compass By Timothy Stanleyand Alexander Lee REBUILDING LABOUR’S MAJORITY DIRECTION FORTHE thinkpieces DEMOCRATIC LEFT compass contents

Rebuilding Labour’s Majority

• Labour & the Voters

• The Impact of Triangulation

• ‘Renewal’

“Milburn pointed out that Labour had lost a considerable degree of popular support. Drawing attention to the fact that his party had ‘lost votes among the young… and more worryingly among aspirant C2 voters,’ he argued that Labour support had ‘slumped’ to the point were ‘an historic fourth term’ seemed unlikely.”

Compass publications are intended to create real debate and discussion around the key issues facing the democratic left - however the views expressed in this publication are not a statement of Compass policy. compass

Rebuilding Labour’s Majority By Timothy Stanley and Alexander Lee

Compass Thinkpiece 17

Labour and the voters

Shortly after the 2005 General Election, Labour’s campaign co-ordinator conducted a grim post-mortem for the Times. In a surprisingly frank article, Alan Milburn warned that the government’s electoral future was in doubt. Despite having been returned to office for a third time with a sizeable majority, Milburn pointed out that Labour had lost a considerable degree of popular support. Drawing attention to the fact that his party had ‘lost votes among the young… and more worryingly among aspirant C2 voters,’ he argued that Labour support had ‘slumped’ to the point were ‘an historic fourth term’ seemed unlikely.

Raw statistics confirm the accuracy of Milburn’s remarks. At the most superficial level, Labour had indeed haemorrhaged support at the 2005 Election. Its majority had been slashed from 160 to sixty-six, and seats which had previously been seen as ‘safe’ now became patently vulnerable. In London, Labour’s share of the vote had dropped by an average of 8.4 percentage points since 2001. In parts of the capital, the picture was even worse than this. In the case of Poplar and Canning Town the party lost 21 per cent of the vote.This pattern was not confined to London. In Edinburgh South, for example, the vote fell by 21.3%.The same picture was repeated around the country, with polls demonstrating that, as Milburn had suggested, support had declined most significantly amongst voters aged between 25 and 35, and amongst the skilled working class.

But the real crisis of the 2005 General Election occurred not in swing seats, but in Labour’s heartlands.Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Labour could rely on the fact that over half of its MPs would be returned with immense majorities by constituencies concentrated in the North-West, the North-East,Yorkshire and Humberside and in the capital.There was a strong positive correlation between habitation in a heavily industrialised urban centre and Labour support which weathered even the party’s darkest days. By 2005, however, this pattern had changed.While Milburn was content to accept the diminution of the party’s backing amongst the skilled working classes, he omitted to mention that Labour’s support amongst C2 voters had dropped by 9 percentage points since 2001 and by 8 percentage points amongst DE voters.The effect of this was more damaging than might initially be thought, and was most apparent in those seats which the party actually held at the 2005 election. In Sheffield Central, for example, (represented by Richard Caborn since 1983), Labour enjoyed over 60% of the vote in each election from 1983 to 2001, yet in 2005, its share abruptly dropped to 49.9%. In Yorkshire and Humberside, the North-East and the North-West, the swing of support away from Labour amongst its traditional social constituency may not have dramatically affected the number of MPs returned to Westminster, but majorities have been slashed and the party’s share of the vote dented severely.

The impression that Labour is losing support amongst those groups which, when highly concentrated, have traditionally provided the basis of its electoral success is emphasised more strongly when voting patterns are compared against socio-economic indicators. Looking at the 208 English constituencies with a level of unemployment above the national average in May 2005, an indisputable relationship can be observed between the level of unemployment and the decline in Labour’s share of the vote. Put simply, the higher the unemployment in a constituency, the greater the swing away from Labour.

Events since the 2005 General Election have confirmed these trends.The May 2006 Local Elections were extremely disappointing for Labour. Not only did it lose 319 seats nationally, coming in third place and suffering the worst defeat of a governing party since the 1980s, but it was also beaten in a number of traditionally safe areas with a high proportion of low-paid manual workers and a high level of unemployment. Labour lost control of councils in Newcastle-Under-Lyme, Bury, Stoke-on-Trent, Lewisham, Merton and Camden. Moreover, in some heartlands, it even suffered embarrassment at the hands of ‘extremist’ minor parties. In Barking, the BNP took 11 seats, contributing to the return of 27 nationwide. In Tower Hamlets, Respect gained 11 seats to become the opposition party, sapping support specifically from Labour.

The most dramatic indication of this collapse of traditional Labour support was, however, recorded in the Blaenau Gwent bye-election. While it is true that voters often take such events as an opportunity to ‘send a message’ to the governing party, it is rare that the message is so clear and rarer still that it is sent by that party’s former supporters. In Blaenau, voters re-elected an independent in an historically Labour-dominated seat, which had been served by both Aneurin Bevin and Michael Foot. Although it could be argued that this represented a specific protest against the Labour’s Party’s internal machinery, the details confound such a comfortable interpretation.The independent victor, Dai Davies, accurately summarised the attitude of his constituents in arguing that Labour was

REBUILDING LABOUR’S MAJORITY www.compassonline.org.uk PAGE 1 compass

being punished for a failure to deliver on its promises.‘What has New Labour done for Blaenau?’ he asked rhetorically.‘When New Labour moved into the South East [of England], it stayed there. It left its bedrock communities to wither on the vine.’This failure to deliver is intimately connected with the socio-economic problems experienced by the people of Blaenau Gwent and, as Mr. Davies correctly identified, is linked to falling standards of living since 1997.‘We’ve got the highest [rate of] unemployment in Wales, deprivation is up and death due to heart disease is rising.’

The impression that Labour is losing support amongst its natural social constituents because it is failing to address positively their socio-economic concerns was confirmed by Jon Cruddas MP.Trying to explain why his constituents in Dagenham abandoned the party to vote for the BNP in such large numbers at the local elections, Mr. Cruddas pointed specifically to the party’s record.‘I cannot look them in the face and say another year of outstanding, relentless achievements.They look at you and they think you are trying to mug them off.They think “hold on, our real wages are in decline.”’ Like Dai Davies, Cruddas has argued that in limiting its economic objectives to macroeconomic tweaking, New Labour has shown itself to be unwilling to deal with complex patterns of deprivation. Constituents have rebelled and turned to whatever alternative presented itself. In Tower Hamlets, the best organised alternative was Respect, in Barking it was the far-right and in Blaenau it was a socialist independent.With marginal constituencies already under threat, the collapse of the party’s traditional social constituency casts Labour’s long-term electoral future in serious doubt.

The impact of Triangulation

In our recent book,The End of Politics, we demonstrated that patterns of electoral behaviour since 1997 had been seriously affected by the development of the strategy of ‘triangulation’ pioneered by New Labour. An innovative and initially effective approach to policy formation, triangulation involves the determination of the party’s position in relation to a perceived centre ground for immediate tactical gain.The spectacular success of the 1997 and 2001 General Elections are testimony to the extent to which triangulation not merely succeeded in out-flanking the Conservative and Liberal Democrat opposition, but also managed to reach out appeal to the widest range of voters. In the period 2001-2005, however, this strategy began to falter. As we have seen, the effect of Labour’s triangulation of policy was to alienate not only swing voters eager for positive solutions to key national issues, but also core supports for whom the retention of power was a means and not an end.

The disaffected amongst Labour’s traditional social constituency have turned away not necessarily because of triangulation in itself, but rather because they perceive it to have led to disappointment in specific policy areas. Previously devoted party supporters, fully aware of the government’s activities in recent years, have been persuaded to stay at home or change their allegiance because they feel that particular concerns – usually those which Labour has historically protected – are being ignored.

In April 2005, MORI polls found that the five most important issues in determining voting behaviour were (in declining order of importance) healthcare, education, law and order, pensions and taxation.The same issues were of similar significance in shaping voters’ decisions in both 1997 and 2001. Amongst those who said that healthcare was an important issue for them, 51% stated that Labour had the best policies on the eve of the 1997 General Election. By 2001, this had fallen to 44% and by April 2005, it had dropped to 36%.Those who mentioned education as important displayed a similar decline in enthusiasm. A year after taking office, in May 1998, 58% of respondents pointed to Labour as having the best party. By 2005, this had fallen thirteen points to 35%.The question of pensions also displays a worryingly comparable pattern. Between April 1997 and April 2005, Labour witnessed a 42% (18 point) decline in its support amongst those whose voting would be affected by the issue and has come dangerously close to being eclipsed by the Conservatives.Where one might expect a positive track record with respect to economic management to have protected the party from any diminution in support over taxation, disappointment is also to be found. Although the party has, since February 1997 enjoyed majority support in this policy area, it had slumped to 24% before the 2005 General Election, overtaken by a comparably weakened Conservative Party and by the ‘don’t know’ option.

It must be admitted that opinion polls are notoriously difficult pieces of evidence. Not merely must respondents’ opinions be treated with caution, but the nature of the polls themselves must be regarded carefully. In an effort to provide continuity and to facilitate comparison, polling agencies like MORI quite reasonably invite opinion on only a limited range of broad policy issues. By their very nature, the picture which they present is national and impersonal.They tell only a portion of the story.While polling results therefore demonstrate that in the period 1997-2005, Labour has lost support in key policy areas, the figures conceal voters’ actual experience of policy.To say that those who were accustomed to look to the Labour Party to satisfy their need for a well-run National Health Service, or for an effective state education, or even for help in old age have gradually been turned off by what they have heard is therefore to succumb to the temptation of generalisation.

The fact that opinion polls indicate a marked decline in approval for Labour policies on healthcare, education, pensions and taxation is best regarded as an emblem for a more localised experience of the party’s perceived failure. In the same way as the implications of the 2005 General Election are made more evident by the 2006 Local Elections and subsequent bye-elections, the evidence of polls is

PAGE 2 www.compassonline.org.uk REBUILDING LABOUR’S MAJORITY compass

clarified by the localised experiences of former Labour areas.The national picture is, at some level, a symbol for the local.

Dagenham is an excellent example. An inner-city constituency in north-east London, it suffers from a range of serious social problems. With unemployment at 5.6% in May 2005, it is far from being the most severely depressed area in England, but is nevertheless blighted by urban depravation. Suffering from a high instance of crime, poor schooling, low-quality housing and worsening community relations, it is a constituency that has for some time needed positive solutions. As Jon Cruddas MP correctly pointed out, the local election results did not mean that the people of Dagenham had suddenly become racists: rather, they saw the BNP as offering the only constructive solutions to the housing crisis and social deprivation. Labour had, in other words, failed to present itself as the party most capable of satisfying the area’s needs.The party’s national failure to propound attractive policies on healthcare, education, pensions and taxation was manifested at the local level as a failure to tackle immediate issues of social concern, from poor housing to regeneration.

Although it is necessary to treat such evidence with a degree of caution, it is nevertheless all too apparent that the collapse of Labour’s traditional social constituency has occurred at the same time as its capacity to command support in key policy areas has waned.Those who were accustomed to look to the Labour Party to satisfy their need for a well-run National Health Service, or for an effective state education, or even for help in old age have gradually been turned off by what they have heard primarily because of their localised experiences. Faced with the continuation and even growth of depressingly severe social problems in its traditional heartlands, Labour has failed to propound adequate solutions. Despite its many achievements, the party’s failure to address this collapse of support with positive and constructive solutions tailored to meet both national and local needs has demonstrably contributed to the fragility of its electoral future.

‘Renewal’

In the wake of recent election results, many Labour activists have begun calling for a ‘renewal’ of values and strategy.‘Renewal’, however, is an ambiguous word that means many things to many politicians. For some it is a return to core Socialist values and policies; for others, a rejuvenation of the New Labour project. On the basis of research conducted for The End of Politics, we would argue that neither approach is appropriate. Both are anachronistic. Labour requires not a ‘renewal’, as such, but a revolution of spirit and ideas that will produce a party that reflects the Britain of today, not of 1997 or 1945. If the party seeks to ‘renew’ its relationship with the British people then it will have to radically reassess its purpose as a political entity.

First, Labour needs to address its economic agenda and think deeply about how best to assist those constituencies it has left behind. It must target commercial development and money to reduce unemployment, regenerate cities and countryside and improve housing stocks.The cornerstone to Labour economics must be an expansive, non-discriminatory and stable job market. But this does not simply mean creating the right fiscal conditions for growth, but also directing investment where the market fears to tread. For the country as a whole, Labour must address new problems relating to the quality of life, the cost of living and consumerism. Its social provision must continue to be universal and related to need. But it must also deal with those left behind in the last ten years, turning the alleviation of their burdens in to a cause that confirms our responsibility to each within our national community and our wider interdependence. It is not simply enough to praise what Labour has done, but it must also publicly, honestly and cathartically confess what it has failed do and what it means to do about it.

Second, Labour desperately needs to build a narrative about social policy. As a consensus on economic policy comes closer, thanks to both Brown’s technocratic personality and Cameron’s embrace of a ‘sharing the proceeds of wealth’ philosophy, so cleavages between the parties on social issues will become electorally more significant.This is an area within which the Tories have an inbuilt lead. In 2005, although Blair was trusted over Howard to deal effectively with the economy by a margin of 55 to 24%, he trailed Howard’s popularly perceived potential to reduce crime and immigration.These were the policy areas that voters told pollsters mattered the most to them in the general election. Particularly in the South East where Labour lost most of its seats and which contains a high number of marginals necessary to hold to form a majority in Parliament.

There is an inevitable temptation to move to the right to combat the Tories’ perceived effectiveness in these areas. But Labour’s electoral coalition traditionally comprises a growing demographic of socially tolerant middle class voters who are concerned by an apparent insensitivity to civil liberties and the benefits of multicultural engagement on the part of the government. Disappointing results for Labour in 2005 in University towns, parts of London undergoing urban regeneration and areas of dense Asian population suggest risks inherent within a strategy of authoritarianism that plays upon awkwardly defined concepts of national identity. As with economics Labour must construct a narrative on social policy that stresses interdependence. It must not seek to distinguish between private liberties and public obligations, but instead emphasise the importance of social cohesion to the individual. Also Labour would do well to blame not just people for the problems they cause, but structures and injustices too.

THE SOCIAL CARE NETWORK www.compassonline.org.uk PAGE 3 compass

Regarding the issue of multiculturalism, Labour needs to invoke the language of confident pluralism. In part this would be a rational response to the natural processes of population change and globalisation. But it would also result in a government that was sensitive both to the powerful politics of community identity and the necessity of balancing the diverse needs of the patchwork of communities and social units that comprise the modern nation state. Labour’s strategy should not be to set one community against another or prioritise one set of cultural values, but rather to talk of common needs and goals. Government should not seek to infringe upon identity, but stress points of congruity of interest.

These suggestions for a change in direction in economic and social policy direct Labour to turn its attention to the most important question facing Britain at start of its new century. Labour must decide what the purpose of government is. As activists must constantly challenge themselves as to why they chose to participate in politics, lest they lose their moral direction or else become electoral fodder, so Labour must reassess the very reasons why it seeks the highest office. Government, if used both prudently and confidently, has the capacity to correct the follies of the market, to foster social harmony and abolish monopolies of power and influence. It can be both the means and the ends of social engagement. Politics is simply the mechanism and expression of social identity. It is a method of turning our recognition of interdependence in to practical outcomes.

Labour must communicate to people the good government can do. It must reconnect people with Westminster, but not simply through marketing techniques or further devolution of its power and responsibilities. Rather, it must explain people’s stake in government and show how participation within it can make a difference in their lives. Political disaffection is not limited to Labour’ ranks, but is part of a wider growth in apathy and cynicism.Yet, though some Labour spokespeople claim this is symptomatic of a ‘political laziness’ within society, it can be proven that the British public still value their democracy and still yearn for government action to resolve social and economic problems. Labour must illustrate our interdependence and utilise it to solve the great problems of the next one hundred years of its history.

PAGE 4 www.compassonline.org.uk REBUILDING LABOUR’S MAJORITY

Compass is the democratic left pressure group, whose goal is to debate “ and develop the ideas for a more equal “ and democratic world, then campaign and organise to help ensure they become reality.

Join today and you can help change the world of tomorrow - www.compassonline.org.uk/join.asp

compass

Southbank House, Black Prince Road, London SE1 7SJ T: +44 (0) 207 463 0633 M: +44 (0) 7900 195591 [email protected] www.compassonline.org.uk