DOCSLIB.ORG

The Syrian Crisis: Military Intensification and Futile Negotiations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Syrian Crisis: Military Intensification and Futile Negotiations ASSESSMENT REPORT The Syrian crisis: military intensification and futile negotiations Policy Analysis Unit - ACRPS | August 2015 The Syrian crisis: military intensification and futile negotiationsSeries: Assessment Report Policy Analysis Unit – ACRPS | August 2015 Copyright © 2015 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved. ____________________________ The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on the applied social sciences. The Center’s paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and communities- to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective. The Center publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to both Arab and non-Arab researchers. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies PO Box 10277 Street No. 826, Zone 66 Doha, Qatar Tel.: +974 44199777 | Fax: +974 44831651 www.dohainstitute.org Table of Contents Introduction 1 Russia-Saudi Rapprochement: no bearing on the conflict over Syria 1 The results of diplomacy 4 TURKEY’S SNAP ELECTIONS Introduction Following intense diplomatic machinations over the past few weeks, the parties to the Syrian conflict are now back at square one. All sides have returned to their original positions, with the only difference being the intensity of the Syrian regime’s attacks on the country’s civilian population, once the Zabadani ceasefire had expired without an agreement between Iran and Syrian resistance forces operating in the border town. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov thus put paid to any hopes – however remote – that Moscow’s policies towards Syria were at a turning point. Lavrov contradicted recent comments by Khaled Khoja, President of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, who, during a visit to Moscow in August, claimed that Russia’s commitment to the permanence of Bashar al Assad as president in the context of a peace settlement was beginning to shake. In fact, Lavrov insisted: “While some of our partners believe that it is necessary to agree in advance that at the end of the transitional period the president will leave his post, this position is unacceptable for Russia.”1 Saudi Arabia took a diametrically opposed view, stating that the country would not join an international coalition against terrorism which included the Assad regime, a possibility floated by Moscow in June. Russia-Saudi Rapprochement: no bearing on the conflict over Syria Recent gains by the armed Syrian opposition, together with a Turkish policy of creating a security corridor along its Syrian frontier, gave the Assad regime’s allies the impetus they needed to begin frenetic diplomatic maneuvers on behalf of their partner in Damascus. With armed opposition forces, and in particular ISIL, approaching the Syrian regime’s strongholds along the coastline, Russian and Iranian anxieties about the impact of these advances have been felt more keenly. This compounds the impression given by recent fighting in areas such as Jisr al Shughoor and Ariha that the regime’s forces are losing morale, with the victory long promised to them by their leaders nowhere to be seen. Sensing the danger, and wishing to take advantage of a change of leadership in Saudi Arabia, Moscow led a new diplomatic initiative. 1 “Assad’s ouster ‘unacceptable’ as Syria peace precondition: Russia”, AFP, see online at: http://news.yahoo.com/assads-ouster-unacceptable-syria-peace-precondition-russia-165142980.html 1 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES Russia’s overtures towards the Gulf states, and in particular to Saudi Arabia, began at the outset of this year, in the context of Western sanctions imposed following Moscow’s annexation of the Crimea and the wider conflict in Ukraine. They also coincided with a dramatic drop in oil prices, brought about by Saudi measures to flood the market with supply. The first sign of such Russian goodwill gestures came in April, when Moscow unexpectedly declined to exercise its veto against a UN Security Council resolution supporting Saudi-led efforts to act against the Houthi militia in Yemen. In addition to legitimizing Riyadh’s military efforts in Yemen, UNSC resolution 2216 also imposed an arms embargo on the Houthis, an ally of Iran. Moscow’s stance provided an opportunity for the rapid advancement of Saudi-Russian relations, leading to a breakthrough visit by Saudi Defense Minister Prince Mohammed Bin Salman to St Petersburg for talks with President Putin, where the two countries signed an agreement for the construction of 16 nuclear power plants in Saudi territory2. Speaking after the meeting, Putin suggested the formation of a broad-based coalition to combat terrorism, and specifically ISIL, which would include both Saudi Arabia and the Syrian regime. Putin’s proposal was met by incredulity, even by Assad’s foreign minister Walid Muallem. Despite this initial skepticism, however, Russia succeeded in brokering a meeting between Prince Mohammed and Major-General Ali Mamlouk, the Director of Syria’s National Security Bureau. Saudi Arabia’s vision for a resolution to the Syrian crisis, expounded at the pair’s meeting in the Saudi Red Sea coastal town of Jeddah, entailed the withdrawal of Iranian-funded militia, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, from Syrian territory in exchange for an end to Saudi funding for armed Syrian opposition groups. Ultimately, the Saudis envisioned that Assad’s political future would be contingent on a political process and peace settlement agreed by Syrian parties, resulting in UN- supervised parliamentary and presidential elections3. When it was announced, the meeting appeared to signal a Russian diplomatic coup leading to a turnaround by Riyadh. The Syrian regime’s response indicated its reliance on Iran, which has now shown itself to be effectively in charge of Damascus. In a speech delivered in late July, President Assad attacked Saudi Arabia and thanked Iran for its support. Assad used the occasion 2 “Russia and Saudi Arabia ink nuclear energy deal, exchange invites”, see online: https://www.rt.com/news/268198-russia-saudi-nuclear-agreements/ 3 See “Saudi Initiative Presented at ‘Miracle Meeting’: presidential elections in Syria supervised by the world community”, Al Hayat, August 8, 2015 (link in Arabic): http://bit.ly/1KVQdlt 2 TURKEY’S SNAP ELECTIONS to legitimize the activities of, and express support for, Hezbollah and other foreign militia that were bolstering his rule, helping the regime make up for a deficiency in morale and manpower within the ranks of the regular army and across the Syrian population more broadly. Indeed, Assad did away with the last remaining fig leaf not only of the regime’s lip-service to pan-Arab nationalism but also of any specifically Syrian patriotism, when he claimed that “Syria belongs to those who defend, not those who [merely] are its nationals”4. Coming from an individual who presents himself as “President of Syria”, this was tantamount to a declaration of intent to carry out a population transfer of those Syrians not sufficiently loyal to the Assad government. Within a week of the Syrian regime’s outright rejection of Saudi Arabia’s planned compromise, Russia’s putative wide-ranging anti-terror alliance also collapsed. This led Moscow, a long-time diplomatic champion of the Syrian regime, to withhold its objection to UNSC Resolution 2235, which called for an independent commission for the investigation of the use of chemical weapons within Syrian territory during 2013. Such a move could ultimately result in legal proceedings being brought against Assad regime officials, should there be evidence to show their complicity in the use of globally banned chemical weapons5. Many regarded Russia’s surprising volte-face as a means of leverage against the regime in Damascus, which had previously hindered a resolution to the conflict. This seemed all the more likely since Moscow had long been preparing for a new round of negotiations between the contesting parties in Syria along the lines of the plan set up by Stefan Di Mistura, and unanimously accepted by the UN Security Council. This dramatic turn of events even led US President Obama to claim that “the window has opened a crack for us to get a political resolution in Syria”6. Moscow’s new position also encouraged the continuation of Russian-Saudi dialogue, with Riyadh dispatching newly appointed Foreign Minister Adel al Jubair to Moscow on August 12, in order to build on progress 4 See “The Scandalous Sentence in Assad’s speech”, Mohammed Kuraishan, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/20107-the-scandalous-sentence-in-assads- speech 5 See: “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2235 (2015), Establishing Mechanism to Identify Perpetrators Using Chemical Weapons in Syria”, online at the UN: http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12001.doc.htm 6 “Obama sees slight opportunity for progress in Syria”, Gulf News, August 7, 2015, online: http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/syria/obama-sees-slight-opportunity-for-progress-in-syria-1.1562886 3 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES made during a tripartite meeting with the Saudi, Russian and American foreign ministers in Doha earlier that month. Yet the Moscow meeting would prove to be a setback for efforts to achieve a resolution in Syria. The results of diplomacy While Al Jubair was en route to Moscow, he made it clear that his country would not be deterred by Assad’s refusal to accept Riyadh’s offer to end support for the armed opposition in exchange for the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syrian territory. Indeed, the Saudi foreign minister was unequivocal about the fact that his country continued to entertain the possibility of militarily toppling the Assad regime as a means of resolving the Syrian conflict.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Timeline of Key Events: March 2011: Anti-Government Protests Broke
    Timeline of key events: March 2011: Anti-government protests broke out in Deraa governorate calling for political reforms, end of emergency laws and more freedoms. After government crackdown on protestors, demonstrations were nationwide demanding the ouster of Bashar Al-Assad and his government. July 2011: Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), paid his first visit to Syria, after his assumption of duties, and demanded the regime to end violence, and release detainees. August 2011: LAS Ministerial Council requested its Secretary General to present President Assad with a 13-point Arab initiative (attached) to resolve the crisis. It included cessation of violence, release of political detainees, genuine political reforms, pluralistic presidential elections, national political dialogue with all opposition factions, and the formation of a transitional national unity government, which all needed to be implemented within a fixed time frame and a team to monitor the above. - The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed of army defectors, led by Col. Riad al-Asaad, and backed by Arab and western powers militarily. September 2011: In light of the 13-Point Arab Initiative, LAS Secretary General's and an Arab Ministerial group visited Damascus to meet President Assad, they were assured that a series of conciliatory measures were to be taken by the Syrian government that focused on national dialogue. October 2011: An Arab Ministerial Committee on Syria was set up, including Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Sudan and LAS Secretary General, mandated to liaise with Syrian government to halt violence and commence dialogue under the auspices of the Arab League with the Syrian opposition on the implementation of political reforms that would meet the aspirations of the people.
    [Show full text]
  • Hintergrund Syrien 24.03.2016 Petra Becker Stiftung Wissenschaftstiftung Politik Und
    Newsletter Projekt »Lokale, regionale und internationale Dynamiken im Syrien- Konflikt« SWP Hintergrund Syrien 24.03.2016 Petra Becker Stiftung WissenschaftStiftung Politik und Freitagsmotti 04.03.2016: Die Revolution geht weiter 11.03.2016: Erneuerung des Schwurs Politik und Sicherheit Politik und 18.03.2016: Freitag der Würde Rund um den 5. Jahrestag des Ausbruchs der Revolution beschwören alle drei Motti den Geist dieser Revolution. Mit Schwur ist das Versprechen gemeint, dass die Revolutionäre auf ihren Demonstrationen seit 2011 den Märtyrern gegeben haben: „Ihr werdet nicht umsonst gestorben sein.“ Das Motto „Freitag der Würde“ entspricht dem Motto der ersten geplanten Freitagsde- monstration am 25.03.2011. Demonstrationen kehren mit Feuerpause zurück Dass es eine neue Welle von Demonstrationen gibt, hat damit zu tun, dass es nach Inkraft- treten der Feuerpause nun an vielen Orten wieder möglich ist, auf die Straße zu gehen. Deutsches Institut für Internationale Auch wenn vielerorts weiterhin gekämpft wird (s.u. sonstige wichtige Entwicklungen), so ist in manchen anderen Orten vorsichtige Ruhe eingekehrt. Verschiedene Quellen berich- ten, dass am ersten Freitag im März landesweit in mehr als hundert Städten demonstriert wurde. Proteste auch gegen Jabhat Al-Nusra Bei den Demonstrationen der letzten Wochen ging es um den Sturz des Regimes, auf man- chen auch gegen die Feuerpause und die Verhandlungen in Genf, weil man befürchtet, dass die Verhandlungen ein Versuch sein sollen, das Regime im Sattel zu halten. Manch- mal ging es auch um lokale Forderungen, z. B. um die Einbeziehung von Daraya in die Waffenstillstandsgebiete. Interessant ist, dass die Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) am 07.03.2016 eine Demonstration in Idlib- Stadt auflöste und den Demonstranten verbot, die Revolutionsfahne zu schwenken.
    [Show full text]
  • Isis: the 21St Century Investment 1
    Running head: ISIS: THE 21ST CENTURY INVESTMENT 1 ISIS: The 21st Century Investment Samy Tolaymat Diablo Valley College ISIS: THE 21ST CENTURY INVESTMENT 2 Abstract On 29 June 2014, ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, announced their establishment over Iraq and Levant Countries. Over 30 countries are fighting ISIS without being able to at least stop the rapid growth of it. Meaning that not only one government is involved in the rise and growth of ISIS, and this proclaimed fight is definitely serving a lot of countries interests. After researching the reasons why ISIS came into being, the data shows that the realism theory is the clearest one to explain the presence of ISIS, and to explain the proclaimed war against ISIS. This essay will prove, through books, documentaries and internet articles, how the presence of ISIS serves the interests of each country proclaims its enmity to ISIS, as well as how some countries are involved in creating ISIS. ISIS: THE 21ST CENTURY INVESTMENT 3 Introduction ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, is the most successful and dangerous jihadist militant group the world has ever seen. Many have analyzed the way this group has grown up. However, there is no doubt that the instability and turmoil caused by the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 looked desirable to any terrorist group like ISIS to take over the country. Bunzel says in the book From Paper State to Caliphate the Ideology of the Islamic State, “While the Islamic State had hoped for this level of zeal from its 2006 founding, its initial efforts failed.
    [Show full text]
  • Information and Liaison Bulletin N°340
    INSTITUT KURD E DE PARIS Information and liaison bulletin N°340 july 2013 The publication of this Bulletin enjoys a subsidy from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGCID) aqnd the Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (The Fund for action and support of integration and the struggle against discrimination) This bulletin is issued in French and English Price per issue : France: 6 € — Abroad : 7,5 € Annual subscribtion (12 issues) France : 60 € — Elsewhere : 75 € Monthly review Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 15 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tel. : 01-48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01-48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: bulletin@fikp.org Information and liaison bulletin Kurdish Institute of Paris Bulletin N° 340 July 2013 • IRAQI KURDISTAN: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN POSTPONED. • SYRIA: VIOLENT FIGHTING BETWEEN JIHADANISTS AND THE PYD FORCES. TURKEY: THE PKK THREATENS TO PUT AN END TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. • IRAN: INCREASED REPRESSION OF THE KURDISH BORDER VILLAGES. • CULTURE: HADASSA YESHURIN, AND ISRAELI SINGER WITH A KURDISH AND ARAMAIC REPERTORY. IRAQI KURDISTAN: THE PRESIDENTIALS ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN POSTPONED utting an end to the dis - the KDP, has preferred this solution was when, at the age of 16, I cussions over the possi - to that of a referendum on the new became a Peshmerga for the free - ble re-election or exten - constitution. It said it considered the dom and the national and democrat - P sion of his Presidential latter option could endanger social ic rights of the people of Kurdistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Sieges and Ceasefires in Syria's Civil
    Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Sieges and Ceasefires in Syria’s Civil War WP Lessons Learned as Regional Players Undermine New Approach by UN Mediator Khaled Yacoub Oweis S Representatives of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, an international alliance that nominally supports the Syrian opposition, met in Berlin in March 2015 on the fourth anniversary of the Syrian revolt. Participants in the meeting discussed ways to revive the mission of UN mediator Staffan de Mistura, whose efforts for achieving a ceasefire in Aleppo – Syria’s former commercial and industrial hub – have gone nowhere. Ger- many has been particularly supportive of de Mistura. But the main players in Syria and their regional supporters have shown little willingness to curb the violence, as the con- flict, together with Yemen, is at the heart of what is increasingly perceived as a Sunni- Shia schism. Germany is committed to finding a political solution in Syria that addresses the regional dimension of the conflict. But this is unlikely to happen without a thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia that would allow for tackling sticky political issues behind the religious rhetoric. Mounting tensions between Arab Gulf coun- at establishing ceasefires and “freeze zones” tries and Iran have hardened the positions in certain areas, starting in the northern of the main players in Syria, thus lessening city of Aleppo. The Aleppo effort was to dif- their willingness to negotiate a solution to fer from previous ceasefires, which were the conflict and undermining the mission reached mostly with little UN involvement, of Staffan de Mistura, the Special UN envoy.
    [Show full text]
  • Shuaiba Oil Refinery Fire
    SUBSCRIPTION TUESDAY, AUGUST 18, 2015 THULQADA 3, 1436 AH www.kuwaittimes.net Kuwaiti dead, Libya risks Iraqi PM scraps Murray ends wife injured becoming third of cabinet drought against in head-on ‘another posts in reform Djokovic with collision3 Somalia’7 drive13 Montreal20 win Shuaiba oil refinery Min 35º Max 49º High Tide fire ‘not terror act’ 02:05 & 13:50 Low Tide KNPC shuts down Shuaiba refinery after fire 08:15 & 20:35 40 PAGES NO: 16613 150 FILS KUWAIT: A fire at Kuwait’s 200,000 barrel-per-day Qatar launches Shuaiba oil refinery yesterday which led to its total shut- down was not the result of a terrorist act, the country’s labor reform for spokesperson for the oil industry said in a statement. Sheikh Talal Al-Khaled Al-Sabah said that any talk of a migrant workers link to terrorism was, “completely devoid of any truth.” DOHA: Qatar yesterday officially launched The cause of the fire is still under investigation. The fire one of its most “significant” labor reforms to led to the refinery’s total shutdown but there were no guarantee migrant workers’ wages, but casualties, an official at state refiner Kuwait National rights groups are concerned over imple- Petroleum Company (KNPC) said. Ahmed Al-Jemaz, act- mentation of the new regulations. The Wage ing chief executive, said in a statement on the compa- Protection System (WPS) aims to ensure ny’s Twitter account that a fire at the heavy oil cracking that migrant laborers, many working on unit at Kuwait’s smallest refinery had been brought 2022 World Cup-related projects, will finally under control.
    [Show full text]
  • Sieges and Ceasefires in Syria's Civil War. Lessons Learned As Regional
    Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Sieges and Ceasefires in Syria’s Civil War WP Lessons Learned as Regional Players Undermine New Approach by UN Mediator Khaled Yacoub Oweis S Representatives of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, an international alliance that nominally supports the Syrian opposition, met in Berlin in March 2015 on the fourth anniversary of the Syrian revolt. Participants in the meeting discussed ways to revive the mission of UN mediator Staffan de Mistura, whose efforts for achieving a ceasefire in Aleppo – Syria’s former commercial and industrial hub – have gone nowhere. Ger- many has been particularly supportive of de Mistura. But the main players in Syria and their regional supporters have shown little willingness to curb the violence, as the con- flict, together with Yemen, is at the heart of what is increasingly perceived as a Sunni- Shia schism. Germany is committed to finding a political solution in Syria that addresses the regional dimension of the conflict. But this is unlikely to happen without a thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia that would allow for tackling sticky political issues behind the religious rhetoric. Mounting tensions between Arab Gulf coun- at establishing ceasefires and “freeze zones” tries and Iran have hardened the positions in certain areas, starting in the northern of the main players in Syria, thus lessening city of Aleppo. The Aleppo effort was to dif- their willingness to negotiate a solution to fer from previous ceasefires, which were the conflict and undermining the mission reached mostly with little UN involvement, of Staffan de Mistura, the Special UN envoy.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran Playing for Time As US Sanctions Start to Bite
    UK £2 www.thearabweekly.com Issue 169, Year 4 August 12, 2018 EU €2.50 Palestinian American to be first Start of haj Muslim woman in US Congress season Pages 6,17 Page 18 Climate change takes its toll on Lebanon’s millennium cedars Samar Kadi Beirut hey have capped Lebanon’s mountaintops for thou- sands of years. The Phoe- T nicians used their wood to build merchant ships and Egyp- tians used their resin to mummify the dead. Now the emblematic ce- dars of Lebanon (Cedrus Libani) are facing their biggest challenge — cli- mate change. Cedar forests covered 5,000 sq.km of Lebanon’s highlands in ancient times. They have outlived invaders, empires and modern wars but centuries of deforestation have reduced the forests to 20 sq.km. The trees, some 3,000 years old, Displaced Syrians queue to receive Russian aid in the northern Syrian town of Tal Rifaat. As the Syrian war Deep roots. Colombian singer thrive on moisture and cool tem- draws to a close with signs of a government offensive in Idlib on the Turkish border, the last province held by Shakira plants a tree in the peratures and their seeds need a rebel forces, the plight of the more than 11 million refugees — half of whom left Syria and fled to Turkey, Jordan, Cedar Reserve, last July. (AP) Lebanon and other countries — is back on the international agenda. UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator minimum amount of snow and rain Panos Moumtzis said that Idlib’s entire population of 2.5 million people could be displaced and moved towards for regeneration.
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis
    ankara round tables ANKARA 2012 Quo Vadis? Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis Ankara Round Tables No: 1 Editor: Ufuk Ulutaş Transcripts: Gülşah Neslihan Demir, Zehra Senem Demir, Dov Friedman, Müjge Küçükkeleş, Saliha Ziya. Event Photos: Volkan Yıldırım Other Photos: AA & Reuters Design&Layout: M. Fuat Er, Ümare Yazar Printed in Turkey, Ankara by Pelin Ofset, May 2012 COPYRIGHT ©2012 by SETA ISBN: 978-605-4023-17-2 All rigts are reserved. SETA, Nenehatun Caddesi No.66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara Turkey Pbx: +90 312 551 21 00 Fax: +90 312 551 21 90 www.setav.org [email protected] twitter: @setavakfi Ankara Round Tables Quo Vadis?: Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis April 3rd, 2012, Ankara A pro-Assad demonstration in Damascus Quo Vadis?: Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis SETA ROUNDTABLE | 16 Content Summary 17 List of Participants 18 1 From Tunis to Damascus: The 20 Road to the Syrian Uprising 4 What is at stake? Regional and 48 Global Positions on Syria 2 The Syrian Crisis: Its Nature, 26 and Domestic and Regional Implications 5 The Moment of Truth: Proposals, 72 Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Syria 3 Syrian Opposition vs. the Assad 32 Regime 6 The Syrian Crisis: An Official 86 Perspective from Turkey Participants 91 Index 96 17 | SETA ROUNDTABLE Quo Vadis?: Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis A massive explosion in Damascus Quo Vadis?: Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis SETA ROUNDTABLE | 18 Summary The demonstrations which broke out in Tunisia the SNC’s progress, the appereance of fragmentation in December 2010 turned into a wave of popular discourages support from the international uprisings.
    [Show full text]
  • A Comparative Analysis of Indonesia and Turkey's
    T.R. ULUDAĞ UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE STUDY OF PALESTINE ISSUE AND SYRIA CRISIS (MASTER DEGREE THESIS) Noor Fahmi PRAMUJI BURSA – 2018 T.R. ULUDAĞ UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE STUDY OF PALESTINE ISSUE AND SYRIA CRISIS (MASTER DEGREE THESIS) Noor Fahmi PRAMUJI Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Tayyar ARI BURSA – 2018 ABSTRACT Name and Surname : Noor Fahmi PRAMUJI University : Uludağ University Institution : Institute of Social Sciences Field : International Relations Branch : International Relations Degree Awarded : Master Thesis Page Number : xxi + 229 Degree Date : …. /…. /2018 Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Tayyar ARI A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE STUDY OF PALESTINE ISSUE AND SYRIA CRISIS This study aims to perform a comparative analysis of Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy on Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis in particular. It also reviews both countries’ foreign policy toward the Middle East since their declaration of becoming Republic states in general. As foreign policy theory, neoclassical realism is applied. It then discusses changing dynamics and analyses influential factors shaping Turkey and Indonesia policies of Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis at the unit and systemic level of analysis. It summarises that the factors of leaders' perceptions upon international and regional systemic changing trends and pressures as well as state powers have become influential factors. In case of Palestine issue, during 2004-2016, Turkish domestic politics has undergone domestic transformations namely first public opinion and civil society's roles influence the foreign policy.
    [Show full text]
  • Six Years of War in Syria Political and Humanitarian Aspect
    SIX YEARS OF WAR IN SYRIA POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECT NR: 005 MAY 2017 RESEARCH CENTRE RESEARCH CENTRE © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED PUBLISHER TRT WORLD CONTRIBUTORS PINAR KANDEMIR RESUL SERDAR ATAS AHMED AL BURAI OZAN AHMET CETIN MUHAMMED LUTFI TURKCAN RAZAN SAFFOUR ALPASLAN OGUZ AHMET FURKAN GUNGOREN MUHAMMED MASUK YILDIZ ESREF YALINKILICLI ACHMENT GONIM ALONSO ALVAREZ COVER PHOTO BURCU OZER / ANADOLU AGENCY (AA) TRT WORLD ISTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BESIKTAS ISTANBUL / TURKEY www.trtworld.com TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM www.trtworld.com TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1620 I STREET NW, 10TH FLOOR, SUITE 1000 WASHINGTON DC, 20006 www.trtworld.com Content 07 INTRODUCTION 08 RUN UP TO THE WAR IN SYRIA 21 POLITICAL ASPECT: SYRIA POLICIES OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL ACTORS 22 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 23 THE UNITED NATIONS 30 THE EUROPEAN UNION 34 THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES 35 STATES 36 TURKEY 43 THE UNITED STATES 50 RUSSIA 57 IRAN 61 SAUDI ARABIA 64 CHINA 66 NON-STATE ACTORS 67 SYRIAN POLITICAL OPPOSITION 73 DAESH 76 PKK’S SYRIA OFFSHOOT: PYD-YPG 80 HEZBOLLAH 83 HUMANITARIAN ASPECT 88 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 96 INTERNALLY DISPLACED SYRIANS 98 REFUGEES IN TURKEY 106 REFUEGES IN JORDAN 108 REFUGEES IN LEBANON 110 REFUGEES IN THE EU 116 CONCLUSION: SHOCKWAVES OF THE SYRIAN WAR 120 ENDNOTES TRT World 6 Research Centre TRT World Research Centre 7 Introduction At TRT World, we aim to do things differently. Since missed opportunities to restore stability in the war- we started the TRT World on 27 October 2015, we torn country.
    [Show full text]
  • Trying to Make Sense of the Senseless: Classifying the Syrian War Under the Law of Armed Conflict
    TRYING TO MAKE SENSE OF THE SENSELESS: CLASSIFYING THE SYRIAN WAR UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT David Wallace, Amy McCarthy, & Shane R. Reeves1 I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 556 II. BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT ......................................... 557 A. A Brief Overview of Syria’s Political History ............................ 557 B. Other Contributing Factors to the Conflict ................................. 559 i) Drought/ Economic Instability Prior to Arab Spring ......... 559 ii) Arab Spring – Domino Effect ............................................. 560 iii)Syrian Uprising ................................................................. 561 III. ACTORS IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR .................................................... 562 A. Free Syrian Army ....................................................................... 562 B. Islamic Front ............................................................................... 565 C. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) ..................... 565 D. ISIS ............................................................................................ 567 E.Kurdish Popular Protection Units (YPG & SDF) ....................... 568 F.Syrian Armed and National Defense Forces (NDF) ................... 569 G. State and Non-State Allies of Syria: Russia, Iran, & Hezbollah. 570 H. U.S. and other International Actors ............................................ 571 I. Summary .....................................................................................
    [Show full text]