Democratic Stress, the Populist Signal and Extremist Threat a Call for a New Mainstream Statecraft and Contact Democracy

Democratic stress, the populist signal and extremist threat A call for a new mainstream statecraft and contact democracy

By Anthony Painter with additional research and contributions from Claudia Chwalisz Published in 2013 by Policy Network

Policy Network 11 Tufton Street, London, SW1P 3QB Tel: +44 20 7 340 2200 Email: [email protected] Website: www.policy-network.net

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Design and layout: Alan Hunt Printed by: John Drewe

Policy Network is a leading thinktank and international political network based in London. We seek to promote strategic thinking on progressive solutions to the challenges of the 21st century, impacting upon policy debates in the UK, the rest of Europe and the wider world.

Through a distinctly collaborative and cross-national approach to research, events and publications, Policy Network has acquired a reputation as a highly valued platform for perceptive and challenging political analysis, debate and exchange. www.policy-network.net Democracy under stress Contents

Executive Summary 7 Introduction 9 1. Stress and crisis 14 2. The underlying causes of democratic ‘stress’ 16 3. Populist response to democratic ‘stress’ 19 4. Extremism and populism 25 5. The ‘demand’ for populism and extremism 27 6. Mainstream party strategies to cope with democratic stress 31 7. Contact democracy as a strategic response 49 Conclusion - a renewed mainstream statecraft and ‘contact democracy’ 50 Annex 53

About the Author

Anthony Painter is a political researcher and writer. He led the Policy Network/Barrow Cadbury Trust project on Populism, Extremism and the Mainstream. He has published research with the Center for American Progress, Demos, Searchlight Educational Trust and Policy Network on political economy, public attitudes, and extremism/populism. Anthony is the author of two books: Barack Obama: The Movement for Change and the forthcoming Left without a future? Social justice after the crash (I.B Tauris). He is a contributing editor with Progress magazine and has written for the Guardian, New Statesman, Huffington Post, LabourList, Open Democracy, Left Foot Forward, and Labour Uncut. He is Chairman of Hackney UTC and Vice-chairman of Hackney Community College. The project was supported by Policy Network research assistant Claudia Chwalisz.

3 Democracy under stress 4 Democracy under stress Acknowledgements

The Policy Network ‘populism, extremism and the mainstream’ project was given tremendous support and trust throughout from the Barrow Cadbury Trust. Ayesha Saran warrants a special mention.

Claudia Chwalisz was absolutely indispensable in supporting this report. Her research, clarity of thought, and overall contribution was intrinsic throughout the process and the report bears her stamp. Michael McTernan kept the project on track organisationally and intellectually. Olaf Cramme, Lord Liddle, Patrick Diamond and Katherine Roberts at Policy Network were critical throughout the process on every level.

Advice and support was generously given to the report’s main author by Michael Kenny, Tim Bale, Matthew Goodwin, Will Somerville, Péter Krekó, Nick Lowles, Ruth Smeeth, Erin Saltman, and Vidhya Ramalingam. We would also like to thank all of the attendees at the three events that supported the research and, of course, all those who spoke at the events. The two events in London and the event in Amsterdam were critically important for the project. Special thanks should go to the Wiardi Beckman Stichting and René Cuperus in particular who ensured that the Amsterdam event was a success in every way.

About the project

The Policy Network project on populism, extremism and the mainstream has over the past 12 months considered the features of identity politics and populist movements in the modern European context and how parties – of the left and right – have responded to their different manifestations. It has investigated campaigns, policies and political approaches that have resisted and defeated the antagonistic and corrosive aspects of identity politics and populism – and considered where mainstream politics has failed.

The project has been generously supported by the Barrow Cadbury Trust. www.bctrust.org.uk

About Policy Network

Policy Network is a leading thinktank and international political network based in London. Policy Network organise debates and conducts research on policy and political challenges that present all governments and political parties with urgent dilemmas, either because sustainable solutions remain elusive, or because there are political barriers to their implementation. www.policy-network.net

5 Democracy under stress 6 Democracy under stress Executive Summary • Populism as the representation of a body of democratic needs and desires • The rise of the populist radical right is is entirely legitimate. If needs and one of the most significant features of anxieties are not expressed within the western democracies in the last quarter democratic system then there is a threat of a century. As a ‘challenger brand’ of greater extremism. Extremism has a within democracy but against liberal casual and periodic engagement with democracy, this suggests that the democracy, but that is simply one route system may be under some ‘stress’. it pursues. It values itself as a movement and as a pure expression of an ideology. • Populism is a democratic argument that It is associated with a politics of hate seeks to change the way democracy and tolerance of violence. functions. It is a threat within democracy to the culture and norms • However, populism is not necessarily of liberal democracy as it functions. In benign. It creates simplicities where other words, right wing populism does real outcomes in public policy need not seek to replace democracy; it seeks complexities to be acknowledged. It can to change it. further corrode trust and hamper the ability of mainstream parties to form • It is not about being ‘popular’ as the term winning and governing coalitions. The is commonly (mis)used in the media rhetoric of the populist radical right can or politics. Margaret Canovan impact upon the welfare of minorities distinguishes the ‘redemptive’ and and may even, in some circumstances, ‘pragmatic’ sides of democracy. justify extremist thought and action. Populism reaches more for the This report has an ambivalence about former – a pure and non-bounded populism at its heart. As two academic ‘will of the people’. Populism is researchers in this field express, expressive and emotive; it rejects populism is a ‘threat and corrective to the institutional checks and balances (liberal) democracy’. of liberal democracy. The political mainstream is ultimately about • Real ‘demand’ exists for a populist pragmatism, balance and institutional radical right but the ability to convert interplay. that ‘demand’ into political power depends on the interplay of populist • The rise of the populist radical right and mainstream forces. is a ‘signal’ of the failure of mainstream democracy to meet the needs and • Strategies at the disposal of mainstream desires of citizens perturbed by social, democratic parties are numerous cultural, economic and political change. and are analysed in the report as falling into three main categories: • Populists have gained a footing in ‘hold’, ‘defuse’ and ‘adopt’. The first democratic systems in a number of involves seeking to avoid the threat of different forms. They include the populism, the second aims to minimise Tea Party in US, the People’s Party in the impact of populist anxieties, Denmark, PVV in the Netherlands, and the third moves towards the the Front National in France, Fidesz in populist position. However, all these Hungary, the SVP in Switzerland, the strategies have limitations. Instead, FPÖ in Austria, and UKIP in the UK. three sequential and concurring

are met, new voters are mobilised new voters met, are hate democracy, into mainstream supportand extremism is challenged, for community life is andextended, withinsocial capital is developed communities is a crucial component This is not of the ‘new statecraft’. simply through political parties – which response comprehensive from the statecraft andpolitical mainstream: Mainstream contact democracy. parties have hold of the ball for now. The difference in this environment are others drop it there that if they is parties of the populist to pick it up - have to fundamentally change to fundamentally have but through community - nonetheless localorganisations, campaigns and authorities. right and perhaps, in the future, of the can - is stressed left too. Democracy and that stress mainstream relieve the question That is a key wisely? govern US politics in the and for European coming years. strategies strategies are recommended: that drive the issues acknowledge the populist support for potential a comprehensive develop radical right; an expression involving new statecraft major public policyof national vision, and jobs, welfare interventions in and national level,housing at a local ‘contactnew a along with building democracy’. local needs democracy’ where ‘Contact • is a call for a there In conclusion, •

Democracy under stress 8 Democracy under stress Introduction right family of parties to become further established. The most successful new family of parties in Europe over the last quarter of a century has The rise of the populist radical right is a been the populist radical right. In country signal. It comes as mainstream politics after country, new right wing populist faces stresses that question its legitimacy parties have established themselves as - the ability to respond to people’s political significant players for office, power,needs and and desires. This signal sits alongside public voice. This advance should not the decline of trust in the political be overstated. Only in Switzerland mainstream - defined as parties who sit and arguably Hungary have these comfortably within the pragmatic, pluralistic populists become leading contenders and institutionally bounded traditions of for office. Nonetheless, across Europe western liberal democracy. Underneath the populist radical right has become these stresses sit structural dynamics that a permanent feature of the political have arisen through economic, social, and landscape. The argument of this report is cultural change. Where mainstream parties that this phenomenon - the populist right found themselves sitting comfortably on as a challenger brand within and to liberal settled class, ideology, faith and/or and democracy - says something very significant patriotic tectonic plates in the post-war era about the state of modern democracy and of universal suffrage, suddenly they seem requires a robust response from the political to have slipped onto a fault-line. Now the mainstream. space of political conflict is not only contested, the very rules on which it is based It should be stated at the outset that are under question. populism is not intrinsically a radical right phenomenon though there are definite Straight away, this discussion runs into affinities with cultural concerns of the problems of definition and the tendency right. The most striking populist movement for a variety of terms to be used in the world today is in fact that of the interchangeably. It is important to be clear now departed Hugo Chavez, whose about meaning before any substantive leftist nationalist movement, ‘chavismo’, analysis can proceed. The basis of this swept to power in Venezuela, changing its project has been that there are three democracy in the process. Nonetheless, in distinct approaches to politics which more established western democracies, it are consequential in terms of real world is the right-wing variant that has been more outcomes: the mainstream, populism and significant. In a sense, this is predicated extremism. The immediate complication upon a series of structural changes in is that the latter two terms here are often western societies that have loosened the fused together and hyphenated or even class basis prevalent in the last century’s used interchangeably. This is unhelpful. politics. Left-wing populism would tend Populism is a democratic argument that to fit more within this traditional socio- seeks to change the way democracy economic dynamic of party competition. functions. It is a threat within democracy Right-wing populism challenges this socio- to the culture and norms of liberal economic dynamic of party competition democracy as it functions. In other and the notion of democracy to which it words, right wing populism does not seek corresponds. The populist radical right has to replace democracy; it seeks to change reacted to the cultural, social and democratic it into a populist, direct, expressive form anxieties of the time in a way that a left of democracy instead of an institutionally populism has not been able to. In turn, that bounded liberal democracy. This basic has opened up space for the populist radical insight is essential in understanding how

expectations from democracy vary. expectations vary. democracy from The contentright wing the populist of from its basis separated has to be immigration Nationalism, form. and concerns, anxiety, cultural economic protection attached are to populism in different ways in different issues and These ideas, contexts. motivations can also be pursued or mainstream through the For the extreme. example, even seen in the been nationalism has within Basque form paramilitary form through in populist separatism, Vlaams Blok or mainstream the Flemish Scottish National the through form civic nationalism. and plural Party’s such as that anxieties particular While do have surrounding cultural change attraction a magnetic to right-wing nonetheless have to be they populism, distinguished from that particular political style. inability to In fact, it is the mainstream’s economic cope with a variety of issues, anxieties and cultural attachments that for a populist an opening has created This fact is circumstantial: it is argument. mainstream failure. for that populists have disdain The moral In fact, is reciprocated. the mainstream one of the has been segregation moral responses of the mainstream primary is no There right. radical to the populist political strategy than assigning better it works. if - illegitimacy moral your threat is that is has not really The problem that for parties There is ‘demand’ worked. economic immigration, focus on culture, and legal change, nationhood, perceived political favouritism towards minority to threat of Islam the perceived groups, ‘western EU values’, ‘threats to national sovereignty’ and Eurozone impositions, Tea seen in the case of the as has been and, of the intrusive state. a fear US, Party in the political that mainstream The problem actors now face is that moral isolation has

1 However, their However, 3 Heartland is essentially an Heartland 2 Normalcy.” In Malmo University, Willy Brandt Series of Working Working of Series Willy Brandt University, In Malmo Normalcy.” March Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations. 2007. SE. Malmo, and (liberal) democracy: a framework for analysis.” In Mudde, in Europe eds. Populism Cristóbal Rovira, Cas and Kaltwasser, Americas: threat or corrective for democracy?” and the 8 University Press. P. Cambridge Cambridge: Press. politics. Taggart points to of a the importance Taggart conception of ‘heartland’ in populist 1 Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2012. “Populism “Populism 2012. Kaltwasser. Cristóbal Rovira Cas and Mudde, 1 University Open Buckingham: Populism. 2000. P. Taggart, 2 A Pathological Radial Right: “The Populist Cas. 2008. Mudde, 3 The analyses of Paul Taggart, Cas Mudde/ Taggart, Paul of analyses The Margaret and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira in appreciating important Canovan are that considers thin-centred ideology “A two into separated society to be ultimately the groups, antagonistic homogenous and and the ‘pure elite’, andpeople’ ‘corrupt mainstream parties might respond - and the and - respond parties might mainstream nature of the that threat the radicalpopulist poses. right in particular Mudde of populism. core characteristics the it as follows: and Kaltwasser defines should bewhich argues that politics of the volonté généralean expression will) of the people.” (general While populists seek to make a moral While populists seek to make ‘idealised’ notion of a morally pure ‘idealised’ The elasticity of this concept people. is itself as populism is useful Canovan elastic. Margaret extremely and distinguishes the ‘redemptive’ sides of democracy. ‘pragmatic’ and emotive; is expressive The former process, balance the latter is about Western institutional and interplay. representative pragmatic: are democracies as democratic. as well liberal and politics redemptive want a more Populists majority the will of the morally pure where is enacted - without much if any obstacle. the mainstream out of simplicity, virtue The two ‘styles’ acknowledges complexity. connected through their of politics are Cas Mudde democratic essence. Indeed, right wing as a populist to the refers ‘pathological normalcy’.

Democracy under stress 10 Democracy under stress not been successful and they are in danger However, this does not mean that populism of seeming disdainful of the real concerns is benign. The populist style of dealing to which the populist radical right responds. with contentious issues is, in fact, highly problematic. To acknowledge that these issues are real concerns is not to accept the arguments Democracy in complex societies is not a proffered by the populist radical right simple affair. There are trade-offs, conflicts, - far from it. It is rather that the moral interests, protections, challenges, as well condemnation form of politics is inadequate as the unseen, unforeseen and and counter-productive. The mainstream unforeseeable. Expressive democracy further undermines itself. We are beyond glosses over these challenges. the initial birth stage of the populist Representative democracy, though radial right. In some cases it has reached imperfect, attempts to reconcile them, puberty. while populism attempts to ignore them. For example, the UK has a commitment to Moreover, populism serves an important a European single market. Such a market function. Mainstream parties may dislike requires common regulations. To achieve the arguments and style of populism these common regulations it is necessary but the alternative is much worse: not only to pool sovereignty in EU extremism. If western democracies cannot institutions, but to accept that too often cope with expressive as well as pragmatic national vetoes will create insurmountable politics then there are less democratic obstacles to agreeing these common avenues available through which regulations. As a centre-right mainstream real anxieties can be expressed. The Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, defining strategy of extremismnotwithstanding is a her rhetorical flourishes, casual and periodic engagement with understood these trade-offs between democracy, but that is simply one route the national interest and formal national it pursues. It values itself as a movement power. Anti-EU populism rejects such and as a pure expression of an ideology. complexity. As in the case of nationalism, The ideology is transcendent. Therefore, euroscepticism is not intrinsically populist whatever means to protect and - there are substantive arguments that advance the ideology - whether ethnic acknowledge trade-offs but come to a nationalism, religious radicalism or different conclusion. revolutionary communism - is legitimate in the eyes of the extremist. Street While content and ‘style’ are not marches, persecution, hatred, inflammatory inextricably linked, ‘style’ does tend to pamphleteering, violence and terrorism are influence content, leading to potentially just some of the methods of extremists. significant and unacknowledged negative This is a highly dangerous and toxic form impacts. Populism has consequences of political action. It poses a major threat for economic well-being, the functions to security and well-being. of democracy, foreign and international relationships, and the relationship of Populism may be pluralistic democracy’s different groups, cultures, regions and ugly sibling; extremism is populism’s nationhood. The concern is substantive as harmful cousin. To a certain extent, the well as political. populist radical right and the extreme right are fishing in the same pond of angstThe impact of the populist radical right on and anxiety as academic surveys of their the mainstream centre-left and centre- respective supporters have shown, but they right varies in accordance with political pursue their cause in a different fashion. systems. In majoritarian democracies such

extremist mode of political action. While While action. of political mode extremist populism between the relationship the and one complex is a extremism and evidence base is shallow, it is difficultconducive are that these elements conclude to community relations and to harmonious there Indeed, understanding. mutual Tea US with the cases, such are the as in has been populism swelling a where Party, by - such rising extremism accompanied groups. militia right-wing as the growth of both from political arguments Populist actors create a sense of and the media crisis and dramatise conflict - often in an While bringing this into untruthful fashion. the democratic space may healthier be its borders, beyond it lingering than leaving that does not mean it is without risks and The absence of evidence consequences. for a strong intrinsic populism link between does not that it does mean and extremism not exist. how the about the debate Therefore, contends and mainstream with populism in the the dark shadow of extremism distance matters not politics, but simply for consequences world of the real because political should the that could occur mainstream - on the left and the right as The rise of populism - fail to adapt. part of the landscape an established of western democracies is a signal by evidenced of failure, mainstream with a decline in trust/engagement formal politics and an increase in ‘people’ The mainstream versus ‘the elites’ issues. will have to think about how deeply it conducts its its politics in the future; of dominance is position unquestioned under threat. ‘populism, month six the of report final This Policy and the mainstream’ extremism Network/Barrow Trust Cadbury analyses of change, the relationship the nature three political ‘styles’ between and strategic responses, and outlooks, possible case studies of how the challenges facing western democracies significant new

4 Sitter. 2010. “If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Join Them, Can’t Beat You “If 2010. Sitter. Challenge from the to the Social Democratic Responses Studies 58: Europe.” Political Western Radical Right in Populist 410–26. 4 Bale, T. C. Green-Pedersen, A. Krouwel, K. R. Luther and N. Green-Pedersen, C. T. Bale, 4 There is a broader impact point here, also. also. impact point here, broader is a There A central charge of populists is that liberal democratic institutions and the elites who them are morally corrupted and occupy antagonistic towards the interests and Populist rhetoric has a wider potential Populist impact as well. Its tendency to group communities, stereotype particular and refuse and in conspiracy indulge theory, to compromise is also found within an virtue of ‘the people’. The centre- The of ‘thevirtue people’. on state action relies mainstream left its goals of collective to achieve extent provision to a greater centre- than is the case with the right. It is difficultaction if the legitimacy of the to call on collective institutions and those who occupy of the The success questioned. them are right has coincided with populist radical some loss of faith in traditional welfare Centre-right institutions, for example. parties also question these institutions - the impact of the populist radical right should not be overstated. as the UK, it is likely to create a greater a greater to create is likely it UK, as the centre-right for the headache electoral it is at least while - centre-left than the votes centre-right that to are drifting case. However, is currently the UKIP as in consensual on political systems the for the is continent, greater the dilemma leaks from When support centre-left. right in to the populist the centre-right consensusparliamentary a it produces The populist right is a more likely seats. or liberal coalition centre-right partner for than conservative parties it is for the centre- “losing Therefore, votes to the populist left. right is worse [for social democratic radical green parties] than losing votes to, say, or the more radical left parties, because the latter - tend to help former - unlike centre-right parties into government.”

Democracy under stress 12 Democracy under stress have been met both within and outside the party system. It concludes that a new approach based around statecraft is required. Statecraft - the way parties acquire and hold on to power whilst governing effectively - means re-engineering political parties to confront new organisational challenges, providing real and comprehensive governing agendas that tackle major challenges head-on, and acknowledging shifting cultural anxieties. An important component of this statecraft is an enhanced engagement within communities - as case after case we encountered during the course of our research demonstrated. This is at the heart of our call for a ‘contact democracy’. What is required is an appreciation of the nature of democratic stress, an understanding of the nature of the threat and alternative to the mainstream, and the resolve to respond. Without such analysis, the failure will begin to move from the temporary to the permanent. Stress then becomes crisis. The consequences can be immense - socially, culturally, and economically.

It is no longer sensible simply to demonise populist forces. Mainstream parties need to demonstrate that they can be trusted more than populists in a political environment where there is a lower lever of natural support for any given party. Politics becomes a more complex game in such an environment. Mainstream parties have hold of the ball for now. The difference in this environment is that if they drop it there are others to pick it up - populist parties of the right and perhaps, in the future, of the left too. Democracy is stressed - can the mainstream relieve that stress and govern wisely? That is a key question for European and US politics in the coming years. Mainstream failure to respond adequately has an impact on individual and collective welfare in a situation of democratic stress.

Therefore, it has free, fair, fair, free, it has Therefore, 6 (expanded edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. University of Chicago: edition). (expanded 6 Dahl, Robert A. 2000. A Preface to Democratic Theory Preface to Democratic A A. 2000. Dahl, Robert 6 Stress Stress is a different state for a democracy to finditself in. It involves challengessystem and the elites who toare elected to the simply alternative govern it that go beyond system.the within choices governing populist of new rise the It involves parties, and extreme parties or movements forces of protest thatorganisations, or game. rules of the democratic the challenge ornot to a system but may occur Violence Stress extent. government-toppling even can democratic system when the occurs new political, culturalstill function but challengesforces create and economic that mainstream parties findconfront. Either they find it difficult reactto difficult to sundering their forces without to these cannot or they coalitions of support existing changingmove towards them without are pragmatically own identity: they their However, or ideologically constrained. is actually theStress can still govern. they forces new - for democracies normal state When continually arise. and challenges that democracies so severe stress becomes as is the case in ‘ungovernable’ become late 1970s,UK in the or the and Italy, Greece a state of crisis. has entered a country then It is democracy is constrained. akinLiberal as Dahl describes to what Robert ‘polyarchy’. equal and contested elections at its elections and contested equal majority to ability of the core, but the constrain the rights of a minority is limited. Constraints are institutional: legally and constitutionally guaranteed basic of expression, association, - freedoms by the underpinned – are etc of minorities also Protection of law. rule means that an interested minority can their way against a disinterestedget seen could be elites Political majority. only though minority, such as one quality a pluralistic This ensures one of many.

as opposed to Even in the context of in the Even 5 McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press. McCarthy. severe austerity, Eurozone-imposed externalEurozone-imposed austerity, severe European and rules debt unsustainability, democracies have this avoided crisis point. There are a couple of near ofexceptions on a certainly and Italy, Greece course. basis, have faced democratictemporary Their stresses. extreme crises or at least shown to be incapable have democracies of responding to the complexities the to of responding While crisis. Eurozone instigated by the technocratic moved beyond both have to which this isadministrations, the degree However, seen. sustainable remains to be democracies facein the main, European than crises. rather stresses 5 Habermas, J. 1975. Legitimation Crisis. Translated by Thomas by Translated Crisis. Legitimation J. 1975. Habermas, 5 The notions of ‘crisis’ and ‘stress’ are and ‘stress’ notions of ‘crisis’ The of degree important in understanding the to the system is within the there challenge game rules of the democratic It is important to understand the distinction when ‘Crisis’ occurs crisis and stress. between a political system is no longer legitimate. In the complete words, it can no longer other This is one aspect of for it. set tasks that are Habermas callsJurgen what the sociologist crisis.’ ‘legitimation perhaps even a tautology that mainstream a tautology even perhaps bound with theparties are intrinsically They democracy. liberal institutions of positions but and ideological policy contest to shift from a system of not seeking are they liberal democracy to a representative, more democracy as people’s majoritarian, direct, an alternative. conflict of ideas, leaders and policies.the Mainstream Mainstream parties the mainstayshave been suffrage. universal since democracy liberal of to the are intrinsically linked In fact, they to maintain struggle they when system - support, it is one signal that there is conflict It is and voters. system the between 1. Stress and crisis and Stress 1.

Democracy under stress 14 Democracy under stress to liberal democracy. In this sense, it is a case parties have the opportunity to step in of ‘minorities rule’.7 This is the system to - by turning ‘the people’ against the system. which the political mainstream is wedded, defined by and definitive of. In a sense, this is turning Schumpeter’s notion of democratic elitism in on itself. Dahl exhibits scepticism of majority rule - New entrepreneurs from within and though he doesn’t discount it as a threat to from outside the party system spot the pluralistic democracy. In fact, he very much market opportunity for popular desires fears an authoritarian alternative. Joseph that are not catered for. These new Schumpeter has a rather more elite-driven forces challenge the system itself and notion of democracy: are not simply new alternatives within the mainstream party system. So the “The democratic method is that institutional Tea Party proposes a radical reduction of arrangement for arriving at political decisions the role of the federal government in the in which individuals acquire the power to US political system. The FPÖ challenged decide by means of a competitive struggle for the authority of Austrian courts with the people’s vote.”8 respect to upholding minority rights. UKIP demands a UK withdrawal from the EU. Democracy becomes a competitive pursuit The Front National drives an anti-Islamic for power (profit) by leaders/parties (firms) and anti-Gypsy agenda in France. Geert elected by voters (consumers). It is not Wilders’ PVV - following in the footsteps of difficult to see a threat to thePim system Fortuyn - also confronts fears over the itself in Schumpeter’s formulation. If growth of Islam and its purported there were a strongly held real incompatibility with Dutch values. Viktor or perceived ‘general will’ and Orbán’s Fidesz re-wrote the Hungarian that happened to impinge upon constitution to give the executive more the rights of a minority view, then an authority over the courts and to safeguard enterprising political leader might traditional family values. Underlying the decide to meet that demand. In modern growth of all these populist movements democracies constrained to a varying is a series of root causes of stress that degree by international treaties, judicial come to bear on liberal democracy and review, coalition formation, separation its mainstream party systems. They are of powers between branches and levels socio-economic, cultural and political in of government, super-majorities and nature. protections from constitutional principles and human rights, demands for action can become frustrated. This is precisely what we have seen: on immigration; rights for prisoners, migrants and minorities; social values in the case of conservative America in particular; terrorism; access to welfare systems; and national sovereignty. In all of these areas the ‘popular will’ has been frustrated not by policy or ideology but by the institutions of liberal democracy themselves. This is where populist

7 Krouse, Richard W. 1982. “Polyarchy and Participation: The changing democratic theory of Robert A Dahl.” Polity (14)3: 441-463. 8 Schumpeter, Joseph, A. 2010. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Oxford: Routledge.

9 Salman Rushdie as follows: Joseph Anton, Joseph P. 110. P. The Rushdie affair was a signal of the strength the of signal a was affair Rushdie The isThere of cultural attachment. of feelings economic no logical reason why someone’s position should definitively betheir primary Their motivation for political expression. can nation and identity of values, perception forces of classAs the as strong. be equally and trade unions, mass industry politics - ‘mass party’, and the clubs, the agriculture, that and communities churches, societies other underpinned them all - weakened, 9 Rushdie, Salman. 2012. Joseph Anton. London: Jonathan Cape. Cape. Jonathan Anton. London: Joseph Salman. 2012. Rushdie, 9 occur occur in a number of of the most some Indeed, contexts. different economic FPÖ such as the populist parties successful and Netherlands PVV in the the Austria, in their enjoyed in France Front National the of the current in advance successes greatest Greek While the context. economic fraught Dawn, hasGolden right party, extreme some limited political success, achieved and movement no such has been there Spanish for the democratic breakthrough extreme right despite, for example, both economic negative nations facing extremely conditions. It is difficult driver circumstance is a primary economic to conclude that more It is rather and extremism. of populism with the way in which it interacts about Inalready present tensions and anxieties. identity the force of cultural isthis regard, crucial. writes on the battle over the publication of battle over on the writes The Verses Satanic of the this new world, in the dialectics “In world beyond the communism-capitalism confrontation, it would be clear that ofThe culture too. be primary could culture was asserting itself against Europe central Union. Soviet the to unmake Russianness Khomeini and Ayatollah as And ideology, be certainly could his cohorts were insisting, The wars of ideology and culture primary. of the stage.” were moving to the centre In his memoir, In his memoir, 2. Cultural identity2. Cultural

community, community, their employer, employer, their nation economic than general welfare. job, It is important to note that the emergenceIt is important to note of populism and of extremismthe presence their is incapable of meeting democracy When there is a reaction. then needs these globalisation aspect of the one Moreover, migration is increasing life of economic flows – one that presents a visible aspect of creating a great dealchange, consequently of anxiety. 2. The underlying causesThe underlying 2. ‘stress’ of democratic Economic change has been driven by shifts in driven by Economic change has been global comparative advantage and stresses and production credit in international Countries are faced with a choice systems. system the costly withdrawal from between or a diminished capability of managing about care more change. People economic their 1. Socio-economic stress and change communal finds class social which in way The has changed over and political expression to whichThe degree decades. recent communities are settled around significant forms has changed;industrial or agricultural have loosenedmedia and technology and facilitated greatercommunal ties measure; in equal liberalism and tribalism the society has led to educated and a more The traditional social norms. of questioning solidarity of class action has been difficult of to parties attachment to sustain and the has - still notable though particular classes - therefore People considerably. weakened political through their objectives other pursue searching for leadership/ action whether - competence or expression an of identity and up for new parties has opened Space values. working to step in where and movements or class, faith-grounded bourgeois parties once stood. parochial,Environmental, and personality drivennationalist, lifestyle, some of the forms thatparties have been however, successful, Most emerged. have only radical right - populist the been have close. are even parties or nationalist green

Democracy under stress 16 Democracy under stress forms of political and democratic expression dynamic and interactive nature of online became more significant. While these and social media can make fears and hatred expressions of cultural identity would not more toxic - in a political sense in the case necessarily become attached to the populist of certain modes of populism or in a security style of politics or even extremism, given the sense in the case of extremism. constraints inherent in liberal democracy, there was certainly a good chance they 3. Political change would. If the functioning of liberal democracy as a set of constraints on the popular will One particularly ugly aspect of this contains the seeds of a populist reaction, phenomenon has been the reaction to the then further constraints are likely to USA’s first African American President, create further opportunities. The major Barack Obama. The ‘Birther movement’, constitutional development over the last which seeks to deny the President’s few decades has been the expansion of citizenship and consequent eligibility for the EU’s acquis communautaire and the presidential office, has been one reaction.growth of supranational decision-making. This movement flows through right-wingA European level demos and popularly media discourse, online blogs and chat- accessible democratic system has not and rooms, Tea Party conspiracy theory, but perhaps could not hope to keep up with also into Republican mainstream discourse, these major constitutional changes. Perhaps most notably through the presidential the most consequential aspect of this has nomination candidacy of Donald Trump. been the freedom of movement of labour Alongside this, research by the Southern which has meant that significant anxieties Poverty Law Center has found that the are difficult to respond to in a clear fashion. number of anti-government ‘Patriot’ groups It is not simply through the actions of the EU has shot up from 149 in 2008 to 1,274 in that national sovereignty has been brought 2012.10 Cultural identity anxieties - and the into question, but through the European conspiracy theories which can accompany Court of Human Rights, which has also them - flow through mainstream media and sometimes been seen to be against popular political discourse into the populist radical national notions of human rights and right and into the extremes. In certain forms justice. These constraints are often viewed and discourses they can become a populist as disempowering and provoke questions challenge and even a security threat. about national and popular sovereignty.

Technology interacts with cultural change Changes in the forms and structure of party in a way that can reinforce fear, hatred competition also create new openings. The and prejudice. The formation of on-line emergence of the ‘catch all’ party which bubbles and tribes reflecting and amplifyingsought to move beyond its traditional base anxieties without challenge is becoming a was an early evolutionary change.11 Over time feature across the political spectrum. This and in interaction with social and cultural is a more interactive and extreme version change, the traditional base can begin to be of what happens when people consume detached from the party and either cease to their own prejudices (whether left or right) vote or become attracted to other parties. in the particular news media to which they Strategic necessity becomes a weakness expose themselves. Echo chambers can be over time. Parties can become cartels, deeply low-level, dip in and out, interest focused or embedded in the system collusively. This was they can be dangerous and corrosive. The the case in Austria, for example, as the SPÖ

10 Potok, Mark. 2012. “For the Radical Right, Obama 11 Kirchheimer, O. 1966. “The transformation of the Western Victory Brings Fury and Fear.” Extremis Project. http:// European party systems.” In LaPalombara, J. and Weiner, M, extremisproject.org/2012/11/for-the-radical-right-obama- eds. Political parties and Political Development. Princeton: victory-brings-fury-and-fear/. Princeton University Press.

17 tend tend to challenge, merge and adapt to one In majoritarianparties. two main of the systems, new parties can form but finddifficult it secureto a parliamentary footing. UK for in the UKIP the case of in However, elections parliamentary European example, an alternative ironically provided have domestic of the blockages where the route for smaller considerable are political system parties. While populism is not the only plausible to response socio-economic, cultural certain it does have and political change, Within to its advantage. that are resources ‘stresses’ on liberal democracy of these each political,opportunities for a populist lies attack: the and rhetorical ideological mendacity; will’ thwarted; ‘elites’ ‘general and their heartland jeopardised; people the ‘other’the and ‘arrogant’ and a threat, posing ‘aloof’ incapable democracy either liberal These or unwilling to respond adequately. hate- highly charged, arguments can become filled and flirtatious threateningwith violent and action - extremism feeds off similar populist of both the The nature anxieties. to democratic responses and extremist explored further. stress will now be

- 13 12 Consensual systems defined 14 consensus government in twenty-one countries. Yale: Yale Yale Yale: consensus government in twenty-one countries. University Press. power. Cambridge: Cambridge Cambridge: University Press. power. Insights. http://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2012- edelman-trust-barometer-global-deck with centralised control and micro-targeted control with centralised out and hollowed messages can become serve. distant from the communities they and forms, strategies, organisational New long the can pit the short against techniques of distrust, disinterest and leave a trail term Trust in their wake. and thin commitment institutions has been democratic in liberal the For example, as a consequence. eroded Edelman Trust Barometer findsseven out featured have countries of nine European ‘trust 40 percent below levels in government’ ‘no trust in government have and seven or more. percent of 50 at all’ levels leaders All of this plays out or consensual democracy - of liberal systems differently in varying majoritarian. As we will see, this ‘elite’ politics combines this ‘elite’ As we will see, change to with cultural and socio-economic and for populist opportunities new create in its radical - The former actors. extremist most successful the right form - has been Europe. Western in new party of families the hand, have other on the Extremists, threat to physical a real potential to create and emotional well-being. 12 Panebianco, A. 1988. Political parties: organisation and parties: organisation A. 1988. Political Panebianco, 12 Global Deck.” Edelman Barometer: Trust Edelman ”2012 13 and A. 1984. Democracies: patterns of majoritarian Lijphart, 14 by greater institutional checks and balancesby greater institutional checks provide voting systems proportional and/or to parties for new opportunities more form and become challengers for office. In Switzerland, and Austria, the Netherlands populist parties have not only won seats taken but have in legislative assemblies, An exception part in government too. US is the amongst consensual democracies of two party system, as a result where the has foughta majoritarian electoral system, off or consumed contenders; forces new and ÖVP held power continuously, ruling in ruling continuously, power held ÖVP and coalition together for almost oftwo-thirds parties Media-focused period. post-1945 the electoral - so-called professional parties

Democracy under stress 18 Democracy under stress 3. Populist response to It is to this ‘voice of the people’ or ‘general democratic ‘stress’ will’ that populism makes its appeal. What is notable about this political ‘style’, however, Inevitably perhaps, faced with these is the ways in which it makes its appeal. democratic stresses, the political Paul Taggart has tracked the historical mainstream has proven to be inadequate in development of populism from which he has the task of eradicating conflict and meeting drawn some essential characteristics. He a wide range of individualised expectations. points out, very importantly, that populism is There are a number of possible responses not simply about ‘attempting to be popular’.16 to this: (1) people reject the system in a Should that be a defining characteristic revolutionary or ‘beyond the ballot box’ then any politician becomes a populist fashion; (2) new forces arise within the as elections approach. It is worth adding mainstream to challenge the establishment, that nor is populism simply about making and (3) people become disinterested in majoritarian appeals to ‘the people’. As we the democratic process. All of these three shall see, however, populism is umbilically courses can be seen. The first is an extremist linked to the political mainstream through or revolutionary response - its impact concepts such as ‘the people’, democratic has been very marginal. The second has voice, and the will of the majority. There is been witnessed in the case of localist, civic something more particular about this style nationalist, green, idealist and lifestyle of political action. parties. Such parties have had a greater impact on Western European consensual Taggart’s concept of populism accords with democracies or where, as in the case of the redemptive versus pragmatic tension civic nationalists, they have been able to within democracy well. It is against the gather concentrations of local support in institutions of representative democracy, a majoritarian democracies. Populists pursue celebration of an idealised ‘heartland’ and its a different logic in response to stresses: people, and has a chameleonic nature: taking they turn one element (democracy) against on board ideas and ideologies as it sees fit another (liberalism) and seek to change given its particular as opposed to universal democracy from within the system. They do nature. Moreover, it rises as a response this in a particular way. to ‘crisis’.17 The argument of this report is that ‘stress’ is a sufficient condition for the In an article entitled “Trust the People!” occurrence of populism and, in economically, Margaret Canovan argues that democracy politically and culturally changing societies, has a pragmatic and a redemptive aspect. ‘stress’ is a normal condition. Populism will The former as we have seen in the earlier ebb and flow in accordance with the degree discussion on the meanings of democracy to which there is a sense of stress within is characterised by checks and balances, representative democracy. separation of powers, pluralism and institutional counter-weight. As Canovan This fact links in well with Cas Mudde’s writes: characterisation of the populist radical right as a ‘pathological normalcy.’ He critiques “Inherent in modern democracy, in tension Erwin Scheuch and Hans Klingemann on the with its pragmatic face, is faith in secular ‘normal pathology’ thesis, which sees the redemption: the promise of a better world populist radical right as alien to the values through action by the sovereign people.”15 of western democracy, yet persisting within it - hence the ‘normal’ adjective. Instead,

16 Taggart, P. 2000. Populism. Buckingham: Open University 15 Canovan, M. 1999. “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Press. Faces of Democracy.” Political Studies 47(1): 11. 17 ibid: 5.

19 Paul Taggart’s analysis of the Taggart’s Paul 20 democracy: a framework for analysis.” In Mudde, Cas and democracy: a framework for analysis.” In Mudde, in Europe and the eds. Populism Cristóbal Rovira, Kaltwasser, Cambridge: Americas: threat or corrective for democracy? University Cambridge Press. 20 Mudde, C. and C. R. Kaltwasser. 2012. “Populism and (liberal) “Populism 2012. C. R. Kaltwasser. C. and Mudde, 20 historical development of populism showshistorical development as anxious corrective be that it can often voices are brought into the democratic much to poorThis applies as process. who were attracted workers agricultural Party in the 1890s and the to the People’s alienated whoculturally and economically day Party in modern Tea to the attracted are Party was subsumed The People’s America. time, just Party over Democratic within the Party has interacted with the Tea as the in Both changed parties Party. Republican with absorption and interaction. accordance New Deal of the Party Democratic The concerns of the quite clearly to the responded At one point, it Party demographic. People’s Roosevelt is worth remembering, Franklin D independence of the the threatened even Tea Without absorbing the Court. Supreme towards have shifted Republicans the Party, and away from the mainstream - its agenda - as primaries have become a battle between Party Tea and mainstream Republicanism radicalism. one may think of the particularWhatever arguments, ideas, values and conflicts that there is a strong case being expressed, are expressed are that they that it is better within, rather than outside, the democratic be may well Some viewpoints system. antagonistic, stereotyping, immersed in alternative there are but conspiracy theory, thanother could reside they spaces where and ideas space. If these democratic the agendas. In another sense, the elites can the elites sense, another In agendas. to initiative enough as not taking be seen afrom ‘others’, the ‘pure people’ protect anti-Islamic the populist of theme dominant seen as a corrupting process is The discourse. and politically. ideologically one: culturally, Rovira Cristóbal Mudde and Cas Indeed, to which the degree Kaltwasser question ‘threatpopulism is a for or corrective democracy’. 19 18 Normalcy.” In Malmo University, Willy Brandt Series of Willy Brandt University, In Malmo Normalcy.” Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Working SE. Malmo, March 2007. Relations. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. “an ideology which holds that states should holds that states “an ideology which by members of thebe inhabited exclusively (“thenative group that non- and nation”) native elements (persons and ideas) are to the nation- fundamentally threatening homogeneity.” state’s Mudde sees the populist radical right as right radical the populist sees Mudde values: of mainstream a radicalisation and populism. authoritarianism nativism, is: ‘Nativism’ 18 Mudde, Cas. 2008. “The Populist Radial Right: A Pathological Radial Right: “The Populist Cas. 2008. Mudde, 18 Canovan, M. 1996. Nationhood and political theory. 19 There is some overlap with Taggart here. Taggart overlap with is some There notion of ‘theThe pure people’ (morally) versus ‘the is an important one. corrupt elite’ In the case of the populist radical right, the ‘corrupt’ elite is seen as taking advantage of ‘the own people’ to perpetuate their “A thin-centred ideology that considers “A society to separated into two homogenous people’ the ‘pure and antagonistic groups, argues that which elite’, an and the ‘corrupt of the volonté should be an expression politics of the people.” générale Mudde defines populism as: Mudde defines populism “The discourses of democracy, social justice social of democracy, “The discourses and liberalism all in not just of a state, the existence presuppose their different ways community.” but of a political Both on the mainstream left and right there versions of this of milder expressions are is dependentSocial democracy outlook. no matteron some notion of citizenship to ‘a people’ how porous, which requires espouses centre-right The be citizens. confident themes of patriotism and national an implicitly nativist which have virtue about immigration,Anxiety to them. tinge andintegration, nationhood, sovereignty mainstream across the globalisation appear it in herCanovan puts As Margaret also. work on nationhood:

Democracy under stress 20 Democracy under stress thoughts, many of them more popular than process, it also has a number of potential many centrists might like to concede, find weaknesses. As a ‘redemptive’ as opposed to their way into the territory of the extreme ‘pragmatic’ ideology or style, it may lack the with its hatred and even violent potential ability to spot trade-offs and contradictions then the harm could be greater. Given some in its political positions. The modern policyof the ideas of the populist radical right, making environment is multi-tiered and it may be that engaging with a populist is highly complex: slogan-led policy-making has preferable to engaging with an extremist: deficiencies in this context. Secondly, it adopts the far lesser of two evils. an overtly moral outlook on the world seeking to de-legitimise mainstream democracy. In On the ‘threat’ side, Mudde and Rovira return, it is often a mainstream tactic to toxify Kaltwasser distinguish between consolidated populist forces. Forging consensus around and unconsolidated democracies. policy solutions in this environment becomes Consolidated democracies have thus far fraught. Finally, populism - in its radical right largely ridden out any populist threat to form - has a disregard for minority rights. The democracy with checks and balances. The potential to do harm by espousing a certain exceptions are perhaps Hungary under rhetoric, changing a legal framework, or Fidesz and, arguably, Italy under Silvio creating adverse economic conditions for Berlusconi where legal systems were brought specific groups is considerable. For all those under tighter control of the executive. who value the protection of minority rights, Unconsolidated democracies experiencing this will be a cause for concern. change through populist forces could include the Egyptian constitution as it is shifted in the The argument of this report is that Mudde’s direction of a Muslim Brotherhood world-view notion of the populist radical right as a backed by plebiscite. ‘pathological normalcy’ is a useful one. Mudde, Taggart and Canovan have all The impacts on democratic politics have provided valuable insight into populism as a been in the field of party competitionphenomenon. as Populism is one response to mainstream parties, to a greater or lesser democratic ‘stress’ - and a significant one. extent, have shifted to respond to any It is not going away anytime soon and, in populist threat to their electoral base. Tjitske fact, we are seeing new populist forces Akkerman has systematically analysed - such as UKIP in the UK - emerge all the the impact of the populist far right on the time. Before looking at some of the aspects governance agendas of centre-right parties. of demand for populism, it is important to She found that centre-right parties in a consider its harmful cousin - extremism - group of eight European countries have and how they may be distinguished as shifted towards the populist radical right well as the nature and strength of their on issues to do with immigration and relationship. It will then be important to asylum (they have kept their distance on consider the ‘demand’ for these political anti-Islamic positions which suggests that standpoints as well as the strategies that there is a toxic zone into which mainstream mainstream parties may adopt in confronting parties are reluctant to travel). Occasionally, populist and/or extreme arguments. populist radical right parties were able to exert influence in coalition - the Danish

People’s Party and the FPÖ have both been 21 Akkerman, T. 2012. “Populist radical right parties in Western able to pressure their centre-right partners Europe: how do mainstream parties react and to what effect?” Paper submitted to Policy Network Amsterdam at various times.21 conference, November 2012. Also see Akkerman, T. & S.L. de Lange. 2012. “Radical right parties in office. Incumbency records and the electoral cost of governing.” Government -While populism can appeal to a ‘silent and Opposition 47(4): 574-596 and Akkerman, T. 2012. “The impact of radical right parties in government. A comparative majority’ and bring them into the political analysis of immigration and integration policies in nine countries(1996-2010).” West European Politics 35(3):,511-529.

CASE STuDy CASE THE CASE OF THE uK’S THE WITH RELATIONSHIP Eu

The conventional political reaction to UKIP has been to interpret its recent success UKIP has been to interpret its success recent The conventional political reaction to Union (EU) European UK’s of the prism the through greater support in building membership. A second place finish for UKIP in the2009 European to commit decision Cameron’s elections this point. David to emphasise won only served seats with13 following renegotiated in 2017 EU membership UK’s on the referendum to an ‘in-out’ both within to euroscepticism a response as seen and correctly, is widely, terms Treaty UKIP support. Intra-party challenges his own party of as a result and increases in recent extra-partyhave party fraught, while made his command of his parliamentary the marginal seats without theConservative a number of UKIP threatens of challenge PR systems. in available opportunities coalition corresponding Looking at the nature of populist parties over the while current position on granting a referendum Cameron’s that David to conclude last ten years or so, it is difficult the both that resolves is one membership campaigning positively for continued to shift is facing a challenge Cameron dilemmas he is facing. and extra-party intra- parliamentaryConservative main directions: (i) position in four eurosceptic to a more voters and (iv) media; UKIP; (iii) eurosceptic (ii) and wider party eurosceptics; UKIP and no voting in response Conservatives, the who switch allegiance between actors in turn, of these looking at each Before the EU. including of issues to a bundle it is necessary to above. presented consider UKIP in the context of the ‘the - of populism elements ‘the versus people’ at key Looking a sense of ‘crisis’, elite’, definitions of populism and checks institutional of the general will with the competition the thin ideology, that to see it is easy and the notion of a ‘heartland’ - of liberal democracy, balances that is precisely Indeed, cause. a populist could quite easily become euroscepticism and European Party. UK Independence by the of discourse adopted mode the to manage will of the people against the as conspiring are seen national political elites their own affairs. The sense of crisis of a heartland of as a historic betrayal of the EEC is seen UK membership palpable. in the context Eurozone of the traders, challenges fishermen and is entrepreneurs with ways of life that wereEU trampled regulation and uponcommon policies in by areas such as fisheries and the free movement times nationalistic (on other but regulation) (on neo-liberal Occasionally of people. UKIP’s immigration), is a thin Institutional ideology. barriers such as qualified majority This is clearly a populist of democracy. view UKIP’s to as impediments seen voting are radical right party. in part to - response mainstream centre-right policy as a European Cameron’s David to have a particular trajectory the coming years over is likely populist radical right - the and may end up fortifying Here UKIP. is the potential impact on the different groups above: identified THE POPuLIST RADICAL RIGHT IN THE uK: THE RIGHT IN RADICAL THE POPuLIST

Democracy under stress 22 Democracy under stress

1. The Tory eurosceptic right and eurosceptics in the wider Conservative party. The simple fact is that this group sees an ‘in-out’ referendum not as a means of gauging the general will, but a means by which the UK can terminate its current relationship with the EU. David Cameron’s commitment to hold an ‘in-out’ referendum should he win the 2015 election and re-open EU treaty negotiations would mean that he will face a shopping list of demands for renegotiation, which he will in all likelihood fail to deliver. His intra-party eurosceptics will then demand that he campaigns for ‘out’. Should he refuse to do so, it is likely that some of them will leave the party and either campaign as independents or join UKIP. This will strengthen UKIP as the only reliable political home for eurosceptics.

2. UKIP. Likewise UKIP will focus quite clearly on campaigning for ‘out’. The binary nature of the referendum will place them at an advantage in gathering even more ‘out’ supporters. They will receive a very high profile, likely to enhance their cause and hurt both Labour and the Conservatives. However, if there is an ‘in-out’ referendum it means (in all likelihood) that a Conservative government has been elected in 2015. If the leader is in favour of ‘in’, then the party will be split and UKIP will be able to project a clear and uncompromising voice. A defeat for the referendum would be expected to mean that much of this new support pretty quickly evaporates, but will it all? In other words, we could expect a UKIP bounce, but when it falls, it may not fall all the way to ground. Moreover, the notion that the issue is resolved once a referendum has occurred does not follow history. The 1975 referendum did not resolve the issue of EEC membership for the Labour party. Indeed, the party’s hostility to EEC membership in the early 1980s was one of the motivating issues behind the split away of the Social Democratic Party in 1981.

3. The eurosceptic media. Faced with a Conservative party that is divided, the eurosceptic elements of the media will begin to make ever warmer noises about UKIP. They may withhold full endorsement but they will improve the party’s brand amongst their readerships. This will mean that in common with many populist radical right parties across Europe, UKIP’s incentive will be to maintain the clarity/purity of its position rather than compromise with the mainstream.

4. UKIP supporters and considerers. Following a recent large-scale survey of UKIP supporters by the Conservative peer, Lord Ashcroft, he concluded:

“Many of those who are drawn to voting UKIP recognise the willful simplicity of the party’s rhetoric: that we could cut taxes, increase defence spending and balance the budget all at once, and cut crime and improve access to the NHS, if only we left EU and clamped down on immigration. For some of them, this simplicity does not matter. They have effectively disengaged from the hard choices inherent in the democratic process, though they still want formally to take part in it.” 22

These are voters who are attracted to a populist radical right cause, of which the EU is just one element - an element linked to deeper issues of cultural anxiety, political

22 Aschcroft, Michael. 2012. “The UKIP threat is not about Europe.” Lord Ashcroft Polls. http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2012/12/ the-UKIP-threat-is-not-about-europe/.

despite recent attempts to address these issues, still projects a metropolitan still issues, these to address recent attempts despite of on issues in many ways to ‘modernise’ party seeking a centre-right image, and mainstream. political of the less part feel voters these and diversity, social liberalism altogetherup on the mainstream give to which they is the degree question The and seek a Lord However, party democracy. in the context of a majoritarian least favoured their populist radical resolved to be unlikely are anxieties that these shows clearly research right Ashcroft’s alternative even may be provoked anxieties these alone. Indeed, EU referendum through an ‘in-out’ though this may and exacerbated. benefit David right party, radical populist UK’s minimise the space for the As a strategy to It may split a misguided one. to be is likely pledge EU referendum Cameron’s away a portion of his party, threaten his UKIP in the of cannot or will not match, boost the brand image party that he own leadership, give profile to a populist eurosceptic media, and fail to address the real underlying anxieties of voters who given are as they UKIP for It is a considerable opportunity UKIP. to attracted are They history. in their entire able to secure have not been they spotlight in a way the Conservative major parties: Labour, three the media as equals with in the will appear of the advantage opportunity it Whether can take Democrats. and Liberal the on leadership, matter and depends is another it secures and hold onto any bounce the referendum that to suppose is little reason there strategy and organisation. However, nature. UKIP’s for a party of demand will remove some of the underlying antipathy and concerns about nationhood. Faced with a centre-left party which,centre-left Faced with a nationhood. about and concerns antipathy

Democracy under stress 24 Democracy under stress 4. Extremism and populism the right-wing extremist universe. Contact is instead seen as first a recipe for conflict Right-wing extremists are conflict theorists and violence, then dilution and, at the very par excellence. For them, where ethnic extreme end of the spectrum, almost as groups come into contact with one another, a form of cultural genocide. The extreme hate and violence is not only inevitable, but right universe is one where group conflict is also desirable. natural, desirable and necessary. Evidence to the contrary is treated as an irrelevance. Conflict theory holds that conflict will result from ethnic mobility and white Both the populist and extreme radical right intolerance is greatest where the size of the subscribe to some notion of conflict as nonwhite population presents a challenge inevitable. This explains a similar intensity to the economic interests and dominant of concern for supporters of both populist social and political position of whites.23 and extremist parties when it comes to Green, Stolovitch and Wong have found attitudes towards political elites and anti- that the ethnic elements of conflict areimmigration hostility (many of these more significant than the socio-economicattitudes are seen within the political impacts in their study of ethnic mobility mainstream too, but with a lower degree of in New York City.24 However, conflict intensity). Robert Ford, Matthew Goodwin theory seems very weak as a general and David Cutts argue on the basis of rule as it is time and place contingent. empirical analysis that the UK’s right wing Any initial conflict can weaken considerably populist party, UKIP, and its extreme right as the notion of the ‘group’ itself changes party, the British National Party (BNP) are: and ethnic boundaries blur and disintegrate. “not simply mobilizing a diverse array of voters This is the essence of contact theory. disconnected from mainstream politics but Sturgis, Jackson and Brunton-Smith have are recruiting electorates that share several found a very different result looking key at attitudinal features, in particular populism communities in London.25 They find that, and anti-immigrant hostility.” 27 once socio-economic deprivation is taken into account, more ethnically diverse There are two differences between the neighbourhoods have more social cohesion. populist and extremist strategies. Firstly, The more contact there is, in terms of populists operate within the sphere of social interaction, then not only is conflictdemocratic politics. They see changing the reduced, but cohesion increases. This nature of democracy as their main target; finding was further reinforced bytheir Saggar goal is to purify and re-moralise and Sommerville who conclude that lower what they perceive as a corrupt system. social cohesion and trust is correlated with Extremists, on the other hand, take a more deprivation rather than diversity.26 This instrumental view of democracy: it either will have implications for strategies for serves their purpose or it does not. combating extremism. For this reason, cohesion through contact is disregarded in Therefore, they enter democratic space and depart from it at intervals depending 23 Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. Toward a Theory of Minority Group on the degree to which it serves their Relations. City?: Wiley. 24 Green, D., D.Z. Strolovitch and J.S. Wong. 1998. “Defended purpose. Some former extreme parties Neighborhoods, Integration and Racially Motivated Crime.” such as the Swedish Democrats see their American Journal of Sociology, 104(2): 372-403. 25 Sturgis, P., J. Jackson, and I. Brunton-Smith. 2011. “Ethnic diversity and the social cohesion of neighbourhoods: The case of London.” 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. 27 Ford, R., M. Goodwin, and D. Cutts. 2011. “Strategic 26 Saggar, S. and W. Somerville. 2012. “Building a British Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the model of integration in an era of immigration: policy lessons United Kingdom Independence Party in the 2009 European for Government.” Transatlantic Council on Migration and Parliament Elections.” European Journal of Political Science Migration Policy Institute. 51(2): 204-234.

25 Democracy under stress interests as served by democracy and often Dutch PVV is one of the more successful change in the process and start to leave populist radical right parties in Europe, but its their extremism behind. The French Front relative success has not been accompanied National has also trodden this path. Others by a growth in extremism. Conversely, the attempt to enter the democratic space emergence of the Tea Party in the US has but ultimately fail, such as the UK’s BNP. been correlated with the growth of militia Some parties, such as Hungary’s Jobbik, groups, and even some horrific cases of exist both within and beyond democracy. extremist violence, such as the massacre Street protests, persecution of minorities of six people by Wade Michael Page in Oak and competition for office co-exist in a ‘oneCreek, Wisconsin. foot in, one foot out’ model of extremism. The English Defence League (EDL), with its It is clear that the relationship between the association with the British Freedom Party, populist radical right and the extreme right has also unsuccessfully experimented with is a contextual and contingent one. From democracy, reverting to a sectarian street a security as well as a political perspective, protest model. A key distinction between there is a need for a much better the populist and extreme right is not pro- understanding of political discourses in the versus anti-democracy, but something more mainstream media, politics, its populist nuanced: change within the system over corollaries and how that impacts any rise in conditional engagement with the system as extremist politics and potential for violence. a tool of mobilisation. This is further compounded by the interplay of ‘extremisms’ as, for example, far-right and The second distinguishing feature of right- Islamic extremist groups fuel one another wing extremism is a tolerance and even in a process Roger Eatwell has described as acceptance of violence. Alongside this, ‘cumulative extremism’.28 extremists mobilise hatred for particular groups defined by their race, ethnicity,Having seen different approaches of religion, migration status or nationality. populism and extremism to advancing their Attitudes towards violence is a clear political case in a context of democracy under distinguishing element between populist and stress - the ‘supply’ side - it is worth taking extremist actors. However, the deployment a look at things from the other end. The of the politics of hate can be fuzzy. There ‘demand’ side - attitudes, demographics, are populist voices such as Geert Wilders of and anxieties - are the context in which all the PVV who has be seen to espouse the political movements and parties operate. politics of hate - notwithstanding failure to The report will then analyse the various convict him under Dutch anti-hate laws - strategic responses that mainstream with anti-Islam rhetoric that has not spilt political actors can adopt to weaken the over into advocating a politics of violence. ‘demand’ and opportunity for populists and While it is definitive of extremism that there extremists. is acceptance and even advocacy of violence, the politics of hate is less respectful of the extremist/populist boundary.

While the populist radical right and the extreme right appeal to many of the same attitudes with the exception of tolerance of violence, the degree to which they interact and support one another is much less clear. Indeed, they may even be inversely related 28 Eatwell, R. 2006. “Community cohesion and cumulative in many circumstances. For example, the extremism in contemporary Britain.” The Political Quarterly 77(2):204-216.

26 Democracy under stress 5. The ‘demand’ for populism ‘reluctant radical’ or ‘latent hostile’ group and extremism that is open to some persuasion.

Populist radical right and extreme right However, there are attractions towards parties have been able to tap into a the populist radical right for this group. public appetite for the politics of identity, Finally, there is a much wider group concern with the performance and process who have a lesser degree of anxiety of representative democracy, and, in but who could drift toward the populist more recent times, anxiety induced by right if a successful mainstream response economic stress. In explaining the success is lacking - these can be termed ‘identity of the populist radical right in particular, it is ambivalents’. When we analyse mainstream necessary to understand the dimensions of strategic responses to these demands for a this context. None of this is deterministic: populist radical right, the measure of their it is opportunity rather than destiny. success is the degree to which: (1) they Mainstream parties, for example, may marginalise the outwardly hostile groups; (2) have found a way of meeting this demand. they limit the pool of potential demand for However, when looking at modern European the populist radical right; and (3) they meet attitudes, it becomes quite clear how it is the anxieties of the mainstream majority - that the populist radical right has been able many of which are shared with the soft or to become the most successful new party hard right. family in the last two decades or so. Zick, Kupper, and Hovermann of the A combination of anxiety over change, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung looked at cross economic strife, cultural angst, mistrust in border comparisons of attitudes towards the ability and competence of governments race, immigration, values and culture.29 On (including in their management of borders), questions of immigration and culture, deep concerns over free-riding upon generous concerns are evident (see table 1 below). European welfare states, and, amongst a minority group of voters, a basic displeasure It should be noted that the same data also of growing diversity are all evident. As the shows some positive attitudes towards analysis of a variety of data will show, there immigration and Muslims. For example, well is perhaps a hardcore minority of voters over half of respondents in all the countries for whom there is little that can be done mentioned above agree that ‘immigrants to persuade them that there is a robust enrich our culture.’ In none of the countries mainstream response to their concerns. This do more than 30 percent believe that proportion varies from country to country. ‘the majority of Muslims find terrorism Beyond this minority, there is a softer justifiable.’ Nonetheless, the data above

TABLE 1

D GB F NL I PT PL Hu There are too many immigrants in [country] 50 62.2 40.3 46 62.5 59.6 27.1 58.7 Immigrants are a strain on our welfare system 40.8 60.2 54.7 20.3 31.7 42.5 45.8 77.2 There are too many Muslims in [country] 46.1 44.7 36.2 41.5 49.7 27.1 47.1 60.7 The Muslim culture fits well into [country/Europe] 16.6 39 48.8 38.7 27.4 50.1 19 30.2 D= Germany; GB=uK; F=France; NL=Netherlands; I=Italy; PT=Portugal; PL=Poland; Hu=Hungary. Source: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/07908-20110311.pdf

29 Zick, A. et al. 2011. “Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report.” Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

report recorded Fear and Hope Table 3 (on the following page) the following page) 3 (on Table 31 how to win back Europe’s populist vote.” Counterpoint. populist vote.” how to win back Europe’s 31 Fieschi, C. et al. 2012. “Recapturing the Reluctant Radical: the Reluctant “Recapturing C. et al. 2012. Fieschi, 31 shows the breakdown between the between breakdown shows the ‘potential’ and mainstream, ‘reluctant’ andradicals, based upon elections surveys to populist parties.strengths of attachment populist or established are there Where mainstream right parties, the extreme This is in all countries. in these is smaller between to an interaction due likelihood the ‘demand’ side and the success of the success ‘demand’ side and the the Hungary is Unsurprisingly, ‘supply’ side. of the spectrum andat one end aversion to with its cultural Germany, of the end other is at the extremism, Both the Fear and Hope spectrum. radical’ analyses and the ‘Reluctant Report show that there is space on the right in in which societies European Western populists can operate. demand side is on the One important caveat widespread acceptance apparently more the the breakdown of the ‘tribes’. of the breakdown the been UKIP support has, up until recently, hostiles.’ ‘latent the amongst concentrated it is little doubt that there However, has the potential to sway some thesome has the potential to sway likely integrationists who are more cultural mayThey Conservatives. to support the even be able to far- British as the enmity’ in ‘active pick off more in on itself. and turns right fragments of those are contingent. elements All these The point is that the populist radical constituency. right does have a potential work of by the underlined This is further ‘potential’Counterpoint on ‘reluctant’ and radicals. into economic anxiety, nation, attitudes to attitudes nation, anxiety, economic into other minorities, Muslims and immigration, and pessimism. nostalgia and optimism, grouped the analysis, Using cluster Populus six ‘identity tribes’population into English attitudes on the liberal ranging from very on the right. enmity’ ‘active left to a group in shows how following page) the Chart 1 (on resulting the

and Golden Dawn in Greece. Golden Dawn in and 30 the rise of the Hungarian radical right.” Journal of East the rise of the Hungarian radical right.” Studies 2(1): 61-92 Asian European and Péter Krekó of Political Capital in Budapest Capital in of Political Krekó Péter as a the value DEREX useful If we take extremism for right-wing proxy for demand value/anxiety right-wing separate and the dimensions as a potential demand for relationships startpopulism then interesting demands and these between to emerge right- and extreme growth of populist the extremes successful The most wing parties. in Europe Central/Eastern in been have provoking anti-Roma Jobbik of shape the sentiment show that populist and/or extremist parties extremist and/or that populist show to tap into have an opportunity of the right Islam, welfare, immigration, around anxiety as well as the concerns about the body politic earlier. identified that were for right- of ‘demand an index has developed DEREX. It accumulates - wing extremism’ to provide attitudes that are likely right extreme for the an opportunity prejudice/welfareacross four dimensions: orientation; value chauvinism; right-wing attitudes; fear, and anti-establishment DEREX(The distrust and pessimism 2 (on Table Annex). structure is shown in the breakdown shows the following page) the Eastern Europe andCentral/ between Europe. Western 30 Karacsony, Gergely and Daniel Rona. 2012. “Reasons behind “Reasons 2012. Gergely and Daniel Rona. Karacsony, 30 Consistently, when voters’ attitudes and attitudes when voters’ Consistently, potential the behaviours are researched, for populist and extremist right support is the organisation behind the In 2011, clear. Hope not Hate campaign commissioned to undertake Populus, polling company, the of English attitudes survey a large-scale This is consistent with the DEREX data. InThis is consistent it has been Europe, and western northern populist parties that have been more adept at tapping into drivers of ‘demand’ for far right driven by representation, prejudice, traditional attitudes, anti-establishment or economic/physical fear. values right-wing also would violence and conflict to Attitudes to this data set. addition be a useful

Democracy under stress 28 Democracy under stress TABLE 2

DEREX Prejudices Anti- Right-wing Fear establishment Orientation attitudes Central/Eastern Europe 8% 26% 25% 28% 16% Western Europe 4% 20% 16% 14% 9% Source: ‘Strategies Against Right-Wing Extremism in Western and Eastern Europe’ - presentation to Policy Network seminar November 2012.

CHART 1 30

15 Percent

5 8% 16% 28% 24% 10% 13% 0 Confident Mainstream Identity Cultural Latent Active multiculturals liberals ambivalents integrationists hostiles enmity

Source: “The New Tribes of British Identity Politics.” 2012. Fear and Hope. http://www.fearandhope.org.uk/

TABLE 3

D DK FN F Hu NL NO SW Mainstream 91.2 86.3 81.4 84.2 66.3 80.7 82.9 85.5 Potential radical 8.2 3.6 14 12.3 25.7 8.1 3.4 1.2 Reluctant radical 0.1 5 2.1 0.8 5.4 5.6 6.2 1.4 D=Germany; DK=Denmark; FN=Finland; F=France; Hu=Hungary; NL=Netherlands; NO-Norway’ SW=Sweden Source: Counterpoint data https://www.smashwords.com/books/download/238093/1/latest/0/0/recapturing-the-reluctant- radical-how-to-win-back-europes-populist-vote-by-catherine-fieschi-marley-morris-and-lila-caballero.pdf

CHART 2 Would you be more or less likely to vote for a party that promised to stop all immigration into the UK? 60

30 Percent

0 18-24 18-24 25-39 25-39 40-59 40-59 60+ 60+ More likely Less likely More likely Less likely More likely Less likely More likely Less likely

Source: Extremis Project/YouGov extremism poll 19th-20th August 2012.

It is clear from this data that attitudes toIt is clear from between markedly quite immigration shift those old and cohorts under 40 years the this is whether remains to be seen It over. of and adherence to notions of liberalism of to notions adherence of and voters. younger amongst and pragmatism Project/YouGov poll by Extremis A recent towards attitudes age impact on shows the clearly very radical right themes populist chart 2). (see an age or cohort age groups latter: these would suggest the effect. Contact theory in a educated and work were raised, more fluid and diverse to shift its focuspopulism will be able Britain. However, i.e.issues, from immigration to other friction,welfare dependency or cultural to any in response generational shift nor supply neither demand that occurs; is static. Party competition will the degree heavily to which different voter influence ‘tribes’ attracted to the mainstream, populismare the of catastrophic failure, event the in or, in organisational, - Party strategy extreme. is critical, terms - and governance electoral neither are choices but the strategic to look at It is important simple nor clear. of both in terms of strategies - a variety and what might work. what has worked populist signal and the extremistThe democracies from liberal threat emerge under stress. How can mainstream parties respond?

Democracy under stress 30 Democracy under stress 6. Mainstream party strategies In consensual systems, the risk to the to cope with democratic stress mainstream is one of representation and coalition formation. Support, even with There are two broad approaches for aggregate thresholds in place, is fairly mainstream parties and political movements quickly converted into parliamentary to cope with the populist radical right: representation. As soon as this occurs, outcompeting them or reducing ‘demand’ for coalition formation is impacted and the populism. A strong strategy would combine mainstream party may become weakened. both: address the anxieties that create Tjitske Akkerman has systematically the opportunity for populist and extremist analysed the party positions of a number of parties to emerge and gain support, while liberal, Conservative/Christian democratic, outcompeting the parties themselves. social democratic and populist radical right parties in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, In the short term at least, it is easier to the Netherlands, UK and Switzerland. Liberal resist the threat from populist parties parties such as the Dutch VVD have co-opted in majoritarian political systems. It is the positions of populist radical right parties difficult for such parties to gain a foothold.on immigration, social rights and asylum, However, once they reach a critical mass, while avoiding their anti-Islamic stances. they can severely dent the support of However, some populist parties have moved mainstream parties of both the right and even further to the right including the Swiss left. For example, UKIP took more votes SVP, Austrian FPÖ, while the Dutch PVV away from Labour in the 2009 European and Flemish Vlaams Blok (VB) have remained elections but has taken many more potential at a far-right pole.33 votes away from the Conservatives since 2010 by a factor of 37%-3%.32 Incumbency What follows are eight potential strategic matters, but what is most striking is that the responses that mainstream parties can deploy majority of UKIP voters have backed neither in response to the populist radical right. They of the two main parties in the previous are not exhaustive, but are illustrative. Bale election. et al. break down strategic responses into three categories: hold; adopt, and defuse. The other risk in majoritarian systems is A hold strategy involves staying the course that a populist force attaches itself to a and avoiding a substantive strategic mainstream party, dragging it away from response to the populist radical right: a majoritarian position - on the left and the cordon sanitaire, tentative engagement right. The most obvious example is the Tea and ‘return to the roots’ broadly fall into Party and its impact on the Republican Party this category. Defuse involves attempts to in the US. It contributed to the Republicans’ decrease the salience of populist radical failure to win a majority in the Senate in 2010 right issues. Triangulation, re-framing and and made it more difficult for Mitt Romney left populism fall into this category. The third to pass through the presidential primary as category is adopt: absorption is an example a moderate. Whether populist parties and of this strategic response. Statecraft and forces meet a support threshold or function contact democracy are the substantive with a mainstream party, they pose a threat approaches that have yet to be tried. They to the mainstream - even if they do not do not seem to fall easily within the hold- become strong forces from a parliamentary defuse-adopt typology. Nor have they been or governmental perspective. comprehensively attempted. Table 4 details strategic responses of centre-left and centre-

32 Ford, R. 2013. “UKIP’s rise is not just a problem for the 33 Akkerman, T. 2012. “Immigration policy and electoral conservatives – they are emerging as the party of choice for competition in Western Europe. A fine-grained analysis of disaffected and angry voters from all parties.” LSE Politics party positions over the past two decades.” Party Politics and Policy blog. 19(1):1-23.

Outcome: social democratic party strategy Other left/ parties'green response Belgium, it often does not work. A similar does not work. Belgium, it often towards attempted approach has been still the Front National in France, yet they a significant minority party. remain quarantine parties, it does not quarantine Flemish issues. nationalism is, if anything, The Front National’s stronger than ever. on immigration, minorityagenda In the case of the populist nationalist anti- of the populist In the case VB, this and elite immigrant, francophone but more A competitor, strategy worked. (New the N-VA moderate nationalist party, the party in has overtaken Alliance), Flemish elections,Antwerp In the recent popularity. VB fell from 33.5 percent to 10.2 percent breeched.of the vote; its stronghold was when uses Cordon sanitaire clearly has its andit comes to marginalising parties bears some resemblance to the ‘no shared platform’ approach adopted by mainstream UK. parties towards the BNP in the this strategy in one ofTherefore, - and does have its uses containment the are parties extremist particularly where drawbacks, however: target. It has several deployment in 1. Despite its successful may While a cordon sanitaire 2.

Social democrat internal debate et al. Conservative/ liberal strategy Defuse United Hold Hold Adopt Divided Hold Defuse Adopt Divided Hold Adopt 34 in Belgium: a case of hegemonic liberal democracy?” In in Belgium: a case of hegemonic liberal democracy?” in eds. Populism Cristóbal Rovira, Cas and Kaltwasser, Mudde, Americas: threat or corrective for democracy? Europe and the Cambridge Cambridge: University Press. DK 1980s DK 1990s DK 2000s NL 2000 Adopt Divided Hold Defuse/hold/adopt NL mid-2000s Defuse Divided Hold/Adopt Defuse N 1970s Defuse United Defuse Defuse N 2000s Defuse United Defuse Defuse AT mid-1980s-mid 1990sAT Defuse United Hold Hold/defuse AT mid-1990s-2000sAT Adopt Divided Hold Hold/adopt 34 de Lange, Sarah L. and T. Akkerman. 2012. “Populist parties “Populist 2012. Akkerman. T. Sarah L. and de Lange, 34 TABLE 4 TABLE The cordon sanitaire strategy is described cordon sanitaire The Akkerman Tjitske and de Lange Sarah by system of the Flemish party in the context A. Cordon Sanitaire to have agreed not “[Established parties] in the Blok(VB)] with the [Vlaams cooperate jointelectoral arena (no electoral cartels, no towards the or declarations conferences press joint arena (no the parliamentary in press), legislative activities or voting agreements, by the for resolutions introduced no support arena (no governmental or the executive VB), coalitions).” as follows: right parties in Denmark, the Netherlands, the right parties in Denmark, Bale Austria within the Norway and This typology gives good means to describeThis typology gives good means What follows is an analysis of the responses. strategic mainstream so) (or merits of eight rise of the populist radical to the responses and democracies European Western right in US.the typology. Note: DK=Denmark, NL=Netherlands, N=Norway, AT=Austria N=Norway, NL=Netherlands, DK=Denmark, Note: social democratic Explaining join them? If you can’t beat them Sitter, and Krouwel, Luther, Green-Pedersen, Source: Bale, 58, p.421 Vol Studies: 2010 Political Europe. Western radical right in populist from the challenge to the responses

Democracy under stress 32 Democracy under stress communities and Islam has been flirted of the positions of the populist right while with by the UMP in France. competing with the parties themselves - absorption in other words. 3. In the context of a moralisation of politics, which is one feature of populism, B. Absorption the very act of quarantine can justify the Absorption works in two ways: either a pariah party’s narrative. It can leave the populist party is co-opted to a cause or mainstream exposed as incapable of their issues are co-opted. Tim Bale has dealing with real concerns, playing to the described the ÖVP (People’s Party) notion of a distant, self-interested elite. led Schussel Cabinet I of 2000-03 as ‘unceremonious cannibalism.’37 The ÖVP 4. It can backfire. The minister-presidents co-opted 50 percent of the populist right of the German federal states are seeking a Freedom Party’s (FPÖ) 1999 support in ban of the far-right NPD. In so doing, they the 2002 election. Immigration policy was could end up amplifying the party and its toughened up and the tensions of office - cause as Kai Arzheimer has argued.35 including responsibility for a tough fiscal policy - weighed heavily on the FPÖ’s internal 5. No shared platform does not mean unity.38 After a new coalition was formed ‘no platform’. Once a party has reached a following weeks of protracted negotiation certain level of strength and has elected in 2003, the FPÖ split in two with leader representatives, it is impossible to deny Jorg Haider forming a new right party - the it a public platform. Moreover, as Nick BZÖ. Absorption was a seemingly successful Lowles, Director of Hope not Hate, has strategy. argued, while some barriers to a platform can and should still be enforced, social Yet, by 2008, the FPÖ had gained 13 media, community and street campaigns seats and increased its vote by 6.5% provide an alternative platform that (the BZÖ similarly increased its support cannot be denied.36 Cordon sanitaire has and representation). Ahead of the 2013 an aspect of ‘out of sight, out of mind’ that legislative elections, opinion polls show is unrealistic and harmful - potentially the FPÖ still in a strong third place. Like leaving extreme arguments and parties non-populist third parties, coalition unanswered. can be toxic as the smallest party for populists. In addition, their ‘moral’ purity of vision Cordon sanitaire is often mainstream quickly crashes into governing reality. parties’ first resort when faced with extremeHowever, once on the outside they can or populist parties. The weakness of the recover more critical and uncompromising strategy is that it does not normally work. positions - a moral car wash. Absorption can Where it could be appropriate is fencing off therefore only work in the medium term extremism with its tendency towards hatred where the populist party is metaphorically and tolerance of violence. However, if strangled to death in office. between 10 and 20 percent of the electorate are attracted to the populist radical right to From the perspective of the mainstream some degree, the cordon sanitaire will quickly party absorbing either the populist party or its become inoperable. Instead, mainstream issues, there are other significant drawbacks parties find themselves absorbing many

37 Bale, T. 2003. “Cinderella and her ugly sisters: the mainstream 35 Arzheimer, Kai. 2013. “Why trying to ban the NPD is a stupid and extreme right in Europe’s bipolarising party systems.” idea.” Extremis Project. http://extremisproject.org/2013/01/ West European Politics. 26(3): 67–90. why-trying-to-ban-the-npd-is-a-stupid-idea/. 38 Fallend, F. 2012. “Populism in government: the case of 36 Lowles, Nick. 2013. “Why ‘No Platform’ means something Austria (2000-2007).” In Mudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal different today.” Hope Not Hate. http://www.hopenothate. Rovira, eds. Populism in Europe and the Americas: threat or org.uk/blog/article/2410/why-no-platform-means-something- corrective for democracy? Cambridge: Cambridge University different-today. Press.

33 2012 - less- likely Labour 29 31 In this mode, In 2012 likely - more- Labour 40 25 2010 - less- likely Labour 34 36 31 32 36 2010 likely - more- Labour

rather than less liberal since the last the since than less liberal rather own supporters. More widely, it is hoping own supporters. More widely, 21st Century politics with an 18th Century brain. New York: York: Century brain. New Century politics with an 18th 21st Penguin. Reduce Reduce ofnumber Muslims/ presence of Islam in society Stop all immigration Source: Extremis Project/YouGov It is very difficult to either to a more populist right ortriangulate see Labour how can mainstream liberal position given this split in its concerned who are more to win voters and culture, immigration, welfare, about but it is difficult to know many of its alienating without achieved how this can be become have and they - supporters current more act of very the Election. Moreover, General in this way would to triangulate being seen of a populist play into the moral accusations faceConservatives The radical right party. the way to marginalise populist radical marginalise way to the the to dramatise could be right parties the and perhaps do to minorities harm they of more to human life consequences wider policies.restrictive to both triangulation draw-backs are There re- and are) voters where they (meeting to your positions). voters framing (bringing The major issue with triangulation is that on these populist issues, it is very difficult to mutually- two between policy bridging a find UK following is the The positions. exclusive attitudes supporters’ on two party’s Labour populist attitude statements: TABLE 5 TABLE 40 Lakoff, G. 2009. The Political Mind: why you can’t understand The 2009. G. Lakoff, 40 facts and evidence and instead conditionand instead and evidence facts in their way. to think voters

What she has 39 competition in Western Europe. A fine-grained analysis of Europe. Western competition in party positions over the past two decades.” Party Politics 19(1): 1-23. to this strategy. First, mainstream parties can parties mainstream First, strategy. to this too removed are they so far before only go The research comfort zone. from their shows that Akkerman Tjitske to by referred able have been radical right parties populist paying an electoralto shunt right without to both the FPÖ and theprice: this applies Party (SVP). Swiss People’s substantive in policy terms thansubstantive in policy terms concerned with It is more triangulation. in a way that an argument presenting The human mind appeal. has cognitive to respond to narrative,is conditioned ‘Liberals’ (in the and empathy. metaphor, American context) should try to rely on Re-framing as outlined by the psychologist by the as outlined Re-framing George Lakoff is in many ways less Triangulation is a strategy that involves taking that involves is a strategy Triangulation opponent’s an traditional solutions to solve ‘owned’ concerns - social democratic ends means or vice versa.through conservative and synthesised It involves adopting a new, policy approach in order totranscendent those of supporters and both existing please centre- of the One example opponent. the this goal in the debate overleft achieving is for example, and identity cultural anxiety, as one of economic problem the to re-cast of onepolicy and social investment instead a centre- Additionally, relations. of cultural of some tightening to left party may agree seen as centre-right, The immigration rules. Austrian VVD and in the cases of the Dutch have tried triangulation alongside ÖVP, absorption as strategies. comfortably it is no coincidencetogether: They can often goesthat triangulation strategy fit alongside a ‘big tent’ approach. C. Triangulation and re-framingC. Triangulation also found is that mainstream parties are mainstream parties also found is that positions with the anti-Islam uncomfortable can loseA party right. of the populist radical to the left what it gains by shifting to the It has, in many ways, aright (and vice versa). to triangulation.similar drawback 39 Akkerman, T. 2012. “Immigration policy and electoral 2012. T. Akkerman, 39

Democracy under stress 34 Democracy under stress a similar dilemma between their current There have been populist-esque movements support, which is fairly hardline on questions such as 15M in Spain, Occupy in the US and of immigration and culture, and the younger/ UK, J14 in Israel, and UK Uncut. They all black and minority ethnic voters who it wants relied on a sense of crisis, juxtaposed a ‘pure’ to attract, but who are more pragmatic. people with a corrupt elite (Occupy’s ‘we are the 99%’ is quintessential populism) and Re-framing is an unconvincing way sought to drive change through expressive around this tricky dilemma. Firstly, the ‘will of the people’ rather than representative ‘framing space’ of politics is competitive politics. In the electoral space, Syriza in so the challenges to your ‘frame’ will be Greece and perhaps the Dutch Socialist considerable. Secondly, no matter how Party are currently the closest equivalent to talented a communicator a mainstream left populist parties within western party may have at their disposal, if they do democracies. At a local level, there has not address anxieties head-on by talking been a flickering of left-wing populism. about cultural as well as social and economic For example, the web and social media matters, they risk irrelevance. Having said amplified a successful campaign of Respect this, there are ‘economic’ elections and in Bradford West with its connection to ‘cultural’ elections. At certain times, such unseen social networks in the Islamic as the current context, economic questions community in particular, showing how can ‘crowd-out’ cultural questions. Much of quickly new political forces can connect this is exogenous and depends on people’s where the mainstream is perceived to have most pressing concern given economic failed.41 Nonetheless, left populism has and political circumstances at the time. been hitherto significantly less successful Therefore, it might be a case of ensuring than the populist radical right. relevance and sequencing the economic and cultural arguments to coincide with The problems with the mainstream left the political moment. The problem comes adopting a more populist stance are when trying to fight with an economic threefold. Firstly, a return to ‘pure’ left roots frame in a cultural moment. That is the risk strategy is often based on attempting to win of over-ambitious re-framing. back lost working class support. However, much of this support has left as it no longer Re-framing sometimes offers a good feels that its anxieties around culture, communication manual for politicians, but immigration and welfare are being met by as an antidote to populism, with its own the mainstream centre-left. An appeal to it powerful imagery and story, it will fall short. on the basis of an economic class populism Indeed, a combination of triangulation and / probably will not work. Secondly, western or re-framing could fall between two stools societies have changed and are now far and play into populist hands: ‘unprincipled more pluralistic. To make an appeal on what politics’ mixed with a misdiagnosis of the is a sectional ground ignores this basic fact. political challenge. Finally, should this strategy succeed in D. Return to roots and Left populism electoral terms then it would face one of the For the centre-left, there is the alternative major draw-backs of populism: governing strategy of adopting a class-based populism reality. Of course, mainstream left parties instead of the more cultural populist need to have a convincing argument on narratives of the populist radical right. In a inequality, jobs, housing, public services sense, this is fighting fire with fire. In some and economic growth. However, populist respects, in the context of economic crisis and austerity, it is quite surprising that a stronger 41 See Baston, L. 2013. “There was more to George Galloway’s triumph in the Bradford West by-election than celebrity left-wing populism has not yet emerged. politics.” LSE Politics and Policy Blog. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ politicsandpolicy/archives/30220.

42 It is an elite level theory It is an level elite 43 electoral Cambridge Cambridge: University market. Press. Jim Buller and Dr Toby James, Structure, Agency and the Structure, James, Toby Jim Buller and Dr Gordon Brown’s assessment of political leaders: the case of statecraft. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2160378 42 Norris, P. 2005. Radical right: voters and parties in the 2005. Norris, P. 42 The statecraft approach is summarised and updated in Dr 43 issues of the populist radical right. It requires right. radical populist of the issues and the concerns that acknowledgement and even anxious in more voters angst of real. It are electorate of the hostile parts following the mean however, does not, rhetoric of the populistor approaches policy, contagion. would be radical right - that and places party leadership in the critical in the and places party leadership context ofdemocratic position. In the to new response democratic stress, the economic and political challengescultural, The statecraft strategy becomes critical. It is simply a tentative engagement It is simply engagement witha tentative which are concerns voters and their these the of territory natural the not necessarily mainstream party. UK Labour by adopted has been This strategy has sought in a as he Ed Miliband leader with to engage of speeches series immigration, and EU, the Englishness, cultural anxieties offering and strong conflict solutions response. without Given or policies the it issaw in the analysis on triangulation, see-saw in effect we holding position. sensible an entirely something more comprehensive However, if it is not to be be required will ultimately Herelip-service. paying as merely seen the picture. in to comes statecraft F. Statecraft F. as: Bulpitt defined statecraft Jim “The elections and, above all,art of winning degree of achieving a necessary competence office.” in across four dimensions:This is achieved a winning developing party management; political argument strategy; electoral hegemony and governing competence. add a furtherJames Toby Buller and Jim rules the to statecraft: bending dimension of the game.

or even populist-light promises promises inmade populist-light or even opposition have a habit office. of backfiring Francois in Hollande,trap. this into precisely fell French President, Socialist the to describe inaccurate it would be Though to for an ‘end his promise as a populist, him towards a in his campaign drifted austerity’ election, heFollowing the light populism. in budget an austerity implemented then office,leaving his approval ratings after six months at historic lows for a French President lows for a French months at historic its politics takes Pragmatic as a result. politics when faced on expressive revenge with real and not Furthermore, betrayal only plays into tough choices opponents, hands of mainstream the in office. it confirms the moral of populism version A left populists. arguments of the deepens as austerity likely more becomes long-term ultimate few offers It persists. and of democracy. solutions to the stresses The range of cultural issues and anxietiesThe range of cultural radical right as populist by the presented for traditional liberal questions well as the a serious political challengedemocracy pose When faced with thorny mainstream. to the issues about immigration, culture, citizenship especially - temptation the and democracy, has been mainstream - centre-left for the hasThe centre-right issues. these to evade E. Acknowledgement/tentative engagement is a holding position this strategy Essentially, short term. Itand can only work in the involves more than just talking about the often tended to drift towards the populistoften tended of political expediency-radical right out notably the case in the Netherlands, UK. the Austria, and even France, Hungary, with engagement there has been When these concerns, the centre-left has tended to adopt a A strategy of acknowledging approach. largely ineffectivere-framing concerns and careful engagement is a first to substantively voters andstep meeting are, as opposed they where their concerns the mainstream party wants themto where to be.

Democracy under stress 36 Democracy under stress requires a fundamental approach on political, them through training, advice and electoral and governance levels. Ultimately, guidance, job brokerage and support for as the mainstream’s ability to govern and wages. meet democratic expectations is questioned, the best medium-term strategy requires 7. Play to mainstream democratic a demonstration that the mainstream can strengths: persuasively articulate the still answer the demands and needs of importance of pragmatic governance in people in the context of democratic stress. defence of individual and national interest.

In response to democratic stress, a 8. Appreciate the sources of mainstream centre-left or -right statecraft distrust in representative politics - could have a number of facets: professionalisation, nepotism, corruption, lack of real diversity, insiderdom. 1. Accept that people’s anxieties are Take real steps to demonstrate that cultural as well as economic. Do not leave mainstream democracy is opening up and thorny issues - such as on-street grooming confronting its weaknesses. Centralised, - to populists or extremists. Ensure they are closed and ‘guild-like’ parties are a dealt with in the democratic mainstream. disaster in this regard- which is exactly what many mainstream parties have 2. Present a national vision that can become. transcend these cultural anxieties; do not accept the inevitability of cultural conflict 9. Insist that political institutions should and the potential harm that implies. be more accessible - where democracy, For example, when Nicolas Sarkozy policy action and services can be localised, launched a debate on national identity, they should be. the French left refused to respond. Not only should they have participated, they 10. Embrace contact democracy - in should have been ahead of this debate. contradiction to a groupist multiculturalist approach - on a local level, even if 3. Be honest about what can and cannot the benefits are not easily quantified. be managed in terms of immigration Meaningful contact between the without causing harm to people’s mainstream party and those it represents incomes, future growth, public services is critical for building trust. Moreover, and particular industries. Manage what community mobilisation that creates one- can be managed; be honest about to-one contact will reduce tensions over what is less manageable. time. Support should be given to groups and campaigns that enable this. 4. Rapid local change can be disconcerting without active management. Ensure that The statecraft approach relies on a blend communities facing such change are able of party change, transparent and fearless to adapt public services, housing and local engagement, practical institution building, employment to the changes. supporting groups and campaigns that create more meaningful local contact 5. Engage with concerns about contribution within communities and democratic and access to welfare - this perhaps more change. It is an elitist approach with than anything else is corrosive of trust in democratic ends. It combines organisation, public institutions. governance, ideology, policy and electoral competition. It is comprehensive and 6. Appreciate how a lack of market power difficult, though not impossible to pull can accentuate anxieties and address off. It requires engaging directly with

The contributory principle principle contributory The Lack of access to affordable, bottom-up, Europe’s mainstream mainstream Europe’s bottom-up, high quality housing in good communities high quality housing in good communities is one of the issues likely to tip beneficial contact into Supply is a fundamental issue but so is a situation based to a greater distribution and access of conflict. of the extent on contribution. Regulation is also important private housing market of stability, to give people a greater sense transparency improve quality and increase may be over costs. Public intervention supply of not only to enhance necessary affordable housing,but to allow people to equity in their home over time accumulate of asset security reinforce the to further those in marginal situations. of this characteristic the elite Despite it relies on grassroots action strategy, as the Just and organisation to succeed. Obama ‘08 campaign was top-down and parties need to pursue a similar strategic it into a governing approach and extend ethos. Many of the groups that support this strategy lie outside of formal party politics. Many already exist and are flourishing. It is worth a reviewing number of groups that have examples of successful variety positive change in a wide provoked of contexts. 2. Welfare. 2. Welfare. 3. Housing. introduction of living wages; and support and support wages; of living introduction to for individuals and out of work both in skills and transition develop help them whilst also helping smooth the move from to another. job one is one which accords with a reciprocal with a reciprocal which accords is one to key moral sense. Linking access social wider to work or welfare resources contribution is one means of responding to context of immigration, this sense. In the is migration, there including intra-EU of looking at the rules further scope for access to benefits and contribution. basis of time-based housing the on

44 The rules of access here are here are of access rules The net/cumulus_uploads/document/lxmy8ohv03/YG-Archives- Pol-Trackers-Issues(1)-290113.pdf. An important element of statecraft is is of statecraft element An important the sources and tensions of ‘democratic of ‘democratic and tensions sources the stress.’ while be said that It should public policy. of betrayal, feeling sense the anger, lack frustration at the of unfairness, lack of and apparent of transparency on competence strong management to cultural response control in border and economic change is significant, the policy levers can at border complete weak. For example, first glance seem withdrawal from management requires notion that one nation can The the EU. control not only its comparative also its economic advantage, but nation, is fanciful distribution within the control of Equally, to say the least. movement and settlement the internal in an state the takes of people direction. Modern authoritarian about statecraft is clear and transparent potentially its limitations as well as its are These caveats impactful interventions. are not acknowledged, important. If they and statecraft then trust is undermined is fatally wounded early in its lifespan. Cameron’s of David The commitment migration net to reducing Conservatives to the ‘tens of thousands’ without the significant ability controlto that hampered example of how trust can be one flow is As a consequence, the from the outset. lead on immigration has Conservative when from 28 percent declined already by percent 13 to office, into came party the 2013. January of the end However, three potential areas of note do do areas of note potential three However, both to ‘pull levers’ present opportunities in a local and national context in ways that concerns address some of the underlying and opportunity: about change, fairness critical: enforcement of minimum wages; wages; of minimum critical: enforcement 44 See YouGov issue tracker http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront. issue tracker YouGov See 44 1. Jobs.

Democracy under stress 38 Democracy under stress 7. Contact democracy We will consider eight case studies from as a strategic response different countries to suggest that there is more than one specific method of contact As previously mentioned, Sturgis, Jackson, democracy that can be successful at and Brunton-Smith’s study on ethnic combating populists and extremists - whilst diversity and social cohesion in London generating greater trust been individuals in neighbourhoods45 presents a compelling different perceived groups. Although there empirical case countering conflict theory,46 is variation in the objectives and strategies suggesting that racial and ethnic diversity pursued by these grassroots movements, decreases prejudice and stereotyping when campaigns, and groups, the common individuals of different ethnic groups are thread is that they have all succeeded in brought into direct contact with one another. engaging citizens in political dialogue and participation. Another recent study by Clive Lennox has similar findings, concluding thatFurthermore, the they have encouraged a formation of ethnically diverse and racially unifying identity politics to counteract the integrated neighbourhoods would make false divisions between groups exacerbated it more difficult for far-right parties toby gain ‘us’ versus ‘them’ rhetoric, which can breed support as white individuals seem to be hate and violence and potentially lead to more tolerant of minorities when they have extremism. Building trust amongst members more exposure to them.47 It has also been in civil society to enhance social relations found that contact with one group, such as is one of the ways that these organisations immigrants, reduces a person’s prejudices are helping relieve some of the ‘stresses’ not only to that group, but to others as well, currently imposed on liberal democracy. such as religious minorities or homosexuals48 Mainstream parties need to engage more – two other groups that tend to be the directly with an increasingly fragmented victims of far right and extremist persecution. electorate. Democratic structures have been Zick, Kupper and Hovermann also slow to respond to the challenge as Harris conclude that there is a relationship Beider has found in his research into white between contact with immigrants and working-class communities. He finds: levels of prejudice, finding that prejudices are more widespread amongst those who “There was a sense that government was not have little contact with immigrants.49 It is listening to the concerns of white working- the notion of positive contact that lies at the class communities and not interested in heart of attempts to reduce conflict through engagement.”50 community level campaigns and organising - with some notable successes. As argued in the section on statecraft, democratic institutions have to be devolved and responsive to local communities if 45 Sturgis, P., J. Jackson, and I. Brunton-Smith. 2011. “Ethnic trust is to be restored. Equally, there is an diversity and the social cohesion of neighbourhoods: The case of London.” In 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. important role for organisations that work 46 Hewstone, M. 2009. “Living apart, living together? The role of intergroup contact in social integration.” Proceedings of within those communities to bring them into the British Academy 162: 243-300. As cited in Sturgis, P., J. closer contact. Mainstream parties need to Jackson, and I. Brunton-Smith. 2011. Ethnic diversity and the social cohesion of neighbourhoods: The case of London. In support and work alongside them if they are 6th ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik. 47 Lennox, Clive. 2012. “Racial integration, ethnic diversity, to drain some demand for the populist radical and prejudice: empirical evidence from a study of the British right and extremism whilst restoring trust in National Party.” Oxford Economic Papers 64(3): 395-416. 48 Pettigrew, T. F. 2009. “Secondary Transfer Effect of Contact: public institutions: working with the people, Do Intergroup Contact Effects Spread to Noncontacted Outgroups? Social Psychology 40: 55-65. As cited in Zick, not just for the people. The following are Andreas, Beate Kupper and Andreas Hovermann. 2011. “Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 50 Beider, H. 2011. “Community Cohesion: the views of white 49 Ibid. working-class communities.” Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

activists. They often target their materials at materials their target often They activists. who women voters groups such as particular to hate literature. aversion a greater have to tend many BNP supporters that Given with individuals contact little direct have of different ethnic backgrounds and Hope minorities, about ethnic knowledge little has been focus on education Not Hate’s level party’s the lowering directly at effective of support. Corby, Central, Manchester 2012 recent In the by-elections, parliamentary and Rotherham right was the leading anti-far Hope Not Hate 16,800 distributed They campaign group. leaflets in Manchester Central,where The the cent. up polling only 2.7 per BNP ended for campaign was also a chance by-election in network to activate their group the elections European 2014 preparation for the wanted– 76 individuals indicated that they Hope Not Hate campaign. Into join the Corby, the group distributed 5,000 leaflets, concentrating their efforts in a ward where The particularly active. BNP has been the asCorby 2.7 per cent in BNP polled a mere the far right had their best well. In Rotherham, had – the BNP recently chances of doing well polled in the constituency, two councillors General Election. 10.3 per cent in the 2010 printed and distributedHope Not Hate of a tabloid newspaper that copies 20,000 far right and issues of the confronted the offered a positivealternative to them. The – higher cent BNP ended up polling 8.5 per still but constituencies other than in the General lower than their result at the last campaigns inThe Hope Not Hate Election. undoubtedly had an impact areas all three Additionally, results. election on the BNP’s local has establish group also helped the activist networks that can campaign at sorts elections and ensure that these future norm. remain the of results in decline in the BNP has been Although Hope Not Hate emphasises the years, recent importance of not becoming complacent, rise party’s the as the factors underlying of immigration, increasing(high levels

The 51 prejudice: empirical evidence from a study of the British from a study of the British prejudice: empirical evidence Oxford Economic Papers 64(3): 395-416. National Party.” Hope Not Hate is a campaigning organisation fighting against the racism and the English by the BNP espoused and fascism amongst others. (EDL) League Defence group The non-partisan works on a local and other against these to campaign level far-right groups. They focus far-right these in neighbourhoods where their efforts study also found evidence that the BNP has that the evidence also found study the where in communities members fewer dispersed population is equally non-white ethnic groups, where numerous between mixed-race is a higher incidence of there of education and where levels relationships, an therefore is There to be higher. tend uponbased argument that BNP support is its as and misunderstanding, stereotyping hate-creating BNP’s the members believe or to lack information about stories due groups. ethnic direct contact with, other gaining support, challengingparties are mobilising as positively claims, as well their aindividuals opposed to racism to provide alternative. In these constituencies,positive Hope Not Hate produces and distributes informative leafletsnewspapers, opposing the BNP ‘on the and and building local networks ofdoorstep’ community 51 Lennox, C. 2012. “Racial integration, ethnic diversity, and “Racial integration, ethnic diversity, C. 2012. Lennox, 51 The aforementioned Lennox study on racial Lennox aforementioned The is and prejudice diversity integration, ethnic British from the on empirical evidence based of its conclusionsOne National Party (BNP). to sign up likely more were is that whites to the far right party when living in areas leading by non-whites, sparsely populated of less that as a result to the argument ethnic of diverse interaction with individuals in these areas are living whites backgrounds, minorities. about ethnic less informed Hope Not Hate, united Kingdom - Kingdom united Hate, Hope Not and forces, education anti-hate mobilising and unity resilience creating community examples of campaigns and organisations and of campaigns examples put this into practice. that have

Democracy under stress 40 Democracy under stress perceptions of identity conflict, andthat have long-term implications for citizens’ the declining strength of cultural and active future participation in the political institutional bonds between citizens and process. Citizens for a Better Arizona mainstream parties)52 are still present. (CBA), Mesa Moving Forward (MMF), Additionally, based upon the evidence put and the Campaign for Arizona’s Future forth by Sturgis et al. and Lennox’s respective (CAF) have engaged Latinos in campaigns studies, a continued focus on education against Russell Pearce and Sheriff Arpaio’s and disseminating information remains re-elections, resulting in many Latinos – a essential. Hope not Hate have also begun to relatively unengaged demographic in the organise events to bring communities closer past – registering to vote for the first time together such as street parties catered with and becoming actively involved in politics. cuisines from a range of ethnic groups. On First, CBA and MMF, two grassroots the electoral, educational and community community groups focused on projects contact levels, Hope not Hate has secured that “promote civic accountability, public a considerable impact on lessening the discourse and political advocacy,” ran demand for and impact of extremism. a very successful campaign to end the ‘reign’ of Arizona Senate President Russell Citizens for a Better Arizona, Mesa Moving Pearce, the Republican lawmaker who was Forward, and the Campaign for Arizona’s the chief individual behind SB 1070. CBA Future, united States - challenging canvassers and volunteers went door to harsh laws and re-vitalising, energising door, encouraging individuals to fill out their democracy in the process ballots and offering to deliver them for the county elections. They also targeted Dominated by a Republican state senator Independents and Hispanics, encouraging and Sheriff advocating for tough anti- them to request Republican ballots since immigration measures for years, the case they are permitted to do so in Republican of Arizona demonstrates how community primaries. This move alone led to an organising can achieve the short-term goals estimated additional 2,000 votes made of political campaigning as well as the long- in favour of Pearce’s rival for the GOP term objective of citizen engagement in the nomination. In addition, CBA members political process. There are numerous civic reminded voters that election day was organisations who have worked together to approaching, offered to provide free lifts to try and counteract Arizona’s anti-immigrant the polls, and left information on people’s state law, Senate Bill 1070, put forward by doorsteps about why Russell Pearce should former Republican State Senator Russell not be re-elected. The campaign achieved Pearce and backed heavily by Sheriff Joeits stated goal, as Pearce’s rival defeated him Arpaio. The law gives police the right to with 53 per cent of the vote. stop people they suspect are in the country illegally and check their immigration status, Similarly, the Campaign for Arizona’s and also requires police to determine Future launched the Adios Arpaio initiative the immigration status of anyone who against Arpaio’s re-election for Sheriff, with is arrested or detained when there is strong support from both the Latino and “reasonable suspicion” that they are not labour communities, particularly youth, legal residents of the US, subjecting people trade unionists, and progressive activists. of colour to racial profiling. In response, It enlisted 20 paid staff and 400 volunteers the Latino community in Arizona has come to target individuals who were not likely to together for two separate but related goals vote, helping register 35,000 new voters – of which over 21,500 were Latino. These new voters are now also on the 52 Goodwin, M and Ford, R. 2010. “Angry White Men: Individual and Contextual Predictors of Support for the British National country’s Permanent Early Voting List, Party.” Political Studies 58(1): 1-25.

become citizens. Compared to when theto when Compared citizens. become energy overwhelming the in 2007, bill failed for amnesty supporting the side is now on of thea result as illegal immigrants Dreamers’ efforts. Although it was a major by fail in 2010 Act the have disappointment to just five votes, it is clear that the organisation in helping shift consensushad an impact past fewOver the in a positive direction. working to have been ‘Dreamers’ the years, ofthrough a series their goal achieve negotiations, public theiryoung people have declared where ‘coming-out’ affairs After of street protests. status, and a number organisation also ‘no’ vote, the the 2010 Obama, who could shifted its focus on to of because his stop deportations executive powers. endeavours Dream’s We United at Looking is a clear there course of 2012, the over determination their that highlights timeline pursued on thethey strategies and the their ultimate goal.path to achieving with organised a meeting they April, In White for advocacy, director House organisation’s officials the confronted Praeli, Lorella and advisor senior wherepresident’s putting the domestic policy advisor, to theforth a challenge thatpresident to issue an order immigrants fromwould protect illegal the One month later, deportation. Obama President presented leaders group’s by 90 immigration signed with a letter law professors that able to act underprecedents he would be specified the deferralfor instigating a deportation legal theObama issued June, program. In action for ‘deferred childhood arrivals’ two-yearprogram, which provided of success, moment Since this deferrals. continued have nonetheless Dreamers the their efforts. They haveclinics to aid immigrants in applying for organised legal clinicsThese deferrals and work permits. ultimately had a the by recruited were to them who came dual effect, as to mobilise voters ahead ofDreamers those

They were behind door-knocking campaigns behind were door-knocking They to vote, migrants not entitled led by those mobilising tomany Latinos who could vote playing no small part go to the polls in 2012, result,As a victory. re-election Obama’s in one of the first items on his agenda is a bill 11 million immigrants in thethat will legalise US, finally offering those who came to the the chance to formally as children country Along similar lines of the Arizona case of the Along similar lines Dream is a national-level We United study, organisation that has effectively mobilised community (both legal migrant Latino the and put together to come and illegal) administration to Obama’s on pressure by in 2009 Act. Founded pass the Dream since banded as one have they local groups, mostly of youngunited force composed shared identity bound by the who are people a ‘Dreamer.’ of being united We We united Dream, united States- new voters to secure policymobilising change Looking at Arizona’s grassroots community Arizona’s at Looking explicitorganising, it is not only the campaigns or not these outcomes of whether Arpaio and in removing Pearce succeeded from power that are significant, implications for engaging long-term their but also excluded marginal groups inpreviously political participation. meaning that for each election, a ballot election, for each that meaning to them mailed be will automatically Like election. prior to the 26 days about membersArpaio Adios MMF, CBA and encouraged individuals to ballots and offered to deliver them. Despite fill out though re-elected, Arpaio was fact that the their vote (down cent of the per with only 50.7 long-lasting the cent in 2008), from 55 per campaign is most importantimpact of the With thousands its success. when measuring and on the voters registered of new List, get-out- future Voting Early Permanent a much have already campaigns the-vote upon. build to stronger foundation

Democracy under stress 42 Democracy under stress the presidential elections in battleground Despite being a nation-wide campaign, it is states.53 a great example of community organising as many efforts are still made on a local Their strategies have been effective atlevel, and the campaign uses the power of gaining momentum for the movement, personal stories to build a notion of shared increasing participation numbers and identity. The United We Dream movement encouraging individuals towards activism. has demonstrated the success of combining This is grassroots contact democracy at targeted action at officials, demonstrations its best. The public events where migrants to raise awareness, mobilisation campaigns reveal their status have also removed some to ‘get out the vote,’ and a strong online of the fear of deportation, and have drawn presence for pursuing and achieving their the Dreamers even closer. The group also goals. Furthermore, it has engaged and operates on an individual, grassroots level empowered a community of ‘Dreamers’ – by telling their personal stories to anyone Latino immigrants – that had for years been and everyone. This was one of the most disenfranchised from the political process in effective methods for voter mobilising the this United States. past November. Additionally, peaceful sit-ins and demonstrations have helped United We Bunt Statt Braun, Germany - Dismantling Dream generate publicity for the movement, and diluting prejudice increasing their support and in the process have placed mounting pressure for the Anti-immigrant and racist attitudes remain Dream Act to be pushed through Congress. a prevalent problem in Germany. A long- Results have also been seen at the state level, term study on intolerance, prejudice and where Republican Senator Marco Rubio in discrimination by Zick et al. found that 50 Florida has prepared a new bill that will allow per cent of respondents in Germany believe young migrants to gain visas in response to that “there are too many foreigners living” in the organisation’s campaign. the country, with just under 30 cent holding the view that foreigners should be sent United We Dream has recognised the back to their home countries in times of importance of having a strong online job scarcity. 51.9 per cent of respondents presence, with a well-designed website also agreed with the notion that it is that is easy to access and an active social necessary to protect their culture from the media presence on both Twitter and influence of other cultures.54 Bunt Statt Facebook. Since they target young people Braun (“colourful instead of brown”) is a in particular, it is undoubtedly an effective non-partisan, community-based citizens’ way of engaging and mobilising their core initiative in the town of Rostock, working demographic who are more attuned to the actively to counter these tendencies potential power of online campaigning, that can lead to populist far right and as was also evidenced in both of Obama’s extremist support in society. Having arisen presidential election campaigns. The as a reaction to a Neo-Nazi arson attack theme of individuals with personal stories on a house hosting Roma asylum seekers coming together to form a larger narrative and Vietnamese contract workers in a is reflected on their site as well, and the Rostock suburb in 1992, the organisation group also hosts events to help immigrants has since sought to promote cultural with their applications as well as a webinar and political tolerance of all nations series that has a more educative element, and ideologies and fights the use of explaining the new immigration policy. violence.

53 Preston, Julia. “Young Immigrants Say It’s Obama’s Time to Act.” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/ 54 Zick, Andreas et al. 2011. “Intolerance, Prejudice and us/dream-act-gives-young-immigrants-a-political-voice.html. Discrimination: A European Report.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

of projects and campaigns to engage and campaigns of projects different these on taking By directly. citizens approaches to address the challenge from Again shows Never than one angle, more how effective a grassroots organisation can and working community the be at engaging causes of the underlying to combat some right party support.that lead to extreme Coalition-building with other groups of interests has shown to be asimilar goals and model. successful Again’s some of Never It is worth considering groupThe detail. initiatives in greater monitors racism and discrimination on the ground via “the Brown Book,” a document andof racist and xenophobic incidences More than 400 in Poland. committed crimes alone, such in 2010 published were entries as unidentified perpetratorsto firebomb attempting a synagogue, or football fans of player throwing bananas at a black and anti-Semitism Zagan FC. Racism Czarni as to be serious problems in Poland, remain of incidences number sheer by the evidenced documented. that were Furthermore, by providing information to issues covering journalists and researchers Again has Never to extremism, related nationalassisted in writing more than 3,000 and books, articles and international press TV and radio broadcasts. In doing as well as onso, it has undoubtedly had an impact raiseinforming the public and helping organisation’s the Additionally, awareness. Parliamentarycooperation with the has helped on Ethnic Minorities Committee influence legislation on topics of racism and a ban on such as incorporating xenophobia, into Poland’s activities racist and neo-Nazi constitution. media with the working together Besides Again has Never and parliamentary groups, project collaborating on a research also been association called with a Potsdam-based Together 2008. since Perspective’ ‘Victim’s they have been exploring different methods based on extremistfor monitoring violence

inclusive On the level of community engagement, Bunt engagement, community of level On the projects have been numerous Statt Braun’s and diverse, with ofthe objective dual haveThey and cohesion-building. education educational executed nights, culture run Tolerance for such as “Youth programmes – against extremism,and Democracy developed and anti-Semitism,” xenophobia community whereby system, SOS sticker an doors their on stickers members can put willing to are that they to signal to others offer emergencyorganised aid, film nights, podium discussions, courses in localinternational cooking and they have schools, as as well various exhibitions. youth encouraged initiatives have These other about to learn and adolescents cohesion from a social building cultures, programme has sticker The age. young of racistshown solidarity with the victims not are attacks, demonstrating that they As an aggregate, by society. tolerated sorts the organised Statt Braun have Bunt that encourage of events The ‘Never Again’ association in Poland Again’ association in Poland ‘Never The of community the success demonstrates organising focused to preventon education prejudices. and racial ethnic and dismantle Its objectives are met through a number of publication of a magazine; the strategies: researchers, media, cooperation with the international and other groups, parliamentary as leading a numberorganisations, as well Never Again, Poland - tracking and - Again, Poland Never and building about extremism education awareness of prejudice through culture, engagementsport and political community-building. They have thereforeThey community-building. political meaningful to have able been tensions surroundingThe impact in Rostock. change of multiculturalism and idea the of political driving forces one of the are by focusing on right; extreme the and diversity multicultural embracing building a strong civil society on a local level, Statt Braun an organisation such as Bunt negativityis able to counteract the far right. from the emanating

Democracy under stress 44 Democracy under stress right-wing motivations in Poland and promote its message. National team Germany, as well as non-governmental help captains reaffirmed their stances against for victims of such attacks. Additionally, the racism and encouraged intercultural project has a secondary goal of establishing dialogue between fans before the start of better transnational cooperation between the final games, followed by supporters victim support initiatives in the two producing choreographed displays before countries. kick off with the word ‘Respect’ to highlight the importance of the fight against racism. Another key to Never Again’s success has Additionally, UEFA promoted ‘Respect been its collaboration with international Diversity’ through a jersey exchange initiative organisations and networks that share featuring football celebrities as campaign similar goals, including Football Against ambassadors, connecting players and fans. Racism in Europe (FARE), UNITED for In combination, all of these efforts before Intercultural Action, and the International and during the 2012 European Football Network against Cyber Hate (INACH) Championships helped spread awareness amongst others. By working together with and have left a longer lasting impact in the other groups, Never Again has been able to entire region. amplify the impact it would otherwise have alone. For example, collectively with the One lesson to extrapolate from the ‘Never Union of European Football Associations Again’ case study is that mainstream parties (UEFA) and FARE, Never Again set up the do not necessarily have to work alone East Europe Monitoring centre in 2009, in engaging the community; cooperating documenting racism and xenophobia with other organisations that share across the region, and they implemented similar values and objectives can also be the Respect Diversity programme before effective. In doing so, Never Again has been and during the 2012 European Football able to have an impact in terms of educating Championships in Poland and Ukraine, citizens and raising awareness, engaging the planning and executing educational and community, especially youth, in its projects, awareness-raising activities. Given that thereby building social cohesion, and in many European countries, especially effectuating positive changes in legislation those in Eastern Europe, football players that make it more difficult for extreme right face regular abuse and are the subjects of parties to establish themselves and gain racist chanting and barracking, anti-racist support. football groups have been an integral part in helping disintegrate the historic Expo, Sweden - using education in schools infiltration of footballer supportand groupsworkplaces to combat racism and by the far right.55 Together, Never Again, xenophobia EUFA, and FARE created 2,500 ‘inclusivity zones’ at the championships – public The education efforts of Expo, a non- areas that were designated as being open profit, privately-owned research foundation and accessible to everyone, regardless established in 1995, have been considerable. of ethnic background, gender, disability, Its goal is to study anti-democratic, or sexual orientation. 80,000 police were right-wing extremist and racist inclinations given discrimination training to be able to in Scandinavian society. The foundation easily identify racist remarks or actions, runs Expo magazine, which publishes and the ‘Respect Diversity’ campaign was editorial and opinion-forming work on given a 30 second television advertisement these phenomena, and runs events to more slot during half time in all countries to actively connect with the community.

55 Fekete, L. 2011. “Pedlars of Hate: the violent impact of the European far right.” Institute of Race Relations.

45 local mainstream ‘Do what is needed’: is ‘Do what Amsterdam West Council, the Netherlands the Council, West Amsterdam - engagement as a means of rebuilding trust of rebuilding as a means engagement institutions democratic in studies of successful the case beyond Looking and engagementcommunity organising and independent civilby non-partisan council West Amsterdam groups, society parties of how mainstream is an example a similar approach can use in government of local, grassroots involvement with the in trust recover community to successfully model institutions. Its cooperative public offers a practical example councils can respond to their communities of how local to and leading antipathy, reducing directly, better social cohesion, client satisfaction, and citizen participation. city of seven is one West Amsterdam neighbourhoods of 22 districts, comprised to the wealthy ranging from the very very poor and representing of which the Moroccan nationalities, 177 different of yearsA number community is the largest. a from suffering was neighbourhood the ago, its citizens and its publicdisconnect between with government- institutions. Frustration in the district services and market-provided vandalismas well dismay at growing crime, was growing and provokingand disorder distrust in politics as a whole. In response, and projects of their many council ended the professionals of frontline a team assembled who set up their office in an empty house in main square.the became the council’s ‘Do what is needed’ began working morenew approach as they addressing closely alongside the community, arose, solving practical needs as they their and inviting parents, children, andproblems, community members to join. Do-it-yourself ofinitiatives were started where a number had failed or services and market-led public as ‘Connect,’ ‘The Book such disappeared, and ‘Buurtzorg.’Store,’

Expo foundation also organises regularExpo foundation also organises – lectures about anti-racism,events right, and the extreme xenophobia as well launches, demonstrations, report lecturesthe as journalism training. Many of Swedish Democrats the far right Since Since it was founded, Expo has had an has Expo founded, it was Since influential impact Swedishon reports for the numerous has published politics. It RacismCentre on Monitoring European as thesuch on issues Xenophobia and and employment.migrants, minorities foundation the 2010, in November Recently, union support for the labour received project “Stop racism in schools,” aimed about racism and children at educating a number of the other xenophobia. Like community organising initiatives, Expo of involving the importance recognises youth in its efforts of building a unified and since Additionally, civic society. tolerant Expo foundation 2012, of beginning the association with a Norwegian Vepsen, and a cooperativesimilar goals, have developed information, to exchange relationship in a joint endeavour and experiences ideas, to fightScandinavia. racism and intolerance in held at schools and workplaces,are youth to attend and challengingencouraging them to become actively involved in the fight against antagonistic identity politics. recently made gains in the polls,have editor of Expo magazine, Daniel Poohl, is frustration that there has expressed that something is happeningSweden in the with, but dealt to be which needs not addressingmainstream parties are engagementCommunity issues. the groups cannot preventby non-partisan populist far right on rise of the the to be partisanits own – there needs community organising in combination with and of acknowledgement strategies the to tackle all of the underlyingstatecraft support. of populist causes

Democracy under stress 46 Democracy under stress The first of these is a training programmeBuurtzorg now has 250 teams all over the for young men initiated by a group of local Netherlands. Moroccan men and youth in response to high crime rates and poor prospects for the All of these do-it-yourself initiatives have youth in the Kolenkit district. The ‘Connect’ developed as a result of having to deal programme aims to provide ‘community with budget constraints and in response to safety guards’ in the area by allowing youth dissatisfaction with both government and to gain work experience in groups with the market-provided services. Consequently, police. It developed into the largest service these shifts have had an impact on the provider in Kolenkit, also offering youth council’s agenda, moving it closer to one work, female empowerment training, and that is much more community-led. The care for young disabled people. The initiative larger impact of this change is that the is now subsidised by the Amsterdam role of local civil servants has become West council and works together with the one of facilitator or mediator rather than local mosques. Most recently, they have policymaker or welfare service provider. established a ‘hate crime team,’ responsible The local administration provides back-up for intervening in confrontations and for the community-led initiatives and is sensitive disputes that occur in the area. there to protect public space and make sure that no initiatives exclude individuals of ‘The Book Store’ initiative was started by two certain religious groups, sexual preference, local artists as a response to the Amsterdam or other discriminative criteria. housing crisis. Getting in touch with one of the biggest housing associations, they Amsterdam West council adopted the inquired if they could use one of the empty principles of co-operative government to apartment blocks in Kolenkit that was counter growing cynicism and restore trust ready to be knocked down. The artists and in the PvdA, the Dutch Labour Party, who locals renovated the building, making it had traditionally done well in the area but liveable and filling it with art, and now rentwhose support was falling as people began it out for almost nothing. A similar project feeling alienated from the district’s public was set up in Amsterdam Hogeschool, institutions – the police, youth care, housing where students are able to rent a place for associations, and education. Amsterdam free in return for doing community work. West council illustrates that there is a strong demand for local political leadership, for Finally, Buurtzorg is a homecare organisation more open politics with approachable set up by a local nurse who was upset by and accountable politicians who can help low client and employee satisfaction generate greater social cohesion in their and how traditional organisations were neighbourhoods. overseen by alienated managers concerned most about technical Projects financial that respond to citizens’ needs targets. As a result, he established a new and develop solutions together with the organisation where district nurses and community recover people’s faith in the ability district healthworkers themselves are of political institutions to be responsive and given a great deal of autonomy, with every effectuate positive change. The PvdA was team responsible for its own clientele. able to gain the most council seats at the 2010 When the objectives were changed to district elections, but the most important focus on client autonomy and satisfaction, outcome of its efforts was the renewed the results were amazing – not only sense of community instilled by responsive did client and employee satisfaction government. The case of Amsterdam increase dramatically, but it also became West shows that local politicians working a cheaper operation. Given its success, closely with local mutual initiatives can

of used outcomes strategies of education, political of education, objectives to achieve these goals should also overlap: goals these to achieve informative magazines and publications; active campaigns (both directly in political sphere such as Hopethe against the BNP, campaign Not Hate’s campaigns targeting as educational as well “Stop racism such as Expo’s youth lectures, including in schools”), and events workshops, and community gatherings ethnic and cultural divisionsthat bridge and create inclusive bonds between positive the groups. Finally, and movements, grassroots groups, the campaigns discussed should encourage mainstream parties to follow or encourage community and not for particular groups. In groups. for particular and not community contact democracy, better facilitate to order councillors to local devolved has been power of echo in an hubs - and community West. Amsterdam that - one outcome of this approach The is to align - elsewhere replicated be could with reciprocal and housing local services notions of welfare facilitateand to and responsiveness.community resilience not simply serves In many ways, Newham but local authorities other for as a model consideringWhen too. for a national party it is about aligning publicstatecraft, outcomes inpolicy with improving real democratichousing, jobs, integration and meeting as well responsiveness expectations and contributory people’s notions of fairness and justice. It is a approach that is makingcomprehensive a difference to canhints on how the political mainstream people’s livesdemocracydeploy statecraft and contact but also againstto buttress mainstream resilience extremism.populism and even highlight the necessity studies case These of mainstream parties incorporating into their agendas.contact democracy Their mobilisation/activism, improving services and policy outcomes, and building social cohesion should be the shared goals of mainstream The parties.

Quid pro Quo not Quid pro Newham Borough Council, theCouncil, Newham Borough 56 second most deprived local authority in the local authority most deprived second agenda to a bold new UK, has presented resilience.’build what it terms ‘community strands. of substantive This has a number direct interventions in theIt involves by the local housing and jobs markets to welfare It has established authority. strong enforcementwork programmes, minimum wage and a partnershipof the collegewith the local further education local to provide to establish a skills centre capabilities. with market-ready residents it is investing in In the housing market, In its strategy paper, paper, In its strategy status quo, Newham Borough Council, London - LocalCouncil, London Borough Newham powers to build local using ‘statecraft’ - ‘resilience’ community housing for social will now give priority “We throughto those in work or contributing the right creating foster caring, activity like for to their personalincentives people improve situation.” have have a very positive effect on community response viable a offer can and engagement critical thingThe agenda. to the populist develop to order in on issues is to engage parties in mainstream political trust wider local of citizens and their the needs to meet communities. housing, it regulatesnew high-quality landlords to enforce standards, andprivate principle contributory the has introduced this It expresses allocations. into housing follows: policy as latter These polices help address fairness help polices These with the borough. It supports theconcerns integration of the local community through the promotion of an ‘English language first’ It scores of supported street parties policy. Diamond Queen’s to coincide with the with one condition: they in 2012 Jubilee whole for the organised parties had to be 56 http://www.newham.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/835AAB4A- E651-4497-AAD8-D40D4A9934AB/0/ Whyweneedawelfarestatethatbuildsresilience.pdf

Democracy under stress 48 Democracy under stress similar pursuits. They include the development of activist networks, the involvement of new groups in political dialogue and participatory politics, as well as the rebuilding of trust in politicians, public institutions, and representative liberal democracy more generally. Overall, they also work at establishing a unifying politics to counteract the antagonism of the populist radical or extreme right; responsible for creating divides, breeding hate, and leaving open the potential for violence if exploited by extremists.

In addition to acknowledging the issues articulated by the populist radical right parties, tentatively engaging with them, and developing a comprehensive policy, governance, and political response for the long-term, mainstream parties need to also organise and engage at the local community level. By doing so, they will be able to combat some of the underlying causes of support for the populist radical right and extremist forces and help relieve some of the tensions causing stress on liberal democracy.

but the early signs the early but seeing we are are that populism. new form of yet another Mainstream parties have yet convincing radical to the populist response to findAnd a US. or in the Europe right either in now new technology organisation and instigatingare more political innovation. frustrated and Pluralistic, fragmented Some many openings. electorates create The some will nose-dive. will thrive and that the mainstream biggest mistake is making is what is dismissal of now an part of established liberal modern, rejection of is a Populism democracy. functioning democracy and its mainstream parties – it The contact approach of the ‘protest’. is not simply as that as much Star Movement, Five a superficial ’08, suggests the ways Obama in of will need parties which mainstream This contact to embrace democracy. of the closed models the old, suggests party will need political mainstream Hitherto, up. radically opened to be new forms of political contact have onto old, the grafted simply been things. closed, tired way of doing over a rusting Paint has applied been The chassis engine. with an unreliable driven parties that result is closed, elite messages push out core activist-focused while sharing through social the media spoils of policy influence and status for a close and politically nepotistic group. organisational and cultural Deep transformation is necessary Europe’s for old political guard. It will not be sufficient. are will have to show that they They also up to the task of governance in statecraft This is where times. complicated immense: are The challenges comes in. economic respond to threat; manage fiscal unsustainability;society; for an ageing maintain provide reform welfare; global competitiveness; secure energy and the climate change; improve manage manage and skills base; and education

- had just secured a quarter a quarter - had just secured Grillismo While the true nature of Grillo’s Five Star Five Grillo’s of nature the true While it does Movement is not yet entirely clear, of the ways in which some emphasise politics is changing. modern His central politics elite is against Italy’s argument bottom- and This anti-elitism media. and politics approach naturally people’s up Celebrity, an anti-EU attitude. becomes of hundreds and social media rallies, Grillo’s where spontaneous meet-ups movement. the drive debated are ideas by-election in the Eastleigh constituency. by-election in the Eastleigh constituency. routinely dismissed And yet populists are as ‘protest’ populists Europe’s fact, In pan. the in parties, flashes clowns, buffoons, – of different kinds – are challenger brands party brands ignore that the established at their peril. thin as Its manifesto was deliberately is an ethos and what coheres the movement Apart from sense rather than a doctrine. its of politics and the media, reform main focus environment was the healthy somewhat quixotically, and, What this approach means for living. or foreign the immigration, economy, What is evident policy is not entirely clear. has Star Movement is that the Five of contact form viral democracy. a mastered of the vote in the Italian election and now election and Italian of the vote in the Danish social ruling The polls. in the leads the populist fallen behind democrats had Party in an opinion poll radical right People’s for the first time UKIPever. had just come Conservatives from nowhere to beat the a parliamentary in place into third It remains to be seen whether it endures, whether seen to be It remains Europe’s mainstream parties have adopted have adopted parties mainstream Europe’s towards democracy for a proprietorial too now out long. Fissures are up opening have of which extremists populists and of going to press, At the time emerged. – with Star Movement Five Grillo’s Beppe its Conclusion - a renewed - Conclusion statecraftmainstream democracy’ and ‘contact

Democracy under stress 50 Democracy under stress migration flows while providing for complacent response could mean that a vibrant yet coherent society. The stress becomes intensified. That is a mainstream has to both connect wholly irresponsible response. The populist with society and demonstrate signal is clear. The extremist threat is governing capacity. Populists are less mostly contained for now. And yet, likely to face this latter challenge. democratic stress is evident. The problem So for the political mainstream it is is that if this situation persists, or indeed a matter of statecraft and contact worsens, then the social, cultural and democracy. Perhaps another Italian economic consequences could be severe. politician points a way forward. The young Mainstream parties face a huge burden of Democratic Party Mayor of Florence, responsibility to change. Matteo Renzi, almost stole his party’s leadership in primaries ahead of the Italian election. He traveled around Italy in a camper van plugging his programme of political, state, educational, healthcare, and fiscal reform and pushed a socially liberal agenda. Again, at the time of writing, he is the most popular choice for Italian Prime Minister – 28 percent favour him with 14 percent favouring his party leader, Pier Luigi Bersani, and Beppe Grillo is in third place with 13 percent. Perhaps his youth is part of this phenomenon in a country that is in desperate need of economic and political renewal. Whatever becomes of Renzi – he is just one individual – it underlines a broader message to Europe’s mainstream political parties – change or risk your mainstream status.

Britain’s majoritarian democracy perhaps protects the mainstream to a greater extent than elsewhere. There we can expect disengagement instead of defection if there is no change. It is not improbable that the next election could be won with a party securing only 35 percent of the vote or so. That will be a very unstable situation indeed as the mandate to govern will be weak and anger is likely to swell. Different political systems create different incentives and impacts, but the underlying forces of political change recur.

A rethink is necessary, and soon. The risk is that deeply damaging political parties and movements can gain traction in a situation of democratic stress. A

51 Democracy under stress 52 Democracy under stress Annex

The DEREX structure

Homophobia Prejudices and welfare chauvinism Anti-immigration attitudes

Value Judgements

Far right self-definition

Right-Wing value Traditionalism orientation

Need for obedience and order

Demand for Right Wing Dissatisfaction with Extremism (DEREX) the political system

Distrust toward international organisations Anti establishment attitudes Distrust toward the legal system and law enforcement

Distrust toward political elite

Public Morale

Dissatisfaction with life

Economic worries Fear, distrust and pessimism Feeling of physical insecurity

Suspicion toward others

Source: “DEREX.” 2010. Political Capital. http://www.riskandforecast.com/post/ in-depth-analysis/back-by-popular-demand_411.html