Letter to Europe

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Letter to Europe LETTER TO EUROPE by Philip H Gordon In an open letter, Washington’s top Europe-watcher proposes a “new deal” to help drag transatlantic relations out of their postwar low. The future of the west is at stake EAR FRIENDS.How did it come to this? I icans and Europeans on a range of issues. The end of cannot remember a time when the gulf the cold war, the rise of US military, political and eco- between Europeans and Americans was nomic power during the 1990s, and Europe’s preoc- so wide. For the past couple of years, I cupation with the challenges of integration and Dhave argued that the Iraq crisis was a sort of “perfect enlargement, have combined to accentuate these dif- storm” unlikely to be repeated, and that many of the ferences. But we have had different strategic perspec- recent tensions resulted from the personalities and tives—and fights about strategy—for years, and that shortcomings of key actors on both sides. The never prevented us from working together towards transatlantic alliance has overcome many crises common goals. And despite the provocations from before, and given our common interests and values ideologues on both sides, this surely remains possible and the enormous challenges we face, I have been today. Leaders still have options, and decisions to confident that we could also overcome this latest spat. make. They shape their environment as much as they Now I just don’t know any more. After a series of are shaped by it. The right choices could help put the increasingly depressing trips to Europe, even my world’s main liberal democracies back in the same optimism is being tested. I do know this: if we don’t camp, just as the wrong choices could destroy it. find a new way to deal with each other soon, the dam- age to the most successful alliance in history could HAT WE need is a “new deal,” and that’s become permanent. We could be in the process of what I am writing to propose: Americans creating a new world order in which the very concept Wwill have to show some humility, admit of the “west” will no longer exist. that we do not have all the answers and agree to lis- I am not saying that Europe and America will end ten, consult and even compromise. We must accept up in a military stand-off like that between east and that even our immense power and new sense of vul- west during the cold war. But if current trends are not nerability does not mean that we can do whatever we reversed, you can be sure we will see growing domes- want, however we want. We must acknowledge that tic pressure on both sides for confrontation rather we need allies to achieve our goals, which means than co-operation. This will lead to the effective end of bringing others into the decision-making process, Nato, and political rivalry in the middle east, Africa however frustrating that process might be. On a and Asia. Europeans would face an America that no range of issues that have divided the US and Europe longer felt an interest in—and might actively seek to in recent years—from climate change and nuclear undermine—the united, prosperous Europe that testing to international law—Americans will have to Washington has supported for 60 years. And Ameri- recommit to seeking practical compromises with oth- cans would find themselves dealing with monumental ers, rather than assuming that our power exempts us global challenges not only without the support of from obligations to the global community. their most capable potential partners, but perhaps in Europeans, in turn, must respect America’s special the face of their opposition. Britain would finally be role and responsibility for global security and join the forced to choose between two antagonistic camps. US in dealing with the challenges such as terrorism Some argue that such an outcome is inevitable. But and weapons proliferation. They must acknowledge I have always thought my friend Robert Kagan’s that European integration and enlargement—while claim that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans themselves enormous contributions to world are from Venus” was exaggerated. Obviously there peace—are no longer enough, and that Europeans are real and even growing differences between Amer- need to do much more to contribute to peace and security beyond their new borders. In exchange for a Philip H Gordon is senior fellow in foreign policy studies real seat at the table, the EU should agree not to try and director of the Centre on the United States and Europe to constrain American power and instead accept the at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC goal of strategic partnership with the US. BY JOSIE JAMMET PORTRAITS 26 PROSPECT July 2004 OPEN LETTERS/GORDON I know you are sceptical. You think Americans Clinton years, but it ran the risk of authorising just have become too arrogant to uphold their side of the about any unilateral action simply as the price of bargain. Perhaps, but I think many Americans—even leadership. Max Boot, another neoconservative some in the Bush administration—are starting to writer, told us not to worry, since “resentment comes realise how costly and uncomfortable it is to try to with the territory.” He was right about that, and now run the world without allies. Iraq has been very we are the most resented country in the world. Our sobering. The mood here is very different from 2001, military power is at an all-time high and our moral when George Bush came to office with a large chip authority at an all-time low. I do not like the trade-off. on his shoulder, or from 2002-03, when Americans The response to 9/11 took this approach to an were sure that victory in Iraq would bring allies extreme. Americans felt more vulnerable than ever crawling back to us. Look at the turnaround on pol- before, and after a decade of economic growth and a icy towards the UN in Iraq. Some of those who last series of low-casualty wars, they were supremely year were trashing the UN have more recently been confident about their power. In this context, Bush begging it to help. If significant resources and com- decided he would not only change the regime in Iraq mitment from Europe were really on offer—and that but also that he would “change the world,” as he often is still a big “if ”—Americans of all political stripes put it, and most Americans went along with the plan. would be willing to make compromises to win them Bush seemed to take the attacks on America as a over. Do not forget, moreover, that America is a licence to do whatever he wanted with little regard— divided country. Many of Bush’s critics have been indeed with disdain—for the views of others. Thus calling for a more multilateral approach to foreign on Iraq, key administration officials mocked you policy for three and a half years, and the balance is Europeans for doubting the threat posed by WMD tipping further in our direction. that don’t exist. They berated There is nothing really new you for questioning whether about the sort of deal I am Saddam was working with al proposing. After 1945, Ameri- Qaeda, when he was not. can power within the west was They took your doubts about even greater than it is now, but their ability to stabilise and leaders like Harry Truman and democratise Iraq as cover for Dean Acheson realised that to your craven commercial self- win the cold war we needed to interest, when it looks as if win hearts and minds around your scepticism was well the world as much as we needed placed. Many in the adminis- to display our strength. Even as tration were not only indiffer- we debated cold war strategy ent to the alliance but actively with Europeans, we respected wanted to undermine it to their core interests in the name enhance America’s freedom of of holding the alliance together. Europeans resented manoeuvre. Our response to your opposition on Iraq American power even then, but European leaders was “old Europe” and “freedom fries.” understood that US power and leadership in the cold I know a lot of you wish that the Democrats had war was essential to success. As they face the enor- stood up to the administration more, especially on mous challenges posed by Islamic extremism, terror- Iraq. Many Democrats did express doubts, raise ism, and the proliferation of WMD, Americans still questions, and propose alternatives to war, but once need Europe’s legitimacy and resources just as Euro- the president had decided that a threat of force was peans still need American power and leadership; the necessary, most Democrats supported him. There only question is whether the two sides realise that. was a range of reasons for this—and it wasn’t just I understand your anger and frustration with political cowardice. Sure, everyone remembers the recent US policy. From the very start, the Bush team first Gulf war and all those who paid a price even a was determined to demonstrate a new style of leader- decade later for not having supported it. There was ship of the alliance. In their view, the Clinton admin- some fear of political death if one opposed the war istration had been far too deferential to allies, which and it turned out that Saddam was on the verge of a resulted in delaying action in Bosnia for two years or nuclear weapon or cooking up vats of smallpox.
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