Welcoming Remarks by Dr. Hamre
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JoongAng Ilbo-CSIS Forum 2014 Welcoming Remarks By John Hamre President and CEO, and the Pritzker Chair, CSIS Dr. John Hamre was elected president and CEO of CSIS in January 2000 and named Pritzker Chair in December 2012. Before joining CSIS, he served as the 26th U.S. deputy secretary of defense. Prior to holding that post, he was the under secretary of defense (comptroller) from 1993 to 1997. As comptroller, Dr. Hamre was the principal assistant to the secretary of defense for the preparation, presentation, and execution of the defense budget and management improvement programs. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed Dr. Hamre to serve as chairman of the Defense Policy Board. Before serving in the Department of Defense, Dr. Hamre worked for 10 years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. From 1978 to 1984, Dr. Hamre served in the Congressional Budget Office, where he became its deputy assistant director for national security and international affairs. Dr. Hamre received his Ph.D. from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University on international politics and economics and U.S. foreign policy. He received his B.A. from Augustana College in Sioux Falls, South Dakota on political science and economics. The following year he studied as a Rockefeller fellow at the Harvard Divinity School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a great honor to be back in Seoul, which feels increasingly like my second home. I am honored to be here, partnering with my good friend and mentor, Chairman Ambassador Hong Seok-Hyun at this, the 2014 JoongAng Ilbo-CSIS Forum. It is a privilege to be partnering with JoongAng Ilbo and with Ambassador Hong. I first met Ambassador Hong when he was Korea’s ambassador in Washington. During his time in Washington we had several difficult problems between our two countries, and he managed these problems with great skill and grace. He is a genuine policy intellectual, as well as a very successful businessman. We are privileged to partner with JoongAng Ilbo for this annual conference, bringing together the best minds in Korea and America to discuss the most pressing problems we face. This is typical of Chairman Hong’s leadership, and I want to thank him and congratulate him for the conference. Before I begin with my remarks, I would like to express my sincere sympathies to the people of Korea, and especially to the families of the school children who were drowned in the tragic ferry boat sinking back on April 16. I have always been amazed at how much Koreans love their children. It is a defining quality of Korean civilization. So I know how painful this is for all Koreans to bear this loss. Words of sympathy are not enough. This tragedy needs to spark a strong government effort to strengthen public safety and to strengthen emergency response. This is the only fitting tribute we can give to these victims. Our hearts go out to all them and their families, and to all Korea. Ladies and Gentlemen, we have arranged for this conference a very interesting set of panel discussions on the most interesting and important foreign policy topics of the day. Our first panel discussion will examine the question “Is China Changing It’s North Korea Policy?” There has been great debate on this question, both here in Korea and in the United States. We all know that North Korea is not a puppet state of China. Our friends in Beijing often say that they don’t understand North Korea and can’t control their behavior. There is undoubtedly some truth to this. But we also know that China has great capacity to shape North Korea’s policy trajectory. China can’t be happy with what they see in North Korea. The Government is increasingly weak and cannot feed its own people. It diverts large percentages of its scarce budget resources for a military that faces no real threat from the South or from the United States. It subjects the vast bulk of its citizens to grinding poverty. China was once like this and has done an amazing job lifting its population out of destitution. China can’t be happy with what they see in North Korea. But will China take a stronger role in shaping North Korean policy choices and economic opportunities? This is well within China’s grasp, and we will devote time with our first panel to explore this key question. Our second panel will examine Japan-Korea Relations. This is a very serious question and one where the United States has a keen interest. Both Japan and Korea are cornerstone allies of the United States. We need both countries to take active roles in regional security in Northeast Asia. But we are painfully aware of the tensions and controversy that divide Korea and Japan. Whether it is wartime occupation or the “comfort women” issue, or disputed sovereignty claims between the two countries, the divisions are real, sharp and painful. Will these tensions overwhelm us now and shatter a shared burden of providing security in Northeast Asia? Can we find a way forward? We have four excellent panelists to explore these issues with you. Our third panel will discuss the US Pivot to Asia. Let me frame this more candidly. I meet with foreign friends all the time from around the world, and the question that everyone asks as some point in the conversation is this: “Is America still a leading nation or are you now in retreat?” Our friends in Europe are now asking whether America will stand with Europe in this tense standoff with Russia over Ukraine. Our friends in the Middle East are asking if America will pull back now that we have greater energy independence. Here in Asia the question usually turns on whether the American “pivot” to Asia is real. America is confronting many challenges these days, and our allies have a right to ask the hard questions. I think this session will be an insightful discussion of these difficult questions. I look forward to listening to these thoughtful intellects and leaders. Like you, I will learn a great deal from this JoongAng Ilbo-CSIS policy forum. I am confident that at the end of the day we will have a deeper understanding of the complexity of the issues. But I also think we will have a deeper commitment to our mutual obligations and opportunities. The future of Northeast Asia is being reshaped by many forces. We must be determined to make this a good and constructive development for Korea, for America and for all our friends in Asia. To get us started today, it is my great pleasure to introduce to you our keynote speaker for the conference, the Honorable Joshua Bolten, who served as the Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush from 2006 until President Bush’s departure in 2009. Prior to his appointment as Chief of Staff, Mr. Bolten was the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, one of the most powerful positions in the United States Government. The Director of OMB serves as the President’s primary arm for organizing the priorities of the Administration and to insure the effective management of the executive branch of the Federal Government. The three most powerful jobs in the White House are the chief of staff, the Director of OMB, and the National Security Adviser. Joshua Bolten held two of those positions, and served with distinction. I should also point out that Mr. Bolten’s other expertise is in trade policy. Mr. Bolten was the General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative and served as Chief Trade Council to the United States Senate Finance Committee. In a time when the Trans Pacific Partnership is one of the most important foreign policy issues in Asia, no one is better prepared to discuss its importance than Joshua Bolten. Would you please welcome Mr. Bolten with your enthusiastic applause. The Korea Chair Newsletter is published by the Office of the Korea Chair (http://www.csis.org/ program/korea-chair) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax- exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). .