Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War Louis Johnson, George Marshall, and Robert Lovett 1949-1952

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Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War Louis Johnson, George Marshall, and Robert Lovett 1949-1952 Establishing theFEBRUARY Secretary’s Role 2012 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War Louis Johnson, George Marshall, and Robert Lovett 1949-1952 Special Study 2 Jeffrey A. Larsen and Robert M. Shelala II Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Establishing the Secretary’s Role Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War Louis Johnson, George Marshall, and Robert Lovett 1949-1952 Cover Photos: Louis Johnson is sworn in as Secretary of Defense, March 28, 1949; President Harry Truman meets in the Oval Office with Secretary of Defense George Marshall and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, 1951. Source: U.S. Army/ Truman Presidential Library, used with permission. Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon. Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Establishing the Secretary’s Role Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War Louis Johnson, George Marshall, and Robert Lovett 1949-1952 Special Study 2 Jeffrey A. Larsen and Robert M. Shelala II Series Editors Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D. Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D. President, Larsen Consulting Group Published for the Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense by National Defense University Press February 2012 ii iii Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War Contents Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Historical Office of the Office of Foreword..........................................vii the Secretary of Defense, Larsen Consulting Group, or any other agency of the Federal Government. Executive Summary...................................ix Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Louis Johnson in Command ............................1 Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, NATO and the Military Assistance Program ................6 provided that a standard source credit line is included. The Office of the Historian to the Secretary of Defense would appreciate a courtesy copy New Threats: The Soviet Atomic Test and of reprints or reviews. China’s Communist Revolution..........................8 NSC 68...........................................13 Implementing NSC 68: The Korean War and German Rearmament ................16 The Changing of the Guard............................19 The Marshall-Lovett Legacy............................25 Conclusion ........................................30 Notes.............................................33 About the Authors...................................41 iv v Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War Foreword This is the second special study in a series by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Historical Office that emphasizes the Secretary’s role in the U.S. foreign policy making process and how the position evolved between 1947 and the early 1990s. The study presented here examines the last 4 years of the Harry S. Truman administration and a succession of Secretaries of Defense who served during the Korean War: Louis Johnson, George Marshall, and Robert Lovett. These three Secretaries took divergent approaches to meeting their mandate from President Truman in an era of increasing foreign policy and national security challenges. The study is not meant to be a comprehensive or detailed look at the Secretary’s involvement in foreign affairs. But as a member of the President’s Cabinet and the National Security Council and the person charged with managing the largest and most complex department in the government, the Secretary of Defense routinely participates in a variety of actions that affect the substance and conduct of U.S. affairs abroad. More influential at some times than at others, the Secretary of Defense has consistently been a key figure among the President’s senior advisors. Concern with foreign affairs goes to the very essence of defense and military policy. That foreign policy consumes a large portion of the Secretary of Defense’s time is not surprising. Without some notion of foreign threats and challenges, the Secretary and his staff would operate virtually in the dark when considering such crucial and contentious matters as the scale and scope of research and development for new weapons, the procurement of equipment and supplies, the allocation of resources among the Services, and the general size and readiness of the Armed Forces. Although the foreign affairs aspect of defense policy and management did not vi vii Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War typically receive much public attention in the early years of the Executive Summary Department of Defense, it has certainly become an omnipresent factor. This series of special studies by the Historical Office is part of an ongoing effort to highlight various aspects of the Secretary’s mission As the first U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal did not have and achievements. This is the second study in a nine-part series on the opportunity to lead the Pentagon under the expanded powers the role of the Secretary of Defense in U.S. foreign policy making of the National Security Act as amended in 1949. His successor, during the Cold War. This series began as a book manuscript by Louis Johnson, committed much time and effort to advance Dr. Steven Rearden, author of The Formative Years, 1947–1950, President Harry S. Truman’s goals of integrating the National in our Secretaries of Defense Historical Series. I wish to thank Dr. Military Establishment into a single, cohesive executive entity, Jeffrey Larsen for his efforts in serializing Dr. Rearden’s previously as well as of economizing national security. Benefiting from the unpublished manuscript. I also wish to thank Dr. Alfred Goldberg, National Security Act amendments, Johnson enlarged the Office former OSD Chief Historian, and Dr. Lawrence Kaplan for their of the Secretary of Defense, cut personnel in the Armed Forces, critique and helpful suggestions. Thanks also to OSD Graphics, stopped the Navy flush-deck supercarrier procurement effort, and especially Kathleen Jones, for designing the cover and formatting favored strategic nuclear forces over more costly conventional the special studies series, and to the editorial team at National forces. Defense University Press, particularly Lisa M. Yambrick, for their At the same time Johnson sought to establish the power of the support. Secretary of Defense, he also was driving a wedge between the We anticipate that future study series will cover a variety of defense Defense and State Departments as tensions grew between himself topics. We invite you to peruse our other publications at <http:// and Secretary of State Dean Acheson over the crafting of foreign history.defense.gov/>. policy. To gain an edge over Acheson, Johnson attempted to influence policy in the National Security Council and limited Erin R. Mahan Defense-State communications. While not an enthusiast of the Chief Historian treaty that created it, Johnson would play an important role in Office of the Secretary of Defense orchestrating the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, providing member states with the logistical and material support necessary to create a strong alliance. The 1949 Soviet nuclear weapons test and the Communist revolution in China triggered a recalibration in the U.S. threat perception of the Soviet Union and China. These events would push two issues to the top of the national security agenda for the Truman administration: the development of the hydrogen bomb, and the reevaluation of U.S. grand strategy. Johnson became a viii ix Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War strong advocate of the hydrogen bomb, a weapon that would help in making the Secretary of Defense a key actor in foreign policy ensure a qualitative edge over the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The making while fostering a positive relationship with the State Defense Department’s isolation from the State Department and Department. The more amicable environment between Defense Johnson’s own reluctance to participate in joint policy planning and State as well as the greater salience of security issues in foreign led to the State Department taking the lead in shaping the grand policy set the stage for the empowerment of the Secretary of strategy published in the report known as National Security Defense in the policy realm that Forrestal had sought and Johnson Council 68 (NSC 68). had fought to obtain. However, the challenges of safeguarding the defense budget and handling the administration of such a vast The requirements for containment delineated in NSC 68, coupled organization complicated the role of the Secretary of Defense, with the demand for an American response to the invasion of as did the requirement of pursuing a budget that balanced fiscal South Korea, served as the catalyst for a shift from economy to prudence with meeting national security demands. Johnson’s rearmament. This shift, along with the sharp antagonism between tenure would serve as a caution that tilting too far toward the lower Johnson and Acheson, eventually brought an end to Johnson’s end of the budgetary spectrum could be detrimental to national tenure as the second Secretary of Defense. security. Marshall and Lovett learned that lesson and strengthened the Office of the Secretary
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