Sieges and Ceasefires in Syria's Civil War. Lessons Learned As Regional

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Sieges and Ceasefires in Syria's Civil War. Lessons Learned As Regional Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Sieges and Ceasefires in Syria’s Civil War WP Lessons Learned as Regional Players Undermine New Approach by UN Mediator Khaled Yacoub Oweis S Representatives of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, an international alliance that nominally supports the Syrian opposition, met in Berlin in March 2015 on the fourth anniversary of the Syrian revolt. Participants in the meeting discussed ways to revive the mission of UN mediator Staffan de Mistura, whose efforts for achieving a ceasefire in Aleppo – Syria’s former commercial and industrial hub – have gone nowhere. Ger- many has been particularly supportive of de Mistura. But the main players in Syria and their regional supporters have shown little willingness to curb the violence, as the con- flict, together with Yemen, is at the heart of what is increasingly perceived as a Sunni- Shia schism. Germany is committed to finding a political solution in Syria that addresses the regional dimension of the conflict. But this is unlikely to happen without a thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia that would allow for tackling sticky political issues behind the religious rhetoric. Mounting tensions between Arab Gulf coun- at establishing ceasefires and “freeze zones” tries and Iran have hardened the positions in certain areas, starting in the northern of the main players in Syria, thus lessening city of Aleppo. The Aleppo effort was to dif- their willingness to negotiate a solution to fer from previous ceasefires, which were the conflict and undermining the mission reached mostly with little UN involvement, of Staffan de Mistura, the Special UN envoy. in that past deals concerned areas besieged Syria has also appeared to drop from the by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and list of US priorities, as the Obama adminis- resulted in de facto rebel surrender. tration has concentrated on military action against the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and on reaching a deal with Iran over Regional Tension Muddies Efforts Tehran’s nuclear program. Aleppo’s historic importance and the huge Seeing little chance to convene another devastation it has incurred presented the international peace conference following city as a high-profile test case for de Mis- the collapse of the US- and Russia-sponsored tura’s approach and a potential model for “Geneva II” talks in February 2014, de Mis- other hotspots in Syria. For months, de tura pursued a ground-up approach aimed Mistura met Assad and his lieutenants to Khaled Yacoub Oweis is a fellow in the project “The fragmentation of Syria” realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) SWP Comments 26 and funded by the German Foreign Office. May 2015 1 talk about Aleppo, as well as foreign powers controlling food and basic supplies, and that included Turkey, Iran, and Russia. De they remained free to mount incursions. Mistura also met the Shamiya (Levant) Front, Hundreds of fighters, who laid down their a grouping of mostly jihadist rebel brigades arms, as well as activists and civilians who in Aleppo, which coordinated with the al- were supposed to be spared were killed, Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, the most formi- imprisoned, or disappeared, such as in dable anti-Assad formation in the north. the al-Qadam neighborhood of southern But outside powers contributed to rais- Damascus, and in Mouaddamiya on the ing the stakes on the ground and the talks western edge of the capital. achieved little. In February 2015, Assad’s The situation differs fundamentally in forces, backed by the Lebanese group Hez- Aleppo from other areas where rebel bri- bollah and other Shiite militias, mounted gades agreed to ceasefires under duress, a major offensive to seal off Aleppo – at the in that Aleppo has not been completely same time that de Mistura was in New York besieged by Assad’s forces. The city, whose briefing the Security Council on his mis- population was around three million before sion. In southern Syria, Hezbollah appeared the revolt, has been roughly split into a to take the lead in a simultaneous offensive western part under the control of the Assad aimed at recapturing, on behalf of the regime and an eastern sector held by anti- Assad regime, strategic military positions Assad brigades. Eastern districts were poorer lost to the Nusra Front as well as Arab- and and contained most of the city’s inhabit- Western-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) bri- ants. Their numbers swelled in the decade gades near the border with Jordan and the before the revolt due to migration from Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Jordan and the countryside and from areas along the Arab Gulf countries regarded the attacks as Euphrates River basin in eastern Syria hit being a major escalation driven by Iran. In by a water crisis and near famine. But only reaction – and reversing a period of appar- 40,000 people or so have remained in east- ent neglect of the rebels – the passage of ern Aleppo, large areas of which have been weapons to anti-Assad forces through Tur- pulverized by regime “barrel bombs” and key and Jordan increased, helping to repel other weapons. Regime-held parts of the the offensives. Progress on a nuclear deal city have fared better and retained a much between Washington and Tehran also larger population because the relative lack added to regional worries about the Islamic of firepower by the rebels has meant less Republic, with Arab Sunni monarchies destruction on this side. Thousands of regarding the deal as a catalyst for what families from eastern neighborhoods have they view as Iranian expansionism. But also found refuge from the fighting and some in the Obama administration hope bombardment in western Aleppo. that a nuclear agreement will usher in a In February 2015, regime regulars and period of cooperation with Iran on solving allied militia backed by Hezbollah tried to Syrian as well as other regional problems. build on their firepower advantage and seal off the city. They mounted an offensive to take Castello Road, the only route leading Aleppo Dynamics in and out of Aleppo still under the control Prior to de Mistura’s focus on Aleppo, of the anti-Assad brigades in the northern several ceasefires, which the regime calls sector. Pro-Assad forces first took the adja- “local reconciliations,” were reached in cent town of Ratyan and executed 48 people, besieged Sunni neighborhoods, for example mostly civilians. Instead of softening in Damascus and Homs. As a result, some Aleppo’s defenses, many residents in rebel- aid has been allowed in, but the situation held eastern Aleppo saw the massacre as a has remained short of conciliatory. Pro- sectarian onslaught and an Iranian attempt Assad forces were left ringing the areas, to capture Aleppo. This helped galvanize the SWP Comments 26 May 2015 2 eastern neighborhoods’ defenses and raised city appeared to settle back into a pro- support for jihadist brigades marketing longed war of attrition. In March 2015, the themselves as a bastion of Sunni resistance. Association of the Forces of the Revolution Islamist militancy in Aleppo had already in Aleppo, an amalgamation of civilian and risen after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq military units that included the Shamiya through the recruitment of jihadists from Front, rejected de Mistura’s ceasefire pro- the city – apparently with tacit support posals at a meeting in the Turkish town of from the Syrian security apparatus – to Kilis near the Syrian border. By that time, fight in Iraq. In 2007 a cleric known as Mah- de Mistura was pursuing a modest deal the moud Abu al-Qaqa, suspected of recruiting regime indicated it might accept. It cen- young jihadists in Aleppo to fight in Iraq, tered on a ceasefire in one contested neigh- was assassinated in the city. The killing borhood rather than the whole of the city occurred at the same time the Assad regime and a six-week halt in regime barrel bomb- began, under US pressure, to make public ings, as well as anti-Assad forces stopping commitments to stop the flow of jihadists the use of “hell cannons,” which are im- to Iraq and imprison jihadists upon their provised gas cylinder bombs fired at regime return to Syria. Yet, the authorities released neighborhoods. But following the recapture most of the jihadists a few months after the of Ratyan, Aleppo defenders were embold- revolt against Assad family rule broke out ened and stepped up their efforts to encircle in March 2011, helping radicalize the upris- the Shiite towns of Zahraa and Nubul, 20 ing. A cycle of cooperation and crackdown kilometers north of Aleppo. The two towns involving the regime and Islamists ap- have been main recruiting grounds for peared to break down for good after the regime irregulars in the north, but the beginning of the revolt. Militant Islamists, towns were not sealed off during the siege. such as the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham, Supplies of food and other goods have con- became the most formidable adversaries of tinued to reach Zahraa and Nubul from Assad, especially in Aleppo and the neigh- Ifrin, a nearby Kurdish enclave. The regime boring agricultural province of Idlib. But also reached the town by air. Thus, fighting Aleppo’s Sunni merchant class has largely has continued in Aleppo and its rural en- remained allied with the minority Alawite virons. By mid-April 2015, the regime had regime against the rebels rooted in poorer stepped up its barrel bombings, killing parts of the city and in the countryside. more than 100 people in Aleppo over a The jihadists have overpowered most span of five days.
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