Ms. Shashi van de Graaff PhD Candidate School of Political Science and International Studies University of Queensland Australia [email protected] Political Studies Association Conference, Sheffield, April 2015

The Global Nuclear Renaissance: Has the R h e t o r i c Become a Reality? Since 2000, swathes of energy experts, government officials, industry representatives and journalists have predicted the emergence of a global ‘nuclear renaissance.’ Nuclear energy was said to be on the precipice of a new era of development, characterised by widespread construction of new nuclear reactors and a concomitant increase in global nuclear capacity. Despite this expectation, there is limited evidence to date which suggests that such a nuclear renaissance has actually taken place. This paper provides an overview of a current PhD research project which is examining the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance. It outlines the research problem and design, as well as the core argument which is being developed in the thesis. Firstly, the thesis argues that there is a significant disconnection between the expectation and reality of the global nuclear renaissance, and therefore, that a renaissance has not taken place. Secondly, this thesis argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance cannot be attributed to any one cause. Rather, in order to understand why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has failed to produce a widespread expansion of nuclear energy development, a broad range of both nuclear- specific and broader contextual factors need to be considered. In making this argument, this research challenges pre-existing explanations for the failure of the renaissance, such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, as being overly simplistic, a-historical and mono-causal. The paper concludes with a summary of the preliminary findings.

A RENAISSANCE IS ANNOUNCED

Nuclear energy has immense potential for addressing two of the most pressing policy problems for governments across the globe – ensuring security of energy supply in the face of rising demand and growing geopolitical tensions, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions to combat the onset of global warming. As the need to address these problems has grown, an increasingly favourable political environment for the use and development of nuclear power has emerged throughout much of the world. In particular, from the early 2000s onwards, a growth in public and political support for nuclear power led to the emergence of a widespread expectation that a ‘nuclear renaissance’ was about to take place. This was significant given that the construction of new nuclear power plants had experienced a global decline since the mid-1970s.

A number of changes took place which lent credence to the claim that a nuclear renaissance was about to take place across the globe, or was already underway. Ambitious growth targets and expansion plans were set for several countries with existing civil nuclear power programmes in Asia, Europe and North America. In Western Europe, a range of countries which had policies in place to phase-out existing nuclear power plants, or which opposed the development of nuclear power in the country altogether, began to re-evaluate or reverse their policy positions. Figures from the WNA (2013) indicated that over forty-five countries that did not use nuclear energy were seriously considering the development of a domestic nuclear power program.

Furthermore, enthusiasm for the nuclear renaissance was driven by numerous political leaders, nuclear industry representatives, and even notable environmental activists who made public statements in support of increased nuclear energy development. In Western Europe and North America, these statements were made by the highest levels of political leaders from both the incumbent political party and the opposition. In the UK, successive Prime Ministers across both party lines have spoken in favour of nuclear power since the mid-2000s. When in power, the Labor Party Prime Minister Tony Blair advised the G8 industrialised nations that a “substantial renaissance of nuclear power” was necessary to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions (Del Buono 2008: 1), while his successor, former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, stated he was “convinced that we need a renaissance of nuclear power” (World Nuclear News 2008: 1). This was then followed by the leader of the subsequent Conservation-Liberal Democrat coalition, Prime Minister David Cameron, who described the development of a cooperative agreement between the UK and France on civil nuclear development as “just the beginning” of investment in the nuclear industry (Nuclear AMRC 2012: 1). In 2013, Cameron described the development of the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station as “a very big day for our country”, and that it would be the first of many new nuclear power stations in the UK (The Daily Mail 2013: 1). Similarly, in the US, both Republican and Democrat Presidents have spoken publicly in favour of nuclear energy development. Former President George W. Bush showed his support for the emerging renaissance, stating that “nuclear power is going to be an essential source…of future electricity for the United States” (Manor 2006: 1). President Barack Obama declared that in order to “prevent the worst consequences of climate change, we’ll need to increase our supply of nuclear power. It’s that simple’’ (Office of the Press Secretary 2010: 1). For both the US and the UK, the political enthusiasm for nuclear energy was a stark contrast to the previous two and a half decades where nuclear energy had largely been kept off the political agenda.

The term ‘nuclear renaissance’ had become common place in media reporting by the mid-2000s. However, exactly what the nuclear renaissance was, or what would constitute a renaissance taking place, was rarely – if ever – defined. Rather, the term was broadly used to refer to a change in nuclear energy development that was defined by two key facets:

1. That there would be a significant increase in the number of nuclear power plants being built. 2. That this increase in nuclear power plant construction would take place both in countries which had stagnating, declining or no nuclear energy industries, as well as in countries which had experienced sustained growth in their nuclear industries. This second facet is crucial to understanding why the emergence of the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was so significant, but is frequently overlooked in existing discussions and analysis of the nuclear renaissance. In order for a nuclear ‘renaissance’ to take place, there must be an earlier period of growth and decline in nuclear energy that is then followed by a resurgence. The expectation of a nuclear renaissance was significant because it was based on the idea that countries which had been experiencing a stagnation or decline of their existing nuclear industries (primarily countries in Western Europe and North America) would once again undertake a significant expansion of their nuclear energy programmes. This would be a significant development given that the vast majority of nuclear growth that had been occurring since the 1990s was located primarily in the regions of Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe (IAEA 2014). While the growth in these regions is an important phenomenon worthy of consideration, it was not the sustained growth of nuclear energy development in these regions that drove the expectation of the nuclear renaissance, nor was it the sustained growth in these regions that made the renaissance such a surprising, interesting and attention-grabbing phenomenon. Rather, it was the expectation of a new era of growth in countries where nuclear energy had been stagnating and declining for several decades that was going to underpin the rebirth, or renaissance, of nuclear energy. This is what made the expectation of a nuclear renaissance so significant, and a stark turning point from the previous two and a half decades of nuclear history. The expectation was not simply that extensive growth in nuclear energy development would occur, but that it would occur in places where no such growth had taken place for more than two decades.

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?

Over time, however, it became increasingly clear that the reality of nuclear energy development was not living up to the earlier grand expectations of a renaissance. Already from 2010, social and political commentators began pronouncing the nuclear renaissance to have failed, or to never have existed at all. Headlines described the nuclear renaissance as a “myth” (Financial Chronicle 2010: 1) and as having “failed to materialize” (Wald 2010: 1). An article in The Economist branded nuclear energy as “the dream that failed”, concluding that “the promise of a global [nuclear] transformation is gone” (The Economist 2012: 1). The anti-nuclear lobbyist, Jim Green, declared that “the nuclear renaissance can now be pronounced stone cold dead” (Green 2013: 1). The nuclear renaissance was described as “just a fairy tale” that had been “based on rhetoric” (Bradford 2013: 1), while others stated that the “nuclear industry ‘rebirth’ is instead stillborn” (Becker 2012). An article in The Telegraph described the nuclear renaissance as “heading the same way as Thatcher’s nuclear rebirth – down the drain” (Warner 2012). Another headline affirmed that “North America’s ‘nuclear renaissance’ grinds to a halt”. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2012: 1) reported that “a so-called nuclear renaissance seems further away than ever”. In a report to their investors, analysts from the US investment research firm, Morningstar, professed that “we think new-build nuclear in the West is dead” (McMahon 2013). Mark Cooper, a senior research fellow for economic analysis at the Institute for Energy and the environment at the Vermont Law School, announced that the renaissance has “failed to produce a new fleet of reactors in the U.S.” (Cooper 2013: 2). When discussing the state of nuclear energy development in America, former NRC commissioner Peter Bradford stated that “two forthcoming projects are all that remain of a 31-reactor fantasy fleet that was said to constitute the real nuclear renaissance as recently as early 2009” (Hiruo 2012: 13).

The conclusion that a nuclear renaissance has failed to materialise is evident in numerous energy analyses and reports. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 described the nuclear renaissance as “all in ruins now” (Schneider et al. 2013: 4). A presentation by the International Energy Agency on the World Energy Outlook 2014 stated that there is “no nuclear renaissance in sight” (IEA 2014b: 11). The World Energy Council’s (WEC) World Energy Resources 2013 Survey stated that “globally, the nuclear industry is in decline” (World Energy Council 2013: 4.6). This was followed by the WEC’s 2014 World Energy Resources Issue Monitor, which highlighted the absence of a nuclear renaissance in the regions of Europe and North America. Specifically, the report noted that “we currently do not see signals for short-term investment in new nuclear projects” for the European region (World Energy Council 2014: 27), and that the North American region is “unlikely to see new coal or nuclear plants until 2025” (World Energy Council 2014: 33).

It is important to note, however, that there is not a universal consensus that the renaissance has failed to live up to its expectations. In a statement released in February 2013, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, highlighted the growth in nuclear development in countries such as China, India and South Africa, and the interest in new nuclear build expressed by governments in Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Nigeria, Poland and Vietnam, as evidence that a nuclear renaissance has not necessarily failed and that nuclear has not necessarily gone into decline (IAEA 2013). However, this thesis disputes this claim as it ignores the second key criterion for what constitutes a nuclear renaissance. That is, that extensive growth was expected to take place in areas of the world where such growth had not taken place for over two decades. This primarily refers to the regions of Western Europe and North America, both of which contain several countries with long histories of stagnation and decline in their nuclear industries. To date, there still has been only very limited growth in nuclear development in these regions since 2000. Consequently, this thesis argues that a nuclear renaissance has not taken place as the second criterion has not been fulfilled. While considerable growth has taken place in Russia, India, China and South Korea, this growth has been sustained since the 1980s and 1990s, and does not fulfil the second criterion necessary to truly have a ‘renaissance’ of nuclear energy development. Similarly, the interest in developing a nuclear programme expressed by currently non-nuclear countries does not constitute evidence of a renaissance, as it also fails to fulfil the second criterion that underpins the idea of a ‘renaissance’ of nuclear energy development.

Journalists, energy analysts and political commentators have frequently attributed the failure of the nuclear renaissance to the crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan in March 2011. The explanation given for the failure of the renaissance is that the crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan reignited public and political concerns over the safety of nuclear power. Governments across the globe responded to the Fukushima nuclear disaster by reviewing and revising their nuclear energy programs (Elliott 2013). Following the Fukushima disaster, the German government declared an immediate three-month moratorium on any nuclear power plans. All seven nuclear power plants that had begun operating prior to 1980, in addition to another plant that began operations in 1984, were temporarily shut- down1 (Kanter and Dempsey 2011: 1). In May 2011, the Reactor Safety Commission concluded that all of Germany’s nuclear reactors were safe. In spite of this, and in the face of growing pressure from large-scale public demonstrations2 and from anti-nuclear federal states, the government decided to re-instate the previous nuclear phase-out policy, and close all reactors by 2022. The eight reactors that were already temporarily shut down as part of the moratorium were declared as permanently closed. German Chancellor Angela Merkel defended her decision by arguing that her views on nuclear safety have changed since witnessing the events at Fukushima, which she described as a “turning point in the history of the industrial world” (The Economist 2011). Merkel stated that Germany “simply can’t go back to business as usual” and that the phase-out of nuclear power would provide Germany with a competitive edge in developing renewable energy (Baetz 2011).

Governments elsewhere followed the German example by announcing their decision to abandon future nuclear energy development as a result of Fukushima. Two months after the Fukushima disaster, the Energy Minister for Switzerland suspended the approvals process for new nuclear reactors, pending a safety review. Shortly after this, the Cabinet announced that it would make the suspension a permanent ban on nuclear development. The existing nuclear reactors would continue to operate, but would not be replaced, effectively phasing-out nuclear power generation in Switzerland. The Swiss Cabinet stated that its decision was made “in the face of the severe damage that the earthquake and tsunami in Fukushima caused” (Kanter 2011). In June 2011, a national referendum on the use of nuclear power was held in Italy, the result of which was overwhelmingly anti-nuclear. More than 94 per cent of the voters opposed the plans to resume nuclear power generation, forcing the government to abandon its hopes for future nuclear development (BBC News 2011). Similarly, the Mexican government abandoned its plans to build up to ten new nuclear reactors (Rodriguez 2011). In 2012, the Belgian government back-flipped on a decision made three years earlier to extend the operating lives of its nuclear reactors, by announcing the accelerated closure of two of its seven operating nuclear reactors (Levitan 2011).

In the face of immense public pressure, the Japanese government also announced in 2012 that it would phase-out all of its operating nuclear reactors by 2040 (although this decision has since been reversed) (McCurry 2013; South China Morning Post 2014). Nuclear power development plans were delayed in Indonesia, and abandoned in Kuwait and Bahrain as a result of the Fukushima disaster (International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles 2012; The Japan Times 2012; TradeArabia 2012: 10). In China, the issuing of safety approvals for new nuclear plants was suspended until new safety rules

1 The eight plants temporarily shut down were Neckarwestheim 1, Phillipsburg 1, Biblis A and B, Isar 1, Unterweser, Brunsbüttel and Krümmel (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 2012: 45-6). 2 50,000 protesters formed a human chain from the state capital, Stuttgart, to that reactor. An estimated 110,000 people demonstrated in 450 towns across Germany against extending nuclear power (Kanter and Dempsey 2011). were developed and implemented (Vivoda 2013). Thailand responded to the Fukushima disaster by deciding to delay its first nuclear power development project for three years, during which time further study would be undertaken into nuclear safety and improving public support for the technology (Phetcharatana 2011: 3; WNA 2014). In the US, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission undertook safety reviews of all nuclear power plants throughout the country (Behr 2011). Even though the US government continued to affirm its support for nuclear power, several nuclear projects in the US were delayed or cancelled in the wake of Fukushima (Elliott 2013: 56). For example, NRG Energy announced that it would abandon its plans for the development of two new nuclear units at the South Texas Project (STP) largely as a result of Fukushima. The President and CEO of NRG Energy, David Crane, justified the decision on the grounds that, “the tragic nuclear incident in Japan has introduced multiple uncertainties around new nuclear development in the United States which have had the effect of dramatically reducing the probability that STP 3&4 can be successfully developed in a timely fashion” (Business Wire 2011).

These government and industry responses to the Fukushima disaster led the media to pinpoint the crisis as the reason why the nuclear renaissance failed. A headline in the German newspaper Der Spiegel read “Fukushima Marks the End of the Nuclear Era”, likening the events to the “9/11 of the nuclear industry” (Der Spiegel 2011: 1). An article in the Energy Economist stated that Fukushima may be the “effective end of the nuclear renaissance in the West” (Thomas 2012a: 6). The resurgence of interest in nuclear power was said to have “ended as soon it started, completely buried by the disaster at the Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant in Japan” (The Voice of Russia 2011: 1). Fukushima was described as the “coup de grâce” for the renaissance (Quiggin 2012: 1), with others declaring that the “era of nuclear renaissance is over. The Fukushima shock marks the beginning of the ‘nuclear ice age’” (Takahashi 2011: 1). The World Energy Outlook 2014 stated that “the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011 ended what some viewed as the start of a global nuclear renaissance” (IEA 2014a: 396).

However, to date, there has not been a systematic analysis into why the renaissance did not amount to what it promised. Such an analysis is necessary given that, despite the intuitive answer that Fukushima caused the downfall of the renaissance, this assumption is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the explanation is mono-causal, as it fails to consider the various causal factors that could potentially influence nuclear energy development. Secondly, the explanation is a-historical, as it fails to locate recent changes in nuclear development within its broader historical context. In addition, the events at Fukushima fail to explain why there was so little evidence of growth or real action towards expanding nuclear power programmes prior to 2011, as well as why nuclear energy development has continued to grow largely unaffected in Russia, China, and India post-2011 despite the Fukushima disaster occurring. Consequently, a systematic analysis into the factors influencing the failure of the nuclear renaissance is required to better understand the phenomenon.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND QUESTIONS The objective of this thesis is therefore to examine why there is a disconnection between the expectation and reality of a nuclear renaissance. In particular, it examines why, despite the expectation of a renaissance, there has been so little change in nuclear development in regions where the domestic nuclear energy industry had been in stagnation or decline for the past several decades. This refers primarily to the regions of Western Europe and North America.

In order to fulfil this objective, this thesis answers the following core research question:

Why has the expectation of a nuclear renaissance failed to produce widespread nuclear growth in Western Europe and North America?

In order to answer this core research question, three sub-research questions are also addressed:

1. What factors have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development in the past? 2. Can the factors which explain the changing fortunes of nuclear energy in the past explain the disconnection between the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of civil nuclear energy development in Western Europe and North America since 2000? 3. What do the factors which explain the changing fortunes of nuclear energy in the past suggest about the future development of nuclear energy in Western Europe and North America?

RESEARCH APPROACH

This thesis adopts what is defined by Shapiro (2005) as a “problem-centred” approach to research. The core feature of a problem-centred or ‘puzzle-driven’ research approach is an absence of commitment to any pre-determined theory or paradigm. The problem-centred approach is unique in that it begins by locating an empirical puzzle, rather than a theoretical framework, as its starting point. Previous attempts to explain the puzzle are reviewed, and any gaps, limitations or inconsistencies within the pre-existing body of research are identified. Once the parameters of the research problem are established, the problem-centred researcher is then free to adopt the theory (or selection of theories) and methods that appear most suitable based on the nature of the problem under investigation. By refusing to automatically prioritise one theoretical approach as fundamentally superior to another, problem-centred research is not limited by the a priori constraints and assumptions of a particular paradigm. Instead, it allows for connections to be made between theories, narratives and ideas that are normally considered and applied separately from one another. This counters the weaknesses apparent in any one paradigm, while allowing for a broader range of possible explanations to be considered.

In accordance with the problem-centred approach, this thesis has started with the identification of an empirical problem – understanding why the nuclear renaissance has failed, particularly in the regions of North America and Western Europe. The failure of the renaissance is an empirical puzzle given that the case for nuclear power in the face of climate change and energy security concerns appears convincing. Similarly, the widespread expectations of a nuclear renaissance suggested that a resurgence of global nuclear capacity was imminent. Yet an examination of the empirical data on nuclear growth as well as an analysis of nuclear energy policy making in North America and Western Europe since 2000 evinces little evidence of nuclear growth, yet alone a nuclear renaissance. In short, there is a disconnection between the widely- held expectations about the prospects of nuclear energy and the reality of what has actually occurred.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis adopts ‘Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism’ (AiC-HI) as an analytical framework to help guide the analysis of the research questions. AiC-HI was developed by Bell (2011, 2012) and Bell and Hindmoor (2014) as an expansive and flexible version of historical institutionalism, which integrates a broad range of causal variables. It recognises the importance of formal and informal institutions, agents, ideas, context and structures in explaining change over time, but crucially does not privilege any one of these variables over another. This perspective departs from the traditional historical institutionalist assumption that institutions determine the behaviour of agents. Instead, institutionally-situated agents are perceived as being able to actively negotiate and exert influence over their reality, and thereby take part in reproducing or reshaping institutions. Agents and institutions are therefore perceived as “mutually shaping” one another over time, without one ever wholly determining the behaviour or outcomes of the other. The ability for institutions and agents to shape one another is also mediated by ideas, as ideational contexts can shape agents’ interests and preferences, and incentivise particular behaviours and actions. Agents are also seen to be operating within broader contextual and structural environments which can be both constraining and empowering. The broad political, economic or social environment can influence the preferences of agents, the resources and opportunities that are available, and can establish costs and benefits to encourage agents to act in a particular way. Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism therefore rebukes the ‘stickiness’ of earlier institutional theories by incorporating a wider range of potential causal variables into its analysis. AiC-HI is also an appropriate complement to a problem-based approach to research, as it typically focuses on addressing real-world empirical questions that have a practical relevance for policymakers and the general public as well as academia.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology adopted in this thesis is a comparatively informed historical analysis. One of the major strengths of comparative historical analysis is its ability to learn lessons from the past in order to better understand policy problems of the present. It facilitates deeper, empirically-driven insights into issues that are commonly taken for granted or clouded in broad-based assumptions – a problem which plagues existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance.

Qualitative research methods are employed in order to build an understanding of both how and why nuclear energy development has changed over time. The particular qualitative research methods used for data collection and analysis in this project are document and thematic analysis, as well as expert interviews. The documents analysed were drawn from a broad range of academic disciplines, including literature from the fields of law, policy, political science, psychology and history. The documents included government policy documents, legislation, parliamentary debates, press releases, political speeches, non-government organisation and industry reports and statements, and newspaper articles from 1945 to the present day. This information was then supplemented by other data sources, including quantitative data on nuclear energy growth and development, accessed from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Power Reactor Information System. Public opinion surveys were accessed to identify how public perceptions and attitudes towards nuclear energy changed over time. The purpose of this data collection is two-fold. Firstly, it is used in a purely descriptive manner in order to build a historical narrative of how nuclear energy development had changed over time, from 1945 until the present day. Secondly, the data is analysed thematically in order to allow factors which appeared to influence nuclear energy development to emerge inductively through the research. As the potential causal variables emerge, comparisons are drawn between the experiences of individual countries and across the experiences within countries over time.

Semi-structured interviews are also being conducted with a broad range of stakeholders who have expertise in the area of civil nuclear energy development or nuclear energy policy, including representatives of government, the nuclear industry, academics and energy analysts. It is expected that approximately twenty interviews will be completed. The interviews are being used to build upon the findings of the document analysis.

CORE ARGUMENT

The core argument of this thesis has two components. Firstly, it argues that there is a significant disconnection between the expectation and reality of the global nuclear renaissance, as the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has failed to generate a widespread expansion of nuclear growth. Secondly, this thesis argues that the failure of the nuclear renaissance cannot be attributed to any one cause. Rather, in order to understand why the nuclear renaissance failed, a broad range of both nuclear-specific and broader contextual factors need to be considered.

Argument 1: There is a disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance

There is not yet a universal consensus as to whether the nuclear renaissance has been a failure. Even after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, a small number of academics, journalists and nuclear industry representatives continue to make the claim that a nuclear renaissance has been successful and is still underway. However, this thesis argues that there is a significant disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance. As a result, the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has not become a reality – especially in the regions of Western Europe and North America. This is because:  there has not been a significant increase in the number of new nuclear reactor construction starts since 2000;  nuclear energy as a proportion of global energy supply has not increased since 2000;  many of the countries which showed signs of starting a nuclear power programme or expanding their existing nuclear programmes have failed to undertake real action towards these goals or have reversed their policy positions on the issue;  the growth that has taken place in nuclear energy industries since 2000 has been focused in a very small number of countries; and  there has been a distinct absence of nuclear growth in many of the countries which were expected to drive the nuclear renaissance. This thesis makes this argument by drawing upon the findings of a widespread academic and policy literature review, statistical data on nuclear energy growth and nuclear power construction starts, as well as the findings from expert interviews.

Argument 2: The disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance cannot be attributed to any one cause

The second argument of this thesis is that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance cannot be attributed to any one cause. Rather, in order to understand why the disconnection exists, and why the nuclear renaissance failed, a broad range of factors need to be considered. These factors relate both specifically to nuclear energy development, as well as to broader changes in the context of politics and society over time. This thesis therefore identifies two ‘types’ of factors which appear to have influenced the failure of the nuclear renaissance. The first set of factors are termed ‘nuclear-specific’ factors. They are factors that are directly related to the construction, operation and management of nuclear power plants. It is these factors which have been the focus of existing research into explaining the reasons for growth and decline in nuclear energy development. While these factors clearly play an important role in determining how and why nuclear energy development changes over time, this thesis argues that the existing academic research into nuclear energy development has focused too heavily upon these factors. As a result, the existing debate around nuclear energy development has too narrow a focus.

Instead, this thesis argues that in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how and why nuclear energy development changes, broader shifts in the political and societal context need to be considered in conjunction with the nuclear-specific factors. This thesis therefore identifies a second set of broader ‘contextual factors’ which have influenced nuclear energy development in the past, and which appear to have played a role in causing the disconnect between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance. Such broader contextual factors include shifts in the perceptions, ideas and priorities of individual agents, as well as changes in the institutions, structures and contexts within which agents operate. Put simply, this thesis argues that the world in which decisions about nuclear energy are made today is fundamentally different from the context in which decisions about nuclear energy were made in the past. It is these differences in contexts which are just as influential as nuclear-specific factors in determining the expansion, stagnation or decline of nuclear energy. Many of the contextual factors which supported and encouraged the post-war boom in nuclear energy development no longer exist, or have been substantially altered or reduced. For example, the early development of nuclear energy was supported by high levels of public trust in government – but this trust has been gradually eroded over time, resulting in the current ‘trust deficit’. Nuclear power in the post-war era was widely perceived to be an inherently safe technology, yet this perception has been almost irrevocably eroded over time in the wake of highly publicised nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima. The early development of nuclear energy was facilitated by high levels of direct government involvement in policy development and implementation. Yet these governance structures have evolved over time, whereby governments are now more hesitant to directly develop, implement and fund nuclear energy programmes themselves. The growing issue salience of nuclear energy over time has changed the political environment surrounding nuclear energy development from one of ‘quiet’ to one of ‘noisy’ politics. This now makes it much harder for governments to undertake the ‘behind closed door’ deals with private corporations that had facilitated the early growth of nuclear energy. The emergence of the environmental movement has raised public and political awareness of the environmental hazards associated with the use of nuclear energy and nuclear waste, making it more difficult for governments to convince the public of the need for nuclear energy.

This thesis argues that these broad contextual shifts make it much harder for nuclear programmes to be developed and expanded upon in contemporary society. While the arguments that were put forward to justify the inevitability of a nuclear renaissance seemed convincing (such as the growing importance of climate change and the need for improved energy security), the broader political and societal context in which the nuclear renaissance was meant to take place had been fundamentally altered over time and was too problematic for nuclear energy to flourish in the same way that it had in the past. Consequently the expectation of the nuclear renaissance was never likely to become a reality, even if the Fukushima nuclear disaster had not taken place. This is evident in the lack of concrete action made towards constructing new nuclear power plants since 2000, particularly in the regions of Western Europe and North America.

CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This thesis provides a unique contribution to knowledge in four key ways. Firstly, this thesis addresses the existing dearth of academic research into the reasons for the failure of the nuclear renaissance. There is a substantial body of academic work investigating the reasons why nuclear energy development has changed over time in different countries. This work has identified a range of explanatory factors. In particular, much attention has been given to the role of different actors in influencing the rise or decline of nuclear energy, such as the role of the state (Camilleri 1984; Fuhrmann 2012; Lester and Rosner 2009), corporate and industry representatives (Hertsgaard 1983), and the anti-nuclear movement (Herring 2010; Joppke 1993; Kitschelt 1986). Cohen, McCubbins and Rosenbluth (1995) argue that policy differences largely follow from different constitutional structures and electoral systems, while Campbell (1988) focuses on the political and economic institutions which constrained development of the nuclear energy sector. Jasper (1990) outlines the weaknesses of a purely structural approach to examining nuclear energy by insisting that explanations of nuclear policy outcomes need to account for cultural and ideological factors. The impact of focusing events on nuclear energy has been considered, particularly the role of nuclear disasters (Elliott 2013; Thomas 2012b; Wittneben 2012). Other factors that have been explored in connection to nuclear energy policy include the evolution of reactor technology (Burn 1978), the economics involved in nuclear projects (Mullenbach 1966), and variations in political styles (Rüdig 1987).

These studies provide valuable insight into the many different factors that can influence how and why civil nuclear energy programmes are formed and change over time. However, this body of work is limited in two key ways. Firstly, this literature has not yet investigated whether and to what extent these factors have played a role in influencing the failure of the nuclear renaissance in particular. This thesis therefore makes a unique contribution to knowledge by explicitly investigating which factors have played a direct or indirect role in influencing the failure of the nuclear renaissance. Secondly, the existing body of literature into the factors influencing changes in nuclear energy development over time is limited in that these studies tend to adopt a singular focus on a particular type of explanatory factor which informs their analysis of nuclear industry development. In doing so, they fail to account for the many different political, social, cultural, structural, institutional, and ideological factors that are occurring at any one time, and which interplay with one another to influence the development of nuclear energy policy.

This thesis therefore makes a second unique contribution to knowledge through its use of a problem- centred approach to research, and its application of Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism. Through adopting a problem-centred approach to research, and thereby foregoing a pre-determined paradigmatic approach, this research expands on previous studies by providing a more holistic and inductive approach to understanding nuclear energy policy development, using a wide variety of explanatory contexts. This provides a more comprehensive and synthesised explanation for why nuclear energy development changes over time, and why the renaissance failed in Western Europe and North America. This holistic approach to investigating the reasons for the failure of the nuclear renaissance is further complemented by the use of AiC-HI as an analytical framework. AiC-HI allows for a broad range of causal variables – institutions, agency, ideas, structures, and context – and their interdependencies to be included in the analysis, without privileging any one of these variables over another. This further enhances the unique holistic and inductive perspective that this thesis adopts to understanding why the nuclear renaissance failed.

Furthermore, this thesis provides a unique contribution to knowledge by challenging existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance. The failure of the nuclear renaissance is commonly attributed in the media to the disaster at Fukushima in March 2011. Commentators suggest that the disaster eroded public confidence in the nuclear industry, reigniting long-held concerns over safety and regulation. In response, governments abandoned plans for nuclear expansion, evidenced by the introduction of a nuclear phase-out in Germany, and the decisions by the Swiss and Italian governments to ban further nuclear development. This thesis disputes this idea that the absence of substantial growth in nuclear energy and the failure of the nuclear renaissance can be attributed to any one action or event, such as the crisis at Fukushima. Instead, it embraces the simple premise that a broad range of contextual factors must be explored in order to fully explain the failed renaissance.

Finally, this thesis provides a unique contribution to knowledge by developing a rigorously detailed, empirical account of changes in nuclear energy policy from 1945 until the present day, with a particular focus on the regions of Western Europe and North America. A considerable amount of research has already focused on charting the history of nuclear energy programmes, documenting why and how civilian nuclear energy industries have developed. While some studies have focused on investigating these issues at a global scale (Damian 1992; Hammond 1996; Scurlock 2010; Walls 2011), the majority have focused on either one or a small number of case-study countries3. However, most of these studies were conducted prior to 1990, and therefore do not consider the many changes in nuclear energy policy that have occurred over the past two decades4. This research addresses this knowledge gap by providing an updated account of changes in nuclear energy policy from 1945 until the present day. These changes are primarily documented for the regions of Western Europe and North America, but contrasts are also be drawn with changes in nuclear development over time in recent nuclear growth countries such as Russia, China, Indian and South Korea. In doing so, it develops a more comprehensive understanding of how current nuclear energy policies have been developed and changed over time and between countries. This is completed to a degree of wide- ranging empirical detail unmatched by previous studies on nuclear energy.

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

A number of preliminary findings have been identified from the research conducted to date. Firstly, both the document analysis and interviews conducted thus far demonstrate that there is not a universal consensus as to exactly what the outcome of the nuclear renaissance has been. The interviews have also revealed that there is considerable variation amongst interpretations of what the ‘nuclear renaissance’ was actually meant to constitute, and what criteria need to be fulfilled in order to determine whether or not a renaissance has taken place. However, despite these differences, there has been a broad agreement amongst many of the interviewees that there has been a disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance, and that the expectation of a widespread growth in new nuclear energy development has not taken place.

3 Previous research has contributed to charting the history of nuclear energy development in specific countries, such as the UK (Gowing 1974a, 1974b; Hall 1986; Parker and Surrey 1995; Pocock 1977; Williams 1980), France (Fagnani and Moatti 1984; Scheinman 1965), Sweden (James 1979; Kåberger 2007; Nordhaus 1997; Wikdahl 1991), Germany (Winnacker and Wirtz 1979), Japan (Lesbirel 1990; Pickett 2002; Tolliday 2012), the US (Campbell 1988), Turkey (Erdogdu 2007), Republic of Korea (Choi et al. 2009; Park 1992), Belgium (Laes et al. 2007), Finland (Kojo and Litmanen 2009; Litmanen 2010), and Ireland (Baker 1988). Others have focused on charting and comparing the history of nuclear power across a small number of case study countries (DeLeon 1980; Goldemberg 2009; Poneman 1982). 4 While there are some exceptions to this, more recent studies have tended to focus on nuclear energy in developing countries and emerging nuclear markets, particularly the Middle East and Asia (Choi et al. 2009; Ebinger and Squassoni 2011; Erdogdu 2007; Goldemberg 2009; Yi-chong 2008). The research conducted thus far also supports the second argument developed in this thesis – that the failure of the nuclear renaissance cannot be attributed solely to the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011. Rather, the research findings suggest that a broad range of factors have influenced the failure of the nuclear renaissance. These factors can be grouped in to two categories: ‘nuclear- specific factors’, and ‘broader contextual factors’. These factors have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development over time. The ‘nuclear-specific factors’ are factors which are specific to the construction, operation, maintenance and closure of nuclear power plants that have influenced the rise and fall of nuclear energy development in the past, and which continue to impact upon the success of the nuclear renaissance and the future trajectory of the nuclear industry. They include the construction costs and finance difficulties of nuclear power plants, growing concerns over the safety of nuclear energy developments, the ongoing problem of nuclear waste storage, transport and disposal, and the rise of public opposition to nuclear energy. The nuclear-specific factors are also factors which have been previously identified in the literature as influencing the development of civil nuclear energy programmes.

In addition to the nuclear-specific factors, a number of broader contextual factors have also been identified as having impacted the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development over time, and as having influenced the outcome of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. These factors include declining levels of public trust in government, changes in the governance structures for nuclear energy development, a shift from quiet to noisy politics of nuclear energy, and changes in public perceptions of risk and nuclear energy. The factors tell us that the context in which nuclear energy is developed today is fundamentally different to the context in which nuclear energy experienced its initial rise in the 1950s and 1960s. This factors mean that it is much more difficult to expand nuclear power programmes now than it was in the past. This helps to explain why there is a disconnection between the rhetoric and the reality of the nuclear renaissance.

The nuclear specific and the broader contextual factors suggest that a renaissance is unlikely to take place in the near future. The new reactors that are being built are encountering significant difficulties, many of which are the same difficulties that have plagued nuclear energy since the 1970s. As a result, many of the reactors that had been planned for construction have been abandoned. These factors need to be overcome if a renaissance is going to take place in the regions of Western Europe and North America.

CONCLUSION

This paper has provided an overview of an ongoing PhD research project examining the outcome of the nuclear renaissance. The research conducted to date suggests that a clear disparity exists between the expectation and reality of a nuclear renaissance taking place in the regions of Western Europe and North America. This disparity can be explained by a range of nuclear-specific factors which have influenced the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development over time. However, broader shifts in the political and societal contexts in which decisions about nuclear power development are made also appear to have played an influential role in determining the outcome of the nuclear renaissance. The combination of these nuclear- specific and broader contextual factors suggest that a nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place in the near future in the regions of Western Europe and North America. The next stage of this research project will involve further data analysis and completing the findings and conclusion section of the research report.

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