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Newsletter-2013-Q4 0.977 MB
SOCIAL FUND FOR DEVELOPMENT 16 pages Newsletter – Edition No. 64, October– December 2013 EDITORIAL SFD’s BoD Holds a Meeting Reading the sectoral distribution The Board of Directors (BoD) of the Social Fund for Development (SFD) held of SFD’s 2013 investments a meeting on November 25, 2013 headed by Mohammed Salem Basendwah, Prime Minister and BoD Chairman. The meeting discussed SFD’s draft budget (commitments), one finds that the for 2014 financial year, which amounts to 36.6 billion Yemeni Riyals (equivalent annual share of each of the Cash-for- to $170.4 million)––increasing by 9% compared to 2013 budget. Work (CfW) Program and water has The draft budget is expected to finance the implementation of 1,391 projects nationwide distributed among the sectors of education, water and environment, been steadily increasing since 2011. health, roads, training and institutional support, microfinance, special-need For instance, while the share of SFD’s groups, labor-intensive works program, agriculture & the integrated interventions contribution to the CfW in 2011 was program. 8%, in 2013 it has reached 20.4%. As The meeting praised the successes achieved by the SFD and its vital role in contributing to poverty alleviation through the provision of job opportunities as for water, there has been an increase well as its active developmental role in improving the living conditions of poor from 13% to 18% for the same period. communities by providing basic needs, facilitating access to social services and raising income through creating temporary and permanent employment. This clearly emphasizes the increasing role of SFD in providing safety net to the most vulnerable Yemenis and responding to critical needs in the country. -
Eiectronic Integrated Disease Early Warning and Response System Volume 07,Lssue47,Epi Week 47,(18-24 November,2019)
Ministary Of Public Health Papulation Epidemiological Bulletin Primary Heath Care Sector Weekly DG for Diseases Control & Surveillance Eiectronic Integrated Disease Early Warning and Response System Volume 07,lssue47,Epi week 47,(18-24 November,2019) Highlights eDEWS Reporting Rates vs Consultations in Govemorates,Epi Weeks 1-47,2019 % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % 95 97 97 % 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 % 96 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 100% % 450000 93 92 96 93 90% 93 400000 •During week no.47,2019, %95(1991/1883) health facilites from 23 80% 350000 70% 300000 Governorates provided valid surveillance data. 60% 250000 50% 200000 Percentage 40% 150000 Consulttaions 30% 20% 100000 10% 50000 •The total number of consultation reported during the week in 23 0% 0 Wk 1 Wk 4 Wk 7 Wk Wk Wk 2 Wk 3 Wk 5 Wk 6 Wk 8 Wk 9 Wk 20 Wk 23 Wk 26 Wk 29 Wk 32 Wk 35 Wk 38 Wk 41 Wk 44 Wk 11 Wk 12 Wk 13 Wk 14 Wk 15 Wk 16 Wk 17 Wk 18 Wk 19 Wk 21 Wk 22 Wk 24 Wk 25 Wk 27 Wk 28 Wk 30 Wk 31 Wk 33 Wk 34 Wk 36 Wk 37 Wk 39 Wk 40 Wk 42 Wk 43 Wk 45 Wk 46 Wk 47 Governorates was 397352 compared to 387266 the previous reporting week Wk 10 47. Acute respiratory tract infections lower Respiratory Infections (LRTI), Upper Reporting Rate Consultations Respiratory Infections (URTI), Other acute diarrhea (OAD) and Malaria (Mal) Distribution of Reporting Rates by Governoraes (Epi-Week 47,2019) % % % % % % % % were the leading cause of morbidity this week. -
Amran, Al Mahwit, Hajjah and Sa'ada
YEMEN - Amran, Al Mahwit, Hajjah and Sa'ada governorates For Humanitarian Use Only The lowest temperatures recorded between December and February (1970-2000) Production date : 04 October 2017 Final District Final District Governorate District Governorate District Priority Priority Al Mahwit Al Khabt Medium Sa'ada Al Dhaher Low or none Al Mahwit Al Mahwait Medium Sa'ada Al Hashwah High Al Mahwit Al Mahwait City Critical Sa'ada As Safra Critical Al Mahwit Ar Rujum Medium Sa'ada Baqim Critical Qatabir Baqim Al Mahwit At Tawilah High Sa'ada Ghamr Medium Al Mahwit Bani Sa'd Critical Sa'ada Haydan Medium Al Mahwit Hufash High Sa'ada Kitaf wa Al Boqe'e Critical Al Mahwit Milhan Medium Sa'ada Majz Critical Al Mahwit Shibam Kawkaban Medium Sa'ada Monabbih Medium Kitaf wa Amran Al Ashah Critical Sa'ada Qatabir Medium As Safra Al Boqe'e Majz Amran Al Madan Critical Sa'ada Razih Medium Monabbih Amran Al Qaflah Critical Sa'ada Sa'adah Critical Amran Amran Critical Sa'ada Sahar Critical Ghamr Amran As Sawd High Sa'ada Saqayn Critical As Safra Sa'ada Amran As Sudah Medium Sa'ada Shada'a Low or none Razih Sa'adah Amran Bani Suraim Medium Amran Dhi Bin Critical Shada'a Saqayn Al Hashwah Amran Habur Zulaymah High Sahar Amran Harf Sufyan Critical Amran Huth Critical Amran Iyal Surayh Critical Amran Jabal Iyal Yazid Critical Al Dhaher Haydan Amran Khamir Critical Amran Kharif Critical Amran Maswar Critical Amran Raydah Critical Bakil Al Mir Harf Amran Shaharah High Sufyan Amran Suwayr Critical Al Ashah Amran Thula High Haradh Qarah Hajjah Abs Critical Hajjah -
Yemen Six Month Economic Analysis Economic Warfare & The
HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME Yemen Six Month Economic Analysis Economic Warfare & the Humanitarian Context January 2017 HUMANITARIAN FORESIGHT THINK TANK HUMANITARIAN FORESIGHT THINK TANK Yemen Six Month Economic Analysis / January 2017 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY An inclusive political solution to the conflict is unlikely in the next six months, despite the high possibility of state economic collapse and a metastasizing humanitarian crisis across the country. President Hadi’s refusal to accept the terms of a recent UN peace plan is likely stalling Saudi financial relief and threatens to fracture his support base in the south. Meanwhile, the crippled state economy is supporting a thriving shadow economy, which will fragment power structures on both sides of the conflict as stakeholders engage in war profiteering. Not only will this diminish the chances for unity in the long run, it also increases food insecurity and poverty for the most vulnerable, while benefiting those in power who already dominate the parallel market. Amidst this turmoil, AQAP and IS influence will increase. This report will examine the economic context affecting humanitarian needs in Yemen, and present scenarios offering potential trajectories of the conflict to assist in humanitarian preparedness. Source: Ali Zifan (6 December 2016), Insurgency in Yemen detailed map, Wikipedia INTRODUCTION The slow progress in the war between the internationally-recognized Yemeni government of Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the Zaidi Shia Houthi-Ali Abdallah Saleh alliance has caused the Saudi- backed Hadi coalition to instrumentalise the Yemeni economy, conducting a war of attrition. As Sanaa’s Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) hemorrhaged through its reserves in the previous two years of war, growing criticism of the governor’s alleged complicity in Houthi embezzlement culminated in the 18 September decision by the Hadi government to move the CBY from the Houthi-controlled capital to Aden and position a new governor to run the institution. -
Whether Civil War Happened During the Arab
國立政治大學外交學系 Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University 碩士論文 Master Thesis 治 政 大 立 學 論阿拉伯之春期間內戰是否發生:以阿爾及利亞 國 和利比亞為例 ‧ ‧ N a y Whether Civil War Happened Duringt the Arab t i i s o r Spring: Exemplifiedn by Algeria eand Libya a i v l C n heng chi U 指導教授:劉長政 Advisor: Liu, Chang-Cheng 作者:楊邵帆 Author: Yang, Shao-Fan 日期:民國 103 年 6 月 16 日 Date: June 16, 2014 Contents Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... iv Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... vi Abstracts ............................................................................................................................ viii 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 1.1. Research Goals .................................................................................................................. 1 1.2. Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 3 1.2.1. Arab Spring in General ......................................................................................................... 3 1.2.2. Situation in Different Country before or During the Arab Spring ...................... 7 1.2.3. Theories for the Onset of Civil War............................治 .................................................. 19 政 大 1.3. Research Design -
YHF Annual Monitoring Report 2020
©: Mahmoud Fadel-YPN for UN/OCHA 2020 ANNUAL MONITORING YEMEN HUMANITARIAN REPORT FUND THE YHF THANKS ITS DONORS FOR THEIR GENEROUS SUPPORT IN 2020 CREDITS This document was produced by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Yemen. OCHA Yemen wishes to acknowledge the contributions of its committed staff in preparing this document. For additional information, please contact: [email protected] Twitter: @YHF_Yemen The designations employed and the presentation of material on this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. KEY MESSAGES Despite access constraints and COVID-19 restrictions, the Yemen Humanitarian Fund (YHF) conducted 65 field monitoring missions to 119 projects in 2020 thus fulfilling all its 2020 monitoring requirements. 56 per cent of monitoring missions assessed The YHF Beneficiary Feedback and Complaints YHF-funded projects as performing well and 35 per Mechanism was launched in February 2020 and 1,775 cent as underperforming but for reasons beyond the people provided feedback. partners’ control. The YHF made 914 recommendations from The YHF provided timely updates to cluster monitoring missions, shared them with implementing coordinators and hub managers with key monitoring partners, and followed up on the actions taken by findings upon review of monitoring reports to ensure partners to address them. that the findings of YHF monitoring can be used by the broader humanitarian community. 96 per cent of 12,302 people interviewed via Key challenges to monitoring of YHF-funded projects Beneficiary Verification Surveys indicated that they included travel restrictions, bureaucratic impediments were satisfied with services they received through and the poor quality of some monitoring reports. -
Militarized Childhood a Report on the Houthis’ Recruitment of Yemeni Children During War
Militarized Childhood A report on the Houthis’ recruitment of Yemeni children during war Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor SAM for Rights and Liberties February 2021 Contents Introduction 4 Child soldiers recruited by the Houthi group: statistics 7 Strategies used in recruiting children 10 Geographical distribution of children recruited by the Houthis 12 Tasks, punishments, and impacts related to child recruitment 13 Houthis’ child training camps 14 Testimonies of child soldiers recruited by the Houthis 23 Child victims recruited by the Houthis 31 Legal background 32 Recommendations 33 Introduction Child recruitment and use by armed forces is one of the gravest violations that Yemeni children fall victim to as Yemen has been witnessing wars and armed conflicts for several years. This phenomenon emerged in Yemen since the era of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, when the Ministry of Defense started to accept children under the age of 15 years old into their ranks. Tribal sheikhs also sent their children to war to secure their monthly salaries the government paid at the time. However, this phenomenon significantly diminished after pressures imposed on the Saleh regime, especially after Yemen had signed several international child rights agreements. On the other hand, armed groups in Yemen, especially the Houthis, sought Militarizing Childhood 4 to recruit children to reinforce their capabilities. The Houthis have been exploiting child soldiers since they waged a war against the Hajour al-Sham tribes in Hajjah Governorate in early 2012; their war on the Dammaj area in Saada governorate in 2013; and at a greater pace, in 2014, after they seized power in Yemen and the battles expanded. -
Justice in Transition in Yemen a Mapping of Local Justice Functioning in Ten Governorates
[PEACEW RKS [ JUSTICE IN TRANSITION IN YEMEN A MAPPING OF LOCAL JUSTICE FUNCTIONING IN TEN GOVERNORATES Erica Gaston with Nadwa al-Dawsari ABOUT THE REPORT This research is part of a three-year United States Institute of Peace (USIP) project that explores how Yemen’s rule of law and local justice and security issues have been affected in the post-Arab Spring transition period. A complement to other analytical and thematic pieces, this large-scale mapping provides data on factors influencing justice provision in half of Yemen’s governorates. Its goal is to support more responsive programming and justice sector reform. Field research was managed by Partners- Yemen, an affiliate of Partners for Democratic Change. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Erica Gaston is a human rights lawyer at USIP special- izing in human rights and justice issues in conflict and postconflict environments. Nadwa al-Dawsari is an expert in Yemeni tribal conflicts and civil society development with Partners for Democratic Change. Cover photo: Citizens observe an implementation case proceeding in a Sanaa city primary court. Photo by Erica Gaston. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No. 99. First published 2014. ISBN: 978-1-60127-230-0 © 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace CONTENTS PEACEWORKS • SEPTEMBER 2014 • NO. 99 [The overall political .. -
Emergency Food Assistance – Active Partners
Partners Monthly Presence (4W Map): Emergency Food Assistance – Active Partners 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 N Amran Reporting for the month of December 2020 <Sadjhg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 E 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 r r r r r r r r M Sa'ada 4 partners 4 partners e e e e e e e Amanat Al Asimah e 4 partner Amran 7 partners A E Sana’a b b b b b b b b Partners by type & volume of response WFP/DRC, WFP/SFHRP NRC, WFP/NRC, YLDF Y m m m m m m m CARE, NRC, OXFAM m WFP/IRY e e e e e e e e Partner Type Volume of Response c c c c c c c SCI WFP/CARE, WFP/IRY c WFP/IRY, WFP/SCI, WFP/SFHRP e e e e e e e WFP/NFDHR, WFP/SFHRP e 7% INGOs D D D D D D D D - - - - - - - - 4 partners NNGOs 1% s s s s s s s Hajjah s e e e e e e e e i i i i i i i i UN agency & t t t t t t t t Amran 92% i i i i i i i BCHR i partners v v v v v v v v i i i i i i i i t t t t t t t t c c c c c c c NRC, OXFAM, ZOA c Sa'ada a a a a a a a a r r r r r r r r e e e e e e e Ale Jawf st st st st st st st st u u u u u u u u l l l l l l l l C C C C C C C C 3 partners Al Maharah e e e e e e e Al Mahwit e Hadramaut r r r r r r r r u u u u u u u Hajjah u Amran 4 partners t t t t t t t Amran t Hadramaut l l l l l l l WFP/SFHRP, WFP/YFCA l u u u u u u u u KSRelief/BCHR, WFP/BCHR Al Maharah 2 partners c c c c c c c c i i i i i i i i r r r r r r r Amanat r WFP/BCHR g g g g g g g g DA A A A A A A A A ! Al Asimah . -
Yemen: Is Peace Possible?
Yemen: Is Peace Possible? Middle East Report N°167 | 9 February 2016 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. The Principal Belligerents ................................................................................................ 5 A. The Huthi-Saleh Bloc ................................................................................................. 5 1. Common narratives and shared interests ............................................................ 7 2. Latent differences ................................................................................................. 9 3. Iranian support .................................................................................................... 10 B. The Anti-Huthi Bloc ................................................................................................... 12 1. Southern separatists ............................................................................................. 12 2. Sunni Islamists .................................................................................................... -
Yemen: Coping With
YEMEN: COPING WITH TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE IN A FRAGILE STATE 8 January 2003 ICG Middle East Report N°8 Amman/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..............................................................i I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1 II. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND ....................................................2 A. COLONIAL AND COLD WAR DIVISIONS .................................................................................2 B. CIVIL WAR AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................4 C. THE ECONOMY ................................................................................................................6 D. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS............................8 1. The Presidency and Political Institutions ..................................................................8 2. Political Parties..........................................................................................................8 3. Militant Islamism in Yemen....................................................................................10 III. THE DOMESTIC ROOTS OF CONFLICT..............................................................13 A. TRIBAL CLASHES ................................................................................................................13 B. KIDNAPPING AND TERRORISM.............................................................................................16 -
The-Degradation-Of-History-English.Pdf
The Degradation of History Violations Committed by the Warring Parties against Yemen’s Cultural Property November 2018 www.mwatana.org Mwatana for Human Rights released this report with support from : Table of Contents 6 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 44 CHAPTER II: CITIES LISTED ON THE 11 LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY WORLD HERITAGE LIST 13 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 46 - CITY OF SHIBAM – HADHRAMAUT 14 - CULTURAL PROPERTY 48 - AL QASIMI NEIGHBORHOOD IN THE OLD CITY 15 - CULTURAL HERITAGE OF SANA’A 15 - TANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE 51 - AL FOULAIHY NEIGHBORHOOD – OLD CITY OF 15 - INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE SANA’A 53 - HOUSE IN THE OLD CITY OF SANA’A 16 METHODOLOGY OF THE REPORT 55 CHAPTER III: MONUMENTS 18 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 56 - KAWKABAN FORTRESS 21 RECOMMENDATIONS 58 - DAR AL-HAJAR PALACE – LAHIJ 22 - TO ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN 60 - THE PALACE OF THE ABDALI SULTAN – LAHIJ 22 - TO ANSAR ALLAH GROUP (HOUTHIS) 62 - AL QAHIRAH (CAIRO) CASTLE – TAIZ 23 - TO ANSAR AL-SHARIA GROUP AND AL- 66 - SALH CASTLE – TAIZ QAEDA 69 - AL SINNARA CITADEL IN THE A’ABLA’SITE – 23 - TO THE YEMENI MILITARY FORCES SA’ADA UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PRESIDENT 71 - AL QEFEL SITE – SA’ADA HADI AND THE AFFILIATED ARMED GROUPS 73 - TOURISTIC PIER – ADEN (THE GROUP OF ABU ABBAS IN TAIZ - AND POPULAR RESISTANCE IN THE REST OF 76 CHAPTER IV: RELIGIOUS MONUMENTS YEMEN) 77 - AL HADI MOSQUE – SA’ADA 23 - TO THE COALITION COUNTRIES LED BY THE 81 - AL MAATBIYA MOSQUE - TAIZ KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED 83 - AL-ASHRAFIYA MOSQUE AND MADRASSA ARAB EMIRATES 85 - THE MUDHAFFAR