Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Sieges and Ceasefires in ’s Civil War WP Lessons Learned as Regional Players Undermine New Approach by UN Mediator

Khaled Yacoub Oweis S

Representatives of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, an international alliance that nominally supports the , met in Berlin in March 2015 on the fourth anniversary of the Syrian revolt. Participants in the meeting discussed ways to revive the mission of UN mediator Staffan de Mistura, whose efforts for achieving a ceasefire in – Syria’s former commercial and industrial hub – have gone nowhere. Ger- many has been particularly supportive of de Mistura. But the main players in Syria and their regional supporters have shown little willingness to curb the violence, as the con- flict, together with Yemen, is at the heart of what is increasingly perceived as a Sunni- Shia schism. Germany is committed to finding a political solution in Syria that addresses the regional dimension of the conflict. But this is unlikely to happen without a thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia that would allow for tackling sticky political issues behind the religious rhetoric.

Mounting tensions between Arab Gulf coun- at establishing ceasefires and “freeze zones” tries and Iran have hardened the positions in certain areas, starting in the northern of the main players in Syria, thus lessening city of Aleppo. The Aleppo effort was to dif- their willingness to negotiate a solution to fer from previous ceasefires, which were the conflict and undermining the mission reached mostly with little UN involvement, of Staffan de Mistura, the Special UN envoy. in that past deals concerned areas besieged Syria has also appeared to drop from the by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and list of US priorities, as the Obama adminis- resulted in de facto rebel surrender. tration has concentrated on military action against the so-called Islamic State (IS) in and on reaching a deal with Iran over Regional Tension Muddies Efforts Tehran’s nuclear program. Aleppo’s historic importance and the huge Seeing little chance to convene another devastation it has incurred presented the international peace conference following city as a high-profile test case for de Mis- the collapse of the US- and Russia-sponsored tura’s approach and a potential model for “Geneva II” talks in February 2014, de Mis- other hotspots in Syria. For months, de tura pursued a ground-up approach aimed Mistura met Assad and his lieutenants to

Khaled Yacoub Oweis is a fellow in the project “The fragmentation of Syria” realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) SWP Comments 26 and funded by the German Foreign Office. May 2015

1 talk about Aleppo, as well as foreign powers controlling food and basic supplies, and that included , Iran, and Russia. De they remained free to mount incursions. Mistura also met the Shamiya (Levant) Front, Hundreds of fighters, who laid down their a grouping of mostly jihadist rebel brigades arms, as well as activists and civilians who in Aleppo, which coordinated with the al- were supposed to be spared were killed, Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, the most formi- imprisoned, or disappeared, such as in dable anti-Assad formation in the north. the al-Qadam neighborhood of southern But outside powers contributed to rais- Damascus, and in Mouaddamiya on the ing the stakes on the ground and the talks western edge of the capital. achieved little. In February 2015, Assad’s The situation differs fundamentally in forces, backed by the Lebanese group Hez- Aleppo from other areas where rebel bri- bollah and other Shiite militias, mounted gades agreed to ceasefires under duress, a major offensive to seal off Aleppo – at the in that Aleppo has not been completely same time that de Mistura was in New York besieged by Assad’s forces. The city, whose briefing the Security Council on his mis- population was around three million before sion. In southern Syria, appeared the revolt, has been roughly split into a to take the lead in a simultaneous offensive western part under the control of the Assad aimed at recapturing, on behalf of the regime and an eastern sector held by anti- Assad regime, strategic military positions Assad brigades. Eastern districts were poorer lost to the Nusra Front as well as Arab- and and contained most of the city’s inhabit- Western-backed Free (FSA) bri- ants. Their numbers swelled in the decade gades near the border with Jordan and the before the revolt due to migration from Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Jordan and the countryside and from areas along the Arab Gulf countries regarded the attacks as Euphrates River basin in eastern Syria hit being a major escalation driven by Iran. In by a water crisis and near famine. But only reaction – and reversing a period of appar- 40,000 people or so have remained in east- ent neglect of the rebels – the passage of ern Aleppo, large areas of which have been weapons to anti-Assad forces through Tur- pulverized by regime “barrel bombs” and key and Jordan increased, helping to repel other weapons. Regime-held parts of the the offensives. Progress on a nuclear deal city have fared better and retained a much between Washington and Tehran also larger population because the relative lack added to regional worries about the Islamic of firepower by the rebels has meant less Republic, with Arab Sunni monarchies destruction on this side. Thousands of regarding the deal as a catalyst for what families from eastern neighborhoods have they view as Iranian expansionism. But also found refuge from the fighting and some in the Obama administration hope bombardment in western Aleppo. that a nuclear agreement will usher in a In February 2015, regime regulars and period of cooperation with Iran on solving allied militia backed by Hezbollah tried to Syrian as well as other regional problems. build on their firepower advantage and seal off the city. They mounted an offensive to take Castello Road, the only route leading Aleppo Dynamics in and out of Aleppo still under the control Prior to de Mistura’s focus on Aleppo, of the anti-Assad brigades in the northern several ceasefires, which the regime calls sector. Pro-Assad forces first took the adja- “local reconciliations,” were reached in cent town of and executed 48 people, besieged Sunni neighborhoods, for example mostly civilians. Instead of softening in Damascus and Homs. As a result, some Aleppo’s defenses, many residents in rebel- aid has been allowed in, but the situation held eastern Aleppo saw the massacre as a has remained short of conciliatory. Pro- sectarian onslaught and an Iranian attempt Assad forces were left ringing the areas, to capture Aleppo. This helped galvanize the

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2 eastern neighborhoods’ defenses and raised city appeared to settle back into a pro- support for jihadist brigades marketing longed war of attrition. In March 2015, the themselves as a bastion of Sunni resistance. Association of the Forces of the Revolution Islamist militancy in Aleppo had already in Aleppo, an amalgamation of civilian and risen after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq military units that included the Shamiya through the recruitment of jihadists from Front, rejected de Mistura’s ceasefire pro- the city – apparently with tacit support posals at a meeting in the Turkish town of from the Syrian security apparatus – to Kilis near the Syrian border. By that time, fight in Iraq. In 2007 a cleric known as Mah- de Mistura was pursuing a modest deal the moud Abu al-Qaqa, suspected of recruiting regime indicated it might accept. It cen- young jihadists in Aleppo to fight in Iraq, tered on a ceasefire in one contested neigh- was assassinated in the city. The killing borhood rather than the whole of the city occurred at the same time the Assad regime and a six-week halt in regime barrel bomb- began, under US pressure, to make public ings, as well as anti-Assad forces stopping commitments to stop the flow of jihadists the use of “hell cannons,” which are im- to Iraq and imprison jihadists upon their provised gas cylinder bombs fired at regime return to Syria. Yet, the authorities released neighborhoods. But following the recapture most of the jihadists a few months after the of Ratyan, Aleppo defenders were embold- revolt against Assad family rule broke out ened and stepped up their efforts to encircle in March 2011, helping radicalize the upris- the Shiite towns of Zahraa and Nubul, 20 ing. A cycle of cooperation and crackdown kilometers north of Aleppo. The two towns involving the regime and Islamists ap- have been main recruiting grounds for peared to break down for good after the regime irregulars in the north, but the beginning of the revolt. Militant Islamists, towns were not sealed off during the siege. such as the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham, Supplies of food and other goods have con- became the most formidable adversaries of tinued to reach Zahraa and Nubul from Assad, especially in Aleppo and the neigh- Ifrin, a nearby Kurdish enclave. The regime boring agricultural province of Idlib. But also reached the town by air. Thus, fighting Aleppo’s Sunni merchant class has largely has continued in Aleppo and its rural en- remained allied with the minority Alawite virons. By mid-April 2015, the regime had regime against the rebels rooted in poorer stepped up its barrel bombings, killing parts of the city and in the countryside. more than 100 people in Aleppo over a The jihadists have overpowered most span of five days. This occurred after rebels of the FSA brigades in northern Syria. By dug tunnels and infiltrated security com- March 2015, attacks by the Nusra Front pounds in the city and after a rebel mortar forced the Hazm Movement – an FSA bri- bomb attack killed nine people in a residen- gade that received Western backing and tial neighborhood under regime control. boasted an arsenal of anti-tank missiles – to dissolve. Four months earlier, leaders of the Syria Revolutionary Front, an FSA unit Too Many Potential Spoilers linked with Saudi Arabia, fled to Turkey The continuous possibility of Aleppo after the Nusra Front overran their posi- becoming encircled by Hezbollah and the tions in northern Syria. The two FSA units Assad regime has helped maintain a sem- did not help their cause by developing a blance of unity among the rebels, although reputation for graft and timidity in con- several groups left the Shamiya Front frontations with the regime. alliance after the Hezbollah assault was Pro-Assad forces were driven back repelled. The Shamiya Front was eventually from Ratyan in February 2015 and a major absorbed into (the Conquest of attempt to completely besiege eastern Aleppo), a new grouping of mostly hardline Aleppo failed. Fighting in and around the Islamists formed in April 2015 with the aim

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3 of taking the whole city from the regime, appetite to compromise further. Jaish further undermining the possibility of a al-Fatah is largely comprised of the Nusra de-escalation of the conflict. Front, as well as the hardline Suqour Outside powers are not all necessarily al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham. Its fighters supportive either. De Mistura’s efforts in stem largely from Idlib and wanted to return Aleppo have weakened a long-standing to their homes, but they appeared to also Turkish call for a northern safe zone to be be driven by a perception that the war has established to protect civilians, and to squarely become a defense of their faith allow a provisional opposition government against – and a takeover of Syria by – Iran based in the southern Turkish city of and Hezbollah. The regime accused Turkey Gaziantep to move to Syria. Without US of aiding the takeover of Idlib, ignoring backing, especially airpower, the Turkish apparent disarray in regime ranks after the proposal remains dormant. But Ankara jihadists targeted communication centers appeared to signal its displeasure with de in the first stage of their assault on the city. Mistura’s focus on the north by allowing After Idlib fell, Jaish al-Fatah captured the rebels brigades and opposition politicians town of Jisr al-Shughour and advanced to meet in Kilis and denounce his Aleppo toward other regime positions on a major efforts. Among the opposition figures in highway leading from Idlib to Alawite Kilis were , the head of the strongholds in the Latakia governorate. Western and Arab-backed National Coali- These developments have rendered de Mis- tion of Syrian Revolution and Opposition tura’s efforts in the north ineffective. In Forces (or: the Coalition), and Samir Nashar, April 2015, the UN Secretary-General asked a senior Coalition member from Aleppo. de Mistura to start a new round of separate Both Khoja and Nashar are closely connect- consultations with opposition groups, the ed with Turkey. Khoja told those at the regime, and outside powers with the aim of meeting that de Mistura’s ideas had to be re-launching the political process. The con- part of an overall solution. Most members sultations are supposed to be guided by the of the Coalition feared that the de Mistura “Geneva I” communiqué of June 2012, which plan would end up handing Aleppo to Assad, calls for a ceasefire and a transitional govern- but several veteran opposition figures were ing body, that is, the approach that regime dismayed by the presence of Khoja at the and opposition forces were not ready to agree Kilis meeting. In their view, de Mistura on in the “Geneva II” talks in early 2014. lacked a strategy as a mediator, but it would have been more beneficial for the Coalition not to take the blame for the perceived Turning Toward Homs failure of de Mistura. In contrast, the Assad At the same time, failure in the north did regime played for time and showed more not mean an end to de Mistura’s local cease- prudence by not rejecting the Aleppo pro- fire approach. The UN envoy has also been posals outright, while having little interest trying to help conclude a ceasefire deal for in ceasefires in areas it could not control. the besieged al-Waer neighborhood, in the central city of Homs, Syria’s third-largest city. The UN’s role in another siege situa- Regime Takes Blow in North tion in Homs in 2014 has come under pri- The Coalition’s mishandling of de Mistura’s vate criticism from within the organization proposals was overshadowed in late March and from Western officials for over-trusting 2015 when Idlib city, a provincial capital, the Assad regime. was taken from regime hands. The capture Iran has also become a main player in of Idlib by an alliance of mostly jihadist Homs, which is near Shiite villages and brigades, known as Jaish al-Fatah (the Army Hezbollah strongholds in the Bekaa Valley, of Conquest), diminished the opposition’s across the border with Lebanon. The rebel-

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4 lion in Homs was all but crushed when because deliveries have not been allowed Assad’s forces entered the city’s old quar- through regime roadblocks. Bread passes ters after two Iranian-engineered deals through almost daily as well as occasional in May 2014. Pro-Assad forces have since deliveries of perishable foods. Fuel and non- tightened their hold on al-Waer, the last perishable foods are not allowed, and pro- area in Homs where rebel fighters are longed electricity cuts are common. present in significant numbers. The conflict De Mistura and his aides have met repre- in the city has been marked by waves of sentatives of al-Waer to see how his mission slaughter and carpet bombings against could help improve the situation. De Mis- rebellious Sunni neighborhoods, as well as tura’s predecessor, , a dip- reprisal killings of Alawite civilians. After lomatic stalwart, pushed for UN involve- the violence intensified in 2012, most of ment in an earlier siege situation in the old the city’s once majority Sunni population city of Homs while he was presiding over fled to Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. Some the Geneva II peace talks. At the time, the managed to move to the regime-held areas UN’s blessing helped seal an Iranian- of Latakia, al-Nabak, on the Damascus-Homs brokered deal for the partial evacuation of highway, and Palmyra, deep in the desert to the old city. UN officials watched in Feb- the east. Also, more than 14,000 families ruary 2014 as 1,150 people, many of whom from Homs neighborhoods such as Bab Amr were malnourished, left the old city over and the old city have found refuge in al- several days. They included at least 450 Waer. The district is situated near a rural men between the ages of 17 and 50 years Shiite region known as al-Mazraa, where old, which the regime regarded as males Hezbollah militias have deployed and oper- of fighting age and detained them upon ated under the cover of the Assad regime’s their exit in the nearby Al-Andalus School, heavy artillery. although they included civilians and am- An Iranian official nicknamed Abu putees. Four men were killed and their Fadi has been negotiating for months with bodies were later found; another 150 dis- al-Waer representatives about a deal to appeared. The remaining 300 men were reestablish the regime’s presence in the freed or were forced to join the Assad army. area in return for letting in food and medi- In early 2015 information emerged about cine and allowing people to leave. A draft the fate of some of the 150 who went mis- of a proposed agreement is vague about the sing when an activist among them turned status of those wanted by the regime, which up alive. The activist was transferred from has prompted opposition to the deal from the makeshift detention facility in Homs to some 2,000 fighters defending the district, a secret police compound in Damascus and who are mostly from al-Oqaidat, a clan tortured. At least half of those who were rooted in al-Waer. But popular pressure on initially held in the Al-Andalus School are the fighters to make a deal has appeared now thought to have been killed. The rest to increase. Dozens of people were killed were transferred to unofficial jails in Damas- by regime shelling and barrel bombs in cus and their fate is unknown. al-Waer in the first three months of 2015, Brahimi was warned from within his including five workers at the Al-Waleed team that the regime was likely to violate Hospital. The facility has been targeted by the Homs deal and killings could follow. regime rockets several times, and only a But he was eager for confidence-building few doctors have remained in the district. measures amid the stalled Geneva talks and Another hospital in al-Waer is under the jumped on the ceasefire bandwagon. From control of the regime, and arrests of patients February to May 2014, another 800 males are common. Four aid organizations sanc- of fighting age in the old city handed them- tioned by the regime operate in al-Waer, selves in. The regime contacted them but their food storage depots are empty through some of the detainees who were

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5 freed from the Al-Andalus School and letting in food. People were arrested when offered not to harm them if they also left. they went to take deliveries of basic sup- Still, some 50 out of the 800 men eventually plies, most notably in the Yarmouk Camp disappeared. Iran then made a push for an- in southern Damascus, theater of several other Homs deal, partly to show the inter- failed deals and sieges of the camp by Assad’s national community it could deliver in forces since May 2013. Syria. On 8 May 2014 the last fighters exited A fallout inside Yarmouk between Islam- the old city to rebel areas in the country- ist fighters culminated in the Islamic State’s side north of Homs. The deal involved free- entry into the camp in early April 2015. ing Alawite captives held by rebels, which Assad’s forces intensified their indiscrimi- helped make the arrangement stick. The nate bombardment of the area as the Islamic regime did not want to appear dismissive State fought, and largely expelled, a faction of its core constituency. This consideration linked to the Palestinian movement Hamas appears to have been crucial for the relative from the camp. UN officials, including a success of one ceasefire in a Damascus dis- deputy of de Mistura, met Syrian officials trict as well. in Damascus to try and save 18,000 trapped civilians, including 3,500 children. Yarmouk was home to 150,000 Palestin- Damascus Neighborhoods ians and a large number of Syrians before Out of some 10 local ceasefires concluded the revolt. It was besieged as part of a since late 2013, the regime lacked over- larger siege on several interconnected rebel whelming advantage in only one deal. It districts. These comprise Yarmouk, Hajar was concluded in January 2014 and covered al-Aswad, which is inhabited mostly by the mixed Barzeh neighborhood of north- refugees from the Israeli-occupied Golan ern Damascus. Barzeh is ringed by Assad’s Heights, as well as districts that have signed forces. Yet, the close proximity of Alawite local ceasefires, including al-Qadam, Isali, and Sunni neighborhoods in Barzeh has Babila, Yalda, and Beit Sahm. The enormity meant that neither side can target the other and lengthy duration of the siege have with impunity. Since the deal was made, helped radicalize the population and estab- detentions and regime incursions into lish jihadist brigades as the main players on Barzeh have been rare, and food and basic the anti-Assad side in southern Damascus. supplies have been allowed in without the Since the beginning of the siege, starvation regime making demands in return. Loyalist and malnutrition have killed an estimated and rebel checkpoints have also been set 160 people in Yarmouk. Infants were among up at the entrances of the district near each the dead as a consequence of the regime’s other. Unlike in besieged areas, where the “surrender or starve” strategy in Yarmouk. rebel arsenals have been depleted, Barzeh Many were newcomers who arrived to Yar- fighters have retained enough firepower to mouk in poor health after Assad’s forces make life difficult for regime supporters in and Hezbollah militia overran rebel areas neighboring areas while still wanting safety around the Shiite shrine of al-Saida Zainab, for their own families. The regime also further south of the capital. People involved judged that provoking the rebels could be- in delivering aid also have come under come too costly. Thus, developments such attack from rebel bridges in the camp. as those that have arisen in other ceasefire Palestinian factions in Yarmouk had split areas have been avoided. Following other at the beginning of the revolt. The Palestine ceasefires in Damascus, markets have been Liberation Organization favored neutrality, shelled. Residents have also been black- Hamas chose a pro-revolt approach, and the mailed to hand over wanted people or Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- allow Syrian state television to come in to tine-General Command (PFLP-GC) remained make propaganda footage in return for pro-Assad. The PFLP-GC, however, lost popu-

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6 larity in Yarmouk after the group – appar- national efforts to spare the camp more ently acting at the behest of the Assad carnage. In response, Nusra Front issued regime – encouraged hundreds of Yarmouk a declaration in mid-April 2015 that the residents to protest at a fence separating group would protect aid entering the camp the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights from and deliver it to a central distribution out- the rest of Syria in June 2011. Israeli forces let. But chances appear dim that the regime killed at least 10 protesters. PFLP-GC militia- would accept aid reaching Yarmouk while men then killed a dozen mourners at the the camp is under the control of a strength- funeral of the protesters in Yarmouk. The ened Nusra Front. After defeating Aknaf, balance of power in the camp began to many Islamic State fighters apparently with- change and the PFLP-GC was expelled. In drew from Yarmouk to their home district early 2012 an armed group called Aknaf of Hajar al-Aswad, which they had left ex- Beit al-Maqdis (Aknaf) was formed in Yar- posed while pursuing Aknaf. In Yarmouk, mouk by members of Hamas who stayed the regime has intensified a “bite by bite” in Syria after the Hamas leadership left strategy, taking areas on the edge of the the country. The new formation joined camp after heavy shelling, then flattening two FSA units in fighting Assad’s forces. them to make sure rebels cannot return. In line with the wider demise of moder- Indeed, the history of Yarmouk since ate rebels, jihadists displaced the FSA in the beginning of the revolt underlines the Yarmouk in 2013; thereafter the Nusra lack of qualms by the regime to shell dense- Front, the hardline Ahrar al-Sham, and ly inhabited population centers on the one Aknaf became the main players inside the hand, and the difficulty of implementing camp. Nearby, the Islamic State drove out ceasefires in areas where rebels still com- other Islamist and FSA units from Hajar pete for turf on the other. In mid-2014, a al-Aswad. ceasefire deal entitled “neutralizing Yar- In a move that antagonized the Nusra mouk camp” was struck with the involve- Front, Aknaf became close with Sham ment of the Relief and Works al-Rasoul, an Islamist rebel formation based Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near in the nearby districts of Yalda and Babila, East. But the deal did not go into effect, which agreed to a ceasefire with the regime partly because of the lack of cooperation in 2014 and subsequently expelled the Nusra from the Nusra Front. A clause in the agree- Front from the area. The Nusra Front there- ment stipulated the exit of fighters who are fore remained on the sidelines when, in not from Yarmouk from the camp, which early April 2015, the Islamic State raided was seen as favoring Aknaf at the expense the headquarters of Aknaf in Yarmouk. The of the Nusra Front. attack came days after Aknaf accused the Islamic State of having assassinated Yihya al-Horani, one of its leaders, and arrested Conclusions and Recommendations several Islamic State fighters who were at A more assertive posture by Iran and Saudi the edge of Yarmouk. Aknaf largely lost Arabia, as well as the lack of a resolution the battle with the Islamic State, and its for Russia’s disputes with the West, will fighters fled to regime positions ringing make a new round of international con- the camp. Others surrendered to the Nusra sultations on Syria initiated by the UN dif- Front. A third group from Aknaf fled to ficult, especially as these consultations Sham al-Rasoul’s enclaves in Yalda and will be held at the same time international Babila, along with hundreds of families powers and Iran negotiate a final nuclear who escaped stepped-up regime bombard- deal. Attentive to its Hezbollah proxy, Iran ment on Yarmouk. has played a major role in local ceasefires Popular pressure has appeared to rise in Syria but it has shown little appetite on the Nusra Front to cooperate with inter- for a political transition at the core of the

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7 Geneva I framework. Such a transition structure not wholly antagonistic to Hez- could lead to a Sunni political ascendency, bollah. Saudi Arabia has also been facing potentially undermining Hezbollah’s problems closer to its own borders in weapons supply route through Syria and Yemen and Iraq. It might be open to a com- weakening an important ally at the center promise that removes Assad but preserves a of the Arab Middle East. Therefore, a region- semblance of the state and limits chaos by al agreement that would support local keeping a stake for those backed by Iran in ceasefires with all the necessary measures the system. Thus, a crucial step would be needed to enforce them effectively remains finding a balance of interests between Iran unlikely. Some UN officials have argued and Saudi Arabia. Syrian opposition leaders that previous ceasefires in Syria have saved have indicated that they recognize that Iran lives, but this is only true when the killings cannot be dismissed, and that a way would apparently committed by the regime are have to be found to safeguard Tehran’s in- glossed over. Indeed, mechanisms for solv- terest in a future Syria. The Jordanian for-

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und ing the conflict on the local level matter eign minister sent a similar message when Politik, 2015 little without addressing the confrontation he told Iranian officials in Tehran in March All rights reserved between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which is that it was time to reexamine Syria and These Comments reflect what underlies the region’s violent con- other issues in cold political terms despite solely the author’s views. flicts which are increasingly being perceived the religious taint to the conflict. SWP in sectarian terms. In addition to the UN In addition, Russian backing would be Stiftung Wissenschaft und mediator, this would require a multi-tiered needed to support a deal on the regional Politik German Institute for diplomatic effort. level. Russia wields significant influence International and First, Germany, the United States, and within the Alawite core of Assad’s military, Security Affairs the other Western powers supposedly and it has continued to back the regime. Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 working with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and But Russian dissatisfaction with Assad will 10719 Berlin other Arab countries under the Friends of grow if he fails to perform. For example, Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 the Syrian People umbrella would have to Moscow seems not to have been pleased www.swp-berlin.org agree on political priorities. The Western when the regime offered virtually no con- [email protected] focus on the Islamic State has relegated the cessions at Syria talks held in Moscow in ISSN 1861-1761 Geneva I principles for a political transition April 2015, which mostly involved Syrian to the sidelines, raising suspicion among figures handpicked by Russia who differ the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia, and Tur- little from Assad. Thus, the time might be key about the West’s seriousness in ending ripe to find some common ground between Assad’s rule and four decades of Alawite the West and Moscow on Syria and the re- domination over the country. Indeed, the gional dimensions of the conflict, although US air raids against the Islamic State have Russia has made it clear that its coopera- indirectly supported Assad by targeting tion with the West in negotiating the nu- fighters who could challenge him. clear deal with Iran is separate from other A second sphere of diplomatic efforts international conflicts. Only when there is would need to deal with the aftermath sufficient regional and international agree- of the nuclear negotiations with Iran. US ment would a “Geneva III” conference stand officials have indicated that they intend to a reasonable chance of containing the approach Tehran about regional problems chaos in Syria. after a final nuclear agreement is signed. Iran has been sending money and person- nel to prop up the Assad regime as the Ala- wite minority bleeds. Eventually, it might become too costly, and Tehran might be tempted to negotiate a transition that would preserve some of its interests and a security

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