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Tribunal PBnal International pour le Rwanda ~wshalnternat~a~i Conference centre P 0 Box6016 Awrha Tanran~a B P 6016 Arurha Tanzan~e UNlTED NATIONS Te 255 27 25M207 11 2504357-72 or 1 212 963 2650 Fax 255 27 250400012504373 N.VI0NSUNIk.C or 1 212 953 2848149
Before : The Trial Chamber Designated Under Rule 11bis (A)
Registrar : Mr Adarna Dieng
Date filed: 2 October 2007
YUSSUF MUNYAKAZI
Case No ICTR-97-36A-I
DEFENCE RESPONSE TO THE PROSECUTOR'S REQUEST FOR THE REFERRAL OF THE CASE OF YUSSUF MUNYAKAZZ TO RWANDA PURSUANT TO RULE 11 BZS OF THE TRIBUNAL'S RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
Office of the Prosecutor Counsel for the Accused
Hassan Bubacar Jallow Jwani Timothy Mwaikusa Bongani Majola Eliane Nyampinga Silvana Arbia Alex-Obote-Odora Richard Karegyesa George Mugwanya Inneke Onsea Francois Nsanzuwera Florida Kabasinga 1. Introduction The Defence Team of the accused, Yussuf Munyakazi, in response to the Prosecutor's Request for the Referral of the Case of Yussuf Munyakazi to Rwanda Pursuant to Rule llbis of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter referred to as "the Motion"), respectfully requests that: (a) The Prosecutor's request aforesaid, dated and filed on 7 September 2007, should not be granted or approved; and
(b) The provisions of articles 1, 5, 7 and 8(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda be strictly adhered to in relation to the case of Yussuf Munyakazi so that the case is tried and determined by this Tribunal according to its applicable Rules of Procedure and Evidence, on the grounds and reasons that are shown herebelow.
2. Factual Background 2.1: The accused, known as WSSUF MUNYAKAZI, was first arrested in the Democratic Republic of Congo on 2 May 2004. He had fled Rwanda in 1994 and was living there, in the DRC, as a refugee. His arrest was made pursuant to the orders of this Tribunal. Subsequent to his arrest, he has been in detention at the UNDF in Arusha from May sth2004.
2.2: On arrival at the UNDF, the accused was, for several months held in isolation, separated from the other detainees at the UNDF and, on that account did experience a difficult condition of life. The decision to keep him separated from the other inmates reversed by the President of the Tribunal on 15 February 2005, following a formal request to that effect by the Defence.
2.3: On the 16 June 2005, the Tribunal's Registry appointed counsel for the accused and he formed his team and it started working for the advancement of the case. This defence team, however, came to an abrupt end in September 2006 with the arrest and detention in Arusha of the Lead Counsel, Mr Callixte Gakwaya, on the request of the Rwandan Government. Although he was released, he had to withdraw from the case. A 96 new counsel for the accused was appointed in January 2007, and constituted a new defence team in late March 2007.
2.4: Currently, investigations by both the Prosecution and the Defence are in good progress. A Status Conference was held on 31 August 2007 and a general consensus was reached that the Prosecution will file an Amended Indictment by the end of October 2007, at the latest, and that all parties should plan for February 2008 as the probable date for the trial to commence. According to the Prosecutor at the Conference, the intended amendments to the indictment will not bring any new charges but will only provide better particulars of the charges contained in the indictment now before the Tribunal. The Prosecutor also added that he will need only 16 days for the presentation of prosecutor's witnesses.
3. No Reason to Take the Accused Away from the ICTR 3.1: In the Motion the Prosecutor has endeavored to paint a rosy picture of the laws and the legal system of the Republic of Rwanda: that they guarantee the accused a fair trial. That picture has no factual substance to support it. Even assuming that all what is stated in the Motion about the system in Rwanda was true (only assuming, because the Defence submits that it is not), that in itself cannot be the reason for transferring the accused from the jurisdiction of the ICTR to the jurisdiction of the courts in Rwanda. There has to be a reason, a good reason, for such transfer, not just the acclaimed excellence of the Rwandan system.
3.2: In the Motion, the Prosecutor does not state why he is asking the Tribunal not to continue with the case of Yussuf Munyakazi itself but to refer it to some other jurisdiction. He does not explain why the Tribunal cannot itself try the accused, whose indictment has been confirmed since 1997 and amended in November 2002. The Tribunal has not been deprived of its jurisdiction to try the case of Yussuf Munyakazi; it is still seized of jurisdiction. The reason for seeking this transfer to Rwanda or to any other jurisdiction has not been given by the Prosecutor; it has not been given because there is no good reason; there is in fact no reason at all. 3.3: It is common knowledge now that the Tribunal's mandate lasts up to December 2008 for all cases of first instance. One could assume that the move by the Prosecutor is part of the Tribunal's "completion strategy" to finish the trial of all pending cases within that deadline. If that was the reason, the Prosecutor should have said so, and there would be no need for assumptions; but he does not mention it in the Motion. The Prosecutor does not mention that to be the reason very deliberately because the argument of the lack of time for the Tribunal to try this case cannot hold. The Prosecutor presented the Motion while the Tribunal still had more than one year and three months to go before the end of its mandate.
3.4: By experience, some single trials do not take much time. For example, in Renzaho trial presentations of both the prosecutor and the defense witnesses took only 8 months, from 7 January to 8 September, 2007. For Ndindabahizi case, the evidence of both the prosecution and defense witnesses was heard from 1 September to 28 November, 2003, while for Muhimana's trial the prosecutor took one month to present 19 witnesses and the defense called 33 witnesses in a span of two weeks. There every logic, therefore, to say that this case too can take just as short a time.
3.5: The Tribunal has not indicated that it cannot try this case because of constraints of time in the remaining period of its mandate. Within that remaining period the trial of the case of Yussuf Munyakazi can commence and proceed to completion. This much was confirmed even by the Prosecutor at the Status Conference held on 31 August 2007; the Prosecutor expressed the view that even if the trial commences on 1 April 2008, the date he was proposing for the trial to commence, the hial can be completed before December 2008, even if the judgment may yet to be given. But the Tribunal has insisted on the trial commencing earlier than April, hence the proposed date of February 2008. So, why should the case be taken away from the Tribunal? No reason is given. No reason is there. 3.6: There is also the question why the Prosecution should pick on this particular accused person, Yussuf Munyakazi, for transfer to Rwanda out of the many other persons the Prosecution is intent to present to justice. We are informed about two other motions, similar to this one, simultaneously filed with this Motion also seeking the transfer of the accused persons indicted before the ICTR. This is not a justification for transferring the accused, Yussuf Munyakazi, from the ICTR to Rwanda, given that there are other suspects arrested subsequent to his arrest, and they remain under the ICTR for trial.
3.7: On the other hand, the Prosecutor does not explain why he has envisaged transferring only this case to Rwanda only while Article 1 lbis on which his request is based provides for the possibility of transferring such a case to other countries as well. The reason for Rwanda as the Prosecutor's choice seems to be in paragraph 5 of the Motion which discloses some agreement between the Prosecutor and the Kigali Government. This appears clearly in the correspondence between the ICTR Prosecutor, Mr. Justice Hassan Bubacar Jallow and Mr. Martin Ngoga, the Prosecutor General for Republic of Rwanda (Annex A to the Motion), and in the statutory amendments hurriedly made by the legislature in Rwanda (Annex C, D, F and G to the Motion). Even special laws have been enacted, namely, the Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty (Annex E to the Motion) and the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases from the ICTR to Rwanda (Annex B to the Motion). But this hyper-activism by the Rwandan Government and its connivance with the ICTR Prosecutor will not serve the interests of justice. As shown hereinafter, if this case is transferred to Rwanda, a lot of injustice is bound to occur, all of which will be avoided if the case remains for trial at this Tribunal.
4. Abolition of the Death Penalty in Rwanda 4.1: The Prosecutor states in the Motion that the Government of Rwanda has abolished the death penalty in all Rwandan laws. However, apart from the Organic Luw Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty and the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases, all the other laws annexed to the Motion do contain provisions for the death penalty. The Prosecutor has not presented any explanation for the continued presence of those provisions in those laws, standing in stark contradiction to his assertions. This casts doubts about the level and degree of achievement and effectiveness of the formal abolition of the death penalty in the Rwandan legal arsenal.
4.2: It is also pertinent that the persons standing accused before the ICTR have, on numerous occasions expressed their worry and concern, as clearly indicated in several of their correspondences to the UN and to the ICTR authorities, that the abolition of the death penalty in Rwanda does not provide any guarantee of security against attack upon the life of prisoners by other means, especially the kidnappings and disguised murders.' Such occurrences have been rampant in Rwanda, as a recounted by Human Rights Watch in a very recent report (Annex B to this Response), rendering support to the detainees' expressed worries.
4.4: The Prosecutor states in paragraph 34 of the Motion that pursuant to article 21 of the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases, in the event of a conviction life imprisonment is "the maximum sentence" that may be imposed on an accused person transferred from the ICTR. There is, however, an ambiguity that can bring great prejudice to every accused so transferred. As it is, the law on the abolition of the death penalty has replaced the death sentence by "the sentence of life imprisonment" or by "la paine de reclusion criminelle a perpetuite", which may translate as "the sentence of criminal imprisonment for life" (article 3). Both refer to life imprisonment. However, there is a difference between the two in that the latter, "the sentence of criminal imprisonmentfor life" is a sentence of life imprisonment with certain conditions stipulated under article 4 of that law. The conditions are that: the convicted person shall not benefit from any kind of mercy, pardon or amnesty, conditional release or rehabilitation, without having accomplished at least 20 years of imprisonment; and the convicted person shall be kept in isolation
I Letters to the UN secretary General: 16 February 2004, 10 January 2007; Letters to UN and KTR Authorities: 29 March 2003, 03 April 2006; Letters to the ICTR President: 10 June 2002, 24 May 2004, 14 June 2004, 12 July 2004, 15 July 2004,19 September 2004, 19 February 2005,23 January 2007,28 March 2007,06 August 2007. Copies of some of these letters are attached to this Response and collectively marked as Annex A. m 4.5: By contrast, the sentence of life imprisonment provided for under article 23 of the Statute of the Tribunal and Rule 101(A) of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as well as according to the ICTR jurisprudence, is not subject to any such conditions. And article 21 of the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases does not indicate that the life imprisonment to be imposed to those convicted after being transferred from the ICTR will not be given the sentence of "reclusion criminelle a perpetuite" with its attendant harsh conditions of pardon-less isolation for life.
4.6: This means that upon conviction in Rwanda, an accused person transferred from the ICTR will be denied the benefits available under article 27 of the Statute of the Tribunal and article 124 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence concerning eligibility for pardon or commutation of sentence. In addition, such a person will be subjected to the horribly drastic and inhumane conditions of isolation for life. In the circumstances, the step taken by the Prosecutor to seek to transfer the accused Yussuf Munyakazi to Rwanda so that, upon conviction, he be subjected to such harsh punishment conditions, far worse than the maximum that the ICTR could impose, is not a step motivated only by the need to render justice. Justice can be rendered by the ICTR which, as of now, is still able and willing to do in this case.
4.7: Clearly, therefore, if the accused is to be convicted after the transfer to Rwanda as now sought by the Prosecutor, he is certain to be subjected to drastically harsh conditions and will not benefit from any of the rights guaranteed to him under International Law in general, and the Statute of the ICTR and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence in particular, rights which are guaranteed to him if tried by the ICTR.
5. Differences Between Rwandan and ICTR Laws 5.1: Contrary to the claims by the Prosecutor, the difference between the law of the ICTR and that of the Republic of Rwanda is quite big. A comparison of the two will show that the ICTR laws provide far better guarantees for justice than the laws of Rwanda. In the interests ofjustice, therefore, the accused should be retained for trial by Sd the ICTR so as to benefit from the principle that the most favourable law should apply to safeguard the interests of an accused person.
5.2: The temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR extends to the preiod from 01 January to 31 December 1994 (article 7 of the Statute of the ICTR). In Rwanda, on the other hand, article 1 of the Organic Law on genocide (Annexure C to the Motion) provides for criminal proceedings to be instituted against persons alleged to have committed acts of genocide and crimes against humanity at any time from 01 October 1990 onwards, to an undetermined date. Although the Organic Law on Transfer of Cases states that persons transferred from the ICTR shall be prosecuted only for offences falling under the jurisdiction of the ICTR, it is silent about temporal jurisdiction.
5.3: There is no certainty, therefore, that the authorities in Rwanda will not prosecute the accused transferred there for acts alleged to have been done outside the period prescribed under the ICTR Statute. This concern is real, not speculative, considering that article 4 of the Organic Law on Transfer of Cases requires the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Rwanda to harmonize the ICTR indictment and make it compliant with the provisions of the Rwanda Code of Criminal Procedure. It means that the accused transferred to Rwanda is likely to face an indictment revised by the Prosecutor General of Rwanda.
5.4: The Rwanda Code ofcriminal Procedure (Annex G to the Motion), still contains provisions for the death penalty (articles 212-217); it constrains prisoners to compulsory hard labour (article 218); and persons convicted of genocide or crimes against humanity under that law cannot benefit from conditional release (article 237). The practical meaning of this is that they cannot be considered for pardon, commutation of sentence or any anticipated release, benefits that are always available to persons tried and convicted by the ICTR (article 27 of the Statute of the ICTR and Rule 124 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence). 5.6: All in all, there are many factors indicating that the ICTR indictment may be abandoned in favour of one to be prepared by authorities under the Rwandan jurisdiction, basing the charges therein upon and referring to Rwandan legislation which is, in many respects, far more stringent and harsh to the accused transferred than what the accused will be subjected to if he remains under the jurisdiction of the ICTR. The Motion is completely silent on that issue; the Prosecutor has deliberately concealed the prejudice that the accused is bound to suffer in the event of his transfer to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Rwanda.
7. Trial by a Competent, Independent and Impartial Tribunal 7.1: There is no guarantee that, if transferred to Rwanda the accused will have the right to be tried by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. The Prosecutor admits in paragraph 39 of the Motion that while the law on Transfer of Cases guarantees the right to "a fair and public hearing" the same law, rather surprisingly, omits to mention that the said public hearing shall be before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal.
7.2: The right to be tried by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal is an extremely essential right, especially for a person being transferred from an international tribunal like the ICTR. It is not a right that should just be assumed to exist on account of provisions to be found in general laws such as the Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure, as suggested by the Prosecutor.
7.3: In any case those general laws do not contain specific provisions guaranteeing the right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. It is amazing, therefore, that a special law specifically enacted for matters of transfer of cases from the ICTR, should omit to mention the prerequisites of competence, independence and impartiality of the Tribunal that will try them in Rwanda. This omission is indicative of how little regard the authorities in Rwanda accord to this right in relation to accused persons to be transferred there. 7.4: The Defence also contests the competence of the High Court of the Republic of Rwanda, constituted by a single judge, to try and determine a case transferred there from the ICTR. The crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes do not fall under the competence of the High Court as generally established by article 149 of the Constitution of Rwanda (Annex F to the Motion). It is both absurd and unacceptable that a single judge be allowed to give rulings on accusations related to serious violations of International Law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
7.5: International standards of fair trial require that persons accused of serious crimes against international humanitarian law appear before a panel of three judges in the first instance and before five judges at the appellate level. That is the case with the ICTR, the ICTY, the Tribunal for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court (KC). It is also the case for the specialized courts cited in article 21 of the Rwandan law on genocide and crimes against humanity (Annex C to the Motion).
7.6: While the Prosecutor has enumerated many provisions in the Rwandan legislation providing for what is claimed to be a good and competent judicial system, the Motion gives absolutely no factual evidence of what actually happens in practice. The Motion merely recites the text of the laws enacted in Rwanda; nothing is said about the actual reality on the ground relating to those laws. Africa is not short of examples of countries in which the text of the law proclaims excellence while the practice is in the neighbourhoods of hell. There is nothing in the Motion to suggest that Rwanda is one of the unique exceptions.
7.7: In the Motion the Prosecutor does not even state how many judges of the High Court or of the Supreme Court there are in Rwanda. But one has to admit that the present Rwandan judicial system is still being reconstructed, both at the level of legislation as well as the level of human resources. This is inevitable, following disruptions caused by the ravages of the war prosecuted by the RF'F against the then Rwanda Government (1990-1994), the genocide of 1994, and subsequent massacres perpetrated after 1994. w 7.8: There are also reports of a deliberate policy of the RPF government to remove and exclude all Hutu from judicial office. One such example is that of Mr. A. Nkundiyaremye, former Vice-president of the Supreme Court and President of the State Council who was forced to resign from office just because he is Hutu, and went into exile in Belgium in 1999. He made a detailed account of the problems afflicting the judicial system under the current regime.2
7.9: One could dismiss Nkundiyaremye's account as that of a person with his own personal grievance against the regime. But there are other reports which support that claim about the current Rwanda regime not only regarding the judiciary but also establishments in the entire public ~ector.~In this report submitted to the ICTR in the Butare case for the accused Joseph Kanyabashi, Professor Filip Reyntjens, who has also served as expert witness for the OTP, denounced the phenomenon of cctutsisation)) and ctFPR-isation))at every level of public life in Rwanda in the following terms:
"The 'tutsisation ' and 'FPR-isation ' are phonemena observed since 1994 at every level of public life in Rwanda. Most of the Ambassadors, the quasi-totality of general secretaries and top-level judges and prosecutors, more than 80% of the burgomasters, the quasi-totality of the executive secretaries, the whole top leadership in the Army, the Police and in the Security services, the great majority of university teachers and students at the Univesity, most of the directors of institutions controlled by the government . . . are Tutsi and RPF member^."^
7.10: Evidently, the RPF may have won the war and taken over state power but they have not succeeded to eradicate the Tutsi-Hutu divide which has continued to afflict state institutions including the judiciary. On account of this Tutsi-Hutu divide officers of the Supreme Court employed under the previous regime were asked to resign, and there were complains that magistrates from that regime who had not been replaced were sabotaging the judicial system; by July 1999, the functioning of the courts was said to have become more and more paralysed.5
'Analysis done, on 24 June 199, by Mr. Alype Nkundiyaremye, former President of the State Council and vice-president of the Supreme Court. 3 .. F~hpReyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On - From Genocide to Dictatorship," in African Affairs, vol. 103:177-210 (2004) 4 Report of Professor Filip Reyntjens dated 1610812007, p. 17, submitted in case No. ICTR- 5 See Annex C to this Response 7.11: All in all, the judicial system in Rwanda is young and fragile. It is a new system built upon a basis determined by the winner in the wars, the RPF, which started laying down its foundations after taking power and control. It has not yet stabilized and proved its worth, notably in relation to the great principles of law such as the independence and impartiality of the judges. The present situation in Rwanda exhibits a weak judicial system that can easily submit to the political whims of a regime happy with its victory and keen to impose its own notions ofjustice.
7.12: Often inhibited by a spirit of revenge against the Hutu, who are generally accused of having massacred the Tutsis, this regime has even rejected offers of service by foreign magistrates who would have helped to build up independence and the impartiality in the Rwandan judicial system. Such offers were generously made by the UN system, notably the ICTR, as well as by bilateral aids in order to improve its performance in matters of respect for human rights, particularly the right to life and personal security, the right to presumption of innocence, the rights to defend oneself in court, the rights of prisoners, as well as other individual liberties acknowledged by the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.
7.13: Reports from organizations or individuals engaged in the defence of human rights, including some from some state departments, coming out year after year, have denounced the many violations of human rights in ~wanda~.They include the analytical account of ten years of the RPF regime (1994-2004) by Professor Filip ~eyntjens.' Answering a question put to him by a Journalist of Radio France International on 19 September 2007 with respect to the idea of transfemng some ICTR detainees to be tried in Rwanda, Filip Reyntjens said the following: "there is a recent Amnesty International report of December 2006 that renders a totally unfavorable opinion, suggesting that people should not be transferred to Rwanda mainly because trials cannot be fair. Amnesty International
6 Amnesty International (1994, 1998, 2003, 2007); Human Rights Watch (1994, 2003, 2005, 2007); US State Department Country Reports; Statement of Dr. Desforges during the Hearing on State Department Country Reports on Human Rights practices for 1999; SOS Rwanda-Burundi: Le Rwanda 2004 face a la declaration des Droits de I'Homme; Communiques du Centre contre I'impunite et I'injustice au Rwanda (No 43198 du 4 novembre 1998, 12 juillet 2004,31 mars 2005). 7 Cited in footnote 3 above. evokes even tales of torture and other acts of maltreatment. ..". And in an address to the United Nations Security Council in December 2006, Amnesty International highlighted that "no court in Rwanda has jurisdiction over alleged war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law." (See: Hirondelle, 15.12.2006, Annex E to this Response).
7.14: While the system is new and has not yet attained stability, the judges in that system also lack the requisite experience one would expect for judges who are to try cases transferred from the ICTR. Paragraph 43 of the Motiqn shows that no particular level of experience is required for judges of the High Court ahd the Supreme Court; it is only for the President and the Vice-president of the Supreme Court that some experience is required: a mere 8 years of work experience for persons entrusted to head the Judiciary. No particular experience in criminal law is required.
7.15: Certainly, the judges in Rwanda do not have the experience required to try cases of violations of international humanitarian law in conformity with international standards, as is the case with the United Nations ad hoc international tribunals (ICTR and ICTY), the International Criminal Court (KC) and UN-backed Tribunals for Sierra Leone and Cambodia. An 8-year experience is not sufficient experience to boast of for that task. And that is only for the most senior judges in Rwanda; other judges are likely to be of relatively less experience.
7.16: Rwandan judges do not have the knowledge and the practice of legal international standards and procedures necessary to guarantee to the transferred accused a trial that respects the standards of justice and equity. It is undoubtedly for that reason that the Prosecutor is silent about the qualifications and experience of human resources employed in the Rwandan judicial system and their lack of experience.
7.17: Contrary to what is suggested by the Prosecutor in paragraph 46 of the Motion, article 13 of the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases does not contain any clause on independence or impartiality of the Courts (High Court, Supreme Court), or of the judges who will hear the cases transferred. Indeed, the Constitution of Rwanda makes reference to the independence of the judiciary but it is a reference made generally in relation to separation of powers among the different branches of government in Rwanda. It is silent about independence with regard to the actual administration ofjustice by judges.
7.18: All in all, the Prosecutor's submissions about the independence of judges in the Rwandan judicial system vis-i-vis the executive branch (paragraph 46-57 of the Motion) are not a true account of the reality on the ground. The declarations in the legal texts do not reflect what is being implemented. Indeed, there are indications contrary to the Prosecutor's assertions.
7.19: Looking at the procedure of appointing judges described by the Prosecutor (paragraphs 49-55 of the Motion), it is clear that all of them, judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court, are appointed by the President of the Supreme Court following decision of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary. Many members of this Council are appointed, directly or indirectly, by President of the Republic, the Head of the Executive (paragraphs 49-50 of the Motion).
7.20: It is President Kagame who nominates candidates to the positions of President and Vice-presidents of the Supreme Court, as well as candidates for the rest of the membership of the Supreme Court (articles 147 and 148 ofthe Constitution). It is very unlikely that the institutions that are consulted in the process (the Senate, the Cabinet, and the Supreme Council of the Judiciary) will reject a candidate presented by President Kagame. In reality, most judges are either committed or sympathetic to the RPF, the political party that controls all institutions of the State.
8. Fundamental Rights of the Accused Will not be Respected 8.1: The rosec cut or has enumerated fundamental rights of the accused as mentioned in the text of international treaties or in the law relating to transfers, but he does not broach the subject of the respect accorded in practice to these rights by the Rwandan authorities and institutions concerned. Again it is the same question of the 'difference between fhe letter of the law and its practical application (paragraph 37 of the Motion).
8.2: It is very unlikely that the accused will be able to benefit from the right to the presumption of innocence guaranteed under the ICTR (article 20.3 of the ICTR Statute), given that all Hutus are usually considered as having participated in the "genocide of Tutsis". According to the letter and the spirit of the ICTR Statute (articles 17, 18, 20.3) and its Rules of Evidence and Procedure (Rules 47, 87), as well as its jurisprudence, it is the Prosecutor who has to prove the guilt of the accused. The latter has no obligation to prove his innocence because he is innocent for as long as his guilt has not yet been proved.
8.3: This major principle of criminal law, universally acknowledged, is not always respected in Rwanda, contrary to what the Prosecutor states in the Motion (paragraph 68); not everything written in the law is also always true in reality. The famous lists of "ginocidaires" by category established by the RPF constitute an eloquent example of the sad reality that the presumption of innocence is absent in Rwanda in so far as genocide is concerned. This is evident from the reaction of the Rwandan government whenever an accused is acquitted by the ICTR: there is always a protest from the Government of Rwanda as if everybody charged is automatically guilty. Since the establishment of the ICTR a lot of lead counsel, investigators and legal assistants have been faced with the threat of arrest or being cited on the lists of "genocidaires" simply because they defend the accused. Professor Peter Erlinder, current President of the Association of ICTR Defence Lawyers (ADAD) has been declared a "genocidaire" by President Kagame him~elf.~
8.4: The situation in Rwanda is such that suspects and accused persons often have to wait for many long years before they get to know the charges against them. Such a situation does not inspire anyone to believe that if referred there the accused will be able
8 See Annex B to this Response 9 Letter dated 20 June 2007 from Prof. Peter Erlinder to the President of the ICTR, attached to this Response as Annex D to be informed, as soon as possible, and in a language that he understands in a detailed manner, of the nature and cause of the charge against him as article 20.4(a) of the ICTR Statute requires. By transfer to Rwanda the accused is put at the risk of being denied that right while his indictment is amended to harmonize it with Rwandan legislation pursuant to article 4 of the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases.
8.5: In addition, the accused will not be able to enjoy his right of "having adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence" (article 20.4(b) of the ICTR Statute) in conditions similar to those under the ICTR, as claimed by the Prosecutor (paragraphs 37, 64-66 of the Motion). It is on record that the government in Kigali has refused to cooperate with the ICTR in availing this right to some persons indicted before the ICTR. The regime has refused to cooperate with members of ICTR defense teams and actually prevented them from preparing adequately the defense of their clients. For example, in the case of Kajelijeli the defense team was denied the disclosure of previous statements made by a Prosecution witness.'' And, in spite of the intervention by the Tribunal, defense teams for Emmanuel Bagambiki and AndrP Ntagerura received the same treatment when they tried to obtain documents relating to the guilty plea of some Prosecution witnesses." Now the Prosecutor does not indicate in the Motion how that same regime will guarantee availability of that same right for an accused person transferred to Rwanda from the ICTR.
8.6: There have even been cases of harassment, intimidation, and even arrest and imprisonment of members of defense teams. The defence team of the accused in this case, Yussuf Munyakazi, has already suffered such treatment when the Lead Counsel, Callixte Gakwaya was arrested in Arusha on 1" September 2006, at the instigation of the Rwanda ~overnrnent;" after his release, he had to abandon his client because he, the counsel, could not be assured of his security, threatened by the Rwandan authorities. The Representative of the government in Kigali keeps on calling Defense lawyers loExtremely Urgent Defense Motion to strike out statements and testimony of detained Witnesses GDD, GDQ, GAP and GAO filed on 18 April 2002, in case No. ICTR-98-44A 'I "Decision on Bagambiki's and Ntagerura's motions for disclosure of confessions of detained witnesses" dated 8 March 2002, Case No. ICTR-97-36 and ICTR-96-l0A I2 See Press release of Hirondelle Agency dated 6 September 2006. "negationists" for having dared, in the framework of the defense of the interests of their clients, to denounce the crimes committed by RPF leaders.13
8.7: Concerning cases of harassment and intimidation of defense witnesses, the Defense in the Ntabakuze case filed, on 2710912004, a motion for dismissal of the charges against him because it was impossible to mount an effective defense due to interference by the Kigali regime. The Chamber denied the motion in its decision dated 28/12/2004. However, the Chamber expressed grave concern about the allegations.and expected the WVSS to follow them up, and to report any credible evidence of intimidation of prospective witnesses. Afterwards, the legal assistant of Ntabakuze Defense Team who had discovered that Defense witnesses had been intimidated and harassed by the representatives of the office of the Military Auditor in Kigali was threatened with prosecution in Rwanda and had to quit his job for safety.
8.8: In May 2007, Mr Cantier, the lead counsel for ex-prefect Renzaho on trial before the ICTR, complained of Rwandan authorities intimidating witnesses who had agreed to testify in favor of his client (see Annex F to this Response). The ICTR was informed but could not do anything for the protection of the witnesses. In August 2007, a defense witness for the ex-prefect Renzaho had to leave Rwanda because of threats made against him. Mr Leonidas Nshogoza, a Rwandan lawyer and an Investigator in the defense team of Father Rukundo before ICTR was arrested in Kigali in June 2007, accused of having pressured witness. The ICTR Registrar's office had to send to Kigali a representative in order to inquire into the arrest but until now Nshogogoza is still in prison in Rwanda (see Annex G to this Response).
8.9: Government institutions, including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defense, the RPF Center for Documentation, the Office of the General Prosecutor, the State Information Agency (ORINFOR), the Police, Prefectural and Communal Services,
I3 Agence Hirondelle on 24 April 2006 reported, for example, a statement made the Representative of the Government of Rwanda against Professor Peter Erlinder, Lead-Counsel of Major Aloys Ntabakuze; also see footnote 9 above Tribunals, have refused to give documents to defense teams while they readily give them to the ICTR Prosecution.
8.10: Thus, Nahimana's defense team could not, for example, obtain information requested on several occasions from Rwandan authorities which they needed in order to refute accusations from the Prosecution, despite intervention by the Trial chamberI4. The team was denied access to some documents, including documents in the archives of the Ministry of Defense and of the RPF. The defense team was also refused an interview with the former President of Rwanda, Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu. The team was also unable to secure appointments despite making numerous requests to the Rwandan officials. Lack of the documents requested prevented Nahimana from having a fair and equitable trial".
8.11: In the case of Ndindiliyimana and Others, many cases of refusal by the Rwandan government to cooperate with the ICTR were recorded. The Prosecutor acknowledged that everything depended on the willingness of the Rwandan government, not on the law. The President did not succeed to compel Kigali to comply with its numerous decisions. Finally the Chamber avoided its obligation by deciding that the Defense should fend for itself in getting the documents from the Rwandan government.I6
8.12: These few examples show the Rwandan Government policy of preventing the accused before the ICTR from adequately defending themselves. Generally, witnesses detained in Rwanda state different things in court from what they have declared before the Rwandan authorities. The Rwandan government, at the heart of this maneuver, knowingly retains information to allow false statements to pass easily without being contradicted. All this is an indication that the Rwandan government does not wish to see fairness and justice rendered to the accused before the ICTR. What will happen to the accused once handed over to that government?
14 "Motion to stay proceedings in the Trial of Ferdinand Nahimana", filed on 13 May 2003, case No. ICTR- 96-1 1 I5 "Motion for disclosure of exculpatory evidence and investigations on the origin and content of exhibit P105", filed on 13 May 2003, case No. ICTR-96-11 I6 Case of Ndindiliyimana et alii (Militairy II), Transcripts of 19/09/ 2005, p 28 ; of 29/03/2005 ;of 26/05/2005, p. 36, case No. ICTR-2000-56 8.13: The Prosecutor cannot guarantee that if transferred to Rwanda the accused and his defense team will be treated better. That is extremely unlikely. It is almost certainly impossible, considering that some other people accused of genocide who have been arrested and imprisoned in Rwanda, or kidnapped from outside the country and taken there, have not been given such benefit. These include Valirie Bemeriki, a former joumalist with the RTLM (a free television station in Rwanda); Agnes Ntamabyariro, former Minister for Justice in the interim government who was kidnapped from Zambia where she had fled to as a refugee; Jean Habyarimana, a former member of the Central Committee of the MRND; and Justin Temahagari, a former ambassador, Dominique Makeli, a former joumalist with Radio Rwanda; and two catholic nuns, sisters Benedicte Mukanyangezi and Bernadette Mukarusine.
9. Transfer Will Cause More Delays 9.1: There is also the question of delay. Already, the case of Yussuf Munyakazi has suffered delay which was unnecessary if not for interference by the Rwandan authorities whose insistence led to the arrest of Mr Callixte Gakwaya, who was then lead counsel for the accused, in September 2006. After his release, he withdrew from the case and a new counsel had to be sought and appointed and a new defense team constituted. This had to take time and it was not until April 2007 that the new team had their first coordination meeting with the accused for the first time; an unnecessary delay of seven months.
9.2: Should the accused be transferred to Rwanda, it is more than certain that his trial will be delayed a lot more than if he remains for trial at the ICTR. On transfer to Rwanda, the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Rwanda will take time to study the indictment from ICTR and to amend it for harmonization and compliance with the Rwanda Code Criminal Procedure. Then there will be the appointing and assigning of a defence lawyer who will take time to study the case. There will also be need for time to form the necessary defence team and make the necessary investigations. All these are activities that the ICTR has already done. 9.3: Sending the accused to Rwanda, therefore, will be an outright contravention of the provisions of article 20.4(c) of the ICTR Statute, requiring an accused to be tried without undue delay. Evidently, the regime in Kigali has no qualms about breaching the right of an accused person to be tried without undue delay; people are known to have been kept in pre-trial imprisonment in Rwanda for up to a decade without being tried or convicted, or otherwise knowing their fate. Again the cases of Valerie Bemeriki, Agnes Ntamabyaliro, Jean Habyarimana, and Justin Temahagari (mentioned in paragraph 8.13 above) do illustrate this.
9.4: Currently, there are thousands of people detained in Rwanda without charges, or awaiting trial." Many suspects die in prison before being tried, after spending years in there. Many of those who get released come out of prison disabled persons. Referring to a Memorandum published on 24 September 2007 by Matata Joseph of the Centre de Lutte Contre I 'Impunit6 et l'lnjustice au Rwanda (CLIIR), a human right association based in Belgium, many prisoners released or acquitted have developed strange diseases due to physical and mental tortures and ill-treatments by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) which has infiltrated administrative, judicial, public and private services (see Annex H to this Response).
9.5: Many examples as follow illustrate that situation. Mr Pasteur Bizimungu, former president of Rwanda and Vice-president of RPF was released after five years of imprisonment. Now, he is very sick because of bad conditions of while in prison. The former prefect of Gikongoro prefecture, Mr Andrew Nkeramugaba died in prison without being tried, and after being tortured. The former president of MDR party, Mr Bonaventure Ubarijoro was imprisoned in 1999 and released after one year, on a wheel chair; he died some years after. Mr Phocas Habimana was arrested and imprisoned in December 1996 after being forced back from former Zaire; he was released in August 1998 but died in December 1998. The former general secretary of MRND during the one party state period, Mr Bonaventure Habimana was imprisoned and released after some
I7 Agence Hirondelle of 1210512006 reported that 20.000 innocent people were detained in Rwandan prisons from 1994 or 1995 according to a document from the "Secretary of Staten of Vatican.
20 years. Now, he lives in Belgium but cannot walk without assistance because of his disability. Other detainees who have been released suffer from various diseases such as aids, stomach problems, kidney problems, tuberculosis, hepatitis, high blood pressure and so on, and are exposed to certain death.
9.6: It is most disturbing, therefore, that for the Prosecutor of this Tribunal is being enlisted to support Rwanda's treatment of suspects and accused persons by making this motion to transfer an accused person from the ICTR to Rwanda. Even with the best of intentions, it certainly does not make sense at all to have the ICTR Prosecutor seek to add more work to a judicial system that it is crumbling under the huge number of detainees awaiting trial.
10. Defence Counsel 10.1: The Prosecutor claims in the Motion that Rwandan legislation guarantees the accused the right to defend himself or to have counsel assigned to the defense if the accused does not have suffirient means to pay for it (paragraphs 62-63 of the Motion); that is indeed the case for accused persons before the ICTR (article 20.4(d) of the ICTR Statute). However, the Prosecutor does not disclose the real situation in Rwanda. He does not give any particulars of what really happens in making available defense lawyers to accused persons who cannot afford one. In fact, in Rwanda, the poor are tried without assistance from a lawyer.
10.2: Defense lawyers play a major role in the administration of justice. This raises the question whether the accused person, if transferred to Rwanda, will get a good and competent defense lawyer. The Prosecutor states in the Motion (paragraph 63) that presently "the membership of Rwanda's Bar is over 200 and continues to expand." The claim that it continues to expand indicates that the present demand for such lawyers surpasses the number available.
10.3: The number of the members of the Bar in Rwanda says nothing about their competence. One relevant fact about Rwanda's Bar, officially known as Kigali Bar, is that it is young and just trying to stand up. It is only 10 years old, set up pursuant to Law No. 0311997 of 19 March 1997. An overwhelming majority of its members are young and inexperienced, who can hardly qualify assignment as defence counsel at the ICTR. It is not surprising that no Rwandan lawyer, resident and practicing in Rwanda, has ever been assigned as defence counsel at the ICTR throughout the existence of this Tribunal.
10.4: The Prosecutor makes reference to a program of legal aid and to a related item of the national budget, but gives no proof of their existence. Finally, he does not show how the accused, who is considered indigent by ICTR, will be assisted by a lawyer after his transfer to Rwanda. There is nothing in the Prosecutor's motion which shows that the Government of Rwanda has firmly committed itself to respecting that fundamental right to a fair and equitable trial by providing the accused with a good and competent lawyer, at its cost.
10.5: Even if there is provision to enable good and experienced lawyers from outside Rwanda to go there and defend accused persons transferred there from the ICTR, there is no provision in Rwanda or elsewhere for remunerating those lawyers for their work. The Prosecutor does not specify where the money to finance good and experienced lawyers will come from, especially when the lawyers involved are expected to defend people who are accused of violating the international humanitarian law.
10.6: The Prosecutor does not say whether the accused can continue to have the services of his current defense team or of a defense team as good as the current one. As it happens, the current defense team cannot be retained by the accused in the event of transfer to Rwanda. Some members of the team are persons who fled Rwanda and are resident in other countries as refugees. They cannot be compelled to go to Rwanda.
10.7: Given the experience that some defence teams have had with the authorities in Rwanda, even if the accused would manage to have a lawyer, it is very unlikely that the lawyer will have access, in Rwanda, to the facilities he needs to prepare a good defense for his client. There is also the fear of working in Rwanda in defence of a person accused of genocide. Many lawyers may be scared of taking up such an assignment for fear of having to undergo a fate similar to that of Me Jean Bosco Kazungu, the defence lawyer for former President Pasteur Bizimungu, who was arrested during the on 2 April 2004 and detained in custody for 48 hours for complaining about the lack of fairness and impartiality in the proceedings. There have been other reports describing that trial as having been notoriously unfair.I8
11. Availability and Protection of Witnesses 11.1: Contrary to the Prosecutor's assertions (paragraphs 37 and 69 of the Motion), it will be impossible for the accused "to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him ... and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his ... behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him ...", as he would if he was tried by the ICTR (article 20.4(e) of the ICTR Statute). Lntense cross examination of prosecution witnesses at the ICTR has not been tolerated by the Government of Rwanda; it cannot be expected that that same government will allow it to occur in its own courts.
11.2: In fact the Government of Rwanda and associations for the defense of Tutsi survivors, IBUKA, AVEGA and Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe, have even tried to exercise extortion upon the Tribunal by accusing it of authorizing or allowing intense cross- examination of Prosecution witnesses, claiming that such cross-examination amounted to acts of harassment. In December 2001, under the pretext of defending the interests of prosecution witnesses allegedly mistreated by defense lawyers, the Government of Rwanda and the above mentioned agenciesI9 launched a powerful campaign against the Tribunal with a view to forcing its officials to submit to their will concerning, notably, the recruitment of investigators for the defence and revision of the system of cross- examination of prosecution witnesses.
urnan an Rights Watch, Rwanda World Report 2005, at httu:lihrw.ore/wr2005.~df;US State Department, Rwanda: Coanhy Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, dated 6 March 2007. l9 Hirondelle Agency Press Release of 5 December 2001, ICTRiBUTARE and ICTRIRWANDAIJUDGES 11.3: From January 2002, IBUKA and AVEGA, who practically control all of the witnesses for the prosecution coming from Rwanda, decided to stop cooperation with the Tribunal. They blocked, with the complicity of the Rwandan government, the transfer of witnesses from Kigali to Arusha. The proceedings in the Butare and Niyitegeka cases had to be suspended for several weeks because there were no prosecution witnesses. Orders issued by two Trial Chambers of the ICTR to compel the Rwandan govemment to allow prosecution witnesses to travel to Arusha to testify before the Tribunal were ignored by the Rwanda government, stating that Rwanda was a sovereign state that did not have to receive orders from ICTR judges.
11.4: The situation got worse. On 27 June 2007 IBUKA and AVEGA organized public demonstrations at the Office of the Prosecutor in Kigali; the Prosecutor and the ICTR Registrar were on official visit to Rwanda then." Since the crisis was taking too long and the proceedings in several trials had been stopped, the ICTR Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte and the then ICTR President, Navathanem Pillay, were obliged to take the matter to the UN Security Council on 23 July and 26 July 2002 respectively.21
11.5: The government in Kigali responded to those complaints by launching a scathing attack upon the ICTR; using practically the same terminologies as those by the organizations IBUKA and AVEGA since January 2002~~.It that same government which the Prosecutor says will be ready with assistance to the accused in securing witnesses and having them examined or cross examined freely once the accused is transferred to Rwanda; it is to expect too much from that govemment.
11.6: The government in Kigali has actually threatened Defense lawyers to prevent them from adequately cross-examining prosecution witnesses from Rwanda. That was the case with M. John Floyd, lead counsel for Hassan Ngeze. He was subjected to direct intimidation from the Rwanda Minister for Justice, Mr Jean de Dieu Mucyo, who accused
20 Agence Hirondelle of 27 June 2002. 21 Statement by the President of the ICTR to the United Nations Security Council by Judge Navathanem Pillay, President, 29 October 2002 22 Letter dated 26 July 2002 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Pemanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations Organization, Doc. S120021842. the lawyer of mistreating a prosecution witness from Rwanda; Mr Mucyo made the accusation when he met the new Registrar, M. Adam Dieng, and his predecessor, M. Agwu Okali. The Minister then went on to say to the press: "if they treat people that way, we would like to know how we should treat them in
11.7: Ngeze's defense lawyer denounced that intimidation before the Chamber, complaining of the interference of the Rwandan Government in the proceedings before the ICTR. M. Floyd stated that that was a clear obstruction of justice and asked the Chamber to render a decision saying that the Government of Rwanda should not interfere in the proceedings and that lawyers have the right to cross-examine witnesses as they wish. The Chamber noted the complaint and promised to find a solution it. But, apparently, the Chamber cannot do much about the interference of the Rwanda Government in the proceedings before the ICTR.
11.8: A government that has defied the ICTR on several occasions will have no scruples or embarrassment to deprive a transferred accused of his legitimate rights in order to prevent him from mounting an adequate defense to the accusations presented by the Chief Prosecutor of Rwanda. That government will not be able and will not want to ensure security of the Defense and of the witnesses, contrary to what is done at ICTR.
11.9: The OTP is seems satisfied by merely what the law says about the transfer of cases (paragraph 42 of the Motion) to affirm that protective measures similar to those provided by the ICTR will be guaranteed in Rwanda. But he disregards the reality which prevails on the ground in Rwanda. Persons who wish to accept to testify in defense of a person accused of genocide are subject to harassment in order to prevent them from testifying. When they persist, they are subject to violence and sometimes assassination. Similar harassments and threats face members of defense teams: investigators, legal assistants, and even counsel.24
" Minute of 28 February 2001, pp. 15 1-157 24 See Annex D to this Response 11.10: Defense Witnesses who wanted to come to testify for the defence at the ICTR have indeed been victims of intimidation and violence. What will happen to witnesses who would not have the protection of the ICTR? The Prosecutor does not give any guarantee of protection for the witnesses to testify for the defence in Rwanda. In the case of Karemera and Others, when the defense of Nzirorera filed a motion to hold some trial sessions in Rwanda, the Registrar strori& objected on the ground that it would be dangerous for the security of protected witnesses to testify within the community where they are accused of having committed crimes.25 This was only in 2005. Today, only two years later, that community has not changed.
11.11: Partly because of the intimidation that prospective witnesses have to face in Rwanda, most witnesses for the defense in this case are lined up to come from outside Rwanda. They are nationals of Rwanda living outside their country as refugees. They cannot travel to Rwanda under the UNHCR Regulations governing their status. And they cannot forcefully be taken back to Rwanda, which they fled because their security was under threat. They can only come to the ICTR under ICTR protection. They are still refugees because their security is still under threat in Rwanda. There will be no security for these witnesses, therefore, if the case is transferred to Rwanda.
11.12: Significantly, the witnesses who come to testify at the ICTR are often identified by pseudonyms only as a way of protecting them. The protection is mainly protection against people in Rwanda, including people in authority there. It grossly absurd, therefore, to expect that these witnesses, who need to be protected from people, including people in authority, in Rwanda, should go and submit themselves to Rwandan authorities in order to testify for the defence. That is unworkable. As such, protection to defence witnesses cannot be guaranteed or even provided at all if the case is transferred to Rwanda. In the circumstances, the accused cannot expect to convince any witnesses to testify in his favour. Without defense witnesses, the accused cannot be equality before the law. In short, there will be justice.
'' ,( Registrar's Submission under Rule 33 (B) of the Rules on Joseph Nzirorera 's Motion to hold Trials sessions in Rwanda s, 4 May 2005, $5 9-10 9'- 11.13: If, as suggested by the Prosecutor, defense witnesses are examined by the judges while the transferred accused or his defense is not granted the right to cross-examine himself (paragraph 69 of the Motion), the right of the accused to defend himself will be violated. In fact, in a system with a good administration of justice, a judge cannot be substitute for the defense. The transferred accused would not benefit from the principle of equality of arms or the principle of adversarial hearing granted by the ICTR, which is an essential element of a fair trial.
11.14: The administration of evidence in the jurisdiction expected to hear the case, if transferred, seems to be gravely compromised by the wording of articles 1, 8 and 10 of the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases (No. 1112007 of 16 March 2007), concerning the admission of evidence used in other trials at the ICTR. The transferred accused risks being judged on the basis of evidence that has not been subjected to scrutiny through an adversarial hearing and debate.
11.15: Before the ICTR, the accused is granted the right "not to be compelled to testzfy against himself or herself or to confess guilt" (art. 20.4, g of the Statute). The Kigali regime will not grant to the accused such a right given that its policy is one that would rather compel the accused Hutu to confess to being guilty. Intimidation and violence, including torture, are used to that end. Examples are many among witnesses that came to testify before the ICTR.
11.16: There is a big risk that the accused, Yussuf Munyakazi, will be subjected to torture in order to compel him to admit crimes that he never committed or to accuse other innocent persons. Evidently, the Prosecutor is content with citing the provisions of the law without any endavour to consider the reality on the ground, experienced by persons accused in Rwanda, and even at the ICTR, due to the policy of the government which seeks to have the greatest number of the accused Hutu admit guilt through confessions extorted by force, intimidation and promise of rewards. 11.17: In the event of transfer to Rwanda, therefore, the conditions for a fair trial as provided for under the ICTR Statute as well as in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence will not be available to the accused. Even if some guaranteed rights may be provided for in some Rwandan legislation, such as the new Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases to Rwanda, there is nothing in the Motion to give any assurance or real guarantee that even the relevant provisions of such legislation will be fully applied and respected. Many of the requirements for a fair trial guaranteed at the ICTR cannot be available in Rwanda.
12. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Rwanda 12.1: Contrary to what the OTP states (paragraph 58 of the Motion), the Office of the Prosecutor General in Rwanda is not independent. It is under the authority of the Minister of Justice (article 162 of the Constitution of Rwanda). It is the Minister of Justice who defines the general policy of the prosecution. He can give orders to the Prosecutor General of the Republic. The Prosecutor General, who will represent the prosecution in the trial of the accused transferred to Rwanda and who will have the task of harmonizing the current indictment with the Rwandan legislation, is not, therefore, independent.
12.2: Moreover, just like the judges and the defence lawyers in Rwanda, the attorneys of the office of the Prosecutor General have no experience in international criminal law and do not have the required level of experience to conduct proceedings relating to international law crimes according to the ICTR standards. A Bachelors degree in law coupled with 8 years of working experience is all that is required to qualify for appointment as Prosecutor General.
12.3: However, nothing is said about the qualification and experience of the prosecuting attorneys from the Prosecutor General's office who are expected to conduct the prosecution. The Motion is silent even about the number of attorneys in that office. This is an omission of an important piece of information, considering that Rwanda's prisons are overcrowded with pre-trial inmates. The Prosecutor has deliberately omitted this information probably because its disclosure would be adverse to the Prosecutor's Motion. 13. Respect for International Treaties 13.1: The Prosecutor enumerates a series of international treaties and conventions to which Rwanda is party (paragraphs 70-74 of the Motion). But, besides the mere texts of the law, he does not give any particulars of any practical measures taken concerning their actual implementation by the Rwandan authorities. Moreover, he does not demonstrate, with concretes facts, what the practice and the performance of various tribunals in Rwanda is, and concerning their respect, if any, for principles of law enshnned in the international treaties and in the provisions of the national law.
13.2: Nevertheless, one knows through regular reports of organizations for the defense of human rights, such as Amnesty international and Human Rights Watch, as well as through reports of the Department of State of the United States, a dependable supporter of the Kigali regime, that Rwanda constantly violates human rights, in general, and the rights of the defense, in particular.2"t is not surprising that the Prosecutor does not mention any of those reports because they do not support the claims that Rwanda can give a fair trial to the transferred accused.
14. International Monitor and Control 14.1: The Prosecutor affirms that Rwanda has accepted to be monitored and evaluated by international bodies, such as the Afncan Commission for Human Rights (ACHM) and the NEPAD Commission (paragraph 73 of the Motion), but he does not reveal the results of such evaluations and how they can guarantee the rights of the transferred accused. In any case, the claim by the Prosecutor is misleading as it does not disclose that President Kagame himself categorically rejected the NEPAD Report at an RPF annual meeting, held in December 1995. That Report accuses the RF'F regime of numerous failings in relation to human rights and individual liberties, as well as to good governance. The Prosecutor would have sounded credible if he had filed that Report.
14.2: The Prosecutor assumes that the mere fact of having designated the African Commission for Human Rights to monitor proceedings in the trials of cases transferred to
26 See footnote 6 above Rwanda guarantees a fair trial (paragraph 75 of the Motion). First of all, it is necessary to note that strictly speaking there is no agreement between the ICTR and the ACHM about the monitoring of those proceedings. In fact, there was only an exchange of correspondence between the Prosecutor and the President of the ACHM. The correspondence does not specify the nature and the details of the mission entrusted to the ACHM as this appears in the answer of the President of the ACHM, dated 2 June 2006 (Annex M to the Motion), written in answer to the letter of the OTP dated April 27, 2006 (this letter is not annexed to the motion and the Defense requests a copy of it).
14.3: The President of the ACHM gives a favorable answer to the Prosecutor's proposition to monitor, on behalf of the ICTR, the proceedings in cases that may be transferred to national jurisdictions. However, she brought to the attention of the ICTR Prosecutor that she was waiting to know "the practical arrangements that your office intends to makefor the concrete implementation of this important project". This is an obvious indication that nothing was put in place for the launching of such supervision.
14.4: Nothing indicates that the Prosecutor has negotiated the practical modalities of the ACHM mission with the government of Rwanda for monitoring cases transferred to Rwanda. Furthermore, the Prosecutor's motion says nothing about the financing of that project. The launching of that project in favor of the transferred accused is no more than hypothetical.
14.5: Finally, there is also the question of competence. Is the Prosecutor competent to make commitments, which have financial implications, on behalf of the ICTR? It is only noted that such competence is not included in the Prosecutor's functions as provided for in Article 15 of the ICTR Statute and Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
14.6: Besides, what makes the Prosecutor believe that ACHM can effectively monitor proceedings in Rwanda? Has the organization carried out similar activities in any other known African country? In other words, what is the experience of the said organization in this matter? Moreover, the Prosecutor is not the convenient person to deal with the control of the fairness of the proceedings because that is the role of a Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 19 of the ICTR Statute. The ICTR Prosecutor's main concern is to prosecute accused persons and try to secure a conviction.
14.7: The monitoring of cases being tried could also be done by other institutions like civil society organizations and especially the media. But this is only possible where the media is indeed free and independent. Trials at the ICTR have always been under the constant glare of the media. That is largely because the ICTR is an international organization and not the property or subject of any national jurisdiction, and its activities attract the attention of all media institutions. national and international.
14.8: It is not expected that the cases transferred to Rwandan courts will have the same media coverage as cases at the ICTR. This is largely because the media in Rwanda is not free enough to take the function of monitoring proceedings in Rwanda national courts. Freedom of the press in Rwanda has been consistently targeted by the Government. Papers have been forced to close down or toe the line. Journalists have been forced to flee. The rare independent papers currently existing in Rwanda are constantly threatened and intimidated, often in a violent fashion."
15. Worrying Conditions of Detention and Security of the Accused 15.1: In his motion, the Prosecutor skims over the issues of detention and security in paragraphs 78 and 79 of the Motion, stating that Rwandan legislation permits granting the minimum conditions provided for in Resolution 431173 of the UN General Assembly made on September 9, 1998. But while on other subjects he makes detailed precise references to Rwandan legislation, there is no reference to any provision of law that guarantees respect for that Resolution. In reality, therefore, there is no formal guarantee those minimum conditions will be respected in respect of the accused, Yussuf Munyakazi, once transferred to Rwanda.
27 See, for example: Rwanda: Freedom of Expression Under Attack, Amnesty International, Public Statement, 27 February 2007, A1 Index: AFR 47l00212007; Amnesty International Annual Report 2006; Amnesty International Annual Report 2007; Attacks on the Press in 2005 Africa, Rwanda section, Committee to Protect Journalists 2005; Attacks on the Press in 2006 Africa, Rwanda section, Committee to Protect Journalists 2006. 15.2: What is even more serious is that the Prosecutor does not guarantee that that accused, if transferred, will not be subjected to the deplorable conditions which reign in the overpopulated prisons of Rwanda. It is thus highly likely that Munyakazi will be, like others accused of 'genocide', the object of acts of violence, torture, kidnapping and assassination, which are regularly reported by international agencies, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as, by the US Department of Prison inspections by the Red Cross, which have existed for a long time, have not prevented these serious and blatant violations of prisoner rights in Rwanda.
15.3: The "UMUSESO" Newspaper published in Kigali reported recently that there was no food for prisoners and that prison officials have not been paid for several An international tribunal having jurisdiction, like the ICTR, should not send detainees to a country that is facing such severe problems.
16. Possibility to Revoke the Referral Order 16.1: The fact that the special law on transfer of cases recognizes the ICTR competence to revoke the referral order, as mentioned in paragraph 80 of the Motion, does not change anything about the serious danger of unfair trials, and of acts of violence including torture and assassination, to which the transferred accused is exposed. That possibility, therefore, cannot be taken as a safeguard against those dangers. Even if it were, there is always the risk that revocation of the referral order and the deferral of the transferred accused might come under consideration when it already too late.
16.2: Moreover, revocation of the referral order is not envisaged by Rule llbis on transfers, especially after conviction of the transferred accused. This Rule does not even provide for the possibility of a transferred accused getting a retrial before the ICTR, pursuant to article 9.2(b) of the ICTR Statute, which provides for the possibility of a
28 See footnote 6 above 29 UMUSESO Newspaper No 287 of 13 to 1910712007 retrial by the ICTR in a case where a court in a national jurisdiction fails to render an impartial and independent judgment, or where the case was not prosecuted with diligence.
17. Conclusion 17.1: The arguments developed above demonstrate that nothing prevents the trial of Yussuf Munyakazi from taking place at the ICTR within the time-limit envisaged by ICTR's completion strategy. The have also shown that while the ICTR is still seized with jurisdiction over this case, there is absolutely no reason, and the Prosecutor has not suggested any, for taking this case away from the jurisdiction of the ICTR.
17.2: In addition, these arguments show that there are insurmountable impediments against considerations for the referral of the case to the Rwanda. Indeed the abolition of the death penalty, prohibited by United Nations and therefore excluded from the sentences that the ICTR may impose, is evidently not reflected in many laws that are fully in force in Rwanda.
17.3: The arguments have shown that if transferred to Rwanda, the accused will not have a fair trial, will be exposed to more adverse conditions than those under which he is held and would be tried by the ICTR or on its behalf
In Rwanda he would be tried by Rwanda's High Court (as a court of first instance) constituted by a single judge, whereas the ICTR trial Chamber is composed of three judges;
The rights granted to the accused by the International Law in general, and by the ICTR Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as well as by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular, will in no way be respected even if they may more or less be in the texts of some Rwandan legislation. The transferred accused would be tried on the basis of a law which provides for a more extended temporal jurisdiction for the tribunals (in Rwanda, the jurisdiction runs from 1" October 1990 to an indefinite time, whereas the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR spans from lStJanuary to 31" December 1994);
The trial of the accused will have to be delayed much longer while the accuse has already been in custody since May 2004;
The accused will be judged by courts of a regime controlled by people who only aspire to apply towards him the justice of the victorious and will thus play the role of judge and jury, contrary to justice;
The accused is not likely to get the witnesses he needs to testify on his behalf as most witnesses are refugees who cannot travel to Rwanda;
The accused will be at the mercy of people who are themselves the object of accusations of crimes against international humanitarian law but so far are enjoying apparent immunity accorded to them by some super powers, and even by the ICTR rose cut or'^;
The physical integrity of the accused and his life will be put to serious jeopardy;
17.4: We also make the observation that this Motion is an almost unnecessary digression from the main concerns of the ICTR and some of its departments. It is forcing the defence team of the accused to embark on a detailed study of the laws and legal system of Rwanda while their assigned task is to defend the accused before the ICTR. It is a digression indeed, especially as the ICTR is still seized with jurisdiction; it can try this case within the remaining period of its mandate and, most important, the OTP has
30 Florence Hartmann, the spokesperson of Carla Del Ponte, revealed in his hook published recently (m et chitimen!; les guerres secretes de la uolitique et de la justice internationales Paris, Flammarion, 10 septemhre 2007, see Annex K to this Response) how Mr. Richard Prosper, US Ambassador at large, hied to convince Mme Carla Del Ponte, then ICTR Prosecutor, not to prosecute RPF soldiers who committed crimes in Rwanda. skirted the question why the case should be taken away from the ICTR and has concentrated, instead, on the question why it should be transferred to Rwanda.
17.5: Finally, considering that there have been reports of there being sufficient grounds to prosecute before the ICTR some people in authority in the Republic of Rwanda but none of those have been prosecuted because of the protection accorded to them by the Rwandan government, transferring this case to Rwanda would be tantamount to the ICTR blessing the refusal of the regime in Rwanda to allow the prosecution of alleged culprits of genocide just because they happen to be in the government.
And for those reasons: The Defence of the accused, Yusuf Munyakazi, prays to the designated Chamber to take the following measures:
(a) Summarily reject, without examination, the Prosecutor's Request to transfer to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Rwanda the case of Prosecutor v. Yusuf Munyakazi; or
In the alternative, in the event of careful examination of the Motion on merit,
(b) Reject the Prosecutor's Request in its entirety for the reasons hereinabove given in the Response of the defence of Munyakazi, which show that the accused would not benefit from a fair trial and that he would be exposed to violence, torture, and other grave threats against his life;
(c) Reject all the non relevant measures sought by the Prosecutor including the irregular and legally baseless demand to authorise the intervention of Rwanda in the present case;
(d) Order the Prosecutor to take the necessary measures so as commence, without delay, the trial of Yussuf Munyakazi; (e) Take all other decisions and measures necessary to ensure that all the rights guaranteed the accused by the Statute and the Rules on Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR are respected.
Respectively submitted.
Dated and signed at Arusha this 2ndday of October 2007
Jwani T. Mwaikusa Eliane Nyampinga Lead Counsel Legal Assistant LIST OF ANNEXES
Annex A Letters (various) to the UN and ICTR authorities Annex B Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: There Will be no Trial, July 2007, and Amnesty Intemational, Rwanda / Uganda: Forcible Return ..., A1 Index AFR 47/00412007, 16 March 2007 Annex C UN Office for the Cordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN-CEA Update No. 715, 15 July 1999 Annex D Letter dated 20 June from the President of ADAD to the President of the ICTR Annex E AI Deplores "The Failure ofthe ICTR" to Prosecute All Sides, Hirondelle News Agency, 15 December 2006 Annex F An ICTR Lawyer Denounces Threats Made to his Witnesses, and Defence Witness to Flee Rwanda, Hirondelle News Agency, 11 June 2007 and 23 August 2007 Annex G Arrest in Kigali of an ICTR Defence Investigator, and ICTR Sends Representative to Kigali ..., Hirondelle News Agency, 21 and 26 June 2007 Annex H Letter dated 24 September 2007 from CLIIR to French Minister for Justice, and CLIIR Memorandum dated 24 September 2007 Annex I HRW Warns Rwanda Against Repraisal Murders, AI Report Still Criticizes Rwanda, and AI Asks for Inqui ry...., Hirondelle News Agency, 21 January 2007,30 May 2006 and 21 March 2006 Annex J Appel au Conseil de Securite des Nations Unies pour qu 'il veille a ce que le mandate du TPIR soit Rempli, Amnesty Intemational 12 decembre 2006 Annex K Florence Hartmann, Paix et Chatiment (Flammarion) ANNEX Les Daenus du Tribunal Penal Arusha, le 10 janvier 2007. International pour le Rwanda (TF'IR) 'Fa - anzanie.
Monsieur Ban KI-MOON Secrhire Wn6ral des Nations Unies, New York, New York, USA.
Q& Presentation de f6licitations et rapel des dossiers restes sans suite.
Monsieur le Secretaire Gheral,
A l'occasion de votre accession au poste de Secrhire Gn6raI des Nations Unies, les detenus du Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda, signataires de la presente, sont heureux de vous presenter leurs chaleureuses felicitations. 11s vous souhaitent plein suds dans vos fonctions wmbien difficiles et complexes dans un monde en perpehelles mutations et a multiples probkmes.
Au cours dw annees 2005 et 2006, nous avons Ccrit 'au Conseil de Shrit6, au Secrktaire Gh6ral des Nations Unies et au President du TPIR pour exprimer nos preoccupations sur des problhmes graves qui se posent au Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda. I1 s'agit de questions qui compromettent l'indkpendance et la neutralit6 de ce Tribunal, crht ainsi une situation de d6ni de justice. Des observateurs autoris6s tel que Charles Onana ou Thierry Cruvellier sont allb jusqu'i pdsenter le TPIR comme un Tribunal du vainqueur sur le vaincu.
Les lettres reprises dans le tableau en annexe traitent des points releves dans le paragraphe pruent. Elks ont envoy& soit au SecrCtaire Wneral B titre de destinataire principal soit au Prhident du TPIR avec chaque fois une copie pour information r6servk au premier responsable de ['administration des Nations Unies. Nous d6plorons aujourd'hui qu'aucune rwnse n'ait &6 r6serv6e a toutes ces correspondances malgrk l'importance et l'acuit6 des probldmes soulev6s.
Nous somrnes conscients que lors de votre prise de fonctions, vous avez it&mis au courant de ce qui se passe au TPIR Mais nous avons des raisons de douter qie lessenrices ou les pemnnalites qui n'ont pas daigne nous faire un feedback sur des problhes epineux et fort pr&mpants que nous posons dans cette abondante correspondance vous aient brief6 objectivement sur le fond des probkmes qui se posent au TPIR.
Nous avons saluC avec joie et soulagement votre determination B rkformer la gestion et l'administration des Nations Unies. Cette organisation est une lourde machine qu'il n'est pas
' Vous tmwem en annexe le re1& de touts ces lettm, leu dates d'envoi ainsi que lnu objet. facile de g&er et oh les inter& des divenes nations se dtoient au quotidien et, souvent, c'est malheureusement la raison du plus fort qui I'emporte. Nous souhaitons que la reforme que vous prknisez puisse aussi toucher le Tribunal penal International pour le Rwanda de mani6re a assurer qu'une justice witable y trouve droit de cit6.
Comme nous avons eu I'occasion de I'exprimer dam nos diverses correspondances, la solution aux problkmes nvandais passe avant tout par I'6tablissement de la vent6 pour realiser une vkitable rhnciliation. Malheureusement, le TPIR n'y attache pas I'importance voulue. Au contraire, le TPIR s'est laissd prendre dans le pikge du FPR en acceptant la delation et la fabrication des faux t6moignages. En effet, les accusb ont demontre que la grande partie des accusations du Procureur n'avaient rien a voir avec la rklite de ce qui s'est reellement passe sur le terrain au Rwanda. Les cas abondent en rapport avec les confessions des d6tenus au Rwanda qui, de connivence avec le Procureur et souvent moyennant une certaine rhmpense, acceptent de changer la version des faits pour faire condamner les detenus du TPIR.
En vous adressant la prhente, nous tenons a reprendre les questions qui, ?inotre avis, sont les plus urgentes. Nous souhaiterions que vous leur accordiez l'attention qu'elles mkitent. Certaines d'entre elles sont d'une ampleur et d'une gravite telles que de leur r&olution dkpend la credibilite de ce Tribunal et, surtout, la survie des ddtenus que nous sommes.
1- NeutralitC. Indeoendance et Imoartialite du TPIR.
Le constat que le TPJR n'agit pas independamment ou impartialement est base sur le fait que, trks souvent, le Tribunal se croit oblige de se referer au Gouvernement du Rwanda avant de prendre des dkisions importantes nous touchant. Pourtant, le TPIR sait que des hauts dirigeants du Rwanda comptent parmi les personnes justiciables devant ce Tribunal. I1 n'est donc pas comprehensible que ces personnalith soient associees aux dkisions nous concernant.
Des officiels hauts places au TPIR continuent de faire des declarations inspirks ou apparemment dictbs par le regime rwandais. L'exemple le plus rhnt est la declaration faite par le GreEer Adjoint du TPIR le 23 novembre 2006 pretendant, faussement, que le TPIR avait obtenu des preuves que I'avion du president Habyarimana aurait dte descendu par un missile land par les militaires des Forces Armees Rwandaises. Suite ila reaction 6nergique des Avocats de la defense exigeant le retrait de cette dklaration mensongkre, le Tribunal a trod. une formule diplomatique pour due que le Greffier Adjoint O'Donnell s'6tait tromp&.
Un autre exemple est celui des pressions constamment exer&s sur le TPIR pour arraer des Rwandais d'ethnie Hutu qui travaillent dans des &pipes de defense. Meme si aujourd'hui I'on a I'impression que le Tribunal semble avoir pris distance par rapport ?ices pressions, il n'emphhe que dans le passe des personnes ont 196 abusivement arrStCes sur dernande du GMlvemement rwandais.
Les luges du TPIR n'ont pas encore renonck A la jubtice a deux vitesses sevissant avec acharnement contre les accuses Hutu, tout en fermant les yeux sur les crimes commis par le FPR. 11s persistent B refuser d'int-r ces crimes et leurs consequences sur ce qui s'est passe au Rwanda en 1994. Ils persistent B dire qae I'attentat du 06 avril94 sur I'avion du F'rhident Habyarimana, que tous les experts affirment qu'il fut le dklencheur des massacres, n'a aucun lien avec les prods conduits au TPIR
Tant que ce Tribunal n'aura pas os6 franchir le pas important d'm&er les membres du F'PR ayant commis des crimes tombant sous sa comp&ence, y compris I'attentat du 06 awil 1994 sur I'avion du Prdsident Habyarimana, la justice rendue par le TPIR continuera a &re perque comme dlective et discriminatoire.
2- Absence de statut du vr6venu. du condamnd du lib&e et de 1'8auitte.
L'existence et le fonctionnement du TPIR sont regis par des textes fondamentaux que sont les Statuts et le Rkglement de Proddure et de Preuve. Aucune disposition n'a 6tt5 consacr6e au statut du prevenu, du condamne, du lib6re et de I'acquitte du TPlR Au moment oh nous krivons, des personnes ayant le statut de prhenu, celui de condamnes et celui d'acquitte vivent dans l'incertitude totale. Des condamnb se trouvent totalement bloquis, faute pour les autoritb du TPIR, d'appliquer les dispositions statutaires sur leur transfert dans les pays ayant sign6 les accords avec le Tribunal pour accueillir ses condamnes. Ils ne savent pas quelle proddure suivre pour demander une commutation de peine ou un recours en grice. 11s ont toutes les dificultCs du monde introduire des recours en r6vision.
Des personnes acquittks ou libdrbes aprks avoir purge leur peine se voient bloqukes dans des (( safe houses D ou a I'H8tel a Axusha. Si un statut les regissant existait, eux et lews familles ne vivraient pas les moment dificiles et d'incertitude qu'ils traversent actuellement. Au TF'IR, il n'y a encore eu aucun cas de liberation proVisoire ou conditionnelle.
Toutes ces anomalies acadditent la thbe selon laquelle le TPJR a requ pour mission de ne prononcer que les condamnations.
3- Proiet de transfert des detenus et des condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda
Des n6gociations sont en coun depuis un certain temps entre le TPIR et le Gouvernement rwandais en vue d'y transferrer quelques affaires A juger ainsi que les personnes dkfinitivement condamnees. Nous avons dCnond ces manoeuvres en expliquant amplement qu'il s'agissait d'actes devant whiner dans notre anhtissement. Que la peine capitale soit maintenue ou pas par le rbime imposd aux Rwandais par les armes, notre transfert vers le Rwanda ne pourra que r6jouir le Prksident Paul Kagame et ses compkres, aujourd'hui point& du doigt par le Rapport du Juge anti-temoriste Jean Louis B~g~i&e.Nous nous demandons pourquoi le TPIR veut donner a des suspects notoires qu'il est sensd poursuivre et juger, le crheau pour se d6barrasser des personnes qu'ils considkrent wmme leurs pires ennemis. Des strat6gies raffinh pow nous faire disparaitre sont un domaine dans lequel le r6gime de Kigali est pass6 maitre. Nous I'avons &rit au Prbident du TPIR et nous vous informons dgalement que ce projet de nous transfdrer au Rwanda est soutenu par certains pays ayant aide le FPR i s'installer au pouvoir au Rwanda depuis la mi-juillet 1994.
Nous owns esperer que vous n'allez pas accepter que les detenus et les condamnb du TPJR soient remis au dgime actuel du Rwanda et que vous n'accepterez pas d'assumer devant I'histoire, devant la Communautd internationale et devant nos familles la responsabilitC de nous voir physiquement lynches suite ir ce transfert. 4- ytilisation iudicieuse du ra~~ortBruwi&e.
L'ordomance de soit-coinmuniqu6 du Juge Jean Louis Bruguiere datCe du 17 novembre 2006 montre qu'aprb une enqu&e minutieuse et rigoureuse, il a 6te 6tabli que des militaires du FPR agissant sous les ordres du GknM Paul Kagame,ont descendu I'avion du Prbident Habyarimana dans la soirk du 06 avril 1994. Le Juge krit (( qu 'ainsi ontpu Ztre &termindes les circonstmrces duns lesquelles le projet avait dtd conp ahm le wntexte d'un scdnario de canqutte ah pouwir que les accordr d 'ilrusha n'auiorisaient par.. P. I1 a &fit, par ailleurs, que a les prkmices de ce complot visant b I'dliminaiion physique du Prdsident en exercice du Rwmula, remontent, d'apris les dldments de I'enquZte, en 1991, &te de I'ouverture au multipurtisme )). Cette conclusion du Juge Jean Louis Bruguike donne la mesure du poids que le TPIR devait attacher cette dklaration de Carla del Ponte en date du 17 avril2000 : r s'il se rkvdait que c 'est le FPR qui a abam I'avion, I 'histoire du gknocide devra &re rddcrite u.
Malheureusement, aprbs le depart du Procureur Carla Del Ponte, le TPIR s'est refuse 11 poursuivre les criminels du FPR sous pr6texte que le Procureur est libre de determiner qui poursuivre et quand le poursuivre. Le Chef des poursuites au bureau du Procureur, M. Stephen Rapp vient d'en donner la conhnation dans une declaration a l'agence Hirondelle ce 28/12/2006 en kstermes : cc leprocureur a discutd d New York devant le Conseil de Sdcuritd des alldgations contre le FPR el dit que &s &cisions serontprises en 2007. Mais bpropos de I'attentat contre I'avion, il a & mZme position que les procureurs avant lui depuis Louise Arbw. Le but de ce Tribunal dtait les attaques come des civils, les massacres des civils, le gknocide, I'assassinat de centaines de milliers de Rtrsis et de hutus. Nous ne gowons nous focalser sur des crimes contre les miliiaires comme au TPIY, ~ 11 y a eu plusieurs actes d'accusations concernant le traiiement des prisonniers de guerre. L 'attaque contre I'avion ktm.t toumde vers des responsables militaires. Ce n'ktait pas un crime contre I'humanite. Quelques urn onr suggkrd qu'il s'agissait de terrorisme comme un crime de guerre. Mais le terrorisme est un crime oir les civik ont kt6 des cibles. Un Chef d'Etat qui ktait aussi un Ghdral Mqor n Wait pas un civil. Le Tribunal a dtd mis en place en raison du ghcide, pas pour des assassinats ahle cadre d'une guerre civile. Par ailleurs, le rappori du Juge Brugui2re n 'esi pas encore arrivt au bureau du procureur u. Cette surprenante dklaration fait fi de ce que le Rwanda n'6tait plus en guerre depuis le 04 aoilt 1993 date laquelle I' Accord de paix fbt sign6 entre le Gouvernement rwandais et le FPR A Arusha. Elle contredit l'engagement pris en 2000 par Carla Del Ponte. Elle fait fi de la saisine du Secr6taire &n&al de I'ONU par le Juge Bruguibre pour qu'il demande au TPIR d'engager les poursuites contre le Pkident Paul Kagame et certains dignitaires du FPR. Quant B nous, au stade actuel, nous estimons que le Tribunal dewait traiter le rapport du Juge Bruguiere avec toute la rigueur judiciaire necessaire et cesser de se cabrer dans la partialite.
Le comportement actuel du TPLR est une fbite de responsabilite que les autoritb qui ont mis en place le TPIR ne peuvent plus cowrir suite B I'interpellation du Juge Jean Louis Bruguiere.
Monsieur le SecrCtaire G6nQa1,
Nous venons de vous faire une prbentation sommaire de quelques uns des problbmes urgents auxquels nous sommes confront6s. Nous aimerions que vous preniez connaissance du menu de tout le coumer qui vous est transmis en annexe. Nous comptons sur votre bienveillante 966 attention et esperons vous voir intervenir rapidement en faveur de la justice en exigeant des Juges du TPIR qu'ils sauvegardent son impartialit6 et son independance.
Veuillez @r, Monsieur le Secretaire Gneral, I'expression de notre tr& haute consideration.
Les d6tenus signataires (voir signatures en annexe) co~iepour information,
-Membres du Conseil de ShritC, New York -D&partementdes Maires Juridiques de I'ONU, New York -Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les Droits de l'Homme, Genbve. -Monsieur le Pdsident de I'Union Europbenne, Bruxelles. -Monsieur le Seaetaire G6nhl de la Francophonie, Paris. -Mesdames, Messieurs les Juges de la Chambre d'Appel du TPIR (tous). -Mesdames, Messieurs les Juges des Chambres de Premikre Instance du TF'IR (tous). -Monsieur le Pdsident du TPR Arusha. -Monsieur le Greffier du TF'IR, Arusha. -Monsieur le Procureur du TPll7, Arusha. -Monsieur le Commandant de I'UNDF, Arusha. -Mesdames et Messieurs les Avocats de la Defense (tous). -Monsieur le President de I'ADAD, Arusha. -Commission Internationale des Juristes, Genkve. -CICR, Genhve. -Amnesty International, Genkve. -Human Rights Watch, New York. -FJDH, Paris. -International Crisis Group, Washington DC. -Association Americaine des Juristes. -Association Internationale des Juristes, New Delhi. -Centre de Lutte wntre I'Impunit6 et SInjustice au Rwanda, BNX~~~S. -Association DUKOMERE, Bmxelles. -La presse. w Annexe I: Liste de lettres envovies P des resoonsables du TPlR et des Nations Unies en
Date Objet Destinataire 1 410 1105 Nkessite de rechercher la verite Dour une iustice President du TPIR de reconciliation au Rwanda
~ ~ ~~~~.-~.des-.. Denonciation du uroiet.* de transfert Prbident du TPIR i condamnes et des dossiers du TPIR au Rwanda et demande de mise en application de la Directive sur le transfert des condamnes Demande de modification de l'article 91 du rkglement de Procedure et de Preuve Dhonciation du refus du TPIR de considerer I'attentat contre l'avion prdsidentiel comme un Secretaire Ghtral ONU element dkclencheur des atrocit&, de la pratique President Assemblee de poursuite collective et la our suite e la Gherale politique de notre anhtissement.' President du TPIR 1 Denonciation des lacunes dans le statut et le Secretaire GCneral ONU Rt5glement du Tribunal International pour le President du TPIR Rwanda et des d&ives administratives au ?PR. 1 Dknonciation de la justice internationale Plusieue autorites dont liscriminatoire et a deux vitesses. le Secraaire G6neral
Votre Memorandum sur la situation du Prevenu et Secretaire Gneral de iu condamne au TPIR du 17 fdvrier 2003 et notre ettre du 12/08/2003 sur la denonciation des PrCident du TPIR
- - !0/06/06 Xnonciation de la campagne de desinformation 'resident du TPIR. nenk par le TPIR a la suite de la publication des ~nclusionsde I'enquSte Bruguikre. I Annexe IT :Signatures des detenus - Lettre adressCe au Seerhire aniral de I'ONU le 10 ianvier 2007. YW Annexe n:Sienatures des dhtenus - Lettre adressCe au Seerhire GCneral de I'ONU le Les Detenus du Tribunal Penal Arusha, le 28 mars 2007 International pour le Rwanda (TPIR) &g&- TANZANIE.
Monsieur Erik Mose, President du Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda a-TANZANIE.
: Nos preoccupations face au projet de transfert des accuses et des condamnes du TPlR au Rwanda.
Monsieur le President,
Lors du ICTH Genernl ~tofmeetin~qui s'est tenu au Simba Hall le Y Fevrier 2007, le Procurcur a annonci : "The r ' Cfr Proseculor's Address to the ICTR General StaITMeeling 9 February 2007. ' La mime demande a ete faite dans une correspondance anterieure. Cfr, entre autres, nos lettres : - celle du 24 inai 2004 qui denonpit le projet d'accord de coopiration enwe le TPIR el le Gouvemement de Kigali en wedu transferl des condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda ; - cellc du 4 juillet 2004 qui sollicitait votre intervention pour obtenir I'abandon du projet de uansfen des detenus du TPIR au Rwanda : - celle du 15 juillel2004 qui traitait du transferl des dossiers des accuses du TPIR au Rwanda : - celle du 19 fevrier 2005 qui denonpit le projet de transfert des condamnes et des accuses du TPlR au Rwanda et qui detnandait la mise en application de la Directive sur le transfert des condamnes etc. ' Cfr Comprehensive Report of the Secretary General on practical arrangements for the effective functioning of thc International Tribucal for Rwanda. recommending Amsha as the seat of the Tribunal (42) ; $11995/134. 13 February 1995 InThe United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, p.465, para 41-45 "Innest). Intema!joml, dans son Bulletin No 320 de Dkmbre 2006, s'oppose au transfen des accuds du TPlR au Rwanda. car il pense que ces accuses ne seraienl pas jug& dans un delai raisonnablc. que le &oil d'&mremis en liberte De fait, apds la victoire militaire du FPR, la plupart des magistrats expbimentes ont ete soit contraints a I'exil, soit tues, soit emprisonnes, soit systematiquement remplaces par de nouveaux cadres proches du pouvoir mais sans preparation adequate. Ainsi, I'Etat preparait le terrain afin qu'il puisse plus aisement s'ingQer dans I'administration de la justice, celle-ci etant devenue un outil fondamental pour la gestion du pouvoirS. Cette disorganisation, ces incompetences et ces ingerences des autorites politiques dam I'adrninistration de la justice ont ete denoncees par Amnesty International 2004 en ces termes : 'Xmnesty Internamonal k concerns focused on four issues: the lack of deknce counsel and witnesses for the vast majority of defendants ; the lack of time and adequate fncilities for defendants to prepare their defence : the competence, impartiality and itdependence of criminal justice officials; and the conduct ofthe trials in which it was frequently clear that those accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity were alreadv considered guilty by both judge andprosecutor. Defendants were even jeered by spectators ... Public ~totementsand actions by some government officrals and the popular pressure exerted by genocide survivors groups against detainees sustained a climate offear that continued to affectjudicial personnel, defendants and witnesses. There continued to be numerous instances alleged interference by government in court decisions and the non respect of court decisions by government oficmls. witnessed in the rearrest of individuals flfter trial and acquittal. Depence counsel and witnesses continued to be intimidated causing the former to withdraw,from the trials and the latter to reficse to testrfi aware rhat prosecution staff would use their testimony to implicate them in crimes committed by defendants. The shortage of qualified and experiencedjudicial personnel continued to raise the serious doubts about the,fairness ofRwondese criminal justice system ... "6 Cene situation decrite par Amnesty International ne s'est pas amelioree puisqu'elle est inherente au systeme installe par le regime. Monsieur le President, face a une situation aussi chaotique, quelle garantie d'un prcces juste et equitable pouvez-vous dower aux accuses que le Prccureur veut vous pousser a livrer aux autorites rwandaises? Si ceux qui sont consideres comme n simples executants u subissent des injustices du genre, quel traitement sera rkserve a ceux que les hommes et les femmes au pouvoir a Kigali se plaisent a appeler r planlficateurs du genocide w 7 Est-ce dam un pareil chat qu'un avocat plaidera la cause de son client ? Sera t-il possible de trouver quelque temoin qui ose intervenir en faveur d'un homme que le rBgime en place condamne des le moment m&mequ'il commence a le suspecter? Le uansfert des accuses au Rwanda serait une mise en danger delibere dc leurs vies, celles de leurs familles et de leun temoins par les autorites du Tribunal, car celles-ci n'ont jamais cesse de reconnaitre elles-m2mes que les problemes de securite se posent avec acuitk dans ce pays7. ne leur est pas gamnti, qu'ils y subiraient des tortures, que les tribunaux nvandais ne sont pas nksairemenl ind&pendantsouhpaniaux. Cfr MATATA, Communiqui n05412001. La Cour d' Assise de Bmxelles face aux Svndicats de delateurs oeuvrant au Rwanda et a I'etranner, in u Centre de Lutle contre I'Impunitk et I'Injustice au Rwanda n, Bruxelles, 2 mai 2001. p.2. Rapport d'Amnesty International 2004 ~&estyInlcmauonal. ncenduring leean of the aena~deand war. p 6 ' Le TF'IR a reconnu que ses accu&s. leurs ternom el leurs &u~pesdc defense nc pourmenl joulr d'aucunc skuntc requise dans le cas o" ies prab se derouleraient au Rwanda. ~n effet, dans sa letue du 4 mai 20%. lc Greffier adjoin. a soutenu : "It will be advisable to bear in mind the securily and sajety of~udges,the accused witnesses, and even the regular UN Swmembers operating in an unfamiliar environment. The various UN security teams have developed prelrminory security plans to ensure the safety ojaN involved, but regardless o/professianol precoulionaiy measures, the Regishy believes that holding trial in Ruhengeri will be more hazardous to aN involved than holding trial in sessions in Arusha". Ruhengeri est au Rwanda! Dans la decision rendue par la Chambre I1 du TPIR. le 3 1 janvier 2006, dam I'Aflaire Le Procureur contre Rugambarara ~R-OO-59-I,lles Juges ont tenu a relever ce qui suit: "The Chamber has considered the general security sifuation in Rwanda, as well as the risks to genocrde victims andpotential witnesses in and outside Rwanda described in the Declaration ofAljed Kwende and the other annexes to the Motion. In light of the supparring material, the Chamber concludes that thefears expressed by potential prosecution witnesses for their own safety or the safely of their family members in and outside Rwanda, are justfled by objective considerafions"(para 11 de la decision). 2. Leproblhe de la peine de morr I1 faut &re de mauvaise foi pour refuser de comprendre que la suppression de la peine de mort du Code Penal nuandais a &e imposee a Kigali. On connait effectivement l'opposition farouche de I'homme fort de Kigali a ~ ~ cette idee. Par ailleurs, y aurait-t-il ankntissement plus absolu et plus absurdc du vaincu que de le livrer malgre lui entre les mains du vainqueur qu'il a combattu pendant quatre ans ? Aucun organe de I'ONU ne devrait s'impliquer dam une entreprisc aussi cynique. Qui ignore qu'en Afrique en genQal, et au Rwanda en particulier, les prisonniers meurent soi-disant n naturellement u alors qu'en realite ils sont victimes de maladie non soignee, d'empoisonnement, de torture, etc. ? Si Ic Gouvernement rwandais est prtt a tout, jusqu'a abandonner n so chPre peine capitale JJ, c'est qu'il pense en tirer des avantages dont la nature n'echappe a personne. Les accuses et condamnb du TPIR qui lui seront livres seront subtilement tues et des alibis ne manqueront pas pour expliquer ces disparitions que tout homme avise devrait prevoir et prevenir des a prkent. 3. Le re'gime carce'ral'du Rwanda est infernal. I1 est pr6visible que les accuses qui seront transferes au Rwanda ouvriront toutes larges les voies du rapatriement des wndamnes du TPIR dam ce pays. Or, Monsieur le President, les familles et proches de la plupart de ces demiers sont des refugies qui ne peuvent pas rentrer chez eux. Par ailleurs, conformement aux prescriptions de I'article 37 des Regles Minima en matiere de detention, aLes derenus doivent &re autorises, sous surveillance necessaire, b communiquer avec leurfamille et ceux de Ieurs amis auxquels on peurfarre confiance, b inrervalles reguliers tant par carrespandance qu 'en recevant des visires,~'. Tout wmpte fait, renvoyer les condamncis du TPIR purger leur peine au Rwanda reviendrait a les priver du minimum de droits dont peut jouir un prisonnier. Pareille decision equivaudrait ales couper definitivemcnt dcs leurs et a pictiner le droit de ces demiers a leur rendre visite a intervalles reguliers. Bien plus, selon les nonnes internationales dont I'ONU est garante, nLe regime penitentiarre comporte un traitement des condamnes dont le bur essentrel est leur amendement er leur reclassement rocralu9. Or, en luttanf pour avoir les prisonniers de I'ONU, le FPR ne vise pas a les recuperer pour la societe rwandaise, mais a les Bliminer pour s'assurer d'une victoire definitive. Allez-vous, Monsieur le President, vous ranger du c6te du FPR dans cette entreprise macabre ? 4. Urgence d1arr6ter les agents du FPR suspect& de ge'nocide, de crimes de guerre et d'autres crimes confre I'humanitc? Les inquihdes que nous venons d'exposer sont d'autant plus fondees que de rkentes preuves, d'une tres grande fiabilitk mettent a nue la responsabilite des hommes au pouvoir a Kigali dans le dklenchement des massacres qui ont endeuille le Rwanda entre avril et juillet 1994. Des temoins fiables disent, en effet, que ce sont les Chefs militaires du FPR qui ont planifie et ordond deliberement I'assassinat du Prkident Juvenal Habyarimanalo. Ce faisant, ils avaient planifie de dhpiter la Republique, de creer un climat de chaos qui devait leur pennettre de s'emparer du pouvoir par la force. Les auteurs de cet assassinat sont deja sous le wup de mandats d'arrtt intemationaux. L'on ne doit jamais oublier quc ces mtmes personnes ont lance le 01 octobre 1990 une guerre injustifiee wntre le Rwanda detmisant ainsi le tissu socio-politique et economique et entrainant une deliquescence du pouvoir. Est-il alors approprie de confier le soin de juger des Rwandais accuses d'avoir commis le genocide a ceux-la mZmes qui sont dorenavant accuses d'Ztre les veritables planificateurs des malheurs qui ont ensanglante le Rwanda depuis 1990 et ont degenere dans le desordre, le chaos, les affrontements et les massacres entre avril Cfr aussi I'anicle 4 de la a Directive pratique relative A la proc6dure que doil suivre le TPIR pour designer un Eta1 dam lequel un condamn-? purgera sa peine d'empriso~ement)). 9 Article 10, paragraphe 3 du Pacte International relatif aux droils civils el politiques. Cfr aussi I'micle 65 des Regles Minima en matiire de detention. I" Implicitement, le President KAGAME plaide coupable quand, dam une emission a de la BBC du 7 dkembre 2006. il kplique ainsi au journaliste Stephen SACKUR qui lui suggkre que le Rwanda ne pourra pas tourner la page tan1 qu'on aura pas identifie I'assassin du president HABYARIMANA : a No, no, no I First of all I am nor responsible for Hab,yarimana 's dedh andl don 't care! I wasn '1 responsibie/or his securily He wasn 'r responsiblejor mine either And he wouldn '1 have cared f I had died I don 'r care that it happened to him. I was jighting rhar governmenl, rhe government thar mode me re/ugee/or those years. /or which I had a right rojight about, and rhe judge wanrs ro ask me wh,v? " et juillet 1994 1 Les tenants du pouvoir de Kigali sont presses d'avoir les accusk et les condamnes du TPIR qui sont des temoins a charge contre eux pour les anfflntir diftnitivement et pour leur faire endosser les crimes commis par le FPR. Ainsi, ils feraient oublier leurs responsabilites dans la tragedie nvandaise. Est-il des lors approprie de livrer les aocuds et les condamnb du TPlR entre les mains de ces presumes criminels avant qu'ils ne repondent de leurs crimes devant le TPIR ou devant d'autres juridictions competentes 1 Monsieur le President, Ce releve n'est certes pas exhaustif; mais il donne une idke du pays ou vous serez bient6t sollicitc de renvoyer des accuses pour qu'ils y soient N juges >) et d'expedier les condamnes pour qu'ils y purgent leurs peines. Vous comprenez, nous I'esperons, qu'accepter une telle demande serait violer leur droit a un proces juste et equitable. Ce serait denier a ces condamnes le droit de jouir du minimum de droits que lui consent encore la societe humaine, ainsi que leur droit a la vie et a la securite de leur personne garanti par le droit international humanitaire. Saki de tous ces faits, nous vous pnons, Monsieur le President, d'he sensible a nos preoccupations pour veiller a ce que la politiquk du TPIR ne consacre notre anhtissement a terme par les dirigemts actuels du Rwanda. Si le TPIR ne peut plus s'acquitter de son devoir, il devrait se dkider a demander que les accuses restant soient transferes dam des pays veritablement democratiques pouvant leur garantir des proces justes et equitables ou de les liberer. A defaut, il devrait, a l'instar du TPN, demander au Conseil de Skurite de I'ONU de prolonger son mandat. Pour ce qui est des condamnes et ayant en memoire le contenu de votre lettre adressee aux detenus le 22 septembre 2004", nous restons confiants que le transfert ne pourra se faire que vers des pays respectueux des droits de I'homme et qui peuvent garantir les conditions minima exigees par I'ONU, notamment les relations avec la famille et les proches et la possibilite de riinsertion dam la socikte. Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le President, I'expression de notre haute consideration Les signataires (voir liste en annexe) Cooie Dour information : - Son Excellence le Secdlaire Geneml des Nations Unies, New York. - Membres du Conseil de Shrite, New York. - Departemen1 des Maires Juridiques de I'ONU, New York. - Haul Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les Droits de I'Homme, Gen.?ve. - Monsieur le President de I'Union EUIO&M~; Bm~elles. - Monsieur le Secdtaire CCnM de la Francophonie. Paris. - Mesdames. Messieurs les Juges de la ~hambred'Appel du TPlR (tous) - Mesdames. Messieurs les Juees des Chambres de Premiere Instance du TPIR ttousl - Monsieur le Greffier du TPI~Arusha. - Monsieur le Procureurdu TPIR, Arusha. - Monsieur le Commandant de I'UNDF, Arusha - Mesdames, Messieurs les Avocats de la Defense (tous) - Monsieur le F'ksident de I'ADAD, Arusha. - Commission Internationale des Juristes, Genkve. - CICR Genhvc. - Amnesly International, Gcnbve. - Human Rights Watch, New York. - FIDH, Paris. - International Crisis Group, Washington DC. - Association AmCricaine des Juristes. - Association :ntemationale des Juristes, New Delhi. - Centre dc Lutte Contre I'lmpun~leer I'lnjustrce au Rwanda. Bmxelles - Assoctatron DLXOMERE. Bruxclles I I Vous ecriviez en effet : n Aucune decision n a h!e prise nipour le transfer! dd'ajfaires au Rwanda ni pour I 'exPculion de pine au Rwanda. Toure decision de cette nature ne pourroir itre prise que par les chambres et le President, comme indiquh ci-apds el en tenant compte de I'avis des personnes concernPes, en conformith avec lesprincipesgdneraux de droi! w. 5 D&enus signatoires de la leare du 28 mnrs 2007 a&-essPe au Rhident du TPIR, le iuze Erik Mose d I dent l'objd esi :((Nos peOCarpotrpotrons face au pojd de rransffl awshd d.& condamnis du au Rwanda P. - DPlenus signataires & la /enre du 28 mars 2007 ndress6e ou Rksident du TPIR, le juge Erik Mose e# font I'objct esr :n Nos prCoccuparrparronsfare au projd de trnnsferi des acrusis d des condamnds du TPIR ru Rwanda H. ,.A* ,7dL9/;//2 ,G&yd Detenus du Tribunal Penal Arusha. le lb Fe\.rier 100" International pour le Rwanda (TPIR) Arusha - ~anzanie ,,y .A Son Excellence. Monsieur le Secretaire General des Nations Cnies Objet Denonciation du projet de transferer les condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda Monsieu~.le Secretaire General; Permettez-nous de commencer par ces paroles de votre emnent predecesseur c< On voulait mettre le Tribunal a La Haye. J'ai dit non. Un probieme akicain : au nom de la dignite, ce tribunal devait se trouver en Afrique. Alors j'ai choisi Arusha. En realite, je me suis borne. C'etait une erreur de ma part, pour creer un tribunal, vous avez besoin de tout un background culturel, un background juridique, la presse, etc., qui vous soutiennent dans votre action. A Arusha, c'est le vide )). Boutros Boutros Ghali, ancien Sectetaire &nerd dc I'ONU, cite dam Robin Philpot : (( Cn ne s'esi pas posse' comme qa u Kigali >I. Montrial, Les Editions des In1ouchables, 2003, p 171. Ces demiers temps, les autorites rwandaises multiplient des declarations dans la presse, dans des receptions de propagande (notamment celles organisees dans la semaine du 2 au 8 fevrier 2004 a Arusha-Tanzanie lors de l'investiture du nouveau representant du Gouvemement rwandais aupres du TPIR) faisant cornprendre que le transfert des condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda est une affaire deja arrhee ou en voie de I'hre tres prochainement. .4u moment ou .-. nous ecrivons, M Adama Dieng, Greffier du TPIR, est en deplacement a Kigali. pout s'entrete~rdu projet avec les autorites judiciaires wdaises. Des questions alors se posent : les autorites onusiennes se preparent-elles a prendre encore une decision lourde de condquences quitte a presenter leur (( mea culpa ))plus tard ? Les principaux decideurs onusiens dans l'affaire nvandaise doivent-ils perpetuellement regretter de s'ztre trompes comme si les erreurs passees ne leur inspiraient pas la prudence et le regard plus atlentif et plus humain sur ceux qui doivent subir les consequences de leurs decisions ? Le personnel de I'ONU appele a trancher des questions africaines, pour justifier leurs propositions ou leurs decisions inappropriees, evoque souvent l'africanite )) des problemes poses. Ainsi, comme le conseil de Securite assignait au Tribunal penal international pour le Rwanda la mission de juyer presque uniquement les Rwandais, Monsieur Boutros Boutros Ghali, alors Secretaire General de I'OhU a trouve que puisqu'il s'agissait d'un ( x Le Trrb~azalaurnrr dC &re cred dnn.7 une gmnde vINepo7rr avoir I 'mteri?tde lo krnndi. viNr. L 'appin psyhologiq~rede la grnnde vrlle. 11ne mfrnslmclure crrlr~rrellepour le 7rihuna1, porrr 1e.s juges pow ie,s avocnts, er pour la pressc ,>. N Etpolfr Ies occusPs el 1e.s condnmnes. 11ri 01-je demand6 7 a Poirr toul /E n~onde.n repondu Icfrindnlerir du TPIR Nox? tous. jur;.ste.s, notis n uvonr~omoic. ahor&; cc crife nnnjuridrquc . c 'csf un cB16 puliliq7re. un cBf~d'ordre mnlc'riel Bon. vous ma conclnrnnc qlirlq~irrn. oil 11 vo,fbire so condirn~no/ion1' Qiii vi7 Ic sun~eiller Po~irquni.> jh n b jnn~oiskri hdre si.rici~scmcnf.,, lbidcm. En effet, le sort des condamnes du TPIR n'a jamais preoccupe les fondatem et les diriseants de ce Tribunal. Ainsi, alors que trois pays : la Suede, la Belgique et la Norvege avaient offert d'accueillir les premiers condamnes. le Grefier de ce Tribunal, Monsieur Agwu Okali, a refuse en pretextant que : (( Cornmr cr sovt des Afr.icai?i.s,un doit Ies incarcerer en Afique N (Idem, p 170). Aujourd'hui, il doit regretter lui aussi sa decision car il sait que les pnsomiers rwandais au Mali sont loin de leurs families st trouvant notamment en Europe et en Amerique 11s sont sans contacts avec elles car au Mali la communication avec l'extkneur est un veritable casse-tste pour les prisonniers et les membres de leurs familles Faisant comme s'il ignorait toutes ces erreurs du passe, le Greffier actuel, Monsieur Adama Dieng, en entente avec les dingeants du TPIR, s'est mis a I'ecoute des autorites politiques et judiciaires mandaises et, selon Kigali, est en passe de conclure avec elles le transfert et I'emprisonnement des condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda. A-t-il jamais prete attention a ces paroles de Monsieur Boutros Boutros Ghali, ancien grand decideur de I'ONU . <( Hon. voir~ mez condomne' quelqu 'un. ozi il vflfiire SLI condflmnotion ? chi vn le surveiller ? Pourquoi ? I) 11 ne fait aucun doute que les honunes au pouvoir a Kigali, soucieux si pas de faire disparaitre tous leurs anciens adversaires du moins de les museler definitivement, n'a~precientpas qu'il y ait encore quelques hauts cadres politiques et militaires, quelques hommes d'affaires et quelques intellectuels qui, mSme condamnes par le TPE leur echappent encore. En effet. Kigali craind qu'ils continuent a clamer leur innocence et a designer, preuves a I'appui, le FPR et ses dirigeants, dont le GenQd President Paul Kagame, conme les premiers responsables de I'hecatombe mandaise Si le pouvoir actuel de Kigali mine aujourd'hui une propagande musclee (et multiplie des declarations sur les antennes de radios internationales et nationales. - dans les joumaux de portee nationale et internationale) en we d'obtenir le transfert et I'emprisonnement au Rwanda des condamnes du TPIR, ce n'est pas parce qu'ils sont Rwandais, qu'il faut donc les incarcQer au Rwanda. mais parce qu'il les considQe toujours comme ses opposants farouches qu'il faut eliminer par tous les moyens. I1 n'est un secret pour personne : dans le cadre de I'enquSte menee par le Juge fian~aisJean- Louis Bruguihe; un bon nombre de detenus et prisonniers du TPR ont thoigne contre le FPR en le dbignant comme I'auteur de l'attentat contre le President Habyarimana, assassinat que tout le monde considere comme I'element declencheur de la tragedie d'avril a juillet 1994. De plus, au cours de leurs procQ. les accuses devant le TPIR ne cessent de clamer haul et fort la responsabilite du FPR dans le drame nvandais et d'inventorier les crirnes qu'il a commis contre le peuple mandais, toutes ethnies confondues Qu'il suffise de mentionner ici, a titre d'exemple. le fait pour lui d'avoir conFu, prepare, declenche et poursuivi une guerre d'agression contre le Rwanda ; d'avoir repris les hostilites apres avoir assassinc le President Habyarimana, le 6 avril 1994 et d'avoir ainsi viole I'accord de paix d'Arusha conch et signe le 4 a03 1993. C'est cette verite que les autoritb de Kigali ne souhaitent plus entendre. Cela lesson de la declaration de Monsieur Martin Ngoga. ex-representant du Rwanda aupres du TPIR, actuellement Procureur adjoint de la Cour Suprhe du Rwanda, le 28janvier2004 En s'exprimant propos du diclen&ement de la greve des avocats de la defense au TPIR, cette autorite de Kisali s'est attaquee au deroulernent des proces qui s'y tiennent. II s'est insurse contre le fait que les juges permettraient aux accuses de transformer les audiences en arenes politiques contre le regime de Kigali. Cela illustre, s'il en etait besoin, que ia justice est encore une notion assez lointaine dans l'esprit des hauts responsables rwandais du doniaine judiciaire. I1 serait alors tres dangereux de leur confier ceux qu'ils n'hesitent pas a qualifier publiquement d'adversaire numero un Profitant de la pression exercee sur lui par les partisans de l'abolition de la peine de mort, le President Paul Kagame est desormais decide a contre gre rayer des lois du Rwanda la peine de mort, essentiellement dans le but d'obtenir de I'ONU et de ses pays membres le benefice de juger toutes les personnes se trouvant en dehors des frontieres wandaises qu'il veut fairc arrher et transferer au Rwanda ainsi que les condamnes du Tribunal penal onusien pour le Rwanda. hnsi, il aura pu neutraliser definitivement tous ses adversaires politiques et faire peur a tous ceux qui auront encore quelque audace de decrier ses crimes. Voila la veritable raison du desir de Kigali de voir transferes les condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda,malgre I'absence des conditions minimales, sugghees dans notre memorandum sur la situation du prkenu et du condamne du TPIR du 17/02/2003,reste sans suite. L'ONU va-t-elle encore une fois commettre la posse erreur dans le dossier rwandais en envoyant les condamnes du TPIR a la deshumanisation, a la torture et a la mort lente mais certaine? Les Rwandak et le monde entier ont deja trop deplore de telles erreurs. Il faut qu'elle les evite desomais. Avec les jugements a caractere politique rendus par le TPIR, il sera necessaire et obligatoire pour les condamnes de recourir aux dispositions du Statut et du Reglement de procedure et de preuve de ce Tribunal ef de demander la revision des jugements. En emprisonnant les condamnes de ce Tribunal au Rwanda, la possibilite de revision sera totalement ecartee. I1 en sera de m6me pour la grke et la commutation de peine. L'ONU aura ainsi contribue a la violation des dispositions juridiques du Tribunal qu'elle a elle-m6me mis en place Face au desir du regime de Kigali d'emprisonner lui-mime les condamnb du TPIR, I'ONU doit obligatoirement repondre a ces deux questions : (( Qui va lrs mveiller o ? (( Pmrq~roi)) ? Que deviendrom ces condamnes, les seuls a pouvoir encore s'exprimer sur le passe et le - present du FPR si 1'OhTJ accede a la demande de ce Front de les recuperer et de les emprisonner au Rwanda 7 Lp situation la moins mauvaise qui attend les plus chanceux qui echapperaient miraculeusement a la mod, c'est 6tre force a nier ce qu'ils sont et de garder le silence sur ce qu'ils savent du drame rwandais. C'est en effet ce que vivent des milliers de rwandais qui croupissent dans les prisons du Pays ou connaissent un semblant de liberte, a I'interieur comme a I'exterieur du Rwanda. 11s devront eviter de soulever la question de l'impunite du FPR dans le drame wandais. En effet, le monde entier sait que cette impunite pemet aux dirigeants de Kigali de continuer a commettre d'autres actes reprehensibles contre le peuple wandais : maintien arbitraire en prison des milliers de personnes sans dossiers, assassinats d'hommes politiques devenus critiques a I'egard du FPR (I'ancien Ministre Seth Sendashonga. le Colonel Theoneste Lizinde, le Colonel Augustin Cyiza, le Depute Leonard Hitimana, etc.). Et comme le President Paul Kagame I'a dija declare ouvertement le 3 I mars 2003 a BWISIGE-BYUMBA, son regime est resolu a ecraser et a reduire en cendre tous ses adversaires politiques. Et il est l'homme qui fait toujours ce qu'il dit I Les Delenus du TPIR Arusha, 14 juin 2004 C/o ICTR - UhDF ARUSHA A I'Honorable Enc Mosc, President du TPIR .4RUSHA Objet : Clarification des preoccupations des Detenus signataires Monsieur le President, Nous accusons bonne reception de votre r$onse du 9 juin 2004 a notre lettre du 24 mai 2004 relative aux negotiations en cows entre le Greffier du TPIR et le Gouvernement de Kigali concemant la conclusion d'un accord de cooperation en vue du transfert des condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda. Nous vous savons grC d'avoir bien voulu consacrer un peu de votre temps precieux pour prendre connaissance de nos preoccupations en rapport avec cette question existentielle pour nous. Nous notons avec satisfaction que les inquietudes que nous avons exprimees dans cette lettre ont retenu votre bienveillante attention. Nous aurions cependant souhait6 connaitre votre sentiment et votre position sur cette question cmciale en votre qualite de President de ce Tribunal. En effet, nous savons que le lieu d'emprisonnernent est determine par le Tribunal (article 103 du Reglement de procedure et de preuve) qui est actuellement sous votre presidence. Dans votre r6ponse prkcitee, vous nous renvoyez devamt le Greffier en disant : (( Les - quesrions soulevies dans le projet auquel vous faites rifirence doivenr en parriculier &re ktudiies uu priulable par le Greffier du Tribunal )). Nous savons que le projet dont il est question touche au statut du condamne qui n'a pas retenu l'attention des autorites des Nations Unies, ni celle des autorites du Tribunal. En effet, cette question a ite soumise a leur attention par notre Mimorandum date du 17 fevrier 2003. Cela fait plus d'un an et trois mois que nous attendons leur reaction. Le Greffier aurait dG, depuis longtemps, mener une etude sur cette question et faire des propositions a I'autorite competente. Nous tenons, d'ailleurs, a rappeler qu'il nc s'est pas donne la peine dc repondre a nos nombreuses invitations que nous hi avons Pait parvenir depuis son anivee au TPIR, atin que nous puissions lui faire part de nos diverses doleances. Nous sommes conscients que le Greffier est au service du Tribunal et que la question relative aux aspects pratiques de I'emprisonnement des condamnks du TPIR rentre dans ses attributions. 11 doit, entre autres, s'assurer que le pays de transfert remplit les conditions de detention requises par les Nations Unics. Cependant, pour ce qui est du Rwanda, ce ne sont pas seulement les conditions materielles de detention qui sont en cause. La question 2 4= fondamentale qui sc posc concerne I'opportunite meme du transfert des prisonniers dans ce pays. A ce sujet, le Tribunal doit dctcrrnincr si les circonstances qui ont empiche le Conscil de Securite de decider d'installer le sikgc du TPIR au Rwanda et d'y mener les proces, n'existent plus. Dans son Rapport adopt& par le Conseil de SecuritC sur ce point, le Secretaire general des Nations Unies disait, entre autres, ce qui suit : n ... in ihe atmosphere now preiailing in Rwanda, there are serious securip risks in bringing info the col~nrrv leaders offheprevious regime nlleped lo have committed acfs of genocide to stand trinl before the ln~ernationalTribunal u . Or, la realit6 actuelle est que le regime en place au Rwanda n'a pas change de nature depuis l'adoption de la decision d'etablir le siege du TPIR en dehors de ce pays. Au contraire, la situation a empire. La tenue de proces et l'emprisonnement des condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda sont impensables tant que le Gouvemement de ce pays ne peut pas et ne veut pas garantir une atmosphere sereine, favorable des procks justes et equitables et a la securite des detenus et des condamnes,. Nous estimons que cette question depasse largement les competences du Greffier. ,- Cependant, nous sommes surpris par les informations inquietantes qui nous parviennent de certains agents ayant pris part aux negotiations menees par le Greffe avec le Rwanda selon lesquelles le hansfert des condamnes au Rwanda est chose deja acquise a 95%. le reste devant itre finalis6 incessamment. C'est pour cette raison que nous insistons aupres de votre Honneur, en votre qualite de President de ce Tribunal qui repond de toutes ses activitb devant le Conseil de Securite et I'Assemblee genhale des Nations Ilnies, pour vous demander de veiller au respect des regles regissant ce Tribunal et de ne pas cautionner des mesures qui mettent en peril notre integrite et notre securite. Tout en esperant que vous accorderez a la presente I'importance et I'urgence qu'elle merite, nous vous prions de bien vouloir agrkcr, Monsieur le Prbident, I'assurance de notre tres haute consideration. Les Dktenus signataires (liste en annexe) S.E.M. Kofi Annan, Secretaire general des Nations Unies Monsieur Adama Dieng, Greffier du TPIR Honorable Juge du TPIR (Tous) Conseil de la Dkfense (Tous) Association des Avocats de la Defence - ADAD Association Dukomere, e-mail : association [email protected] Familles des Detenus CICR Amnesty International Presse Compreliensive repon of the Secretary General on practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the International 'Tribunal for Rwanda, recommending Arusha as the seat of the Tribunal (42); S119951134, 13 February 1995 in The United Nations and Rwanda 1993.1996, p.465, para. 43 Liste des signataires de la leitre du 14 juin 2004 adressie au Prisident dl TPlR relative a la clarification des preoccupations des Detenus Liste des signataires de la lettre du 14 juln 2004 adresske au President dr TPlR relative a la clarlflcation des preoccpp~onsdefietenus CENTRE DE LUTTE CONTRE L'IMPUNITE ET L'INJUSTICE AU RWANDA BP 141 Bruxelles 3 Bruxelles, le 12 juillet 2004 1030 BRUXELLES TelIFax : 32.81.60.1 1.13 GSM: 32.476.70.15.69 ObJgt : Transmission notre Com.n074 contre le transferf des detenus du TPIR A I'Honorable Eric Mose, President du Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda Monsieur le President, Selon le reglement du Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda (TPIR), ies peines d'emprisonnement prononcees par le tribunal sont executees au Rwanda ou dans un autre Etat qui en a manifest6 la volonte. Le porte-parole du TPIR, Rolland Amoussouga qui a conduit une delegation du TPlR depuis le 24 mai 2004 pour Bvaluer les conditions de detention au Rwanda, a affirm6 que le gouvernement rwandais et le Tribunal avaient entame un "dialogue" a ce sujet mais que "c'est au president du TPIFT', Erik MOSE, de decider du transfert d'un condamnb. Jusqu'a present, aucun condamn6 n'a BtB transfer6 au Rwanda. Actuellement, six condamnes du TPlR purgent leur peine I'etranger, au Mali. Le Benin, le Swaziland, la France, I'ltalie et la Suede ont deja signe des accords pour accueillir des condamnes du tribunal. D'apres le courrier vous adresse par les detenus du TPlR en date du 24 mai et du 14 juin 2004, vous les renvoyez devant le Greffier dans ces termes : (< Les questions soulevees dans le projet auquel vous faites reference doivent en particulier &re etudiees au prealable par le Greffier du Tribunal n, Monsieur Adama DlENG qui aurait dO s'abstenir d'imaginer un seul instant le transfert de ces detenus vers le Rwanda. Si le Rwanda se dit pret appliquer les conditions d'emprisonnement requises par les Nations unies pour accueillir dans ses centres de detention les detenus condamnes par le TPIR, il existe mille et une raisons qui devraient empecher un tel transfert. Parmi ces raisons evidentes, les plus importantes sont les suivantes : 1. Le Rwanda est dirig6 actuellement par un Chef d'Etat terroriste considere comme un des principaux responsables du genocide rwandais par le fait d'avoir conduit la guerre de conquete du pouvoir et pour avoir commandit6 I'attentat du 6 avril 1994 qui a declenche le chaos et les massacres au Rwanda. En effet, le President de la Republique Rwandaise, le General Paul KAGAME, est cite comme le principal commanditaire de I'attentat terroriste aerien qui a coat6 la vie a deux presidents Hutu de la Republique en fonction a savoir le President rwandais Juvenal HABYARIMANA et le President burundais Cyprien NTARYAMIRA. Le journal LE MONDE du 9 mars 2004 devoile sa culpabilite dans ces tenes : (( Dans on rapport de 220 pages, date du 30 janvier et intitule (( Resultat de I'enquete de la Division nationale anti- terroriste de la Direction generale de la police judiciaire )), le GBneral Paul KAGAME et actuel chef de I'Etat rwandais, est design6 comme le principal decisionnaire de I'attentat, en t6te d'une liste de dix officiers superieurs du FPR et de deux (( servants des missiles sol-air u tires sur I'avion presidentiel, qui y sont Bgalement identifies. Ce sont ces dits officiers qui gouvernent u officieusement n le pays. 2. La junte militaire rwandaise s'assure I'impunite par tous les moyens criminels et refuse, depuis 10 ans, de collaborer avec le TPlR et de livrer ses propres militaires impliques dans les crimes de genocide. Au lieu de punir ses propres criminels, le gouvernement rwandais a decide le 2 Juillet 2004 de promouvoir, a des grades superieurs, des officiers superieurs du FPR impliques dans les crimes de genocide tels que les generaux Fred IBINGIRA, James KABAREBE, Charles KAYONGA, Kayumba NYAMWASA, Caesar KAYIZARI, Karenzi KARAKE, Martin NZARAMBA, Patrick NYAMVUMBA. Andrew RWIGAMBA, Jack NZIZA, etc. La &he de poursuivre les criminels du FPR a kt6 confiee au TPlR qui doit les arreter et non les transformer en u gebliers )) de ses detenus. Le TPlR doit cesser de demissionner devant ses responsabilites et de comploter contre ses propres dbtenus de la prison d'Arusha. Les Conseils des Ministres du 26 juin 1998 et du 5 juin 2002 les avaient promus ainsi que d'autres officiers superieurs parmi lesquels se trouvent des chefs militaires impliqubs dans le genocide rwandais et les massacres des refugies rwandais hutu et des populations congolaises apparent& aux Hutu depuis 1990 jusqu'aujourd'hui. Ces promotions, jugees (( scandaleuses D par de nombreux rwandais (dont certains membres de I'APR eux-m&nes) viennent consacrer encore I'IMPUNITE des hauts responsables militaires qui sont les vrais (t dbtenteurs du pouvoir occulte )) au Rwanda. 3. La Magistrature Rwandaise a subi une veritable epuration ethnique et politique. Dans la mesure ou le regime de Kigali reste domine, gangrene et paralyse par le "pouvoir occulte" ou le "gouvernement paralldewdes extrbmistes tutsi, il porte la responsabilite des consequences de cette epuration ethnique et politique qui ne peut que "favoriser et institutionnaliser" I'lmpunit6 au Rwanda. En effet, suite A leur part de responsabilite dans le genocide rwandais et au volume impressionnant des crimes qu'ils ont continue de commettre depuis leur victoire en juillet 1994, les extremistes tutsi au pouvoir n'avaient plus d'autres choix que de s'assurer I'impunite dont ils ont besoin, par la mise en place d'un Systeme judiciaire parfaitement contn3lable et qui leur est totalement dbvou6. Pour ce faire, ils ont assassine, fait disparaitre etlou emprisonne ilkgalement et arbitrairement des magistrats honnetes et wurageux. SimuItanBment, en plus des lois et predures judiciaires qu'ils imposent au peuple rwandais depuis 10 ans, ils ont reussi a faire nommer des magistrats de leur seule obedience. u Ces magistrats a majoM6 tutsi ont Bt6 d'abord formes au rabais, avant d'6tre affect& 4 des postes-cl6s et pkis au sein de la Magistrature Rwandaise, pour mieux prot6ger et servir les int6r6ts d'un petit noyau d'extrhistes tutsi qui ont besoin de s'assurer I'impunite de leurs crimes. C'est ainsi qu'ils continuent de priver le peuple rwandais d'une justice sereine et 6quitable; et d'karter toute solution de transparence, de neutralit6 et d'6quite que des rwandais de bonne volont6 avaient souhaitee u. L'assistance judicaire massive, qui avait 6t6 initialement envisagee par le "gouvernement ofikiel" mis en place le 19 juillet 1994 et publiquement sollicitee aupr&s de la Communaute lntemationale lors de la Conference de La Haye en Octobre 1994, a ete rejetee par le "pouvoir occulte" des extremistes, sous p&texte de la "souverainet6 nationale". Pourtant, en refusant I'offre d'assistance internationale en magistrats &rangers, ce "gouvemement parallele" n'a pas hdsit6 a conclure des accords d'assistance militaire avec des grandes puissances; ce qui lui penet d'envahir ou d'intimider des pays de la r6gion des grands lacs. Or, sans une Magistrature independante et capable de cr&r les conditions nbcessaires B une veritable et durable rkonciliation nationale. toute solution de paix durable est wmpromise non seulement au Rwanda, mais aussi dans la region des Grands Lacs. En iuin 1995. ~lusde 40 maqistrats hutu Btaient em~risonnessuite a cette e~uration.Les magistrats sont traumatises, terrorises et inca~ablesde travailler en toute indkpendance, suite A-l9ing6rence militaire. 85% de detenus n'avaient pas de dossiers judiciaires en 1997!! C'est dans ce climat de terreur totale que des procbs pour juger les personnes pr6sum6es coupables du genocide ont commence fin 1996. Bien qu'ils se deroulent en public, on ne peut pas dire qu'ils sont pour autant Bquitables et transparents. Ce constat a &e fat par I'ancien Ministre de la Justice du Rwanda du 19/07/1994 au 28/08/1995, Monsieur Alphonse Marie NKUBITO, qui fut retrouve mort mysterieusement dans son lit dans la matin& du 13 fkvrier 1997. Le jour suivant, son vieil ami, le President du Conseil d'Etat, Monsieur Vincent NKEZABAGANWA, fut assassine chez lui dans la soiree du 14 fevrier 1997 A Gisozi (Kigali-ville) par des hommes arm& en tenue militaire. II a Bte tub en m&me temps avec trois autres personnes qui btaient chez lui. Son successeur, Monsieur Alype NKUNDIYAREMYE, a dO s'exiler en Belgique oh il est mort de maladie fin novembre 1999. 11 avait Bte reconnu comme refugie politique suite A sa fuite en mai 1999. 4. Les assassinats politiques et les emprisonnements arbitraires d'opposants politiques continuent de se derouler au Rwanda. L'annBe 2003 a 6te caracterisee par des dispariiions de personnalites hutu parce qu'ils sont simplement soup~onn6esd'&e des opposants politiques. Le Lt Colonel Augustin CYIZA, qui fut President de la Cour de Cassation de 1994 a 1998, a bte enlevb le 23 avril 2003 A Kigali ou il s'Btait recycle comme professeur de droit B I'Universite Libre de Kigali. Selon le Porte Parole de la Police, son vehicule aurait BtB trouve A KANIGA -4 (prefecture Byumba) pr6s de la fronti6re nord avec I'Uganda. Jusqu'aujourd'hui, le Lt Colonel CYlZA est port6 disparu et ces proches estiment qu'il a tit6 assassin6 malgre les pressions exercees par les organisations des droits humains sur les autorites rwandaises pour le retrouver. L'Honorable LBonard HITIMANA, membre du Bureau politique du Parti MDR (Mouvement Democratique R6publicain) et Depute a I'Assemblbe Nationale de Transition sous le Regime FPR, est port6 disparu depuis le 07/04/2003 alors qu'il venait de rendre visite A une famille amie A REMERA, dans la Mairie de la Ville de Kigali entre 20H00 et 21H00. I! est a rappeler que les disparitions sont devenues banales au Rwanda ou plusieurs autres personnes sont portees disparues depuis novembre 2002 et parmi lesquelles se trouvent le policier JMV Mugenzi, le commerqant JMV Nkulikiyinka, I'ex-sergent Damien Musayidizi et le soldat Franqois MATABARO, qui n'ont plus donne signe de vie malgre les recherches de leurs proches. Considerant tout ce que nous venons d'enumerer ci-haut, nous vous demandons d'ordonner au greffier en chef du TPIR. Monsieur ADAMA DIENG, de suspendre immediatement toutes les negociations concernant le transfert des detenus du TPlR vers le Rwanda et d'examiner rapidement le statut du condamne TPlR vous soumis par ces detenus. Au cas ou ce transfert aurait lieu, vous serez consideres, vous personnellement ainsi que tous les responsables du TPlR qui se permettront de tremper dans ce complot criminel, comme des criminels susceptibles dSBtre traduits en justice par les Bpouses et les enfants de ces detenus. Le Centre de Lutte contre I'lmpunit6 et I'lnjustice au Rwanda (*) denonce et condamne les negociations sur ce transfert des dBtenus car elles traduisent une evidente demission du TPIR devant ses responsabilites. Les detenus du TPlR sont des personnes qui s'etaient exilBes pour des raisons Bvidentes de sbcuritb. Comme tous les rbfugies du monde entier, ces detenus u rbfugies w ont aussi droit A la protection independamment de leurs responsabilites individuelles dans la tragbdie nvandaise. Leurs Bpouses et leurs enfants, qui sont eux-m&mes refugies, ont le droit de rester en contact avec eux et de pouvoir leur rendre visite en toute securit6. Ce qui ne serait plus le cas, s'ils Btaient transfer& au Rwanda ou ils ne peuvent plus remettre les pieds. Nous vous remercions d'avance de la decision courageuse que vous prendrez en vue de suspendre ces negociations et vous prions d'agreer. Monsieur le Prbsident, I'expression de notre haute consideration. Pour le Centre, MATATA Joseph, Coordinateur. -CPI B Monsieur le Greffier Adama Dieng et A I'Association des Avocats de la Defense (') Le Centre de Lulte contre I'lmpunite et I'lnjustice au Rwanda est une association de defense des droits humains basbe en Belgique, cr&e le 18 aolrt 1995. Ses membres sont des militants des droits humains de longue date. Cerkains ont Bte actifs au sein d'associations mandaises de defense des droits hurnains et ont participe d I'enquete CLADHOlKanyamanda sur le genocide de 1994. Lorsqu'ils ont commence A enqueter sur les crimes du regime wandais actuel (le regime du Front Patriotique Rwandais), ils ont subi des menaces et ont ete contraints de s'exiler b l'ktranger ou ils poursuivent leur engagement en faveur des droits humains. ANNEX "There Will Be No Trial" Police Killings of Detainees and the Imposition of Collective Punishments Summary ...... I Recommendations ...... 4 Attacks on Genocide Survivors and Gacaca Participants ...... 6 Police Killings of Detainees ...... 9 Killings of Detainees arrested by Soldiers ...... 18 Partial List of Detainees Killed by Police Officers and Soldiers ...... 21 April 2006-May 2007 ...... 21 Official Responses ...... 25 Destruction of property belonging to survivors and collective punishments ...... 27 Violations of International and Rwandan Law ...... 30 The Donor Community ...... 32 Conclusion ...... 33 Annex One -Statement sent by Commissioner General of Rwanda National Police Andrew Rwigamba to Human Rights Watch researcher Christopher Huggins. June 4. zoo7. electronic communication ...... 34 Summary Officers of the Rwanda National Police (RNP) shot and killed at least 20 detainees in 10 separate incidents in the six months from November zoo6 to May 2007. Many of these killings appear to have been extrajudicial executions, crimes that violate both international human rights law and Rwandan law. The police acknowledge the deaths of the 20 detainees in a statement sent to Human Rights Watch by Commissioner General of Rwanda National Police Andrew.. . Rwigamba but say all were shot in escape attempts or attempts to take weapons from police officers. They say the deaths are being investigated. Although detainees were killed in official custody in earlier incidents, the number of such deaths increased significantly beginning in late 2006 following several highly publicized killings of survivors of the 1994 genocide and others involved in the gacacajurisdictions, a popular justice initiative meant to prosecute those accused of genocide. Faced with demands for increased protection of such vulnerable persons, officials responded by establishing a policy of collective responsibility making all Rwandans responsible for the security of their fellow citizens. The meaning of the policy was not precisely spelled out, nor was it enacted in law, but officials ordered increased night patrols by citizens. They also warned repeatedly that anyone who harmed or tried to harm survivors would face severe if unspecified punishment. The congruence between these official pronouncements and the increase in the number of deaths in police custody raises concern that some police officers may have interpreted official exhortations as a license to abuse detainees, particularly but not exclusively those accused of crimes against su~ivorsor persons involved in the gacacaprocess. Cases of police killings have occurred in several parts of Rwanda but those documented thus far have been concentrated in the south and east, regions known for the severity of the genocide and continuing tensions surrounding gacaca. The police statement did not condemn the killings of the 20 detainees but rather noted that most of the victims were "of extreme criminal character ready to die for their genocide ideology," implying that accusations against the detainees untested in court in some way justified their killing. In some cases both before and since late 2006, police officers also killed detainees accused of crimes unrelated to the genocide and thegacacaprocess, including persons accused of murder, rape, and theft. According to the police statement and Human Rights Watch research, such killings have also increased since 2006. The police acknowledge that detainees not suspected of genocide or crimes related to gacaca were killed, but offer no explanation otherthan that the victims were trying to escape. Several donor governments, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have asked police officials for explanations of the killings. The Rwanda National Police has promised investigations, but without giving assurance that they will be carried out by independent and impartial investigators. In a number of communities, local authorities interpreted the national policy of collective responsibility as permitting or even requiring collective punishment whenever survivors or participants in gacacawere troubled or attacked. Assisted by police officers and members of the Local Defence Force, administrators imposed fines or even beatings on citizens who had not been tried but were held responsible for alleged offenses because they had the misfortune to live near the scene of the crime. The imposition of collective punishments violates the presumption of innocence and the right of accused persons to a fair trial, rights guaranteed both by international human rights law and by the Rwandan constitution. As Rwandan officials strive to demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law. they must ensure that abusive police killings of detainees be halted immediately; that thorough, impartial investigations be carried out; and that those responsible for these crimes be held accountable. They must also honorthe presumption of innocence and ensure fair trials to accused persons rather than punishing those who have not been convicted in a court of law. Recommendations To the Government of Rwanda Order officers ofthe Rwanda National Police and other law enforcement agencies, such as the Local Defence Force, to protect the lives of all persons in Rwanda. Ensure that officers have been trained in and adhere to international human rights law and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. The internationally accepted Basic Principles require law enforcement officials to use their firearms only when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life. In accord with international legal obligations, carry out prompt, independent, and impartial investigations into all deaths of persons in custody, including those named in this report. Prosecute all police officers against whom there is credible evidence of having ordered or implemented extrajudicial executions. Ensure that such trials be conducted according to internationally accepted fair trial standards. Investigate fully and bring promptly to justice those responsible for attacks or threats of attacks on survivors and other participants in the gacacaprocess. Ensure that all police officers, members of the judiciary, and administrative officials afford all Rwandans the presumption of innocence. Ensure that Rwandans not be punished for any crime unless found guilty of that crime before a legally constituted, independent, and impartial tribunal. Adopt and implement a law to protect witnesses and judicial personnel engaged in all judicial proceedings. To International donors Use your influence to persuade the Rwandan government to protect the lives of all persons within its territory and to investigate and bring to justice all persons, including police officers, responsible for unlawful killings or assault. Stress the importance of effective and transparent investigation of deaths in police custody. Governments providing assistance or training to the Rwanda National Police should particularly insist that police officers adhere to international human rights standards, including the right to life, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial. Assist the Rwandan government in finding more effective ways to protect survivors and participants in the gacaca process. HUMAPIRtGnTs WATCH JULY 1007 Attacks on Genocide Survivors and Gacaca Participants In an atmosphere of growing public concern about harassment and attacks on survivors of the 1994genocide, Human Rights Watch published a report in January 2007 documenting the killing in East Region of one survivor and a subsequent reprisal killing of eight persons who lived in the community where the murder was committed. In another case, the report documented the killing of a judge in a gacaca jurisdiction-a people's court set up to try crimes of genocide-and the killing the next day by police officers of three suspects detained,on suspicion of involvement in the judge's killing. Citing these 13 killings, as well as the concerns being voiced by survivors and authorities, Human Rights Watch cautioned that ethnically based tensions continued to trouble some parts of Rwanda.' In mid-zoo6 the government established an office of witness protection that had registered 26 complaints by late in the year.' There is no general law on witness protection, although the law on gacaca jurisdictions provides up to one year in prison for persons who harm witnesses and judges involved in the gacaca proce~s.~ Passage of a law to protect witnesses, recently requested by a commission ofthe Rwandan Senate,* would make it easier for police and judicial authorities to assure the security of witnesses, thus contributing to the legitimacy of judicial proceedings. In late December 2006 participants in the national dialogue-an annual meeting of leading Rwandans-discussed at length the issue of preventing and punishing threats, harassment, and attacks against survivors and participants in the gacaca jurisdictions. Since that time authorities including President Paul Kagame, military 'Human Rights Watch. Killingsin Fasfern Rwanda, no. 1, January 2007, hnp://mw.hrw.org/backgr~~nder/afri~a/~~anda~~~~/wanda~~~peb.pdf. 'Ibid, p. 1t. 'Organic Law no. 1612004 of 19/6/2004establishingthe organization, competence, and functioningof gacara couN, article 30. 'Rwanda. Senate. Rwanda: Genocide Ideology~ndStrafe~esforifsEradication(Kigali. n.d.. issued April 2007). p. 169. commanders, and local administrators, have told the public that strong new measures had been adopted to deter and punish such cond~ct.~ Arguing that people residing nearby would necessarily know of any plan to attack a survivor, officials insisted repeatedly that all Rwandans would be held responsible for the security of their neighbors. In most communities local officials created new night patrols or increased the number of existing patrols, particularly in the vicinity of homes of persons thought to be at risk.6 Local residents were responsible for doing the patrols, an unpaid community obligation. In some areas, officials also increased surveillance of persons thought likely to engage in attacks on survivors. In addition, officials warned that there would be sanctions against any who troubled survivors; the sanctions were left undefined, although in April Finance Minister James Musoni said there "would be no mercy" for those caught troubling survivor^.^ Survivors, particularly representatives of the association lbuka, continued to express concern about the security of survivors and authorities continued to issue warnings during the first six months of 2007. In a late May meeting, an lbuka representative said that six survivors had been killed in April, often a month of violence because of its associations with the 1994 genocide, but he did not list other deaths for the year. At the same meeting, the executive secretary of the human rights organization, Rwandan League forthe Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LIPRODHOR). reported three killings that appearto have been related to ethnic tensions.' Press accounts spoke of two deaths of survivors, one probably related to land disputes rather than the genocide as such, and an attack on a child, reportedly wounded Paul Ntambara. "Kagame warns local leaders over survivors and witnesres'securily." mcNew Times, April 15.2007 http://www.newtimes.co.~~/index.php?option-com~ontent&task=~ie~&id=~~o8&Itemid=(accessed April 15.2007); John Bayingana. 'Ibingira assures survivors of securily." TiwNew limes,Aprilzz, 2007, http://www.newtimes.~0.1~/inder.php?optisk=iw&id=6&1temid=(accessed April 12.2007). ~inisterof~usticeTharrisse Karugarama. News (in Kinyawanda). Radio Rwanda.January 24.2007.7 p.m. 'John Bayingana. "75 percent of population have reconciled -James Musoni." TheNew limesApril12,2007. hnp://www.newtimes.~0.1~/inder,php?option=com~rontent&tark=~iew&id=1~67<emid=(accessed April 22,2007). 'Comments bv Dievdanne Kavitare of lbuka and by lean-Baptirte Ntibagoronva, executivesecretary of LIPRODHOR. at a Jaurn6e .ocalr d'lnformallon, sponsored by LDGL (Leagde for the Defense of human Rnghts of the Greal Lakes), on u L' eta1 des lie~rae la criminal'ti ad Rwanda el le role der mstancer wandaises margees du maintien de la s6curit6 danr son eradication. n May 25. 2007. Alpha Palace Hotel. Kigali. because his fatherwas a witness in ga~acatrials.~In 2006 survivors' organizations reported numbers ranging from 12 to 20 killings of survivors,'" so these accumulated reports suggest that the numbers for zoo7 have not increased and may have decreased somewhat. Indeed, Tharcisse Karugararna, minister of justice, and Domitilla Mukantaganzwa, executive secretary of the National Service of Gacaca jurisdictions, both expressed the opinion that attacks on survivors had diminished during the first quarter of 2007." *Daniel Sabiiti. "65Year Old Survivor Murdered," TheNew nmeslune 20.2007 hn~:/lwmv.newtimes.co.wlindex.~h~?o~ti~(accessed lune 20. 2007): . . hnp mm.newtlmer.ro.wl~naex.php?option=comcontent&tar~=view&id=70281temid=~ (accessed landary 31.2007); Stevenson M-gisha. "Seven arrested owr survivor's murder," &New lime* feor~ary18.2007 at http.1 newtimerco wlindex php'opl~on-rom.content&ta1k=~ie~Bid=17~<d=(accerrea Februa~18.2007): Daniel Sabiiti, "Genocide survivors, witnesses under seturitythreats."fieNew limes.lanualy20.2007 http://wmv.newtimes.co,w/index.php?opti=cott&task=&id6&1tmd= (accessed lanualy 2t.2007) 10 US State Department Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005: Rwanda". March 8,2006, hup://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hnpf/2oo5/6is87.htm (accessed December 19.2006). 3, Human Rights Watch interview with Executive Serretalyofthe National Service of Gacacalurisdictims Domitille Mukantaganma, Kigali. March 33.2007: Gasheegu Murarnila, "Genoride ideologl is now minimal-Karugarama. meNew limes. April 17.2007, hnp://www.newtime~.~o.w/index.php?0pti0n=~om~c0ntent&task-~ie~&id=t~~8 <emid=~(accessed April ~7.2007). Police Killings of Detainees Human Rights Watch researchers investigated reports of suspicious deaths of detainees in a wide range of locations from April 2006 through May 2007. Most of those killings took place in the six months between November 2006 and May 2007. Details of 26 deaths (and ofthree men who have not been seen since police reported they had escaped) are given in the table below. Many appearto have been extrajudicial executions. Human Rights Watch has received reports of other killings in police custody that have not yet been confirmed. These include incidents in Nyanza town, Nyanza district; Gasabo district, Kigali City; Nyarugenge sector, Kigali City; Kibangu sector and Kibilizei sector, Muhanga district; and Shyrongi district, North Region. Some of these incidents have attracted little attention, in part because witnesses fear sanctions if they speakopenly about them. On a number of o'ccasions, witnesses afraid for their security have refused to speak with researchers from Human Rights Watch or other organizations and on one occasion a person who did meet with a Human Rights Watch researcher was subjected to interrogation following the meeting. Of the 26 deaths detailed in the table below, 14 are of persons accused of attacks on genocide survivors and others involved in the gacacaprocess; nine involve persons charged with murder, rape or theft; and three involve persons detained for unknown reasons. Detainees Accused of Attacks on Survivors or GacacaParticipants This section reports the deaths of five men in two incidents in January 2007 and of two others killed in April 2007. In each case, the police claim the men were shot while trying to escape. HUMAN RlGnrs WATCH IULV 2007 Killings in Ngamba Sector, Kamonyi District, South Region Landuardi Bayijire, president of the gacaca jurisdiction of Ngamba sector, Kamonyi district, was killed in the early hours of December 28, 2007. According to a news report, Bayijire, who was also the local president of lbuka, was killed in his home with a knife and a blunt instrument. He was sleeping alone in a house located ctose to his fields, while other members of the family stayed in his other residence on a nearby hill." Coming in the wake of other attacks on survivors and persons involved in the gacaca process, many assumed that his death was connected to his being a survivorand to his role in the gacacacourt. According to local residents, more than onegacaca suspect had remarked about Bayijire's severity as a judge, saying that if he had not been part of the panel of judges, they would have an easier time in front of the court. Other residents of the community, however, told a Human Rights Watch researcher that Bayijire had been engaged in a land dispute with one of his sons. Theoneste Niyomugabo, and had quarreled angrily with him the day before the killing. Some local residents said that his son, anxious to get land in order to get married, had previously threatened to kill him.'' On December 29 members of the Local Defence Force, a government paramilitary organization, arrested several men, including Daniel Uwimana, Polycarpe Munyangoga, Alphonse Kagambirwa, and SilvSre Kagenza.14 At the time of the arrest, one of the men reportedly asked why he was being taken away since he had always complied with orders to attend gacacameetings and do the unpaid public labor known as ~muganda.'~Four others were also arrested, Celestin Munyaneza, Cyriaque 11 Anonymous. "Another Gacacaludge Murdered". TheNew limes, lanuav 2.2oe7. hnp:i~www.newtimes.co.1~/inde~.php?opti0n=comontenttak=viewid=6aitemid=(accessed lanuary 3.2007). Human Rights Watch interviews with residents of Ngamba sector. Kigali. April 18.2007. In Rwanda a young couple lacking the land to supporttheir new household finds it difficult to many. Most Rwandans are farmers and land is scarce. '4 Yircumrtances in which Policemen shot detainees," statement rent by Commissioner General of Rwanda National Police Andrew Rwigamba to Human Rights Watch researcher Christopher Huggins,lune 4,2007, etectronir communication. IS Human Rights Watch interviews with residents of Ngamba sector. Kigali. April 18.2007. "THERE WILL BE NO TRIAL" Uyisabo, Nkinamubanzi, and an unidentified man who was accused of attackinga gacacaofficial, not of having killed Bayijire.I6 The mayors of Kamonyi and Muhanga districts, as well as the president of lbuka at the national level, attended Bayijire's burial, which was marked by a heavy downpour of rain. Officials told those present that they could not seek shelter, as would usually be done, but must stand, hatless in the rain. After the burial, officials directed people to sit on the wet ground and, according to one person present, said that they would sit there "for the next three days" unless they provided information on Bayijire's killing.'7Although people were kept sitting at the gravesite for some time, this effort by officials apparently neither elicited information, nor did a search of the homes of the suspects on December 30.'' At a public meeting at Ngamba parish on December 30, a policeman identified by witnesses as the Chief of Police for Kamonyi district told residents that it was important for them to provide information about the crime, given that police officers had not yet found the evidence necessary to build a case against the detained person^.'^ In an interview published on January 2, 2007 in TheNew Times, a newspaper close to the government, Jean-PaulMunyandamutsa, mayor of Kamonyi district, said that the suspects had not confessed or given any relevant information on the death of Bayijire.'" The suspects were first detained at Kamonyi district lock-up where family members visited at least one of the suspects several times between December30 and January 2. He asked that a clean set of clothes be brought because he had been told he and the others would be taken to Musambira police station for interrogation. When *6 Human Rightr Watch intetviewwith residentsof Ngamba sector, Kigali. April 24.2007. "Human Rights Watrh interview with residents of Ngamba sector. Kigali, April 24, 2007. *Human Rights Watch interview with residentsof Ngamba sector. Kigali. April 24.2007. "Human Rights Watch interviewwith residents ofNgamba sector. Kigali, April 24.2007. 10 Anonymous. "Another Garacaludge Murdered", TheNew Times, January 2.2007. http:/l~.newtimes.~0.1~/index.php?option=~om~content&task=viewid=6<emid=(accessed lanuary 3.2007), visitors arrived at Kamonyi on January3, a police officertold them that Uwimana, along with the unidentified man, had been shot as they attempted to flee." Some detainees, including Polycarpe Munyangoga, Alphonse Kagambirwa, and SilvPre Kazenga, were transferred to Musambira, where several, including Kagenza, were badly beaten. Those injured asked visitors to bring medication. As the week wore on, the detainees apparently lost hope. One told visitors, "Don't bother bringing any more food. There will be no trial."" On January to, some of the detainees held at Musambira were transferred to Gitarama central prison, but those involved in the Bayijire case were kept in the lock- up. Because family members and friends believed that the men had been transferred to Gitarama prison, at first they did not come to visit. After learning the men were still at Musambira, they brought food on January 13. When visitors returned on January 14. they found police officers loading the bodies of Munyangoga, Kagambirwa, and Kagenza into police vehicles. Police officers drove the bodies to the vicinity of their homes and called local people to carry the bodies to the ho~ses.'~One local man told Human Rights Watch researchers that a policeman said, "Get those bodies out and look at the consequences of what you have done".24 Police officers gave families no notification of the deaths of these men before delivering the bodies. One officer told family members that the three men had been killed trying to attack police officers when they were being taken to the toilet. Members of the Local Defence Force present at the Musambira lock-up told local residents that police officers had executed the three." According to those who saw the bodies, one had a single bullet wound at the temple, another had a wound in the backof the neck, while the third had wounds in the head and the stomach.26 2, Human Rights Watch interview with residents of Ngamba rector. Kigali, /\pril24,2007. 22 Human Rights Watch interview with rerident of Ngamba sector, Kigali.April24. 2007. Unlike persons incarcerated in central prisons who are fed bythe government, those held in local lock-ups depend on family and friends for food. l3Human Rights Watch interview with residents of Ngamba sector. Kigali. April 24.2007. Y( Human Rights Watch interview with resident of Ngamba sector, Kigali, April 18, 2007. Human Rights Watch interview with residents of Ngamba sector. Kigali. Aprilzq. 2007. 26 Human Rights Watch interviews with residents of Ngamba sector. Kigali. April 24. 2007 Killings in Gasako Sector, Nyomagabe District, Southern Region On April lo 2007 in Ngiryi umudugudu, or village, Gasaka sector, assailants entered the home of a witness who testified frequently in gacacasessions and beat both the witness and the witness' mother. The mother was so severely injured that she required hospitalization for a week." On April 12, police officers arrested at least five men who had participated in the local night patrol on that date, including lean Gatera, executive secretary of the umudugudu, Gahamanyi, Joseph Nkurikiyimana, Modeste, and Emmanuel Nshirniyimana, also known as "Kajyung~ri.'"~At the time of the arrests, police officers beat several people who were not detained, including Gatera's wife, Violette Uwimbabazi, using heavy sticks. Police officers detained the men at Nyamagabe police station and on April 13 refused to allow visitors to see them. When visitors returned the following day, a police officer told them that JeanGatera and Gahamanyi had been shot while tying to escape. According to a local source of information, both had been shot in the back of the neck.29Police officers said that three others, Joseph Nkurikiyimana, Emmanuel Nshimiyimana, and Modeste, had escaped. These three men have not been seen or heard from since and family members believe that they are dead.'" Detainees Accused of Other Crimes The rapid increase in numbers of detainees shot by police between November 2006 and May 2007 coincides with a period of heightened concern and rhetoric about attacks on genocide survivors and others involved in the gacacaprocess. But both before and during the period of increase, police officers have shot and killed detainees in cases when they were suspected of involvement in serious crimes "'Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees"; Human Rights Watch interview with Rwandan human rights colleague. Kigali. April 27. 2007. "Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees"; Human Rights Watch interviewwith Rwandan human rights colleague. Kigali. April 27. 2007. Human Rights Watch interviewwith resident of Gasaka sector, Kigali. April 27,2007. 30"Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees"; Human Rights Watch interview with resident ofGasaka sector. Kigali. April 27.2007. The namesofthe three disappeared persons are not counted in the tally offhose killed by police officers. unrelated to the genocide or to the gacacaprocess. Several cases are described below. These also appear to have been extrajudicial executions, underlining that there is a general problem of deaths in police custody. Killings in Kibungo Sector, Ngoma District Police officers arrested three men, Alphonse Nshikili, Tetesphore Karemera and Emmanuel Mfitimfura, at about 6:30 p.m. on April 4, 2006. They found the men in a small bar in the Cyasemakamba area of Kibungo town, Eastern Province and arrested them on suspicion of armed robbery. They arrested another unidentified man shortly after.3' The police, along with the detainees, went to search the house of Nshikili where they found a television set and a large bag. Police officers said the television set had been stolen and latertold others in the community that the bag had contained a Kalashnikov automatic rifle." According to residents of the Kabare area of Kibungo town, they heard a vehicle stopping nearby, followed by gunfire, several individual shots and then a burst of successive shots, at about 8 p.m.33 Several who went to see what happened found two bodies, lying about lom apart from each other, in pools of blood, one with tissue, apparently from his brain, near his head. Nearby were four uniformed police officers, at least two of whom were armed with Kalashnikov rifles. They told the onlookers that the dead men were robbers who had tried to escape while en route to show the police where other members of their group were living. They added that a third suspect had managed to get away.34 One local resident told Human Rights Watch researchers thatthe police officers had brought Nshikili, Karemera, and an unidentified third man to Kabare because 31H~m~nRights Watch interview with local resident Kibungo town, March 26,2007. 32 Human Rights Watch interview with local resident, Kibungotoum. March 26, 2007. 33 Human Rights Watch interview with local resident. Kibungo town. March 26.2007. "Human Rights Watch interview with local resident, Kibungo town. March 26.2007. Nshikili had told the police that a resident of Kabare had given him the gun supposedly found at his home.35 Witnesses who saw Nshikili's body claim that his thumb had been amputated and that there was a knife wound in his chest and a gunshot wound in his neck. A relative of Nshikili, skeptical of the official version of his death, exclaimed to Human Rights Watch researchers, "If someone is running away, how can you cut off his thumb?"36Members of Nshikili's family say that police officers were reluctant to release the body and that when they arrived at the Kibungo General Hospital to claim the body, workers were preparing to bury the body without the family's knowledge. Relatives state that police also objected to them gaining access to an official autopsy report." On the day when Nshikili was buried, a family member remembers that police officers warned local people notto talk about his death. "If you do talk, they say that you are an accomplice of those 'thieves,"' said Nshikili's relati~e.~' According to local residents, they were surprised that Nshikili, the son of a genocide survivor, had been arrested since he was not known to have been involved in any previous criminal activity. Emmanuel Mfitimfura, arrested at the same time as Nshikili and Karemera, was released after spending a week in the lock-up at Kibungo police ~tation.'~ Nshikili's family members have engaged a lawyer and have written to both the commissioner general of police and to the prosecutor general of Rwanda, requesting an investigation of his death, with no result at the time this report was written. 35 Human Rights Watch interview. Kigali. April 26.2007. 36 Human Rights Watch interviewwith relative of victim, Kibungo town, March 26. 2007. 37 Human Rights Watch interview with relatives ofvictim. Kibungo town. March 26. 2007. Human Rights Watch interview with relative oivictim. Kibungotown. March 26. 2007. 39 Human Rights Watch interview with local residents. Kibungo town, March 26. 2007. In May 2007, the gacaca judges of Karenge ceU took the extraordinary step of summoning a policeman named Gakwisi to explain the deaths4"Under law, gacaca jurisdictions are authorized to inquire into genocidal crimes during the period 1990- 1994, but have no mandate to deal with more recent crimes. Nonetheless the police officer attended the gacacasession and reportedly told the court that'the two men had offered to show the police where other thieves were hiding, but en route they had jumped out of the police pick-up truck and were shot trying to escape. According to persons present at the hearing, the police officer was asked how Nshikili could have been shot in the throat while running away. The police officer replied, "That depends on the skill of the hooter".^' According to local residents, the area continues to be troubled by armed robberies. The killing of Emmanuel Ndahiriwe, Kicukiro Sector, Kigali On the morning of Friday, April 20, 2007, police officers and members of the Criminal Investigations Department of the National Police (CID) arrested Emmanuel Ndahiriwe at his workplace, Electrogaz (the state energy, gas and water utility). Members of Electrogaz's internal investigations unit accompanied the investigating officers. According to the police, Ndahiriwe was one of a number of Electrogaz employees and others arrested in an investigation of theft of Electrogaz eq~ipment.~' He was taken in an Electrogaz vehicle, first to Remera police station and later to Kicukiro police station, both in the city of Kigali. That eveninga family member visited him and left the Kicukiro police station at about 6:30 p.m." The next day, April 21, 2007, persons wanting to visit Ndahiriwe were told by police officers at the Kicukiro station that he had been taken away by CID officers for questioning. In the evening, members of Ndahiriwe's family sought him at CID "The gacdcasystem isonly mandated to judge accusations of genocide crimes committed between 1990 and 1994 and has no jurisdiction over any other cases. "Human Rights Watch interview with relative ofvictim. Kibungo town. March 26.2007. 42 Chief Superintendent Costa Habyara, Director of CID. News On KinyamandaX Radio Rwanda, April 25.2007.7 p.m.; "Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees." 43 Human Rights Watch interviewwith a friend of victim, Kigali, April 26. 2007. THEREWILL OE NO TRIAL" r6 headquarters but were told that officers in charge of the file were absent. Friends and relatives hoped that they would be able to locate him on Monday, April 23. By that time Ndahiriwe would have been detained more than 72 hours and under Rwandan law a detained person must appear before a magistrate within 72 hours of his arrest. But on Monday the police officers told them nothing.44 At 5:45 a.m. on Tuesday morning, Radio Rwanda broadcast descriptions of bodies that had been delivered to the morgue at.Kigali Central Hospital, a regular feature of early morning broadcasts. Relatives listening to the announcement recognized one description as fitting that of Ndahiriwe. When they went to the morgue, they were able to identify his body. They were told that his body had been delivered by a Toyota "Hi-Lux"vehicle belonging to Electrogaz on Friday April 20, at about 8:30 p.m. Other witnesses saw an Electrogaz vehicle with blood in it. The vehicle in question, used by the internal investigations unit, bore the registration plaque numbered GR 779A,'l According to persons who viewed the body, Ndahiriwe had been stabbed in the chest and shot in the head.@ In a press conference broadcast on national radio, Chief Superintendent Costa Habyara, Directorof the CID, stated that Emmanuel Ndahiriwe had been killed by police officers in self-defense, as he tried to grab a weapon. According to Habyara, the death occurred outside of the police station as the detainee was on his way to show the police where stolen equipment was stored and where criminals were hiding.47 Human Rights Watch interview with hiend ofvictim. April 16.2007. 45 Human Rights Watch intervim with local human rights activist, April 27,2007. 46 Human Rlqhts Watch interview with hiend ofvictim, April 26, 2007. " Chiefsuperintendent Costa Habyara, national head of CID, News (in Kinyamanda),Radio Rwanda,April25,2007,7p.m.; 'Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees." Killings of Detainees arrested by Soldiers Soldiers of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDQdo not have jurisdiction over civilians. In one case investigated by Human Rights Watch researchers, however, soldiers arrested two men on suspicion of armed robbery and then killed them. Killings in Rwabicuma Sector, Nyanza District, South Region In May 2006 officials established a military post in Rwabicuma sector, Nyanza district, to deal with several armed robberies in which residents had been injured. Soldiers at the military post, located at Kakamushi Primary School, Nyarusange cell, were to carry out night patrols and otherwise discourage criminal a~tivity.~' According to a local resident, members of the Local Defence Force (LDF), aided by local residents, found a man named John but known as "Samunani" hiding in the bush on May 9,2006, followinga robbery in an area known as Kabiri~i.'~Samunani was taken to the Nyagisozi sector offices where, according to a witness, he was "seriously beaten" with truncheons by members of the LDF before a large crowd. Samunani named several persons whom he said participated in robberies with him and on May lo, soldiers were sent to 'arrest' them, although they had neither legal authority to do so nor any arrest warrants. In one case, they apparently persuaded the persons whom they were seekingto accompany them to the militarypost under the guise of having lost their way.50 Local residents told a Human Rights Watch researcherthatthe soldiers brought at least seven persons to the Nyarusange military post, five of them men: Rukara, a resident of Kigogo village, Kamabuye cell; Vincent Hakizimana; Hakizirnana's brother Aminadabu; Denis Ndagijimana; and an unidentified older man, and two women, *Human Rights Warh intewiew with local resident. Nyarusange cell.April3. 2007. Human Rights Watch intewiew with local resident, Nyarusange cell April 3. 2007. 50 Human Rights Watch interview with local resident. Nyarusange cell, April% 1007. lmmaculiie Uwimana and the wife of a man known as "Kazung~".~'Several soldiers interrogated and allegedly threatened those who had been rounded up and later drove Vincent Hakizimana, Aminadabu, and the older man to the local lock-up in nearby Rurangazi cell.i' Later in the afternoon of May lo, soldiers took other suspects, including Samunani and Denis Ndagijimana, to the lock-up at the Nyagisozi sector offices. That evening, soldiers took Samunani and Ndagijimana from the lock-up, saying thatthey were taking them, on foot, to Nyanza town.13 The journey, which takes about 40 minutes in a car, takes about two hours on foot. It is unclear why such a journey would be taken on foot and at nighttime, and why soldiers, ratherthan policemen, would take responsibility for the two detainees. At about 7 p.m., local people heard gunshots and found the bodies of the two men lying in a small patch of open forest, several hundred meters from the military post. Sarnunani had been shot in the base of the spine and was laying face-down, while Ndagijimana had been shot in the head and the back. Soldiers and local authorities told local residents that the two men had tried to flee.lY One skeptical local resident questioned the explanation that the men had tried to flee. He told Human Rights Watch researchers: The police sent a vehicle to pick up the bodies of the two who died. Why couldn't they have sent a vehicle to take them to Nyanza when they were still alive?15 On May 11, police officers, who had apparently taken custody of the detainees at the Rurangazi lock-up, brought them to the scene ofthe killings to view the bodies, " Human Rights Watrh interviews with local residents. Nyarusange cell. April 3,2007 and Kamabuye cell, April 28.2007. I' Human Rights Watrh interview with local residents. Rwabicuma rector, March 26,2007. "Human Rights Watch interviewwith man living near to Rwabicuma sector oiTices. April 3.2007. 54 Human Righfs Watch interviews with local residents. Rwabicuma sector and Nyarusange cell. Aprii 3.2007. " Human Rightswatch interview with local resident, Rwabicuma sector. April 3.2007. which were still laying there. According to witnesses, three of the detainees had been so badly beaten that they had difficulty walking and they said they had also been threatened with death by police officers.i6 They were freed shortly after. In an interview with Human Rights Watch researchers the executive secretary of Rwabicuma sector denied that armed robberies had occurred in the area and also denied that Sarnunani, Denis Ndagijimana, or anyone else had been arrested in connection with cases oftheft or robbery during 2006.~~ - 56 ~manRights Watch interviewwith local resident Rwabicuma sertor,April j. 2007. " Human Rights Watch interview with Ephraim Kavutse, executive secretaiy of Nyagisazi sector.April28,2007. Lf.23 Partial List of Detainees Killed by Police Officers and Soldiers April 2006-May 20075" Place Explanation Given (Region/ Date Names of victims Crime alleged by police andlor Other remarks District authorities Seaor/ CelO May 8. South/ Emmanuel Rape of seven year old Police say that the two zoo7 Nyanzal Niringiyimana and girl. attempted to escape Muyira Noel Nsabimana from their cellat night and were shot by guards. 9pril 20, Kigali ville. Emmanuel Ndahiriwe Theft of Electrogaz Police provided no 2007 Kicukiro cable. date or place of death butsaid that Ndahiriwe was arrested in conjunction with arrest of Zirimwabagabo. accused of stealing Electrogaz cable. Police say that en mute to helping them 'ind anothersuspect Vdahiriwe tried tograb weapon from a loliceman who shot iim in self defense. Comptled from Human Rlghts Watch research. 'C~rrumrtancer in wnm Poocemen shot detamcer." statement rent by Comm rrloncr General of Rwanda National Poltce Andrew Rw gamba to Human Rlghts Watch researcher Chrtrtopher h~~qns June 4.2007. electronic communicationand from information presented byleanlaptiste. Ntibagororwa, execufive recr& of LIPRODHOR at aJourn6e Locale d'lnformation, sponsored by LDGL(Leaguefarthe Defense of Human Rights of the Great Lakes), on N L'6tat des lieux de la criminalit6 au Rwanda et le role des instances mandaires chargees du maintien de la s6curite dans son eradication, % Mayzs, 2007. Alpha Palace Hotel. Kigali. April 18. East/Mugesera/ Mugabo wa Kigeri Murder of genocide Police said all three 2007 Ngoma Rugamba, Paul su~ivornamed confessed and were luratsinze, and Nyirahabimana killed when they 4ugustin Fatirisigaye grabbed weapon of a policeman en route to show police other suspects. April 13. South1 ean Gatera and Attempted murder of Police stated that they According to loca 2007 Nyamagabei Sahamanyi [killed genocide witness arrested genocide sources, a basaka lpril 131 suspects lean Pierre nurnber of peoplc oseph Nkurikiyimana; Gatera. Gahamanyi. including Gatera' immanuel Modeste Mutwarasibo, wife. Violette dshimiyimana alias Kajuguri who tried to Uwimbabazi, wer 'Kajyunguri" and kill genocide witness. beaten by police. viodeste All broke out of cell in whereabouts escape attempt. Police ~nknown] killed two (unnamed) but three escaped. 4pril 13, South/ narcel Habyarirnana Habyarimana: attempted According to police, 2007 Muhangal ~ndMukunzi. murder of Ndahayo the suspects tried to Kiyumba Mukunzi : having escape while being genocide ideolopy. taken to toilet and were shot by police. 4pril 9. South1 Unknown Local human 2007 Gisagaral rights activists Mamba report that Utitese was killed by security forces. 4pril 9, Kigali- Attempted murder of According to police zoo7 citylGasabol gacaca witness. Sibomana, a genocide Gatsata suspect, wounded and tried to kill a witness. 4Rer his arrest and ~hilebeing nterrogated, he tried !o disarm a policeman. ntending to kill him. mdwas shot in self- iefense. April I. South/ Pierre Muhizi Murder of wife. According to police 2007 Nyarugurul Pierre Muhizi killed hi: (March Ngoma wife with axe, was 2007). arrested March 31, anc was killed April 1 outside Cyahinda police station during an escape attempt. Feh I, East/ 1. Bosco Ntawuyinoza Raping and killing a Police state that lean- 2007 Bugeseral young woman. Bosco Ntawurimuzo Ruhuha broke out of hiscell: and was killed during the escaDe afternot. lanualy South/ Daniel Uwimana and Murder of gacaca judge According to police. 2007 Kamonyil unidentified man Uwimana was killed Ngamba [killed ianuary 31 lanuary 2; Polycarpe Munyangoga. Munyangoga. Kagambinva, and Alphonse Kagambinva, Kagenza were killed and Silvere Kagenza, Ian 10 as they [killed night oflanuav attempted to escape 13-14] Nov 24 East/ lean Hakizamungu, Aurder of gacaca judge Police state that three 2006 Rwamaganal John Rukondo, and 1persons were arrested Mwulire Francois Ndagijimana Nov 22, all confessed; they tried to strangle policeman in order to escape. Police shot in self-defense. May 2006 South/ Samunani and trmed robbery. Local Local Authorities deny Local witnesses Rwabicuma Ndagijimana arrested eople say that lhat anyone was state that by soldiers. [Killed nmacul6e Uwimana, arrested in connection Samunani was evening May lo.] ukara , Vincent ~itharmed robberies. arrested May 9 lakizimana and his and beaten, he rother "Aminadabu". gave names of enis Ndagijimana. the others and was rife of one "Kazungu". killed. Three nd an unidentified older suspects beaten, Ian were arrested May later released. 3. April 2006 East/ Alphonse Nshikili. Armed robbery, along Kibungo town Telesphore Karemera with Emmanuel Mfitimfura [released one week later] and an unidentitied man. THERE WILL BE NO TRIAL" Official Responses The Rwanda National Police state they are committed to serving the people of Rwanda and on their website announce various ways of lodging complaints about abuses by police 0fficers.~9Inthe one instance in which a complaint was made in the case of the killing of a detainee-that of Alphonse Nshikili killed in April 2006- appeals by the family of the victim to both the commissioner general of police and to the prosecutor general of Rwanda remained unanswered at the time of this writing. Human Rights Watch, Rwandan human rights organizations, and several representatives of the diplomatic community have repeatedly pressed Rwanda National Police officers for explanations of the police killings of detainees. On June 4, 2007 Commissioner General Rwigamba sent a three-page statement to Human Rights Watch (attached as an annex to this report) listing 10 incidents between November 2006 and May 2007 in which police officers had shot and killed 20 detainee^.^' The explanations in this statement, like that offered by Deputy Mary Gahonzire in an interview with a Human Rights Watch researcher in December 2006,~'were all variations on a single theme: the detainees had been shot while trying to escape. The statement said that all the police officers involved had been questioned and that investigations were underway. It also indicated that police officers needed further training in the use of firearms, betterfacilities in police stations (to eliminate the need to take detainees outside the buildingto use latrines), and more handcuffs. All the detainees were killed within days and in some cases within hours of their arrests. In no case had trials begun, far less verdicts been reached, yet in the opening paragraph of the statement, several of the detainees are referred to as 59 Rwanda National Police website is rmw.poiice.gov.rw. 60 "Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees" annexed to this report 61 Human Rights Watch. Xilingsin EastemRwanda. p. 9. "killers," not suspects. In its final paragraph, the statement acknowledges that some of those killed by the police had no involvement with genocide but nonetheless it declares that "the suspects involved in these cases were of extreme criminal character ready to die for their genocide ideology." It concludes that these detainees were "terroristic in nature and don't care about their own lives leave alone other^."^' Deputy Commissioner Habyara also seemed convinced that the detainees were necessarily guilty of the crimes forwhich they had been arrested. He told a public meeting on May 25, 2007: However someone who rapes a baby, somsone who kills a child, someone who sexually mutilates a girl, a member of the clergy who kills his colleague. . .what is he not capable of doing? Would it be surprising if he tried to grab the rifle from a police officer? These are exceptional cases. Just as these killings are exceptional, they are done by extraordinary people who could do anything at any time.. . . These are not extrajudicial executions, rather they are exceptional cases committed by exceptional criminals.63 The assumption that the detainees were criminals-and even exceptionally dangerous criminals-shows a regrettable disregard for the presumption of innocence. The readiness to try to shift the blame for their death on to the victims throws into question the likelihood of independent, impartial investigations. 61 "Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees." 63~~mmentrby Deputy Commissioner Costa Habyara at alournee Locale d'lnformation, sponsored by LDGL(1eagueforthe Defense of Human Rights ofthe Great Lakes), on n L'etat des lieuxde la criminalit6 au Rwanda et le role des instances wandaises chargCes du maintien de la skurite dans son eradication, n Mayzs. 2007, Alpha Palace Hotel. Kigali. Destruction of property belonging to suwivors and collective punishments Over the last year survivors reported scores of cases of property damage, such as the uprooting of their crops or the killing of farm animals, by persons who wished to harm them. Since the end of 2006, officials have been imposing collective punishments, including fines, obligatory labor, and beatings on residents of communities where such abuses have occurred. In Gikombe umudugudu, Bulimba cell, Shangi sector, Nyamasheke district, for example, each local household was required to pay 1,550 FRW (US $2.80) to reimburse a survivor whose cow died in suspicious circumstances. This represented a considerable sum of money in a country where most people live on less than 55oFRW (US $1) a day. 64 Those unable or unwilling to pay were detained in the cell lock-up until others paid the fine f~rthem.~~In Huye district, South region, the mayor forced residents to help rebuild the house of a survivor that had burned down. He said the obligatory labor, being done even before the police had finished their investigation of the crime, would help break impunity and indifferen~e.~~ In an interview with Human Rights Watch researchers, Domitilla Mukantaganzwa, executive secretary of the National Service of Gacacalurisdictions mentioned several other examples from elsewhere in Rwanda, suggesting that implementation of collective punishment is relatively widespread. Madame Mukantaganzwa spoke approvingly of the "educational" aspects of the practice, its effectiveness as punishment, and its practical usefulness in restoring thevalue of lost property. She 64 Rural Poverty Parlal, http:llwww.ruraipove~p~rlal~~rg/english/egios/aia/a/slatitis,hlm(accesedjune 26. 2006). 65 Human Rights Watch inferviewwith reridenls of Burimba cell. Shangi sector. Manh 29,2007. Stevenson Mugisha. "Seven arrested over rutvivofs murder." The Wew limes, February 18.2007 htt~://ne~imes.co.~~/index.ph~?option=comcontentlak=viewid=lleid=(accessed February 18.2007). said that she believed attacks on survivors had decreased since the policy was implemented.67 Beatings by Police officers in Huye Sector, Huye District, South Region In at least one case, the collective punishment involved beatings of local residents as well the imposition of a fine to restore damaged property. On February 13,2007, some crops were uprooted from fields belonging to Josepha Mukarwego, who lives in an umuduguducalled Rwezamenyo. Local residents saw the destruction ofthe crops as a vindictive action, probably related to Mukawego's testimony in gacaca. During the genocide, she had lost her six children, her husband, and her mother-in-law. Mukarwego was also involved at this time in a land dispute with her sister-in-law, also a survivor. It is unclear how much importance the land dispute had, if any, in the destruction of Mukawego's crops.68 The local authorities and police officers based at Huye sector, one of them named Batera, convened a meeting of residents at the site of the damaged crops. Members of the Local Defense Force (LDF) ensured that residents attend the meeting. After some discussion, participants settled on 45,000 FRW as thevalue of the destroyed crops, and each household was told to pay 500 RWF.69 As the meeting was in progress, several police officers identified by local people as based in Ngoma (formerly Butare town) arrived with two LDFmembers not resident in the sector. After surveying the damaged crops, the police officers ordered the men to lie down on the ground and told the LDF members who had come with them to cut stout branches from the nearby trees. According to one of the victims, a police officer rejected the first sticks brought by the LDF members, saying they were not stout enough. The LDF members beat the men on their backs and buttocks. Most people received between six and fifteen strokes, but three young men (including Antoine 67~umanRights Watch interview with Executive Secretaty of the National Sewice of Gacacalurisdictionr Domitille Mukantagannva. Kigali, March 13, zoo,. Human Rights Watch interviewswith residents of Huye sector, February 27 and March 15,2007 69 45.000 FRW is about US 5 80. Mutabazenga, 21 years old, Jean-BoscoGahamanyi. 22 years old, and ALphonse Nsabimana, 24 years old) were singled out for extra punishment. The resident elected to coordinate security in the umuduguduwas told that he would be given 200 blows, which he was made to count out loud. But, according to some present at the time, he cried out after73 blows, "I am finished, that's all I can take". The police then told him, "Take these [blows] for now, we will give you the others later."'" The police officers from Ngoma also threatened more drastic consequences for residents if they had to come back to Sovu for any similar case in the future. As explained by officials, all Rwandans must take responsibility forthe security of their neighbors, but in this case, it was not all residents of Sovu who were punished. The two male genocide survivors were not beaten. One did not lie down andanother hurriedly left the meeting. Similarly all households in the umuduguduwere included on the list recording payments of the fine, but according to one knowledgeable source, the suwivorfamilies would not be asked to actually pay the fine. Sovu residents who bitterly resented both the beating and the attendant humiliation blame police officers from the nearby town for the punishment, but some also remarked that the incident undermined their respect for the local authorities.7'They see themselves as unjustly punished fora crime of which many-or perhaps even all-of those punished were innocent. Those punished may extend their anger beyond officials to survivors who were the original victims of the attacks, seeing them eventually as the cause of the fines they must pay, the labor they must contribute, and the beatings they must take. Should this happen, the policy of collective punishment may actually increase the vulnerability and isolation of survivors. At least one senior official in the government recognized this risk. He told a Human Rights Watch researcher, "We must not create a victimized people. That would be disastrous for rec~nciliation."~' "Human Rights Watch interviews with local residents. Sovu cell. FebruaV27 and March 15.2007. Human Rights Watch interviews with local residents, Sow cell and Ngoma town. Marrh 15.2007. pHurnan Rights Watch interview with seniorgovernment official Kigali, May 13,2007. HUWMI RIGHTS WATCH lULI 1007 Violations of International and Rwandan Law The use of lethal force against detainees is highly restricted by commonly accepted international standards put into effect by most states. The 1990 United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms emphasizes that intentional lethal use of firearms only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect 1ife.n In the context of a detainee in police custody, such circumstances would include "self- defence or the defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury" or preventing the detainee's escape when such action would "prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life."" The evidence we have collected, including the official explanations presented by senior police officers, suggests that not all-indeed perhaps none-of the killings discussed in this report meet those criteria. Only thorough and impartial investigations, drawing on as wide a range as possible of forensic evidence and witness testimony, can determine if any or all of these killings constitute cases of extrajudicial execution. Such cases would violate the right to life guaranteed by the lnternational Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), of which Rwanda is a state party, as well as the Rwandan constit~tion.~~ Statements by senior police officers about these shootings violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the ICCPR and by the Rwandan constitution. To the extent that attitudes expressed in these statements are hetd generally by police officers, the shooting of detainees is unsurprising and seems likely to continue unless specific action is taken to change the attitudes and halt the killings. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Adopted bythe Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders. 1990, principleg. 74 lbid and principle 16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, r966, G.A. Res. zooAWl), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966). 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23,1976, art. 6; Constitution of Rwanda (2003). art. 12. "THEREWILL BE NO lRlAL" The practice of collective punishment is illegal in times of peace and war alike. It is not only a serious violation of international humanitarian law,76but also violates human rights law by subjecting individuals to arbitrarj arrest, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, by contravening the right to recognition as a person by the law, as well as by violating the presumption of innocence and the right ofall persons to be tried in lawful and impartial tribunals for any crimes of which they are accused. These rights are guaranteed to the citizens of Rwanda by the ICCPR and by the Rwandan constitution." 76 Laws and Customs ofwar on Land (Hague IV),r9o), art. 50 and Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in lime ofwar. Geneva, 1949, Part Ill, section I, common provisions, art. 33. The imposition of collective punishments happens most frequently in times ofwar and is rare in times of peace. nlCCPR, an. 7.9.14 (1 and 2) and 16; Constitution of Rwanda (zooj), an. 19. The Donor Community Rwanda continues to depend heavily on donor assistance, both with general support and for specific projects. Although its government is one of those most ready to criticize donors, its leaders have often shown themselves ready to listen to counsel from international actors. The Netherlands, apparently the first to be alerted to the problem of police shootings of detainees, raised the issue with other donor representatives. An initial discussion by the members of the European Union in April brought no action, but the ambassadors of the United States and the United Kingdom, and perhaps other diplomats, asked senior police officers for explanationsof the killings. The statement sent to Human Rights Watch on June4 or one like it was sent to at least one major donor. Donors, particularly those most directly engaged with assistance to the police (Belgium, Sweden, South Africa), should insist that the investigations promised by the national police in this statement are carried out immediately and impartially and that any officers suspected of illegal killings are prosecuted. 'THEREWILL BE NO TRIAL" Conclusion Attention to police shootings of detainees, as well as to the issue of presumption of innocence for accused persons, comes at a time when the Rwandan government is particularly eagerto demonstrate its high standards in the field of justice. Some leaders are concerned with showing a level of judicial competence and impartiality that will encourage greater investments of the capital so badly needed for economic development. Othersare focused on persuading judges and prosecutors elsewhere that Rwandan courts can fairly try persons accused of genocide who are resident abroad and are now being considered for extradition to Rwanda in the United Kingdom and other European countries. The legitimacy of a judicial system is intimately connected with that of its police system. According to international standards, to which Rwanda subscribes along with many other nations, such legitimacy requires, among other things, the protection of the lives of detainees and the presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial for persons accused of any crime. If the Rwandan government is to demonstrate the quality of its courts and police, it must take clear and prompt action to ensure that police officers and other Rwandans respect these standards. Annex One - Statement sent by Commissioner General of Rwanda Nationai Police Andrew Rwigamba to Human Rights Watch researcher Christopher Huggins, June 4,2007, electronic communication REPUBLIC OF RWmA Kigali. 04/06/2007 ,, i NOYXJ~NP~ARISKIM NATIONAL POLICE OWICE OF CO~ONJ3RGEh'ERAL P.O. BOX 6304 KIGALI Human Rights Watch Rwanda Researcher, Mr Christopher Huggins Dear sir, Please receive hereby attached explanations about the Police shoorings you asked about. Circumstances in which Policemen shot detainees Seven men UWIMANA Daniel, MUNYANGOGA Polycalpe, KAGENZA Silver, KAGAMBIRWA Alphonse, NKINAMUBANZI Francois, USABYMEZU Cyriac and MUNYANZIZA Celestin had on 28'" December 2006 killed one BAYUIRE Landouard a Gacaca court president and a vice president of IBUKA association in the sector of Ngamba, Kamonyi District, Southern region. On ZM lanuary 2007 at 6.00 am as inmates were being taken to the toilet, they attempted to disarm and kill a policeman on guard before they could escape. The Pollce man shot and killed UWIMANA Daniel in self defense. After Police had completed its investigations, six remaining suspects were transferred to police station Musambira because the case File was under prosecution department awaiting for court decision. On lom January 2006, three of the six suspects by names of KAGENZA Silver, MUNYANGOGA Polycalpe and KAGAMBIRWA Alphonse attempted to escape and a police officer who was guarding them shot them dead. The three remaining are at present in MUHANGA central prison. In Ruhuha sector, Bugesera district, Eastern region one NTAWURIMUZO J.8osco was arrested suspected of defiling and later killing a young girl. This suspect was a renowned hard-core criminal in that area. He was shot dead by a police on guard on 1" February at around 5.00 am in the morning after he had broke a police cell in an attempt to escape detention. One MUHIZI Pierre was arrested on 3lS March 2007 after killing his w~fewith an axe Ngoma sector, Nyaruguru district, southern region. On 1'' April 2007 when he was under police guard at Cyahinda Pollce station he decided to run away in order to escape, one of the police guards run after him but the suspect so fast, so a policeman shot him. On 2~~ November 2006, three suspects (HAKIZAMUNGU John, RUKUNDO J.Boxo and NDAGUIMANA Francois) were arrested in a process of investigations after an assassination of a Gacaca President of Mwurire sector, Rwamagana district, eastern region. After being arrested, these suspects confessed to have connived in assassinatlng their victim. After being interrogated, they attempted to strangle a policeman on guard and get a riffle to help them escape after killing other people. The policeman shot them in self defense. 5. In Gatsata sector, Gasabo district in Kigali city, one SIBOMANA (a suspect to have committed genocide) was arrested after he attacked and attempted to kill one UWIMANA Priscilla (a witness In Gacaca court of that sector). People in the neighborhood saved Priscilla's life after she had already been harmed by SIBOMANA. SIBOMANA was arrested and taken to a police station. As SIBOMANA was being interrogated he struggled to disarm a policeman with an intention of shooting policemen that were there. In the process, a policeman shot hlm in self defense. 6. On 13* April 2007, 05 SUSpectS (GATERA Jean Pierre, GAHAMANYI, MUTWARASIBO Modeste and KAJUGURI) were arrested in Gasaka sector, Nyamagabe district, Southern region after they had attacked and attempted to kill a genocide witness in Gacaca. The life of this witness was saved by neighbors as she yelled for help. All suspects had cases of having participated in genocide. As they were in police detention, they broke the police cell at night and ran away, a police man on guard randomly fired at them and two of them were caught by bullets while other three managed to escape and they are still at large. 7. HABYARIMANA Marcelin and MUKUNZI Alphonse were arrested on 13" April 2007 in Kiyumba sector, Muhanga district Southern region. One of the Suspects (HABYARIMANA Marcelin) had attempted to kill one NDAHAYO and drop his body in Nyabarongo river. Another one (MUKUNZI Alphonse) was suspected of genocide Ideology. As detainees were being taken to the toilet, these suspects tried to run away and were shot by a policeman on guard. 8. On 18L"prll 2007 three suspects MUGABO wa Kigeri Rugarnba, TURATSINZE Paul and FATIRISIGAYE Augustin were arrested suspected of killing a genocide survivor called NYIRAHABIMANA Doda in Mugesera sector, Ngoma district, Eastern region. During interrogation they all conceded to have conspired in killing the victim. However, they said that there are other suspects they wanted to show investigators when they were on their way to show police investigators those other suspects, they tried to grab a riffle from a police man that was escorting them, the policeman then shot and killed them in self defense. 9. One ZIRIMWABAGABO was suspected of stealing electricity cables From ELECTROGAZ. His house was searched in the process of investigations and he was found to be fraudulently keeping electricity cables that belonged to ELECTORGAZ in his house. He "THERE WILL BE NO TRIAL" was then arrested and taken to the police station. One NDAHIRIWE Emmanuei was also arrested in the process. NDAHIRIWE Emmanuel later admitted to assist in investigations and went with Police investigators to look for another suspect who also sells ELECTOGAZ's electricity cables. On the way, NDAHIRIWE tried to escape by running away. A police man run after him and caught him. NDAHIRIWE then tried to grab a rime from the Police man, the policeman then shot and killed hlm in self defense. 10. Two suspects (NIRINGIYIMANA Emmanuel and NSABIMANA Noel) were arrested on 8"' May 2007 in Muyira sector, Nyanza district, southern region after raping a 7 year old girl called UMURANGA. Both suspects tried to escape from a police cell in that night of 08" May 2007 and were shot dead by a police man on guard. 11. Ail of the policemen that were involved in these circumstances were summoned for questioning by their relevant unit's administration and the department of Inspectorate responsible for inspecting police conduct and accountability. Investigations are underway to assess the officers' responsibility under the law. 12. Our officers need extensive training in usage of firearms. We have started this exercise for all the units so that there is precision in handling of detainees and escapees 13. Our detention facilities on police stations also need to be updated because on most police stations, toilet facilities are outside Police station premises hence detainees taking that as an advantage to escape. The current Police Stations were not designated for this job; we are looking for resources to build Police Stations. 14. We shall acquire enough hand - cuffs and equip them with ail police stations. 15. Although there are few cases that are not of suspects of genocide, it should be noted that the suspects involved in these cases were of extreme criminal character ready to die for their genocide ideology. They are terroristic in nature and don't care about their own lives leave alone others. "There will be no trial" Police Killings of Detainees and the Imposition of Collective Punishments Officers of the Rwandan National Police killed at least 20 detainees in the six months between November zoo6 and May 2007. Some of these cases appear to have been extrajudicial executions in violation of international human rights law and Rwandan law. In this report Human Rights details its investigations into several of these cases based on dozens of interviews with families ofvictims and eyewitnesses. The report publishes a statement by the Rwandan National Police claiming that all the victims were shot while trying to escape and that many were characterized by 'extreme genocidal character." In fact many ofthe victims in the cases reported here werearcused of crimes like murder, rape, and then. not of anyfhing related to the 1994 genocide which killed some three-quarters ofthe Tutsi population of Rwanda. The report also documentsthe implementation of a policy of collective responsibilitywhereby officials and police punish people living near genocide survivors who have been attacked or suffered damage to their property. This policy violates the presumption of innocence guaranteed by international convention and enshrined in the Rwandan constitution because those punished have not been found guilty of the alleged crime by a trial or any other judicial process. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL r HOME ;. LIBRARY WORLD WIDE SITES ABOUTAI NEWS LIBRARY ACT NOW CAMPA,GNS HESOURCES hLIN _I E-mail thls Daqe &Printer fr~endly --LIBRARY > AFRICA 5 CENTRAL AFRICA 5 Document library A1 Index: AFR 47/004/2007 16 March 2007 Recent documents URGENT ACTION Documents bv reqion 1 Ument Actions Amnesty International's global Documents bv theme Rwanda I Uganda: Forcible return1 fear of Urgent Action network torture or ill-treatment provides an effective and rapid Annual reoorts means of preventing some of the PUBLIC most life-threatening human The Wire Al Index: AFR 47/004/2007 rights violations against 16 March 2007 individuals. Receive u~datesbv e-mail UA 65/07 Forcible return/ fear of torture or loin the Urqent Action network ill-treatment Order A1 oublications RWANDA1 Francois Ruceba (m), aged 451 UGANDA Jackson Safari (m), aged 43 ] Search by A1 INDEX Peter Kabagambe (m), aged 34 ] Peter Bisamaza (m), aged 22 ] nmVedaste Lyalwema (m), aged 40 ] Rwandan nationals Paul Rwangabo (m), aged 281 Daniel Kazungu (m), aged 22 ] Aloysius Badege (m), aged 201 liew this page in Asumani Rutigana (m), aged 31 ] lsmail Salomo (m), aged 18 ] Espaaol And approximately 60 further individuals Francals The 10 men named above were forcibly returned on 13 March from Uganda to Rwanda, on suspicion of involvement with an illegal armed group. Amnesty International fears that they are likely to face torture or ill-treatment, and an unfair trial, at the hands of the Rwandan authorities. Approximately 60 further individuals in Uganda facing similar accusations are also at imminent risk of forcible return to Rwanda. They all claimed that they fled Rwanda fearing for their lives, and at least one had initiated an application for asylum in Uganda. The 10 were handed over by the Ugandan government to Rwanda's chief of external security, Joseph Nzabamwita on 13 March in the town of Kibale in westem Uganda. They are believed to be detained at Remera Military Barracks in the Rwandan capital, Kigali. The Rwandan authorities allege that the 10 Rwandan nationals are members of the Rassemblement du Peuple Rwandais (Assembly of Rwandan People), an armed group seeking to overthrow the country's government. They were arrested in different locations by Ugandan Military Intelligence agents who alleged that the 10 Rwandese had been recruiting members for the Rassemblement du Peuple Rwandais in refugee camps and villages in Central and Westem Uganda. Amnesty lnternational believes that there is a real risk that detainees will be tortured or subjected to other inhuman and degrading treatment in Rwanda> Rwanda has not ratified the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). BACKGROUND INFORMATION Amnesty lnternational has receivednumerous consistent reports of torture, extrajudicial killings and prolonged detention without trial of people alleged to be members of rebel groups based in Rwanda and Uganda. In 2006, the United States District Court of Columbia found in the case of USA vs Franwis Karake et al that three Rwandan nationals alleged to have confessed to the murder of eight foreign nationals and one Ugandan guide in Bwindi Impenetrable National Park near the Ugandan border with Rwanda in 1999 were all tortured into "confessing" by the Rwandan army. All three of those accused admitted to being members of the armed rebel group, the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR). Amnesty lnternational opposes the transfer of cases to Rwanda until the Rwandan government is able to guarantee full security to returned suspects during and after their detention; and until the Rwandan legal system can guarantee suspects the right of fair trial in accordance with internationally-recognized law and standards. Amnesty lnternational has documented several cases of people, accused of crimes of genocide, who have been in pre-trial detention for more than 12 years. A1 Index: AFR 47/004/2007 16 March 2007 _J E-mail this paqe &Printer friendly - Further Information I A1 Reuort 2005 entry I Back to Top "" ABOUT 1 II I I ACT NOW I CAMPAIGNS I RESOURCES 8 LINKS I CONTACT I SITEMAP ~.,.,L,, , ,I.:, .'%>,,sC..:.>, . . .f.,. :,. ~ ., ANNEX e IRIN-CEA Update 71 5 for 15 July [I99907161 U N I T E D N A T I0N S Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AfYairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa Tel: +254 2 622147 Fax: +254 2 622129 e-mail: [email protected] IRIN-CEA Update No. 715 for Central and Eastern Africa (Thursday 15 July 1999) RWANDA: Top judicial officials replaced Rwanda's erstwhile general prosecutor Simeon Rwagasore has been appointed the new president of the country's supreme court, the Himndelle news agency reported. Five vice- presidents were also approved and appointed by parliament on Monday. The agency recalled that all the court's former officials had been asked to resign. It said the hnctioning of the court had become more and more paralysed, and Rwagasore's predecessor, Jean Mutsinzi had complained to the Rwandan authorities that magistrates from the former regime had not been replaced and were "sabotaging" the institution. He said thev had refused to cam out his orders and accused them of "insubordination". In the ex-president df the State Council, AIype Nkundiyaremye, had described the country's genocide law of 1996 as "unconstitutional". Hirondelle said the stagnation of the court had severe consequences for the judicial system, with numerous tribunals unable to function as there was no coordination. Many genocide cases were pending as a result. There was also conuption within the court as many of its employees had not been paid for months. Hirondelle cited analysts as saying the new appointments were all "government-approved". Categov One list amended Before his new appointment, Rwagasore - in his capacity as general prosecutor - announced he had put his signature to a new list of "first category" genocide suspects. At least 800 names were withdrawn from the old list and replaced by 900 new suspects. Huondelle noted that the first list, comprising some 1,946 names, had come under criticism for "imprecisions and repetition of names". Some of the people on the list had died before 1994, or were even victims of the genocide. Others were found to be innocent. Now, the list has been "corrected", Rwagasore said. Over 21,000 Rwandans have returned from the DRC since the start of the year fleeing conflict, the latest OCHA monthly report said, citing UNHCR figures. It said another 30,000 returnees may arrive from the DRC in the next few months. The report, received by IRIN,said there was concern that among the returnee population, there could be "active members of the Interahamwe who may cause disruptions again within the country". However, the report noted that the security environment in June and previous months had been "relatively stable and incident-free". Less people attending feeding centres Meanwhile, several NGOs are reducing their involvement in health and nutrition programmes in the northwest in view of improvements in the situation of resettled displaced populations, the OCHA report said. "Caseloads in most therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres are fairly low and many services will soon be under the full stewardship of the Region Sanitaire," the report said. It warned, however, that the population's health status was linked to the country's food supply and agricultural situation, which "could become increasingly precarious". Aid agencies have noted a "great need" for seeds and tools as people prepare for the next planting season. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Rebels reject amnesty offer Rebels of the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD) have turned down President Lament-Desire Kabila's amnesty offer, arguing that they are not "criminals to seek amnesty". "I think Kabila is the one who deserves to be offered an amnesty," RCD Vice-president Moise Nyarugabo said. Reuters quoted RCD leader, Emile Ilunga, who rejected claims by Kabila that the rebels had launched attacks on several flonts in the northeast and southeast of DRC. "Kabila and his allies proceeded on a well-known method of making accusations because that is the best attack," he said. Allied forces hand over 20 prisoners The allied forces of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) on Monday handed over 20 POWs to the Congolese Armed Forces, DRC state television reported. The report said most of the prisoners - 17 Congolese and three Angolan UNITA members - were captured in various operational areas. Some of them surrendered as they fled the "intrigues and atrocities meted out to them by Rwandans". Annan to send team to Lusaka UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was due to send a three-person team to Lusaka on Thursday to "liaise" with Zambian President Frederick Chiluba who is trying to convince the rebels to sign the ceasefire accord, a UN statement said. "The Secretary-General is still prepared to send a full-fledged technical survey team to the DRC upon the full signing of the agreement," the statement added. Algeria "accepts" to head intervention force Meanwhile, the Algerian government has "accepted to provide its commander in chief to meeting is scheduled to take place in Lusaka on 19 July in this regard." It said the WO meeting would be attended by the foreign and defence ministers of all the countries implicated in the war. TANZANIA: Rekgee increase in wake of truce accord The number of people fleeing into Tanzania &om eastern DRC has risen since the signing of the ceasefire agreement last week, a UNHCR spokesman told IRmT on Thursday. The refugee influx "has been steadily increasing, &om about 100 people on 9 July to almost 500 on the 12thW,the spokesman said. The new arrivals said the area was tense, with fighting between rebel; and groups opposed to them reported around several South Kivu villages, including Talama and Sele. "There was also apparently some kind of clash at ~akobola"on 7 July, the spokesman added. Some 90,000 DRC refkgees have crossed to western Tanzania since August 1998. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: Thousands flee DRC conflict Thousands of people, including many child soldiers fleeing conflict in DRC's Equateur province, have arrived in the Mobaye and Bangassou areas of the CAR since last week, UNHCR said on Thursday. "We have counted at least 5,000 armed persons," a UNHCR regional spokesman told IRIN. "Some appear to be [DRC] government soldiers, but a significant number are children who were taken from schools and armed," he said. The influx began after Gbadolite and Yakoma were taken by Congolese rebel forces. UNHCR was currently undertaking a "status determination" exercise of the new arrivals, the spokesman said. Meanwhile, Reuters quoted a government spokesman as saying the arriving soldiers had been disarmed by CAR forces. UNHCR has not yet been able to verify press reports that some 6,000 civilians had also arrived in Mobaye and Bangassou from the DRC. "This is a huge area ... We may have to send in more staff," the UNHCR spokesman said. He added that another 100 people had arrived at Bangui from the Zongo area of Equateur. Bangui denies bombing role The CAR government on Tuesday "categorically" denied claims, made by the rebel Mouvement de liberation congolais (MLC), that a Sudanese aircraft had flown from Bangui to bomb Gbadolite airport on Sunday, Gabon's A6ica Number 1 radio reported. It quoted a government spokesman as saying Sudan "cannot violate CAR air space to bomb DRC territory". He added that "it is not in our country's interest to have such events disrupting or compromising the smooth organisation of the [upcoming presidential] elections." BURUNDI: Arusha process "risks disintegrating" Iqdependent analysts have expressed scepticism over the Arusha peace process, which is ai risk of disintegrating. One analyst told IRIN the sides have resumed their "tough" negotiating stances to maximise their own positions. "Trust is disappearing, the process has become personalised," the analyst said. Another analyst said the external process could not progress without the inclusion of the armed factions, and the government and international community and its power base weakened, but a Burundian government official pointed out to IklN recently: "Look what happened with the 1nt&ahamweV. AFRICA: US hopes to "do better" 39 9 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, admitting the US has been more active in Europe than Africa, has said the lessons of Kosovo should help Washington "do better" in Africa. Addressing the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) in New York onTuesday, she said Africa was "being pulled in two ways". Noting the democratisation process underway in some countries, she also stressed the continuing wars that were ravaging the continent. "The world must come together with Africa, not to compete for influence but to cooperate for peace, development and law." She urged the international community to back "strong, democratic leaders in their fight against corruption". She also stressed the need to halt the "uncontrolled flow of guns and other weapons into A6ica... which feed conflict and crime". Albright concluded by hoping for progress "against an even deadlier threat" to Africa, HIV/AIDS. Nairobi, 15 July 1999, 14:30 gmt [ Feedback: [email protected] UN IRIN-CEA Tel: +254 2 622123 Fax: +254 2 622129 I Item: kin-english- 123 5 IThis item is delivered in the "irin-english" service of the UN's IRIN humanitarian information unit, but may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. For further infoqation or free subscriptions, or to change your keywords, contact e-mail: [email protected] or fax: +254 2 622129 or Web: http://www.reliefweb.intlIRIN. If you re-print, copy, archive or re-post this item, please retain this credit and disclaimer.] Copyright (c) UN Oflice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 1999 Editor: Dr. Ali B. Ali-Dinar, Ph.D ANNEX 'fiasl! 'leunq!u aw c ' 40 4u6a)u! aq) JOJ pue sweal aauapa 40 b~n3asJOJ stuaauoa avav :a8 make clear that the OTP had the evidence to prosecute Paul Kagame for the assassination of former President Habyarimana, and many of the crimes related thereto as early as 1997, according to the sworn statement of former OTP attorney Michael Hourigan (please see the dossier and evidence in Military 1). In light of the above, as President of ADAD, I must protest in the most vociferous way possible the June 11, 2007 request of the Prosecutor to transfer the ICTR case against Fulgence Kayishema to Rwanda for prosecution. As the President is aware, trials in absentia are NOT consistent with the jurisprudence of either the ICTR, the ICTY. OR the ICC. However, such "show trials' are permissible in Rwanda. But, more importantly, known parties to the crimes within the mandate of the ICTR lack proper juridical standing to undertake prosecutions of those defeated by the RPF, many of whom, according to Ms. del Ponte, Judge Brugiere, the Courts of Spain, and the evidence put before Chamber I in this c3 Tribunal, are criminals themselves. Transfel~ingthis case, or other cases or detainees, to the jurisdiction of the cument Rwandan government would be a derogation of the Securky Council mandate to the ICTR to hold accountable all those who committed crimes in Rwanda, during the temporal jurisdiction of this body. Moreover, it would make a mockery of the juridical foundation upon which all aspects of this Tribunal will eventually be judged by history, as well as the reputations of all of us charged with responsibility for ensuring its integrity. In addition, another urgent matter has come to my attention regarding interference of the Rwandan government in the functioning of the Defence at the lCTR which threatens to make a mockery of the adversary process and "equality of arms" upon which this entire undertaking is grounded. A member of the Team of ADAD member Me. Aiche Conde has been detained by the Rwandan government, while on investigative mission in Kigali. As the President knows, last September a former member of ADAD Me. Gakwaya was detained in Arusha upon the request of the Rwandan government, even though he had been fully investigated by UN personnel, had been granted political asylum by a member-state and was covered by UN diplomatic immunity ADAD members found it necessary to withhold their services until he was released. However, because the UN would not ensure his security, it was necessary for Mr. Gakwaya to withdraw from his client's case at the ICTR. On June 27, 1 will be testifying before an immigration court in the Netherlands in support of a request for political asylum of my own former Team member Emilien Dusabe, who was similarly threatened with arrest in Rwanda because of his work as an investigator for the Defence. I am also working with UNCHR who have provided protected status to witnesses who testified against the interests of the culsent Rwandan government, who cannot return to Rwanda because of threats to their safety emanating from Kigali. As the President may also be aware, I have been personally attacked as a "genocidaire' and 'negationist" by President Kagame, himself, as well as other highly placed members of the Rwandan governments because of my own work as Lead Counsel in the Military 1 case. Under these conditions, it is simply not possible to pretend that the Defence can carry out its assigned functions at the ICTR, and the inability of the Tribunal andlor the Security Council to provide a neutral, juridical foundation upon which proper litigation can take place is becoming more and more apparent with each passing day. It is not longer possible for me, or other members of ADAD, to pretend that the ICTR is able to provide a forum for fair resolution of the many important issues which the President, and the judges of the Chambers, are charged with resolving for posterity. L 3 At one time, it might have been possible to claim that the imbalance that has been the reality at the ICTR was not well-known or understood by those of us charged with the solemn juridical responsibility of doing justice. This is not longer the case. I, and all the members of ADAD, are prepared to cooperate with the President and the Registry, in protecting the integrity of the Tribunal and our own bona fides as professionals charged with the sacred task for providing meaningful defence within the Rules of the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal must also begin demonstrate that it will not be manipulated by a one-sided presentation of the cases brought before it by the OTP and that it is willing and able to provide conditions that will permit the Defence to complete its necessary work without harassment and intimidation from the very parties who should be in the dock at the ICTR.... and are not. Under these circumstances, I must request your immediate attention to the problem of the release of the investigator of Me. Conde, in the same manner that the release of Mr. Gakwaya was accomplished with the assistance of the 3 President and Registry. Further. I implore the President to reject any transfer of cases to detainees to the jurisdiction of Rwanda. Moreover, ADAD stands ready to assist the President in ensuring that the lCTR not be manipulated to accomplish short-ten political objectives that will have longlasting negative consequences on the historical record of the Tribunal, as well as our own actions, now that these manipulatiions have come to light. The history of international jurisprudence is unlikely to treat kindly those of us who were presented with an opportunity to act. and who failed to do so. Because of my academic professional obligations in the United States. I will be relying heavily on the assistance of the ADAD Vice-president, Me. Gershom Otachi of the Bar of Nairobi, Kenya to maintain personal contact with your office between my own visits to Arusha. He is being copied with this letter, as well, and he will be contacting your office in my stead. In the meanwhile. I will be representing ADAD at United Nations Headquarters in New York. It is my hope, and that of the ADAD membership. to work together with the President and the Registry to successfully fulfill the mandate of the ICTR and to establish a foundation of international criminal jurisprudence that will stand the test of time and of which we can all be prwd. Please contact me at your earliest convenience if I may be of assistance in any way. n 1-3 sel. Ntabakuze Defence President, ADAD (the ICTR defence lawyers association) 651-290-6384 cc: G. Otachi Detainees UNDF Members. ADAD Members of the Security Council President. ICTY President, Appeals Chamber Prosecutor, ICTR Prosecutor, ICTY ANNEX ~www.hrondelle.org: 15.12.06 - ICIKIAI - A1 UEPLOKES cc 'I'HEPALLURE OF 1'... Page 1 sur 1 Close window Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Arusha (Tanzania): News ICTRlAl -At DEPLORES a THE FAILURE OF THE ICTR n TO PROSECUTE ALL SIDES Atusha, December 14 2006 (FH) - In an address to the United Nations Security Council, which is to Start examining Friday the furtherance of the proceedings of the lnternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Arnnesty International (Al) notably deplores u the failure n of the tribunal to prosecute the crimes committed by all sides involved in the war in Rwanda in 1994. Al u remains seriously concerned by the failure of the ICTR and the Rwandan authorities to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by all sides in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994~,the human rights organization, says in its communique. u Up to 60.000civilians are estimated to be have been killed by Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF currently in power) forces between April and July 1994n. Amnesty International alleges. u No public indictments against the RPF have been issued n by the ICTR regarding its crimes, the communiqub continues. Arnnesty stresses that there are u serious doubts about the political will of Rwanda authorities to investigate n these crimes. The organization also highlights that u No court in Rwanda has jurisdiction over alleged war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law r. Furthermore. Al uopposes the transfer of cases (of the ICTR) to Rwanda at this time n, notably on grounds of a u real risk that transferred persons would be exposed to torture or other ill-treatment r. u The Rwandan legal system cannot guarantee suspects the right of fair trial in accordance with internationally-recognized law and standards n, Amnesty continues. For its u completion strategy D, the ICTR, which has been asked by the Security Council to close all trials in 2008,is considering transferring some accused to national jurisdictions, Rwanda included. So that the 12 accused currently detained by the ICTR and awaiting for their trial and the 18 at large can ail be tried, Amnesty calls the Security Council to grant the ICTR an extension of its mandate, should the . Tribunal ask for it. > ERIPB O Hirondelle News Agency Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne, Switzerland Atusha, Tanzania Tel : +41 21 654 20 20 Tel : +255 713 51 08 94 Email : [email protected] Email : [email protected] This project is funded by Belgium, European community, Noway and Luxemburg '- 7 '3,FlJ 1996 - 2007. Fondation Hirondelle - Av du Temple 190 - CH 1012-Lausanne [Sissee] - Tel +41 21 654 20 20 Fax +41 21 654 20 21 -E-mail info~Dhirondelleorg ANNEX www.hirondelle.org : 11.06.07 - ICTRIWITNESS - AN ICTR LAWYER DENONC ... Page 1 sur 2 Close wtndow Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Arusha (Tanzania): News ICTRMTNESS -AN ICTR LAWYER DENONCES THREATS MADE TO HIS WITNESSES Arusha, 11 June 2007 (FH) - Franpis Cantier, the French lawyer of a defendant at the International Crminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), wrote to the Registrar of the Tribunal to complain about threats exerted in Rwanda on his potential witnesses and asked for the creation of an independent board of inquiry. In this letter, the counsel of Tharcisse Renzaho, the former prefect of Kigali, asks the Registrar, chief of the administration of the ICTR, to solicit the Security Council of the United Nations so that it creates a board of inquiry on this subject. As of the opening of the trial, last January, he had expressed the state of these threats which weigh, according to him, on the equity of the trial. "Taking into account the political context prevailing in Rwanda, I do not think that your Registrats Office is able to carry out such an investigation" wrote Cantier. "Furthermore, he adds, it will be impossible for us to give you the names of certain witnesses for fear that being questioned by your services may immediately lead to harassment in an official or semi-official way by the Rwandan authorities". "The characteristic of justice rendered here is that it rests largely on testimonies" writes in this letter Cantier; recalling that the Anglo-Saxon procedure in effect at the ICTR expects the physical presence of witnesses before the Court. According to him, on the eight witnesses whom he had had a presentiment of in Rwanda, three no longer wish to come because of fear, a fourth fled the country after being threatened, another is unreachable in prison and the sixth would like to have particular measures of protection. These threats intervened affer, he regrets, he had communicated the names in accordance with the rules of procedure. The majority of lawyers in front of the ICTR have, at one time or another of their defence arguments. complained about the threats made to their witnesses or a member of their families living in Rwanda. Monday morning, regretting the absence of his witness Gilles Saint-Laurent expressed the state of threats exerted against his family; at which the Prosecutor Mr. Ci& Ba replied that these statements came from witnesses "eager to profit from savings and budgets". The proceedings were adjourned. In order to protect the witnesses a particular service from the court takes care of them. Transported on a specially chartered aircraft, they are lodged in protected houses and their identities are protected. But because of the social overlap and the density of the Rwandan population, these precautions hold only a few hours before their absence is announced or that their anonymity is lifted. PBlERlMM O Hirondelle News Agency Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne. Switzerland Arusha. Tanzania Tel : + 41 21 654 20 20 Tel : + 255 713 51 08 94 Email : ~nfo@h~rondelle.org Email : h~rondelle@habar~co tz This project is funded by Belgium, European community, Norway and Luxemburg ,.-, -'3,FI.l1996 - 2007. Fondation Hirondelle -A". du Temple 19C - CH 1012-Lausanne [Suisse] - Tel+41 2 1 654 20 20 - Fax +41 21 654 20 21 -E-mail [email protected] www.hirondelle.org : 23.08.07 - ICI'WKhNLAHU - A UWENCE WI'INESS FOK ... Page 1 sur 1 Close window Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Amsha (Tanzania): News ICTRIRENZAHO -A DEFENCE WITNESS FOR COLONEL RENZAHO FORCED TO FLEE RWANDA A~sha.23 August 2007 (FH) -A defence witness for the former Prefect Tharcisse Renzaho, currently on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), had to leave Rwanda where he lived because of threats made against him, it was learned from a source close to the case. 'This information could not be confirmed by an official source. Questioned on the subject, the spokesperson of the tribunal affirmed that no contact on this issued had been made by the defence team. The witnesses who testify before the ICTR are theoretically protected by the United Nations which guarantees their anonymity and ensures their safety. The principal counsel for Renzaho, Franwis Cantier of the Bar of Toulouse (France), has already on several occasions announced to the chamber that there are threats made on witnesses. An investigation was opened in June by the registrar's office of the tribunal on this subject and it was ent~~tedto a Rwandan lawyer. ccording to the lawyer, some of the witnesses that he had contacted and who had agreed to testify then to come to the ICTR following threats. This witness, the 23rd of the defence who is called MAY for safety reasons, had to escape Rwanda several weeks ago because he had received death threats. He testified before the chamber at the beginning of the week. The majority of his testimony was made in closed session. At a brief public hearing, he indicated that he had heard at a roadblock Prefect Renzaho be called an "accomplice" of the RPF, the rebel movement then in war against the government. Tharcisse Renzaho was prefect of Kigali and the last remaining civil authority in the capital after the entire government fled to the south of the country. He is accused of genocide and murder as a crime against humanity. He has pled not guilty. His trial began on 8 January and should end next month. PBIATIMM O Hirondelle News Agency Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne. Switzerland Arusha, Tanzania Tel : + 41 21 651 20 20 Tel : + 255 713 51 08 94 Email : [email protected] Email :[email protected] This project is funded by Belgium, European community, Norway and Luxemburg :c>FI.l1996 - 2007, Fondatlon Hirondelle - A". du Temple 190 - CH 1012-Lausanne [Suisse) - Tel +41 21 654 20 20 -Fax +41 21 654 20 21 [email protected] ANNEX www.hlrondelle.org : 21.06.07 - ICIK/KUKUNUO - AKKEYI' IN KIGALI OF AN I... Page 1 sur 1 Close w~ndow Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Arusha (Tanzania): News ICTRIRUKUNDO -ARREST IN KIGALI OF AN ICTR DEFENSE INVESTIGATOR Arusha. 21 June 2007 (FH) - A Rwandan lawyer, member of the defense team of Father Emmanuel Rukundo, tried before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), was arrested last Saturday in Kigali, it was learned from a concordant sources in Arusha. LBonidas Nshogoza, who is an investigator with this team headed by French lawyer Aicha Conde, would be accused of having pressured witness, according to an official statement transmitted by Rukundo to the Hirondelle agency. His arrest was confirmed at the ICTR. This witness, called BLP in order to preserve his safety, was called by the prosecution 15 and 16 of last November but had been called again by defense so, states the official statement of Rukundo, to reconsider his statements. In addition to the Rwandan authorities, the Office of the Prosecutor, according to the official statement of Rukundo, accuses the lawyer of having pressured the witness so that he reconsidered his statements. The statement of the accused recalls that Nshogoza was part of the defense team Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, recently convicted on appeal. In this case, several purgety charges have been issued. One of them resulted in the indictment of a Rwandan witness last week. This arrest occurs as the Rukundo case, which began on 15 November 2006, must restart at the beginning of July with the presentation of the defense evidence. Father Rukundo, military chaplain in Ruhengeri (northern Rwanda) then in Kigali, was arrested on 12 July 2001. He is accused of genocide and crimes against humanity and plea non guilty. PBlMM O Hirondelle News Agency Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne, Switzerland Amsha, Tanzania Tel : + 41 21 654 20 20 Tel : + 255 713 51 08 94 Email : [email protected] Email :[email protected] This project is funded by Belgium, European community, Norway and Luxemburg Close window :;a, >-,Fl 1996 - 2007 Fondat~onH~rondelle - Av. du Temple 190- CH 1012-Lausanne [Suisse] - Tel +41 21 654 20 20 - Fax 141 21 654 20 21 - E-mall info'@hirondelle.org www.hlrondelle.org : L6.Ub.U I- 1C I WKUKUNUU - I HC 1C 1 K SCNUS A KWKk... Page I SW I Close window Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Amsha (Tanzania): News - THE ICTR SENDSA REPRESENTATIVE TO KIGALI AFTER THE ARREST OF AN -f------~rusha.26 June 2007 (FH) -The Registrar's office of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) sent to Kigali a representative in order to inquire into the arrest. Saturday 16 June, of a member of the defense team of Father Emmanuel Rukundo, it was learned from an official source Monday in ANS~~. "We are taking steps to ascertain the full facts and deal with the situation", answered the Associate-Registrar to a request for information by the Hirondelle agency. The charges weighing against Lbonidas Nshogoza, who is an investigator in the team directed by French lawyer Aicha Conde, have not yet been officially specified. According to an off~ialstatement issued by her customer, Nshogoza would be accused of having tried to pressure a witness. This arrest occurs as the Rukundo trial is set to restart at the beginning of July with the presentation of the defense evidence. The principal lawyer of Rukundo. Mrs. Conde, was in Rwanda when her investigator was arrested. She should meet the Attorney General of Rwanda, Mr. Martin Ngoga, it was learned from a close source to the case. Father Rukundo, military chaplain in Ruhengeri (northern Rwanda) then in Kigali, was arrested on 12 July 2001. He is accused of genocide and crimes against humanity and pled not guilty. PBlMM 0 Hirondelle News Agency Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne. Swikerland A~sha,Tanzania Tel : + 41 21 654 20 20 Tel : + 255 713 51 08 94 Email : [email protected] Email :[email protected] Th~sproject is funded by Belgium. European community. Norwzy and Luxemburg Close w~ndow fc2RJ 19% - 2007, Fondation H~rondelle-A". du Temple 1% - CH 1012-Lausanne (Su~sse]- Tel+41 21 654 20 20 -Fax +41 21 654 20 21 -E-mail infaGlhirondelle.org ANNEX CENTRE DE LUTTE CONTRE L'IMPUNITE ET L'INJUSTICE AU RWANDA (CLIIR) Boulevard L6ooold 11.11'227 Bruxelles, le 24 septembre 2007 GSM: 32.476.70.15.69 -Mail : [email protected] Objet : Extradition du p2re Wenceslas Munyeshyaka et Laurent Bucyibaruta. Madame Rachida Dati, Ministre de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux 13, Place Vtindome 75001 PARIS Madame le Ministre. La diabolisation du pkre Wenceslas MUNYESHYAKA date des annees 1994-1995 et traduit la cI5cit6 politique et diplomatique des dirigeants du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) qui ne cessent de manipuler le TPIR. Ces dirigeants, qui s'attaquent depuis plus de 13 ans aux religieux et religieuses catholiques, semblent avoir programme la destruction lente de 1'Eglise catholique du Rwanda. Ces dirigeants ne cachent plus leur volonte de se faire dedommager par le tr6sor du Vatican. C'est pour cette raison qu'ils n'eprouvent m&me plus la honte de s'achamer sur ]'Abbe Wenceslas. Ce demier est pourtant connu pour avoir accueilli, noum, log6 et soigni plus de 18.000 refugiis 5 la paroisse Sainte Famille. Tous les temoins oculaires, cadres de la Croix rouge, cadres administratifs et militaires ont constati et admire la bravoure de ce jeune prtitre qui bravait, chaque matin, les balles et les bombes qui pleuvaient sur la capitale nvandaise Kigali. Habill6 de son gilet anti-balles et d'un pistolet (qui lui permettait d'impressionner les miliciens interahamwe et de jouer la comidie sur les banikres), il allait chercher de la nourriture, des medicaments, du bois de chauffe et de I'eau pour les refugies Tutsi et Hutu qu'il a su girer pendant trois mois. Aucun rifugii Hutu n'a agresse un rifugie Tutsi alors que le FPR a lance plusieurs bombes sur la paroisse, dans I'intention de faire fuir cette masse de refugies qui n'aurait pas manque de diclencher un mouvement de panique et d'abandonner la capitale Kigali aux mains du FPR. Mais le pkre Wenceslas a tenu bon jusqu'au 4 juillet 1994, date i laquelle toute la capitale s'est videe de ses demiers habitants. Dans la soiree du mardi 5 septembre 2007, sur base de mandats d'arrtit du TPIR, la police franqaise a arrtiti pour la deuxihme fois, en moins de deux mois, les deux suspects Wenceslas Munyeshyaka et Laurent BUCYIBARUTA, parce qu'ils font I'objet d'une demande d'extradition par le TPIR. 11s avaient it6 arrtites le 20 juillet 2007 sur pression du TPIR et des associations proches du FPR. Ils furent libkres le le' aofit 2007 par la justice qui ne jugeait pas necessaire leur detention preventive. Si la justice fran~aiseaccepte de les livrer au TPIR qui fermera ses portes fin 2008, ce ne sera pas pour les juger au TPIR i Arusha en Tanzanie. Les deux suspects courent le risque d'6tre trait& comme des << colis B que le TPIR livrera au Rwanda oii leur skurit6 physique et mentale ne sera pas garantie. Nous voulons suggkrer aux autorites judiciaires franqaises d'adopter la m&me attitude et la mtme prudence qui ont caractirisi les magistrats belges lors de l'arrestation du general RUSATIRA LLonidas. Celui-ci est un autre brave citoyen rwandais qui a evacue, loge et nourri des centaines de familles Tutsi et Hutu menacees par les massacreurs en 1994. I1 a etk arr&tele 15 mai 2002 et le TPIR fut oblige de le libirer le 20 aoDt 2002 faute de preuves de culpabilite. La procureure, Madame Carla Del PONTE, qui s'itait diplacie pour venir le voir en personne s'est rendue compte que ce sont les autorites rwandaises qui avaient monte un faux dossier qu'ils ont mkdiatisk B travers une organisation londonienne African RIGHTS. Cette organisation s'est rendue cilebre par la diffusion de fausses accusations orchestrees contre des intellectuels Hutu innocents. Plusieurs intellectuels, professeurs, midecins, religieux et hommes d'affaires Hutu sont regulikrement calomniks par cette organisation qui est la seule B jouir de la sympathie des agents de la DMI' (Directorate of Military Intelligence), des chefs militaires et politiques du FF'R. African Rights n'a jamais cessi de participer B la carnpagne de delation orchestree par le regime FPR contre tous les religieux catholiques en giniral et particulikrement contre I'Abb6 Wenceslas Munyeshyaka. En effet, les autorites fran~aisespourraient s'inspirer de cette stratigie belge qui consista B faire trainer la dicision d'extrader le Geniral Rusatira pour permettre aux timoins B dicharge de riagir et d'opposer leurs timoignages credibles aux fausses accusations que le TPIR avaient acceptees d'avaliser sans aucune verification. Curieusement, que ce soit dans l'arrestation de Rusatira Uonidas en Belgique ou dans celle des deux suspects Wenceslas Munyeshyaka et Laurent Bucyibaruta, c'est toujours la m&meMadame Sylvana ARBIA', chef des poursuites au TPIR, qui s'implique dans ces arrestations spectaculaires et sur base de faux temoignages collectks par la DM1 qui les refilent ensuite B AFRICAN RIGHTS. Cette organisation a perdu le peu de cridibilite qui pouvait lui rester lorsqu'elle a accusi injustement Amnesty International de travailler avec les ghocidaires Hutu parce qu' Amnesty avait denonce les massacres aveugles des milliers de civils Hutu innocents commis par 1'Armie Patriotique Rwandaise en 1998 et 1999 durant une guerre attribuke aux infiltris hutu. Le Centre de Lutte contre l'Impunit6 et l'hjustice au Rwanda (CLIIR)* saisit cette occasion pour vous transmettre son Memorandum du 24 septembre 2007 intitulie : << Mkmorandum sur toute demande d'extradition commanditee par le Rwanda << via ,, le Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda,, et son comrnuniqu6 n088/2006 du 9 janvier 2006 intitule : << Les hCos du genocide rwandais sont assassinks, emprisonnes et perskutes au lieu d'avoir des mbdailles : Le Cas du prgtre Wenceslas MUNYESHYAKA diabolise' injustement H. Nous voulons vous mettre en garde contre toute extradition du p&re Wenceslas vers le Rwanda ou vers le TPIR. Nous saisissons cette occasion pour vous confirmer la consolidation de la culture du mensonge et de la dilation institutionnalide au plus haut sornmet de 1'Etat rwandais. La dilation a battu tous les records dans plusieurs tribunaux GACACA financis par la Belgique, la Hollande et plusieurs pays occidentaux et de 1'Union Europienne. Cette culture du mensonge est inn6 chez les extrimistes Tutsi qui restent convaincus que les Ctrangers, les europtens en particulier, ne sont pas intelligents dans l'art de mentir. Voici ce I La DM1 (Directorate of Military Intelligence) est une vtritable *machine A tuer ,,, une sorte de GESTAPO Tutsi cr&e et dirigee par le president rwandais et president du FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais), le Gentral Paul KAGAME. La DM1 a impunkment assassine, tonurt, emprisonnt et fait disparaiue des milliers d'opposants politiques (reels ou supposts), des anciens dignitaires et intellectuels Hutu ainsi que de simples citoyens rwandais Hutu et Tutsi depuis plus de 12 ans. 'Madame Sylvana Arbia est une amie de RAKIYA Omar, directrice de African Rights (manipulk par la DMI). qu'en dit notamment Stanislas Bushayija, un prctre catholique tutsi qui fait une analyse pertinente de son groupe ethnique : I. A vrai dire, les principes d'e'quiti que les Belges voulaient faire privaloir dans le domaine de la justice, de la proprie'te', de la liberte' et des droits de la personire hurnaine quelle qu'elle fiit, de'routerent le Mututsi et le firem dourer de la finesse de I'Europken. Celui-ci lui parut plus un technicien, une sorte de magicien qu'un diplomate, comme le prouvent les expressions kinyanvanda encore courantes : Abazungu ntibazi ubwenge (les Europe'ens ne sont pas malins), ubwenge bw'abazungu (intelligence europeenize). Si le Mututsi reconnait b I'Europe'en ses compe'tences dans le domaine technique, - ilectricite', physique, mathirnatique, etc., - s'il lui reconnait l'intelligence du livrc (ubwenge bwo mu gitabo), il diplore son absence de finesse d'esprit. Savoir travestir la viriti, donner le change sans eveiller le moindre soupcon est une science qui fait dkfaut u I'Europe'en et que le Mututsi est jier de possider ; le ge'nie de l'intrigue, l'art du mensonge sont 6 ses yeux des arts dans lesquels il s'enorgueillit d'&-e fort habile :c'est la le propre du Mututsi et, par contagion et par rkjlexe de difense, de tout Munyanvanda ... ,. Stanislas Bushayija est un prEtre tutsi n6 en 1915 et dCc6d6 le 21/10/1990. I1 faisait partie du Conseil SupCrieur du Pays (CSP) de 1954 B 1959, une sorte de parlement nvandais sous le rkgne du Roi Mutara Rudahigwa. Connu pour son franc parler, il a expliqui la mise en esclavage des Hutu par les monarques tutsi et la culture du mensonge dans un article intituli c Aux origines du problkrne Bahutu au Rwanda u, dans la Revue Nouvelle, Tome XXVIII, No 12 de d6cembre 1958, pp. 594-597. Ouatre phases pour dkcapiter. neutraliser et rkcupber 1'Eglise catholique du Rwanda : 1994 : La phase de dkcapiter I'Eglise catholique fut d6cid6 par le G6n6ral Paul Kagame en personne. Les prEtres du petit dminaire et de la paroisse de Rwesero sont massacris avec les diplacis de guerre qu'ils avaient accueillis. Le 5 juin 1994, trois 6v&ques dont I'archevEque de Kigali et une dizaine de prEtres et de religieux sont assassinis par le FPR B Gakurazo (prks de Byimana) dans le diockse de Kabgayi. Le 30 novembre 1996, Mgr Phocas NIKWIGIZE fut enlev6 par le FPR et port6 disparu B la frontikre nvando- congolaise de Gisenyi. 1994-1998 : La phase de neutralisation. Aprks I'assassinat de quatre ivEques catholiques et des dizaines de prEtres HUTU, le projet d'assassiner plusieurs prEtres occidentaux et nationaux, qui parlent Kinyanvanda et qui connaissent trks bien la population, les coutumes et I'histoire du Rwanda, a dimad d6jB avec I'assassinat du pkre espagnol Joacquim VALLMAJO SALA tu6 le 26/04/1994 21 Byumba et du pkre canaden Claude SIMARD tu6 le 17/10/1994 dans sa paroisse de Ruyenzi dans la province de BUTARE. Parce qu'il avait d6nonci les massacres du FPR auprks des agents du HCR (Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies aux R6fugies) infiltris eux-m&mes par les agents du FPR. 1994-2000 : La campagne de diffamation et de terreur: Aprks la vague d'assassinats de plusieurs prEtres catholiques europ6ens. la prise en otage des (< cobayes europe'ensn comme le pkre Guy THEUNIS a 6t6 planifiie depuis les ann6es 1998 B I'ipoque oij le nom de Guy Theunis apparaissait plusieurs fois dans les nouveaux midias de la haine financis par le FPR. A cette ipoque les midias gouvernementaux, tous dirig6s par des agents du FPR, se sont lances dans une viritable campagne de diffamation et de terrorisme d'Etat contre 1'Eglise catholique en g6n6al et en particulier contre la Sociiti des Missionnaires d'Afrique (SMA) notamment dans la a Nouvelle Relkve no 360, 361 et 362 de juin 1998~.Des religieux et autres la'ics ont kt6 expulsk du Rwanda. I1 s'agit de : Mme BERNADETTE, une fran~aiseemploy6 de la CARITAS, qui a it6 expulsie en 1997 et 1'Abbi Andrk LERUSSE qui a kt6 expulse du Diockse de Gikongoro le 12 janvier 1998. 4) 1994-2005 : La phase de neutralisation et de rtkup6ration: Les enlhvements par les klkments du FPR dkguisks en rebelles Hutus etaient destines a contraindre les pritres europkens et etrangers B fuir le pays. Un be1 exemple : Selon la dkptche de I'Agence France Presse (AFP) du 22/07/98 rapport6 par Emmanuel Goujon:a Deux pPres blancs belges ont 6ti enlives vers 21h00 (I9hGMT) mardi 21 juillet 1998, dans la commune de Ruhondo de la prifecture Ruhengeri (nord). Les deux missionnaires enlevis dans la paroisse RWAZA (a 5Km au sud-est de la ville de Ruhengeri) sont le PPre Marc Franqois, qui officiait ci Ruhengeri depuis deux ans, et le Pire Jean Lefebvre. 11s appartiennent tous deux a l'ordre des Missionnaires d'Afrique (P2res blancs) u. Enl&vementdans la nuit du 7 au 8 juillet 1998 de trois religieuses de la Congregation des Soeurs de Sainte-Chrktienne (dont la maison mire se trouve au Qutbec au Canada) ont kt6 enlevkes dans leur couvent de Bungwe en commune KIVUYE, prefecture BYUMBA par des hommes armis (une quarantaine selon les sources officielles). I1 s'agit de la Soeur canadienne GisPle ALLARD et de deux soeurs rwandaises EMMA et SUZANNE. Elles ont Be libkrees samedi le 11 juillet 1998 tel que confirmi B I'AFP par 1'Evtque du Diocise de Byumba, Mgr Servilien NZAKAMWITA. Les trois soeurs avaient kte retrouvkes B la paroisse catholique de Nemba en commune NYARUTOVU (Ruhengen). Dans la nuit du 22 au 23 mars 1998, sept religieuses de I'Ordre de la Charite Sainte- Anne avaient kt6 enlevees dans leur couvent de KIVUMU dans la prefecture de Ruhengen par un groupe de prktendus a rebelles hutu~.I1 s'agissait de deux soeurs espagnoles et de cinq soeurs novices rwandaises. Les deux soeurs espagnoles avaient it6 rel2chkes samedi le 28/3/98 ?iGOMA (a 1'Est de la Rkpublique Dkmocratique du Congo-RDC) par leurs ravisseurs. Les cinq soeurs novices rwandaises avaient kt6 libtries dans le courant de la semaine du 22 au 29/3/98. 1995-2005 : La phase de rbcup6ration : Emprisonner et exiler les religieux Hutu et rkcupkrer les places vacantes. Come par hasard, avec la victoire militaire du FPR, I'Eglise catholique du Rwanda a perdu sept de ses anciens kveques. Quatre ont kte assassinks par le FF'R, il s'agit de : Mgr Vincent NSENGNUMVA, Mgr Joseph RUZIlVDANA, Mgr Thaddee NSENGIYUMVA et Mgr Phocas NIKWIGIZE. Trois autres sont morts de maladie en cinq ans : Mgr Wenceslas KALDBUSHI dkckdk. le 20/12/1997, Mgr Joseph SIBOMANA dkckdk le 09/11/1999 et Mgr Jean Baptiste GAHAMANYI d6c6d6 le 18/06/1999. Trois kv&quesseulement ont survkcu, il s'agit de Mgr Frkderic RUBWANGA, Tutsi ordonnk Cvique de Kibungo le 9/07/1992, Mgr Augustin MISAGO, Hutu ordonnk kvtque de Gikongoro le 28/06/1992 et de Mgr Thaddee NTMINYURWA nomme archevtque de Kigali- le 25/03/1996, un Hutu ordonne evique de Cyangugu le 24/01/1982, Plusieurs pr&trescatholiques ont Ctk diffamks par les medias gouvemementaux avant d'&tre emprisonnks arbitrairement. La diabolisation et la demand; d'extradition du pkre ~enceslas-ainsique l'inculpation arbitraire du phe belge Guy Theunis risquent d'accilerer la fuite d'autres religieux europtens et nationaux pour faciliter I'kpuration ethnique, la neutralisation et la rkcupkration de I'Eglise du Rwanda par le rkgime du FF'R. Mais aussi, la diabolisation des religieux et religieuses catholiques servira d'autres agendas cachks du FPR qui a rkussi B museler la Socie'ti Civile Rwandaise. Treize dirigeants de la Ligue Rwandaise pour la promotion des droits de I'Homme (LIPRODHOR) ainsi que plusieurs joumalistes indkpendants ont Ctk contraints de s'exiler ces deux demiires anntes. Nous esperons vous avoir fourni assez d'elLments sur le sort reserve aux pretres non-tutsi de 1'Eglise Catholique qui est diabolisee et accusee d'avoir planifie le genocide des Tutsi depuis la r6volution des Hutu de 1959. Nous espQons qu'avec tous ces elements, les autoritis fran~aises,concernies par cette demande d'extradition, sont bien armies pour exiger que le TPIR fournisse des preuves consistants justifiant une extradition et une garantie solide que le TPIR pourra juger les deux suspects au lieu de les livrer au Rwanda. Comptant sur votre sagacite et votre bon sens habituel, nous vous prions d'agreer, Madame le Ministre, l'assurance de notre haute consideration. Pour le Centre, MATATA Joseph, Coordinateur Copie pour information : Son Excellence Monsieur Nicolas Sarkozy President de la Republique Fran~aise Monsieur Franqois Fillon Premier Ministre, HBtel Matignon 57 rue de Varenne, 75007 Paris Monsieur Bernard Kouchner Ministre des Affaires Etrangkres 37, Quai d'Orsay 75007 PARIS Madame Edith Boizette Presidente de la Chambre d'instmction Mandat Europeen et Extradition 4, Boulevard du Palais 75055 PARIS - France Monsieur Laurent Le Mesle Procureur General de la Cour d'Appel de Paris 34 Quai des Orfkvres Monsieur Jean Charles Lecompte Avocat GLniral de la Cour d'Appel de Paris 34 Quai des Orfkvres 75055 PARIS Louvre Monsieur Jean Yves Dupeux 250 bis Boulevard Saint-Germain 75345 PARIS Cedex 07 CLIIR* : Le Centre de Lutte contre I'ImpunitL et I'hjustice au Rwanda est une association de dtfense des droits humains bade en Belgique, crtCe le 18 aofit 1995. Ses membres sont des militants des droits humains de longue date. Certains ont Mi actifs au sein d'associations nvandaises de dtfense des droits humains et ont participt B I'enquite CLADHO Kanyanvanda sur le gtnocide de 1994. Lorsqu'ils ont commenct B enquEter sur les crimes du rtgime nvandais actuel, ils ont subi des menaces et ont kt15 contraints de s'exiler B I'ttranger oh ils powsuivent leur engagement en faveur des droits humains. CENTRE DE LUTTE CONTRE L'IMPUNITE ET L'INJUSTICE AU RWANDA (CLIIR) Boulevard Liopold 11, n0227 Bruxelles, le 24 septembre 2007 GSM: 32.476.70.15.69 -Mail : [email protected] Mkmorandum sur toute demande d'extradition commanditke par le Rwanda << via M le Tribunal Pknal International pour le Rwanda Introduction : Le Centre de Lutte contre 1'Impunite et 1'Injustice au Rwanda (CLIIR)* demande A tous ies pays, qui ditiennent des ditenus rwandais recherchis par le Tribunal pinal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR) ou par le gouvemement nvandais, de rejeter systhatiquement toute demande d'extradition de ces dktenus vers le TPIR et vers le Rwanda. En effet, ce tribunal subit le chantage permanent du gouvemement nvandais qui manipule et corrompt certains enquiteurs et magistrats de ce tribunal. Comme ce tribunal fermera ses portes fin 2008, toute demande d'extradition des ditenus Hutu cache la volonti de ce tribunal de les livrer au gouvemement rwandais. Or les membres de ce gouvemement n'ont aucun pouvoir de faire respecter les lois en vigueur et de protiger les personnes et leurs biens. Les Institutions officielles de 1'Etat Rwandais A savoir le Gouvemement, le Parlement, le Sinat et la Magistrature sont devenus des institutions de fa~adecompl&tement contr8lees et paralysies par le << pouvoir occulte n ditenu par la Junte Militaire du Giniral Paul KAGAME et le noyau dur des extrimistes tutsi. Les ditenteurs de ce pouvoir occulte ou << gouvemement parall?le n n'ont aucune volonti politique de mettre en place une justice Cquitable et sereine pour toutes les victimes nvandaises. Ils ont d'abord neutralisi et opiri I'ipuration ethnique et politique de I'appareil judiciaire en assassinant et en emprisonnant de nombreux magistrats honnites et courageux depuis septembre 1994. Ensuite, ils ont encouragi et organisi des emprisonnements arbitraires massifs pour a stocker des de'tenus n qui constituent une sorte de riserve d'esclaves permanents (qu'on peut louer). Le taux Clew5 des dicks de ditenus torturis, ma1 noums et rnal soignks, constitue igalement une autre forme de genocide. En effet, des milliers de dCtenus sont morts ou portis disparus dans les prisons mouroirs du Rwanda. Leurs femmes et enfants meurent ou dipirissent par la maladie et la faim pace que les chefs de families, pourvoyeurs de moyens de subsistance, croupissent en prison depuis 13 ans. De nombreux rapports des organisations internationales des droits humains, tels qu'Amnesy International (AI) Human Rights Watch (HRW), la FCdiration Internationale des Droits de Homme (FIDH) confirment que de nombreuses personnes innocentes sont victimes d'ex6cutions extrajudiciaires et d'arrestations arbitraires (Voir le Rapport 2007 de HRW). Plus nornbreux sont encore les prCvenus innocents qui croupissent dans les prisons rnouroirs nvandaises sans dossiers judiciaires et sans jugements. Des milliers de dktenus, dont plusieurs intellectuels Hutu (ma~istrats,. - enseimants, - cadres administratifs et politiques, religieux, hornmes d'affaires, leaders d'opinion, etc.) sont morts en prison (tuCes par la torture, les mauvaises conditions de vie, la faim, la maladie et la dipression) sans avoir it6 soignis ou jugis pendant 13 ans. Les tribunaux Gacaca : une nouvelle arme de destruction massive? Puisque le TPIR fermera ses portes fin 2008, tout detenu qui sera extrade vers le TPIR risque d'dre transfer6 au Rwanda oh les arrestations aveugles etmassives par les tribunaux discriminatoires GACACA ont provoque la fuite de plus de 100.000 personnes vers les quatre pays voisins du Rwanda et le Kenya depuis leur lancement dans tout le pays le 10 mars 2005. Dans les procks GACACA, les timoins ?idecharge sont intimides, terrorisis, sanctionnes et souvent condamnes B des peines de prison (variant entre 3 et 12 mois) lorsqu'ils insistent pour dire la vent6 et RIEN que la VERITE. La v6rit6 qui contrane les juges Gacaca places et manipules par le << pouvoir occulte n des chefs militaires et politiques du Front ~atrioti~ue Rwandais (F'PR). La vent6 qui fait peur aux juges GACACA choisis par la DMI' Directorate of Military Intelligence pour remplacer des vrais juges Gacacax qui avaient Me democratiquement ilus par la population (au debut du processus Gacaca en 2002) mais qui ont kt6 G disqualifies N parce qu'ils sont Hutu par le regime WR. Dans son interview A la BBC du 15 juillet 2006, Madame Domitila MUKANTAGANZWA, Secrktaire Exkcutif du Service National des Juridictions Gacaca (SNJG), a reconnu que son Service a remplack plus de 45.000 juges 6111s initialement par la population (soit environ 25% des 200.000 juges Gacaca). Ces juges, elus cornme des personnes intkgres par la population ont kt6 ajoutes sur des nouvelles listes des presumes genocidaires itablis par les agents de la DM1 infiltres au sein du SNJG). Les a nouveaux juges Gacaca choisis et manipulks par la DMI ou les agents DM1 infiltrks duns le SNJG D bloquent tout debat contradictoire durant les procks. Par leur mipris et leur arrogance, ils terrorisent les temoins B dtcharge et encouragent les mensonges et les complots orchestres par les temoins B charge manipulis ou achetes pour donner de faux temoignages. Selon les previsions du SNJG, les tribunaux Gacaca, qui prevoient I'emprisonnement d'environ 761.000 nouveaux suspects tous Hutu, sont les tribunaux discriminatoires car ils ne jugent que les seules suspects Hutu. L'impunite est assuree aux chefs militaires et politiques ainsi qu'aux militaires et civils tutsi qui ont massacre des centaines de milliers de civils Hutu. Les demikres condamnations massives par les GACACA ont frappe les demiers medecins Hutu qui venaient de travailler durant 13 ans sans que personne ne les accuse. Fin aoDt 2007, ils ont it6 condamn& arbitrairement, certains avec leurs femmes, B de lourdes peines oscillant entre 20 et 30 ans. En novembre 2006 ce fut deux anciens professeurs de I'Universite Nationale du Rwanda (UNR) qui furent condamnes arbitrairement B 30 ans tandis que leurs epouses ont icope de 25 ans chacune. D'autres professeurs et intellectuels Hutu qui travaillaient B Butare (dans le sud du Rwanda) croupissent en prison depuis la prise du pouvoir par le F'PR sans dossier et sans procks. Nous pouvons citer parmi ces detenus de longue duree les professeurs Runyinya Barabwiriza et Bernard Mutwewingabo. Les infirmikres Hutu ont kt6 egalement detenues come Sceur Thiopista MUKARUBIBI, de la congrigation des Benebikira, condamnee arbitrairement B 30 ans de prison le 8 novembre 2006 par le tribunal Gacaca de Butare (Pour d'autres cas, Voir notre Mimorandum adressi le 31 octobre 2006 ri 1'Union Europienne sur les tribunaux Gacaca). 1) Le cas de dew sus~ectsrksidant en France : I La DM1 (Directorate of Military Intelligence) est une vtritable u machine i tuer a, une sone de GESTAPO Tutsi crtk et dirigke par le prtsident rwandais et prtsident du FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais), le Gntral Paul KAGAME.La DM1 a impun6ment assassink, torturt, emprisonnt et fait disparaitre des milliers d'opposants politiques (rtels ou supposts), des anciens dignitaires et intellectuels Hutu ainsi que de simples citoyens rwandais Hutu et Tutsi depuis plus de 13 ans. Risidant en France B partir de 1995, I'Abbi Wenceslas MUNYESHYAKA et I'ancien prifet Laurent BUCYIBARUTA, deux suspects Hutu du genocide rwandais, itaient visks par des plaintes depodes en France depuis 12 et 7 ans. La procidure judiciaire suivait son cours normalement comme d'autres dossiers qui trainent devant la justice franqaise. Faisant parallklement l'objet d'enquites par le Tribunal penal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR) implant6 B Arusha en Tanzanie, les dossiers visant ces deux prisumes suspects devaient itre envoyes, par le TPIR, 21 la justice fran~aiseB Paris et servir d'iliments de preuve dans la prockdure en France. La France avait accept6 le transfert de ces dossiers en juillet 2006 et s'appretait B continuer les enquhes et 2 organiser des procks iquitables si nicessaire. Subitement dans la soirie du mardi 5 septembre 2007, sur base de mandats d'arrgt du TPIR, la police franqaise a arrhi pour la deuxikme fois, en moins de deux mois, les deux suspects, pace qu'ils font I'objet d'une demande d'extradition par le TPIR. 11s avaient it6 arrgtis le 20 juillet 2007 sur pression du TPIR et des associations proches du FTR. 11s furent libiris le 1" aoQt2007 par la justice franqaise qui ne jugeait pas nicessaire leur ditention priventive. Si la justice franqaise accepte de lzs livrer au TF'IR qui fermera ses portes fin 2008, ce ne sera pas pour les juger au TPIR B Arusha en Tanzanie. Les deux suspects courent le risque d'ctre traitcis comme des << colis * que le TPIR livrera au Rwanda oii leur scicuritci physique et mentale ne sera pas garantie. En effet, plusieurs &tenus nvandais libiris ou acquittis ont diveloppi de curieuses maladies et divers handicaps physiques et mentales susceptibles d'avoir eti provoques par la torture physique et mentale etlou par des empoisonnements opiris par des agents de la DM1 (Directorate of Military Intelligence) infiltres dans tous les services administratifs et judiciaires et dans les entreprises publiques et privies. Les exemples sont nombreux pour illustrer le sort tragique des ditenus libkris : - L'ancien prisident la ripublique et vice-president du FPR, Monsieur Pasteur BIZIMUNGU, a kt6 emprisonni depuis le 20/04/2002. Il fut condamnk arbitrairement B 15 ans. I1 est sorti de la prison le 6 avril 2007. I1 est trks malade suite aux harcklements moraux et aux mauvaises conditions de ditention subies ; - L'ancien prkfet de Gikongvro (Sud du pays), Monsieur Andri NKERAMUGABA, est mort en prison des suites de la torture physique et mentale. I1 a it6 tui sans procks. - L'ancien prisident du Mouvement Dimocratique Rkpublicain (MDR), Monsieur Bonaventure UBARUORO, a kt6 emprisonni en 1999. I1 est sorti aprks une annie de prison en chaise roulante. I1 est mort quelques annies plus tard ; - l'ancien Secritaire Gkniral du Mouvement Rivolutionnaire National pour Diveloppement (MRND) avant le gknocide, Monsieur Bonaventure HABIMANA, est sorti de prison. Tout B fait dirninuk. I1 vit en Belgique ob il n'est plus visible en public, car il ne peut plus marcher sans I'aide de quelqu'un. - L'ancien directeur de service, Monsieur Ignace Kanyabugoyi, a kt6 d'abord enlevi, puis emprisonnk dans des lieux secrets. I1 a it6 aperqu ensuite au centre psychiatrique de Ndera. Finalement il a it6 libkrk mais il marche i l'aide d'une Mquille B son ige ! - Monsieur Phocas HABIMANA a it6 arriti en dicembre 1996 aprhs son rapatriement forci de I'ex-Zaire. I1 fut libkrk en aoDt 1998 pour mourir en dkcembre 1998. - D'autres ditenus ont kt6 libkris mais ils ont presque tous des maladies bizarres assimilables B des maladies connues (sida, reins, estomac, tuberculose, hkpatite, hypertension, etc.) mais les traitements midicaux classiques ne les soulagent pas. Le TPIR a inculpk Bucyibmta de gknocide, incitation B commettre un gknocide, extermination, meurtre et viol. IRs timoins oculaires qui l'ont c6toyk pendant les massacres affirment qu'il a tout fait pour s'y opposer mais qu'il n'avait pas les moyens necessaires pour neutraliser les tueurs. I1 a nianmoins aid6 et cache beaucoup de personnes menacees. Ancien responsable de la paroisse de la Sainte-Famille, i Kigali, Munyeshyaka est kgalement inculpk au TPIR pour ghocide, viol, extermination et crimes contre I'humanitk. I1 a par ailleurs it6 condamn6 B perpetuiti le 16 novembre 2006 par un tribunal militaire du Rwanda pour compliciti de genocide et viol dans le m&meprocis que le geniral Laurent MUNYAKAZI, un des derniers collaborateurs fidiles et << Hutu de service D du president Paul Kagame. Pendant plus de 10 ans, Laurent Munyakazi a monti de grade sans &re inquiete par qui que ce soit. Les magistrats de ce tribunal se sont rendus coupables de crimes de genocide entre avril 1994 et dicembre 1998. I1 s'agit du general KARAKE Karenzi qui etait president de ce tribunal militaire et du Capitaine Tharcisse IDAHEMUKA qui instmisit la plupart des temoignages B charge. Ces deux militaires du FPR sont citks parmi les plus redoutables massacreurs qui ont supervise les massacres B Byumba, Kibungo, Kigali- Rural, Gitarama et Butare. Pour effacer les traces, ils ont organis6 le transport par camions des centaines de milliers de cadavres de Hutu entre avril et dicembre 1994. Lors des massacres de dkplacis de guerre de Kibeho en avril 1995, ces m6mes officiers ktaient chargks de massacrer, de transporter les cadavres et de les incinkrer dans des sites crimatoires identifiis dans le livre de RUZIBIZA, un ancien officier Tutsi du Front Patriotique Rwandais r6fugii en Norvige. Voyons le timoignage du Lieutenant Abdul Joshua RUZIBIZA qui confirme le genocide des Hutu dans son livre de 494 pages intitule < 2) Toute extradition ou transfert de dktenus Hutu vers le Rwanda. gouverd par un noyau de criminels Tutsi, est inacce~table: I1 est immoral et inacceptable d'extrader des ditenus Hutu vers un pays gouverni par des criminels Tutsi dont l'impuniti est assurie par le TPIR et les grandes puissances qui les soutiennent. Un nombre important de criminels Tutsi, impliquis dans les crimes de ginocide, crimes de guerre et crimes contre l'humaniti, occupe des postes importants dans l'administration, dans l'armie et la police, dans les services de renseignement et dans la justice. 11s ont continui leur sale boulot de tuer, de torturer et d'organiser des exicutions extrajudiciaires et des disparitions forcies dans tout le pays. Le prisident nvandais, le ginhal Paul KAGAME, a rameni au Rwanda, les m2mes iquipes de tueurs et de tortionnaires qu'il utilisait Zi l'ipoque oh il itait Directeur Adjoint de la DM1 (Directorate of Military Intelligence) en Ouganda dans les annies 1986. Les rapports d'Amnesty International n'ont pas manque Zi les dinoncer. Ce sont ces criminels qui sont promus dans les forces de paix de I'ONU. L'exemple d'une teile promotion : le G6nCal Karenzi Jean Karake a 6t6 dbign6 Commandant adjoint de la force de maintien de la paix au Darfour (Soudan). Le Conseil de Sicuriti de I'ONU et I'Union Africaine ont avalisi cette nomination sans chercher Zi savoir qu'elles avaient a faire B un criminel notoire. Au Rwanda, le giniral KARAKE Karenzi cumulait les fonctions de commandant de la quatrikme Division rnilitaire fonctionnant dans la province du Sud et celles de prisident du tribunal militaire qui a condamni B perpituiti 1'Abbi MUNYESHYAKA Wenceslas. Ce pritre catholique Hutu, qui a aid6 plus de 18.000 Hutu et Tutsi survivre au ginocide de 1994 i la paroisse Sainte Farnille Zi Kigali, fut condamni par un giniral tutsi, KARAKE Karenzi, implique dans les crimes commis au Rwanda, au Congo et en Ouganda. 3) D'autres paw occidentaw s'apdtent ?I extrader des suspects Hutu vers le Rwanda ou vers le TPIR qui fermera ses portes fin 2008. Le Centre de Lutte contre 1'Irnpuniti et 1'Injustice au Rwanda (CLIIR) demande aux pays qui ditiennent des suspects Hutu du genocide nvandais de rejeter toute extradition vers le Rwanda ou vers le TPIR. Ces pays sont : la Grande Bretagne, la France, I'Allemagne, la Hollande, le Canada et la Finlande qui ont m2ti un ou plusieurs rifugies Hutu qui rksidaient dans ces pays depuis plusieurs annies. Bien que le Rwanda a supprime la peine de mort dans les peines appliquis aux personnes condamnis pour les crimes de genocide, le < Considirant toutes les violations massives et graves qui continuent de se commettre au Rwanda, le Centre de Lutte contre 1'Impuniti et I'Injustice au Rwanda exhorte les gouvemements des pays, ci haut cites, i rejeter toute demande d'extradition vers le Rwanda ou vers le Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda siigeant i Amsha en Tanzanie. En effet, le TPIR se trouve dans l'incapaciti d'organiser d'autres procks puisque son procureur, Monsieur Boubacar Jallow, a deji fait savoir qu'il va extrader TROIS ditenus (tous Hutu) et plusieurs dossiers judiciaires (des suspects Hutu en fuite) vers le Rwanda. Or le TPIR refuse de poursuivre les criminels Tutsi du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) impliquts igalement dam les crimes de ginocide, massifs et aveugles, commis sur des Hutu avant, pendant et aprks les massacres de 1994. Si le TPIR avait poursuivi kgalement les criminels tutsi depuis sa crkation en 1995, les peuples rwandais et congolais auraient pu Cviter des centaines de milliers d'autres morts inutiles qui sont tombis sous les balles des militaires du FPR au Rwanda et en Republique Democratique du Congo (RDC). 4) Les iuridictions rwandaises, europhennes ou le TPIR ne aourront iamais organiser des arocb kquitables tant qu'elles dhpendront des magistrats rwandais soumis au FPR : Le Centre de Lutte contre 1'Impunite et ]'Injustice au Rwanda ainsi que d'autres organisations de difense des droits humains ne cessent de faire le constat suivant qui privaut depuis 13 ans: 1. Tant que la justice internationale sera dipendante de la justice rwandaise (contr61Ce et paralysie par un noyau de criminels Tutsi), elle ne pourra jamais organiser des procks iquitables dans les dossiers lits au genocide nvandais ; 2. Tant que les juridictions nationales (nvandaises et europiennes) et le TPIR verront dtfiler de nombreux << syndicats de dilateurs >> manipults par les extrimistes au pouvoir i igali, il leur sera impossible de rendre une justice iquitable et sereine ; 3. Tant que les investigations des juges d'instmction et des enqusteurs nationaux ou internationaux seront supervides par les magistrats nvandais contr6lis par le rigime de Kigali, elles seront entachies par des mensonges et des fausses accusations qui ne pourraient qu'aboutir i des procks inequitables. 4. I1 n'y aura pas de justice tquitable tant que la magistrature nvandaise sera perpituellement purifiie ethniquement, contr6lCe et paralysie par les chefs militaires et politiques du FPR impliques dans les crimes de gtnocide, des crimes de guerre, et des crimes contre I'humanitt. Plusieurs magistrats sont soumis au rigime FPR et certains d'entre eux sont impliquis dans les crimes de gtnocide commis au Rwanda. Considerant cette dtpendance prijudiciable i leur image, nous recornmandons aux juridictions des pays europiens, ci haut citis, de suspendre momentaniment toutes les enqugtes liees au genocide tant que la magistrature rwandaise restera prise dans I'ktau du << pouvoir occulte n des chefs militaires et politiques du FPR impliques eux-mhes dans les crimes de genocides, les crimes contre I'humaniti et les crimes de guerre. Considirant que toutes les institutions officielles de I'Etat Rwandais sont compl&tement contr6lees et paralysies par ces mhes ditenteurs du << pouvoir occulte n, tous les efforts de reconstruction et de dkveloppement d'une magistrature credible au Rwanda sont vouks a I'echec. Les tribunaux GACACA, qui ont provoqui I'emprisonnement arbitraire des dizaines de milliers de personnes grke aux nombreux << syndicats de dklateurs N encadris par les agents de la DMI, font des victimes innocentes pmi les rescapis Hutu du ginocide nvandais. Nous insistons sur le fait que prks de 100.000 personnes ont diji fui le pays depuis le 10 mars 2005 suite lancement de ces tribunaux crimineis sur tout le temtoire rwandais. Le GACACA est considire comme une sorte de nouvel N holocauste n pour les rescapks Hutu des massacres du FPR. ConsidQant que la capacitk de manipulation et I'art de mentir du rkgime rwandais se sont affinks depuis 13 ans, I'iradication de I'impuniti ne pourra riussir que si elle conceme egalement tous les chefs militaires et politiques du FPR qui ont massacre des innocents et qui rackettent et tiennent en otage le peuple rwandais, toutes ethnies confondues. I1 est faux de croire que les pays occidentaux pourront jouer le r61e de pays neutres alors que de nombreux thoins crkdibles montrent que certaines puissances comme les USA, la Grande Bretagne, la Belgique et le Canada continuent de favoriser I'oppression et la remise en esclavage du peuple rwandais par leur soutien aveugle au regime du FPR. Un peuple kcrasi par la repression d'une poignke de criminels de guerre tutsis qui s'assurent I'impunite par tous les moyens extraligaux. Le pillage du Congo, objectif final de la tragedie rwandaise, ne profite qu'B ce petit noyau dur de criminels soutenus et protiges par les grandes puissances qui pillent le Congo par << mercenaires nvandais >> interposks. rf Le grand ennemi de la viriti, est tr6s souvent non le mensonge dilibiri, arti$ciel et malhonnt?te, mais le mythe persistant, convaincant et irrialiste v Cette dkfinition, empmntie au prksident amiricain John Kennedy illustre trks bien combien le mythe selon lequel le FPR a m2t6 le genocide est le plus grand obstacle h la vkrite, i3 la justice et B la rkconciliation. La discrimination entre les victimes d'une m&me tragkdie et le mhisex~rime Dar les autorites rwandaises actuelles B I'endroit des victimes non Tutsies sont des comportements inhumains, cyniques et irresponsables que les juridictions europkennes et les gouvemements occidentaux devraient combattre sur le temtoire europken. 5) RECOMMANDATIONS : Pour conclure, nous recommandons aux gouvemements des pays qui dktiennent dans leurs prisons des suspects du genocide (accusks B tort ou i3 raison par les autoritks rwandaises) de ne pas les extrader vers le Rwanda ou le TPIR (qui ferme ses portes en 2008) en attendant le ritablissement de 1'Etat de droit et le respect des droits et des libertis publiques au Rwanda. I1 s'agit des pays suivants : Ces pays sont : la Grande Bretagne, la France, I'Allemagne, la Hollande, le Canada et la Finlande. Pour le Centre, MATATA Joseph, Coordinateur. (Discours de remise des diplbes B I'Universitt de Yale, le 11 juin 1962 par le prtsident amtricain John Fitzgerald Kennedy (JFK). CLIIR* : Le Centre de Lutte contre I'Impunit6 et 1'Injustice au Rwanda est une association de difense des droits humains basLe en Belgique, crLLe le 18 aoClt 1995. Ses membres sont des militants des droits humains de longue date. Certains ont it6 actifs au sein d'associations rwandaises de d6fense des droits humains et ont participi B I'enquEte CLADHOKanyanvanda sur le ginocide de 1994. Lorsqu'ils ont commenc6 B enqueter sur les crimes du rLgime rwandais actuel, ils ont subi des menaces et ont it6 contraints de s'exiler A 1'6tranger oh ils poursuivent leur engagement en faveur des droits humains. ANNEX \Yww.hlrondelle.org : 23.01.07 - RWANDAIHRW - HRW WARNS RWANDA AG ... Page 1 sw 1 Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Amsha (Tanzania): News RWANDAlHRW - HRW WARNS RWANDA AGAINST REPRISAL MURDERS Arusha, January 22 2007 (FH) - Human Rights Watch (HRW), a human rights organization based in New York, calls on the police and the judicial authorities of Rwanda to enforce the law and punish the crimes committed recently to avoid the beginning of a new cycle of violence in the country. In a twenty pages long report entitled r Murders in Eastem Rwanda n, HRW recounts in detail 13 murders, 11 of which committed in reprisal, and recommends as a conclusion to condud a a thorough and independent investigation n on these deaths. Eight persons, among wh~chchildren aged three, eight and thirteen, a woman and an old man of seventy, were killed on November 19 by people living in a village named Mugatwa in retaliation of the murder of a n, , genocide survivor. The eight victims r were apparently not connected to the murder HRW indicates On November 23, a second incident happened in Rwamagana (about 50 km east of Kigali): a judge of a gacaca court was assassinated and the three suspects arrested by the police were killed the very same night. u The clues collected on the murder place and the testimonies of the witnesses suggest that the three men might have been the victims of an extra judiciary execution n, reads the report. u The murder of genocide survivors costs lives and threaten justice. The right answer to this threat lies in a quick and efficient enforcement of the law, not in reprisal murders n. Alison Des Forges, senior advisor in the African division of the organization, declares. Alison Des Forges adds that reprisal murders have been r very few in the past, but if they happen more frequently, they might trigger a new cycle of violence 5. HRW concludes that a in every society, deaths in custody must be investigated thoroughly. Policemen, as every other citizen, should be punished if they commit a crime P. MGIAT 0 Hirondelle News Agency 7 Arusha. Tanzania Tel : + 41 21 654 20 20 Tel : + 255 713 51 08 94 Email : [email protected] Email :[email protected] This project is funded by Belgium. European community. Norway and Luxemburg :lose '~indow 'ZFlI 1996 - 2007 Fondmon H~rondelle- Av du Temple 19C - CH 1012-Lausanne [Su~sse]- Tei +41 21 654 20 20 -Fax +41 21 654 20 21 E-mall tnfo@h~rondelleorg Www.huondelle.org : 30.03.06 - KWANVAIAMNkSI Y - AMNkSI'Y IN'IEKNA'II... Page 1 sur 1 Close wmdow Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Arusha (Tanzania): News RWANDAIAMNESTY -AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT STILL CRlTlCUES RWANDA Arusha, May 22nd, 2006 (FH) -The human rights organisation, Amnesty International (At), has, in its annual report, castigated Rwanda's human rights record for the year 2005. It says it has not improved. In its annual report titled "Report 2006: The state of the world's human rights", Al denounced in particular the treatment of human rights organisations in Rwanda which "were prevented from working freely and activists were harassed and attacked". The new report repeats many of the criticisms it made last year. It also touches on the current state of the semi-traditional Gacaca courts, which were set up to speed up the trials of hundreds of thousands of genocide suspects held in Rwandan jails. 'There were concerns about the fairness of some of the trials," says the report. -J It also reports on the thousands of Rwandan refugees who fled to neighbouring Burundi, fearing bring brought before Gacaca or "rumours of politically motivated "disappearances". A delegation of Al visited Rwanda last November to investigate several issues regarding human rights. KNlPB O Hirondelle News Agency Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne. Switzerland Arusha, Tanzania Tel: +41 21 654 20 20 Tel: +255 741 51 08 94 Hirondelle audio products are avadable in English. French, Swahil~and Kinyarwanda www hlrondelle org 3 This project 1s funded by the European Commun~ty,Norway and Luxembourg Close w~ndow %:m 1996 - 2007. Fondation Hirondelle - Av. du Temple 190 - CH 1012-Lausanne (Suisse] -Tel+41 21 654 20 20 -Fax +41 21 654 20 21 -E-mail [email protected] -www.nlrondelle.org : ZI.Uj.Ub - KWANUAIHUMAN KItiH'I'S- AMNESI'Y IN'I'E... Page 1 sur 2 Close w~ndow Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Amsha (Tanzania): News RWANDAIHUMAN RIGHTS - AMNESTY INTERNATIONALASKS FOR INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF EXECUTIONS OF PRISONERS Arusha, March 17th, 2006 (FH) -A human rights organisation, Amnesty International (Al) has called on the Rwandan Government to set up an independent commission to investigate reports of possible extrajudicial executions by the military police in Mulindi military detention Centre located in Kigali. A public statement by the organisation says it has received reports of allegations that at least three unarmed prisoners at the military detention centre were killed and more than 20 injured by military police on December 21 st 2005. "Amnesty lnternational calls for a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of these events," says the report. The reports indicate that an assault case of a prisoner on December 21st 2005 at the detention centre by guards for consuming cannabis sparked off discontent amongst some prisoners who had been complaining about ill-treatment at the camp. In response, says the report, several dozen prisoners staged a protest and locked the internal court yard. The military police were called in and they unsuccessfully tried to unlock the doors of the courtyard. Then they reportedly surrounded the same courtyard and started to shoot at the unarmed prisoners with Kalashnikovs and other machine guns. 'If this version of the events is confirmed, the reported shooting by the military police of unarmed prisoners would be in violation of the right to life and would constitute excessive use of force. " Although the government has asked the army prosecution department to investigate the allegations, its impartiality is being questioned by Al. 'Amnesty lnternational is concerned that this investigation does not offer the necessary guarantees of impartiality and independence. Amnesty lnternational has received information contradicting- the government's. official position on these events." According to Al, it received information suggesting that names of those killed were Private Ruzindana, Private Assimwe Munyarubuga and Private Assiel Karinganire. The human rights watchdog is also asking the Rwandan government to bring to justice the alleged perpetrators, including their superiors who reportedly gave the order to shoot at the unarmed prisoners "If sufficient evidence is obtained, the competent authorities must to bring to justice all those suspected of being responsible for the deaths and injuries of the prisoners," demanded Al. The allegations come in the wake of a report recently released by USA, critical on human rights situation in Rwanda. It 0bse~edthat the "government's human rights record remained poor and there were instances when the government committed serious abuses". But Rwanda disputed the report arguing that many things have changed over the last few years, and that the authors of the report simply didn't take any of the positive changes into account. O Hirondelle News Agency ANNEX www.hlrondelle.org : 23.01.07 - RWANDAIHRW - HRW WARNS RWANDA AG ... Page 1 sur 1 Close wmdow ~ ~ ~ . ~ ,. ~~~ .... -- ~ -~ - ~~ ~ ..~~ Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Arusha (Tanzania): News 2301.07 RWANDAIHRW - HRW WARNS RWANDA AGAINST REPRISAL MURDERS Arusha. January 22 2007 (FH) - Human Rights Watch (HRW). a human rights organization based in New York, calls on the police and the judicial authorities of Rwanda to enforce the law and punish the crimes committed recently to avoid the beginning of a new cycle of violence in the country. In a twenty pages long report entitled a Murders in Eastern Rwanda r, HRW recounts in detail 13 murders, 11 of which committed in reprisal, and recommends as a conclusion to conduct r a thorough and independent investigation n on these deaths. Eight persons, among which children aged three, eight and thirteen, a woman and an old man of seventy. were killed on November 19 by people living in a village named Mugatwa in retaliation of the murder of a -3- genocide survivor. The eight victims a were apparently not connected to the murder n, HRW indicates On November 23, a second incident happened in Rwamagana (about 50 km east of Kigali): a judge of a gacaca court was assassinated and the three suspects arrested by the police were killed the very same night. a The clues collected on the murder place and the testimonies of the witnesses suggest that the three men might have been the victims of an extra judiciary execution a, reads the report. u The murder of genocide survivors costs lives and threaten justice. The right answer to this threat lies in a quick and efficient enforcement of the law, not in reprisal murders n,Alison Des Forges, senior advisor in the African division of the organization, declares. Alison Des Forges adds that reprisal murders have been a very few in the past, but if they happen more frequently, they might trigger a new cycle of violence n. HRW concludes that a in every society, deaths in custody must be investigated thoroughly. Policemen, as every other citizen, should be punished if they commit a crime n. MGIAT O Hirondelle News Agency Amsha. Tanzania Tei : + 255 713 51 08 94 This project is funded by Belgium. European community, Noway and Luxemburg Close window :?:FI.l IS96 - 2007. Fondation Hirondelle -A". du Temple IgC - CH 1012-Lausanne [Suisse] - Tel +41 21 654 20 20 -Fax t41 21 654 20 21 -E-mail [email protected] www.hlrondelle.org : jU.U3.Ub - KWANUAIAMNCSI Y - AMNkSIY IN'IEKNA'I'I... Page 1 sur 1 Close window -- . . . ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~. . -- Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Awsha (Tanzania): News RWANDAIAMNESTY - AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT STILL CRlTlCUES RWANDA Arusha, May 22nd, 2006 (FH) -The human rights organisation, Amnesty International (Al), has, in its annual report, castigated Rwanda's human rights record for the year 2005. It says it has not improved. In its annual report titled 'Report 2006: The state of the world's human rights". Al denounced in particular the treatment of human riahts omanisations in Rwanda which "were prevented from working. freely and activists were harassed and akcked! The new report repeats many of the criticisms it made last year. It also touches on the current state of the semi-traditional Gacaca courts, which were set up to speed up the trials of hundreds of thousands of genocide suspects held in Rwandan jails. "There were concerns about the fairness of some of the trials." says the report. I -3 It also reports on the thousands of Rwandan refugees who fled to neighbouring Bu~ndi,fearing bring brought before Gacaca or "rumours of politically motivated "disappearances". A delegation of Al visited Rwanda last November to investigate several issues regarding human rights. O Hirondelle News Agency Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne, Switzerland Arusha. Tanzania Tel: +4121654 20 20 Tel: +255 741 51 08 94 Hirondelle audio products are available in English. French. Swahili and Kinyarwanda www hlrondelle.org 3 " Th~sproject n funded by the European Communtty. Norway and Luxembourg Close window r-l ..%m1996 - 2007. Fondation Hirondelle - Av. du Temple 19C - CH 1012-Lausanne [Suisse] - Tel +41 21 654 20 20 -Fax +41 21 654 20 21 -E-mail infoQhirondelle.org * www.hIrondelle.org : L1.UJ.Ub - KWANUAJHUMAN KLGH'I'S- AMNESI'Y IN'I'E... Page 1 sur 2 Close window ~ ~~..-~p~~---~~ .~.~ ~~.~.. ~~~~. Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Anrsha (Tanzania): News RWANDAIHUMAN RIGHTS - AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ASKS FOR INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF EXECUTIONS OF PRISONERS Arusha, March 17th, 2006 (FH) - A human rights organisation, Amnesty lnternational (Al) has called on the Rwandan Government to set up an independent commission to investigate reports of possible extrajudicial executions by the military police in Mulindi military detention Centre located in Kigali. A public statement by the organisation says it has received reports of allegations that at least three unarmed ~risonersat the militalv detention centre were killed and more than 20 injured by military police on December "Amnesty lnternational calls for a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of these events," says the report. a- The reports indicate that an assault case of a prisoner on December 21st 2005 at the detention centre by guards for consuming cannabis sparked off discontent amongst some prisoners who had been complaining about ill-treatment at the camp. In response, says the report, several dozen prisoners staged a protest and locked the internal court yard. The military police were called in and they unsuccessfully tried to unlock the doors of the courtyard. Then they reportedly surrounded the same courtyard and started to shoot at the unarmed prisoners with Kalashnikovs and other machine guns. "If this version of the events is confirmed, the reported shooting by the military police of unarmed prisoners would be in violation of the right to life and would constitute excessive use of force. ' Although the government has asked the army prosecution department to investigate the allegations, its impartiality is being questioned by Al. "Amnesty lnternational is concerned that this investigation does not offer the necessary guarantees of impartiality and independence. Amnesty lnternational has received information contradicting the government's official position on these events," According to Al, it received information suggesting that names of those killed were Private Ruzindana. Private Assimwe Munyarubuga and Private Assiel Karinganire. The human rights watchdog is also asking the Rwandan government to bring to justice the alleged perpetrators, including their superiors who reportedly gave the order to shoot at the unarmed prisoners. "If sufficient evidence is obtained, the competent authorities must to bring to justice all those suspected of being responsible for the deaths and injuries of the prisoners," demanded Al. The allegations come in the wake of a report recently released by USA, critical on human rights situation in Rwanda. It Observed that the "government's human rights record remained poor and there were instances when the government commilted serious abuses". But Rwanda disputed the report arguing that many things have changed over the last few years, and that the authors of the report simply didn't take any of the positive changes into account. O Hirondelle News Agency ANNEX Imprimer : Appel au Conseil de sicuriti des Nations unies pour qu'il veille iceque le... Page 1 of 3 Le site officiel diAmnesty Belgique : 3a defendre les droits humains dans le http://www.amnestrInternational.be/doc/spip.php' monde artlcle9639 Appel au Conseil de securite des Nations unies pour qu'il veille a ce que le mandat du Tribunal penal international pour le Rwanda soit rempli --mardi, 12 decembre 2006 / phensmans Declaration publique Index A1 : IOR 40/045/2006 (Public) Bulletin no : 320 12 decembre 2006 Le 15 decembre 2006, le Conseil de securite des Nations unies procedera a son examen bisannuel de la mise en oeuvre de la << strategie d'achevement n visant le Tribunal penal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR). La strategie d'achevement fixe arbitrairement a 2010 la date a laquelle tous les proces, y compris en appel, devront &re termines, alors que 18 accuses n'ont toujours pas ete arretes et que les tribunaux rwandais ne peuvent pas, ou ne veulent pas, engager de veritables poursuites penales qui respectent les normes internationales d'equite et excluent la peine de mort. Amnesty International craint que la strategie d'achevement n'empkhe la justice d'Stre rendue aux personnes qui ont ete victimes de genocide, de crimes contre I'humanite et de crimes de guerre pendant le genocide de 1994, et qu'elle n'ait pour consequence que ces crimes resteront impunis. La procureure du Tribunal penal international pour I'ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY), dont le mandat est soumis a la m&ne echeance, a indique recemment qu'elle prevoyait de demander un delai supplementaire pour terrniner ses affaires, mais le TPIR n'a pas fait de mhe. Au lieu de cela, dans ses precedents rapports au Conseil de securite, le TPIR a propose pour respecter les echeances de deferer environ 17 affaires aux juridictions nationales, en application de I'article 11 bis du Reglement de procedure et de preuve du TPIR. Dans son rapport au Conseil de securite du ler juin 2006 (S/2006/358),le TPIR declare qu'il a I'intention de demander le transfert a des juridictions nationales de cinq personnes en instance de jugement et de 12 accuses en fuite. Cette proposition fait craindre qu'a moins que d'autres tribunaux nationaux ne se manifestent, ces affaires ne soient transferees au Rwanda. L'article 11 bis sur le Renvoi de I'acte d'accusation devant une autre juridiction fixe deux conditions a respecter pour pouvoir effectuer un tel transfert : (1) I'accuse devra Stre juge equitablement et (2) la peine de mort ne devra pas &re prononcee ni mise a execution. Bien que le Rwanda ait entame des demarches pour abolir la peine capitale, Amnesty International s'oppose pour I'instant au renvoi d'actes d'accusation devant les juridictions rwandaises parce qu'elle considere que le gouvernement n'est pas en mesure d'assurer pleinement la securite des suspects renvoyes avant, pendant et apres leur detention, et que la justice rwandaise ne peut pas garantir le droit des suspects a un proces equitable conforme a la legislation et aux normes internationales, teiles que : le droit d'ktre juge dans un delai raisonnable ou d'@tre remis en liberte. Amnesty International a recense piusieurs cas de personnes accusees de crimes de genocide et qui sont en detention provisoire depuis plus de douze ans ; le droit de ne pas 6tre soumis a la torture ou a d'autres formes de traitement cruel, inhumain et degradant. Le Rwanda n'a pas ratifie la Convention des Nations Unies contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou degradants. Amnesty International considere qu'il y a un risque reel que des personnes transferees soient torturees ou soumises a d'autres formes de mauvais traitement ; le droit d'stre juge par un tribunal competent, independant et impartial etabli par la 101. Au cours des deux dernieres annees, Amnesty International et d'autres organisations internationales ont rassemble des informations sur le manque d'independance, de competence et d'irnpartialite des tribunaux gacaca. Bien que les tribunaux gacaca ne soient pas habilites a juger les suspects transferes par le TPIR, I'existence de ces tribunaux suscite de vives inquietudes quant a la maniere dont la justice rwandaise s'occupe des cas de personnes soup~onneesde participation au http://www.amnestyintemational.be/doc/spip.php?page=imprimir~articulo&id article... 31)/09/201)7 lmprimer : Appel au Conseil de skurite des Nations unies pour qu'il veille i ce que le... Page 2 of 3 genocide. A cela s'ajoute le fait que les autorites rwandaises ont deja pris beaucoup de retard dans le jugernent de plus de 48 000 autres personnes soup~onneesde participation au genocide, de crimes de guerre et de crimes contre I'humanite, et qu'il est donc permis de douter de la capacite de la justice rwandaise a prendre en charge de nouveaux dossiers. Le transfert de dossiers vers d'autres juridictions nationales a egalernent rencontre des difficulte. En particulier, le 30 aoOt 2006, la chambre d'appel du TPIR a confirme la decision de la charnbre de premiere instance de ne pas autoriser le renvoi de I'affaire Bagaragaza en No~ege,au motif qu'il n'y avait pas dans ce pays de juridiction en rnesure de juger I'accuse pour les violations graves du droit international, dont le genocide, dont il a ete incuipe. II se peut que d'autres pays n'aient pas les memes, problemes legislatifs que la No~ege,mais le TPIR risque neanmoins d'avoir du msl a trouver des Etats qui peuvent et veulent rnener ces poursuites. Tant que ies autorites du Rwanda ne voudront pas, ou ne pourront pas, mettre fin a I'impunite pour de tels crimes, il reviendra a la communaute internationale de veiller a ce que la justice soit rendue, tant au niveau international que national. En creant le TPIR aux termes de la resolution 955, le Conseil de securite s'est engage a u juger les personnes presumees responsables d'actes de genocide ou d'autres violations graves du droit international humanitaire commis sur le territoire du Rwanda, et les citoyens rwandais presumes responsables de tels actes ou violations commis sur le territoire d'Etats voisins, entre le lerjanvier et le 31 deqembre 1994 D. C'est pourquoi, Amnesty International exhorte le Conseil de securite et les Etats membres des Nations unies a veiller a ce que les rnesures suivantes soient prises : Prolongation de la strategie d'achevement, si elle est dernandee. Amnesty International craint que I'echeance de 2010 ne laisse pas le temps de juger en premiere instance et en appel toutes les personnes inculpees par le TPIR, meme si le transfert des 17 personnes vers d'autres juridictions a effectivement lieu. L'organisation appelle le Conseil de securite a envisager le prolongation de la strategie d'achevement si le TPIR en fait la demande pour traiter ces dossiers jusqu'au bout. Si les actes d'accusation concernant les 17 affaires en question ne peuvent Stre renvoyes devant des jurididions nationales, le Conseil de securite devrait prolonger la strategie d'achevement afin de permettre au TPIR d'aller jusqu'au bout de ces procedures. Renforcement de la decision selon laquelie les 18 personnes en fuite doivent arretees et remises au TPIR. II est imperatif que le TPIR engage et conduise des poursuites contre tous ceux qui ont ete inculpes, et que personne ne beneficie de I'irnpunite en raison de la strategie d'achevement. Amnesty International appelle le Conseil de securite, qui considere toujours la situation aux termes du chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations unies comme une menace a la paix et la securite internationales, a prendre les mesures appropriees pour que les 18 personnes restantes soient arretees et remises au TPIR sans plus attendre. Opposition au transfert de cas vers le Rwanda. Comme explique ci-dessus, Amnesty International s'oppose pour I'instant a ce que le TPIR renvoie des actes d'accusation devant les juridictions rwandaises. En particulier, I'organisation considere que la justice rwandaise n'est pas en mesure pour I'instant de faire en sorte que le droit a un proces equitable soit pleinement respecte. Amnesty International appelle le Conseil de securite a donner pour instruction au TPIR de ne transferer aucune affaire au Rwanda tant que les problernes que connait la justice dans ce pays n'auront pas ete resolus. Appel aux tats pour qu'ils appliquent le principe de competence universelle pour les affaires que le TPIR cherche a transferer. Amnesty International est favorable au renvoi d'actes d'accusation devant des juridictions nationales qui peuvent et souhaitent engager des poursuites pour ies violations graves du droit international, dans le respect des norrnes internationales d'equite et sans avoir recoun a la peine capitale. En effet, comme le Conseil de securite I'a reconnu depuis sa resolution 978 du 27 fevrier 1995, le recours a la competence universelle pour juger les infractions au droit international devrait etre preconise comme moyen de lutte efficace covtre I'impunite. C'est pourquoi, I'organisation exhorte le Conseil de securite a appeler tous les Etats a apporter leur soutien a une strategie d'achevement efficace pour le TPIR, en appliquant le principe de competence universelle aux cas que celui essaie de transferer a des juridictions nationales. Ce faisant, le Conseil de securite devrait egalement demander aux Etats de passer en revue leur legislation pour s'assurer qu'elle leur permet d'exercer la competence universelle sur les crimes relevant du TPIR, afin d'eviter les problemes rpcontres au moment du transfert de I'affaire Bagaragaza en NOW& Pour encourager les Etats de tous les continents a accepter les affaires en http:llwww.amnestyinternational.be/doc~icuo&idarticle ... 3010912007 Imprimer : Appel au Conseil de sicuriti des Nations unies pour qu'il veille $ ce que le ... Page 3 of 3 provenance du TPIR, le Conseil de securite devrait demander a I'Assemblee generale de creer un fonds de contribution aux depenses occasionnees par la prise en charge de ces cas. Engagement ferme a fournir des res;sources suffisantes au TPIR. Pour mener a bien sa mission, le TPIR va avoir besoin continuellement de fonds. Amnesty International appelle le Conseil de securite a s'engager a fournir des ressources suffisantes au TPIR jusqu'a ce qu'ii ait termine son travail, et a ne pas modifier le systeme existant qui perrnet de payer le TPIR a partir du budget ordinaire des Nations unies. Le fait pour les tribunaux penaux internationaux pour la Sierra Leone et le Cambodge de dependre d'un financement volontaire les a genes dans leur travail eta mis a ma1 leur inde~endance. Mise en place au Rwanda d'un plan global d'action a long terme pour mettre fin a I'impunite. Amnesty International exhorte le Conseil de securite a promouvoir d'autres initiatives pour mettre fin a I'irnpunite au Rwanda, en prenant notamrnent des mesures pour que les milliers d'autres violations du droit international sur lesquelles le TPIR n'aura pas ete en mesure d'enquiter ou d'engager des poursuites dans le respect des normes internationales fassent neanmoins I'objet d'enquites et d'actions en justice. En particulier, I'organisation appelle le Conseil de securite a demander a tous les Etats de fournir au Rwanda le personnel, le materiel et les ressources qui lui permettent d'elaborer un plan global d'action a long terrne pour mettre fin a I'impunite en resolvant tous les crimes relevant du droit international qui ont ete commis entre 1990 et 1994. I1 faudrait qu'il s'acquitte de cette mission en toute transparence et en collaboration etroite avec la societe civile. Amnesty International demande egalement au Conseil de securite d'appeler tous les autres tats a cooperer aux enquetes et aux poursuites pour les violations du droit international commises au Rwanda, et a appliquer le principe de competence universelle en enquitant sur ces crimes et en les jugeant devant leurs tribunaux. Amnesty International demeure vivement preoccupee par le fait que le TPIR et les autorites rwandaises n'ont pas enquete sur le5 crimes commis par toutes les parties au Rwanda entre 1990 and 1994, ni engage de poursuites dans ces affaires. En particulier, I'organisation fait observer que 60 000 civils auraient ete tues par les forces du Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) entre avril et juillet 1994. Bien que le TPIR a declare qu'il avait u fait fond sur le mandat donne au Tribunal, tel que le rappelle la resolution 1503, pour enqueter sur des informations faisant etat de violations commises par le Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) w, aucun acte d'inculpation contre le FPR n'a ete rendu public. La volonte politique des autorites rwandaises d'enqueter a ce sujet et d'engager des poursuites contre les suspects en ca5 de preuves suffisantes suscite de serieux doutes. En 2004, toute reference aux Conventions de Geneve et a leurs protocoles additionnels, en particulier a I'article 3 commun aux Quatre Conventions, a ete exclue de la legislation nationale rwandaise. De ce fait, aucun tribunal rwandais n'est competent pour intervenir sur les allegations de crimes de guerre et d'autres violations du droit international humanitaire. http://www.amnestyinternationa1.be/doc/spip.php?page=imprimir articulo&id article 30/09/7007 [Q3 nov 19981 DWG1985 : LE COMITE CONTRE LA TORTURE TIENDRA SA VINGT ET ... Page 1 of 4 3 novembre 1998 Communiquk de Presse DWGl985 LE COMITE CONTRE LA TORTURE TIENDRA SA VINGT ET UNIEME SESSION A GENEVE DU 9 AU 20 NOVEMBRE 1998 COMMUNIQUE DE BASE DH/G/985 I1 examinera les rapports des pays suivants : Croatie, Hongrie, Islande, Rtpublique fidirale de Yougoslavie, Royaume-Uni et Tunisie Genkve, le 3 novembre 1998 -- Le Comitt contre la torture tiendra sa vingt et unikme session du 9 au 20 novembre 1998, i I'Office des Nations Unies i Genkve. I1 doit examiner, au cours de la session, les rapports qui seront prtsentts par les dtltgations de six pays : Croatie, Hongrie, Islande, Ripublique ftdirale de Yougoslavie, Royaume-Uni et Tunisie. Entrt en fonction le ler janvier 1988, le Comiti, compost de dix experts, est chargt de surveiller I'application de la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cmels, inhumains ou dtgradants. Actuellement, 107 tats ont ratifit la Convention ou y ont accidi. Aux termes de la Convention, les tats parties sont tenus de prtsenter ptriodiquement au Comitt un rapport sur les mesures qu'ils ont prises pour donner effet ?i leurs engagements en vertu de cet instrument. Le Comiti prtsentera, i la fin de l'examen de chacun des six rapports qui seront examints au cours de la session, ses observations et recommandations finales sur I'application de la Convention dans le pays concernt. Le Comitt examinera tgalement, au cours de stances i huis clos, les Observations finales du Comiti concernant les rapports ptriodiques prickdents de la Croatie, de la Hongrie, du Royaume-Uni et de la Tunisie Quatre des six tats parties qui prtsentent un rapport au Comit6 la prtsente session ont diji soumis des rapports lors de sessions pricidentes du Comiti, i savoir, la Croatie, la Hongrie, le Royaume-Uni et la Tunisie. - 2 - DWG1985 3 novembre 1998 Suite i I'examen du rapport initial de la Croatie, en mai 1996, le Comitt avait recommandt la qualification du crime de torture dans des termes conformes 2 la dtfinition figurant dans la Convention. I1 a recornrnandi i la Croatie de veiller ?i ce que toute alltgation de torture ou traitement cruel, inhumain ou dtgradant lite aux tvinements de 1995 et ?i ses suites fasse I'objet d'une enqu&tesysttmatique par une commission indtpendante et impartiale dont les rtsultats seront transmis au Comitt. Le ComitC a par ailleurs estimt qu'un programme d'tducation de la police, du personnel pinitentiaire, mtdical et judiciaire devrait 6tre mis en oeuvre. [03 nov 19981 DWGl985 : LE COMITE CONTRE LA TORTURE TIENDRA SA VINGT ET... Page 2 of 4 En ce qui concerne le deuxikme rapport piriodique prisenti par le Royaume-Uni en novembre 1995, le Comiti a recommand6 que le gouvemement ferme les centres de ditention en Irlande du Nord et abolisse la legislation d'urgence. I1 a suggiri une riiducation des policiers en Irlande du Nord, en particulier les policiers charg6s de mener des enqu&tes.Eu tgard B la dcessitt de disposer de centres pinitenciers, le gouvernement britannique devrait poursuivre sa politique actuelle de reconstruction de ces centres en tenant compte des normes les plus modernes dans ce domaine. Le Royaume-Uni devrait en outre interdire le chitiment corporel. Le Comit6 avait exprim6 I'espoir, lors de I'examen du second rapport piriodque de la Hongrie, en avril 1993, que ce pays introduirait des dispositions spicifiques dans son code pinal et prendrait de nouvelles mesures administratives visant B privenir plus efficacement des actes de torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou digradants. I1 avait igalement suggiri aux autoritis hongroises de renforcer les programmes de formation des personnels concernis par l'application de la Convention. Dans ses observations finales concernant le rapport initial prisenti par la Tunisie en avril 1990, le Comit6 avait salui I'ivolution de la situation dans le domaine des droits de I'homme dans le pays depuis novembre 1987. Le Cornit6 avait exprim6 l'espoir que les contradictions entre les dispositions de la Convention et celles de la ltgislation nationale seraient risolues aussi t6t que possible et que des riponses seraient fournies, lors du prochain examen du rapport tunisien, aux questions du Comiti qui sont resties sans rtponses en 1990. La Convention contre la torture La Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cmels, inhumains ou digradants a it6 adoptie par I'Assemblte ginirale le 10 dtcembre 1984 et est entrie en vigueur le 26 juin 1987. Elle difinit la torture comme atout acte par lequel une douleur ou des souffrances aigues, physiques ou mentales sont intentionnellement infligies B une personne aux fins, notamment, d'obtenir d'elle ou d'une tierce personne des renseignements - 3 - DWGl985 3 novembre 1998 ou des aveux, de la punir d'un acte qu'elle ou une tierce personne a commis ou est soup~onnied'avoir cornrnis, de I'intirnider ou de faire pression sur elle ou d'intimider ou de faire pression sur une tierce personne, ou pour tout autre motif fond6 sur une forme de discrimination quelle qu'elle soit, lorsqu'une telle douleur ou de telles souffrances sont infligies par un agent de la fonction publique ou toute autre personne agissant B titre officiel ou B son instigation ou avec son consentement exprks ou tacite,,. La Convention stipule que les tats parties interdiront la torture et autres traitements inhumains dans leur ligislation nationale. Elle dispose qu'aucune circonstance exceptionnelle ni aucun ordre d'un suptrieur ou d'une autoriti publique ne peuvent &re invoquis pour justifier des actes de torture. Elle prtvoit I'extradition des coupables d'actes de torture afin qu'ils soient jugts dans le pays de leurs crimes ou dans n'importe quel tat partie ?ila Convention. Le Comiti peut, aux termes d'une disposition facultative de la Convention, procider B une enqu&te confidentielle lorsqu'il dispose d'informations dignes de foi faisant itat d'actes de torture. L'enquite peut comporter une visite sur le tenitoire de ta tat partie concerni. Aux termes de I'article 22, tout i tat partie B la Convention peut diclarer B tout moment qu'il reconndt la compitence du Comitt pour recevoir et examiner des communications prisentks par ou pour le compte de particuliers relevant de sa juridiction qui pritendent &trevictimes d'une violation, par un Etat partie, des dispositions de la Convention. Le plaignant doit avoir prialablement tpuisi les voies de recours disponibles au niveau national. [03 nov 19981 DWGl985 : LE COMITE CONTRE LA TORTURE TLENDRA SA VINGT ET ... Page 3 of 4 Tout tat partie peut en outre, au titre de l'article 21, reconnaitre la compitence du Comiti pour recevoir des communications d'un tat partie qui pritend qu'un autre tat partie ne s'acquitte pas de ses obligations au titre de la Convention. Le Comiti n'a pas it6 saisi de plaintes au titre de cet article. Lors de sa demikre session, la Commission des droits de l'homme a inviti tous les tats qui ratifient la Convention ou y adh&ent, ainsi que les tats parties qui ne I'ont pas encore fait, B faire les diclarations privues aux articles 21 et 22 de la Convention et B iviter de formuler des riserves sur I'article 20 ou B envisager la possibiliti de lever leurs riserves sur cet article aux termes duquel < - 4 - DWG/985 3 novembre 1998 Autres activitis des Nations Unies dans la lutte contre la torture Outre les efforts visant B 1'Bimination de la torture, I'Organisation des Nations Unies pr&teassistance aux victimes de la torture gr2ce au Fonds de contributions volontaires des Nations Unies pour les victimes de la torture, itabli en 1981. Lors de sa demikre session, qui s'est tenue B Genhe du 16 mars au 24 avril, la Commission des droits de I'homrne a lanci un appel B tous les gouvemements, B toutes les organisations et B tous les particuliers qui sont en mesure de le faire pour qu'ils contribuent annuellement au Fonds afin que de faire face B une demande d'assistance en augmentation constante. Par la m&merisolution, adoptie le 17 avril 1998, la Commission a dkcidi de proroger de trois ans le mandat du Rapporteur spicial sur la torture et a encouragi tous les gouvemements B envisager sirieusement d'inviter le Rapporteur spicial B se rendre dam leur pays. La Commission a igalement prii le Prisident du Comiti contre la torture et le Rapporteur spicial sur la question de la torture B participer aux activitis du groupe de travail chargi d'ilaborer le projet de protocole facultatif se rapportant B la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains, qui doit faire rapport sur ses travaux B la Commission au d6but de 1999. Ce projet de protocole facultatif est destini B instaurer, i titre de mesure priventive de la torture, un systkme international de visites aux lieux de ditention. En effet, les cas de torture imputables B des agents de l'~tatdans l'exercice de leurs fonctions surviennent le plus souvent durant les piriodes de detention dite priventive ou administrative, c'est-B-dire avant procks. tats parties B la Convention Les 107 tats suivants ont ratifii la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou digradants ou ont accidi B cet instrument : Afghanistan, Albanie, Algirie, Allemagne, Antigua-et-Barbuda, Arabie Saoudite, Argentine, Armtnie, Australie, Autriche, Azerbai'djan, Bangladesh, B6larus. Bilize, Benin, Bosnie-Herzigovine, Brisil, Bulgarie, Burundi, Cambodge, Cameroun, Canada, Cap- Vert, Chili, Chine, Chypre, Colombie, Costa Rica, CBte d'Ivoire, Croatie, Cuba, Danemark, Egypte, El Salvador, Guateur, Espagne, Estonie, ~tats-~nis,~thiopie, ex-Ripublique Yougoslave de Mackdoine, Fidiration de Russie, Finlande, France, Giorgie, Grkce, Guatemala, Guinie, Guyane, Honduras, Hongrie, Islande, Israel, Italie, Jamahiriya arabe libyenne, Jordanie, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kowei't, Kirghizistan, Lettonie, Liechtenstein, Lituanie, Ripublique de Moldova, Luxembourg, Malawi, Make, Maroc, Maurice, Mexique, Monaco, Namibie, Nipal, Niger, Norvkge, Nouvelle-Zilande, Ouganda, Ouzbilustan, Panama, Paraguay, Pays-Bas, Ptrou, [03 nov 19981 DWGl985 : LE COMITE CONTRE LA TORTURE TIENDRA SA VINGT ET ... Page 4 of 4 - 5 - DWGl985 3 novembre 1998 3a Philippines, Pologne, Portugal, RCpublique de CorCe, RCpublique dkmocratique du Congo, Rkpublique slovaque, Rkpublique tchkque, Roumanie, Royaume-Uni, SknCgal, Seychelles, SlovCnie, Somalie, Sri Lanka, Sukde, Suisse, Tchad, Tadjikistan, Togo, Tunisie, Turquie, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yimen et Yougoslavie. Des declarations ont Cti faites au titre des articles 21 et 22 par les 39 tats parties suivants : AlgCrie, Argentine, Australie, Autriche, Bulgarie, Canada, Chypre, Croatie, Danemark, huateur, Espagne, Ftdkration de Russie, Finlande, France, Grkce, Hongrie, Islande, Italie, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Make, Monaco, Norvkge, Nouvelle-ZClande, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Portugal, Rkpublique tchkque, Sinkgal, Slovaquie, SlovCnie, Sukde, Suisse, Togo, Tunisie, Turquie, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yougoslavie. Le Royaume-Uni et les ~tats-~nisont fait la dkclaration prCvue B I'article 21 seulement. Composition du Comitk Le Comitk est un organe de dix experts sikgeant B titre personnel. I1 est actuellement composC des experts suivants : M. Peter Thomas Bums (Canada), M. Guibril Camara (Sknkgal), M. Sayed Kassem el Masry (~~~pte),M. Antonio Silva Henriques Gaspar (Portugal), M. Alejandro Gonzilez Poblete (Chili), M. Andreas Mavrommatis (Chypre), M. Bent Sorensen panemark), M. Alexander Yakovlev (FCdCration de Russie), M. Yu Mengja (Chine) et M. Bostjan M. Zupan (SlovCnie). Le ComitC est prCsidk par M. Bums. MM. Camara, Gonzilez Poblete et Zupancic sont les Vice-Prksidents et M. Sorensen le Rapporteur du Comitk. Calendrier pour I'examen des rapports Le calendrier provisoire pour l'examen des rapports B la vingt et uni6me session est prCsentC B titre indicatif, sous risewe de l'approbation du Comitk B l'ouverture de la session : Date d'examen Pays Cote du rapport Mercredi 11 novembre Yougoslavie : rapport initial (CATlCl16lAdd.7) Jeudi 12 novembre Islande : rapport initial (CATlCl37lAdd.2) Vendredi 13 novembre Croatie : deuxi6me rapport (CATIC133lAdd.4) Lundi 16 novembre Royaume-Uni : troisikme rapport (CATlCl44lAdd.1) Mardi 17 novembre Hongrie : troisikme rapport (CAT/C/34/Add,lO) Mercredi 18 novembre Tunisie : deuxikme rapport (CATlC/20/Add.7) Le contenu de chacun de ces rapports sera refl6tC dans nos cornmuniquCs de presse au moment de leur prksentation devant le Comitk. Etats qui ont signe ou ratifie la Convention Page 1 of 5 NATIONS UNIES 3s E Conseil Economique Distr. et Social GENERALE ElCN.411995135 24 novembxe 1994 FRANCAIS 0riginal:ANGLAIS COMMISSION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME Cinquante et unikme session Point 10 b) de I'ordre du jour provisoire QUESTION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME DE TOUTES LES PERSONNES SOUMISES A UNE FORME QUELCONQUE DE DETENTION OU D'EMPRISONNEMENT ETAT DE LA CONVENTION CONTRE LA TORTURE ET AUTRES PEINES OU TRAITEMENTS CRUELS, INHUMAINS OU DEGRADANTS Rapport du Secritaire giniral 1. L'Assemblie gknirale, par sa rbolution 39146 du 10 d6cembre 1984, a adopt6 et ouvert i la signature, i la ratification et B I'adhtsion la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou d6gradants et a demand6 i tous les gouvemements d'envisager de signer et de ratifier la Convention B titre prioritaire. 2. La Convention a 6ti ouverte i la signature i New York le 4 f6vrier 1985. Conformiment i son article 27, la Convention est entree en vigueur le 26 juin 1987, trentikme jour aprb la date du dipat auprks du Secritaire g6niral de I'Organisation des Nations Unies du vingtikme instrument de ratification ou d'adhision. 3. Par sa r6solution 1994138, du 4 mars 1994, la Commission des droits de I'hornrne a encouragC les Etats parties ?I notifier dks que possible au Secr6taire giniral qu'ils acceptaient les amendements aux articles 17 et 18 de la Convention 11 et a demand6 instamment aux Etats parties qui n'avaient pas encore vers6 leur quote- part, et en particulier ?iceux dont le retard portait sur deux ou plusieurs exercices financiers constcutifs, de s'acquitter sans plus tarder de leurs obligations; elle a aussi demand6 instamment i tous les Etats de devenir parties ?i la Convention i titre prioritaire, et invite tous les Etats qui ratifiaient la Convention ou y adhiraient, ainsi que les Etats parties qui ne I'avaient pas encore fait, B faire les diclarations pr6vues aux articles 21 et 22 de la Convention et i envisager la possibiliti de retirer leurs r6serves i l'article 20. 4. Au 15 novembre 1994, 84 Etats avaient ratifii la Convention ou y avaient adhiri et 14 autres l'avaient signie. On trouvera en annexe au pr6sent rapport la liste des Etats qui ont sign6 ou ratifi6 la Convention ou qui y ont adhCr6 ainsi que la date de leur signature, de leur ratification ou de leur adhision. 5. A la m&medate, 35 des Etats parties ?ila Convention, B savoir I'Algirie, ]'Argentine, I'Australie, I'Autriche, la Bulgarie, le Canada, Chypre, la Croatie, le Danemark, l1Equateur,ltEspagne, la Fidiration de Russie, la Etats qui ont sign6 ou ratifi6 la Convention Page 2 of 5 Finlande, la France, la Grhe, la Hongrie, I'Italie, le Liechtenstein, le Luxembourg, Make, Monaco, la Norvkge, la Nouvelle-Zlande, les Pays-Bas, la Pologne, le Portugal, la Slovinie, la Sukde, la Suisse, le Togo, la Tunisie, la Turquie, I'Umguay, le Venezuela et la Yougoslavie, avaient fait les declarations privues aux articles 21 et 22 de la Convention. En outre, deux Etats parties, les Etats-Unis d'AmCrique et le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, avaient fait uniquement la diclaration privue ?i l'article 21, ce qui porte ?i37 le nombre total de dCclarations faites au titre de cet article 21. Aux termes de I'article 21, tout Etat partie ?i la Convention peut dkclarer ?i tout moment qu'il reconnait la compitence du Comiti contre la torture pour recevoir et examiner des communications dans lesquelles un Etat partie pritend qu'un autre Etat partie ne s'acquitte pas de ses obligations au titre de IxConvention. Aux termes de l'article 22, tout Etat partie ?ila Convention peut d6clarer ?i tout moment qu'il reconnait la compitence du Comiti pour recevoir et examiner des communications prisenties par des particuliers ou pour le compte de particuliers relevant de sa juridiction qui pritendent itre victimes d'une violation, par un Etat partie, des dispositions de la Convention. 6. Les dispositions des articles 21 et 22 sont entries en vigueur le 26 juin 1987, conformCment au paragraphe 2 de I'article 21 et au paragraphe 8 de l'article 22. 7. Le Comiti contre la torture a tenu ses douziime et treizikme sessions I'Office des Nations Unies ?i Genkve du 18 au 29 avril 1994 et du 7 au 18 novembre 1994, respectivement. ConformCment aux dispositions de l'article 24 de la Convention, le Comiti a prCsentC aux Etats parties et ?i 1'Assemblie gCnCrale, ?i sa quarante-neuviime session, son rapport annuel 3/, qui portait sur les travaux de ses onzikme et douzikme sessions. 8. Pour 1994-1995, la composition du Comiti est la suivante : M. Hassib Ben Ammar (Tunisie) M. Peter Thomas Bums (Canada) M. Alexis Dipanda Mouelle (Cameroun) M. Fawzi El Ibrashi (Egypte) M. Ricardo Gil Lavedra (Argentine) Mme Julia Iliopoulos-Strangas (Grkce) M. Hugo Lorenzo (Umguay) M. Mukunda Regmi (NCpal) M. Bent Sorensen panemark) M. Alexander Yakovlev (FCdiration de Russie). -11 Amendements adoptis le 9 septembre 1992 par la ConfCrence des Etats parties, conformiment au paragraphe 1 de I'article 29 de la Convention (CATlSPlSR.4) et entirinis par 1'AssemblCe gtnCrale dans sa risolution 4711 11. du 16 dicembre 1992. -21 Pour le texte des diclarations, riserves ou objections faites par les Etats parties au sujet de la Convention jusqu'au ler janvier 1994, voir le document CAT/CI2/Rev.3. -31 Documents officiels de 1'AssemblCe ginirale. auarante-neuvihme session. Suppliment No 44 (Al49144). ANNEXE Liste des Etats qui ont signi ou ratifit la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cmels. inhumains ou dkpradants ou y ont adhCrC au 15 novembre 1994 Etats qui ont sign6 ou ratifit la Convention Page 3 of 5 393 &&s Date de la signature Date de rtception de l'instmment de u ratification ou d'adhtsion Afghanistan 14 fkvrier 1985 1 ler avril 1987 Afrique du Sud 129 janvier 1993 1,I Albanie 11 mai 1994 bl Algtrie a/ 1126 novembre 1985 1 12 septembre 1989 Allemagne 113 octobre 1986 I ler octobre 1990 Antigua-et-Barbuda 7119 juillet 1993 bl Argentine a/ 14124 septembre 1986 Armtnie 7113 septembre 1993 bl Australie a/ 10 dkcembre 1985 8 aofit 1989 Autriche a/ 14 mars 1985 29 juillet 1987 Btlarus -19 dtcembre 1985 13 mars 1987 Belgique 4 ftvrier 1985 1 Belize 1-1 Bknin 71112-mars 1992 b/ I Bolivie I-4 fkvrier 1985 Bosnie-Herzkgovine 716 mars 1992 c/ Brtsil 123 septembre 1985 128 septembre 1989 Bulgarie a/ 110 juin 1986 1 16 dkcembre 1986 Burundi 1118 ftvrier 1993 b/ Cambodge 1-1 15 octobre 1992 b/ Cameroun 19 dtcembre 1986 bl Canada a/ 123 aoat 1985 124 juin 1987 Cap-Vert 14juin 1992 b/ Chili 23 septembre 1987 30 septembre 1988 Chine -12 dtcembre 1986 4 octobre 1988 Chypre a/ 9 octobre 1985 18 juillet 1991 Colombie 10 avril 1985 8 dtcembre 1987 Costa Rica 4 ftvrier 1985 11 novembre 1993 Croatie a/ 718 octobre 1991 6 Cuba 127 j-1 = Danemark a/ -1 27 mai 1987 Egypte 71~5juin 1986 b/ Equateur a/ 14130 mars 1988 Espagne a/ 114 ftvrier 1985 121 octobre 1987 Estonie 7121 octobre 1991 bl Etats-Unis d'Amtrique d/ 17121 octobre 1994 l~thio~ie 7114 mars 1994 b/ Ftdkration de Russie a/ 10 dtcembre 1985 13 mars 1987 Finlande a/ 4 fkvrier 1985 130 aofit 1989 Etats qui ont signi ou ratifii la Convention Page 4 of 5 3Sr France al 4 fkvrier 1985 (18fkvrier 1986 Gabon 21 janvier 1986 1 Gambie 23 octobre 1985 Giorgie 126-octobre 1994 b/ Grkce al 14 fivrier 1985 16- octobre 1988 Guatemala [p5 janvier 1990 bl -Guinee 30 mai 1986 10 octobre 1989 Guyana 25 janvier 1988 19 mai 1988 Hongrie a/ 28 novembre 1986 15 avril 1987 Indonksie 23 octobre 1985 I Irlande 28 septembre 1992 Islande 4 fkvrier 1985 IsraEl 22 octobre 1986 - Italic4 fkvrier 1985 -12 janvier 1989 Jamahiriya arabe libyenne 7116 mai 1989 bl Jordanie 113 novembre 1991 bl Lettonie 14 avril 1992 b/ Liechtenstein al (27juin 1985 ( 2 novembre 1990 Luxembourg a/ 122 fivrier 1985 129 septembre 1987 Make a/ 13 septembre 1990 bl Maroc 18 janvier 1986 121 juin 1993 Maurice 19dkcembre 1992 b/ Mexique (18 mars 1985 (23janvier 1986 Monaco al 716 dicembre 1991 bl Nipal 7114 mai 1991 bl Nicaragua 15 avril 1985 NigCria 28 juillet 1988 Norvkge al 4 fivrier 1985 -9 juillet 1986 Nouvelle-Zlande al 14 janvier 1986 -10 dkcembre 1989 Ouganda 13novembre 1986 bl Panama 22 fkvrier 1985 24 aoGt 1987 Paraguay 23 octobre 1989 12 mars 1990 Pays-Bas al 4 fkvrier 1985 21 dkcembre 1988 P6rou 29 7 juillet 1988 Philippines 71- Pologne a/ 13 janvier 1986 26 juillet 1989 Portugal a/ 4 fkvrier 1985 9 fivrier 1989 Rkpublique dorninicaine 4 fivrier 1985 Rkpublique tchkque 71ler janvier 1993 GI Roumanie 7)18 dCcembre 1990 b/ Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne 115 mars 1985 (8dkcembre 1988 Etats qui ont sign6 ou ratifii la Convention Page 5 of 5 et d'Irlande du Nord d/ u %a Stntgal 14 ftvrier 1985 121 aoQt 1986 Seychelles 15 mai 1992 bl Sierra Leone (18mars 1985 Slovaquie 1) 1- 29 mai 1993 bl Slovknie a/ )16 juillet 1993 bl Somalie 1724janvier 1990 bl Soudan 14 juin 1986 A- Sri Lanka )) 3 janvier 1994 bl Sukde a/ 4 ftvrier 1985 8 janvier 1986 Suisse a/ 4 ftvrier 1985 2 dkembre 1986 Togo a/ 25 mars 1987 18 novembre 1987 1 Tunisie a/ 26 aoQt 1987 23 septembre 1988 Turquie a/ 25 janvier 1988 2 aoat 1988 Ukraine 27 ftvrier 1986 24 ftvrier 1987 Uruguay a/ 4 ftvrier 1985 24 octobre 1986 Venezuela a/ 15 fivrier 1985 29 juillet 1991 Ytmen 15 novembre 1991 b/ Yougoslavie a/ 118 avril 1989 (10septembre 1991 -a/ A fait les dtclarations prtvues aux articles 21 et 22 de la Convention. -cl Succession. d/ A fait la d6claration prkvue B l'article 21 de la Convention. - PAGE D'ACCUEILI PLAN DU SITE1 RECHERCHE1 Wl DOCUMENTSI-1 REUNIONS1-1 MESSAGES O Copyright 1996-2000 Haut Commissariat aux Droits de 1'Homme Gensve, Suisse ANNEX FLORENCE HARTMANN LES GUERRES SECRETES DE LA POLlTlQUE ET DE LA JUSTICE INTERNATIONALES Fin Pa& rr ch2timrnr a% partic 6 k qui lui pcrmcmaicnt dc boucler plus npidcmcnt ss cnq awil 1994, quclques beures avant dCdcnchemcnt du gho- cidc. 11 a ttC saki par les hilles des trois mernbres Franqak de Font mine dc nc posstdcr aucun 4Cmenr s~ula suspects db ou sur ccmk officicl scrba qui ont aid6 ~inarMiom I'tquipagc qui onr p6i aux cBr& du prGidcnt rwandais ct de son du pouvoir aprtr I'avoir accompagnt clans su crima. Ils homologue burundais. U est pcrsuadk quc Paul Kagamt saait Fcrmcr Ic TPI mais, auparavant. Ic fiqonncr i lcur guise. I'instigarcur dc cct ancnrar. Tourchis, si le r&ultat de ses invwd- sent cnuevoir qu'h son[ opposu i ccnaines pounuita ct s im: gations concluait A la participation prGumtc de I'acrud pr&i- miscent de ~luen olus ouvcrrcmenr dam la polidque. .rdnale du dent rwandais, il ne pourrait pas cngager de poursuites conwc bureau du procurcur, au prix de violcnta disputes EL au nom lui en raison dc I'immunitt accordtc cn France aux chefs d'~rat dc la srabilir6 da gouverncmcnu locaux, h rcnoncenr h excrcer en exercicc. I1 dcvrair don demander A I'ONU de saisir lc TPIR juqu'au bout la prcrsions qu'ils om misa en place pour obrcnir ou i son procurcur d'acrccr sa prirnaud pour dklencher une I'arrararion dc Karadzic cr de Mladic. procCdure judi~aire'~~.En novcmbre 2001, Ies Amtricains se sonr intiressts aux dimarches du jugc Bruguiuitrc auprts du TPlR Pour lc TPIQ Isenjeux amtricains sonr diECrena, le march6 4 er onr qucstionnt Dd Ponte sur cc qu'il savair au sujct dc aussi. La Etau-Unis vculcnt s'assurcr du soutien de lcun allits KagamC. Mais ils n'onr pas encore fait pan de lcur opposition a mandais A la fcrmerurc du tribunal d'hha mtmc s'il atloin tourc pomuitc contrc lcur dliC dans la rtgion da Grands Lacs i'zvok tcmint dc juger !es plus Eiun &pirake du pouvoir ou courre son cnrourag. Pour le moment, ia swategie ambicainc hum, instigatcur du ghocidc dc 1994 dam kqucl prtr d'un cn vu dc pridpirer la fermerurc du TPIR consisce d'd'abord million dc Tuuis cr Hum modCrG 01-11 pCri cn ccnr joun. A exerccr des prasions sur les gouvcrncmenrr africains pour qu'h I'annoncc, cn novunbrc 2001, d'unc fcrmcture rapide du tribu- hchent les hgitifs rwandais, rcfugib sur leur tcrriroire. Lcurs nal, la autorir& mandaises om protart, jugcant I'idCc prtma- dimarcha dent preuvc du souticn amtricain aux dcux TPI ct nu&. Mais le prbidenr Paul Kagamt n'wr pas diEicilc i aboutisscnt a trois arresrarions sur lcs vingr-dcux inculpb nvan- connincre. Carla Dcl Ponte a ouven cn dtccmbre 1999 des dais cn hire. cnqukcs conuc da offidcrs mrris dc I'm& du Front patrio- tiquc wandais (FPR) quc KagamC commandait Ces enquh dita spCdales * nc portent pas sur le ghoadc des Tuais, le 103. LC 17 novcmbcc 2006, lc jugc Bruguihrc a rcndu offiudlcmcnt premier mandat du TPIR, mais sur la massacres mmmis conuc Iu concllrciom de son cnquttc, rermintc cn 2004.11 duignc Paul Kapnt Ics ghocidaircs et les civils hum qui &cnt cn mvsc Ic Rwanda comme le cammandiuirc prtrumC de I'mcnrar qui fur I'Cvtncmcnt devanr I'avancte dc I'armte du FPR Fon dc ccne victoire mili- dtdcnchcur du gtnocidc. Ncuf mandau d'm& inrcmationu sonr don dClivrtr pour s complicirt d'a~rauinar* conuc dm prochu du priri- Pire qui a mis fin au ghocide, lc prkident-&Cral &me que dcnr rwandais, donr James IGbycbc, chef &bur-major gtnCnl dcr Forca ses homma n'ont pas de comprcs h rcndre la justice d'unc lwyldlirer de &fenre, er Charles IGyonga, chcf #Cut-major dc I'arm~c communautt intanauonalc qui a l&C lu Tuais x fairc massa- dc rcrrc. LC Rwanda rompc immtdiarcmcnr sa rclarions diplomariquu crcr. Prosper prornn quc la fcrmemre du TPIR mema un rcrmc avcc la Fmcc, qu'il accuse dc vodoir nicr lc gtnocidc cr masqucr son rdle dmr I'enrincrncnr da soldarr wandais impliqutr dam lcs -sacra. La i cacnqutrs qui le dtrangcnr. Elle permema, en mtme rcmps, France hair I'ditc du pouvoir hum qui a prcparC cr mis cn lruvrc lc de aoupcr court aux vdltitb du juge Jean-Loui Bmguikrc dc gtnocidc de 194. Le 19 avril2007, le R~vandainrcnu unc acrion conuc Faire inculper le prbidcnr Kagamt par lc TPIR k juge franqais la FMCCdmc la COUIinrcrnarionde dc justice (ClJ). I'accwmr &en- m depuis 1998 chqC de I'insnucrion sur Pmentat conwe frcindrc lc droir inrcmariond en chcrchanr i pounuivrc lc prtsidcnr Pad I'avion du prisidenr rwandais Juvtnal Habyarimana, harm lc &gmt er cerraim dc ra prochcs. Cns jusricc uop cotireuse, sans impact quanriLable er dkrabi- expliquc Del Ponre. Formellemenr saisi depuis le 10 ocrobre par lisarrice, aussi bien au Rwanda qu'en a-Yougoslavie : les TPI le prtsidenr du TPI sur le manque de cooptradon de Belgrade, le ne sonr plus perGus quc comme dcs obsracles la gexion de Conseil de sicurire refuse, par une r6olurion, d'enjoindre i la I'aprk-guerre. Arntricains et Europtens s'enrendent pour laisser Serbie d'arrtrer lcs fugirifs er de cesser d'enmver le travail de Iss rribunaux conduirc leurs procts jusqu'en 2008 mais som- la justice intcrnarionale. Pourrant tvlladic esr i Belgrade, sous la menr Is parquet de rcrminer scs enqueres d'ici h. la fin 2004. Et, prorecrion de I'arrnCe, avec l'aval du chef de I'Erar, Kosrunica. pour imposcr Imr volonrk, ils votenr des coupes budgCtaires qui Zoran Djindjic, le Premier minisue serbe, n'a pas s&samrnent rouchenr principalcmenr le parquet. Au pied du mur, Eel Ponre dc pouvoir pour I'arrCrer. Unc r6solurion conrraignanre du doir rwoir i la baisse son programme des poursuires. Dc cent Conscil de s6uritt pouvait I'aider B convaincre la classe politique cinqumrc suspms courant 2000, la liste a ttt rtduire fin 2001 serbe. Pierre Richard Prosper rassure Del Ponre. L'aide finan- a cmr huir suspects prioritaires. Mais il faudrair jusqu'en 2015 citre amtricaine, accordte chaque ante i Belgrade, esr condi- pour les iuger., Fin 2002. la lisre cst scindte en dcux cadgories rionnte i I'arrestarion des hgirifs : clle ne sera pas verstc si D'un cdrt, les affaires qui ne pcuvcnr pas &re jugtes ailleurs Mladic n'est pas arr6t.i avant le prinrernps 2003. I1 ne riendci qu'au TPI. Dc I'autrc, celles qui pourraienr Crrc cdhs aux juri- pas sa promessc. cic:ions locales. Les tquipes se concenrrcnr d&mnais en prioritt Prosper rare sourd aux rccornmandarions du TPI. Ddbur sw la prcmitrc lisre. Lcs enquetes concernant la cinquantaine 2003, il fiche plus ouverrcmenr que jamais la volontt am& de suspects de la deuxicme lisre sonr gcltes. Si le temps le pcr- cainc de soumenre le tribunal i unc gesrion entii.remenr poli- met, elks seronr complCtks avant d'hre rransmises aux parquets riquc dc sa srrar6gie de sonie. Lsrs d-une visire i Belgrade en a-yougoslaves. Del Ponte ne veur pas les abandonner car, pour janvicr, il propose aux auroritts a'arrtter qurre accusCs sur la le morncnt, les oibunaux locaux ne sonr pas en mesurc de garan- vingraine de fugirifs vivant en Serjis : Karadzic, Mladic ainsi tir une justice utdible. De peur de dissuadcr rourc cooptrarion, que Sljivancanin et Radic, poursuicis dans I'aKaire Vukovar. I1 elle rehx d'annoncer publiquemenr les coupes drastiques qu3eUe leur promer, en conrrepanie, la sqension des cnqu&cs en cours vient d'optrer. qui risquent d'envoycr sur le banc 3ss accllsts unc bonne parde Le 30 ocrobre 2002. Del Ponrc s'efforce dc convaincre le de la direction serbe du temps dc la guerre en Bosnie er au Conseil de sCcuritt dc ne pas laisser la strartgic d'achkvemcnt se Kosovo, dont ccnains membres sonr roujours aux affaires. La fahe au dtrrimenr de la justice. S'il commandc au parquet de pressc belgradoisc consrare immtdlaternem k ILhzgs du TPI ressexer ses poursuites cr aux juges de priparer les ddlocalisa- par la superpuissance americaine. La piuparc des rirrss s'en rions, il doir pardtlcmcnt dorcr la Bosnie-Herripvine d'une rCjouisscnr cr croienr voir dans is5 dimarchss amtricaines le jurilic:ion i mtme dc prendre lc relais. I1 doir tgalemenr mercer signe d'une volonrd de ne pas laiscr le TPI r$gir le destin de les pr&ons ntcasaires pour obrenir I'arresration des fugitifs er I'm-Yougoslavie cr licr les maizs dss polirlqccs. Del Pofire 1'acc:s aux archivcs cr aux ttmoins quc Belgrade ma& aussi demande aux hCricains de 26-snrir. Prosper y consent Zag& rcfuscnr. Q I1 esr impCratif que les hauts responsables quelques semaines plus rard, lots Tcne cor.itr:nce de presse i civi!s er milirairss soient arrerks ssan dili ct qu'une Cour spt- La Hayc. tvlais sur le terrain, il pccrruir ses ni+arions j.xrkes cidc soit cr&, sans quoi les tchtances ne pourront pas Ctre qui onr pour effer de dissuadcr rc~xscoo;t:arion drs sauvernc- respestcs ... A ca conditions seulement, le TPI pourra envisager ments locau. avec le ?PI, consci?:is quc lcur; manczv:es &la- dc conc!urc sa mission avec la cerrirudc d'avoir rendu la justice no, roires om roures lcs chanccs d'&: ;ymrcs. Fin dr partic Les EuropCens x monucnt indifireno cerrc ingtrencc qui une e coopCradon sans r&ewe 8 avec la juridiction internauo- bafoue le principe qu'ih avaient auuefois dtfendu d'une justice nale. Prosper cncouragc donc Del Ponre i profirer de sa visite i Washington pour rktablir Jc dialogue avec les dirigeano rwandais indtpcndanrc. Del Ponre leu dir mi-2003 : r Je suis au point mort, j'ai dix-neuf fugitifs en Serbie, donr Karadzic cr Mladic, 6gaIemenr de passage. La magistrare accepre volonuers, car I'obs- mais plus personnc nc veur cntendte parler du TPI. Commc si uuction dc Kigali risque de conduire I'acquittemenr des je dcvais fermcr les pones aprh le proch Milosevic [donr la fin accusCs dc genocide, Faute de rhoins. La quasi-toralitt des est alors prCvue debut 20051. D Mais les EuropCens n'onr dtror- rhoins de I'accusation vienncnr du Rwanda. Cerre arme redou- mais plus qu'un mot i la bouche : Ies uibunaux son1 chers er table donr dispose le pouvoir rwandais esr un conrre-feu allumt " nc produiscnr pas de rerour sur investiiemenr a. D'aucuns par Kidpour amcner Del Ponre i renoncer 8 ses enquires en vonr jwqu'i dire : r IL nc dent ni le temps ni I'argenr qui rnarge du gdnocidc, qui vixnr des officiers de I'armie rutsic du leur sont consacrts. r La CPI a incidemment chiles TPI da From patriotique rwandais. Car le rnandar du TPIR ne sc Limite prtoccupariom da EuropCens qui ne comprennent pas que leu pas au gtnocide organist cr dirigt par les exrrtmisres hum rnais abandon fair lc lit dc la crotadc de I'administradon amCricainc i routes la graves arreintes au droit humanitire inremarional, conrre la jusricc internadonale. La granda puissances n'ont pcrpttrtes en 1994. Selon les experrs indtpendants, auelque disormais plus de scmpulcs h assumer leur decision dc fcr~ueris rrcnre milk Hum auraienr trt ruts sur le terriroire rwandais, tribunal. Les discussions informella au sein du Conscil de sku- lots de la progression de I'armte du FPR Le parquet d'kusha rirt cn vuc de I'adoption d'unc rtrolurion formalisvlt lc den- a reperrorik quarorzc sites de massacres cr renre de remonrer la drier du plan dc fermrmre pour ies deux TPI commencenr au chaine de commandemenr. Officiellemenr, Kagamt a promis i printemps 2003. L'annie 2003 va tuc la quinresscnce de la diE- Dcl Ponre son assistance main le gtneral-prisidenr n'a jamais eu cult6 pour la justice inrernauon.de de Faire valoir ses principes I'inrenrion de her un seul de ses hommes au TPIR D'oh les Face au jcu politique. pressions exerctes pendant I'Cre 2002. Del Ponre esr alors Les dtbau sur I'Irak vicnncnt de diviser les membrs du conrrainrc d'ordonner i sa rrois enquCreurs de suspendre leur Conxil de skurirt. La Maison de verre at en effervescence. mission au Rwanda mais elle refuse de suspendre, mtme rempo- RCglCe, L'fire TPI ne mtrirc pas quc I'on s'y arrarde. La prtpa- rairement, I'insuuction. L'equipe doir rravailler depuis Arusha ration de la rtsoluuon ar une simple formalirt. Du moins pour sur les preuves dtji accumultes er sur I'idenrificarion de rtmoins, la France, la Russic cr la Chine. Bien qu'accaparb par la gucrre rtfugits hors du Rwanda. cn Irak. la ktau-~niscr la Grande-Breragne y voient poumnr A I'insu de Carla Dd Ponre, Lbtricain Michael Johnson, I'occasion dc servir plusieurs desseins A la fois. Mi-mai 2003, arrivt en seprernbre 2002 Prosper force unc rcnconuc cntrc ies diripnu nvandais er la &usha pour assurer I'intcrirn le procureure des TPI, Carla Del Ponre. Depuis un an, les reladons temps de pourvoir le posre de procureur adjoinr, rest6 vacant cnrrc Kigali ct &ha sont au plus bas. A I'itt 2002, le gouvcr- depuis un an, ordonne la suspension des cq enquCres spicidcs .. nemenr rwandais a pdyst pendant plusicws semaines la pro- Del Ponrc ne le dtcouvre qu'en decernbre. Johnson esr immedia- cb sur le gtnocide en bloquanr la venue dsrtmoins-victiia i tcmenr sommt de renrrer i La Haye. La responsabilire de l'sn- Amha. Del Ponre a prorest6 en juillet puis en octobre auprts querc esr alors confide i un substirut brirannique, Mark bloore. du Conscil dc sCcurir.4 de I'ONU mais celui-ci s'esr conreyt, en Les aurorires rwandaises savenr dtsormais que Del Ponrc ne dtcernbre 2002, d'unc simplc dtclararion appelanr les Etats i cedcra pas. Elles se rournent vets leurs puissants allizs americins Pair er chritimmt Fin dr partie er brinnniques. Dts lors Kigali exigc une rcnconue avec la procu- .. droit de poursuivre les rnernbres de son armk. Ils disent vouloir reure, sous midiation amtricaine, officiellement pour rtgler la , s'en charger. Du moins le prtrendent-ils pour essayer de neutral- pmblha de coopttation. Mais le dCdenchement de la gucrre en xr Del Ponte. Prosper intervienr B plusieurs reprises pour encou- Ink rcpoussc sans cme I'khtance. La venue de Dcl Ponte mi-mai : rager la procureurc B ceder la enquires spiciales au Rwanda. La 2003 B Washington at I'occasion de rtunir les deur parries. Prm magistrate, qui s'esr vu refuser I'accks am sits des massacres et per rassure la magisrrate : Ies Erats-Unis proposcnt leurs bons aux archives militaires, ex disposte i laisser les Rwandais entre; offices er n'onr pas I'inrention d'interftrer dam la discussion. Del prendre, paralltlemenr au TPIR, leurs propres enquires. A Ponte ne se doute pas un instant de ce qui vase produirc. condition que les enqueteurs d'hha puissenr acdder aux dos- Mercredi 14 mai 2003, en fin d'aprk-midi, dans une Cltgante 3 siers d'instruction wandais. n Je ne peux pas me baser unique- .$ sdle de conftrence du DCparrerncnt d'~tatoi~ le son de rant de .: rnenr sur les prewes rccueillies i I'exdrieur du Rwanda auptks -%, pays s'est sans doure joui. Del Ponre ct sa cowillers prennenr .k. . dc la diaspora hurue don[ la ttmoignages sont motivk par des IM. -;L inttrtrs poliriques opposts aux vbtres. Je dois pouvoir vtrificr place autour d'unc table, face B la dtICgadon wndaise En bout ,.< de cable, Pierre Prosper joue la rnalua de ctrtrnonie. 11 interhe, ces informations sur place. Je veux bien travaillcr avec vous mais sugghe les grandes lignes dadibars. La parrie at biaide d'encree j'ai besoin de votre pleine cooptrarion n, explique Del Ponre. La de jeu. Elk se joue selon des r+es pretmblies pales Amtricajns procureure cri pr& B accorder quclques mois a.a aurorith d: er les Rwandais. Del Ponte se plaint dcs manauvres rwandaises Kigdi pour appomr la preuve de leur volonte de rendre jusice. pour paralyser lc tribunal er du refus de cooptrer sur la enquetes u Ces crimes existent, ils nc peuvent pas etre passes sous silence. spkiales. Les Rwandais ritorqucnt que le parquet esr loin d'avoir Les poursuivre serait un tltmenr de rCconciliation n, insisre- accompli son mandat. Pour preuve, iL onr pdparC une disqueue t-cue. Mais eUe ccigc de pder la haute main sur leurs enquires. cornportant trois cent cinquante noms de haurs raponsables prt- Prosper tente de I'en dissuader : r Le Rwanda conduitair les sum& du gtnocide concre qui le TPI n'a pas encore engagt de poursuires et les proces.. poursuires. La strarCgie d'achhcment qu'ils dtnoncent risque de permettre aux instigateurs du &nocide d'tchapper h la jusrice. Dans l'absolu, le TPIR pourrair renoncer i sa primautt au Prosper conclut cctte premiere rencontte en soulignant la ntcessitt profit du Rwanda si les enqutres aboutissaient i I'inculparion dc parvenir i un accord sur le renvoi de dossiers au Rwanda. d'officiers responsables des rnasncres commis en marge du gh- cide. Mais dans un Rwanda domine par les milicdires oltsis qui Jeudi 15 mai, 17 heury Nouvelle renwncre dam la mime ont libtrt le Rwanda des gtnocidaires, la justice est aux ordres sale du Dtpmement d'Erar La discussion s'engage immC- et les ttmoins de leun crimes condamn& au silence. Del Ponte diarcmenr sur lcs enquPtes sptddes. Le message est clair : Ic ne peut donc pas les laisser seuls en charge de poursuires tvcn- TPIR ne peut pas ltgirimer des enquttes conue les milicaires oleUes ni renoncer i sa primautt sur les proctdures qu'ils ouvri- rursis alors qu'il csr loin d'avoir tcrmint son uavail sur ic #no- client, comme le suggere avec insistance Prosper. A I'issue de la cide. Les Rwandais ne nienr pas les crimes mais conrescent i rtunion, aucun accord n'a ttt conch. Quelques pistes ont ttt quiconque, et en paniculier i la communautt internationale, le explortes qui miritenr &&re tlabortes. Prosper propose de la 104. La dtltprion mandaisc Cnir cornposte dc Gcdd Gzhihina, le rtsumer, dam les jours qui viennent, dans un document qui procurcur gtntd du Rwanda, Manin Ngap. I'offidcr de liaison -- pourra scrvir dc base i dc futures ntgociauons. Une nouvelle &r aupdr du TPIR er de Richard Saibcra. I'ambasudcur du Rwanda strie d'enuetiens cst prhemi-juillet i Kigali. Del Ponte encou- qrbdrs Narions Unis. rage les Rwandais discuter dans I'inrervalle avec les juga et 1e Fin dr partic grcffier pour rtgler ks qucsdons de la prorcction da dmoins cn chargc des enquetcs sptciales et des poursuires iventuclla. LC appclG k Amha, ct des possibilirCr de dtpaysement da procb procureur du TPIR n'aura plus aucun conrrdle sur la conduite aprb la fermeture du TPIR dcs cnqutres ni sur k dtmulernenr d'tvenrucls proca cr scra tenu de cMer routes lcs informadons cn sa possession aux auto- 11 heures. La Rwandais ne sonr pas dc Vendredi 16 mai, rick rwandaises. Del Pontc repousse lc documenr de la main ct la parrie. Del Ponre a rendn-vous au DCpmemenr d'~atpour laisse Xses conseillm lc soin d'informer Prospcr dc son refus d'y dixuter du TPN. Prospcr cr scs consciUm I'anendenr dam un souscrirc. De son cBtC, elk avertit lc cabinet dc Kofi hanqui burcau cxigu. Ils lui sournetrent un documenr intitult r RCsumt condamnc la manauvre amtricaine mais dent grief Del Ponte dcs conclusions cnuc le gouvcrncmcnt du Rwanda et lc TPIR rn dc s'8uc aposte i Ia prcssion d'un cat. er forrnulC cornme unc fcuille de route. Prise au pi+, Del Pontc acceptc nkmoins dc rcgarder le rate. Le projet a navesti L tencur des discussions dc la vciue. II prhroir I'abandon dc routes Ies enquem h I'cncontre da suspects de I'Armtc parrioriqur Prospcr n'acceptc pas la dtfaitc, d'aurant que son gouvcr- rwandaisc (APR) par lc puquet du TPIR er leur rcnvoi dcvant ncmenr s'at engag.! auprks dc Kieali er a d&jintgccie le: conrc- la juridicrion mandaisc, sans aucune ,wde de r&ulw. I1 ege panics. En Cchanse des garantics d'impunid contre route du parquct d'hha qu'il communique les sires rtpemorits des poursuite I'enconuc dcs miliraires tutsis dwanr k TPIR, Kigali massacres. Mais aussi qu'x il parrage tout tlCmenr dc prcuvc avec doit signer prochainuncnr un accord biadral avec la EW-~nis le gouvcrncmcnt du Rwanda *, malgrC I'interdiccion de trans- qui prortgc 1- ressomissants amCricaim de poursuita devanc la mcnrc la dtpositions dc rhoins & une auue juridiction sans Cour ptnale internarionale. Dcpuis lc dtbur de I'anntc 2003. les leur accord. Aurrc point litigieux, lc document stipulc que r le ktats-Unis tentcnr de condurc avec le plus grand nornbrc d'~tats parquet aura I'occasion de pasxr en revue les investigations une panics au rrairt dc Rome I'accord bilattral d'immunid de juri- fois qu'ella wont reninCes edou unc fois les poursuires cnga- dicrion visant ernpkher que Isressonissants amtricains soient gCcs s. Del Ponte proresre. Elle rappcllc sa proposition de la livrc's i la CPI. Aprb cettc signature, Kigali va en outre btndfi- veille. Prosper I'invirc I. modifier ie rare. Et, plut6r que de da- cicr dc la ldedc I'anbargo sur lcs armcs quc le Congrts am6ri- quer la pow clle s'y excrcc pour hriter une confronation avec cain avair mainrcnu ct d'unc assisrancc militairc subsmticlle da lc reprCsenranr amtricain.,Mais rout serait changer. L4 conseii- ~tats-Unisdots que la gucrrc dam la Rtpubliquc dhocraciquc lcrs du Dtparrcmcnr d'Etat notcnt les objccdons, font mine du Congo voisinc fair rage cr a dtjh cmponC plus dc rrois mil- dinscrirc la rccrificarions cxigtcs. Del Ponrc ar prcssCc. Son lions dc vie. Or Kigali nc s'at jusqu'ici pas privt de dCsrabicr avian pour La Hayc part dam moins de trois hcures. Elle veut la rtgion des Grands Lacs ni son armtc d'ajourer i la gucrrc sunout sorrir de cc guct-apens avant d'avoir i annonccr am dam l'at du Congo pour y exploiter lcs ressourca rnintrals cr h&icains qu'elle ne signca rim. Lorsquc Prospcr sugghc de naturelles qui suscirenr rant de convoidsa. hi envoyu la nouvellc version par fax La Haye, cUc rcparr Washingon passc oucre au refus de Del Pontc ct Prosper Fair soulagte. courir le bruit qu'dle a cnttrint I'u accord n. Dcl Pontc a beau Le document arrive la scmainc suivanre au bureau de dhenur, clle peinc h convaincre tanr Prospcr s'ac cmployi La Haye. La Amtricains n'ont rim modifit de subsrantiel. En Ccorner, au passagc, la ripuration de dame de fer indtpendantc vertu du prttendu N accord n, le gouvernement nuandais sera seul dont clle jouissair auprks dc; ONG ct dajournalires sptcialicb. prCrcnd qu'elle n'a qu'unc vague idtc de cc qu'csr le &it inter- dcnr aux Brianniqua de monter au front. Puissant souden la national ct qu'ellc ne cesse de meme en peril le uibunal en x CPI, la Grandc-Brctagnc sera plus convaincantc pour poursuivre cornporranr commc un Cliphanr dam un magasin dc porcclaine. Ie bras de fcr conuc les juridicdons inrernauonales. Fin juin, Mais, au-deli de la rtpuation de la Suissesse qu'ils souhaitem Jack Straw rcmct I. Kofi Annan, de passage I. Genhre, une lcmc cntachcr I. l'cdrieur, c'rst sunour son autorite au sein du par- dam laqudle il dcmande de sdndcr lc poste de procurcur, qucr que ics uois magisuats chcrchcnt B rernetm cn quadon. , commun au TPIR et au TPN, et la nomination d'un ptocu- Ils veulent avou la mains libres pour amCnager ies pounuitcs reur pour lc tribunal d'hha. Il jusrifie sa demarche par un comrnc ils Sentendent, conduirc le procts Miloscvic ?a leur guisc souci d'efficaciti et dc tidunion des coiits. Pour avoir rcjetC et supprirncr le gCnocide et tout auuc volet qui les d&~angc'~~. I'accord condu cntre Washingron cr Kigali avec I'aval de Les rcsponsables britanniques et americains se raillent dc ces ten- Londres Dcl Ponte va Crrc &in& du TPIR sions internes qui afFaiblisscnt un pcu plus le parquet au moment oh il doit faire face I. une pression accrue dcs bs ct assembler Entree en fonction le 14 scptcmbrc 1999, la Suiscsse arrive au rermc de son mandat dc quarre ans dam quclqua rnois. Elle toutcs sa forces pour achcver xs cnqu6ra contrc les plus hauts dirigcurs Lnpliqutr dans les crimes en ex-Yougoslavie. a 5; sz-air qu'elle souhaire rempiier. Pour la conrinuitt dc la suaregic d'achtvemcnt dont la prcmihe CchCancc concerne lc Lcs consukauo~entrc les membra du Conseil dc sCcuritC parquet, k renouvell~rncntdu mandat de Del Ponte scmblc man- pour scindct le poae de Del Pontc qui cumule lc TPIR et le ~errout le monde. A I'ccception de Londres ct dc Washingron, TPIY commcncent debut juillet 2003. Londres ct Washingron qui voudraicnt la menre hors jeu. Hormis certains mcmbres de ont habilement pr+d le rcrrain avcc l'aidc dc Kigali. Pour son bureau, qui aspirenr eux aussi B I'Ccarrcr. Depuis l'automnc mobiliser la souticns diplomatiqua, le pouvoir mandais a, dis 2002, son adjoint Graham Blewin fair campagnc pour empkher le debut du rnois de juin, engagt avcc les organisauons dc vic- s~ rttlcction. L'Ausdien qui voudrait ptcndre sa place at ad6 times une virulente campagnc conue le TPIR. Kqyh dtnonce j. Londres, Sydney, Pretoria ct Tgpei et s'apprke I. s'envolcr d& 101s un procureur n i temps parriel n qui Fait insultc aux pour New York ahdc la discreditcr auprts de la direction onu- . victimes du genocide s. Dcl Ponte tcntc de les conucr mais scs sicnnc lorsquc, informtc dc ses manoeuvres, Carla DJ Ponte l'cn puivjants ditractcun passcnt immidiatement I. I'offcnsivc. Am&- ernpeche. Michael Johnson, donr elk a interrompu k mission i ricains et Briranniques l'accuscnt de nc pas consacrer assa dc 9. t\nisha, fair Le voyage Washingron pour la denigrer auprh dcs temps 9. Arusha, sa voyqes coGtcnt chcr, clle est crop occupte aurorirts amiricaincs, affirmant que jamais eUc ne rapera ses au pro& Mioscvic et B I'arrcstation de Karadrric cc de MIadic. engagements sur la strartgic d'achirement. Geoffrey Nice U appone son concours debut 2003. carcsse I'espoir de succedcr 105. Dam un cnrrecicn pub12 daar le quoddien dc Smjnjom Dnmi i Dcl Pontc, mais sunour de I'tvinccr avant la fin du proces AUG lc 26 avrii 2007, Graham Blovin rmonnair s'em oppd zux cdrtr Evliloscric. I1 muluplic don ies visircs au Foreign Office, se fai- dc GcoRcy Nicc aux pounuircr pour gCnocide conuc Milodc cr aoir smt parfois acmmpagncr par Michael Johnson, ct ne manque approchC .plusieurs pay du Coweil dc &rC a paur anpkhcr la &- par une rencontrc avec dcs pcrsonnalitts du mondc juridique ou lection cn 2003 dc Dcl Ponrc. Aujourd'hui, Blmin conrinuc d'atfirmer que lc parqucr ne dirmair par de preuvu suffisvlm pur inculpcr diplomauquc pour qualifier sa patronne d'incompkenre, de Milawvt dc gtnoddc, oubliant hilc jugcmcnr prtliminairc du 16 juin pierrc rnanageur, plu soucicusc dc ses privil?ga et de sa couver- 2004 qui confirmc 1 I'irsuc dc la phve d'accmrion la charge de gCnocidc rure mCdiariquc quc dc la bonne marchc dc son bureau. I1 au vu da prcuvcr prCrcnrtcr cn audicncc. Fin & partie de Kofi Annan qui, au mois de mi, cntendair rccommandcr sa Ellc ne -peut -pas mcncr de fmnt la dcux mttp'.es arguments semblcnt mnvaincanu ct la majorit6 des membres du reconduction au double poste de procureur da PI. I] saMir Conseil de s.6curitt accueillent favotablcment la proposition. IL qu'dle avair don lc souticn des Eats qui la percwaicnt come sont loin dc soupqonner une manauvrc motivCe par la volontC la guante du maintien d'un progcunme rtduit ct rccentr6, d'Ccarrer Del Ponre atin dc memc fin aux enqu&~sp&ala r. arracht par une communauri inrematinnale soucieusc de le voir Le principc de la scission du postc de pmcureur acquis haut La mcme en euvre sans rccard. L'ivencualitt d'un changement de main, Washington tcnte d'obtcnir la mix pied de Del Pontr procureur n'effleure donc penonne. Carla Del Ponre at, en Mais les Britanniques uouvent I'initiative uop risqute. Ils pr6fe- outre, persuadte quc le secthire gCnCral n'acceptera pas de cau- rent I'habillage dc La dpararion qui nc suscire ni tbiccni tionner un straaghme qui porte aneinre a la justice. Kofi Annan questions indiscrktcs. Les Amtricains testent toutefoi la n'cst cependanr pas pr2r un nouvel afiionrement avec les ht- membres du Conseil de sCcurir6 en proposanr de renoweler k ricains. La crise sur I'enu6e en gucrre en Irak au Conseil de mandar dc Del Ponte au TPN pour sculement un an. La Am& stcurid a failli lui cotter son propre poste. Broye par la machine ricains esphrent qu'ainsi dbvoute la magistrate tournera la amtricaine, il the de prendre sa revanche, mais I'enjeu n'en vaut talons er rcnucra dans son Tessin natal. Mais I'idk, qualiie pas la peine : * Cela risque de crier trc~de ::rax~s comyre tenu n d'a absurdc D, fair long feu. Dd Ponte agace, elle at souvent de la rendancc au sein du Conseil dc stcurirt. A Del Ponte qui pcrgue commc dangerme ct distabilisacrice da regions dout le tare en demandant si eUe peut choisir entre le poste de pracu- clle s'occupe. Mais la !hats respectent son couragc ec ne veulent reur d'lirusha et celui de La Haye, il rtpond : * Je nc crok pas, pas renicr ccUc qui symbolie le co,mbat conm I'impunitt dots Miiosevic est entre vos mains, vous de vous cn occupcr. A que lc pmcts du prcmier chef d'Enr traduir dcvaut la justice I'issue de la rCunion, Del Pontc lui lance : n Vous n'aurez pas inccrnationale at en cours. d'enquttes spkiales ! u Et Kofi Aman de rtpondrc : n Non, ils nc femnt pas cela. - Vous vcucz *, titorque Del Ponte cn lui Dtbur juiller, les projets de r4solution commencenr ?i circulcr, tendant ses notes : e Consewa-les pour I'Hktoire. n DhbusC, d'abord entre les cinq membres pcrmanents puis enue la dix Iqbal Riza confie Del Pontc en apart6 : H Tour esr poliaque. auucs mcmbrcs non permanents du Conseil de s6curite. Amtri- I1 n'autait pas dd en €m ainsi mais tour esr politis.6. a Del cains cr Britanniqucs tircnt les ficelles mais continucnr dc nicr Ponte : a Cat injusa que la polirique sape noue travail. Gla lcur implication. Ils ant fait croirc ?i leurs pmenaires que I'initia- me fait du mal de voir que I'on parvienr i bafouer le prinope tivc vicnt de Kofi Annan, soucieux d'encourager une plus gmde de la justice internationale patce que Kagamt a sign6 I'acwrd cffiucirt du TPIR pat cc dtdoublcmcnr de poste Gvlr rkclamt bilattral [sur Ie CPI avec les krats-~nis]et que I'on a dtcidt cn par les Rwandais. Dcl Pone arrive New York, k 28 juillet, Cchange dc protiger ses soldars. n Le chef dc cabinet de pour tcnter de d6jouer les plans de scs dtuactcurz. Elle vcut Kofi Annan tenre de I'apaiser : .Les priincipes sonr prtsewb. u dcmander A &re entcnduc par le Conscil de sCcurit.6 avant Del Ponte : " Non car la sbparation, c'esr la fin des enquEtes I'adoption de la rboluuon cr expliquer la dangers du d6double- sptciales. a. Er Iqbal &a dc condure : Oui, je sair. Je un an . ment de son poste, I'absurdirt de changcr de procurcur recomais la force de vos ataweno, je comprends enti.?remcnr de la fin dcs enquera au risquc dc mcme en danger la stradgie mais ne me citez pas publiquement. n d'achhvemenr dans * sa phase la plus crudale B. Heveut ami alerrcr la mcmbres du Conseil de skurit6 sur la intentions Les manceuvres amtricaines et britanniques ont suscitt un sur- cach&s de Londres cr dc Washington. Elle misc sur le souticn saur de la France qui, depuis la ctisc sur I'Itak, n'a pas cnvie de Fin & partir leu fairc la rnoindre concasion. EUc d6sapprouve la ingtrmccs Il avait Ctt crtt en 1993 pour poursuivrc la r auteurs dc viola- dmlc travail de Dcl Ponte rnais eUe a sumut dscornpm tions du Droir humaniraire international ". Il aMit ttt invitC par rtglcr sur lc Rwanda. Gr avcc l'arrivte au pouvoir de -4 la rholution 1329 du 30 novernbre 2000 I. se pencher dayantage aprk le genocide, Paris a perdu un pcu plus dc son prC cart6 sur les r hauts responsabla politiqua et rniliraira n. Dtsormais, africain. Le Rwanda cst d&or& sous influence 40-saxomc il doit re limiter aux * tout principaux responsabla x et sc dusai- et la France y est honnie pour avoir soutenu le rCgime gtnoci- sir, au profit des juridicdons Ida, de routes la autra daire hum. Ce sursaur rnotiv6 par dcs intCriu paniculiers a le enqufta. Lcs hats de la rCgion sont sommts de hrer la fugitifs rntrire de profiter aux imptratifr de la justice. Paris exige que et a tout parriculitrernent Radovan Karadzic. Radro Mladic, le planning strict impost aux TPI, commandant d'achcvn la ainsi qu'Ante Gotovina rt. EuropCens cr AmCricains n'onr pas enquhes fin 2004 et les procSs en prcmikc instance en 2008, rCussi surrnonter le blocage mse pour I'inscrire dans la rtsolu- soir conrraignant mais pas dCfmitif. Elk sc bat avec succb pour tion rnais assurent quc le TPI ne fermera pas ses pones sans quc une mention des e enqufta specides * dans la rbolution. Le Radovan Karadzic er Ratko Mladic lui soient livrb. Briranniqua te..(re final appcllc lc Rwanda I. s intensifier [sa] cwpirarion avec cr htricains onr rernpont une victoirc sur La scission du postc Ie TPIR noramrnent sur la cnqutres conrre I'ArmCc patricticpe dc procurcur. Carla Del Ponte est CcartCe du parquet du TF'IR mandaisc n. avec effer immtdiat. Elle at rcconduire dam la foulte pour Soutcnu par plusieurs rnernbres du Conseil de dcuritt, Paris quauc am au TPN. Frustds par un bilan mitigi sur la autres panrient Cgalernenr bloquer la proposition initialc anglo- points, Washington et Londrcs vont s'ernployer rectifier le rir. amtricaine de rnetue immCdiatcrncnt fin aux cnqufto du Tniu- Pour acctlkrcr le processus de dtlocalisation, le ConseiI de nal de La Haye. Le pmjet du 10 aohr su&rait que r route stcuritt s'est rtsolu appeler i Strabliiemenr, dam les plus brefi nouvelle inculpation serait incompatible avcc la suatgie d'acht- dilais, d'une Cour sptciale en Bosnie-Henigovine. Depuis deux vcment du TPIY a. Lcs dtmarchcs dc Dcl Ponte fin juillet n: ans, lc TPI rtclame la crCation d'une smcmre mtmc dc son intervention, i. huis clos, k 8 aoht devant lc Conseil de prcndrc lc relais mais les grandes puissances rechignaient stcurit.! ob elle a CnumtrS touta la rnenaca qui pesaient sur mctue la main la poche. Sous la houlerte dahtricains, une la dcux nibunaux onr pod leurs fruits. L'initiative de Londra confirence cst findement organisCe La Haye, Ie 30 octobre et de Washington va Eue vidCc de sa substance, a I'cxception dc 2003, pour lever dcs fonds. Dix-sepr millions d'euros ront Siviction de Del Ponte du TPIR rccueillis pow assurer lc financement pendant ks trois prcmitres Si les hats insistent tous pour que la dtlais soient respect&, anntes de la juridiction mine de Sarajevo. EUe doit powoir la rnajoritt da quinze rnernbres du Conseil de shitt nc vcut conduire une dizaine de proces qui auraient dii sc dirouler 2, pas assurncr la responsabilid de demander I'arrtr imrnbdiat des La Hayc ct conclure lcs cnquttes conrre la cinquantaine de sus- poursuircs qui donncrait l'impunitt aux haua mponsabla, pem que Del Ponte a Crt contrainre dc gcler en 2002 La d$orrnais dam la ligne de mire du parqucr. 11s priknr rwcncr Chambre pour les aims de gucrre de Bosnie-Hemigovine voir un peu plus le mandat du TF'I. Selon les termcs de la rholution le jour dCbur 2005 aprSs une rtfonne du Code ptnal, op6rCc 1503 du Conscil de sCcuritC du 28 aoiir 2003, lc TPI a dhr- par lcs Anglo-Sk~onsqui imposent un systkrne dc commun (aw rnais vocation de concenuer son champ d'action w u les tout dam un pays et unc region de droit romain. Ce choix va vite principaux responsabla n da crimes cornmis en ex-Yougoskvie. appardtre cornrne une entrave la coopCracion judiciaire mtre TRANSMISSION SHEET FOR FILING OF DOCUMENTS WITH CMS ,,,.... ,,,** ..,.... .=,.. . ~nitp;~6"a:ms COURT MANAGEMENT SECTION l4a: :x%lJ';,cs (Art. 27 of the Directive for the Registry) I - GENERAL INFORMATION (To be completed by the Chambers I Filing Party) (ql Trial Chamber I Trial Chamber iI Trial Chamber Ill 1 (ql Appeals Chamber1 Arusha To: N M. Diallo R. N. Kouambo C. K. Hometowu F. A. Talon i I I Chief, CMS Deputy Chief, CMS Chief, JPU, CMS 1 [7 Appeals Chamber IThe Hague I J.-P. Fornet6 M. Diop K. K. A. Afande R. 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