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Information and Liaison Bulletin N°340 INSTITUT KURD E DE PARIS Information and liaison bulletin N°340 july 2013 The publication of this Bulletin enjoys a subsidy from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGCID) aqnd the Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (The Fund for action and support of integration and the struggle against discrimination) This bulletin is issued in French and English Price per issue : France: 6 € — Abroad : 7,5 € Annual subscribtion (12 issues) France : 60 € — Elsewhere : 75 € Monthly review Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 15 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tel. : 01-48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01-48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: bulletin@fikp.org Information and liaison bulletin Kurdish Institute of Paris Bulletin N° 340 July 2013 • IRAQI KURDISTAN: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN POSTPONED. • SYRIA: VIOLENT FIGHTING BETWEEN JIHADANISTS AND THE PYD FORCES. TURKEY: THE PKK THREATENS TO PUT AN END TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. • IRAN: INCREASED REPRESSION OF THE KURDISH BORDER VILLAGES. • CULTURE: HADASSA YESHURIN, AND ISRAELI SINGER WITH A KURDISH AND ARAMAIC REPERTORY. IRAQI KURDISTAN: THE PRESIDENTIALS ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN POSTPONED utting an end to the dis - the KDP, has preferred this solution was when, at the age of 16, I cussions over the possi - to that of a referendum on the new became a Peshmerga for the free - ble re-election or exten - constitution. It said it considered the dom and the national and democrat - P sion of his Presidential latter option could endanger social ic rights of the people of Kurdistan. term of office, the peace, as stated by Arslan Bayiz, Kurdistan Regional Government’s Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament Being a Peshmerga was my life’s President resolved the issue by post - and a member of the PUK. greatest source of pride. I have, poning the Presidential elections since then, held many responsibili - while maintaining the parliamentary In a public speech addressed to “cit - ties. In fighting I have served the General Elections, as planned, for izens of Kurdistan” Massud Barzani interests of my people with the val - September 2013. made the point that his decision was ues and soul of a Peshmerga. due to his concern not to leave Iraqi The opposition obviously didn’t Kurdistan in a “constitutional vacu - I am also proud of having called on miss the opportunity of attacking um”, while repeating that he did not the Kurdistan Front, at the start of this delay as “illegal” and undemo - wish to be a candidate at the next our people’s uprising in the spring cratic, as Mohammed Tofiq, head of Presidential election. of 1991, to hold free elections so as Gorran’s Political Relations to enable the people of Kurdistan to Committee described it. Other edi - These are the terms of this impor - chose its own destiny. All this torial writers even spoke about a tant speech by Massud Barzani, resulted in some aims that I set “coup d’état”. made on 16 July 2013: myself during my struggles as a Peshmerga, during the period of the For its part, the Patriotic Union of “Dear People of Kurdistan, revolution in the mountains. It was Kurdistan (PUK), which has shared Political entities and organisations also a national duty to apply the government office in the Region for of civil society, principles of democracy and set up several years past but has decided a democratic political and adminis - this year not to form a joint list with The happiest decision of my life trative system. • 2 • Information and liaison bulletin n° 340 • July 2013 Since then, the people of Kurdistan, showing our people and to the peo - I will make every effort to set up a as well as all the loyal parties of the ples outside Kurdistan, another new platform so as to achieve a con - Region, have initiated the democratic example of the democratic process in sensus. The people of Kurdistan and process. Today, with the help of God, Kurdistan. Moreover I sought to the political parties have seen that I the support of the loyalists, the strug - make easier a consensus between the had already made considerable gle and endurance of our people, we political trends and other elements of efforts to achieve a consensus regard - are seeing some significant improve - the Kurdistan community to enable ing the Constitution before it was ments in all aspects of life for the them to properly present their com - adopted in 2009 so that it secured the people of Kurdistan. That is why, ments and arguments. agreement of all the parties in today, Kurdistan enjoys a good repu - Kurdistan. I insisted on the fact that tation regarding its policy, security Letting the different parties send in all the ethnic and religious groups and coexistence. their remarks had the aim of finding a should find their place in this consti - general consensus within and outside tution and that is what took place. Parliament. The views of each would Then Parliament approved the draft The Kurdistan Region has gone have established a better road map Constitution. Here again I wanted to through long discussions on the and a more suitable platform for the set up a platform for a consensus that nature and the concept of its political draft Constitution and the elections. went beyond the differences within system, and the project of its Moreover, I wanted to inform the the political parties. Constitution. In order to provide people of Kurdistan, in all sincerity another example of adherence to the that I, personally, had no intention of Unfortunately, the opposition’s democratic process and to the law, I being re-elected, that I observe all the behaviour for the last four years wrote to the Electoral High laws and that I will confide the hassled a considerable number of Commission asking it to organise Region’s Presidency to whoever people to conclude that the opposi - parliamentary and Presidential elec - would then be elected. tion will not e satisfied with any - tions for September of this year. That thing and that in its view “consen - was clearly to carry out my obliga - Unfortunately, the opposition did not sus” means imposing its views on tions. The date of these elections was support the process just as it prevent - others, which contradicts the stan - set for 21 September 2013. However, ed the other parties from taking part dards of politics and democracy. before and after this, there were dif - in the meetings organised by the ferences of opinion regarding the Speaker of Parliament, thus making The three opposition parties should mechanisms of the Presidential elec - these efforts and the process to fail. know that there are other compo - tions in Kurdistan. These differences nents of Kurdistan besides the KDP were whether the President should be I really want to stress here that “con - and the PUK, and that they have directly elected by the people, in sensus” does not mean “reach and also experienced hard times and that respect of Law N° 1 on the Kurdistan agreement” between the Kurdistan these parties made sacrifices to Region’s presidency, adopted in Democratic Party and the Patriotic defend the existence of our people 2005, and in the draft Constitution, or Union of Kurdistan and the three and the very name of Kurdistan. whether the President should be opposition parties. A consensus needs elected by Parliament, which was the all these parties and other parties and Moreover, today, we can see many view of several political parties. This elements of Kurdistan. other legal parties that have some - generated discussions between the thing to say about the development political parties as well as on the draft - previously, this draft Constitution of Kurdistan. Constitution, which, unfortunately, let was the result of discussions between some parties to aggressive acts in the 36 political parties and ethnic groups The three opposition parties cannot, course of the political process and so, today, we must not marginalise in any case, be allowed to prevent finally led to a crisis. them — Kurdistan does only include others from expressing their point of the five groups already cited. Here view before the highest institutions Moreover, I wrote a second letter, on again, I am asking all the parties to of Kurdistan or to humiliate these 25 May 2013, calling on all the think about the question of the parties by their discourse in any Kurdistan political parties to give Constitution and I offer them my way —this is totally undemocratic. their views of the draft Constitution. total support. Let us prevent a politi - Thus I am asking all those associat - Following reception of their answers, cal crisis so as not to disturb the ed with the opposition to act on the I asked Parliament to meet all sides peace that our people is enjoying. Let basis of accept the views of others. of the political trends of Kurdistan us use all our strength and all our society so as to reach a consensus. I means to seize every opportunity our My dear and valiant people of hoped, in this way, to find a better region has available for our people Kurdistan. platform for working in common and and for our nation. On 30 June 2013 the Kurdistan n° 340 • July 2013 Information and liaison bulletin • 3• Parliament adopted two laws that I sincerely hope that Mam Jalal will duties until this 4 th Assembly begins extended the Parliament’s and the rapidly his health and soon return its work and reaches a consensus.
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