• n the I ·United Front A reprint oJ Young Communist Bulletin No.3, 1976 Spartacist Publishing Company Box 1377 GPO, New York, NY 10116 ~X-623 i\", 0, Table of Contents On the United Front ......................... 3 based on the RCY "National Bureau Document on the United Front," 3 July 1973 The People's Front in the United States ... 8 from The People's Front: The New Betrayal, James Burnham, Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1937 On the United Front Question ............. 10 Joseph Seymour, 1974 A Talk on the Labor Party Question . ...... 13 1972 speech by Jim Robertson This pamphlet was first published in 1976 by the Spartacus Youth League (SYL), the name of the youth section of the Spartacist League/U.S. (SL) from 1974 to 1986. The SYL was previously named the Revolutionary Communist Youth (RCY) from its founding in 1971 until 1974. Second printing, January 1996 , l On the United Front based on the RCY "National Bureau Document on the United Front," 3 July 1973 he united front (UF), as embodied in the work of the democratic centralism is the appropriate form only for a early Communist International (CI) and the sub­ revolutionary party. Luxemburg's fears that the German Tsequent struggle of Trotsky for a revolutionary inter­ Social Democracy's (SPD) adoption of democratic central­ national, grew out of the experience of building the Bol­ ism would mean simply the subordination of the revolu­ shevik party. The struggle over the UF in the CI was due tionary wing of the party to the Kautskyites was well­ to what might be called the "uneven and combined devel­ founded. But it was her responsibility, while struggling for opment" of the parties and groups, especially in Western the maximum freedom within the SPD, to build a revolu­ Europe, which rallied to the Bolshevik Revolution and the tionary democratic-centralist faction within it. CI. These parties and groups had their origins in social Thus, while Luxemburg's history as a heroic revolution­ democracy (Germany, France, Italy) and often represented ary is unimpeachable (it is not accidental that our tendency the fusion of left-wing social democracy with revolutionary has adopted the name "Spartacist"), her views on party syndicalism (U.S. and France). Their schooling in social discipline, party building and the relationship between the democracy gave them a conception of the party as a "party party and the class were simply the most left-wing expres­ of the whole class," or as one of the most articulate and sion of social-democratic organizational norms. These left-wing exponents of this conception, Rosa Luxemburg, norms equated the party with the class or placed the class stated in Leninism or Marxism?: above the party, denied the necessary vanguard role of the "The fact is that the Social Democracy is not joined to the party of proletarian revolution and, hence, were fundamen­ organization of the proletariat. It is itself the proletariat." tally liquidationist. (emphasis in original) Although she was in the forefront of the fight against The UF: Class Unity and Bernsteinism which saw the transformation of capitalism Communist Hegemony into socialism as organic and evolutionary, yet, like Bern­ For the CI and Trotsky the UF had two equally important stein, she saw the transformation of consciousness within and inseparable aims:. class unity and communist hegemony. the working class, from capitalist to socialist consciousness, Flowing from the dual nature of the UF is the necessity to as an organic, evolutionary, undifferentiated process. Lux­ maintain both the complete organizational independence of emburg saw the party and class consciousness emerging the communist party"and the complete freedom to criticize organically from "the struggle itself." For Lenin the "strug­ one's temporary allies within the UF. The dual nature of gle itself," the experiences of the masses of workers, were the UF is captured in the CI slogan, "March separately, shaped both materially and ideologically by bourgeois soci­ strike together." Each participant in the UF retains its organ­ ety. From the "struggle itself" at best only trade-union con­ izational identity; agreement in the UF need pertain only sciousness could emerge. Scientific socialism had to be to the details of the specific action to be carried out and brought to, joined to, the "struggle itself." For Luxemburg, can only be reached through unanimous agreement. Another the party represented the proletariat as it is. Such a party slogan which captures the dual nature of the UF is "freedom can at best be only a party of trade unionism, of reformism. of criticism, unity in action." Organizations like the Class For Lenin the party represented the proletariat as it must Struggle League which take the definition of the UF and be if it is to carry through its historic mission of the socialist substitute it for the definition of the combat party effectively reconstruction of society. liquidate the party into the UF. This is the very essence of Thus, the common error of left-wing social democracy centrism. was the liquidation of the party into the class: The struggle for the UF at the Third and Fourth CI Con­ ..... the Social Democratic movement cannot allow the erec­ gresses represented the recognition that the post-WWI rev­ tion of an air-tight partition between the class-conscious nucleus of the proletariat already in the party and its im­ olutionary upsurge had passed over the heads of many of mediate popular environment, the nonparty sections of the its national sections because they were unable to lead a proletariat. " majority of the working class into battle for the conquest -Leninism or Marxism? of power. By the Third Congress the upsurge had already The party is seen as an "all~inclusive" bloc of tendencies begun to recede, taking off the agenda, at least for the of which the central apparatus, the party functionaries, the immediate period, the conquest of power, and placing on party bureaucracy, is seen as the most conservative since it the agenda the conquest of the masses. is the most distant from the "struggle itself," while the ranks The need for the UF flowed from the fact that the majority of the party, and even the non-party workers, are seen as of workers in most countries had gone through the post-war subjectively more revolutionary. This is, of course, often revolutionary upsurge retaining their allegiance to the the case in social-democratic parties and reformist trade reformist leaderships in the trade unions and the social­ unions, but this is precisely because these organizations democratic parties. At the same time, capitalism itself, in have merged with the "struggle itself" which, confined to the wake of the receding revolutionary tide, went on the the laws of the capitalist market, never transcend the simple offensive. It was not a question of a "revolutionary offen­ battle to exchange labor power for its equivalent, i.e., never sive" as was seen by the "ultra-lefts" in the CI, but of a transcend wage slavery. Within this context, democratic capitalist offensive that was forcing even the reformist-led centralism is seen simply as the subordination of the rev­ organizations into partial and defensive struggles to fight olutionary ranks to the conservative apparatus. Indeed, for their life, to fight simply to maintain the organizational 3 gains and standard of living they had won in the past. This to the UF call or respond only in a half-hearted way, situation placed on the agenda the need for a united workers the call can serve to discredit their authority over the non­ front against the capitalist offensive. communist workers and "set the base against the top." The question was posed to the national sections of the An important international application of the CI UF tactic CI: What was to be done in the face of the capitalist offensive was the CI call for common class action with the Second which drove even refonnist organizations to battle and inten­ International and the Vienna Union or "Two-and-a-Half sified the objective need in the proletariat for class unity? International." Negotiations for common action broke down, The majority of the CI drew the conclusion that propaganda and the Two-and-a-Half International was forced to move and agitation alone were not sufficient to break the mass to the right to prevent its membership from engaging in of workers from their refonnist leaderships. The infamy of common battles with the communists. This eventually drove the reformists, fighting capacity of the communists and via­ the Vienna Union into fusion with the Second International. bility of the communist program had to be demonstrated in While CI members who were skeptical about the UF policy action. A period in which the refonnists are drawn into considered the fusion of the Two-and-a-Half International battle, albeit in a half-hearted, partial way, is precisely the and Second International a defeat, Trotsky and other CI best time to expose their infamy through common action supporters of the UF considered the fusion to be a positive side by side with them, where the workers can measure in gain for the communists in as much as it cleared the path their own immediate experiences and struggle the fighting of an obstacle between the communists and the reformists. capacity and program of the communists vs. those of their There was no longer a third pole which claimed to be both refonnist leadership. "revolutionary" and non-communist, thereby confusing mil­ In the CI discussions a distinction was drawn between itant workers and creating obstacles in the class struggle. the "UF from above" which was an agreement reached be­ Likewise, in the late '60s, Progressive Labor Party (PL) tween communist and non-communist leaderships to carry was an obstacle between the SL and those sections of the out a particular class action and the "UF from below" which New Left which were moving leftward toward proletarian was a direct appeal made to non-communist workers over socialism.