The Who's Who of Numbers Stations
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CIA Best Practices in Counterinsurgency
CIA Best Practices in Counterinsurgency WikiLeaks release: December 18, 2014 Keywords: CIA, counterinsurgency, HVT, HVD, Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan, Thailand,HAMAS, FARC, PULO, AQI, FLN, IRA, PLO, LTTE, al-Qa‘ida, Taliban, drone, assassination Restraint: SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) Title: Best Practices in Counterinsurgency: Making High-Value Targeting Operations an Effective Counterinsurgency Tool Date: July 07, 2009 Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Author: CIA Office of Transnational Issues; Conflict, Governance, and Society Group Link: http://wikileaks.org/cia-hvt-counterinsurgency Pages: 21 Description This is a secret CIA document assessing high-value targeting (HVT) programs world-wide for their impact on insurgencies. The document is classified SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) and is for internal use to review the positive and negative implications of targeted assassinations on these groups for the strength of the group post the attack. The document assesses attacks on insurgent groups by the United States and other countries within Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan and Thailand. The document, which is "pro-assassination", was completed in July 2009 and coincides with the first year of the Obama administration and Leon Panetta's directorship of the CIA during which the United States very significantly increased its CIA assassination program at the -
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PB 34-04-4 Volume 30 Number 4 October-December 2004 STAFF: FEATURES Commanding General Major General Barbara G
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PB 34-04-4 Volume 30 Number 4 October-December 2004 STAFF: FEATURES Commanding General Major General Barbara G. Fast 8 Tactical Intelligence Shortcomings in Iraq: Restructuring Deputy Commanding General Battalion Intelligence to Win Brigadier General Brian A. Keller by Major Bill Benson and Captain Sean Nowlan Deputy Commandant for Futures Jerry V. Proctor Director of Training Development 16 Measuring Anti-U.S. Sentiment and Conducting Media and Support Analysis in The Republic of Korea (ROK) Colonel Eileen M. Ahearn by Major Daniel S. Burgess Deputy Director/Dean of Training Development and Support 24 Army’s MI School Faces TRADOC Accreditation Russell W. Watson, Ph.D. by John J. Craig Chief, Doctrine Division Stephen B. Leeder 25 USAIC&FH Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned Managing Editor (OIL) Process Sterilla A. Smith by Dee K. Barnett, Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Editor Elizabeth A. McGovern 27 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Intelligence Operations Design Director SSG Sharon K. Nieto by Michael A. Brake Associate Design Director and Administration 29 North Korean Special Operations Forces: 1996 Kangnung Specialist Angiene L. Myers Submarine Infiltration Cover Photographs: by Major Harry P. Dies, Jr. Courtesy of the U.S. Army Cover Design: 35 Deconstructing The Theory of 4th Generation Warfare Specialist Angiene L. Myers by Del Stewart, Chief Warrant Officer Three (Retired) Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelli- gence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the Military DEPARTMENTS Intelligence Professional Bulle- tin quarterly under provisions of AR 2 Always Out Front 58 Language Action 25-30. MIPB disseminates mate- rial designed to enhance individu- 3 CSM Forum 60 Professional Reader als’ knowledge of past, current, and emerging concepts, doctrine, materi- 4 Technical Perspective 62 MIPB 2004 Index al, training, and professional develop- ments in the MI Corps. -
National Cyber Security Organisation: POLAND
Joanna Świątkowska Izabela Albrycht Dominik Skokowski National Cyber Security Organisation: POLAND Tallinn 2017 This publication is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (the Centre). It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of the Centre, NATO, any agency, or any government. The Centre may not be held responsible for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication and is not responsible for the content of the external sources, including external websites referenced in this publication. Digital or hard copies of this publication may be produced for internal use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non-profit and non-commercial purpose, provided that copies bear a full citation. www.ccdcoe.org [email protected] About NATO CCD COE The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) is a NATO-accredited knowledge hub, research institution, and training and exercise facility. The Tallinn-based international military organisation focuses on interdisciplinary applied research, as well as consultations, trainings and exercises in the field of cyber security. The heart of the Centre is a diverse group of international experts, including legal scholars, policy and strategy specialists who join forces with technology researchers, all from military, government and industry backgrounds. The Centre is staffed and financed by its sponsoring nations and contributing participants. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States are signed on as Sponsoring Nations of NATO CCD COE. -
Geheimdienste
1 | 2016 Preis: GLOBAL 3,– Euro VIEWUnabhängiges Magazin der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Außenpolitik und die Vereinten Nationen (ÖGAVN) und des Akademischen Forums für Außenpolitik (AFA) Geheimdienste http://www.globalview.at ISSN: 1992-9889 DVR: 0875538 Nr.1/2016; global view cover 1/2016.indd 1 11.04.16 09:57 Mit einem Beitrag von Rudolf Hundstorfer Bitte gehen Sie wählen! Die Bundespräsidenten Wahl naht und wir möchten an Sie appellieren, von Ihrem Wahl- recht Gebrauch zu machen. Gehen Sie zur Wahl und bestimmen Sie mit, wer die nächsten 6 Jah- re unser Staatsoberhaupt sein soll. Weder das AFA noch die ÖGAVN können aufgrund Ihrer Überparteilichkeit eine Wahlempfehlung abge- ben, aber Sie zumindest bitten, Ihrer demokra- tischen Pflicht nachzukommen und wählen zu gehen. Wir möchten Ihnen hier auch einige Bücher von den Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten bzw. ein Buch, in dem zwei Kandidaten einen Beitrag verfasst haben, präsentieren. Zudem natürlich auch die Bücher unseres amtierenden Staats- oberhaupts und seiner „First Lady“. Liebe Leserin! Lieber Leser! Dear Readers! Jeder kennt ihn, viele begehren ihn, viele fürch- gehrten James-Bond-Filmen, entsprechen ver- ten ihn: Die Rede ist von Mr. Bond, James Bond. mutlich (noch) nicht der Realität, aber dennoch Der wohl bekannteste Geheimagent der Welt ist werfen wir einen Blick auf das Land, in dem ei- zwar nur Fiktion in Ian Flemmings Geschichten, ner der Nobelkarosen unseres Vorzeigeagenten, aber der Stereotyp eines „Geheimdienstlers“ ein BMW, produziert wird, und beleuchten den ist geschaffen. Gut aussehend, charmant, stark Waffenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. und den Bösewichten immer um einen Schritt Den so wertvollen Treibstoff für diese Autos pro- voraus. -
“We Will Crush You”
“We Will Crush You” The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo Copyright © 2008 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-405-2 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org November 2008 1-56432-405-2 “We Will Crush You” The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo ................................................................ 1 I. Summary ............................................................................................................... 2 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 7 II. Recommendations ............................................................................................... 9 To the Congolese Government ............................................................................. 9 To the Congolese National Assembly and Senate .............................................. 10 To International Donors ..................................................................................... 10 To MONUC and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 10 III. -
Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence
Updated December 30, 2020 Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence The Intelligence Community (IC) is charged with providing Intelligence Program (NIP) budget appropriations, which insight into actual or potential threats to the U.S. homeland, are a consolidation of appropriations for the ODNI; CIA; the American people, and national interests at home and general defense; and national cryptologic, reconnaissance, abroad. It does so through the production of timely and geospatial, and other specialized intelligence programs. The apolitical products and services. Intelligence products and NIP, therefore, provides funding for not only the ODNI, services result from the collection, processing, analysis, and CIA and IC elements of the Departments of Homeland evaluation of information for its significance to national Security, Energy, the Treasury, Justice and State, but also, security at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. substantially, for the programs and activities of the Consumers of intelligence include the President, National intelligence agencies within the DOD, to include the NSA, Security Council (NSC), designated personnel in executive NGA, DIA, and NRO. branch departments and agencies, the military, Congress, and the law enforcement community. Defense intelligence comprises the intelligence organizations and capabilities of the Joint Staff, the DIA, The IC comprises 17 elements, two of which are combatant command joint intelligence centers, and the independent, and 15 of which are component organizations military services that address strategic, operational or of six separate departments of the federal government. tactical requirements supporting military strategy, planning, Many IC elements and most intelligence funding reside and operations. Defense intelligence provides products and within the Department of Defense (DOD). -
“Why Protest? I've Got Nothing to Hide” Collective Action Against And
“Why protest? I’ve got nothing to hide” Collective Action against and Chilling Effects of Internet Mass Surveillance A Master’s Dissertation presented to the Faculty of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent and the Faculty of Social Science and Philosophy, Philipps-Universität Marburg in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Peace and Conflict Studies (International Double Award) by Dipl.-Psych. Johannes Nau Marburg August 2014 ! “Why protest? I’ve got nothing to hide” - Collective Action against and Chilling Effects of Internet Mass Surveillance A Master’s Dissertation presented to the Faculty of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent and the Faculty of Social Science and Philosophy, Philipps-Universität Marburg in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Peace and Conflict Studies (International Double Award) Word Count: 14790 Copyright © 2014 Johannes Nau This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) The content of this master’s dissertation may be used, shared and copied on the condition that appropriate credit is given to the author, indication of changes are made and the material is used for non-commercial purposes only. The full-length legal code / license can be accessed under: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode ! Acknowledgments In preparation for this thesis, I have received support from various people whom I would like to thank. First of all I want to give credit to my supervisors from Marburg and Canterbury Prof Dr Wagner and Dr Morgan-Jones for the friendly, competent and reliable supervision and support. -
Russian Intelligence Services and Special Forces
BRIEFING PAPER Number CBP 8430, 30 October 2018 Russian intelligence By Ben Smith services and special forces Contents: 1. KGB reborn? 2. GRU 3. Spetsnaz 4. What’s new? www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 2 Russian intelligence services and special forces Contents Summary 3 1. KGB reborn? 4 1.1 FSB 4 1.2 SVR 5 1.3 FSO and GUSP 5 2. GRU 7 Cyber warfare 7 NCSC Review 8 3. Spetsnaz 9 4. What’s new? 12 Cover page image copyright: Special operations forces of the Russian Federation by Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (Mil.ru). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license / image cropped. 3 Commons Library Briefing, 30 October 2018 Summary The Salisbury incident and its aftermath brought the Russian secret services into the spotlight. Malcolm Chalmers of Royal United Services Institute said Russian security services were going well beyond normal spying practice: “By launching disruptive operations that threaten life in target societies, they blur the line between war and peace”. The main domestic service, the FSB, is a successor to the Communist-era KGB. It is responsible for counter-terrorism and counter espionage and Russian information security. Critics say that it continues the KGB’s work of persecution of ‘dissidents’ and is guilty of torture and other human rights violations, and of extortion and corruption. One estimate put its staff complement at 200,000, and it has grown in power, particularly since the election of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia. -
2019 National Intelligence Strategy of the United State
The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America IC Vision A Nation made more secure by a fully integrated, agile, resilient, and innovative Intelligence Community that exemplifies America’s values. IC Mission Provide timely, insightful, objective, and relevant intelligence and support to inform national security decisions and to protect our Nation and its interests. This National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) provides the Intelligence Community (IC) with strategic direction from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) for the next four years. It supports the national security priorities outlined in the National Security Strategy as well as other national strategies. In executing the NIS, all IC activities must be responsive to national security priorities and must comply with the Constitution, applicable laws and statutes, and Congressional oversight requirements. All our activities will be conducted consistent with our guiding principles: We advance our national security, economic strength, and technological superiority by delivering distinctive, timely insights with clarity, objectivity, and independence; we achieve unparalleled access to protected information and exquisite understanding of our adversaries’ intentions and capabilities; we maintain global awareness for strategic warning; and we leverage what others do well, adding unique value for the Nation. IAL-INTE AT LL SP IG O E E N G C E L A A G N E O I N T C A Y N U N A I IC T R E E D S M TATES OF A From the Director of National Intelligence As the Director of National Intelligence, I am fortunate to lead an Intelligence Community (IC) composed of the best and brightest professionals who have committed their careers and their lives to protecting our national security. -
Sismi-Telecom» Trial
Geographic Information Systems Conference and Exhibition “GIS ODYSSEY 2016”, 5th to 9th of September 2016, Perugia, Italy Conference proceedings CYBER-SECURITY IN ITALY: ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE «SISMI-TELECOM» TRIAL Giovanni Luca Bianco, Ph.D. Ionian Departament of Law Economics and Environment University of Bari e-mail: [email protected] Bari, Italy Abstract «SISMI-Telecom scandal», as it is known in Italy, is illegal phone tapping by some people in charge of security at the Telecom Italia Company. The case became common knowledge in September 2006 because 34 people were indicted and there were 21 provisional arrests among many employees at Telecom Italia, among national police and members of the Carabinieri Corps (paramilitary police of the Italian Armed Forces) and of the Guardia di Finanza (Inland Revenue Police)». In 2010, some journalists revealed what was happening and stated that thousands of people had been secretly put under unauthorised surveillance by Telecom Italia and illegal dossiers had been created. People’s lives were monitored as well as their bank accounts; even the data banks of the Italian Ministry of the Interior were accessed. Ultimately, the SISMI-Telecom trial ended with very mild sentences between settlements and state secrets. Yet, in the information age, the SISMI-Telecom scandal can be considered “dead” only from a procedural point of view. According to the interpretation of some experts on the case, the famous law that has destroyed and ordered the destruction of those dossiers, is a suicide law because those files were all in electronic format, and of course continue to circulate and keep producing poisons. -
Application No. 28761/11 Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad AL NASHIRI Against Poland Lodged on 6 May 2011
FOURTH SECTION Application no. 28761/11 Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad AL NASHIRI against Poland lodged on 6 May 2011 STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. The applicant, Mr Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad Al Nashiri, is a Saudi Arabian national of Yemeni descent, who was born in 1965. He is currently detained in the Internment Facility at the US Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. The applicant is represented before the Court by Mr J.A. Goldston, attorney, member of the New York Bar and Executive Director of the Open Society Justice Initiative (“the OSJI”), Mr R. Skilbeck, barrister, member of the England and Wales Bar and Litigation Director of the OSJI, Ms A. Singh, attorney, member of the New York Bar and Senior Legal Officer at the OSJI, and also by Ms N. Hollander, attorney, member of the New Mexico Bar. A. Background 1. USS Cole bombing in 2000 2. On 12 October 2000 a suicide terrorist attack on the United States Navy destroyer USS Cole took place in Aden, Yemen when the ship stopped in the Aden harbour for refuelling. It was attacked by a small bomb- laden boat. The explosion opened a 40 foot hole in the warship, killing 17 American sailors and injuring 40 personnel. The applicant, considered to have been one of the most senior figures in al’Qaeda, has been the prime suspect in the 2000 bombing. He has been suspected of masterminding and orchestrating the attack (see also paragraph 55 below). 2 AL NASHIRI v. POLAND – STATEMENT OF FACTS AND QUESTIONS 2. MV Limburg bombing 3. -
Report on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services
Strasbourg, 15 December 2015 CDL-AD(2015)010 Or. Engl. Studies no. 388 / 2006 and no.719/2013 EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) REPORT ON THE DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY SERVICES Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 71st Plenary Session (Venice, 1-2 June 2007) On the basis of comments by Mr Iain Cameron (Substitute member, Sweden) Mr Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe (Substitute member, France) Mr Jan Helgesen (Member, Norway) Mr Valery Zorkin (Member, Russian Federation) Mr Ian Leigh (Expert, United Kingdom) Mr Franz Matscher (Expert, Austria) Updated by the Venice Commission at its 102nd Plenary Session (Venice, 20-21 March 2015) On the basis of comments by Mr Iain Cameron (Member, Sweden) This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy. http://venice.coe.int CDL-AD(2015)010 - 2 - TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 4 The need to control security services .......................................................................................... 4 Accountability .............................................................................................................................. 4 Parliamentary Accountability ....................................................................................................... 5 Judicial review and authorisation ................................................................................................ 6