PROOF

Contents

List of Tables viii

List of Figures xii

List of Abbreviations xv

Acknowledgements xxi

Notes on Contributors xxii

Foreword: South East Europe Means Business xxix Valentin Inzko

South East Europe: A Diversity of Perspectives on a Diverse Region xxxi

Part I Political and Legal Perspectives on South East Europe

1 South East Europe 1980–2010: A Short Historical Overview 3 Christian Promitzer

2 Europeanization in South East Europe 25 Danica Fink-Hafner and Damjan Lajh

3 Political Culture in South East Europe: The Examples of Bulgaria and Romania 51 Karin Liebhart

4 Corruption in South East Europe 87 Ruslan Stefanov and Dobromir Hristov

5 Networks and Informal Power Structures in South East Europe 109 Åse Berit Grødeland

6 Legal Certainty and the Rule of Law in South East Europe 150 Alexander Patsch

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Part II Perspectives on Economic Developments in South East Europe

7 Regional Disparities and Economic Convergence in South East Europe 169 Reinhold Kosfeld and Alexander Werner

8 Macro-Economic Consequences of the Integration of the SEE Area into the Eurozone 189 Reinhard Neck

9 Innovation Capacity in the SEE Region 207 Ðuro Kutlaˇca and Slavo Radosevic

10 Small Firms as a Development Factor in South East Europe 232 Will Bartlett

11 Direct Taxation of Business in South East European Countries 251 Christian Bellak and Mario Liebensteiner

12 Consumer Behaviour and Food Consumption Patterns in South East Europe 271 Elka Vasileva and Daniela Ivanova

13 The Transport and IT Infrastructure in South East European Countries 294 Markus Leibrecht and Mario Liebensteiner

Part III Social and Cultural Perspectives on South East Europe

14 ‘Social Capital’ in Central, Eastern and South East Europe: Methodological, Theoretical and Epistemological Debates 325 Dimitrina Spencer

15 Trends in the Western Balkan Labour Markets 356 Hermine Vidovic

16 Higher Education in Former Yugoslav Countries: Impact of the Bologna Process 376 David Crosier and Elizabeth Heath

17 Cultural Diversity in South East Europe 395 Albert Simkus

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18 Work-Related Attitudes in the SEE Region 428 Ágnes Borgulya

19 Values and Trust in Business Relationships in Former Yugoslav Markets 453 Maja Makovec Brenˇciˇc and Vesna Žabkar

Appendix: Country profiles 466

Index 490

October 19, 2011 8:5 MAC/STEN Page-vii 9780230_278653_01_prexxxviii PROOF 1 South East Europe 1980–2010: A Short Historical Overview Christian Promitzer

Introduction

In South East Europe the three decades between the early 1980s and the present day have been marked by a historical caesura, which can be roughly described as the transition from a system of ‘real Social- ism’ towards a concept that can be subsumed under the terms of ‘democracy’ and ‘free market economy’. The 1990s were character- ized by the onset of war, ‘ethnic cleansing’, mass rape and destruc- tion for a considerable part of the region. In the last decade we can finally observe the accession to the European Union (EU) of three of the region’s countries – Slovenia in 2004, and Romania as well as Bulgaria in 2007. There is also the promise of accession for other can- didates – Croatia, Montenegro and probably Serbia. Simultaneously we can also observe a shared disillusionment among the population about the achievements of the last 20 years. In the so-called ‘Western Balkans’ (Petrovic,´ 2009), state borders and the number of states did not remain the same during this period. From 1991 to 1992, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was dismembered through the recog- nition of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia (officially called the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’) as inde- pendent states. The two remaining republics, those of Serbia and Montenegro, formed the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ in 1992, which was renamed as ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ in 2003. In 2006 Montenegro became independent, while the Autonomous Province of Kosovo officially seceded from Serbia by declaring its indepen- dence in 2008. Since 1995, after the end of the war on its territory, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been an international protectorate of the United Nations (UN) and of the EU. Likewise, since the end of

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October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-3 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF 4 Political and Legal Perspectives on South East Europe the war between Serbia and NATO in 1999, Kosovo has become the second international protectorate under the auspices of both the UN and the EU. At first sight, this summary of the succession of processes and events does not allow one to see interconnections between the development paths that the region of South East Europe has taken during the last three decades. Therefore it is necessary to structure this short historical survey into several sections, in order to shed some light on important aspects of the course of events. All of the countries under consideration shared a common system called ‘real Socialism’; therefore we will have to deal with the character of this system, which in the 1980s was already in a state of maturity, not to say close to decay in terms of economy. Thereafter we will discuss the process of transition to multi-party sys- tems in the individual countries. Two sections will briefly describe the Wars of Yugoslav Succession of 1991–95 and the Kosovo War of 1999. The final section will deal with the legacies of real Socialism in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Real Socialism in South East Europe

Socialism, a once powerful economic and social system that controlled one-third of the world, has, within two decades, been transfigured under a mist of oblivion. Out of the arena of the bipolar world, the Western model of free market economy and democracy emerged victorious in a grudge match, which had allegedly wound up in the ‘end of his- tory’. Forgetfulness about the once powerful reality of real socialism may also be connected with the caesura of 9/11. It seems that the once strong memory of the apprehension caused by mutually assured destruction has faded away under the impression of the events of 2001; the latter brought along a new fear of terrorist assaults on institu- tions of the triumphant Western model, a fear that is still determining the relationship of the so-called Western world with Muslims, a small fraction of whom also lives as an autochthonous population in the Balkans. Real socialism claimed to have achieved ultimate social equity and to be on the way to a classless society. In practice, the people’s democra- cies were under the ideological hegemony of single-ruling communist parties that availed themselves of a powerful state security apparatus in each case; thus we have to speak of different nuances of police states that sensibly narrowed the freedom of action of their citizens. The Yugoslav model was the least intolerable in South East Europe, while

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-4 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF Christian Promitzer 5 the Albanian and Romanian people’s democracies had the harshest regimes. The people’s democracies had many features in common – single- party rule; the prominence role of the state security; the transfer of private ownership of the means of production in industry, trade and banking sector to ‘social property’. But their concrete manifestations could differ from each other in fundamental respects. For example, while in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania agriculture was solely organized on the base of state and cooperative property, in Yugoslavia private indi- viduals could own plots up to an area of ten, and in certain cases even fifteen hectares. The reasons for these differences can primarily be sought in the way communist parties came to power in the countries of South East Europe. In Romania, the establishment of the People’s Republic of Romania in 1948 was a consequence of the Soviet occupation of the coun- try in August 1944. Real socialism, therefore, was introduced with the bayonets of the Red Army. The case of Bulgaria was similar. Soviet occu- pation of the country took place in the first half of September 1944. Here it is also important to mention the overthrow of the govern- ment on 9 September 1944 by the communist-led Fatherland’s Front in Sofia, several days before the Soviet troops reached the Bulgarian cap- ital. In retrospect, the Bulgarian Communists would call this event the ‘socialist revolution’ in Bulgaria. Consequently, Romania up to the mid- 1960s and Bulgaria even up to Mikhail Gorbachev’s advent to power as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985 were the closest allies of the Soviet Union in South East Europe, and Bulgaria in particular followed literally all the provisions issued by Moscow. The course of events was quite different in Yugoslavia and Albania. In these two countries, which had been occupied by ‘Axis Powers’ since 1941, communist-led partisan movements gained strength over bourgeois or monarchist resistance groups at an early stage. There were no communist cadres flown in from Moscow, such as Giorgi Dimitrov (1882–1949), the former leader of the Moscow-based Com- munist International, in the case of Bulgaria – just to name the most striking example. Also, the communist takeovers, both in Yugoslavia and Albania, were different from those in Bulgaria and Romania; they happened by way of popular uprisings, though led by totally Stalinist parties. Consequently the new rulers in Yugoslavia and Albania felt more self-confident towards Moscow than their comrades in Bulgaria and Romania, and they abolished the façade of the multi-party system

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-5 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF 6 Political and Legal Perspectives on South East Europe earlier than was the case there. At different stages of history, the com- munist elites of Yugoslavia and Albania developed self-styled policies independent from advice from Moscow, although, ideologically, the two countries would run in totally different ways. Stalin’s failed attempt to subdue the victorious partisan leader Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) led to an ideological split in 1948, which would set Yugoslavia on the track of socialist self-management, through which the already nationalized means of production were transferred into ‘social property’. At least in theory, social property was controlled by worker’s councils in the indi- vidual enterprises. This new system led to the partial abandonment of central planning and to the introduction of market elements. The Com- munist Party renamed itself the ‘League of the Communists’ in order to signal its return to authentic Marxism, since this was the name of the organization in whose name Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had written their Communist Manifesto in 1848. The Yugoslav League of Commu- nists claimed to have abandoned the classical role of communist parties with respect to their identity as power-holders within the framework of single-party systems and to have adopted the role of ‘an active partici- pant during the deepening and implementation of socialist democracy’ (Popovic,´ 1980, p. 76). Simultaneously, the role of the central power was increasingly reduced in favour of those of the five Republics (Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia) and of the two autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Due to the constitution of 1974, Yugoslavia – still a federation by name – became a confederation in practice. The country was mainly kept together by the still powerful ideology of the Titoist variant of socialism and by the charismatic figure of Josip Broz himself. Albania, whose partisan detachments during the war had profited from supplies of their Yugoslav comrades, would stay devotedly on the path of Stalinism, however. For the Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha (1908–85), Tito’s split with Stalin offered a welcomed opportunity to liberate himself from Yugoslav paternalism, and the same was the case with the Soviet Union more than a decade later, after Nikita Sergeyevich Krushchev (1894–1971), then General Secre- tary of the CPSU, had openly turned away from the adoration of his predecessor, Joseph Stalin (1878–1953). Regardless of their concrete manifestations, all these variants of real socialism in South East Europe can be termed developmental dicta- torships. By their brutal policies of investment in heavy industries and of transforming the dominant rural population into a working

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-6 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF Christian Promitzer 7 class, the ruling elites wanted to rocket these predominantly agricul- tural countries (with the exception of Slovenia) to the level of mature industrial societies, even if consumption and demands for a better liv- ing standard of the masses had to suffer during this period. The people’s republics of South East Europe indeed achieved high rates of economic growth in the 1950s, and even partly in the 1960s. In the 1970s it was considered necessary to transform extensive economic growth into intensive growth, in order to stabilize these economic achievements. At that time the additional build-up of consumer industries, which had been neglected for a long time, was increasingly financed by credits from the capitalist world. Attempts to adjust to the standards of the latter, however, not to mention exceeding them, were far from satisfactory. In the case of Albania, it was the autarkic strategy that led to stagnation and to intensified isolation, particularly after the country cut its links with China, its last ally, in 1978.

Mature socialism

If we want to understand the underpinnings of mature socialism in the 1980s, we have to proceed from the fact that popular support for its individual variants differed from country to country. With the excep- tion of Croatia, where a mass movement for greater autonomy at the expense of the federation had taken place in 1971, the Yugoslav vari- ant of real socialism – at least until the death of Tito – enjoyed relatively wide support among the population under its rule. In Bulgaria, too, com- munist rule was accepted by the broad masses as long as the modest promise of improvement in living standards could be credibly upheld. If we put aside the special case of Yugoslavia, it is interesting to note that the phenomenon of dissidence, which could otherwise be observed in the case of the people’s republics of Central Europe and in the Soviet Union, did not very prominently occur in South East Europe. The lack of intellectual opposition was therefore one of the reasons why the harsh regime of Nicolae Ceau¸sescu (1918–89) in Romania and of Enver Hoxha in Albania could go on unimpeded even in the 1980s. In this period, the Romanian population suffered deeply from the austerity measures imposed by Ceau¸sescu, who wanted to assure the repayment of loans granted by the International Monetary Fund. In Albania, on the other hand, the last years of Hoxha’s personal regime became increasingly weird. Among his legacies were more than 700,000 bunkers scattered across the country – a vivid symbol of his paranoid fear that Albania could be overrun by its neighbours.

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In a widely read article, the American anthropologist Katherine Verdery (1996) described the main features in real socialism’s way of functioning. For Verdery, the bargaining of managers within the frame- work of central planning led to the ‘padding of budgets and hoarding of materials’, therefore the main traits of real socialism were those of economies of shortage (Verdery, 1996, p. 21). Since ‘the system’s mode of operation tended to sacrifice consumption in favor of production and controlling the products’, the population was engaged in acquiring consumer goods on grey markets (p. 27). The regimes tried to elimi- nate the informal economy by means of Western loans, which were to be invested into consumer industries. But informality became more and more influential and undermined the pillars of the system after ‘the 1979–80 decision of the Western banking establishment not to lend more money to socialist countries’, so that those factions within the communist elites – mostly the managers – who were in favour of economic reform gradually gained preponderance (p. 32). Verdery does not see the fall of real socialism as a necessary conse- quence of built-in flaws, but of its incapability to keep pace with the developments in capitalism. Real socialism was prepared to match itself with the Fordist mode of capitalist regulation, but since the 1970s this mode was bit by bit replaced by a more flexible regime of accumula- tion, which relied on new developments in telecommunications and in computer engineering, as well as on the reduction of costs for ‘human capital’ through the weakening of trade unions and on the increasing role of financial markets and financial speculation. This mode of regula- tion is often called neo-liberalism or post-Fordism. If the socialist debtor countries had united in a boycott of debt repayment, Verdery maintains, they could have avoided their own demise and ‘they might well have brought down the world financial system’ (p. 37) This assertion is not unreasonable, if we bear in mind the major dimensions of the financial crisis of 2007–10. But at that time the ideological aplomb of the com- munist elites was already shaken to a degree that made concerted action impossible.

Nationalism – from surrogate to leverage

Due to their increasing ideological weakness, communist power holders increasingly began to rely on different variants of what James F. Brown (2001) called ‘surrogate nationalism’ (p. 38). Originally, real socialism had claimed that it had overcome ethnic tensions that had character- ized the modern states of South East Europe since their foundation. The relationship of the communists towards nation and nationalism was not

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-8 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF Christian Promitzer 9 really consistent; they maintained that national liberation had ended with the creation of people’s republics, but in principle they never put into question the concept of nation as they had inherited it from the bourgeois period. This principle was based on the German idea of the nation as a genetic community with a common origin (Sundhaussen, 1992). Throughout the last one and half centuries, this idea was much more prone to be (mis-)used by nationalist movements than the more inclusive French model of a nation of citizens (although the latter also has its weaknesses, as the recent uprisings in the Parisian sub- urbs have shown). Even the multiethnic Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was not immune to nationalist unrest, all the more as the fed- eration increasingly became an agglomeration of six nation-states (the six Yugoslav republics) together with a seventh one – the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, an embryonic second Albanian nation-state. It was therefore only logical that the ruling classes of Romania, Bulgaria and of some of the Yugoslav republics resorted to nationalism in order to safe- guard their retaining power after they had realized that their ideological hegemony was decreasing. Beyond Albania, where the communists already practised national- ism by isolating the country from its neighbours, the ruling elites in other South East European states either stirred nationalist emotions among the population against other ethnic groups in their own polity or were engaged in assimilation programmes. Already in 1968, Romania’s Ceau¸sescu had abolished the remnants of the Hungarian Autonomous Region in Transylvania. His ensuing policies of de-Magyarization even led to a harsh protest of the ‘brotherly’ Communist Party of Hungary in 1985. In Bulgaria, attempts to merge the Turkish minority with the ‘uni- fied Bulgarian Socialist Nation’ can be observed since the second half of the 1950s. In 1984 the communist leader of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov (1911–98), launched an anti-Turkish campaign of particular intensity. It was planned that all Muslims of the country should change their names to Slavic ones, in addition to a prohibition of Turkish clothing and a ban of the use of Turkish language. In order to guarantee the sup- port of the Bulgarian population, the campaign was termed a measure of national ‘revival’. In practice this ‘revival’ led to resistance from the Turkish minority and to the brutal use of police force. Finally, in May 1989, when the clashes reached a climax and resulted in casualties, the Communist Party organized the exodus of 300,000 Turks to Turkey, of whom only a small fraction would return after the fall of the Zhivkov regime several months later. In 1981, one year after Tito’s death, the guiding principle of social- ist Yugoslavia, ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, was severely shaken; Albanian

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-9 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF 10 Political and Legal Perspectives on South East Europe protestors in the city of Prishtina unsuccessfully asked for the consti- tutional advancement of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo to the status of a formal republic under their control, since nine-tenths of the population of Kosovo was Albanian. Several years later, the alleged endangerment of the Serbian minority in Kosovo formed the main argument for the rise of the Serbian Party leader Slobodan Miloševic´ (1941–2006) as the national leader of the Serbs across Yugoslavia. Due to the ample use of nationalist populism, Miloševic’s´ claim would go undisputed by a major part of the Serbs for a long time. Miloševicfound´ his ideological base in the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sci- ences and Arts of 1986, which denounced the discrimination of Serbs and Serbia not only in Kosovo, but also in other parts of Yugoslavia. In 1988 and 1989 Miloševic´ launched what was known as the ‘Anti- Bureaucratic Revolution’, a series of mass protests against the govern- ments of the Autonomous Region of Vojvodina, of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro and finally of Kosovo. This move enabled Miloševicto´ replace the local leaderships with politicians who were dependent on him. In the case of Kosovo, this strategy meant the dismissal of Albanian politicians and the suppression of the Albanian majority for more than a decade. The only adversary of Miloševic’s´ advance was the League of Com- munists in Slovenia, which in turn had to cope with a democratic movement similar to the simultaneous green and pacifist movements in Western countries. This movement intensified in 1988, when a political trial by the Yugoslav People’s Army was held against four journal- ists, on a charge of ‘betraying military secrets’. Within a short period, the cause of the four became a national one. The show trial itself shook the pro-Yugoslav attitude of the Slovene communists and brought the democratic opposition into a more nationalist wake against the Yugoslav federalism. Miloševic’s´ strive for the control of the Yugoslav state presidency, now made possible by the changed power relations as a consequence of the ‘anti-Bureaucratic Revolution’, his handling of Albanians in general and quarrels about the distribution of the resources between the republics in the ailing federation even resulted in an eco- nomic warfare between Serbia and Slovenia. The break-up of Yugoslavia became, all of a sudden, a realistic scenario.

The transition to multi-party systems (1989–91)

In retrospect, the demise of communist rule in Central and South East Europe appears to have been consequent. Contemporaries, however,

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-10 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF Christian Promitzer 11 were taken aback by the rapidity of the transition to multi-party systems. The repercusssions of the careful steps of political and economic reform taken in Hungary and Poland in the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s will to release the East Central European countries from the Soviet grip and the prospective economic collapse put a sudden end to nearly half a century of communist rule in this part of the world. In South East Europe the first ground was broken in Bulgaria, and not – as one would have thought – in Yugoslavia, the least authoritarian polity under communist rule. After Tadeusz Mazowiecki had become the first non-communist premier in Poland and Erich Honecker (1912–94) had been dismissed as General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, in its meeting on 10 November 1989, relieved Todor Zhivkov from his post as General Secretary, which he had held for 33 years. Eight days later, the first informal organizations – the trade union Podkrepa and the civic organization Ekoglasnost – organized the first public demon- stration. The parliament consequently removed the leading role of the Communist Party from the text of the constitution. In early 1990 the first round table between the government and the opposition took place. In the first multi-party elections of June 1990, the Commu- nist Party – then figuring as the Bulgarian Socialist Party – gained the absolute majority of votes. In contrast to the change in Bulgaria, transition in Romania took a violent path. In mid-November 1989 Ceau¸sescu was re-elected as Gen- eral Secretary of the Communist Party. Although the people’s republics around Romania were falling apart and public protests in the country itself could only be suppressed by ample use of the Securitate, Ceau¸sescu managed to stay in power, at least for the moment, by referring to his policy of severe rationing, which had resulted in the successful repay- ment of the external debts. Beneath the surface, however, Ceau¸sescu’s harsh economic policy had caused widespread discontent even within the Communist Party. In mid-December, public protests and riots broke out in the western Romanian town of Timi¸soara; they were brutally suppressed by the police, which resulted in several casualties. Ensuing protests in Bucharest were supported by dissenters among the ruling elite. Thus, in the bloody revolution the protest had grown into, a National Salvation Front under the deviant communist cadre Ion Iliescu emerged as a deus ex machina. Ceau¸sescu and his wife were arrested and executed after a summary judgment. The Salvation Front established itself as the new power holder and would consequently prepare the path to a multi-party system under its tutelage.

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The development in Yugoslavia needs to be considered separately for each republic. Although the country was not part of the Warsaw Pact, the crumbling of the other people’s republics did not leave the ruling elites untainted, especially as economic crisis, national tensions and Slobodan Miloševic’s´ control of Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo had already been discussed at length in the mass media of the country. Economic transition towards a fully fledged marked economy, the introduction of a multi-party system and aspirations to transform the Yugoslav federation into a confederation formed an inextricable knot. This knot would be unravelled by military force. When the Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia met in Belgrade in January 1990, it came to a showdown between the already belligerent factions of the Slovene Communists, who demanded far- reaching reforms of the political and economical system with respect to a further decentralization of the country, and their Serbian ‘com- rades’, who argued for the status quo, in which they hoped to secure a majority for themselves. The Slovene delegates, who were outvoted, left the congress, while the remaining majority adjourned it indefi- nitely. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia had ceased to exist. Multi-party elections were organized separately by each Yugoslav repub- lic. Slovenia and Croatia organized the first elections in April 1990. The reformist Communists competed in the two countries under the new names of Party of Democratic Renewal and Party of Democratic Change, respectively. The acronym SDP should announce their defec- tion to social–democratic ideology. In both cases, these formations were defeated by the still embryonic opposition – DEMOS in Slovenia and the openly nationalist party Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) under Franjo Tudman¯ (1922–99) in Croatia. The latter would stay in power for a decade. DEMOS started to steer a stricter course with respect to Slovenian autonomy, and eventual independence. Tudman’s¯ HDZ did so, too, but apart from that it also reduced the constitutional and prac- tical role of the autochthonous Serbian minority in Croatia, which in turn caused an uprising among them and eventually paved the way for war in this republic. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the first multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections were held in November 1990. They led to a national assembly, which was dominated by three ethnically based par- ties: the Muslim or Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) – which was a local branch of the party now governing in Croatia. These parties, whose ringleaders had simultaneously won seats in the

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-12 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF Christian Promitzer 13 republic’s presidency, would form a loose coalition in order to overcome the vestiges of communist rule and to divide the country into eth- nic portions under their respective influence. Since two of the three parties – the SDS and HDZ – were prone to directives from their respec- tive ‘mother republics’, Bosnia and Herzegovina would soon be a bone of contention between Serbia and Croatia, whereby the Muslim population would become the main victim. Likewise, in November 1990 parliamentary and presidential elec- tions were held in the Republic of Macedonia. Here the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO–DPMNE) gained the relative majority, while the League of Communists of Macedonia – Party of Democratic Change and the Union of Reformist Forces (which would later become the Liberal Party of Macedonia), together, held the absolute majority and consequently formed a coalition government that would pave the way for independence of the country. The main issue of the country – as the future would show – was not so much the issue of Yugoslav succession, but the threatening of its national identity from the side of Greece. It is important to notice here that the foundation of Macedonia as a separate nation was the result of a compromise between Bulgarian and Yugoslav communists during the Second World War in order to dampen aspirations on both sides for controlling the area. But this compromise would prove to be viable, and the local Slavic popula- tion of the Republic of Macedonia accepted it very soon. The novelty of Macedonian nation-building was, furthermore, the reason for provoca- tive moves of Macedonian nationalists of the 1990s against the Greek part of the historical region of Macedonia, which in turn provoked Greek nationalism. The conflict resulted in a Greek plea, in response which Macedonia was internationally recognized only under the clumsy name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. But let us return to the developments of 1990: Slobodan Miloševic,´ seeing that he himself could not avoid facing multi-party elections, secured the parameters for his eventual victory. He merged his League of Communists of Serbia with the Socialist Alliance, a mass organiza- tion that had hitherto been responsible for the organization of elections within the single-party system, and dubbed the new formation the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). By trimming the electoral system as his last move, Miloševic´ was able to outmanoeuvre the emerging non- communist opposition in the parliamentary and presidential elections of December 1990. But with respect to further elections in the 1990s, it was mainly the boycott of the Albanian voters from Kosovo who would

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-13 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF 14 Political and Legal Perspectives on South East Europe grant Miloševic´ preponderance over his adversaries in the inner-Serbian rally until his final downfall. In Montenegro, finally, Miloševic’s´ adherents in the local League of Communists won the December elections of 1990. This party changed its name to the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro in 1991. Under Milo Ðukanovic,´ who seized the reins in 1997, the party became more flexible with respect to UN and EU demands; it consequently started to distance itself from Miloševic’s´ Serbia. This independent ori- entation, an elastic, not totally transparent handling of black market structures in the country, lucrative dealings with foreign investors in the field of tourism and the inclusion of representatives of ethnic minorities into power structures have secured this party a firm and unrelent- ing grip on power since the end of the Second World War until the present day. Due to its isolation, Albania was the late-comer in the process of transition to a multi-party system. Demonstrations against the regime started in early 1990 and went on throughout the year, despite brutal police encroachments. In autumn the regime had to accede to negotia- tions with the demonstrators. In December the Democratic Party was founded. Due to the deteriorating economic situation, the collective emigration which had started in mid-1990 increased rapidly. Supported mainly by the rural population, the regime could have won the first, elections of April 1991. But already in summer, due to a general strike, it had to accept the inclusion of the Democratic Party into government, and it also signed the Decalogue of the Helsinki Accords. Several months later, the Democratic Party left the unstable government and were in a position to easily defeat the incumbent Socialist Party of Albania (as the former Communists called themselves at the time) in the hasty elections of March 1992. Under their leader Sali Berisha, a Democrats formed a new government. However due to the poor economic starting posi- tion of the country, Berisha could not stop further emigration of the population. His rule became more and more authoritarian, which was symbolized by the imprisonment of Fatos Nano, the popular leader of the Socialist Party. Finally, due to the failure of then prominent Ponzi schemes, the ‘Lottery uprising’ in 1997 led to Berisha’s fall and to the socialists’ return to power under Nano.

The Wars of Yugoslav succession (1991–95)

The most prominent event in 1990s in South East Europe was undoubt- edly the Wars of Yugoslav Succession. The number of casualties has still

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-14 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF Christian Promitzer 15 not been finally assessed. For Bosnia and Herzegovina alone the official number of casualties ranges between slightly above 100,000, as esti- mated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague, and about 200,000, as estimated by the Bosnian govern- ment. A major part of the infrastructure was destroyed or damaged in the affected countries. The war also touched the neighbouring coun- tries of former Yugoslavia and seriously interfered with their further development. After the demise of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, none of the newly elected republican presidents or parliaments was interested in creating a new, democratically legitimated institution at the federal level. In the first six months of 1991, the republican presidents decided to discuss the future of the federation in informal talks within their own ranks. But, due to their different concepts – the notion of federation promoted by the presidents of Serbia and Montenegro, that of a con- federation, proposed by the Slovenian and Croat presidents, and that of a compromise, an ‘asymmetric federation’, presented by Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – it was not possible to reach a common standpoint. On 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. Two days later the Yugoslav People’s Army attempted to seize the border checkpoints in Slovenia but could not overcome the resistance of the units of the Slovene Territorial Defence. After ten days, the first, rather low-key war was over. In the following weeks and months the Yugoslav People’s Army retreated from Slovene territory, so that Slovenia became de facto independent. Croatia was the next site of military conflict. The Serbian uprising of 1990 had led to the foundation of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina on its territory. In spring of 1991, the first military clashes between Croatian special police and Serbian paramilitary forces took place in Plitvice and eastern Slavonia. The Yugoslav People’s Army first imposed itself as an arbitrator between the warring sides, but in the course of summer 1991 it went over to open support for the Serbian side. In autumn there was already regular warfare between the Yugoslav People’s Army and Serbian irregular forces on the one hand, and the Croatian National Guard (the later Croatian Army) and Croatian irregu- lar forces on the other hand. Serbians in the other parts of Croatia were put under pressure because of their nationality and many of them left the country; in the occupied territories the local Croatian population in turn became victim to Serbian oppressors and was overwhelmingly expelled. Towards the end of 1991 combat operations abated, since a

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-15 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF 16 Political and Legal Perspectives on South East Europe major part of the Serbian war aims – the military conquest of an essen- tial part of the Serbian areas of settlement in Croatia and the foundation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina – had been achieved. At this moment Germany single-handedly recognized Croatia and Slovenia as indepen- dent states; on 15 January 1992 the other member states of the European Community followed suit. During the following years the demarcation lines were supervised by UN peacekeeping troops, the UNPROFOR. In spite of a general arms embargo for states on the territory of former Yugoslavia, the Croatian government managed to obtain weapons via illegal channels and to train their own army with tacit help from the USA. In May 1995 the Croatian Army recaptured western Slavonia, and in early August the major part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The recapture led to a mass exodus of the Serbian population from the affected territories, only a minor part of which has returned since. The third war on the territory of former Yugoslavia took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the years of 1992–95. In early 1992, the Bosniak (Muslim) and Croat parties supported a referendum for inde- pendence, which was accepted by two-thirds of the population. The Serbs, however, who constituted the last third of the population, at the behest of their SDS party, were in favour of the retention of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the remains of Yugoslavia. On 6 April 1992 the European Community recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. Against benevolent expectations, this move did not result in ending the fighting that had already broken out. At least vis- ibly, Slobodan Miloševic´ wanted to avoid a connection of Serbia with the developments in Bosnia and arranged the proclamation of the Fed- eral Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro alone, on 27 April 1992. Consequently, all officers of the Yugoslav People’s Army who were born in Serbia and Montenegro were asked to leave Bosnia. This move did not prevent the new Yugoslav state, however, from becoming subject to severe economic and political sanctions pro- claimed by the UN, which also did not accept the claim of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be the legal successor of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Nor did it accept the new state as a member. In the meanwhile, the bulk of the Yugoslav People’s Army’s weaponry was handed over to the newly established Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, later known as Republika Srpska. With this logistic aid, the military forces of the Bosnian Serbs, together with irreg- ular forces from Serbia, were able to consolidate their territorial conquest of about 70 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mainly

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-16 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF Christian Promitzer 17 the Bosniak, but also the Croat population living in these regions, underwent immediate expulsion at best, detention, torture and mur- der in camps at worst. Many women became victims of mass rapes. This made Bosnia and Herzegovina the major venue of war crimes in Europe after the Second World War, even before the events in Srebrenica. In 1993, plans by representatives of the EU and the UN as to how to divide ethnically Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted in further clashes between Croat and Bosniak military forces, which had been hitherto united in their fight against the military forces of the Bosnian Serbs. In this year, the only result that would have a longlasting impact was the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for- mer Yugoslavia. Until 2010 the court that had its seat in The Hague had indicted 161 persons from various ethnic backgrounds. In Bosnia – after months of mutual fighting and deportation of civil population – a peace agreement between the two warring parties was achieved with the help of the USA in February 1994. The Washington Accord not only stipulated a ceasefire, but also a viable federation of Bosniak and Croat territories. In July 1995 the Army of the Republika Srpska conquered Bosniak enclaves in Eastern Bosnia that had been proclaimed ‘save havens’ under the protection of the UN. Much of the male population of Srebrenica was executed. Shortly thereafter heavy Serbian shelling of Sarajevo finally provoked an air war of NATO forces under the auspices of the UN against positions of the Army of Republika Srpska. This enabled the Bosniak and Croat ground forces, together with the Croatian Army, to recapture a considerable part of Serbian-held territories, which dwindled down to about 50 per cent. Thereafter NATO immediately terminated bombing from the air. This status quo formed the base for the Dayton Peace Accord, which once more stipulated the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was declared a polity consisting of two entities, one of which was the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the 1994 Washington Accord, while the other part was the territorially essentially reduced Republika Srpska. Since the Dayton Accord, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a pro- tectorate of both the UN and the EU; the main institution of this protectorate is the Office of the High Representative, which has far- reaching competencies. Despite many partial successes with respect to overcoming various consequences of war, the return of refugees is still not fully implemented. Those nationalist parties that started the war are still in power, or have been replaced by similar political networks. The most problematic ones are those in the Republika Srpska, because they

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-17 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF 18 Political and Legal Perspectives on South East Europe know that they would lose influence if the central powers of Bosnia and Herzegovina were strengthened in order to make the country a viable state. In any case, Bosnia’s main problem consists in the fact that clan- destine groups manipulate the ethnic segmentation of the population as a shield for hiding their own material interests.

The Kosovo War of 1999 and its repercussions for the whole region

The last military conflict of high intensity was the Kosovo War of 1999. It was preceded by the already mentioned suspension of the autonomy status of the Province of Kosovo in 1989 by Slobodan Miloševic.´ During a decade of peaceful protests, which were organized by the Democratic League of Kosovo under Ibrahim Rugova (1944–2006), the Albanian majority boycotted the Serbian elections and, relying on their own resources and on those of Albanian migrants in Western and Central Europe, managed to build up a parallel underground state that oper- ated in the fields of education, medical care and taxation. But the power relations on the ground had not been changed essentially, and the road to independence was not paved by this approach. Such an assessment established the basis for the creation of the KLA, the Kosovo Libera- tion Army, which appeared on the scene in 1996. The KLA profited from the far-reaching disintegration of the Albanian state in the wake of the Lottery uprising of 1997, which opened the possibility to acquire weapons from the stocks of the Army of Albania. Also other ‘dark’ and criminal channels were tapped in order to organize armaments for the freedom fighters. Subsequently, major actions of the KLA against the Serbian occupation took place in 1998. As an act of reprisal, the Yugoslav Army and units of the Serbian Ministry of Interior Affairs burnt to the ground Albanian villages that were considered to be strongholds of the KLA and proceeded in various ways against the Albanian civil popu- lation, which had to take shelter in the forests and mountains. This activated a cycle of violence and counter-violence, which in early 1999 led to negotiations under international supervision. The Serbian side rejected the conditions of a treaty that provided for the deployment of foreign troops. Consequently, on 24 March 1999 NATO – without being authorized by the UN – started air raids against Yugoslavia. Mean- while the Serbian forces organized the expulsion of several hundred thousand Albanians from Kosovo. The ceasefire of 9 June 1999 initiated the retreat of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. Serbia’s defeat heralded the start of Miloševic’s´ downfall. He was toppled by popular protests during

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-18 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF Christian Promitzer 19 his failed re-election as president of Yugoslavia in October 2000; some months later he was handed over to the International Criminal Tri- bunal for the former Yugoslavia for war crimes in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In early 2006, amidst the court proceedings, Miloševic´ died of a heart disease. Political change in Serbia itself was once more threatened by the assassination of its prime minister, the philosopher Zoran Ðindi¯ c´ (1952–2003), by members of criminal net- works whom he had declared war on. But even this incident did not cause a change of the pro-Western course that Ðindi¯ c´ had pursued immediately after the fall of Slobodan Miloševic.´ In Kosovo, military protection was taken over by the multinational Kosovo Force (KFOR) immediately after the ceasefire, while the civil- ian administration fell under the competencies of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The ceasefire opened the possibility for the return of both the Albanian refugees and the KLA. A considerable part of Kosovo’s Serbian minority as well as members of other ethnic groups – in particular Roma – felt endangered by these developments and fled from Kosovo. In March 2004 the con- flict between the dominant Albanians and the Serbs of Kosovo flared up for a short period, resulting in encroachments from both sides. Since then, the Serbian communities are even more isolated in their enclaves throughout the country. Due to UN-Resolution 1244, Kosovo was recognized as part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The transformation of the latter into the confederation of Serbia–Montenegro in 2003 did not change this status; nor did the declaration of independence of Montenegro in 2006, which simply transferred the affiliation of Kosovo to the newly independent Republic of Serbia. Negotiations about the future status of the province continued, but no solution could be found that was viable for both sides, since Serbia claimed Kosovo as an essential part of its territory, while the Albanian side – backed by the majority of the population – strove for full independence, which was finally declared by Kosovo’s parliament in early 2008. A division of the province that would annex to Serbia a small part in the north, mainly inhabited by Serbs, was not seriously considered. Since the end of 2008 major competencies of the UNMIK were transferred to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Since then, the manpower of KFOR, which had amounted to 50,000 soldiers in the beginning, was also reduced to 10,000 men in 2010. In retrospect, one can safely say that the Kosovo War has changed the further development of the whole region. It motivated the foundation of

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-19 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF 20 Political and Legal Perspectives on South East Europe the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which in the years of 1999– 2008 stimulated developments towards the strengthening of peace, democracy, human rights, market economy and private sector business in this part of Europe. Among the representatives of the international community, one has to name the World Bank, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as the International Monetary Fund. Another spin-off effect of the Kosovo War was the advancement of the Montenegrin attempts for independence, and – due to their official compliance with respect to the international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and during the NATO air raids of 1999 – the accession of Serbia’s Eastern neighbours, Romania and Bulgaria, to NATO in 2004 and to the EU in 2007. The clashes of 2001 between Albanian insurgents who had been formed after the example of the KLA and military and police forces of the Republic of Macedonia ended with the Ohrid Agreement, which improved the constitutional position of Macedonia’s Albanian citizens. Thus dreams of a ‘Greater Kosovo’ as a second Albanian nation- state that, beyond Kosovo, would also comprise parts of Montenegro, Southern Serbia and Macedonia had to be shelved.

Socialist legacies at the beginning of the early twenty-first century: a conclusion

With the end of the Yugoslav Wars of Succession of 1991–95 and of the Kosovo War of 1999, the brutal dynamics of the recent history of South East Europe have, at least temporarily, exhausted themselves. With this development, shared structural contexts are going to be more and more discernible for the region’s countries. A possible approach to assess the common situation in these countries in the early twenty-first century is the concept of socialist legacies or – to use another term – the notion of ‘post-socialism’, as developed by the political scientist Dieter Segert. Due to Segert, the use of the terms ‘transformation’ or ‘transition’ is misleading, since these concepts are based on the assumption that the lethal crisis of real socialism created a tabula rasa, which would have enabled energetic agents of the new post-communist elites to rebuild certain institutional contexts of the West – namely democracy and a market economy. By way of contrast, the notion of post-socialism refers to the manifold bridges between the socialist past and the present situa- tion. Continuities are the focus of this approach – continuities in social expectations, as well as in other contexts and spheres of everyday life.

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-20 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF Christian Promitzer 21

And, what is more, even if the aim of creating market economies was met, one has to admit that these new market economies function in a different way from those of the West. In this respect one has to consider the peripheral status of the countries of South East Europe within a sym- bolic and practical geography of capitalist power relations, the nucleus of which is shaped by the EU. Or, to put it in the words of Dieter Segert (2007): ‘Until now, at least, the East has not arrived in the West’ (p. 3). Today three countries of the region are members of the EU, although only one of them, Slovenia, has fully met the requirements on the base of its own economic power. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria was conditioned by political reasoning, as already indicated. This is the rea- son why these two states are regularly under scrutiny of the European Commission with respect to corruption and the rule of law. Croatia is the only other state of the region that could immediately meet most of the requirements of the EU; it would have already been a member state if there had not been longlasting negative consequences to Franjo Tud-¯ man’s authoritarian regime of the 1990s, which until 2004 prevented the country from becoming a candidate for EU accession. But there is still a considerable distance between Croatia, which is already far in membership negotiations, and the Republic of Macedonia, which was granted the status of candidate just one year later. Montenegro applied for EU membership in 2008 and was granted the status of candidate in late 2010; Serbia applied in 2009. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are listed as potential candidate countries. Membership or prospective membership pf the EU is, however, not a yardstick for the well-being of the population of the polities in ques- tion. In the territory of former Yugoslavia the consequences of warfare have caused immense economic damage, Bosnia and Herzegovina being the most affected country. Due to longlasting international sanctions and to the Kosovo War, the economic power of Serbia and Kosovo is also severely weakened. For the whole region one can, furthermore, observe a debilitation of state authority. A major part of the economic life is now taking place outside state control. This process already started under mature socialism, when the informal economy had grown into an increasingly important sector. Its consequences are corruption and private appropriation of the commons by the ruling political and eco- nomic elites, and in addition by nepotistic, criminal and nationalist networks. In former Yugoslavia these networks have come to power due to their ‘merits’ in warfare and the war economy. But in the whole region such networks are continuously produced by the underlying con- ditions of post-socialism. The Austrian political scientist Vedran Džihic´

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(2007) claims that in the successor states of former Yugoslavia – with the exception of Slovenia – ‘rentier economies’ (p. 176) are at stake. Such economies consist of distorted market relations, which are charac- terized by corruption, informal networks, oligopolies, unequal starting conditions for individual players and a weak state, which in certain economic sectors may partly profit by assuming the role of a ‘rentier state’. ‘Rentier economies’ find their highest expression in the protec- torates of Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo, where high amounts of aid money circulate; similar structures are also present beyond the former Yugoslav territory, namely in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. But we should not turn a blind eye to the investment policies of the mem- ber states of the EU either, which are mostly based upon neo-liberal logics and often concentrate themselves on the financial services indus- try, without paying attention to small- and medium-sized businesses (Džihic,´ 2007). On the other hand, foreign investment in South East Europe in privatized communal services often results in palpable price increases for consumers. Nor should we forget that foreign investments tend to use South East Europe as an extended work bench in order to reduce production costs, as the examples of Renault and Nokia in Romania show. The lack of redistribution of wealth in the face of accelerated growth, low wages, high working hours and the continued poverty of large por- tions of the population are the main reasons for emigration and for the ongoing brain drain from the states of South East Europe. This gen- eral situation features apathy, disillusionment and fears for the future as general concomitants of everyday life; it also creates two other phenom- ena that are widely disseminated in the region: nostalgia for socialism and right-wing populism. As for nostalgia, this cannot be interpreted as a political programme. Left-wing organizations with convincing pro- grammes are hardly present on the political scene; and the former communist parties, which have given themselves social democratic pro- grammes, belong to the right wing within the Socialist International. When in power, their social and economic policies do not differ much from those of the other parties. Idealization of the socialist past is therefore mostly an expression of a vague demand for social security, combined with the recollection of one’s own youth in socialism. In the absence of left-wing options, populism from the moderate or far right of the spectre has gained ground in several countries of South East Europe. Therefore, if we want to understand fully the undaunted popularity of ethnic nationalism, we also have to consider that it is still fuelled by right-wing populists who are exploiting a situation of permanent social

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-22 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF Christian Promitzer 23 crisis in order to find scapegoats among ethnic minorities and marginal groups. An assessment of the changes in South East Europe since 1989–91 necessarily needs to be ambiguous. The new freedom of movement, which was yearned for under communist rule, was soon restricted by the harsh visa regimes of the EU member countries in the 1990s. Only since December 2009 has the EU abolished visa requirements for Serbia and Macedonia; Bosnia and Herzegovina, then Albania following by the end of 2010. The introduction of a market economy only partly fulfilled the expectations of large portions of the population with respect to wel- fare and consumption. Democracy opened the chance for voting for different options, but at the same time South East Europe has become a focal point for post-democratic structures: the ideologies and practice of the competing political groups do not differ much from each other, and parliamentary decisions have lost their importance due to infor- mal decision structures within the ruling elites, the influence of foreign investors and provisions from the European Commission, which have to be fulfilled even by non-member states in order to secure their future accession to the EU. Most of the governments in the region advocate an idiosyncratic ideology, which consists of nationalism, a neo-liberal approach in economic affairs and lip-service to ‘European values’. At the same time, people increasingly turn away from political participation; many tend to idealize the socialist period, although this cannot be of practical help. What remains is an uncertain future in the backyard of the EU.

References

Brown, J. F. (2001) The Grooves of Change: Eastern Europe at the Turn of the Millennium (Durham and London: Duke University Press). Džihic,´ V. (2007) ‘Spurensuche im jugoslawischen Postsozialismus – Was bleibt?’ in Segert, D. (ed.), Postsozialismus: Hinterlassenschaften des Staatssozialismus und neue Kapitalismen in Europa (Vienna: Braumüller), 165–183. Petrovic,´ T. (2009) A Long Way Home: Representations of the Western Balkans in Political and Media Discourses (Ljubljana: Peace Institute), http://mediawatch. mirovni-institut.si/eng/a_long_way_home.pdf, accessed 20 December 2010. Popovic,´ M. (1980) ‘Bund der Kommunisten Jugoslawiens (BdKJ)’, in Trifunovic,´ B. (ed.), Die sozialistische Selbstverwaltung in Jugoslawien. Grundbegriffe (Belgrade: Sozialistische Theorie und Praxis), 75–78. Segert, D. (2007) ‘Postsozialismus-Spätsozialismus-Staatssozialismus: Grundlinien und Grundbegriffe einer politikwissenschaftlichen Postsozialismus-Forschung’, in Segert, D. (ed.), Postsozialismus: Hinterlassenschaften des Staatssozialismus und neue Kapitalismen in Europa (Vienna: Braumüller), 1–23.

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Sundhaussen, H. (1992) ‘Nationsbildung und Nationalismus im Donau-Balkan- Raum’, Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, 48, 223–258. Verdery, K. (1996) What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Further reading

Aligica,˘ P. D. and Evans, A. J. (2009) The Neoliberal Revolution in Eastern Europe: Economic Ideas in the Transition from Communism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Böröcz, J. (2009) The European Union and Global Social Change: A Critical Geopolitical–Economic Analysis (London: Routledge). Brunnbauer, U. (2007) ‘Die sozialistische Lebensweise’: Ideologie, Gesellschaft, Familie und Politik in Bulgarien (1944–1989) (Köln/Wien/Weimar: Böhlau). Breda Luthar, B. and Pušnik, M. (eds) (2010) Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia (Washington: New Academia). Ramet, S. P. (2002) Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosˇevi´c, 4th edn (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press). Ramet, S. P. (ed.) (2010) Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Todorova, M. (2009) Imagining the Balkans, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press).

October 18, 2011 13:20 MAC/STEN Page-24 9780230_278653_02_cha01 PROOF

Index

Aasland, A., 112, 145 Albania Aberg, M., 347 corruption in, 94–5 Abreu, M., 181 country profile for, 466–8 absolute β convergence, 171–3, electoral reform in, 37 180–3 qualification of legal certainty and absorption, 216 rule of law for, 163 absorptive capacity, 35, 209, 211, 218 Socialist Party of, 14 Accession Treaty, Article 39 of, 155 Albanian Muslims, 400 Albanian Orthodox, 400 accountability, 37 Albanian Railway Network, achievement, 445–6 312–13 acquis communautaire, 35, 51, 159 alcohol, 282 Acs, Z., 232 Alder, J., 151 2005 Action Plan, 37 Alesina, A., 192 active labor market policies (ALMPs), Ali, M., 142 370 Allied Forces, 59 Adam, F., 331, 347 Almond, G., 52–3, 76 adaptive Europeanization, 30 amnesia, systematically supported, 72 Additional Protocol to the Council of Anderson, J. C., 456 Europe Criminal Law Convention Andreev, S. A., 79 on Corruption, 96 Angelusz, R., 331, 335, 337 adjustable exchange rates, 196 Anglo-Saxon legal system, advertising, 273 150, 151 age, 358, 435 Annual Corruption Perception Index aggregate demand curve, 190 (CPI), 88–9, 92, 97, 100, 103 aggregate supply curve, 190 Anselin, L., 173 Ágh, A., 30, 43, 51, 76 anti-Bureaucratic Revolution, 10 Agion, P., 296, 317 anticipatory Europeanization, 29 agreements anti-corruption policies, 89, 92 anti-homosexual attitudes, 417 collective, 435 anti-Semitism, 66 Europe, 29, 34 Antonescu, I., 66–7, 72 Ohrid, 20 Arandarenko, M., 366–7 Partnership and Cooperation, 37 aristocracy, 279 Stabilization and Association, 29, 36 Army of the Republic of Bosnia, 16 agricultural employment, 356 Army of the Republika Srpska, 17 Aidis, R., 240 Arnauld, A., 151–2 Aidt, T., 245 Arts, W., 450 Ajani, G., 142 Aschauer, D., 299 Akaike information criterion (AIC), Ashdown, P., 243 182–3 Askegaard, S., 285 Alas, R., 435 Aslund, A., 113

490

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-490 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 491 assessment methods, 155, 344, 385–6 behaviors asymmetric federation, 15 of consumer, 274–6, 279 Attack Politic Party (ATAKA), 62, 63 general food, 280 attainment levels of education, 361 product-related food, 280 attitudes, 428–9 Bektashi, 411 anti-homosexual, 417 Belev, B., 101 divergence’s in, 429 Belk, R., 272–3 on gender roles, 418 Bellak, C., 251–69, 294, 298, 314 general food, 280 Bénassy-Quéré, A., 298 personal, 435 benefits, childcare, 446 Audretsch, D. B., 232 Bénéï, V., 336 Austro-Hungarian Empire, 66, 112, Bengston, R., 47 135 Bennathan, E., 300 Autengruber, C., 51, 70, 73–4 Berdahl, D., 336 authoritarianism, 408, 409 Berend, I. T., 59 authoritarian royal dictatorship, 59 Bergling, P., 137 Autonomous Province of Kosovo, 9 Berisha, S., 14 Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATPs), Berrer, H., 203 37 Bertelsmann Institute, 157, 158 autonomy, 401 Bertelsmann Stiftung, 160, 161 awakeners movement, 58 Bertelsmann Transformation Index Axis Powers, 5, 59, 67 (BTI), 156–7 Bertschi, C. C., 146 Bácovic,´ M., 185 Bessarabia, 67 Baeva, I., 64 beverages, 281–2 Baker, W., 406 big-bang enlargement, 33 Baldwin, R. E., 252 Bjornskov, C., 346–7 Balkan Peninsula, 58 Blois, K., 457 Balkan Wars, 59 Blonigen, B., 257 Ballinger, P., 395 Blue Coalition, 63 Bánáti, D., 285 Boc, E., 70, 71 bank credit, 244 Bohle, D., 26 banks, commercial, 244 Bohnec, D., 191 Baptists, 65 Bohr, N., 389 Barba Navaretti, G., 315–16 Boia, L., 64–7, 78 Barbu, M., 277 Boissevain, J., 336 bargaining powers, 130 Bojicic-Dželilovic, V., 368 Barnes, J. A., 335 Bologna Declaration, 380 Barnes, S. H., 52, 56–7 Bologna Process Barro, J., 171–2 impact of, 378–9 Barro, R. J., 296, 299 misunderstanding, 382–4 Bartlett, W., 232–48 objectives of, 377–8 Basescu,ˇ T., 70, 72 Borgulya, Á., 428–51 basic food needs, 281 Boris III, 59 Basileus, 388 Borissov, B., 63 Bateman, M., 341 Borowski, J., 193 Baturo, A., 260–2 Börzel, T. A., 25, 29

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-491 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 492 Index

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 110 Socialist revolution in, 5 Army of the Serbian Republic spirits in, 57 of, 16 Bulgarian Empire, 58 Bosniak–Croat Federation of, 17 Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 57 corruption in, 95–6 Bulgaria Socialist Party (BSP), 9, 11, country profile for, 468–9 59–61 Federation of, 17, 246 Burawoy, M., 336, 339 ICTY, cooperation with, 37 bureaucracy, 261 motorway in, 313 Buscaglia, E., 99, 104 qualification of legal certainty and businesses rule of law for, 161 cooperation in, 462 Botric, V., 366 credit to, 244 Bougarel, X., 326, 336–7, 339–41, cycle synchronization in, 191 346 determinants for, 434 Bourdieu, P., 325, 334 incorporated, 236 Bracewell, W., 395 law legislation in, 155 brain drain, 356 networks of, 135 Brajdic-Vukovi´ c,´ M., 408, 413 R&D expenditures in, 211–12 brand commitment, 273 regulatory policies in, 238 Breuss, F., 191 relationships within, 457, 460 Bridger, S., 336 tax rates for, 243, 251–2 Bringa, T., 336, 339 Buttle, F., 456 broad band, 213, 304, 311 buyer-driven networks, 228 Broadman, H. G., 227 buyer-driven value chains, 227–8 brotherhoods, 119 Bytyqi, H., 284 Brown, J. F., 8 Bytyqi, N., 284 Broz, J., 6 Byzantine Empire, 58 Brück, F., 441 Brunwasser, M., 59 café culture, 109 Brussels European Council, 38 Calderón, C. A., 299, 317 Bucharest, 71 Canning, D., 300 Büchsenschütz, U., 169, 174 capability innovation, 216 Buhr, W., 294–6, 317 capacities Bukovina, 67 of community, 335 Bukvic,ˇ V., 239, 243 innovation, 208, 209, 220, 222 Bulgaria knowledge generation, 213, 218, Central Committee of the 223 Communist Party of, 11 national innovation, 220 Communist Party of, 5, 59 capital/capitalism, 8, 279, 342 corruption in, 92–3 gross fixed, 193 country profile for, 470–1 human, 296, 428 cultural revival in, 58 knowledge, 209 de-Stalinization process in, 59 neoliberal model of, 26 EU enlargement in (2007), 34–5 network, 335 Golden Age of, 58 social, 295, 325–6, 334, 339, 341 government of, 59 soft view of, 343 political culture in, 53–64 in stock market, 216 qualification of legal certainty and venture, 221 rule of law for, 159 capitalist economy, 33

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-492 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 493 cardiovascular diseases, 283 clientelism, 63 Carol I, 66 clubs, 119

Carol II, 66 coefficient of variation (CVu), 170 Ceausescu, N., 7, 9, 11, 67–8 Cohen, A., 336 Cellarius, B. A., 334 Cold War, 26, 28, 42, 207, 334 Cemrek, M., 51–2, 57 Coleman, J. S., 325, 334, 336 Center for the Study of Democracy, 89 collective agreements, 435 Central and Eastern European collective dismissals, 369 Countries (CEECs), 256, 260, 267, collective perception of culture, 457 298 collectivist values, 274 informal networks in, 335–41 Colton, D., 272–4 main themes in study of, 334–46 commercial banks, 244 social capital in, 330–4 commercial intermediaries, 346 Central Committee of the Communist commercialization, 301–3 Party of Bulgaria, 11 commercial law, 153 Central Europe, EU enlargement in Commission for the Analysis of (2004), 31–4 Communist Dictatorship in Central European Exchange Program Romania, 72 for University Studies (CEEPUS), commitment, 457 388 brand, 273 Central European legal system, 150 mutual, 432 Central Powers, 59 common law, 150 Cerjak, M., 284 Communism, 27, 29, 66–7, 112, 116, certainty of the law, 151 234, 271 certezza del diritto, 151 Communist International, 5 ceteris paribus, 253, 266, 294, 296–7 Communist Manifesto (Marx and character assessment, 344 Engels), 6 Chary, F. B., 59 Communist Party, 6, 9, 11, 67, 71 Chavdarova, T., 109 of Bulgaria, 5, 59 Chêne, M., 101 of Hungary, 9 Cheng, L. K., 298 of Slovenia, 10, 12 Cheshire, L. G., 325 of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 5 child care, 418, 446 Communist Socialist Labour Party Chiveralls, K. R., 326 (PSM), 69 choices community capacity, 335 beverage, 282 competition, 208, 216, 232, 246, 435 consumer behavior, 274–6 composite infrastructure index, 298 food, 283 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, Chong, A., 317 62 Christianity, 57–8, 65 concessions, 92 Cicic, M., 275, 279–80 conditional β convergence, 182 Ciobanu, C., 143 conflicts Ciorbea, V., 69 domestic, 111 circles, 119 of interest, 93 Citizens for the European at work, 444 Development of Bulgaria (GERB), Constantin, D.-L., 69 63 Constantinescu, E., 69 citizenship, 283 Constitutional Court, 70, 94 civil society, 329 construction industry, 371

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-493 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 494 Index consumer behavior and food of vegetables, 280 consumption patterns, of wine, 282 271–8 contemporaries, 10 cultural aspects of, 274–8 continuity culture of, 280–3 of ethnic groups, 66 ethnic aspects of, 274–8 historical, 339 European ‘food culture,’ continuous vocational training (CVT), convergence with, 285–6 213 family role in, 277–8 convenience foods, 281 general, 280–1 cooperation and verification health-related, 283 mechanism (CVM), 92, 155 of individual, 283–5 cooperative firms, 234 luxury product consumption, as Copenhagen Criteria, 27, 31–2, status symbol, 43, 51 278–80 coping strategies, 281 product nationality, induced by, Coretchi, I., 314 274–7 corporate income tax (CIT), 252–4, product-related, 281–3 261, 263, 266 social class, as status symbol, 278–80 Corridor 10, 313 sustainable, 286–8 corruption, 63, 87–106, 245 in transitional economies, 272–4 current situation of, 89–92 consumer cultures in transitional economic development and, link economies, 272–4 between, 99–101 consumer ethnocentrism, 275–6 in EU candidate and potential consumer materialism, 276 candidate countries, 94–9 consumer of foods as individual, in EU member states, 92–4 283–5 gray economy and, link between, consumer price index, 216 101–3 consumers measurement of, methodological choice behaviors of, 274–5, 276 approach for, 88–9 knowledge of, 273 organized crime and, link between, luxury, 279 101–3 of luxury goods, 279 trade and, link between, 103–5 of milk, 284 Corruption Monitoring Systems patterns of, 277 (CMS), 89 product knowledge of, 273 cosmopolitanism, 406 product perceptions of, 277 Coulter, R., 272–3 services for, 234 Council of Europe (CE), 29, 43 consumption, 272–3, 278–9 Council of Europe Development Bank alcohol, 282 (CEB), 312 beverage, 281 country law assessments, 155 of fresh fruit, 280 Craciun,˘ L., 277 government, 299 craft firm, 236 luxury, 279 Crampton, R. J., 58–60 patterns of, 283 credit of prepared food, 281 bank, 244 of processed food, 281 to businesses, 244 sustainable, 286–8 domestic, 216 trends in, 280 Creed, G., 278

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-494 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 495

Creed, G. W., 336–8 Cuza, A. I., 66 crime, organized, 92, 103 Cyrillic alphabet, 58 criminal networks, 102 Czaplinski,´ W. A., 147 Croatia, 36 Cuˇ ckoviˇ c,´ N., 232, 238 corruption in, 96 country profile for, 472–3 Dabrowski, M., 195 qualification of legal certainty and Dacians, 65–6 rule of law for, 160–1 Dahl, R., 31 Roman Catholicism in, 400 dairy products, 284 Croatian Army, 15, 16, 17 Deimel, J., 61 Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), De la Fuente, A., 299–301 12–13 Damijan, J. P., 455 Croatian Employment Service, 366 De Mooij, M., 456 Croatian National Guard, 15 DeMooij, R., 266–7, 269 Crompton, R., 418 de Nève, D., 74 cross-border investment, 253, 256–7 Danis, W. M., 445 domestic, 257 Das, V., 339–40 inward, 256–7 Daskalov, R., 58 tax rates on, 256–9 data limitations, 358 cross-ethnic groups, 414 Davies, R. B., 257 cross-national ethnic groups, 414 Dawisha, K., 76 Crvenkovski, B., 121 Daxner, M., 380 cultivation of land, 281 Dayton Peace Accord, 17 cultural determinants, 434 Decalogue of the Helsinki Accords, 14 cultural diversity, 395–425 decentralized higher education economic development, based on, institutions, 386 405–9 decision-making, informal, 109 in ethnic groups, 396–405 Decree 56, 234 main bases of, 396–405 deep and comprehensive free trade social development, based on, area (DCFTA), 37 405–9 de facto coalition, 69 cultural diversity surveys demand, 209 analyses on, in previous, 409–14 aggregate curve of, 190 comparisons on, 414–24 for innovation, 216–18 in Western Balkans, 410–24 for R&D, 216–18 cultural openness, 275–6 side effects of, 190 culture, 274 see also supply and demand aspects of, 342 demand shock, 196–7 Bulgaria, revival of in, 58 democracy, 3, 23, 112 café, 109 building of, 27 collective perception of, 457 parliamentary, 59 fatalistic type of, 71 performance of, 55–6 individual perception of, 457 political structure of, 56 matters of, 53 promotion in, 26 political, 52–3, 273 socialist, 6 public, 340 Western, 333–4 traditional political, 53 Democratic League of Kosovo, 18 Curtis, K., 285 Democratic National Salvation Front Cutura, M., 275 (FDSN), 68

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-495 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 496 Index

Democratic Party, 14 divergence’s in attitudes, 429 of Italy (PD), 68, 70 diversity, 430 of Socialists of Montenegro, 14 see also cultural diversity Democratic Union for Integration divorce, 420 (DUI), 126 Djindjic, Z., 39, 125 Democratic Union of Hungarians in Dmitrovic,´ T., 275–6 Romania (UDMR), 68–9 doctorate graduates, 221 democratic values, 55 domestic conflict, 111 democratization, 92 domestic corporate income in SEEC’s, Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB), 254–6 63 domestic credit, 216 demographic characteristics/variables, domestic cross-border EATR, 257 275, 409 domestic direct investment, 261 DEMOS, 12 domestic political mechanics, 27 Depoliticizing Development: The World domestic product appraisal, 276 Bank and Social Capital (Harriss), domestic purchase bias, 275, 276 329 domination, 401 deregulation, 302 donor organizations, 388 determinants, 434 Döring, T., 173, 274 deus ex machina, 11 double taxation, 257, 259 development innovation, 220 Douglas, M., 52 Devereux, M. P., 253–6, 259 downstream integration, 208, 227 devotion, 435 Drace-Frances, A., 395 Diamond, L., 76 Dreher, A., 101 Dicey, A. V., 150 drinking habits/patterns, 280–2 dictatorship, 59 drunkenness, public, 282 diet, 280, 283 Dubois, B., 279 diffusion, 209, 213–16, 223 Ðukanovic, M., 14 activities for, 216 Dunn, E., 336–7 capacities of, 213, 218 Duquesne, P., 279 of innovation, 213 Dwyer, F. R., 456 DiFranceisco, W., 112 dynastic socialism, 67 Dijk, J. Van, 100, 101 Džihic,´ V., 22 Dimitrov, G., 5, 59 Ðindic,´ Z., 19 Earle, J. S., 237 Diploma Supplement, 382 Easterly, W., 299 direct business taxation, 251, 252 Eastern Bloc, 59 direct investment, domestic, 261 Eastern Partnership (EaP), 31, 43 direct job creation, 370 Eckey, H., 171–2, 185 direct taxation of business, 251–69 Economic and Monetary Union FDI, 263–7 (EMU), 192 firms viewpoint of, 252–3 economic catch-up, 207 governments viewpoint of, 252 Economic Commission, 43 recent developments and current economic crisis, 371–3 trends of, 254–63 economy role of, 252–3 capitalist, 33 discontinuity, 339 catching-up, 207, 218 diseases, 283 crisis, 379 Ditchev, I., 57 determinants of, 434

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-496 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 497

development of, 99–101, 236 endowment in infrastructure, 294, entrepreneurial, 233 297, 299, 300–1, 303 freedom in, 3, 104, 184–5 Engel, C., 6, 194 growth performance in, 299 enlargement, big-bang, 33 imperialism of, 327 Entente Powers, 66 individualism in, 336 Enterprise Law, 234 informal, 365 enterprises liberalization in, 237, 378 large, 234–5 managed, 232–3 multinational, 252, 253, 263 moral, 336, 338 private, 234 planned, 59 small and medium-sized, 233–5 rationality in, 327 enthusiasm, 333, 334 rentier, 22 entrepreneurial economy, 233 ECTS, 382 entrepreneurship, 236–7, 261, 342, Ederveen, S., 266–7, 269 345, 435 education, 406, 409, 435 equal treatment, 442 attainment levels of, 361 Erasmus Mundus, 388 secondary, 368 Erasmus programme, 384 see also higher education ethnic groups/ethnicity, 399, 409, 414 Edwards, R., 326 affiliation with, 276 Edwards, S., 194 cleansing of, 413 effective average tax rates (EATRs), continuity of, 66 255–7, 266 cultural diversity in, 396–405 efficiency, 252 exclusionism in, 409, 413, 423 Égert, B., 299 intolerance of, 413, 423 Ekoglasnost, 11 minorities within, 397, 430 Elbasani, A., 43 status of, 435 elected representatives, 128 electoral reform, 37 systems of, 274 Ellingsen, T., 413 tolerance of, 413–14, 422–4 Ellis, R., 51–3 unemployment of, 366 Elsner, K., 285 ethnocentrism, 275–6, 277 Emerson, M., 192, 198 ethnographic approach, 345 employee layoffs, 435 Euro Area (EA) enlargement, 180–3, employees, see work/workers 185, 193, 196, 198, 201–2 employment analysis of, 195–7 agricultural, 356 EMU accession, theoretical female, 358 arguments on, 190–4 growth of, 236, 356 macro-economic consequences of, incentives for, 370 189–204 industrial, 356 quantification and, 201–4 informal, 367–8 in Slovenia, 197–201 involuntary, 367 Eurobarometer 69 (2008), 56 male, 358 Eurobarometer 70 (2010), 54, 56 private sector, 357 Europe Agreements (EAs), 29, 34 rates of, 358–62, 434 European Bank for Reconstruction Employment Protection Legislation and Development (EBRD), 20, (EPL), 368 153, 155, 302, 312–14 empowerment, 335 Transition Report, 155, 246

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-497 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 498 Index

European Central Bank (ECB), 190, legal certainty and rule of law, 199–200, 201 monitoring of qualification of European Charter for Small in, 155–6 Enterprises, 246 politics in, 25 European Commission, 21, 23, 43, 62, R&D in, 223, 227 70, 87–8, 92–3, 152–3, 155–6, EU member states 159–61, 246, 312, 389 corruption in, 92–4 European Community (EC), 16, 26, qualification of legal certainty and 33, 152 rule of law, current status of for, European Council, 33, 34, 38 158–60 European Court, 151–2 EU nonmember states European Credit Transfer and corruption in, 94–9 Accumulation System (ECTS), qualification of legal certainty and 384–5 rule of law for, 160–4 EU’s policies European ‘food culture,’ 285–6 development trends in, 38 European Free Trade Association on EU enlargement, 30–8 (EFTA), 69 in Moldova, 37 European Higher Education Area in Western Balkans, EU’s (EHEA), 383–4, 385, 390 conditionality for, 35–7 European Innovation Scoreboard European Union Rule of Law Mission (EIS), 220–1 in Kosovo (EULEX), 19 European Investment Bank (EIB), 20, European Union Statistics Office, 174 312–14 European Values Study (EVS), 23, 407, Europeanization, 25–44 436 adaptive, 30 Europe 2020 strategy, 389, 390 anticipatory, 29 Euro System, 190 broad concept of, 27 Evans, G., 426 domestic factors for, 38–42 Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM-II), EU’s policy towards South East 191, 200 Europe, 30–8 exchange rates, 192–4, 196 international community and, role exchange relationships, 342 of (extra-EU), 42–3 exclusionism, 409, 413–14, 423 of R&D, 225 Extended Credit Facility, 37 European Monetary Union, 158 Extended Fund Facility, 37 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), external finance, 239 27, 37 externalities, 172–3 extramarital sex, 417 European Parliament, 35 European Patents Office, 211, 218 Faculty of Economics, University of European Research Area, 224 Ljubljana (FELU), 453 European Social Survey (ESS), 408–10 Fagerberg, J., 207 European System of Central Banks familism, 342 (ESCB), 190 family farm food products, 285 European Union (EU) family holidays, 446 acquis communautaire, 51 family life, 446 enlargement of, 30–8 family networks, 341 Erasmus programme, 384 family role in consumer behavior, integration in, 227 277–8

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-498 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 499 fast food restaurants, 281 home production of, 281 fatalistic type of culture, 71 organic, 284 Fatherland Front Government, 59 patterns of, 283 Fatherland’s Front, 5 prepared, 281 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 3, 16, processed, 281 19, 20 retailers of, 281 federation, asymmetric, 15 see also consumer behavior and food Federation of Bosnia, 17, 246 consumption patterns Feick, L., 272 Ford, D., 457 Feira European Council, 38 Fordism, 8 female employment, 358 foreign actors, 346 Ferguson, J., 340 foreign direct investment (FDI), Fernald, J., 299–301 263–7 Fidrmuc, J., 195 economic rationale of, 263 finance-first view, 239 impact of taxes on, 266–7 financial security, 439–40 measurement of, 263–6 financial system foreign R&D, 225 external, 239 formal infrastructure, 296 neutrality in, 252 formal institutions, 337 security within, 439 formal labor market, 367 Fine, B., 325–30, 347 Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Fingleton, B., 173 Macedonia, 13, 20, 21, 27, 36 Fink, G., 442 corruption in, 96–7 Fink-Hafner, D., 25–47 country profile for, 474–5 First Bulgarian Empire, 58 higher education in, 376–93 First World War, 59, 66, 401 trust in business relationships in, Fish,S.M.,41 453–64 fixed broad band, 213 values in business relationships in, flat rate taxes, 260–1 453–64 personal income, 262 Freeman, C., 208 policies for, 260–1 free market economy, 3 in regimes, 243–4 freight transport efficiency, 311 revolution for, 260 Frenkel, J. A., 191 system of, 261–2 Frey, R. L., 294, 297, 302, 317 Florida, R., 430 Fritsch, M., 297 Florkowski, W., 282 fruit preserves, 281 flow value, 265 fruits, 280–1 Foca-Hum Road, 313 Fuchs, D., 52, 55–6 FOCUS-BALKANS: Food Consumer Fukuyama, F., 341–3 Sciences in the Balkans project, Fuller, C. J., 336 281 foods Gabanyi, A. U., 68–71, 79 basic needs for, 281 Gabriel, O. W., 52, 56 behavior towards, 280 Galichnik lobby, 126 choice of, 283 Gambetta, D., 341 consumption of, 286 Ganesan, S., 457 convenience, 281 Ganev, V., 337 for diet, 280, 283 Gativa, E., 34–5 genetically modified, 285 gay relationships, 417

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-499 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 500 Index

Geertz, C., 76 gray economy and corruption, gender, 435 101–3 gender roles, 409, 418 Greater Kosovo, 20 in Western Balkans, 411–12, Greater Romania Party (PRM), 69 417–20 Great Recession, 200 gender traditionalism, 409, 410, Greskovits, B., 26 419 Griffith, R., 253, 255 general food behavior and attitudes, Grødeland, Å. B., 109–47 280–1 Grönroos, C., 457 generalization, 396 Grootaert, C., 326 generalized trust, 345, 346 gross domestic product (GDP), 89, generic assessment, 344 99–101, 112, 199–201, 211, 213, generous holidays, 446 221, 261, 298–9, 356, 371, 407, genetically modified foods, 285 437 Ger, G., 272–3 gross fixed capital, 193 German Bertelsmann Foundation, 156 Gross National Income, 236 German Reich, 67 gross regional product (GRP), 169, Germany, Socialist Unity Party of, 11 170–1, 176, 177, 180–1, Ginarte, J. C., 229 183, 184 Gini index, 177, 180 group harmony, 447 Giordano, C., 346 Grupe, C., 435 Gitelman, Z., 112 Grupp, H., 229 Gjonbalaj, M., 289 Guineva, S., 64 Glaser, E. L., 428 Gulyás, E., 288 globalization, 336, 340, 377, 462 Gupta, A., 336, 340 Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs, 336 Haber, G., 195, 204 goals of relationship, 456 Habsburg, 158 Godhino, M. M., 207 hackademia, 328 Goetz, H. K., 25, 28, 46 Hackfurth, O. M., 74 Goev, V., 102 Haerpfer, C., 52 Golden Age of Bulgaria, 58 Hahn, J., 431, 435 Goodspeed, T., 298 Hall, R., 259 Gorbachev, M., 5, 11 Hall, St., 53 Gorenje, 462, 463 Halpern, J. M., 339 Goschin, Z., 184 Hanley, E., 237 Governance Indicator, 88 Hann, C., 237 government Hannover, B. G., 65, 78 of Bulgaria, 59 Harris, F., 418 consumption by, 299 harmony, 442, 447 infrastructure, role in, 295–7 Harrison, L. E., 53 investment in, 299 Harriss, J., 326, 329, 342–5, 347 Grabbe, H., 26 Hartmann, M., 285 graduation statistics, 382 Hashi, I., 245 Graf, R., 65–7 Haukkala, H., 43 Graf Lambsdorff, J., 99 health insurance, 364 Gramlich, E. M., 296 health-related food behavior and Granovetter, M., 335 attitudes, 283 Gray, J., 260–2 hedonists, 279

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-500 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 501

Heinen, A., 65 Hoti, A., 370 Helsinki Group, 51 Household Budget Survey Heritage Foundation, 184 (HBS), 367 Herzfeld, M., 336 household size and structure, 435 High Court of Cassation and Justice, House, J. R., 456 160 Howard, E., 281 higher education Hoxha, E., 6, 7, 401 assessment methods for, 385–6 Hristov, D., 87–106 cultural impact of, 379 Huber, P., 365 in former Yugoslavia, 376–93 Hulten, C. R., 300–1, 317 laws of, 384 human capital, 296, 428 reform efforts in, 381–2 human development, 38–9 regeneration of, 380–1 Human Development Index (HDI), 38, staff in, 377 100, 407–8 high-expectation entrepreneurs, 237 human relationships, 442 high human development, 38 human resource development, 360 high trust system, 343 Humphrey, C., 336 Hillion, C., 44 Hunt, S. D., 454, 456 Hilly, M.-A., 348 Hirschman, A. O., 294 Huntington, S., 52 historical continuity, 339 Huntington, S. P., 53 historical determinants, 434 Hungarian Empire, 112 historical overview (1980–2010), Hungary 3–23 Communist Party of, 9 Kosovo War of 1999, 18–20 country profile for, 476–7 multiparty systems, transition to, Husic, M., 279–80 10–14 nationalism, 8–10 identity socialism, 4–8 ‘blueprints’ of, 53 socialist legacies, 20–3 economics of, 336 Wars of Yugoslav Succession, 14–18 national, 276 Hix, S., 46 Iglic,´ H., 244, 247 Hodson, R., 413 Iliescu, I., 11, 68–9, 72 Hofstede, G., 454, 456 Iliev, I., 336 Hoggett, P., 232, 237 immigration status, 435 holidays, 446 imperialism of economics, 327 Holocaust, 65, 72 Holzmüller, H., 276 incentives Holzner, M., 296, 299, 303, 306, 308, assessment of, 344 312, 317–18 for employment, 370 Homburg, S., 252 neo-liberal, 260 home food production, 281 inclusiveness, 430 homosexuality, 413 income flat tax, personal, 260, 262 Honecker, E., 11 income levels, 434 honey, 284 incomplete transition, 60 Horak, R., 52 incorporated businesses, 236 horizontal voluntary organizations, independent monetary policy, 199 329 in-depth interviews (IDIs), 110, 112, Horvath, J., 189 117, 122, 125–6, 128, 135

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-501 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 502 Index indexes government and, role of, 295–7 composite infrastructure, 298 information and communication, consumer price, 216 297, 301, 304–5, 382 Corruption Perceptions Index 2002, institutional, 295–6, 296 56 material, 295 Gini, 177, 180 personal, 295–6 Organized Crime Perception, 101 private sector involvement in Summary Innovation, 220 provision of, 301–3 Theil, 171, 177, 180 production-related material, and indignant inertia, 383 economic growth, 297–301 individual comforts, 446–7 quality aspect of, 300 individualism, 274, 447 quantity aspect of, 300 demographic characteristics of, 409 road, 303, 308 of ethnic minorities, 397 of transportation network/system, individual perception of culture, 457 298, 305, 312 industrial employment, 356 see also transport and IT industrialization, 406 infrastructure industrial upgrading, 211 Infrastructure and Signaling inequality, 444 Improvement Project, 312 informal decision-making, 109 Infrastructure Projects Facility (IPF), informal economy, 365 312 informal employment, 367 Inglehart, R., 406–7, 410–11 informal institutions, 337 in-house unemployment, 431 informal labor markets, 367–8 innovation based activities, 222 informal networks, 109, 114, 117, innovation capacity, 207–29, 131, 134, 137, 326 232, 435 elite perceptions of, 112–27 capability, 216 exposure to, business capacity, 208–9, 220, 222 representatives and politicians demand for, 216–18 on, 127–33 development, 220 low-key, 119, 134, 136 diffusion of, 213 personal use of, business international technology representatives and politicians integration and, 223–8 on, 133–40 national, 208–23 social capital in, 335–41 R&D capability and, 211–13 Western-style, 129 technology, 208 informal sector employment, 367, institutional infrastructure, 295–6, 367–8 296 information and communication (IT), institutional mentors, 30 294, 297, 301, 304–5 institutional reorganization, 346 information and communication instrumental friendships, 109 technology (ICT), 213 Instrument for Structural Policies for information infrastructure, 382 Pre-Accession (ISPA), 88 infrastructure insurance, 364, 368 composite index of, 298 integration defined, 294, 295 downstream, 208, 227 endowment in, 294, 297, 299, in EU, 227 300–1, 303 upstream, 208 formal, 296 inter alia, 253, 294, 302, 312

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-502 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 503 inter-company relationships, 343 inward cross-border EATR, 257 interdisciplinary analysis, 345 inward investment, 256 interest, conflict of, 93 Iron Guard, 66, 67 interesting job, 446 Islam, 65 interethnic marriage, 413 ISO 9000 certifications, 213 intermediaries, commercial, 346 Ivanova, D., 271–89 internally displaced person (IDP), 372 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Jacobs externalities, 172 Organization – Democratic Party Jackson, M., 169, 174 for Macedonian National Unity Jackson, T., 288 (VMRO–DPMNE), 13 Jacobsen,D.H.,33 international community, role of Jansen, S., 339 extra-EU in, 42–3 Javidan, M., 456 International Criminal Tribunal for Jávor, I., 429 the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15, Jeffrey, A., 334 17, 19, 29, 36–7, 43 jobless growth, 356 International Development Assistance jobs (IDA), 330 creation of, 232–3, 356, 370 International Financial Corporation interesting, 446 (IFC), 330 part-time, 446 international influence, outsourcing search assistance for, 370 of, 43 security of, 434, 439 internationalization, 383 Jochimsen, R., 295 international migration, 357 Jones, D. C., 234 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 7, Jovic,´ D., 42 20, 30, 43, 71, 153 Judaism, 65 international R&D, 223 judicial independence, 37 International Social Survey Project judicial reform, 92 (ISSP), 408, 410, 413, 417 judiciar procurement, 110 international tax law, 256 jurisprudential research, 151 international technology integration, 223–8 Kainzbauer, A., 441 Internet, 218, 304, 311 Kalb, D., 340 Inter-Sectoral Strategy on the Prevention Kalleberg, A. L., 432 and Combating of Corruption Kaneff, D., 336–7 2008–2013, 94 Karklins, R., 109, 113 interstate highway system, 300 Kaser, K., 158 interviews, 111 Kearney, M., 336 see also in-depth interviews (IDIs) Keen, M., 260–1 intolerance of ethnic groups, 413, 423 Kessides, I. N., 302, 317 investment Kideckel, D., 339 cross-border, 253, 256–7 Kideckel, D. A., 336 domestic direct, 261 kindergarten, 446 government, 299 King, J., 261 inward, 256 King Mihai, 67 neutrality in, 252 Kiossev, A., 60 outward, 256 Kipnis, A., 343 public, 298, 300 Kleinman, A., 339–40 involuntary employment, 367 Klingemann, H. D., 55

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-503 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 504 Index

Kluckhohn, C., 456 labor migration, 356 knowledge, 194, 273 labor taxes, 368 knowledge capital, 209 Lajh, D., 25–47 knowledge generation capacities, 213, Lambsdorff, J. G., 99 218, 223 Lampland, M., 337–8 knowledge-intensive networks, 223 Lange, T., 443 knowledge-intensive services, 221 large enterprises, 234–5 Kolodko, G. W., 246 Law on the Conflict of Interests, 159 Kornai, J., 113 Law on the Development of Small and Kosfeld, R., 169–87 Medium-Sized Enterprises, 246 Kosovo Law on the Encouragement of Small Autonomous Province of, 9 Business Development, 246 country profile for, 478–9 Lawrence, G., 325 Democratic League of, 18 laws Province of, 18 Kosovo Force (KFOR), 19 assessments of, 155 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 18, 20 certainty of, 151 Kosovo War, 18–21 commercial, 153 Kostov, I., 60 common, 150 Kostova, D., 346 of higher education, 384 Kovác, I., 334 international tax, 256 Kraft, E., 244 predictability of, 151 Krastev, I., 334, 338 recognizability of, 151 Krešic,´ G., 284 reliability of, 151 Kroenig, M., 40–1 supranational tax, 256 Krstic,´ G., 367–8 see also rules of law Krugman, P., 252 layoff of employee, 435 Krushchev, N. S., 6 Lead International Finance Krystallis, A., 284 Institution, 312, 313 Kucerová,ˇ E., 334 League of Communists, 6, 13 Kuèan, M., 121 of Serbia, 13 Kühn, Z., 147 of Slovenia, 10 Kušic,´ S., 435 of Yugoslavia, 6, 12, 15 Kutlaca,ˇ D., 207–29 learning outcomes in higher Kwan, Y. K., 298 education, 385–6 leaseholder, 346 Labor Force Surveys (LFS), 237, 358, Ledeneva, A., 114 364, 366 unemployment rate, 363, 371 Ledeneva, A. V., 335, 337 labor markets in Western Balkans, legal certainty and rule of law, 150–65 356–73 approaches to, 152–3 economic crisis impact on, 371–3 Bertelsmann Transformation Index formal, 367 (BTI) for, 156–7 informal, 367–8 concepts of, 150–2 policies in, 369–71 EU member states current status of, structural features of, 358–69 158–60 supply and demand for skills in, EU monitoring of, 155–6 360–3 EU nonmember states current status unemployment in, 363–9 of, 160–4

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-504 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 505

European Bank for Reconstruction low trust system, 343 and Development (EBRD), luxury consumers/consumption, 279 efforts by for, 155 luxury goods, 279 individual countries status of, luxury market consumers, 279 157–8 luxury product consumption, as status International Monetary Fund (IMF), symbol, 278–80 efforts by for, 153 luxury shame, 279 qualification of World Bank, efforts by for, 153 Macedonia legal form neutrality, 252 Former Yugoslav Republic of, 13, legalities, 346 20–1 Le Gallo, J., 172–3 League of Communists of, 13 legal systems legal certainty and rule of law for, Anglo-Saxon, 150, 151 qualification of, 163–4 Central European, 150 Liberal Party of, 13 legislation, business law, 155 Macek, I., 339 legitimacy, 340, 346 macro-economic stability, 216 Leibrecht, M., 266–7, 294–318 macro-economic supply-side effects, Leipziger, D., 317 199 Leiße, O., 79 Madsen, T., 285 Leonidou, L., 277 major ethnic groups, cultural diversity LeSage, J., 185 in, 396–404 lesbian relationships, 417 Making Democracy Work (Putnam), 329 liberalism, 8 Makovec Brenciˇ c,ˇ M., 453–64 liberalization, 237, 280, 378 male employment, 358 Liberal Party of Macedonia, 13 Malinov, S., 61, 63 Liebensteiner, M., 251–69, 294–318 malls, 281 Liebhart, K., 51–80 malnourishment, 283 lifelong learning, 211 Malová, D., 51 Light, D., 69 Mamuneas, T., 299 limitations of data, 358 managed economy, 232–3 limited liability companies, 234 Mandel, R., 336 Lippert, B., 29–30 Mandjak, T., 457 Lisbon Treaty, 33, 389, 390 Manrai, A., 274 Lisonová, Z., 51 Manrai, L., 274 Listhaug, O., 408 manufacturing, 371 Living Standards Measurement Mareš, P., 432, 451 Surveys (LSMS), 367 MAR-externalities, 173 LM(err) test, 173, 182 Marinov, M., 273 LM(lag) test, 173, 182 market consumers, luxury, 279 lobbies, 119 market distribution, 301 local shops, 281 market economy, 3, 272, 276, 281, 345 Lundvall, B. A., 209 market failure, 301 long-term unemployment in Western Markov, D., 92 Balkans, 364–5 Markova, I., 113 Lottery uprising of 1997, 18 marriage in Western Balkans, 412–13, Lötzsch, K., 63–4, 70, 72, 74–5 420–2 low-key informal networks, 119, 134, Martin, B. R., 207 136 Marx, K., 6

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-505 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 506 Index

Marxism, 6 mistrust, 346 material infrastructure, 295–7 Mitchell, D. J., 261–2 materialism, 276 Mitchell, J. C., 336, 340 maternity leave, 446 Mitra, P., 244 Matkovic, G., 371 mobile phone, 303–4, 311 mature socialism, 7–8 mobility, 336, 383 maximum to minimum ratio (MMR), modernization, 33, 66, 406 170, 177 Mody, A., 298 Mazowiecki, T., 11 Moeltner, K., 285 McKibbin, W. J., 195 Mogee, M. E., 229 ‘McDonaldization,’ social capital as, Mohan, G., 325 327–30 Mohan, J., 325 McMillan, J., 239 Moldova, 37, 480–1 Meagher, K., 336 Mollick, A. V., 298 meat, 284 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 67 Medgyesi, M., 432 Money, R., 272–3 Mediterranean pattern of drinking, monopolies, 233 282 Montenegrin Orthodox Church, 400 medium human development rating, Montenegro 39 accountability in, 37 medium-sized enterprises, 235 corruption in, 97–8 Medium Term Strategy, 246 country profile for, 482–3 Meierewert, S., 442 judicial independence in, 37 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of qualification of legal certainty and Sciences and Arts, 10 rule of law for, 161–2 mentors, institutional, 30 Socialist Republic of, 10 Merkel, W., 51 Moore, M., 344 Mero, N. P., 428, 433 Moorman, C., 456 Methodius, 58 Mooslechner, P., 189 Meurs, M., 234 moral claims, 339–40 Micevska, M., 367–8 moral economy, 336, 338 Michalski, A., 43, 46 Moran, I, 173, 182 migration, 356–7 Morgan, R. M., 454, 456 Mihailova, N., 59, 121 mortality rates, 283 Mihaylova, D., 331, 334–5, 337–8, motivation, 284, 429 345 Movement for Rights and Freedoms Milanova, E., 276, 280–1 (MRF), 60, 62 milk, 284 Mowery, D. C., 207 Millan, E., 281 MSG2 Model, 195, 201 Miller, W. L., 114, 134, 140, 147 MSGR44A Model, 195 Miloševic, S., 10, 12, 13–14, 15, 18–19, Muent, H., 245 124, 162 Müller, D., 72, 169, 174 minimum wages, 370 multiculturalism, 57 Ministers of Education, 380, 389 multinational companies (MNCs), 461 Ministry of the Interior, 123 multinational corporations, 272 minorities multinational enterprises (MNEs), within ethnic groups, 404–5, 430 252, 253, 263 individual ethnic, 397 multiparty systems, 10–14 Mishler, W., 113 Mundell, Nobel L. R., 191

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-506 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 507

Mundell, R., 191 Nelson, R. R., 207 Mungiu-Pippidi, A., 66–7, 71, 78 neoliberal incentives, 260 Munteanu, I., 39 neo-liberalism, 341 Muslim Party of Democratic Action neoliberal model of capitalism, 26 (SDA), 12 net job creation, 233 Muslims, 399–400 network capital, 335 mutatis mutandis, 192, 196 networks and informal power mutual commitment, 432 structures, 109–43 business, 135 Nadiri, M. I., 299 buyer-driven, 228 Nano, F., 14 criminal, 102 Narus, J. A., 456 family, 341 Nastase,˘ A., 69, 70 informal, 109, 114, 117, 119, 129, Nastav, B., 367 131, 134, 136–7, 326 National Anticorruption Directorate knowledge-intensive, 223 (ANI), 93–4 low-key, 119, 129, 134, 136 national anti-corruption strategy, 93 methodological approach to, National Bank, 164 110–12 national history, 64 rail, 298, 302, 305–6, 308 national identity, 276 road, 298, 308, 309 national innovation capacity (NIC), Securitate, 125 208–23 social, 335–40, 343 assessment of, 218–23 Vlach, 122–3, 126 industrial upgrading, absorptive Western-style informal, 129 capacity for, 211 winners, 337 national innovation system (NIS), see also informal networks 209, 216, 222 neutrality nationalism, 8–10, 276, 408, 409 financial, 252 nationality, 397 in investment, 252 National Liberal Party (PNL), 68, 70 legal form, 252 National Movement Simeon II (NMS), New Economic Geography, 171 61, 62 new EU member states (NMS), 356 National Qualifications Frameworks, Nicodeme, G., 252, 269 382 Nicolae, V., 7, 65, 67, 68 National Salvation Front (FSN), 68 Nijkamp, P., 317 National Socialist (NS), 59, 67 Nis-Presevo, 313 National Union for the Advancement Nokia, 22 of Romania (UNPR), 70 Nomenclature des unités territoriales NATO (North Atlantic Treaty statistiques (NUTS) II, 111, 174 Organization), 17, 18, 20, 42, 61 nominal tax rate, 256 Naudé, P., 456 nonpayment of social insurance, 368 Navaro-Yashin, Y., 336 non-registration of workers, 368 Navarro, V., 325 Norris, P., 406–7, 410–11 Neck, R., 189–204 Norwegian Institute for Urban and Need, A., 426 Regional Research, 110 negative demand shock, 196 notion of trust, 344 negative tax elasticity, 266 nouveaux riche, 122, 279 neighborhood matrix, 173 Nový, I., 441 Neighbourhood Policy, 31 nursery facilities, 446

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-507 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 508 Index obese adults, 283 Papadimitriou, D., 34–5 obligational contractual relationships, Pappova, M., 335 343 parcelized sovereignty, 401 Office of the High Representative, 17 Park, W. G., 229 Ognjenovic, K., 368 Parkhe, A., 445 Ohrid Agreement, 20 parliamentary democracy, 59 old aristocracy, 279 Partnership and Cooperation older workers, 368 Agreement, 37 Olsen, P. J., 25 partnerships, 38, 234 Olteanu, T., 51, 67–8, 71, 73–4, 79 part-time jobs, 446 open confrontation, 445 Party of Democratic Action (SDA), 12 opportunism, 63 Party of Democratic Change, 12–13 optimum currency area (OCA), 191 Party of Democratic Renewal, 12 Order, Law, Justice (RZS), 63 Party of Romanian National Unity ordinary citizens, 150 (PUNR), 69 ordinary least squares (OLS), 199 Party of Social Democracy of Romania organic foods, 284 (PDSR), 68, 69 organic yogurt, 284 Parvanov, Georgi, 62 Organization for Economic passenger transport, 306, 309, 311 Cooperation and Development patenting, 213 (OECD), 96, 195, 242, 246–7, paternalism, 6 262–3, 266, 368 patriarchy, 63 Organization for Security and patronage, 158 Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Patsch, A., 150–65 29, 43 paved roads, 308, 309 organized crime, 92, 101–3 Pavlicˇ Damijan, J., 455 Organized Crime Perception Index, Pearce, N., 335 101 pedagogy practice for higher originality, 66 education, 386–7 Orth, U., 273 Peichl, A., 261 Orthodox Christianity, 57–8, 399 Orthodox Church, 59, 65, 400–1 Penninx, R., 348 Orthodoxy, 65, 400, 411 Pentecostalsim, 65 Oschlies, W., 68 People’s Republic of Romania, 5, 67 Ostapenko, N., 279–80 perfectionists, 279 Ottoman Empire, 57, 58, 65–6, 112, personal attitudes, 435 135, 158, 401 personal computers (PCs), 218 outsourcing of international personal enrichment, 118 influence, 43 personal income flat tax, 260, 262 outward investment, 256 personal infrastructure, 295–6 over-fourty-fives and the younger personality cult, 67 generation, 431 personal loyalties, 63 overweight adults, 283 personal responsibilities, 447 Owens, J., 268 Peterson, R., 232 Petrescu, C., 72, 79 Pace, R., 185 Petrescu, D., 72, 79 paid work, 432 Petro, N. N., 346 Paldam, M., 331, 336 Petrovic,´ T., 3 Pan European Corridor Vc., 313 Petrovici, D., 273, 280, 285–6

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-508 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 509

PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Aid for private sector employment, 357 Restructuring of the Economies), private sector involvement, 301–3 34, 88 private shop, 236 Phinnemore, D., 34, 38, 69 privatization, 26, 33, 61, 92, 122, 162, physical environment, 434 278, 302 Pickering, P. M., 339 privileged partnership, 38 Pilot Mobility Partnership, 37 processed food, 281 Pincione, G., 150 producer-driven value chains, Pine, F., 336 227–8 Pissarides, F., 239 product appraisal, domestic, 276 planned economy, 59 product involvement, 273 Plasser, F., 52 production Podkrepa, 11 home food, 281 policies networks for, 208 anti-corruption, 89, 92 private, 301 business regulatory, 238 public, 301 independent monetary, 199 production-related material for R&D, 218 infrastructure, 297–301 regulatory, 238 productivity growth, 300 for small firms, 245–8 product nationality, 274–7 see also EU’s policies product-related food behavior, political conditions, 36 280–3 political culture, 51–75, 273 products in Bulgaria, 53–64 consumer knowledge of, 273 concept of, 52–3 consumer perceptions of, 277 in Romania, 53–7, 64–72 dairy, 284 politics in European Union (EU), 25 family farm food, 285 Ponzi schemes, 14 fruit, 280 Pop-Eleches, G., 71 nationality of, 275 Popescu-Tariceanu,˘ C., 70 traditions in, 282 Popkostadinova, N., 62, 80 progress in transition, 153 Popova, S., 282 Promitzer, C., 3–23 Popovic,´ M., 6 promotion in democracy, 26 Popovic,´ P., 237 property Porter, M. E., 218 public, 92 Portes, A., 335–6 rights of, 240 post socialism, 20, 21 social, 5, 6 potential candidate status, 38 Protestantism, 399, 401 poultry meat, 284 Province of Kosovo, 18 Prašnikar, J., 454 public child care, 418 predictability of law, 151 public culture, 340 prepared food, 281 public drunkenness, 282 pre-prepared meals, 281 public expenditures, 299 prestige-seeking consumer behavior, public funding of R&D, 213 279 public institutions, 346 Pridham, G., 76 public investment, 298, 300 Primatarova, A., 155 public procurement, 92–4, 110, 162 private enterprise, 234 public production, 301 private production, 301 public property, 92

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-509 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 510 Index public R&D expenditures, 211–12 Rechtssicherheit, 151 Public Revenue Office, 164 recognizability of law, 151 public sector participation, 301 Red Army, 5, 59 public self-perception, 331 red bosses, 125 public work, 370 red Mob, 125 purchase/purchasing reductionist approach, 339 domestic bias in, 275, 276 Rees, C., 435 of food, 281 Reformed Protestant Church, 65 purchasing power parities (PPP), 169, reforms 176, 177, 180–2, 183 in higher education, 381 Putnam, R. D., 325, 329, 334, 336, 345 judicial, 92 radical tax, 260 qualitative surveys, 111 Regan, M., 296 quantification of progress, 153, regional disparities and economic 201–4 convergence, 169–86 quantitative quota-based elite surveys, empirical analysis of, 176–85 110 graphical analysis of, 176–80 quantitative surveys, 110–11 measuring, 170–4 quantity aspect of infrastructure, 300 in regional data system, 174–6 regional unemployment, 365–7 Rabushka, A., 259 registered unemployment, 216, 364 Radaelli, M. C., 27, 45 regulatory policy in business, 238 radical tax reforms, 260 Reid, A., 224 Radman, M., 284–5 relationship goals, 456 Radosevic, S., 207–29 relationships rail density, 304, 306 business, 457, 460 rail network/system, 298, 302, 305–6, exchange, 342 308 gay, 417 Railway Sarajevo-Podlugovi, 313 human, 442 Raiser, M., 345 inter-company, 343 Rangelova, R., 234 lesbian, 417 rates/rating obligational contractual, 343 CIT, 254 social, 337 of employment, 358, 360–2, 434 value of, 457 exchange, 192–4, 193–4 relative β convergence, 183, 183–5

medium human development, 39 relative mean deviation (Rw), 170–1, mortality, 283 177 nominal tax, 256 reliability of law, 151 of profit tax, 244 religiosity in Western Balkans, university dropout, 380 410–11 youth employment, 359 religious behavior, 415–16 rationality in economies, 327 self-reported, 417 rational–secular values, 406 religious behavior in Western Balkans, Ravald, A., 457 415–16 Raz, J., 151 religious denominations, 399 real socialism, 4–7 Renault, 22 real transition, 60 Renko, N., 285 Reardon, J., 275 Renko, S., 285 Rebelo, S., 299 rentier economies, 22

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-510 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 511

Republic of Serbia, 19 Roman Catholic Church, 65, 400 Republic of Serbian Krajina, 16 Roman Catholicism, 399, 400, 411 Republic of Yugoslavia, 401, 402 Roman Dacia, 65 Republika Srpska, 16 Roman Empire, 65 research and development (R&D), 207 Romania capability and innovation activities, corruption in, 93–4 211–13 country profile for, 484–5 cooperation in, 208 EU enlargement in (2007), 34–5 demand for, 216–18 political culture in, 53–7, 64–72 on employment, 213 qualification of legal certainty and Europeanization of, 225 rule of law for, 159–60 in European Union (EU), 223, 227 Romanian Communism, 72 expenditures for, 211–12 Romanian Constitutional Court, 94 foreign, 225 Romanian Democratic Convention international, 223 (CDR), 68 personnel per labour force, 211 Romanian Jews, 65 policies for, 218 Romanian Orthodoxy, 65 public funding for, 213 Roncevic, B., 331, 347 on supply, 209, 218 Rose, A. K., 52, 191, 194 Research Council of Norway, 110 Rose, R., 113, 331 restaurants, 281 Rose-Ackerman, S., 113 rest of the EA (REA), 195 Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N., 315 retailers, 281 Rostowski, J., 195 retail kiosks, 237 royal dictatorship, 59 retail trade, 237, 371 Rozgonyi, T., 429 retirement age, 358 Rugova, I., 18 Reve, T., 432 rules of law, 112, 150–1 revenue maximization, 252 see also legal certainty and rule of Riedel, S., 61, 63 law Ringdal, K., 408, 413–14 Rumelia, 58 Rischkowsky, F., 274 Rus, A., 244, 247 risk aversion, 442 Russian Empire, 112, 401 Risse, T., 25, 29 Russo-TurkishWar, 58 Ritson, C., 280 Rivera León, L., 224 Sachs, J. D., 195 road network/system, 298, 302, safeguard measures, 35 308–9 Saints Cyril, 58 density of, 304, 308 Sakova, Z., 237 efficiency of, 309 Sakskoburggotski, S., 61 freight on, 309 Sala-i-Martin, X., 171, 172 infrastructure of, 303, 308 salaries, 439 passengers on, 309 Salter, J., 207 paved, 308, 309 Salvation Front, 11 Róbert, P., 432 Sandu, D., 345 Roeller, L., 299 Sanfey, P., 367, 368 Rokeach, M., 454, 456 Santarelli, M., 312 Roller, E., 52, 55–6 Savin, A., 71 Romagna, E., 233 Sayer, A., 343 Roman, Petre, 68 Schankerman, M., 296, 317

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-511 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 512 Index

Scharpf, F. W., 26 qualification of legal certainty and Scharr, K., 65, 66, 67 rule of law for, 162–3 Schirmer, D., 52 Republic of, 19 Schmitter, P. C., 52 Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina, Schneider, F., 101 15 Schnellenbach, J., 173 Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), 10, Scholz, F., 151 12–13 Schöpflin, G., 395 Serbian Ministry of Interior Affairs, 18 Schroll-Machl, S., 441 Serbian Orthodox Church, 400 Schuh, A., 276 Sersic, D.M., 435 Schüler, S., 55, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 77, Servén, L., 299, 317 78 Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), Schwab, K., 226 223, 225 Schwartz, A., 208 sex Schwelling, B., 76 extramarital, 417 Scott, J., 336 moral values related to, 409 search assistance for jobs, 370 in Western Balkans, 412–13 secondary education, 368 Siderov, V., 62 Second Bulgarian Empire, 58 Simeon the First, 58 Second World War, 13, 14, 17, 57, 59, simplicity, 261 65, 67, 233, 327, 376, 379, 396, Single Market regulations, 245 401 Shah, A., 170, 171 secret services, 125 Shama, A., 272 sectarianism, 411 Shankar, R., 170, 171 secular–rational values, 407 Sharma, A., 336 Securitate networks, 125 Shortall, S., 325 securité juridique, 151 Sik, E., 281, 335 security Simkus, A., 395–426 within financial system, 439 skepticism, 158 of jobs, 434, 439 SLOPOL7 model, 198–9, 201 of livelihood, 434 Slovene Territorial Defense, 15 Sedelmeier, U., 29, 32, 34, 36, 38, 46 Slovenia Segert, D., 20, 21, 74, 76 Communist Party of, 10, 12 Sekulíc, D., 413 country profile for, 488–9 selective trust, 343 elite’s of, 125 self-employment, 236–8, 357, 368 Euro Area (EA), integration into, self-expression values, 406, 407 197–201 self-fulfillment, 445, 445–6 League of Communists in, 10 self-governing, 379 qualification of legal certainty and self-management, 379 rule of law for, 158–9 self-perception, 331 Small and Medium Enterprises self-reported religiosity in Western Development Authority (SMEDA), Balkans, 417 246 Selnes, F., 457 small and medium-sized enterprises Serbia (SMEs), 233–5 corruption in, 98–9 small firms country profile for, 486–7 barriers to entry and growth of, ICTY, cooperation with, 37 238–45 League of Communists of, 13 development factor of, 232–48

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-512 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 513

policies for, 245–8 social role in the household, 435 self-employment and, 236–8 social science, McDonaldization of, small sectors of, 236–8 327 small retail kiosks, 237 social support, 335 small sectors of small firms, 236–8 socio-cultural beliefs, 272, 278 small traders, 237 Soete, L., 208 snob effect, 279 soft sector activities, 380 social assistance beneficiaries, 372 soft view of capitalism, 343 social capital, 325–47 sole proprietorships, 234, 236, 237 concept of, 325 Šoljan, N. N., 394 critical evaluations of, 327–30 Solomon, N., 274, 278, 279, 282 limitations of, 326 Solow-Swan model, 171 main themes in study of, 334–46 Sommerbauer, J., 63, 64, 70, 72, 74, 75 as ’McDonaldization,’ 327–30 Sorabji, C., 336, 339 popularity of, 325 SouthEastEuropeanCountries as trust, 341–6 (SEECs), 251–3, 256–7, 260, 263, social class, as status symbol, 278–80 265–7, 294, 301 social–democratic ideology, 12 CIT rate in, 254 Social Democratic Party in Romania direct business taxation in, 254 (PSD), 69 tax systems in, 259–63 social environment, 434 Southeast European Legal social insurance, nonpayment of, 368 Development Initiative (SELDI), socialism, 122, 278, 332, 338, 402 89 dynastic, 67 SouthEastEuropeanR&Dsystems, mature, 7–8 223 post, 20, 22 South-East European Social Survey real, 4–7 Project (SEESSP), 400, 408, Titoist variant of, 6 410–14, 417 Socialist Alliance, 13 sovereignty, parcelized, 401 socialist democracy, 6 Soviet Bloc, 26 Socialist Federative Republic of Soviet Union, Communist Party of, 5 Yugoslavia, 3, 9, 16 Special Drawing Rights (SDR), 37 socialist ideology, 447 specific assessment, 344 socialist legacies, 20–3 specific trust, 343 Socialist Party, 60 Spekman, R., 456 of Albania, 14 Spencer, D., 325–48 of Serbia (SPS), 13 Spendzharova,A.B.,35 Socialist Republic of Montenegro, 10 Spies-Butcher, B., 325 Socialist Revolution in Bulgaria, 5 spill-over effects, 196 Socialist Unity Party of Germany, 11 spirits, 57, 282 Socialist Youth Organizations, Spirova, M., 62 121–2 Spitaler, G., 52 socialization, 433 Sredl, K., 272, 273, 276, 278 social networks, 335–40, 343 Stability Pact for South Eastern social overhead capital, 295 Europe, 20, 380 social perspectives, 446–7 Stabilization and Association social property, 5, 6 Agreement (SAA), 29, 36 social reactions to alcohol, 282 Stabilization and Association Process social relationships, 337 (SAP), 36

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-513 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 514 Index

Staddon, C., 334 supply-side effects, macro-economic, staff in higher education, 377 199 Stalin, J., 6 supporting working atmosphere, Stalinism, 6 441–5 standard of living, 434, 437 supranational tax law, 256 Stanishev, S., 62 surrogate nationalism, 8–10 start up schemes, 370 surveys on cultural diversity state-backed institutions, 329 analyses on, in previous, 409–14 State Judicial Council, 160 comparisons on, 414–24 StateSecurityfiles,64 for elite’s, 111 Steenbergen, J., 152 qualitative, 111 Stefanov, R., 87–106 quantitative, 110–11 Stiftung, B., 41, 156, 157, 160, 161, in Western Balkans, 410–24 162, 164 survival values, 406, 407 Stiglitz, J., 297 sustainable consumption, 286–8 stock market capitalization, 216 Svaljek, S., 261 stock value, 263 Svašek, M., 336 Stolojan, T., 68 Svendsen, G. T., 331, 336 Storey, D., 232, 237 sweet preserves, 281 Strabac, Z., 413, 414 symmetric demand shock, 196 strategies synchronization of business cycle, 191 coping, 281 systematically supported amnesia, 72 Europe 2020, 389, 390 systems of ethics, 274 national anti-corruption, 93 Szabó, E., 285 Strategy for the Fight Against Szalay, G., 442 Corruption, 95–6 Szewczyk, B. M. J., 146 Strategy for the Fight Against Šošíc, V., 367 Organized Crime and Corruption, 95 Strizhakova, Y., 277 tabula rasa, 20 Stulhofer, A., 408, 413 Tardos, R., 331, 335, 337 student enrollment, 382 Tarnosauskas, T., 313, 314 student mobility barriers for higher taxes/taxation, 243 education, 387 avoiding, 262 Sturdza, A., 70 direct, 251–2, 266 subcontracting linkages, 223 double, 259 Summary Innovation Index (SII), 220 evasion of, 262, 368 Sundhaussen, H., 9 exemptions to, 255 Sunni Islam, 411 flat rate, 260 Sunni Muslims, 400 incentives for, 255 supermarkets, 281 labor, 368 supply laws on, 256 aggregate curve for, 190 negative elasticity of, 266 of R&D, 209 personal income flat, 260, 262 see also demand reductions in, 252 supply and demand, 190, 209, 218 reforms for, 260 for skills in labor market in Western revenues generated by, 252 Balkans, 360–3 territorial, 259 supply shocks, 196–7 treaties on, 257

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-514 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF Index 515 tax rates, 243, 254–9 Transparency International, 88, 92 on cross-border income, 256–9 Corruption Perceptions Index on domestic corporate income in 2002, 56 SEEC’s, 254–6 transport and IT infrastructure, Taylor-rule type equation, 199 294–315 technical development of a society, current projects on, 312–14 434 endowment in, current state of, technology catch-up, 222 303–12 technology innovation, 208 see also infrastructure telecommunication, 302 transportation network/system, 297, telephones, 304, 311 301, 304 territorial tax system, 259 efficiency of, 311 The Hague, 17 infrastructure of, 298, 305, 312 Theil index (T), 171, 177, 180 passenger, 306, 309, 311 Thompson, M., 52, 53 Transylvania Thracia, 58 Christian churches in, 65 Thurik, R., 232 Hungarian Autonomous Region Tiemann, G., 73 in, 9 Timmins, G., 42 Trappe, J., 72, 79 Tismaneanu,˘ V., 69 Traser, U., 431 Tito,J.B.,6 Trauner, F., 35, 38, 46 Titoist variant of socialism, 6 Treaty of Berlin, 66 Tito nostalgia, 402 Treaty of Paris, 67 Todorov, A., 63 Treaty of San Stefano, 58 tolerance, 414, 430 Trojanov, I., 60, 77 Torsello, D., 335 Trompenaars, F., 456 Tosi, H. L., 428, 433 Trouillot, M.-R., 340 total factor productivity (TFP), 193–4, trust, 326, 339, 343, 456, 457 195, 198–200, 203, 208 in business relationships, tourism, 357, 371 453–64 trade, 234 defined, 343 and corruption, 103–5 economic development, impact on, retail, 237, 371 345 small, 237 generalized, 345–6 trade unions, 435 high, 343 traditionalism, 408, 412 low, 343 traditional political culture, 53 notion of, 344 traditional values, 406 selective, 343 training, 370 social capital as, 341–6 training programmes, 213, 370 specific, 343 Trans-European Network (TEN), 313 Trust: The Making and Breaking of Trans-European Transport Network Cooperative Relations (Gambetta), (TEN-T), 312 341 transition/transformations, 278 Trust: The Social Values and the Creation in economies, 235 of Prosperity (Fukuyama), 341 incomplete, 60 Tsarist army, 58 transitory negative supply shocks, 196 Tudman, F., 12, 21 trans-log production function model, Tudor, C. V., 69, 72 300 Türck, M., 169, 172, 173, 174, 181

October 13, 2011 21:23 MAC/STEN Page-515 9780230_278653_22_ind01 PROOF 516 Index

Turkish yoke, 58 US Patent and Trademark Office, Tyson, L. d’Andrea, 246 213, 218 Uvalic, M., 189 Uhlir, D., 346 unemployment in Western Balkans, Vac˘ aroiu,˘ N., 68 357, 363–9 Vadovic, E., 288 benefit systems for, 369–70 Valliere, D., 232 employment protection legislation value added services, 303 and, 368–9 value chains, 227–8 of ethnic groups, 366 value preferences, 433–5 in-house, 431 values, 274 insurance systems for, 369 in business relationships, long-term, 364–5 453–64 rates of, 358, 363, 365, 371 collectivist, 274 regional disparities and increasing, democratic, 55 365–7 flow, 265 registered, 216, 364 of individual, 433 of women, 372 rational–secular, 406 Uniate Greek Catholic Church, 65 of relationship, 457 Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), of religiosity, 410 60, 61, 63 secular–rational, 407 Union of Reformist Forces, 13 self-expression, 406, 407 United Nation’s Development stock, 263 Programme (UNDP), 330, 341, survival, 406, 407 372 traditional, 406 United Nations Interim of work/workers, 438, 439 Administration Mission in Kosovo van Aarle, B., 198 (UNMIK), 19 Van Dijk, J., 99–101, 104 United Nations Statistics Division, 174 van Wincoop, E., 194 university dropout rates, 380 Vanhanen, T., 76 University of Mitrovica, 389 Vasileva, E., 271–89 University of Novi Sad, 389 Vassileva, E., 284 University of Pristina, 389 Vecernik,ˇ J., 430–1, 435, 444 university system, 379 vegetables, 280 unpaid family workers, 368 Venables, A. J., 315–16 UNPROFOR, 16 Venables, T., 431 UN-Resolution 1244, 19 venture capital, 221 unweighted coefficient of variation Verba, S., 52–3, 76

(Cu), 177 Verdery, K., 8, 336, 339 unweighted (Gu) index, 171 Verspagen, B., 207 upper social classes, 279 Vertovec, S., 336 upstream integration, 208 Vida, I., 275–6 Upton, G., 173 Vidovic, H., 356–74 urbanization, 406, 435 Vlach lobby, 126 useful people, 135 Vlach network, 122–3, 126 US interstate highway system, Vobruba, G., 75 299–300 Vojvodina, Autonomous Region of, 10 US multinational enterprises (MNEs), voluntary organizations, horizontal, 298 329

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Von Beyme, K., 153 Wheeler, D., 298 Voulgaris, F., 233 White, L., 325 Vukasovic, T., 284 Whitehead, L., 52 Vukojevic, V., 367 White Paper on the Modernization of Vukotic,´ V., 185 the Administration, 62 Vukov, N., 64 Whitley, R., 342 Wildavsky, A., 52 wages, 370, 439 Wimmer, A., 457 Wallace, C., 281 wine, 282 Ward, T., 434 Winkler, A., 204 Warsaw Pact, 12 winners networks, 337 Wars of Yugoslav Succession Winnifrith, T. J., 126 (1991–1995), 14–18 Wirtén, P., 77 Wars of Yugoslav War, 27, 28, women, unemployment of, 372 31, 42 Woodruff, C., 239 war veteran benefits, 358 work-related attitudes, 428–50 Washington Accord, 17 fundamental changes in, 430–2 Waverman, L., 299 for productivity and efficiency, wealth, 406 importance of, 429–30 weddings, 278 value preferences and, determinants weighted coefficient of variation of, 433–5

(Cw), 177 see also work-related values weighted (Gw) index, 171 work-related values, 432–47 Wellman, B., 335 financial security, 439–40 Welzel, C., 406 individual comforts, 446–7 Wennekers, S., 232 self-fulfillment, 445–6 Wennerström,E.O.,152 social perspectives, 446–7 Werner, A., 169–87 supporting working atmosphere, Wessels, B., 55 441–5 West, R., 425 work/workers Western Balkan countries (WBC), 356 age population of, 360, 361 anti-homosexual attitudes in, 417 conditions for, 435, 442 cultural diversity surveys in, conflicts at, 444 410–14 importance of, 437 ethnic tolerance in, 413–14, non-registration of, 368 422–4 paid, 432 EU’s conditionality for, 35–7 public, 370 exclusionism in, 413–14 skills, 434 gender roles in, 411–12, 417–20 unpaid family, 368 labor market trends in, 356–73 World Bank, 20, 30, 43, 70, 88, 101, marriage in, 412–13, 420–2 153, 158, 174, 235, 240, 242, religiosity in, 410–11, 417 326, 329, 330–2, 337, 358, religious behavior in, 415–16 368, 372 sexual behavior in, 412–13 Doing Business ranking by, Western Balkans Investment 153–4 Framework (WBIF), 312 legal certainty and rule of law for, Western democracy, 333–4 qualification of, 153 Western-style informal networks, 129 World Development Indicators Weyerstrass, K., 198–9, 202–4 (WDI), 304, 308

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World Bank Institute, 100 youth employment rates, 359 World Economic Forum (WEF) Yugoslavia Global Competitiveness Federal Republic of, 16, 19, 20 Report, 225 League of Communists of, 6, 12, 15 world frontier technology activities, Socialist Federative Republic of, 16 221 Yugoslav People’s Army, 10, 15, 16 World Health Organization (WHO) Zaragiu, G., 70 Global Alcohol Database, 282 Zarezankova-Potevska, M., 234 Global Status Report on Alcohol, Zaric, V., 285 282 Zhelev, Z., 60 World Values Survey (WVS), 407, Zhivkov, T., 9, 11, 59 410–11, 417 Zinnes, C., 218 Zucker, L., 344 xenophobia, 66 Zysman, J., 208 Xheneti, M., 245 Žabkar, V., 453–63

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