro, express-highway, energy sector, etc. But, all the credit for development comes to nothing if the citizens feel unsafe.

The present SP government is facing exactly this situation. The people see law and order during Mayawati regime as the golden era. That's the reason the SP supremo Mulayam Singh Yadav publicly reprimanded Akhilesh and his ministers to mend their ways or face the wrath of the public in the next elections.

Why does Mulayam criticise Akhilesh and his government in public so often? One argument is that, sensing the impending defeat of the SP in 2017, he wants to dissociate himself from the failure. In other words, he wants to create an escape route for himself by referring to his previous warnings. The second thesis is that, by rebuking Akhilesh, the head of the government, he is, by proxy, also rebuking all Ministers, thus saving Akhilesh from the unpleasant task. The Akhilesh government needs to worry that SP's support base in UP was seriously eroded in the 2014 LS elections. It lost votes across all the sections of the society except the Muslims.

199 The chances are that, because of the emergence of Owaisi’s party MIM, SP may lose some votes from among the Muslims. That has forced staunch communal elements in the SP as Azam Khan to change the tone, tenor and substance of their speeches to find ways to get Hindu votes.

The SP is in trouble also due to Rashtriya Swayam Sevvak Sangh (RSS)- supported Muslim Rashtriya Manch's (MRM) mobilisation of Muslims under the leadership of Indresh Kumar, targeting those who come from arzal Muslims (Dalit Muslim community). The class schism in Muslim community is contributing to this mobilisation. And, this community is very large among Muslims.

What about Mayawati?

Mayawati had been defeated in the 2012 assembly elections. Her party BSP lost 126 seats and 4.5% votes. But in the 2014 LS elections, her losses were very substantial. She could not win a single seat and her vote share was reduced from25.5% in 2012 to 19.6% in 2014 - a massive loss of 5.9% votes.

Many feel that Mayawati cannot be written off in UP politics since she has a substantial Dalit base. However, having a support base is one thing and, converting those numbers into votes, something else altogether.

Will the Dalits vote for Mayawati in the next Assembly elections? After all, she used to be a symbol of the Dalit identity, which had always strengthened her claim over the Dalit voters. But, how long can her image of an icon influence voters in the absence of qualitative improvement in their day-today lives?

It is possible that the Dalits believe that they want to back a party that may give them better returns, better life. Indeed, in the 2014 LS elections, a substantial chunk of Dalit voters moved away from the BSP to the BJP. However she is devising a new social engineering formula by combining dalit-muslim together to form a formidable force. Eighteen percent of Jatavs (hardcore BSP voters) and 45% non- Jatav Dalit voters voted for the BJP, although 68% Jatavs and 29% non-Jatavs still voted for Mayawati. But, finally, the myth of Dalit voters being captive to Mayawati dissolved. They were prepared to vote for another promising leader. That is the risk for Mayawati.

Additionally, BJP is not leaving any stone unturned to win the support of the Dalits. Through the help of RSS, it is accommodating them in organisational structure

200 and leadership positions. Also, the BJP government at the Centre is trying to improve their economic lot by bringing in schemes of financial inclusion(Pradhan Mantri Jan- Dhan Yojana) and social security (Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana), which will benefit Dalits, who are also at the lowest rung of social and economic hierarchy. The latest in the series is the creation of over one lakh SC/ST start-tips through public sector banks with each branch patronising at least one SC/ST start-up. These may facilitate a Dalit shift from identity politics to development politics. And, there, Mayawati stands to lose.

BJP's Chances

The BJP lost power in UP in 2002 with Rajnath Singh as the Chief Minister. For the last 13 years, the party had been in a complete disarray in the state. It was powerless, leaderless, and virtually voter-less.

Mulayam's SP and Mayawati's BSP dominated.

In the previous assembly elections (2012), the BJP was reduced to just 47 seats and 15% votes. Viewed in that backdrop, the party's performance in the 2014 LS elections looked very puzzling. Political pandits searched for answers and came up with many as well.

Will the BJP replicate its LS performance in the assembly elections in 2017? In 2014, BJP's LS show was mainly credited to Modi. He was able to convince the voters about his twin agenda of inclusion and development. His impact was proved when the party received votes from all the sections of the society, including Muslims. A Centre for Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) post-poll survey shows that about 10% Muslims in UP voted BJP.

So, should the BJP feel confident about its victory in the 2017 assembly elections? UP politics is complex; one needs a good grasp of electoral arithmetic and political chemistry to comprehend electoral dynamics.

In the 2014 LS elections in UP, BJP's vote share was an impressive 42.3%. Earlier, Mayawati won a clear majority with 30% votes in 2007 and Akhilesh with fractionally less in 2012. Can one expect the BJP to manage a vote share between 30% and 40% to register a clear win? And, is the BJP preparing for the same to happen in 2017?

201 Modi's development agenda was the focal point that brought the voters together in 2014. But, there are serious doubts on whether BJP will develop a similar focal point for assembly elections.

It is possible that people won't view Modi with the sort of reverence that they did during the national-elections. The BJP boasts of being a cadre-based party, but it has not been able to project state level leaders.

In the previous election, the party had to import Uma Bharati from MP, leading to a big fiasco. Who else, then? May be Smriti Irani. That is the dilemma. If the BJP has no face to project in the UP, more prominent leaders -that is, Akhilesh and Mayawati - may emerge as the frontrunners.

Who can BJP introduce as its political face in UP? A beginning was made when Smriti Irani contested in Amethi against Rahul Gandhi. Perhaps, the idea was not only to take Rahul head-on and give Smriti wider publicity but also to explore whether she would click with voters of UP. Smriti provided a stiff challenge by polling three lakh plus votes.

Minister of Human Resource Development, Smriti Irani Given the facts that the young leader scripted the few first lines of her story of rise with debut in UP and now has the experience of an important ministerial portfolio at the Centre, she can possibly-become a formidable candidate for the top leadership position in UP. At present, no one seems even close to her in that race. Besides, she can take on Mayawati and Akhilesh, who definitely cannot match her oratory skills.

If she is projected as a potential chief ministerial candidate, the BJP can hope to make it to the finishing line with a clear victory in the state.

What is Congress Doing?

The Congress lost power in UP on 5 December 1989 to Mulayam Singh Yadav, then in Janata Dal. Since then, it has suffered regular setbacks before hitting the rock bottom in the 2014 LS elections in which it could win only two seats.

The party is not ready to believe that it can be run without Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, and hence, without Sonia, who has been the President for 17 long years. It is not ready to democratise its party apparatus and reward grassroots workers,

202 discourage sycophantic culture and promote dedicated workers. How, then, will it revive?

As Sonia Gandhi is desperate to elevate Rahul to the top, chances of democratization of Congress have become very slim. Steadily, all the other influential leaders in the party both at the state and national level have been marginalized. Is that really a sign of party democracy? Can a party steered by feudal principles dream of winning in a democracy? Unless the Congress is prepared to change itself, chances are that the people of UP will continue to reject the Congress.

AAP and MIM

The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and MIM of Owaisi may play the spoilsport in the next elections. While AAP has suffered due to party factionalism and leadership war between Arvind Kejriwal and Yogendra Yadav and Prashant Bhushan, Owaisi has created panic for self-styled secular parties, especially SP.

The SP got 39% Muslim votes in UP in 2012, while Owaisi's MIM, an alternative and autonomous political platform, may make inroads among the Muslims. That means danger for the SP.

4.10. Conclusion

The electoral politics of Uttar Pradesh gives the evidence of endemic instability throughout the 1990s up to 2007 until BSP came to power with thumping majority. Hung assemblies in 1996 and in 2002 were an outcome of the logic of the electoral identity politics practiced by all parties in the state. As studies on elections in India have shown, the dialectics of the working of identity politics in an electoral democracy is inevitably one of increasing polarization of the electorate and break-up of political parties. In U.P., this process has resulted in the fragmentation and decay of parties and de-institutionalization of the party system. Further, the internal decay of parties reflected in weak leadership and lack of firm ideological moorings. The Samajwadi Party is also the same and it is no different from others.

Prof. Sudha Pai argues that three developments, namely, the decline of parties, poor governance and a growing financial crisis with negative economic growth are collectively responsible for the political instability that U.P. has experienced. Due to ethnic mobilization parties, confine to their narrow sectarian bases, have been unable to aggregate public opinion and get public support. The impact of identity politics on

203 Samajwadi party is visible at two levels - the internal structure and working of the party and the party system as a whole. Loosely held together by caste leaders with little inner democracy SP suffers from centralization, factional divisions and low level of discipline, criminalization, relentless pursuit of power and absence or ambiguity of ideological foundations. It seems that Samajwadi Party is declining and along with it, there is a halt to backward class mobilization as well. The Samajwadi Party has changed its ideological commitment of Lohiyaite Samajwad in favour of Corporate Samajwad, in the name of development discourse, thanks to the efforts of Amar Singh, ex. Gen. Secy, of the SP. But now the prized question after Amar Singh's stunning comeback is- Would SP revert back to its old ideology or search out other ways to clinically handle the situation. The answer lies in future.

204 Reference:

1. Verma. A.K.2004. 'Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh', Economic and Political Weekly, April 3-10, p.l509.

2. These districts are now the part of the state of Uttarakahand which was carved out from U.P. in 2001.

3. Bribhoomi is so called because of the mythological association with Lord Krishna. It is understood that Mathura is the birthplace of the Lord Krishna.

4. Now the number of seats remaining is 22 since SP has lost Firozabad bye- election.

5. However in the 2007 Assembly elections electorates has given an absolute mandate in the favour of BSP.

6. Samajwadi party got 35 seats in 2004 Lok Sabha elections.

7. See The Hindu, 16th July, 2010, Delhi.

8. For detailed discussion see- Pai S. (ed.). 2007'.Political process in Uttar Pradesh-Identity, Economic Reforms and Governance. New Delhi. Pearson Longman, p.xxx.

205

Chapter V

Conclusion, Suggestions and Recommendation

Chapter V

Conclusion, Suggestions and Recommendation

5.1 Conclusion:

Social churning and the emergence of new identities have been a continuous process in Uttar Pradesh, since the early 1980s and it has maintained a stranglehold on the politics of this state. Throughout the 1990s, mass politics in the state of Uttar Pradesh was driven by identities constructed around the terms "Hindutva", "Mandal" and "Dalit", as political parties mobilized and divided the electorate along the lines of Social cleavages. The collapse of the Congress party led to a fragmented multi-party system with narrower identity-based parties, new strategies of mobilization and sharp contests in electoral politics, resulting in political instability and coalition governments.(Prof. Pai :2007).

The regional parties (like SP) have largely thrived on the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) vote bank by adopting socialist overtones and populist policies. The shift of political power from the savarna classes to backward classes- what is called by Christophe Jeffrelot as "Silent Revolution" has been gradual since independence but gained momentum with emergence of regionalization of political parties in Indian politics. These outfits have assiduously cultivated the OBC vote bank and have tried to maintain their support base. The emergence and consolidation of the Samajwadi Party (SP) is very interesting and important phenomenon in national as well as state politics in U.P. The emergence of SP acquires added significance in the context of the Uttar Pradesh being the most populated state and its traditional preeminence in Indian politics. The SP in U.P. emerged as an offshoot of the backward caste/class movement.

The Backward castes form a large block in the state, according to some estimates approximating 52 % of the total population. It is necessary to understand that they do not form a homogenous bloc, nor have they operated as one in politics. The first round of backward/middle caste mobilization in the 1960s brought the upper sections consisting primarily of Jats and some of the better land-owning Yadavs in western U.P. into politics, creating a fissure between them and the rest of the

206 backwards. Hence, while the Bhartiya Kisan Dal (BKD) became an important party, its support base remained limited largely to western U.P. and pockets elsewhere.

The 1980s witnessed a second round of mobilization that brought the Other Backward Castes (OBCs) the Yadavs, the Ahirs, the Kurmis and the Kories into politics fuelled by the extension of the green revolution into eastern and central U.P. and a desire for share in politics so far dominated by the upper castes and Jats.

In the fast changing social and political scene in U.P., during the 1990s two factors impacted upon the OBCs: 1) increasing awareness of their distinct sub-caste identity 2) and rapid economic differentiation. These two factors have proceeded to divide them into segments with implications for politics. Class divisions among the backwards have widened with the Yadavs, Ahirs, Kurmis using their political clout to advance economically. When Mulayam Singh was in power the lower posts in bureaucracy and the police were given mainly to Yadavs, a move which is described as "Yadavization Campaign". All backward groups have also imbibed the lesson that capture of state power is important as it enables them to improve the economic situation of their community at the expense of 'others'. The example is provided by Mayawati's Dalit -oriented policies which created intense antagonism and jealousy both among the upper castes and those sections of the lower backwards who were left out.

By the end of 1990s, this process led to the emergence of the Most Backward Castes (MBCs) made up of groups such as the Gadarias, Luhars, Jogis, Dhiwars. Nais, Kumhars, Mallahs etc. Perched on the line of pollution, they form the lowest rung of the backward caste ladder and are also the poorest sections among them. These landless castes remained earlier within the Jajmani System and therefore, scattered all over the state. They are difficult to mobilize along political lines. Although numerically the MBC group together are much larger than the Dalits in U.P.,- none of them with the exception of Sainis- form an effective political force in electoral politics. It is due to the fact that these groups have not found yet an alternative party after the disintegration of the Congress. They lack a strong leader with whom they can identify and who could weld these various groups in a cohesive force. Consequently, they have remained divided among all the major parties- the BJP, BSP and SP. Mulayam's Yadavization make them apprehensive. The results of the SP's efforts at bringing about social justice could not percolate to the MRBCs and MBCs as the elite

207 among them (Yadavs, Ahirs) were really not keen on sharing the advantages with those sections below them in the social hierarchy. This factor has been a stumbling block in achieving backward caste homogenization as these groups resent their exploitation at the hands of their own community. This is also seen in the social profile data. While 73% yadavs supported SP in 2004 Lok Sabha elections, only 23% of non-yadav OBCs voted for it. Now, the statistics of the electoral politics suggest that MBCs are coming back to Congress in U.P. in the recent past. Rahul Gandhi has played a substantive and significant role in this regard.

Many political parties that espoused the cause of the backwards in Uttar Pradesh remained wedded to the same ideological tradition, with a difference in emphasis. They played a part in defining the contours of Indian Politics, in providing the platform for transformative politics.(Yadav:1996)

On important issues, however, the performance of the backward movement in U.P. has been less than satisfactory. The SP appeared at a historic juncture and could have attained greater heights and loftier goals had it, but, made a serious attempt. The Party appears to be in decline, as indicated by its performance in certain areas. The backward movement has failed to address the issue of "backward identity". The backwards constitute a major segment of Indian society, but the traditional structure of social relations has not allowed them to be recognized politically. The SP also shares the blame for this; its failure to create a political identity through the mobilization of the backwards can be analysed on four counts (Verma: 2007). These are-

1) Its failure to develop backward class constituency. 2) Its failure to attempt the homogenization of the upper and the lower castes among OBCs 3) Its lack of will in attempting the consolidation of the upper backward caste throughout the state. 4) Its failure to connect the backwards in the different states of the country.

Prof. Zoya Hasan remarks that there could not even be a successful attempt to bring the upper backward castes together in the entire state of U.P. The SP could not even attempt a limited and partial backward caste mobilization at an all-U.P. owing to differences in social stratification, production relations and power structures in

208 different parts of the state. The more prosperous Jat peasants of western U.P. and the more numerous but poor kisans of eastern U.P. could not come together on a common political platform. Once the Mandal factor entered the politics of U.P., the BLD-LD could not sustain their position in the politics of the state.

The Mandir issue came as windfall for the SP. The BJP (Kalyan Singh as Chief Minister) government was in power in U.P. when the SP was launched formally in 1992.The demolition of the Ram Janmabhoomi- Babri Masjid structure in Ayodhya in December the same year presented the SP with a politically explosive issue that it could exploit for its own purposes. It is due to the fact that Muslims saw destruction as an act of Sangha- Parivar with acquaintance of Congress. The result was that the Muslims turned to Mulayam Singh Yadav, who opposed the demolition with all his might. The SP organized protests all over the country, which even turned violent. Earlier also, when he was the Chief Minister of the U.P.(05 Dec. 1989-23 Junel991) he had taken unusually harsh and repressive measures resulting in firing on Kar Sevaks. Consequently, the Muslims hailed him as the saviour and defender of Secularism so much so that he was praised for his pro-muslim policies with the epithets of "Mulla Mulayam" or "Maulana Mulayam". The decade of 1990s simply belonged to the SP so far as commitment to Secularism was concerned. But in the meantime the SP realized that its framework of caste-class cleavages was not sufficient for the party to cross the threshold necessary for commanding the popular mandate for governance. This is the reason why it has renounced "exclusionary politics" and resorted to "inclusionary politics". The party felt the need of persuading upper class people to join the party. This made the entire rationale of the party irrelevant. If the party wanted to accommodate people of all shades and denominations, then, it would have to abandon "cleavage politics" and give all caste groups representation in the party structure. The BSP has also done the same. It has also accepted the philosophy of "Sarvajan Hitay, Sarvajan Sukhay" and deserted the policy of serving Bahujan Samaj only. Earlier, its slogan was used to be "Tilak, Taraju aur Talwar, Inko Maro Jute Chaar" which has now been replaced with "Tilak, Taraju aur Talwar, Ye hain BSP ke Aadhar. (Here Tilak denotes Brahmins, Taraju is for Banias and Talwar means Rajputs/kshtriyas).

The inadequate and incomplete political mobilization of the backward castes and classes resulted in the absence of a bi-polar party system in U.P. The splendid

209 performance of JD in 1989 elections in U.P. had raised the possibility for same. The JD got 54 out of 85 Lok Sabha seats with 35.9% of votes and 208 out of 425 assembly seats with 29.71% of votes. Some scholar have opined that it represented the coming together of rich and middle peasantry in the medium and semi-medium landholding areas because of the green revolution (Prof. Pai 1993:11-12) while others have challenged this argument by pointing to the disintegration of JD in less than 18 months, when in the assembly and Lok Sabha elections in 1991, the JD was reduced to half its size (Verma 2003:256). But by the time SP came in to being, it was too late. The BSP had already appeared on the political scene and sealed the fate of any movement seeking to establish itself on the basis of consolidating the Dalit votes. This led to the emergence of a multi-polar divergence model of the party system in U.P. from 1989-1996. This later transformed into the multi-polar convergence model since 1996 as the agendas of multiple parties converged on the core ethnic issues of Mandalization and Dalits (Yadav and Palshikar 2003:21).

The attempt of the SP to forge an alliance of OBCs across the states also failed. In June 1998, the SP and RJD of Laloo Prasad Yadav floated the Rashtriya Loktantrik Morcha (RLM). Mulayam Singh became its president. With both the leaders nursing ambitions at all-India, level and also claiming to be the leader of backward community, this front was bound to be a non-starter, according to Prof. A.K. Verma.

The Organizational capacity of SP like that of other state-level parties is weak. To many people, it appears as a one man show. Mulayam Singh Yadav continues to be the party's undisputed leader. Since its inception, the SP has never really discussed and debated the issue of leadership. There is no second line of leadership and hence, inner party working has been based not on any collective leadership and decision- making but on the whims and fancies of the leaders. At the most, the party is being run as a family business. Many members of Mulayam's family- Ramgopal Yadav (Brother), Shivpal Singh Yadav (Brother), Akhilesh Yadav (Son) and Dimple Yadav (Daughter-in-law) hold important positions and weild considerable influence in party affairs.

The SP has never imparted the kind of political training to its workers and supporters that could give them a clear and solid orientation in the ideology of the party, its structure, functioning and constitution. Moreover, Mulayam's line of Muslim

210 appeasement has also exposed the de-ideologized political perspective of the party. Notwithstanding with his claim of representing the secular face in U.P. politics, the lack of ideological training to party cadres results in ignorance. Of late, SP has realized this and has organized some training camps for its rank and file.

The SP has not been able to hold to the socialist ideology of Dr. Lohiya, Acharya Narendra Dev and J.P. Narayan. There are repeated references to these leaders and their ideologies in the constitution and the resolutions of the SP claiming that the entire socialist movement led by the party stands on the foundation laid by these stalwarts. So far as the question of its social base is concerned, it suffers from a dualistic approach. On the one hand, it originated as an enlarged caste association i.e. it evolved as a party with the dominant backward caste of Yadavs at the core but claimed not only to represent the OBCs but also the other section of the Indian population- the savarnas, the dalits and the minorities. While nothing is dear to its founder-leader than the economic and political interests of his fellow caste-men, even if he claims to be struggling for social justice for all. The ideology of caste has swayed over the ideology of socialism.

We do not think this is something undemocratic or illegitimate in Indian milieu. This is a characteristic and normal feature of all the Indian parties without any exception. Leave aside the rightist parties which openly espouse the cause of the upper castes/classes, even the extreme left is too caste-ridden. There is no party institution or policy or decision that is neither determined nor influenced by caste- considerations.

Of late, Mulayam's continued association with industrial magnets ostensibly seeking to boost the development of the state do not quite match his socialist commitments, although he defends these people as social assets who could be used for social welfare. The ideological position of SP seems to have adjusted itself to the broad socio-economic policy paradigm of Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization (LPG). Thus, the emphasis is on big and luxury cars, -urban development, industrialization, big projects, even though the SP continues to retain the agenda of furthering the cause of rural, agricultural and poor citizens of the state.

The SP is also charged with having criminal associations. Whatever may be the reality, there is a widespread belief that whenever the SP has come to power,

211 criminal elements have become more active and fearless. It is widely believed that SP harbours criminals, though the party leaders vehemently deny the charges as baseless and politically motivated. However, the statistics reveals the different story. In 2007 Assembly elections hardcore criminals like Mukhtar Ansari who is facing charges in 29 cases (of murders and other atrocities), Raghuraj Pratap Singh alias Raja Bhaiya, with 35 cases filed against him won with SP's support. Also, Chandrabhadra Singh, notorious gangster, won from Issauli in Sultanpur district on SP's ticket.

The number of criminal politician participating in the elections in U.P. has been growing particularly because they have been successful in the past. In 13 .P. assembly elections 2002, candidates with criminal records won 206 out of 403 seats in the assembly i.e. more criminals were elected than regular politicians (Source- Financial Times, 13-05-07). Similarly, in 2007 participation by criminals increased significantly. Prior to elections, 74% more criminal politicians were given tickets by the mainstream parties-BSP-36.27%, SP-27.01%, BJP-23.05% and INC-21.60% (Sourcer UP Election watch, Independent NGO headed by ex. DIG-I.P. Dwivedi). However, partially owing to strict measures adopted during elections only 100 persons with criminal records won the election as opposed to 206 in previous elections. These include Mayawati, Mulayam Singh Yadav and other hardcore gangsters/hardened criminals.

Likewise, U.P. has once again set a record of sending the maximum number of tainted MPs to 15th Lok Sabha (2009). 31 out of 80 MPs in the state have criminal cases pending against them. Out of these 31, as many as 22 have serious criminal charges against them according to the figures released by Association for Democratic Reforms(ADR), an umbrella organization of NGOs that monitors elections. Previous Lok Sabha had 128 trained MPs, now the no. has gone up to 150. There is an increase of about 17.2% in MPs with criminal records and 30.9% increase in the MPs with serious criminal records. To add to U.P. statistics, 3 MPs of the state have made it to the top 10 list of MPs with heinous criminal charges against them. These are- Varun Gandhi (BJP), Kapilmuni Karwaria (BSP) and Bal Kumar Patel(SP). The BJP leads the partywise figures with 42 MPs who have criminal cases against them, followed closely by INC with 41. The SP is in third place with 8 followed by BSP's 6 criminal MPs.

212 This analysis depicts the fact that no party in U.P. is clean and crystal clear so far as politics-criminal nexus is concerned. It seems that whosoever comes into power in U.P. harbours nexus to crime and corruption. This is done to fill up their pockets and foreign bank accounts, to intimidate the oppositionist forces and to consolidate the rule. The charges of Crime, Corruption and Capitalism have damaged the Image of SP significantly. It depicted in its defeat by BSP in 2007 elections.

The role of the SP as an opposition party is not worthy of mention. Driven out of power because of its own follies, the party finds itself in a tight comer. It has paid a heavy price in the form of ousting and expulsion of various influential leaders (like Beni Prasad Verma, Mohd. Azam Khan and not to forget Amar Singh) and scores of its loyalists and victimization of others. The regrouping and resurgence of Indian National Congress and the exclusivism of Mayawati bloc is gradually eroding the support-base of the SP. It is in the light of the foregoing discussion that we have an apprehension that the backward caste movement led by SP is declining despite its good electoral performance. One of the major constituent of the party- the Muslims hold the key to its dominance in U.P. That is why

Mulayam Singh Yadav has tendered a public apology in wake of his connections with Kalyan Singh (former BJP Chief Minister). If the Muslims were to turn to other party, the SP may be shown the door in state politics. The irrelevance of SP in .national politics is motivating the Muslims to turn to the Indian National Congress, BSP and BJP. We have already seen its glimpse in the parliamentary elections held in 2009 and 2014 where SP's graph came down to 22 and 05 respectively. If such a calculation goes on, we might see BSP with its New Social Engineering of Dalit- Muslim Combine, regaining the lost ground in U.P. That day may be a said one not only for the SP, but also for the entire backward movement and politics in the state of U.P. since SP has been an offshoot of this very movement and claims to carry it further.

The establishment of modern political institutions and practices in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries threw open new opportunities to the hitherto marginalised sections of society, who were traditionally relegated to only the subordinate, lowly, and service professions to aspire for. However, breaking the traditional structures of power proved awesomely difficult, especially for the backward sections of society. Any such attempt demanded from them a certain

213 amount of social status, educational competence, cultural disposition, and' economic standards, which the backward sections of society in India were definitely lacking. They could tap the strength of their numbers in a system where political power is reproduced through universal adult franchise. It took a long time for this fact to sink in, to' ostracize the hegemonic influences present within and to convert the power of numbers into an effective political strategy. Therefore, it took a very long period for these oppressed social groups to make their autonomous existence in the political map of India in general and that of U.P. in particular.

The dominant proprietary class was the first to question the Brahmin domination in South in the fields of political and administrative power and access to educational facilities. The powerful Vokkaliga and Lingayat communities led the movement against Brahmin domination. Following this path, other backward communities too organised themselves to secure their due share. One of the facilitating conditions for their claim to obtain their due share in political and administrative power was the extent to which they had succeeded in establishing a distinct social identity and promoted the educational capabilities of its members. Today, the presence of Backward Classes in the social, political, and economic fields in India is very striking. The State of Uttar Pradesh is no exception to it.

We have seen that in spite of the support of the colonial government to the Brahmins and other forward castes, the modern legal, social, and economic system introduced by it had a 'trickle-down' effect helping the mobility among the backward castes and dalits. The work of Christian Missionaries and socio-religious reformers in different parts of the country opened some space for the low castes in India. The Backward Class Movement, which initially started as a cultural revolt, in due course transformed itself into a political initiative with the development of the representative and democratic institutions. The formation of caste associations and caste federations facilitated the process in the making of the political constituency of Backward Classes by forming a common platform of active units.

The Backward Class Movement did not climb its heights in the North as it did in South India. In South India there was a very strong anti-Brahmin sentiment fuelled due to many reasons including being well entrenched in all spheres of life - power, status, and comforts - compared to non-Brahmin castes and communities. On the other hand, anti-Brahmin sentiment did not emerge in North India early on due to

214 many reasons, including the relative weight age of the twice-born castes. The presence of a large number of twice-born castes in the North acted as a fortress, unlike the South where Brahmins formed only 3 per cent of the population. In some parts of the North, the Arya Samaj Movement mellowed down caste cleavage to some extent. In the North-Eastern states the presence of tribal communities had diluted caste- cleavages to a very great extent. However, in spite of such regional variations the Backward Class Movement had some common features shared across regional boundaries.

The Backward Class Movement was a part of the National Movement before independence. But after independence, the backward class expressions were largely reflected in the peasant movement, especially in movements led by middle and lower peasantry. The peasant class, which was both numerically significant and economically dominant among the backward castes groups initially, had its sway over the whole movement. Though dalits too formed a part of the Backward Class Movement in the initial stages, soon they drifted away from the Backward Classes to form an autonomous constituency as they felt that the problems of the dalits were fundamentally different from those of the Backward Classes. Further, it was increasingly evident that some of the Shudra castes turned out to be formidable oppressors of dalits. However, even after the separation of the dalits from the Backward Class Constituency, the Backward Class Constituency did not become free from its nebulous character.

After independence, by and large, the Backward Classes resorted to participation in democratic politics increasingly to pursue their, interests. Though in some states like Tamil Nadu, the Backward Classes were successful in organising their own party they failed to employ this strategy in practice in other states. The ruling Congress Party tried to bring the backward caste groups within its broad coalitions of social groups but it could not do so due to the opposition of the dominant peasant castes considered backward. The OBCs have always been trying to establish a niche for themselves outside the ruling party. Traditionally, they were divided across the Bharatiya Kranti Dal, Socialist Party, independents, and other small regional and local parties. In recent years, they have been supporting the Samajvadi Party, Bahujan Samaj Party, Bharatiya Janata Party, and other regional parties to a significant extent.

215 Consequently, the Backward Class Constituency has been diluted to some extent in recent years.

The process of liberalization and globalization has also affected the backward class interests. Preferential treatment around which the whole discourse of social justice has been constructed in India is losing its centrality due to the liberalization process. The state has increasingly deserted the Backward Classes, and the concept of ‘social justice’ has been reduced to symbolical significance.

Legacies and memories often help in the growth of the movement. We have argued in this study that the region of the present Karnataka State witnessed a powerful anti-caste movement with strong non-Brahminical overtones in the form of the Veerashniva Movement in the 12''' century itself. Though that movement could not succeed in totally eradicating the caste oppression, it had definitely introduced egalitarianism as the core value to be pursued in social relations. However, the struggle at that point of time was not for political power but for cultural access, recognition, and dignity.

It was only in the beginning of the 20th century that the demand for political and administrative access came up in Karnataka from the Backward Classes when economically and numerically powerful non-Brahmin Communities raised their voice against Brahmin domination in those spheres. Of course, the ideological baggage required for such a movement was imported from neighbouring regions such as Maharastra, Madras, and Kerala.

Eventually, the Backward Class Constituency came to be redefined and reformulated so as to exclude the dominant sections from it. Although such a redrawing of boundaries did not always succeed politically there was an increased moral consensus on it. This study has attributed a great part of the success of the Backward Class Movement to the efforts of caste associations and Backward Class Federations, representing the interests of the Backward Class Constituency.

Recently, the perception that the preferential treatment given to the Backward Classes is monopolised by the forward sections within the caste-group is gaining public attention. There is-a growing demand for die exclusion of this 'creamy layer' from backward class benefits. Though outwardly this argument appears genuine, the context in which the argument is made may prove detrimental to the interests of the

216 'real backwards' too. The debate on 'creamy layer' is centered on the understanding that Backward Classes is an economic category. The idea that the creamy layer is also a sociological category is totally missing in this perspective. It is necessary to reopen this issue afresh by contending against the economic mould in which Backward Classes are perceived.

We have seen that in the absence of compartmentalized division of Backward Classes, benefits have accrued to only a few entrenched sections among the Backward Classes. This has resulted in the demand for much finer classification of backward class categories. Such an orientation has made politically powerful groups to attempt to secure a much more beneficial category. This study therefore suggests the need for a very systematic investigation of the relative position of various caste groups in the state. The study brings out that in the initial days backward class benefits were mainly expressed in terms of government jobs and seats in academic institutions. But recently, in view of the reduction in job opportunities the Backward Classes are increasingly after political representation and other welfare schemes of the state. A demand has also been voiced to extend reservation benefits in the private sector.

The social and political changes ushered in at the national level during the 1960s and 1970s coupled with the social dynamics among the Backward Classes in the region, brought to the fore new political equations. They threw up a host of non- dominant backward caste members to frontline leadership, challenging dominant caste hegemony. However, such affront of the non-dominant groups did not last long. In 1980s, once again the dominant caste groups elevated themselves to the position of power and reduced the Backward Classes to the condition of instrumental utility. They even attempted to dilute the Backward Class Constituency through the inclusion of the dominant landed castes among them. As a result, in 1990s, the Backward Class Constituency was in a fragmented condition. Almost all political parties tended to make inroads into the Backward Class Constituency. Consequently, the whole constituency came to be politically diluted and impotent. The “constituency seemed to have further lost its edge due to the process of liberalisation and globalization. However, this alarming situation has created a new awareness among the Backward Classes and attempts are on to consolidate this constituency by undertaking more intensive organisational efforts among themselves. They have resorted to ‘self-help’ as a strategy to reconstitute their constituency from the late 1990s. Backward Classes

217 wish to be a major presence in civil society and do not merely wish to confine themselves to the political domain.

Democratization in former colonial states has been inconsistent and erratic. India has been an exception. It has maintained and consolidated a democratic system, despite the fact that the preconditions often associated with democracy, ranging from industrialization and mass literacy to a minimum standard of living, were absent in the 1950s when India first became a democratic; secular republic. Yet, democracy has not only endured, it has developed into a vibrant system. The democratic process has deepened, drawing historically disadvantaged groups into the political system. Political parties have undoubtedly played a decisive role in this process. It is hard to conceive of India's democratic system and its success without the crucial role played by political parties.

Political parties were significant institutions even before Independence. After Independence, they assumed a new importance. On the one hand, they provide the linkage between institutions and constituencies within the polity, and on the other, they provide the crucial connection between the political process and policy makers, and bring to the forefront issues affecting the interests of social groups and the public at large. Yet, there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with parties. Parties and politicians are accused of weakening the democratic fibre of the country: by practicing corrupt politics, by eschewing a long-term perspective on social welfare, and by maximizing their personal gains and influence at the expense of larger national interests. However, without political parties the democratic system would not have worked. Parties remain the principal force around which contestation and mobilization are organized, working to structure political alternatives and formulating policies and translating them into effective choices for the people. Parties are, in short, the agencies and mechanisms through which power is organized and exercised in a democracy,

The most striking feature of India's party politics is that it does not fit neatly into any of the theories of liberal democratic politics or the conventional categories of party systems known in the West Political parties in India do not correspond to European or American party processes, At the same time, India's traditional social divisions have not translated easily into the party political system. Congress dominance, for instance, was not based on a particular caste, religion, or class; in fact, no party based exclusively on a single social cleavage such as majority-minority or

218 caste can hope to sustain its dominance throughout the country. Political parties display numerous contradictory features, which reveal the blending of different forms of modern organization and participatory politics with indigenous practices and institutions. Parties are indeed complex, and an important reason for this complexity is the social heterogeneity that has made it impossible for a single set of parties to emerge across the country, as has happened in more homogeneous societies. Thus, there exist many types of parties. Among them should be noted the continued presence of one of the oldest parties in the world, the Congress (established in 1885); the emergency of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); and the world's longest surviving democratically elected communist party government at the state level in West Bengal.

Major changes have taken place in Indian party politics since Independence (Manor 1990: 62-98). From 1989 the leadership, organization, electoral strategies, and support base of political parties have undergone significant changes. To understand the significance and implications of these developments, it is useful to distinguish broadly two important phases in its development. One-party dominance, moderate levels of political participation, and elite consensus characterized the first phase. This has given way to a second phase of greater demo eratization and the opening up of the political system to non-elite participants. Major changes in party politics include the replacement of the Congress system with multi-party competition; an intensification of political competition; and fragmentation of the party system and coalition politics. Particularly marked is the decline of one-party dominance, the rise of the BJP as the single largest party in Parliament, and the advent of coalition politics. Since the last six parliamentary elections have not produced a single-party majority, they have necessitated a coalition government.

Equally significant is the democratic upsurge among the hitherto underprivileged and the influence of subaltern sections on the structure of electoral choices and outcomes. A significant aspect of the political process is that on the one hand, parties are the key to democratization, leading to a deepening of democracy; and on the other, they lack strong organizational structure or internal democracy and mobilize support along ethnic lines.

Through a combination of these processes—the creation of new parties and groups and their pursuit of sectional strategies—parties have increasingly fragmented

219 over the years. Frequent party splits, mergers, and counter-splits led to a significant increase in the number of parties.

Political parties are registered with the Election Commission of India (ECI) under the law. The registered parties are granted recognition at the state and national levels by the ECI on the basis of their poll performance at general elections according to criteria prescribed by it. There are three types of parties according to the criteria laid down by the ECI: national parties, multi-state parties, and state parties.

The Congress party has been the most important political institution in India's modem political history. Led by the Cambridge-educated Jawaharlal Nehru, Congress reaped the rewards of its role during the anti-colonial movement against the British. It won nearly three-fourths of the seats in Parliament in the national elections in 1952, 1957, and 1962. The Congress ruled every state until 1967. However, an important feature of Congress dominance was the large degree of autonomy that provincial units were able to assert in relation to the central party leadership—a far cry from the situation that obtained after Indira Gandhi. Their recommendations for candidates for parliamentary or assembly seats or Chief Minister were almost always accepted by the central leadership. Although led by upper-caste/class leadership, there were Muslims, Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), and various regional and linguistic groups represented in its higher echelons. It enjoyed enormous prestige with the rural and urban masses. Its hegemony was based on a concrete set of achievements: an independent model of industrial growth; considerable reduction in large-scale feudal landholdings, which benefited the upper peasantry; growth in infrastructure; expansion in educational facilities and technical personnel. A noteworthy feature of this project was a national definition of the polity with an emphasis on the states responsibility towards society. It did deliver some tangible benefits to the broad mass of the population through various development projects, die initiation and construction of the public sector, and the provision of public services such as health; education, and transport.

This political system worked until the split in the Congress in 1969. The split transformed the Congress party from a loose coalition of ideologically diverse groups, which stretched from the Right to the Left to a populist party, in which the supremacy of the parliamentary wing over the organizational was once and for all established. Political rule was entirely dominated by central command and control, and in party

220 affairs, by the high command. From this period onwards, it evolved into an elector list catch-all party. The breakdown of the Congress system was starkly evident after Indira Gandhi's disastrous Emergency experiment, which resulted in a sharp and substantial drop in the vote base. After the defeat of the Congress in the 1977 election and die formation of the first non-Congress government at the Centre led by the Janata Party, a conglomeration of four parties (Jana Sangh, Bharatiya Lok Dal, Congress [O], and the Socialist Party), the backward castes emerged as a major force in national politics. However, once again the disenchantment with the Janata Party's uninspiring leadership and its internecine squabbling brought the Congress back to power in 1980. In the 1984 election, held after Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the Congress polled the highest vote and seat tally ever as a sympathy vote swept the country and brought her son Rajiv to power. But the underlying trends signified the collapse of one-party dominance and the end of the Congress epoch in Indian politics.

With the decline of Congress dominance, the second phase of party politics began taking shape. New opposition parties and ideologies began to take centre stage from the late 1980s. This period saw the emergence of the BJP as a major force in Indian politics. It soon overshadowed the Congress as the largest party in the 1996, 1998, and 1999 elections. At no point before 1989 had the BJP received even one- tenth of the national vote. It emerged for the first time as the single largest party in 1996; its vote share increased to 20.3 per cent. The BJP-led government under A.B. Vajpayee lasted only 13 days. Subsequently, the United Front government, consisting of the Janata Dal, some Left parties, and some state parties, formed a government for the first time in 1996, with Deve Gowda as the Prime Minister. In 1998, the BJP-led alliance secured 253 of the 543 seats and in 1999, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of 24 parties led by the BJP, won 304 seats.

Among political parties, the BJP is atypical. It is not a denominational party, but it promotes Hindu interests. The BJP can be better defined as an ethnic party, the promoter of a Hindu ethnicity and nationalism defined along religious lines, which is something much narrower than a broad, encompassing, multi-ethnic Indian nationalism. Its aim is to create a unified Hindu nation through the politics of polarization. It was founded on the ideology of Hindutva, which encourages Hinduness. It is the political outgrowth of an extremist right-wing ideological movement. It has enduring ties with its parent organization, the Rashtriya

221 Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and its various fronts like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bajrang Dal, sharing features of the fascist type of organizations minus the cult of the supreme leader. Many of its party cadres come from the RSS, and its affiliation to the RSS-VHP network has proved decisive in its recent growth.

During the six years of BJP-led NDA rule at the Centre (1998-2004), the party struggled to achieve what Christophe Jaffrelot called a 'division of labour’, with Vajpayee, perceived as more moderate, on one side, and the RSS and other elements of the Sangh which continued to pursue a Hindu nationalist agenda on the other . The BJP came to power denouncing Nehruvian secularism, advocating militant Hindu nationalism, and encouraging anti-Muslim rhetoric and action. Arguably, the anti- Muslim sentiment was deflected on to the international scene, where a range of issues identified

Muslims as a threat surrounding India, whether in Kashmir, Bangladesh (infiltration across the border), or the Middle East, where the BJP government dramatically reversed the policy of supporting Palestine to forge a new relationship with Israel. After September 2001, the 'fight against terrorism' became the centerpiece of the BJP's domestic and foreign policy. In some of these actions, the BJP had the support of groups that went far beyond its own traditional social base. The NDA lost control of the government in the elections of April-May 2004, and was defeated by the United Progressive Alliance (UFA), led by the Congress. The Congress emerged as the single largest party with 145 seats, and the UPA secured 220 seats.

The BJP's vote share dipped from 22.2 per cent in 2004 to 18.8 per cent in 2009. Their number of seats dropped to 116 in 2009 from 138 in 2004 (The Hindu, 26 May 2009). In 1999 when the NDA was at its peak, the vote share of the alliance was 41.1 per cent which came down to 24.1 per cent in 2009. Marking a major retreat for the BJP, it implied a shrinking of its social base of support, a decline in its voter base in its strongholds and failure to make inroads into other states. It also revealed its difficulties in holding on to allies or adding new ones to compensate for those who left the alliance. Big allies like the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), Trinamool Congress, and Biju Janata Dal had moved out of the NDA for fear of losing minority support. Its capacity to represent and accommodate diverse interests severely dented, the BJP was increasingly less attractive to existing and potential allies.

222 The balance between the BJP and the Congress shifted decisively to the advantage of the Congress in 2009. In this election, voters delivered a significant verdict with the Congress and its alliance winning 262 just 10 short of the majority mark. The Congress won 206 seats, crossing the threshold of 200 seats for the first time since 1991. The party has made major gains in Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, and Rajasthan.

The 1980s, a period of great turbulence in Indian politics, marked the appearance of several new political parties. As the Congress went into a long decline and the Janata Party unravelled, several regional parties emerged in various states and enlarged their support. In the process, national parties were marginalized, or became adjuncts to the state parties in major states of the country. Many of these state-based parties are not confined to one state, but exist in several states, whether recognized or not. Parties such as the Samajwadi Party (SP), Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Janata Dal (Secular), Janata Dal (United) have units, and have fielded candidates in many states. National parties such as the CPI[M], Communist Party of India (CPI), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), and the Nationalist Congress Party could also be described as multi-state parties because their presence and representation in the Lok Sabha is limited to a few states.

Regional parties with an explicitly regional-ethnic character include the TDP in Andhra Pradesh, the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK), and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIDMK) in Tamil Nadu, Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) in Assam, and the Akali Dal in Punjab. For example, the Akali Dal represents only the Sikhs and the AGP represents caste Hindu Assamese. While the SP and the BSP in Uttar Pradesh (UP) are essentially ethnic in character and represent the backward and lower castes, they also share the characteristics of an elector list part)', promoting the interests of distinct social constituencies.

The story of UP is a telling illustration of the fragmentation of the party system, and with it the nature and dynamics of catch-all parties in particular. For many decades after. Independence, UP was the fulcrum of politics and remained central to the formation of any government in New Delhi. The party which won UP invariably formed the government at the Centre. But more important than the number of parliamentary seats was the strategy of building inclusive social coalitions which would include the majority of the electorate. The withering away of the Congress

223 umbrella and its social coalition of Brahmins, Dalits, and Muslims gave rise to new alliances represented by caste-and community-based parties. This led to the institutionalization of caste-based fragmentation and the exponential growth of the BSP and SP in UP at the expense of the Congress. The BSP emphasized its distinct character as a Dalit-based party; and attempted to mobilize the underprivileged using caste as a tool to break the existing system, so as to distinguish itself from the Congress and the BJP and create an alternative space as a Dalit party. Subsequent years witnessed a shift in its strategy as the party attempted to gain the support of Brahmins by providing them with tickets, further weakening the influence of national parties. Its social engineering collapsed in the 2009 election; with both Brahmins and Muslims returning to the original Congress coalition of extremes.

On the other hand, the contrasting trajectory of the Left parties that have been elected to power in Kerala, West Bengal, and Tripura stresses the centrality of broad- based mobilization in determining the salience of social cleavages on patterns of voting and party strategies. The most important of these is the CPI (M), which has run the state government in West Bengal for nearly three decades, and has deep pockets of influence and support in Kerala and Tripura as well, where too it has regularly won elections. The Left parties were able to establish a strong presence in these three states by focusing on distributive policies and radical reforms, rather than the politicization of caste differences and subordination.

The vote share of Left parties has varied from 7 in 1957 to below 8 per cent in 2009. The 2004 parliamentary election represented a high point for the Left, as it surpassed its own previous record of 56 seats in 1991. The Left bloc had 61 MPs, and the overall vote share for the Left was 8.3 per cent, compared to less than 8 per cent in 2009. However, the elections of 2009 delivered a severe blow to the Left parties. The CPI(M) suffered its worst defeat since its inception after the split in the united CPI in 1964. Its seat share plummeted to 24, its vote share declined from 5.7 in 2004 to 53 per cent in 2009. Between the CPI (M) and CPI, the strength of the CPI has declined to just 4 and that of the CPI(M) to 16. Most of the Left MPs are drawn from West Bengal and Kerala. This underlines the limits of the Left's electoral support, which has been unable to grow beyond West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura, despite their resolve and attempts to do so. Their vote share has fluctuated in their strongholds at the same time as it has not registered an increase in the other states such as Andhra

224 Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu where they have had some presence.

In the 1990s political power shifted from the grand encompassing parties which had dominated politics for close to three decades to regional parties and multi- party coalitions. Until the late 1980s, it was taken for granted that national parties would govern India. Regional and state-based parties did, of course, contest elections, but their role was insignificant. In 1952, about 50 parties contested elections) while the number had gone up to 342 in 2009. Since the fragmentation of the party system that set in after the decline of one-party dominance and the coming to power of a non- Congress coalition government more and more parties have been formed with the largest number in last elections-over a hundred new parties formed between 2004 to 2009 (ibid).

While there has been no actual decline in the number of national parties from 1957, the number of Indians who vote for them has come down. Until 1996 the total number of seats won by regional parties did not change much. Their numbers varied between a low of 31 (1957) and a high of 75 (1984). The major change occurred in 1996 when the number of seats won by them went up to 127, in 1999 it climbed up to 158 and in 2004 to 159 and 28.1 per cent of the vote. This increase has taken place at the expense of national parties, especially the BJP and the Congress, which had just over 320 seats between them in 2009. The combined votes of the Congress and the BJP in the 2004 and 2009 elections was under 50 per cent. The vote share of regional parties remained the same—roughly 29 per cent in the last three elections. This means more than half the voters continued to vote for parties other than the two big parties. Even though the balance appeared to have shifted in favour of a national party reflected in the resurgence of the Congress, regional parties remain significant because states continue to be the principal arena of politics and hence state-specific parties are still, relevant. Indeed, a striking feature of this election was the strong showing of regional parties, such as the Janata Dal (United) in Bihar, Biju Janata Dal in Orissa, Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, and DMK in Tamil Nadu.

Six elections between 1991 and 2009 did not produce an absolute majority for a single party or coalition, and, as a consequence, minority and/or coalition governments. However, the 2009 elections resulted in a near majority for the Congress-led UPA which won 262 seats. In the first five national elections from 1952

225 to 1971, India had a one party dominant system in which the Congress party received a plurality of votes averaging more than 40 per cent, while the second largest party could win only 10 per cent of the vote. In the 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, and 1999 elections, the Congress majority was well short of the vote share needed for a seat majority. These elections saw the vote share of the second party or alliances go up, thereby making the system more pluralistic and competitive.

More than eighteen state parties have held power both at the Central and state levels, while many more have shared power at the state level. Both regional and state- based parties are contenders for power in all the states except Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh. Taken as a whole, all these changes have substantially altered India's party system, and the transformation has been far- reaching. Three major trends post-1989, the decline of the Congress, the rise of the BJP, and that of regional and state-based parties have led to the formation of minority and coalition governments. After a considerable change in parties and the party system, two coalition blocs have emerged. Both the NDA, led by the BJP, and the UPA, led by the Congress, were propped up by a host of state-based and regional parties eager to share the spoils of office. Some major state parties are not part of the two coalition blocs, and from time to time they attempt to revive a Third Front, opposed to both the Congress and the BJP.

The succession of coalition governments since the 1990s, while reflecting the expanding process of democratization, is based on spatial, not ideological, compatibility. This was the case with the BJP's Alliances in 1998, 1999, and 2004, as well the Congress-led UPA in 2004. Thus, in 2004, the strategic alliance of the Congress and the Left, forged in the six years of the Vajpayee period, formed the lynchpin of the new dispensation built around a strong opposition to communal politics; at the same time, there was a range of issues, especially in economic and foreign policies, where their policies and perceptions differed, resulting in the withdrawal of support by the Left parties in August 2008 on the issue of the controversial Indo-US nuclear deal and the growing strategic partnership between the two countries.

226 5.2. Findings:

1. Transition from Caste to Class Politics:

Caste relations in India are governed by relative caste superiority-inferiority in caste hierarchy. Each caste is in conflictual relationship with its immediate caste either in the ascending or descending order. While there has been a macro-level conflict between the forward castes (Brahmans, Rajputs, Vaishyas, and Kayasthas) and the backward castes (OBCs/Dalits), there have been greater conflicts within the forward and the backward caste groups. By this logic, we have seen more conflicts between Brahmans and Thakurs (in upper castes), between Yadavs and Kurmis (in OBCs), and Chamars and Pasis (in Dalits). Gradually, the focus in north Indian states has been shifting from inter-caste exploitation to intra-caste exploitation.

The dominance of castes in political contestations in India had always been an enigmatic point baffling scholars. Why had ideologies been relegated to margins in such contests? Why primordial bases attract people in place of the political and the economic when it comes to exercising their franchise? Why had caste politics overtaken class politics in India?

Western liberal societies insist on ideology-based political contestations. These societies were largely homogenized at the beginning of their democratic politics; political mobilization was possible only on basis of the political, that is, ideology. India accepted Western liberal democratic model for her polity with a society rich in diversity, multiculturalism, and heterogeneity. Hence, when it came to political mobilization for electoral contestation, we had a choice; we had primordial factors (caste, religion, language, ethnicity, and so on) as well as ideologies, and we could use either as instrument of effective political mobilization. But we chose the social (caste) over political (ideology). Why?

That was because of historical reasons. During the freedom struggle, all social denominations coalesced under the umbrella of the Indian National Congress acquiring common political orientation. So, there was ideological homogenization, and most people thought alike politically. All social groups continued to stay in Congress making it a rainbow social coalition. When new parties started showing up, they were still not sure about any alternative ideology as there was still very great deal of consensus in country on political and economic issues in domestic and international

227 arena. Hence, 'political' (ideology) and 'economic' (class) could hardly help such new parties in effective political mobilization; so they had only one option-social (caste). That is why caste came to define political contestations in India. The only exceptions were communists who followed communist ideologies but did not find favour with people in spite of a very favourable environment owing to acute poverty, unemployment, and exploitation of masses.3

The rise of backward caste politics in north Indian states in early nineties was accompanied by two more very important developments-beginning of the era of globalization and sharpening of the communal-secular divide. In UP, religion tried to overtake caste but for a short time. The people of UP defeated BJP and there was a steady decline in party's performance during nineties and thereafter [1991: 221 seats (31.5 percent vote); 1993: 177 (33.3 per cent); 1996: 175 (33.9 per cent); 2002: 88 (20.7 per cent); and 2007: SO (16.9 per cent)]. Very soon, caste emerged as a dominant variable and overtook religion signaling the coming to power of caste parties, the BSP and the SP. But caste proved to be limiting experience as its share in overall population was limited, and whatever the share, there was no homogenization of respective caste groups, especially OBCs and Dalits. Hence, the third variable- 'plurality of castes'-entered through inclusive politics of BSP and SP. The BSP got absolute majority (206 out of 403) in 2007 assembly elections with just 30 per cent votes. But people demonstrated in subsequent Lok Sabha elections (2009) that caste support to BSP had been given with a purpose and that purpose having been lost sight of, they shifted their focus to new variable in state politics, that is, 'development'. That resulted in surprise win of the Congress from UP where it fought elections on development plan. The party not only more than doubled its performance (from 9 to 21), it also improved its vote share in almost every section of society.

But development may work as a catalyst to create awareness among deprived sections of all castes and religions about their common plight, and hence may work as a facilitator to create 'new subaltern classes'. Thus, 'classes' may soon overtake everything else in the domain of political contestation in UP (Verma 2010). This shows that electoral politics in UP has travelled a long way from religion to class through intermediary variables of caste, inclusion and development. So, backward politics in UP would do well to ‘transcend caste and address this class' (ibid.).

228 Bihar was a case of better backward class politics but myopic leadership of Lalu Yadav reduced it to backward caste politics that is shared between Lalu-led JD and Nitish-led Samata Party. Today, competition between the two is how to become more and more inclusive so as to transcend from caste to class.

The Bihar model of backward caste mobilization demonstrates 'class orientation'. However, the Lalu-Rabri class orientation was a limiting one, exclusivist and focused more on horizontal homogenization among Dalits and OBCs, whereas the Nitish orientation is more open, inclusive, and has greater focus on vertical integration of the marginalized that runs through entire hierarchical social structure attempting formation of a 'subaltern class’.

The compulsions of inclusive politics are so obvious, as in UP, that a logical corollary appears to be an all out effort by parties to expand their constituencies through (a) vertical and horizontal homogenization of 'backward castes' and (b) reaching out to subalterns from other castes, especially from upper castes, so as to reinvent a 'backward (read subaltern) class' constituency for them replacing 'backward caste constituency.

The 2012 (February-March) assembly elections in UP giving SP absolute majority (224 out of 403 seats) also substantiate this thesis. Akhilesh Yadav, the new and youngest chief minister, succeeded not only in homogenizing 'backward castes'" but also in amalgamating them with the Dalits to create a new 'subaltern class constituency'. Hence, the SP vote share; among UBCs (+14 Kurmis, +6 most-backwards) and Dalits (+12 Jatavs, +6 other SCs) increased substantially. That was a difficult task that had defied even Dr Lohia and Kansi Ram earlier. The political coming together of these two social denominations had been blocked by conflictual economic relations between them; the Dalits were usually subjected to exploitative labour by predominantly landowning Yadavs (Verma 2012).'Ironically, some Yadavs- the hardcore supporters of the party-shifted away (-7 percentage points) from SP and moved to BSP (+3 percentage points). Notwithstanding that, 2012 assembly elections in UP may be considered a u-turn in the history of 'backward class' movement in the state.

As backward leadership is divided in Bihar, the one led-by JD (U)-BJP combining non-Yadav OBCs (lower OBCs) and upper castes has a better chance of

229 structuring 'subaltern class' because upper caste subalterns have greater comfort with and better access to this leadership. The amalgamation of lower OBC and upper-caste subalterns may also attract lower Muslims owing to subaltern osmotic effect'. The JD (U)-BJP alliance is actually attempting to form a subaltern class in Bihar that includes lower OBCs, Mahadalits, pasmanda Muslims, and the poors of upper castes. The CSDS data shows sharp decline in OBC, Dalit, and Muslim support for RJD since 1995 (Kumar 1999).

The JD (U) has a strong support base amongst Kurmis and Koeris, and its alliance with BJP helped attract upper caste voters. Yet, in simple numerical terms, the JD (U)-BJP alliance lagged behind the RJD-LJP alliance that represented 50 per cent of total electorate (Yadav, Muslims, and Dalits). But in spite of that, the RJD-LJP alliance was defeated in 2009. Nitish Kumar sought to break Yadav-Muslim alliance by initiating several welfare measures for weaker sections of Muslims. He identified backward Muslims as 'Pasmanda' Muslims (such as weavers and dhobis) who constitute about 15 per cent of Muslim population and gave them reservation in local bodies. Dalits constitute 16.5 per cent of state's population and LJP leader Ram Vilas Paswan is their powerful leader coming from the 'Dusadhs’. The Nitish government floated welfare schemes for 'Mahadalit' that included Dalits other than Dusadh and Chamars. That was to break Paswan's hold on Dalits. Post-Mandal Lalu politics hinged on support from lower OBCs. The 2009 Lok Sabha elections confirm shift of lower OBCs from Lalu's RJD to JD (U) of Nitish: more than half of lower OBCs voted for JD (U)-BJP and only a meagre 12 per cent for RJD-LJP. While 'Kurmis and Koeris (supporters of JD [U]) turned out in large numbers, Yadavs and Dalits turnout was low (Sanjay and Rakesh 2009). The structuring of a backward (subaltern) class had been on agenda of Bihar for quite some time. A very unique attempt at concretising that could be seen in the reservation policy of socialist Chief Minister Karpoori Thakur who promulgated it in 1978. It provided 26 per cent reservation to 'Backward Classes' in government employment in addition to 24 per cent reservation for Harijans and Adivasis. Out of the 26 per cent, 'more backwards' were allotted 12 per cent and 'less backwards' 8 per cent; 3 per cent were reserved to women of any group, and 3 per cent to those who were 'economically backward' (Blair 1980).

In Bihar, identity assertion and empowerment urge of backwards led to greater mobilization and empowerment of RJD espousing their cause initially. But RJD

230 provided them only 'notional' empowerment without improving their economic life. Steadily, Bihar was plagued with crime, corruption, and misgovernance that led to disillusionment of lower backwards with Yadav dominant RJD government in Bihar.

As the 2010 assembly elections have demonstrated, the JD (U)-BJP combine led by Nitish Kumar has made a significant move in the direction of creating a 'subaltern class'—a conglomerate of backwards, Dalits, STs, and Muslims. The density of subaltern groups is greater around JD (U)-BJP than RJD-LJP combine (Figure 13.4a). But in spite of decline in overall vote share of RJD-LJP, the pattern of support in different economic groups is not different from JD (U)-BJP alliance.

Madhya Pradesh is a different case altogether. The backward castes/classes have been almost evenly divided between two major parties-the Congress and the BJP. But a new phenomenon is the appearance of BSP on political firmament of Madhya Pradesh. The BSP has been an insignificant player so far but is slowly driving a wedge between the Congress and the BJP. In 2008 assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh, BSP got 11 per cent votes and won seven seats. But the party could have won at least 17 more seats (Verma 2009b). It is also very significant that the BSP very effectively drove a wedge between the BJP and the Congress and played role of spoiler resulting in defeat of the Congress in 48 constituencies and defeat of the BJP in 33 constituencies (ibid.). If that is any indication, we may say that present position of the BSP in Madhya Pradesh is similar to its position in UP in the early 1990s when it used to get about 9-11 per cent votes (1989: 9.41 per cent, 1991: 9.3 per cent, 1993: 11.1 per cent, 1996:11.2 per cent).

So, contrary to UP and Bihar, Madhya Pradesh has potential for slow but steady formation of subaltern class that was evenly coopted by the Congress and the BJP. However, much will depend on the BSP leadership and their strategies to take advantage of situation and extricate backward classes from the clutches of the present players.

Thus, the entire northern India seems to be undergoing transition from 'caste polities' to 'class polities'. On a deeper analysis, it appears that nineties was not only a decade of beginning of liberalization, privatization, and globalization, but also a decade of deepening of democracy in India owing to coming of panchayati raj institutions that suddenly empowered three main castes/classes at grassroots level—

231 OBCs, Dalits, and women—by giving them reservations in the third tier of our federal structures both in rural and urban segments.

The third tier elections in UP, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh seem to be diluting the element of caste in political contestations as these elections are won or lost on the basis of socializing and mobilizing within a very small group of electors where caste does not work because the same caste candidates contest elections in a small 'panchayat or ward, and for winning, a candidate needs to mobilize people of other castes so as to offset division of votes in the same caste group. This is because of reservation of seats for OBCs, Dalits, and women-that means that in most of constituencies, all the candidates are either only OBCs or only Dalits or only women.

While Bihar and Madhya Pradesh reserve 50 per cent seats for women in panchayati raj institutions at all level, UP gives them 33 per cent reservation. In Bihar, one of the first acts of Nitish-led JD (U)-BJP government was to enhance the women reservation from 33 per cent to 50 per cent by amending the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act 2006. In the same Act, OBCs were granted reservation up to 20 per cent. Nitish Kumar also favours the implementation of Ranganath Mishra Committee recommendations giving 10 per cent reservations to Muslims on the basis of educational and economic backwardness. Of late, the JD (U) strategy in Bihar is to attract ati-Dalits (by organizing 'maha dalit sarnmelans'), pas-manda (Dalit and backward) Muslims, and more/most backward caste along with women. This is a very calculated strategy to structure a 'subaltern class" to be used for political purposes. But this drive is perfectly inclusive and in tune with democratic politics.

2. Pragmatism of Indian Parties:

One remarkable feature of political parties in India since the 1990s has been their tendency to move away from ideological frameworks. It is important to note that until this period, there were different types of parties in India. There were parties that represented the interests of the established order, and parties that sought basic social and economic transformations and engaged in struggles on behalf of the interests of the oppressed and those marginalized in society. However, this has changed as most political parties are more like each other on many issues and are devoted to parliamentary politics, including the Left parties. The ideological differences between parties are mining and hence they are likely to adopt the same mix of policies when in

232 power. By and large, Indian parties are more pragmatic than ideological, which make party boundaries highly flexible an impermeable. The majority of leaders and legislators could be in one party or the other because their presence in the party is often influenced by their success in obtaining the party ticket. Parties seem to have no distinct ideology that would distinguish one party from another in the course of election campaigns, for instance, although what they do when they are in power embodies or expresses interests of various kinds (Sarangi 1984: 189-207). The idealism that exemplified the first few decades after Independence has been replaced with a purposefulness characterized by self-interest, flexibility, and dissimulation. The nationalist fervour in the aftermath of Independence has given way to the politics of unbridled power, involving all the features of bargaining, negotiation, and compromise. Intra-party debates on secularism versus religion or market versus the state in the Congress, or globalization versus swadeshi in the BJI are fairly infrequent. Even secularism, which has bee a defining difference between parties, is confined to the Congress, the BJP, and the Left parties. None of the state or regional parties has displayed any real ideological reluctance in allying with communal parties such as the BJP, if their interests so require, despite the party's open association with the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in 1992, the pogrom in Gujarat in 2002, and its active association with numerous anti-Muslim campaigns.

The explanation for these changes is traceable to the radical transformations taking place in both state and society, and the way in which individuals and groups perceive their roles as constitutive elements of a political community (Nayyar 2001: 361-96). During the earlier decades, each political party tried to locate Itself in an ideological continuum and in relation to the state. The economic policy paradigm shift that took place in 1991 entailed shifting priorities away from distributive justice to high growth as a state goal, the demotion of planning and the planning commission, public-sector industries, and the encouragement of private investment to achieve this goal. These changes were quite significant as they involved a shift from a multi-class state committed to pro-poor measures to a narrow conception of the state that Js more closely aligned with business, capital, and the middle classes, and openly committed to a capitalist path of development. The new phase is characterized by an intensification of conflict in the economy and polity, and a clear tension between the economics of markets and political democracy. The result of this shift was a widening

233 gap between these classes and the bulk of people, who have not gained significantly from the economic reforms of the past two decades or so.

The growing disjunction between policies and the support base of parties is an obvious consequence of these processes. The Congress has had to reconcile the contradiction between economic reforms, which benefit the elite and upper-middle classes, and its mass support among the poor, who have been the losers in this process. This discrepancy results from the effect of two factors: the change in India’s social structure-from an elite-mass structure to one with a substantial middle class sandwiched between these two poles-and the parties’ need to continue to cater to a range of groups. Earlier, party leaders used to argue that they represented the interests of the people. Now, since the parties-tend to represent sectional interests, they seem to claim that they themselves are 'the people'. On the one hand, this represents a step in the inclusion of marginalized groups. On the other, the parties and their leaders can afford to be undemocratic and authoritarian, because their own interests are submerged in that of the group (Hasan 2006).

This shift towards pragmatism is a strong tendency in the development of parties globally. Both the Democratic Party in the United States and the Labour Party in Britain, as well as other many parties of the Left have embraced the free market policies first made acceptable by Bill Clinton, and subsequently by Tony Blair. Indian parties are not immune to this trend. Quite a few major parties have moved ideologically in a rightward direction, even as they remain politically opposed to the right-wing BJP. Except for the CPI and CPI(M), no other political party uses the term socialism or anti-imperialism; these terms have virtually disappeared from the political discourse. Almost all the political parties today, despite each one's familiar slogan to defend the interests of the poor, the disadvantaged, and the marginalized, increasingly think and act in similar ways. In spite of some differences between parties, there is a fair degree of consensus on economic and foreign policies. No matter which party comes to power the Central and state governments are unwilling to roll back neo-liberal. A remarkable feature of Indian politics lies in the advent of parties centred around one person, be it a politician or movie stars turned leaders. There is a proliferation of parties that promote family rule and personality cults around the family name, caste, or charisma. Parties have become a preserve or families and are subservient to one supreme leader. The leader can wilfully impose

234 her/his offspring or relatives on the party. Twenty-seven MPs in the Fifteenth Lok Sabha and a large number of cabinet ministers in the second UPA government belonged to prominent political families’- an indication that politics has indeed become a family business. Major and mini dynasties control national and regional parties.

`Family rule or dynasty is a striking feature of the Congress, but it is only fair to add that neither family rule nor the dynastic pattern is the monopoly of thee- Congress. Quite a few political families have sprung up in the recent past, and more are mushrooming all the time. In other words, what began in the Congress now extends to the bulk of party politics. From the Karunanidhi clan in Tamil Nadu to the Abdullah and Mufti families in Kashmir, the Thackerays and Pawars hi Maharashtra, Sangmas in Meghalaya, Patnaiks in Orissa, and the Mulayam Singh Yadav clan in Uttar Pradesh, parties have become a family business propped up by an unremitting focus on these leaders. The most striking change has occurred in the cadre-based DMK which has yielded itself to dynastic pressures and gradually turned into a family, enterprise. Family control or dynastic rule is not as pervasive in ideology- based parties as it is in others. One consequence of family dominated politics is that parties have become a closed shop with entry restricted only to those who have the right credentials of birth (Sanghvi 2009). As the political class becomes a self- perpetuating dynastic elite Indian politics is rendered less representative. Such politics of inheritance has undermined internal democracy and obstructed institutionalization of parties because it can constrain the individual discretion and personal power of charismatic leaders (Chandra 2005: 87-125). The absence of clear democratic procedures, parties will continue to be plagued by the factionalism that has been so detrimental to both their own interests and the stabilization of party structures (Chandra 2004) All in all, the internal structures of parties, and the lack of intra-party democracy in particular have impeded the growth of strong and vigorous parties.

A larger consequence of the decline of ideology and the rise of one-leader or one-family centred parties is the reduction of party organizations into election winning machines, which depend for their success on the charisma of the leader and their capacity to raise massive funds. An important aspect of the struggle for power is the financing of election campaigns. This has assumed tremendous importance because winning and losing elections has become the only role a party envisages for

235 itself. The party and the leader's ability to win a majority in the national or state elections is the sole basis for judging the success or failure of a party and its top leader Since most parties function as vote-gathering machines, there is a distinct unwillingness to enlist public support through political campaigns and movements between elections, build cadres, or mobilize people around new political initiatives. The privileging of elections at the expense of other aspects of the democratic process implies that parties are inattentive to the need for constant organizational renewal, or to the requirements of popular mobilization. Leaders are valued for their capacity to attract crowds, strike deals and alliances, and raise resources as elections become more and more expensive in India.

Electioneering is labour-intensive and expensive in India's sprawling urban and rural constituencies. Parties and candidates need large sums of money for advertising, polling, consulting, travel, vehicles and fuel, and the printing of campaign materials that are to reach voters in constituencies. Historically, parties have been dependent for finance on big businesses and wealthy individuals, especially parties of the Right and the Centre (Sridharan 2006: 311-40). During the 1950s and 1960s, the business community contributed the bulk of the funds (Venkatesan 1999). There are laws to limit campaign finances and restrict the expenditure of parties in elections, but they are largely inoperative because it is easy to circumvent them. Since the 1980s, there has been a closer and more open link between big businesses and the corporate sector and parties after the lifting of the ban on company donations in 1984 (Sridharan 1999: 229-54). The objectives of corporate funding of parties underwent a significant change in the wake of liberalization and the perceived irreversibility of the economic reform process. Nowadays, organized industry and business houses fund parties and dominate policy making for individual benefits.

The growing nexus between politics and the corporate sector and the corporate sector and the dependence of parties on the corporate sector for funds is a not a new feature of party politics, but has become more manifest. This is also because the unrealistic ceiling on election funding has made the process of election and party financing less than transparent. The Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2003 was one measure that promised major changes in the financing of political parties and their candidates for elections. However, these provisions have failed to ensure transparency in party finances-both how money is raised and spent.

236 Consequently, there is a growing dominance of special interests in the polity, leaving parties politically vulnerable to these leading interests. This limits the ability of parties to boldly articulate the concerns of the marginalized and poor people. Political finance reform is necessary for the stability of democracy itself, because election funds raised through corrupt means increase cynicism about parties and politic.

Political parties in India have played an important role in democratic consolidation. They have done so through a politics of accommodation and consensus that binds the political class together despite their different party affiliations .They have facilitated the inclusion of varied groups in the political system, by giving voice to historically excluded groups, and helping them to gain access to the political system. At the same time, it is increasingly difficult to reconcile the absence of intra- party democracy within parties with the robustness and resilience of the democratic polity.

There is considerable dissatisfaction with parties and politicians as vehicles of representation and governance. Paradoxically, voters feel that parties are essential for the functioning of democracy, but do not seem to trust them to make democracy work (State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report). The biggest institutional weakness of parties is that they arc leader-centric and Tack internal democracy, as leaders are unwilling or unable to institutionalize party elections or procedures for the selection of candidates, and increase the participation of members in party functioning (Suri 2005). The absence of internal democracy, dynastic rule, elite capture, and the inability of parties to offer real choices to the people j are among the major issues confronting India's parties'.

By a long way-the most disturbing trends are noticeable in political parties which function as family fiefdoms and without a trace internal democracy, most political parties lack the political capacity to take the lead in formulating and debating policies which reflect people s aspirations and needs. Although parties and party leaders do profess to stand for ideology, in reality they are flexible and not all reluctant to give up their ideological stance or put it on-the-back burner if that helps them to gain a share of political power or to obtain a ticket for contesting an election. Although the divergence between election rhetoric and the actual implementation of government policy remains large particularly with regard to policies that have distributive and welfare outcomes, the UPA government has attempted to shift away

237 from technocratic strategies of governance to a political approach which focused on inclusive growth through social and welfare measures. At one level, the Congress has stuck to the neo-liberal path of market-oriented reforms, which was aimed at generating economic growth but at another level to contain the ill-effects of the market economy, it came out with legislations like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, and a host of other social welfare schemes which held out promise of relief, particularly for the rural poor.

Though encountering serious problems with regard to the healthy functioning of parties, the fact remains that there is no alternative to political activity based on party competition. Parties cannot be dispensed with as long as we have a democratic parliamentary system of government. India's democratic stability, which defies conventional theories of democracy, underscores the positive relationship between" parties and democracy. In India, the legitimacy of party-based governments has never been questioned. Even frequent elections for Parliament, state assemblies, and panchayats have not alienated the electorate; in fact, they seem to give the mass of voters a sense of popular control over government. The significant changes in the social composition of India's ruling elite since Independence, both in politics and in the bureaucracy are largely due to parties opening their doors to new recruits from marginalized groups, which ultimately make their way into the government. This is obvious from the significant increase in the number of lower-caste legislators and senior civil servants in influential government positions (Suri 2005). This trend signals a social revolution that is giving voice to previously marginalized groups (Jaffrelot 2002). Despite the erosion of party organizations and the degeneration of politicians; which so preoccupies intellectuals, the media, and the middle classes, the Indian voter, going by the over 60 per cent turnout in national elections and an even higher turnout in state ; assembly elections, appears satisfied with the choices that political parties offer.

None of this minimizes the seriousness of the problems facing political parties and the political system they run. The most serious problem, is the failure of parties to keep their promises to the electorate-promises to implement economic development alongside the reduction of social inequalities. India cannot build a truly inclusive polity without an inclusive economy. Parties need to think why, six decades after Independence, more than a quarter of our population still lives below the official

238 poverty line, and millions are deprived of the basic necessities of life or face daily preventable problems such as malnutrition and endemic hunger, or lack of purchasing power. Parties must ask why faster and more effective political intervention to relieve the suffering of millions of the poorest and disadvantaged is not forthcoming. These are the difficult questions confronting our political parties. This is the great unfinished agenda of the nation-building project that parties have yet to implement.

3. Decline of Backward Caste Politics in Northern India

The SPs record in UP since early 1990s has been a story of sharp incline in vote share (1991-2002: 12.5-25.4 per cent) followed by stagnation (2002-7: at 25.4 per cent) and, then, beginning of decline (2007-9: 25.4-23.2 per cent) (Figure 13.1a). The party had two major support bases: Yadav and Muslims. While Yadav support base remains intact, there has been loss of support in more backward castes (MRBCs: -11 per cent) and most backward castes (MBCs: -2 per cent) during 2007 assembly elections (Verma 2010). But what must worry SP is loss of Muslim voters. Since 2002, Muslim support for SP has been declining sharply; during 2002-7, it declined by 5 percentage points, but between 2007 and 2009, it declined by 17 percentage points (Figure 13.1b).

The RJD in Bihar ruled from 1990 to 2005. Interestingly, its vote share was stagnant in both 1995 (32.2 per cent) and 2000 (33 per cent) assembly elections. But in every subsequent election since 2000, RJD's vote share had declined. During 2000- 9, party's vote share declined by 13.7 percentage points. Unfortunately for RJD, lower OBCs have sharply shifted from RJD to JD (U)-BJP combine. In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, JD (U)-BJP got a huge 58 per cent lower OBC votes as compared to their

239 paltry 12 per cent votes polled by RJD (Figure 13.2b). The position remained the same in 2010 assembly elections [JD (U)-BJP: 55 per cent, RJD-LJP: 12 percent].2

Thus, there is a common cord between UP and Bihar. Parties claiming to be champions of backwards are slowly being disowned by a section of backwards and their traditional supporters in both states. Why is this happening? And, where are the deserting backwards and their supporters going? Madhya Pradesh is a different case where backwards have yet to come up as a social group claiming distinct identity, building social movement, and asserting for empowerment. They have yet to incline in the politics of state and, hence, the question of their decline does not arise.

Is mobilization only providing 'notional' empowerment to backwards and Dalits? And, is that a valid strategy for long-term politics? Do we not need to link mobilization not only with greater consciousness, identity, and notional empowerment but also with better governance and greater development positively impacting the day-to-day life of backwards and Dalits?

Lohia 'argued that horizontal mobilisation of lower castes on basis of explicit appeals to caste identity had substantial political potential for organising poor and the deprived. That shows that Lohia not only realized the need for transcending caste barrier to form 'subaltern class' but anticipated possibility of horizontal division among backward castes once mobilization had taken them towards political empowerment (as was to happen in UP and Bihar later). Probably, Lohia's ‘jati todo andolan was aimed more at horizontal homogenization of backwards than anything else.

Another reason for decline of the backward movement in north Indian states may be due to elite-based leadership of backward castes and its failure to become a mass based radical movement. Owing to changes in agrarian structure, urbanization, and English education, some backward castes improved their economic condition and attempted ‘sanskritisation’. Yadavs in Bihar and UP took early lead in this. Their links with cow and Lord Krishna facilitated their ‘sanskritisation’. Kurmis and Koeris followed suit. The sanskritisatioin was aimed at getting rid of socio-economic exploitation by zamindars. Jaffrelot opines that Yadavs tried to substantiate their sanskritization through attempt to ‘aryanise’ their history. Conversely, lower backwards did not attempt this; hence, wide disconnect appeared between upper

240 backwards and lower/lowest backward castes that prevented cultural homogenization of backwards as a whole. That was in contrast to low castes of Maharashtra and south India where they did not attempt sanskritization but revolted against the caste system.

In UP, caste politics had been showing signs of unease for quite some time now. The two caste parties-BSP and SP-realized this during the second half of the 1990s. They represented what we call 'backward class' that included two major social denominations known as OBCs and Dalits. Unfortunately for 'backward class' movement and politics, these two groups got horizontally divided; the upper segment (OBCs) was led by the SP and its leader Mulayam Singh Yadav, and the lower segment (Dalits) was led by BAMCEF, DS-4, and BSP and their leaders Kansi Ram and Mayawati. It is surprising that backward classes could not homogenize in spite of the fact that ideological moorings of the two parties vouched for ‘backward class’ and not for ‘backward caste’, But the old social structure with in-built exploitation of lower ones in the hierarchy by the higher ones ensured that OBC-Dalit exploitative relationship and economic conflict would browbeat this ideological commonality between Kansi Ram and Lohia, and not allow backward castes and Dalits to come together and homogenize to form a subaltern class.

In Bihar, upper castes generally owned land and wielded social and political power. The backward castes, who owned some land, provided strength to land reform movement expecting direct benefit. They were able to improve their economic status and emerged as new-rich agrarian class, popularly known as 'kulaks', and played important role in the politics of state. Their aspirations for a share in political power led to realignment of social forces in 1970s. That process galvanized in early 1990s. However, it is now giving way to a process of 'de-alignment' among the forces of backward castes. The backward castes are splitting and a section of them aligning with upper castes to challenge the dominance of Yadav led OBCs.

Bihar displayed an early protest by backward castes against upper castes. The Ahirs (Yadavs) and Kurmis/Koeries in Bihar opposed beggar (forced labour) during 1910s. They collectively refused to perform beggar for landlords and opposed taxes imposed by them. The Ahirs refused to sell cow dung cakes, curd, and milk to upper castes at concessional rates. In independent India, they used electoral process as a tool of effective political mobilization, and because of their superior numerical strength, they succeeded in getting more and more seats in state legislative assembly

241 inviting some scholars to call that as 'India's Silent Revolution. The Yadavs and Kurmis in Bihar organized movement and got support of various sub-castes. But leadership for backward caste movement came from the rich. Businessmen and large farmers supported Yadav movement. The Yadavs were also very quick in organizing caste associations not only at district levels but also at state and national levels.

We may conclude our argument by saying that without either a well-defined socialist agenda or a clear socialist ideology and with the handicap of soiled image among electorates SP faces a uncertain future.

ABP news opinion poll: BSP to win 185 seats if up polls are held now

It's an alarming situation for the incumbent government Samajwadi Party, nine or ten months before Uttar Pradesh is set to hold state elections.

Table 5.1

ABP News comparative voting % prior to 2017 State Assembly elections

Party Actual vote % in the Actual seats in Forecast vote % Forecast vote % as per 2012 election the 2012 elections as per Opinion Opinion Poll Mar 2016 Poll Mar 2016 BJP 15.3 42 24 120 AD 1.0 1

BSP 24.8 80 31 185

INC 11.5 29 11 13 RID 2.3 8

SP 30.1 228 23 80

IND and 15.0 15 11 5 Others Total 100.0 403 100 403

Source: ABP News Bureau New Delhi. Wednesday, 16 March 2016

ABP News latest opinion poll that gauges the current mood of UP has revealed that BSP supremo Mayawati will make a comeback in the state by roping in allies if elections were to be held today. The survey has predicted that BSP is likely to win 185 seats in the 403-member assembly. BSP was reduced to 80 seats in the defeat of 2012 polls but the scenario now would let Mayawati return to the helm of affairs in

242 the state. SP, on the other hand, is keen on repeating its performance of 2012, but the party is witnessing a wane in its popularity. The survey has found that Samajwadi Party may win only 80 seats (228 in 2012) this time around. In last year's Lok Sabha polls, it won only five of the 80 seats in the state. The BJP swept the state by winning 73 seats along with allies. The 2017 election that holds the key to Narendra Modi's second term in 2019 has suggested that the BJP+ is likely to bag 120 seats but that wouldn't be enough to form the government. Uttar Pradesh is also crucial because after being routed in Bihar last year, the BJP cannot afford to lose the heartland state.

Despite attaining successes in Gujarat in 2014 and then Bihar in 2015, master poll strategist and public health professional, Prashant Kishor, does not seem to be doing wonders for Congress. The party with RLD is seen winning mere 13 seats while Others in fray bag five.

Table 5.2 Region-wise break-up below

Party Avadh Pradesh Bundelkhand Paschim Pradesh Purvanchal Total

BJP+ 19 5 32 64 120

BSP 31 11 80 63 185

INC+ 1 1 3 8 13

SP 12 2 28 38 80

IND and 0 0 2 3 5 Others

TOTAL 63 19 145 176 403

Important points of the Opinion Poll:

Maya ‘Best Suited CM’

BSP Chief Mayawati (31%) has emerged as best suited to become the next CM of UP closely followed by Akhilesh Yadav (30%) of SP. Rajnath Singh (18%) of the BJP was a distant third.

Four key issues

According to the respondents, unemployment, inflation, corruption and poverty are going to be the four most important election issues in the forthcoming Vidhan Sabha Elections to be held during 2017.

243 SP's 'Below Average' Performance

Performance of the SP Government since last four years has been rated just below average with a mean score of 2.9. 32% respondents gave a rating of Very Good or Good compared to 36% who rated the government performance as Poor or Very Poor. However, Muslim voters feel it is well above average. Similar response received when asked about the performance of the UP Chief Minister, Akhilesh Yadav.

Law & order has become worse

A high proportion of respondents, 60% said that the law and order situation has become worse in last four years of SP Government. Except the Muslim population, 54% of whom feel it has improved, the response is same across the demographics. Two thirds of the respondents said that they have not seen or heard about any development work undertaken by the Government in the last four years. Even half of the Muslim voters agree to this view. Nearly two-third respondents were dissatisfied as Govt. unable to prevent crimes against women.

Constant threat to religious harmony

More than half of the respondents were dissatisfied with the current government in maintaining the religious harmony among people. However, half of the Muslim voters feel otherwise and the opinion is divided among other minority religions. Controlling the law and order situation is a big concern; nearly two-thirds of the respondents recorded their dissatisfaction with the current UP Government on this count.

BSP less corrupt

The current SP Government led by Akhilesh Yadav has been seen as more corrupt compared to the previous Mayawati led BSP government in UP. This perception is higher among the Hindus and BPL respondents.

62% satisfied with BJP-led NDA in Centre

62% of the respondents said that they were satisfied when asked about the performance of the current BJP led Central Government. But more than half of the Muslim voters felt dissatisfied with the Central Government.

244 Modi Still Popular

Narendra Modi emerges as the most popular leader in Uttar Pradesh. Mayawati comes in at second position closely followed by the current Chief Minister, Akhilesh Yadav.

5.3. Suggestions and Recommendations:

1. Ideology based political contestation should take place during elections.

2. Inner party democracy is to be established and institutionalized in the party.

3. Stop Yadavisation of the Political and Administrative system with immediate effect. This would help in attaining lost confidence of electorates in U.P.

4. Decision making must take a note of promises made in election manifesto.

5. Leader worship/ leader centricism to wither away.

6. Strict monitoring of electioneering process has to be done by State election commission during the election at grass root level.

7. To break down the corporate political nexus, a regulatory body should be framed.

8. Inclusive Politics /Subaltern class category.

5.4. Direction for future Research:

245 changed in near future. But as caste parties in UP and Bihar have shown, compulsions of democratic politics have forced them to take new initiatives in twenty-first century; instead of caste-based exclusive politics, they had to turn to class-based inclusive politics. And the most convenient inclusion can be of those segments of society who come from the lower/lowest strata and marginalized sections of society.

5.5. Epilogue

This study has been aimed at the Backward Caste Movement in Uttar Pradesh. The Samajwadi Party Claims to be its offshoot/brain child. The study has been conducted with the sole objective of knowing the reality of Backward Caste Movement and Performance of Samajwadi Party in actual practice in Northern part of India and particularly in Uttar Pradesh. To find out the consequences primary and secondary data along with empirical method has been used. The study has provided valuable results and further scope for more improvements. Thus, the study has fulfilled its aims and objectives; and hence, is now completed.

246

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Tripathi, R.P, Mulayam Singh Yadav: Rachna Au Sangharsh (Lucknow: Ram Manohar Lohia Trust, 1996) in Hindi.

Verma, Rajni Kant, Samajik Privartan Ke Mahanayak: Dr. Ram Manohar Lobia (Lucknow: Department of Information and Public Relations, Govt. of U.P., 1994) in Hindi.

______, Mulayam Singh Yadav Ki Rajneeti Bevastha Badalne Ki Hai Auron Ki Rajneeti Sirf Satta Ke Liye Hai (Lucknow: Himalaya Features, no date) in Hindi. Verma, Rajni Kant, (ed.). Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, Bharat. Pak- Bangladesh Mahasaugh [India- Pakistan-Bangladesh Confederation] (Lucknow: Himalaya Features, 23 March 1997).

______, (ed.), Mulayam Singh Yadav, Samajwadi Party Hi Keyon ? [Why only Samajwadi Party?] (Lucknow: Himalaya) Features, no date).

Verma, Laxmikant, Samajwadi Aandolan Lohia Ke Bad [Socialist movement after Lohia] (Lucknow: Department of Information and Public Relations Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, 1995) in Hindi.

Weiner, Myron, State Politics in India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968).

______, Party Politics in India.. The Development of multi- party system (Princeton NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1957).

______, Party Building in a New Nation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967).

Yadav, Yogendra, ‘Political Change in North India: Interpreting Assembly Election Results’, Economic and Political Weekly, Special Number, December 18, 1993, pp. 2767-2774.

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______, ‘Reconfiguration in Indian Politics: State Assembly Elections, 1993-95’, Economic and Political Weekly, January 13-20, 1996, pp. 95-104.

Journals:

• Economic and Political Weekly • Journal of International Development and Cooperation • American Political Science Review • International Journal of Public Administration, 27(13 &14) • Yojana • Indian Journal of Public Administration • Indian Journal of Political Science • Kurushetra • KAAV International Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences

News Papers:

• Times of India • The Hindu • The Business Economic • The Indian Express • Amar Ujala • Dainik Jagran • Hindustan Times

Website:

• http://eci.gov.in • http://samajwadiparty.in • http://censusindia.gov.in • http://abplive.in • http://mha.nic.in • www.bspindia.org • www.bjp.org

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