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LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS

IN A NEWLY-CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY:

THE CASE OF SPAIN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Lynn M. Maurer, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1995

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

Richard Gunther

Samuel Patterson Advisor Goldie Shabad Department of Political Science UMI N um ber: 9544635

UMI Microform 9544635 Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Lynn M. Maurer 1995 To Mark and Salena

and My Parents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my dissertation chair, Dr. Richard

Gunther, whose skill and knowledge 1 have come to greatly admire during my time at

The Ohio State University. I would like to thank him for his support and guidance and for serving as an excellent role model for any aspiring political scientist. 1 have also been most fortunate to work under Dr. Samuel Patterson and Dr. Goldie Shabad, both of whom have been very encouraging and helpful.

I would also like to acknowledge the support of the Program for Cultural

Cooperation Between Spain’s Ministry of Culture and United States’ Universities, the

Graduate Student Alumni Research Awards and the Latin American Studies Program

Travel Grants of The Ohio State University, and The Ohio State University Columbian

Quincentenary Committee.

In Spain, of the many people were very helpful in helping me obtain information,

I would like to especially thank Manuel Gonzalo, Director of Studies and Documentation at the Congress of Deputies, Jaime Mariscal de Gante y Mirdn of the Spanish Ministry of Relations with the Cortes, Enrique Amaldo Alcubilla, Leu&do de las Cortes Générales, and Maite Guezala, as well as Professors Juan de Dios Izquierdo Collado, Miguel Angel

Ruiz de Aziia, José Ramdn Montero and Joan Marcet i Morera. I am also most grateful

in for the many parliamentarians and government ministers who provided invaluable information through interviews.

Many friends were supportive throughout the process, namely Ilze Barobs, Phillip

Hinz, Neovi Karakatsanis, Paula Markovich, and Terri Waugh. I would like to thank everyone in the Maurer family, especially my parents, Richard and Judythe Maurer, and my sister, Karen Maurer Buening. Finally, I most appreciate the support of those closest to me, my husband, Mark Weikle, and my daughter, Salena Weikle Maurer, who due to my long hours at work, learned to say the word "dissertation" before the age of two.

IV VITA

June 15, 1960...... Bora - Salem, Ohio

1982 ...... B.A., Spanish Otterbein College Westerville, Ohio

1985 ...... M.A., The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio

1988-1991 & 1995...... Graduate Teaching Assistant Department of Political Science The Ohio State University

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iü

VITA ...... V

LIST OF TABLES ...... ix

LIST OF FIGURES...... x

CHAPTER PAGE

I INTRODUCTION...... I

Existing Frameworks for Comparisons...... 4 The Nature of Legislative-Executive Relations ...... 6 Measuring the Influence of the Legislature ...... 8 Factors Expected to Affect Parliamentary Influence...... 10 Standard Factors Affecting Parliamentary Influence ...... II Size of Government Majority or Minority in the Parliament ...... 11 Degree of Party U nity...... 13 Specialization and Influence of the Committee System ...... 15 Contextual Factors Affecting Parliamentary Influence...... 18 Special Requirements and Conditions of the Process of Democratic Consolidation...... 18 Formal Rules; The Constitution and Standing Orders of the Parliament and Their Applications...... 21 Involvement in Supranational Organizations and the Structure of the State...... 23 Nature of Legislation ...... 25

Summary and Explanation of Data ...... 27

VI II HISTORY OF THE CORTES AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY...... 30

The Cortes under Franco...... 30 The Franquist Regime . 41 The Cortes in Transition ...... 44 The Electoral Law and the Development of the Party System .... 46 The Communist P a rty...... 48 The Socialist Workers’ P a rty...... 50 The C en trists...... 51 The Popular Alliance ...... 53 The Basque Nationalist P arty...... 54 Catalan regionalist parties...... 55 The Development of Legislative-Executive Relations ...... 55 The Constituent Legislature ...... 57 The Consolidation of D em ocracy...... 60

III HOW INFLUENTIAL IS THE SPANISH PARLIAMENT?...... 62

The Makeup of the Legislature, 1979-1993 ...... 64 Identifying parties involved ...... 66 Indicators of Parliamentary Influence...... 67 Level of activity ...... 67 Ability to reject and pass legislation ...... 72 Ability to influence Government a g en d a...... 84 Ability to modify executive legislation...... 89 Modification through prior negotiations...... 90 Modifications during parliamentary p ro cess...... 93 Quantity of Amendments...... 94 Substantive Amendments ...... 95 Negotiated Am endm ents ...... 97 How modifications are negotiated ...... 100 Conclusion ...... 105

Vll IV PARLIAMENTARY GROUP SIZE, PARTY UNITY, AND THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM ...... 108

Size of Executive Majority or Minority in the Parliament ...... 110 Party Unity ...... 116 Specialization and Influence of the Committee System ...... 126 Summary ...... 133

V LEGISLATING IN A NEW DEMOCRACY: HOW THE CHANGE AFFECTS THE PARLIAMENT...... 135

The Nature of the Democratic Transition and Consolidado6.... 135 Formal Parliamentary R u les...... 142 Involvement in Supranational Organizations...... 144 Structure of the State: Federal v. Unitary...... 148 The Nature of Legislation ...... 153 Summary ...... 161

VI THE NEW CORTES: ITS POLICY-MAKING ROLE ...... 163

What determines parliamentary influence? ...... 165 Relevance to Other Legislatures...... 172

APPENDIX: EPILOGUE...... 173

LIST OF REFERENCES...... 179

vni TABLES

TABLE 1 ELECTION RESULTS CONGRESS OF DEPUTIES, 1977 & 1979 ...... 47

TABLE 2 ELECTION RESULTS CONGRESS OF DEPUTIES, 1979-1993 ...... 65

TABLE 3 ACTIVITY BY BILLS INTRODUCED, 1979-93 ...... 68

TABLE 4 OPPOSITION ACTIVITY BY BILLS INTRODUCED, 1979-93 ...... 70

TABLE 5 ORIGIN OF LAWS, 1979-93 ...... 73

TABLE 6 SUCCESS OF GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL BILLS, 1979-1986 ...... 76

TABLE 7 SUCCESS OF GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL BILLS, 1986-1993 ...... 76

TABLE 8 SUCCESS OF CONGRESSIONAL BILLS BY PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS, 1970-1986 ...... 80

TABLE 9 SUCCESS OF CONGRESSIONAL BILLS BY PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS, 1986-1993 ...... 81

IX FIGURES

FIGURE 1 INTERACTION OF PARTY UNITY AND NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE PARTY PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ...... 117 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The nature of legislative influence on public policy within liberal democracies has

fascinated scholars throughout this century. Legislatures have been examined on a case by case basis giving us rich detail in the national characteristics that set the climate for

the operation of the legislature. Various frameworks have also been suggested by

scholars who aim to lend to our cumulative knowledge by comparing the legislatures of

many countries. Such a large comparative question entails so many national variations that it becomes impossible to reach the perfection of rank ordering national legislatures

in terms of influence. However, many comparative studies have been successful in setting up frameworks and continua against which to measure the influence of legislatures of additional countries. They have also been successful in engaging in constructive debate concerning the definition of legislative influence, as well as in identifying factors which appear to affect the degree of that influence.

Much is known about the legislatures of two long-standing democracies, the U.S.

Congress and the British parliament. The American case has served as a model of a very influential legislature, one that plays a "transformative" role on public policy in Polsby’s terminology. The British case has been set forth by Polsby and others as the prime example of a legislature that serves as an arena for debate and has little or no independent

1 2 power to influence policy (Polsby [1990] 1975). Other Western European parliaments have been examined in terms of influence and compared to these two extremes.

Legislative influence on public policy is generally believed to be affected by certain standard factors such as the existence or not of a government majority in the legislature, degree of party unity, the strength of the committee structure, and the resources available to the legislators.

Yet newly consolidated democracies present us with legislative cases whose variations in policy influence are not entirely explained by these standard factors. In the early phases of institutionalization, relations between the legislature and other institutions, namely the executive, are still malleable and parliament’s impact on policy making will vary. As such, the behavior of parliaments in new democracies is liable to be more sensitive to the influence of factors that would have little effect or that do not exist in seasoned democracies where behavioral norms guiding institutional relations are well established.

Degree of parliamentary influence in newly-consolidated democracies is subject to the initial instability of a new regime and a lack of historical diffuse support for the legislature. The dynamic nature of the new regime in which political parties, institutions, a constitution, norms, and citizen awareness of participation and representation are developing provides a drastically different setting from those of older democracies. In addition, external factors such as new found involvement in organizations of the international community are liable to have more impact on an institutionalizing parliament than on a more mature legislature. 3

No general irameworks exist exclusively for comparing the legislatures of newly- consolidated democracies. Neither are such frameworks necessarily desirable since in the interest of cumulative knowledge the degree of influence of legislatures of both new and old democracies should be readily comparable. However, the examination of the legislative bodies of new democracies poses numerous challenges for the standard approaches to legislative influence, namely as mentioned above, the setting of the legislatures may differ drastically. Therefore, the factors affecting its influence will vary from the ‘norm.’ Secondly, when examining a recently formed legislative body, our knowledge tends to be quite limited due to its young age. Studies and documents tend to be of a legal nature and explain what parliament should do - rather than what it actually does. Therefore, when looking at the legislatures of new democracies we need to start from scratch to discover the behavioral patterns and fluctuations which have occiured during its short life. Once we have gained this knowledge we can move to making comparisons with the legislatures of other newly-consolidated democracies or soon-to-be democracies.

In this study I examine the role of the Spanish parliament, the Cortes, during the

13 years since the formation of its new democracy (1979-1991) by systematically testing hypotheses concerning legislative involvement in decision making. Certain factors considered in this study are derived from previous studies on the British and American legislative bodies, whereas additional factors that appear to have impact on parliamentary influence arise from the particular circumstances of a new democracy. 4

Existing Frameworks for Comparisons

The existing frameworks for comparisons are general enough that we can benefit from them in our studies of the legislatures of newly consolidated democracies. One of the most useful concepts in terms of parliamentary influence on public policy is Nelson

Polsby’s continuum ranging from transformative legislatures lo legislatures that serve purely as arenas for debate with no real policy impact. While transformative legislatures have the ability to shape legislation, whether it originates in the legislature or with the government, arena-like legislatures "serve as formalized settings for the interplay of significant political forces in the life of a political system..." (Polsby [1975] 1990, p.

129-130). Polsby maintains that the study of transformative legislatures necessitates the examination of internal legislative forces such as the committee structure, whereas the study of arena-like legislatures calls for consideration of the external forces (political parties, interest groups) that find representative expression within the legislature. In practice, however, since most legislatures are liable to fall somewhere on the continuum between these two models, both the internal processes of the legislature and outside factors must be taken into account in attempting to ascertain the independence exerted by the legislature on policy.

A more complex but still very broad matrix has been offered by Michael Mezey who, like Polsby, takes into account policy-making impact. Legislatures fall into three categories in terms of influence on policy:strong policy-making power, the ability to modify and reject government bills; modest policy-making power, the ability to modify but not completely reject government bills; and little orno policy-making power, neither 5 the ability to reject nor modify them (Mezey 1979, pp. 26-27). Mezey also considers a second factor, the degree of support enjoyed by the legislature, defined as "a set of attitudes tliat look to the legislature as a valued and popular political institution" (Mezey, p. 27). A legislature with \ery weak popular support, even if it possesses strong policy­ making power, could actually be eliminated by other political elites and, therefore, cannot be seen as a powerful institution. While he points to the difficulty in measuring such support in any country, in new democracies where legislatures have not yet had time to develop diffuse support, measurements of support "are of little use and can be quite misleading" (Mezey, p. 33). Thus, while it will be useful to look at popular polls that measure support over time in a new democracy, it is not the optimal indicator of legislative strength for this study.

In order to distinguish between the U.S. Congress and the less powerful British

House of Commons, Pliilip Norton later breaks down Mezey’s "strong policy-making power" into two categories:policy-making legislatures "which cannot only modify or reject government measures but can themselves formulate and substitute a policy for that proposed by government" and policy-influencing legislatures that "can modify or reject measures put forward by government but cannot substitute a policy of their own" (Norton

1990a, p. 178). This distinction should be useful for cross-national comparisons, although the Spanish parliament has seldom been capable of rejecting government bills, and is still liable to fall in Mezey’s category of modest policy-making power somewhere on the continuum between Polsby’s two extremes. 6

Still another guideline for measuring the policy-making influence of a legislature is Blondel’s concept ofviscosity which views the legislature in terms of its ability to resist government initiatives. Low viscosity at one end of the continuum indicates a low potential for resistance and therefore, little policy-making influence. At this level, opposition amendments presented to government bills are routinely rejected by the government’s legislative support. At a slightly higher level of resistance to the government, opposition amendments may be passed with the consent of the government.

And at the far end of this continuum, we find legislatures with high viscosity and therefore, independent policy-making influence wherein opposition amendments succeed against the will of the government (Blondel et al. 1970, pp. 200-201). Blondel’s resistance concept could be useful for measuring parliamentary influence of the opposition through amendments. However, it overlooks the very important relationship between the government and its own backing in parliamentary systems as well as other ways in which the parliament may influence policy such as through agenda setting. Thus, before proceeding with the discussion of legislative influence, it is necessary to assess our concepts and definition of the legislative body itself and legislative-executive relations.

The Nature of Legislative-Executive Relations

Legislative-executive relations are often studied as though the legislature and the executive were two separate bodies, with the influence of each covarying with the power of the other. Although in some instances, such as in the United States, the two 7

institutions are separate powers, this assumption is erroneous when applied to parliamentary regimes with strong party systems (Andeweg, 1992; King [1976] 1990).

In such regimes party loyalties cross-cut legislative-executive lines as the government is directly responsible to the parliament and often enjoys the majority backing of its own party or coalition. In addition, membership may overlap in the two bodies, for example in Great Britain where the government members also serve in the parliament and in Spain where ministers may or may not simultaneously be members of parliament. Actors in such parliaments are defined by their adherence to party groups which tend to be highly disciplined and cohesive. Therefore, as Anthony King suggests when speaking of the

British House of Commons, "we should use as our units of analysis not parliament as a whole or even parliament minus the government but rather these party groupings and/or combinations of them" (King, p. 211).

Thus, in studying parliament’s influence vis-a-vis the executive we must consider at least two major types of relations: those between the opposition parties and the government and those between the government and its own party members in parliament.

Drawing from King in his study of legislative-executive relations in the Netherlands,

Andeweg indicates two possible modes of relations: intraparty, in which conflict occurs between the Government and its members of parliament, and interparty, in which the main friction exists between parties, be it between the opposition and the Government, or between parties ruling in coalition (Andeweg, p. 169). Both of these approaches will be applicable and essential to the period under study in Spain as the earlier Centrist

Governments experienced almost constant conflict with its own deputies, while the later 8

Socialist government benefitted from the unwavering loyalty of its own majority in parliament. To examine parliamentary influence purely in terms of the legislature versus the government would sorely overlook the nature of the party system in Spain and in democratic parliamentary systems at large.

Measuring the Influence of the Legislature

What types of indicators will serve then to measure legislative influence on policy­ making? To focus purely on legislation would ignore the complex nature of relations within the legislature and between the legislature and the executive. In addition, we must examine the rcîc of the legislature in determining the legislative agenda.

In a parliamentary system the legislative agenda is generally set by the ruling party’s program and policy decisions made by the government while in power. However, the opposition parties or the government’s backbenchers in parliament, as well as other outside sources, have the potential to affect the agenda. Formal means of parliamentary influence in agenda setting are more easily studied than informal methods, yet the degree to which they shape the agenda is not always obvious. Examples of such formal measures of control are written and oral questions, interpellations which may induce the government to deal with a given topic, and non-legislative motions which request the government to present legislation on a certain topic within a specified length of time.

Furthermore, legislation which is proposed by opposition parties might also serve to affect the agenda. For example, in Spain it is a common practice for opposition-initiated 9 legislation to be denied consideration in parliament because the government itself would prefer to sponsor legislation on the topic.

Parliamentary groups might also affect the agenda through informal methods, a point that is often overlooked in studies of parliamentary influence since these are hidden and almost inaccessible for investigation. Such influence might take place tiirough the press coverage of debate in plenary or committee sessions or through comments made by opposition leaders outside the parliament. Likewise, unseen agenda setting is likely to take place in closed door negotiations between the government and opposition leaders or between the government and members of its own parliamentary party or coalition. At times, negotiations are not even necessary to influence the agenda, for one can easily imagine occasions in which the executive chooses to postpone proposing certain subjects in the parliament due to the mereanticipation o f opposition, either when it does not enjoy a parliamentaiy majority or on issues for which it desires widespread support (Damgaard

1992, p. 142; Mezey, pp. 25-26). A second manner in wliich parliament has the potential to influence public policy is through direct influence on legislation, an aspect more easily measured and thus, more widely focused on in studies of this nature. As scholars mentioned above have pointed out, this can be measured through the ability of opposition parties and government backbenchers to initiate and pass legislation, through their ability to reject government bills outright, and most commonly in parliamentary

regimes through their success in making substantial amendments to government bills.

Nonetheless, the substance of government legislation may also be affected through the

same indirect avenues that help to set the agenda, namely, negotiations between the 10 government and parliamentary members as well as the anticipated reaction of the legislature.

Factors Expected to Affect Parliamentary Influence

Ascertaining the degree of policy influence of a legislative body is most useful on a cross-national level when we can also define the determinants of that influence. As such we can discover if the same factors hold when the legislature under study is compared with other legislative bodies of both new and established democracies. Two groups of factors that may affect the degree of parliamentary influence on public policy will be examined in this study. One group of factors consists of standard variables generally believed to be of importance in cross-national literature on legislatures, and includes the size of the Government majority or minority in the parliament, party unity and strength, the degree of specialization and the influence of the committee system. The second group of factors consists of contextual variables specific to newly-consolidated democracies which are expected to help determine the degree of parliamentary influence.

These include the special requirements and conditions of the process of democratic consolidation, recent entry into international organizations, the structure of the state

(federal, unitary, etc.), the nature of legislation, and the Standing Orders of the legislature and their application. All of these variables, whether standard or contextual, must be seen as interactive. No single variable will act upon parliamentary influence independently of its relation to the other factors. 11

Standard Factors Affecting Parliamentary Influence

Size of Government Majority or Minority in the Parliament

The most well-known and perhaps the most weighty factor affecting the influence

of parliamentary parties is the size of the government backing in the parliament. A one-

party government that controls a large majority will be faced with very little independent

policy influence from the parliament. The impact of this variable without a doubt

interacts strongly with other factors, probably most clearly with degree of party unity.

A large disciplined majority supporting the government program severely hampers the

impact of both the opposition and government backbenchers and leads to a situation of

opposition versus the government and its party, rather than of the legislature versus the

executive. This situation will be reinforced if majority-minority status is mirrored throughout the parliament in committees and other bodies within the legislature. In

addition, the influence the opposition is able to wield may depend on the specific bill under consideration. Since a government with a slight majority may desire widespread

support for certain important pieces of legislation for public opinion purposes, or for legislation that formally requires a larger majority for passage, substantial legislative concessions may be traded for votes particularly with opposition parties which are ideologically close to the government.

At times, a government may depend on a coalitional backing in the parliament, whether or not all the parties of the coalition are members of the government. In such cases, the opposition’s strength will be curtailed by the cohesiveness of a formal coalition 12

in parliament that religiously supports government legislation. However, if the government and its party must negotiate for support on virtually every vote, the parties

being courted possess the potential to influence the policy substantially. As Polsby asserts in a concise hypothesis; "The less fixed and assured the composition of legislative

majorities on successive specific issues, the more transformative the legislature" (Polsby

[1975] 1990, p. 142). Moreover, in such situations, as Kaare Strom maintains, governments will lack necessary effectiveness: "Over anything but the very short run, they [governments] must regularly be able to muster legislative majorities for their legislative and budgetary bills, their appointments, etc. Parliamentary governments.. .must be both viable and effective" (Strom 1990, p. 5). A government that must negotiate most votes over a sustained period of time with opposition parties or even with its own party, not only uses up untold energy but also runs the risk of collapse.

Certain contextual variables such as the formal regulations governing parliament and their practical application may enhance or diminish the degree of impact of the size of a government majority or minority in parliament. Founders of a new regime often enhance or detract from the potential power of the executive in order to avoid the recurrence of past experiences in which the executive became too strong or too weak.

In regimes downplaying executive strength, parliamentaiy rejection of a major piece of government legislation may act as a negative vote of confidence, causing the government to resign. In cases where the executive is protected, the government may suffer a certain amount of defeats without any threat to its longevity, a situation which has recently developed in Denmark (Damgaard, p. 34). If formal rules may have been written to 13 protect and stabilize minority governments, majority governments will also be endowed with enhanced power. Such an arrangement is bound to markedly diminish the policy influence of the opposition.

Degree of Party Unity

It is widely believed among studies of parliamentary influence that the greater the party unity and cohesiveness, the less influence the parliament will be able to exert on policy. In fact, parties were largely blamed for the so-called ‘decline’ of legislatures complained of by Bryce in the early 20th century. This decline included a

"reduced...value of debates” and "quality of legislation", and especially a diminishing

influence of individual legislators (Biyce [1921] 1990, pp. 49-50; Norton 1990b, p. 3).

Likewise, Norton, among many others, has recently pointed out that in the function of

policy making, legislatures sacrifice power because the group demands of the party

override individual initiative. He maintains that "political parties have served as the

conduits of the transfer of policy-making power from legislatures to executives" (Norton

1990b, p. 4). In parliaments where party loyalties crosscut legislative-executive lines, this

claim appears to hold true.

The impact of the degree of party unity will, of course, covary greatly with the

government’s numerical backing in parliament. While a government that benefits from

both a large majority and strong party unity in parliament will encounter little challenge

on its policies, the government that is lacking either of these will find its task more

difficult. Along the same lines, a one-party minority government which enjoys strong 14 party cohesiveness need only bargain with other parliamentary groups for a majority vote, while the same type of government lacking the automatic support of its party will spend much energy in negotiations as well as risk instability. While high cohesiveness in voting is not the only indicator of party unity, many studies have shown that this very valuable aspect of party unity is strictly adhered to in most parliamentary regimes. As Anthony

King asserts: "It is well known that government back-benchers’ reluctance to exploit their greatest resource - their votes - greatly inhibits their exercise of influence" (King, p.

214). Therefore, voting cohesiveness will serve as one indicator of party unity.

Highly unified parties tend to operate as hierarchies with strong party leadership and backbenchers who adhere to the party line. This is the dominant model among

Western European legislatures, those that Mezey dubs ‘reactive’ legislatures which enjoy modest policy-making power and high support. In such legislatures the "legislators...are shaping their behavior to meet the expectations of party elites rather than the expectations of mass publics" (Mezey, p. 40). In these cases, the decision makers are not always to be found in parliament, but are likely to be extra-parliamentary party executives and governmental ministers - whether or not they serve in parliament. Strongly unified parties maintain their cohesion through the loyalties of their backbenchers, not just through sanctions imposed for deviant voting or for absenteeism. Both party leaders and parliamentary members share a common loyalty to the party and belief in the party program (Andeweg 1992, p. 169; Griffith 1974, p. 41). Maverick legislators are weeded out in favor of those who tow the party line. Such strong party loyalty greatly benefits a party in government and leads to a situation in which all parliamentarians act not as 15

individuals but as members of party groups. Parliament then becomes an arena for the

acting out of party relations, a fact which compels us to look at the parliament in terms

of party groups and not as a body which operates vis-a-vis the executive (King, p. 216).

Specialization and Influence of the Committee System

In recent times parliaments have had to become more structured in order to deal

with rapidly increasing workloads and complex issues. Just as executives deal with a

wide range of intricate issues through bureaucratic division of labor, parliaments must

also decentralize decision making in order to effectively manage its workload. Many

models of policy making have been offered to explain governmental decision making.

The rational-comprehensive policy-making model in which all possible outcomes are

known and weighed against each other only functions in practice for very small scale problems with very few variables. Legislatures in varying degrees come closer to

imitating the branch or organizational policy-making model used to describe bureaucracies. In such an organization, decision making is fragmented and the division of labor provides the opportunity for multiple actors to develop expertise in the role that is assigned to them. Instead of attempting the impossible task of thoroughly researching all possible outcomes, actors deal with a known repertoire of relevant alternatives. As such, the need for information is reduced without exerting tension on the capacity of the organization. Policies are developed from a manageable number of alternatives that vary only slightly from one another. Within this model and within democracies in general, policies change incrementally based on experience with past policies and as such are 16

constantly made and remade (Allison 1971, pp. 80-91; Lindblom 1959, pp. 80-81;

Wildovsky, pp. 6-7).

This is an attractive model to apply to legislatures since committee systems

provide the potential for decentralized decision making. In addition, within this model

actors need only agree on policy and not on the values or objectives leading them to agree

on the policy, nor on the ends that the policy will entail (Lindblom, p. 83). Ideologically

different party groups, the actors in a parliament, may through bargaining agree on a

specific policy but their objectives and perceived ends will necessarily differ, perhaps drastically. In fact, these differences will lead parties to act as watchdogs of one another and to force other actors to consider certain policy options that might have otherwise been overlooked. However, the nature of legislatures restricts them from perfectly imitating bureaucracies because legislators elected to represent constituencies do not easily fall into the rank order pattern found in bureaucracies (Loewenberg & Patterson 1979, p. 117).

Still, in most parliamentary regimes where party unity is strong a degree of hierarchy can be found within each parliamentary party and, therefore, within the parliament.

As some degree of fragmented decision making and division of labor is represented in legislative committees, the nature of the committee system must be carefully considered when examining the policy-making impact of a parliament.

Specialized and independent committees have been found to be a necessary requirement for high legislative influence in policy making (Loewenberg & Patterson, p. 125; Mezey, p. 43; Strom, p. 43). In particular, committees with powerful jurisdictions tend to favor the input of opposition parties since the government party is less likely to make 17 concessions in the highly visible plenary sessions where the media are present. The opposition stands more of a chance of having its substantive amendments adopted or of negotiating joint amendments with the government party in committee (Griffith, p. 33;

Strom, p. 43).

The degree of strength or independence of legislative committees is reflected in several different features. Strom offers a five indicator measurement of the strength of the opposition vis-a-vis committees which includes: the number of standing committees, whether or not they are given a fixed jurisdiction, whether or not such jurisdictions correspond to ministerial departments, the likelihood of committee member specialization based on how many committees one legislator might serve on, and the party distribution of committee seats (Strom, p. 71). This list of indicators appears to be inclusive. For example, in Great Britain traditionally legislative "standing committees" are not at all permanent with fixed jurisdictions, but instead committees are formed for each individual bill and as such, members of the committees have not been able to develop an expertise or to substantially alter legislation. More recently, however, ‘select committees’ formed in the 1970s have allowed for some specialization but their powers are of scrutinization and not over legislation.

The question here is two fold. First, we must determine the power of committees and, second, ascertain whether the degree of committee strength affects the policy-making influence of the legislature. As a factor affecting parliamentary influence, the strength of committees in policy making appears to covary strongly with party unity. In Sweden,

Damgaard has found that voting dissention has become more frequent and acceptable in 18 committees, and that the committees have thus become more independent and specialized

(Damgaard, p. 114). A preliminary assessment indicates that, in Spain, party unity will also be a powerful covariant with committee strength. Whereas the committees enjoy more independence through standing committees with Hxed jurisdictions and some committee member expertise, their mark-up ability appears to have been affected when a strong cohesive majority has been in government.

Contextual Factors Affecting Parliamentary Influence

In addition to the standard factors affecting the role of parliament in policy making, each parliament’s experience is set against a background of contextual factors specific to that countiy.

Special Requirements and Conditions of the Process of Democratic Consolidation

The role played by parliaments in new democracies presents a particularly challenging area for study. While it has been determined that the study of new parliamentary regimes do not call for the use of a model separate from those used for long-standing regimes, the contextual factors affecting the role of these parliaments vary drastically from those of democracies such as the U.S. or Britain (Lijphart, et al. 1987 cited in Liebert & Cotta, 1990, p. 251). In a five-country study of Southern European parliaments (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain & Turkey), the editor Ulrike Liebert praises the authors for measuring the strengths and weaknesses of the parliaments within the 19 context of the democratization process rather than strictly comparing them to standard ideal types (Liebert, p. 250).

Yet it would be erroneous to assume that all new democracies share common contextual factors that affect their parliaments and other political institutions. They do share the characteristics of drastic regime change, political crisis, and the accompanying task of legitimizing democratic political authority - yet the processes of democratization differ from country to country (Pridham 1990, p. 246). Each country approaches democratic transition with a different set of historical lessons inferred from past regimes and crises. The solutions arrived at in an attempt to avoid future repetition of past crises

(to the degree that this is attempted) will help mold the particular path to democratization taken by that country and thus the role played by the parliament both during and after the transition.

The onset of a new democratic regime involves several key choices that will ultimately shape the nature of its institutions as well as relationships among them.

Geoffrey Pridham refers to choices made on three levels that act as constitutional bases for democratic parliaments. At the macro level, the choice made is simply to pursue a liberal democracy. At the mesa level, fundamental decisions are made as to the nature of that democracy - presidential versus parliamentary regime, centralist versus federal structure, and the electoral law that will govern the choice of elite. Last, at themicro level, Pridham sees the formal rules that apply to tlie parliament, derived from the

Constitution and the new parliamentary standing orders (Pridham, p. 226). Both the structure of state (unitary or federal) and formal rules (including the electoral law) will 2 0 be considered below as separate factors that continue to affect parliament after both democratic transition and consolidation are complete.

In addition to these fundamental decisions, the degree to which the parliament is used as a central arena in setting up the Constitution and other fundamental laws during the transition and consolidation period will affect the policy-making influence of the parliament during that period hut not necessarily afterward. In both Italy and Spain the

Constitutions were elaborated by consensual means principally - though not exclusively - in the parliament. They were not, as was the case in Greece and Portugal, elaborated outside of parliament and approved by a parliamentary majority (Liebert, p. 269). In

Spain, this process of consensual decision-making carried over in modified form into the next legislature (1979-82). However, the prestige and respect gained by parliament through its involvement in the constituent process declined when the Socialist majority took power in 1982, and consensual decision-making rules were virtually eradicated. It appears that this shift from consensual to majoritarian decision-making rules siphoned policy influence away from the parliament and into the government via the Socialist Party

(Capo Giol et al. 1990, p. 103; Pridham, p. 237; Liebert, p. 255).

The role played by political parties in the democratization process in new parliamentary regimes as well as the nature of the developing party system will act as a major determinants of the degree of policy-making impact of the parliament. As Pasquino maintains, consensus among political elites on fundamental decisions is functional during the transition to democracy but majoritarian decision making is most desirable in the long run (Pasquino, 1995). Botli of these conditions were present in Spain. However, strong 2 1

party unity between party executives and their parliamentary groups can mean that

decision making is being controlled by actors outside of the parliamentary arena. Thus,

the nature of the governing party is critical. Strong party unity in addition to majoritarian

decision-making rules will help to channel policy impact from the parliament and to the

government, whereas weak party cohesion and consensual decision-making rules will

assure opposition and backbencher influence in the parliament.

Formal Rules: The Constitution and Standing Orders of the Parliament and Their

Applications

The influence of the parliament in public policy depends largely on the formal jurisdiction granted to it by the Constitution, internal procedures established by the

Standing Orders, and the manner in which these formal rules come to be applied. Checks

and balances between the executive and the legislature in a parliamentaiy system tend to

include the executive’s ability to dissolve the legislature and parliamentary capacity of

executive censure (Blondel, 1973). These institutional arrangements implemented in

varying degrees can limit the policy-making capacity of both the executive and the

legislature. Effective and stable governments must rally majorities on parliamentary votes

of censure as well as on the final votes of important government legislation (Strom, p.

4). When the parliament is granted independent parliamentary decision-making power

in important areas such as the budget and setting the agenda, conflict tends to arise 2 2

between the parliament and the executive (Liebert, p. 266). A consideration of these

formal rules and jurisdictions will give a basic idea of what the parliament has to work

with when attempting to influence policy.

The standing orders of a legislature set up internal procedures such as formal voting procedures that also determine its influence on public policy as discussed in the previous section. Standing orders also define the formal role of the individual legislators, party groups and committees. Both formal parliamentary rules and political party statutes have tended to strengthen the role of party groups in parliamentary systems today, thus weakening the individual independence of parliamentary members. As Liebert argues, the link between party group and the external party apparatus transfers power away from the parliament and into the party organization (Liebert, p. 253). The role of individual members of parliament is diminished while their dependence on the party grows. Formal rules which lead to this dependence include restrictions on the formation of party groups to avoid schisms, constraints on the transfer of members between groups, and mandatory approval of member initiatives by parliamentary party group leaders (Capo Giol, p. 105).

Other formal rules which will affect the role of opposition groups and individual parliamentary members include the procedures established for both government and opposition proposed legislation, the makeup of committees and their role and jurisdiction in the legislative process, the formation and role of investigative committees, and the official functions of other parliamentary bodies such as the bureau. Obviously, these formal rules will vaiy from country to country and will be affected by the gradually developing norms in newly democratic countries. 23

Involvement in Supranational Organizations and the Structure of the State

As a country moves from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democracy, it is more likely to abandon closed-door policies and become more involved in democratic international organizations and supranational structures of a federal or semi-federal nature. There is speculation that membership in transnational organizations with some degree of supranational jurisdiction may take away from the national jurisdiction of the parliament. Indeed, it may reduce the powers of both the legislature and the executive.

As John Kincaid states: "...the nation-state is being buffeted by the emergence of transnational regimes, whether they be regional associations, such as the European

Community, or global functional regimes, such as those in the field of environmental protection" (Kincaid 1992, p. 28).

On the other hand, legislative jurisdiction may be absorbed not only by a supranational level but also within the nation-state in the form of regional or state governments. Thus, in a new democracy the question of the structure of the state - unitary or federal - will be fundamental to the degree of power developed by the national legislature. John Kincaid discusses this double-tiered pull on national jurisdiction:

"Internationally, it is becoming increasingly necessary for nation-states to cede more of their sovereign prerogatives to varieties of multinational or transnational regimes. Intranationally, it is becoming increasingly necessary for national governments to cede more of their sovereign prerogatives to subnational regional and local authorities" (Kincaid, p. 29).

In new democracies distinct cultures or nationalities which may have been severely suppressed under an authoritarian regime may strive to obtain and protect regional rights by demanding a federal or semi-federal state structure. Federalism will involve varying 24

degrees of separate decision-making bodies, fiscal competence, historical and cultural

rights, and regional or state involvement in both its own decision-making as well as in

central decision-making (Nathan 1992, pp. 92-93). Macmahon has pointed out that

nationalist sentiments may lead to the formation of separate states, a federalist state, or

to a less than federalist arrangement in the form of a decentralized unitary state. The

later was the case in Italy where its Constitution held the "emphatic promise of regional

autonomy" which has been granted gradually over the years (Macmahon 1993, pp. 8-9;

Putnam 1993).

Spain’s traditional struggle between center and periphery was mitigated by the

1978 Constitution that established a semi-federalist state in which three separate routes could be followed to regional autonomy. By 1987, the seventeen regional executives and parliaments were in function with varying degrees of jurisdiction over regional political and fiscal matters (Donaghy & Newton. 1989, pp. 98-117). Peaceful and gradual implementation of this semi-federalist structure, Nathan argues, represents "an effort.. .to avoid political disintegration" and therefore, represents one of the great successes of the

Spanish democratic transition (Nathan, p. 98).

Nonetheless, the powers of the Cortes appear to have been diminished due to the augmentation of powers by the regional legislatures as well as the involvement of nationalist parties in the national Cortes. As Kincaid states;

"A question being asked in Spain today essentially captures the potential implications of these transnational and subnational challenges to the nation-state. That question is: What will Madrid do once it has ceded half its powers to the EC and devolved the other half to the regions? This question certainly overstates the case, but questions of this nature will have to be addressed in the coming decades by all nation-states that wish to be 25

part of the world community rather than a workers’ paradise like Albania under the old communist regime" (Kincaid, p. 29).

Thus, in examining the development of parliamentary influence in public policy since the

onset of democracy both in Spain and elsewhere, the development of both regional and

supranational federal structures must be carefully considered.

Nature of Legislation

The nature of the legislation being considered may also affect the degree of

influence the parliament is able to exert over policy. New democracies are faced with an abundance of constitutional and fundamental legislation that needs to be created or revised within the first few years. Either formal rules or informal constraints may call for large majority support in the parliament, thus leading to a bargaining process in which opposition parties are able to substantially influence legislation.

While no formal rules existed requiring a large majority approval of the current

Spanish Constitution, great care was taken to draft it in a consensual manner among all major parties in order to avoid significant pitfalls of the past and instability in the new regime. Concessions were made from Left to Right resulting in a rather long document that attempted to satisfy all. It was approved by 90% of parliamentary members and close to 90% of the citizenry who voted in a referendum. Although the government party operated from a more powerful position than the other parties, the desires of the opposition parties and the parliamentary arena were key in drafting the Constitution due to its fundamental nature (Donaghy & Newton, pp. 9-10). 26

Similarly, any constitutional reform calls for a close to consensual vote in the

parliament, in this case by formal constraint. The Constitution requires a 3/5 majority

in both houses for approval, and in the case of a discrepancy between the two houses, a

simple majority in the Senate and a 3/5 majority in the Congress. A referendum is

purely optional and was not called when a constitutional amendment was made in 1992.

Therefore, opposition parties are guaranteed a voice in any Constitutional reform

proposed.

Opposition parties may also be able to substantially affect regular parliamentary

legislation. The Cortes has sole jurisdiction over two types of legislation;organic and

ordinary. Formal constraints allow for greater opposition party influenceorganic in

legislation which requires the approval of an overall majority of parliamentary members,

as opposed to simple majority approval forordinary legislation. Of course, potential

oppositional influence will vary according to the need of the current government for

additional votes to make up an overall majority. Laws of fundamental importance to the

state are classified as organic and include: "the development of fundamental rights and public liberties; electoral arrangements; statutes of autonomy; and ‘others envisaged in

the Constitution'" (Donaghy & Newton, p. 54). For example, laws concerning the

restructuring of public education and the military have tended to fall under this category

and to involve government party-opposition party negotiations during their passage

through parliament.

The issue area of the legislation may place certain informal constraints on the

government allowing for greater oppositional influence in bothorganic and ordinary 27

legislation. Laws of political or social transcendence with great impact on public opinion

are liable to induce the Government to seek widespread parliamentary support regardless

of the formal vote necessary for passage (Blondel et al. 1970, p. 192; Griffith, p. 202;

Hall, 1992). In addition, fluctuations in degree of opposition influence that appear to be due to issue area, may actually be accounted for by the minister involved and bis or her willingness to negotiate with opposition forces. For these reasons, the nature of the legislation - both the formal type of law and the issue area - must be carefully considered when examining parliamentary influence on public policy.

Summary and Explanation of Data

In summary, studies of legislative-executive relations in parliamentary regimes must take into account the lack of clear boundaries between the legislature and the executive. In addition, the study of parliamentary influence on public policy in newly- consolidated democracies must analyze both standard as well as contextual factors that are specific to that country and the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Although these conditions will vary even among new democracies, existing frameworks for cross- national comparison are sufficient for the inclusion of these parliaments. Standard factors tliat should be considered include the existence of a majority or minority governmental backing in parliament, degree of party unity and cohesion, and the nature of the committee system. Contextual determinants include the special requirements and conditions of the process of democratic consolidation, involvement in supranational organizations, the federal or unitary nature of the state, the nature of legislation 2 8

considered in parliament, and the formal rules that are applied to the legislative body.

These factors will be examined here in the case of the Spanish Cortes since 1979 in order

to contribute to our knowledge of parliamentary influence on public policy in newly-

consolidated democracies.

In this study I will examine the degree of formal and informal parliamentary

influence in both agenda setting and in affecting legislation directly. Given the newness

of the institution, quantitative data have not been consistently gathered across legislative

sessions. Nonetheless, sufficient documentation exists to draw general conclusions in

comparing the four sessions. Fortunately, again due to the youth of the democracy, political elites involved in policy making from its onset were available for interviews, thus adding rich detail and insight. Through these two approaches I will analyze in the following pages both formal and informal parliamentary influence that has occurred in

Spain’s new democracy.

In order to tap informal yet potentially powerful means of influence, I will be using both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative measures such as percentage of bills or amendments passed can give us a cursory idea of the level of parliamentary influence by examining the success o f formal actions taken by deputies to heighten their

influence. Yet informal means of influence, such as off-the-record negotiations or

ministerial anticipation of parliament’s support, are not easily measured and are best

understood through first-hand accounts. In addition, although the use of formal procedures may be easily observed, their impact may be indirect and not so easily

assessed. Therefore, quantitative assessments need to be complemented by qualitative 29 information. In this case, I will utilize information gathered from congressional deputies and Government ministers in 38 interviews carried out in Spain in the fall of 1991. The respondents represent a sample from each of the major parliamentary groups, both back backbenchers and parliamentary group leaders from each of the four legislative sessions.

The 40 respondents were drawn from all major parliamentary parties (thus excluding those in the Mixed Group) in a sample approximately proportionate to the sizes of the parliamentary groups. The breakdown is the following: from the first legislative session in which the Centrists were in power (1979-82) a total of 19 respondents were made up of 18 deputies, 1 both minister and deputy, and 1 minister that did not serve in the parliament.' From the following three legislative sessions in which the Socialists were in power (1982-86; 1986-89; 1989-93), a total of 33 respondents included 33 deputies and 2 simultaneous ministers and deputies. The total appears to exceed 40 due to the overlap in membership in the Centrist and Socialist sessions.

' In Spain, Ministers can simultaneously serve the role of Deputy. CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF THE CORTES AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

One of the most notable aspects of the Cortes is that it was not a new institution created within the new democracy. Instead it grew directly out of the legislature that had existed throughout most of the former authoritarian regime. In fact, the change to a democratically elected legislature was approved by the Franquist legislature itself. On the one hand, this meant the end of the Franquist Cortes which the members

{Procuradores) themselves voted to disband. On the other hand, the former body’s approval of democratic procedures to choose its membership signified a continuity with the past and a legitimation of the new body from important elites who could have represented anti-regime forces to the new democracy. In this chapter, I will explore the nature of the authoritarian Cortes, its move to a democratic parliament within the context of the transition to democracy, and the rise of pluralism through the development of a political party system, thus setting a background for the study of the democratic Cortes.

The Cortes under Franco

The heading "The Cortes under Franco" conveys immediately the nature of executive-legislative relations in an authoritarian regime in which the legislature is

3 0 31

subordinate to the executive. In this case, the Cortes were beholden to Franco both in

law-making and in the executive’s ability to control the membership of the Cortes.

However, it was able to constrain some important executive policy initiatives through its

"watchdog" role (Gunther 1980, p. 96). This capacity is particularly interesting given

the limitations placed on the legislature by the nature of this non-democratic regime.

As with all authoritarian legislatures, no member of the executive (here in

particular, the Head of State, and the Cabinet, and in the later years, also a Prime

Minister) was responsible to the legislature. Any influence the Cortes wielded was not

gained through the representativeness of democratic elections. The Franquist Cortes

attempted to be a corporative body as did the Italian legislature under Mussolini. The

fact that it fell short of true corporatism (as all attempts have) led Juan Linz to refer to

the regime with the term "organic statism"' (Linz 1979, p. 89). In fact, corporative representatives made up only a plurality of the seats in the legislature. But true to

Franco’s intents, it neither represented pluralistic interests through competing political parties as in a liberal democracy, nor was it a meeting place for one single state party

with an official ideology as in many authoritarian or totalitarian regimes (Linz, p. 98).

It fell short of true corporatism mainly in that many of the seats were controlled by the

' The expression "organic statism" was developed by Alfred Stepan (1978). Linz explains that in authoritarian regimes principles of corporatism are often compromised with the structures of "bureaucratic-military-technocratic and single-party movement regimes" ("organic regimes") thus falling short of true corporatism (Linz, p. 89) 32 government (either by Franco or local governments) and that after 1967 elected "family representatives" made up a third sector of the legislature.

The institutions of the Franquist regime were based on a series of "fundamental laws" which were constitutional in nature. These laws individually created the Cortes, established rules for succession of the Head of State (Franco), and established the functions of and the relations between the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Head of State, the one legal and privileged party, the Movimiento Nacional, and the National Council

{Consejo Nacional) of the Movimiento.^ Yet it was not until the 1967 Ley Orgdnica del

Estado that many functions of principal offices and actors were legally defined (some were changed at this time). Spanish legal analyses of the time displayed both awareness and support of Franco’s practice of little by little defining his own power and that of others through the placing of "self-limitations" on the Head of State by these laws

(Femdndez-Carvajal 1967, p. 57).

A useful way to explore the role of the legislature in any given regime is to analyze the extent to which it fulfilled the major functions of legislatures in general.

Here I will consider the Cortes’ performance in law-making, representation, criticism and control of the executive, as an arena for debate, its effectiveness in recruiting regime leaders, and its ability to serve as a legitimizing body for the regime. Indeed, attempts

' The Movimiento Nacional was called the F.E.T. y de las J.O.N.S. (Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las Juntas Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista) until the 1958 Ley de Principios Fundamentales del Movimiento. In 1967, the Movimiento Nacional was constitudonalized in the Ley Orgdnica del Estado. 33 were made to have the Franquist legislature fulfill most of these functions -with the exception of the recruitment of regime leaders- or to at leastappear as though it did.

The Cortes were not established until 1942, three years after the termination of the Civil War through which General Francisco Franco, supported by the church, the military, and traditionalist, nationalist forces, took power. The 1942 Ley Consdtutiva de las Cortes declared that the Cortes were "‘the one supreme organ of representation of the Spanish people in the work of the State’, whose ‘principal mission’ rests in ‘the preparation and elaboration of laws, without prejudice to the approval corresponding to the Head of State" (Martin Oviedo 1974, p. 233). Thus, representation and law-making were intended to be two major functions of the Cortes. Linz adds to this list the expression of opinions (debate) and criticism (Linz, p. 98).

The Cortes’ ability to make laws, as stated above in the Ley Constitutiva, was subject to the approval (or veto power) of Franco. The ability that it wielded in affecting certain policy initiatives appears to have stemmed from the divisions that existed within the executive and Franco’s indifference to certain policy areas (Gunther 1980, p. 93).

I first turn to the constraints placed upon the body’s legislative capacity. According to the Ley Constitutiva, the Cortes held no independent legislative initiative. All bills originated in the executive and the Cortes were limited to discussion and generally non- substantial amendments to these bills. According to Article 10 of the Ley Constitutiva, the Cortes’ jurisdiction included "bills dealing with public finance and expenditure, the institutions of the Spanish state itself, national education plans, and the fundamental legal framework upon which other laws were to be based" (Gunther 1980, p. 39). Although 34 this jurisdiction was relatively limited it did allow for influence in a few key areas which

1 will explore below. Nonetheless, the executive could issue decree laws within a wide jurisdiction, and could bypass the legislature even in laws pertaining to the Cortes’ jurisdiction when it was deemed urgent. Legally, the Cortes was most needed to ratify constitutional changes (Linz, p. 109).

A second restriction to lawmaking independent of the executive was the makeup of the body. As the membership of the Cortes was largely controlled by the government, most members were directly or indirectly responsible to Franco. Even about two-thirds of the so-called "elected" family members came from candidate lists that were government construed. Secondly, handpicked Procuradores were likely to agree with the executive anyway. Most opposition to the Franquist regime either existed outside of the

Cortes or had left Spain altogether.

Yet, we must be careful not to oversimplify the unity of the Franquist elite for at times they suffered serious divisions in policy opinion. The conservative Cortes was able to take advantage of these situations in order to temper the progressive innovations of some ministers. As Gunther maintains, a legislature cannot act as a rubber stamp legislature (the most uninfluential type of legislature) unless the executive is "a monolithic unit, with a single widely accepted set of policy goals" (Guntlier 1980, p. 96). In his study of policy making under Franco, Gunther found that certain members of the

Franquist Government hoped to implement innovative tax reform while others were

hostile to such actions. This was a particularly salient issue in 1973 when Franco

restructured his entire Government apparently to oust the Minister of Finance and stifle 35

his proposal that would restructure the tax system. Gunther reports of the role of the

Cortes:

"A considerable number of respondents interviewed in 1974-75 said that they regarded the overwhelmingly conservative Cortes as a major obstacle to tax reform - and other reforms as well. While very few tax reform proposals were actually rejected by the Cortes during the regime’s final two decades, this substantial body of opinion cannot be lightly dismissed. The most reasonable resolution of this apparent contradiction would portray the Cortes as a deterrent to the introduction of tax reform proposals, thus obviating the necessity of actually having to vote against such bills. "A Minister of Finance who was unsuccessful in such an attempt might be forced to resign,’ one respondent claimed. According to this ‘deterrence’ explanation, a widespread belief among Finance Ministry officials that the Cortes would reject tax reform proposals would be a self-fulfilling prophecy" (Gunther 1980, p. 96).

As Mezey points out, a legislature has influence on legislation when ministers adjust their policy proposals based on the mere anticipation of reaction of the legislature to the bill

(Mezey 1979, pp. 25-26). This would be such a case.

The same study also revealed that if a given policy fell within Franco’s "zone of indifference", conflicts among the ministers were not resolved by Franco. The initiative would then go on to the Cortes, which would play the role of the conservative

"watchdog", either by moderating the bill’s provisions or by inducing the minister to withdraw it (Gunther 1980, p. 96-7). The Cortes, however, had no impact on the budget bills. This lack of influence was largely due to jurisdictional restrictions; however,

Gunther found that state officials did not take into account the possible reaction in the

Cortes when drafting the budget, usually perceiving the Procuradores as lacking technical expertise or the Cortes as an unimportant - even illegitimate - body. Nonetheless, the

Cortes under Franco cannot be regarded as a mere rubber-stamp legislature because it was 36 often able to affect policy by playing off executive conflicts (Gunther 1980, pp. 162-

163).

A second indicator of legislative influence is its degree of representativeness.

Franco and his supporters rejected political parties and their representation in a legislative body, yet they claimed that the Cortes was a representative body based on the tenets of an "organic democracy". It was, in actuality, made up of both "elected" members, who served three-year terms, and ex-officio members. Those Procuradores appointed by

Franco were not subject to terms and 40 National Councillors of the Movimiento remained as Procuradores up to age 75. As mentioned above, it was also claimed that the Cortes was a corporative body, although in practice it fell short of this claim. Franco and his supporters, having opposed the working class in both the previous democracy of the Second Republic and the Civil War (1936-39), adopted corporatist notions which ran contrary to social definitions or conflict along class lines. A verticalsindicato was created for each of 27 sectors or trades which included members ft'om all levels: owners, employers, managers, workers (Gunther, Sani, & Shabad, 1988, p. 23). Representatives from these sindicatos were then elected to the Cortes, albeit indirectly, through multi­ stage elections (about 5 stages removed from the lower level workers) or were appointed ex-officio by virtue of holding leadership positions within the sindicatos (Linz, p. 100).

Although these corporative representatives made up the largest group within the

Procuradores, they still only represented about 150 of well over 500 seats.’ Another

’ The number of seats increased over time. The numbers here reflect the composition of the Cortes toward the end of the regime. 37

group, while appearing to be corporative in nature, really overrepresented the upper class as they were delegates from professional organizations (law, medicine, etc.), state universities and academies and the National Research Council (Linz, p. 102).

A "governmental" sector of about 115 seats was made up of several groups directly or indirectly appointed by Franco or other members of government (who were in turn responsible to Franco). These included provincial representatives elected by the provincial and municipal councils, as well as one representative from each of 7 large cities, Ceuta, and Melilla (Spanish cities on the African mainland). In addition, all members of the Cabinet, the high courts and advisory councils were ex-officio members of the Cortes. With another 25 (previously 50) seats being selected by the Head of State, the overlap between the executive and legislative (as well as the judicial) branches was substantial. This contributed to the subordination of the legislature to the executive without holding the executive responsible to the legislature, as in modem parliamentary regimes.

A third sector of the Cortes represented the National Council of the Movimiento

Nacional. Of these 113 National Councillors, 40 were named directly by Franco. The

National Council was the body that preceded the Cortes, although it continued to exist after the Cortes was created in 1942. Because it began to meet separately and regularly to discuss policy toward the end of the Franquist era, it was sometimes considered an upper chamber, casting doubt on whether the Franquist Cortes should be defined as a unicameral or bicameral legislature (Linz, p. 97-98). 38

A fourth category of seats, that of "family representatives", was added in 1967 and came closest to being democratically elected. The electorate was made up of men and women with families, dubbed "heads of households" and "married women".

Candidates were placed on electoral lists either by gaining the approval of other government officials or by obtaining 1000 signatures. This latter method resulted in about one-third of the family representative seats. Some of these Procuradores took advantage of their democratic basis of legitimacy by providing some opposition in the

Cortes and strengthening ties with the public through meetings with their "constituents".

However, the government quickly ruled this activity illegal. Therefore, even when

Procuradores were elected, the executive still practiced ample control by affecting candidate lists, limiting the number of total elected representatives, and or by post-hoc illegalization of their activities. But there is some indication that the establishment of these seats was in response to demands for a more representative legislative body.

Thus, the Franquist Cortes was neither corporatist nor representative. First, it was not truly corporatist because non-corporative sectors of seats existed in the legislature.

Franco adapted corporatism (as he did other tenets of fascism) only insofar as it would be beneficial to his regime. Secondly, the professional organizations that were represented in the Cortes were not vertical organizations but instead made up of upper- class interests. There were no analogous working-class organizations (i.e. trade unions) that were allowed to exist. In addition, even if the regime -and the legislature- had been true to corporatist principles, the Cortes still would not have been representative in a 39 liberal democratic sense because pluralism was limited; many interests within the society did not enjoy representation. Most importantly, mass suffrage was not practiced.

In terms of recruiting leaders for the regime, a third legislative function, the

Cortes did not serve this role at all. In fact, a reverse phenomenon was occurring.

Regime leaders such as cabinet members. National Councillors of the Movimiento, even judges, mayors, and local government leaders became Proem adores. Ex-cabinet members tended to stay on in the Cortes, so that it appears that leadership roles were actually mechanisms for recruiting parliamentarians.

A fourth function of legislatures is to serve as an arena for debate. In a pluralistic society, this would mean that the legislature provides one legal mechanism for channeling the different and conflicting interests within a society. This could exist to a limited degree in an authoritarian regime. However, Linz maintains that, unlike in democratic or single party mobilizational regimes, corporative or semi-corporative structures will lead to apathy within the institutions and opposition without. He states:

"The great ideological lines of cleavage -basic class conflicts, regional- cultural linguistic conflicts, and religious-cultural divisions- that occur in a modem society have to find expression outside the channels created for representation of society. Therefore, non-institutionalized alignments within the regime and a-legal and illegal oppositions sooner or later appear. They will not be reflected even with minimum effectiveness in the halls of the legislature" (Linz, p. 96).

Throughout the greater part of the life of the Franquist Cortes, it did not serve at all as an arena for lively political debate. However, the body did become increasingly politicized and active in the last 10 years of the regime, and there was some attempt on the part of elected family representatives to bring political debate into the Cortes. 40

Likewise, there was a slight increase in a fifth legislative function, that of serving to

criticize and oversee the executive. In this case, oversight mechanisms such as questions

posed to the government were used more often (mostly by "family representatives"). On

one hand, this reflected the heightened debate, opposition, and expectations occurring in

the society at large. On the other hand, the Cortes fell far short of representing the

magnitude of socio-political change that was happening outside its walls.

Legislatures can also serve as a legitimizing force for the regime. In liberal

democracies, through mass elections, legislators claim to be representative of the people.

In Franquist Spain, although members of the Cortes were not elected democratically,

there was an attempt to claim that they were representative of society. In reality. Franco

was the ultimate source of legitimacy (Gunther et al. 1988, p. 23). Furthermore, it is

difficult for a body as marginalized as the Cortes under Franco to serve as a legitimating

force. Neither the Cortes nor the Procuradores were highly visible and the role of

Procurador did not bring much prestige (Linz, p. 114). In fact, Gunther found in

interviews carried out in 1974-75 that many state officials and even Procuradores did not

view the Cortes as legitimate because it was not representative. The legislature was

further minimized through the use of referenda, which was also one of De Gaulle’s

favorite methods to strengthen the executive in early Fifth Republic France. In bypassing the legislature. Franco attempted to forge direct ties with the public in referenda over

laws such as the Ley de Sucesidn (1947) and the Ley Orgdnica del Estado (1967). The 41

1942 Ley Constitutiva de las Cortes, however, was not submitted to a referendum,

perhaps underlining the parliament’s lack of prominence in the system/

In the last ten years of the Franquist legislature, it become more active. Yet as

Linz notes, it was the changes that were occurringoutside the legislature that were of

major relevance (Linz, p. 111). Inside the legislature, of course, significant anti-regime

groups such as the Socialists, Communists, and their illegal trade unions, to name a few, were not represented. It is important to note that even the Franquist elite were not in

agreement on what type of regime would be desirable after Franco’s death in terms of the degree and pace of liberalization, if any.

The Franquist Regime

A quick look at some characteristics of the Franquist regime will help in understanding the demise of the regime and the developments of the transition.

Throughout most of the 1940s and 50s the regime was quite repressive, with the military and the Movimiento playing major roles. The Catholic Church also acted as a supporter of the regime. In terms of the economy, which was highly agricultural. Franco followed isolationist policies. The verticalsindicatos, although nominally representing corporative interests at all levels of any given trade, really served as "instruments for the elimination of strikes and the maintenance of low wages" (Preston, p. 3). Nonetheless, in the 1950s a series of strikes and a wave of unrest led to an opening toward capitalist policies. This

“ As Linz points out, the use of referenda is not an organic nor a corporative means of legitimation. It stems from liberal democratic practices. 42 policy switch was largely spurred by a group of technocrats from the Opus Dei, a right- wing Catholic group which sometimes appeared ideologically moderate compared to the military and the Movimiento. Yet their intent was economic modernization, not political liberalization or democratization. The inclusion of Opus Dei technocrats in the cabinet instigated rifts within the elite which remained until (and beyond) Franco’s death. It also contributed to the decline in power of the Movimiento.

By the 1960s, Spain was enjoying prosperous economic growth and saw the development of a new working class. The benefits of modernization led to greater demands for economic, as well as political, liberalization. The 1960s met with worker strikes, student demonstrations, and awakened nationalist sentiments, most notably in the form of terrorism on the part of the ETA, a Basque group which advocated obtaining political independence through violence. The regime remained rather repressive in spite of some socially liberal policies such as the Press Law of 1966, which eliminated censorship through prior restraint and led to the publication of dissenting political opinions even in regional languages (Gunther, Sani, & Shabad, p. 31). The regime faced additional opposition from Catholic priests, as well as from the Vatican. As many priests began to see the poor conditions of the working class, they expressed their opposition more and more openly. Divisions between the regime and the prominent members of the

Church became evident to the public and encouraged even anticlerical opposition. The

Cortes itself faced increased criticism from the press during these years as it opened its plenary and committee sessions. 43

Although Franco had long intended for his regime to continue through a monarchy after his death, he hesitated in naming a successor, evidently unsure as to the political loyalties of the possible candidates. In 1969, two significant events occurred that fundamentally affected regime change after Franco’s death. First, Juan Carlos de

Borbdn, the grandson of the last legitimate monarch, was named Franco’s successor as

Head of State (Monarch). Having been trained for the role by Franco since the early

1960s, there was little suspicion that he would turn out to have democratic tendencies.

Secondly, Franco named hardliner and long-time advisor Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco as Prime Minister, as well as shifted important political powers to him. Although his stay in power did not survive Franco, the repressive nature of the 1969-1973 period served to push hitherto loyalists toward the liberal opposition. Carrero Blanco’s assassination by ETA in 1973 removed one of the principle guarantees of the continuation of Franquismo. Thus, both his hardline policies and his assassination served in some sense to further democratization.

Upon Carrero Blanco’s assassination. Franco appointed Carlos Arias Navarro to the office of Prime Minister. While not as repressive and conservative as Carrero

Blanco, he nonetheless only favored reforms that would maintain the institutions and structure of the authoritarian regime. However, some of his reformist policies prompted those who were more liberal to continue in their pursuit of pluralism. In a February,

1974 speech before the Cortes, he spoke favorably of the development of participation, pluralism, and representation (Gunther, Sani & Shabad, p. 33). His 1974 Statute of

Associations at first appeared to be paving the way for the legalization of political parties. 44

Yet it was quickly made clear that "associations" would only be accepted within the

boundaries of the Movimiento. The contribution of this Statute to the regime was not in

creating a party system, but in encouraging speculations and dialogue about the rise of

legalized parties in Spain (Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1988, p. 33). It inspired aperturistas

who favored an opening of the regime or a liberalization within the guideline of existing

Franquist laws. Linz maintains that the Statute of Associations andapermrista

sentiments marked a departure from organic democracy, insofar as associations -even if

they are not the equivalent of political parties- are "based on direct appeals by political

leaders to citizens as citizens and not as members of organic groups. They offer vaguely

formulated political ideological alternatives within the narrow spectrum of the sectors that

support the regime. " Thus, he continues, the legitimacy of organic democracy was being eroded within by system elites themselves, as well being faced with intense opposition

from antisystem groups (Linz, p. 109).

The Cortes in Transition

Thus the transition was underway by the time of Franco’s death in 1975. It is important to distinguish the notion of a transition to democracy from that of democratic consolidation. While they are not temporally distinct (they may overlap), a transition has fewer requirements than the regime stabilization that is necessary for consolidation.

According to Gunther, a transition to democracy "begins with the breakdown of the former authoritarian regime and ends with the establishment of a relatively stable configuration of political institutions within a democratic regime" (Gunther 1995, p. 3). 45

In Spain, the transition would have been complete by about the time of the second general elections in 1979, right after the ratification of the 1978 Constitution.

What were the events that took place between the time of Franco’s death and the onset of the first legislative session in 1979, and what role did the Cortes play? Franco had left Juan Carlos in place as King, expecting him to exercise full political power. He also had created a group of advisors to the King, dubbed the Council of the Realm, designed to guarantee the survival of the authoritarian nature of the regime. Indeed, the regime continued in much the same fashion until key elites were replaced by more liberal system elites, leading to a regime reform or a "revolution from above. " By July, 1976

Prime Minister Arias Navarro was dismissed and Adolfo Suarez, who replaced him, moved quickly with the King to open up the regimethrough existing laws toward a liberal democracy. The most important of the elite appointments leading to the ascendence of

Suarez also affected the Cortes. This was the case of Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda Hevia who became not only the President of the Council of the Realm, but also President of the

Cortes. Fernandez-Miranda was not only influential in shuffling Suarez’s name past the

Council of the Realm but also in introducing democratic procedures in the Cortes

(Gunther 1980, pp. 287-88).

Under Suarez, debate heated up over whether the regime should remain authoritarian or become democratic and, if it were to democratize, whether the change should take place through an opening of the laws and institutions in place, or through a complete and abrupt break with the past. The choice made by Suarez and the King was to democratize peacefully Ifom above, which meant not only a series of transformative 46 decree laws but ultimately convincing the authoritarian Cortes to transform itself into a democratically elected body. This difficult move was accomplished through the Political

Reform Law approved in the Cortes 425 to 59 (with 13 abstentions) in November, 1976 and in turn, upheld by the public in a nation-wide referendum the following month in which all adults could vote.^ The Political Reform Law called for a popularly elected

Cortes which would consist of both a lower and upper chamber (Congreso and Senado); and it set up the first tree elections and provided a legal framework for the transition.

The importance of the Cortes’ choice is underscored by Linz’s words that the Political

Reform Law; "...was in fact the provisional constitutional law for the passage to democracy. It permitted a transacted transition within the formal legality of the old regime and prevented the break with the past advocated by the opposition" (Linz, p.

121). Spurred by this success, Suarez disbanded the Movimiento and the vertical sindicatos, legalized political parties and class-based trade unions, pardoned political prisoners, and set up provisional electoral rules by decree laws (negotiated with opposition leaders) before the elections on June 15, 1977.

The Electoral Law and the Development of the Party System

The electoral law established a modified proportional representation system in which 3 seats were allocated to each province regardless of population by the D’Hondt method. This meant that more than one party could gain representation in each province.

' Of eligible voters, there was a 77.7% turnout of which 73.2% voted in favor and 2.0% voted against (Linz, p. 121). 47

Electoral lists were developed by each of the parties placing their candidates in rank order. The net effect of the law was to overrepresent large national parties while it underrepresented or eliminated small parties unless they were geographically concentrated. Since regionalist or micronationalist sentiments were strong a few regional parties were able to gain representation and become players in the national arena (Gunther, Sani & Shabad, pp. 43-48).

TABLE 1

ELECTION RESULTS CONGRESS OF DEPUTIES, 1977 & 1979

IN NUMBER OF SEATS

Party 1977 1979

PCE-PSUC/IU 20 23

PSOE 118 121

UCD 165 168

AP/CD/CD 16 9

PCD/CiU 11 8

PNV 8 7

Others 12 14

Source: Gunther, Sani & Shabad, p. 402. 48

The June 15, 1977 elections defined the political party system by reducing the

parliamentary playing field to 4 major nation wide parties, 2 principle regional parties,

along with other representation mainly comprised of minor regional parties/ Suarez’s centrist coalition, the Unidn del Centro Democrdtico, won the largest amount of seats in the Congress with 165 of 350, thereby falling short of a majority. The party ruled as a minority government both in this legislative session (the Constituent session) and in the following session (1979-1982). The largest opposition party represented was the Socialist

Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espahol - PSOE) with 118 seats. Other parties that gained some representation and became major players in the regime were the Communist

Party (Partido Comunista Espanol-PCE) with 20 seats, the rightist Popular Alliance

(Alianza Popular) with 16 seats, and the regionalist groups, the Partido Nacionalista

Vasca (PNV or Basque Nationalist Party) with 8 seats and the Cataldn coalition

Convergencia i Unid (CiU) with 11 (Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1988, p. 402).

The Communist Party

Since some of the parties gaining parliamentaiy representation enjoyed long histories while others were created in haste as electoral vehicles, a brief discussion of their origins is in order. Both the PCE and the PSOE had been active in the Second

Republic, the 1931-36 experiment with democracy that gave way to Civil War in 1936.

The PCE, which originated from a split with the PSOE in 1920, fought vehemently against the Nationalists in the Civil War on the Republican side. Throughout the

More than 150 parties had taken part in the elections. 49

Franquist period, it remained in Spain conducting anti-regime activities. As a tight-knit, clandestine organization, it maintained strict hierarchical control in the model of a

"devotee" party.’ By the late 1950s, when it became evident that the Franquist regime was not about to fall, the party adopted a "Policy of National Reconciliation." This more peaceful policy marked a move toward organizational transformation to a "mass- mobilization" party. In the 1960s and 1970s it began to infiltrate legal organizations such as the sindicatos and recruited membership rapidly particularly among students (Gunther,

Sani & Shabad 1988, pp. 59-65).

With its membership ranks swelling, the parly leadership first expected that democracy would have to come about tfu"oughruptura (a complete break with the past regime), and pursued the appropriate policies. It was active in promoting large street demonstrations and mobilizing strikes. However, Suarez was quick to realize that an illegal Communist Party presented a much larger threat to the stability of democracy than one of democratic opposition. In order to placate the military, the PCE -the longstanding

"enemy" of Franquismo, was not legalized with the other political parties. Instead,

Suarez waited until April, 1977 -just two months before the elections- and made his move

’ As explained by Gunther, Sani, and Shabad: "The ‘devotee’ model conceives of the party as an elite ‘vanguard,’ whose objective is to lead an overthrow of the existing political regime and bring about a revolutionary change in society. Given these revolutionary aspirations, such parties are usually illegal and must function in clandestinity. This implies that the party must be a relatively closed organization: membership is highly selective and is compartmentalized organizationally into isolated and semisecret cells. Such parties are authoritarian, highly centralized in decision making, and intolerant of opinions and behavior that clash with their official policy. This gives rise to expulsions of dissidents and a strictly enforced ideological homogeneity" (Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1988, pp. 59 & 60). 50 unilaterally by decree law. The PCE moved quickly to alter its policies and its image to one consistent with democratic reform and ultimately fared rather well in the first elections although it gained less seats than it had anticipated (Gunther, Sani & Shabad

1988, pp. 66-70).

The Socialist Workers’ Party

The PSOE was nearly one hundred years old by the time of the transition.

Although it had been the largest party of the left throughout the Second Republic, it did not enjoy the tight organizational structure necessary to survive under Franco as did the

PCE. By the 1940s, its remaining leadership had exiled itself and its membership dwindled. Soon before Franco’s death, Felipe Gonzalez was elected Secretary General at the 1974 party congress, representing a young new leadership. Refusing to acknowledge the changeover in power, the older leaders (the ‘histdricos’) formed their own short-lived party, "PSOE-Histdrico" (Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1988, pp.70-72).

With the infusion of fresh blood and new ideas more in tune with Spain of the 1970s, the leadership succeeded in expanding party membership and organizational structure.

Although its platform became even more radical (for example, adopting the term

"Marxist"), it conveyed a somewhat moderate image to the voters (Gunther, Sani &

Shabad 1988, p. 75). Its young democratic image was successful in transforming it into the largest opposition party in 1977 and 1979, and later, into the party of government in

1982. 5 1

The Centrists

The Unidn del Centro Democratico was only an electoral coalition when it supported Adolfo Suarez in the 1977 elections. It had been formed through a series of mergers among small ideologically heterogeneous groups such as liberals, Christian democrats, and social democrats. While many of these leaders had been active in the moderate opposition against Franco, others had been active within the regime. Following the mergers within each of these groups, the ideological families began to merge together in a wider electoral coalition eventually known as the Centro Democratico. Just a few months before the elections, an agreement was struck with prime minister Adolfo Suarez in which the coalition would benefit from his prestige while he would benefit from the coalition’s electoral support. Of electoral benefit for the coalition was that about half of the names on the electoral lists included past or present government officials who had no prior link to any of the constituent groups. Because the coalition possessed either weak organizational links in the provinces or none whatsoever, it benefitted in the elections

Ifom both the government structure and personalistic links brought to the group by

Suarez’s "independents" (Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1988, pp. 92-104). Winning 165 seats of 350, it became the governing party, and Suarez’ role as Prime Minister gained democratic legitimacy. The government also benefitted from the political experience in office of many people that Sudrez placed in the cabinet.

Within six months after the elections, the coalition formed executive boards, transformed itself officially into a political party, and set to work on preparing an official ideological statement. The statement was necessarily vague, as the party included 52 members ranging from the center-right to the center-left. Although some of the group’s elites represented ties with the Franquist past, this served to help legitimate their role in the new regime, rather than to work against them as it did in the case of the Popular

Alliance (Alianza Popular - AP) which occupied the right wing of the political party spectrum. One reason was that the group was not made up entirely of ex-Franquists

(Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1988, p. 103). The eclectic background of its leaders was evident in its representation in the parliament. As one constituent group leader and parliamentarian explained:

"...the majority of UCD parliamentarians were not professional politicians. There were three types of UCD parliamentarians: the professional politician that had been in the previous regime as part of the ‘evolutionist’ or'apermrista' sectors. They had lived in, from, and for politics for yeai s. Then there were those of us that had been militant in moderate opposition parties during Franquismo, so that we had been in politics but not to maJce a living as much as to make problems. We had our professions, and our own lives. And last, there were those who had been neither for Franquismo nor against it. They were engaged in their own professions and at that time they felt a civic obligation to ensure that the transition in this country would avoid social convulsions" (Interview # 2).

During the early years of the democracy, these differences in political -as well as ideological- background appear to have been overcome by the leaders’ mutual aspirations to democracy, which in turn, contributed to the party’s success. Although the move to democracy was to be made through reforming the old regime, it signified a complete move away from authoritarianism, a point that was not always evident at that time to parties to the right and left of the UCD. As one UCD party leader described in an interview: 53

"A portion of the Spanish right accepted the UCD as a necessary evil. It was an instrument that guaranteed the continuity of a certain situation. But, of course, within the UCD there were many people whose political plan was the transformation of the countiy, or at least to put a process of transformation in motion at all levels: cultural, religious, and social" (Interview #2).

In the second general elections of 1979 which took place a few months after the

Constitution was signed, the party’s minority rule in government was extended by 3 seats.

In spite of the UCD’s electoral success and its contributions to ushering in democracy, divisions within the party gave way to its demise. The most poisonous divisions were personalistic, more than ideological (Gunther, unpublished; see Chapter 4 of this text).

This short-lived but historic organization did not survive Suarez’s departure and the third general elections of 1982.

The Popular Alliance

The Popular Alliance, unlike the centrist UCD, was made up entirely of people associated with the past regime. All leaders had been high-ranking officials under

Franco, many of them ministers. The leader, Manuel Fraga, though attempting to formulate a center-right conservative party, had served as Minister of the Interior in the

Arias Navarro government after Franco’s death. Given the dwindling number of

Franquist supporters among the electorate, it took some time for this party to convince the voters of its commitment to democracy. The party was originally formed by merging a handful of rightist parties, some of which envisioned themselves closer to the Spanish ideological center of tlie Spanish electorate than they were (Gunther, Sani & Shabad

1988, p. 83). The electorate, viewing this party as a continuance of Franquismo in spite 54 of its democratic proclamations, largely rejected it. It gained 16 seats in the 1977 elections and only 9 in 1979. The party later managed to turn its image around in incidences such as Fraga’s defense of the new democracy during the attempted coup of

1981. The party’s ideological ambiguity was reduced during the 1982-86 legislative session, when the party worked hard to develop a party platform with viable democratic options to the Socialist government’s policies. Later organizational and leadership changes helped develop the party’s popularity and define its image as a democratic player.

The Basque Nationalist Party

The PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco), though not the only Basque regional party, gained the largest representation in the Cortes. In the new democracy, it played a role both in developing and protecting regional rights and policies as well as in lending support at times to government parties for needed votes. The party dates back to the late

1800’s and played a major role in Basque society as well as in the Second Republic. Its policies, while not very radical, were at first ambiguous (Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1988, p. 344; Gunther 1985, p. 50). It promoted both Basque identity and Basque rights but was not as clear about its stance on separatism or ETA violence (Gunther, Sani & Shabad

1988, p. 344). 55

Catalan regionalist parties

From Cataluna, the Convergencia Democrâtica de Catalunya (CDC) gained a representation of 8 seats in the constituent legislature running in a coalition under the name Pacte Democràtic per Cataluna (PDC). In 1979 the CDC coalesced with the Unid

Democràtica de Catalunya and won 12 seats. The policy of the group stressed Catalan autonomy but within the limits of the 1978 Constitution (Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1988, p. 348). The ideological position of the CDC has been described by Gunther as "centrist- social democratic, with a significant infusion of liberalism" (Gunther 1985, p. 50). The

CDC was staunch in pursuing the official status of the Catalan language especially in education.

The Development of Legislative-Executive Relations

The nature of legislative-executive relations began to develop amongst the difficult issues that the parliament immediately faced, namely the writing of the Constitution and the dire economic situation. The President of the Cortes, Femdndez-Miranda resigned out of a sense of democratic responsibility, stating that the Political Reform Law’s call for a democratically elected Cortes extended to its presidency. A provisional bureau

(mesa) was set up during the summer after the elections under a new congressional president Alvarez de Miranda.® Temporary rules were devised by congressional attorneys

* The bureau, originally consisting of one President, 2 Vicepresidents, and 2 Secretaries, later came to include 4 Vicepresidents and 4 Secretaries. 56

to serve until the approval of provisional Standing Orders on Oct. 17, 1977.’ Key

committees were formed to deal with the formation of the Constitution, the Standing

Orders, legislative jurisdiction, and economy and finance.

The Deputies (members of parliament) worked hard to ensure that the notion of parliamentary control of the executive would materialize in practice. As stated by

President Alvarez de Miranda:

"Even in the absence of Standing Orders, there is no doubt that the Congress is the chamber where the work or the executive must be scrutinized, and in due time, criticized. Democratic control should be a reality in our country and it will be" {ABC, 18 August, 1977).

Executive responsibility to the parliament was established when the Government was submitted to a Motion of Censure in September, 1977. The motion was a response of opposition parties to the "Blanco Case" in which Socialist Deputy, Jaime Blanco, was imprisoned during a demonstration in spite of the policy of parliamentary immunity.

Many members of the Cortes considered this an aggressive act against parliament, smacking of Franquist tactics, and held the Ministry of Interior directly responsible. The

Government survived the Motion of Censure by a vote of 160 against, 118 in favor, and

58 abstentions {ABC, 22 September, 1977). However, the long term significance was not the outcome of the vote, but the fact that the vote took place at all, with the UCD

Government submitting itself to censure before the Constitution had been ratified. To fill the legal gap, the executive quickly submitted an emergency bill to the Cortes establishing provisional ground for legislative-executive relations until they could be formally

’ The permanent Standing Orders o f the Congress o f Deputies were adopted on February 10, 1982. 57 solidified by the Constitution and the Standing Orders. In the legislation the Government expressed its "willingness to submit itself institutionally to tlie control of the Cortes" and introduced the practices of Votes of Censure and Votes of Confidence{ABC, 29

September, 1977).

The Constituent Legislature

In the meantime, work on the Constitution had already been under way since the summer of 1977. A ponencia (subcommittee) of 7 members had been set up consisting of three UCD deputies, and one member each flrom the PSOE, the PCE, the Catalan parliamentary group and the Popular Alliance.'" These subcommittee members faced the task of drafting a document resolving deep, longstanding conflicts which had led to the Civil War of 1936-39 and had been suppressed under Franco. These issues involved labor and economic matters, the role of the Catholic Church, the legitimacy of the monarch, and regional demands for autonomy or independence. From August to

December, 1977 the subcommittee met in private to negotiate a draft. The document was released to the public in December, 1977. All political parties then had 20 days to submit amendments, upon which time the subcommittee reconvened until a final draft was signed in March, 1978 (Gunther 1985, p. 52-53).

Members were as follows: From the UCD: José Carlos Pérez, Gabriel Cisneros, Miguel Herrero de Mindn; from the PSOE: Gregorio Peces Barba; from the PCE: Jordi Solé Tura; from the Catalan Parliamentary Group: Miguel Roca Junyent; and from the Popular Alliance: Manuel Fraga. 58

Compromise gave way to outright debate when the draft proceeded to the full

Constitutional Committee. The disagreement and conflict of the first month in committee jeopardized the success of the constituent process. A rift developed between the parties of the left (the PSOE and PCE) and parties of the right (the UCD and the AP) so that majoritarian decision-making rules were applied leaving nearly half of the members in opposition. Recognizing the resulting threat to regime legitimacy, party leaders of the

UCD and the PSOE -the two major groups in disagreement- met privately to resolve several areas of conflict, thereby implementing a period of what became known as the

"politics of consensus". Having gained prior authority from the Communist and the

Catalan leaders, the leadership of these two parties negotiated agreements on the constitutional treatment of all divisive religious issues, labor and economic issues, and the military (Gunther 1985, p. 53). Implementing strict party control on all subsequent votes in the committee, the remaining articles of the draft constitution were approved within one month. This incident, along with a similar approach in the Senate, became the root of the high party discipline that has remained characteristic of the democratic

Cortes. The "politics of consensus" remained prominent throughout this and the following legislative session when many fundamental issues left open in the Constitution still had to be decided.

Having been approved by the Congreso in July, 1977, the draft’s carefully compromised provisions met a second challenge in the Senate. In spite of attempts on the part of backbench Senators to significantly alter the document, as well as ensure a prominent role for the Senate in the institutional makeup of the regime, party leaders 59 managed to protect the document. The final version that emerged from the joint

Congreso-Senado committee in October virtually ignored the Senate’s amendments

(Gunther 1985, p. 54.) Like the Political Reform Law, the Constitution gained status and legitimacy through a nationwide referendum in which close to 90% cast a yes vote out of a 68% turnout of eligible voters (Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1988, p. 124).

The negotiations over the Constitution were successful in establishing democratic pluralism and guaranteeing basic civil rights and liberties. It also resolved adequately or entirely the issues of the monarchy, political parties, the role of the Church, the electoral law, and some economic issues. However, it fell short of settling polarized sentiments over Basque demands for self-determination (Gunther 1985, pp. 55-56). Instead, the

Constitution recognized the right to autonomy of all regions "within the framework of the

Constitution" of Spain (Gunther 1992, p 62). It set forth a two different routes for obtaining that autonomy thus setting up a semi-federal state in which powers vary from region to region (see Chapter V). In fact, the PNV deputies abstained from the Cortes’ vote and advocated abstention in the national referendum. Only 46% of Basque voters turned out for the referendum. (Gunther, Sani & Shabad, p. 146).

The Consolidation of Democracy

Although the Constitution established democratic institutions and rules of the game, the democracy was not consolidated until their explicit acceptance a few years later. A more elaborate definition of consolidation is provided by Gunther: 60

"We consider a democratic regime to be consolidated when all politically significant groups regard its political institutions as the only legitimate framework for political contestation, and adhere to democratic rules of the game. This definition thus includes an attitudinal dimension wherein existing political institutions are regarded as acceptable and without legitimate alternatives, as well as behavioral criterion, according to which a specific set of norms is respected and adhered to by all politically significant groups" (Gunther, 1995. in Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros, p. 9).

Several events contributed to the consolidation. Even though the second general elections took place without mishap in March/April 1979, anti-system strands of the military still presented a threat to the regime. Three unsuccessful coups d’état were believed to have been provoked by attempts to meet Basque demands through their autonomy statute and other transfers of central administrative power. The attempt of February 21, 1981 frightfully reminded Spanish citizens of the fragility and desirability of their new democracy. As certain members of the Civil Guard and the military took the Congress

hostage, elites in the chamber adamantly defended the new regime -perhaps most notably

(other than Suarez), Manuel Fraga Iribame, the ex-Franquist leader of the Popular

Alliance, and General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, the military general, who served as

Minister of Defense. Outside of the chamber, the King, in his capacity of Commander of the Armed Forces, appeared on national television to condenm the attempt. Without the necessary support the coup failed. Yet its effects lingered in the form of more moderate or even unresponsive policies toward increased regional powers (Clark 1987).

Another key event -the changeover in the executive and the parliament from the

centrist UCD to the Socialist party the following year- also contributed to the process of

consolidation of the regime. However, neither this nor the failed coup is sufficient to 6 1 constitute consolidation. The democracy is considered to have been fairly consolidated by the time the instigators of the attempted February coup were convicted in 1983

(Aguero 1991). This particular act represented the acceptance of new regime rules and authority on the part of all elites except for the PNV, who did not acknowledge the constitution until 1985 (Shabad 1986, p. 144). In fact, at the time of writing it is still evident that certain extremists -mainly the supporters of Herri Batasuna and ETA-do not accept the regime as legitimate. However, in spite of some avid anti-system opposition the new regime now functions as a healthy stable democracy. CHAPTER III

HOW INFLUENTIAL IS THE SPANISH PARLIAMENT?

Measuring the influence that a parliament wields within a democratic system is complicated in any case and confounded in the case of new democracies such as Spain.

As the institutions of a new regime develop, they are open to an influx of rapidly changing factors that may not be present in long-standing democracies, for example the formation of a party system, the development of political norms and support, and the difficulties faced in resolving effectively a barrage of critical and fundamental issues. By examining the early years of a regime up close and in detail, we can tap the fluctuation in legislative influence and the factors affecting it. In a monographic study of a new democracy, this can be done by comparing time periods which occur early on in the parliament’s life - in this case the first four legislative sessions in the current Spanish democracy (1979-93). The study of long-standing democracies can obviously consider a longer time frame, and in doing so may have to forego gathering some detail. Yet the true difference between the approaches used in studying parliaments of new and old democracies lies in the consideration of the independent factors affecting parliamentary influence not in how influence is evaluated. Since legislatures serve similar functions within democracies, the indicators used in evaluating parliamentary influence in young democracies should be and can be readily comparable with those used in studying

62 63

established parliaments. The challenge comes in choosing the indicators and the methods of analysis to most accurately assess level of legislative influence and its fluctuations.

Many approaches have been developed to evaluate legislative influence in policy making as well as its overall influence in its regime, as were discussed in Chapter I. The authors of these approaches tend to agree that parliaments can potentially range from powerful to weak bodies or to use Polsby’s terms, from ‘transformative’ bodies which can initiate legislation and modify executive proposals to ‘arenas’ which act as

"formalized settings for the interplay of significant political forces in the life of a political

system" (Polsby [1975] 1990, p. 128). The question here is to determine where the new

Spanish Cortes falls within this range of influence. In searching to best measure the level

of influence of the Spanish Congress in the current democracy, I will diaw on several indicators that are generally agreed on and used in other studies of this nature. These

indicators are level of parliamentary activity, the ability of the parliament to reject executive legislation and substitute alternative legislation, the ability of the parliament to

influence the agenda, and the ability of the parliament to modify executive legislation.

In determining how to best measure these indicators, 1 will consider not only formal

methods of influence, but also behavioral aspects and informal methods of influence.

Such aspects are too easily overlooked because they are difficult to measure, thus leading to inaccurate assessments of the level of and the fluctuation in legislative influence.'

' For a description of the data gathered for this study, see Chapter I, p. 29. 64

The Makeup of the Legislature, 1979-1993

The array of parliamentary groups in the 1979-82 legislative session was similar to that of the 1977-79 Constituent legislature which I described in Chapter II. The UCD remained in power in 1979-82, again with only minority backing in the parliament (168 of 350 seats - see Table 2). This session was also characterized by a large Socialist opposition group (121) and four smaller parliamentary groups. On the right, the small

Popular Group or Popular Alliance (AP)* had ties to the Franquist regime and on the left, the Communist Party (PCE), which had worked underground during the authoritarian regime, made ideological concessions in order to participate in the new democracy.

Located more closely to the center were two regionally based Nationalist groups, the

Cataldn coalition Convergencia i Unid (CiU) and the Basque Partido Nacionalista Vasca

(PNV).

In 1982 the Socialist PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Espahol) won the elections and remained in power throughout the remaining three legislative sessions which are examined here (1982-86, 1986-89, and 1989-93). The 1982 elections not only gave rise to a new and powerful executive party, but they also left the parliamentary opposition in disarray. The Centrist UCD completely collapsed, the Popular Alliance suddenly inflated to 107 members in spite of its lack of organizational strength, and the Communists were

^ The conservative group, originally named Alianza Popular (AP) underwent a name change in 1988 to Partido Popular (PP), as well as an organizational change. In the 1986-89 session its parliamentary group included other small parties under the blanket name of Coalicidn Popular (CP). 65

TABLE 2

ELECTION RESULTS CONGRESS OF DEPUTIES, 1979-1993

BY NUMBER OF SEATS

Party 1979 1982 1986 1989 Ccsnuniti»* PCE/IU* 1C 23 ** 17

Sociatutf-PSOE 121 202 184 175

CenlniU«UCD 168 11 --

Cenritu-CDS - 2 19 14 Popular Gr-AP/CD/CD 9 107 105 107

CataUn Naiioaaliau-CiU 8 12 18 18 Baaqus Natioaalista-PNV 7 8 5 5 Mbied Oroxf 14 4 12 14

Total 350 350 350 350

Results for 1979, 1982, 1986 are taken from Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1988, p. 402. Results for 1989: Anuario El Pais. 1990. Ediciones EL PAIS, 1990, p. 60.

* In these 2 legislative sessions the Communists formed part of the Mixed Group with 4 and 7 Deputies respectively.

Shaded areas: Executive party group 66

subsumed into the Mixed Group.’ The UCD was succeeded by the Centro Democrdtico

y Social (CDS) which never regained its precursor’s political force and ultimately

disappeared in 1993. In the later two legislative sessions, the Popular Group remained

the largest opposition group while increasing in both size and organizational strength.

Identifying parties involved

In this chapter I will examine the actions of all congressional political parties in

order to determine fluctuations in the influence of the Congress, both opposition and

executive parliamentary groups in the four legislative sessions from 1979-93.“ Although

the governing party’s parliamentary group generally backs the Government’s policies,

therefore enhancing the power of the executive, in times of stress between the executive

and its party, they may also contribute to the power of the parliament by modifying,

rejecting, or substituting government bills and by influencing the agenda. These

conditions were present during the UCD legislative session of 1979-82 and measures taken by the UCD’s parliamentary group were often made independently of the

Government. Thus, their success would reinforceparliamentary influence vis-a-vis the

Executive (King 1976). However, during the three PSOE sessions (1982-93) the

Government and its parliamentary group enjoyed strict party discipline with the

’ The mixed group is made up of all parties who do not have the five deputy minimum necessary to form their own parliamentary group.

“ The constituent legislature will not be considered here as its legislative output, namely the Constitution, caimot be easily compared with that of the post-constituent sessions. 67 parliamentary group acting in unison with party leadership. Therefore, in interpreting the data one must remember that the success of measures taken by the PSOE parliamentary group (legislation, amendments, etc.) tends to reflect the strength of the executive, not the parliament.

Indicators of Parliamentary Influence

Level of activity

At the very least, parliamentary groups can show some influence by refusing to act as a ‘rubber stamp’ parliament passing executive initiatives without question.

Damgaard taps this intention among four Northern European parliaments by measuring the degree of activity among the opposition parties (Damgaard 1992, pp. 196-198). In actively presenting alternative legislation, an opposition group employs a strategy to prove itself as a viable alternative to the executive. The ability to present consistent alternative legislation calls for party organization and cohesion, in addition to a well-defined party platform and strategy. It does not imply that the opposition group is successful in creating this image, nor does it mean that the opposition is successful in passing its proposals, but it does show that the legislative body acts as more than a rubber stamp body.

I focus on this legislative activity (shown in Table 3) by considering for the four legislative sessions in question the number of bills presented by three groups of parliamentary actors - the executive, the executive party group, and the opposition. This TABLE 3

ACTIVITY BY BILLS INTRODUCED, 1979-93

Origin Bills Introduced Bills Introduced Bills Introduced Bills Introduced 1979-1982 1982-86 1986-1989 1989-1993 Centrists-UCD Socialists-PSOE Socialists-PSOE Socialists-PSOE N % N % N % N %

Executive 287 58.9% 200 64.4% 125 47.3% 128 45.4%

Exec, party 15 3.1% 5 1.6% 6 2.2% 11 3.9% group Opposition 185 38.0% 103 33.3% 133 50.4% 143 50.7%

TOTAL 487 100.0% 308 100.0% 264 100.0% 282 100.0%

Sources: Capo Giol et al. 1990,Memoria de la III Legislatura, and official data from the Congress of Deputies 1993. My percentages. 69 allows us to compare activity among the groups by showing the percentage of bills they introduced as a proportion of the total legislation presented. In real numbers, total activity (bottom row) decreased significantly from the first to the second sessions from

487 to 308 total bills introduced, and in the last two sessions the volume of legislation introduced has remained at about one half of its original 1979-82 level. The fact that all three groups of actors became less active in terms of amount of legislation introduced most likely reflects the decline in the volume of urgent fundamental legislation as democracy stabilized.

When the Socialists won the elections of 1982, executive ouQ)ut increased by about 5% (58.9% to 64.4%) whereas opposition output decreased by the same amount

(38% to 33.3%). However, after that the opposition appeared to have become more active in creating policy initiatives. In fact, total opposition initiatives surpassed executive proposals in the last two sessions at slightly more than half of total initiatives

(50.4% and 50.7%, respectively) whereas they represented closer to one third of total initiatives in the UCD session and the first Socialist session (38% and 33.3%). Reasons for this could range from improved organization of opposition parties to strategies designed to prove their ability to set policy.

A breakdown of the opposition into parliamentary groups in examining level of activity reveals that the largest opposition group is always the most active in terms of presenting legislation, with almost half of opposition legislation being presented by the

PSOE in 1979-82 and by the Popular Alliance/Popular Party in the three subsequent TABLE 4

OPPOSITION GROUP ACTIVITY BY BILLS INTRODUCED, 1979-93

Origin Bills Introduced Bills Introduced Bills Introduced Bills Introduced 1979-1982 1982-86 1986-1989 1989-1993 N % N % N % N %

Soctalbta-PSOE 83 44.9% See Rxec. PO See Exec, r a See Esee. K>

PeçuJtr Gf CP/AP/PP 11 5.9% 48 46.6% 48 36.0% 67 46.9%

Cmmnitf-PCE/TU-1C 32 17.3% See OÜKM 26 18.2% CtuUn NiiicnilbU'CiU 15 8.1% 23 22.3% 12 9.0% 20 14.0% Basque Ntlk«altaU*PNV 0 0 6 5.8% 8 6.0% 13 9.1%

Cenlrbu-CDS - - 16 12.0% 14 9.8% Mixed G fn ^ 44 23.8% 26 25.2% 49 43.2%* 3 2.1%

Opposition 185 100.0% 103 100.0% 133 100.0% 143 100.0% Total

Sources: Capo Giol at al. 1990,Memoria de la HI Legislatura, and official data from the Congress of Deputies 1993. My percentages.

* 20 of these were presented by Communist deputies.

Shaded areas represent largest opposition parliamentary group.

o 7 1 socialist sessions (Table 4). This is due not only to the larger size of the main opposition party but also to a party strategy different from those employed by smaller opposition groups.

As the main opposition group in 1979-82, the Socialists were very active in presenting legislation in their attempt to prove themselves as a viable governmental alternative to the UCD before the next elections. In the words of one UCD minister,

"while the UCD was in the process of dissolving, the PSOE was more and more able to give the image that it was the only possible alternative to put order to life" (Interview

#5). When the PSOE was successful in this bid in 1982, the conservative Popular

Coalition suddenly found itself increased from a group of 9 to the largest opposition parliamentary group with 107 deputies. Although we would expect that it would not have enjoyed the cohesion necessary to match its predecessor’s legislative activity, it did present close to half of opposition legislation, although it did not match its predecessor’s output in number. The Popular Alliance’s leadership followed a similar strategy to present alternative legislation with the aim of improving party image with the electorate.

A parliamentary leader of that time period explains that the AP;

"followed the technique of presenting alternative texts...Why did we do this? Because Î believed and I continue to believe that it is clearly more useful. Why? Because it has more repercussion with public opinion. And also because whether or not the text is accepted, a body of doctrines is hammered out. In other words, the Popular Party did not have a serious program until 1986. In 1986 there was a program like it or not, but there was a serious program, thanks to our parliamentary initiatives in 1982- 86.. The effort of making a series of parliamentary initiatives -even if they are not successful- helps to determine party positions" (Interview #14). 72

Thus, in attempting to improve its public image, the AP also developed a cohesive program, solidified its organization and embarked upon a route of serious opposition.

The Popular Alliance/Party remained the main opposition group throughout the three

Socialist sessions and remained active in presenting alternative legislation.

There are a few drawbacks to the use of activity level as an indicator of parliamentaiy influence. It does not show how many bills actually pass, or how the opposition might affect the legislation introduced by the executive. Perhaps most importantly, it only taps the intent of those parties that are seeking to distinguish their positions from that of the government, which is to be perceived as a governmental option.

But other opposition groups may not perceive themselves as a future alternative as much as a current constructive opposition, anxious to wield influence in the present by modifying government bills. Such have been the positions of two major regionalist groups, the Basques represented largely by the PNV and the Catalans represented by the

CiU. As such, influence exerted by these two groups would be less evident in measures of parliamentary activity, and more obvious through their ability to modify government legislation. Given these conditions, measurements of the level of parliamentary activity only provide a limited assessment of the nature of parliamentary influence.

Ability to reject and pass legislation

More important than the ability to present bills (which may be unsuccessful) is the

parliament’s ability to influence the legislation that actually becomes law. This can be

done in many ways both formal and informal. The most powerful legislatures, dubbed TABLE 5

ORIGIN OF LAWS, 1979-93

Ifg k k lrv e Se*i!on eriflmlinc in I ^ M ori|fralIn( in Autonomy A iiuk#/ Roytl Decree Law# T o u t L an iP mjw) Aulonnmnui ComrmwJty* N % U m N % N » U w t N % X pBMed PuM d P u w d Puaed 1979-82 UCD 205 76.2% 35 13.0% 12 4.5% 17 6.3% 269 1982-86 PSOE 180 85.3% 16 7.6% 16 7.6% 11 5.2% 211 1986-89 PSOE 107 88.4% 13 10.7% - 1 .8% 121 1989-93 PSOE 101 73.7% 16 11.7% 9 6.6% 8 5.8% 137

Sources: Spanish Government, Ministry of the Presidency, October, 1993 & official data of the Congress of Deputies 1993. 74

"policy-making legislatures" by Norton, have the ability to reject executive proposals and

are successful in having their alternative legislation passed into law (Norton 1990a, p.

178; Polsby [1975] 1990, p. 127; Blondel et al. 1970). One first cut at measuring this

is to determine whether bills which become laws originate in the executive or the

legislature. The total number of laws passed in each of the four legislative sessions is

shown in Table 5 as well as the percentage that originated in the executive, the Congress,

or from the other two sources possible in Spain, the autonomous communities and Royal

Decree-Law. In Spain, as in any parliamentary system, the bulk of bills passed are

presented by the executive while successful legislation originating in parliament represents

a much smaller portion of total laws. Here the number of laws originating in Congress

has never surpassed 13% (1979-82) whereas the laws initiated by the executive has never

fallen below 73% (1989-93).

Within this range, variations over time in the percentages of laws originating in

Congress versus the executive will give us an indication of the level of influence of the parliament in each session. According to this indicator, the parliament exercised more influence on public policy during the Centrist legislative session of 1979-1982 and the third Socialist session of 1989-93. In the Centrist 1979-82 session, when the UCD lacked a majority backing in the Congress, 13% of laws originated in Congress. This figure was reduced to 7.6% when the Socialists took power and had at their disposition the

overwhelming majority needed to implement their platform. As the Socialist majority declined over the next two sessions, the percentage of successful bills proposed by 75

parliamentary groups gradually increased to 10.7 and 11.7% - almost the pre-Socialist

level of 13.0%.

This picture is mirrored by the figures representing the percentage of laws

originating in the executive. The overwhelming Socialist victory of 1982 and a tightly-

knit party are most likely responsible for the nearly 10% increase in the share of laws

originating in the government from 76.2% in 1979-82 under the Centrists to 85.3% in

1982-86. A slight increase is shown in these laws in the second Socialist session of 1986-

89 in spite of its drop in numerical representation from 202 to 184, reflecting the tight

hold that the Socialist government maintained on legislation. In the 1989-93 session,

when the Socialist majority was reduced to half of the seats in Congress, we see a full

14% drop in the percentage of laws rooted in governmental policy from 88.4% to 73.7%

- actually slightly less than the percentage of executive laws during the UCD government

of 1979-82. This preliminary measure indicates that the Congress was able to pass the

highest percentage of legislation originating in the parliament in the 1979-82 UCD

session, was the least successful in the first Socialist session of 1982-86, and gradually

more successful at having its legislation become law in the two subsequent Socialist sessions of 1982-86 and 1986-89.

A second indication of parliamentary ability to reject and substitute executive

legislation would take into account the success of bills proposed in becoming laws and allow us to compare success rates among actors. The success rates of bills presented by the executive, the parliamentary group of the executive’s party, and opposition parliamentary groups are shown in Tables 6 and 7 for the four sessions in question. A 7 6 TABLE 6

SUCCESS OF GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL BELLS, 1979-1986

1979-82 UCD 1982-86 PSOE

OfigiD Pmwed % Pmwed o f Bilb Introduced PMMd X P mmx I of Bilk faifodund E « a .i v . 287 207 72.0 200 183 91.5 Exec. f*ny graup 15 5 33.3 5 5 100.0

OppoiikD 185 28 15.1 103 11 7.8

Sources: Capo Giol et al. 1990, p. 111. My percentages.

TABLE 7

SUCCESS OF GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL BILLS, 1986-1993

1986-89 PSOE 1989-93 PSOE

Ongm b& ro(hnd Puacd X Pueed of BUk fairaduced PlMcd % fmÈtoi of Bilk faxjoducod

125 108 86.0 128 101 78.9

Exec, p u ty (fw p 6 3 50.0 11 6 54.5

Opfi»iUoB 133 6 4.5 143 10 7.0

Sources: Memoria de la III Legislatura & official data from Congress of Deputies 1993. 77 larger success rate would indicate greater influence. Not surprisingly, the three PSOE

Governments met with more success than the UCD Government of 1979-82 in having their bills become law. Whereas only 72.0% of executive bills became law under the divided UCD legislative session, this figure soared 20% to 91.5 % in the first session after the landslide Socialist victory (1982-86). Yet the Socialist government’s success has dropped steadily by 5.5% in the 1986-89 session and by another 7.1 % to 78.9% in 1989-

93, perhaps indicative of their decline in seats among other factors. Thus, the Congress was able to reject higher levels of executive policy during the 1979-82 Centrist session and during the third Socialist session of 1989-93.

The executive parliamentary groups presented relatively few legislative initiatives.

However, in considering the success rate of their initiatives , we should remember that the UCD success rate (executive party group 1979-82) is not easily comparable to the

PSOE success rates (executive party group 1979-93) due to the nature of relations between the executive and its parliamentary group. Since relations were strained between the UCD parliamentary group and the executive, many bills initiated by that group were not approved by the UCD Government. Therefore, the 33% success rate of bills presented by the UCD parliamentary group may indicate independent parliamentary influence vis-a-vis the executive. However, given the strong party loyalty of the PSOE backbenchers, the bills the Socialist group presented in the three legislative sessions between 1982-93 represent bills which either originated in the executive or were condoned by it. Their approval may be evidence of executive influence not 78 parliamentary. Therefore, it is noteworthy’ that the 100% Socialist success rate of 1982-

86 dropped to 50% and 54,5% in the next two sessions.

Total opposition influence in terms of ability to have bills turned into laws shows the greatest success rate in the 1979-82 centrist legislature with 15.1% of their bills passing. This success dropped by half to 7.8% with the Socialist victory of 1982-86, dropped again in the following session to 4.5%, and increased slightly to just 7.0% in the most recent session. Unlike the previous measures, the success rate of bills presented by the opposition is not higher in the 1989-93 when the Socialists lost their majority than under the large Socialist majority of 1982-86.

Perhaps this is due to the fact that an increase in opposition influence on public policy may manifest itself in ways other than the ability of the opposition to have its bills become law. As mentioned above, parliamentary groups may also attempt to gain influence by modifying government bills - either as a general strategy or at times with specific legislation. The drawback to the present measure is that it does not show the process that bills go through, in other words amendments and negotiations are overlooked. For example, government bills that did become law - especially during the

1979-82 and 1989-93 sessions- were likely to have been substantially amended or negotiated as these non-majority governments may have accepted changes in order to gain votes from other parliamentary groups. Thus, parliamentary influence is likely to be actually lower or higher than these figures indicate.

In other words, this indicates decline, although total N’s are small. 79

Before moving on to measures which tap modification of government bills, 1 will break down the opposition success rates into parliamentaiy groups to see if any further patterns can be revealed. This breakdown is shown in Tables 8 and 9. In addition to the bills presented and passed, I have added a category labeled "Bills considered" which shows the portion of the bills presented that were even taken into account in Congress.

In Spain, the legislative process includes a phase known as la toma en consideraciôn in which, after the initial presentation of the bill, the entire plenary session votes to consider the bill further or to reject it. Thus we are able to compare by parliamentaiy party group the number of bills introduced, considered, and passed, as well as the success rate of those introduced.

As we have seen, the opposition groups were most successful in having their proposals passed into bills in the 1979-82 UCD legislature. The decline in this success in the 1982-86 first Socialist session (from 15.1% to 7.8%) becomes a bit clearer with the party breakdown as we see an overall decline in major opposition parties. First, the

Socialist parliamentary group which had provided a powerful, active, and well organized opposition party in the UCD session, having 10 of its proposals become law^, moved to executive party status. Secondly, the government party of the 1979-82 session, the UCD, completely collapsed and therefore could not act as a principal opposition group to the

Socialist Government. Instead the role of the largest opposition group was filled by the less organized Popular Coalition, made up of the Popular Alliance and other groups

‘ One of these laws, the Ley del Defensor del Pueblo, was cited by many respondents as having great importance. 80

TABLE 8

SUCCESS OF CONGRESSIONAL BILLS BY PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS, 1979-1986

1979-82 UCD 1982-86 PSOE

Pari. Wfoduoed Conaidefod Paawi SPMMdof Cooaidewd Pmm4 « p H H d o f BUla BQb Group S % baraduad N % htfoduced

Ccotm(*-UCD 15* 8 53.3 5 33.3 - - --

Socttlktf 1 2 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 PSOE 23 27.7 5* 5 100 5

CoaraBtfU* See PCE 32 7 21.9 3 9.4 MUed Cr.

Caiabto CiU 15 7 46.7 4 26.7 23 3 13.0 2 8.7

Poputtx Or* CP/AP/PP 11 7 63.6 2 18.2 48 2 4.2 2 4 J

NftiV -- PNV - - 6 1 16.7 1 16.7

Mixed GfO^» 44 12 27.3 9 20.5 26 5 19.2 5 19.2

Total 200 64 32.0 33 16.5 108 16 14.8 13 1 2 . 0

Oppoiitloa Total 185 56 30.3 28 15.1 103 11 10.7 8 7.8

Source: Capo Giol at al. 1990, p. 112. My percentages.

Shaded area: Main opposition parliamentary group.

* Executive party parliamentary group. 81

TABLE 9

SUCCESS OF CONGRESSIONAL BILLS BY PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS, 1986-1993

1986-89 PSOE 1989-93 PSOE

Coniideml Pwaol % PMMd of h ü « iu -d Ccaaidned PMMd % PMMd of Bilk Bilk N % intreduaed N * bXfodueed CcMmwA-CDS 16 5 31.3 1 6.3 14 6 42.9 1 7.1

Soctalku* * 1 0 0 . 0 1 1 1 0 0 . 0 PSOE 6 6 3 50.0 11* 6 54.5

Coovmaùtfl See ru-ic 26 6 23.0 4 15.4 Mixed Cr«

CftuUs NfttV 1 2 1 CiU 9 75.0 8.3 2 0 1 1 55.0 3 15.0

Popuiif Gr- 45.8 2 4.2 67 34.5 2 3 .0 CP/AP/PP III B«*quB NatV PNV 8 1 12.5 0 0.0 13 4 30.8 0 0.0

Mbced Gfoup 49** 14 28.5 2 4.1 3 2 66.7 0 0.0

Total 139 57 41.0 9 6.5 154 63 40.9 16 10.4

Oppoiitiao Total 133 51 38.3 6 4.5 143 52 36.6 1 0 7.0

Sources; Memoria de la III Legislatura, p. 145 & 146 & official data firom the Congress of Deputies 1993.

Shaded area: Main opposition parliamentary group.

* Executive party parliamentary group.

** 20 belonged to lU-lC, 4 of which passed. 82 which split off from the UCD. Yet in spite of its massive increase in seats from 9 to

107, it lacked the organization and cohesion necessary to match the challenging oppositional role that the PSOE had filled in the previous session and managed to have only 2 laws approved (4.2% of the bills they presented). Third, with the dip in popularity of the Communist Party, it ceased to be an independent parliamentary group with its drop from 23 to 4 seats thus ranking them among the "Mixed Parliamentary

Group." The two regionalist groups, the Catal6i coalition Convergencia i Unid and the

Basque PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco) also manage to have 2 bills and 1 bill become law, respectively. Yet as we have seen, the party strategies employed by these two groups do not focus on legislative initiatives. On the whole, as a mirror image of the overwhelming majority held by the governing Socialist group, we see an opposition in disarray, unable to challenge the Socialist clout in parliament.

In the next two Socialist legislative sessions of 1986-89 and 1989-93, the number of bills becoming laws remains very low, with only 1 or 2 per parliamentary group, in spite of the return of a Centrist group (the CDS) and a Communist group as well as increasing organization and direction among the chief opposition party. Popular

Alliance/Popular Party. The Catalan Minority (CiU) and the Communist group managed to reach success rates of about 15% in the second of these sessions with just 3 and 4 bills becoming law respectively. Again, if the opposition groups in parliament were able to influence bills during these sessions, it is not evident from the rate of independent initiatives becoming law. 83

In terms ofbills presented taken into consideration, the 1979-82 UCD legislative session boasts fairly high percentages of opposition bills considered (ranging from 21.9% of the Communist (PCE) bills to 63.6% of the Popular Alliance bills), comparable only to the high proportions of the last Socialist session (1989-93) where the bills considered ranged from 23% (lU-lC) to 66.7% (Mixed Group/Others).Congressional influence declined in 1982-86 when the Socialist executive showed little willingness to allow opposition bills to enter the legislative process (4.2% of CP/AP bills to 19.2% of bills of the Mixed Group/Others.) This is not surprising considering the lack of challenge presented by the opposition groups. However, in the third session (1986-89) there was a marked increase in percentage of opposition bills being considered, particularly of the largest opposition party, the Popular Alliance/Party when its bills being considered increased to 45.8% from 4.2%.

These measures lend some quantitative indication of the variation in parliamentary influence over tlie four legislative sessions in question in terms of ability to reject executive legislation and substitute parliamentary legislation. However, as I have noted throughout, other important sources of parliamentary influence are overlooked by these measures: the abilities to affect the agenda and to modify executive legislation. These two means of possible parliamentary influence, which could lead to less simplistic results, will now be considered. 84

Ability to influence Government agenda

In reality, legislatures in parliamentaiy systems have more potential to modify the executive’s platform and policies than they do to pass legislation that originates in the parliament. As is often overlooked in studies of this nature, both the opposition parliamentary groups and the executive’s parliamentary group have the potential to affect government policy before it is ever presented to the legislature. Although the

Government largely controls agenda setting in parliamentary regimes, it does not act in a political void. The opposition can use formal methods to induce the Government to present a bill on a given topic within a certain time frame. However, the Government may also alter its agenda due to anticipation of strong opposition to its stance based on its perception of the opposition’s positions (Mezey 1979, pp. 25-26; Blondel, p. 199).

These views are made known through lawmaking and oversight measures, through informal negotiations and opposition party platforms. As Blondel points out, it is impossible to precisely measure the number of bills that "are nol presented by the government because the government realizes (or, strictly, thinks) that these bills would not be passed, or would consume too much energy on its part" (Blondel, p. 199). We can best assess the influence of parliamentary groups in agenda setting through personal accounts of the actors themselves, both ministers and parliamentarians.

The UCD Governments of 1979-82 appeared to have been more restricted in their ability to base the executive’s parliamentary agenda on their own electoral platform than the subsequent PSOE Governments due to the nature of the democratic transition. Both the Constitution of 1978 and the economic Moncloa Accords dictated certain organic laws 85 which were to be resolved in the parliament. For example, the regional autonomy statutes were given "absolute priority" as dictated by the Constitution. In addition, many fundamental laws left over irom the authoritarian Franquist regime had to be replaced by laws of a democratic, pluralistic nature. Other urgent issues came up during the course of the transition that had to be dealt with immediately.

The opposition apparently had a hand in the Government’s agenda as the UCD did not control a majority of parliamentaiy seats. One ex-minister and close advisor to

President Suarez admits that the executive agenda constantly had to be merged with issues and questions stemming from the opposition, leaving the Government with a "capacity of initiative reduced to 50%. The other 50% was determined by the opposition and the nature of the Spanish democratic process" (Interview #5). Interestingly enough, the opposition deputies from this period did not agree that their parliamentary groups were able to influence the Government’s agenda, but instead felt that their ability to influence executive bills came after bills had been introduced in the form of amendments. Both

UCD ministers and deputies agreed that the Government’s own parliamentary group had no part in setting the executive’s agenda. Rather, the Government informed the Centrist parliamentary group of the executive bills that would be introduced in the parliament.

The same minister reported that this was due to the fact that President Sudrez was not interested in the UCD except for electoral purposes and that the parliamentary group was considered too divided to provide alternative legislation. This perception of division went two ways. Some UCD deputies expressed the belief that the Government did not have 8 6 the sense of direction necessary to follow its own electoral platform strictly, thereby leaving individual ministers with much autonomy in legislative initiative.

The Socialist Governments of the later 3 legislative sessions enjoyed majority status within a stable democracy and were able to base their agendas fundamentally on their party’s electoral platforms, as well as to respond to urgent events and topics that arose. Members of all major opposition parliamentary groups reported that they were not able to influence the Government’s agenda and were not consulted by Government ministers on agenda setting. As with the UCD legislative session, opposition members felt that there was a greater chance to modify bills during the parliamentary process than to affect the executive’s agenda. No variation over the three sessions in opposition influence on the agenda was reported. Respondents agreed that the Socialists’ power in agenda setting was largely due to their majority status.

The Socialist parliamentary group also appears to have had little or no influence in setting the Government’s priorities. One former minister who had served in tlie first two Socialist sessions insisted that the Government enjoyed total autonomy in determining the agenda and in drafting legislation (Interview #29). However, relations were so cohesive between the Socialist Government and its parliamentary group that the Socialist deputies interviewed did not perceive the Government’s power of initiative as a lack of influence on their part. As one Socialist deputy explained;

"The Government fundamentally has legislative priority in introducing bills to the house. And naturally the Government and the Socialist Group act together, the executive and legislative [members of the Socialist party] are two sides of the same coin. As such, the determination of priorities is not set by vote in the Socialist Group. It is a balance between the 87

Government’s initiative and the response or the advice that the Socialist Group can give in harmony with the correlation of forces" (Interview, #24).

Weekly reunions of the Socialist parliamentary group were attended by ministers who informed the deputies of upcoming legislation. The deputies could attempt to amend legislation, but the Government’s agenda was planned previously and not open to debate.

Thus, high party unity appears to have been another important factor affecting the executive’s agenda setting capacity.

In spite of the general belief that the opposition was not able to directly affect the

Government’s agenda, there were two parliamentary practices that were known to affect the executive’s agenda: non-legislative motions’ and opposition bills - the latter being more successful than the first. The opposition groups have many oversight means available to bring issues to the forefront and to demand answers or action from the

Government: written and oral questions, interpellations, and motions. However, one measure, the non-legislative motion, was used to formally induce the executive to introduce legislation on a given issue. In these non-legislative motions, the opposition often asked the government to present legislation on a proposed topic within a set period of time, for example, three months. The Government frequently responded that it would need more time than indicated in order to properly address the topic. Because the resolution is non-binding, opposition members often complained that the Government was unresponsive to the motion, either surpassing the target date indicated or not introducing

’ These motions call for the parliament to pass resolutions of a non-legislative nature, such as approving of or condemning military action between other countries or condemning international human rights violations. 8 8

legislation on the topic at all. Therefore, this means of oversight was only partially

useful to the opposition groups in influencing Government agenda.

The more successful method for opposition groups to affect Government

legislation was to actually present legislation themselves. Nearly all respondents were

able to give at least one example in which executive legislation appeared to have been

introduced as a response to parliamentary bills presented by the opposition. In such a

scenario, an opposition group presented a bill which was rejected for consideration. Yet

the legislative initiative served to sensitize the Government, as well as other opposition

groups and public opinion, to the necessity of dealing with the issue. Because of their

parliamentary majorities, the PSOE Governments were more successful than the UCD

Governments in refusing to allow opposition bills into the legislative process. They often justified rejecting the bill by stating that the Government was already studying the topic

and would soon be introducing legislation concerning it. Opposition deputies from both

the UCD and the PSOE eras were able to provide countless examples in which the

opposition presented legislation which was defeated in the consideration phase. Within

a few months, the Government would introduce legislation dealing with the same topic.

Although this is clearly a method of parliamentary influence, it is indirect and often

leaves the opposition deputies feeling inefficacious because the Government’s proposal

treated the issue from the Socialist party position and was often difficult for the

opposition to amend. While the opposition groups were also often frustrated because

their propositions had been rejected, the Socialist viewpoint was that the legislation

needed to be "rectified". Since opposition bills were seldom successful in becoming 89 legislation, it appears that now this measure which was designed as a legislative measure did not serve as such. Instead it became in practice a method of parliamentary impulse to attempt to influence the Government’s agenda and sensitize public opinion rather than a means to produce laws.

In sum, there is an indication that the UCD agendas were in large part affected by the opposition, but that the PSOE Governments based their priorities largely on their own electoral platform. Nonetheless, the opposition often swayed the Government to deal with their concerns through presenting opposition bills and bringing an issue to the forefront. The Government often introduced legislation on the topic but the resulting legislation was most likely to reflect the Government’s position not the opposition’s.

There was most definitely some parliamentary effect on the legislative agenda; however, it did not necessarily reflect influence on the legislation itself.

Ability to modify executive legislation

A parliament’s ability to modify executive bills shows "modest policy-making power" according to Mezey, especially in the absence of the capacity to reject government legislation (Mezey, p. 155-156). Executive legislation can be modified before or during the parliamentary legislative process. Both stages of bill modification will be considered here. 90

Modification through prior negotiations

As with agenda setting, the Government may modify a bill before it is presented in parliament. This may be done due to prior negotiations carried out with opposition group leaders, members of its own parliamentary party, or again due to the minister’s own anticipation of the possible reaction in the parliament.

During the 1979-82 UCD legislative session, members of the UCD’s own parliamentary group were consulted frequently before the presenting of a bill to the parliament according to most respondents, but it was never a formal practice. Instead, some ministers would consult with certain experts or committee members in the group.

The group was consulted as a whole only on a few occasions. As far as the opposition, it was common for the ministers of that legislative session to consult with opposition leaders or committee members when drafting a bill and modifications were made accordingly. The three ex-ministers interviewed from this time period all maintained that this was frequently the case, although not with all laws. One of them stated that most of the Organic Laws that were negotiated with the Socialist group were not discussed until after the legislation had been presented to the Parliament. Most respondents remarked that governmental willingness to negotiate legislation in advance varied according to issue and from minister to minister. However, it is safe to conclude that a large amount of important legislation was substantially modified due to opposition stances before it was presented to the parliament during the UCD legislative session studied here.

This fit with the spirit of consensus present during the transition to democracy. 9 1

During the PSOE legislative sessions, it was never common practice for the

executive to consult with the Socialist Parliamentary Groupas a whole in drafting a bill.

During weekly meetings the parliamentary group was informed that a minister was

drafting a bill on a certain topic, but it was rarely, if ever, presented in written or

detailed form until after the Council of Ministers had approved the final draft and it had

been made public to all parties. This was considered common and acceptable practice

by the deputies who generally backed the Government’s legislation. All the Socialist

respondents agreed, however, that the minister sometimes consulted with certain deputies

during the drafting, if they were involved on the relevant committee or would be a

principle defender of the bill in Congress. It appears that there was less consultation

between the minister and the executive party’s parliamentary group members than during the 1979-82 UCD session.

The Socialist Governments from 1982-1993 also consulted with opposition leaders in drafting legislation, although with some parties more than others. Moreover, both

Socialist ministers and most opposition deputies agreed that the opposition was sometimes consulted in drafting a bill, although it was not a usual practice. The Catalans were the group most consulted throughout this period. A Catalan deputy reported that the CiU was consulted frequently, although not as a rule. A PNV deputy also reported that the

Socialist Governments consulted regularly with the Basque group in drafting legislation.

Although the Popular Party/Alliance complained that their policy positions were ignored by the Socialists, particularly during the 1982-86 "steamroller" government, quite a different story emerges from a Socialist minister’s view. He claimed to have consulted 92 in the drafting stage most frequently with the Catalans, and to some extent with the

Basque PNV and the centrist CDS. However, he maintained that the AP/PP, the

Izquierda Unida (lU) and even the PNV were somewhat unreceptive to doing business.

In the case of the PNV, their clerical positions often clashed with Socialist policy.

Another impediment had less to do with substance than with disagreements over jurisdictions. Speaking of attempted talks with a Basque official, the minister maintained:

"...the Basque advisor told me that he completely agreed with the content of the bill but that it was a law that he wanted to make for the Basque Country. It was not a confrontation over content but instead over jurisdictions...according to him a fundamental part of this law had to be a Basque law not a law made by the Spanish parliament" (Interview #20).

While some clashes with the PNV may have had to do with jurisdiction, the AP/PP appears to have been following a strategy of opposition that precluded negotiations. If they chose not to participate it does not mean that they did not have any influence in the legislative process; rather they chose to exercise their influence by maintaining outright opposition, instead of negotiating details that would not have entirely fit their program.

Thus, the opposition parties were able to wield some influence on legislation in spite of the Socialists’ majorities in the 1982-89 period and their near majority of 1989-

93. In fact, since no variation was reported to me over the time period as the Socialist majority declined, it appears that negotiations during drafting may have occurred independently of the Socialist support in Congress. The same former Socialist minister shed some light on the Government’s willingness to take opposition views into account when writing a bill. He maintained that the Socialists knew throughout the period that they might lose their majority in the future and that a coalition would be necessary with 93 one party or another, most reasonably the Catalans, and possibly the Basques. Secondly, he claimed the Socialists wanted to avoid enacting legislation that would be overturned if another party came into power. Therefore, even when opposition parties were not open to negotiations, modifications were sometimes made in this stage based on the executive’s perception of opposition groups’ stances. Confirming the minister’s statements, there was a widespread perception that the Government "took opposition views into account more than consulting with them". In sum, opposition leaders were consulted more often than the Government’s parliamentary group members in all four legislative sessions and both members of the opposition and the Government’s parliamentary group appear to have been consulted more frequently during the UCD than the PSOE legislative sessions, although opposition negotiations were present under both parties’ executives.

Modifications during parliamentary process

Formal changes effected to executive bills during the parliamentary process are more public and therefore, at least at first glance, appear to be easier to assess than modifications made before the bill is presented to the parliament. However, the

legislative process in any country is much more complex than that. In this section, I will

show that the influence that the Cortes exercises must be measured from many different

perspectives, considering formal and informal methods of influence, as well as the

behavior of both deputies and the government as informal legislative-executive norms 94

developed in Spain. Here I will consider in succession, the quantity of amendments, the

substance of amendments, negotiated amendments, and how modifications to bills were

negotiated.

i. Quantity of Amendments

A first cut at showing the ability of the parliamentary groups to amend executive

legislation is to consider the percentage of amendments accepted of those presented by party group for each legislature. We can then compare which parties are more

successful, and therefore, more able to have changes -at least in number- implemented to executive legislation. While we might assume that the number of amendments

presented and accepted would be easily measured and compared by legislative session I

have found that this is not the case. In Spain, although there has been some rigorous

gathering of quantitative information on amendments for the 1986-89 and 1989-93

legislative sessions, to the best of my knowledge the number of amendments by group was never systematically calculated for the 1979-82 and 1982-86 sessions and could only be obtained by examining each bill and comparing the records from tlie time that the bill

was introduced, through the committee and subcommittee sessions, and the final plenary session. Yet even the data that have been gathered for the 1986-93 give us a very

superficial and simplistic story. In short, opposition amendments in those two sessions were seldom accepted outright, whereas amendments presented by the Socialist party group were usually accepted. It would be erroneous to draw the conclusion that no opposition group had influence during this time and that the Socialist group did. 95

That this quantitative information is not consistently available is of no great

consequence to this study because thequantity of parliamentary amendments to executive

bills is neither the only nor the most accurate measure of parliamentary influence. Most

respondents agreed that parliamentary influence in all four legislative sessions has been

most exercised throughsubstantive changes made to executive bills. These changes can

be effected either through substantive amendments made to executive legislation or

through consultations that induce the Government to modify the billbefore it is presented

to the parliament.

ii. Substantive Amendments

The classification of substantive amendments versus insignificant amendments

presents more than one problem for the researcher who attempts to undertake this task

empirically. In addition to the amount of time that would be involved, it would be difficult to classify amendments. An amendment can be dubbed substantive only in relation to other amendments, the bill, and the researcher’s subjectivity (Griffith, 1974, pp. 195-196). These are judgments that are best left up to the actors involved in drafting and modifying a bill.

Respondents from all political parties were asked if their parliamentary group and other parliamentary groups were able to substantively amend bills during the legislative process. Members of all groups were able to give examples of government bills substantially amended during all four legislative sessions, yet the general pattern varied greatly over time. Most notably there was much greater sense among parliamentarians from all party groups and executive members that during the 1979-82 UCD session most 96 legislation underwent important modifications in the parliament and that it was much easier for the parliament to substantively modify legislation during that era than it was under the Socialist Governments. One UCD minister reported "In the parliamentary process, modifications were always made, improvements, some more than others, but the

Parliament always played a role" (Interview #5). Another UCD deputy reported that it was a great deal easier for opposition groups to modify executive bills during the UCD era. "First because the UCD did not have an absolute majority. Secondly, they reached agreements in order to not oppose the UCD. It was the spirit of the transition. It was also the subject matter of the bills" (Interview #9).

All opposition groups, as well the UCD group, had important amendments approved in the UCD legislative session, whereas opposition influence through amendments under the three PSOE executives appears to have been limited to certain parliamentary groups. Most notably the largest opposition group under the UCD

Government, the PSOE, had a large number of substantive amendments accepted throughout the session whereas most members of the Popular Alliance/Party, the largest opposition group under the PSOE Governments of 1982-93, believed that their group’s substantive amendments were almost never accepted by the Congress.

The respondents also reported variation in the success rate of opposition amendments over the three Socialist legislative sessions, and claimed that the Socialist executive was much more willing in the last session (1989-93) to accept opposition modifications. The opposition parties complained openly about their inability to affect legislation during the first Socialist session of 1982-86 under the overwhelming Socialist 97 majority, dubbed the ’’steamroller’’ by the opposition. During these four years, the PSOE

Government swiftly and consistently implemented policies from their platform often rewriting fundamental legislation that had been painstakingly negotiated in the previous legislative session. In addition, the powerful majority was able push through major legislation that had remained at an impasse as consensus broke down.® None of the opposition groups felt that it was able to implement substantive amendments during this period. They maintained that any important amendments came from the Socialist parliamentary group after being approved by tlie parliamentary group leadership and the

Government. In the subsequent two Socialist sessions (1986-93), most respondents agreed that it was increasingly easier for the opposition to modify bills. Examples of important modifications stemming from all opposition groups were readily available.

However, all respondents felt that most major modifications consistently originated with the two major regionalist groups, the CiU and the PNV. iii. Negotiated Amendments

The distinction of parliamentary independence vis-a-vis the executive is important to Blonders measurement ofviscosity (parliament’s ability to resist the executive), in which moderate viscosity is exercised when opposition amendments are passed with the

consent of the government, and high viscosity is shown when opposition amendments are

passed without the consent of the government. Throughout the four legislative sessions,

most amendments were not accepted without the government’s approval. During the

1979-82 UCD legislature, when the Government’s party held only a minority in the

For example, the Ley de Autonomia Universitaria. 98 parliament, it was numerically possible to pass parliamentary amendments against the

Government’s will, if the opposition groups could rally behind a positive vote. However, due to many factors surrounding the nature of the transition, both the UCD and opposition parties sought to negotiate changes that were to be made during the legislative process.

During majority governments in which government party discipline is strong, such as the three PSOE Governments studied here, it is practically unfathomable that amendments could be passed against the executive’s will as in Blondel’s concept of high viscosity. One Socialist ex-minister surmised that any attempts of the opposition to impose their point of view through legislative votes were absurd since they would lose due to the minority status of the opposition groups. However, he maintained that opposition groupscould impose their amendments, namely when the amendments were

"well presented pointing out an important defect in the law. And naturally, the

Government and the PSOE Parliamentaiy Group believed that the more votes the better"

(Interview #20). Therefore, opposition amendments were accepted during the Socialist legislatures when the executive and the Socialist Parliamentary Group believed that the amendment was worthy and that it would help the Government receive more votes on the final passage of the bill.

In Spain, the measurement of parliamentary influence through these negotiated amendments is complicated further by the fact that they are often incorporated into transactional amendments amendments - originally presented by the opposition and negotiated between the executive parliamentary group and one or more opposition groups. 99 then presented in committee or plenary sessions by the Executive’s parliamentary group.

It is very difficult to distinguish opposition influence from executive power in these cases.

The opposition deputies themselves - especially during the PSOE legislatures - were hard put to recognize a transactional amendment as opposition influenceeven when the transactional amendment remained almost word fo r word as it had been presented by the opposition. Their complaint was that transactional amendments are formally presented by the executive parliamentary group and therefore, claims to authorship belong to the

Government’s group - not the opposition. They agreed that this was a form indirectof influence at best.

While the respondents from the UCD era reported that opposition parties were rather influential through amendments to executive bills, few of them mentioned the distinction between outright amendments and transactional amendments. One UCD deputy mentioned that the Socialists, as the largest opposition group, were very willing to negotiate transactional amendments with the UCD Parliamentary Group. However, concerning the three Socialist legislative sessions, respondents from all groups often mentioned the use of transactional amendments, not always in a positive light. The greatest feelings of inefficacy came from the backbenchers of the major opposition party, the Popular Party/Alliance, many of whom mentioned the frequent use of transactional amendments;

"They [the Socialists] almost never accept an amendment. They usually write what they call a transactional amendment - a transactional amendment that often says what the opposition says. But they change 4 words so it doesn’t appear like an acceptance" (Interview #30). 1 0 0

Another deputy added that "they write a transactional amendment that says the same thing ours did and put their name on it" (Interview #13). Claims to authorship appear to have been so important to the Popular Parliamentary Group that with one law in which transactional amendments had been painstakingly negotiated between the Socialists and the Popular group, both groups actually presented the transactional amendments in the plenaiy session, thus allowing both groups to claim authorship, as well as allowing them to display their willingness to negotiate. This action pushed the Parliamentary Rules of

Order to the limit since this right is formally reserved only for the Government’s parliament group.’

As for the other parties, the Catalan and Basque respondents were not as concerned that they be recognized as the authors of an amendment, as long as they gained favorable concessions through the amendments. A respondent from the CDS claimed that although transactional amendments were frequent, they did not gain many important modifications through them (Interview #8). A former Socialist minister agreed that most amendments accepted by the government were transactional amendments, not outright amendments. The Socialists contend that this is a valid way for a majority government to operate. iv. How modifications are negotiated

The nature in which the informal norms of legislative negotiations develop in a new democracy will affect the distribution of power within the parliament. Since much

’ This action was agreed upon between the two parliamentaiy group spokespersons, Martin Toval and Herrero de Mindn. The law regulated the obligation of citizens and authorities to appear in congressional investigative committees. 101 of the parliamentary influence on policy during the four legislative sessions has been attained through negotiations among the parliamentary groups and the executive, influence is variable depending upon where the negotiations take place and who is doing the negotiating. During both the UCD and PSOE legislative sessions, negotiations could take place at any time during the parliamentary process and amendments were proposed and accepted either during the committee and subcommittee phases or during the plenary sessions. In terms of the committee system, important decisions tended to be reached more often within the committees and subcommittees during the UCD 1979-82 legislature than they were in the subsequent PSOE legislative sessions. However, respondents from all sessions and all parties made it clear that major decisions reached through negotiations usually took placeoutside o f the parliamentary process altogether, that is to say, through

informal conversations in the halls of the Cortes, the Ministries, the Presidential palace,

and over the phone.

Despite the extraparliamentary location of these negotiations, they represent

another form of parliamentary influence. The authority to negotiate does not lie with the

typical backbencher; rather negotiations are mainly carried out among the spokespersons

for the parliamentary group or the spokespersons representing their group on a given

committee. In fact, the comments of those persons in positions with authority to

negotiate reflected a greater belief in general in the efficacy of their party through

modifications to executive bills than did most backbenchers, regardless of party.'"

Outside players were often included in negotiations on legislation, namely the governments of the Autonomous Communities. The Basque and Cataldn Governments were probably the most included due to the high profile of these regions in Spain as a 102

Some parliamentary groups were able to wield more parliamentary influence on policy than others throughout the four legislative sessions. Since negotiations were of great importance, the influence exercised by any given party largely depends on the ideological space occupied by that party as well as the willingness to compromise of that parliamentaiy group and the Government. During the 1979-82 minority UCD legislature, the minority UCD was forced to negotiate on each bill in order to gain the votes necessary to pass legislation. The UCD reportedly negotiated mostly with the major opposition party, the PSOE, during this session although they were known to negotiate with any parliamentaiy group, particularly the Cataldn, Basque, and Communist groups.

Agreements were reached with different groups depending on the nature of the law and the minister’s own political beliefs. It was reported that most fundamental laws affecting the nature of the regime were negotiated with the PSOE, mainly due to the fact that they were the largest opposition group and liable to gain power in the future. Social laws, such as labor and education laws, often entailed multilateral agreements with both the

Socialists and the Communists. With laws affecting the autonomous regions and laws of an economic nature, modiflcations were often negotiated with the Basque and Catalan groups.

The extent of modifications through negotiations has varied throughout the three

PSOE sessions. As mentioned above, the opposition groups complained that the

Socialists were unwilling to negotiate modifications after the bill was presented during the

whole and to the pivotal role played by the Catalan and Basque national parliamentaiy groups, particularly in the 1979-82 UCD legislature and the third Socialist legislature of 1989-93. 103

"steamroller" Socialist session of 1982-86. The Socialists on the other hand, reported that the opposition groups during this period were difficult to negotiate with because their

stances were so opposed to those of the government. Although tensions lessened somewhat during the 1986-89 session, it was not until the last session of 1989-93 that the opposition groups reported that the Socialist Government was more willing to negotiate substantial modifications to Government bills. Their increased willingness to negotiate was believed by the opposition to have been motivated at times by a need for votes (since the Socialists held exactly one half of the Congressional seats), and also by the anticipation that they might lose even more seats in the next national elections and might need to form a coalition government.

The ability to negotiate with the PSOE varied according to parliamentary group.

The Communist lU (United Left) maintained that their proposals were not taken seriously by the Socialists. The CDS reached agreements with the PSOE Government from time to time, but appeared to be more concerned about maintaining a separate ideological identity than making concessions to the Socialists. Leaders from the Popular Party conceded that some but very few substantive amendments proposed by their group were accepted by the government in the 1989-93 session. Respondents from all other groups maintained that the PP’s lack of success was largely due to the oppositional nature of their amendments as well as general positions. Even one prominent member of the

Popular Party actually agreed with this opinion, stating that: "I have the impression that presently a lot of the PP’s amendments are opposition amendments for opposition’s sake, without knowing the reasons for the opposition. Therefore, it is clear that they will never 104

be successful. It is the negative in a void" (Interview #14). A higher-placed Popular

Parliamentary Group leader maintained that Popular amendments were seldom accepted by the Socialists simply because the Popular ideology differed so greatly from that of the

Socialists.

The two major regionalist groups, the PNV and the CiU, clearly played the most pivotal opposition roles in this legislative session through negotiations with the PSOE

Government. In contrast to the opposition strategy practiced by the Popular Party, they maintained an approach of constructive opposition. Respondents from both of these groups claimed to be employing a strategy of negotiating bill by bill with the government party in order to maintain or increase regional jurisdiction and authority." They would lend their support to a government bill when satisfactory governmental concessions were made to their interests. A Cataldn deputy under the PSOE governments said:

"The difference is that we do not maintain an opposition of extremes, that is to say, systematic, because we believe that Cataluna is governed by us and we have many points of contention with the Spanish government. We are not as interested in systematic opposition with the aim of opposing the government. We are not an alternative to the Spanish Government. We know very well that we will never govern Spain. Therefore, we are interested in obtaining as many compromises, benefits, and transfers as possible either through the finance of services transferred to us or through recognition of Cataluna’s national character, respecting its language, its culture, its folklore, its literature, etc" (Interview #15).

Along the same lines, one PNV parliamentary group leader described the Basque group as a "sort of embassy or outpost of the Basque Government" in Madrid employing a strategy of attempting to protect their regional jurisdiction bill by bill (Interview #3).

" Although members of both groups acknowledged that the Catalans were more interested in national Spanish politics than was the PNV. 1 0 5

The growing importance of the regionalist groups was of utmost importance considering that a future minority Socialist Government would have to rely on their support to pass legislation, either through a coalition Government or a pact of parliamentary support.

Conclusion

While the parliament was influential in public policy throughout the four legislative sessions of the new democracy, this level of influence fluctuated with the opposition being rather influential in the 1979-82 UCD session, exercising much less power under the Socialist majority of 1982-86, and increasing in influence in the subsequent two Socialist sessions.

Opposition influence was most evident through modifications made to Government legislation, and these modifications were usually agreed upon through negotiations which took place among leaders outside of the parliamentary process. The extent of influence exercised varied from party to party. During the UCD session, most opposition parties, particularly the Socialists, were able to affect Government legislation. The UCD parliamentary group also exerted some independent power in that session. During the

Socialist sessions, it was not the largest opposition group that was able to influence legislation. Rather, the small Nationalist Basque and Catalan groups appeared to be the most influential in affecting government policy particularly in the 1989-93 session, largely due to their strategies of constructive opposition. Influence also varied according to the role of the deputy within the parliamentary group, with many backbenchers feeling less efficacious than parliamentary group leaders. 106

The second most effective way for the parliament to affect legislation was in agenda setting. The agenda set by the Government was reportedly very influenced by

opposition positions in the UCD session and much less so in the three PSOE sessions.

However, it is clear that the opposition groups were able toindirectly affect

Governmental priorities throughout the four sessions by bringing issues to the forefront through non-legislative motions and proposing their own legislation.

The other two measure used here -level of activity and ability to reject and pass legislation- turned out to be more superficial quantitative measures. However, the findings did parallel (with much less detail) the results of the other two indicators. Level of activity measurements showed that the opposition was least active in presenting legislation in the 1982-86 Socialist session when opposition influence was reported to be at its lowest point by the other measures. In examining the ability of the parliament to reject and pass legislation, it was clear that most laws passed originated in the executive in all four sessions. However, Congress passed a greater percentage of opposition bills into law in the 1979-82 UCD session and the last PSOE session of 1989-93 than in the other two sessions. In terms of success rates of bills becoming law, the UCD

Government was less successful than the Socialist Governments. The parliament was able to reject a greater percentage of executive bills in the UCD 1979-82 session and in the last Socialist session. Parliament has never been very successful in having its own legislation passed, but it was more successful during the UCD session during than the others. 1 0 7

In short, the Cortes is not a rubber stamp nor a monolithic institution; it is a dynamic and influential body. Its influence has been exercised in many ways - not always in the most obvious manner. Moreover, its level of influence on public policy varied over the four sessions of the new democracy and differed by parliamentary group. CHAPTER IV

PARTY SIZE, PARTY UNITY, AND THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM

The initial power of the Cortes, which was greatly reduced under a strong executive in 1982, was again on the rise throughout the third and fourth sessions (1986-

93). The variation in level of influence of Spain’s parliament raises many questions.

What circumstances and events are responsible for making the Congress strong at some times and weak at others? Was its initial strength or fluctuation in strength due to variables which determine the role of any legislative body? Or was it perhaps due to the newness of Spain’s democracy resulting in the inexperience of the politicians and the lack of a stable role or niche for the Congress? In the previous chapter, 1 measured the level of parliamentary influence on public policy in Spain from 1979-1993 using indicators that can be applied to any legislature, regardless of the standing of its democracy. Since these indicators are frequently used in determining level of legislative influence, we could now compare the role of the Spanish parliament to the role of other legislatures and attempt to give some rank order as to the strength of the world’s legislatures. We can also compare the factors responsible for tlie level of parliamentary influence on public policy.

Yet it is likely that the circumstances that affect parliamentary strength in a new democratic regime might differ greatly from those surrounding the legislature of an older democracy.

108 109

Ali possible determinants of parliamentary influence must be considered in the case of a new parliament including both commonly examined variables and those that might be prominent characteristics of a regime in the process of transition and consolidation. Olsen and Mezey have laid out a rather inclusive list of factors and circumstances that affect the "policy participation" of legislatures (Olsen & Mezey 1991,

Chapter 1). Some of these factors may vary from country to country but are less likely to change over time within one country, for example, whether the regime is presidential or parliamentary. Some of the determinants they set forth have not varied over the 1979-

93 period in Spain. Spain’s new democracy is a parliamentary system, with a centralized, closed executive, and a party-centered electoral law. All three of these features are likely to limit the policy participation of the Spanish parliament in comparison with the legislature of a presidential system with an open, decentralized executive and a candidate-centered electoral system.

Other factors presented by these and other authors may vary over time within any given country, such as, the nature of the party system, number of executive party seats in parliament, the internal nature of the parties, and the strength of the committee system.

In this chapter, I consider the impact of these aspects -which I refer to as standard factors-

on parliamentary influence in Spain. It is expected that public policy making influence in a parliament will be higher when; 1) the party of the executive does not hold a majority of parliamentary seats, 2) party unity and voting discipline are low within the executive party, 3) the committee system is specialized and independent. While I find that the size of executive party representation in the parliament and the degree of unity 110 of the executive party are of great importance in having shaped the fluctuation in policy­ making influence in the Cortes, the nature of the committee system does not play out as would be expected in existing literature. After considering the weight and interaction of these standard factors, in the following chapter I will turn to contextual factors surrounding the Cortes in the early years of the new Spanish democracy.

Size of Executive Majority or Minority in the Parliament

Perhaps the most well-known factor affecting the influence of parliamentary parties is the size of the government backing in the parliament. Opposition parliamentary groups will have less ability to influence legislation under a one-party government that controls a large majority. This will especially be the case if the government party enjoys strict party discipline and can count on the supportive votes of the members of its parliamentary group. We would expect then that the parliament will be able to exercise greater influence over public policy during the times that the executive does not hold a majority of the parliamentary seats.

An analysis of my interview data shows that this hypothesis holds for all sessions in question. The parliament was most influential in the first session (1979-82) and the fourth session (1989-93) in affecting public policy. In both cases the executive party held only a minority in parliament. This was particularly true in the first post-constituent session of 1979-82, when the Centrist UCD (Unidn del Centro Democrdtico) Government had a Congressional backing of only 168 deputies, eight less than necessary for a majority in the House of 350 seats (See Table 1). The UCD parliamentary group had to bargain I l l constantly with opposition groups in order to gain the support required to pass the executive’s initiative into law. All opposition groups were included in negotiations during this legislative session, although depending on the type of legislation certain groups were more desirable allies for the executive.

The Centrist Government (UCD) of 1979-82 needed the support of at least one of the opposition groups to pass even most ordinary legislation which requires only a simple majority vote in Spain. The Government’s choice of opposition group for negotiation tended to vary according to the topic and importance of the legislation. An absolute majority is necessary for passage of Organic Laws, which are fundamental laws, thereby ensuring consensus among parliamentary groups on basic legislation under a minority government.' In these cases, the UCD most often consulted with the Basque or Catalan Nationalists groups with 7 and 8 deputies respectively, or the Socialists (121 deputies), who were often closest to the Centrists’ position ideologically. A Cataldn

Deputy recalled:

"The UCD legislature was very rewarding in terms of reaching agreements. Since the UCD governed with a minority, it negotiated everything and our vote was often very decisive because without it the Government might not have succeeded in the House. We were negotiating constantly. Remember that in 1980, we [the Catalan Nationalists] were also governing with a relative minority in Cataluna, which forced us to constantly reach a consensus with the UCD - in order for us to govern there and for the UCD to govern here [at the national level]. Many important institutional laws were successful thanks to our support" (Interview #38).

‘ The Standing Orders of Congress, Section 131.2. 112

When the UCD negotiated with the Socialists, the Communist Party (the PCE with 23 seats) was often included. Least consulted was the conservative Popular Alliance (AP -

Alianza Popular). In spite of the fact that the AP had enough deputies to help the UCD form a majority, it was often a less popular choice by certain sectors of the UCD due to its ties to the former Franquist dictatorship. For most of the fundamental legislation of this period, the UCD negotiated with the Socialist PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero

Espanol) which was the largest opposition group. Such a broad consensus appeared to be a safeguard against the instability created by possible revocation and revision of fundamental legislation in the event that the largest opposition group would be elected to the Government in future elections. For those votes that called for a qualified majority, the Socialists were obviously the preferred ally.^

In the two subsequent sessions (1982-86 & 1986-89), the Socialist executive held a majority and in the last session (1989-93) it held a near majority, thus giving us the chance to further test the hypothesis that the parliament holds less influence vis-a-vis the executive when the executive has majority backing in the parliament. The hypothesis holds for the next three sessions with the parliament having very little independent influence in the first of these sessions and gradually gaining the ability to affect legislation throughout die next two sessions. When the Socialists came into power in the second session of 1982-86 with an overwhelming majority, the parliament was virtually ineffective in changing bills once they were presented to the legislature. During this session, the executive was widely referred to by the opposition as the "steamroller"

■ Appointments, such as to the Supreme Court, call for a qualified majority. 113

Government. Although at times Socialist ministers consulted with opposition leaders in

drafting executive bill, bills introduced by the opposition parties were seldom considered,

much less passed into law. Moreover, members of the executive reported that the opposition did not affect the agenda and the opposition’s ability to modify legislation through amendments and negotiations nosedived to its lowest point in the four sessions.

The opposition maintained that the executive’s majority not only impeded their

ability to affect legislation, but also drastically reduced their capacity for legislative oversight of the executive throughout the 1982-93 period. This was the case because the principle of the majority is pervasive throughout the Spanish parliamentary structure, such as in committee membership, and majority approval is needed for most opposition

oversight initiatives. As one key member of the largest opposition party stated:

"It seems fine to me that the Government imposes a law according to its policy. But I think it is bad for a Government to maintain a posture in which it is daily obstructing investigative committees and the work of overseeing the executive...It’s as though parliamentary oversight is impossible just because the executive is opposed to that oversight" (Interview #23).

These limitations on oversight were largely due to the nature of parliamentary formal rules which enforced executive strength (see Chapter V).

In the Spanish Cortes, parliamentary influence has been most evident through the

modification of executive bills throughout the time period in question. However, under the overwhelming Socialist majority of the 1982-86 legislative session, even the ability to modify executive bills was practically non-existent. Amongst a sea of complaints ft-om opposition parties that they were ignored by the Government, one opposition member justified the position of the majority: 114

1 think that if they |the executive] have sufficient votes, it is normal that they endeavor to govern not by reaching agreements, but with their strength. And it is normal that die opposition parties attempt to portray a situation of exaggerated majorities. It is normal daily practice of a healthy system where there is a tendency of Governments to distance themselves as much as possible from the Parliament. I don’t think it is a dynamic that differs much from what is happening in other European parliaments" (Interview #25).

Although the Socialists were clearly able to enjoy the power that accompanied their majority status, one former Socialist minister contended that the executive was more than willing to negotiate modifications to their bills with the major opposition party in the

1982-86 legislative session, but that this party, the Popular Alliance, was not open to negotiations:

"There was always the possibility of reaching agreements with the Popular Party whenever they wanted to. But as I said before, they were interested in developing basic strategy of opposition more than of agreement. At that time, they were interested in defining veiy clearly their position but it was very difficult to reach agreements" (Interview #20).

This former minister maintained that there were times that he called meetings with

Popular Alliance leaders only to have the Conservatives decide not to take part in

negotiations. He also reported that a Popular Alliance leader once told him that his party

would not be able to support an important law, in spite of the fact that the content of the

law was acceptable, because the party had to remain attractive to a sector of the electorate

that did not want the party to compromise itself by reaching agreements.

Throughout the three Socialist sessions, the executive seldom reached agreements

with the Popular Alliance/Party, although they negotiated major legislation more often

in the last of the three sessions (1989-93) when the Socialist majority fell to exactly one-

half of parliamentary seats. A Socialist deputy maintained that the executive was indeed 115 more willing to compromise on their legislation in order to gain opposition support in the

(1989-93) legislative session. However, he denied that the lack of a majority was the sole reason for the executive’s increased interest in negotiating:

"The truth is that there exists a much greater flexibility than in the first [Socialist] session and a strong collaboration among the majority on executive bills. The parliament really functions as though there were an absolute majority [since the 4 representatives of the extremist Kerri Batasuna do not attend the sessions ] I believe that it is a result of already having established substantial legislative lines and now the logical thing is to reach the closest agreement possible. There is a kind of important sensitivity to try to reach maximum consensus in all legislative work. It is an objective of the Government now, whereas in 1982, it seemed that the fundamental objective was to assume the hegemony awarded by such an overwhelming majority" (Interview #17).

The view of the opposition parties tended to be, however, that the Socialists’ increased willingness to negotiate was indeed due to the drop in their numerical backing in parliament. In spite of the fact that in the last session (1989-93) the Socialist government was often able to function as though it held a majority in the Congress, there is evidence that it was increasingly amenable to negotiating with certain opposition parties because of the high possibility that it might govern with a minority in the next session.^ Both the

Basque and Catalan Nationalist parties (both possible future partners) gained increasing ability to modify executive legislation substantially with the executive’s consent in the last session.

Although the hypothesis holds that parliament will be more influential when the executive does not hold a strong majority in parliament, according to my respondents it

^ Indeed, in 1993, the Socialist began their fourth term in power with only 159 of 350 deputies in the Congress. 116 appears that other factors may have been at work in determining the degree to which the parliament was able to affect public policy.

Party Unity

Highly unified parties tend to operate as hierarchies with strong party leadership and backbenchers who adhere to the party line. This is the dominant model among

Western European legislatures, those that Mezey dubs ‘reactive’ legislatures which enjoy modest policy-making power and high support. In such legislatures the "legislators...are shaping their behavior to meet the expectations of party elites rather than the expectations of mass publics" (Mezey, p. 40). In these cases, the decision makers are not always to be found in parliament, but are likely to be extra-parliamentary party executives and governmental ministers - whether or not they serve in parliament. Strongly unified parties maintain their cohesion through the loyalties of their backbenchers, not Just through sanctions imposed for deviant voting or for absenteeism. Both party leaders and parliamentary members share a common loyalty to the party and belief in the party program (Andeweg 1992, p. 169; Griffith 1974, p. 41). Maverick legislators are weeded out in favor of those who tow the party line. Such strong party loyalty greatly benefits a party in government and leads to a situation in which all parliamentarians act not as individuals but as members of party groups. Parliament then becomes an arena for the acting out of party relations, a fact which compels us to look at the parliament in terms of party groups and not as a body which operates vis-a-vis the executive (King p. 216). 117

Executive Party Seats in Parliament

Executive Majority Minority Intraparty Relations

Unity Executive can act alone Executive needs support of opposition groups

Disunity Executive must bargain Executive must bargain with its own group &/or with BOTH its own group with opposition groups and with opposition groups

FIGURE 1

INTERACTION OF PARTY UNITY AND

NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE PARTY PARLIAMENTARY SEATS

The explanation provided above by the majority/minority factor holds only if party unity and party discipline of the executive’s parliamentary group remain strong.

However, as evidenced by its collapse in 1982, the Centrist UCD parliamentary group of 1979-82 suffered from factionalization and low party unity. What role do intraparty relations play in the level of public policy-making influence wielded by parliaments and to what degree does degree of party unity covaiy with government backing in the legislature? A simple matrix can help demonstrate the outcomes of variations in these two characteristics (Figure 1). Holding all other circumstances equal, parliament’s independent power vis-a-vis the executive will be most limited when the executive enjoys a unified majority backing in the parliament (upper left cell). In such cases, the executive 118 can act independently of opposition parliamentary groups and its own parliamentary group serves as a transmission belt to propel influence to the executive. An executive which possesses unified parliamentary group support but holds only a minority must obtain the support of one or more opposition groups to pass legislation (upper right cell). This be can be done by governing in coalition, by governing alone with a parliamentary pact in which one or more opposition groups agree to vote with the government, or by negotiating each and every vote. In any of these situations, the executive is weakened and parliament’s potential to influence policy is enhanced, at least for certain opposition groups. An executive which holds a non-unified majority (lower left cell) will have to bargain within its own group for votes and/or with opposition groups. And last, the executive party which holds only minority backing and cannot count on its support will have to bargain with both its own parliamentary groupand one or more opposition groups. This position is the one of greatest stress on the government lending the greatest potential for parliamentary influence on public policy for both the opposition and executive’s parliamentary groups.

The Unidn del Centro Democrdtico did not fit the model of a highly unified party and it possessed only a minority of seats in the parliament. The result was that the executive had to bargain constantly for votes both within its own parliamentary group and with opposition groups as in the lower right-hand cell. Intraparty conflict in the UCD was rooted in the nature of its origin. It was constituted shortly before the 1977 elections to the constituent legislature by bringing together several small center-right to center-left parties under the leadership of the current Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez, who was 1 1 9

associated with none of these groups. Its ideological heterogeneity was represented by

Christian democrats, liberals, and social democrats, and was confounded by the fact that

many groupings were headed by politicians with their own personal interests (Gunther

unpublished). This was true not only among the parliamentary representation but also

within the Government. Therefore, in lieu of speaking of relations between the executive

and its parliamentary group, we must consider the many contacts that were carried out

between individual ministers and their own supporters in parliament. In addition,

negotiations for votes with opposition groups -which were necessary for passage of bills-

were complicated by the existence of factions within the UCD parliamentary group.

Those Centrists with social democratic leanings were more receptive to negotiating with

parties of the left (the Socialist party held 121 seats), while factions of the right were

more amenable to making concessions to the Alianza Popular on the right (only 7

deputies but enough to form a majority). Therefore, whereas the three Socialist

Governments from 1982-93 enjoyed the strict voting discipline of their party in the

Congress, in the first legislative session of 1979-82 the Government and the Centrist

Group leaders had to bargain constantly within their own ranks just as it negotiated with opposition parties.

A further obstacle for passage of Governmental bills was that relations were not

always smooth between Prime Minister Sudrez and his government on one hand and the parliamentary spokesperson on the other. In fact, the parliamentary group spokesperson

elected in 1980 was chosen by the group in opposition to the candidate presented by the

executive. In spite of the group’s support for the Government in a 1980 vote of 120 confidence, this group spokesperson, Miguel Rodriguez Herrero de Mindn, publically published a list of demands and conditions to be met by the Government. Toward the end of this legislative session, factions began to split off from the parliamentary group.

Both intraparty and interparty negotiations then became absolutely essential for the passage of Government bills.

In spite of these major difficulties in obtaining party unity, respondents reported that there existed only 3 bills of major contention: the divorce law, a somewhat liberal law which was utilized by a social democratic UCD minister as a vehicle into the

Socialist party; the LAU (Law of University Autonomy) which, after having passed through most of the legislative process under three different ministers, was withdrawn by the Government right before its presentation for final passage; and the Ley de Centres

Docentes (Law of Educational Centers), dealing with educational institutions. Almost all respondents reported that difficulties were due more to UCD factional squabbles than to the subject matter of the bills. As one former minister reported:

"I believe that these differences, and this is the point, were not irreparable differences in themselves, but rather that they became irreparable insofar as they served as a cover for preexisting personal attitudes that inclined one to reach agreements or not to reach agreements" (Interview #31).

Likewise another former minister and former party Secretaiy General stated:

"The Divorce law and the Ley de Centros Docentes were the focus of internal UCD conflict rather than the actual cause of that conflict" (Interview #5).

Thus, Gunther’s contention that the ultimate demise of the UCD was caused by personalistic ambitions rather than ideological disagreements is supported by the data I 121

have gathered (Gunther unpublished). These ambitions resulted in party conflict which

led to a more powerful role played by parliamentaiy groups in affecting public policy.

In contrast, throughout the next three sessions the highly unified Socialist party

held a majority or near-majority in parliament, thus giving the executive the ability to act

independently of the parliament as shown in the upper right-hand block of Figure 1. The

party enjoyed a century-long history and was by nature more cohesive. In spite of some

bitter initial internal battles over the ideological bent of the party (such as whether to

define the party as ‘Marxist’) and some later internal challenges, the parliamentary group acted as a cohesive body throughout the four legislative sessions in question. Throughout the first session (1979-82) when the Socialists served as the largest opposition party, this unity helped to distinguish it as the only true alternative to Government in subsequent elections. One deputy, who had served in the Socialist party in all five sessions

(including the constituent legislature), reflected on the party in opposition:

"1 believe that they did excellent parliamentary work while at the same time, logically, the party was consolidating itself as a political force, as a political alternative...because the UCD by that time no longer represented a viable option" (Interview #32).

When the PSOE took power in 1982, the Government enjoyed the strict voting discipline of a highly unified parliamentary group. The government’s strength, argues Gillespie, was fortified by already having overcome the worst of the Socialist internal battles:

"Since the PSOE leadership was dominated by parliamentarians who had defeated critical currents of opinion well before assuming office, the stage was set for a period of party subordination to the first government in the country’s history to be formed overwhelmingly by members of the Socialist Party. The PSOE became virtually a rubber stamp for government policy" (Gillespie 1989, p. 420). 122

However, as noted by Share, the maintenance of this high degree of unity was indeed a wonder considering that the PSOE Government reversed its policy on NATO membership and imposed some economic measures that alienated the Socialist trade union and their working class supporters. The Government managed to win over its most loyal members (which were well in the majority) as it opted not to repeat the economic misfortunes of the French Socialists and began to see NATO membership as a vital link to membership in Western Europe. Major internal opposition was posed by the left wing of the party, the Socialist Left (IS), and the socialist trade union, the UGT (Union

General de Trabajadores). However, in the end neither group campaigned openly against the referendum held in 1986 concerning NATO membership nor did their critical stances

affect parliamentary group discipline. Throughout the 1982-86 and 1986-89 sessions, the

few parliamentary deputies that spoke out openly against Socialist policies (including the

UGT leader, Nicolas Redondo and IS leader, Pablo Castellano) either chose to leave the

parliament or were excluded from subsequent party electoral lists (Share, p. 127 & 128).

Strict organization and party cohesion were of utmost priority to party leaders.

Maravall reports;

"Unity and party discipline became the main organizational interests. Internal battles were considered to be negative for democratic consolidation and incompatible with governmental aspirations" (Maravall 1994, p. 16)."

My translation. 123

That this conviction was made a reality is attributable to four main factors according to scholars of the Socialist party. First, the national electoral law -a modified proportional representation system with closed party list dubbed the d’Hondt method- allowed the party apparatus complete control in choosing parliamentary candidates. Secondly, the internal party electoral rules were winner-take-all, permitting mainstream party candidates to defeat UGT and IS members critical of the party line.^ Thirdly, the party’s Federal

Executive Committee possessed sweeping powers and resisted turnover in membership.®

Fourth, and of great importance, was the popularity of the party leader and president

Felipe Gonzalez and the unwillingness of party congress delegates to go against him

(Maravall, p. 18; Share, p. 125-134). In parliament, these cohesional advantages were bolstered by party fines for missing sessions, "a move designed to prevent absenteeism from turning into a form of silent protest against the government" (Share, p. 125).

In the years after the Socialists took office there were member complaints of a lack of internal democracy in the PSOE, yet the party continued to enjoy the loyalty of backbenchers. In terms of voting discipline, the Socialist deputies always voted the party line. Although strict party fines inhibited absenteeism or deviant votes, the major determinant of high parliamentary group cohesion was the allegiance of the backbenchers.

® At the Thirtieth Congress of the PSOE in December 1984 this internal electoral law was changed to one of proportional representation to appease the Socialist Left. However, this did not apply to the top party decision-making board, the Federal Executive Committee (Share, p. 126).

® Maravall reports that whereas only 42% of the Executive Committee was reelected in 1979, 76% were reelected in the 1981 and 1984 Party Congresses, 81% in 1988, and only one member (who did stand for reelection) was not reelected in 1990 (Maravall, p. 21). 124

While many respondents from the opposition parties expressed views that the Socialist

backbenchers acted as pawns of the Government, the Socialist backbenchers did not

perceive a lack of influence on their part and viewed their support of the executive’s

positions as a natural manifestation of a unified party. One Socialist deputy defended

their voting discipline as all issues were discussed weekly in parliamentary group

meetings, albeit after the legislation had reached its final form for presentation in

Congress:

"The Deputies are in their seats and some are up on the debate and others are not, like in all parliaments. Then at the moment of the vote, there is a party leader in each of the groups that gives one of 3 signals: a three [holds up three fingers] that means to vote NO. One finger means to vote YES. And two fingers means that the group is abstaining. So there exists an image that the Deputies act under orders given by a signal...as though we had no personality. But what people don’t know is that the entire daily agenda is previously analyzed in the Tuesday morning [parliamentary group] sessions, and that we never enter a plenary session without knowing the position of the parliamentary group, and without having previously arrived at a consensus in the group. We vote according to the signal in order to avoid asking what we are voting on right then" (Interview #17).

Thus, whereas the UCD strayed far from the unified party model discussed above, the

PSOE proved itself to be very close to this prototype. In addition, although the UCD had many ‘leaders’ within the parliamentary group, the Socialists’ major decision makers were reported by the respondents to be outside of the parliament in the party’s executive as

Mezey contends is often the case with parties in parliamentary systems.

If the parliamentarians fit well into the model, i.e. if they are backbenchers who adhere to the party line within a hierarchical party, they will feel loyalty to the party elite and will act according to elite wishes rather than exert individual influence. Through the 1 2 5 interviews, 1 learned that more UCD deputies felt greater independence vis-a-vis their party than Socialist deputies did. When asked if they represented more their party or their own constituents, only one (who happened to be a parliamentary group leader) responded that his/her loyalty was "regrettably" with the party. The rest of the UCD deputies from

1979-1982 responded that their loyalty was with their own constituents or that their loyalties to both the party and their electorate sometimes clashed and created a problem for them. Socialist deputies, on the other hand, almost invariably answered that it was impossible to distinguish between the loyalty toward the party and the electorate since voting lists are closed party lists. In fact, it was evident that a few respondents had left parliamentary life because of the lack of independence they could exert vis-a-vis the party.’

As expected then, party unity appears to covary strongly with the majority/minority factor. The parliament exercised its greatest influence on public policy in the first session of 1979-82 when the Government held only a minority backing in the

Congress and party unity was extremely low. Likewise, parliamentary effect on public policy was lower in the subsequent three legislative sessions when the party in

Government, the Socialists, maintained strict party discipline. However, this two-variable interpretation would prove true only if all other variables remained equal. As Spain was in a state of flux throughout most of the period in question, an examination of other factors that may have affected the variations in parliamentary influence is still necessary.

’ Some of these deputies switched from the UCD to the PSOE in 1982 but later dropped out for this reason. Others simply left parliamentary life after the 1982 collapse of the UCD. 126

Specialization and Influence of the Committee System

Powerful committees with the ability to substantially alter or even block legislation can contribute to the overall policy-making influence of the legislature. All other things being equal, I would expect that committees were powerful during the first (1979-82) legislative session and the last (1989-93) session when opposition groups were able to modily legislation substantially. Committees with the ability to substantially amend legislation have been found to be permanent, specialized committees (Loewenberg &

Patterson 1979, p. 125; Mezey 1979a, p. 43; Strom 1990, p. 43). Committees tend to be more specialized when they possess narrow, specialized jurisdictions, low turnover and high expertise among members, and ample stalf and resources. Over the time period in question in Spain, however, most of these characteristics were not present. Although the committee system was designed with permanent committees with fixed jurisdictions,* they were still young and were subject to inexperienced membership and high turnover.

Staff and resources were seen as a luxury and were quite limited compared to the standards of some countries. Nevertheless, committees and subcommittees were rather powerful in the first session of 1979-82. The following analysis will show that their markup ability was due to other circumstances, namely, disunity in the executive party.

* The Standing Orders of the Congress set up 11 legislative standing committees: "i) Constitutional, ii) Foreign Affairs, iii) Justice and Home Affairs, iv) Defense, v) Education and Culture, vi) Economy, Commerce and Finance, vii) Budget, viii) Agriculture, Stockbreeding and Fisheries, ix) Industry, Public Works and Services, x) Social and Employment Policy, xi) Public Administration’s Status; 3 non legislative standing committees: i) Rules, ii) Members’ Status, iii) Petitions; and ad hoc committees "for a specific task." (Chapter III: Division 2, Sections 46-50 & Division 3, Sections 51- 53). 1 2 7 the existence of a mirority government in a parliament where parties were mirrored proportionately in committees, and the desirability of consensus among elites in order to stabilize democracy. Conversely, Spanish parliamentary committees weakened as consensus declined, a unified majority government took power, and the informal norm of negotiating outside of parliamentary committees developed.

Respondents reported that while committees were never the central decision­ making arena in the Congress, they had much more markup ability in the 1979-82 UCD session than after the Socialists took power. This is particularly surprising considering that new regulations adopted in 1982 allowed for committees to have full jurisdiction and final say over certain legislation (Subirats 1986, p. 331.) Many reasons were presented by the respondents for the decline. One deputy who had served both in the UCD and the

Popular Coalition said that deputies increasingly wanted to defend important political amendments in the public eye of the plenaiy sessions rather than in less visible committees:’

"Committees have definitely lost more and more importance...the subcommittees as well. Because, as the Parliament has lost interest for public opinion, parliamentarians have ensured that all major arguments are made in the plenary session, where there is something to be gained. I believe that the importance of committees has declined" (Interview #9).

When asked if committees had the power to substantially amend bills, another deputy who had served in all four sessions responded:

"Yes, in theory. The truth is that the subcommittee is a phase that used to be important. And the committee too. Now parliamentary life is a

’ The Popular Coalition was made up of the Popular Alliance and other center right parties. 128

terrible, terrible bore. I think that no parliament in the world is at its best right now, but Spain is at the worst moment of all. It’s terrible. The subcommittee is not worth anything and debates in both committee and plenaiy sessions are nothing but a series of superimposed monologues" (Interview #14).

The committees’ ability to affect legislation in the first 1979-82 session corresponded with

greater initial influence of the parliament in general on public policy, and the decline in

committee strength beginning in 1982 corresponded with a weaker parliament. But ! have

found that the parliament -or at least of some of its parties- were increasingly able to

affect public policy in the last 1989-93 session. This was not paralleled by an increase

in committee strength.

Why is the variation in parliamentary influence on public policy not fully

explained by variation in committee strength? A closer look at why committees were stronger in the first legislative session than in the subsequent sessions provides some answers. Committees are expected to have more ability to amend legislation when their jurisdictions are narrow and specialized, members possess expertise in the area, membership turnover is low, and staff and other resources are readily available. Yet my analysis reveals that committees were strong in the first legislative session due to factors other than these. First, committees in 1979-82 benefitted from certain circumstances surrounding the parliament and the transition. Their power turned out to be less due to expertise of the committee members and more attributable to the lack of majority backing of the government, the lack of government party unity, and above all, the consensual nature of the transition. Second, as the norm of informal negotiations developed in the

Congress, major decisions were removed from the committee process until they were 129

made almost exclusively in private negotiations between party and parliamentary group

leaders. 1 will now examine the effect of each of these factors on the committee system.

As specialized committees are seen to be strong committees, one possibility might

be that there was high expertise in the 1979-82 session and that this was possibly wiped

out by an influx of new legislators in 1982. However, this was not the case. The vast

majority of committee members tended not to be experts during any of the sessions in

question and if anything, expertise increased over time. Responding to a series of

questions designed to measure degree of specialization, respondents agreed that in spite

of an overall lack of expertise there was an attempt to place people on committees of

which they had some understanding of the subject matter. Respondents asserted that on

any given committee only about 2 to 5 members were experts. “* These tended to include

the committee chair and the party spokespersons on the committees, thus creating a

hierarchical structure of elite expertise. Yet most respondents reported that expertise was

on the rise in the latest two sessions, due to increasing committee service.

Turnover in committee membership was high in the Congress, thus impeding

further development of expertise" (Capo Giol 1990, pp. 118-123). Some of this

turnover was actually due to the fact that deputies desired membership on committees in

At about 50 members per committee, this results in approximately 4 to 10%.

" My data do not include the fourth session (1989-93). Capo Giol found that in the first session 68% of members remained in their committees throughout the legislature, in the second session (1982-86) 53%, and in the third session (1986-89) 52%. Between legislatures, continuity was very low. In the second legislature (1982-86), for example, between 54% and 73% of the committee members were new. Moran found that 24% of overall membership was new in this legislature (Moran 1989, p. 79) 130 which they have expertise and pursued their requests to serve on the committees that represent their occupational backgrounds, namely as educators and lawyers. Therefore, three committees were reported to have a higher proportion of expert membership, as well as more requests than members: the Justice and Interior Committee, the Education

& Culture Committee and the Committee on Social and Employment Policy. On the other hand, the Defense Committee was cited as one of the least desirable committees because few Spanish parliamentarians are knowledgeable in defense matters. Only a few experts served on the committee; the rest of the members tended to be fulfilling a party quota. Expertise could be more easily developed by those members that served on few committees but this depended on party size. During the three Socialist legislative sessions, most Socialist deputies served on only one committee. Members of the largest opposition party, the Partido Popular, served on 1 to 2 committees. Members of the smaller groups such as the Nationalists, Centrist CDS, and the Communist group lU-IC, however, were obligated to participate in many committees in order to have their parliamentary group represented on all committees. Therefore, they had to possess a general knowledge of many subjects.

There appeared to be more than one reason for the lack of expertise and the high membership turnover on the committees. One Socialist deputy pointed to the newness of the democracy and the resulting inexperience of the politicians:

"In reality, it is a result of the lack of consolidation - a consequence of a short time period. Generally, we see specialization in other legislatures such as the U.S. Senate, but here we have very little parliamentary experience. Yet lately, we have more and more experts - especially the spokespersons" (Interview #33). 131

In spite of the fact that deputies were able to develop some knowledge in their committee area, the development of real expertise was also impeded by a lack of staff and resources.

Throughout the first four legislative sessions, members did not have individual offices in

Madrid, unless they were committee or parliamentary group spokespersons, and thereby lacked access to phones, fax machines, computers, etc.'' Deputies had to rely on parliamentary group staff (one staff member available for every 1-3 committees) instead of personal staff. Many deputies related that they depended upon staff available in other government offices, for example in regional government offices or mayoral offices. One committee spokesperson from an opposition party even reported paying an administrative assistant out of her/his parliamentary salary. In terms of drafting bills, deputies with a law background could use their own expertise, although parliamentary group staff was available to draft bills. In sum, variations in committee strength cannot be attributed to level of expertise, rate of turnover or the availability of resources.

Both party unity and size of executive support appeared to be powerful covariants with committee strength. Membership on committees is proportional to overall seats in the house; therefore a majority party with strong voting discipline, such as the Socialist party from 1982-93, was represented throughout the committee structure. High party discipline will obviously diminish the strength of independent committee members.

During the 1979-82 UCD session, factionalization in the UCD gave rise to negotiations between blocs of the UCD and opposition parties, while other UCD committee members

" Deputy offices were being built during the 1989-93 Legislature and were projected for completion before the upcoming legislature. 132 disagreed. A former UCD member of the social democratic sector gave the example of a pact being formed over a particular clause in the Law on University Autonomy:

"The committees had power because of the ideological battles [among] the different groups [of the UCD]. For example, the concession of the university as a public service. So that it would be successful in the committee, the Socialdemocrats [of the UCD] reached an agreement with the Socialist Party. It was successful because there were negotiations between 2 groups that were not from the same party" (Interview #10).

In contrast, decision making in the committees under the PSOE sessions (1982-93) was reported to be majoritarian, with the Socialists taking advantage of both their majority backing and their strong party unity.

A norm of informal private negotiations developed in the Congress which drained the decision making power from the committees. This trend began even in the earliest

UCD legislative sessions with major Constitutional decisions being made through elite negotiations behind closed doors (Gunther 1992). Respondents from the Socialist era reported that this practice continued as the Socialist majority declined. Negotiations often took place between committee spokespersons and parliamentary group leaders before the committee meetings. This allowed the Government to negotiate concessions for votes with the smaller Nationalist parties, instead of conceding to the major opposition party, the Popular Party, whose policies tended to differ radically from those of the PSOE.

Subcommittees were reportedly more powerful during the UCD era than in later sessions as it was a center for negotiations and the acceptance of amendments. These sessions were closed to the press and the closed-door policy helped make it safe for bargaining and concessions. However, the opposite was true for the PSOE period.

Groups whose proposed amendments were bound to be defeated in subcommittee -or any 133

other phase for that matter- saved their amendments for presentation in committee or in

the plenary session in hope of gaining some press coverage. In this way, even though

the will of the majority prevailed, the opposition could receive some leverage through

publicity. The regionalist PNV and CiU seemed less concerned that they gain direct

credit for their amendments and more concerned in actually altering the legislation.

Thus, both groups tended to take advantage of informal negotiations with the Socialist

leaders in which transactional amendments were agreed upon and later proposed by the

Socialists. All opposition groups attempted to maximize their impact on policy in

whatever way proved most effective to tliem.

Respondents reported over and over the strength of the committees, as well as of the Congress in general, was due to a willingness to reach consensus or to negotiate in the very early stages of the democracy under the UCD government. As their strength was not due to the commonly considered determinants high expertise, low turnover, or ample resources, I will investigate further in the next chapter the effect of the nature of the transition on both the committee system and the parliament in general.

Summary

The influence of the Spanish parliament on public policy has proven to be greatly determined by two of the factors considered here: whether or not the executive party enjoys a majority in the parliament and the degree of party unity, particularly of the governing party. These two factors appear to interact strongly. The third factor considered here, strength of the committee system, has not easily explained the influence 134 of the parliament, at least not in the manner that might be expected. Committees were strong in the first session when parliamentary influence on policy was high, yet the recent increase in parliamentary influence was not accompanied by a rise in committee strength.

In addition, the early strength of tlie committees was not due to common determinants such as expertise of members. Degree of committee strength appears to have been very dependent on the nature of decision making during the transition and by the development of the norm of informal negotiations outside of the committee system.

These circumstances have partially explained the variation in parliamentary influence on public policy from 1979-93. In the following chapter, 1 will consider circumstances specific to Spain that may complete the picture. CHAPTER V

LEGISLATING IN A NEW DEMOCRACY:

HOW THE CHANGE AFFECTS THE PARLIAMENT

The variation in public policy influence of the newly democratic Spanish parliament has been affected by certain standard variables that are generally important to legislative power in any democracy. The size of majority backing of the government in parliament, degree of party unity, and to a lesser degree, committee strength are interactive variables that influenced the public policy-making impact of the Spanish parliament from 1979-82. However, they do not appear to explain fully the power of the

legislature of 1979-82, its decline in 1982-86, nor the increase in parliamentary power in the last two Socialist legislatures. Particularly, it is not clear why the Centrist

government of the earliest legislature consistently sought consensus among all major and

minor party groups. The UCD at 168 seats could have bargained, for example, with only

the small conservative Popular Alliance with its 8 seats, thereby passing its legislation

with a bare majority (176 of 350) and feasibly compromising their policy to a lesser

degree. Instead, the Centrists regularly negotiated with the largest opposition party, the

Socialists, making major policy concessions to that group as well as others, passing most

major legislation - even that of a controversial nature - with near unanimity. Conversely,

135 136

the Socialist party, once in power, was able to pass its bills with the majority backing of

its own party (202 and 184 seats respectively in the two sessions of the 1982-1989 period)

and negotiated usually with only the small regionalist PNV and CiU increasingly

throughout its three legislative sessions as its parliamentary seats fell to exactly half. Yet,

if we consider the situation specific to Spain during the time under question, the

developments in parliamentaiy influence are put in a more focused perspective. These

contextual factors are: the nature of the transition to democracy, the formal rules of the parliament, the federal and supranational characteristics of the regime, and the nature of

legislation.

The Nature of the Democratic Transition and Consolidation

Legislatures in new democracies are found in an environment of rapidly changing political, economic, and social situations that are normally well established in older,

stable democracies. These factors may include the rise of a new inexperienced elite, the formation of a party system, the lack of established norms and rules in the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches, opposition from anti-system actors, a democratically underdeveloped political culture, and the legacy of the country’s political history. The role played by the legislature in public policy is likely to fluctuate as these conditions change, develop, and stabilize. Scholars of institutions in new democracies have recently sensitized their studies to the developing political environment posed by democratization (Liebert 1990, p.250). While certain characteristics are shared among new democracies - drastic regime change, political crisis, and the necessity to legitimize 137

the new democratic system - each country approaches the transition with a different set

of historical legacies and available resources (Pridham 1990, p. 246). Democracies may

succeed authoritarian regimes that are right-wing or left-wing, military or civilian, with

centrally plaiuied or more loosely controlled economies, along with a different range of

attitudes stemming from historical memories. They may take place slowly or abruptly,

either including leaders of the past regime or barring their participation.

Spain had suffered a turbulent political past, complete with longstanding cleavages

between economic classes, center and periphery, and church and state. The previous

democratic experiment of the 1930s erupted in Civil War followed by nearly four decades of Franco’s authoritarian government. In short, there was nothing automatic or inevitable ensuring the peaceful gradual transition which ensued. However, the historical memories of a violent divisive past, coupled with the desire to avoid its reoccurrence, prompted leaders from across the political spectrum to cooperate and compromise in the transition

(Gunther 1992).’

The informal norms and values which developed in the effort to avoid past failures and successfully carry out tlie transition and consolidation affected the relations in parliament and ultimately its impact on public policy. Specifically, consensus among elites from across the political spectrum was key to the peaceful nature and success of the

Spanish transition. Gunther stresses the importance of elite efforts and the inclusion of

' Gunther points out that historical memories could lead to either cooperation or conflict: "Historical memories do not, however, invariably produce moderation in political attitudes and behavior. History can be used in efforts to counsel restraint, but it can also be used to reawaken old hatreds, to rekindle old passions; it can be used to justify either appeals for national reconciliation or calls for revenge" p. 77. 138

all "politically significant" elites stating that "successful democratic consolidation in Spain

was primarily the product of a profound transformation of Spain’s political elites from

disunity into consensual unity" (Gunther 1992, p. 40). Although the inclusion of all

major elites helps to lead to compromise and stability, it is less obvious whether or not

early decisions should be carried out in the parliamentary arena. Indeed, the large size

and public nature of a legislative body may impede compromised Yet, the inclusion of

the parliament as a central arena for "politically significant" elite in the building of basic

regime laws will contribute to that institution’s political importance and enhance its ability

to influence public policy in relation to the executive (at least during that period). In

Spain, much of the Constituent process took place within the parliamentary arena.

Moreover, it was carried out in a consensual manner contributing to the influence of most of the parties represented in parliament, thereby, strengthening parliament’s impact on the foundational laws of the new democratic regime.

This process of consensual decision-making carried over in modified form into the next legislature (1979-82). However, the prestige gained by parliament through its involvement in the constituent process declined when the Socialist majority took power

^ Gunther maintains that in Spain "once the draft of the constitution was passed from the ponencia [subcommittee] to the full Constitutional Committee of the Congress of Deputies, two of these structural and procedural aspects of decision making were abandoned. [These included inclusiveness of key elites, relatively small number of participants, and privacy]. All parliamentaiy groups were represented on the committee, but the large size of that body (36 members) and the highly public nature of its deliberations did not facilitate consensual elite behavior..." When negotiations came to a gridlock in the Parliament, key elites privately negotiated agreements that were later approved by the Parliament (Gunther, forthcoming in Institutions, Elites, and the Consolidation o f Democracy, eds. Bert A. Rockman, Metin Herper and Ali Kazancigil). 139 in 1982, and consensual decision-making rules were virtually eradicated. This shift from consensual to majoritarian decision-making rules siphoned policy influence away from the parliament and into the Government via the Socialist Party (Capo Giol et al., 1990, p.

103; Pridham, p. 237; Liebert, p. 255).

Respondents were asked to describe the nature of decision-making rules in the

1979-82 UCD legislature in which all parliamentary groups were able to affect legislation. The overwhelming response from members of all parties was that consensus prevailed, however to a somewhat lesser degree than in the 1977-79 constituent

legislature. Particularly, certain laws were either difftcult to pass or were never approved

because of disagreements both between parties and among UCD factions. Although one

might be tempted to attribute the constant search for agreement to the minority status of

the Government, that would not explain the Government’s search for near unanimous

votes, when bargaining with only one parliamentary group, such as the Popular Alliance,

would have been sufficient to pass much legislation. In fact, the consensual decision­

making rules applied throughout this legislature were reported to be part and parcel of

the nature of the transition, independent of the size of executive backing in the

Parliament. In the words of one UCD deputy and parliamentary leader:

"It was the spirit of the transition. It was due to the subject matter and the fact that each one of us there ended up being part of the process. The UCD had to be in constant negotiations, consensus, in search of agreements. It was also because Spanish society was very demanding. It was because the press, the media vehemently defended human rights. It was a UCD Government, and political party that made a banner out of freedom. From the first moment, there was a desire to collaborate - if not, we would not have been able to do it. I think that even if the UCD had had an absolute majority, they still would have pursued consensus" (Interview #9). 140

Certain respondents, however, maintained that the era of consensus was extended for too long. By the end of the 1979-82 legislature, agreements were becoming more difficult to reach and certain laws were either rewritten many times or were never passed.

These arguments would correspond with arguments set forth by both Pasquino (in the case of Italy) and Gunther (in the case of Spain) that "open, consensual or proportional styles of decision making may be extremely useful to secure support for a new regime, but that once the new regime has been set in place, more decisive, majoritarian patterns of decision making may be preferable to allow for the resolution of difficult policy problems" (Gunther forthcoming, p. 5; Pasquino 1995). Moreover, I would maintain that not only did the Socialists consider "majority rule" techniques preferable, but that, upon the advent of consolidation, they felt more secure in applying them without risking the destabilization of the regime.

Perhaps these arguments help explain the change in decision-making approaches of the executive when the Socialist Government took power in 1982. It was neither subjected to the purely mathematical need to piece together votes for passage, nor to the demands of the transition process. Spain’s democratic regime has been considered to have been consolidated by about 1982 or 1983 (almost simultaneously with the PSOE’s ascendence) by the time when the instigators of the attempted coup of February 23, 1981 were put on trial (Aguero 1991).’ Regime stability still deserved some consideration as

’ This fits the concept set forth by Higley and Gunther that a "consolidated democracy is a regime that meets all the procedural criteria of democracy and also in which all politically significant groups accept established political institutions and adhere to democratic rules of the game" (Higley and Gunther, 1992, p. 3). 1 4 1 consolidation was not yet seen to be complete in Euskadi (the Basque region) and because consolidated democratic regimes can continue to be strengthened (Gunther 1992).

However, the Socialist Government was generally in a position to unilaterally implement its platform. Although a Socialist minister claimed to have consulted frequently with the

Catalan CiU and Basque PNV in drafting bills even in 1982-86, a Catalan deputy maintained:

"In the first Socialist legislature, we in the opposition didn’t do anything. The Socialists had 202 or 204 deputies. Everything went right through - boom, boom, boom, boom. The opposition didn’t do anything in that legislature" (Interview #16).

In the third (1986-89) and fourth (1989-92) legislatures, the Socialists gradually backed down from pure majoritarian decision-making rules. The instances in which the

Government negotiated appeared to vary by subject matter and to include the two major nationalist parties more than other parliamentary groups. However, there is a general feeling among the respondents that a change in the Socialist Government’s attitude toward more open negotiations coincided with a decline in social support reflected by the nationwide strike of December 14, 1988. In sum, the consensual spirit surrounding the transition contributed to the role of parliament in policy making in 1979-82. However, even after the consolidation of the democracy, there are still times in which negotiations and agreements were seen as desirable by both the Government and the opposition. The following contextual factors surrounding the Cortes will help elucidate these occasions. 142

Formai Parliamentary Rules

With a minority Government in power, formal rules established by the

Constitution and parliamentary Standing Orders concerning the parliament of the new

Spanish democracy were designed to protect the executive. The investiture vote and questions of confidence, both measures of support for the Government, require only a simple majority. On the other hand, a motion o f censure against the government requires an absolute majority and must be constructive (requires a proposed replacement for the

Prime Minister). The drafters of the provisional Standing Orders of Congress of 1979 designed them to strengthen the executive for two reasons. First, they believed that minority governments would prevail in the ftiture. Second, they possessed the historical memory of the ftagmented and ideologically polarized parliament of the failed democracy of the 1930s and hoped to ensure a stable government. The current Standing Orders approved in February, 1982 did not challenged these notions. Whereas these rules helped to balance parliamentary-executive relations under the minority UCD Government of

1979-82, the 1982 nosedive in parliament’s importance was largely due to their application with an absolute majority in the executive. A high-ranking UCD member of the committee to write the Standing Orders reflected in 1991:

"The parliament is still suffering a little from the consequences of Standing Orders made in the UCD era. We drafted Standing Orders protective of a minority Government. We gave the Government several prerogatives without which it practically would not have been able to govern. And later, the PSOE Government has not changed the Standing Orders because they are advantageous to it" (Interview #9).

According to the Standing Orders, ordinary legislation requires only a simple majority for passage and organic laws require an absolute majority. Under a minority Government 143 this ensured that the executive would need to seek agreement with other parliamentary groups to pass fundamental legislation, but that it would not have its hands tied on ordinary legislation.

Since the Socialists easily controlled an absolute majority with high party discipline in 1982, these provisions protecting minority governments gave them the ability to implement legislation that had reached an impasse in the earlier legislature and to completely rewrite basic laws which had been carefully negotiated under the UCD

Governments. An ex-UCD deputy described the situation:

"Imagine these stabilizing mechanisms in the hands of a Government that has an absolute parliamentary majority. Naturally, it will say: ‘I will not change the Standing Orders or the Constitution. I respect them and I will not change them.’ It leaves the opposition groups with very little power in parliamentary life. The fact is that the rules of the game were invented as if nobody would ever have a majority. And if someone has a majority, there are no sufficient mechanisms of compensation. I am not a Socialist, nor do I vote for the Socialists. But they did not create this situation - they inherited it" (Interview #2).

Thus, the interaction of three institutional variables -high party discipline, majority representation, and Standing Orders protective of the executive- was largely responsible for the 1982 decline in parliament’s role, in addition to the process of democratic consolidation.

Respondents from the opposition of the last three legislatures not only complained

of limitations imposed on their lawmaking capacity but also on their legislative oversight

function. In particular, ad hoc investigative committees were hard to establish because

they must be petitioned by a majority. Under a minority government, this guarantees that

two or more opposition groups must request the formation of an investigative committee. 144

Yet the Socialist majority Governments were able to regularly deny any opposition requests for this oversight measure. The opposition groups demanded a rewriting of the

Standing Orders, yet disparate positions are liable to impede changes which would swing the balance of power very far toward the parliament.

In sum, it is evident that while the formal rules which protected the Government did not seem to damage the level of parliamentary influence under a minority

Government, they quickly aided to the decline in influence when a majority Government took power in 1982.

Involvement in Supranational Organizations

One of the benefits of becoming a democratic regime is the possibility of moving away from the isolationist policies of the former authoritarian regime and becoming a member in the international community. In Western Europe, this has meant entry into the European Community (now the European Union). Involvement in the EC, while enhancing economic and political status, could have directly affected the power of the parliament by transferring specific areas of national jurisdiction to a supranational level.

It may also contribute to a change in the general setting that the parliament finds itself in, namely, from a country waffling in regime instability to an active and respected player in the international democratic arena.

According to the information and opinions shared by the interview respondents, it is clear that Spain’s entry into the EC has already had some effect on the Congress of

Deputies and may have begun to affect the balance of power between the executive and 145

the legislature. This trend may have been evident as early as the mid-80s, when Spain

and Portugal began an adaptation period for entry into the European Community.

Recently in 1992, the Spanish parliament, spurred by the government, approved

unanimously its first amendment to the 1978 Constitution in order to correct an

inconsistency with the terms of the EC’s 1991 Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty

calls for the right of EC nationals to be eligible to vote and to be elected in local elections

in other EC states, yet the Spanish Constitution reserved these rights for Spanish citizens.

The manner in which this amendment was received in parliament is of importance. Ail

parliamentary parties agreed that this change as well as future constitutional changes

should be met with consensus among them. Moreover, parties from left to right

expressed their concern that the jurisdiction over this matter remain with the parliament.

Although tliere were whispers of a possible referendum submitting this constitutional reform to the Spanish citizenry, most felt that such an act would undercut the representative power of the parliament within the democratic system (De la Cuadra 1992;

Valdecantos 1992).

However, it may be too soon in the life of the EC to draw conclusions as to the ultimate effects of the union on national parliaments. Clearly, the congressional agenda has been broadened to include topics of the EC. For example, before the Conference of

Maastricht, a special congressional subcommittee met for about a year and a half in which

"each [parliamentary] group shared its visions on European political union" and ultimately, signed a document regarding the stance of the parliamentary groups (Interview

#3). It is also important to note that Prime Minister Gonzalez, who was seldom present 146

in congressional sessions, made an appearance to address the Congress and take part in the debate over the subcommittee document before the international conference. Spain’s

entry into the EC was obviously of great importance to both the executive and the legislature and there was an attempt to reach consensus in the parliament on EC matters

(perhaps with the exception of the Popular Party which took advantage of the Prime

Minister’s appearance to criticize his policies).

The siphoning of national decision-making power in specific jurisdictional realms to supranational organizations can affect not only the legislature but also the executive, ultimately altering the relationship between the two national branches of government. In the case of a new democracy, where this relationship was not fully established to begin with, supranational supremacy is likely to afiect the original development of the legislative-executive relationship in setting policy.

The respondents were able to make some speculations about the effect of Spain’s entrance into the EC on legislative-executive relations. There was a sense that parliament’s role may have already been diminished by the EC membership. But there was some disagreement about the effect on the executive. One ex-CDS deputy saw the membership as weakening both the legislative and executive jurisdictions;

"There are expectations concerning European union. Several pieces of legislation are being produced at the European level. Parliamentary debates until now have had some importance, but they are starting to have less, because everyone waits until there is a Community norm before taking a stance in favor or against. This reduces parliamentary power. And Government power too because the Government has less legislative initiative. The important consequence of the speed at which the European Union is creating a system over the past few years is a reclassification of all national parliaments" (Interview #22). 147

Another respondent, however, pointed to the fact that the executive may be strengthened by the membership by being privy to political information:

"The supranational power of the European Community has taken power away [from the Spanish Government]. But there is one other consideration. Actually, the Government -and no one else- is the one who has contact with the other members. In other words, the language, the gestures, and the codes are known only by the Government and the Ministers. And this also gives them an increased understanding of where things are going. As such, I think that the Government possesses more real power because it has information of where things are going, more than the Congress" (Interview #9]

At this point, I can speculate that there has been some effect on Spanish legislative- executive relations - that it appears to have reduced parliamentary power, while its effect on the executive remains somewhat ambiguous.

A second and more general effect of Spain’s entry into the EC its contribution to the consolidation of the regime. Membership in the EC was a major impetus in Spain’s pursuit of democratic stability as all member-states are required to be democracies.

Maravall describes the domestic impact of EC membership:

"The intergration in the European Community was the last crucial aspect of the democratic consolidation. It anchored die democracy in a favorable political and economic context. The Sudrez Government had requested entry in July, 1977; after eight years of negotiations Spain became a full member in January, 1986, along with Portugal { with the support of all major political parties and unanimous support in parliament.] The entry into the European Community had an enormous symbolic impact; the general belief was that the isolation of the past had been related to internal political agitation so it reduced the fears surrounding the traditional uncertainty about Spanish politics. A shared future was perceived as a more secure future. In general, the people associated the entry in the EC with the restoration of democracy and modernization" (1994, pp. 28-29). 148

If this enhanced international status had a diminishing effect on internal instability and divisions, then it also indirectly contributed to parliament’s role. 1 have already argued that, as the democratic consolidation progressed, players felt more confident in engaging in majoritarian decision-making rules in the domestic policy-making process, and moved away from the consensus that helped sustain the new political system through the instability surrounding the transition. The move from consensus to winner-take-all votes on policy meant that the Socialist Government seldom bargained with the principal opposition group, the Partido Popular, in gathering support, thus reducing that parliamentary party’s potential for influence on policy. However, when the Socialists no longer could maintain a majority on their own they enlisted the support of the regionalist groups (Catalan CiU and Basque PNV), often making major concessions in return. This contributed to the importance of the parliament as a key bargaining and decision-making arena.

The effect of entry into the EC on the Spanish Cortes -as well as on the legislatures of all EC member states- obviously deserves more consideration as relations between the EC and national institutions develop. We should pay particular attention to the impact of entry into the international sphere on new democracies and the development in decision-making rules and norms in the legislative arena.

Structure of the State: Federal vs. Unitary

Just as the jurisdiction of the legislature may be encroached upon from above, power may be absorbed by regional bodies and officials. Therefore, the semi-federal 1 4 9

state structure adopted in Spain is likely to have affected the Cortes’ ultimate impact on

public policy. In many new democracies, the fear of an overly powerful central

government as well as the existence of different ethnic groups and regional differences,

are incentives to decentralize political authority. In Spain, no clear-cut federal structure

with specific jurisdictions was established. Instead, a semi-federal structure developed

in the first few years of the regime in which uneven regional jurisdictions were

established. It can even be argued that these jurisdictions are still dynamic, although for

the most part the structure Spain’s autonomous communities is settled.

Multiple ethnic groups, with diverse languages and cultures, exist within Spain’s

borders. Historical tensions, resulting from the dominance of the Castillian central

government over other ethnic groups, have often erupted in violence and civil war. With

Franco’s recent oppression of Spain’s ethnicities still fresh in mind, the framers of the

Constitution established one route to regional autonomy for the three ethnic groups with historical claims to self-governance (Euskadi, Cataluna, and Galicia) as well as slower alternatives for other regions who quickly echoed the cry for autonomy. Following a period of pre-autonomy during the writing of the constitution, seventeen Autonomous

Communities were establish by 1983 and each elected their own regional executive and parliament.

The national parliament’s influence has been affected by strict jurisdictional rules.

Many respondents mentioned the pull of power from both the EC and from the regional governments as well. One Socialist deputy on the Agricultural Committee spoke of the double effect in particular on the Ministry of Agriculture; 150

"In Agriculture, we have found ourselves with a curious problem. In the Ministry of Agriculture a double phenomenon of transferring jurisdictions has occurred. On one hand, we have encountered the transference to the Autonomous Communities [regions] of all questions of information, agricultural education, even structure. And on the other hand, we have the issue of super-structural price policies. [The Ministry] has lost from both sides" (Interview #32)

However, parliament’s influence has also been affected by phenomena concerning the

regional and national governments that is less formal and less direct than strict jurisdictions. For example. Parliament’s role has been affected by the degree to which

it served as an arena for negotiations between the regional and national governments

during the formulation of the Constitution and the regional autonomy statutes. In

addition, it has been influenced by specific laws and the pivotal roles played by

regionalist parties in the national legislature particularly, in the 1986-89 and 1989-93

legislative sessions.

The parliament did not serve as a central arena in key decisions regarding the

development of the Autonomous Communities. Although the parliament was fairly

central throughout the constituent process, matters of regional autonomy were largely negotiated among leaders of the central and regional governments. Moreover, the

Constitution did not successfully resolve the conflicts surrounding the issue of regional autonomy (Gunther 1985). Although Cataldn leaders were included in the drafting of the

Constitution, the Basque PNV was not. In fact, the PNV parliamentary delegation did not ratify the constitution, ostensibly because it reestablished Basque self government

"within the framework of the Constitution". It is thus somewhat of an understatement to say that Parliament’s role in the system was notenhanced by the nature of negotiations 1 5 1 on constituent matters of state structure, since the PNV’s refusal to ratify the Constitution actually presented a risk to the legitimacy of the regime (Gunther 1985; Shabad, 1986).

The parliament was largely excluded from the negotiations formulating the regional Autonomy Statutes. This precedent was set early on by Sudrez’s attempt to reach agreements with the Basque and Cataldn leaders through private negotiations

(Shabad 1986). These two regions -due to historic claims to self-government and the need to resolve these potentially explosive issues- were the first to have their statutes approved in the fall of 1979. In the case of the Basque Statute of Guernica, the draft was originally prepared by PNV and PSOE deputies. Once presented to the parliament, it met with much opposition from the UCD over such issues as education, regional financing, and the jurisdiction of law enforcement agents. These difficult issues were taken out of the Congreso and painstakingly negotiated in private between Adolfo Suarez, the current prime minister, and Carlos Garaicoechea, the Basque president, at the same time that the text was being considered by the Constitutional Committee. Thus, deliberations in the

Congreso were dependent upon the agreements reached by executive leaders (Clark 1987;

Gunther 1985). The negotiations on the Cataldn statute did not entail as many points of contention as did the Basque but it was also negotiated outside of the Parliament between

Suarez and leaders of each of the parties represented in the Catalan Assembly (the

Generalitat). Galicia, the third and final region to have enjoyed its own autonomy statute before the Civil War, had its autonomy statute approved in April of 1981. Andalucia followed suit that same summer and by 1983, 17 autonomous communities existed without major input in the parliamentary arena. 152

In spite of the agreements that were reached in the regional autonomy statutes, after the attempted coup of February, 1981 threatened the stability of the regime the ftansfer of powers to the regional governments was largely halted -or even reversed- until the mid-1980s. The Basque and Catalan governments, with the most to gain from decentralization, also stood to lose the most from this reversal. The Organic Law for the

Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (LOAPA), drafted by the UCD and the PSOE

(excluding the regional parties), was an attempt to slow down decentralization and represented a change of heart in their commitment to decentralization. The regional parties were not able to prevent its approval in the Congreso in June, 1982, but they did manage to add an amendment requiring its approval by the Constitutional Court before it could take effect. The Court eventually ruled its major provisions unconstitutional, but damage had already been done to relations between the UCD and PSOE on the one hand, and the regionalist parties on the other (Shabad 1986).

Over the next few years, the attitude of the executive kept the process of transferring powers to the Autonomous Communities slow or non existent. The Socialist government attempted to equal out jurisdictions of the regional governments, which denied the Basque and Catalans powers they considered to belong to their regional governments. The Socialist majority during 1982-1986 at times invalidated regional laws by passing contrary legislation (Clark 1987). However, when the Socialists and the PNV agreed to a regional legislative pact in January, 1985, the PSOE agreed to respect the

legal transfer of certain powers to the Basque region. Although tensions between center

and periphery continued to exist, in the 1986-89 and 1989 legislative sessions. 153

concessions were often made to Cataluna and Euskadi by the national government in

return for parliamentary support of executive bills. A significant amount of the rise in

parliamentary influence (as measured by modification of executive bills) in the last two

legislatures was due to these concessions made by the executive to the regions. This may

have important implications since this rise in parliamentary influence would actually

represent powers and jurisdictions being taken away from a national level altogether and

reassigned to the Basque and Catalan regional governments.

The Nature of Legislation

Parliament’s influence on policy may also be affected by the nature of the

legislation at hand. Given that consensus among all major political players was of utmost

importance in the formation of the regime, I would expect that parliament’s policy­

making influence would have been enhanced in dealing with fundamental legislation. The

creation or revision of such fundamental legislation dominated the first few years of the

legislature.

There are two types of legislation over which the Spanish parliament has sole jurisdiction; organic and ordinary legislation. Laws of fundamental importance to the

state are classified as organic and include: "the development of fundamental rights and

public liberties; electoral arrangements; statutes of autonomy; and ‘others envisaged in the Constitution.’" (Donaghy & Newton, p. 54). Formal rules allow for greater opposition party influence in these laws which require the approval of an overall majority of parliamentary members, as opposed to simple majority approval forordinary 154

legislation. Of course, potential oppositional influence will vary according to the need

of the current government for additional votes to make up a majority.

In appraising variations in opposition influence according to the nature of

legislation, respondents were asked two questions: 1) What type of law was the

opposition most able to influence?, and 2) With what type of law and with which groups

was the UCD/PSOE Government most willing to negotiate? Responses reveal that during

the 1979-82 centrist legislature the high amount of opposition influence wielded on public policy was largely due to the desire of all parliamentary parties to reach agreements on

legislation of a fundamental nature. Moreover, in this first post-constituent legislature, the bulk of all legislation was indeed of a fundamental nature. But this fact must be seen within the broader spectrum of the transition. In other words, parliamentary elites aspired to consensual documents not simply due to their fundamental nature but because elites desired a peaceful and stable transition to democracy in which all major legitimate political players supported and were held accountable for the cornerstones of the new democracy. In addition, their decisions were constantly scrutinized by the media and a public anxious to avoid the repetition of past turmoil. Therefore, the consensual decision­ making rules so carefully applied throughout the writing of the constitution were extended into the first legislature in which basic decisions regarding the regime were still being made.

The desire to reach agreement on legislation for the most part transcended issue areas. One PCE (Communist) deputy from that era explained that the political and social 1 5 5 situation was responsible for agreements being sought on most laws in the 1979-82 legislature;

"We shared in a situation in which democracy was very recent and the political history of the past century was present in everyone’s mind, as well as the process by which we had arrived at democratic transition. The spirit prevailed that the consensus through which the Constitution had triumphed was still necessary" (Interview #40).

Much of the basic legislation dealt with in this legislature stemmed from Constitutional stipulations, for example, the regional Autonomy Statutes. Such laws were seen to be similar to the Constitution in status, thus contributing to efforts to reach agreements. An ex-UCD deputy maintained that consensus was as important in the first legislature as it had been in the writing of the Constitution:

"In spite of the fact that the Constitution was ‘The Basic Law’, certain organic laws and the Autonomy Statutes were also small ‘basic laws’. We need only to look at parliamentary records to see that almost all of the first laws - the important ones, I am not talking about the Law of protection of whatever park - were virtually passed by absolute unanimity. The fundamental laws - the Autonomy Statutes, the Constitution, the Basic Law of Judicial Power, the Law of Public Order- were almost all approved unanimously" (Interview #26).

Although not all fundamental laws passed unanimously, there was in general an attempt by the UCD Government to negotiate agreements with the largest opposition parliamentary group, the Socialists, in order to hold a major party of the left responsible in the formation of the regime.'’

Of course, we cannot ignore the fact that the UCD Government held only a minority backing in the Congress (168 of 350), and that its desire to negotiate with other

“ The Socialists actually maintained three parliamentary groups in this legislature, one national and two regional, but all connected with the PSOE. 156 parliamentary groups for votes could have been solely attributable to numerical considerations. However, as I argued in Chapter IV, the UCD’s minority, while clearing affecting the situation, was not the driving force of UCD negotiations with other groups but, instead, the informal norm of consensual decision-making rules prevailed among all parliamentary groups and the Government throughout most of the first legislature.

Although at the opening of the first legislature Prime Minister Suarez spoke of a change from consensual politics to and approach of more strictly applying the UCD platform, he and his Government maintained their commitment to negotiations on fundamental legislation. One right-hand man of Suarez remarked;

We were convinced that the basic laws of Constitutional development, those called organic laws, on the one hand, as well as many of the issues presented by the economic crisis truly required consensus...for two reasons. First, because laws originating in the Constitution passed by a simple majority are bad for the country. And this was a continuation of the evolution of the Constitution; it practically was the Constitution. But in issues of political economy, we negotiated a lot. This was not only to show the support of a parliamentary majority [but also to work with the Trade Unions]. At that time, the trade unions were very controlled - Comisiones Obreras by the PCE and the Unidn General de Trabajadores by the PSOE" (Interview #5).

As such, consensus or at least large majority support was desirable on most laws considered in the first legislature due to the fundamental nature of the laws. This desire on the part of all parliamentary groups as well as the executive led to a higher incidence of opposition influence on this legislation.

However, dynamics within the UCD and the Government also affected the UCD’s willingness to negotiate on any given bill. Many respondents maintained that the extent 1 5 7 and timing of negotiations, as well as the party negotiated with, depended more on the

Minister than on the type o f law. As UCD party disunity became more evident toward the end of the first legislature, certain bills became the focus of both intra and interparty disunity, in particular, the Divorce Law, Law of University Autonomy, and the educational Ley de Centres Docentes, as mentioned. Since two of these laws dealt with education we might conclude that there tended to be a lack of parliamentaiy consensus on educational issues. However, the problems surrounding these laws tended more to reflect conflict in the party and the Government and high ministerial turnover (3 ministers passed through the Ministry of Education in 4 years). Therefore, although both the

Government and opposition groups aspired to consensus in laws of a fundamental nature, the converse -that when consensus was not reached it was due to the non-fundamental nature of the law- was not true. Party disunity in the UCD was the primary cause of the lack of successful negotiation surrounding these pieces of fundamental legislation.

When the Socialists took power in 1982, democratic consolidation was close to completion and their overwhelming majority backing in the Congress gave them little numerical need to negotiate legislative amendments in return for votes. Their treatment of fundamental legislation differed from that of the UCD Government. Although opposition leaders were sometimes consulted or taken into account in drafting bills, certain pieces of fundamental legislation that had been carefully negotiated in the 1979-82 legislature were completely rewritten. Throughout the next two legislatures (1986-89), the efforts on the part of the Government to negotiate amendments with opposition groups 158

gradually increased. However, they never returned to the UCD policy of seeking

consensus on all fundamental legislation.

When asked what type of law the Socialist governments were more likely to seek

agreements on, respondents’ answers varied widely according to party. Virtually every

Socialist respondent, both deputies and ministers, replied that accords were sought on

fundamental legislation. According to one Socialist ex-minister:

"In general, the Government wanted the support of the opposition. In fact, the more fundamental the law, the better it was that it not pass with only Socialist support" (Interview #20).

Other Socialist respondents indicated some breakdown within the broad heading of

"fundamental". For example, they reported seeking opposition agreement on laws

dealing with law and order, terrorism, and international policy. In addition, laws that

were "relevant to society" such as health and education were considered important issues

to negotiate, yet fiscal laws -in particular, the annual budget- were laws best left

untouched by the opposition. Indeed, during debate on the 1992 budget, the opposition

groups walked out in protest because opposition amendments were consistently rejected by the Socialists.

The opposition respondents’ answers somewhat mirrored the Socialist responses, with one very important distinction. Fundamental laws, they responded, were not negotiated with the opposition groups unless the Socialist position was liable to be unpopular with public opinion, particularly if the legislation varied from the campaign platform of the Socialist party. This would support the hypothesis set forth by Olson and

Mezey that a legislature’s role will be greater "on issues...that are more rather than less 159 salient" (Olson and Mezey 1991, p. 17). The greatest example of deviation from their own platform came when the Socialist Government advocated maintaining membership in NATO after having campaigned vehemently against it. Also mentioned, were cuts and restrictions to social aid programs, policies bound to be unpopular with a Socialist electorate. A prime example of a socially significant law which was rather unpopular with the electorate was the 1991 Law of Military Service in which the Socialists maintained obligatory military service against the cries of the opposition for purely professional armed forces. On this law the Socialists sought and ultimately gained support from the largest opposition group, the Popular Party. Another organic law from the same year, the Law of Public Order (Ley Organica de Seguridad Ciudadana) contained a controversial provision that the national police be able to enter a residence without a warrant in cases where they had reason to suspect drug-trafficking.’ Both the

Catalan CiU and the Basque PNV supported this law after gaining jurisdictions for their respective regional police and the Socialist Government was able to present a united front with certain opposition groups to the public.

Although both the Basque and Cataldn nationalist groups (the PNV and the CiU) were the most frequently engaged in negotiations with the government, only the Catalan group reported having any influence on laws of fiscal matters. One of their deputies maintained that the Socialist Government wanted to negotiate with them on economic issues because of the fiscal expertise of some of their deputies, in addition to the constructive opposition offered by their group; "They know that we negotiate without

This provision was later ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. 160 the political weight that comes along with being an alternative to their government"

(Interview #15). A Basque deputy, however, expressed frustration at not being able to influence laws of a fiscal nature. This deputy maintained that the Socialists’ lack of willingness to negotiate was due to the personality of the Minister of Economy and to the fact that the Socialists were implementing a centralized economic structure that did not coincide with the regional policies of the PNV.

As with the UCD Government, the willingness of the individual minister to negotiate was also mentioned as a factor. Members from different parties mentioned that one Socialist Minister of Education was more eager to reach agreements on legislation than another. However, a difference among ministers was mentioned much less frequently than it had been regarding the divided UCD Government. Last, respondents from all parliamentary groups except for the Socialist Group maintained that the increased willingness of the Government to trade concessions for support in the 1986-89 and 1989-

93 sessions was due to their declining numbers of Socialist seats in the Congress. Their increased willingness to negotiate, particularly with the Catalan CiU and to some extent the Basque PNV, appears to have represented their expectations that after 1993 they might need to govern with either a coalition government or a parliamentary coalition.

In conclusion, during the 1979-82 UCD legislature, the fundamental nature of the bulk of legislation along with elite desires for a peaceful transition contributed to the willingness of the government party to reach consensus, and therefore, to parliamentary influence on public policy. However, under the Socialist legislatures from 1982-1993, the opposition’s ability to amend government proposals appears to have been limited to 1 6 1 the times in which the government sought backing on fundamental issues that threatened their popularity with the public.

Summary

The development of the Cortes’ policy-making influence in the new Spanish democracy has been open to numerous conditions not present in long-standing democracies. In particular, the desire of elites to ensure a stable and peaceful transition through consensus boosted the importance of the Congress, its parliamentary groups, and its committees in the formation of fundamental legislation from 1979-82. The parliament’s drop in policy-making influence in 1982-86 was largely due to two commonly examined determinants: the government’s overwhelming backing in the parliament and strict party discipline among those ranks. Other conditions specific to

Spain also contributed to the decline in legislative power, namely the nature of formal rules and the increased regime security associated with the consolidation of democracy.

The gradual increase in parliamentary influence throughout the 1986-89 and 1989-93 legislatures was in large part due to the dwindling numbers in the Socialist parliamentary group, although its party discipline has remained strong. Of the supranational and subnational conditions considered in this study, Spain’s semi-federal structure most clearly influenced parliament’s role in policy making, especially throughout 1986-93, with the increased importance of two regional opposition parties, the Basque Nationalist Party

(PNV) and the Cataldn nationalist group, the CiU. Ironically, an increase in parliamentary influence of these two groups has the potential of pulling power away from 162 the national level to the regional level, and could ultimately negatively affect the national parliament’s influence in policy-making. Last, the results of this study point to both the comparability of legislatures of new and old democracies and, when assessing the development of legislatures of newly-consolidated democracies, the importance of considering the impact of the conditions surrounding the transition to democracy. CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Now that the role of the Cortes since the onset of democracy in Spain is clearer, two questions can be explored: what does this tell us about Spanish legislative-executive relations and politics, and what does this tell us about other legislatures in other democracies, new or old? All in all, the Cortes displayed "modest policy making ability" (Mezey 1979) as do most western democratic parliaments. The agenda is almost exclusively set by the executive yet the parliament has the capacity to modify executive bills. However, such a statement is too broad because the capacity to modify bills varies over time and can be constrained by several factors. A more specific picture can now be sketched of the Cortes’ role in policy making.

First, the Cortes was a significant player in policy making throughout the 14 years under study. Even during the lowest point of parliamentary influence (1982-86), the executive was to some extent constrained. During that session, although executive bills were seldom modified during the legislative process, ministers reported that they often took opposition positions into account either through negotiations or unilateral concessions when drafting the bills. Although the numerical need for votes did not exist, even the strongest Spanish executive perceived a need to maintain a positive public image

163 164 by enjoying opposition support when possible. Ministers also claimed that they did not want to make policy so radical that would be reversed if an opposition party came to power. On a methodological level, this finding points out the importance of not using an oversimplified concept of parliamentary influence that considers only the degree to which bills are amended in the policy process. Parliamentary influence can be exerted in many ways, such as through the executive’s perception of the opposition and their anticipation of the parliament’s reception to a bill. In terms of legislative-executive relations in Spain, this finding indicates that the Cortes have never served as a rubber stamp body throughout the years of the current democracy.

Secondly, the level of influence exercised by the parliament fluctuated significantly during the four sessions studied. Particularly, during the first (1979-82) and fourth (1989-93) sessions studied, it was evident that the Cortes was an arena for

opposition parties to substantially affect public policy. However, the influence the parliament held at these two times appears to be due to very different circumstances.

During the 1979-82 session the regime was still in transition. Democracy, being new and

unstable, was nurtured by political leaders through gradual change, broad consensus, and

compromise. The Cortes became a major (though not exclusive) forum for building the

foundations of the new regime. In the last legislative session, opposition parties again

found themselves able to influence policy. But by then the democracy had stabilized and

much basic policy had already been set. The Socialist Government tended to seek

agreements with the opposition particularly in issues that were salient to the public, such

as education, military service, or public order. The executive also appeared to be looking 165 ahead to the next legislative session when it was becoming increasingly clear that the

Socialists would need coalitional support to maintain their control of the executive.

An interesting and unexpected discovery of my research is the development of the informal norm of private negotiations among political elites. Growing out of the practice of consensus of the Suarez years, it increasingly became the norm for executive and opposition leaders to privately negotiate modifications to executive policy (either in drafting bills or in introducing amendments). As these negotiations increasingly took place outside of the parliament’s formal process, committees and subcommittees quickly lost the power they had enjoyed during the UCD’s 1979-82 session. Yet these negotiations are a principal method for the opposition parties to affect policy. Again, this underscores the importance of carefully researching informal methods when measuring parliamentary influence.

What determines parliamentary influence?

From 1979-1993, the Cortes was operating in the context of a new democracy.

Accordingly, it was found that the policy-making role of the Cortes was affected by dynamic factors that have been settled in older democracies. In this study, I explored two sets of independent variables; first, those which exist in any democracy and are generally examined in studies of legislative influence and second, those factors which were specific to Spain, particularly the fact that the democracy was still very young. The fact that the

Cortes was operating within the context of a new democracy was important in two ways.

First, not all standard factors operated in the way that might be expected in an older 166

democracy. Second, certain important contextual factors were present that would not

normally exist in a long standing democracy, such as an agenda overloaded with

fundamental legislation and the need to maintain stability of the regime.

Previous research on legislative policy-making influence, led me to hypothesize

that legislative influence would be higher 1) when the executive’s party held fewer seats

in parliament; 2) when party unity and discipline was low in the executive’s party, and

3) when committees were influential. The first two hypotheses were upheld by my findings, and in fact, strongly interacted. When the executive’s party was in the minority

and suffered increasingly from internal disunity under the 1979-82 UCD legislative session, the parliament exercised a high level of influence on public policy (in terms of modifying executive bills and affecting the agenda). Conversely, when the Socialists came to power in 1982 with a large majority of parliamentary seats and a highly unified, cohesive parliamentary group, the influence the Cortes wielded over policy drastically declined. However, these two variables did not account for the fact that the UCD

Government generally sought broad consensus on legislation instead of settling for minimal supporteven if it meant making major concessions to the opposition by altering the bill. The Socialists, however, did not feel compelled to seek such sweeping agreements and largely applied majoritarian decision-making rules. This was due to the nature and development of the transition which I will elaborate on below.

The third hypothesis, that the parliament would be more powerful when committees were influential, was found to be only partially true. Indeed, committees were more powerful in the first legislative session when parliamentary influence was 1 6 7

substantial. However, the decline in committee strength which paralleled the decline in

parliamentary policy-making influence in 1982-86 was not reversed as parliament’s effect

on policy gradually increased over the Socialist legislatures. At the end of the 1989-1993

session, committees remained weaker than ever.

Two sets of circumstances and events appear to account for these discrepancies.

First, the strength of the committee system in the 1979-82 UCD period was not due to

the factors which are normally attributed to strong committees. Committees did not enjoy

member expertise, low turnover, large staffs or ample resources. Their importance in

the policy-making process can be attributed to the central role accorded them in the

politics of consensus which largely disappeared after 1982 as the democracy took hold.

Second, the rise in parliamentary influence under the Socialist executives was not matched

by an increase in committee strength. This was due to the development of the norm of

informal private negotiations among parliamentary leaders that largely determined the

outcome of committee sessionsbefore the committees met. This norm became so

widespread that it counteracted the effects of circumstances that would normally

strengthen committees: changes in formal rules that enhanced committee jurisdiction, and

slowly increasing member expertise coupled with a decline in membership turnover.'

In all, standard factors frequently found to affect legislative influence on policy

making are neither adequate nor satisfactory explanations of the fluctuation in policy­

making influence of the Spanish parliament. However, a careful examination of the

‘ Morân (1994) found that membership turnover has declined since the 1982 stabilization of the party system. 1 6 8 nature of the transition and other factors specific to the Spanish context provide a more contoured picture of the role of the Cortes.

The role of the Cortes was boosted by the peaceful and consensual nature of the transition. The mutual desire on the part of political elites from all major political parties to avoid the mistakes of the past and compromise in the name of stabilizing the new regime resulted in consensual decisions and compromise. This decision-making style used in writing the Constitution also allowed opposition parties the opportunity to affect policy in the parliament from 1979-82 . This added to the stabilization of the regime by creating consensual laws and allowed both large and small opposition parties the chance to participate. In addition, parliamentary influence was high because, in spite of many private negotiations, the Cortes was used as an arena for the making of fundamental laws in 1979-82 just as it had been for the writing of the Constitution in 1977-79.

As the democracy consolidated, the Socialist Governments had less impetus to seek consensus. In fact, many respondents complained that the practice of consensus

lasted too long. With the stabilization of democracy, the Cortes began to ftmction as

legislatures do in most democracies - under majoritarian principles with broader consensus

sought under certain circumstances, such as the passage of legislation with social salience.

The inexperience of the regime’s leaders with democracy led to the creation of

formal rules that jeopardized the Cortes’ potential to influence policy. The founders,

believing that minority governments would prevail in Spain, supplied the new regime

with a Constitution (and later Standing Orders of the parliament) which protected the

executive. While this worked to stabilize the minority UCD government and prevent 169 stalemate and chaos in the parliament in the 1979-82 session, it tied the hands of opposition party deputies under the Socialist majorities. Therefore, under the current formal laws regulating executive and legislative functions, the parliament is rather constrained both in its policy-making and oversight capacities.

Spain’s membership in the European Union is rather new, yet its effects have been felt. There was an increased effort on the part of the parliamentary groups to reach consensus issues concerning the European Union or on constitutional changes which result from European directives. The effect on parliamentary power was still not clear. Most respondents felt that parliamentary power had been somewhat reduced, although not substantially. Respondents were mixed, however, about whether EU membership had enhanced or decreased executive power (which in turn affects parliamentary power). As the 1991 Treaty of Maastricht allowed for increased powers of the European Parliament, further elfects might become clearer in the future.

The semi-federal nature of the state clearly affected the Spanish political arena as well as the parliament. Regional governments, more than regional parliaments, were active in negotiating national policy with the executive. For example, in the formation of regional autonomy statutes the national parliament was largely left out of the process.

Legal transfers of powers to the regional parliaments also reduced the jurisdictional powers of the parliament and its committees. Most of all the regional parties of Cataluha and the Basque region, aided by an electoral law which encourages geographically concentrated small parties, were able to be principal actors in the national policy-making process. Their strategies to cooperate with the Government party to gain real concessions 170

in exchange for legislative support contrasted starkly with the strategy of the Partido

Popular to distinguish its policy options from those of the Government. The regional parties were able to make substantial amendments to Government policy and secure an important role for themselves in the parliamentary process. The paradox, however, is that in enhancing the influence of the parliamentary opposition, real policy concessions that were made to the regions may have siphoned powers away from the jurisdiction of the parliameny to the regions.

Last, the nature of legislation was found to be of importance in determining the executive’s desire to negotiate with opposition parties in the parliament. During the UCD

1979-1982 session, the parliament dealt with an abundance of legislation establishing the foundations of the new regime and correcting the archaic laws of the former authoritarian regime. During the 1979-82 legislative session the opposition was able to help shape policy, in large part due to the desire of all parliamentary parties to reach agreements on this basic legislation. Issue areas were for the most part irrelevant during this legislature.

During the Socialist legislatures, however, the willingness of the executive to negotiate amendments with the opposition was most evident in the areas of education, law and order, terrorism, and international policy - in general, laws that were of great social salience. Moreover the Socialist executive negotiated policy more often with the Basque and Cataldn parties than with the largest opposition party, the Partido Popular.

In short, although the Spanish parliament has received very little attention from scholars, it would be erroneous to write it off as an uninfluential body. At times, the 171

Cortes have been able to wield much influence over policy and even under the most

constrained conditions, the opposition parties had some impact on policy.

Relevance to other legislatures

The case of Spain can shed some light on our approach to studies of other

legislatures. First, studies of any legislature that draw on standard indicators of

legislative influence on public policy can be easily compared. Therefore, a logical next

step would be to compare this monographic study with knowledge of the legislatures in

other regimes to see where the Cortes ranks as an influential body.

Second, there will be some standard independent variables which can be

considered in any country such as those employed here: the existence of a majority or

minority government, degree of party unity, strength of the committee system. This will

also lend to the study’s comparability.

Third, whether the democracy is old or new, it is of utmost importance to

consider the context in which the legislature finds itself. The conditions that are specific

to that country may be much more important than standard variables in determining

legislative influence on public policy. In the case of a new democracy, we must carefully

search out these conditions for they may be hard to recognize due to their newness. It

is particularly helpful if the transition to democracy has been thoroughly analyzed before

proceeding to study the role of the legislature in the policy-making process.

Future legislative studies may reveal that the nature of the transition consistently plays a role in determining executive-legislative relations as it did in the case of Spain. 1 7 2

Transitions may take place slowly or abruptly, either including leaders of the past regime or barring their participation. Decisions may be made in a consensual style, as in Spain, or they may be made to the exclusion of major political players. The nature of the previous regime may largely determine the pace and nature of the transition.

Democracies may succeed authoritarian regimes that are right-wing or left-wing, military or civilian, with centrally planned or more loosely controlled economies, along with a different range of attitudes stemming from historical memories. Memories and impressions of past regimes will affect not only the transition itself but also the institutional arrangements that are established in the new democracy, in particular for our purposes, the type of legislative body and its formal powers. The founders of the new regime also shape the role and prestige of the legislature by including it in the formation of the regime and its foundations or by excluding it.

By carefully measuring legislative influence with standard indicators and then analyzing the factors that determine that influence we will be able to continue increasing our understanding of executive-legislative relations in both old and new democracies. APPENDIX: EPILOGUE

Since the end of the last legislative session considered in this study, another session is threatening to come to a premature end amidst the impending collapse of the government’s parliamentary coalition and the latest of a series of scandals that have weakened the government. The fifth Cortes session began after the general elections of

June 6, 1993 in which the PSOE won only 159 of the 350 Congressional seats. As a minority government, they enjoyed a slim majority backing with the parliamentary support of the 17 deputies of the Catalan CiU. This has been purely a parliamentary coalitional pact as the CiU has not filled any ministerial posts. The Basque PNV maintained their 5 seats in the Congress and, soon after the elections, made it clear that they were not interested in participating in the cabinet with the Socialists nor in a long- range parliamentary pact. In the same elections, the size of the largest opposition party, the Partido Popular, swelled to 141 (compared to 106 seats in the previous session). The leftist lU/PCE fared well with 18 seats and continued to oppose the Socialist

Government. The Centrist Centro Demdcrata y Social met its demise after unsuccessfully resolving chronic internal party problems.

The Partido Popular throughout the session has become increasingly more viable as a governmental alternative. Starting out with a large representation in the Congress

(141), its leaders immediately anticipated winning the next general elections to be held

173 174 no later than June 1997. Indeed, it fared better than the PSOE both in elections for the

European Parliament in June 1994 and in Spain’s municipal and regional elections in May

1995. Moreover, according to a polls carried out by the national newspaperEl Pais, the popularity of its leader. José Maria Aznar, has surpassed that of Prime Minister, Felipe

Gonzalez for the first time (Reuters, 10 July, 1995).

With no detailed studies available, all reports indicate that parliamentary groups have increased in both bargaining power and policy influence. Disagreement with the

Socialist executive has not been limited to the opposition parties; members of the Socialist parliamentary group have demonstrated some independence. Socialist deputies have clashed over the choice of parliamentary group leaders, as well as the Government’s damage control policies in the wake of corruption scandals. While some disagreements point to rifts in the party, others have been dismissed as normal democratic functioning.

While not surprisingly the Government has made concessions to the Catalan CiU in a number of bills, negotiations with the Partido Popular have also become more common place. For example, within months of the opening of the session, the Socialists and conservatives reached a pact altering certain parliamentary oversight procedures that the opposition had bitterly complained about in the past. It was decided that the signatures of 70 deputies would be sufficient to form investigative committees (limited to twice a year) instead of the previously required majority{El Pais, 27 December,

1993). By September 1994, the Prime Minister began appearing weekly in the Congress to answer opposition questions as many parliamentary groups had been demanding. He 175

has spent much of his time defending his government as one scandal after another has

unfolded.

The Socialists’ relationship with the Catalan CiU has been one of both cooperation

and strain. CiU leaders have complained many times that the Socialists have not shown

"progress" in policy making and that the executive has not adequately dealt with

governmental or party corruption, yet they have still to withdraw their support in the parliament. Over the past 18 months the Socialists have faced several charges of

corruption and each time it has been described by the press as the worst situation the

Government has faced during its years in power. In the spring of 1994, two incidents of white-collar crime arose concerning government officials. First, the director of the

Civil Guard from October 1986 to December 1993, Luis Roldan, was charged with embezzling $40 million in funds (Associated Press, 10 July, 1995). While the

Government’s responsibility in the case was being debated, Roldan, free on bail, escaped the country. The Ministry of Interior (and its current and past ministers) took the fall for having trusted Roldan. The ex-director was not detained until 10 months later in Laos.

He was indicted in July 1995 on corruption charges. Simultaneously, the former governor of the national Banco de Espaha, Mariano Rubio, faced similar charges which led to the indictment of many others. To further complicate the situation, the Socialist government had still not satisfactorily resolved an older situation, theCaso Filesa involving illegal party finances.

Among the list of casualities from these three scandals were the Minister of

Interior, Antoni Asuncidn, the former Minister of Interior and deputy, José Luis 176

Corcuera, and the President of the Socialist parliamentary group (and former Economic

Minister), Carlos Solchaga. The party then suffered from the widely publicized resignation of a high profile judge, Baltasar Garzdn, who was simultaneously serving as parliamentary deputy and Secretary in charge of tire National Plan against Drugs. Garzdn

was unhappy with the executive’s handling of the corruption charges. A display of

disunity came from the Socialist parliamentary group in September 1994 when faced with

the executive’s nominee for President and Spokesperson of the group, Joaquin Almunia

to replace Carlos Solchaga. Almunia, opposed by theGuerrista sector of the party’,

narrowly captured the post with 81 votes in favor, 31 abstentions, 3 against, and 44

deputies not attending. In fact, Solchaga had faced a similar situation when he was

elected at the beginning of the legislative session when a group of Socialist deputies

supported the candidacy of the guerrista former Spokesperson, Eduardo Martin Toval

(who won 67 votes compared to Solchaga’s 87). It is not evident that these

disagreements in the group have been reflected in voting discipline, but it is possible that

the executive has given greater weight to the opinions of its deputies in drafting bills or

considering amendments.

Scarcely four months later in Januaiy 1995, the Government suffered from the

accusations of two police officers, jailed for life for involvement in GAL (or Anti-

Terrorist Liberation Groups) which had been active in using terrorist tactics against

’ The party has suffered a longstanding rift between the Guerristas, followers of the Vice Secretary General of the PSOE and the former Vice President, Alfonso Guerra, and the renovadores. Ill members of the ETA, the Basque terrorist organization/ These men charged that the

Ministry of Interior had created, funded, and run the GAL organization. While fiercely defending the innocence of the Government, Gonzalez also faced increased demands from the opposition (particularly the Partido Popular) that he resign and call early elections.

The peseta took a dangerous nose dive as the market suffered the political impact.

Following the May victory of the Partido Popular in the municipal and regional elections, the Socialists have once again found themselves face-to-face with charges of corruption and the possibility that they will not be able to avoid early elections. In this latest unraveling, the newspaper El Mundo published leaked mobile phone conversations that had been tapped by CESID, the military intelligence unit under the Ministry of

Interior. Since even conversations of the popular King Juan Carlos de Borbdn had been recorded, the public and opposition groups were outraged. Gonzalez carried out only a minor cabinet reshuffle, but he did accept the resignation of the Vice President Narcis

Serra, and the Minister of Defense, Julio Vargas Garcia.

With little left to gain from continued support of the Socialists, Jordi Pujol,

President of the CiU, has demanded that Gonzalez resign by the end of 1995 and call for elections in early 1996. Gonzalez was anxious to avoid such a move, as on July 1, Spain ascended to the 6-month rotating presidency of the European Union. However, he has recently conceded that he will consider calling elections after the 6-month term. In spite of their precarious position, the Socialist cabinet has recently approved a bill that has

^ Members of GAL allegedly killed 27 Basque separatists between 1983 and 1987 (Reuters, 9 January, 1995). 178 been, rejected outright by the Christian democratic wing of the CiU. This bill would allow for an amendment to the current abortion law that would legalize abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy in cases "where pregnancy causes the woman severe anxiety for economic or social reasons" (Reuters, July 7, 1995). (Abortion is now legal only in the cases of risk to the fetus or mother, rape, and incest). Much to the dismay of supporters of the bill, the Catalan group, which until now has been largely concerned with procuring goods for their region, could now affect a policy which is salient nationwide. In spite of the opposition of the CiU, the bill could pass with the approval of the leftist lU.

Without a systematic analysis of the fifth legislature (1993 to the present), we can only speculate on how the policy-making influence of the parliament may have been affected by the conditions studied here. It appears that many variables considered in this study underwent some transformation during this session. For example, the Socialists became a minority government, dependent on the coalitional backing of the Catalans.

There appears to have been decreased party unity in the PSOE while at the same time the

Partido Popular has benefitted ft-om organizational strengthening and improved image.

Membership in the European Union, as well as the role played of Spanish regional governments and parties, appear to be of increasing importance and may have definitively affected the parliament. Moreover, the informal norm of negotiations outside of the committee process may well have taken hold to become a permanent characteristic of policy making in the Cortes. LIST OF REFERENCES

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