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TRIAL CHAMBER I11

Before : Judge Ines M. Weinberg de Roca, Presideing Judge Lee Gacuiga Muthoga Judge Robert Frernr

Registrar : Mr Adama Dieng

Date filed: 28 July 2008

THE PROSECUTOR v. Fulgence KAYISHEMA

Case No ICTR-01-67-I

RESPONSE to the PROSECUTOR'S REQUEST FOR THE REFERRAL OF THE CASE OF FULGENCE KAYISHEMA TO RWANDA PURSUANT TO RULE 11 BZS OF THE TRIBUNAL'S RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE

Office of the Prosecutor For the interests of the Accused

Hassan Bubacar Jallow Jwani Timothy Mwaikusa Bongani Majola Inneke Onsea Francois Nsanzuwera Florida Kabasinga 1. Introduction In the interests of the accused, Fulgence Kayishema, this response to the Prosecutor's Request for the Referral of the Case of Fulgence Kayishema to Rwanda Pursuant to Rule llbis of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter referred to as "the Motion"), respectfully requests that the said request of the Prosecutor should not be granted or approved on the grounds and reasons that are shown herein below.

2. Factual Background 2.1: The indictment against the accused, known as FULGENCE KAYISHEMA, was first filed in this Tribunal on 10 June 2001 and confirmed on 4 July 2001. Subsequently, on 11 June 2007, the Prosecutor filed the Motion seeking referral of the case to the Republic of Rwanda for trial.

2.2: The accused is all this time still at large; he has not been arrested. In the circumstances, no defence counsel has been assigned to him and there is no defence team constituted for him.

2.3: On 27 October 2007, a request was made to the President of the Tribunal to appoint counsel to represent the interests of the accused in the referral proceedings. On 13 November 2007 the President referred this request to the Trial Chamber. On 2 May 2008 the Chamber rendered its decision on the referral of the request to appoint defence counsel and directed that counsel be appointed to represent the interests of the accused in the rule 1lbis referral proceedings. It is pursuant to that decision of the Chamber that this particular counsel was assigned the responsibility that includes the writing and filing of this Response. Perhaps it is worth noting that even the Prosecutor made a similar request in paragraph 81(b) of the Motion: that the Registrar be required to designate counsel to watch over the interests of the accused in this matter.

2.4: Having said that, we should point out right at the outset, the big handicap with which this Response is made. The handicap is that there having been no contact ever with the accused, who is at large, this counsel has had no opportunity of making any appraisal of how the accused himself would have reacted to the Motion for referral of his case to Rwanda. This response submission, therefore, is premised on the assumption that transferring this case to Rwanda will not be in the best interests of the accused person not because he is Fulgence Kayishema, but because the same arguments would be made against transfer even if the accused was somebody else.

3, No Reason to Take the Accused Away from the ICTR 3.1: In the Motion the Prosecutor has endeavored to paint a rosy picture of the laws and the legal system of the Republic of Rwanda: that they guarantee the accused a fair trial. That picture has no factual substance to support it. Even assuming that all what is stated in the Motion about the system in Rwanda was true (only assuming, because we submit here that it is not), that in itself is not a sufficient reason for transferring the case of the accused from the jurisdiction of the ICTR to the jurisdiction of the courts in Rwanda.

3.2: In the Motion, the Prosecutor does not state why he chose this particular case for transfer to Rwanda. The reason for seeking to take this take this particular case out of the jurisdiction of the ICTR has not been given by the Prosecutor; one can say that no reason has been given because there is no good reason; there is in fact no reason at all for seeking transfer of this case to Rwanda. It is the sheer exercise of discretion by the Prosecutor that has come upon this case as one suitable for transfer to Rwanda. But its human rights record makes Rwanda an unsuitable jurisdiction to transfer this (or any other) case to; this much has been observed by none other than Ms. Sylvana Arbia who was ICTR Chief of Prosecutions until a few days before she made the observation.' One thing that may certainly result from the transfer of this case to Rwanda is the trial of the accused in this case in absentia. Rwandan law and practice allows trial of accused persons in absentia; this much has been confirmed by the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Rwanda at the oral hearing of another rule 1lbis transfer motion before this same Trial ~hamber.~The accused in this case is still at large. We fear that if this case is

'~irondelleNews Agency: 18 April 2008 2 See: Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, ICTR-97-36A-I, Transcript of 28 April 2008 transferred to Rwanda a lot of injustice is bound to occur, all of which will be avoided if the case is not transferred there.

4. Abolition of the Death Penalty in Rwanda 4.1: The Prosecutor states in paragraph 28 of the Motion that Rwanda has abolished the death penalty. The Motion was filed in June 2007. By then the statement that Rwanda had abolished the death penalty was certainly not correct because the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases, upon which that statement was based, did not abolish the death penalty in Rwanda. As admitted by the Prosecutor in paragraph 26 of the Motion, that law does not prescribe sentences for each (or any) crime; it only states that a sentence of life imprisonment shall be the heaviest penalty that may be imposed upon a convict in a case transferred from the ICTR. It is common knowledge, though, that the death penalty was abolished in Rwanda by the Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty which was passed sometime in July 2007. All the same, it is submitted here that the said abolition of the death penalty does not, in itself, render the jurisdiction in Rwanda a suitable one for trial of a case like this one.

4.2: It is pertinent that the persons standing accused before the ICTR have, on numerous occasions expressed their worry and concern, expressed through several correspondences to the UN and to the ICTR authorities, that the abolition of the death penalty in Rwanda does not provide any guarantee of security against attack upon the life of prisoners by other means, especially the kidnappings and disguised murders.' As a recounted by Human Rights Watch in a fairly recent report (Annex B to this Response), such occurrences have been rampant in Rwanda and they render support to the detainees' expressed worries.

4.4: The Prosecutor states in paragraph 33 of the Motion that pursuant to article 21 of the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases, in the event of a conviction, life imprisonment

Letters to the UN secretary General: 16 February 2004, 10 January 2007; Letters to UN and ICTR Authorities: 29 March 2003,03 April 2006; Letters to the ICTR President: 10 June 2002,24 May 2004, 14 June 2004, 12 July 2004,15 July 2004,19 September 2004,19 February 2005,23 January 2007,28 March 2007,06 August 2007. Copies of some of these letters are attached to this Response and collectively marked as Annex A. is "the muximum sentence" that may be imposed on an accused person transferred from the ICTR. There is, however, a significant ambiguity regarding sentence that can bring great prejudice to an accused person transferred to Rwanda for trial. Besides merely stating that life imprisonment shall be the maximum sentence that may be imposed on an accused transferred from the ICTR, the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases does not abolish or prescribe any sentences. This much is admitted by the Prosecutor in paragraph 26 of the Motion. Sentences are prescribed by other laws; for the offences with which the accused, Fulgence Kayishema, is charged the sentence is prescribed by the Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty. For the offences of genocide and crimes against humanity, offences which the accused in this case is charged with, this law prescribes the sentence of imprisonment for life with special provisions, expressed in the French text of that law as "la paine de reclusion criminelle a perpetuite".

4.5: As it is, therefore, the law on the abolition of the death penalty has replaced the death sentence by "the sentence of life imprisonment" or by "la paine de reclusion criminelle a perpetuite ", which may translate as "the sentence of criminal imprisonment for life" (article 3). Both refer to life imprisonment. However, there is a difference between the two in that the latter, "the sentence of criminal imprisonmentfor life" is a sentence of life imprisonment with certain conditions stipulated under article 4 of that law. The conditions are that: the convicted person shall not benefit from any kind of mercy, pardon or amnesty, conditional release or rehabilitation, without having accomplished at least 20 years of imprisonment; and

the convicted person shall be kept in isolation

4.6: By contrast, the sentence of life imprisonment provided for under article 23 of the Statute of the Tribunal and Rule 101(A) of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as well as according to the ICTR jurisprudence, is not subject to any such conditions. And article 21 of the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases does not indicate that the life imprisonment to be imposed to those convicted after being transferred from the ICTR will not be given the sentence of "reclusion criminelle a perpetuite" with its attendant harsh conditions of pardon-less isolation for life. There is absolutely nothing under the laws of Rwanda to prevent the courts from imposing the sentence of "reclusion criminelle a perpetuite" upon a convicted person whose case was transferred there from the ICTR.

4.7: It is certainly for this reason that this same Chamber held in the case of Yussuf Munyakazi that there was no guarantee that the harsh sentence of life imprisonment with special provisions will not be imposed upon the accused if transferred to ~wanda.' There is indeed no basis upon which to assume that only the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases will apply and that no provision under the Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty will apply to the accused if the case is transferred to Rwanda. It is significant that the latter law declares in article 9 that it overrides all other provisions that are contrary to it. The most that can be said is that the relationship between these two laws regarding the sentence to be imposed is unclear, as was correctly observed by this Tribunal in the case of ~an~aruki~a.'There is no basis to assume that the accused will not be given the sentence which the Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty prescribes for genocide and crimes against humanity.

4.8: It means, therefore, that upon conviction in Rwanda, an accused person transferred from the ICTR sentenced according to the Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty will be denied the benefits available under article 27 of the Statute of the Tribunal and article 124 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence concerning eligibility for pardon or commutation of sentence. In addition, such a person will be subjected to the horribly drastic and inhumane conditions of isolation for life. In that event, the accused will not benefit from any of the rights guaranteed to him under International Law in general, and the Statute of the ICTR and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence in particular, rights which are guaranteed to him if tried by the ICTR or by courts in some jurisdictions other than Rwanda.

Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, ICTR-97-36A-Rl lbis: Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to Rwanda, para 28, rendered on 28 May 2008. 5 Prosecutor v. Gaspard Kanyarukiga, ICTR-2002-78-R11bis: Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to Rwanda, para 96, rendered on 6 June 2008. 5. Differences Between Rwandan and ICTR Laws 5.1: Contrary to the claims by the Prosecutor, the difference between the law of the ICTR and that of the Republic of Rwanda is quite big. A comparison of the two will show that the ICTR laws provide far better guarantees for justice than the laws of Rwanda. We have already mentioned the fact that in Rwanda a person may be tried in absentia. This has happened in respect of one person who was acquitted by the ICTR.~ The ICTR does not try accused persons in absentia. We submit that it is in the interests of justice that the accused should benefit from the principle that the most favourable law should apply to safeguard the interests of an accused person.

5.2: The temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR extends to the preiod from 01 January to 3 1 December 1994 (article 7 of the Statute of the ICTR). In Rwanda, on the other hand, article 1 of the Organic Law on Genocide (Annexure C to the Motion) provides for criminal proceedings to be instituted against persons alleged to have committed acts of genocide and crimes against humanity at any time from 01 October 1990 onwards, to an undetermined date. Although the Organic Law on Transfer of Cases states that persons transferred from the ICTR shall be prosecuted only for offences falling under the jurisdiction of the ICTR, it is silent about temporal jurisdiction.

5.3: There is no certainty, therefore, that the authorities in Rwanda will not prosecute the accused transferred there for acts alleged to have been done outside the period prescribed under the ICTR Statute. This concern is real, not speculative, considering that article 4 of the Organic Law on Transfer of Cases requires the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Rwanda to harmonize the ICTR indictment and render it compliant with the provisions of the Rwanda Code of Criminal Procedure. It means that the accused transferred to Rwanda is bound to face an indictment revised by the Prosecutor General of Rwanda.

5.4: The Rwanda Code of Criminal Procedure (Annex F to the Motion) constrains prisoners to compulsory hard labour (article 218); persons convicted of genocide or

6 See footnote 2 above . crimes against humanity under that law cannot benefit from conditional release (article 237); and the Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty prescribes the horrible criminal imprisonment for life, already referred to in paragraphs 4.4 to 4.8 above. The practical meaning of all this is that if the case is transferred to Rwanda and then tried and convicted there, the accused cannot be considered for pardon, commutation of sentence or any anticipated release, benefits that are always available to persons tried and convicted by the ICTR (article 27 of the Statute of the ICTR and Rule 124 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence).

7. Trial by a Competent, Independent and Impartial Tribunal 7.1: There is no guarantee that, if transferred to Rwanda the accused will have the right to be tried by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. The Prosecutor admits in paragraph 38 of the Motion that while the law on Transfer of Cases guarantees the right to "a fair and public hearing" the same law, rather surprisingly, omits to mention that the said public hearing shall be before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. The right to be tried by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal is an extremely essential right, especially for a person being transferred from an international tribunal like the ICTR. It is not a right that should just be assumed to exist on account of provisions to be found in general laws such as the Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure, as suggested by the Prosecutor. In any case those general laws do not contain specific provisions guaranteeing the right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. It is amazing, therefore, that a special law specifically enacted for matters of transfer of cases from the ICTR, should omit to mention the prerequisites of competence, independence and impartiality of the Tribunal that will try the cases in Rwanda. This omission betrays the low regard that the authorities in Rwanda accord to this right in relation to accused persons to be transferred there.

7.2: The Defence also contests the competence of the High Court of the Republic of Rwanda, constituted by a single judge, to try and determine a case transferred there from the ICTR. The crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes do not fall under the competence of the High Court as generally established by article 149 of the Constitution of Rwanda (Annex E to the Motion). It is unacceptable that a single judge be allowed to give rulings on accusations related to serious violations of International Law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. International standards of fair trial require that persons accused of serious crimes against international humanitarian law appear before a panel of three judges in the first instance and before five judges at the appellate level. That is the case with the ICTR, the ICTY, the Tribunal for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court (ICC).~It is also the case for the specialized courts cited in article 21 of the Rwandan law on genocide and crimes against humanity (Annex C to the Motion).

7.3: While the Prosecutor has enumerated many provisions in the Rwandan legislation providing for what is claimed to be a good and competent judicial system, the Motion gives absolutely no factual evidence of what actually happens in practice. The Motion merely recites the text of the laws enacted in Rwanda; nothing is said about the actual reality on the ground relating to those laws. Africa is not short of examples of countries in which the text of the law proclaims excellence while the practice is in the neighbourhoods of hell. There is nothing in the Motion to suggest that Rwanda is one of the unique exceptions. The Prosecutor does not even state how many judges of the High Court or of the Supreme Court there are in Rwanda. But one has to admit that the present Rwandan judicial system is still being reconstructed, both at the level of legislation as well as the level of human resources. This is inevitable, following disruptions caused by the ravages of the war prosecuted by the RPF against the then Rwanda Government (1990- 1994), the genocide of 1994, and subsequent massacres perpetrated after 1994.

7.4: There are also reports of a deliberate policy of the RPF government to remove and exclude all Hutu from judicial office. One such example is that of Mr. A. Nkundiyaremye, former Vice-President of the Supreme Court and President of the State Council who was forced to resign from office just because he is Hutu, and went into exile in Belgium in 1999. He made a detailed account of the problems afflicting the judicial

7 Article 1 l(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; article 12 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia; article 12 of the Statute of the Special Criminal Tribunal for Sierra Leone; article 39(1) of the International Criminal Court system under the current regime.8 There are other reports which support that claim about the current Rwanda regime not only regarding the judiciary but also establishments in the entire public se~tor.~In this report submitted to the ICTR in the Butare case for the accused Joseph Kanyabashi, Professor Filip Reyntjens, who has also served as expert witness for the OTP, denounced the phenomenon of cctutsisation,, and <

7.5: Evidently, the RPF may have won the war and taken over state power but they have not succeeded to eradicate the Tutsi-Hutu divide which has continued to afflict state institutions including the judiciary. On account of this Tutsi-Hutu divide officers of the Supreme Court employed under the previous regime were asked to resign, and there were complains that magistrates from that regime who had not been replaced were sabotaging the judicial system; by July 1999, the functioning of the courts was said to have become more and more paralysed." The courts to which this case may be transferred to have indeed been set up and they have gone through a number of reform;I2 but one fact about these courts is that they have not been particularly active in genocide related cases.13

7.6: All in all, the judicial system in Rwanda is young and fragile. It is a new system built upon a basis determined by the winner in the wars, the RPF, which started laying down its foundations after taking power and control. It has not yet stabilized and proved

Analysis done, on 24 June 1999, by Mr. Alype Nkundiyaremye, former President of the State Council and vice-president of the Supreme Court. Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On - From Genocide to Dictatorship," in African Affairs, ~01.103:177-2 10 (2004) lo Report of Professor Filip Reyntjens dated 16/08/2007, p. 17, submitted in case No. ICTR- " See Annex C to this Response l2 Rwanda: Country Summary, Human Rights Watch, January 2007; US State Department, Rwanda: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 6 March 2007 '3 Rugendo, M., The Impossible Myth of Gacaca Justice in Rwanda, International Justice Tribune, No. 63, Paris, 19 March 2007 its worth, notably in relation to the great principles of law such as the independence and impartiality of the judges. The present situation in Rwanda exhibits a weak judicial system that can easily submit to the political whims of a regime happy with its victory and keen to impose its own notions of justice.

7.7: Reports from organizations or individuals engaged in the defence of human rights, including some from some state departments, coming out year after year, have denounced the many violations of human rights in ~wanda'~.They include the analytical account of ten years of the RPF regime (1994-2004) by Professor Filip ~e~ntjens."Answering a question put to him by a Journalist of Radio France International on 19 September 2007 with respect to the idea of transferring some ICTR detainees to be tried in Rwanda, Filip Reyntjens said the following: "there is a recent Amnesty International report of December 2006 that renders a totally unfavorable opinion, suggesting that people should not be transferred to Rwanda mainly because trials cannot be fair. Amnesty International evokes even tales of torture and other acts of maltreatment.. .". And in an address to the United Nations Security Council in December 2006, Amnesty International highlighted that "no court in Rwanda has jurisdiction over alleged war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law." (See: Hirondelle, 15.12.2006, Annex E to this Response).

7.8: The system in Rwanda is new and may not have attained stability as yet. The judges in that system also lack the requisite experience one would expect of judges who are to try cases transferred from the ICTR. Paragraph 42 of the Motion shows that no particular level of experience is required for judges of the High Court; it is only for the President, the Vice-President and the judges of the Supreme Court that some experience is required: a mere 8 years of work experience for persons entrusted to head the Judiciary. No particular experience in criminal law is required. Certainly, many of the judges in

l4 Amnesty International (1994, 1998, 2003, 2007); Human Rights Watch (1994, 2003, 2005, 2007); US State Department Country Reports; Statement of Dr. Desforges during the Hearing on State Department Country Reports on Human Rights practices for 1999; SOS Rwanda-Burundi: Le Rwanda 2004 face ZL la declaration des Droits de 1'Homme; CommuniquCs du Centre contre I'impunitC et l'injustice au Rwanda (No 43/98 du 4 novembre 1998, 12 juillet 2004,31 mars 2005). Cited in footnote 9 above. Rwanda do not have the experience required to try cases of violations of international humanitarian law in conformity with international standards, as is the case with the United Nations ad hoc international tribunals (ICTR and ICTY), the International Criminal Court (ICC) and UN-backed Tribunals for Sierra Leone and Cambodia. An 8- year experience is not sufficient experience to boast of for that task. And that is only for the most senior judges in Rwanda; the President, the Vice President and the judges of the Supreme Court; other judges are bound to be of relatively less experience. They do not have the knowledge and the practice of legal international standards and procedures necessary to guarantee to the transferred accused a trial that respects the standards of justice and equity. It is undoubtedly for that reason that the Prosecutor is silent about the qualifications and experience of human resources employed in the Rwandan judicial system and their level of experience.

7.9: Contrary to what is suggested by the Prosecutor in paragraph 45 of the Motion, article 13 of the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases does not contain any clause on independence or impartiality of the Courts (High Court, Supreme Court), or of the judges who will hear the cases transferred. Indeed, the Constitution of Rwanda makes reference to the independence of the judiciary but it is a reference made generally in relation to separation of powers among the different branches of government in Rwanda. It is silent about independence with regard to the actual administration of justice by judges. The Prosecutor's submissions about the independence of judges in the Rwandan judicial system vis-h-vis the executive branch (paragraphs 45-56 of the Motion) are not necessarily a true account of the reality on the ground. The declarations in the legal texts do not reflect what is being implemented.

7.10: The dangers to independence and impartiality of the judges are greatly enhanced by the mere fact that this is a case of genocide, not just any criminal offence. The judges may be sufficiently independent to act free from external pressure or influence in a case where, say, one is charged with a bank robbery or defrauding the Government of its funds or murder committed in the execution of a robbery. But the same cannot be the case in relation to cases of genocide; that is why the ICTR was set up and given its mandate in the first place. As mentioned in paragraph 7.5 above, it is indeed an undeniable fact that (with the possible exception of the gacaca courts) the experience of the Rwandan courts with genocide related cases is far from impressive.

7.11: Looking at the procedure of appointing judges described by the Prosecutor (paragraphs 48-54 of the Motion), it is clear that all of them, judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court, are appointed by the President of the Supreme Court following decision of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary. Many members of this Council are appointed, directly or indirectly, by President of the Republic, the Head of the Executive (paragraphs 48-49 of the Motion). It is President Kagame who nominates candidates to the positions of President and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court, as well as candidates for the rest of the membership of the Supreme Court (articles 147 and 148 of the Constitution). It is very unlikely that the institutions that are consulted in the process (the Senate, the Cabinet, and the Supreme Council of the Judiciary) will reject a candidate presented by President Kagame. In reality, most judges are either committed or sympathetic to the RPF, the political party that controls all institutions of the State.

7.12: The RPF regime has, over the years, exhibited an obvious reluctance to restrain itself from interference with judicial proceedings and decisions when they do not please it. This is evident from its reaction to some of the decisions or proceedings of the ICTR which the regime did not like, some of which are referred to further below in this submission (paragraphs 8.2, and 11.1-1 1 .5). A further indication of this tendency of the regime is the way it reacted to some foreign judges' indictments of some members of the RPF regime. The regime's reaction has been to condemn those judges in a language that is outright contemptuous;'6 it is certainly not the kind of reaction that reflects a regime committed to respect the independence of the judiciary.

16 See the few words quoted in Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, ICTR-97-36-R1Ibis: Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Referral of the Case to Rwanda, para 43 and 44 and footnotes 75 and 76 8. Fundamental Rights of the Accused Will not be Respected 8.1: The Prosecutor has enumerated fundamental rights of the accused as mentioned in the text of international treaties or in the law relating to transfers, but he does not broach the subject of the respect accorded in practice to these rights by the Rwandan authorities and institutions concerned. Again it is the same question of the difference between the letter of the law and its practical application (paragraph 36 of the Motion). It is very unlikely that the accused will be able to benefit from the right to the presumption of innocence guaranteed under the ICTR (article 20.3 of the ICTR Statute), given that all Hutus are usually considered as having participated in the "genocide of Tutsis". According to the letter and the spirit of the ICTR Statute (articles 17, 18, 20.3) and its Rules of Evidence and Procedure (Rules 47, 87), as well as its jurisprudence, it is the Prosecutor who has to prove the guilt of the accused. The latter has no obligation to prove his innocence because he is innocent for as long as his guilt has not yet been proved.

8.2: This major principle of criminal law, universally acknowledged, is not always respected in Rwanda, contrary to what the Prosecutor states in the Motion (paragraph 68); not everything written in the law is also always true in reality. The famous lists of "gknacidaires" by category established by the RPF government'7 are an eloquent example of the sad reality that the presumption of innocence is absent in Rwanda in so far as genocide is concerned. This is evident from the reaction of the Rwandan government whenever an accused is acquitted by the ICTR: there is always a protest from the Government of Rwanda as if everybody charged is automatically guilty. The acquittals of Emrnanuel Bagambiki and Andre Ntagenua in February 2004, and Jean Mpambara in September 2006 evoked angry reactions from Rwandan Government officials and condemnation of the ICTR.'~Since the establishment of the ICTR a lot of lead counsel, investigators and legal assistants have been faced with the threat of arrest or being cited on the lists of "genocidaires" simply because they defend the accused. Professor Peter

l7 See Annex B to this Response 18 See Hirondelle News Agency, 27 and 29 February 2004, and The New Times, Kigali, 12 September 2006: Annex L to this Response Erlinder, current President of the Association of ICTR Defence Lawyers (ADAD) has been declared a "genocidaire" by President Kagame himself.I9

8.3: In addition, the accused will not be able to enjoy his right of "having adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence" (article 20.4(b) of the ICTR Statute) in conditions similar to those under the ICTR, as claimed by the Prosecutor (paragraphs 36, 63-65 of the Motion). It is on record that the government in Kigali has refused to cooperate with the ICTR in availing this right to some persons indicted before the ICTR. The regime has refused to cooperate with members of ICTR defense teams and actually prevented them from preparing adequately the defense of their clients. For example, in the case of Kajelijeli the defense team was denied the disclosure of previous statements made by a hosecution witness.20 And, in spite of the intervention by the Tribunal, defense teams for Emmanuel Bagambiki and Andre' Ntagerura received the same treatment when they tried to obtain documents relating to the guilty plea of some Prosecution witne~ses.~'Now the Prosecutor does not indicate in the Motion how that same regime will guarantee availability of that same right for an accused person transferred to Rwanda from the ICTR.

8.4: There have even been cases of harassment, intimidation, and even arrest and imprisonment of members of defense teams. The defence team of the accused in the case of Yussuf Munyakazi suffered such treatment when the Lead Counsel, Callixte Gakwaya was arrested in Arusha on 1'' September 2006, at the instigation of the Rwanda ~overnment;~~after his release, he had to abandon his client because he, the counsel, could not be assured of his security, threatened by the Rwandan authorities. The Representative of the government in Kigali has called defense lawyers "negationists" for

l9 Letter dated 20 June 2007 from Prof. Peter Erlinder to the President of the ICTR, attached to this Response as Annex D 20 Extremely Urgent Defense Motion to strike out statements and testimony of detained Witnesses GDD, GDQ, GAP and GA0filed on 18 April 2002, in case No. ICTR-98-44A 2' "Decision on Bagambiki's and Ntagerura's motions for disclosure of confessions of detained witnesses" dated 8 March 2002, Case No. ICTR-97-36 and ICTR-96-10A 22 See Press release of Hirondelle Agency dated 6 September 2006. having dared, in the framework of the defense of the interests of their clients, to denounce the crimes committed by RPF leaders.23

8.5: Concerning cases of harassment and intimidation of defense witnesses, the Defense in the Ntabakuze case filed, on 27/09/2004, a motion for dismissal of the charges against him because it was impossible to mount an effective defense due to interference by the Kigali regime. The Chamber denied the motion in its decision dated 28/12/2004. However, the Chamber expressed grave concern about the allegations and expected the WVSS to follow them up, and to report any credible evidence of intimidation of prospective witnesses. Afterwards, the legal assistant of Ntabakuze Defense Team who had discovered that Defense witnesses had been intimidated and harassed by the representatives of the office of the Military Auditor in Kigali was threatened with prosecution in Rwanda and had to quit his job for safety. In May 2007, Mr Cantier, the lead counsel for ex-prefect Renzaho on trial before the ICTR, complained of Rwandan authorities intimidating witnesses who had agreed to testify in favor of his client (see Annex F to this Response).

8.6: Government institutions, including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defense, the RPF Center for Documentation, the Office of the General Prosecutor, the State Information Agency (ORINFOR), the Police, Prefectural and Communal Services, Tribunals, have refused to give documents to defense teams while they readily give them to the ICTR Prosecution. Thus, Nahimana's defense team could not, for example, obtain information requested on several occasions from Rwandan authorities which they needed in order to refute accusations from the Prosecution, despite intervention by the Trial The team was denied access to some documents, including documents in the archives of the Ministry of Defense and of the RPF. The defense team was also refused an interview with the former President of Rwanda, Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu, not even to

23 Agence Hirondelle on 24 April 2006 reported, for example, a statement made the Representative of the Government of Rwanda against Professor Peter Erlinder, Lead-Counsel of Major Aloys Ntabakuze; also see footnote 18 above. 24 "Motion to stay proceedings in the Trial of Ferdinand Nahimana", filed on 13 May 2003, case No. ICTR- 96- 1 1 secure an appointment, despite making numerous requests to the Rwandan officials. Lack of the documents requested prevented Nahimana from having a fair and equitable trial2'. In the case of Ndindiliyimana and Others, many cases of refusal by the Rwandan government to cooperate with the ICTR were recorded. The Prosecutor acknowledged that everything depended on the willingness of the Rwandan government, not on the law. The President did not succeed to compel Kigali to comply with its numerous decision^.^^

8.7: These few examples show the Rwandan Government policy of preventing the accused before the ICTR from adequately defending themselves. Generally, witnesses detained in Rwanda state different things in court from what they have declared before the Rwandan authorities. The Rwandan government, at the heart of this maneuver, knowingly retains information to allow false statements to pass easily without being contradicted. All this is an indication that the Rwandan government does not wish to see fairness and justice rendered to the accused before the ICTR. What will happen to the accused once handed over to that government? It is absurd to expect the Rwandan government to suddenly change and cooperate with the defence in a case after its transfer to Rwanda; the Government cannot give to the accused person before a Rwandan court a right it is reluctant to give to an accused person before the ICTR.

8.8: The Prosecutor cannot guarantee that if transferred to Rwanda the accused and his defense in this case will be treated better. That is extremely unlikely. It is almost certainly impossible, considering that some other people accused of genocide who have been arrested and imprisoned in Rwanda, or kidnapped from outside the country and taken there, have not been given such benefit. These include Vale'rie Bemeriki, a former journalist with the RTLM (a free television station in Rwanda); Agnes Ntamabyariro, former Minister for Justice in the interim government who was kidnapped from Zambia where she had fled to as a refugee; Jean Habyarimana, a former member of the Central Committee of the MRND; and Justin Temahagari, a former ambassador, Dominique

25 "Motion for disclosure of exculpatory evidence and investigations on the origin and content of exhibit P105", filed on 13 May 2003, case No. ICTR-96-11 26 Case of Ndindiliyimana et alii (Militairy 11), Transcripts of 191091 2005, p 28 ; of 29/03/2005 ; of 26/05/2005, p. 36, case No. ICTR-2000-56 Makeli, a former journalist with Radio Rwanda; and two catholic nuns, sisters Be'nidicte Mukanyangezi and Bernadette Mukarusine.

9. Rwanda is Highly Constrained 9.1: Transferring this case to Rwanda will have the effect of adding to the burdens of that country relating to its criminal justice system. People are known to have been kept in pre-trial imprisonment in Rwanda for up to a decade without being tried or convicted, or otherwise knowing their fate. Again the cases of ValCrie Bemeriki, Agnes Ntamabyaliro, Jean Habyarimana, and Justin Temahagari (mentioned in paragraph 8.8 above) do illustrate this. There are thousands of people detained in Rwanda without charges, or awaiting triaL2' Many suspects die in prison before being tried, after spending years in there. Many of those who get released come out of prison disabled persons. Referring to a Memorandum published on 24 September 2007 by Matata Joseph of the Centre de Lutte Contre l'lmpunite' et l'lnjustice au Rwanda (CLIIR), a human rights association based in Belgium, many prisoners released or acquitted have developed strange diseases due to physical and mental tortures and ill-treatment by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) which has infiltrated administrative, judicial, public and private services (see Annex H to this Response).

9.2: Many examples illustrate that situation. Mr Pasteur Bizimungu, former President of Rwanda and Vice-president of RPF was released after five years of imprisonment. Now, he is very sick because of the bad conditions he went through while in prison. The former prefect of Gikongoro prefecture, Mr Andrew Nkeramugaba died in prison without being tried, and after being tortured. The former president of MDR party, Mr Bonaventure Ubarijoro was imprisoned in 1999 and released after one year, on a wheel chair; he died some years later. Mr Phocas Habimana was arrested and imprisoned in December 1996 after being forced back from former Zaire; he was released in August 1998 and died in December 1998. The former general secretary of MRND during the one party state period, Mr Bonaventure Habimana was imprisoned and released after some

'' Agence Hirondelle of 12/05/2006 reported that 20,000 innocent people were detained in Rwandan prisons from 1994 or 1995 according to a document from the "Secretary of State" of Vatican. years. He now lives in Belgium but cannot walk without assistance because of his disability. Other detainees who have been released suffer from various diseases such as aids, stomach problems, kidney problems, tuberculosis, hepatitis, high blood pressure and so on, and are exposed to certain death.

9.3: That is what happens in the criminal justice system of Rwanda. It is most disturbing, therefore, that the Prosecutor of this Tribunal is being enlisted to support that kind of treatment of suspects and accused persons by making this motion to transfer the case of an accused person from the ICTR to Rwanda. Even with the best of intentions, it certainly does not make sense at all to have the ICTR Prosecutor seek to add more work to a judicial system that it is crumbling under the huge number of detainees awaiting trial.

9.4: It will be sheer speculation to expect that an accused person whose case is transferred to Rwanda will be spared from the pre-trial detention conditions suffered by other persons also held in pre-trial detention there. There is a criminal justice system in Rwanda, under which persons accused of genocide and genocide related offences are being tried, or are being held to await trial. In the event of transfer of this case, the accused should be handed over to that system. What is happening to those already held for trial under that system is what is bound to happen to those to be transferred there from the ICTR, in the event of such transfer. It will be baseless speculation to claim that the accused transferred to Rwanda from the ICTR will be treated differently. After all, as we are reminded by Prof. Andre ~uichaoua,~~in the event of transfer, what will be transferred to Rwanda will be the accused, and the accused only, and no more; there will be no transfer of a system of justice, no transfer of the rule of law.

10. Defence Counsel 10.1: Before the ICTR an accused person is guaranteed the right to defend himself, which includes the right to be defended by counsel, and to have counsel assigned to the defense if the accused does not have sufficient means to pay for one (article 20.4(d) of

28 Rwanda 2008: Can the Rule of Law be Transferred, Just Like the Accused?, by Andre Guichaoua, see Annex L to this Response the ICTR Statute). However, the Prosecutor does not disclose the real situation in Rwanda. He does not give any particulars of what really happens in making available defense lawyers to accused persons who cannot afford one. It is in fact common knowledge that in Rwanda the poor are tried without assistance from a lawyer.

10.2: Defense lawyers play a major role in the administration of justice. This raises the question whether the accused person, if transferred to Rwanda, will get a good and competent defense lawyer. The Prosecutor states in the Motion (paragraph 62) that presently "the membership of Rwanda's Bar is over 200 and continues to expand." The claim that it continues to expand indicates that the present demand for such lawyers surpasses the number available. The number of the members of the Bar in Rwanda says nothing about their competence. One relevant fact about Rwanda's Bar, known as the Kigali Bar Association, is that it is young and just trying to stand up. It is only 11 years old, set up pursuant to Law No. 0311997 of 19 March 1997. An overwhelming majority of its members are young and inexperienced, who can hardly qualify assignment as defence counsel at the ICTR. It is not surprising that not many Rwandan lawyers, resident and practicing in Rwanda, have been assigned as defence counsel at the ICTR. Throughout the existence of this Tribunal, there have been only two such lawyers.

10.3: The surprisingly small number of lawyers being assigned to serve as defence counsel at the ICTR could also be a reflection of the Tutsi-Hutu divide referred to in paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5 above. The persons accused of genocide before the ICTR are Hutu. They are reluctant to accept to be defended by counsel who are either Tutsi, or are practicing or practicing in what they perceive as a Tutsi controlled jurisdiction. Even this perception supports our contention that the Bar in Rwanda is only young and growing, and not sufficiently experienced.

10.4: The Prosecutor makes reference to a program of legal aid and to a related item of the national budget, but gives no proof of their existence. Finally, he does not show how the accused, if found to be indigent, will be assisted by a lawyer after his case is transferred to Rwanda. There is nothing in the Prosecutor's motion which shows that the Government of Rwanda has firmly committed itself to respecting that fundamental right to a fair and equitable trial by providing the accused with a good and competent lawyer, at its cost. Even if there is provision to enable good and experienced lawyers from outside Rwanda to go there and defend accused persons transferred there from the ICTR, there is no provision in Rwanda or elsewhere for remunerating those lawyers for their work. The Prosecutor does not specify where the money to finance good and experienced lawyers will come from.

10.5: Given the experience that some defence teams have had with the authorities in Rwanda, even if the accused would manage to have a lawyer, it is very unlikely that the lawyer will have access, in Rwanda, to the facilities he needs to prepare a good defense for his client. There is also the fear of working in Rwanda in defence of a person accused of genocide. Many lawyers may be scared of taking up such an assignment for fear of having to undergo a fate similar to that of Me Jean Bosco Kazungu, the defence lawyer for former President Pasteur Bizimungu, who complained of lack of fairness and impartiality in the proceedings and was arrested during the trial on 2 April 2004, and detained in custody for 48 hours. There have been other reports describing that trial as having been notoriously unfair.29

11. Availability and Protection of Witnesses 11.1: Contrary to the Prosecutor's assertions (paragraphs 36 and 68 of the Motion), it will be impossible for the accused "to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him .. . and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his .. . behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him ...", as he would if he was tried by the ICTR (article 20.4(e) of the ICTR Statute). Intense cross examination of prosecution witnesses at the ICTR has not been tolerated by the Government of Rwanda; it cannot be expected that that same government will allow it to occur in its own courts.

29~umanRights Watch, Rwanda World Report 2005, at httv://hrw.org/wr2005.pdf;US State Department, supra, footnote No. 12. 11.2: In fact the Government of Rwanda and associations for the defense of Tutsi survivors, IBUKA, AVEGA and Pro-Fernmes Twese Hamwe, have even tried to exercise extortion upon the Tribunal by accusing it of authorizing or allowing intense cross- examination of Prosecution witnesses, claiming that such cross-examination amounted to acts of harassment. In December 2001, under the pretext of defending the interests of prosecution witnesses allegedly mistreated by defense lawyers, the Government of Rwanda and the above mentioned agencies3' launched a powerful campaign against the Tribunal to force its officials to submit to their will concerning, notably, the recruitment of investigators for the defence and revision of the system of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.

11.3: From January 2002, IBUKA and AVEGA, who practically control all of the witnesses for the prosecution coming from Rwanda, decided to stop cooperation with the Tribunal. With the complicity of the Rwandan government, they blocked the transfer of witnesses from Kigali to Arusha. The proceedings in the Butare and Niyitegeka cases had to be suspended for several weeks because there were no prosecution witnesses. Orders issued by two Trial Chambers of the ICTR to compel the Rwandan government to allow prosecution witnesses to travel to Arusha to testify before the Tribunal were ignored by the Rwanda government, stating that Rwanda was a sovereign state that did not have to receive orders from ICTR judges.

11.4: The situation got worse. On 27 June 2002 IBUKA and AVEGA organized public demonstrations at the Office of the Prosecutor in Kigali, when the Prosecutor and the ICTR Registrar were on official visit to ~wanda.~'Since the crisis was taking too long and the proceedings in several trials had been stopped, the ICTR Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte and the then ICTR President, Navathanem Pillay, were obliged to take the matter to the UN Security Council on 23 July and 26 July 2002 respectively.32 The government in Kigali responded to those complaints by launching a scathing attack upon the ICTR;

30 Hirondelle Agency Press Release of 5 December 2001, ICTRIBUTARE and ICTRIRWANDAIJUDGES 3' Agence Hirondelle of 27 June 2002. 32 Statement by the President of the ICTR to the United Nations Security Council by Judge Navathanem Pillay, President, 29 October 2002 using practically the same terminologies as those by the organizations IBUKA and AVEGA since January 2002~~.It is that same government which the Prosecutor says will be ready with assistance to the accused in securing witnesses and having them examined or cross examined freely once the accused is transferred to Rwanda; it is to expect too much from that government.

11.5: The government in Kigali has actually threatened Defense lawyers to prevent them from adequately cross-examining prosecution witnesses from Rwanda. That was the case with M. John Floyd, lead counsel for Hassan Ngeze. He was subjected to direct intimidation from the Rwanda Minister for Justice, Mr Jean de Dieu Mucyo, who accused the lawyer of mistreating a prosecution witness from Rwanda; Mr Mucyo made the accusation when he met the new Registrar, Mr Adama Dieng, and his predecessor, Mr Agwu Okali. The Minister then went on to say to the press: "if they treat people that way, we would like to know how we should treat them in return."34 Ngeze's defense lawyer denounced that intimidation before the Chamber, complaining of the interference of the Rwandan Government in the proceedings before the ICTR. M. Floyd stated that that was a clear obstruction of justice and asked the Chamber to render a decision saying that the Government of Rwanda should not interfere in the proceedings and that lawyers have the right to cross-examine witnesses as they wish. The Chamber noted the complaint and promised to find a solution to it. But, apparently, the Chamber cannot do much about the interference of the Rwanda Government in the proceedings before the ICTR.

11.6: A government that has defied the ICTR on several occasions will have no scruples or embarrassment to deprive a transferred accused of his legitimate rights in order to prevent him from mounting an adequate defense to the accusations presented by the Chief Prosecutor of Rwanda. That government will not be able, and will not want, to ensure security of the Defense and of the witnesses, contrary to what is done at ICTR. The OTP seems satisfied by merely what the law says about the transfer of cases (paragraph 41 of the Motion) to affirm that protective measures similar to those provided

33 Letter dated 26 July 2002 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations Organization, Doc. S/2002/842. 34 Minute of 28 February 2001, pp. 15 1-157 by the ICTR will be guaranteed in Rwanda. But he disregards the reality which prevails on the ground in Rwanda. Persons who wish to accept to testify in defense of a person accused of genocide are subject to harassment in order to prevent them from testifying. When they persist, they are subject to violence and sometimes assassination. Similar harassments and threats face members of defense teams: investigators, legal assistants, and even counsel.35

11.7: Examples of witnesses who have been subjected to harassment in Rwanda after testifying at the ICTR include some witnesses in the Kajelijeli case (ICTR-98-44-A-T); witnesses FBM, and RHU-23 were arrested while witnesses RHU-21, RHU-29 and ZLG got killed. Uwizeye Fidele, who testified for the defence in the case of Akayesu (ICTR- 96-4-T) was arrested upon return to Rwanda and kept in prison for two years. Some witnesses have been forced to flee Rwanda after testifying for at the defence at the ICTR. Witness DR who testified in the case of Muhimana (ICTR-95-1B-T) suffered arrest and then fled to Europe. Witnesses RMB and JNQ in Bagambiki's case (ICTR-99-46-T) also fled to Europe after suffering harassment on return to Rwanda. Witnesses MA1 in Renzaho 's case (ICTR-97-4 1-T) and RNN in Nshamihigo 's case (ICTR-200 1-63-T) have similarly fled the country. Indeed, some witnesses have stated while testifying before the ICTR that they cannot go back to Rwanda after giving testimony because their security will be in danger. These include witness BZWF in Ntagerura's case (ICTR-96-lOA), testifying on 18 March 2002 (page 70, line 11 to 14, French version, public session), witness PCD in Imanishimwe's case (ICTR-97-36), testifying on 30 December 2002 (from page 6 line 23 to page 7 line 3, French version, closed session), and witness ZSA in Nshamihigo's case (ICTR-2001-63-T), testifying on 25 April 2007 (page 24 line 17 to 27, French version, closed session).

11.8: Defense Witnesses who wanted to come to testify for the defence at the ICTR have indeed been victims of intimidation and violence in Rwanda. What will happen to witnesses who would not have the protection of the ICTR? The Prosecutor does not give any guarantee of protection for the witnesses to testify for the defence in Rwanda. In the

35 See Annex D to this Response case of Karemera and Others, when the defense of Nzirorera filed a motion to hold some trial sessions in Rwanda, the Registrar strongly objected on the ground that it would be dangerous for the security of protected witnesses to testify within the community where they are accused of having committed crimes.36 This was only in 2005. That community has not changed today.

11.9: Partly because of the intimidation that prospective witnesses have to face in Rwanda, most witnesses for the defense case are lined up to come from outside Rwanda. This is not peculiar to any particular case; rather, it is the pattern. To mention just a few examples, in Ntagerura's case (ICTR-96-10A) all the 33 defence witnesses came from outside Rwanda; in Imanishimwe's case (ICTR-97-36), all the 23 defence witnesses came from outside Rwanda; and Nshamihigo's case (ICTR-01-63), only 3 out of a total of 35 defence witnesses, that is to say only 9%, came from Rwanda. There is no reason to expect this particular case to be different from this common pattern. These witnesses are nationals of Rwanda living outside their country as refugees. Under the UNHCR Regualtions governing their refugee status they cannot travel to Rwanda. They cannot be forcefully taken back to Rwanda, which they fled because their security was under threat. But they can come to the ICTR under ICTR protection. It is unimaginable that someone, a refugee who left Rwanda for his security, is going to be persuaded to come back there, jeopardizing his security, just because he has to testify for the defence; he will lose his refugee status if he accepted to go to Rwanda.

11.10: It must not be forgotten that when ICTR provides protection for defence witnesses the protection is often protection against ~wanda.~~The witnesses who come to testify at the ICTR are usually identified by pseudonyms only as a way of protecting them. The protection is mainly protection against people in Rwanda, including people in authority there. It is grossly absurd, therefore, to expect that these witnesses, who need to be protected from people, including people in authority, in Rwanda, should go and submit themselves to Rwandan authorities in order to testify for the defence. That is

36 (( Registrar's Submission under Rule 33 (B) of the Rules on Joseph Nzirorera's Motion to hold Trials sessions in Rwanda u, 4 May 2005,s 9- 10 37 Ibid. unworkable. As such, protection to defence witnesses cannot be guaranteed or even provided at all if the case is transferred to Rwanda. In the circumstances, the defence cannot expect to convince any witnesses to testify in its favour. Without defense witnesses, the accused will not have the right of equality before the law. In short, there will be no justice.

11.11: If, as suggested by the Prosecutor, defense witnesses are examined by the judges while the transferred accused or his defense is not granted the right to cross-examine himself (paragraph 68 of the Motion), the right of the accused to defend himself will be violated. In fact, in a system with a good administration of justice, a judge cannot be substitute for the defense. The transferred accused would not benefit from the principle of equality of arms or the principle of adversarial hearing granted by the ICTR, which is an essential element of a fair trial. The administration of evidence in Rwanda, should the case be transferred there, also seems to be gravely compromised by the wording of articles 1, 8 and 10 of the Organic Law on the Transfer of Cases (No. 1112007 of 16 March 2007), concerning the admission of evidence used in other trials at the ICTR. The transferred accused risks being judged on the basis of evidence that has not been subjected to scrutiny through an adversarial hearing and debate.

11.12: Before the ICTR, the accused is granted the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt" (art. 20.4, g of the Statute). The Kigali regime will not grant to the accused such a right given that its policy is one that would rather compel the accused Hutu to confess to being guilty. Intimidation and violence, including torture, are used to that end. Examples are many among witnesses that came to testify before the ICTR. Sometimes, accused persons are be subjected to torture to compel them to admit crimes that they never committed, or to make them accuse other innocent persons. Evidently, the Prosecutor is content with citing the provisions of the law without any endavour to consider the reality on the ground, experienced by persons accused in Rwanda, and even at the ICTR, due to the policy of the government which seeks to have the greatest number of the accused Hutu admit guilt through confessions extorted by force, intimidation and promise of rewards. 12. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Rwanda 12.1: Contrary to what the OTP states (paragraph 57 of the Motion), the Office of the Prosecutor General in Rwanda is not independent. It is under the authority of the Minister of Justice (article 162 of the Constitution of Rwanda). It is the Minister of Justice who defines the general policy of the prosecution. He can give orders to the Prosecutor General of the Republic. The Prosecutor General, who will represent the prosecution in the trial of the accused transferred to Rwanda and who will have the task of harmonizing the current indictment with the Rwandan legislation, is not, therefore, independent.

12.2: Nothing is said about the qualification and experience of the prosecuting attorneys from the Prosecutor General's office who are expected to conduct the prosecution. Just like the judges and the defence lawyers in Rwanda, the attorneys in the office of the Prosecutor General have little experience, if any at all, in international criminal law to have the required level of competence to conduct proceedings relating to international law crimes according to the ICTR standards. A Bachelors degree in law coupled with 8 years of working experience is all that is required to qualify for appointment as Prosecutor General. The Motion is silent even about the number of attorneys in that office. This is an omission of an important piece of information, considering that Rwanda's prisons are overcrowded with pre-trial inmates. The Prosecutor has deliberately omitted this information probably because its disclosure would be adverse to the Prosecutor's Motion.

13. Respect for International Treaties 13.1: The Prosecutor enumerates a series of international treaties and conventions to which Rwanda is a party (paragraphs 69-72 of the Motion). But, besides the mere texts of the law, he does not give any particulars of any practical measures taken concerning their actual implementation by the Rwandan authorities. Moreover, he does not demonstrate, with concretes facts, what the practice and the performance of various tribunals in Rwanda is, and concerning their respect, if any, for principles of law enshrined in the international treaties and in the provisions of the national law. 13.2: Nevertheless, one knows through regular reports of organizations for the defense of human rights, such as Amnesty international and Human Rights Watch, as well as through reports of the Department of State of the United States, a dependable supporter of the Kigali regime, that Rwanda constantly violates human rights, in general, and the rights of the defense, in particular.38 It is not surprising that the Prosecutor does not mention any of those reports because they do not support the claims that Rwanda can give a fair trial to the transferred accused.

14. International Monitor and Control 14.1: The Prosecutor affirms that Rwanda has accepted to be monitored and evaluated by international bodies, such as the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) and the NEPAD Commission (paragraph 72 of the Motion), but he does not reveal the results of such evaluations and how they can guarantee the rights of the transferred accused. In any case, the claim by the Prosecutor is misleading as it does not disclose that President Kagame himself categorically rejected the NEPAD Report at an RPF annual meeting, held in December 1995. That Report accuses the RPF regime of numerous failings in relation to human rights and individual liberties, as well as to good governance. The Prosecutor would have sounded credible if he had filed that Report.

14.2: The Prosecutor assumes that the mere fact of designating the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights to monitor proceedings in the trials of cases transferred to Rwanda guarantees a fair trial (paragraph 74 of the Motion). The monitoring of trials does not, in itself, render such trials fair; it only makes it possible for the world to know whether or not the trials were fair or not. Regarding this case, it is necessary to note that strictly speaking there is no agreement between the ICTR and the ACHPR about the monitoring of those proceedings. In fact, there was only an exchange of correspondence between the Prosecutor and the President of the ACHPR. The correspondence does not specify the nature and the details of the mission entrusted to the ACHPR.

38 See footnote 14 above 14.3: Indeed, the President of the ACHPR gives a favorable answer to the Prosecutor's proposition to monitor, on behalf of the ICTR, the proceedings in cases that may be transferred to national jurisdictions. However, she brought to the attention of the ICTR Prosecutor that she was waiting to know the practical arrangements that the OTP intended to make for the implementation of the project, indicating that nothing was in place for the launching of such supervision. Nothing indicates that the Prosecutor has negotiated the practical modalities of the ACHPR mission with the government of Rwanda for monitoring cases transferred to Rwanda. Furthermore, the Prosecutor's motion says nothing about the financing of that project. The launching of that project in favor of the transferred accused is no more than hypothetical.

14.4: Finally, there is also the question of competence. Is the Prosecutor competent to make commitments, which have financial implications, on behalf of the ICTR? It is only noted that such competence is not included in the Prosecutor's functions as provided for in Article 15 of the ICTR Statute and Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Besides, what makes the Prosecutor believe that ACHPR can effectively monitor proceedings in Rwanda? Has the organization carried out similar activities in any other known African country? In other words, what is the experience of the said organization in this matter? Moreover, the Prosecutor is not the convenient person to deal with the control of the fairness of the proceedings because that is the role of a Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 19 of the ICTR Statute. The ICTR Prosecutor's main concern is to prosecute accused persons and try to secure a conviction.

14.5: The monitoring of cases being tried could also be done by other institutions like civil society organizations and, especially, the media. But this is only possible where the media is indeed free and independent. Trials at the ICTR have always been under the constant glare of the media. That is largely because the ICTR is an international organization and not the property or subject of any national jurisdiction, and its activities attract the attention of all media institutions, national and international. It is not expected that the cases transferred to Rwandan courts will have the same media coverage as cases at the ICTR. This is largely because the media in Rwanda is not free enough to take the function of monitoring proceedings in Rwanda national courts. Freedom of the press in Rwanda has been consistently targeted by the Government. Papers have been forced to close down or toe the line. Journalists have been forced to flee. The rare independent papers currently existing in Rwanda are constantly threatened and intimidated, often in a violent fashion.39

15. Conditions of Detention and Security of the Accused 15.1: In the motion, the Prosecutor skims over the issues of detention and security in paragraphs 77 and 78 of the Motion, stating that Rwandan legislation permits granting the minimum conditions provided for in Resolution 431173 of the UN General Assembly made on 9 December 1998. We just note again that the accused in this case has not bee arrested; addressing the subject of conditions of detention is relevant all the same. We should point out, though, that while on other subjects the Prosecutor gives detailed precise references to Rwandan legislation, there is no reference to any provision of law that guarantees respect for that Resolution. In reality, therefore, there is no formal guarantee that those minimum conditions will be respected in respect of the accused once transferred to Rwanda.

15.2: What is even more serious is that the Prosecutor does not guarantee that that accused, if transferred, will not be subjected to the deplorable conditions which reign in the overpopulated prisons of Rwanda. It is thus highly likely that the accused will be, like others accused of 'genocide', the object of acts of violence, torture, kidnapping and assassination, which are regularly reported by international agencies, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as, by the US Department of Prison inspections by the Red Cross, which have existed for a long time, have not prevented these serious and blatant violations of prisoner rights in Rwanda.

39 See, for example: Rwanda: Freedom of Expression Under Attack, Amnesty International, Public Statement, 27 February 2007, A1 Index: AFR 47100212007; Amnesty International Annual Report 2006; Amnesty International Annual Report 2007; Attacks on the Press in 2005 Africa, Rwanda section, Committee to Protect Journalists 2005; Attacks on the Press in 2006 Africa, Rwanda section, Committee to Protect Journalists 2006. 40 See footnote 14 above 15.3: The "UMUSESO" Newspaper published in Kigali reported recently that there was no food for prisoners and that prison officials have not been paid for several month^.^' An international tribunal having jurisdiction, like the ICTR, should not send detainees to a country that is facing such severe problems.

16. Possibility to Revoke the Referral Order 16.1: The fact that the special law on transfer of cases recognizes the ICTR competence to revoke the referral order, as mentioned in paragraph 80 of the Motion, does not change anything about the serious danger of unfair trials, and of acts of violence including torture and assassination. The possibility of revocation, therefore, cannot be taken as a safeguard against those dangers. Even if it were, there is always the risk that revocation of the referral order and the deferral of the transferred accused might come under consideration when it is already too late.

16.2: Moreover, revocation of the referral order is not envisaged by Rule 1lbis on transfers, especially after conviction of the transferred accused. This Rule does not even provide for the possibility of a transferred accused getting a retrial before the ICTR, pursuant to article 9.2(b) of the ICTR Statute, which provides for the possibility of a retrial by the ICTR in a case where a court in a national jurisdiction fails to render an impartial and independent judgment, or where the case was not prosecuted with diligence.

17. The RPF Regime: A One Sided Establishment 17.1: From the very beginning the ICTR mandate has been to investigate and prosecute offenders from both sides of the conflict in Rwanda in 1994: the two sides are Hutu and Tutsi, generally understood to be represented by the Habyarimana government and the RPF establishment respectively. So far, the ICTR has not had even a single prosecution of offenders from the RPF establishment, the reason being that the RPF regime has been protecting its members from prosecution before the ICTR or elsewhere.

4' UMUSESO Newspaper No 287 of 13 to 19/07/2007

3 1 17.2: Investigations have shown that some members of the RPF establishment did, in the year 1994, commit atrocities for which they ought to answer serious criminal charges but no such indictments have been preferred against them so far. Michael Hourigan shows in his affidavit, tendered as Exhibit No. 365 in the Military I case (ICTR-00-56), that investigations started by his team clearly indicated that some very senior members of the RPF ought to be indicted for the same offences as the accused in this case is charged with. The investigations were suddenly stopped, under pressure, and Hourigan decided to resign from his position as investigator at the ICTR (see Annex 0 hereto). Carla Del Ponte also, as Head of Prosecution at the ICTR, had some investigations done into members of the RPF, against intense pressure from Rwanda, the US and the UK; the investigations were then stopped and Del Ponte was replaced as Head of Prosecution, and no prosecutions of any RPF members was undertaken.42

17.3: It is against that background that Judge Bruguire of France issued an indictment citing 9 persons, and then a Spannish judge, earlier this year, issued another indictment citing 40 accused persons, for the same offences as the offences the accused in this case is charged with. Those listed in both indictments are persons in positions of authority in the RPF establishment; they are listed as persons who ought to answer the charges made against them but the RPF regime has so far shielded them against the obligation to answer those charges. As pointed out above (paragraph 7.12) the reaction of the regime to the indictments by the French and Spanish judges was actually contemptuous of the judicial systems under which those judges operate. That is why it is argued, and this humble response supports the argument, that there is no competent impartial tribunal in Rwanda to try the case of an accused transferred from the ICTR because the authorities in Rwanda are themselves suspect; a suspect in not competent to sit in judgment over another suspect. Therefore, in our humble submission, transferring this case to Rwanda

42 Florence Hartrnann, the spokesperson of Carla Del Ponte, revealed in her book published in 2007 (Paix et chstiment: les nuerres secr4tes de la ~olitiaueet de la iustice internationales Paris, Flammarion, 10 septembre 2007, see Annex K to this Response), how Mr. Richard Prosper, US Ambassador at large, tried to convince Mme Carla Del Ponte, then ICTR Prosecutor, not to prosecute RPF soldiers who committed crimes in Rwanda. would be tantamount to the ICTR blessing the refusal of the regime in Kigali to allow the prosecution of alleged culprits of genocide just because they happen to be in the regime.

17.4: We make this submission fully aware of the fact that recently four officers of the army, members of the RPF, have been arrested in relation to genocide or genocide related offences committed at Kabgayi in 1994. These arrests, in our humble submission, do not water down our argument or change the position that the RPF regime is itself suspect and it has, for all these years, been shielding its members from prosecution by the ICTR for the same offences which it now claims to be capable of trying with impartiality. Significantly, the Head of the Catholic Church in Rwanda, whose clergy are the ones for whose murder the four soldiers have been arrested, has warned against conducting the trial of the four soldiers in Rwanda; he has stated that justice in that case cannot be rendered by Rwandans because they "are most likely to be compromised by the e~tablishment."~~Our argument, therefore, that the establishment in Rwanda should not be trusted to act impartially has support even in Rwanda itself.

17.5: The timing of the arrest of those four soldiers also deserves some comment. Claims that members of the RPF regime also committed genocide and other offences triable by the ICTR have been there for years. But the regime has persistently refused to take or support any action against the suspects. Even recently when some foreign judges issued indictments against some members of the regime, the regime has rudely dismissed those indictments as irrelevant. It is only after the ICTR started pronouncing decisions refusing requests to transfer some cases to ~wanda~~that the regime took the step to arrest the four soldiers. The conclusion that this step has been taken as a deliberate ploy to counter further resistance against other applications for transfer of cases, which are pending or in the pipeline, is inevitable.

43 See press report by Hirondelle News Agency, 16 June 2008, Annex N to this Response 44 Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, ICTR-97-36-R1Ibis: Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda, rendered on 28 May 2008; Prosecutor v. Gaspard Kanyarukiga, ICTR-2002-78-R1 Ibis: Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, rendered on 6 June 2008. 18. Conclusion 18.1: The arguments developed above demonstrate that if this case is transferred to Rwanda, the accused will not have a fair trial, will be exposed to more adverse conditions than those he would be subject to if tried by the ICTR or on its behalf:

In Rwanda he would be tried by Rwanda's High Court (as a court of first instance) constituted by a single judge, whereas the ICTR trial Chamber is composed of three judges;

The rights granted to the accused by the International Law in general, and by the ICTR Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as well as by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular, will in no way be respected even if they may more or less be in the texts of some Rwandan legislation.

The transferred accused would be tried on the basis of a law which provides for a more extended temporal jurisdiction for the tribunals (in Rwanda, the jurisdiction runs from lStOctober 1990 to an indefinite time, whereas the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR spans from lStJanuary to 3 lStDecember 1994);

The accused will be judged by courts of a regime controlled by people who only aspire to apply towards him the justice of the victorious and will thus play the role of judge and jury, contrary to justice;

The accused is not likely to get the witnesses he needs to testify on his behalf as most witnesses are refugees who cannot travel to Rwanda;

The accused will be at the mercy of people who are themselves the object of accusations of genocide and other crimes against international humanitarian law but who have avoided being prosecuted so far and are enjoying apparent immunity accorded to them by the RPF regime with the support of some super powers45;

The physical integrity of the accused and his life will be put to serious jeopardy;

18.2: Finally, considering the fact that there have been reports of there being sufficient grounds to prosecute before the ICTR some people in authority in the Republic of Rwanda but none of those have been prosecuted because of the protection accorded to them by the Rwandan government, transferring this case to Rwanda will be tantamount to the ICTR blessing the refusal of the RPF regime to allow the prosecution of those numerous alleged culprits of genocide just because they happen to be in that regime.

18.3: Finally, we are not saying in this Response that the Republic of Rwanda is for ever doomed to remain incapable of handling a case like this one with the required standards of justice. We only wish to echo the words of this Trial Chamber in the case of Yussuf Munyakazi when it took "notice of the positive steps taken by Rwanda to facilitate referral" and expressed the positive hope that if the country continues along that path, "the Tribunal will hopefully be able to refer some future cases to Rwandan courts."46 All that we are saying is: that stage in Rwanda's development has not yet been reached.

And for those reasons: This Response prays to the Trial Chamber to take the following measures:

(a) to reject the Prosecutor's Request in its entirety for the reasons hereinabove given in this Response, which show that the accused would not benefit from a fair trial and that he would be exposed to violence, torture, and other grave threats against his life;

45 Florence Hartmann, the spokesperson of Carla Del Ponte, revealed in his book published recently (&& et cmtiment: les nuerres secrdtes de la ~olitiaueet de la justice internationales Paris, Flammarion, 10 septembre 2007, see Annex K to this Response) how Mr. Richard Prosper, US Ambassador at large, tried to convince Mme Carla Del Ponte, then ICTR Prosecutor, not to prosecute RPF soldiers who committed crimes in Rwanda. 46 Prosecutor V. Yussuf Munyakazi, ICTR-97-36-R1Ibis, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda, 28 May 2008, para 67. (b) to direct that all necessary measures should proceed and continue to ensure that the accused is tried by the ICTR, or by some other impartial tribunal in any national jurisdiction other than Rwanda;

(c) Take all other decisions and measures necessary to ensure that all the rights guaranteed the accused by the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR are respected.

Respectively submitted.

Dated and signed at Arusha this 28" day of July 2008

Jwani T. Mwaikusa Counsel for the Interests of the Accused LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex A Letters (various) to the UN and ICTR authorities

Annex B Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: There Will be no Trial, July 2007, and Amnesty International, Rwanda / Uganda: Forcible Return.. ., A1 Index AFR 47/004/2007, 16 March 2007

Annex C UN Office for the Cordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN-CEA Update No. 715, 15 July 1999

Annex D Letter dated 20 June from the President of ADAD to the President of the ICTR

Annex E AI Deplores "The Failure of the ICTR" to Prosecute All Sides, Hirondelle News Agency, 15 December 2006

Annex F An ICTR Lawyer Denounces Threats Made to his Witnesses, and Defence Witness to Flee Rwanda, Hirondelle News Agency, 11 June 2007, 23 August 2007, and 17 May 2007

Annex G Arrest in Kigali of an ICTR Defence Investigator, and ICTR Sends Representative to Kigali.. ., Hirondelle News Agency, 21 and 26 June 2007

Annex H Letter dated 24 September 2007 from CLIIR to French Minister for Justice, and CLIIR Memorandum dated 24 September 2007

Annex I HRW Warns Rwanda Against Repraisal Murders, AI Report Still Criticizes Rwanda and AI Asks for Inquiry ...., Hirondelle News Agency, 21 January 2007, 30 May 2006 and 21 March 2006

Annex J Appel au Conseil de Securite des Nations Unies pour qu'il veille a ce que le mandate du TPIR soit Rempli, Amnesty International 12 decembre 2006

Annex K Florence Hartmann, Paix et Chatiment (Flammarion)

Annex L Professor Andre Guichaoua's article

Annex M Press reports: Hirondelle News Agency, 27 & 29 February 2004, and The New Times, Kigali 12 September 2006

Annex N Press report: Hirondelle News Agency, 16 June 2008

Annex 0 Affidavit of Michael Andrew Hourigan ANNEX Les Menus du Tribunal Pdnal International pour le Rwanda (TPIR) - anzanie.

Monsieur Ban KI-MOON SdtaireGendral des Nations Unies, New York, New York, w Obiet. Prdsentation de fdlicitations et ra~pel des doss'iers restds sans suite.

Monsieur le Secrhire Ghdral,

A I'occasion de votre accession au poste de Secrhire Gendral des Nations Unies, les d&enus du Tribunal Pdnal International pour le Rwanda, signataires de la pdsente, sont heureux de vous prbenter leurs chaleureuses fdicitations. 11s vous souhaitent plein suds dans vos fonctions combien difficiles et complexes dam un monde en perphelles mutations et A multiples problbmes.

Au cours des annb 2005 et 2006, nous avons krit 'au Conseil de Shritd, au Secrbtaire Ghhldes Nations Unies et au Prdsident du TPlR pour exprimer nos prdoccupations sur des probl4mes graves qui se posent au Tribunal Pdnal International pour le Rwanda. I1 s'agit de questions qui compromettent I'ind6pendance et la neutralit6 de ce Tribunal, &ant ainsi une situation de ddni de justice. Des observateurs autorishs tel que Charles Onana ou Thierry Cruvellier sont allds jusqu'i phnter le TPIR comme un Tribunal du vainqueur sur le vaincu.

Les lettres reprises dans le tableau en annexe traitent des points releves dans le paragraphe prWent. Elks ont &d envoyks soit au Secthire GenM B titre de destinataire principal soit au Mident du TPJR avec chaque fois une copie pour information rhservtk au premier responsable de I'administration des Nations Unies. Nous d4plorons aujourd'hui qu'aucune *rise n'ait &d rdservtk B toutes ces correspondances malgd l'importance et l'acuith des probl4mes soulevds,

Nous sommes conscients que lors de votre prise de fonctions, vous avez 4t4 mis au courant de ce qui se passe au TPIR. Mais nous avons des raisons de douter que lesservices ou les personnalit6s qui n'ont pas daignd nous faire un feedback sur des problhmes dpineux et fort prbccupants que nous posons dans cette abondante conespondance vous aient brief6 objectivement sur le fond des probl&mesqui se posent au TPIR.

Nous avons salu6 avec joie et soulagement votre d&errnination h r6former la gestion et l'administration iies Nations Unies. Cette organisation est une lourde machine qu'il n'est pas

' Vous tro~ertzen annexe le reled de toutes ces lettres, leur dates d'envoi ainsi que leur objet. facile de g&er et oi~les int&&s des diverses nations se c6toient au quotidien et, souvent, c'est malheureusement la raison du plus fort qui l'emporte. Nous souhaitons que la rhforme que vous prhnisez puisse aussi toucher le Tribunal penal International pour le Rwanda de manihe ii assurer qu'une justice witable y trouve droit de cite.

Comme nous avons eu l'occasion de l'exprirner dans nos diverses correspondances, la solution aux problhmes rwandais passe avant tout par I'&ablissement de la v6rit4 pour raiser une vdritable rbnciliation. Malheureusement, le TPIR n'y attache pas I'irnportance voulue. Au contraire, le TPIR s'est laissb prendre dans le pibe du FPR en acceptant la dklation et la fabrication des faux temoignages. En effet, les accusQ ont d6montre que la grande partie des accusations du Procurew n'avaient rien ii voir avec la rhlitb de ce qui s'est r6ellement passe sur le terrain au Rwanda. Les cas abondent en rapport avec les confessions des d&enus au Rwanda qui, de connivence avec le Procureur et souvent moyennant une certaine dcompense, acceptent de changer la version des faits pour fake condamner les d&enus du TPIR.

En vous adressant la prdsente, nous tenons B reprendre les questions qui, B notre avis, sont les plus urgentes. Nous souhaiterions que vous leu accordiez l'attention qu'elles mhitent. Certaines d'entre elles sont d'une ampleur et d'une gravit6 telles que de leur rhlution d-d la dibilite de ce Tribunal et, surtout, la survie des ddtenus que nous somrnes.

1- Neutralitd. Ind6~endanceet Impartialit6 du TPIR.

Le constat que le TPIR n'agit pas inddpendamment ou impartialement est bas6 sur le fait que, trhs souvent, le Tribunal se croit oblig6 de se fl6rer au Gouvemernent du Rwanda avant de prendre des dkisions importantes nous touchant. Pourtant, le TPIR sait que des hauts dirigeants du Rwanda comptent parmi les personnes justiciables devant ce Tribunal. I1 n'est donc pas compdhensible que ces personnalitCs soient associ&s aux dkisions nous concernant.

Des officiels hauts plads au TPIR continuent de faire des d6clarations inspirdes ou apparemment dicth par le regime rwandais. L'exemple le plus rhnt est la dblaration faite par le Grefier Adjoint du TPIR le 23 novembre 2006 prbtendant, faussement, que le TPIR avait obtenu des preuves que I'avion du president Habyarimana aurait 6t6 descendu par un missile land par les militaires des Forces h6esRwandaises. Suite ii la rhction 6nergique des Avocats de la d6fense exigeant le retrait de cette dhlaration mensongkre, le Tribunal a trow6 une formule diplomatique pour due que le Greffier Adjoint O'Donnell s'ebit tromp6

Un autre exemple est celui des pressions constamment exedes sw le TPIR pour arr&er des Rwandais d'ethnie Hutu qui travaillent dans des Quipes de d6fense. Meme si aujourd'hui I'on a l'impression que le Tribunal semble avoir pris distance par rapport A ces pressions, il n'emphhe que dans le pass6 des personnes ont &B abusivement arrSties sur dernande du Gowemement rwandais.

Les Juges du TPIR n'ont pas encore renond B la jubtice A deux vitesses sevissant avec achamement contre les accusb Hutu, tout en fennant les yeux sur les crimes wmmis par le FPR. 11s persistent tt refbser d'intwr ces crimes et leurs condquences sur ce qui s'est pa& au Rwanda en 1994. Ils persistent tt dire que l'attentat du 06 avril94 sur l'avion du Prhident Habyarimana, que tous les experts affirment qu'il fbt le dklencheur des massacres, n'a aucun lien avec les pro& conduits au TPIR. Tant que ce Tribunal n'aura pas ost5 fi-anchir le pas important dYarr&erles membres du FPR ayant commis des crimes tombant sous sa wmp&ence, y compris l'attentat du 06 avril 1994 sur l'avion du Prdsident Habyarimana, la justice rendue par le TPIR continuera B &re perwe comme selective et discrirninatoire.

2- Absence de statut du vrkenu. du condamnh du lib& et de I'acquitte.

L'existence et le fonctionnement du TPIR sont rdgis par des textes fondamentaw que sont les Statuts et le Rdglement de Produre et de Prewe. Aucune disposition n'a 66 consa~au statut du prdvenu, du condamnd, du libdrd et de l'acquittd du TPIR Au moment oh nous hrivons, des personnes ayant le statut de prhenu, celui de condamnds et celui d'acquittt5 vivent dam l'incertitude totale. Des condamn& se trouvent totdement bloqub, faute pour les autorites du TPR d'appliquer les dispositions statutaires sur leur transfert dans les pays ayant sign6 les accords avec le Tribunal pour accueillir ses wndamnes. 11s ne savent pas quelle produre suivre pour demander une commutation de peine ou un recours en grace. 11s ont toutes les difficult& du monde A introduire des recours en &ision.

Des personnes acquitt&s ou libdrdes aprts avoir purgk leur peine se voient bloqudes dam des (< safe houses )> ou B l'H8tel a Arusha. Si un statut les regissant existait, eux et leurs fkmilles ne vivraient pas les moment difliciles et d'incertitude qu'ils traversent actuellement. Au TPIR, il n'y a encore eu aucun cas de liberation pro\iisoire ou conditionnelle.

Toutes ces anomalies accrdditent la thtse selon laquelle le TPIR a retp pour mission de ne prononcer que les condamnations.

3- Pqiet de transfert des ddenus et des condamn6s du TPIR au Rwanda.

Des nbgociations sont en wurs depuis un certain temps entre le TPIR et le Gouvernement mandais en we d'y transfker quelques affaires B juger ainsi que les personnes ddfinitivement wndamndes. Nous avons dCnonc6 ces manceuvres en expliquant amplement qu'il s'agissait d'actes devant culminer dans notre anhtissement. Que la peine capitale soit maintenue ou pas par le r6gime impost5 aux Rwandais par les annes, notre transfert vers le Rwanda ne pourra que rbjouir le Prbident Paul Kagame et ses comptres, aujourd'hui pointb du doigt par le Rapport du Juge anti-temriste Jean Louis Bruguihe. Nous nous demandons pourquoi le TPIR veut donner A des suspects notoires qu'il est sea4 poursuivre et juger, le crheau pour se ddbmasser des personnes qu'ils considbent comme leurs pires ennemis. Des strat6gies raffink pour nous faire disparaitre sont un domaine dans lequel le rt5gime de Kigali est passe maftre. Nous l'avons 6crit au Prbident du TPIR et nous vous informons dgalement que ce projet de nous transfdrer a.Rwanda est soutenu par certains pays ayant aid6 le FPR s'installer au pouvoir au Rwanda depuis la mi-juillet 1994.

Nous owns espdrer que vous n'allez pas accepter que les d&enus et les condamnds du TPIR soient remis au erneactuel du Rwanda et que vous n'accepterez pas d'assumer devant l'histoire, devant la Communautd internationale et devant nos fhilles la responsabilitd de nous voir physiquement lynch6s suite I ce transfert. L'ordonnance de soit-coinmuniqub du Juge Jean Louis Bruguihe dat& du 17 novembre 2006 montre qu'aprb une enqu&e minutieuse et rigoureuse, il a &6 dtabli que des militaires du FPR agissant sous les ordres du G6nM Paul Kagame ont descendu I'avion du Phident Habyarimana dans la soirk du 06 avril 1994. Le Juge hit (( qu 'aim'ontpu @iredtennindes les circOIlSkPtces dims lesquelles le projet avait kt4 conp drms le contexte d'un sckmMnode conqui?fech pouvoir que les accords d 'Amsha n'autorisaient pas.. D. I1 a hit, par ailleurs, que << les prkmices de ce complot vimd I'bliminafion physique dtr Prtsident en exercice du Rw& remontent, d1apr4s les dlhents de l'enqugte, en 1991, date de l'ouverture au multipartisme D. Cette conclusion du Juge Jean Louis Bruguihe donne la mesure du poids que le TPIR devait attacher B cette dklaration de Carla del Ponte en date du 17 avril2000 : cu s'il se rbvklait que c 'est le FPR qui a abathr I'avion, ZIistoire ahr &mi&ha &re rkkcrite B.

Malheureusement, aprh le dbpart du Procureur Carla Del Ponte, le TPIR s'est refus4 poursuivre les criminels du FPR sous prkexte que le Procureur est libre de ddterminer qui poursuivre et quand le poursuivre. Le Chef des poursuites cur bureau du Prooureur, M. Stephen Rapp vient d'en donna la confirmation dans une dklaration a l'agence Hirondelle ce 281 lZ/2OO6 en kes termes : << le procureur a discutd h New York devant le Conseil de Sdcuriik des aIl2gations contre le FPR et dit que des &cisions serontprises en 2007. Mais h props de I'attentat contre Z'm'on, iZ a la m6me position que les procureurs avant lui &pis Louise Arbour. Le but & ce lMbuna1 &tail les attaques contre 'des civikr, les massacres des civils, ie gdnwide, J'assassimat de centaines de milliers de rutss et de hutus. Nous ne pouw,ns nous focaliser mu des crimes wntre les militaires comme au PNl oir il y a eu plusieurs actes d'accwalions concernant le traitement des prisonniers de guerre. L 'attaque confre I'avion btait lournde vers des reqwnsables militaires. Ce n'ktait pas un crime contre I'humanitt. Quelques uns ont su&rk qu 'il s'agissait de terrorisme comme un crime de guerre. Mais le terrorisme est un crime o& les civils ont ttb &s cibles. Vit Chef d'Etat qui dtait aussi un WralMajor n 'tiait un civil. Le Tribunal a kt4 mis en place en raison ahr gknoci&, pus &s asasimfs alms le cadre d'une guerre civile. Par ailleurs, Ze rapport rtu Juge Bruguidre n 'est pas encore arrivd au bureau du procweur )A Cette surpreziante dblaration fait fi de ce que le Rwanda n'etait plus en guerre depuis le 04 aoGt 1993 date B laquelle 1'Accord de paix fit sign6 entre le Gouvernement rwandais et le FPR B Arusha. Elle contredit {'engagement pris en 2000 par Carla Del Ponte. Elle fait fi de la saisine du Secrkaire G6ndral de I'ONU par le Juge Bruguiere pour qu'il demande au TPIR d'engager les poursuites contre le Phident Paul Kagame et certains dignitaires du FPR. Quant it nous, au stade actuel, nous estimons que le Tribunal dewait traiter le rapport du Juge Bruguihre avec toute la rigueur judiciaire nbcessaire et cesser de se cabrer dans la partialite

Le comportement actuel du TPIR est une bite de responsabilite que les autoritb qui ont mis en place le TPIR ne peuvent plus cowrir suite l'interpellation du Juge Jean Louis Bruguke.

Monsieur le Secr&aire Gh&al,

Nous venons de vous faire une prhntation sommaire de quelques uns des probldmes urgents auxquels nous sommes confront6s. Nous aimerions que vous preniez connaissance du contern de tout le courrier qui vous est transrnis en annexe. Nous comptons sur votre bienveillante attention et esp6rons vous voir intervenir rapidement en faveur de la justice en exigeant des Juges du TPlR qu'ils sauvegardent son impartialit6 et son indeendance.

Veuillez agder,. Monsieur le Secr6taire G6ndral, I'expression de notre tr&s haute wnsid6ration.

Les d&enus signataires (voir signatures en annexe).

go~ie our information.

-Membres du Conseil de Shrit6, New York -D6partement des Maires Juridiques de l'ONU, New York. -but Commissaire des Nations Unies pow Ies Droits de I'Hornme, Genhve. -Monsieur le Prbident de 17UnionEurophne, Bruxelles. -Monsieur le Sedtaire G6nCral de la Francophonie, Paris. -Mesdames, Messieurs les Juges de la Chambre d'Appel du TPIR (tous). -Mesdames, Messieurs les Juges des Chambres de Premi6re Instance du TPIR (tous). -Monsieur le Pdsident du TPIR, Arwha. a -Monsieur le Greffier du TPIR, Arusha. -Monsieur le Procureur du TPIR, Arusha. -Monsieur le Commandant de I'UNDF, Arusha. -Mesdames et Messieurs les Avocats de la Defense (tous). -Monsieur le Prhident de I'ADAD, Arusha. -Commission Internationale des Juristes, Gen6ve. -CICR, Genhve. -Amnesty International, Genhe. -Human Rights Watch, New York. -FIDH, Paris. -International Crisis Group, Washington DC. -Association Am6ricaine des Juristes. -Association Internationale des Juristes, New Delhi. -Centre de Lutte contre 171mpunit6et 1'Injustice au Rwanda, Bnarelles. -Association DUKOMERE, Bruxelles. -La presse. ,Annexe I: Liste de lettres envovges B des remonsables du TPlR et des Nations Unies en 2005 et en 2006

Date Objet Destinataire -

14/01/05 Nkessite'de rechercher la v6rit6 Dour une iustice I President- .~-. du TPIR de rhnciliation au Rwanda 19/02/0 5 Dknonciation du projet de transfert des President du TPIR condamnds et des dossiers du TPIR au Rwanda et I demande de mise en application de la Directive I sur le transfert des condamn6s 03/06/05 Demande de modification de I'article 91 du Prksident du VIR rkglement de Procedure et de Preuve 22/08/05 Dhonciation du refbs du TPIR de considerer Conseil de Skurite I'attentat contre I'avion presidentiel comme un Secr&aire anbra1 ONU element declencheur des atrocites, de la pratique President Assemblte de poursuite collective et la poursuite e la Wkrale politique de notre anhtissement. Prdsident du TPIR 12/09/05 Dhonciation des lacunes dans le statut et le Secr&aire anera1 ONU

Rklement du Tribunal International Dour le President. .. du- TPIR ~&da et des d&ives administrative5 au ~IR. 3 111 Of05 Nnonciation de la justice internationale Plusieurs autorit6s dont discriminatoire et a deux vitesses. le Secraaire anera1 OW )3/04/06 Notre Memorandum sur la situation du Prhenu et Secretaire Gn6ral de du condamne au TPIR du 17 fbvrier 2003 et notre I'ONU lettre du 12/08/2003 sur la denonciation des President du TPIR pressions exerdes sur le TPIR. 15/05/06 Neutralit6 et impartialit6 du TPIR. Prdsident du TPIR. 25/06/06 Reaction 21 la decision de la Chambre d' Appel du President du TPIR 16/06/2006 et au Communique du TPIR du

20/06/06 1 2611 1/06 1 Dhonciation de la carnpagne de dtsinformation I Prbsident du TPIR. I menee par le TPLR A la suite de la publication des I I conclusions de l'enquhe ~mgui~re. 1 Annexe II :Si~natures des ddtenus - L*m adressk au Secdtaire Geniral de I'ONU le 10 ianvier 2007.

Les Detenus du Tribunal Penal Arusha, le 28 mars 2007. International pour le Rwanda (TPIR) Arusha - TANZANIE.

Monsieur Erik Mose, Prbident du Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda Arusha - TANZANIE.

QbJgJ : Nos prkoccupations face au projet de transfert des accusb et des condamnks du TPIR au Rwanda.

Monsieur le President,

Lors du ICTR General Staflmeering qui s'est tenu au Simba Hall le 9 Fevrier 2007, le Procureur a annonce : "The rt?ferralremains a very important and crucial element of the Completion Strategy. In this respect, the enactment this week by Rwanda of a law on transfer of cnses by ICTR and by states with provisions for exclusion of the death penalty and some detailed guarantees Jor fair trial should now clear the wayfor the OTP to shortly-filesuch requestsfor refirral to Rwanda"'. Depuis lors les medias n'ont cesse de relayer cette information, allant m&mejusqu'a preciser que sur les neuf cas qui restent pendants devant le TPIR, cinq seront transferes au Rwanda. Et le 14 mars 2007 a 19H30 (heure de Tanzanie), BBC-Gahuzamiryango a rapport6 que M. Timothy Gallimore, porte-parole du burcau du Procureur, a tenu une conference de presse a I'issue d'un sejour de travail au Rwanda par le Procureur. Au cours de cette conference de presse, il a wnfirmt I'information vehiculte par les medias depuis quelques jours. I1 a annonce que le Procureur fera des requttes au debut du mois d'avril 2007 pour demander le transfert de cinq dossiers des accusb du TPIR au Rwanda. Devant des annonces aussi insistantes provenant surtout des hautes autoritb du Tribunal, nous nous voyons dans I'obligation de vous adresser la presente pour vous demander de nouveau' de ne pas nous livrer entre les mains des dirigeants de Kigali. A cette fin, nous vous prions de trouver ci-apres un resume des arguments qui vous ont etc deja present& tout au long des am& 2004 et 2005 pour vous prouver qu'il n'est pas dans I'interZt de la justice de transferer les dossiers des accuses du TPIR aux juridictions rwandaises. Nous profiterons de I'occasion pour vous redire que ce serait dgalement agir en violation de toutes les conventions internationales que d'envoyer les condamnes du TPIR purger leur peine dans les prisons d'un pays qu'ils ont fiti et qui, de surcroit, bafouc ostensiblement tous les droits de I'homme. I. Manque d'indPpendance, d'impartialitt! et de sdcuritd LC Conseil de Skurite de I'ONU? sur recommandation du Secretaire General Boutros Boutros Ghali3, a tenu a installer le siege du TPIR hors des frontieres rwandaises dans I'intention d'assurer son independance et son impartialite. Ce fbt une decision d'une rare perspicacite politique car, comme le demontrent de nombreux rapports des ONG, le systeme judiciaire mis en place par le FPR a &e progressivement mine par la delation, I'incompCtence, la subordination aux autorites politiques et la corruption'.

' Cfr Prosecutor's Address to the ICTR General Staff Meeting 9 February 2007. ' La meme demande a ete faite dans une correspondance anttrieure. Cfr, entre autres, nos lettres : - celle du 24 inai 2004 qui dtnonvit le projet d'accord de coopdration entre le TPIR et le Gowemement de Kigali en we du transfert des condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda ; - celle du 4 juillet 2004 qui sollicitait votre intervention pour obtenir I'abandon du projet de transfert des ddtenus du TPIR au Rwanda : - celle du 15 juillet 2004 qui traitait du msfert des dossiers des accuds du TPIR au Rwanda ; - celle du 19 fevrier 2005 qui denonpit le projet de transfert des condarnnes et des accuses du TPIR au Rwanda et qui dernandait la mise en application de la Directive sur le Iransfert des condamnds etc. Cfr Comprehensive Report of the Secretary General on practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the International Tribu?al for Rwanda. recommending Arusha as the seat of the Tribunal (42) ; S/1995/134. 13 Februar); 1995 In The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, p.465, para 41-45 Amnesty Internalional, dam son Bulletin No 320 de Dkmbre 2006, s'oppose au transfert des acculs du TPIR au Rwanda, car il pense que ces accusds ne seraient pas jug& dans un ddlai rai6nnable. que le droit d'etre remis en libertt De fait, apds la victoire rnilitaire du FPR, la plupart des magistrats experirnentes ont ete soit contraints a I'exil, soit tues, soit emprison&, soit systernatiquement remplaces par de nouveaux cadres proches du pouvoir mais sans pdparation adequate. Ainsi, I'Etat preparait le terrain afin qu'il puisse plus aisement s'ingerer dam I'adrninistration de la justice, celleci &ant devenue un outil fondarnental pour la gestion du pouvoir5. Cette dborganisation, ces incompetences et ces ingerences des autorites politiques dam I'administration de la justice ont etd denoncks par Amnesty International 2004 en ces termes : "Amnesty International S concerns focused on four issues: the lack of defence counsel and witnesses for the vast majority of defendants ; the lack of time and adequate fwilities for defendants to prepare their defence : the competence, impartialiry and independence of criminal justice offjcials; and the conduct of the trials in which it was frequently clear that those accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity were alreadv considered guilry by both judge and prosecutor. Dejendants were even jeered by spectators ... Public statements and actions by some government offjclals and the popular pressure exerted by genocide survivors groups against detainees sustained a climate offear that continued to afSect judicial personnel, defendants and witnesses. There continued to be numerous instances alleged interference by government in court decisions and the non respect of court decisions by government officials, witnessed in the re-arrest of individuals Mter trial and acquittal. Defence counsel and witnesses continued lo be intimidnted causing the former to withdraw from the trials and the latter to refise to testrfi aware that prosecution staH would use their testimony to implicate them in crimes committed by defendants. The shortage of qualifed and experienced judicial personnel continued to raise the serious doubts about the fairness ofRwnndese criminal justice system ... "6 Cette situation decrite par Amnesty International ne s'est pas amelioree puisqu'elle est inhhnte au systeme installe par le regime. Monsieur le Pdsident, face a une situation aussi chaotique, quelle garantie d'un proces juste et equitable pouvez-vous dower aux accuds que le Procureur veut vous pousser a livrer aux autoritds rwandaises? Si ceux qui sont considerds comrne r simples exdcutants ,Y subissent des injustices du genre, quel traitement sera rberve a ceux que les hornmes et les femrnes au pouvoir a Kigali se plaisent a appeler t planflcateurs du gdnocide )) ? Est-ce dam un pareil climat qu'un avocat plaidera la cause de son client ? Sera t-il possible de trouver quelque ternoin qui ose intervenir en faveur d'un homme que le regime en place condamne dble moment rntrne qu'il commence a le suspecter? Le transfert des accusb au Rwanda serait une mise en danger delibere de leurs vies, celles de leurs familles et de leurs thoins par les autoritds du Tribunal, car cellesci n'ont jamais cesse de reconnaitre elks-mhes que les problernes de securite se posent avec acuitt dam ce pays7.

ne leur est pas garanti, qu'ils y subiraient des tortures, que les tribunaux rwandais ne sont pas nkessairement indtpendants ou impartiaux. Cfr MATATA, Communiqu6 n054/2001. La Cour dlAssise de Bmxelles face aux Svndicats de dtlateurs oeuvrant au Rwanda et ii I'ttranger, in 44 Centre de Lutte contre 1'Impunitk et I7Injusticeau Rwanda n, Bruxelles, 2 mai 2001, p.2, Rapport d' Amnesty International 2004 Amnesty Interoational, The enduring le~acvof the eenocide and war, p.6 7 Le TPIR a reconnu que ses accuds, leurs temoins el leurs &pipes de defense ne pourraient jouir d'aucune shritk requise dans le cas oi~les pro& se dkrouleraient au Rwanda En effet, dans sa lettre du 4 mai 2005, le Greffier adjoin, a soutenu : "It will be advisable to bear in mind the security and safety of judges, the accused, witnesses, and even the regular (IN SraJ/ members operating in an unfamiliar environment. The various UN security teams have developed preliminary security plans to ensure the safety of all involved, but regardless of professional precautionary measures, the Registry believes that holding trial in Ruhengeri will be more hazardous to all involved than holding trial in sessions in Arusha': Ruhengeri est au Rwanda! Dans la decision rendue par la Chambre I1 du TPIR, le 3 1janvier 2006, dam 19AJaire Le Procureur contre Rugambarara (ICTR-00-59-4, les Juges ont tenu A relever ce qui suit: "The Chamber has considered the general security situation in Rwanda, as well as the risks to genocide victims and potential witnesses in and outside Rwanda described in the Declaration ofAlfred Kwende and the other annexes to the Motion. In light ofthe suppbrting material, the Chamber concludes that the fars expressed by potential prosecution witnesses for their own safety or the safety of their family members in and outside Rwanda, are justiJed by objective considerations"(para 1 1 de la ddcision). 2. Le problhe de la peine de morL I1 faut etre de mauvaise foi pour refuser de comprendre que la suppression de la peine de mort du Code Penal rwandais a &e imposee a Kigali. On connait effectivement I'opposition farouche de I'homme fort de Kigali a cette idee. Par ailleurs, y aurait-t-il anhntissement plus absolu et plus absurde du vaincu que de le livrer malgre lui entre les mains du vainqueur qu'il a combattu pendant quatre ans ? Aucun organe de I'ONU ne devrait s'impliquer dans une entreprise aussi cynique. Qui ignore qu'en Afiique en general, et au Rwanda en particulier, les prisonniers meurent soi-disant (( naturellement N alors qu'en rhlite ils sont victimes de maladie non soignee, d'empoisonnement, de torture, etc. ? Si le Gouvernement rwandais est prit a tout, jusqu'a abandonner (( sa chbre peine capitale s, c'est qu'il pense en tirer des avantages dont la nature 'n'echappe a personne. Les accuses et condamnes du TPIR qui lui seront livres seront subtilement tues et des alibis ne manqueront pas pour expliquer ces disparitions que tout homme avise devrait pdvoir et prevenir dba prbent. 3. Le rPgime carcdraidu Rwanda est infernal. I1 est pkvisible que les accuses qui seront transferes au Rwanda ouvriront toutes iarges les voies du rapatriement des condamn& du TPIR dans ce pays. Or, Monsieur le President, les families et proches de la plupart de ces derniers sont des refugies qui ne peuvent pas rentrer chez eux. Par ailleurs, conformement aux prescriptions de I'article 37 des Regles Minima en matiere de detention, rLes direnus doivent Ptre autorisPs, sous surveillance ndcessaire, a communiquer avec leurjbmille et ceux de leurs amis auxquels on peut faire confiance, rf intervalles riguliers rant par correspondance qu 'en recevant des visitesw8. Tout compte fait, renvoyer les condamnes du TPIR purger leur peine au Rwanda reviendrait a les priver du minimum de droits dont peut jouir un prisonnier. Pareille decision equivaudrait a les couper definitivement des leurs et a pietiner le droit de ces derniers a leur rendre visite a intervalles reguliers. Bien plus, selon les normes internationales dont I'ONU est garante, cuLe regime penitentinire comporte un traitement des condamnes dont le but essentiel est leur amendement et leur reclassement socials9. Or, en luttant, pour avoir les prisonniers de I'ONU, le FPR ne vise pas a les recuperer pour la societe rwandaise, mais a les Climiner pour s'assurer d'une victoire definitive. Allez-vous, Monsieur le President, vous ranger du c6te du FPR dans cette entreprise macabre ? 4. Urgence d'arr8ter les agents du FPR suspect& de g&ocide, de crimes de guerre et d'autres crimes contre I'humanitl Les inquihdes que nous venons d'exposer sont d'autant plus fondtes que de rkcentes preuves, d'une tres grande fiabilite, mettent a nue la responsabilite des hommes au pouvoir a Kigali dam le declenchement des massacres qui ont endeuille le Rwanda entre avril et juillet 1994. Des temoins fiables disent, en effet, que ce sont les Chefs militaires du FPR qui ont planifie et ordonne dbliberement I'assassinat du Prbident Juvenal Habyarimanal'. Ce faisant, ils avaient planifit de dhpiter la Rcipublique, de crQr un climat de chaos qui devait leur permettre de s'emparer du pouvoir par la force. Les auteurs de cet assassinat sont deja sous le coup de mandats d'arrGt internationaux. L'on ne doit jamais oublier que ces mQmes personnes ont lance le 01 octobre 1990 une guerre injustifiee wntre le Rwanda detruisant ainsi le tissu socio-politique et economique a entrainant une dkliquescence du pouvoir. Est-il alors approprie de confier le soin de juger des Rwandais accuses d'avoir commis le genocide a ceux-la memes qui sont dorenavant accuses d'etre les veritables planificateurs des malheurs qui ont ensanglante le Rwanda depuis 1990 et ont degenCr6 dam le dtsordre, le chaos, les affrontements et les massacres entre avril

Cfr aussi I'article 4 de la c( Directive pratique relative A la procidure que doit suivre le TPIR pour designer un Etat dam lequel un condamnt purgera sa peine d'emprisonnement n. Article 10, paxagraphe 3 du Pacte International relatif am droits civils et politiques. Cfr aussi I'article 65 des R6gles Minima en matiere de detention. 'O Implicitement, le Wsident KAGAME plaide coupable quand, dam une emission cc de la BBC du 7 dhmbre 2006. il v5plique ainsi au journaliste Stephen SACKUR qui lui sugghre que le Rwanda ne pourra pas tourner la page tan1 qu'on aura pas identifie I'assassin du president HABYARIMANA : u No, no, no ! First of all I am not responsible for Habyarimana 's dedh and I don 't care! I wasn 't responsible for his security. He wasn 't responsiblefor mine either. And he wouldn't have cared if I had died. I don't care that it happened to him. I was fighting that government, the government that made me refugee for those years, for which I had a right to fight about, and the judge wants to ask me why? " et juillet 1994 ? Les tenants du pouvoir de Kigali sont presses d'avoir les accusb et les condamnes du TPIR qui sont des temoins a charge contre eux pour les anhntir dkfhitivement et pour leur faire endosser les crimes commis par le FPR. Ainsi, ils feraient oublier leurs responsabilites dans la tragedie mandaise. Est-il des lors approprie de livrer les accuses et les condamnes du TPIR entre les mains de ces presumes criminels avant qu'ils ne repondent de leurs crimes devant le TPIR ou devant d'autres juridictions comp6tentes ? Monsieur le Prhident, Ce releve n'est certes pas exhaustif; mais il donne une idee du pays ou vous serez bientdt sollicite de renvoyer des accuses pour qu'ils y soient c( juges 1) et d'expedier les condamnes pour qu'ils y purgent leurs peines. Vous comprenez, nous l'esperons, qu'accepter une telle demande serait violer leur droit 21 un procb juste et Quitable. Ce serait denier a ces condamnb le droit de jouir du minimum de droits que lui consent encore la soci6te humaine, ainsi que leur droit a la vie et a la securite de leur personne garanti par le droit international humanitaire. Saki de tous ces faits, nous vous prions, Monsieur le President, d'bre sensible a nos prdoccupations pour veiller a ce que la politique du TPIR ne consacre notre anbtissement a terme par les dirigeants actuels du Rwanda. Si le TPIR ne peut plus s'acquitter de son devoir, il devrait se dkider a demander que les accuses restant soient transfer& dans des pays veritablement democratiques pouvant leur garantir des proces justes et iquitables ou de les liberer. A defaut, il devrait, a I'instar du TPIY, demander au Conseil de Skurite de I'ONU de prolonger son mandat. Pour ce qui est des condamnes et ayant en memoire le contenu de votre lettre adressee aux detenus le 22 septembre 2004", nous restons confiants que le transfert ne pourra se faire que vers des pays respectueux des droits de I'homme et qui peuvent garantir les conditions minima exigees par I'ONU, notarnment la relations avec la famille et les pmches et la possibilite de dinsertion dam la societe. Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le President, I'expression de notre haute consideration.

Les signataires (voir liste en annexe)

Couie Dour information : - Son Excellence le Secdciire Gdntral des Nations Unies, New York. - Membres du Conseil de Skurite, New York. - Departement des Affaires Juridiques de I'ONU, New York. - Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les hitsde I'Homme, Genkve. - Monsieur le President de I'Union EuropBenne, Bmelles. - Monsieur le Secktaire GtnW de la Francophonie, Paris. - Mesdames, Messieurs les Juges de la Chambre d'Appel du TPIR (tous). - Mesdames, Messieurs les Juges des Chambres de Premibre Instance du TPIR (tous). - Monsieur le Greffier du TPIR, Arusha. - Monsieur le Procureur du TPIR, Arusha. - Monsieur le Commandant de I'UNDF, Atusha. a - Mesdames, Messieurs les Avocats de la Defense (tous). - Monsieur le Wsident de I'ADAD, Arusha. - Commission lntemationale des Juristes, Genbve. - CICR Genkve. - Amnesty International, Genthe. - Human Rights Watch New York. - FIDH, Paris. - International Crisis Group, Washington DC. - Association Am6ricaine des Juristes. - Association htemationale des Juristes, New Delhi. - Centre de Lutte Contre I'lmpunite et I'lnjustice au Rwanda, Bmelles. - Association DUKOMERE,Bruxelles. - La Presse.

11 Vous dcriviez en effct : r Aucune ddcision n 'a Ptd prise nipour le translert d 'affaires au Rwanda ni pour I 'execution de pine au Rwanda. Toute decision de cette nature ne pourrait Ptre prise que par les chambres et le Prdsident, comme indiquP ci-aprPs et en tenant compte de I 'avis des personnes concernkes, en conformitP avec les principes gPnPraux de droit )A D&enus signataires de la leedu 28 mars 2007 akske au Rbident du WIR, te juge Erik Mose ei dont l'djet est :N Nos prt?occuptions~aceau projet de tran accuse5 et des wndamnb du TPIR au Rwanda m - -4' 3%-k

+ +/v~;R_ Menus signataires & la &re du 28 mars 2007 adressde au Bbident du TPIR, le jqe Erik Mose et dont I'objet at: cc Nos prhoccupations face au prcjet de transftrt des accushs d des condamnks du TPIR Detenus du Tribunal Penal Arusha, le '16 Fevrier 2004 International pour le Rwanda (TPIR) Arusha - Tanzanie.

A Son Excellence Monsieur Ie Secretaire General des Nations Unies New York GcQ

2 '

Objet : Denonciation du projet de transferer les condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda

Monsieur le Secretaire General,

Permettez-nous de commencer par ces paroles de votre eminent predecesseur :

a- (( On voulait mettre le Tribunal a La Haye. J'ai dit non. Un probleme africain : au nom de la dignile, ce tribunal devait se trouver en Afrique. Alors j'ai choisi Arusha, En realite, je me suis tromp& C'etait une erreur de ma part, pour creer un tribunal, vous avez besoin de tout un background culturel, un background juridique, la presse, etc., qui vous soutiennent dans votre action. A Arusha, c'est le vide B. Boutros Boutros Ghali. ancien Scdtaire G6neral de I'ONU, cite dans Robin Philpot : cc Ca ne s'esi pas passt! comme qa d Kigali H, Montrkl, Les Editions des Intouchables, 2003, p 172.

Ces derniers temps, les autorites wandaises multiplient des d6clarations dans la presse, dans des receptions de propagande (notarnrnent celles organisees dam la semaine du 2 au 8 fevrier 2004 a Arusha-Tanzanie lors de l'investiture du nouveau representant du Gouvernement rwandais aupres du TPIR) faisant comprendre que le transfert des condarnnes du TPIR au Rwanda est une affaire deja arrctee ou en voie de 17&retres prochainement. Au moment oh - nous ecrivons, M. Adama Dieng, Greffier du TPLR, est en dkplacement a Kigali, pour s'entretenir du projet. . avec les autorites judiciaires rwandaises. a Des questions alors se posent : les autorites onusiennes se preparent-elles a prendre encore une decision lourde de consequences quitte a presenter leur (( mea cu&a )>plustard ? Les principaux decideurs onusiens dans i'affaire rwandaise dojvent-ils perpetuellement regretter de s'hre trompes comme si ies erreurs passees ne leur inspiraient pas la prudence et le regard plus atrentif et plus humain sur ceux qui doivenr subir les consequences de leurs decisions ?

Le personnel de 170NU appele a trancher des questions africaines, pour justifier leurs propositions ou leurs decisions inappropriees, evoque souvent << l'afiicanite )) des problemes poses. Ainsi, comme le conseil de Securite assignait au Tribunal penal international pour le Rwanda la mission de juger presque uniquement les Rwandais, Monsieur Boutros Boutros Ghali, alors Secretaire General de I'ONU a trouv6 que puisqu'il s'agissait d'un ({problPme afncazn : nu nom de la di,gniti, ce mbunal devart se trorrver en Afnque D. Aujourd'hui il le regrette , il va jusqu'a reveler qu'en ce qui concerne les accuses et les condanmes par ce Tribunal aucune consideration n7ena ete faite ! 11 fait cet aveu egalement en signe de regret :

K Le Tribunal atrrait dfi elre cr46 dans tm~.pnde ville pour avoir I 'intkrgt de In grande ville. L 'appd psychologique de la grande ville, ltne injiastmclurt. c&urelle pour le 7iibuna1,pour Zes juges, pour les avocats, et pour la presse >r. (( Etpour les accuses el les condnmnes. hi ai-je demande ? N

(( Pour tout It. monde. a r4pondu Ie,fbnhtntr du TPIR. Nous tous, juristes, nous n avon.s,~amais crbordc! ce ccirh non juridique : c 'cst un c6ti polirique, un c61c d'ordre maltriel. Bon, vous mez condanznl qzrelq~kn,oil il va fizire sn condamnation ? Qui vn le suweiller ? Yozrrquoi ? (?an 'a jarnais elk etudic! ~Prieuserncnl.n Ibidem.

En effet, le sort des condarnnes du TPIR n'a jarnais prbccupe les fondater~rset les dirigeants de ce Tribunal. Ainsi, alors que trois pays : la Suede, la Belgique et la Norvege avaient offert d'accueillir les premiers condamnes, le Greffier de ce Tribunal, Monsieur Agwu Okali. a refuse en pretextant que : cr Come ce sortt des Aficaim, on doit /es incarcerer en Afripe >> (Idem, p 170). Aujourd'hui, il doit regretter lui aussi sa decision car il sait que les prisonniers rwandais au Mali sont loin de leurs familles sz trouvant notarnment en Europe et en Arnerique 11s sont sans contacts avec elles car au Mali la communication avec l'exterieur est un veritable casse-tEte pour Ies prisonniers et les membres de leurs families

Faisant comme s7il ignorait touter ces erreurs du passe, le Greffier actuel, Monsieur Adama Dieng, en entente avec les dirigeants du TPIR, s'est mis a I'ecoute des autorites politiques et judiciaires rwandaises et, selon Kigali, est en passe de conclure avec elles le transfert et I'emprisonnement des condamnes du TPIR au Rwanda. A-t-ii jarnais pr6te attention a ces paroles de Monsieur Boutros Boutros Ghali, ancien gand decideur de 170NU: (( Bon. vous nvez condamnf'quelq~i 'un, ozi il va.firre sn condamnation P Qui va le surveiller ? Pourquoi ? ))

I1 ne fait aucun doute que les honlmes au pouvoir a Kigali. soucieux si pas de faire disparaitre tous leurs anciens adversaires du moins de les museler deiinitivement, n'a~precientpas qu'il y ait encore, quelques hauts cadres politiques et militaires, quelques hommes d'affaires et quetques intellectuels qui, meme condamnes par le TPIR, leur echappent encore. En effet. Kigali craind qu'ils continuent a clamer leur innocence et a designer, preuves a l'appui, le FPR et ses dirigeants, dont le GknCral President Paul Kagame, comme les premiers responsables de l'hecatombe rwandaise. Si le pouvoir actuel de Kigali mene aujourd7hui une propagande musclee (et multiplie des declarations sur les antennes de radios internationales et nationales, - dans les journaux de portee nationale et internationale) en we d'obtenir le transfert et I'emprisonnement au Rwanda des condamnes du TPIR, ce n'est pas parce qu'ils sont Rwandais, qu'il faut donc les incarcker au Rwanda, mais parce qu'il 1es considbe toujours cornme ses oppossnts farouches qu'il faut tliminer par tous les moyens.

I1 n'est un secret pour personne : dam le cadre de IYenqu&emenee par le luge fianqais Jean- Louis Bruguiere, un bon nombre de detenus et prisonniers du TPIR ont temoigne contre le FPR en le designant comme I'auteur de 17attentatcontre le President Habyarimana, assassinat que tout le monde considere comme l'element dklencheur de la tragedie d7avrila juillet 1994. De plus, au cours de leurs proces, les accuses devant le TPIR ne cessent de clamer haut et fort la responsabilite du FPR dans le drame rwandais et d'inventorier les crirnes qu'il a commis contre le peuple rwandais, toutes ethnies confondues. Qu'il suffise de mentionner ici, a titre d7exemple. le fait pour lui d7avoir conp, prepare, declenche et poursuivi une guerre d'agression contre le Rwanda, d'avoir repris ies hostilites apris avoir assassine le President Habyarimana, le 6 avril 1994 et d'avoir ainsi viole I'accord de paix dYArushaconclu et signe le 4 aoCt 1993 C'est cette verite que les autorites de Kigali ne souhaitent plus entendre. Cela . sessort de la declaration de Monsieur Martin Ngoga, ex-representant du Rwanda aupres du TPLR, actuellement Procureur adjoint de la Cour Supreme du Rwanda, le 28janvier2004 En s'exprimant a propos du declenchement de la greve des avocats de la defense au TPIR, cette autorite de Kigali s'est attaquee au deroulement des proces qui s'y tiennent I1 s'est insurge contre le fait que les juges pernlettraient aux accuses de transformer les audiences en arenes politiques contre le regime de Kigali. Cela illustre, s'il en etait besoin, que la justice est encore une notion assez lointaine dans I'esprit des hauts responsables rwandais du dornaine judiciaire. I1 serait alors tres dangereux de leur confier ceux qu'ils n'hesitent pas a qualifier publiquement d'adversaire numero un Profitant de la pression exercee sur lui par les partisans de I'abolition de la peine de mort, le President Paul Kagame est desormais decide a contre gre rayer des lois du Rwanda la peine de mort, essentiellement dans le but d'obte~zirde I'ONU et de ses pays membres le benefice de juger toutes les personnes se trouvant en dehors des fiontieres rwandaises qu'il veut faire arriter et transferer au Rwanda ainsi que les condamnes du Tribunal penal onusien pour le Rwanda. Ainsi, il aura pu neutraliser definitivement tous ses adversaires politiques et faire peur a tous ceux qui auront encore quelque audace de decrier ses crimes. Voila la veritable raison du desir de Kigali de voir transferes les condarnnes du TPIR au Rwanda,malgre l'absence des conditions mjnirnales, suggerees dans notre memorandum sur la situation du prevenu et du condamne du TPIR du 17/02/2003,restC sans suite.

L'ONU va-t-elle encore une fois commettre la grosse erreur dam le dossier nvandais en envoyant les condamnes du TPIR a la deshumanisation, a la torture et A la mort lente mais certaine ? Les Rwandais et le inonde entier ont deja trop deplore de telles eneurs. I1 faut qu'elle les evite dbonnais. Avec les jugements a caractere politique rendus par le TPIR, il sera necessaire et obligatoire pour les condamnes de recourir am dispositions du Statut et du Reglement de proddure et de preuve de ce Tribunal et de demander la revision des jugements. En emprisonnant les condarnnes de ce Tribunal au Rwanda, la possibilite de revision sera totalement kart&. I1 en sera de meme pour la grice et la commutation de peine. L'ONU aura ainsi contribue a la violation des dispositions juridiques du Tribunal qu'elle a elIe-meme mis en place.

Face au desir du regime de Kigali d'emprisonner lui-meme les condarnnes du TPIR, I'ONU doit obligatoirement repondre a ces deux questions : <( Qui va Zes surveiller )) ? <( Pcn~rquoi)) ?

Que deviendront ces condamnes. les seuls a pouvoir encore s'exprimer sur le passe et le - present du FPR, si I'ONU acdde a la demande de ce Front de les rkcupkrer et 'de les emprisonner au Rwanda ? Lfi situation la moins mauvaise qui attend les plus chanceux qui echapperaient rniraculeusement a la mort, c'est dtre force a nier ce qu'ils sont et de garder le silence sur ce qu'ils savent du drarne rwandais. C'est en effet ce que vivent des milliers de rwandais qui croupissent dans les prisons du Pays ou conmissent un semblant de liberte, a I'interieur cornme a I'exterieur du Rwanda. 11s devront eviter de soulever la question de I'impunitd du FPR dans le drame rwandais.

En effet, le monde entier sait que cette impunite pennet aux dirigeants de Kigali de continuer a commettre d'autres actes reprehensibles contre le peuple rwandais : maintien arbitrake en prison des rnilliers de personnes sans dossiers, assassinats d'homrnes politiques devenus critiques a l'egard du FPR (i'ancien Ministre Seth Sendashonga, le Colonel Theoneste Lizinde, le Colonel Augustin Cyiza, le Depute Lbnard Hitirnana, etc.). Et cornme le President Paul Kagame I'a dkja declare ouvertement le 3 1 mars 2003 a BWSIGE-BYUMBA, son regime est resolu a ecraser et a reduire en cendre tous ses adversaires politiques. Et il est I'hornrne qui fait toujours ce qu'il dit I Les DQenus du TPIR Arusha, 14 juin 2004 C/OICTR - UhTDF ARUSHA

A 1'Honorable Eric Mose, President du TPIR ARUSHA

Objet : Clarification des preoccupations des Detenus signataires

Monsieur le President,

Nous accusons bonne rkception de votre rkponse du 9 juin 2004 a notre lettre du 24 mai 2004 relative aux negociations en cows entre le Greffier du TPR et le Gouvernement de Kigali concernant la conclusion d'un accord de cooperation en vue du transfert des condamn& du TPIR au Rwanda. Nous vous savons gre d'avoir bien voulu consacrer un peu de votre temps precieux pour prendre connaissance de nos prloccupations en rapport avec cette question existentielle pour nous.

Nous notons avcc satisfaction que les inquietudes que nous avons exprimees dans cette lettre ont retenu votre bienveillante attention. Nous aurions cependant souhait6 cotmaitre votre sentiment et votre position sur cette question cruciale en votre qualite de PrCsident de ce Tribunal. En effet, nous savons que le lieu d'emprisonnement est dCterminC par le Tribunal (article 103 du Reglement de procedure et de preuve) qui est actuellement sous votre presidence.

Dans votre rkponse precitee, vous nous renvoyez devant le Greffier en disant : ct Les questions souleve'es dans le projet auquel vous faites rkfkrence doivent en particulier &re etudie'es au prialable par le Greffier du Tribunal M. Nous savons que le projet dont il est question touche au statut du condamne qui n'a pas retenu l'attention des autorites des Nations Unies, ni celle des autorites du Tribunal. En effet, cette question a Cte soumise a leur attention par notre Memorandum datC du 17 fevrier 2003. Cela fait plus d'un an et trois mois que nous attendons leur rbaction. Le Greffier aurait dQ, depuis longtemps, mener une Ctude sur cette question et faire des propositions a l'autorite competente. Nous tenons, d'ailleurs, a rappeler qu'il ne s'est pas donne la peine de repondre a nos nombreuses invitations que nous lui avons fait parvenir depuis son arrivee au TPIR, afin que nous puissions lui faire part de nos diverses doleances.

Nous somrnes conscients que le Greffier est au service du Tribunal et que la question relative aux aspects pratiques de I'emprisonnement des condamnes du TPIR rentre dam ses attributions. I1 doit, entre autres, s'assurer que le pays de transfert remplit les conditions de detention requises par les Nations Unies. Cependant, pour ce qui est du Rwanda, ce ne sont pas seulement les conditions materielles de detention qui sont en cause. La question fondamentale qui se pose concerne i'opportunitt meme du transfert des prisonniers dans ce pays.

A ce sujet, le Tribunal doit determiner si les circonstances qui ont empkhe le Conseil de Securitt de ddcider d'installer le sikge du TPIR au Rwanda et d'y mener les proces, n'existenl plus. Dans son Rapport adopte par le Conseil de Securitt sur ce point, le Secrttaire gtneral des Nations Unies disait, entre autres, ce qui suit : (( ... in the atmosphere now prevuiling in Rwanda, there are serious security risk in bringing into the country leaders of the previous regime rclleped to have committed acts of genocide to stand trial before the Infernational Tribunal N . Or, la realit6 actuelle est que le regime en place au Rwanda n'a pas change de nature depuis l'adoption de la dtcision d'btablir le siege du TPIR en dehors de ce pays. Au contraire, la situation a empire. La tenue de proces et I'emprisonnement des condamnts du TPIR au Rwanda sont impensables tant que le Gouvemement de ce pays ne peut pas et ne veut pas garantir une atmosphere sereine, favorable ZI des procbs justes et equitables et a la sCcuritC des detenus et des condarnnes,.

Nous estimons que cette question dkpasse largement les competences du Greffier.

L Cependant, nous sommes surpris par les informations inquiktantes qui nous parviennent de certains agents ayant pris part aux n6gociations menees par le Greffe avec le Rwanda selon a lesquelles le transfert des condarnnCs au Rwanda est chose dkja acquise a 95%, le reste devant etre finalist5 incessamment. C'est pour cette raison que nous insistons aupres de votre Honneur, en votre qualit6 de President de ce Tribunal qui repond de toutes ses activitks devant le Conseil de Skurite et I'Assemblee gtntrale des Nations Unies, pour vous demander de veiller au respect des regles rtgissant ce Tribunal et de ne pas cautionner des mesures qui mettent en p&il notre inttgrite et notre sCcuritt5.

Tout en esptrant que vous accorderez a la presente l'importance et l'urgence qu'elle merite, nous vous prions de bien vouloir agreer, Monsieur le PrCsident, l'assurance de notre tr6-s haute considbration.

Les DCtenus signataires (liste en annexe)

- S.E.M. Kofi Annan, Secretaire gkneral des Nations Unies - Monsieur Adama Dieng, Greffier du TPIR - Honorable Juge du TPIR (Tous) - Conseil de la DCfense (Tous) - Association des Avocats de la Defence - ADAD - Association Dukomere, e-mail : association dukomere@yahoo. fr - Familles des Detenus - CICR - Amnesty International - Presse

Comprehensive report of the Secretary General on practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, recommending Arusha as the seat of the Tribunal (42); Sl19951134, 13 February 1995 in The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, p.465, para. 43 Liste des signataires de la lettre du 14 juin 2004 adressie au Prisident du TPlR relative h la clarification des pr4occupations des Ditenus Liste des signataires de la lethe du 14 juin 2004 adressCe au Prbsident du TPlR relative b la clarification des pr6occ-s dfltenus 1

w CENTRE DE LUTTE CONTRE L'IMPUNITE ET L'INJUSTICE AU RWANDA BP 141 Bruxelles 3 Bruxelles, le 12 juillet 2004 1030 BRUXELLES TdIFax : 32.81.60.1 1.13 GSM: 32.476.70.15.69

Obiet : Transmission notre Com.n074 contre le transfert des detenus du TPlR

A IIHonorable Eric Mose, President du Tribunal P6nal International pour le Rwanda

Monsieur le Prbsident,

Selon le r6glement du Tribunal Phal International pour le Rwanda (TPIR), les peines d'emprisonnement prononckes par le tribunal sont execut6es au Rwanda ou dans un autre Etat qui en a manifest6 la volonte. Le porte-parole du TPIR, Rolland Amoussouga qui a conduit une delegation du TPlR depuis le 24 mai 2004 pour evaluer les conditions de detention au Rwanda, a affirm6 que le gouvernement rwandais et le Tribunal avaient entam6 un "dialogue" B ce sujet mais que "c'est au pr6sident du TPIR", Erik MOSE, de decider du transfert d'un condamn6. Jusqu8B prksent, aucun condamn6 n'a 6te transfer6 au Rwanda. Actuellement, six condamnes du TPlR purgent leur peine B I'btranger, au Mali. Le Benin, le Swaziland, la France, I'ltalie et la Suede ont d6jB sign6 des accords pour accueillir des condamnes du tribunal.

D'apres le courrier vous adress6 par les detenus du TPlR en date du 24 mai et du 14 juin 2004, vous les renvoyez devant le Greffier dans ces termes : Les questions soulev6es dans le projet auquel vous faites r6f6rence doivent en particulier &re 6tudiBes au pr6alable par le Grefier du Tribunal D, Monsieur Adama DlENG qui aurait dO s'abstenir d'imaginer un seul instant le transferl de ces dktenus vers le Rwanda. Si le Rwanda se dit prgt B appliquer les conditions d'emprisonnement requises par les Nations unies pour accueillir dans ses centres de detention les detenus condamnes par le TPIR, il existe mille et une raisons qui devraient empgcher un tel transfert. Parmi ces raisons kvidentes, les plus importantes sont les suivantes :

1. Le Rwanda est dirigb actuellement par un Chef d'Etat terroriste consider6 comme un des principaux responsables du ghocide rwandais par le fait d'avoir conduit la guerre de conqugte du pouvoir et pour avoir commandit6 I'attentat du 6 avril 1994 qui a declench6 le chaos et les massacres au Rwanda. En effet, le President de la R6publique Rwandaise, le General Paul KAGAME, est cit6 comme le principal commanditaire de I'attentat terroriste aerien qui a coot6 la vie a deux presidents Hutu de la R6publique en fonction B savoir le President rwandais a Juv6nal HABYARIMANA et le President burundais Cyprien NTARYAMIRA. Le journal LE MONDE du 9 mars 2004 devoile sa culpabilite dans ces termes : << Dans un rapport de 220 pages, datB du 30 janvier et intitdB K R6sultat de I'enqugte de la Division nationale anti- terroriste de la Direction g6nBrale de la police judiciaire )), le Gdn6ral Paul KAGAME et actuel chef de I'Etat rwandais, est d6signB comme le principal d6cisionnaire de I'attentat, en tete d'une liste de dix oficiers supBrieurs du FPR et de deux (( servants des missiles sol-air w tir6s sur I'avion p&sidentiel, qui y sont Bgalement identifiBs. Ce sont ces dits officiers qui gouvernent << officieusement >> le pays.

2. La junte militaire rwandaise s'assure I'impunitb par tous les moyens criminels et refuse, depuis 10 ans, de collaborer avec le TPlR et de livrer ses propres militaires impliqu6s dans les crimes de genocide. Au lieu de punir ses propres criminels, le gouvernement rwandais a decide le 2 Juillet 2004 de promouvoir, B des grades sup6rieursI des officiers sup6rieurs du FPR impliques dans les crimes de genocide tels que les generaux Fred IBINGIRA, James KABAREBE, Charles KAYONGA, Kayumba NYAMWASA, Caesar KAYIZARI, Karenzi KARAKE, Martin NZARAMBA, Patrick NYAMVUMBA. Andrew RWIGAMBA, Jack NZIZA, etc. La tsche de poursuivre les criminels du FPR a 6tti confi6e au TPlR qui doit les t arreter et non les transformer en a ge6liers >> de ses detenus. Le TPlR doit cesser de demissionner devant ses responsabilitks et de comploter contre ses propres detenus de la prison dlArusha. Les Conseils des Ministres du 26 juin 1998 et du 5 juin 2002 les avaient promus ainsi que d'autres officiers sup6rieurs parmi lesquels se trouvent des chefs militaires impliquks dans le genocide rwandais et les massacres des refugies rwandais hutu et des populations congolaises apparent& aux Hutu depuis 1990 jusqu'aujourd'hui. Ces promotions, jugees a scandaleuses >> par de nombreux rwandais (dont certains membres de I'APR eux-memes) viennent consacrer encore I'IMPUNITE des hauts responsables militaires qui sont les vrais << d6tenteurs du pouvoir occulte >> au Rwanda.

3. La Magistrature Rwandaise a subi une v6ritable 6puration ethnique et politique. Dans la mesure ou le rkgime de Kigali reste domine, gangrene et paralyse-. par le "pouvoir occulte" ou le "gouvernement parallble" des extremistes tutsi, ilporte la responsabilit6 des cons6quences de celte epuration ethnique et politique qui ne peut que ''favoriser et institutionnaliser" I'lmpunit6 au Rwanda. En effet, suite B leur part de responsabilite dans le g6nocide rwandais et au volume impressionnant des crimes qu'ils ont continue de commeltre depuis leur victoire en juillet 1994, les extremistes tutsi au pouvoir n'avaient plus d'autres choix que de s'assurer I'impunit6 dont ils ont besoin, par la mise en place dun Syst6me judiciaire parfaitement contr6lable et qui leur est totalement d6vou6. Pour ce faire, ils ont assassine, fait disparaitre eVou emprisonne ilkgalement et arbiirairement des magistrats honnetes et courageux. Simultan6ment, en plus des lois et pro&dures judiciaires qu'ils imposent au peuple wandais depuis 10 ans, ils ont reussi a faire nommer des magistrats de leur seule obkdience. Ces magistrats 9 major#& tutsi ont 6t6 d'abord a form& au rabais, avant d'etre affect& 8 des postes-cl6s et p&is au sein de la Magistrature Rwandaise, pour mieux pmt6ger et servir les inttWts d'un petit noyau d'extr6mistes tutsi qui ont besoin de s'assurer /'impunit& de leurs crimes. Crestainsi qu'ils continuent de priver le peuple rwandais d'une justice sereine et dquitable; et d'6carter toute solution de transparence, de neutralit& et drdquit6 que des wandais de bonne volonttl avaient souhame w. L'assistance judicaire massive, qui avait 6t6 initialement envisagee par le "gouvemement ofkiel" mis en place le 19 juillet 1994 et publiquement sollicit& auprh de la Communaut6 lntemationale lors de la Conf6rence de La Haye en Octobre 1994, a et6 rejete par le "pouvoir occulten des extrkmistes, sous pretexte de la "souverainet6 nationale". Pourtant, en refusant I'offre d'assistance intemationale en magistrats &rangers, ce ugouvemement parall&le"n'a pas hesit6 8 conclure des accords d'assistance militaire avec des grandes puissances; ce qui lui permet d'envahir ou d'intimider des pays de la r6gion des grands lacs. Or, sans une Magistrature independante et capable de crbr les conditions necessaires B une veritable et durable r6conciliation nationale, toute solution de paix durable est compromise non seulement au Rwanda, mais aussi dans la region des Grands Lacs. En iuin 1995, ~lusde 40 manistrats hutu dtaient em~risonnessuite B cette buration. Les magistrats sont traumatises, terroris& et incapables de travailler en toute independance, suite B 11ing6rence militaire. 85% de detenus n'avaient pas de dossiers judiciaires en 1997!! C'est dans ce climat de terreur totale que des procb pour juger les personnes pr6sumbs coupables du genocide ont commenc6 fin 1996. Bien qu'ils se a deroulent en public, on ne peut pas dire qu'ils sont pour autant 6quitables et transparents. Ce constat a et6 fait par I'ancien Ministre de la Justice du Rwanda du 19/07/1994 au 28/08/1995, Monsieur Alphonse Marie NKUBITO, qui fut retrouve mort myst6rieusement dans son lit dans la matink du 13 f6vrier 1997. Le jour suivant, son vieil ami, le President du Conseil d9Etat, Monsieur Vincent NKEZABAGANWA, fut assassin6 chez lui dans la soir6e du 14 fevrier 1997 B Gisozi (Kigali-ville) par des hommes arm& en tenue militaire. II a 6te tu6 en meme temps avec trois autres personnes qui 6taient chez lui. Son successeur, Monsieur Alype NKUNDIYAREMYE, a dO s'exiler en Belgique 00 il est mort de maladie fin novernbre 1999. 11 avait kt6 reconnu comme refugi6 politique suite B sa fuite en mai 1999.

4. Les assassinats politiques et les emprisonnements arbitraires d'opposants politiques continuent de se derouler au Rwanda. L'annBe 2003 a kt6 caracteriske par des disparitions de personnalites hutu parce qu'ils sont simplement soup$onn6es d'btre des opposants politiques. Le Lt Colonel Augustin CYIZA, qui fut President de la Cour de Cassation de 1994 B 1998, a 6t6 enlev6 le 23 avril2003 A Kigali ou il s36taitrecycle comme professeur de droit B I'Universite Libre de Kigali. Selon le Porte Parole de la Police, son vehicule aurait 6t6 trouve B KANIGA (prkfecture Byumba) pr&s de la frontiere nord avec I'Uganda. Jusqu'aujourd'hui, le Lt Colonel CYlZA est port6 disparu et ces proches estiment qu'il a 6t6 assassin6 malgr6 les pressions exerc6es par les organisations des droits humains sur les autorit6s rwandaises pour le retrouver. L'Honorable Lbnard HITIMANA, membre du Bureau politique du Parti MDR (Mouvement D6mocratique R6publicain) et D6put6 B I'Assembl6e Nationale de Transition sous le R6gime FPR, est port6 disparu depuis le 07/04/2003 alors qu'il venait de rendre visite B une famille amie B REMERA, dans la Mairie de la Ville de Kigali entre 20H00 et 21H00. II est &I rappeler que les disparitions sont devenues banales au Rwanda 00 plusieurs autres personnes sont port6es disparues depuis novembre 2002 et parmi lesquelles se trouvent le policier JMV Mugenzi, le commerpnt JMV Nkulikiyinka, I'ex-sergent Damien Musayidizi et le soldat Fran~oisMATABARO, qui n'ont plus donn6 signe de vie malgr6 les recherches de leurs proches.

Considerant tout ce que nous venons d'6num6rer ci-haut, nous vous demandons d'ordonner au greffier en chef du TPIR, Monsieur ADAMA DIENG, de suspendre immaiatement toutes les negociations concernant le transfert des d6tenus du TPlR vers le Rwanda et d'examiner rapidement le statut du condamne TPlR vous soumis par ces d6tenus. Au cas ou ce transfert aurait lieu, vous serez consid6r6sl vous personnellement ainsi que tous les responsables du TPIR qui se perrnettront de tremper dans ce complot criminel, comme des criminels susceptibles dl&re traduits en justice par les 6pouses et les enfants de ces detenus.

Le Centre de Lutte contre I'lmpunit6 et I'lnjustice au Rwanda (*) denonce et condamne les negociations sur ce transfert des d6tenus car elles traduisent une bvidente demission du TPlR devant ses responsabilit6s. Les dbtenus du TPlR sont des personnes qui s16taient exilees pour des raisons Bvidentes de securitt5. Comme tous les r6fugi6s du monde entier, ces dbtenus cc refugi6s m ont aussi droit la protection independamment de leurs responsabilit6s individuelles dans la tragedie wandaise. Leurs 6pouses et leurs enfants, qui sont eux-mhes r6fugi6s, ont le droit de rester en contact avec eux et de pouvoir leur rendre visite en toute s6curit6. Ce qui ne serait plus le cas, s'ils Btaient transf6r6s au Rwanda od ils ne peuvent plus remettre les pieds.

Nous vous remercions d'avance de la decision courageuse que vous prendrez en vue de suspendre ces negociations et vous prions d9agr6er,Monsieur le Prksident, I'expression de notre haute consid6ration.

Pour le Centre, MATATA Joseph, Coordinateur.

CPI B Monsieur le Greffier Adama Dieng I'Association des Avocats de la Defense

(") Le Centre de Lutte wntre I'lmpunite et I'lnjustice au Rwanda est une association de defense des droits humains basee en Belgique, creee le 18 aoOt 1995. Ses membres sont des militants des droits humains de longue date. Certains ont 6t6 actifs au sein d'associations rwandaises de defense des droits humains et ont participe d I'enquete CLADHOIKanyarwanda sur le genocide de 1994. Lorsqu'ils ont commend B enqueter sur les crimes du regime rwandais actuel (le r6gime du Front Patriotique Rwandais), ils ont subi des menaces et ont ete contraints de s'exiler B 1'6tranger oSr ils poursuivent leur engagement en faveur des droits humains.

"There Will Be No Trial" Police Killings of Detainees and the Imposition of Collective Punishments

Summary ...... 1

Recommendations ...... 4

Attacks on Genocide Survivors and Gacaca Participants ...... 6

Police Killings of Detainees...... 9

Killings of Detainees arrested by Soldiers ...... 18

Partial List of Detainees Killed by Police Officers and Soldiers ...... 21

April 2006-May 2007 ...... 21

Official Responses ...... 25

Destruction of property belonging to survivors and collective punishments ...... 27

Violations of International and Rwandan Law ...... 30

The Donor Community...... 32

Conclusion ...... 33

Annex One .Statement sent by Commissioner General of Rwanda National Police Andrew Rwigamba to Human Rights Watch researcher Christopher Huggins. June 4. 2007. electronic communication ...... 34 Summary

Officers of the Rwanda National Police (RNP) shot and killed at least 20 detainees in 10 separate incidents in the six months from November 2006 to May 2007. Many of these killings appear to have been extrajudicial executions, crimes that violate both international human rights law and Rwandan law.

The police acknowledge the deaths of the 20 detainees in a statement sent to Human Rights Watch by Commissioner General of Rwanda National Police Andrew Rwigamba but say all were shot in escape attempts or attempts to take weapons from police officers. They say the deaths are being investigated.

Although detainees were killed in official custody in earlier incidents, the number of such deaths increased significantly beginning in late 2006 following several highly publicized killings of survivors of the 1994genocide and others involved in the gacaca jurisdictions, a popular justice initiative meant to prosecute those accused of genocide.

Faced with demands for increased protection of such vulnerable persons, officials responded by establishing a policy of collective responsibility making all Rwandans responsible for the security of their fellow citizens. The meaning of the policy was not precisely spelled out, nor was it enacted in law, but officials ordered increased night patrols by citizens. They also warned repeatedly that anyone who harmed or tried to harm survivors would face severe if unspecified punishment.

The congruence between these official pronouncements and the increase in the number of deaths in police custody raises concern that some police officers may have interpreted official exhortations as a license to abuse detainees, particularly but not exclusively those accused of crimes against survivors or persons involved in the gacaca process.

Cases of police killings have occurred in several parts of Rwanda but those documented thus far have been concentrated in the south and east, regions known for the severity of the genocide and continuing tensions surrounding gacaca. The police statement did not condemn the killings of the 20 detainees but rather noted that most of the victims were "of extreme criminal character ready to die for their genocide ideology," implying that accusations against the detainees untested in court in some way justified their killing.

In some cases both before and since late 2006, police officers also killed detainees accused of crimes unrelated to the genocide and the gacacaprocess, including persons accused of murder, rape, and theft. According to the police statement and Human Rights Watch research, such killings have also increased since 2006. The police acknowledge that detainees not suspected of genocide or crimes related to gacaca were killed, but offer no explanation other than that the victims were trying to escape.

Several donor governments, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have asked police officials for explanations of the killings. The Rwanda National Police has promised investigations, but without giving assurance that they will be carried out by independent and impartial investigators.

In a number of communities, local authorities interpreted the national policy of collective responsibility as permitting or even requiring collective punishment whenever survivors or participants in gacaca were troubled or attacked. Assisted by police officers and members of the Local Defence Force, administrators imposed fines or even beatings on citizens who had not been tried but were held responsible for alleged offenses because they had the misfortune to live near the scene of the crime.

The imposition of collective punishments violates the presumption of innocence and the right of accused persons to a fair trial, rights guaranteed both by international human rights law and by the Rwandan constitution.

As Rwandan officials strive to demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law, they must ensure that abusive police killings of detainees be halted immediately; that thorough, impartial investigations be carried out; and that those responsible for these crimes be held accountable. They must also honor the presumption of innocence and ensure fair trials to accused persons rather than punishing those who have not been convicted in a court of law. Recommendations

To the Government of Rwanda Order officers of the Rwanda National Police and other law enforcement agencies, such as the Local Defence Force, to protect the lives of all persons in Rwanda. Ensure that officers have been trained in and adhere to international human rights law and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. The internationally accepted Basic Principles require law enforcement officials to use their firearms only when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.

In accord with international legal obligations, carry out prompt, independent, and impartial investigations into all deaths of persons in custody, including those named in this report. Prosecute all police officers against whom there is credible evidence of having ordered or implemented extrajudicial executions. Ensure that such trials be conducted according to internationally accepted fair trial standards.

Investigate fully and bring promptly to justice those responsible for attacks or threats of attacks on survivors and other participants in the gacaca process.

Ensure that all police officers, members of the judiciary, and administrative officials afford all Rwandans the presumption of innocence.

Ensure that Rwandans not be punished for any crime unless found guilty of that crime before a legally constituted, independent, and impartial tribunal.

Adopt and implement a law to protect witnesses and judicial personnel engaged in all judicial proceedings.

"THEREWILL BE NO TRIAL" To International donors Use your influence to persuade the Rwandan government to protect the lives of all persons within its territory and to investigate and bring to justice all persons, including police officers, responsible for unlawful killings or assault. Stress the importance of effective and transparent investigation of deaths in police custody.

Governments providing assistance or training to the Rwanda National Police should particularly insist that police officers adhere to international human rights standards, including the right to life, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial.

Assist the Rwandan government in finding more effective ways to protect survivors and participants in the gacaca process. Attacks on Genocide Survivors and Gacaca Participants

In an atmosphere of growing public concern about harassment and attacks on survivors of the 1994 genocide, Human Rights Watch published a report in January 2007 documenting the killing in East Region of one survivor and a subsequent reprisal killing of eight persons who lived in the community where the murder was committed. In another case, the report documented the killing of a judge in a gacaca jurisdiction-a people's court set up to try crimes of genocide-and the killing the next day by police officers of three suspects detained on suspicion of involvement in the judge's killing. Citing these 13 killings, as well as the concerns being voiced by survivors and authorities, Human Rights Watch cautioned that ethnically based tensions continued to trouble some parts of Rwanda.'

In mid-zoo6 the government established an office of witness protection that had registered 26 complaints by late in the year.' There is no general law on witness protection, although the law on gacaca jurisdictions provides up to one year in prison for persons who harm witnesses and judges involved in the gacaca pro~ess.~ Passage of a law to protect witnesses, recently requested by a commission of the Rwandan Senate: would make it easier for police and judicial authorities to assure the security of witnesses, thus contributing to the legitimacy of judicial proceedings.

In late December 2006 participants in the national dialogue-an annual meeting of leading Rwandans-discussed at length the issue of preventing and punishing threats, harassment, and attacks against survivors and participants in the gacaca jurisdictions. Since that time authorities including President Paul Kagame, military

'Human Rights Watch. Killingsin Eastern Rwanda, no. i. January2007, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/afrita/~

'Ibid. p. ii. Organic Law no. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 establishingthe organization, competence, and functioning of gacaca courts. article 30. Rwanda. Senate. Rwanda: Genocide Ideology andstrategies forits Eradiration(Kigali, n.d.. issued April 2007). p. 169.

THERE WILL BE NO TRIAL" 6 commanders, and local administrators, have told the public that strong new measures had been adopted to deter and punish such c~nduct.~

Arguing that people residing nearby would necessarily know of any plan to attack a survivor, officials insisted repeatedly that all Rwandans would be held responsible for the security of their neighbors. In most communities local officials created new night patrols or increased the number of existing patrols, particularty in the vicinity of homes of persons thought to be at risk.6 Local residents were responsible for doing the patrols, an unpaid community obligation. In some areas, officials also increased surveillance of persons thought likely to engage in attacks on survivors. In addition, officials warned that there would be sanctions against any who troubled survivors; the sanctions were left undefined, although in April Finance Minister James Musoni said there "would be no mercy" for those caught troubling sur~ivors.~

Survivors, particularly representatives of the association Ibuka, continued to express concern about the security of survivors and authorities continued to issue warnings during the first six months of 2007. In a late May meeting, an lbuka representative said that six survivors had been killed in April, often a month of violence because of its associations with the 1994genocide, but he did not list other deaths for the year. At the same meeting, the executive secretary of the human rights organization, Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LIPRODHOR), reported three killings that appear to have been related to ethnic tensions.' Press accounts spoke of two deaths of survivors, one probably related to land disputes rather than the genocide as such, and an attack on a child, reportedly wounded

Paul Ntambara, "Kagame warns local leaders over suwivors and witnesses' security," The New Times, April 15, 2007 http:llwww.newtimes.co.mr/index.php?option=comcontent&taskiew&idio8<emid= (accessed April 15.2007); John Bayingana. 'Ibingira assures suwivors of security," The New 7imes. April 12.2007. http://www.newtimes.co.Nv/index.php?optio=cocontent&taskew&id=6<emid= (accessed April 12,2007).

15 Minister of JusticeTharcisse Karugarama, News (in Kinyamanda). Radio Rwanda, January24,2007.7 p.m.

John Bayingana, '75 percent of population have reconciled -James Musoni," meNew Times, April 12. 2007, http://www.newtimes.co.nv/index.php?option=com~content&task=view&idtii6~<emid=r (accessed April 12,2007). 'comments by Dieudonne Kayitare of lbuka and by Jean-BaptisteNtibagororwa, executive secretary of LIPRODHOR. at a Journ6e Locale d'lnformation. sponsored by LDGL (League forthe Defense of Human Rights of the Great Lakes), on cc L' &at des lieux de la criminalit6 au Rwanda et le role des instances rwandaises charg6es du maintien de La &curit6 dans son eradication. n May 25,2007, Alpha Palace Hotel, Kigali.

7 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCHJULY zoo7 because his father was a witness in gaca~atrials.~In 2006 survivors' organizations reported numbers ranging from 12 to 20 killings of survivor^,'^ so these accumulated reports suggest that the numbers for 2007 have not increased and may have decreased somewhat. Indeed, Tharcisse Karugarama, minister of justice, and Domitilla Mukantaganzwa, executive secretary of the Nationat Service of Gacaca jurisdictions, both expressed the opinion that attacks on survivors had diminished during the first quarter of 2007.''

Daniel Sabiiti, '65 Year Old Survivor Murdered." nte New Times, June 20, zoo7 http://www.newtimes.co.m/index.php?option=com~content&task=view&id=~~~<emid=~~(accessed June20,2007); Anonymous, "Genocide suspects hack child," nte New Times, January 31, zoo7 http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?option=com~content&task~view&id=~o~<emid=i(accessed January31.2007); Stevenson Mugisha, "Seven arrested over survivor's murder." nte New Times, February 18.2007 at http://newtimes.co.m/ind~php?option=com~content&task~iew&id=i<emid=i(accessed February 18,2007); Daniel Sabiiti, "Genocide survivors, witnesses under security threats," me New Times, January20, zoo7 http://www.newtimes.co.~index.php?option=comcontent&taski&id=6o<emid= (accessed January 21.2007). 10 US State Department Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005: Rwandaw. March 8.2006. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/~oo5/6i587.htm (accessed December 19,2006). ll Human Rights Watch intewiew with Executive Secretary of the National Service of GacacaJurisdictionsDomitille Mukantaganzwa, Kigali, March 13,2007; Gasheegu Muramila. 'Genocide ideology is now minimal-Karuprama," nte New Times, April 17,2007, http://www.newtimes.co.Nv/index.php?option=com~content&task=view&id=i~i8 &Itemid=l (accessed April 17.2007).

"THERE WILL BE NO TRIAL" Police Killings of Detainees

Human Rights Watch researchers investigated reports of suspicious deaths of detainees in a wide range of locations from Aprit 2006 through May 2007. Most of those killings took place in the six months between November 2006 and May 2007. Details of 26 deaths (and of three men who have not been seen since police reported they had escaped) are given in the table betow. Many appear to have been extrajudicial executions.

Human Rights Watch has received reports of other killings in police custody that have not yet been confirmed. These include incidents in Nyanza town, Nyanza district; Gasabo district, Kigali City; Nyarugenge sector, Kigali City; Kibangu sector and Kibilizei sector, Muhanga district; and Shyrongi district, North Region. Some of these incidents have attracted little attention, in part because witnesses fear sanctions if they speak openly about them. On a number of occasions, witnesses afraid for their security have refused to speak with researchers from Human Rights Watch or other organizations and on one occasion a person who did meet with a Human Rights Watch researcher was subjected to interrogation following the meeting.

Of the 26 deaths detailed in the table below, 14 are of persons accused of attacks on genocide survivors and others involved in the gacaca process; nine involve persons charged with murder, rape or theft; and three involve persons detained for unknown reasons.

Detainees Accused of Attacks on Survivors or Gacaca Participants This section reports the deaths of five men in two incidents in January 2007 and of two others killed in April 2007. In each case, the police claim the men were shot while trying to escape. Killings in Ngamba Sector, Kamonyi District, South Region Landuardi Bayijire, president of the gacaca jurisdiction of Ngamba sector, Kamonyi district, was killed in the early hours of December 28,2007. According to a news report, Bayijire, who was also the local president of Ibuka, was killed in his home with a knife and a blunt instrument. He was sleeping alone in a house located ctose to his fields, while other members of the family stayed in his other residence on a nearby hill."

Coming in the wake of other attacks on survivors and persons involved in the gacaca process, many assumed that his death was connected to his being a survivor and to his role in the gacaca court. According to local residents, more than one gacaca suspect had remarked about Bayijire's severity as a judge, saying that if he had not been part of the panel of judges, they would have an easier time in front of the court. Other residents of the community, however, told a Human Rights Watch researcher that Bayijire had been engaged in a land dispute with one of his sons, Theoneste Niyomugabo, and had quarreled angrily with him the day before the killing. Some local residents said that his son, anxious to get land in order to get married, had previously threatened to kill him.13

On December 29 members of the Local Defence Force, a government paramilitary organization, arrested several men, including Daniel Uwimana, Polycarpe Munyangoga, Alphonse Kagambirwa, and Silvere Kagenza.14At the time of the arrest, one of the men reportedly asked why he was being taken away since he had always complied with orders to attend gacaca meetings and do the unpaid public labor known as umuganda.'5 Four others were also arrested, Cdestin Munyaneza, Cyriaque

il Anonymous, "Another Gacaca JudgeMurdered". 71re New 7imes, January2,2007. http://www.newtimes.co.Nv/index.php?option=comcontent&skiew&id=6<emid= (accessed January3.2007). l3Human Rights Watch interviews with residents of Ngamba sector. Kigali, April 18,2007. In Rwanda a young couple lacking the land to support their new household finds it difficult to marry. Most Rwandans are fanners and land is scarce.

"Circumstances in which Policemen shot detainees," statement sent by Commissioner General of Rwanda National Police Andrew Rwigamba to Human Rights Watch researcher Christopher Huggins, June4,2007. electronic communication. l5Human Rights Watch interviews with residents of Ngamba sector, Kigali, April 18.2007.

"THERE WILL BE NO TRIAL" 10 Uyisabo, Nkinamubanzi, and an unidentified man who was accused of attacking a gacaca official, not of having killed Bayijire.16

The mayors of Kamonyi and Muhanga districts, as well as the president of lbuka at the national level, attended Bayijire's burial, which was marked by a heavy downpour of rain. Officials told those present that they could not seek shelter, as would usually be done, but must stand, hatless in the rain. After the burial, officials directed people to sit on the wet ground and, according to one person present, said that they would sit there "for the next three days" unless they provided information on Bayijire's killing.17 Although people were kept sitting at the gravesite for some time, this effort by officials apparently neither elicited information, nor did a search of the homes of the suspects on December 30."

At a public meeting at Ngamba parish on December 30, a policeman identified by witnesses as the Chief of Police for Kamonyi district told residents that it was important for them to provide information about the crime, given that police officers had not yet found the evidence necessary to build a case against the detained persons.19 In an interview published on January 2,2007 in The New 7imes, a newspaper close to the government, Jean-PaulMunyandamutsa, mayor of Kamonyi district, said that the suspects had not confessed or given any relevant information on the death of Bayijire.'"

The suspects were first detained at Kamonyi district lock-up where family members visited at least one of the suspects several times between December 30 and January 2. He asked that a clean set of clothes be brought because he had been told he and the others would be taken to Musambira police station for interrogation. When

16 Human Rights Watch interview with residents of Ngamba sector, Kigali, April 24,2007. l7 Human Rights Watch interview with residents of Ngamba sector. Kigali, April 24.2007. "Human Rights Watch interview with residents of Ngamba sector, Kigali, April 24.2007. l9 Human Rights Watch interview with residents of Ngamba sector. Kigali, April 24.2007.

20 Anonymous, "Another Gacaca Judge Murdered", The New 7imes, January2.2007. http:llwww.newtimes.co.mr/indenphp?option=com~content&task=view&id=~6<emid=(accessed January3.2007). visitors arrived at Kamonyi on January 3, a police officer told them that Uwimana, along with the unidentified man, had been shot as they attempted to flee."

Some detainees, including Polycarpe Munyangoga, Alphonse Kagambirwa, and SilvPre Kazenga, were transferred to Musambira, where several, including Kagenza, were badly beaten. Those injured asked visitors to bring medication. As the week wore on, the detainees apparently lost hope. One told visitors, "Don't bother bringing any more food. There will be no trial.""

On January 10, some of the detainees held at Musambira were transferred to Gitarama central prison, but those involved in the Bayijire case were kept in the lock- up. Because family members and friends believed that the men had been transferred to Gitarama prison, at first they did not come to visit. After learning the men were still at Musambira, they brought food on January 13. When visitors returned on January 14, they found police officers loading the bodies of Munyangoga, Kagambirwa, and Kagenza into police vehicles. Police officers drove the bodies to the vicinity of their homes and called local people to carry the bodies to the houses.23One local man told Human Rights Watch researchers that a policeman said, "Get those bodies out and look at the consequences of what you have done".24

Police officers gave families no notification of the deaths of these men before delivering the bodies. One officer told family members that the three men had been killed trying to attack police officers when they were being taken to the toilet. Members of the Local Defence Force present at the Musambira lock-up told local residents that police officers had executed the three.25According to those who saw the bodies, one had a single bullet wound at the temple, another had a wound in the back of the neck, while the third had wounds in the head and the ~tomach.'~

21 Human Rights Watch intewiew with residents of Ngamba sector, Kigali, April 24,2007.

22 Human Rights Watch intewiew with resident of Ngamba sector. Kigali, April 14,2007. Unlike persons incarcerated in central prisons who are fed by the government, those held in local lock-ups depend on family and friends for food.

"Human Rights Watch intewiew with residents of Ngamba sector, Kigali, April 24,2007.

"Human Rights Watch intewiew with resident of Ngamba sector. Kigali. April 18.2007.

25 Human Rights Watch intewiew with residents of Ngamba sector, Kigali, April 24.2007. 26 Human Rights Watch intewiews with residents of Ngamba sector, Kigali. April 24,2007.

%ERE WILL BE NO TRIAL" Killings in Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District, Southern Region

On April 10 2007 in Ngiryi umudugudu, or village, Gasaka sector, assailants entered the home of a witness who testified frequently in gacacasessions and beat both the witness and the witness' mother. The mother was so severely injured that she required hospitalization for a week.27

On April 12, police officers arrested at least five men who had participated in the local night patrol on that date, including Jean Gatera, executive secretary of the umudugudu, Gahamanyi, Joseph Nkurikiyimana, Modeste, and Emmanuel Nshimiyimana, also known as "Kajy~nguri."'~At the time of the arrests, police officers beat several people who were not detained, including Gatera's wife, Violette Uwimbabazi, using heavy sticks.

Police officers detained the men at Nyamagabe police station and on April 13 refused to allow visitors to see them. When visitors returned the following day, a potice officer told them that Jean Gatera and Gahamanyi had been shot while trying to escape. According to a local source of information, both had been shot in the back of the neck.2gPolice officers said that three others, Joseph Nkurikiyimana, Emmanuel Nshimiyimana, and Modeste, had escaped. These three men have not been seen or heard from since and family members believe that they are dead.30

Detainees Accused of Other Crimes The rapid increase in numbers of detainees shot by police between November 2006 and May 2007 coincides with a period of heightened concern and rhetoric about attacks on genocide survivors and others involved in the gacaca process. But both before and during the period of increase, police officers have shot and killed detainees in cases when they were suspected of involvement in serious crimes

""Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees"; Human Rights Watch interview with Rwandan human rights colleague, Kigali, April 27,2007. 28 "Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees"; Human Rights Watch interview with Rwandan human rights colleague. Kigali. April 27,2007. "'Human Rights Watch interview with resident of Gasaka sector. Kigali. April 27.2007. '"Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees"; Human Rights Watch interview with resident of Gasaka sector, Kigali, April 27,2007. The names of the three disappeared persons are not counted in the tally of those killed by police officers. unrelated to the genocide orto the gacaca process. Several cases are described below. These also appear to have been extrajudicial executions, underlining that there is a general problem of deaths in police custody.

Killings in Kibungo Sector, Ngoma District Police officers arrested three men, Alphonse Nshikili, Teksphore Karemera and Emmanuel Mfitimfura, at about 6:30 p.m. on April 4, 2006. They found the men in a small bar in the Cyasemakamba area of Kibungo town, Eastern Province and arrested them on suspicion of armed robbery. They arrested another unidentified man shortly after."

The police, along with the detainees, went to search the house of Nshikili where they found a television set and a large bag. Police officers said the television set had been stolen and later told others in the community that the bag had contained a Kalashnikov automatic rifle.32

According to residents of the Kabare area of Kibungo town, they heard a vehicle stopping nearby, followed by gunfire, several individual shots and then a burst of successive shots, at about 8 Several who went to see what happened found two bodies, lying about iom apart from each other, in poots of blood, one with tissue, apparently from his brain, near his head. Nearby were four uniformed police officers, at least two of whom were armed with Kalashnikov rifles. They told the onlookers that the dead men were robbers who had tried to escape while en route to show the police where other members of their group were living. They added that a third suspect had managed to get away.34

One local resident told Human Rights Watch researchers that the police officers had brought Nshikili, Karemera, and an unidentified third man to Kabare because

"Human Rights Watch interview with local resident, Kibungo town, March 26,2007.

3z Human Rights Watch interview with local resident, Kibungo town, March 26.2007.

33 Human Rights Watch interview with local resident. Kibungo town. March 26,2007.

34 Human Rights Watch interview with local resident. Kibungo town. March 26,2007. Nshikili had told the police that a resident of Kabare had given him the gun supposedly found at his home.35

Witnesses who saw Nshikili's body claim that his thumb had been amputated and that there was a knife wound in his chest and a gunshot wound in his neck. A relative of Nshikili, skeptical of the official version of his death, exclaimed to Human Rights Watch researchers, "If someone is running away, how can you cut off his thumb?"36Members of Nshikili's family say that police officers were reluctant to release the body and that when they arrived at the Kibungo General Hospital to claim the body, workers were preparing to bury the body without the family's knowledge. Relatives state that police also objected to them gaining access to an official autopsy reporL3'

On the day when Nshikili was buried, a family member remembers that police officers warned local people not to talk about his death. "If you do talk, they say that you are an accomplice of those 'thieves,"' said Nshikili's relati~e.~'

According to local residents, they were surprised that Nshikili, the son of a genocide survivor, had been arrested since he was not known to have been involved in any previous criminal activity. Emmanuel Mfitimfura, arrested at the same time as Nshikili and Karemera, was released after spending a week in the lock-up at Kibungo police station.39

Nshikili's family members have engaged a lawyer and have written to both the commissioner general of police and to the prosecutor general of Rwanda, requesting an investigation of his death, with no result at the time this report was written.

35 Human Rights Watch interview. Kigali, April 26,2007.

36 Human Rights Watch interview with relative of victim, Kibungo town. March 26.2007.

"Human Rights Watch interview with relatives of victim, Kibungo town, March 26.2007.

38 Human Rights Watch interview with relative of victim. Kibungo town. March 26.2007.

39 Human Rights Watch interview with local residents, Kibungo town, March 26.2007. In May 2007, the gacaca judges of Karenge cell took the extraordinary step of summoning a policeman named Gakwisi to explain the deaths.40Under law, gacaca jurisdictions are authorized to inquire into genocidal crimes during the period iggo- 1994, but have no mandate to deal with more recent crimes. Nonetheless the police officer attended the gacacasession and reportedly told the court that the two men had offered to show the police where other thieves were hiding, but en route they had jumped out of the police pick-up truck and were shot trying to escape. According to persons present at the hearing, the police officer was asked how Nshikili could have been shot in the throat while running away. The police officer replied, "That depends on the skill of the ~hooter".~'

According to local residents, the area continues to be troubled by armed robberies.

The killing of Emmanuel Ndahiriwe, Kicukiro Sector, Kigali On the morning of Friday, April 20,2007, police officers and members of the Criminal Investigations Department of the National Potice (CID) arrested Emmanuel Ndahiriwe at his workplace, Electrogaz (the state energy, gas and water utility). Members of Electrogaz's internal investigations unit accompanied the investigating officers. According to the police, Ndahiriwe was orre of a number of Electrogaz employees and others arrested in an investigation of theft of Electrogaz eq~ipment.~'

He was taken in an Electrogaz vehicle, first to Remera police station and later to Kicukiro police station, both in the city of Kigali. That evening a famity member visited him and left the Kicukiro police station at about 6:30 p.m.43

The next day, April 21, 2007, persons wanting to visit Ndahiriwe were told by police officers at the Kicukiro station that he had been taken away by CID officers for questioning. In the evening, members of Ndahiriwe's family sought him at CID

40 The gacacasystem is only mandatedto judge accusations of genocide crimes committed between iggo and 1994 and has no jurisdiction over any other cases. Human Rights Watch intewiew with relative of victim, Kibungo town. March 26,2007.

42 Chief Superintendent Costa Habyara, Director of CID. News (in Kinyarwanda), Radio Rwanda. April 25,2007.7 p.m.; "Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees."

43 Human Rights Watch interview with a friend of victim. Kigali, April 26.2007. headquarters but were told that officers in charge of the file were absent. Friends and relatives hoped that they would be able to locate him on Monday, April 23. By that time Ndahiriwe would have been detained more than 72 hours and under Rwandan law a detained person must appear before a magistrate within 72 hours of his arrest. But on Monday the police officers told them nothing.44

At 5:45 a.m. on Tuesday morning, Radio Rwanda broadcast descriptions of bodies that had been delivered to the morgue at Kigali Central Hospital, a regular feature of early morning broadcasts. Relatives listening to the announcement recognized one description as fitting that of Ndahiriwe. When they went to the morgue, they were able to identify his body. They were told that his body had been delivered by a Toyota "Hi-Lux" vehicle belonging to Electrogaz on Friday April 20, at about 8:30 p.m. Other witnesses saw an Electrogaz vehicle with blood in it. The vehicle in question, used by the internal investigations unit, bore the registration plaque numbered GR 779A.45According to persons who viewed the body, Ndahiriwe had been stabbed in the chest and shot in the head.46

In a press conference broadcast on national radio, Chief Superintendent Costa Habyara, Director of the CID, stated that Emrnanuel Ndahiriwe had been killed by police officers in self-defense, as he tried to grab a weapon. According to Habyara, the death occurred outside of the police station as the detainee was on his way to show the police where stolen equipment was stored and where criminals were hiding.47

44 Human Rights Watch interview with friend of victim, April 26,2007.

45 Human Rights Watch interview with local human rights activist, April 27.2007.

46 Human Rights Watch interview with friend of victim. Aprit 26.2007.

"Chief Superintendent Costa Habyara, national head of CID. News (in Kinyamanda). Radio Rwanda, April 252007.7 p.m.; "Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees." Killings of Detainees arrested by Soldiers

Soldiers of the Rwandan Defence Force (RD9 do not have jurisdiction over civilians. In one case investigated by Human Rights Watch researchers, however, soldiers arrested two men on suspicion of armed robbery and then killed them.

Killings in Rwabicurna Sector, Nyanza District, South Region In May 2006 officials established a military post in Rwabicuma sector, Nyanza district, to deal with several armed robberies in which residents had been injured. Soldiers at the military post, located at Kakamushi Primary School, Nyarusange cell, were to carry out night patrols and otherwise discourage criminal activity.48

According to a local resident, members of the Local Defence Force (LDF), aided by local residents, found a man named John but known as "Samunani" hiding in the bush on May 9,2006, following a robbery in an area known as Kabiri~i.~~Samunani was taken to the Nyagisozi sector offices where, according to a witness, he was "seriously beaten" with truncheons by members of the LDF before a large crowd. Samunani named several persons whom he said participated in robberies with him and on May lo, soldiers were sent to 'arrest' them, although they had neither legal authority to do so nor any arrest warrants. In one case, they apparently persuaded the persons whom they were seeking to accompany them to the military post under the guise of having lost their way.50

Local residents told a Human Rights Watch researcher that the soldiers brought at least seven persons to the Nyarusange military post, five of them men: Rukara, a resident of Kigogo village, Kamabuye cell; Vincent Hakizimana; Hakizimana's brother Aminadabu; Denis Ndagijimana; and an unidentified older man, and two women,

48 Human Rights Watch interview with bcal resident, Nyarusange cell April j. 2007.

49 Human Rights Watch interview with local resident, Nyarusange cell April j. 2007.

50 Human Rights Watch interview with local resident, Nyarusange cell. April 3,2007. Immacul6e Uwimana and the wife of a man known as "Kazung~".~'Several soldiers interrogated and allegedly threatened those who had been rounded up and later drove Vincent Hakizimana, Aminadabu, and the older man to the local lock-up in nearby Rurangazi cell.52

Later in the afternoon of May lo, soldiers took other suspects, including Samunani and Denis Ndagijimana, to the Lock-up at the Nyagisozi sector offices. That evening, soldiers took Samunani and Ndagijimana from the lock-up, saying that they were taking them, on foot, to Nyanza town.53The journey, which takes about 40 minutes in a car, takes about two hours on foot. It is unclear why such a journey would be taken on foot and at nighttime, and why soldiers, rather than policemen, would take responsibility for the two detainees.

At about 7 p.m., local people heard gunshots and found the bodies of the two men lying in a small patch of open forest, several hundred meters from the military post. Samunani had been shot in the base of the spine and was laying face-down, while Ndagijimana had been shot in the head and the back. Soldiers and local authorities told local residents that the two men had tried to flee. 54

One skeptical local resident questioned the explanation that the men had tried to flee. He told Human Rights Watch researchers:

The police sent a vehicle to pick up the bodies of the two who died. Why couldn't they have sent a vehicle to take them to Nyanza when they were still alive?55

On May 11, police officers, who had apparently taken custody of the detainees at the Rurangazi lock-up, brought them to the scene of the killings to view the bodies,

" Human Rights Watch interviews wlth local residents. Nyarusange cell. April 3.2007 and Kamabuye cell, April 28. 2007. " Human Rights Watch interview with local residents, Rwabicuma sector. March 26,2007. "Human Rights Watch interview with man living near to Rwabicuma sector offices. April 3,2007.

Human Rights Watch interviews wlth local residents, Rwabicuma sector and Nyarusange cell, April 3.2007. '' Human Rights Watch interview with local resident. Rwabicuma sector. April 3.2007. which were still laying there. According to witnesses, three of the detainees had been so badly beaten that they had difficulty walking and they said they had also been threatened with death by police officers.56They were freed shortly after.

In an interview with Human Rights Watch researchers the executive secretary of Rwabicuma sector denied that armed robberies had occurred in the area and also denied that Samunani, Denis Ndagijirnana, or anyone else had been arrested in connection with cases of theft or robbery during 2006.~'

56 Human Rights Watch interview with local resident, Rwabicuma sector, April 3,2007.

57 Human Rights Watch interview with Ephraim Kavutse, executive secretary of Nyagisozi sector, April 28,2007. Partial List of Detainees Killed by Police Officers and Soldiers

Place Explanation Given (Region/ Date Names of victims Crime alleged by police and/or Other remarks District authorities Sector1 Cell)

May 8, South1 Emmanuel Rape of seven year old Police say that the two 2007 Nyanzal Niringiyimana and girl. attempted to escape Muyira Noel Nsabimana from their cell at night and were shot by guards.

4pril 20, Kigali ville, Emmanuel Ndahiriwe Theft of~lectrogaz Police provided no 2007 Kicukiro cable. date or place of death but said that Ndahiriwe was arrested in conjunction with arrest of Zirimwabagabo, accused of stealing Electrogaz cable. Police say that en route to helping them find another suspect Ndahiriwe tried to grab weapon from a policeman who shot him in self defense.

Compiled from Human Rights Watch research. 'Circumstances in which Policemen shot detainees." statement sent by Commissioner General of Rwanda National Police Andrew Rwigamba to Human Rights Watch researcher Christopher Huggins, June4,2007, electronic communication and from information presented by Jean-Baptiste, Ntibagororwa, executive secretaly of LIPRODHOR at a Journ6e Locale d'lnformation, sponsored by LDGL (League for the Defense of Human Rights of the Great Lakes), on u L' &at des lieude la criminalit6 au Rwanda et le role des instances mandaises charg6es du maintien de la s(curit6 dans son eradication. w May 25.2007, Alpha Palace Hotel Kigali. April 18, East/Mugesera/ Mugabo wa Kigeri Murder of genocide Police said all three 2007 Ngoma Rugamba, Paul survivor named confessed and were Turatsinze. and Nyirahabimana. killed when they Augustin Fatirisigaye grabbed weapon of a policeman en route to show police other suspects. April 13, Jean Gatera and Mtempted murder of Police stated that they According to local 2007 Gahamanyi [killed genocide witness arrested genocide sources, a April 131 suspects Jean Pierre number of people Joseph Nkurikiyimana; Gatera, Gahamanyi, including Gatera's Emmanuel Modeste Mutwarasibo. wife. Violette Nshimiyimana alias Kajuguri who tried to Uwimbabazi, were "Kajyunguri" and kill genocide witness. beaten by police. Modeste All broke out of cell in [whereabouts escape attempt. Police unknown] killed two (unnamed) but three escaped. April 13, South/ Marcel Habyarimana Habyarimana: attempted According to police. 2007 Muhanga/ and Mukunzi. murder of Ndahayo the suspects tried to Kiyumba Mukunzi : having escape while being genocide ideology. taken to toilet and were shot by police. April g, South/ Ufitese Unknown Local human 2007 Gisagaral rights activists Mamba report that Ufitese was killed by security forces. April g, Cigali- Sibomana 4ttempted murder of According to police 2007 :ity/Gasabo/ jacaca witness. Sibomana. a genocide Satsata suspect, wounded and tried to kill a witness. After his arrest and while being interrogated, he tried to disarm a policeman, intending to kill him, and was shot in self- defense. April 1. South/ Pierre Muhizi Murder of wife. According to police 2007 Nyarugurut Pierre Muhizi killed his (March Ngoma wife with axe, was 2007). arrested March 31, and was killed April 1 outside Cyahinda police station during an escape attempt. Feb I, East/ I. Bosco Ntawuyinoza Raping and killing a Police state that Jean- 2007 Bugesera/ young woman. Bosco Ntawurimuzo Ruhuha broke out of his cell; and was killed during the escape attempt. South/ Daniel Uwimana and Murder of gacaca judge According to police. Kamonyil unidentified man Uwimana was killed Ngamba [killed January g] January 2; Polycarpe Munyangoga, Munyangoga, Kagambirwa, and Alphonse Kagambirwa, Kagenza were killed and Silvere Kagenza, jan 10 as they [killed night of January attempted to escape 13-14)

Nov 24 East1 Jean Hakizamungu, Murder of gacaca judge Police state that three 2006 Rwamaganal John Rukondo, and persons were arrested Mwulire Francois Ndagijimana Nov 22, all confessed; they tried to strangle policeman in order to escape. Police shot in self-defense. May 2006 South/ Samunani and 4rmed robbery. Local Local Authorities deny Local witnesses Rwabicuma Ndagijimana arrested people say that that anyone was state that by soldiers. [Killed mmacul6e Uwimana, arrested in connection Samunani was evening May lo.] Pukara , Vincent with armed robberies. arrested May 9 iakizimana and his and beaten, he roth her "Aminadabu", gave names of 3enis Ndagijimana, the others and was ~ifeof one 'Kazungu", killed. Three snd an unidentified older suspects beaten, man were arrested May later released. LO. I April 2006 East/ Alphonse Nshikili, Armed robbery, along Kibungo town Telesphore Karemera with Ernrnanuel Mfitimfura [released one week later] and an unidentified man.

THEREWILL BE NO TRIAL" Official Responses

The Rwanda National Police state they are committed to serving the people of Rwanda and on their website announce various ways of lodging complaints about abuses by police 0fficers.~9In the one instance in which a complaint was made in the case of the killing of a detainee-that of Alphonse Nshikili killed in April 2006- appeals by the family of the victim to both the commissioner general of police and to the prosecutor general of Rwanda remained unanswered at the time of this writing.

Human Rights Watch, Rwandan human rights organizations, and several representatives of the diplomatic community have repeatedly pressed Rwanda National Police officers for explanations of the police killings of detainees. On June 4, 2007 Commissioner General Rwigamba sent a three-page statement to Human Rights Watch (attached as an annex to this report) listing ioincidents between November 2006 and May 2007 in which police officers had shot and killed 20 detainee^.^'

The explanations in this statement, like that offered by Deputy Mary Gahonzire in an interview with a Human Rights Watch researcher in December 2006,~'were all variations on a single theme: the detainees had been shot while trying to escape.

The statement said that all the police officers involved had been questioned and that investigations were underway. It also indicated that police officers needed further training in the use of firearms, better facilities in police stations (to eliminate the need to take detainees outside the building to use latrines), and more handcuffs.

All the detainees were killed within days and in some cases within hours of their arrests. In no case had trials begun, far less verdicts been reached, yet in the opening paragraph of the statement, several of the detainees are referred to as

59 Rwanda National Police website is wmw.police.gov.m. 60 "Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees" annexed to this report. 61 Human Rights Watch. Kilingsin EasternRwanda, p. 9.

HUMlRIGHTS WATCH )ULY 2007 "killers," not suspects. In its final paragraph, the statement acknowledges that some of those killed by the police had no involvement with genocide but nonetheless it declares that "the suspects involved in these cases were of extreme criminal character ready to die for their genocide ideology." It concludes that these detainees were "terroristic in nature and don't care about their own lives leave alone other^."^'

Deputy Commissioner Habyara also seemed convinced that the detainees were necessarily guilty of the crimes for which they had been arrested. He told a public meeting on May 25,2007:

However someone who rapes a baby, someone who kills a child, someone who sexually mutilates a girl, a member of the clergy who kills his colleague. . .what is he not capable of doing? Would it be surprising if he tried to grab the rifle from a police officer? These are exceptional cases. Just as these killings are exceptional, they are done by extraordinary people who could do anything at any time. . . . These are not extrajudicial executions, rather they are exceptional cases committed by exceptional criminals.63

The assumption that the detainees were criminals-and even exceptionally dangerous criminals-shows a regrettable disregard for the presumption of innocence. The readiness to try to shift the blame for their death on to the victims throws into question the likelihood of independent, impartial investigations.

6z "Circumstances in which Policemen Shot Detainees."

63 Comments by Deputy Commissioner Costa Habyara at a IournCe Locale delnfonnation,sponsored by LDGL (League for the Defense of Human Rights of the Great lakes), on a L' &at des lieux de la criminalit6 au Rwanda et le role des instances rwandaises charg6es du maintien de la securit4 dans son Cradication, n May 25.2007, Alpha Palace Hotel, Kigali. Destruction of property belonging to survivors and collective punishments

Over the last year survivors reported scores of cases of property damage, such as the uprooting of their crops or the killing of farm animals, by persons who wished to harm them. Since the end of 2006, officials have been imposing collective punishments, including fines, obligatory labor, and beatings on residents of communities where such abuses have occurred.

In Gikombe umudugudu, Bulimba cell, Shangi sector, Nyamasheke district, for example, each local household was required to pay 1,550 FRW (US $2.80) to reimburse a survivor whosexow died in suspicious circumstances. This represented a considerable sum of money in a country where most people live on less than

55oFRW (US $1) a day. 64 Those unable or unwilling to pay were detained in the cell lock-up until others paid the fine for them.65In Huye district, South region, the mayor forced residents to help rebuild the house of a survivor that had burned down. He said the obligatory labor, being done even before the police had finished their investigation of the crime, would help break impunity and indifferen~e.~~

In an interview with Human Rights Watch researchers, Domitilla Mukantaganzwa, executive secretary of the National Service of GacacaJurisdictionsmentioned several other examples from elsewhere in Rwanda, suggesting that implementation of collective punishment is relatively widespread. Madame Mukantaganzwa spoke approvingly of the "educational" aspects of the practice, its effectiveness as punishment, and its practical usefulness in restoring the value of lost property. She

64 Rural Poverty Portal, http://mvw.ruralpovertyportal.org/english/reons/aca/a/statistics.htm(accessed June 26. 2006).

65 Human Rights Watch interview with residents of Burimba cell, Shangi sector. March 29.2007.

66 Stevenson Mugisha, "Seven arrested over survivor's murder." The New Times, February 18.2007 htt~:llnewtimes.co.~w/indenphp?option=comcontent&task=view&id=i&temid=(accessed Februafy 18.2007). said that she believed attacks on survivors had decreased since the policy was im~lemented.~~

Beatings by Police officers in Huye Sector, Huye District, South Region In at least one case, the collective punishment involved beatings of local residents as well the imposition of a fine to restore damaged property.

On February 13,2007, some crops were uprooted from fields belonging to josepha Mukarwego, who lives in an umuduguducalled Rwezamenyo. Local residents saw the destruction of the crops as a vindictive action, probably related to Mukarwego's testimony in gacaca. During the genocide, she had lost her six children, her husband, and her mother-in-law. Mukarwego was also involved at this time in a land dispute with her sister-in-law, also a survivor. It is unclear how much importance the land dispute had, if any, in the destruction of Mukarwego's crops.68

The local authorities and police officers based at Huye sector, one of them named Batera, convened a meeting of residents at the site of the damaged crops. Members of the Local Defense Force (LDF) ensured that residents attend the meeting. After some discussion, participants settled on 45,000 FRW as the value of the destroyed crops, and each household was told to pay 500 RWF.69

As the meeting was in progress, several police officers identified by local people as based in Ngoma (formerly Butare town) arrived with two LDF members not resident in the sector. After surveying the damaged crops, the police officers ordered the men to lie down on the ground and told the LDF members who had come with them to cut stout branches from the nearby trees. According to one of the victims, a police officer rejected the first sticks brought by the LDF members, saying they were not stout enough. The LDF members beat the men on their backs and buttocks. Most people received between six and fifteen strokes, but three young men (including Antoine

67 Human Rights Watch interview with Executive Secretary of the National Service of Gacacajurisdictions Domitille Mukantaganma, Kigali, March 13,2007. 68 Human Rights Watch interviews with residents of Huye sector, February 27 and March 15.2007.

69 45,000 FRW is about US S 80. Mutabazenga, 21 years old, Jean-BoscoGahamanyi, 22 years old, and Alphonse Nsabimana, 24 years old) were singled out for extra punishment. The resident elected to coordinate security in the umuduguduwas told that he would be given 200 blows, which he was made to count out loud. But, according to some present at the time, he cried out after 73 blows, "I am finished, that's all I can take". The police then told him, "Take these [blows] for now, we will give you the others later."70The police officers from Ngoma also threatened more drastic consequences for residents if they had to come back to Sovu for any similar case in the future.

As explained by officials, all Rwandans must take responsibility for the security of their neighbors, but in this case, it was not all residents of Sovu who were punished. The two male genocide survivors were not beaten. One did not lie down and another hurriedly left the meeting. Similarly all households in the umuduguduwere included on the list recording payments of the fine, but according to one knowledgeable source, the survivor families would not be asked to actually pay the fine.

Sovu residents who bitterly resented both the beating and the attendant humiliation blame police officers from the nearby town for the punishment, but some also remarked that the incident undermined their respect for the local a~thorities.~'They see themselves as unjustly punished for a crime of which many-or perhaps even all-of those punished were innocent.

Those punished may extend their anger beyond officials to survivors who were the original victims of the attacks, seeing them eventually as the cause of the fines they must pay, the labor they must contribute, and the beatings they must take. Should this happen, the policy of collective punishment may actually increase the vulnerability and isolation of survivors. At least one senior official in the government recognized this risk. He told a Human Rights Watch researcher, "We must not create a victimized people. That would be disastrous for rec~nciliation."~~

Human Rights Watch intewiews with local residents, Sovu cell. February 27 and March 15,2007.

Human Rights Watch intewiews with local residents. Sovu cell and Ngoma town. March 15.2007.

Human Rights Watch interview with senior government official, Kigali. May 13,2007. Violations of International and Rwandan Law

The use of lethal force against detainees is highly restricted by commonly accepted international standards put into effect by most states. The 1990 United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms emphasizes that intentional lethal use of firearms only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life." In the context of a detainee in police custody, such circumstances would include "self- defence or the defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury" or preventing the detainee's escape when such action would "prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life."74

The evidence we have collected, including the official explanations presented by senior police officers, suggests that not all-indeed perhaps none-of the killings discussed in this report meet those criteria. Only thorough and impartial investigations, drawing on as wide a range as possible of forensic evidence and witness testimony, can determine if any or all of these killings constitute cases of extrajudicial execution. Such cases would violate the right to life guaranteed by the lnternational Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ofwhich Rwanda is a state party, as well as the Rwandan con~titution.~~

Statements by senior police officers about these shootings violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the ICCPR and by the Rwandan constitution. To the extent that attitudes expressed in these statements are held generally by police officers, the shooting of detainees is unsurprising and seems likely to continue unless specific action is taken to change the attitudes and halt the killings.

" Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders. 1990. principle 9.

74 lbid and principle 16.

" InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16.1966. GA. Res. 2200A (MI). 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52. U.N. Doc. A16316 (19661,999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March zj.ig76, art 6; Constitution of Rwanda (2003). art. 12. The practice of collective punishment is illegal in times of peace and war alike. It is not only a serious violation of international humanitarian law,76 but also violates human rights law by subjecting individuals to arbitrary arrest, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, by contravening the right to recognition as a person by the law, as well as by violating the presumption of innocence and the right of all persons to be tried in lawful and impartial tribunals for any crimes of which they are accused. These rights are guaranteed to the citizens of Rwanda by the ICCPR and by the Rwandan con~titution.~~

76 Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 1907. art. 50 and Convention QV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 1949. Part Ill, section I. common provisions, art. 33. The imposition of collective punishments happens most frequently in times of war and is rare in times of peace.

ICCPR, art. 7.9. iq (1 and 2) and 16; Constitution of Rwanda (2003). art. 19.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH jULV 2007 The Donor Community

Rwanda continues to depend heavily on donor assistance, both with general support and for specific projects. Although its government is one of those most ready to criticize donors, its leaders have often shown themselves ready to listen to counsel from international actors.

The Netherlands, apparently the first to be alerted to the problem of police shootings of detainees, raised the issue with other donor representatives. An initial discussion by the members of the European Union in April brought no action, but the ambassadors of the United States and the United Kingdom, and perhaps other diplomats, asked senior police officers for explanations of the killings. The statement sent to Human Rights Watch on June 4 or one like it was sent to at least one major donor. Donors, particularly those most directly engaged with assistance to the police (Belgium, Sweden, South Africa), should insist that the investigations promised by the nationat police in this statement are carried out immediately and impartially and that any officers suspected of illegal killings are prosecuted. Conclusion

Attention to police shootings of detainees, as well as to the issue of presumption of innocence for accused persons, comesat a time when the Rwandan government is particularly eager to demonstrate its high standards in the field of justice. Some leaders are concerned with showing a level of judicial competence and impartiality that will encourage greater investments of the capital so badly needed for economic development. Othersare focused on persuading judges and prosecutors elsewhere that Rwandan courts can fairly try persons accused of genocide who are resident abroad and are now being considered for extradition to Rwanda in the United Kingdom and other European countries.

The legitimacy of a judicial system is intimatety connected with that of its police system. According to international standards, to which Rwanda subscribes along with many other nations, such legitimacy requires, among other things, the protection of the lives of detainees and the presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial for persons accused of any crime. If the Rwandan government is to demonstrate the quality of its courts and police, it must take clear and prompt action to ensure that police officers and other Rwandans respect these standards. Annex One - Statement sent by Commissioner General of Rwanda National Police Andrew Rwigamba to Human Rights Watch researcher Christopher Huggins, June 4,2007, electronic communication

Dear sir,

Please receive hereby attached explanations about the Police shootings you asked about. Circumstances in which Policemen shot detainees

1. Seven men UWIMANA Daniel, MUNYANGOGA Polycalpe, KAGENZA Silver, KAGAMBIRWA Alphonse, NKINAMUBANZl Francois, USABYEYEZU Cyriac and MUNYANZIZA Celestin had on 28" December 2006 killed one BAYUIRE Landouard a Gacaca court president and a vice president of IBUKA assoclatlon In the sector of Ngamba, Kamonyi District, Southern region. On 2* January 2007 at 6.00 am as inmates were being taken to the toilet, they attempted to disarm and kill a policeman on guard before they could escape. The Police man shot and killed UWIMANA Daniel in self defense. After Police had completed its investigations, six remaining suspects were transferred to police station Musamblra because the case file was under prosecution department awaiting for court decision. On larn January 2006, three of the six suspects by names of KAGENZA Silver, MUNYANGOGA Polycalpe and KAGAMBIRWA Alphonse attempted to escape and a police officer who was guarding them shot them dead. The three remaining are at present In MUHANGA central prison.

2. In Ruhuha sector, Bugesera district, Eastern region one NTAWURIMUZO 3 .Bosco was arrested suspected of defiling and later killing a young girl. This suspect was a renowned hard-core criminal in that area. He was shot dead by a police on guard on ld February at around 5.00 am in the morning after he had broke a police cell in an attempt to escape detention.

3. One MUHIZI Pierre was arrested on 31% March 2007 after killing his wife with an axe Ngoma sector, Nyaruguru district, southern region. On 1* April 2007 when he was under police guard at Cyahinda Police station he decided to run away in order to escape, one of the police guards run after him but the suspect so fast, so a policeman shot him.

4. On 22"6 November 2006, three suspects (HAKIZAMUNGU John, RUKUNDO J.Bosco and NDAGUIMANA Francois) were arrested in a process of investigations after an assassinatlon of a Gacaca President of Mwurire sector, Rwamagana district, eastern region. After being arrested, these suspects confessed to have connived in assassinating their victim. After being interrogated, they attempted to strangle a policeman on guard and get a riffle to help them escape after killing other people. The policeman shot them in self defense. 5. In Gatsata sector, Gasabo district in Kigali city, one SIBOMANA (a suspect to have committed genocide) was arrested after he attacked and attempted to klll one UWIMANA Priscilla (a witness In Gacaca court of that sector). People in the neighborhood saved Priscilla's life after she had already been harmed by SIBOMANA. SIBOMANA was arrested and taken to a police station. As SIBOMANA was being interrogated he struggled to disarm a policeman with an intention of shooting policemen that were there. In the process, a policeman shot hlm In self detense.

6. On 13" April 2007, 05 suspects (GATERA Jean Pierre, GAHAMANYI, MUNIlARASIBO Modeste and KAIUGURI) were arrested in Gasaka sector, Nyarnagabe district, Southern region after they had attacked and attempted to kill a genocide wkness in Gacaca. The life of this witness was saved by neighbors as she yelled for help. All suspects had cases of having participated in genocide. As they were In police detention, they broke the police cell at night and ran away, a police man on guard randomly fired at them and two of them were caught by bullets while other three managed to escape and they are still at large.

7. HABYARIMANA Marcelin and MUKUNZI Alphonse were arrested on 13~~April 2007 in Kiyumba sector, Muhanga district Southern region. One of the Suspects (HABYARIMANA Marcelin) had attempted to kill one NDAHAYO and drop his body in Nyabarongo river. Another one (MUKUNZI Alphonse) was suspected of genocide Ideology. As detainees were being taken to the toilet, these suspects tried to run away and were shot by a policeman on guard.

8. On 18'"prll 2007 three suspects MUGABO wa Kigeri Rugamba, TURATSINZE Paul and FATIRISIGAYE Augustin were arrested suspected of killing a genocide survivor called NYSRAHABIMANA Doda in Mugesera sector, Ngoma district, Eastern region. During interrogation they all conceded to have conspired in killing the victim. However, they said that there are other suspects they wanted to show investigators when they were on their way to show police investigators those other suspects, they tried to grab a riffle from a police man that was escorting them, the policeman then shot and killed them in self defense.

9. One ZIRIMWAEMGABO was suspected of stealing electricity cables from ELECTROGAZ. His house was searched in the process of investigations and he was found to be fraudulently keeping electricity cables that belonged to ELECTORGAZ In his house. He was then arrested and taken to the police station. One NDAHIRIWE Emmanuel was also arrested in the process. NDAHIRIWE Emrnanuel later admitted to assist in investigations and went with Poke investigators to look for another suspect who also selk ELECTOGAZ1s electricity cabtes. On the way, NDAHIRIWE tried to escape by running away. A police man run after him and caught him. NDAHIRIWE then Med to grab a riffle from the Police man, the policeman then shot and killed hlm In self defense.

10. Two suspects (NIRINGMMANA Emmanuel and NSABlMANA Noel) wew arrested on 8t"May 2007 in Muyira sector, Nyanza district, southern reglon after raprng a 7 year old girl called UMURANGA. Both suspects tried to escape from a police cell in that night of 08* May 2007 and were shot dead by a police man on guard.

11. All of the policemen that were involved in these circumstances were summoned for questioning by their relevant unit's administration and the department of Inspectorate responsible for inspecting police conduct and accountability. Investigations are underway to assess the officers' responsibility under the law.

12. Our officers need extensive training in usage of firearms. We have started this exercise for all the units so that there is precision in handling of detainees and escapees

13. Our detention facilities on police stations also need to be updated because on most police stations, toilet facilities are outside Police station premises hence detainees taking that as an advantage to escape. The current Police Stations were not designated for this job; we are looking for resources to build Police Stations. 14. We shall acquire enough hand - cuffs and equip them with all police statfons.

15. Although there are few cases that are not of suspects of genocide, it should be noted that the suspects involved in these cases were of extreme criminal character ready to die for their genocide ideology. They are terroristic in nature and don't care about their own lives leave alone others.

$ "There will be no trial" Police Killings of Detainees and the Imposition of Collective Punishments

Officers of the Rwandan National Police killed at least 20 detainees in the six months between November 2006 and May 2007. Some of these cases appear to have been extrajudiciat executions in violation of international human rights law and Rwandan law. In this report Human Rights details its investigations into several of these cases based on dozens of interviews with families of victims and eyewitnesses. The report publishes a statement by the Rwandan National Police claiming that all the victims were shot while trying to escape and that many were characterized by "extreme genocidal character.' In fact many of the victims in the cases reported here were accused of cdhes like murder, rape, and theft, not of anything related to the 1994 genocide which killed some three-quarters ofthe Tutsi population of Rwanda.

The report also documents the implementation of a policy of collective responsibility whereby officials and police punish people living near genocide survivors who have been attacked or suffered damage to their property. This policy violates the presumption of innocence guaranteed by international convention and enshrined in the Rwandan constitution because those punished have not been found guilty of the alleged crime by a trial or any other judicial process. % 13 AMNESTY lN7ERNATlONAL > HOME > LIBRARY WORLD WIDE SITES 13' ACT US SITEMAI

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--LIBRARY > AFRICA CENTRAL AFRICA > RWANDA Document library A1 Index: AFR 47/004/2007 16 March 2007 Recent documents URGENT ACTION Documents bv reaion Amnesty International's global Documents bv theme Rwanda I Uganda: Forcible return1 fear of Urgent Action network torture or ill-treatment A&I reports provides an effective and rapid means of preventing some of the PUBLIC most life-threatening human The Wire Al Index: AFR 47/004/2007 rights violations against 16 March 2007 individuals. Receive updates by e-mail UA 65/07 Forcible return/ fear of torture or Join the Ursent Action network ill-treatment Order A1 ~ublications RWANDA1 Francois Ruceba (m), aged 45 ] Search by A1 INDEX UGANDA Jackson Safari (m), aged 43 ] Peter Kabagambe (m), aged 34 ] Peter Bisamaza (m), aged 22 ] Vedaste lyarwema (m), aged 40 ] Rwandan nationals Paul Rwangabo (m), aged 28 ] Daniel Kazungu (m), aged 22 ] Aloysius Badege (m), aged 20 ] /iew this page in Asumani Rutigana (m), aged 31 ] lsmail Salomo (m), aged 18 ] And approximately 60 further individuals

The 10 men named above were forcibly returned on 13 March from Uganda to Rwanda, on suspicion of involvement with an illegal armed group. Amnesty Internationalfears that they are likely to face torture or ill-treatment, and an unfair trial, at the hands of the Rwandan authorities. Approximately 60 further individuals in Uganda facing similar accusations are also at imminent risk of forcible return to Rwanda. They all claimed that they fled Rwanda fearing for their lives, and at least one had initiated an application for asylum in Uganda.

The 10 were handed over by the Ugandan government to Rwanda's chief of external security, Joseph Nzabamwita on 13 March in the town of Kibale in westem Uganda. They are believed to be detained at Remera Military Barracks in the Rwandan capital, Kigali. The Rwandan authorities allege that the 10 Rwandan nationals are members of the Rassemblement du Peuple Rwandais (Assembly of Rwandan People), an armed group seeking to overthrow the country's government. They were arrested in different locations by Ugandan Military Intelligence agents who alleged that the 10 Rwandese had been recruiting members for the Rassemblement du Peuple Rwandais in refugee camps and villages in Central and Westem Uganda. Amnesty lnternational believes that there is a real risk that detainees will be tortured or subjected to other inhuman and degrading treatment in Rwanda. Rwanda has not ratified the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).

BACKGROUND INFORMATION Amnesty lnternational has received numerous consistent reports of torture, extrajudicial killings and prolonged detention without trial of people alleged to be members of rebel groups based in Rwanda and Uganda. In 2006, the United States District Court of Columbia found in the case of USA vs Francois Karake et al that three Rwandan nationals alleged to have confessed to the murder of eight foreign nationals and one Ugandan guide in Bwindi Impenetrable National Park near the Ugandan border with Rwanda in 1999 were all tortured into "confessing" by the Rwandan army. All three of those accused admitted to being members of the armed rebel group, the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR).

Amnesty International opposes the transfer of cases to Rwanda until the Rwandan government is able to guarantee full security to returned suspects during and after their detention; and until the Rwandan legal system can guarantee suspects the right of fair trial in accordance with internationally-recognized law and standards. Amnesty lnternational has documented several cases of people, accused of crimes of genocide, who have been in pre-trial detention for more than 12 years.

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RWANDA: Top judicial officials replaced

Rwanda's erstwhile general prosecutor Simeon Rwagasore has been appointed the new president of the country's supreme court, the Hirondelle news agency reported. Five vice- presidents were also approved and appointed by parliament on Monday. The agency recalled that all the court's former officials had been asked to resign. It said the hnctioning of the court had become more and more paralysed, &d Rwagasore's predecessor, Jean Mutsinzi had complained to the Rwandan authorities that magistrates from the former regime had not been replaced and were *sabotagingnthe instit&on. He said they had rehsed to carry out his orders and accused them of "insubordination". In particular, the ex-president of the State Council, Alype Nkundiyaremye, had described the country's genocide law of 1996 as "unconstitutional".

Hirondelle said the stagnation of the court had severe consequences for the judicial system, with numerous tribunals unable to fbnction as there was no coordination. Many genocide cases were pending as a result. There was also corruption within the court as many of its employees had not been paid for months. Hirondelle cited analysts as saying the new appointments were all "government-approved".

Category One list amended Before his new appointment, Rwagasore - in his capacity as general prosecutor - announced he had put his signature to a new list of "first category" genocide suspects. At least 800 names were withdrawn fiom the old list and replaced by 900 new suspects. Hirondelle noted that the first list, comprising some 1,946 names, had come under criticism for "imprecisions and repetition of names". Some of the people on the list had died before 1994, or weae even victims of the genocide. Others were found to be innocent. Now, the list has been "corrected", Rwagasore said.

~---~-- Over 21,000 Rwandans have returned fiom the DRC since the start of the year fleeing conflict, the latest OCHA monthly report said, citing UNHCR figures. It said another 30,000 returnees may arrive fiom the DRC in the next few months. The report, received by IRIN, said there was concern that among the returnee population, there could be "active members of the Interahamwe who may cause disruptions again within the country". However, the report noted that the security environment in June and previous months had been "relatively stable and incident-fiee".

Less people attending feeding centres

Meanwhile, several NGOs are reducing their involvement in health and nutrition programmes in the northwest in view of improvements in the situation of resettled displaced populations, the OCHA report said. "Caseloads in most therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres are fairly low and many services will soon be under the full stewardship of the Region Sanitaire," the report said. It warned, however, that the population's health status was linked to the country's food supply and agricultural situation, which "could become increasingly precarious". Aid agencies have noted a "great need" for seeds and tools as people prepare for the next planting season.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Rebels reject amnesty offer

Rebels of the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD) have turned down President Laurent-Desire Kabila's amnesty offer, arguing that they are not "criminals to seek amnesty". "I think Kabila is the one who deserves to be offered an amnesty," RCD Vice-president Moise Nyanrgabo said. Reuters quoted RCD leader, Emile Ilunga, who rejected claims by Kabila that the rebels had launched attacks on several fionts in the northeast and southeast of DRC. "Kabila and his allies proceeded on a well-known method of making accusations because that is the best attack," he said.

Allied forces hand over 20 prisoners

The allied forces of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) on Monday handed over 20 POWs to the Congolese Armed Forces, DRC state television reported. The report said most of the prisoners - 17 Congolese and three Angolan UNTA members - were captured in various operational areas. Some of them surrendered as they fled the "intrigues and atrocities meted out to them by Rwandans".

Annan to send team to Lusaka

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was due to send a three-person team to Lusaka on Thursday to "liaise" with Zambian President Frederick Chiluba who is trying to convince the rebels to sign the ceasefire accord, a UN statement said. "The Secretary-General is still prepared to send a full-fledged technical survey team to the DRC upon the full signing of the agreement," the statement added.

Algeria "accepts" to head intervention force

Meanwhile, the Algerian government has "accepted" to provide its commander in chief to . . . . meeting is scheduled to take place in Lusaka on 19 July in this regard." It said the meeting would be attended by the foreign and defence ministers of all the countries implicated in the war.

TANZANIA: Refugee increase in wake of truce accord

The number of people fleeing into Tanzania &om eastern DRC has risen since the signing of the ceasefire agreement last week, a UNHCR spokesman told IRIN on Thursday. The refbgee influx "has been steadily increasing, &om about 100 people on 9 July to almost 500 on the 12thW,the spokesman said. The new arrivals said the area was tense, with fighting between rebels and groups opposed to them reported around several South Kivu villages, including Talama and Sele. "There was also apparently some kind of clash at Makobola" on 7 July, the spokesman added. Some 90,000 DRC rehgees have crossed to western Tanzania since August 1998.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: Thousands flee DRC conflict

Thousands of people, including many child soldiers fleeing conflict in DRC's Equateur province, have amved in the Mobaye and Bangassou areas of the CAR since last week, UNHCR said on Thursday. "We have counted at least 5,000 armed persons," a UNHCR regional spokesman told IRIN. "Some appear to be [DRC] government soldiers, but a significant number are children who were taken fiom schools and armed," he said. The influx began after Gbadolite and Yakoma were taken by Congolese rebel forces. UNHCR was currently undertaking a "status determination" exercise of the new arrivals, the spokesman said. Meanwhile, Reuters quoted a government spokesman as saying the arriving soldiers had been disarmed by CAR forces.

UNHCR has not yet been able to verify press reports that some 6,000 civilians had also arrived in Mobaye and Bangassou fiom the DRC. "This is a huge area ...We may have to send in more e"the UNHCR spokesman said. He added that another 100 people had arrived at Bangui fiom the Zongo area of Equateur.

Bangui denies bombing role

The CAR government on Tuesday "categorically" denied claims, made by the rebel Mouvement de liberation congolais (MLC), that a Sudanese aircraft had flown fiom Bangui to bomb Gbadolite airport on Sunday, Gabon's Africa Number 1 radio reported. It quoted a government spokesman as saying Sudan "cannot violate CAR air space to bomb DRC territory". He added that "it is not in our country's interest to have such events disrupting or compromising the smooth organisation of the [upcoming presidential] elections."

BURUNDI: Arusha process "risks disintegrating"

f dependent analysts have expressed scepticism over the Arusha peace process, which is 41 fisk of disintegrating. One analyst told IRIN the sides have resumed their "tough" negotiating stances to maximise their own positions. "Trust is disappearing, the process has become personalised," the analyst said. Another analyst said the external process could not progress without the inclusion of the armed factions, and the government and ...... - . . . . 8 11 I., 4 . international community and its power base weakened, but a Burundian government official pointed out to IRIN recently: "Look what happened with the Interahamwe".

AFRICA: US hopes to "do better"

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, admitting the US has been more active in Europe than Afiica, has said the lessons of Kosovo should help Washington "do better" in Afiica. Addressing the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) in New York on Tuesday, she said Afiica was "being pulled in two ways". Noting the democratisation process underway in some countries, she also stressed the continuing wars that were ravaging the continent. "The world must come together with Africa, not to compete for influence but to cooperate for peace, development and law." She urged the international community to back "strong, democratic leaders in their fight against corruption". She also stressed the need to halt the "uncontrolled flow of guns and other weapons into Afiica ...which feed conflict and crime". Albright concluded by hoping for progress "against an even deadlier threat" to Africa, HIVIAIDS.

Nairobi, 15 July 1999, 14:30 gmt

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Copyright (c) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 1999

Editor: Dr. Ali B. Ali-Dinar, Ph.D ANNEX President Charles M.D. Byron International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Arusha, TZ

June 20.2007

Re: ADAD concerns for securii of Defence Teams and for the integrity of the Tribunal, itself.

Dear President Byron,

My original intention was to offer my congratulations on your election to the Presidency, and to express my interest in continuing the dialogue between the Office of the President and the Bureau of ADAD. However, events have overtaken us, and my first formal communication with you must be an expression of concern regarding a several issues which have serious implications for the integrity of the Tribunal, and the future of the system of international humanitarian law in general.

While I hope to continue to address these issues with the President and other organs of the ICTR and Security Council in confidential settings as necessary to the task, I hope you will understand that the issues raised in this letter are far too important to put before you in a confidential fashion. This is an open letter that will be distributed to members of ADAD and the relevant international bodies.

First, as the President is aware, a dossier detailing many crimes committed by leaders of the current government of Rwanda whii the Prosecutor at the ICTR has failed to prosecute, and which have been charged to detainees at the ICTR has been delivered to the President and all members of the Security Council. Much of this evidence has been introduced into the public record of the ICTR in the Miliry 1 trial and a copy of the dossier has been delivered to your office.

Second, it is undeniable that that former ICTR Prosecutor Ms. Del Ponte acknowledged in 2003 that the OTP had sufficient evidence to prosecute members the current Rwandan govemment for crimes for which only members of the former Rwandan govemment have been held accountable. Also, the dossier, the Report of Judge Bruguiere, as well as the evidence in the Military 1 trial, all make dear that the OTP had the evidence to prosecute Paul Kagame for the assassination of former President Habyarimana, and many of the crimes related thereto as early as 1997, according to the sworn statement of former OTP attorney Michael Hourigan (please see the dossier and evidence in Military 1).

In light of the above, as President of ADAD, I must protest in the mod vociferous way possible the June II, 2007 request of the Prosecutor to tranafer the ICTR case against Fulgence Kayishema to Rwanda for prosecution. As the President is aware, trials in absentia are NOT consistent with the jurisprudence of either the ICTR, the ICTY, OR the ICC. However, such "show trials' are permissible in Rwanda. But, more importantly, known parties to the crimes within the mandate of the ICTR lack proper juridical standing to undertake prosecutions of those defeated by the RPF, many of whom, according to Ms. del Ponte, Judge Btugiere, the Courts d Spain, and the evidence put before Chamber I in this Tribunal, are criminals themselves.

Transfening this case, or other cases or detainees, to the jurisdiction of the current Rwandan government would be a derogation of the Security Council mandate to the ICTR to hold accountable all those who committed crimes in Rwanda, during the temporal jurisdiction of this body. Moreover, it would make a mockery of the juridical foundation upon which all aspects of this Tribunal will eventually be judged by history, as well as the reputations of all of us charged with responsibility for ensuring its integrity.

In addition, another urgent matter has come to my attention regarding interference of the Rwandan government in the functioning of the Defence at the ICTR which threatens to make a mockery of the adversary process and "equality of armsn upon which this entire undertaking is grounded. A member of the Team of ADAD member Me. Aiche Conde has been detained by the Rwandan government, while on investigative mission in Kigali.

As the President know, last September a fmer member of ADAD Me. Gakwaya was detained in Arusha upon the request of the Rwandan govemment, even though he had knfully investigated by UN personnel, had been granted political asylum by a msmber-state and was covered by UN diplomatic immunity. ADAD members found it necessary to withhold their seivices until he was released. However, because the UN would not ensure his security, it was necessary for Mr. Gakwaya to withdraw from his client's case at the ICTR.

On June 27, 1 will be testifying before an immigration court in the Netherlands in support of a request for political asylum of my own former Team member Emilien Dusabe, who was similarly threatened with arrest in Rwanda because of his work as an investigator for the Defence. I am also working with UNCHR who have provided protected status to witnesses who testified against the interests of the current Rwandan government, who cannot return to Rwanda because of threats to their safety emanating from Kigali. As the President may also be aware, I have been personally attacked as a "genoddaim" and 'negationist" by Pmsident Kagame, hbnself, as well as other highly placed members of the Rwandan governments because of my own work as Lead Counsel in the Military 1 case.

Under these conditions, it is simply not possible to pretend that the Defence can carry out its assigned functions at the ICTR, and the inability of the Tribunal andlor the Security Council to provide a neutral, juridical foundation upon which proper litigation can tdre place is becoming more and more apparent with each passing day. It is not longer possible for me, or other members of ADAD, to pretend that the ICTR is able to provide a forum for fair resolution of the many important issues which the President, and the judges of the Chambers, are charged with resolving for posterity.

At one time, it might have been possible to claim that the imbalance that has been the reality at the ICTR was not WelCknm or undemby those of us charged with the solemn jurklical responsibility of doing jubice. This is not longer the case.

I, and all the members of ADAD, are prepared to cooperate with the President and the Registry, in protecting the integrity of the Tribunal and our own bona fides as professionals charged with the sacred task for providing meaningful defence within the Rub8 of the Tribunal. Hawever, the Tribunal must also begin demonstrate that it wll not be manipulated by a one-sided presentatii of the cases brought before it by the OTP and that it is willing and able to pmvide conditions that will permit the Defence to complete its necessary work without harassment and intimidation from the very parties who should be in the dock at the ICTR.. ..and are not.

Under these circumstances, I must request your immediate attention to the problem of the release of the investigator of Me. Conde, in the same manner that the release of Mr. (3akwaya was accomplished with the assistance of the President and Registry. Further, I implore the Pmsident to reject any transfer of cases to detainees to the jurisdiction of Rwanda. Moreover, ADAD stands ready to assist the President in ensuring that the ICTR not be manipulated to accomplish short-term political objectives that will have long-lasting negative consequences on the historical record of the Tribunal, as well as our own actions, now that these manipulations have come to light.

The history of international jurisprudence is unlikely to treat kindly those of us who were presented with an opportunity to act, and who failed to do so.

Because of my academic professional obligations in the United States, I will be relying heavily on the assistance of the ADAD Vice-President, Me. Gershom Otachi of the Bar of Nairobi, Kenya to maintain personal contact with your office between my own visits to Arusha. He is being copied with this letter, as well, and he will be contacting your office in my stead. In the meanwhile, I will be representing ADAD at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

It is my hope, and that of the ADAD membership, to work together with the President and the Registry to successfully fulfill the mandate of the ICTR and to establish a foundation of international criminal jurisprudence that will stand the test of time and of which we can all be proud. Please contact me at your earliest convenience if Imay be of assistance in any way.

0 wnsel, Ntabakuze Defence President, ADAD (the ICTR defence lawyers association) 651-290-6384 651-290-6406 (fax) perlinder~mitchell.edu

cc: G. Otachi Detainees UNDF Members, ADAD Memben of the Security Council President, ICTY President, Appeals Chamber Prosecutor, ICTR Prosecutor, ICTY ANNEX I www.hrondelle.org : 15.12.06 - IC'I'KJAI - A1 DEYLOKES (( '1'l-E FAlLURE OF 'I-... Page 1 sur 1

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ICTRlAl - Al DEPLORES a THE FAILURE OF THE ICTR B TO PROSECUTE ALL SIDES Arusha, December 14 2006 (FH) - In an address to the United Nations Security Council, which is to start examining Friday the furtherance of the proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Amnesty International (Al) notably deplores cr the failure B of the tribunal to prosecute the crimes committed by all sides involved in the war in Rwanda in 1994. I Al a remains seriously concerned by the failure of the ICTR and the Rwandan authorities to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by all sides in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994~,the human rights organization, says in its communiqu6.

a Up to 60,000civilians are estimated to be have been killed by Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF currently in e power) forces between April and July 1994~,Amnesty International alleges. a No public indictments against the RPF have been issued r, by the ICTR regarding its crimes, the

I communique continues. Amnesty stresses that there are a serious doubts about the political will of Rwanda authorities to investigate B these crimes.

The organization also highlights that a No court in Rwanda has jurisdiction over alleged war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law B.

Furthermore, Al aopposes the transfer of cases (of the ICTR) to Rwanda at this time B, notably on grounds of 1 a u: real risk that transferred persons would be exposed to torture or other ill-treatment r,. I a The Rwandan legal system cannot guarantee suspects the right of fair trial in accordance with internationally-recognized law and standards B, Amnesty continues.

For its a completion strategy B, the ICTR, which has been asked by the Security Council to close all trials in 2008, is considering transferring some accused to national jurisdictions, Rwanda included.

So that the 12 accused currently detained by the ICTR and awaiting for their trial and the 18 at large can all be tried, Amnesty calls the Security Council to want the ICTR an extension of its mandate. should the Tribunal ask for h. * Em, O Hirondelle News Agency

Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne, Switzerland Arusha, Tanzania Tel : +41 21 654 20 20 Tel : +255 713 51 08 94 Email : [email protected] : [email protected]

This project is funded by Belgium, European community, Norway and Luxemburg

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f 7 @U 1996 - 2007, Fondat~onHirondelle - Av. du Temple 190 - CH 1012-Lausanne [Su~sse]- Tel+41 21 654 20 20 - Fax +41 2 1 654 20 2 1 - E-mail info9hirondelle,org ANNEX www.hirondelle.org : 11.06.07 - ICTRIWITNESS - AN ICTR LAWYER DENONC ... Page 1 sur 2

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ICTWITNESS - AN ICTR LAWYER OENONCES THREATS MADE TO HIS WITNESSES Arusha, 11 June 2007 (FH) - Franpis Cantier, the French lawyer of a defendant at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), wrote to the Registrar of the Tribunal to complain about threats exerted in Rwanda on his potential witnesses and asked for the creation of an independent board of inquiry.

In this letter, the counsel of Tharcisse Renzaho, the former prefect of Kigali, asks the Registrar, chief of the administration of the ICTR, to solicit the Security Council of the United Nations so that it creates a board of inquiry on this subject. As of the opening of the trial, last January, he had expressed the state of these threats which weigh, according to him, on the equity of the trial.

"Taking into account the political context prevailing in Rwanda, I do not think that your Registrar's Office is able to cany out such an investigation" wrote Cantier. "Furthermore, he adds, it will be impossible for us to give you the names of certain witnesses for fear that being questioned by your services may immediately lead to harassment in an official or semi-official way by the Rwandan authorities".

"The characteristic of justice rendered here is that it rests largely on testimonies" writes in this letter Cantier; recalling that the Anglo-Saxon procedure in effect at the ICTR expects the physical presence of witnesses before the Court.

According to him, on the eight witnesses whom he had had a presentiment of in Rwanda, three no longer wish to come because of fear, a fourth fled the country after being threatened, another is unreachable in prison and the sixth would like to have particular measures of protection. These threats intervened after, he regrets, he had communicated the names in accordance with the rules of procedure.

The majority of lawyers in front of the ICTR have, at one time or another of their defence arguments, complained about the threats made to their witnesses or a member of their families living in Rwanda. Monday morning, regretting the absence of his witness Gilles Saint-Laurent expressed the state of threats exerted against his family; at which the Prosecutor Mr. Cire Ba replied that these statements came from witnesses "eager to profit from savings and budgets". The proceedings were adjourned.

In order to protect the witnesses a particular service from the court takes care of them. Transported on a specially chartered aircraft, they are lodged in protected houses and their identities are protected. But because of the social overlap and the density of the Rwandan population, these precautions hold only a few hours before their absence is announced or that their anonymity is lifted.

PBIERIMM O Hirondelle News Agency

Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne, Switzerland Arusha, Tanzania Tel : + 41 21 654 20 20 Tel: +255 713 51 08 94 Email : [email protected] Email :[email protected]. tz

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,* om 1996 - 2007, Fondation Hirondelle - Av. du Temple 190 - CH 1012Causanne (Suisse) - Tel+41 21 654 20 20 - Fax +41 2 1 654 20 2 1 - E-mail info@_irondeIle.org www.hirondelle.org : 23.08.07 - IC I'KtKENLAHO - A UEFENCE WI'I'NBSS FOK ... Page 1 sur 1 r 961

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ICTRIRENZAHO -A DEFENCE WITNESS FOR COLONEL RENZAHO FORCED TO FLEE RWANDA

Arusha, 23 August 2007 (FH) - A defence witness for the former Prefect Tharcisse Renzaho, currently on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), had to leave Rwanda where he lived because of threats made against him, it was learned from a source close to the case.

This information could not be confirmed by an official source. Questioned on the subject, the spokesperson of the tribunal affirmed that no contact on this issued had been made by the defence team.

The witnesses who testify before the ICTR are theoretically protected by the United Nations which guarantees their anonymity and ensures their safety.

The principal counsel for Renzaho, Fran~isCantier of the Bar of Toulouse (France), has already on several occasions announced to the chamber that there are threats made on witnesses. An investigation was opened in June by the registrar's office of the tribunal on this subject and it was entrusted to a Rwandan lawyer.

to the lawyer, some of the witnesses that he had contacted and who had agreed to testify then fused to come to the ICTR following threats.

This witness, the 23rd of the defence who is called MAY for safety reasons, had to escape Rwanda several weeks ago because he had received death threats.

He testified before the chamber at the beginning of the week. The majority of his testimony was made in closed session. At a brief public hearing, he indicated that he had heard at a roadblock Prefect Renzaho be called an "accomplice" of the RPF, the rebel movement then in war against the government.

Tharcisse Renzaho was prefect of Kigali and the last remaining civil authority in the capital after the entire government fled to the south of the country.

He is accused of genocide and murder as a crime against humanity. He has pled not guilty. His trial began on 8 January and should end next month.

PBIATIMM B Hirondelle News Agency

Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne, Switzerland Arusha, Tanzania Tel: + 41 21 654 2020 Tel : + 255 713 51 08 94 Email : [email protected] Email :[email protected]

This project is funded by Belgium, European community, Noway and Luxemburg ------. . . ------Close window

f 3 &m 1996 - 2007, Fondation Hirondelle - Av, du Temple 190 - CH 1012-Lausanne (Suisse] - Tel+41 21 654 20 20 - Fax +41 21 654 20 21 -E-mail info~hir~ndelje~org He testified before the chamber at the beginning of the week. The majority of his testimony was made in closed session. At a brief public hearing, he indicated that he had heard at a roadblock Prefect Renzaho be called an "accomplice" of the RPF, the rebel movement then in war against the government.

Tharcisse Renzaho was prefect of Kigali and the last remaining civil authority in the capital after the entire government fled to the south of the country.

He is accused of genocide and murder as a crime against humanity. He has pled not guilty. His trial began on 8 January and should end next month.

O Hirondelle News Agency

17.05.07 ICTRIRENZAHO RENZAHO'S DEFENSE - - J.A ACCUSES KIGALI OF WITNESS INTIMIDATION

Arusha, 17 May 2007 (FH) - Franqois Cantier, the lead counsel of the ex-prefect of Kigali, Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho, on trial before International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), accused, on Thursday, the Rwandan authorities of intimidating witnesses who had agreed to testify in favour of the officer.

The French lawyer, in presenting defense arguments, deplored the defection of several witnesses, one which he qualified as "' essential", of a second who "refused any contact with us whereas he had, at the time of a preceding mission, ensured us of his availability and his enthusiasm to come and testify for Renzaho", and of a third which 0 "has just fled his country due to threats which were made to him". "The defense, under these conditions, is denied access to essential evidence and the Court (denied the access) of the truth" says Cantier, who, at the opening of the trial last January, had already informed the Tribunal of the difficulties that he met on this subject. "Today nobody can be unaware of this situation" said the lawyer president- founder of Lawyers Without Borders - France. "A perfect justice is possible in the United States or in Canada but in Rwanda which became completely opaque, it is not possible" he added. The Chamber decided, by the Presiding Judge Erik Mose, that "the Court will require that an investigation be diligent".

Renzaho is notably accused of having helped and encouraged the massacres of Tutsis in two buildings belonging to the Catholic Church in the city: the Center for the Teaching of African Languages (CTAL) and the church of the Holy Family. According to the charge, Renzaho would have benefited, in the massacres of the Holy Family, of the assistance of a priest, the abbot Wenceslas Munyeshyaka condemned by contumacy last November by a Rwandan court and who lives in France where he is the subject of legal proceedings. "Renzaho disputes to have had any particular relations" with the man of the church, pled Cantier. He testified before the chamber at the beginning of the week. The majority of his testimony was made in closed session. At a brief public hearing, he indicated that he had heard at a roadblock Prefect Renzaho be called an "accomplice" of the RPF, the rebel movement then in war against the government.

Tharcisse Renzaho was prefect of Kigali and the last remaining civil authority in the capital after the entire government fled to the south of the country.

He is accused of genocide and murder as a crime against humanity. He has pled not guilty. His trial began on 8 January and should end next month.

O Hirondelle News Agency

4 7.05.07 ICTRIRENZAHO RENZAHO'S DEFENSE - - .&I ACCUSES KIGALI OF WITNESS INTIMIDATION

Arusha, 17 May 2007 (FH) - Fran~oisCantier, the lead counsel of the ex-prefect of Kigali, Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho, on trial before International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), accused, on Thursday, the Rwandan authorities of intimidating witnesses who had agreed to testify in favour of the officer.

The French lawyer, in presenting defense arguments, deplored the defection of several witnesses, one which he qualified as "' essential", of a second who "refused any contact with us whereas he had, at the time of a preceding mission, ensured us of his availability and his enthusiasm to come and testify for Renzaho", and of a third which "has just fled his country due to threats which were made to him".

"The defense, under these conditions, is denied access to essential evidence and the Court (denied the access) of the truth" says Cantier, who, at the opening of the trial last January, had already informed the Tribunal of the difficulties that he met on this subject. "Today nobody can be unaware of this situation" said the lawyer president- founder of Lawyers Without Borders - France. "A perfect justice is possible in the United States or in Canada but in Rwanda which became completely opaque, it is not possible" he added. The Chamber decided, by the Presiding Judge Erik Mose, that "the Court will require that an investigation be diligent".

Renzaho is notably accused of having helped and encouraged the massacres of Tutsis in two buildings belonging to the Catholic Church in the city: the Center for the Teaching of African Languages (CTAL) and the church of the Holy Family. According to the charge, Renzaho would have benefited, in the massacres of the Holy Family, of the assistance of a priest, the abbot Wenceslas Munyeshyaka condemned by contumacy last November by a Rwandan court and who lives in France where he is the subject of legal proceedings. "Renzaho disputes to have had any particular relations" with the man of the church, pled Cantier. ANNEX .www.hlrondelle.org : 21.06.07 - lCl'K/KUKUNL)U - AKKES'I' 1N KIGALI OF AN I... Page 1 sur 1

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ICTRIRUKUNDO -ARREST IN KIGALI OF AN ICTR DEFENSE INVESTIGATOR

Arusha, 21 June 2007 (FH) - A Rwandan lawyer, member of the defense team of Father Emmanuel Rukundo, tried before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), was arrested last Saturday in Kigali, it was learned from a concordant sources in Arusha.

Lbonidas Nshogoza, who is an investigator with this team headed by French lawyer Aicha Conde, would be accused of having pressured witness, according to an official statement transmitted by Rukundo to the Hirondelle agency. His arrest was confirmed at the ICTR.

This witness, called BLP in order to preserve his safety, was called by the prosecution 15 and 16 of last November but had been called again by defense so, states the official statement of Rukundo, to reconsider his statements. In addition to the Rwandan authorities, the Office of the Prosecutor, according to the official statement of Rukundo, accuses the lawyer of having pressured the witness so that he reconsidered his statements.

The statement of the accused recalls that Nshogoza was part of the defense team Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, recently convicted on appeal. In this case, several purgery charges have been issued. One of them resulted in the indictment of a Rwandan witness last week.

This arrest occurs as the Rukundo case, which began on 15 November 2006, must restart at the beginning of July with the presentation of the defense evidence.

Father Rukundo, military chaplain in Ruhengeri (northern Rwanda) then in Kigali, was arrested on 12 July 2001. He is accused of genocide and crimes against humanity and plea non guilty.

PBlMM O Hirondelle News Agency

Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne, Switzerland Arusha, Tanzania Tel : + 41 21 654 20 20 Tel : + 255 713 51 08 94 Email : [email protected] Email :[email protected]

This project is funded by Belgium, European community, Noway and Luxemburg - -- Close window

Gm 1996 - 2007, Fondation Himndelle -A". du Temple 19C - CH 1012-Lausanne (Suisse] - Tel +41 21 654 20 20 - Fax +41 21 654 20 21 - [email protected] .www.h~rondelle.org : 26.06.U/ - LC I'KIKUKUNUO- 'lfif:1C 1.KSbNUS A KWW. .. Page I sur I w4 Close window

Information, Documentation and Training Agency, Arusha (Tanzania): News

ICTRIRUKUNDO - MEICTR SENDS A REPRESENTATIVE TO KIGALI AFTER THE ARREST OF AN

Arusha, 26 June 2007 (FH) - The Registrar's office of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) sent to Kigali a representative in order to inquire into the arrest, Saturday 16 June, of a member of the defense team of Father Emmanuel Rukundo, it was learned from an official source Monday in Arusha.

"We are taking steps to ascertain the full facts and deal with the situation", answered the Associate-Registrar to a request for information by the Hirondelle agency.

The charges weighing against L-idas Nshogoza, who is an investigator in the team directed by French lawyer Aicha Conde, have not yet been officially specified. According to an official statement issued by her customer, Nshogoza would be accused of having tried to pressure a witness.

This arrest occurs as the Rukundo trial is set to restart at the beginning of July with the presentation of the defense evidence. The principal lawyer of Rukundo, Mrs. Conde, was in Rwanda when her investigator was arrested. She should meet the Attorney General of Rwanda, Mr. Martin Ngoga, it was learned from a close source to the case.

Father Rukundo, military chaplain in Ruhengeri (northern Rwanda) then in Kigali, was arrested on 12 July 2001. He is accused of genocide and crimes against humanity and pled not guilty.

PBIMM Q Hirondelle News Agency

Hirondelle Foundation Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne, Switzerland Arusha, Tanzania Tel : + 41 21 654 20 20 Tel: +25571351 08 94 Email : [email protected] Email :[email protected]

This project is funded by Belgium, European community, Norway and Luxemburg ------. Close window

f @mI996 - 2007. Fondation Himndelle - A". du Temple 19C - CH 1012-Lausanne [Suisse) - Te1+41 21 654 20 20 - Fax +41 21 654 20 21 - E-mail infoQhironde_lle.org ANNEX CENTRE DE LUTTE CONTRE L'IMPUNITE ET L'INJUSTICE AU RWANDA (CLIIR) Boulevard Mopold 11, n0227 Bruxelles, le 24 septembre 2007 1080 BRUXELLES TClIFax : 32.81.60.11.13 GSM: 32.476.70.15.69 -Mail : cliir2004 @ yahoo.fr

Objet :Extradition du pbre Wenceslas Munyeshyaka et Laurent Bucyibaruta.

Madame Rachida Dati, Ministre de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux 13, Place Vhdome 75001 PARIS

Madame le Ministre,

La diabolisation du .phre Wenceslas MUNYESHYAKA date des annCes 1994-1995 et traduit la cCcit6 politique et diplomatique des dirigeants du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) qui ne cessent de manipuler le TPIR. Ces dirigeants, qui s'attaquent depuis plus de 13 ans aux religieux et religieuses catholiques, semblent avoir programmC la destruction lente de 1'Eglise catholique du Rwanda. Ces dirigeants ne cachent plus leur volontC de se faire dedommager par le trksor du Vatican. C'est pour cette raison qu'ils nYCprouventmeme plus la honte de s'acharner sur 1'AbbC Wenceslas. Ce dernier est pourtant connu pour avoir accueilli, nourri, log6 et soignC plus de 18.000 r6fugiCs i la paroisse Sainte Farnille. Tous les tCmoins oculaires, cadres de la Croix rouge, cadres admmistratifs et militaires ont constate et admirC la bravoure de ce jeune pr8tre qui bravait, chaque matin, les balles et les bombes qui pleuvaient sur la capitale rwandaise Egali. HabillC de son gilet anti-balles et d'un pistolet (qui lui permettait d'impressionner les rniliciens interahamwe et de jouer la comCdie sur les barribres), il aHait chercher de la nourriture, des medicaments, du bois de chauffe et de l'eau pour les rCfugiCs Tutsi et Hutu qu'il a su gCrer pendant trois mois. Aucun rCfugiC Hutu n'a agress6 un r6fugiC Tutsi alors que le FPR a land plusieurs bombes sur la paroisse, dans l'intention de faire fuir cette masse de rCfugib qui n'aurait pas manquC de ddclencher un mouvement de panique et d'abandonner la capitale Kigali aux mains du FPR. Mais le @re Wenceslas a tenu bon jusqu'au 4 juillet 1994, date h laquelle toute la capitale s'est vid6e de ses demiers habitants.

Dans la soirbe du mad 5 septembre 2007, sur base de mandats d'arret du TPIR, la police franqaise a arrCtC pour la deuxihme fois, en moins de deux mois, les deux suspects Wenceslas Munyeshyaka et Laurent BUCYIBARUTA, parce qu'ils font l'objet d'une demande d'extradition par le TPIR. Ils avaient CtC arri3tCs le 20 juillet 2007 sur pression du TPIR et des associations proches du FPR. Ils furent libCrCs le la aoQt 2007 par la justice qui ne jugeait pas nCcessaire leur dktention prkventive.

Si la justice frangaise accepte de les livrer au TPIR qui fermera ses portes fin 2008, ce ne sera pas pour les juger au TPIR i Arusha en Tanzanie. Les deux suspects courent le risque d96tretrait& comme des (4 colis n que le TPIR livrera au Rwanda oh leur shrit.6 physique et mentale ne sera pas garantie. Nous voulons suggCrer aux autoritQ judiciaires fran~aisesd'adopter la mCme attitude et la mCme prudence qui ont caractCris6 les magistrats belges lors de l'arrestation du gtntral RUSATIRA Uonidas. Celui-ci est un autre brave citoyen rwandais qui a CvacuC, log6 et nourri des centaines de farnilles Tutsi et Hutu menac6es par les massacreurs en 1994. I1 a Ctt arrCtt le 15 mai 2002 et le TPIR fut oblige de le libCrer le 20 aoQt 2002 faute de preuves de culpabilitk. La procureure, Madame Carla Del PONTE, qui s'ktait dCplacCe pour venir le voir en personne s'est rendue compte que ce sont les autoritts rwandaises qui avaient montt un faux dossier qu'ils ont mCdiatist ii travers une organisation londonienne African RIGHTS. Cette organisation s'est rendue cClkbre par la diffusion de fausses accusations orchestrees contre des intellectuels Hutu innocents. Plusieurs intellectuels, professeurs, mtdecins, religieux et homes d'affaires Hutu sont rtgulikrement calomnits par cette organisation qui est la seule 2I jouir de la sympathie des agents de la DMI' (Directorate of Military Intelligence), des chefs militaires et politiques du FPR. African Rights n'a jamais cessC de participer 21 la carnpagne de dClation orchestrCe par le rCgime FPR contre tous les religieux catholiques en gCn6ral et particulikrement contre 1'AbbC Wenceslas Munyeshyaka.

En effet, les autoritis franqaises pourraient s'inspirer de cette strattgie belge qui consista ii faire trainer la decision d'extrader le GCnCral Rusatira pour permettre aux tCmoins 2I dCcharge de rtagir et d'opposer leurs temoignages crtdibles aux fausses accusations que le TPIR avaient acceptCes d'avaliser sans aucune vtrification. Curieusement, que ce soit dans l'arrestation de Rusatira Uonidas en Belgique ou dans celle des deux suspects Wenceslas Munyeshyaka et Laurent Bucyibaruta, c'est toujours la mCme Madame Sylvana ARBIA~,chef des poursuites au TPIR, qui s'implique dans ces arrestations spectaculaires et sur base de faux tCmoignages collect6s par la DM1 qui les refilent ensuite 2I AFRICAN RIGHTS. Cette organisation a perdu le peu de crtdibilitC qui pouvait lui rester lorsqu'elle a accusC injustement Amnesty International de travailler avec les ginocidaires Hutu parce qu'Amnesty avait dCnonct les massacres aveugles des milliers de civils Hutu innocents cornmis par 1'Armte Patriotique Rwandaise en 1998 et 1999 durant une guerre attribute aux infiltrks hutu.

Le Centre de Lutte contre 1'IrnpunitC et 1'Injustice au Rwanda (CLIIR)* saisit cette occasion pour vous transmettre son MCmorandum du 24 septembre 2007 intitulCe : << MCmorandum sur toute demande d'extradition commanditCe par le Rwanda c< via n le Tribunal PCnal International pour le Rwandan et son comuniqu6 n088/2006 du 9 janvier 2006 intitult : << Les hCros du g6nocide rwandais sont assassin&, emprisonnCs et persCcut6s au lieu d'avoir des m6dailles : Le Cas du pr&e Weneeshs MUNYESHYAKA diabolist! injustement N.

Nous voulons vous mettre en garde contre toute extradition du @re Wenceslas vers le Rwanda ou vers le TPIR. Nous saisissons cette occasion pour vous confirmer la consolidation de la culture du mensonge et de la dklation institutionnaliste au plus haut sornmet de 1'Etat rwandais. La d6lation a battu tous les records dans plusieurs tribunaux GACACA finances par la Belgique, la Hollande et plusieurs pays occidentaux et de 1'Union Europ6enne. Cette culture du mensonge est inn6 chez les extrkmistes Tutsi qui restent convaincus que les Ctrangers, les europt5ens en particulier, ne sont pas intelligents dans l'art de mentir. Voici ce

' La DM1 (Directorate of Military Intelligence) est une veritable u machine A tuer *, une sorte de GESTAPO Tutsi cr& et dirigte par le president rwandais et prtsident du FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais), le G6neral Paul KAGAME. La DM1 a impundment assassint, torture, emprisonnt et fait disparaitre des rnilliers d'opposants politiques (rkels ou supposts), des anciens dignitaires et intellectuels Hutu ainsi que de simples citoyens rwandais Hutu et Tutsi depuis plus de 12 ans. Madame Sylvana Arbia est une arnie de RAKIYA Omar, directrice de African Rights (manipulke par la DMI). qu'en dit notamment Stanislas Bushayija, un pretre catholique tutsi qui fait une analyse pertinente de son groupe ethnique : a A vrai dire, les principes d'e'quite' que les Belges voulaient faire pre'valoir dans le domaine de la justice, de la propribte', de la liberte' et des droits de la personne humaine quelle qu 'elle fit, de'routbrent le Mututsi et le firent douter de la finesse de 1'Europe'en. Celui-ci lui parut plus un technicien, une sorte de magicien qu'un diplomate, comme le prouvent les expressions kinyarwanda encore courantes : Abazungu ntibazi ubwenge (les Europe'ens ne sont pas malins), ubwenge bw'abazungu (intelligence europe'enne). Si le Mututsi reconnait a 1'Europe'en ses compe'tences dans le domaine technique, - e'lectricite', physique, mathe'matique, etc., - s'il lui reconnait l'intelligence du livre (ubwenge bwo mu gitabo), il de'plore son absence de finesse d'esprit. Savoir travestir la ve'rite', donner le change sans e'veiller le moindre soupqon est une science qui fait de'faut a 1'Europe'en et que le Mututsi est jier de posse'der ; le ge'nie de l'intrigue, l'art du mensonge sont a ses yeux des arts dans lesquels il s'enorgueillit d12trefort habile :c'est la le propre du Mututsi et, par contagion et par rt;flexe de de'fense, de tout Munyarwanda. .. >>. Stanislas Bushayija est un pretre tutsi nC en 1915 et dCcCdC le 21/10/1990. Il faisait partie du Conseil SupCrieur du Pays (CSP) de 1954 9 1959, une sorte de parlement rwandais sous le r&ne du Roi Mutara Rudahigwa. Connu pour son franc parler, il a expliquC la mise en esclavage des Hutu par les monarques tutsi et la culture du mensonge dans un article intitulC << Aux origines du problbme Bahutu au Rwanda w, dans la Revue Nouvelle, Tome XXVIII, No 12 de dicembre 1958, pp. 594-597.

Quatre phases pour dkapiter, neutraliser et r6cup6rer 1'E~lisecatholiaue du Rwanda :

1) 1994 : La phase de dCcapiter 17Eglisecatholique fut dCcidC par le GCkral Paul Kagame en personne. Les pretres du petit sCminaire et de la paroisse de Rwesero sont massacrks avec les dCplac6s de guerre qu7ilsavaient accueillis. Le 5 juin 1994, trois Cveques dont l'archeveque de Kigali et une dizaine de pretres et de religieux sont assassin& par le FPR A Gakurazo (pr2s de Byimana) dans le dioche de Kabgayi. Le 30 novembre 1996, Mgr Phocas NIKWIGIZE fut enlevC par le FPR et port6 disparu 9 la frontisre rwando- congolaise de Gisenyi. 2) 1994-1998 : La phase de neutralisation. Aprgs l'assassinat de quatre Cveques catholiques et des dizaines de prstres HUTU, le projet d'assassiner plusieurs pretres occidentaux et nationaux, qui parlent Kinyarwanda et qui connaissent trss bien la population, les coutumes et l'histoire du Rwanda, a dCmarrC dCj9 avec l'assassinat du pike 0 espagnol Joacquim VALLMAJO SALA tuC le 26/04/1994 9 Byumba et du pgre canadien Claude SIMARD tuC le 17/10/1994 dans sa paroisse de Ruyenzi dans la province de BUTARE. Parce qu7il avait dCnoncC les massacres du FPR auprgs des agents du HCR (Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies aux RCfugiCs) infiltris eux-mCmes par les agents du FPR. 3) 1994-2000 :La campagne de diffamation et de terreur: Aprgs la vague d'assassinats de plusieurs pretres catholiques europCens, la prise en otage des << cobayes europe'ens~ comrne le pgre Guy THEUNIS a CtC planifiCe depuis les annks 1998 9 l'tpoque ob le nom de Guy Theunis apparaissait plusieurs fois dans les nouveaux mCdias de la haine financis par le FPR. A cette Cpoque les mCdias gouvernementaux, tous dirigCs par des agents du FPR, se sont lancCs dans une vCritable campagne de diffamation et de terrorisme d'Etat contre 1'Eglise catholique en gCnCral et en particulier contre la SociCtC des Missionnaires d7Afrique (SMA) notamrnent dans la << Nouvelle ReEve no 360, 361 et 362 de juin 199th Des religieux et autres laics ont Ct6 expulsb du Rwanda. I1 s'agit de :Mrne BERNADETTE, une franqaise employ6 de la CARITAS, qui a CtC expulsCe en 1997 et 1'AbbC AndrC LERUSSE qui a 6tC expulsC du Diocsse de Gikongoro le 12 janvier 1998.

4) 1994-2005 : La phase de neutralisation et de rCcupCration: Les enlhements par les ClCments du FPR dCguisCs en rebelles Hutus Ctaient destinCs ii contraindre les pretres europkens et Ctrangers ii fuir le pays. Un be1 exemple : Selon la dCpeche de 19Agence France Presse (AFP) du 22/07/98 rapport6 par Emmanuel Goujon:<

1995-2005 : La phase de rCcupCration : Emprisonner et exiler les religieux Hutu et rCcupCrer les places vacantes. Come par hasard, avec la victoire militaire du FPR, 1'Eglise catholique du Rwanda a perdu sept de ses anciens Cveques. Quatre ont CtC assassinks par le FPR, il s'agit de : Mgr Vincent NSENGIYUMVA, Mgr Joseph RUZINDANA, Mgr ThaddCe NSENGIYUMVA et Mgr Phocas NIKWIGIZE. Trois autres sont morts de maladie en cinq ans : Mgr Wenceslas KALIBUSHI dCcCd6 le 20/12/1997, Mgr Joseph SIBOMANA dCcCdC le 09/11/1999 et Mgr Jean Baptiste GAHAMANYI d6cCdC le 18/06/1999. Trois Cvcques seulement ont survCcu, il s'agit de Mgr FrCdCric RUBWEJANGA, Tutsi ordonnC CvCque de Kibungo le 9/07/1992, Mgr Augustin MISAGO, Hutu ordonnC Cveque de Gikongoro le 28/06/1992 et de Mgr ThaddCe NTIHINYURWA nomC archeveque de Kigali le 25/03/1996, un Hutu ordonnC Cvcque de Cyangugu le 24/01/1982. Plusieurs pretres catholiques ont CtC diffamks par les mCdias gouvernementaux avant d'stre emprisonnCs arbitrairement. La diabolisation et la demande d'extradltion du pkre Wenceslas ainsi que l'inculpation arbitraire du pkre belge Guy Theunis risquent d'accC1Crer la fuite d'autres religieux europ6ens et nationaux pour faciliter 1'Cpuration ethnique, la neutralisation et la rCcupCration de 1'Eglise du Rwanda par le regime du FPR. Mais aussi, la diabolisation des religieux et religieuses catholiques servira B d'autres agendas cachCs du FPR qui a rCussi B museler la SociCtC Civile Rwandaise. Treize dirigeants de la Ligue Rwandaise pour la promotion des droits de 1'Homme (LIPRODHOR) ainsi que plusieurs journalistes independants ont CtC contraints de s'exiler ces deux derni2res annCes. Nous esperons vous avoir fourni assez d'kltments sur le sort reserve aux pretres non-tutsi de 1'Eglise Catholique qui est diaboliste et accusee d'avoir planifik le genocide des Tutsi depuis la r6volution des Hutu de 1959. Nous espkrons qu'avec tous ces Clkments, les autorites frangaises, concernkes par cette demande d'extradition, sont bien armCes pour exiger que le TPlR fournisse des preuves consistants justifiant une extradition et une garantie solide que le TPIR pourra juger les deux suspects au lieu de les livrer au Rwanda.

Comptant sur votre sagacite et votre bon sens habituel, nous vous prions d'agrier, Madame le Ministre, l'assurance de notre haute consideration.

Pour le Centre, MATATA Joseph, Coordinateur

Copie pour information :

Son Excellence Monsieur Nicolas Sarkozy President de la Republique Frsngaise Monsieur Franqois Fillon Premier Ministre, H6tel Matignon 57 rue de Varenne, 75007 Paris Monsieur Bernard Kouchner Ministre des Affaires Etrang2res 37, Quai d'Orsay 75007 PARIS

Madame Edith Boizette Prksidente de la Chambre d'instruction Mandat EuropCen et Extradition 4, Boulevard du Palais 75055 PARIS - France Monsieur Laurent Le Mesle Procureur General de la Cour d'Appel de Paris 34 Quai des Orfhres Monsieur Jean Charles Lecompte Avocat GknCral de la Cour d'Appel de Paris 34 Quai des Orfkvres 75055 PARIS Louvre

Monsieur Jean Yves Dupeux 250 bis Boulevard Saint-Germain 75345 PARIS Cedex 07

CLIIR* : Le Centre de Lutte contre 1'Impunite et l'hjustice au Rwanda est une association de defense des droits humains basCe en Belgique, cr6Ce le 18 aoDt 1995. Ses membres sont des militants des droits humains de longue date. Certains ont 6t6 actifs au sein d'associations wandaises de defense des droits hurnains et ont particilk B l'enquete CLADHO Kanyarwanda sur le genocide de 1994. Lorsqu'ils ont commence ii enquher sur les crimes du regime wandais actuel, ils ont subi des menaces et ont kt6 contraints de s'exiler ii 1'Ctranger oh ils poursuivent leur engagement en faveur des droits humains. CENTRE DE LUTTE CONTRE L'IMPUNITE ET L'INJUSTICE AU RWANDA (CLIIR) Boulevard IRopold 11, n0227 Bruxelles, le 24 septembre 2007 1080 BRUXELLES TCVFax : 32.8 1.60.1 1.13 GSM: 32.476.70.15.69 -Mail : [email protected] Memorandum sur toute demande d'extradition commanditee par ~ - le Rwanda << via H le Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda

Introduction :

Le Centre de Lutte contre 1'ImpunitC et 1'Injustice au Rwanda (CLIIR)* demande B tous les pays, qui dCtiennent des dCtenus rwandais recherchks par le Tribunal pCnal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR) ou par le gouvernement rwandais, de rejeter systdmatiquement toute demande d'extradition de ces ddtenus vers le TPIR et vers le Rwanda. En effet, ce tribunal subit le chantage permanent du gouvernement rwandais qui manipule et corrompt certains enqusteurs et magistrats de ce tribunal. Comme ce tribunal fermera ses portes fin 2008, toute demande d'extradition des dCtenus Hutu cache la volontC de ce tribunal de les livrer au gouvernement rwandais. Or les membres de ce gouvernement n'ont aucun pouvoir de faire respecter les lois en vigueur et de protCger les personnes et leurs biens. Les Institutions officielles de 1'Etat Rwandais B savoir le Gouvernement, le Parlement, le SCnat et la Magistrature sont devenus des institutions de fagade complGtement contr61Ces et paralysCes par le << pouvoir occulte >> dCtenu par la Junte Wlitaire du GCnCral Paul KAGAME et le noyau dur des extrkrnistes tutsi. Les dktenteurs de ce pouvoir occulte ou << gouvemement parallble >> n'ont aucune volontC politique de mettre en place une justice &quitable et sereine pour toutes les victimes rwandaises. Ils ont d'abord neutralis6 et opCrC 1'Cpuration ethnique et politique de l'appareil judiciaire en assassinant et en emprisonnant de nombreux magistrats honn&tes et courageux depuis septembre 1994. Ensuite, ils ont encouragC et organis6 des emprisonnements arbitraires massifs pour i

De nombreux rapports des organisations internationales des droits humains, tels qu9Arnnesy International (AI) Human Rights Watch (HRW), la F&dration Internationale des Droits de Homme (FIDH) confirment que de nombreuses personnes innocentes sont victimes d'errkutions extrajudiciaires et d'arrestations arbitraires (Voir le Rapport 2007 de I-IRW). Plus nombreux sont encore les pkvenus innocents qui croupissent dans les prisons mouroirs rwandaises sans dossiers judiciaires et sans jugements. Des milliers de dktenus, dont plusieurs intellectuels Hutu (magistrats, enseignants, cadres administratifs et politiques, religieux, hornmes d'affaires, leaders d'opinion, etc.) sont morts en prison (tutes par la torture, les mauvaises conditions de vie, la faim, la malade et la ddpression) sans avoir Ctt soignts ou jug& pendant 13 ans.

Les tribunaux Gacaca :une nouvelle arme de destruction massive? Puisque le TPIR fermera ses portes fin 2008, tout dCtenu qui sera extradC vers le TPlR risque d'etre transfCrC au Rwanda oG les arrestations aveugles et massives par les tribunaux discriminatoires GACACA ont provoquk la fuite de plus de 100.000 personnes vers les quatre pays voisins du Rwanda et le Kenya depuis leur lancement dans tout le pays le 10 mars 2005. Dans les procks GACACA, les ttmoins A dCcharge sont intimidis, terrorisCs, sanctionnts et souvent condamnts A des peines de prison (variant entre 3 et 12 mois) lorsqu'ils insistent pour dire la vtrit6 et RIEN que la VERITE. La vtritk qui contrarie les juges Gacaca placCs et manipulCs par le << pouvoir occulte >> des chefs militaires et politiques du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR). La vCritC qui fait peur aux juges GACACA choisis par la DMI' Directorate of Military Intelligence pour remplacer des vrais juges Gacaca>>qui avaient CtC dkmocratiquement tlus par la population (au debut du processus Gacaca en 2002) mais qui ont CtC << disqualifits >> parce qu'ils sont Hutu par le rCgime FPR. Dans son interview ii la BBC du 15 juillet 2006, Madame Domitila MUKANTAGANZWA, SecrCtaire Exkutif du Service National des Juridictions Gacaca (SNJG), a reconnu que son Service a remplacC plus de 45.000 juges Clus initialement par la population (soit environ 25% des 200.000 juges Gacaca). Ces juges, Clus comrne des personnes intkgres par la population ont W ajoutes sur des nouvelles listes des prksumks gknocidaires dtablis par les agents de la DM1 infiltrks au sein du SNJG).

Les << nouveaux juges Gacaca choisis et manipulis par la DMI ou les agents DMI infiltrks dam le SNJG >> bloquent tout dCbat contradictoire durant les prods. Par leur mdpris et leur arrogance, ils terrorisent les tCmoins h dkcharge et encouragent les mensonges et les complots orchestrks par les tCmoins B charge manipulCs ou achetCs pour donner de faux tkmoignages. Selon les prkvisions du SNJG, les tribunaux Gacaca, qui prdvoient l'emprisonnement d'environ 761.000 nouveaux suspects tous Hutu, sont les tribunaux discriminatoires car ils ne jugent que les seules suspects Hutu. L'impunitC est assurCe aux chefs militaires et politiques ainsi qu'aux rnilitaires et civils tutsi qui ont massacrk des centaines de milliers de civils Hutu.

Les dernikres condamnations massives par les GACACA ont frappC les derniers medecins Hutu qui venaient de travailler durant 13 ans sans que personne ne les accuse. Fin aoQt 2007, ils ont Ctt condarnnes arbitrairement, certains avec leurs femrnes, h de lourdes peines oscillant entre 20 et 30 ans. En novembre 2006 ce fut deux anciens professeurs de 1'UniversitC Nationale du Rwanda (UNR) qui furent condamnes arbitrairement h 30 ans tandis que leurs t5pouses ont 6cop6 de 25 ans chacune. D'autres professeurs et intellectuels Hutu qui travaillaient B Butare (dans le sud du Rwanda) croupissent en prison depuis la prise du pouvoir par le FPR sans dossier et sans procks. Nous pouvons citer parmi ces ditenus de longue durCe les professeurs Runyinya Barabwiriza et Bernard Mutwewingabo. Les infirrnikres Hutu ont CtC Cgalement dCtenues cornrne Soeur ThCopista MUKARUBIBI, de la congrkgation des Benebikira, condamnee arbitrairement h 30 ans de prison le 8 novembre 2006 par le tribunal Gacaca de Butare (Pour d'autres cas, Voir notre Me'morandum adresse' le 31 octobre 2006 h Z'Union Europe'enne sur les tribunaux Gacaca).

1) Le cas de deux sus~ectsrhidant en France :

' La DM1 (Directorate of Military Intelligence) est une viritable (( machine tuer >>, une sorte de GESTAPO Tutsi cr& et dirigke par le president rwandais et prbsident du FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais), le General Paul KAGAME. La DM1 a impunkmcnt assassinb, torture, emprisonne et fait disparake des milliers d'opposants politiques (rkls ou suppods), des anciens dignitaires et intellectuels Hutu ainsi que de simples citoyens rwandais Hutu et Tutsi depuis plus de 13 ans. RCsidant en France B partir de 1995, 1'AbbC Wenceslas MUNYESHYAKA et l'ancien prefet Laurent BUCYIBARUTA, deux suspects Hutu du gknocide rwandais, Ctaient visCs par des plaintes dCposCes en France depuis 12 et 7 ans. La procCdure judiciaire suivait son cours normalement comme d'autres dossiers qui trainent devant la justice franpise. Faisant paralldement l'objet d'enquetes par le Tribunal penal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR) implant6 B Arusha en Tanzanie, les dossiers visant ces deux presumts suspects devaient &re envoy&, par le TPIR, B la justice franpise B Paris et servir dlCICments de preuve dans la procedure en France. La France avait accept6 le transfert de ces dossiers en juillet 2006 et s'appretait B continuer les enquetes et B organiser des prochs tquitables si necessaire.

Subitement dans la soirCe du mardi 5 septembre 2007, sur base de mandats d'arr6t du TPIR, la police franpaise a arrM pour la deuxikme fois, en moins de deux mois, les deux suspects, parce qu'ils font l'objet d'une demande d'extradition par le TPIR. 11s avaient Ct6 arr6tCs le 20 juillet 2007 sur pression du TPlR et des associations proches du FPR. Ils furent IibCrCs le 1"' aoQt2007 par la justice franpise qui ne jugeait pas nCcessaire leur dCtention preventive.

Si la justice franpaise accepte de les livrer au TPIR qui fermera ses portes fin 2008, ce ne sera pas pour les juger au TPIR Arusha en Tanzanie. Les deux suspects courent le risque d'6tre trait& comme des a colis n que le TPIR livrera au Rwanda oii leur siicurit6 physique et rnent.de ne sera pas garantie. En effet, plusieurs dttenus rwandais IibCres ou acquittts ont dtveloppk de curieuses maladies et divers handicaps physiques et mentales susceptibles d'avoir CtC provoquCs par la torture physique et mentale et/ou par des empoisonnements opCrCs par des agents de la DM1 (Directorate of Military Intelligence) infiltres dans tous les services administratifs et judiciaires et dans les entreprises publiques et privCes. Les exemples sont nombreux pour illustrer le sort tragique des dttenus libtrCs : - L7ancien pr6sident la rdpublique et vice-prksident du FPR, Monsieur Pasteur BIZIMUNGU, a Ct6 emprisonnC depuis le 20/04/2002. Il fut condamn6 arbitrairement B 15 ans. I1 est sorti de la prison le 6 avril 2007. 11 est tr2s malade suite aux hardements moraux et aux mauvaises conditions de detention subies ; - L'ancien prtfet de Gikongoro (Sud du pays), Monsieur Andrt NKERAMUGABA, est mort en prison des suites de la torture physique et mentale. I1 a CtC tut sans procks. - L'ancien president du Mouvement Dtmocratique Republicain (MDR), Monsieur Bonaventure UBARIJORO, a Ctt emprisonnC en 1999.Il est sorti aprss une annte de prison en chaise roulante. I1 est mort quelques annCes plus tard ; - l'ancien Secrttaire GCntral du Mouvement Rkvolutionnaire National pour DCveloppement (MRND) avant le genocide, Monsieur Bonaventure HABIMANA, est sorti de prison. Tout B fait diminut. 11 vit en Belgique oh il n'est plus visible en public, car il ne peut plus marcher sans l'aide de quelqu7un. - L'ancien directeur de service, Monsieur Ignace Kanyabugoyi, a CtC d'abord enlevt, puis emprisonnt dans des lieux secrets. 11 a CtC aperp ensuite au centre psychiatrique de Ndera. Finalement il a CtC libCrC mais il marche B l'aide d'une b6quille B son age ! - Monsieur Phocas HABIMANA a CtC arrCt6 en dtcembre 1996 ap&s son rapatriement for& de l'ex-Zdire. I1 fut liMrC en aofit 1998 pour mourir en dtcembre 1998. - D'autres dCtenus ont 6tC libCres mais ils ont presque tous des maladies bizarres assimilables 2i des maladies connues (sida, reins, estomac, tuberculose, htpatite, hypertension, etc.) mais les traitements mCdicaux classiques ne les soulagent pas.

Le TPIR a inculp6 Bucyibaruta de genocide, incitation h cornrnettre un gknocide, extermination, meurtre et viol. Les tkmoins oculaires qui l'ont c8toy6 pendant les massacres affirment qu'il a tout fait pour s'y opposer mais qu'il n'avait pas les moyens nkcessaires pour neutraliser les tueurs. I1 a n6anmoins aid6 et cache beaucoup de personnes menacCes. Ancien responsable de la paroisse de la Sainte-Farnille, ii Kigali, Munyeshyaka est Cgalement inculpC au TPIR pour gCnocide, viol, extermination et crimes contre 11humanit6.I1 a par ailleurs CtC condamn6 B perpCtuitC le 16 novembre 2006 par un tribunal militaire du Rwanda pour complicitC de gCnocide et viol dans le m&meprocks que le gCn6ral Laurent MUNYAKAZI, un des demiers collaborateurs fidgles et Hutu de service >> du prksident Paul Kagame. Pendant plus de 10 ans, Laurent Munyakazi a montC de grade sans Ctre inqui6tC par qui que ce soit. Les magistrats de ce tribunal se sont rendus coupables de crimes de gknocide entre avril 1994 et dCcembre 1998. Il s'agit du gCn6ral KARAKE Karenzi qui Ctait prisident de ce tribunal militaire et du Capitaine Tharcisse IDAHEMUKA qui instruisit la plupart des tCmoignages B charge. Ces deux militaires du FPR sont cit6s parmi les plus redoutables massacreurs qui ont supervisC les massacres i Byumba, Kibungo, Kigali- Rural, Gitarama et Butare. Pour effacer les traces, ils ont organis6 le transport par carnions des centaines de milliers de cadavres de Hutu entre avril et d6cembre 1994. Lors des massacres de dCplacCs de guerre de Kbeho en avril 1995, ces mCmes officiers Ctaient chargCs de massacrer, de transporter les cadavres et de les incinerer dans des sites crkmatoires identifiCs dans le livre de RUZIBIZA, un ancien officier Tutsi du Front Patriotique Rwandais rCfugiC en Norvkge. Voyons le t6moignage du Lieutenant Abdul Joshua RUZIBIZA qui confirme le genocide des Hutu dans son livre de 494 pages intitulC << Rwanda : Histoire secrkte m dans les pages 334-

335 : (( L'APR (Annke Patriotique Rwandaise) a commis un gknocide contre les Hutus si le mot (( ge'nocide w se de'finit comme suit : Ge'nocide, crime contre l'humanite' imprescriptible qui s'entend, selon la de'finition de la Convention des Nations unies de 1948, comme : << l%n quelconque des actes ci-aprh, commis dans l'intention de dbtruire, en tout ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, tels : meurtres de membres du groupe; atteinte grave h l'intkgrite' physique ou mentale de mernbres du groupe ;soumission intentionnelle du groupe a des conditions d'existence devant entrainer sa destruction physique totale ou partielle ;mesures visant h entraver les naissances au sein du groupe :transfert force' d'enfants du groupe h un autre groupe >>. Les massacres perpe'tre's par Z'APR ttaient toujours planifiks. I1 ne s'agissait pas d'actes de vengeance ni de simples faits accidentels comme certains le pre'tendent. Comme je l'ai ivoquk, apr2s l'attentat contre l'avion pre'sidentiel de Juve'nal Habyarimana, la guerre a directement embrast le pays. J'ai dit e'galement comment toutes les unite's avaient rep des ordres bien sptcifques quant ci leurs missions. La tciche de massacrer syste'matiquement la population ktait attribue'e a une cate'gorie de militaires bien choisis et forme's spe'cialement sous la supervision de bourreaux qui exer~aienten qualite' d'oficiers de renseignement, de personnels de renseignement (Intelligence OficerLntelligence StaB ou de commissaires politiques dans l'arme'e (Political Commissar). Cela n 'empechait pas que les spe'cialistes des tueries fassent parSois appel ci une compagnie pour les ipauler dans les ope'rations d'enterrement, de chargement, d'incine'ration ou de dissimulation des corps. Tout de'pendait de l'importance du nombre de gens tuks ou devant etre tue's. ParSois on faisait appel ci plusieurs compagnies. Mais de telles interventions ttaient d'autant plus rares que chaque unite' militaire avait sa propre compagnie spe'ciale ou son propre peloton spe'cial. Une compagnie de ce genre comptait souvent plus de 200 hommes et un peloton de plus de 100 hommes, ope'rant sous la supervision des I0 (Intelligence Oficers) des PC (Political Commissars).. . K La premizre phase des massacres de la population, orchestre's par 1'APR apr2s la prise du pouvoir par le FPR a concr2tement dtbutt au mois de juillet 1994 pour continuer jusque fin 1996. La plupart des Hutus ont cru qu'il s'agissait de vengeances. Pourtant les massacres btaient planifit%. Les populations hutues ont kt6 dtfcimtfessur ordre des hauts militaires de Z'APR. Les instances militaires ont vu leur tdche facilite'e par un service spe'cialise' de renseignement oeuvrant au sein d'autres services de renseignement w...RUZIBIZA confirme B la page 337 : << Au niveau des services de la DMZ (Directorate of Military Intelligence) ou de la G2 Army, les aflaires traite'es avaient une autre envergure. I1 y avait des sections au sein de la DMZ qui tftaient chargkes de trier les personnes h assassiner, de les emmener sur le lieu d'exbcution et de dissimuler toutes les traces. En sus, comme la DMZ compte beaucoup d'agents dans chaque unite' de 17APR, se'lectionner, capturer, tuer et dissimuler les traces, tout cela e'tait fait par des agents disse'mine's ici et la dans le pays B...

2) Toute extradition ou transfert de dCtenus Hutu vers le Rwanda, gouvernC par un noyau de criminels Tutsi, est inacceptable :

I1 est immoral et inacceptable d'extrader des detenus Hutu vers un pays gouvernt5 par des criminels Tutsi dont I'impunitC est assur6e par le TPIR et les grandes puissances qui les soutiennent.

Un nombre important de criminels Tutsi, impliqu6s dans les crimes de gCnocide, crimes de guerre et crimes contre l'humanite, occupe des postes importants dans l'administration, dans l'armee et la police, dans les services de renseignement et dans la justice. 11s ont continu6 leur sale boulot de tuer, de torturer et d'organiser des executions extraju&ciaires et des disparitions forctes dans tout le pays. Le prksident rwandais, le g6nCral Paul KAGAME, a ramen6 au Rwanda, les memes Cquipes de tueurs et de tortionnaires qu'il utilisait ii 1'Cpoque oii il Ctait Directeur Adjoint de la DM1 (Directorate of Military Intelligence) en Ouganda dans les ann6es 1986. Les rapports d'Amnesty International n'ont pas manqu6 it les denoncer. Ce sont ces criminels qui sont promus dans les forces de paix de I'ONU. L'exemple d'une telle promotion : le G6nCral Karenzi Jean Karake a it6 d6ign6 Commandant adjoint de la force de maintien de la paix au Darfour (Soudan). Le Conseil de Stcurit6 de I'ONU et 1'Union Africaine ont avalise cette nomination sans chercher B savoir qu'elles avaient B faire B un criminel notoire. Au Rwanda, le gtntral KARAKE Karenzi cumulait les fonctions de commandant de la quatri2me Division militaire fonctionnant dans la province du Sud et celles de president du tribunal militaire qui a condamn6 ii perpetuite I'Abb6 MUNYESHYAKA Wenceslas. Ce prgtre catholique Hutu, qui a aid6 plus de 18.000 Hutu et Tutsi B survivre au ghocide de 1994 ii la paroisse Sainte Farnille it Kigali, fut condamn6 par un gtntral tutsi, KARAKE Karenzi, impliqu6 dans les crimes commis au Rwanda, au Congo et en Ouganda.

3) D'autres pavs occidentaux s'apprgtent B extrader des suspects Hutu vers le Rwanda ou vers le TPIR aui fermera ses portes fin 2008.

Le Centre de Lutte contre l'Impunit6 et 1'Injustice au Rwanda (CLIIR) demande aux pays qui detiennent des suspects Hutu du genocide rwandais de rejeter toute extradition vers le Rwanda ou vers le TPIR. Ces pays sont : la Grande Bretagne, la France, l'Allemagne, la Hollande, le Canada et la Finlande qui ont &ti un ou plusieurs rtfugiks Hutu qui dsidaient dam ces pays depuis plusieurs anntes. Bien que le Rwanda a supprimt la pine de mort dans les peines appliques aux personnes condamnts pour les crimes de gCnocide, le << gouvemement invisible u, qui contrdle et paralyse toutes les institutions officielles de 1'Etat Rwandais, utilise depuis 13 ans << d'autres instruments de mise h mort lente et sere >> plus discrets que le peloton d'exkcution. I1 suffit de regarder l'ttat de dblabrement des dCtenus en prison et les nombreux dCch ou graves handicaps constatts parmi les dCtenus libCrts provisoirement ou acquittCs par quelques tribunaux. Les ddtenus, qui ont << marchand6 >> leurs aveux avec la DM1 pour etre utilisCs parmi les << syndicats de dkZuteurs D, sont rC emprisonnts une fois qu'ils ont rCussi ou Cchout it calomnier des Hutu innocents. Ces syndicats de de'lateurs, qui sCvissent partout au Rwanda devant les tribunaux GACACA ou devant les juridictions ordinaires, permettent aux dirigeants du << gouvemement invisible >> d'orchestrer de nouveaux emprisonnements arbitraires et de maintenir en prison des milliers de dCtenus innocents.

ConsidCrant toutes les violations massives et graves qui continuent de se cornrnettre au Rwanda, le Centre de Lutte contre 1'ImpunitC et 1'Injustice au Rwanda exhorte les gouvernements des pays, ci haut citCs, B rejeter toute demande d'extradition vers le Rwanda ou vers le Tribunal PCnal International pour le Rwanda siCgeant ?iArusha en Tanzanie. En effet, le TPIR se trouve dans 1'incapacitC d'organiser d'autres procbs puisque son procureur, Monsieur Boubacar Jallow, a dCj8 fait savoir qu'il va extrader TROIS dCtenus (tous Hutu) et plusieurs dossiers judiciaires (des suspects Hutu en fuite) vers le Rwanda. Or le TPIR refuse de poursuivre les criminels Tutsi du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) impliqds kgalement dans les crimes de gknocide, massifs et aveugles, cornrnis sur des Hutu avant, pendant et aprbs les massacres de 1994. Si le TPIR avait poursuivi Cgalement les criminels tutsi depuis sa crhtion en 1995, les peuples rwandais et congolais auraient pu Cviter des centaines de rnilliers d'autres morts inutiles qui sont tomb& sous les balles des militaires du FPR au Rwanda et en RCpublique DCmocratique du Congo (RDC).

4) Les iuridictions rwandaises, europCennes ou le TPIR ne ~ourrontiamais or~aniser des ~roc&sCuuitables tant au'elles dCpendront des maeistrats rwandais soumis au FPR :

Le Centre de Lutte contre 1'ImpunitC et 1'Injustice au Rwanda ainsi que d'autres organisations de defense des droits humains ne cessent de faire le constat suivant qui prCvaut depuis 13 ans: 1. Tant que la justice internationale sera dtpendante de la justice rwandaise (contr6lte et paralysCe par un noyau de criminels Tutsi), elle ne pourra jamais organiser des procbs Cquitables dans les dossiers lits au gknocide rwandais ;

2. Tant que les juridictions nationales (rwandaises et europkennes) et le TPIR verront dCfiler de nombreux a syndicats de de'lateurs >> manipults par les extrCmistes au pouvoir it Kigali, il leur sera impossible de rendre une justice Cquitable et sereine ;

3. Tant que les investigations des juges d'instruction et des enqueteurs nationaux ou intemationaux seront supervisCes par les magistrats rwandais contr61Cs par le rCgime de Kigali, elles seront entachCes par des mensonges et des fausses accusations qui ne pourraient qu'aboutir ii des procbs inkquitables.

4. I1 n'y aura pas de justice &pitable tant que la magistrature rwandaise sera perpCtuellement purifik ethniquement, contr6lk et paralysCe par les chefs militaires et politiques du FPR impliquks dans les crimes de gCnocide, des crimes de guerre, et des crimes contre I'humanitC. Plusieurs magistrats sont soumis au rkgime FPR et certains d'entre eux sont impliquCs dans les crimes de genocide cornrnis au Rwanda.

ConsidCrant cette dkpendance prkjudiciable ii leur image, nous recomrnandons aux juridictions des pays euro@ens, ci haut citCs, de suspendre momentankment toutes les enquetes likes au gknocide tant que la magistrature rwandaise restera prise dans l'ktau du <

ConsidCrant que toutes les institutions officielles de 17Etat Rwandais sont compEtement contr61Ces et paralyskes par ces mbmes dktenteurs du <> pour les rescapks Hutu des massacres du FPR.

Considtrant que la capacitk de manipulation et l'art de mentir du rkgime rwandais se sont affinks depuis 13 ans, l'dradication de l'impunitk ne pourra rdussir que si elle concerne tgalement tous les chefs militaires et politiques du FPR qui ont massacrk des innocents et qui rackettent et tiennent en otage le peuple rwandais, toutes ethnies confondues.

I1 est faux de croire que les pays occidentaux pourront jouer le r6le de pays neutres alors que de nombreux tkmoins crtdibles montrent que certaines puissances comme les USA, la Grande Bretagne, la Belgique et le Canada continuent de favoriser l'oppression et la remise en esclavage du peuple rwandais par leur soutien aveugle au r6gime du FPR. Un peuple kcrask par la repression d'une poignke de criminels de guerre tutsis qui s'assurent l'impunitk par tous les moyens extralkgaux. Le pillage du Congo, objectif final de la tragkdie rwandaise, ne profite qu'h ce petit noyau dur de criminels soutenus et protkgks par les grandes puissances qui pillent le Congo par << mercenaires rwandais B interposks.

<< Le grand ennemi de la vbritb, est tr2s souvent nun le mensonge dklibbrb, arttpciel et malhonne^te,mais le mythe persistant, convaincant et irrbaliste H Cette dkfinition, empruntke au prksident amkricain John Kennedy illustre tr2s bien combien le mythe selon lequel le FPR a arrgtd le gknocide est le plus grand obstacle i la vdritd, h la justice et B la rkconciliation. La discrimination entre les victimes d'une m6me tragtdie et le mkpris exprim6 par les autoritds rwanhses actuelles B l'endroit des victimes non Tutsies sont des comportements inhumains, cyniques et irresponsables que les juridictions europ6ennes et les gouvernements occidentaux devraient combattre sur le territoire europken.

5) RECOMMANDATIONS : Pour conclure, nous recomrnandons aux gouvernements des pays qui ddtiennent dans leurs prisons des suspects du gknocide (accusCs B tort ou h raison par les autoritds rwandaises) de ne pas les extrader vers le Rwanda ou le TPIR (qui ferme ses portes en 2008) en attendant le ktablissement de 17Etatde droit et le respect des droits et des libertds publiques au Rwanda. I1 s'agit des pays suivants : Ces pays sont : la Grande Bretagne, la France, l'Allemagne, la Hollande, le Canada et la Finlande.

Pour le Centre, MATATA Joseph, Coordinateur.

' (Discours de remise des dipl6mes 2 1'Universid de Yale, le 11 juin 1962 par le president americain John Fitzgerald Kennedy (JFK). CLIIR* : Le Centre de Lutte contre 1'ImpunitC et 171njusticeau Rwanda est une association de dCfense des droits humains basbe en Belgique, crCCe le 18 aofit 1995. Ses membres sont des militants des droits humains de longue date. Certains ont CtC actifs au sein d'associations rwandaises de dCfense des droits humains et ont particip6 B l'enquete CLADHOIKanyarwanda sur le gCnocide de 1994. Lorsqu'ils ont commencC B enqueter sur les crimes du rCgime rwandais actuel, ils ont subi des menaces et ont 6tt5 contraints de s'exiler B 1'Ctranger oh ils poursuivent leur engagement en faveur des droits humains. ANNEX -1 - www.hrondelle.org : 23.01.07 - RWANDA/HRW - HRW WARNS RWANDA AG ... Page 1 sur 1

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RWANDAIHRW - HRW WARNS RWANDA AGAINST REPRISAL MURDERS Arusha, January 22 2007 (FH) - Human Rights Watch (HRW), a human rights organization based in New York, calls on the police and the judicial authorities of Rwanda to enforce the law and punish the crimes committed recently to avoid the beginning of a new cycle of violence in the country.

In a twenty pages long report entitled a Murders in Eastem Rwanda w, HRW recounts in detail 13 murders, 11 of which committed in reprisal, and recommends as a conclusion to conduct a a thorough and independent investigation w on these deaths.

Eight persons, among which children aged three, eight and thirteen, a woman and an old man of seventy, were killed on November 19 by people living in a village named Mugatwa in retaliation of the murder of a genocide survivor. The eight victims a were apparently not connected to the murder w, HRW indicates .aJ On November 23, a second incident happened in Rwamagana (about 50 km east of Kigali): a judge of a gacaca court was assassinated and the three suspects arrested by the police were killed the very same night. u The clues collected on the murder place and the testimonies of the witnesses suggest that the three men might have been the victims of an extra judiciary execution w, reads the report.

u The murder of genocide survivors costs lives and threaten justice. The right answer to this threat lies in a quick and efficient enforcement of the law, not in reprisal murders B, Alison Des Forges, senior advisor in the African division of the organization, declares.

Alison Des Forges adds that reprisal murders have been a very few in the past, but if they happen more frequently, they might trigger a new cycle of violence w.

HRW concludes that a in every society, deaths in custody must be investigated thoroughly. Policemen, as every other citizen, should be punished if they commit a crime B.

MGlAT O Hirondelle News Agency

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'7 &bm1996 - 2007, Fondation Hirondelle - Av. du Temple 190- CH 1012-Lausanne [Suisse) - Tel+41 21 654 20 20 - Fax +41 21 654 20 21 - E-mail infoQhirondelle.org I www.hlroncielle.org : 2 1.U3.Ub - KWANUAJHUMAN KlCiH'l'S - AMNBS'l'Y 1N'l'E... Page 1 sur 2 4

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RWANDAIHUMAN RIGHTS - AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ASKS FOR INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF EXECUTIONS OF PRISONERS

Arusha, March 17th, 2006 (FH) -A human rights organisation, Amnesty lnternational (Al) has called on the Rwandan Government to set up an independent commission to investigate reports of possible extrajudicial executions by the military police in Mulindi military detention Centre located in Kigali.

A public statement by the organisation says it has received reports of allegations that at least three unarmed prisoners at the military detention centre were killed and more than 20 injured by military police on December 21st 2005.

"Amnesty lnternational calls for a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of these events," says the report. 0- The reports indicate that an assault case of a prisoner on December 21st 2005 at the detention centre by guards for consuming cannabis sparked off discontent amongst some prisoners who had been complaining about ill-treatment at the camp.

In response, says the report, several dozen prisoners staged a protest and locked the internal court yard. The military police were called in and they unsuccessfully tried to unlock the doors of the courtyard. Then they reportedly surrounded the same courtyard and started to shoot at the unarmed prisoners with Kalashnikovs and other machine guns.

"If this version of the events is confirmed, the reported shooting by the military police of unarmed prisoners would be in violation of the right to life and would constitute excessive use of force. "

Although the govemment has asked the army prosecution department to investigate the allegations, its impartiality is being questioned by Al.

"Amnesty lnternational is concerned that this investigation does not offer the necessary guarantees of impartiality and independence. Amnesty lnternational has received information contradicting the government's official position on these events,"

Acmrding to Al, it received information suggesting that names of those killed were Private Ruzindana, Private Assimwe Munyarubuga and Private Assiel Karinganire.

The human rights watchdog is also asking the Rwandan govemment to bring to justice the alleged perpetrators, including their superiors who reportedly gave the order to shoot at the unarmed prisoners.

"If sufficient evidence is obtained, the competent authorities must to bring to justice all those suspected of being responsible for the deaths and injuries of the prisoners," demanded Al.

The allegations come in the wake of a report recently released by USA, critical on human rights situation in Rwanda.

It observed that the "government's human rights record remained poor and there were instances when the government committed serious abusesn.

But Rwanda disputed the report arguing that many things have changed over the last few years, and that the authors of the report simply didn't take any of the positive changes into account.

(O Hirondelle News Agency ANNEX Imprimer : Appel au Conseil de dcurite des Nations unies pour qu'il veille h ce que le ... Page 1 of 3

Le site officiel dlAmnesty Belgique : defendre les droits humains dans le http://www.arnnestyinternational.be/doc/spip.php? monde article9639

Appel au Conseil de securite des Nations unies pour qu'il veille a ce que le mandat du Tribunal penal international pour le Rwanda soit rempli mardi, 12 decembre 2006 / phensmans

Declaration publique

Index A1 : IOR 40/045/2006 (Public) Bulletin no : 320 12 decembre 2006

Le 15 decembre 2006, le Conseil de securite des Nations unies procedera a son examen bisannuel de la mise en oeuvre de la u strategie d'achevement * visant le Tribunal penal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR). La strategie d'achevement fixe arbitrairement a 2010 la date a laquelle tous les proces, y compris en appel, devront Ctre termines, alors que 18 accuses n'ont toujours pas ete arrMs et que les tribunaux rwandais ne peuvent pas, ou ne veulent pas, engager de veritables poursuites penales qui respectent les normes internationales d'equite et excluent la peine de mort. Amnesty International craint que la strategie d'achevement nlempCche la justice d'etre rendue aux personnes qui ont etC victimes de genocide, de crimes contre I'humanite et de crimes de guerre pendant le genocide de 1994, et qu'elle n'ait pour consequence que ces crimes resteront irnpunis.

La procureure du Tribunal penal international pour I'ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY), dont le mandat est soumis a la mCrne CchCance, a indique recemment qu'elle prevoyait de demander un delai supplementaire pour terminer ses affaires, rnais le TPIR n'a pas fait de meme. Au lieu de cela, dans ses precedents rapports au Conseil de securit6, le TPIR a propose pour respecter les dcheances de deferer environ 17 affaires aux juridictions nationales, en application de I'article 11 bis du Reglement de procedure et de preuve du TPIR. Dans son rapport au Conseil de securitd du lerjuin 2006 (S/2006/358), le TPIR declare qu'il a ['intention de demander le transfert a des juridictions nationales de cinq personnes en instance de jugement et de 12 accuses en fuite. Cette proposition fait craindre qu'a rnoins que d'autres tribunaux nationaux ne se manifestent, ces affaires ne soient transferees au Rwanda.

L'article 11 bis sur le Renvoi de I'acte d'accusation devant une autre juridiction fixe deux conditions a respecter pour pouvoir effectuer un tel transfert : (1) I'accuse devra ktre juge equitablement et (2) la peine de mort ne devra pas etre prononcee ni mise a execution. Bien que le Rwanda ait entame des demarches pour abolir la peine capitale, Amnesty International s'oppose pour I'instant au renvoi d'actes d'accusation devant les juridictions rwandaises parce qu'elle considere que le gouvernement n'est pas en mesure d'assurer pleinement la securite des suspects renvoyes avant, pendant et apres leur detention, et que la justice rwandaise ne peut pas garantir le droit des suspects 2 un prods equitable conforme a la I6gislation et aux normes internationales, telles que :

le droit d1&trejug6 dans un delai raisonnable ou d'Ctre remis en liberte. Amnesty International a recense plusieurs cas de personnes accusees de crimes de genocide et qui sont en detention provisoire depuis plus de douze ans ;

le droit de ne pas &re soumis B la torture ou a d'autres formes de traitement cruel, inhumain et degradant. Le Rwanda n'a pas ratifie la Convention des Nations Unies contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou degradants. Amnesty International considere qu'il y a un risque reel que des personnes transferees soient torturees ou soumises a d'autres formes de mauvais traitement ;

le droit dlCtre juge par un tribunal competent, independant et impartial etabli par la loi. Au cours des deux dernieres annees, Amnesty International et d'autres organisations internationales ont rassemble des informations sur le manque d'inddpendance, de compbtence et d'impartialitb des tribunaux gacaca. Bien que les tribunaux gacaca ne soient pas habilitks a juger les suspects transferes par le TPIR, I'existeqce de ces tribunaux suscite de vives inquietudes quant a la maniere dont la justice rwandalse s'occupe des cas de personnes soup~onneesde participation au http://www.amnestyinternational.be/doc/spip.php?page=impriculo&id article... 3010912007 Imprimer : Appel au Conseil de dcuritk des Nations unies pour qu'il veille A ce que le ... Page 2 of 3

genocide.

A cela s'ajoute le fait que les autorites rwandaises ont deja pris beaucoup de retard dans le jugement de plus de 48 000 autres personnes soup~onneesde participation au genocide, de crimes de guerre et de crimes contre I'humanite, et qu'il est donc permis de douter de la capacite de la justice rwandaise a prendre en charge de nouveaux dossiers.

Le transfert de dossiers vers d'autres juridictions nationales a Cgalement rencontre des difficulte. En particulier, le 30 aoirt 2006, la chambre d'appel du TPIR a confirme la decision de la chambre de premiere instance de ne pas autoriser le renvoi de I'affaire Bagaragaza en Norvege, au motif qu'il n'y avait pas dans ce pays de juridiction en mesure de juger IraccusC pour les violations graves du droit international, dont le genocide, dont il a Cte inculpe. II se peut que d'autres pays n'aient pas les mCmes, problemes legislatifs que la Norvege, mais le TPIR risque neanmoins d'avoir du ma1 a trouver des Etats qui peuvent et veulent mener ces poursuites.

Tant que les autorites du Rwanda ne voudront pas, ou ne pourront pas, mettre fin a I'impunite pour de tels crimes, il reviendra a la communaute internationale de veiller a ce que la justice soit rendue, tant au niveau international que national. En creant le TPIR aux termes de la r6solution 955, le Conseil de securite s'est engage a * juger les personnes presumees responsables d'actes de genocide ou d'autres violations graves du droit international humanitaire commis sur le territoire du Rwanda, et le? citoyens rwandais presumes responsables de tels actes ou violations commis sur le territoire drEtats voisins, entre le lerjanvier et le 31 de~embre1994 B. C'est pourquoi, Amnesty International exhorte le Conseil de securite et les Etats membres des Nations unies a veiller 2 ce que les mesures suivantes soient prises :

Prolongation de la strategie d'achevement, si elle est demandee. Amnesty International craint que I'echeance de 2010 ne laisse pas le temps de juger en premiere instance et en appel toutes les personnes inculpees par le TPIR, mCme si le transfert des 17 personnes vers d'autres juridictions a effectivement lieu. L'organisation appelle le Conseil de securite a envisager le prolongation de la strategie d'achevement si le TPIR en fait la demande pour traiter ces dossiers jusqu'au bout. Si les actes d'accusation concernant les 17 affaires en question ne peuvent Ctre renvoyds devant des juridictions nationales, le Conseil de securite devrait prolonger la strategie d'achevement afin de permettre au TPIR d'aller jusqu'au bout de ces procedures.

Renforcement de la decision selon laquelle les 18 personnes en fuite doivent arrCtCes et remises au TPIR. II est imperatif que le TPIR engage et conduise des poursuites contre tous ceux qui ont ete inculpes, et que personne ne bCnCficie de I'impunite en raison de la strategie d'achevement. Amnesty International appelle le Conseil de securit6, qui considere toujours la situation aux termes du chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations unies comme une menace a la paix et la securite internationales, a prendre les mesures appropriees pour que les 18 personnes restantes soient arrCtees et remises au TPIR sans plus attendre.

Opposition au transfert de cas vers le Rwanda. Comme explique ci-dessus, Amnesty International s'oppose pour I'instant a ce que le TPIR renvoie des actes d'accusation devant les juridictions rwandaises. En particulier, I'organisation considere que la justice rwandaise n'est pas en mesure pour I'instant de faire en sorte que le droit a un proces equitable soit pleinement respectti. Amnesty International appelle le Conseil de securite a donner pour instruction au TPIR de ne transferer aucune affaire au Rwanda tant que les problemes que connait la justice dans ce pays n'auront pas etC resolus.

Appel aux r tats pour qurils appliquent le principe de competence universelle pour les affaires que le TPIR cherche a transferer. Amnesty International est favorable au renvoi d'actes d'accusation devant des juridictions nationales qui peuvent et souhaitent engager des poursuites pour les violations graves du droit international, dans le respect des normes internationales d'equite et sans avoir recours a la peine capitale. En effet, comme le Conseil de securite Ira reconnu depuis sa resolution 978 du 27 fevrier 1995, le recours a la competence universelle pour juger les infractions au droit international devrait &re preconise comme moyen de lutte efficace covtre I'impunite. C'est pourquoi, I'organisation exhorte le Conseil de securite a appeler tous les Etats $I apporter leur soutien a une strategie d'achevement efficace pour le TPIR, en appliquant le principe de competence universelle aux cas que celui essaie de transferer a !es juridictions nationales. Ce faisant, le Conseil de securite devrait egalement demander aux Etats de passer en revue leur legislation pour s'assurer qu'elle leur permet d'exercer la competence universelle sur les crimes relevant du TPIR, afin d'eviter les problemes rencontres au moment du transfert de I'affaire Bagaragaza en Norvege. Pour encourager les Etats de tous les continents a accepter les affaires en

http:Nwww.amnestyinternational.be/doclspip.php?pae=impriculo&id article... .30/09/2007 Jmprimer : Appel au Conseil de sCcuritC des Nations unies pour qu'il veille ii ce que le ... Page 3 of 3

provenance du TPIR, le Conseil de securite devrait demander a I'Assemblee generale de creer un fonds de contribution aux depenses occasionnees par la prise en charge de ces cas.

Engagement ferme a fournir des ressources suffisantes au TPIR. Pour mener a bien sa mission, le TPIR va avoir besoin continuellernent de fonds. Amnesty International appelle le Conseil de securite a s'engager a fournir des ressources suffisantes au TPIR jusqu'a ce qu'il ait terrnine son travail, et a ne pas modifier le sysdme existant qui permet de payer le TPIR a partir du budget ordinaire des Nations unies. Le fait pour les tribunaux penaux internationaux pour la Sierra Leone et le Cambodge de dependre d'un financement volontaire les a genes dans leur travail et a mis a ma1 leur independance.

Mise en place au Rwanda d'un plan global d'action a long terme pour mettre fin a I'impunite. Amnesty International exhorte le Conseil de skurite a promouvoir d'autres initiatives pour mettre fin a I'impunite au Rwanda, en prenant notamment des mesures pour que les milliers d'autres violations du droit international sur lesquelles le TPIR n'aura pas ete en mesure dlenquCter ou d'engager des poursuites dans le respect des normes internationales fassent neanmoins I'objet dlenquCtes et d'actions en justice. En particulier, I'organisation appelle le Conseil de securite a demander a tous les tats de fournir au Rwanda le personnel, le materiel et les ressources qui lui perrnettent d'elaborer un plan global d'action a long terme pour mettre fin a I'impunite en resolvant tous les crimes relevant du droit international qui ont et6 comrnis entre 1990 et 1994. I1 faudrait qu'il s'acquitte de cette mission en toute transparence et en collaboration etroite avec la societe civile.

Amnesty International demande egalement au Conseil de securite d'appeler tous les autres tats a cooperer aux enquCtes et aux poursuites pour les violations du droit international comrnises au Rwanda, et a appliquer le principe de competence universelle en enquCtant sur ces crimes et en les jugeant devant leurs tribunaux.

Amnesty International demeure vivement prCoccupCe par le fait que le TPIR et les autorites rwandaises n'ont pas enquCt6 sur les crimes commis par toutes les parties au Rwanda entre 1990 and 1994, ni engage de poursuites dans ces affaires. En particulier, I'organisation fait observer que 60 000 civils auraient ete tuds par les forces du Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) entre avril et juillet 1994. Bien que le TPIR a declare qu'il avait ac fait fond sur le mandat donne au Tribunal, tel que le rappelle la r6solution 1503, pour enquCter sur des informations faisant etat de violations cornrnises par le Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) *, aucun acte d'inculpation contre le FPR n'a etC rendu public. La volonte politique des autorites rwandaises drenquCter a ce sujet et d'engager des poursuites contre les suspects en cas de preuves suffisantes suscite de sdrieux doutes. En 2004, toute reference aux Conventions de Genhve et a leurs protocoles additionnels, en particulier a I'article 3 commun aux Quatre Conventions, a ete exclue de la ldgislation nationale rwandaise. De ce fait, aucun tribunal rwandais n'est competent pour intervenir sur les allegations de crimes de guerre et d'autres violations du droit international humanitaire.

http:llwww.arnnestyinternational.beldoc/sr articulotkid article... 3010913.11117

- [03 nov 19981 DWG/985 : LE COMITE CONTRE LA TORTURE TIENDRA SA VINGT ET ... Page 1 of 4

3 novembre 1998

CommuniquC de Presse DHlGl985

LE COMITE CONTRE LA TORTURE TIENDRA SA VINGT ET UNI~MESESSION A GENEVE DU 9 AU 20 NOVEMBRE 1998

COMMUNIQUE DE BASE DH/G/985 I1 examinera les rapports des pays suivants : Croatie, Hongrie, Islande, Rkpublique fkdCrale de Yougoslavie, Royaume-Uni et Tunisie

Genbe, le 3 novembre 1998 -- Le ComitC contre la torture tiendra sa vingt et uni5me session du 9 au 20 novembre 1998,B 1'Office des Nations Unies i Genhe. I1 doit examiner, au cours de la session, les rapports qui seront prCsentCs par les d61Cgations de six pays : Croatie, Hongrie, Islande, RCpublique fCd6rale de Yougoslavie, Royaume-Uni et Tunisie.

EntrC en fonction le ler janvier 1988, le ComitC, compos6 de dix experts, est chargC de surveiller l'application de la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dCgradants. Actuellement, 107 fitats ont ratifid la Convention ou y ont accede.

Aux termes de la Convention, les fitats parties sont tenus de prksenter p6riodiquement au ComitC un rapport sur les mesures qu'ils ont prises pour donner effet B leurs engagements en vertu de cet instrument. Le Comit6 prksentera, B la fin de I'examen de chacun des six rapports qui seront examines au cours de la session, ses observations et recommandations finales sur l'application de la Convention dans le pays concernb.

Le ComitC examinera Cgalement, au cours de sCances B huis clos, les <>qui lui sont soumises par des particuliers qui se plaignent d'Ctre victimes de la violation d'une ou plusieurs dispositions de la Convention par un des 39 fitats parties ayant expresskment reconnu la compCtence du Comitk B cet Cgard. a- Observations finales du ComitC concernant les rapports p6riodiques prCcCdents de la Croatie, de la Hongrie, du Royaume-Uni et de la Tunisie

Quatre des six fitats parties qui pdsentent un rapport au ComitC B la prCsente session ont dCj&soumis des rapports lors de sessions prCcCdentes du ComitC, 21 savoir, la Croatie, la Hongrie, le Royaume-Uni et la Tunisie.

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Suite B I'examen du rapport initial de la Croatie, en mai 1996, le ComitC avait recommand6 la qualification du crime de torture dans des termes conformes B la definition figurant dans la Convention. I1 a recommand6 A la Croatie de veiller B ce que toute allCgation de torture ou traitement cruel, inhumain ou dkgradant lit% aux CvCnements de 1995 et B ses suites fasse l'objet d'une enquCte systematique par une commission indkpendante et impartiale dont les rCsultats seront transmis au ComitC. Le ComitC a par ailleurs estimC qu'un programme d'tducation de la police, du personnel pbnitentiaire, mCdical et judiciaire devrait $tre rnis en oeuvre. 503 nov 19981 DWGI985 : LE COMITE CONTRE LA TORTURE TIENDRA SA VINGT ET ... Page 2 of 4 w2 En ce qui concerne le deuxisme rapport piriodique present6 par le Royaume-Uni en novembre 1995, le ComitC a recommand6 que le gouvernement ferme les centres de dCtention en Irlande du Nord et abolisse la ltgislation d'urgence. I1 a suggCrC une reducation des policiers en Irlande du Nord, en particulier les policiers chargCs de mener des enquetes. Eu Cgard h la nCcessitC de disposer de centres pknitenciers, le gouvernement britannique devrait poursuivre sa politique actuelle de reconstruction de ces centres en tenant compte des normes les plus modernes dans ce domaine. Le Royaume-Uni devrait en outre interdire le chhiment corporel.

Le ComitC avait exprime l'espoir, lors de I'examen du second rapport pCriodique de la Hongrie, en avril 1993, que ce pays introduirait des dispositions sptcifiques dans son code pCnal et prendrait de nouvelles mesures adrninistratives visant h prdvenir plus efficacement des actes de torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dkgradants. I1 avait Cgalement suggCrC aux autorites hongroises de renforcer les programmes de formation des personnels concern& par l'application de la Convention.

Dans ses observations finales concernant le rapport initial prCsentC par la Tunisie en avril 1990, le ComitC avait saluC 1'Cvolution de la situation dans le domaine des droits de l'homme dam le pays depuis novembre 1987. Le ComitC avait exprim6 l'espoir que les contradictions entre les dispositions de la Convention et celles de la legislation nationale seraient rbsolues aussi t6t que possible et que des rCponses seraient fournies, lors du prochain examen du rapport tunisien, aux questions du ComitC qui sont restCes sans rCponses en 1990.

La Convention contre la torture

La Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dkgradants a 6tC adoptbe par ltAssemb16egCn6rale le 10 ddcembre 1984 et est entr& en vigueur le 26 juin 1987. Elle d6finit la torture comrne <

- 3 - DWGl985 3 novembre 1998 ou des aveux, de la punir d'un acte qu'elle ou une tierce personne a comrnis ou est soupqonnCe d'avoir comrnis, de l'intimider ou de faire pression sur elle ou d'intimider ou de faire pression sur une tierce personne, ou pour tout autre motif fond6 sur une forme de discrimination quelle qu'elle soit, lorsqu'une telle douleur ou de telles souffrances sont infligkes par un agent de la fonction publique ou toute autre personne agissant h titre officiel ou h son instigation ou avec son consentement exprh ou tacite,,.

La Convention stipule que les tats parties interdiront la torture et autres traitements inhumains dans leur legislation nationale. Elle dispose qu'aucune circonstance exceptionnelle ni aucun ordre d'un sup6rieur ou d'une autoritC publique ne peuvent &re invoquCs pour justifier des actes de torture. Elle prdvoit l'extradtion des coupables d'actes de torture afin qu'ils soient jug& dans le pays de leurs crimes ou dans n'importe quel tat partie 2 la Convention.

Le ComitC peut, aux termes d'une disposition facultative de la Convention, procCder h une enquete confidentielle lorsqu'il dispose d'informations dignes de foi faisant Ctat d'actes de torture. L'enqugte peut comporter une visite sur le tenitoire de 1'~tatpartie concernt.

Aux termes de l'article 22, tout tat partie h la Convention peut declarer tout moment qu'il reconnait la compttence du ComitC pour recevoir et examiner des communications prCsent6es par ou pour le compte de particuliers relevant de sa juridiction qui pretendent ttre victimes d'une violation, par un Etat partie, des dispositions de la Convention. Le plaignant doit avoir prealablement CpuisC les voies de recours disponibles au niveau national. 103 nov 19981 DWGI985 : LE COMITE CONTRE LA TORTURE TIENDRA SA VINGT ET ... Page 3 of 4

Tout tat partie peut en outre, au titre de I'article 21, reconnaitre la compktence du Comitt pour recevoir des communications d'un tat partie qui pretend qu'un autre tat partie ne s'acquitte pas de ses obligations au titre de la Convention. Le ComitC n'a pas CtC saisi de plaintes au titre de cet article.

Lors de sa dernihe session, la Commission des droits de I'hornme a invite? tous les tats qui ratifient la Convention ou y adherent, ainsi que les tats parties qui ne I'ont pas encore fait, B faire les ddclarations prCvues aux articles 21 et 22 de la Convention et B Cviter de formuler des reserves sur l'article 20 ou i envisager la possibilite de lever leurs riserves sur cet article aux termes duquel ale ComitC peut, s'il juge que cela se justifie, charger un ou plusieurs de ses membres de proctder B une enquete confidentielle et de lui faire rapport d'urgence>>s'il regoit des indications bien fondCes que la torture est pratiquCe systCmatiquement sur le territoire d'un tat partie.

- 4 - DWGl985 3 novembre 1998

Autres activitCs des Nations Unies dans la lutte contre la torture

Outre les efforts visant B l'dimination de la torture, I'Organisation des Nations Unies prete assistance aux victimes de la torture griice au Fonds de contributions volontaires des Nations Unies pour les victimes de la torture, Ctabli en 1981. Lors de sa dernihe session, qui s'est tenue B Genbve du 16 mars au 24 avril, la Commission des droits de l'hornme a lancC un appel B tous les gouvernements, B toutes les organisations et B tous les particuliers qui sont en mesure de le faire pour qu'ils contribuent annuellement au Fonds afin que de faire face B une demande d'assistance en augmentation constante.

Par la meme resolution, adoptCe le 17 avril 1998, la Commission a dCcidC de proroger de trois ans le mandat du Rapporteur spCcial sur la torture et a encourage tous les gouvernements B envisager ~Crieusementd'inviter le Rapporteur special B se rendre dans leur pays.

La Commission a Cgalement pri6 le President du ComitC contre la torture et le Rapporteur spCcial sur la question de la torture B participer aux activitks du groupe de travail charge d'Claborer le projet de protocole facultatif se rapportant B la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains, qui doit faire rapport sur ses travaux h la Commission au dCbut de 1999. Ce projet de protocole facultatif est destine B instaurer, B titre de mesure priventive de la torture, un systeme international de visites aux lieux de detention. En effet, les cas de torture imputables B des agents de letat dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions surviennent le plus souvent durant les pkiodes de detention dite preventive ou administrative, c'est-8-dire avant proces.

tats parties ?ila Convention Les 107 tats suivants ont ratifi6 la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dbgradants ou ont accCdC B cet instrument : Afghanistan, Albanie, AlgCrie, Allemagne, Antigua-et-Barbuda, Arabie Saoudite, Argentine, ArmCnie, Australie, Autriche, Azerbdidjan, Bangladesh, BClarus, BClize, BCnin, Bosnie-HerzCgovine, Brdsil, Bulgarie, Burundi, Carnbodge, Cameroun, Canada, Cap- Vert, Chili, Chine, Chypre, Colombie, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Croatie, Cuba, Danemark, Egypte, El Salvador, Ikpateur, Espagne, Estonie, ~tats-~nis,~thiopie, ex-Rbpublique Yougoslave de Macbdoine, Ftddration de Russie, Finlande, France, GCorgie, Grke, Guatemala, Guinte, Guyane, Honduras, Hongrie, Islande, Israel, Italie, Jamahiriya arabe libyenne, Jordanie, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kowe'it, Kirghizistan, Lettonie, Liechtenstein, Lituanie, Republique de Moldova, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malte, Maroc, Maurice, Mexique, Monaco, Narnibie, Nepal, Niger, Norvege, Nouvelle-Zlande, Ouganda, OuzbCkistan, Panama, Paraguay, Pays-Bas, Ptrou, [03 nov 19981 DWGl985 : LE COMITE CONTRE LA TORTURE TIENDRA SA VINGT ET ... Page 4 of 4 , . ?5"0 - 5 - DWGl985 3 novembre 1998

Philippines, Pologne, Portugal, RCpublique de CorCe, RCpublique ddmocratique du Congo, RCpublique slovaque, RCpublique tchbque, Roumanie, Royaume-Uni, SCnCgal, Seychelles, SlovCnie, Somalie, Sri Lanka, Subde, Suisse, Tchad, Tadjikistan, Togo, Tunisie, Turquie, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, YCmen et Yougoslavie.

Des dkclarations ont 6tC faites au titre des articles 21 et 22 par 1es 39 tats parties suivants : Algerie, Argentine, Australie, Autriche, Bulgarie, Canada, Chypre, Croatie, Danemark, huateur, Espagne, PCdCration de Russie, Finlande, France, Gr*ce, Hongrie, Islande, Italie, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malte, Monaco, Norvbge, Nouvelle-ZClande, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Portugal, RCpublique tchsque, SknCgal, Slovaquie, SlovCnie, Subde, Suisse, Togo, Tunisie, Turquie, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yougoslavie.

Le Royaume-Uni et les ~tats-~nisont fait la dtclaration prdvue B l'article 21 seulement.

Composition du ComitC

Le ComitC est un organe de &x experts siegeant i titre personnel. I1 est actuellement composC des experts suivants : M. Peter Thomas Burns (Canada), M. Guibril Carnara (Senegal), M. Sayed Kassem el Masry agypte), M. Antonio Silva Henriques Gaspar (Portugal), M. Alejandro Gonzaez Poblete (Chili), M. Andreas Mavrornmatis (Chypre), M. Bent Sgrensen @anemark), M. Alexander Yakovlev (F6deration de Russie), M. Yu Mengja (Chine) et M. Bostjan M. Zupan (SlovCnie).

Le ComitC est prCsid6 par M. Bums. MM. Camara, Gonzilez Poblete et Zupancic sont les Vice-Presidents et M. Sgrensen le Rapporteur du Comite.

Calendrier pour l'examen des rapports

Le calendrier provisoire pour l'examen des rapports B la vingt et unibme session est present6 B titre indicatif, sous rCserve de l'approbation du ComitC B l'ouverture de la session :

Date d'examen Pays Cote du rapport

Mercredi 11 novembre Yougoslavie : rapport initial (CATlCl16lAdd.7) Jeudi 12 novembre Islande : rapport initial (CATlCl37lAdd.2) Vendredi 13 novembre Croatie : deuxibme rapport (CATlCl33lAdd.4) Lundi 16 novembre Royaume-Uni : troisi&merapport (CATlCl441Add. 1) Mardi 17 novembre Hongrie : troisibme rapport (CATlCl34lAdd. 10) Mercredi 18 novembre Tunisie : deuxi2me rapport (CATlCl20lAdd.7)

Le contenu de chacun de ces rapports sera reflCtC dans nos comrnuniqu6s de presse au moment de leur prksentation devant le ComitC. , Etats qui ont sign6 ou ratifi6 la Convention Page 1 of 5 7g5 NATIONS UNES

mh Consea Economique Distr. GENERALE

E/CN.4/1995/35 24 novembre 1994

FRANCAIS 0riginal:ANGLAIS

COMMISSION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME Cinquante et unibme session Point 10 b) de l'ordre du jour provisoire

QUESTION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME DE TOUTES LES PERSONNES SOUMISES A UNE FORME QUELCONQUE DE DETENTION OU D'EMPRISONNEMENT

ETAT DE LA CONVENTION CONTRE LA TORTURE ET AUTRES PEINES OU TRAITEMENTS CRUELS, INHUMAINS OU DEGRADANTS

Rapport du Secr6taire nCn6ral

1. L'AssemblCe gCnCrale, par sa rtisolution 39146 du 10 d6cembre 1984, a adopt6 et ouvert B la signature, B la ratification et B I'adhCsion la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou degradants et a demand6 B tous les gouvernements d'envisager de signer et de ratifier la Convention B titre prioritaire.

2. La Convention a kt6 ouverte B la signature li New York le 4 f6vrier 1985. ConformCment B son article 27, la Convention est entrde en vigueur le 26 juin 1987, trentibme jour aprbs la date du d6p8t auprbs du Secritaire gtntral de l'organisation des Nations Unies du vingtibme instrument de ratification ou d'adh6sion.

3. Par sa rksolution 1994138, du 4 mars 1994, la Commission des droits de l'hornrne a encourage les Etats parties B notifier dbs que possible au Secrktaire gCn6ral qu'ils acceptaient les amendements aux articles 17 et 18 de la Convention 11 et a demand6 instamment aux Etats parties qui n'avaient pas encore verse leur quote- part, et en particulier B ceux dont le retard portait sur deux ou plusieurs exercices financiers cons6cutifs, de s'acquitter sans plus tarder de leurs obligations; elle a aussi demand6 instamment B tous les Etats de devenir parties B la Convention B titre prioritaire, et invit6 tous les Etats qui ratifiaient la Convention ou y adhdraient, ainsi que les Etats parties qui ne l'avaient pas encore fait, B faire les dtclarations prevues aux articles 21 et 22 de la Convention et B envisager la possibilit6 de retirer leurs reserves B l'article 20.

4. Au 15 novembre 1994,84 Etats avaient ratifit? la Convention ou y avaient adhere et 14 autres l'avaient signte. On trouvera en annexe au pr6sent rapport la liste des Etats qui ont sign6 ou ratifit la Convention ou qui y ont adh6rt ainsi que la date de leur signature, de leur ratification ou de leur adh6sion.

5. A la meme date, 35 des Etats parties B la Convention, B savoir ltAlg6rie, IfArgentine,lfAustralie, l1Autriche, la Bulgarie, le Canada, Chypre, la Croatie, le Danemark, l'Equateur, lqEspagne,la Federation de Russie, la Etats qui ont sign6 ou ratifiC la Convention Page 2 of 5

Finlande, la France, la Gr*ce, la Hongrie, ltItalie, le Liechtenstein, le Luxembourg, Malte, Monaco, la Norvbge, la Nouvelle-Zklande, les Pays-Bas, la Pologne, le Portugal, la SlovCnie, la SuPlde, la Suisse, le Togo, la Tunisie, la Turquie, l'uruguay, le Venezuela et la Yougoslavie, avaient fait les declarations prCvues aux articles 21 et 22 de la Convention. En outre, deux Etats parties, les Etats-Unis d'AmCrique et le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'lrlande du Nord, avaient fait uniquement la dkclaration prCvue B l'article 21, ce qui porte B 37 le nombre total de dtklarations faites au titre de cet article 21. Aux termes de l'article 21, tout Etat partie B la Convention peut declarer B tout moment qu'il reconnaft la comp&ence du ComitC contre la torture pour recevoir et examiner des communications dans lesquelles un Etat partie prktend qu'un autre Etat partie ne s'acquitte pas de ses obligations au titre de la Convention. Aux termes de l'article 22, tout Etat partie B la Convention peut dkclarer B tout moment qu'il reconnait la compCtence du ComitC pour recevoir et examiner des communications prCsentCes par des particuliers ou pour le compte de particuliers relevant de sa juridiction qui pretendent 2tre victimes d'une violation, par un Etat partie, des dispositions de la Convention.

6. Les dispositions des articles 21 et 22 sont entrkes en vigueur le 26 juin 1987, conformCment au paragraphe 2 de l'article 21 et au paragraphe 8 de l'article 22.

7. Le ComitC contre la torture a tenu ses douzibme et treiziPlme sessions B Itoffice des Nations Unies B Genbve du 18 au 29 avril 1994 et du 7 au 18 novembre 1994, respectivement. ConformCment aux dispositions de l'article 24 de la Convention, le Comit6 a prksent6 aux Etats parties et B 1'AssemblCe gCnCrale, il sa quarante-neuvibme session, son rapport annuel 31, qui portait sur les travaux de ses onzibme et douzibme sessions.

8. Pour 1994-1995, la composition du ComitC est la suivante :

M. Hassib Ben Ammar (Tunisie) M. Peter Thomas Bums (Canada) M. Alexis Dipanda Mouelle (Cameroun) M. Fawzi ~1 Ibrashi (Egypte) M. Ricardo Gil Lavedra (Argentine) Mme Julia Iliopoulos-Strangas (GrPlce) M. Hugo Lorenzo (Uruguay) M. Mukunda Regmi (NCpal) M. Bent Sorensen (Danemark) M. Alexander Yakovlev (FCdCration de Russie).

Notes

-11 Amendements adopt& le 9 septembre 1992 par la Conference des Etats parties, conform6ment au paragraphe 1 de l'article 29 de la Convention (CATlSPlSR.4) et entCrinCs par l'Assembl6e gCn6rale dans sa rCsolution 4711 11, du 16 dCcembre 1992.

-21 Pour le texte des d&larations, rkserves ou objections faites par les Etats parties au sujet de la Convention jusqu'au ler janvier 1994, voir le document CATlCI2lRev.3.

-31 Documents officiels de 1'Assemblte ~Cntrale,auarante-neuvibme session, Su~vlCmentNo 44 (Al49144).

Liste des Etats qui ont sim?ou ratifi6 la Convention contre la torture et autres pines ou traitements cruels. inhumains ou dkeradants ou y ont adhCrC au 15 novembre 1994 Etats qui ont sign6 ou ratifit5 la Convention Page 3 of 5

Etats Date de la signature Date de reception de l'instrument de ratification ou d'adhtsion Afghanistan 4 ftvrier 1985 ler avri11987 Afriaue du Sud 29 ianvier 1993 1 - Albanie I lllmai1994bl Algtrie a/ 26 novembre 1985 12 septembre 1989 Allemagne 13 octobre 1986 ler octobre 1990 Antigua-et-Barbuda ,I19 juillet 1993 h/ Argentine a/ (4 ftvrier 1985 ( 24 septembre 1986 AnnCnie 613 se~tembre 1993 -b/ 11 Australie a/ 1 10 dtcembre 1985 18 ao6t 1989 Autriche a/ 14 mars 1985 29 juillet 1987 19 dCcembre 1985 BClarus 13 mars 1987 I Belgique 14 fCvrier 1985 1e Belize 1) 17 mars 1986 hl BCnin 6112 mars 1992 b/ Bolivie 14 fCvrier 1985 JI Bosnie-HerzCgovine )I 6 mars 1992 g/ Br6sil 23 septembre 1985 28 septembre 1989 Bulgarie al 10 juin 1986 16 dtkembre 1986 Burundi 18 fkvrier 1993 _W Cambodge I(15 octobre 1992 b/ Cameroun I(19 dCcembre 1986 b/ Canada al 123 ao6t 1985 1 24 juin 1987 Cap-Vert I]4 juin 1992 b/ Chili 23 septembre 1987 30 septembre 1988 Chine 12 dkcembre 1986 4 octobre 1988 Chypre a/ 9 octobre 1985 18 juillet 1991 Colombie 10 avril 1985 8 dkembre 1987 Costa Rica 4 fCvrier 1985 11 novembre 1993

Croatie -a1 18 octobre 1991 c/ 1 ~uba 1127 janvier 1986 Danemark a/ 14 fevrier 1985 (27mai 1987 IEgypte [[I 25 juin 1986 bl II~~uateurpl 114 fCvrier 1985 1130 mars 1988 t !I Espagne al 14 fkvrier 1985 (21octobre 1987 IEstonie 121octobre 1991 -b/ Etats-Unis d'Arn6rique dl 118121 octobre 1994 Ethiopie 1114 mars 1994 bl FCderation de Russie a/ 10 dicembre 1985 3 mars 1987 Finlande a/ 4 fevrier 1985 30 aoQ 1989 t 1 Etats qui ont sign6 ou ratifi6 la Convention Page 4 of 5

France a/ 4 fkvrier 1985 11 8 fCvrier 1986 I Gabon 21 janvier 1986 I I~arnbie 23octobre1985 16 GCorgie )I 26 octobre 1994 bl Grke a/ 14 fCvrier 1985 ( 6 octobre 1988 Guatemala 115janvier 1990 b/ GuinCe 130 mai 1986 1 10 octobre 1989 Guyana 25 janvier 1988 19 mai 1988 Il Hongrie al 28 novembre 1986 15 avril 1987 IndonCsie 23 octobre 1985 I Irlande 28 septembre 1992 Islande 4 fCvrier 1985 PsraLLl 122 octobre 1986 1 3 octobre 1991 Italie al 14 fCvrier 1985 1 12 janvier 1989 @ Jamahiriya arabe libyenne 1116mai 1989 b/ Jordanie 1113 novembre 199 1 bl Lettonie I(14 avril1992 bl Liechtenstein a/ 27 juin 1985 2 novembre 1990 Luxembourg al 22 fCvrier 1985 29 septembre 1987 Malte a/ 1 1 13 septembre 1990 b/ Maroc 18 janvier 1986 I 2 1 juin 1993 Maurice 119dkembre 1992 hl Mexique 118 mars 1985 1 23 janvier 1986 Monaco a/ 16 dCcembre 199 1 h/ NCpal 1 1114 mai 1991.b/ Nicaragua 15 avril1985 NigCria 28 juillet 1988 5 Norv2ge a/ 4 fCvrier 1985 19 juillet 1986 IlNouvelle-Zlande a/ 1114 janvier 1986 (1 10 dkembre 1989 - (I Ouganda 1 1 3 novembre 1986 bl Panama 122 ftvrier 1985 ( 24 aoQ 1987 Paraguay 23 octobre 1989 12mars 1990 Pays-Bas a/ 4 fCvrier 1985 121dkembre 1988 PCrou 29 mai 1985 7 juillet 1988 Philippines .I18juin 1986 bl Pologne a/ 13 janvier 1986 26 juillet 1989 Portugal a/ 4 fCvrier 1985 9 fkvrier 1989 Republique dorninicaine 4 fCvrier 1985

- ~ RCpublique tch8que Iler janvier 1993 gl Roumanie I18 dCcembre 1990 bl Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne 11 5 mars 1985 8 dCcembre 1988 Etats qui ont sign6 ou ratifi6 la Convention Page 5 of 5

(let d'Irlande du Nord -d/ 11 11 IiSCn~~al 4 fivrier 1985 21 aoQt 1986 I ll~e~chelles 1) 115 mai 1992 h/ !I Sierra Leone 118 mars 1985 11 Slovaquie 1129 mai 1993 W SlovCnie a/ 16 juillet 1993 bl Somalie 24 ianvier 1990 bl ------Soudan 14 juin 1986 Sri Lanka 13 ianvier 1994 bl 114 fkvrier 1985 118 janvier 1986 - !I Suisse a/ 4 fCvrier 1985 2 dkembre 1986 ITogo -a/ 25 mars 1987 18 novembre 1987 li~iisiea/ 26 aoQt 1987 23 septembre 1988 , (125 janvier 1988 112 aoQt 1988 Ukraine 27 fCvrier 1986 24 fCvrier 1987 Uruguay a/ 4 fCvrier 1985 24 octobre 1986

-Venezuela a/ 115 fdvrier 1985 1 29 juillet 1991 YCmen 15 novembre 1991 - bl 1b I. 11 [~ou~oslaviea/ 1118 avril 1989 1110 septembre 1991 -a/ A fait les dkclarations prkvues aux articles 21 et 22 de la Convention.

-C/ Succession.

-dl A fait la ddclaration privue 2i I'article 21 de la Convention.

PAGE D'ACCUEILI PLAN DU SITE1 RECHERCHE1 DOCUMENTSl TRAlTESl REUNIONS1 PRESSEl MESSAGES

Q Copyright 1996-2000 Haut Commissariat aux Droits de I'Homme GeJve, Suisse ANNEX FLORENCE HARTMANN

LES GUERRES SECRETES DE LA POLlTlQUE ET DE LA JUSTICE INTERNATIONALES

Fin a5 pam'c

La EuropCens se monuenr in&%rena 1cette ingtrence qui me a cooptration sans rkwe a avec la juridiction internatio- bafoue le principe qu'ils avaient aurrefois dKcndu d'une jurda nde. Prosper encourage donc De! Ponte i profiter de sa visite ?t Washington pour retablir le dialogue avec les dirigeanu rwandais indipendante. Del Ponre leur dir mi-2003 : a Je suk au point mon, jld dk-neuf fugitih en Serbie, donr Karadzic et Mladic, 4galement de passage. La magistrate accepte volontiea, car I'obs- mais plus personne ne veut entendre parler du TPI. Cornme si uuction de Kigali riique de conduire A l'acquittement des je devais fermer les porn aprb le procb Milosevic [dont la fin accusds de gtnocide, kute de dmoins. La quasi-totalid des est dors prtvue dibut 20051. P Mais les Eumptens nBontdbor- ttmoins de I'accusation viennent du Rwanda. Cette arme redou- rnais plus qu'un mot 1la bouche : la tribunaux sont chen a table dont dispose le pouvoir mandais at un contre-feu allumd a ne produisent pas de retour sur invalscment m. D'aucuns par Kidpour amener Del Ponte h renoncer A ses enqutta en vont juqu'i dire : a Us ne dent ni le temps ni l'argent qui rnarge du genocide, qui visenr des officiers de l'armk tutsie du leur sont con&. m La CPI a incidemment &ad les TPI Qs Front pauiotique rwandais. Car le mandat du TPIR ne se hte prioccupations des EuropCens qui ne comprennent pas que leur pas au ghocide organisd et dirigt par la extrdmistes hutus mais abandon &t le Lit de la croisade de l'adminisaarion arnCricaiae A toutes les graves atteintes au droit humaniraire international, conue la justice internationale. La prides puissances n'ont . pcrpttrts en 1994. Selon les ccpem independants, quelque dtsormais plus de scrupules 1asstuner leur decision de fer~ucrle trente rnille Hutus auraient dd tuds sur le territoire rwandais, tribunal. LM discussions infOrmdes au sein du Comil de sku- lors de la progression de ParmCe du FPR Le parquet d'Arusha riti en vue de I'adoption d'une rtsolution fonnalisanr le den- a repertorid quatorze sites de massacres et tente de remonter la drier du plan de fermrmre pour les deux TPI commencenr au chaine de commandement. ORciellement, KapmC a promis i printernp 2003. L'annde 2003 va &re la quinteuence de !a diffi- Del Ponte son rrsistance mds le gCnOd-prisident n'a jamah eu culd pour la justice internationale de fiire vdoir sa principes l'intention de livrer un sed de ses hommes au TPIR D'oh les hce au jeu politique. pressions aercdes pendant I'Cd 2002. Del Ponte tst alors La dtbao sur I'Irak viennent de diviser les mcmbres du contrainte d'ordonner h ses rrois enqutteun de suspendre leur Conscil de skurid. La Maison de verre est en effervescence. mission au Rwanda mak elle re& de suspendre, meme tempo- RCS1&, I'affaire TPI ne mtrite pas que l'on s'y amrde. l prCpz- niremenr, P~muuction.L'4quipe doit travailler depuis Arusha ration de la rtsolution est une simple formalitC. Du moins pour sur les preuves ddjh accumulees et sur I'identification de dmoins, la France, la Russie et la Chine. Bien qu'accaparb par la guerre rih& hors du Rwanda. en Irak, les ktau-~niset la Grande-Bretagne y voient poumnt A I'im de Cula Del Ponte, I'~~CricainMichael Johnson, I'occasion de sewir plusieun desseins 1 la fois. Mi-mai 2003, arrivi en septembre 2002 h &usha pour assurer Pintcrim le Prosper force une rencontre enue les diiiurvm& et h procumue daTPI, Carla Del Ponte. Dcpuis un an. la relations temps de powoir le poste de procurcur adjoint, resd vacant enue Kigali et Arusha sont au plus bas. A I'Cti 2002. !e gouver- depuis un an, ordonne !a suspension des (g enquhs sptciala B. nernent mdais a pad# pendant plusieurs semaines les pro- Del Ponte ne le dicouvre qu'en decernbre. Johnson esc immkdia- cb sur le O,tnocide en bloquant la venue des dmoins-vicrimes 3 tement sommd de tentrer A La Haye. La responsabilirC de l'sn- tlusha. &I Ponte a prot&td en juillet puis en octobre auprts quCte est dors confite i un substirut britannique, Marb Moore. du Conseil de sdcuritd de l'ONU mais celui-ci s'est contend, en La autorith wandaises savent disormds que Del Ponre ne dkcrnbre 2002, dlune simple dtclaration appelanr les ktao 1 ctdera pas. Ella se tournent vers leurs puissanrs alliis arnericains 4J b\ -., Paix et chitimmt Fin dr partie et brirmniques. DbIon Kigali exip une renconue avec la procu- dtoit de poursuivre les membres de son arm&. 11s disent vouloir reure, sous mCdiation amtricaine, officiellement pour rdgler la , s'en charger. Du moins le prttendent-ils pour essayer de neuaali- problkrnes de cooptration. Mais le dCdcnchuncnt de la gucrrc en ser Del Ponce. Prosper intervient A plusieun reprises pour encou- Irak repowe sans cesse I'cchtance. La venue de Del Ponte mi-& rager la procurcure ic dder les enquttes spdciales au Rwanda. La 2003 d washington at Poccasion de r&r les deux parties. Pros- magistrate, qui s'en vu r&er l'accb aux sites des massacres et per rassure la magistrate : les Erars-Unis proposent leurs bons aux archives rnilicaires, est disposte h laisser les Rwandais entre; offices et n'ont pas I'intention GinterfCrer dans la discussion. Del prendre, parallelement au TPIR, leurs propres enquktes. A Ponte ne se doute pas un instant de ce qui va x produirc. condition que les enqu&eurs d'Arusha puissent accdder aux dos- Mercredi 14 mai 2003, en fin d'aprb-midi, dam une tlCgante siers &instruction wandais. w Je ne peux pas me baser unique- dede co&cnce du Dtpartement d'ktat oh le sort de cant de ment sur les prewes recueillies I'exttrieur du Rwanda auprhs pays s'est sans doua jout, Dd Pontc a ses conseillers prennent de la diaspora hurue dont les dmo- sont motivb par des place autour d'une table, fie A IadtlCgation rwandaise IM. En bout indrsts politiques opposts aux vatres. Je dois pouvoir vCrifier de cable. Pierre Prosper joue les maltres de cirtmonie. I1 intedre, ces informations sur place. Je veux bien trader avec vous mais suergkre les grandes Lgnes des dibats. La parrie stbiaiste d'enuee j'ai besoin de votre pleine coopiration B, explique Del Ponte. La de jeu. Elle se joue selon des rwes pr&tablies par Ics Amtricains procurrurc: at yrGcr B accorder quelqucs mois aii autorids de a les Rwandais. Del Ponte se plaint des rnanocuvres rwandaises Kigali pour apponer la preuve de leur volond de rendre justice. pour paralyser le tribunal et du refus de coopdrer sur les enqdtes u Ces crimes existent, ils ne peuvent pas &re passes sous silence. spkiales. Les Rwandais rttorquent que le parquet est loin d'avoir Les poursuivre serait un ClCment de r6conciliation *, insisre- accompli son mandat. Pour preuve, ils ont pdpad une disquette t-elle. Mais elle exige de pder la haute main sur leu enquttes. comportant wis cent cinquante noms de hauts responsables prt- Prosper tente de Yen dissuader : w Le Rwanda conduirait les sum& du ghocide contre qui Ic TPI n'a pas encore engag4 de poursuires et les procks. w poursuires. La stracdgie d'achhement qu'ils dhoncent risque de perrnettre aux instigatcurs du ginocide d'tchapper A la justice. Dans l'absolu, le TPIR pourrait renoncer sa primautt au Prosper conclut cette premitrc rcncontre en soulignant la ntcessitt profit du Rwanda si les enquetes aboutissaienr ?iPinculpation de parvenir A un accord sur Ie renvoi de dossiers au Rwanda d'offiders raponsables des massacres commis en marge du @no- cide. Mais dans un Rwanda domint par les milimires rut& qui Jeudi 15 rnai, 17 hcures. Nowelle renconuc dans la mhe ont libtrt le Rwanda des gdnocidaires, la justice est aux ordres salle du Dtpartement d'~tat. La discussion s'engage id- a les ttmoins de leurs crimes condamn& au silence. Del Ponte diatement sur les enquttes spdciales. Le message est clair : le ne peut donc pas les laisser seuls en charge de poursuites &en- TPLR ne peut pas ltgitimer des enqutta contre les militaim desni renoncer h sa primautC sur les procidures qu'iis ouvri- cursis don qu'il cst loin d'avoir termini son travail sur le #no- raient, comme le @re avec insistance Prosper. A I'issue de la cide. Les Rwandais ne nient pas les crimes mais contestent H riunion, aucun accord nsa Ctt conch. Quelques pistes ont CtC quiconque, et en parriculier A communautt internationale, le a arplordes qui mtritent &&re tlabortes. Prosper propose de les 104. La dCIigauon rwandaix ttait cornposCe de Gcnld Gahina, Ie rdsumer, dam Ies joun qui viennent, dam un document qui procurcur gCnd du Rwanda, Manin Ngoga, I'officier de &on pourra servir de base A de futures ncigociations. Une nouveile dais -- auprts du TPIR et de Richard Saibera. I'ambaaadeur du Rwanda strie d'enaetiens est prhe mi-juillet A Kigah. Del Ponte encou- auprts drs Nations Unia. rage les Rwandais h discuter dam l'intervalle avec la juges et le Pair ct chiti-t Fin & partir greffier pour rtgler Ics questions de la protection da ttrnoim en charge des cnquetes sptciala et des poursuites iventuellet. k appclb ?I Amha, er des posibit& de dCpaysement da procb procureur du TPlR n'aura plus aucun conu6le sur la conduite aprts la fermaure du TPIR des enquetes ni sur le ddroulement d'hrenruds procb ec sera tenu de &er routes les informations en sa possession aux auto- Vendredi 16 rnai, a 11 heurer. Les Rwvldzis ne sont pas de rick twandaises. Del Ponte rcpousse le document de la main et b partie. Dd Ponte a rendcz-vous au Ddpurcrnent b~tatpour kisse Xses conscillcrs le soin d'informu Prosper de son ref& d'y discuter du TPIY. Prosper et ses conseillers Sattendent dans un souscrirc. De son &tC, elk avertit le cabinet de Kofi Annan qui bureau exigu. 11s lui sournetttent un document intitulC r RtsUmC condamne la manauvre amtricaine mais dent grief i Del Ponte des conclusions entre le gouvernement du Rwanda et le TPIR D de s'ttre expos& 1la pression d'un kcat. et formulC amme unc kuille de rouw. Prii au pi& Del Pone acccpte nbmoins & rcgardcr It tate. Le pmjet a mesti h teneur dadiscussions de la veille. I1 prhroit I'abandon de toua ks enqueta l'encontre des suspects de ShCe patriotiquc Prosper n'accepn pas la dCFaite, d'autant que son gouver- rwandaise (APR) par le pvquet du TPIR et leur renvoi dcvant nernent s'est en@ sup* de Ki$i et a dCji ndpciC lc coniic- la juridiction rwandaisc, sans aucune ,rrsnnde de rtsdut. 11 dge parcia. En tchange des garanties d'impunitt contrc toute du parquet d'Maqu'il communique les sites rdpenorits des poursuite i I'enconue des miiitaires tutsis devant k TPIR, Kigali massacres. Mais awi qu'* il parcage tout ClCment de preuve avec doit signer prochainement un accord biittral avec les ~tats-~nis le gouvernement du Rwanda m, malgrt Pinterdiction de trans- qui protkgc les ressortissants amtricains de poursuins dcvant la metrre les ddpositions de ttmoins h une autre juridiction sans Cour ptnde internationale. Depuis le ddbut de I'annte 2003, les kur accord. Autre point litigieux, Ie document stipulc que a le Lo-unis tentent de condure avec le plus grand nombre &ha parquet aura I'ocasion de passcr en revue les investigations une p"rties au vaid de Rome l'accord bilatCrd d'immunitt dc juri- fois qu'elles seront terminks cdou une fois les poursuites enga- diction visant i unp&her que Isressortissancs amCricains soient gtes *. Del Ponte proteste. EUe rappelle sa proposition de la Livris h la CPI. Aprts cette signature, Kigali va en outre bCn&- veiUe. Prosper I'invite h modifier le tme. Et, plutdt que de da- cier de la lev& de I'embargo sur la armes que le Congrts am&- quer la porn, elk s'y arerce pour tviter unc confrontation avec cain avait rnaintenu n d'une assiitancc militairc substantielk da le reprCsentanr amtricain.,Mais tout serait h changer. Les conseil- hts-unis don que la guerre dans h RCpublique dhocratique lers du Ddpartemtnt d'Etat notent Ies objecrions, fbnt mine du Congo voisinc fiit rage et a dCjh ernportd plus de trois mil- d'inscrire les rectifications exigk. Del Ponte cst press&. Son Lions de vie. Or Kigali ne s'est jusqu'ici pas privd de dktabiliser avion pout La Haye part dam moins de uois heurs EUe vat la dgion des Grands Lacs ni son armtc d'ajouter Ia guerrc surtout sortir de ce guct-apcns avant d'avoir annoncer aux dam I'at du Congo pour y exploiter les ressourccs mintdes et Americains qu'eue ne signera rien. Lorsque Prosper su&re de natureUes qui suscitent tam de convoitises. lui envoy- la nouvelle version par fax La Haye, de repart Waslungon passe outre au r& de Del Pona ct Prosper soulagte. Fait coutir le bruit qu'elle a entkrind I'n accord n. Del Ponte a beau Le document arrive la maim suivante au bureau de ddmentir, dle peinc A convainme tant Prosper s'est cmployC ?i La Haye. LtJ Amtrih n'ont rien mod& de substantiel. En kcorner, au passage, la rtputation de dame de fer indipendante vertu du pdtendu n accord n. Ie gouvernement rwandais sera seul dont elk jouissait auprts dcs ONG et da journalistes sp4ciahb. Pak et c&imrnr Fin a% partic

Les repnbilles ne se font pas anendre. Les Amdricains dunan- prdtend qu'de n'a qu'une vague id& de cc qu'at le &it inter- dent aux Briranniqua de monter au fiont. Puissant soutien a la national et qu'elle ne cesse de meme en pkil le tribunal en se CPI, la Grande-Brecagne sera plus convaincante pour poursuivre comportant comme un ClCphant dam un magasin de porcclainc le bras de kr conm les juridictions internationales Fin juin, Mais, au-deli de la dputation de la Suissesse qu'ils souhaitem Jack Straw remet Kofi Annan, de passage a Genhre, une letme entacher I'actt!rieur, c'est surtout son autorite au sein du par- dans laqueUe il demande de sunder le poste de procureur, quet que Ics uois magistracs cherchent ?I rernem en question. commun au TPIR et au TPTY, et la nomination d'un procu- 11s veulcnt avoir la mains libres pour amtnagcr 1s poursuites rcur pour le tribunal d't\rusha Il just& sa ddmarche par un comme ils Sentendent, conduirc le pmcts Miosevic a leur guise souci d'efficacitt! et dc dduction des coiro. Pour avoir rejed et supprimer Ie gknocide et tout auue volet qui les dtrange1%. !'accord condu en= 'W;whiftgron ec Kigali avec Pad de Les responsables bricanniques et ameicains se raillent de ces ccn- Londres Del Ponte va ttre tvincfc du TPIR sions internes qui aEiiblissent un peu plus le parquet au moment Entde en fonaion Ic 14 septunbre 1999, h Suissesse arrive 05 ii doit Faire f'& une pression accrue des fitats a rassembler au tenne de son mandat de quaue ans dam quelqua rnois. Elk toutes ses forces pour achever ses enqdtes contre les plus haurs dam a 5 sz-ioir qu'cUe souhitc rempiier. Pour la continuiti de la dirigemcs impiiqub Its crimes en ex-~ou~oslavie. suat@c d'achtverncnt dont la premike tchtance ooncerne le Les consultations entre les membres du Conseil dc StcuritC parquet, Ie renouvd~entdu mandat de Del Ponte semble man- pour scindcr le poste de Del Ponte qui cum& le TPIR et le gr rout le monde. A I'ccception de Londrcs et dc Washington, TPIY cornencent debut juillet 2003. Londres et Washington qui voudraient la rncnre hors jeu. Hods urrains membres de ont habilement pr+C le terrain avec l'aide de Kigali. Pour son bureau, qui aspircnt cux aussi b I'tcarrer. Depuis Pautornne mobiliier la soutiens diplomatiques, le powoir rwandais a, dts 2002, son adjoint Graham Blewin fait campagne pour empkher le ddbut du mois de juin, engag4 avec Ics organisations de vic- sa ridkction. L'liusualien qui voudrait prcndre sa place at alk times une virulente campagne conue le TPIR Kigali dtnonce B Londres, Sydney, Pretoria et Tdpei et s'apprtte s'envoler db lon un pmxreur i temps partiel Y qui Gt * insulte aux pour New York &n de la discdditer auprks de la direction onu- victimes du ghocide *. Del Ponte tente de les conmr mais ses sienne lorsque, informCe de ses manoeuvres, Carla Dd Ponte Yen puissants ddtractcurs passent immddiatement l'offensive. AmC- emp&he. Michael Johnson, dont dle a interrompu la mission ricains et Briranniques I'accusent de ne pas consacru assa dc Amha, fait le voyage B Washington pour la ddnigrer auprts des nmps Arusha, scs vow coGtent cher, elle est mop occupie dle ses autorids amiricaines, affirmant que jamais ne respectera au procks Miosevic et A I'arrcstation de Karadzic et de Mladic engagements sur la smrtgie d'achhrcment. Geof&ey Nice apporte son concours dibut 2003. Jl caressc I'espoir de succCder 105. Dans un entrerien pub12 daas le quoadien dc Sarajevo Dtmni h Del Ponn, rnais surrour de I'hrinccr avant la fin du procks Avaz le 26 ad2007, Graham Blewin monnait s'ktre opposC amcB& Miloscvic. I1 multiplie dors Ies visites au Foreign Office, se fai- de Gcoffrcy Nice aux poursuites pour gCnocide conae Miioscvic et noic sanr padois accompagner par Michael Johnson, et ne manque approchi plusieurs pays du Coascil de stcurit6 n pour crnpkher la &- pas une rencontre avec des personnalitb du monde juridique ou leetion en 2003 de Dd Poncc. Aujourd'hui. Blewin continue d'a6mer que le parquet ne &tenair pas de preuva shmpour inculpcr dipiomatique pour qualifier sa pauonne d'incompetence, de Milosevic de gCnocide, oubliant hile jugemem prtlimiruire du 16 juin pitrre -cur, plus soucieuse de ses privilkga et de sa couver- 2004 qui confirme i I'i de la phase d'accusation la charge de gkocide ture mddiatique que de la bonne marche de son bureau. I1 au vu du preuver prbeacta en audience. Fin dcpartie

Elle ne peut pas mener de fiont les deux stratdgcs de sortie. La de Kofi Annan qui, au mois de mail entendair recommanda sa arguments semblent convaincants et la majorit6 des manbres du reconduction au double poste de procureur dcs TPI. I1 savait Conseil de dcuritd accueillent fimrablement la proposition. IE qu'elle avait dors le soutien des itas qui la percevaint come sont loin de soupsonner me manauvrc motivtc par la volontt la garante du maintien d'un programme r6duit et recent& &tarter Del Ponte & de mme fin am enquk s@es n. arrachd par me communautd internationale soucieuse de le voir Le principe de la scission du poste de procureur acquis haut la mem en mresans recard L'dventuaIitC d'un changcment de main, Washington tente d'obtenir la mise h pied de Del Pontc procureur n'efneure donc penonne. Carla Del Ponte est, en Mais les Britanniqucs uowent I'initiadve uop risquCe. Ils p&- outre, persude que le sea4taire g6nCral n'acceptera pas de cau- rent l'habii de la dparation qui nc suscite ni rbice ni tionner un suaqkme qui pone atteinte h la justice. Kofi Annan questions indiscrttts. Lcs Amtricains tcstent mu&s les n'est cependaat pas pr& A un nouvel affiontement avec les Amt- mcmbrcs du Consd de stcutird en proposvlt de renowelcr k ricains. La crise sur I'entrtc en perre en It& au Conseil de mandat de Del Ponte au TPIY pour hatun an. Lcs Am& sCcurit6 a fad&lui dterson propre poste. Broyt? par la machine ricains esptrent qu'ainsi dCsavouCe la magistrate tournera 1s am~ricaine,il rive de prendre sa revanche, rnais I'enieu den vaut talons et rentrera dam son Tessin natal. Mais l'idh, qualiitc pas la peine : a Cela risque de crier uc~de remcm cornpce mu d'a absurde n, bit long feu. Del Ponte agace, de at souvent de la tendance au sein du Conseil de dcurirC. n A Del Ponre qui persue commc dangereux et dcstabiittice des r&gions dont le tscc en demandant si elle peut choisir entre le poste de prom- e~~es'occupe. ~ais~es Gats respectent son courage a ne veulent reur d'Arusha et celui de La Haye, il repond : # Je ne crois pas, pas rcnier celle qui symbolise le co,mbat conuc I'impunirt alors Milosevic est entre vos mains, 3 vous de vous en occuper. * A que le pmb du premier chef d'Em traduit dcvant la justice l'issue de la dunion, Del Ponte lui lance : u Vous n'aurez pas intanationale at en cours. d'enquttes spdciales ! u Et Kofi Annan de rdpondre : a Non, ils ne fant pas cela. - Vous verra n, rdtorque Del Ponte en lui Dibut juillet, les projets de r&olution cornmencent h circulu, tendant ses notes : a Conserva-les pour I'Histoire. n Ddsabust?, d'abord entrc les cinq manbres permanents puis enuc les dbr IqM Riza confie 1 Del Ponte en apart6 : u Tout est politique. autres membres non permanents du Conseil de s6curitC. Amdri- I1 n'aurait pas dG en ewe ainsi mais tout est politisd. m Dd de cains et Briranniqucs tirent 1s fictlles mais continuent nier Pona : * C'st injuste que la politique sape notre uavail. Gla leu1 implication. Ils ont fait aoire h leun parcenaires que Pinitia- me hit du maJ de MU que 1'on pwient 1 b&ua le prinape tive vient de Kofi Annan, soucieux d'encourager unc plus grande de la justice internationale puce que Kagam6 a sign4 I'accord efficacit6 du TPIR par ce dddoublunent de pose rant ddamt bilatdral [sur le CPI avec Ies krats-~nis]et que I'on a &id& en par les Rwandais. Dd Ponce arrive h New York, k 28 juillet, &change de prottgcr scs soldats. n Le chef de cabinet de pour tenter de d6joucr les plans de scs ddtracteurs. Elle veut Kofi Annan tente de I'apaiser : Les principes sont prtscnrb. n h ttre demander entendue par le Conseil de s4curitC avant Dd Ponte : u Non car la siparation, Zest la fin dcs cnqutes I'adoption de la r&olution ct cxpliquer les dangers du dCdouble- sp6ciaIe.s. r. Et Iqbal Riza de conclure : a Oui, je sais. Je ment de son poste, l'absurdit6 de changer de procurcur h un an reconnais la force dc vos ar,ouments, je comprends entitrement de la fin des enquk au risque de mcttre en danger la stradgie mais ne me citez pas publiquement. D d'achhrement dam a sa phase la plus cruciale n. Elle veut aussi derrer les membres du Conscil de stcurit6 sur la intentions Les manmuvres amtfricaineset britanniques ont susdtd un sur- cachtes de Londres et de Washington. EUe mise sur le soutien saut de la France qui, depuis ia crise sur l'Irak, n'a pas envie de 4

?74 8 Fin a2 partic leur &re la moindre concession. Elle dbapprouve la ingCmcts II avait Ctt crCC en 1993 pour poursuivre la a auteurs de viola- dans le travail de Dd Ponte mais elle a surtout des comptcs A tions du Droit humanhire international n. 11 avait dtC invid par dgler sur le Rwanda. Cu avec I'arrivCe au pouvoir de KagamC la rksolution 1329 du 30 novernbre 2000 h se pencher &vantage apris le gdnocide, Paris a perdu un peu plus de son prC cart4 sus les a huts responsables politiques et militaires n. DCsormdrs, africain. Le Rwanda at dhrmais sous influence 40-saxome il doit se limiter arn: a tout principaux responsables n a se dcssai- et la France y est honnie pour avoir soutcnu le rtgime gdnoci- sir, au profit des juridictions locales, de toutes les amm daire hum. G sursaut motivd par des inttrtts particulien a le enqutta. L. hats de la rdgion sont som&de herlcs hyit& mtrite de profiter aux imptratifs de la justice. Pads exige que ct a tout particulikrement Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, k planning stria imposC aux TPI, commandant dachcva ks ainsi qu'hte Gotovina n. EuropCens et ArnCricains n'ont pas enquhes fin 2004 a Ics pro& en premik instance en 2008, rkussi I surmonter le blocage ruse pour I'inscrire dans la rbolu- sitronnaiapaot mais pas dcfinitif. Elk ~llcbat avcc suds pour tion mais wurcnt quc k TPI ne f;ermen pas ses pores sans que une mention dd r enqub #ciaIcs rn dans la rbolution. Le Radovan Karadzic et EL& Mladic lui soient Livrb. Brimnniques tme final appelle le Rwanda A a intensifier [sa] cooptrarion avec et Amdricains ont rempod une victoire sur la scission du poste le TPIR noramment sur les enquttes contre I'Ar~~lttpatrictig~e de procurcur. Carla Del Ponte est Ccartde du parquet du TPIR mdaise n. avec effet irnmtdiat. Elle at reconduite dam la foulde pour Soutenu par plusieurs membres du Conseil de Sccuritt, Paris quaue ans au TPIY. Frustds par un bilan mitigt! sur les autres parvient Cgaement I bloquer la proposition initiale an&- points, Washington et Londres vont s'employer I rectifier le tir. dricaine de meme imm&tement fin aux enq&cs du Tniu- Pour accdirer le processus de &localisacion, Ie Conseil de nd de La Haye. Lc projct du 10 aofit suggdrait que a route sdcuritd s'est rtrolu I appeler I l'ttabliement, dans les plus br& a nouvelle inculpation serait incompatible avec la stratcgie d'achk- ddlais, d'une Cour spkide en Bosnie-HenCgovine. Depuis &ux vement du TPIY .. Les dCmarchcs de Del Ponte fin juillex ct @ ans, le TPI rklvns la crhtion d'une structure P mtme de j$ son intervention, huis clos, k 8 aoat devant le Conseil de rendr re le relais mais les grandes puissances rechignaient A & sCcuritC oh elle a CnurntrC toutts les menaces qui pesaient sur merue la main h la poche. Sous la houlette des ArnCricains, une x-7. ladeux tribunaux ont pord leurs fruits. L'initiativc de Londm &_ confirence est findement organide I La Haye, le 30 octobre i i et de Washington va &re vidk de sa substance, I l'aception de 2003, pour lever des fbnds. Du-sept miIlions d'euros sont : lshriction de Del Ponn du TPIR recueillis pour assurer le financement pendant Les vois prdres - Si les hats insistent tous pour que les ddlais soient respec&, annkes de la juridiction mixte de Sarajevo. Elle doit powoir la majoritt dcs quinze membres du Conseil de sCcuritt ne veut conduire une dizaine de procks qui auraient dQ se dtroukr A pas assumer la responsabilitt dc demander I'dt immtdiat des La Haye ct condure les enquks contre la cinquantaine de sus- poursuites qui donnerait I'ipunitt aux huts nsponsables, pects que Del Ponte a Ctt contrainte de gtler en 2002 La disormais dans la lipde mire du parquet. Ils p&nr resserm Chambre pour les aimcs dc guerre de Bosnie-Hexztgovine voit un pcu plus le mandat du TPI. Sclon lcs termcs de la dsolution It jour dtbut 2005 aprh une rtforme du Code pknal, opt!& 1503 du Conseil de stcuritt du 28 aoht 2003, Ic TPI a dhr- par les Anglo-Saxons qui imposent un systkme de common law mais vocation dc concentrer son champ d'action sur a les tout dam un pays a une rigion de droit romain. Ce choix va vite principaux raponsables rn des crimes commis en ex-Yougoslavie. apparaitre comrne une enmve A la coopCration judiciaire catre

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From: Philippe Larochelle [[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2008 3:lg PM To: Erlinder, Peter Cc: dushimilimana athanase; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Jwani Mwaikusa; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; richard- [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; a [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; Maitre Bahati; kamile Subject: TransferIGuichaoua

Hello all,

I have received this yesterday from Professor Guichaoua.

Maybe it can help re: transfer issue.

Regards,

Philippe Larochelle Rwanda 2008 : can the Rule of Law be transferred, just as the accused ?

On November 13th, Joseph Mutaboba, General Secretary of the Ministry of Interior in Rwanda, stated : << Rwanda should be seen as it is rather than perceived as it is not D. The gap between official truth and its perception, in my opinion, clearly indicates how difficult it is for all observers to appreciate and assess the Rule of Law in the Rwandan context : a context which is rooted in war and genocide, and which is marked by an intensive ideological and police surveillance in every field that somehow relates to (< politics D.

Journalists are the most threatened, of course. Pressure and repression against journalists is what brought Rwanda to the top of the << predators of press freedom D list that Reporters Without Borders published at the end of last year. After the problems that RFI and Voice of America faced with their FM programming, for certain journalists or radio broadcasts, it is now the BBC's turn to be targeted by the authorities. On November 13th, the entire political elite charged with maintaining ideological law and order at the national level held a meeting in Kigali during which the Director of the Great Lakes Department of the BBC was solemnly accused of the most serious charges in relation with their latest broadcast in the Kinyarwanda language. The most serious charges concerned , in this order : the subjects which they chose to handle, the language they used, the emphasis they put on ethnicity, their criticism of the government's policies, their propagation of genocide ideology, etc. At the end of what was described as an (( excellent meeting D, the BBC's representative was firmly invited to seriously consider the requests that had been expressed if the BBC wanted to get its partnership agreements renewed.. .

Academics and researchers in the social sciences, both national and international, are another group under heavy surveillance that has fully understood the stakes in this ideological monitoring: most do not publish anything but variations of the official discourse; others waffle or resort to understatement, and many just wait until they are outside of the country before they decide to express themselves.

A similar attitude prevails among activists in national human rights organizations.. Although their mandates are regularly renewed by the authorities - like in the case of Liprodhor - their leaders tend to flee the country just as soon as they realize the constraints of their positions.

Lastly, despite their long experience in self-censorship, major foreign representations and international aid agencies must endure the fUry of the authorities every time the studies that they%undertake to assess civil liberties and good governance lead to disappointing conclusions: they publish bowdlerized versions or instead issue joint statements with the official apologetics, or simply fully censor their conclusions. Confiscation of the research documentation, arrests of field researchers or witnesses, forced dismissal of program managers, and departure of expatriate staff are standard fare. Embassies and delegations are not particularly keen to publicize such (( incidents )) or << misunderstandings D.. .

Against this background, on the eve of general elections which are meant to consecrate the progressive normalization of the current political framework, the authorities that emerged from the war expect the international community to recognize their full sovereignty by ending the tutelage that still prevails in the most sensitive domain in terms of legitimacy : the justice sector. Indeed, except for a few trials, 2008 should see the end of both the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, which is charged with trying those most responsible for having organized the massacres and the genocide, and inside the country, that of the domestic transitional justice system that would be responsible for trying all the remaining accused. The ICTR, the very symbol of judicial exceptionalism conferred by the United Nations' Security Council, should now give way to the national judiciary, which has been brought into line, at least in theory, with international standards. The stakes are crucial because, beyond the assessment to be made of the how the justice system works, it would also examine the political program that was inaugurated at the end of the war to judge the horrendous crimes that were committed at that time, to end impunity, and to establish (( truth, justice and reconciliation D.

This program of (( national reconstruction D is probably the one that has been carried out with the greatest determination : after the forced return of some three million Hutu rehgees from across the border, the conquest of ZaYre in order to pursue and slaughter tens of thousands of runaway cr. genocidaires )), and a purge of the State apparatus, the new military authorities had expected to assume hll control of the country's political and social machinery in order to bring close to one million people accused of genocide to trial before the ad hoc courts, those people's courts, the so-called traditional gacaca jurisdictions (which is to say, almost the entire male Hutu population who was old enough to be held responsible). Most of the 5 to 600 000 who are expected to be found guilty will be granted the option of having their prison sentences converted into forced labour, the so-called public interest work s.

Judging by the President's own pronouncements, this shock therapy, which is strongly ethnicized, explicitly aims to remedy thirty years of a regime described as fascistic and genocidal and to collectively re-educate a population in which, as an official recently said to members of the diplomatic corps, unlike Nazi Germ~y,(( every Rwandan personally behaved like an SS D.

Today, as the trials are about to end and their objectives, in terms of figures, are almost attained, the time is still not yet ripe for an evaluation of this system of justice, if only because of the above-mentioned restrictions that limit access to the field and freedom of analysis and expression. Let us limit ourselves to acknowledging the disillusionment of most ordinary people who expected much of this (( grassroots justice system D, the increasing reservations of national and international NGO's, the critical distance that several cooperative agencies (who financed the system) now take, several of which no longer conceal their apprehensions about having participated in creating this monstrous justice system. Beyond its procedures and legal framework, which are repeatedly modified, the central issue of political instrurnentalization seems more pressing in the field of justice that in any of the other fields previously discussed.

The omnipresence of the RPF's cadres and their strict control over the population appear to be decisive : the political authorities regulate, without any real checks, the very process of public denunciation upon which the system is built, since there is no formal investigation. In fact, and the observation is easily made where businessmen, officers and high-ranking civil servants are concerned, only the RPF can decide to exonerate or set free a confessed (( genocidaire )) in return for their public endorsements or for some other service, or, at the other extreme, decide to hound those who had initially joined the RPF because of personal convictions, but who no longer felt that they owed the party any blind allegiance. On the other hand, among its own ranks, none has ever been, or is ever likely to be, prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against humanity or for any abuses against the Hutu population during the RPF's conquest and seizing of power (looting, illegal occupation of properties, crimes of (( revenge D, collective massacres, etc.). But even more hdamental is the fact that the co-extensive definition of the crimes linked to the genocide to which the authorities resort (with concepts such as genocidal tendancy )) or (( genocidal ideology D) serves also to encumber every expression of opposition to the new regime. This mechanism of political blackmail has been institutionalized at the international level by publishing regularly updated lists of presumed (< gknocidaires N who are sought for prosecution by the Rwandan authorities, which then demands their extradition by their host countries. Every time there is a new list, alongside the names of notorious killers, the names of persons who had never been associated with the genocide are inserted or removed, depending on the political << messages D that RPF authorities wish to convey to them via the judiciary, which then fabricates indictments upon request.

This is the context in which the ICTR has been working since its inception, and the background against which the issues linked to the completion strategy of its mandate is raised. Like all other international bodies that have had to deal with the ins and outs of the Rwandan crisis, the ICTR fulfilled the mission that was expected from it and which consisted in strengthening the justice sector to rebuild a ruined country, within the boundaries tolerated by the new authorities.

@ Let us then say that the RPF has been willing to collaborate with the ICTR in direct proportion to its ability or success in imposing its will on it, and in blocking any initiative of which it did not approve. In its view, the ICTR's mandate was confined to examining the civil war within the narrow scope of the most dramatic feature of its outcome: the genocide of the civilian Tutsi population. Looking at the prosecution's accomplishments to date, it is obvious that, whereas the most important protagonists of the genocide have been tried and judged, its singular approach only reinforces the one-sided vision of the Rwandan conflict that the winning camp has been trying to solidify.

This is the viewpoint from which one should consider the stakes of the completion strategy of the ICTR's mandate. By calling for the transfer of the tribunal's archives and the transfers of the accused who have not yet been tried or arrested - which no other country has officially accepted to date - the present Rwandan authorities intend to appropriate the work and the legitimacy of the ICTR, notwithstanding the fact that these same authorities were originally envisaged as targets of inquiry in a comprehensive prosecution investigations strategy. To endorse this demand would amount to granting moral legitimacy to an abuse of their @ dominant position. The page would then have been turned definitively and the RPF would be cleared of its own crimes by the granting of what one could only characterize as (( plenary indulgence D, by analogy with a traditional practice of the Catholic Church whose Popes were entitled to grant partial or full remission of their sins to - almost always high-ranking - members of their congregation who had rendered service to the church and who professed to make amends.

Does the realignment of the Rwandan judiciary along international standards result from a will to promptly build the Rule of law, which would guarantee transparency, the right to a fair trial and the right to appeal, for the various accused persons that the authorities pursue or whose extradition or transfer to Rwanda they now demand ?

No argument that would back up this assertion can be provided to date. For example, whereas Kigali's Minister of Justice recently described Rwanda's achievements in the field of civil and political rights before the United Nations' Human Rights Committee, the Rwandan government disregards the requests for information from the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (just as it does those of the World Interparliamentary Union) about the extra-judicial methods of elimination practiced by the Rwandan security services, of which several important personalities have been the victims, notably the Vice-president of the Supreme Court in April 2003. Those requests for information have undoubtedly been received, given the brutal retaliation that other family members have had to face in the immediate aftermath of certain inquiries.

Moreover, in July 2007, thanks to an exceptional combination of circumstances, it was clearly demonstrated that the international arrest warrant issued against someone described as one of the (( genocide master-minds D was based on allegations that had been precisely dated and particularized by a number of witnesses, according to which the alleged crimes had been committed in Rwanda in April, May and June 1994, whereas it was a well-recognized fact that the said person was out of the country during the entire war. Beyond the political will to harm, this strongly raises the major issue of the Rwandan judiciary continually resorting to quasi-professionalized perjurers inside the country, who are being actively supported abroad, for better or worse. How many suspects are actively being traced today by Interpol, or are subjected to extradition proceedings on the basis of such cr evidence D, which the host e countries, or even the ICTR, unquestioningly endorse? To what point will the ICTR accept to submit to the obligation of political realism that the present Rwandan regime imposes on all international actors as the price to be paid for their vacillation before the massacres and the genocide in 1994 ?

At the end of its mandate, although the final review of its achievements is rather mixed, it should be solemnly repeated that the ICTR is an ethical institution whose international vocation is to be independent, and which cannot be held accountable in any way for the failings of those who set it up and vested it with the power to declare what is true and what is right, and to make the legal pronouncements that all would have to abide by. The distinction to be made between the demand for full accountability and the extra-judicial considerations of where and how this should be accomplished appears all the more necessary today since most countries which host Rwandan refugees hope, above all, one day, to be relieved of the controversies and accusations that the very presence of these Rwandans brings : they would rather, once again, "leave the Rwandans to settle their disputes among themselves" by simply expelling them. Transferring the accused is thus also about attempting to get rid of those @ embarrassing individuals and the memories they keep alive.

The alignment of the new Rwandan legal framework along (( international )) standards (notably the abolishment of death penalty), recourse to management principles and prison construction that meets international standards, certainly pleases the international jurists and aid agencies who promoted and financed it all. But equity, respect for civil and political rights and sound management practices cannot be decreed, cannot be negotiated and cannot be transferred. They either prevail or they do not prevail. To forget that is to take the chance of making the very same mistakes as before, when similar good grades were granted to a former regime, with the same self-importance, by the same aid agencies and experts. Confidence in the Rwandan judiciary can only be built over the long term, through trial and experience. It has firstly to be recognized and shared by the Rwandan people and international public opinion. This is obviously far from being the case today.

AndrC Guichaoua, 1 February 2008 FEBRUARY 27th 2004

RWANDA ANGERED AND SURPRISED BY ACQUITTAL OF EX-RWANDAN PREFECT BY UN TRIBUNAL

Cyangugu, February 27th, 2004 (FH) - Rwandan Attorney General, Jean de Dieu Mucyo has said that Wednesday's acquittal of the former prefect of the Cyangugu province, Emmanuel Bagambiki by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda(lCTR) is "unacceptable".

"It is impossible. It is impossible", Mucyo said reacting to the acquittal on genocide and crimes against humanity charges of Bagambiki and former minister of transport and telecommunications, Andre Ntagerura. "The prosecutor must appeal", he added.

"This is a joke", retorted Adrienne Muhimpundu, an official with the genocide survivor's education fund, FARG, in Cyangugu town said. "If Bagambiki is set free, they may as well release everyone else".

Judges at the ICTR ruled that whereas there was evidence of "widespread attacks against the Tutsi civilian population of Cyangugu on ethnic grounds", the prosecution had failed to prove any responsibility by Bagambiki, 55 and Ntagerura, 54.

The court however found co-accused and former commander of Karambo military barracks in Cyangugu, 43- year old Lieutenant Samuel lmanishimwe guilty of participating in the 1994 genocide in Cyangugu and sentenced him to 27 years in jail.

"Bagambiki! That is unbelievable", Faustin Ngabonziza, a taxi driver in Cyangugu town said of the former prefect's acquittal. "At least acquitting Ntagerura may be understandable. I think this whole thing is going to heat up people's heads in this country", he added.

"We come across this man's name (Bagambiki) many times during testimonies about killings in Cyangugu. These are testimonies in different trials but they all mention Bagambiki in the killings", said prosecutor for Cyangugu, Emmanuel Mukunzi.

On the other hand a few of the people interviewed on the streets of Cyangugu said that the decision of the court should be respected as it is.

"I respect the decision of the judges. They know what they are doing", Ali Nzabonimpa, a radio-repairer in Cyangugu town told Hirondelle. "I think they have heard testimonies and taken their decision on the basis of that".

"I trust this decision. The judges used their wisdom", a man who only identified himself as Damascent said.

Most of the people interviewed by Hirondelle focused their comments on Bagambiki. IDTA - The project FEBRUARY 29th 2004 Trials & Detainees GENOCIDEIRWANDA 1 THOUSANDS DEMONSTRATE AGAINST UN TRIBUNAL Kigali, February 29th, 2004 (FH) -An estimated 10,000 people turned up on the streets of the south west Rwanda town of Cyangugu on Thursday to demonstrate against the acquittal of two senior leaders from the province on genocide charges by the UN International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

The ICTR on Wednesday absolved former prefect of Cyangugu Emmanuel Bagambiki and former minister of transport and telecommunications, Andre Ntagerura who hails from the province, of any responsibility in the killings that took place in the province during the 1994 genocide. Former military commander of Karambo military barracks in Cyangugu, Samuel lmanishimwe was found guilty of ordering and abetting the killings of many ethnic Tutsis that had taken refuge at a football pitch on the outskirts of the town. He was sentenced to 27 years in jail.

Demonstrators carrying placards denouncing "revisionist ICTR", "useless UN" and "Bagambiki the killer" among others matched along the main streets chanting anti- a ICTR and anti-UN slogans. The demonstrators called on the ICTR to reconsider the judgement.

Leaders of civil society organisations and genocide survivors made speeches denouncing the ICTR, Bagambiki, Ntagerura and Imanishimwe.

Demonstrations against the lCTR judgements on Friday atso took place in Kigali- Rural province. Bagambiki was prefect of that province prior to being transferred to Cyangugu. He has been accused of responsibility in the 1992 killings of ethnic Tutsis in the Bugesera region of Kigali-Rural province.

The judgements enraged the Rwandan government and genocide survivors. A communique from the ministry of justice on Thursday "categorically denounced" the decision to acquit Bagambiki and Ntagerura. It also called for a tougher sentence for Imanishimwe. The prosecutor of the ICTR has appealed against the judgements.

This is only the second time that the ICTR has delivered an acquittal. The first and only other suspect to be acquitted was former mayor of Mabanza commune lgnace Bagilishema in 2001. The Rwandan government on that occasion accepted the decision of the ICTR.

By Hirondelle news agency Rwanda: Tribunal Acquits Ex-Rukara Mayor

The New Times (Kigali) September 12, 2006 Posted to the web September 13, 2006 James Munyaneza Kigali

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), yesterday acquitted a former Bourgmestre (mayor) of the former Rukara commune and jailed a top military officer in the defunct FAR forces to 25 years. The UN tribunal's Trial Chamber I absolved Jean Mpambara, of any responsibility in the killings that took place in the commune during the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, while Trial Chamber I1found Lieutenant Colonel Tharcisse Muvunyi, guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity

Muvunyi is a former Commander of Ecole des Sous-officiers (ESO), a Rwandan military academy, based in the Southern province. According to press releases from the Tribunal, Mpambara was not found guilty of genocide and extermination for his alleged involvement in attacks at three different locations in his Commune, while Muvunyi was found guilty of not preventing attacks by his soldiers on civilians.

The Chamber also held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that in May 1994, Muvunyi addressed a public meeting attended by about one thousand mainly Hutu, said one of the releases. "During his speech, Muvunyi called for the killing of Tutsis, the destruction of Tutsi property, associated Tutsis with the enemy, and denigrated Tctsi people by referring to them as snakes," the tribunal said in a statement.

"The Chamber found the accused, Tharcisse Muvunyi, guilty of direct and public incitement to commit genocide," it added.

However, the Chamber, presided over by Asoka de Silva , dismissed the charge of rape as crimes against humanity "because the witnesses called by the Prosecution attributed the rapes to soldiers of ESO yet the specific charges in the indictment referred to rapes committed by soldiers from the Ngoma camp and Interahamwe."

The Prosecution had prayed court to hold Mpambara liable for aiding and abetting crime.

"The Chamber found that the evidence did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Mpambara ever instigated or positively assisted the attackers." it adds. His case was presided over by judge Jai Ram Reddy.

The Chamber ordered the immediate release of Mpambara, who was arrested in northern Tanzania on June 20, 2001 and charged with genocide.

Acquittal upsetting

In reaction to the verdict freeing Mbambara, both the Rwandan government and the Umbrella association of genocide survivors, Ibuka (Remember), said they were upset and astonished by the ruling. Justice Minister Tharcise Karugarama (pictured) described the news as an "upsetting", while Ibuka Executive Secretary Benoit Kaboyi, called it a shock.

"We feel upset that we were not able to secure conviction of one of the worst perpetrators of the genocide," said the minister.

He added: "We do recognize the independence of the Tribunal and are obliged to accept its decision; but as a sovereign state, we do not agree with the verdict."

Both the minister and Kaboyi said the ruling would demoralise witnesses.

"I have talked to various survivors and they are all telling me that they distressed and demoralised. In Rukara, Mpambara is remembered in the same way (Emmanuel) Bagambiki is remembered in CyanguguIr1said Kaboyi.

Bagambiki, a former prefect of the former Cyangugu province, was also released several months ago by the tribunal, but is still wanted by Rwanda to answer rape charges which were not included in his ICTR Indictment. "I hope the prosecution will appeal and then try to strengthen its evidence," Kaboyi said.

Mparnbara had pleaded not guilty to all counts, in the trial that commenced on September 19, 2005.

Relations between the Rwandan government and ICTR are in balance following the court's alleged involvement in the controversial release of one Calixte Gakwaya, a defence counsel of one of the Accused at the Tribunal.

0 FORUM : Urubuqa rw'iqihuha

16.06.08 - ICTRITRANSFERS - RWANDAN CATHOLIC HEAD WANTS RPF SOLDIERS TRIAL OUTSIDE THE 3,.J COUNTRY

16.06.08 - ICTRITRANSFERS - RWANDAN CATHOLIC HEAD WANTS RPF SOLDIERS TRIAL OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY

Arusha, 16 May,2008 (FH)-The Head of the Roman Catholic in Rwanda, Arcbishop Thaddee Ntihinyurwa, said that the trial of the four Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) soldiers alleged to have killed members of the Catholic clergy during the 1994 genocide, was best to have it conducted outside Rwanda in the interest of justice.

He is not convinced that the church's lost clergy would get justice, citing possible interference from government authorities, reported Rwanda News Agency (RNA).

"Justice can only be rendered by foreigners not Rwandans that are most likely to be compromised by the establishment" claimed Ntihinyurwa.

Ntihinyurwa was then Bishop of Cyangugu at the time of genocide until 1996, when he was named to succeed Archbishop Vincent Nsengiyurnva, who was among 13 clergymen allegedly killed by the RPF soldiers on 5 June 1994 in Kabgayi, Muhanga District., central Rwanda.

The Rwandan Ministry of Defence announced last week that it had detained four officers in connection with the clergymen's killings-Brig Gen Wilson Gumisiriza, Maj. Wilson Ukwishaka, Capt. John Butera and Capt (Retired) Dieudonne Rukeba.

They are expected to appear in court soon.

According to ICTR Prosecutor, Justice Hassan Jallow, Rwanda shared concurrent jurisdiction with the tribunal over such offences and that the UN Court would monitor the trial. However, he has warned that the trial can be retracted if it lacked transparency.

Justice Jallow's predecessor, Swiss Carla Del Ponte, was the first to disclose over the RPF investigations during her tenure between 1999 and 2003.

The Rwandan government in the past has been furious over the investigations and even reached a boiling point by refusing to co-operate with the UN tribunal and once even denied entry visa to Del Ponte.

O Hirondelle News Agency

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA ARUSHA TANZANIA

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL ANDREW HOURIGAN

Date of document: 27 November 2006

Filed on behalf of the Plaintiff by: Michael Hourigan Carrington House 61-63 Carrington Street Adelaide South Austrlia 5000 AUSTRALIA Ph: (08) 8237 0584 Mobile: 0415 668 732 Fax: (08) 8237 0555 Email: [email protected]

Date and time of filing or transmission: 27 November 2006 AFFIDAVIT

I, MICHAEL ANDREW HOURIGAN Lawyer of 61-63 Carrington Street Adelaide 5000 in the State of South Australia Solicitor MAKE OATH AND SAY as follows:

I am a qualified legal practitioner in the State of South Australia. I was also a former police detective before completing a law degree in 1995 after which time I took up a post as a Crown Prosecutor with the Director of Public Prosecutions (D .P.P. Adelaide).

In April, 1996 I left the D.P. P. in Adelaide and took up a position as an investigator with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Soon after my arrival in Rwanda I was put made a team leader in charge of a team consisting of about 20 members and the team was to be known as 'the National Team'.

I was directed by Judge Richard Goldstone (the then Chief Prosecutor) and Judge Honor6 Rakotomana (the then ICTR Prosecutor) and Mr. Alphonse Breau (the then Director of Investigations) to focus my teams investigations on the following matters:-

4.1. Investigate the criminal conduct of Colonel Theoneste Bagosora and then locate and arrest him; 4.2. Investigate the criminal conduct of Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva and then locate and arrest him; 4.3. Investigate the murder of thousands of Rwandan elite in the first days of the genocide by the Rwandan Presidential. 4.4. Identify the person($ responsible for the fatal rocket attack on 6 April 1994 killing President Habyarimana and all others on board;

Together with my investigators we conducted investigations into these matters throughout the next year. During the course of 1996 I was called . upon to brief Judge Goldstone and then his replacement Judge Louise Arbour and other senior prosecutors on the progress of our investigations into Bagosora, Nsengiyumva, the Presidential Guard and the rokket attack upon President Habyarimana's aircraft.

At no time did Judge Goldstone, Judge Arbour or any other member of the ICTR ever indicate to me that our investigations into the downing of the President Habyrimana's aircraft were outside the ICTR mandate. On the contrary, it was made clear to me that our investigations into the rocket attack upon the President's aircraft was an a ct of international terrorism which clearly fell within the ICTR statute Article 4 Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions:- 7 I am pleased to say that the National Team was successful and we achieved the following results:- 7.1. Located, arrested and charged Colonel Theoneste Bagosora with Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity; 7.2. Located, arrested and charged Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity; 7.3. Gathered evidence against senior members of the Presidential Guard in relation to the killing of key Rwandan citizens, including but not limited to, UNAMIR-protected VIPS Justice Joseph Kavaruganda, (President of the Constitutional Court) and Vice President Lando Ndasingwa (the head of the Parti liberal); 7.4. In late January or early February 1997 members of the National Team were approached by three (3) informants (either former or serving member of the R.P.F.) claiming direct involvement in the 1994 fatal rocket attack upon the President's aircraft. Thei r evidence specifically implicated the direct involvement of President Paul Kagame, hembers of his administration and military. The informants also advised that the Kagame administration was actively involved in covert opprations aimed at murdering high profile expatriate Rwandaq - once such murder was the death of Seth Sedashonga in Nairobi.

8 With respect to the highly sensitive information from the three informants regarding the plane crash I immediately informed my Commander Jim Lyons. My Director Mr. Alphonse Breau was out of the country and I arranged for him to be told by telephone.

9 The information from the sources was very detailed and seemed very credible. I was +cry concerned about the sensitivity of the information and arranged for an urgent ' secure' telephone call to Judge Arbour.

Commander Jim Lyons and I attended at the US Embassy in Kigali and I made a call to Judge Arbour at the US Embassy in the Hague using an encrypted ('secure') STU 111 telephone. I informed Judge Arbour in considerable detail about the information implicating President Kagame. She was excited by the break through and advised me that the information corroborated some other information she had just learnt from Alison Des Forge the week before. At no time did she suggest that our investigations were improper. On the contrary, I would describe her mood as upbeat and excited that at last we were making significant progress into the events surrounding the plane crash.

Judge Arbour was concerned about the safety of the informants and my men. I advised her that the informants' identi ties had been kept secure and if she so directed me I would arrange for my investigators involved in the plane crash to leave Rwanda. She directed that my investigators should leave and I agreed to have them travel from the country on suitable inquiries in Nairobi. As for me I declined to leave Rwanda and advised her that I wanted to stay with my team and assist them complete other important investigations. She consented to this but asked me to keep in touch with her while she considered what to do with this sensitive information.

During the next week I was directed by senior members of the UN in Kigali that I was required to travel to the ICTY in the Hague in order to meet with Judge Arbour and brief on her on our investigations in the rocket attack upon President Habyarimana's aircraft.

Some days later I was approached at the ICTR headquarters in Kigali by Mr. Michael Hall, UN Deputy Security (NY). He advised me that I would be flying to Arusha the next day on the ICTR aircraft and from there board an international KLM flight to Amsterdam. Mr. Hall asked me to give him any information that I had on air crash and he would convey it to the airport in a UN diplomatic pouch. I then gave Mr. Hall a single floppy disc containing a memorandum I bad prepared for Judge Arbour.

The next day Mr. Hall conveyed me to the Kigali airport where I checked in for the UN flight. There Mr. Hall and I were told that the flight was overbooked and that I could not to Arusha. Mr. Hall became agitated and told the UN flight officer that the UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan had personally ordered my attendance in Arusha for an international connection the next day. As a consequence I was given a seat on the UN flight and flew to Arusha.

The next day I flew to the Hague and over-nighted in a hotel near the ICTY.

The following morning I met with Mr. A1 Breau and briefed him on the information coqcerning the plane crash. Together we discussed forming a special ICTR investigations unit based outside of Kigali to investigate the plane crash.

17 Following breakfast Mr. Breau and I attended at the ICTY and met with Judge Arbour. Also present was Mr. Mohammed Othrnan, Acting ICTR Prosecutor.

I briefed Judge Arbour on the informants and their information regarding the involvement of President Kagame and members of the RPF in the downing of President Habyrirnana's aircraft.

I presented her with a copy of a memo I had prepared entitled 'Secret National Team Inquiry - Internal Memorandum' and this document which is undated is attached to this statement. This document detailed the information provided by the three informants.

To my surprise Judge Arbour was aggressive and questioned me about the source of the information regarding the informants and the quality and potential reliability of their information. I advised her that the information was given to me by members from my team - the National Team. Those members were Amadou Deme and Peter Dnistriansky. I advised her that I held both investigators in the highest regard. I did say that I was not able to provide any advice as to the reliability of their information as it had not been tested. However, I did suggest that it was very detailed and this is itself meant that it could be subjected to considerable forensic examination.

Mr. A1 Breau also expressed his strong view that both Amadou Deme and Peter Dnistrianksy were highly effective and reliable men.

Judge Arbour then advised me that the National Team investigation was at an end because in her view it was not in our mandate. She suggested that the ICTR's mandate only extended to events within the genocide, which in her view began 'after' the plane crash.

I was astounded at this statement. I pointed to the temporal mandate of the ICTR being 1 January 1994 until 3 1 December 1994 and this clearly covered the time of the plane crash. I also addressed the 'terrorism' and 'murde r' provisions of the ICTR statute.

More particularly I also told her that this was the first time she had ever suggested that this was outside the ICTR mandate. I reminded her that I had personally briefed her before about our investigations into the plane crash and that she had never ever expressed a view that this matter should be part of an ICTR inquiry.

I expressed my strong view to her that these Rwandan informants were courageous and were deserving of our protection. I cautioned her that the UN had a histofy of abandoning informants in Rwanda and I specifically reminded her of the UN's abandonment of Jean Pierre Turatsinze in 1994.

Judge then became hostile and asked me if I was challenging her authority to direct to end our investigations into the plane crash.

I told her that I was not questioning her authority only her judgement. I informed her that I was her servant and I would obey her direction.

Judge Arbour then asked me if the memo that I had prepared for her was the only copy. I told her that it was and she said she was pleased to hear that and placed in her office filing cabinet.

She then asked me to leave the room.

I was extremely concerned at Judge Arbour's decision and felt that it was wrong both in law and policy.

I returned to Kigali and a short time later resigned from the ICTR.

After my resignation from the ICTR I was offered a position as an investigator with the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (010s) in New York. Soon after taking up my appointment I was asked to provide 010s investigators investigating corruption within the ICTR with a statement re my service in Rwanda for the ICTR.

On 1 August 1997 I prepared an internal memorandum detailing various issues which I felt lay behind some of the difficulties with the ICTR. A copy of this memorandum is attached here.

The 010s leadership were not at all interested in the memorandum and they expressed their concern at some of the contents of the document implicating the Secretary General in some of the serious events in Rwanda in1994.

I completed six months with 010s and resigned.

I feel that unknown persons from within the UN leadership and possibly elsewhere pressured Judge Arbour to end the National Team's investiga tions into the shooting down of President Habyarimana.

Following my resignation my National Team was dismembered - the National Team investigations into the plane crash were brought to an end.

I have suffered at the hands of Judge Arbour and the UN because my career with the ICTR was brought to an untimely and ignominious end. I was proud of serving with the ICTR but I felt that I could not work for Judge Arbour when, in my view, she acted for personal reasons against the interests of the ICTR, the UN and world community which we served. 39 I know the facts deposed to herein to be true of my own knowledge, information and belief except where otherwise plainly appears.

SWORN by the above named Deponent ) at Adelaide South Australia on the day of ) ...... November 2006 1 Signature of Deponent 1 Before me: ) 1 TRANSMISSION SHEET FOR FILING OF DOCUMENTS WITH CMS . - United Nations COURT MANAGEMENT SECTION Nations Unies (Art. 27 of the Directive for the Registry)

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