A Realist Theory of Science ‘A genuinely original argument in the philosophy of science is a rare thing indeed. Bhaskar has produced a new…strong, elaborate and well-integrated, elegant and powerful argument.’—Rom Harre, Mind, 1977. ‘A remarkably interesting and stimulating book in an area of philosophy in which such books have become all too rare.’— S.Korner, Times Literary Supplement, 1975. Now acknowledged as a classic in the philosophy of science, A Realist Theory of Science is one of the very few books which has transformed not only our understanding of science, but that of the nature of the world it studies. Since its original publication in 1975, the book has inspired the multi-disciplinary and international movement of thought known as ‘critical realism’, and its ideas have been influential across the whole spectrum of the sciences, arts and humanities and in a diverse array of social practices and professions. A new introduction to this edition by Mervyn Hartwig describes the context, significance and impact of A Realist Theory of Science, and supplies an expert critique of its content. Roy Bhaskar is the originator of the philosophy of critical realism, and the author of many other acclaimed and influential works, including The Possibility of Naturalism, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, Reclaiming Reality, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom and Reflections on Meta-Reality. He is an editor of Critical Realism: Essential Readings and was the founding chair of the Centre for Critical Realism. Currently he is a World Scholar at the University of London Institute of Education. Mervyn Hartwig is founding editor of the Journal of Critical Realism and editor of A Dictionary of Critical Realism. Classical Texts in Critical Realism Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom Roy Bhaskar A Realist Theory of Science Roy Bhaskar Forthcoming: Plato Etc Roy Bhaskar Reclaiming Reality Roy Bhaskar Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation Roy Bhaskar A Realist Theory of Science Roy Bhaskar LONDON AND NEW YORK First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX 14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2008 Roy Bhaskar All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN10: 0-415-45494-8 (pbk) ISBN10: 0-203-89263-1 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-45494-0 (pbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-89263-3 (ebk) ISBN 0-203-09073-2 Master e-book ISBN Contents Introduction by Mervyn Hartwig ix Preface xxvii Preface to the Second Edition xxxii Introduction 1 Chapter 1. Philosophy and Scientific Realism 11 1. Two Sides of ‘Knowledge’ 11 2. Three Traditions in the Philosophy of Science 14 3. The Transcendental Analysis of Experience 20 A. The Analysis of Perception 21 B. The Analysis of Experimental Activity 23 4. The Status of Ontology and Its Dissolution in 26 Classical Philosophy 5. Ontology Vindicated and The Real Basis of Causal 35 Laws 6. A Sketch of a Critique of Empirical Realism 46 Chapter 2. Actualism and the Concept of a Closure 53 1. Introduction: On the Actuality of the Causal 53 Connection 2. Regularity Determinism and the Quest for a Closure 59 3. The Classical Paradigm of Action 69 4. Actualism and Transcendental Realism: The 81 nterpretation of Normic Statements 5. Autonomy and Reduction 95 Contents vi 6. Explanation in Open Systems 107 Appendix. Orthodox Philosophy of Science and the 117 Implications of Open Systems Chapter 3. The Logic of Scientific Discovery 133 1. Introduction: On the Contingency of the Causal 133 Connection 2. The Surplus-Element in the Analysis of Law-like 139 Statements: A Critique of the Theory of Models 3. Natural Necessity and Natural Kinds: The 154 Stratification of Nature and The Stratification of Science 4. The Social Production of Knowledge by Means of 176 Knowledge 5. Objections to the Account of Natural Necessity 190 Proposed 6. The Problem of Induction 206 Appendix. Natural Tendencies and Causal Powers 221 Chapter 4. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science 231 Postscript to the Second Edition 243 Bibliography 255 Index of names 263 Index of subjects 267 To my mother Introduction First published in 1975,1 A Realist Theory of Science (RTS) deploys Kantian-type transcendental procedure to develop a position within the philosophy of science known as transcendental realism, a species of scientific realism. It presents novel and stunning resolutions of problems generated by classical empiricism and rationalism, and the newer philosophy of science, problems such as that of induction and that of reconciling the relativity of scientific knowledge as a social process with realism about its objects. Moreover, these resolutions cohere in comprehensive new treatments of ontology, which the book sets out to revindicate, and epistemology, together with a striking new account of science, an account that was hailed as revolutionary at the time. While it can thus be read for its own sake as an unparalleled stand- alone contribution to the philosophy of science, RTS can arguably even more profitably be approached as the founding moment in the elaboration of the philosophical system of critical realism and meta- Reality,2 the abiding concern of which is human emancipation understood as the replacement of unneeded and unwanted sources of determination with needed and wanted ones; and of a new intellectual movement—‘critical realism’—which is international and multidisciplinary in scope. For those who are familiar with the Bhaskarian system this will in any case be unavoidable. All interpretation is inherently dialogical and we bring all the resources at our command to the task of understanding a text. Furthermore, though trained as an analytical philosopher and operating initially from within the analytical tradition, Ram Roy Bhaskar3 is through and through a dialectical thinker. RTS already implicitly or proleptically contains much of the rest of the system, the chronologically later moments of which accordingly shed a vertically striking light in the present on its founding moment (and vice versa: the earlier illuminate the later, as I hope the series of introductions that I, as founding editor of Journal of Critical Realism and editor/author of Dictionary of Critical Introduction x Realism,4 have been commissioned to write to a number of Bhaskar’s subsequent works will also show).5 Systems—though much out of favour these days, in which characteristically the enormous complexity of the world is acknowledged, and in which, it is claimed, we can only ever get epistemological purchase on some aspects of it (if that)—are like ontologies (which they sometimes embrace): if philosophers do not develop one explicitly, their work will implicitly or tacitly secrete one. Such an implicit system will, moreover, usually be highly confused, precisely because it has not been thought through comprehensively and as such will unwittingly incorporate elements of the compromise formations6 that define the intellectual horizons into which we are all ‘thrown’. Where ‘PMR’ stands for ‘the philosophy of meta-Reality’, ‘TDCR’ for ‘transcendental dialectical critical realism’, ‘DCR’ for ‘dialectical critical realism’, ‘EC’ for ‘the theory of explanatory critiques’, ‘CN’ for ‘critical naturalism’, ‘TR’ for ‘transcendental realism’ and ‘>’ for ‘constellationally contains’ or ‘preservatively sublates’, the place of transcendental realism within this beautifully articulated system can be written as: PMR>TDCR>DCR>EC>CN>TR This system is also articulated in terms of seven dimensions of being (the ontological-axiological chain) that I normally designate ‘stadia’—that is, its dialectic is a seven-termed one—as follows (where ‘7A’ [seventh awakening] stands for non-duality, ‘6R’ [sixth realm] for (re-)enchantment, ‘5A’ [fifth aspect] for reflexivity understood as spirituality, ‘4D’ [fourth dimension] for human transformative praxis, ‘3L’ [third level] for totality, ‘2E’ [second edge] for negativity, ‘1M’ [first moment] for non-identity: 7A>6R>5A>4D>3L>2E>1M7 Or conversely, and chronologically (omitting the numerals): MELDARA.8 This is by no means a purely mnemonic device; thus, as I have written elsewhere: ‘Moment signifies something finished, behind us, determinate—a product: transfactual (structural) causality, pertaining to NON-IDENTITY, first is for founding. Edge speaks of the point of transition or becoming, the exercise of causal powers in rhythmic (processual) causality, pertaining to NEGATIVITY’,9 and so on for the remainder of the series, which need not detain us here.10 xi A Realist Theory of Science Transcendental realism thinks being as 1M non-identity (above all as between epistemology and ontology), more specifically as structured and differentiated. Each subsequent moment adds a new inflection to thinking being at 1M (as well as to any other stadion or stadia, 2E-6R, the elaboration of which has preceded its own development, which likewise need not detain us). Thus at 1M, the main focus of scientific realism, whereas TR thinks being as structured and differentiated, CN thinks it also as containing mind and concepts, EC also as intrinsically valuable, DCR also as alethic truth, TDCR also as spiritual, and PMR also as enchanted and non- dual. It is important to bear in mind that the sublations here are preservative;11 thus each moment constellationally embraces all its predecessor moments.