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Harry S.Truman,El Arma Atómica Y La Gestión De La Paz

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Harry S.Truman,El Arma Atómica Y La Gestión De La Paz FACULTAD DE HISTORIA Departamento de Historia Contemporánea HARRY S. TRUMAN, EL ARMA ATÓMICA Y LA GESTIÓN DE LA PAZ. PRESUNCIONES, PERCEPCIONES Y NARRATIVA POLÍTICA DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN TRUMAN DURANTE LA POSGUERRA, 1945 - 1948 Tesis doctoral presentada por: GERARDO ANDRÉS MORENO Dirigida por AURORA BOSCH SÁNCHEZ Programa de Doctorado: Nuevas Perspectivas en Historia Contemporánea Valencia, Noviembre de 2015 I II III A MI FAMILIA: POR LA PACIENCIA, POR EL APOYO, POR EL EJEMPLO… A AURORA, QUIEN ME CONTAGIÓ LA PASIÓN POR LA HISTORIA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS A LOS ALUMNOS, CON LOS QUE APRENDO Y CREZCO TODOS LOS DÍAS Puedo ordenar al espejo que revele muchas cosas – respondió ella [Galadriel] – y a algunos puedo mostrarles lo que desean ver. Pero el espejo muestra también cosas que no se le piden, y éstas son a menudo más extrañas y provechosas que aquellas que deseamos ver. Lo que verás, si dejas en libertad al espejo, no puedo decirlo. Pues muestra cosas que fueron, y cosas que son, y cosas que quizá serán. Pero si fueron, son o serán ni siquiera el más sabio puede decirlo. ¿Deseas mirar? (El Señor de los Anillos, 389) IV HARRY S. TRUMAN, EL ARMA ATÓMICA Y LA GESTIÓN DE LA PAZ ABREVIATURAS ......................................................................................................................................................... XIV INTRODUCCIÓN .............................................................................................................................................................. 1 OBJETIVOS, METODOLOGÍA Y FUENTES ............................................................................................................... 5 OBJETIVOS ........................................................................................................................................................................ 5 CONTENIDOS Y METODOLOGÍA .......................................................................................................................................... 7 El contenido de la investigación.......................................................................................................................... 7 La metodología .................................................................................................................................................... 9 LAS FUENTES Y SU PROBLEMÁTICA ................................................................................................................................. 11 Las fuentes utilizadas ........................................................................................................................................ 12 Los problemas de las fuentes ............................................................................................................................. 14 a. Las memorias. La selección de los protagonistas ............................................................................................................ 15 b. La selección del propio autor ........................................................................................................................................... 16 LA GUERRA FRÍA Y LA BOMBA ATÓMICA. GUERRAS HISTORIOGRÁFICAS ............................................ 19 LA GUERRA FRÍA ............................................................................................................................................................ 19 Las explicaciones oficialistas o tradicionales ................................................................................................... 20 Las teorías revisionistas .................................................................................................................................... 24 Las teorías pos revisionistas ............................................................................................................................. 26 LA HISTORIOGRAFÍA SOBRE LA BOMBA ATÓMICA............................................................................................................ 33 La bomba como el fin de la II Guerra mundial ................................................................................................. 33 Las bombas atómicas como el inicio de la Guerra Fría ................................................................................... 34 a. La diplomacia atómica ..................................................................................................................................................... 35 b. La diplomacia atómica revisada ...................................................................................................................................... 37 c. Las explicaciones culturalistas y estructuralistas ............................................................................................................. 38 Un debate sin fin ............................................................................................................................................... 39 a. La exposición del Smithsonian. Celebrando el fin de la guerra ....................................................................................... 40 b. Un debate en tablas .......................................................................................................................................................... 41 UN MUNDO EN GUERRA ............................................................................................................................................. 45 LAS CONDICIONES GEOPOLÍTICAS ................................................................................................................................... 46 El espíritu de Yalta ............................................................................................................................................ 50 a. El reparto del mundo en Yalta ......................................................................................................................................... 52 El idealismo político en Yalta. Las Organización de las Naciones Unidas ...................................................... 55 a. La gestión del proyecto .................................................................................................................................................... 55 b. La negociación. Dumbarton Oaks y el asunto del derecho de veto. ................................................................................. 57 c. Las Naciones Unidas durante la Conferencia de Yalta .................................................................................................... 60 d. Los caminos desde Yalta ................................................................................................................................................. 61 VISIONES CONTRAPUESTAS. F.D. ROOSEVELT Y LA URSS .............................................................................................. 63 Aliados de una dictadura .................................................................................................................................. 63 V HARRY S. TRUMAN, EL ARMA ATÓMICA Y LA GESTIÓN DE LA PAZ El valiente ejército soviético y el pueblo ruso ................................................................................................... 69 LAS LECCIONES DE LA GUERRA ....................................................................................................................................... 74 Pearl Harbour y la necesidad de inteligencia ................................................................................................... 74 Distancias inmensas. Los problemas de ser una potencia global ..................................................................... 76 La resiliencia y estupidez del fanatismo ............................................................................................................ 79 El poder aéreo. La guerra es muerte ................................................................................................................. 81 El final del conflicto bélico y sus estructuras administrativas .......................................................................... 83 EL PROYECTO MANHATTAN. LA APARICIÓN DEL FACTOR ATÓMICO ............................................................................... 85 La bomba como ciencia ficción ......................................................................................................................... 85 La bomba como posibilidad .............................................................................................................................. 88 a. El ejército y la construcción de la bomba ........................................................................................................................ 89 b. La comunidad científica y la construcción de la bomba .................................................................................................. 93 c. La administración norteamericana y la construcción de la bomba ................................................................................... 95 La alternativa de los científicos. El nacimiento del tabú atómico ..................................................................... 98 LOS MESES DE LA VICTORIA ................................................................................................................................. 105 EL GABINETE DE TRUMAN Y EL CAMINO A POTSDAM ...................................................................................................
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