Why Just War Needs Feminism Now More Than Ever

Home , Laura Sjoberg, Moral clarity, War on women

International Politics, 2008, 45, (1–18) r 2008 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 1384-5748/08 $30.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/ip

Why Just War Needs Feminism Now More Than Ever Laura Sjoberg Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 503 Major Williams Hall, (0130) Blacksburg, Virginia, VA 24061, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

This article notes the just war tradition’s difficulty adapting to 21st century warfare, its susceptibility to political appropriation, its lack of conceptual clarity, and its blindness to the gender subordination inherent in its theoretical assumptions. Still, just war theory cannot be discarded — it is a ‘necessary evil,’ due to both its popularity in political discourse and the necessity of having a framework for ethical analysis of war. This article proposes a feminist reinterpretation of just war theory as the revitalization that just war theory needs. It explains this feminist just war theory based on relational autonomy, political marginality, empathy, and care. It introduces some feminist ‘standards’ for considering the morality of war. After brief applicatory explorations into the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, it concludes by arguing that the added normative strength and explanatory power coming from a feminist perspective is something just war theory sorely needs, now more than ever. International Politics (2008) 45, 1–18. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800216 Keywords: just war; feminism; war on terror; Iraq; Afghanistan

Introduction The era of the ‘war on terror’ has seen a sharp increase in the use of the rhetoric of good and evil in global politics (Ivie, 2002). Leaders in international relations and those who study their actions have channeled new attention towards the words and standards of the age-old tradition of just war in the post-9/11 era (Bennett, 2003). For example, in the 2002 State of the Union Address, United States President George W. Bush explained to legislators, ‘there can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name’ (Bush, 2002). In these times of perceived conflict between good and evil, political decision-makers do not always base their choices in international conflicts on considerations of justice (Duffy, 2005). Still, those leaders’ policy statements are often full of just war claims, and their constituencies and opponents in international politics often measure the moral Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 2 worth of their choices by just war standards (Beer and Hariman, 1998, 10; Burke, 2004). States universally pay lip service to the importance of the rules of just war, even as they act in ways that most would consider violating those standards (Walzer, 1992, 171). These standards, like just cause, right intent, legitimate authority, last resort, and civilian immunity, hold a high profile in international political discourse (Walzer, 1977). While some see the increasing use of just war words as a sign of the increasing salience of questions of ethics and war (e.g., Aiken, 2004), others see it as a result of the vagueness and susceptibility to political manipulation (Claude, 1980; Sjoberg, 2006b). Certainly, different people interpret just war standards in radically different ways. For example, an amazon.com search performed September 10, 2007 for books utilizing just war theory to analyze the current war in Iraq finds 130 books. I have read 58 of them. Of those 58, 36 found the war to be unjust, 16 found the war to be unjust, and six did not reach a conclusion. Even the books that used the same theory to reach the same ultimate conclusion did so in on very different paths. If just war theories are the pulse of our understandings of the ethics of war, they are often a pulse that is difficult to keep track of and measure effectively. This is because just war theory, owing to the diversity of its underlying sources of moral inspiration, lacks conceptual clarity and has difficulty adjusting to changes in the strategy and tactics of war (Crawford, 2003; Sjoberg, 2006a). By arguing that just war theories have multiple sources of moral inspiration, I mean to argue that, even though millennia of just war theorists have used similar terms for their ‘standards’, different just war theorists use very different ethical perspectives to define those terms, including religions, political interests, intellectual approaches, and cultures (Johnson, 1984; Sjoberg, 2006a). As a result, different actors can use the same standards to reach different conclusions in similar circumstances.1 These interpretational problems are augmented by the just war traditions struggle to remain relevant (see Elshtain, 1992, 268; Crawford, 2003) times of great change in the means and methods of warfare. A world of nuclear bombs, terrorists, chemical and biological weapons, guerilla warfare, and the like would have been inconceivable to classical just war theorists. This world is difficult for the just war tradition to provide insight into, especially given the increasing challenges posed by the attempt to discriminate between combatants and civilians. These changes in how war is made and fought require substantial rethought of just war standards. Given these conceptual difficulties, Jean Elshtain laments that just war standards are often ‘presented as a cluster of ‘‘Thou shalts’’ and ‘‘Thou shalt nots’’’ without any real understanding of what justice means or real analysis of actual policy situations (Elshtain, 1987, 150). This conceptual fogginess within the just war tradition has two important impacts: it makes just war theories unable to account for some of the worst

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 3 horrors of war, and it increases the likelihood that the political appropriation of just war theories will be affected to excuse more horrors (Phillips, 1984; Sjoberg, 2006a). This is because the utterance of just war words creates a halo effect for the speaker, removing his/her behaviors from suspicion (Calhoun, 2002, 50). In fact, Laurie Calhoun has compared just war rhetoric to propaganda, persuading through discourse rather than argument (2002, 50). The combination of the frequency with which leaders violate just war standards, the difficulty interpreting just war mandates, and the possibility for political appropriation has led many scholars to declare the just war tradition’s death as an intellectually relevant and ethically important element of the analysis of war (e.g., Elshtain, 1992; Cuomo, 1996). This article argues, however, that the conundrum is not that simple. The argument that just war theory is dead (and reformulation unnecessary) implies either that war is always permissible or that war is never permissible. Both arguments fail. Morally, permitting war without constraint is the equivalent of an ethical stamp of approval for the extermination of the human race. Arguing that war is never permissible, on the other hand, justifies all oppression that can be handed out without formal warfare, and no war to correct that oppression. A theory of when and how it is acceptable for actors to fight wars, then, is an ethical imperative. Additionally, a number of scholars have argued convincingly that the motive of justice is sometimes significant for decision-makers in global politics (e.g., Kalshoven, 1973; Weigel, 1992). This article argues that the just war tradition should not be discarded, but instead clarified and reformulated. To that end, this article argues that ‘gender lenses’ can serve as a tool through which just war theory is redefined, sharpened, and redeployed (Peterson and Runyan, 1999, 1). It argues that just war theory is inherently gendered, and introduces feminist critiques of the just war tradition through the framework of human relational autonomy. It then proposes feminist values of care and empathetic cooperation as a new source of moral inspiration for just war theories, and explains the advantages of such an approach for the revival of just war as an ethical tradition. The article then examines two contemporary conflicts: in Afghanistan and Iraq, in terms of a feminist approach to just war theory. It argues that such an approach provides ethical coherence and policy guidance where the just war tradition currently leaves a vacuum. It concludes that, in these troubled times, just war theory needs the insights of feminism now more than ever.

The Gendered Just War Tradition Early feminist accounts of the just war tradition argued that its theories have historically failed to address the differential impacts of war on men and women, gender-specific wartime atrocities (such as rape as a weapon of war),

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 4 or the impact of war on sex equality norms in society (e.g., Stiehm, 1983; Elshtain, 1987). In the late 1980s, feminist scholars began to point out that the omission of women from just war discourse was not incidental, but a structural feature of just war thinking (Elshtain, 1987; Pierson, 1989). These scholars argue that the just war narrative relied on men’s willingness to fill the role of ‘just warriors’ justified by definition to fight wars to protect women (Elshtain, 1987, 1992; Tickner, 1992). In these narratives, whatever the actual impact of war on women, women are discursively categorized as ‘beautiful souls’: innocent, uninvolved (thus unstained), and protected by their just warriors (Elshtain, 1992; Sjoberg, 2006a). These gender-based ideal-types at once obscure women’s suffering and perpetuate a cycle of war and conflict (Sjoberg, 2006b). Feminist theorists argued that just war theory should be tempered (Peach, 1994) or discarded entirely (Ruddick, 1989; Cohn and Ruddick, 2002) because of its gendered understandings and the insidious impacts of those biases. In response to these arguments, there are those who have argued that the gender bias in just war theory and practice is actually for rather than against women (Carpenter, 2005, 2006). Based on her observation that transnational advocacy groups feature women in their campaigns for civilian immunity, Carpenter argues that there is a bias towards the protection of women over (and perhaps even exclusive of) the protection of men (2005). Still, others (Kinsella, 2003, Sjoberg, 2006b) have pointed out that women’s prominence in advocacy literature for civilians might not mean that women are protected and men are not. Instead, ‘‘it is not that the use of ‘women and children’ as a proxy protects women and neglects men. Instead, the evidence demonstrates that it stereotypes women as helpless and perpetuates the gender-subordinating effects of war- fighting’’ (Sjoberg, 2006b, 891). Causally, ‘it is not the advocacy groups’ words that are responsible for the perpetration of gendered war-fighting, but the salience of gendered war-fighting that inspires the advocacy groups’ words (Sjoberg, 2006b, 891). If the emphasis on women’s needs in the civilian advocacy networks means anything, it ‘reflects gender essentialism inherent in millennia of just war theories and continues the gender subordination perpetrated by the gendered just war tradition’ (Sjoberg, 2006b, 892). The element of just war theory that many feminists note spans both time and culture is the image of women as the protected and the prize, ‘beautiful souls’, in war. For example, Helen of Troy was at once described as uninvolved and unaffected by the Trojan War and as the goal of the war (both in terms of protection and victory). If a single image spelled victory for the Coalition in the first Gulf War, it was the image of a disheveled-looking American woman, dressed in a white dress and holding a baby, coming off a plane after being trapped in the United States embassy in Baghdad for the duration of the conflict (Sjoberg, 2006a). The utilization of this picture in the media implied that the war had accomplished its purpose: protecting innocent women and

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 5 children. The woman, though she was affected by the conflict, maintained both her femininity and her innocence. Feminists argue that the construction of women as ‘beautiful souls’ at once serves as moral justification for war-fighting stronger than the underlying jus ad bellum standards (protecting innocent women and children), obscures women’s actual suffering in war (given the moral reliance of war-fighting on women’s being shielded from the actions and effects of war), and props up gender subordination more generally (by limiting women’s capabilities inside war and supporting gender differentiation in citizenship status and other social roles). As such, the just war tradition’s reliance on gendered ideal-types in the non-combatant immunity principle has real negative impacts, both inside and outside of the making of war. The gender subordination that just war theory perpetrates is another problem to add to the laundry list of difficulties that the tradition has as it looks for current applicability. Not only does a gender-based critique of the just war tradition demonstrate gender bias in the just war tradition, but also reveals that just war theory often fails on its own terms because of that gender bias (Sjoberg, 2006b). This demonstrates that just war’s difficulties cannot be solved by simply adding new rules for new sorts of war; broader problems exist. A feminist critique of just war theory reveals important ways forward, and suggests broader solutions. This paper argues that a gender-based critique and reformulation of just war theory can suggest an agenda for the reinvention of the tradition in a sharper, more relevant form. Before proceeding to that reformulation, perhaps a note on the method by which one draws gender-based critique is appropriate. Feminist scholars study global politics through ‘gendered lenses’, where gender as an evaluative and constitutive variable frames their analysis of global politics (Peterson and Runyan, 1999). When looking through gendered lenses, feminists are concerned with the influence of gender subordination in global politics and interested in paths to redress that subordination. As Jill Steans notes, ‘feminist critical theorists are trying to find a way forward which retains both gender as a category of analysis and retain the historical commitment to the emancipator project in feminism’ while addressing broader policy issues across state and cultural boundaries (Steans, 1998, 29). A feminist critique of the just war tradition, then, looks for locations of gender subordination within the foundations of just war theory, and then uses gender as a category of analysis to search for emancipatory alternatives.

Gender-based Critiques and Reformulations of Just War Theory Gender lenses looking for subordination in just war theory first find gender- based stereotypes about actors in war, as mentioned above, the roles of ‘just

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 6 warrior’, and ‘beautiful soul’ (Elshtain, 1987). These gendered stereotypes exclude women by definition from the class of decision-makers and fighters in war (Moser and Clark, 2001; Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007). This exclusion is both actual and epistemological. When women are excluded by definition, so are the perspectives of half of the population. As Catharine MacKinnon explains, ‘the feminist theory of knowledge is inextricable from the feminist critique of power because [when women are excluded] the male point of view forces itself upon the world as a way of apprehending it’ (1989, 657). A feminist reformulation of just war theory, then, would move away from a tradition based on the narrow perceptions of those recognized as actors, and embrace a more dialogical approach to the knowledge of justice. Such an approach could be modeled after Sandra Harding’s epistemological concept of ‘strong objectivity’, which presents ‘a concept of objectivity, and methods for maximizing it that enable scientific projects to escape containment by values, interests, discursive resources, and ways of organizing the production of knowledge’, evident knowledge produced solely or largely by dominant groups (Harding, 1998, 133). To accomplish this, strong objectivity intentionally includes different strategies for producing knowledge and a broad array of people’s understandings. Applied to just war analysis, strong objectivity suggests that the standards of justice in war be produced in an inclusive dialogue across differences in national interests value systems, geographical location, and cultural tradition. The second major critique that feminists have levied against just war theory is that it relies on a gendered understanding of human decision-making (Sjoberg, 2006a, b). While just war theory assumes that states’ decisions are made entirely autonomously, feminists note that the assumption of autonomy is not an accurate reflection of the empirical realities of international relations (Sylvester, 1990). Feminists recognize that, in social organizations where gender subordination exists, women often have obligations that they did not voluntarily assume (Hirschmann, 1989). Gendered lenses note that the assumption of states’ complete autonomy in decision-making is not only unrepresentative of real experience, but also unrepresentative because of the gender bias in just war’s understanding of how actors interact in global politics. Feminist scholars observe that there is structural gender bias in the system of autonomy and obligation, demonstrated in ‘the bias of the very structure of obligation (its being defined solely in voluntarist terms, and the fact that non-voluntary obligation is an oxymoron) towards a masculinist perspective, which automatically excludes women from obligation on an epistemological level’ (Hirschmann, 1989, 1,229). Taking this into account, feminist observers see people (and states) are relationally autonomous, interactive, and interdependent. The realization of relational autonomy has three direct implications for just war theory. The first is that states, even when they evaluate just war criteria

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 7 seriously, do not always have complete freedom of choice or actions. Instead, they rely at least in part on the choices and actions of other states, whether or not leaders realize this. Second, states in different positions hold different perspectives, based both on differential freedom of choice and divergent experiences. As such, no state’s understanding of justice (generally or in a specific conflict) is universally applicable. Third, since states have different degrees of power and freedom of choice, their meanings of justice are not on equal footing in current just war debates; instead, the understandings of more powerful actors are often more powerful in defining justice. These three implications of human relational autonomy have led feminists to ‘see responsibility as response, an interactive, sometimes involuntary, assumption of obligation’ (Sjoberg, 2006a). Given this, a feminist perspective argues that individuals and states can go on believing that they are independent operators, but discarding this illusion and embracing relational autonomy has both theoretical and practical advantages beyond the improved empirical accuracy that it provides. Embracing relational autonomy allows the preservation of identity independence, while recognizing the circumstantial and constitutive interdependence of self and other (Sylvester, 2002, 119). Relational autonomy does not deny actors’ decision-making ability, it just complicates their capacity: ‘decisions can be made within constraints or with fellow constrainees, but never without constraints’ (Sjoberg, 2006a). A feminist reinterpretation, then, stresses strategies for making decisions within constraints and with fellow constrainees. Empathy and care serve as foundational concepts to build such strategies. Empathy, or ‘the willingness to enter into the feeling or spirit of something and appreciate it fully — to hear others’ stories and be transformed by our appreciation of their experiences,’ provides a tool for communication and community-building within strong objectivity (Bystudzienski, 1992; Sylvester, 1994, 96). If actors normally make their own determination of the question of justice and then act accordingly, an empathetic approach suggests that actors consider the perspectives of others in coming to a dialogical understanding of what the just action would be. Through empathetic cooperation, relationality can be transformed from a handicap to a tool for social emancipation. A third feminist critique of the just war tradition is that its discourses abstract human suffering by limiting both accountability for war damages and the language that we use to describe it (Elshtain, 1987; Peach, 1994). For example, the impacts of war, which disproportionately affect women, such as long-term damage to health care systems, disease, and economic deprivation, rarely count as violations of civilian immunity (Cuomo, 1996). A feminist ‘ethic of care’ (Jabri, 1999) is instructive to the project of humanizing just war theory. An ethic of care considers issue of equity in participation and empowerment, accommodates subjectivity and value difference, values local knowledge, and

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 8 prioritizes the positions of women (Lennie, 1999, 107). As Fiona Robinson explains, ‘to care for others and foster caring relations within and among families, social groups, and political communities involves the ability to recognize persons as concrete and unique (rather than idealized, independent agents) and to learn how to focus attention on others’ (1999, 47). As such, ‘it means that those who are powerful have a responsibility to approach moral problems by looking carefully at where, why, and how the structures of existing social and personal relations may have led to exclusion and marginalization’ (Robinson, 1999, 47). As applied to just war theory, an ethic of care changes the question of casualties in war from one of abstract calculation to one of emotional attachment; from a political question to an interpersonal one. An ethic of care recognizes war as an emotional experience, and the victims of war (soldiers and civilians) as human beings with dignity. As such, jus ad bellum and jus in bello rules should recognize the wide spectrum of humanitarian impacts of war and conflict (including but not limited to wartime violence, economic deprivation, gender subordination, ecological degradation (Tickner, 2001). They should also analyze the human impacts ‘before’ and ‘after’ a war caused by the continual state of violence and conflict in international politics. The way that just war theory asks those broader questions can also be influenced by feminist emphasis on dialogue.

Feminist Guidelines for Just War Theory Given the contingent, dialogical, and empathetic nature of the feminist suggestions for the reformulation of just war theory, I have argued that: Feminist interpretations of just war standards accordingly do not generate a laundry list of what choices are acceptable and unacceptable in war-making and war-fighting. Instead, they provide y a process of equitable decision- making as well as a framework for contextual determinations of values that should be important in decision-making process (Sjoberg, 2006a). Still, feminist just war theory can be articulated in several guiding principles. The traditional categories in the just war tradition, jus ad bellum (justice in making war) and jus in bello (justice in fighting war) contain many generally agreed upon ‘standards’ (Walzer, 1977). In terms of jus ad bellum, potential belligerents must have a just cause to make war, have right authority to declare war, have right intention in choosing war, go to war only as a last resort, and have a reasonable chance of success (Walzer, 1977). Jus in bello standards include discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, immunity for non-combatants, proportional use of force, and abstention from the use of intrinsically heinous means (Walzer, 1977).

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 9

Through gendered lenses, we can see a number of guidelines for the reinterpretation of these standards. First, a feminist perspective would argue that the question of just cause is one that should not be decided by any one actor or from any one epistemological perspective or political standpoint. Instead, in keeping with strong objectivity, justice needs to be considered dialogically. Additionally, feminists’ interest in empathy would mean that potential belligerents should, in the dialogue about the meaning of justice, attempt not only to comprehend but also to emotionally identify with the positions of the other actors in the dialogue. An ethic of care demands that the planning and fighting of wars be done with a special concern for the plight of those traditionally marginalized in social and political life. A care-based politics of war-making demands that states and/or other political actors refrain from fighting wars that will not mainly impact those people against whom those actors have just cause. It also suggests that calculations of the ‘civilian damage’ of war include a broader range of human insecurities, including issues like unemployment, debt, transportation damage, health infrastructure damage, and the like (Tickner, 1992). Along the same lines, a gender perspective suggests a broader group of situations that just war theory should be used to analyze. These include any situations where conflict is likely to cause mass human insecurity, including economic sanctions, civil conflicts, and/or religious or cultural oppression. The source of these observations is feminist work on the continuity of violence in international politics. Twenty years ago, Betty Reardon called the international political arena a ‘war system’, indicating that constant political violence, economic deprivation, gender and cultural subordination, and environmental destruction are a structural feature of people’s (and especially women’s) lives in global politics (1985). Chris Cuomo followed up, arguing that war ‘is not just an event’ and instead can be seen as a continuous property of global politics (1996). These insights demonstrate that a feminist approach to war, and its moral consequences, differs substantively from conventional just war approaches. As such, a feminist perspective suggests several foundational principles for a reformulated just war tradition, less totalizing but more honest about its capacities, less deterministic but more prepared to deal with the contingency of today’s international conflicts:

(1) A dialogue about the meaning of justice for just cause, inclusive of a broad array of international actors and aiming at building consensus through empathetic cooperation. (2) Emotional identification as a major component of international relations in times of conflict. (3) An ad bellum prescription that an actor should not engage a war, no matter how just the cause, that cannot be fought mainly against those who have created the just cause.

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 10

(4) Special attention to the impacts of war on those traditionally marginalized in social and political life, especially women. (5) A new, more sensitive principle of discrimination, which acknowledges the terrible civilian damages caused by war, and calculates not only the immediate effects of guns and bombs, but also the lasting human effects of conflict and violence. (6) A modified, ‘war system’ approach to those situations that should be covered by just war analysis that covers the most intense sources of human- inflicted human insecurity, even outside of the traditional confines of ‘war’.

Feminist Just War Theory and Today’s International Conflicts While this article cannot possibly provide a full explanation of the applicability of a feminist perspective on just war theory to contemporary conflict, it will present a distinctive issue with which just war theory has struggled in each of two current conflicts. It will then suggest that feminist just war theory may be able to bridge the gap between the just war tradition and (equitable and) insightful guidelines for policy action. These issues are, first, the question of the actor(s) against whom the United States claimed just war in its invasion of Afghanistan; second, issues with post bellum (conflict concluding) justice as they relate to the United States’ occupation of Iraq.

Identifying the enemy in the conflict in Afghanistan The United States’ ‘war on terror’ following the attacks on New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001 has been the subject of a substantial amount of debate within the just war tradition as well as of outside discussion about the tradition’s continued utility (e.g., Crawford, 2003; Elshtain, 2003; Rengger, 2004). Much of this work has centered around the question of whether or not the United States had just cause in its decision to invade Afghanistan (e.g., Walzer, 2004a; Schwartz, 2004). Some scholars argue that the United States had just cause against the state of Afghanistan, either because of Afghanistan’s complicity in the attacks, its lack of cooperation in turning over to justice for the participants in the September 11 conspiracy, or its potential to sponsor future aggression (Bennett, 2003; Walzer, 2004a; Hurka, 2007). Others express concern that ‘the war on terror as conceived by the Bush administration does not satisfy these tests because it threatens to wage war on those who have done no wrong and constitutes a disproportionate response’ (Bellamy, 2005; see also Coady, 2004; Brown, 2003). At the bottom of this debate, a number of just war theorists have pointed out, is the question of the identity of the enemy against whom the United States

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 11 could claim just cause (Holland, 2005; Byman et al., 2005). Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, created a just cause for the United States to go to war, the question of which actor(s) the United States had just cause against is less clear. If it were only the actual attackers, then the United States would have no just war, since the attackers died in the attacks. If, on the other hand, the just cause were with the people involved in planning the September 11 attacks (presumably, some subset of the Al Qaeda organization), the organization responsible for the attacks (presumably, Al Qaeda), those actors and/or states that provided active support to the organization in planning the attack (depending on who was asked, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and/or the Palestinian territories), or even those actors and/or states that share the political perspective of Anti- Americanism (too numerous and controversial to list), then the question of the possibility of just war becomes relevant again. This question is a difficult one for a just war tradition deeply divided about questions of the meaning of responsibility in the making and fighting of wars (Hurka, 2007). A feminist perspective on the questions of jus ad bellum might start by identifying who the United States did not have just cause against. A dialogical exploration with emotional identification would likely lead us to believe that the United States did not have just cause against the majority of Afghan civilians, who either actively opposed or passively cooperated with the Taliban government. Before the September 11 attacks, the CIA World Factbook explained that ‘in addition to the continuing civil strife, the country suffers from enormous poverty, a crumbling infrastructure, and widespread live mines’ (2000). The Factbook listed a population of almost 26 million with a life expectancy of less than 46 years, 31.5% literacy, and a per capita GDP of $800/ year (2000). Emotional identification with people in such a dire situation in terms of economic welfare, health care, and educational availability suggests a need for empathy and a politics of care. Such a politics would steer the United States away from a view that these civilians might be acceptable collateral damage or even legitimate enemies, and towards a desire to care for those Afghanis marginalized in local and global politics. A feminist politics of war ethics would suggest that a care approach be taken, identifying political and social marginality within Afghanistan and intentionally resisting entrenching those inequalities. Even if a few paragraphs in this essay cannot solve the question of who the enemy is in terms of the United States’ reaction to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a feminist perspective can unequivocally point out that this is a problem it should have been crucial to solve before the United States’ decision to invade Afghanistan. This is because, according to gender lenses, a just war cannot be fought unless it is both possible and feasible to fight the war mainly against those responsible for the just cause. This principle is meant both

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 12 to give more gravitas to the non-combatant immunity principle and to effectuate the immunity of those who are not complicit in the making and fighting of wars (Sjoberg, 2006a). As such, the question of ‘who is being fought’ is an a priori one for feminist just war theory. Perhaps, had a feminist perspective been guiding United States policy, this question would have been considered more seriously at the outset of the conflict, and the resultant difficulty distinguishing (Knickerbocker, 2004; Benini and Moulton, 2004), counting (Herold, 2002; Roblyer, 2005), and justifying (Wheeler, 2002; Wolfe and Darley, 2005) civilian casualties could have been minimized.

Jus post bellum: whither the conflict in Iraq? Brian Orend argued 7 years ago that jus ad bellum and jus in bello categories were important, but ‘it seems yet another distinction, yet another just war category is required if we are to achieve the desired kind of comprehensiveness and completeness sought by just war theory’ (2000, 118). This category, he proposes, is ‘jus post bellum, justice after war’ (Orend, 2000, 118). Orend finds the conceptual foundation for such a concept in Kant, and explains that just war theorists have often been concerned with ‘the proverbial status quo ante bellum: the victorious just regime ought simply reestablish the previously existing ground rules, and/or state of affairs, that obtained before the war broke out,’ but ‘such an assertion makes no sense at all y because that situation was precisely what led to armed conflict and war in the first place’ (2000, 123). Given this, Orend lists jus post bellum principles:

(1) Just cause for termination. A state has just cause to seek termination of the just war if there has been a reasonable vindication of those rights whose violation grounded the resort to war in the first place y . (2) Right intention. A state must intend to carry out the process of war termination only in terms of those principles contained in the other jus post bellum rules y . (3) Public declaration and legitimate authority y (4) Discrimination. In settling the terms of the peace, the just and victorious state is to differentiate between the political and military leaders, the soldiers, and the civilian population within the Aggressor y . (5) Proportionality. Terms of peace y must be proportional to the end of reasonable rights vindication (Orend, 2000, 128–129).

Since Orend laid out these principles, the question of jus post bellum has been a popular one among just war theorists (e.g., Alford, 2002; Walzer, 2004b), especially in analysing strategies for closing the current conflict in Iraq (e.g.,

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 13

Dodge, 2003; Feldman, 2004). As Michael Quinlan notes, To their credit, the coalition partners so far seem determined to stick to the job of seeing the aftermath through; but it does seem (and seemed so before- hand) questionable whether they had thought hard enough and planned seriously enough about that aftermath y in advance of committing them- selves to war. We need perhaps a kind of jus post bellum, a recognition of duty to make weighing later consequences and preparing them for a systematic and important part of what the justice of war requires (Quinlan, 2004, 13). What these post bellum requirements ought to be, however, is a matter of substantial debate. Some argue that post bellum justice relies on democracy (Bass, 2004), while others prioritize the preservation of peace (Marten, 2006), stability (Orend, 2007), human rights (Williams and Caldwell, 2006), or self- determination (Bjola, 2005). In other words, just war theorists have answered the question of whether or not belligerents have a responsibility for the aftermath of a war in the affirmative, but the content of that responsibility is still a matter of controversy. Above and beyond the theoretical difficulty determining what a fair aftermath might look like, if the United States’ experience in Iraq is any indication, belligerents are far from understanding how to produce a just order after a conflict. A feminist perspective on just war theory can shed some light on these problems. First, as mentioned above, a feminist perspective focuses special attention on the impacts of war on those traditionally marginalized in social and political life, especially women. In terms of the conflict in Iraq, then, an approach to just aftermath would be concerned with the high rape rate of Iraqi women by American soldiers (Hynes, 2004), increases in the measures of gender inequality in Iraq (Enloe, 2004; Kandiyoti, 2007), and decreases in indicators of social welfare (Pollack, 2004; Harding, 2007). Second, a feminist perspective on just war theory encourages potential belligerents to follow a new, more sensitive principle of discrimination, which acknowledges the terrible civilian damages cause by conflict, and calculates the long-term human impacts in addition to the immediate costs of fighting. This perspective can influence the debate about the count of civilian casualties (which, it is estimated by a British survey, have topped 1 million) (Susman, 2007), directions for post- conflict reconstruction (in terms of economic well-being, human rights, and infrastructure reconstruction), and the approach to aiding individual Iraqis (which a feminist perspective suggests be approached with empathy and care). Because feminist theory recognizes security as a question of individual safety, feminist scholars suggest that post bellum measures focus less on the form and organization of government in Iraq (except insomuch as it is directly related to the safety of Iraq’s most marginalized citizens), and more on individual’s safety. Finally, a feminist perspective’s interest in a continuum, or war system,

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 14 approach is instructive about the difficulties that the United States has had in ending the conflict in Iraq (see Gartner and Bercovitch, 2006). Seeing the conflict in Iraq as a continuum (including Iraq’s colonized past, its 20th century histories of government overthrows and transition, the unnatural construction of Iraq’s borders, and Iraq’s resulting domestic, region, and global insecurity) has a number of analytical advantages including insight into the complexity of the conflict. As such, a feminist approach to the analysis of war would suggest that the United States’ post-conflict strategy, to be more just, needs to analyze Iraqi security with more depth (in terms of history) and more breadth (in terms of concerns about individual safety at the margins).

Why Just War Needs Feminism Now More than Ever In a world where there are as many just war theories as there are just war theorists, yet massively destructive wars take place, just war theory needs both focused moral priorities and some way to regulate meaning without excluding perspectives. Because excluding perspectives is likely to increase, rather than decrease, the number and intensity of international conflicts; just war cannot regulate meaning either by imposing some actors’ meanings on others or by giving way to absolute relativism. Instead, an approach to meaning that is both communicative and empathetic has a number of distinct advantages. First, it demands that parties in a conflict listen to their opponents’ and third parties’ understandings of the meaning of justice. Listening can be a first step to overcoming conflicts. Second, it requires that parties reconsider the claimed universalism of their understandings of global politics. This could inspire less myopic understandings of security states, transgressing realism as a self- fulfilling prophecy. Third, the element of emotional identification adds an important additional layer to listening. In empathetic cooperation, actors not only have to ‘hear’ other states’ positions, but are also asked to attempt to understand on rational and emotional levels. Finally, attention to the political margins is important, and long-neglected, in the analysis of the ethics of war. The 21st century has seen a number of international political conflicts that are increasingly violent and increasingly difficult to analyze using traditional just war standards. Where just war theory used to be able to find a state that made war, the war on terrorism has made obvious the relevance of non-state actors to war-making. Where just war theory used to be able to talk about non- combatant identification and immunity, guerilla wars, air wars, and wars against an unidentified enemy have complicated the discrimination principle. Where just war used to be able to confine itself to the cultural context of the belligerents, an increasingly global world sees conflicts between cultural contexts. In such an international political atmosphere, political leaders need an ethical compass to war-making and war-fighting now more than ever.

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 15

In the face of this increasing need for a moral compass, political leaders find a just war tradition that struggles with being outdated, risks susceptibility to political manipulation, lacks clarity in conceptual understandings of justice and war, and entrenches gender subordination in global politics. Just war needs a unifying motivating morality that allows for both diversity and decision- making. The feminist reformulated just war principles contained in this article provide the groundwork for such a motivating morality. Just war needs a way to adapt to cultural pluralism; feminist empathy constructs a workable dialogue. Just war needs a way to adapt to the constant challenge of technological change; feminisms center their moral thinking on the lives of individuals and thus provide a framework for thinking about new technologies. Just war needs a way to pay attention to the structural violence and human security effects of infrastructural attacks and aerial wars. Feminisms’ focus on political marginality helps just war to see this suffering, and to prioritize it in ethical evaluation. From the top levels of strategic policy-making to the margins of political life, people need just war theory now more than ever. Because people need just war theory, just war theory needs feminism.

Note

1 For example, George W. Bush has made it clear that he believes that the defensive element of the just cause standard is satisfied by the chance of a future attack by the other party. Woodrow Wilson, using a similar just cause standard, was concerned that the United States’ allies in Europe were insufficiently defensive to meet the standard. Many theorists of just war, like practitioners, come up with divergent, if not contradictory, answers to these fundamental questions of war- making and war-fighting (see e.g., McKenna, 1960; Wells, 1969; Yoder, 1996).

References

Aiken, L.R. (2004) Morality and Ethics in Theory and Practice, Springfield: University of Illinois Press. Alford, R.P. (2002) ‘On War as Hell’, Chicago Journal of International Law 13(1); Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract 867208. ¼ Bass, G.J. (2004) ‘Jus Post Bellum’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 32(4): 384–412. Beer, F. and Hariman, R. (1998) ‘Post-Realism, Just War, and the Gulf War Debate’, in O. Feldman and C. I. de Landsteer (eds.) Politically Speaking: A Worldwide Examination of Language Use in the Public Sphere, Westport, CT: Praeger. Bellamy, A.J. (2005) ‘Is the War on Terror Just?’, International Relations 19(3): 275–296. Benini, A.A. and Moulton, L.H. (2004) ‘Civilian Victims in an Asymmetrical Conflict: Operation Enduing Freedom, Afghanistan’, Journal of Peace Research 41(4): 403–422. Bennett, W.J. (2003) Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism, New York: Regnery Publishing. Bjola, C. (2005) ‘Legitimating the Use of Force in International Politics: A Communicative Action Perspective’, European Journal of International Relations 11(2): 266–303. Brown, G.D. (2003) ‘Proportionality and Just War’, Journal of Military Ethics 2(3): 171–185.

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 16

Burke, A. (2004) ‘Just War or Ethical Peace? Moral Discourses of Strategic Violence After 9/11’, International Affairs 80(2): 329–353. Bush, G.W. (2002) ‘State of the union address’, Los Angeles Times. 29 January. Byman, D., Scheuer, M., Lieve, A. and Patrick Lang, W. (2005) ‘Iraq, Afghanistan, and the War on ‘‘Terror’, Middle East Policy 12(1): 1–24. Bystudzienski, J.M. (ed.) (1992) Women Transforming Politics: Worldwide Strategies for Empowerment., Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Calhoun, L. (2002) ‘Legitimate Authority and ‘Just War’ in the Modern World’, Peace & Change 27(1): 37–58. Central Intelligence Agency. 2000 ‘Afghanistan’, CIA World Factbook, Accessed 9/14/2007 at http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2000/geos/af.html. Carpenter, R.C. (2005) ‘Women, Children, and Other Vulnerable Groups: Gender, Strategic Frames, and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue’, International Studies Quarterly 49(2): 295–335. Carpenter, R.C. (2006) Innocent Women and Children: Gender, Norms, and the Protection of Civilians, London: Ashgate. Claude, I.L. (1980) ‘Just War: Doctrines and Institutions’, Political Science Quarterly 95(1): 83–96. Coady, C.A.J. (2004) ‘Terrorism and Innocence’, The Journal of Ethics 8(1): 37–58. Cohn, C. and Ruddick, S. (2002) ‘A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, in S. Lee and S. Hashmi (eds.) Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Crawford, N.C. (2003) ‘Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War’, Perspectives on Politics 1(1): 5–25. Cuomo, C.J. (1996) ‘War is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence’, Hypatia 11(4): 30–45. Dodge, T. (2003) Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied, New York: Columbia University Press. Duffy, H. (2005) The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Elshtain, J.B. (1987) Women and War, Washington Square, New York: New York University Press. Elshtain, J.B. (ed.) 1992 Just War Theory, New York: New York University Press. Elshtain, J.B. (2003) Just War Against Terror: Ethics and the Burden of America’s Power in a Violent World, New York: Basic Books. Enloe, C. (2004) The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in an Age of Empire, Berkeley: University of California Press. Feldman, N. (2004) What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation-Building, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gartner, S.S. and Bercovitch, J. (2006) ‘Overcoming Obstacles to Peace’’ The Contribution of Mediation of Short-Lived Conflict Settlements’, International Studies Quarterly 50(4): 819–840. Harding, S. (1998) Is Science Multicultural?, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Harding, S. (2007) ‘Man-made Disaster and Development: The Case of Iraq’, International Social Work 50(3): 295–306. Herold, M. (2002) ‘Counting the Dead’, The Guardian August 8, accessed 9/14/2007 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,770915,00.html. Hirschmann, N. (1989) ‘Freedom, Recognition, and Obligation: A Feminist Approach to Political Theory’, The American Political Science Review 83(4): 1227–1244. Holland, D.M. (2005) The War Against Islamic Terrorism: Who is the Enemy and How Can it Be Defeated?, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Defense Technological Information Center. Hurka, T. (2007) ‘Liability and Just Cause’, Ethics and International Affairs 21(2): 199–218.

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 17

Hynes, H.P. (2004) ‘On the Battlefield of Women’s Bodies: An Overview of the Harm of War to Women’, Women’s Studies International Forum 27: 431–445. Ivie, R.L. (2002) ‘Rhetorical Deliberation and Democratic Politics in the Here and Now’, Rhetoric and Public Affairs 5(2): 277–285. Jabri, V. (1999) ‘Explorations of Difference in Normative International Relations’, in Jabri V. and O’Gorman E. (eds.) Women, culture, and international relations, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Johnson, J.T. (1984) Can Modern War be Just?, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kalshoven, F. (1973) The Law of Warfare: A Summary of its Recent History and Trends in Development, Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff. Kandiyoti, D. (2007) ‘Between the Hammer and the Anvil: Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Islam, and Women’s Rights’, Third World Quarterly 28(3): 503–517. Kinsella, H. (2003) ‘Securing the Civilian: Gendering Grotius’, in M. Barnett and R. Duvall (eds.) Power and Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Knickerbocker, B. (2004) ‘Who Counts the Civilian Casualties?’, Christian Science Monitor 31 March 2004, accessed 9/14/2007 at http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2000/geos/ af.html. Lennie, J. (1999) ‘Deconstructing Gendered Power Relations in Participatory Planning: Towards an Empowering Feminist Framework of Participation and Action’, Women’s Studies International Forum 22(1): 97–112. MacKinnon, C. (1989) Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Marten, K.Z. (ed.) (2006) Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past, New York: Columbia University Press. McKenna, J.C. (1960) ‘Ethics and War: A Catholic View’, The American Political Science Review 54(3): 647–658. Moser, C. and Clark, F. (eds.) (2001) Victims, Perpetrators, or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict, and Political Violence, New York: Zed Books. Orend, B. (2000) ‘Jus Post Bellum’, Journal of Social Philosophy 31(1): 117–137. Orend, B. (2007) ‘Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just-War Theorist’, Leiden Journal of International Law 20: 571–591. Peach, L.J. (1994) ‘An Alternative to Pacificsm? Feminism and Just War Theory’, Hypatia 9(2): 151–172. Peterson, V.S. and Runyan, A.S. (1999) Global Gender Issues, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Phillips, R.L. (1984) War and Justice, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Pierson, R.R. (1989) ‘Beautiful Soul or Just Warrior: Gender and War’, Gender and History 1(1): 77–86. Pollack, K.M. (2004) ‘After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq’, Foreign Affairs 12 January 2004, accessed 9/15/2007 at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040109faupdate83175/ kenneth-m-pollack/after-saddam-assessing-the-reconstruction-of-iraq.html%EF%BF%BD. Quinlan, M. (2004) ‘Justifying War’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 58(1): 7–15. Reardon, B. (1985) Sexism and the War System, New York: Teachers’ College Press. Rengger, N. (2004) ‘Just War Against Terror? Jean Bethke Elshtain’s Burden and American Power’, International Affairs 80(1): 107–116. Robinson, F. (1999) Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International Relations, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Roblyer Lt. Col., D.A. (2005) ‘Beyond Precision: Morality, Decision-Making, and Collateral Casualties’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 11(1): 17–39. Ruddick, S. (1989) Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace, New York: Houghton-Miffin. Schwartz, J.M. (2004) ‘Misreading Islamist Terrorism: The ‘‘War Against Terrorism’’ and Just War Theory’, Metaphilosophy 35(4): 273–302.

International Politics 2008 45 Laura Sjoberg Why Just War Needs Feminism 18

Sjoberg, L. (2006a) Gender, Justice, and the Wars in Iraq, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Sjoberg, L. (2006b) ‘The Gendered Realities of the Immunity Principle: Why Gender Analysis Needs Feminism’, International Studies Quarterly 50(4): 889–910. Sjoberg, L. and Gentry, C. (2007) Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics, London: Zed Books. Steans, J. (1998) Gender and International Relations: An Introduction, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Stiehm, J. (ed.) (1983) Women and Men’s Wars, Oxford: Pergamon Press. Susman, T. (2007) ‘Poll: Civilian Toll in Iraq May Top 1 Million’, Los Angeles Times 14 September 2007, http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-iraq14sep14,1,1207545.story?coll la-news-a_section. ¼ Sylvester, C. (1990) ‘Feminists and realists on autonomy and obligation in international relations. Center for International Studies, University of Southern California Discussion Paper 14. Sylvester, C. (1994) Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Post-modern Era, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sylvester, C. (2002) Feminist International Relations: An Unfinished Journey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tickner, J.A. (1992) Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, New York: Columbia University Press. Tickner, J.A. (2001) Gendering World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press. Walzer, M. (1977) Just and Unjust Wars, New York: Basic Books. Walzer, M. (1992) ‘Justice and Injustice in the Gulf War’, In D.E. Decrosse (ed.) But Was it Just? Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War, New York: Doubleday, pp. 1–19. Walzer, M. (2004a) ‘Words of War: Challenges to the Just War Theory’, Harvard International Review 26(1). Walzer, M. (2004b) Arguing About War, New York: Carnegie Council for International Affairs. Weigel, G. (1992) ‘From Last Resort to Endgame: Morality, the Gulf War, and the Peace Process’, In D.E. Decrosse (ed.) But Was it Just? Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War, New York: Doubleday, pp. 20–43. Wells, D.A. (1969) ‘How Much Can ‘the Just War’ Justify?’, The Journal of Philosophy 66(23): 819–829. Wheeler, N.J. (2002) ‘Dying for ‘Enduring Freedom’: Accepting Responsibility for Civilian Casualties in the War against Terrorism’, International Relations 16(2): 205–225. Williams, R.E. and Caldwell, D. (2006) ‘Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of Peace’, International Studies Perspectives 7(4): 309–320. Wolfe, R.J. and Darley, J.M. (2005) ‘Protracted Asymmetrical Conflict Erodes Standards for Avoiding Civilian Casualties’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 11(1): 55–61. Yoder, J.H. (1996) When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

International Politics 2008 45 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.