Hamas Triumphant Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy

Robert Satloff, Editor

Policy Focus #53 | February 2006 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any infor- mation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

© 2006 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Published in 2006 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036.

Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: A Palestinian youth celebrates the victory of Hamas in parliamentary elections, January 26, 2006. Th e Palestinian fl ag he waves contains the Islamic affi rmation of faith: “Th ere is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his Prophet.” Copyright AP Wide World Photos/Mohammed Ballas Contributors

Soner Cagaptay is senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at Th e Washington Institute.

Jamie Chosak is a research assistant in the Terrorism Studies Program at Th e Washington Institute.

Patrick Clawson is deputy director for research at Th e Washington Institute.

Michael Eisenstadt is senior fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at Th e Washington Institute.

Ben Fishman is researcher and special assistant to Ambassador Dennis Ross at Th e Washington Institute.

Christopher Hamilton is senior fellow in the Terrorism Studies Program at Th e Washington Institute.

Simon Henderson is a senior fellow of Th e Washington Institute, focusing on Gulf politics, based in London.

Michael Herzog, a brigadier general in the Israel Defense Forces, is a visiting military fellow at Th e Washington Institute.

David Makovsky is senior fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at Th e Washington Institute.

Dennis Ross is counselor and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at Th e Washington Institute.

Robert Satloff , editor, is the executive director of Th e Washington Institute.

Joseph Solomon is a research intern in the Terrorism Studies Program at Th e Washington Institute.

Mohammed Yaghi is a Ramallah-based political analyst and columnist for al-Ayyam newspaper.

■ ■ ■

Th e opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Publication of this Policy Focus was made possible by special grants from Ellen and Murray Koppelman and Janine and Peter Lowy, benefactors of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process, and the supporters of the Michael Stein Counterterrorism Research Fund. Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ...... v

Introduction ...... 1

Part I: The Strategy and Tactics of Hamas

A Primer on Hamas: Origins, Tactics, Strategy, and Response ...... 5 Robert Satloff

Understanding the Hamas Agenda ...... 10 Mohammed Yaghi

Part II: Political Implications of Hamas’s Victory

Israeli Policy and Politics in the Wake of Hamas’s Victory ...... 15 David Makovsky

Hamas, Fatah, and Palestinian Politics aft er January 25 ...... 21 Ben Fishman

Responses to Hamas’s Victory from Israel’s Arab and Muslim Neighborhood ...... 27 Soner Cagaptay

Part III: Security Implications of Hamas’s Victory

Th e New Palestinian Political Map and Its Security Implications ...... 33 Michael Herzog

Maintaining the Tahdiyya: Hurdles for Hamas’s Postelection Military Strategy ...... 37 Christopher Hamilton, Jamie Chosak, and Joseph Solomon

Regional Security Implications of the Hamas Electoral Victory ...... 41 Michael Eisenstadt

Part IV: Responding to Hamas’s Victory: Options for External Actors

From Washington to Hamas: Change or Fail ...... 47 Dennis Ross

European Policy Options toward a Hamas-Led Palestinian Authority ...... 52 Simon Henderson Pressing the Palestinian Authority Financially: Not as Easy as It Looks ...... 56 Patrick Clawson

Illustrations

Final Results of 2006 Palestinian Legislative Elections ...... 25

Distribution of Seats by Party ...... 25

Distribution of Seats by District ...... 26 Acknowledgments

THIS SPECIAL POLICY FOCUS was written, edited, and prepared for publication in just two weeks. Many people deserve recognition for this Herculean eff ort: the contributors, all of whom (except one, Mohammed Yaghi) are members of the outstanding research staff of Th e Washington Institute; Ben Fishman, who prepared the charts and tables of Palestinian election results; designer Daniel Kohan; David Makovsky and Elizabeth Young, who did a yeoman’s job of proofreading; and the fi ne editorial staff at Publications Professionals, including Barbara Hart, Laura Glassman, and Ashley Young. Th anks to all of you.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v

Introduction

THE VICTORY OF the Islamic Resistance Move- recalibrating how America pursues its still-worthy objec- ment—Hamas—in Palestinian Legislative Council tive of promoting democracy in the broader Middle East. elections on January 25, 2006, unleashed a political But fi rst things fi rst—at the current moment, it is essen- tsunami throughout the Middle East and beyond. tial to understand who Hamas is and what its victory Aft er forty years of undisputed dominance in Palestin- means for the pursuit of security and peace in a region of ian politics, the secular, nationalist Fatah—the party of vital U.S. interest. Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, the party of both The Washington Institute is fortunate to have a the Oslo Accords with Israel and violent uprisings group of outstanding scholars, experts, and practitioners against Israel—had been displaced by a radical Islamist who could be enlisted at short notice to address specifi c upstart that has deep roots but was itself founded less aspects of the Hamas question. Th e eleven contributors than two decades ago. Hamas’s success has compelled to this collection hail from the United States, Britain, all regional and international actors to undertake a Turkey, Israel, and the West Bank; they range across dis- wholesale review of the assumptions that have long ciplines, including diplomats, generals, historians, jour- guided their policies in the Arab-Israeli and even wider nalists, economists, and law enforcement personnel. Muslim arenas. By its very nature, this collection is neither an exhaus- At this moment of transition, there are more ques- tive nor a comprehensive assessment of Hamas and the tions than answers about such issues as the resilience of predicament its electoral victory poses. In our haste to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, the adroitness of produce it, no doubt some issues are left unaddressed the emerging Hamas, the fortunes of the defl ated Fatah, and some questions still unanswered; also, some overlap the vigilance of the members of the Quartet, the clarity between essays is likely as experts examine the various of Israel’s approach, and the opportunism of regional strategic, political, military, and economic issues at play. spoilers such as Iran. At this moment, when U.S. poli- But on balance, at this moment of uncertainty, we off er cymakers are considering their own strategic response to these essays in the belief that the process of devising pol- the changed circumstances wrought by the Hamas vic- icies to deal with the Hamas challenge is strengthened tory, Th e Washington Institute presents this collection by the insights and analysis they present. of essays to shed light on this murky situation. This collection does not represent the full range of Th e purpose of this collection is to inform policy in Washington Institute analysis on the Hamas challenge. the very near term. Drafted within days of the Hamas Additional Policy Watch essays, reprints of newspa- victory, these essays are designed to explain who Hamas per op-eds authored by Institute scholars, and summa- is, what the implications are of its electoral success for ries of Policy Forum presentations on this topic can be politics and security in the Arab-Israeli arena, and how found at the Institute’s award-winning website, www. the United States and its international partners can best washingtoninstitute.org. As the situation in the Arab- respond to this new challenge. In the months to come, Israeli arena evolves, please check the site on a regular ample time will be available to assess longer-term implica- basis to fi nd the freshest and most up-to-date analysis our tions, including the dangerous impact that the empower- experts have to off er. ment of Hamas could have on the ambitions of Islamist Robert Satloff movements throughout the region and the importance of Executive Director

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1

PART I The Strategy and Tactics of Hamas

A Primer on Hamas: Origins, Tactics, Strategy, and Response

By Robert Satloff

HAMAS, THE ARABIC WORD for zeal, is the acro- These three circles each have different spheres of nym of al-Harakat al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya—the responsibility. Considerable evidence indicates that Islamic Resistance Movement. The group was estab- both the insiders and the outsiders play a central role lished by the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Broth- in the determination of Hamas strategy on terrorist erhood (MB) at the outset of the fi rst Palestinian upris- operations against Israel and the solicitation and dis- ing in late 1987, in order to provide a vehicle for the bursement of funds for that purpose. In other arenas, MB’s participation in the violent confrontation against the inner circle is more responsive to the daily con- Israel without exposing the Brotherhood and its wide cerns of Palestinian life and builds up Hamas’s politi- network of social welfare and religious institutions to cal standing in the territories through its fi ght against Israeli retaliation. corruption and its support of social welfare activities; the outer circle maintains contact with Hamas’s inter- What Is Hamas’s Mission? national supporters and funders, including leadership As outlined in its 1988 charter (www.yale.edu/law- of other terrorist organizations and Iran. As for the web/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm), Hamas’s princi- outermost circle of global MB leaders, they are likely to pal objective is the confrontation of Israel, which it begin to exert greater authority over the strategic direc- considers a foreign cancer on sacred Muslim land. tion Hamas takes now that Hamas has registered such Indeed, without this mission, Hamas has no reason a historic achievement for the global Islamist cause. to exist; it would simply revert to being the Muslim Brotherhood. Numerous routes exist for achieving Can Hamas Moderate? this goal, ranging from the evolutionary Islamization Hamas is sure to evince tactical flexibility in its of Palestinian society, which would overwhelm Israel approach to governance, but it is highly unlikely to through demography, to the armed struggle against change any aspect of its fundamental strategy. If Hamas the Jewish state. succeeds in convincing Abbas that it has put its violent intentions on hold in the pursuit of a good-governance Who Are Its Leaders? platform, it will likely form a cabinet of “clean” tech- Hamas has three circles of leadership. Th e fi rst circle nocrats that preserves the independence and fl exibil- consists of local leaders inside the West Bank and ity of the traditional leadership. It will focus its early Gaza. Th e most famous of these—Sheikh Ahmed Yas- time in power on fi ghting corruption; improving social sin and Abdul Aziz Rantisi—were killed by Israel in services; and gradually Islamizing social, cultural, and recent years; their place has been fi lled by others, such education life of the Palestinian society. Nevertheless, as Mahmoud al-Zahar and Ismail Haniyeh. Th e second none of this activity should be confused with strategic circle includes Hamas’s external leadership, a “political moderation or a fundamental change in Hamas’s long- bureau” that includes Khaled Mashal and Mousa Abu term goal of eradicating Israel. Indeed, even in a post- Marzouk. Th e third circle consists of the international election article he wrote for the Los Angeles Times and leadership of the global Muslim Brotherhood move- the Guardian (London), Khaled Mashal stated without ment, which includes respected Brotherhood fi gures equivocation Hamas’s principled rejection of the right such as Muhammad Akef, head of the Egyptian MB, of Israel to exist—in any size, in any borders. In assess- and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Qatari-based Muslim ing Hamas’s likely performance in power, understand- scholar cum television star. ing the following ideas is important.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 5 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy

Hamas is not in a hurry. Organizationally, Hamas’s in return) and with clear dominance on the domestic immediate objective is to deepen and broaden its levers political scene. Th is consolidation of its authority, in of control over all aspects of Palestinian society. Th is turn, would be a prelude to Hamas’s preparation for control is the foundation of its long-term strategy to the next stage in the battle against the Jewish state, confront Israel. Hamas is fearful of a misstep that could which would be fought from a much stronger position threaten to abort its experiment at political power. Such (diplomatically, politically, and militarily) than the one a misstep could take the form of support for terrorist Hamas occupies today. activity that is so brazen that it invites massive Israeli military retaliation or of puerile pursuit of unpopu- What Is the Legal Status of a lar domestic measures, such as banning rock music or Hamas-led Palestinian Authority? ending mixed swimming at Gaza beaches, that invites Th is status is unclear, because the legal status of the ter- public ridicule and political backlash. In this respect, ritories themselves is murky. Since 1967, the West Bank Hamas will draw lessons from the experience of the and Gaza have been under Israeli control, implemented Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which was awarded by through Israel’s military government which most inter- King Hussein with fi ve cabinet portfolios in 1990 only national actors have termed as “occupation.” (Tradition- to leave offi ce in disgrace several months later aft er a ally, the government of Israel disputed this characteriza- ham-handed attempt to implement unpopular aspects tion of its control over the territories as “occupation,” of its Islamist social agenda. To avoid that fate, Hamas with its attendant legal implications, though Ariel will avoid that mistake. Sharon used the word in a speech to the UN General Assembly. His spokesman later explained he was refer- Hamas will talk truce but not peace. Hamas will ring to the occupation of people, rather than of territo- deign to talk with Israel and even be willing to work ries.) The Oslo Accords—agreements signed between out various de facto relationships with Israeli govern- the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organi- ment agencies (municipalities, ministries, and agencies zation (PLO)—established a Palestinian Authority (PA) responsible for transport, customs, provision of water responsible for civil and security aff airs in areas under its and electricity, and the like). In Hamas’s worldview, control. One institution created by those accords was such cooperation is a necessity of life that does not the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), a represen- constitute diplomatic or offi cial recognition. Hamas tative body of all Palestinians resident in the territories offi cials have even talked of reaching a long-term hudna (including formerly Jordan-held Jerusalem, whose Pal- (truce) with Israel, based on the latter’s withdrawal to estinian residents were permitted to vote in the recent the 1967 borders, agreement to a sovereign land bridge PLC election). Most international law experts argue that between the West Bank and Gaza, release of all Pales- the establishment of the PA did not derogate either Isra- tinian prisoners, and commitment to end all attacks el’s rights or its responsibilities as the occupying power, on Palestinian targets. To reach this accord, Hamas though in practical terms the establishment of the PA is likely to agree to negotiate with the Jewish state. changed the situation. However tantalizing a long-term period of calm may Th e withdrawal of Israeli forces and civilians from be, the prospect of a hudna should not be mistaken Gaza in mid-2005 added a further complication. Th at for renunciation by Hamas of its strategic objective of withdrawal met the strict language of UN Security the eradication of Israel. On the contrary, a hudna to Council Resolution 242 vis-à-vis the Gaza front (that which Israel agrees would provide Hamas with inter- resolution called for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces national political legitimacy to stamp out the secular from territories occupied in the recent confl ict”), a fact nationalist movement (asserting that only the Islamists recognized in statements by Palestinian president Mah- were able to achieve Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 bor- moud Abbas. Nevertheless, no state or international ders and succeeded in doing so without giving peace institution recognizes Israeli withdrawal as fulfi lling its

6 Policy Focus #53 A Primer on Hamas: Origins, Tactics, Strategy, and Response Robert Satloff

Resolution 242 obligations vis-à-vis Gaza and, at least In an ironic twist, the trend inside Israel toward technically, Israel remains the occupying power, despite unilateral disengagement meshes quite nicely with the total control of Gaza by Palestinian authorities. Hamas’s strategy, because unilateralism changes the With Hamas’s election, the situation enters an espe- status quo without having to reach a negotiated agree- cially murky legal arena because Hamas is not a con- ment with the other side. Although powerful reasons stituent group of the PLO and does not consider itself exist for Israelis to pursue a unilateralist path, the fact bound by any agreements reached between the PLO cannot be avoided that Israeli unilateralism also com- and Israel, including the Oslo Accords. Nevertheless, plements Hamas’s objective to create its own self-con- the Oslo Accords provide the legal authority for the tained Islamist state without any connection to Israel. PA and the PLC. In essence, Hamas ran for elected offi ce in institutions it never before considered legal or Does Hamas’s Victory legitimate. If the process of its empowerment proceeds, Have a ‘Silver Lining’? it will take over a governing authority whose legiti- No. Th e emergence of an armed, radical Islamist gov- macy it does not accept in territory that, technically at ernment in the heart of the Arab-Israeli arena—espe- least, remains fully under Israeli occupation. Of course, cially one that came to power through an allegedly Hamas has in the past declared its desire to enter the democratic process blessed by the international com- PLO framework, if it receives a suitably large slice of munity—has negative repercussions for Israel, for authority within the PLO, in order to change the orga- moderate Arab states, and for a wide range of U.S. poli- nization’s character from within. Now it is in a better cies, including the goal of advancing democracy as the position than ever before to demand a preeminent role long-term response to the systemic problems of Arab within the organization that claims to be “the sole, and Islamic societies. Th is view does not mean that vic- legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” tory for the secular nationalist alternative to Hamas, with all that will imply for the future direction of the the long-governing Fatah movement, would have Palestinian national movement. been a happy outcome; Fatah had proven itself cor- One unilateral change in the current legal status rupt, incompetent and—at best—ambivalent about that Israel may consider is to sever its customs union its renunciation of terrorism. Nevertheless, the inter- with the PA, at least in Gaza, which is governed by an national community has a stake in the success of the economic agreement reach with the PLO known as secular, nationalist model, despite the deep fl aws in the the Paris Protocol. Th e practical implication of the sev- party that represented that model. erance of this accord would be to end the process by Th e following three schools of thought advocate the which Palestinian imports and exports come through idea that Hamas’s victory has a positive side: Israeli ports, with Israeli authorities collecting cus- Citing the fact that the majority of Palestinians toms and other taxes on behalf of the PA. In this cir- voted for secular nationalist parties as well as poll cumstance, all Gaza trade would have to pass through results suggesting that 60 percent of voters still sub- Egypt. On the plus side for Israel, it would be relieved scribe to the two-state solution, advocates of the fi rst of the awkward responsibility of providing the eco- school suggest that Hamas’s victory is not representa- nomic lifeline to a PA led by a party bent on Israel’s tive of the mainstream of Palestinian politics. How- destruction; the most serious downside would be Isra- ever, by any international standard, Hamas’s sizable el’s loss of any control over the fl ow of goods—includ- plurality vote in a multiparty legislative election con- ing, potentially, weaponry, through the Egypt-Gaza stitutes an overwhelming landslide. Moreover, given border, with responsibility left in the hands of the the presence of other parties on the ballot who ran Egyptians. At the same time, Palestinians would suff er on a platform emphasizing law and order, the fight because access though Egypt is much less effi cient and against corruption, and promises to improve the eco- much more costly than access through Israel. nomic situation, Hamas voters clearly knew they were

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 7 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy voting for the one major party that rejected any form through violence and terrorism. Whatever benefi ts can of peace process with Israel. It is condescending to be derived from the academic knowledge of the true argue that Palestinians were somehow unaware that political affi nity of Palestinian voters are outweighed they were casting ballots for the party that advocates by the negative repercussions of playing with the lives violent jihad as the preferred form of achieving Pales- of millions of people—Palestinians, Israelis, and others tinian legitimate rights. throughout Arab and Muslim societies who will suff er Th e second school of optimists points to the experi- because of the muscle-fl exing of radical Islamists and ence of other Islamist parties (in Turkey, for example) the likely timorous reaction of regional states. to suggest that Hamas stands a good chance of eventu- ally moderating its currently intransigent views. How- How Should the World Respond ever, this view overlooks the absence of key factors that to a Hamas-led Government? made possible the co-optation or moderation of those In strategic terms, the emergence of a Hamas-led gov- parties. Th e record shows that the few examples of co- ernment in the West Bank and Gaza constitutes a optation of Islamic parties occurred only aft er decades “democratic coup” against the institutions of peace- of evolution in countries that enjoyed strong institu- making and a fi llip to radical Islamists everywhere. It tions, powerful security apparatuses, and a supreme must be recalled that the entire purpose of the peace guarantor of the sanctity of the political system (for process is to provide a diplomatic means to ensure Isra- example, the army in Turkey, or the king in Jordan or el’s security and enable Palestinians to enjoy their legit- Morocco). Regrettably, the Palestinian case lacks all imate rights; a process that gives birth to a Palestinian these attributes. government whose raison d’être is Israel’s destruction The third school describes the election results as is, by its very nature, illegitimate. useful for unmasking the true political leanings of More generally, the Hamas victory has had the the Palestinian populace; exposing the hollow politi- eff ect of both internationalizing and Islamizing a con- cal support among Palestinians for moderate politics, fl ict that had become a local, national dispute between secular nationalism, or a negotiated two-state solution; Israelis and Palestinians. However bloody the Palestin- and generally injecting a salutary dose of clarity into ian uprising of 2000–2005 had been, one of its most the Arab-Israeli arena. This group usually advocates notable aspects was that no other Arab state actively permitting Hamas to take the reins of power, confi dent sided with the Palestinians or even was affected by that it will fail in government, thereby undermining the the violence. The great fear that historically moti- appeal of the Islamist model. However, this view over- vated international interest in the Arab-Israeli peace looks the potential for a radical Islamist party, once in process—that the conflict between Israelis and Pal- power, to maintain its grip despite political failure. It estinians could ignite regional and even international could do so through undemocratic means, such as sus- confl agration—proved to be passé. Indeed, over time, pending elections in the event of “national emergency,” this dispute had become localized (if intensely lethal). or by rigging the vote, through outright vote-stealing However, the Hamas victory changed all that. Over- or with an Iranian-style election engineering that per- night, the Israel-PA border became the front line of the mits only a limited slice of candidates to even appear great international contest between radical Islamists on the ballot. Notably, failing at government does not and the West, with the world’s most radical actors— necessarily produce the collapse of a regime; such has Iran, al-Qaeda, and Hizballah—chomping at the bit been the case in Iran, currently celebrating its twenty- to exploit this opportunity to carry their battle to the seventh year in power despite having cost millions of gates of Jerusalem. lives and lowered living standards for tens of millions A “solution” to this problem can only be achieved of Iranians. And should Hamas totter on the verge of by either preventing the assumption of power by a losing power, it is most likely to lash out against Israel Hamas-led regime or, once in offi ce, ensuring its swift -

8 Policy Focus #53 A Primer on Hamas: Origins, Tactics, Strategy, and Response Robert Satloff est possible collapse, through means that are as non- Arab and Muslim societies. The longer a Hamas-led violent as possible. Only the speedy collapse of this government stays in power, the greater the chance government—achieved through an effective quaran- that it will deepen its hold on Palestinian institutions tine of international economic aid and diplomatic (including the military), welcome the contribution of support—will erode the appeal of the radical Islamist radical Islamist opportunists, and prepare for the even- model, both among Palestinians and more widely in tual resumption of the armed struggle against Israel.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 9 Understanding the Hamas Agenda

By Mohammed Yaghi

PALESTINIAN PRESIDENT Mahmoud Abbas’s Hamas’s rejection of a two-state solution and its strategy of integrating Hamas into the Palestinian preference for a long-term truce stem from three fac- political system backfi red with Hamas’s sweeping elec- tors. First, Hamas’s Islamic ideology believes that any toral victory in the legislative elections. Abbas had part of the Muslim land is an Islamic endowment, or hoped that Hamas, as a minority party in the Palestin- waqf, and no Muslim has the right to give up owner- ian Legislative Council (PLC), could be tamed by its ship of the land. Historic Palestine is an especially acceptance of the rules that it had consistently fl outed signifi cantwaqf in as much as it contains the Haram since rejecting the establishment of the Palestinian al-Sharif in Jerusalem—the first Kiblah, or object of Authority (PA); he thought he could disarm Hamas Muslim prayers. through democratic means. But with Hamas’s winning Second, Hamas’s religious connection to the land majority control of the PLC, a chance no longer exists coincides with its role in the wider Muslim Brother- to dictate terms to it. hood movement, which values the essential impor- Already, Hamas’s leaders have said they will not tance of establishing Islamic regimes throughout the compromise their core principles, even if it means a region as prerequisite to liberating historic Palestine. cutoff of international aid to the PA. Khaled Mashal, Recognizing Israel’s right to exist is thus anathema to the Damascus-based chief of Hamas’s political bureau, Hamas’s Islamic identity and its identity within the announced: “Hamas will manage and the Arab coun- Muslim Brotherhood. tries and Muslims won’t let the Palestinians down. Third, Hamas also derives the concept of hudna Hamas will not trade its political program for money from Muslim tradition, where the Sunnah of the from the international community.” In this context, it Prophet Muhammad teaches that seeking a truce with is important to understand what Hamas’s political pro- enemies is legitimate as a practical measure when- gram will be, including its domestic priorities, interna- ever Muslims are not in a position either to conquer tional policies, and strategy toward Israel. their foes or to impose their demands on them. Th e Prophet himself arranged such a truce with his rivals Hamas’s Strategy toward Israel in Mecca before conquering them two years later In a January 29 press conference broadcast on al- after they violated the agreement. For Hamas, the Jazeera, Mashal said Hamas is willing to negotiate a hudna represents an opportunity to rest and rebuild. long-term truce, or hudna, with Israel in return for a A truce is not, by any means, a fi nal resolution of the complete Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines, cre- confl ict, unlike the “end of confl ict” agreement envis- ation of linkage between Gaza and the West Bank, and aged in both the Oslo process and the roadmap. For release of all Palestinian prisoners. Mashal, however, now, Hamas says it will respect existing agreements suggested that the door would remain open when he between the PA and Israel, but this approach is lim- said, “When Israel proposes a genuine offer, we will ited only to resolving issues of daily life rather than look into it, but right now there is nothing on the table applied to forging a longer-term peace. to discuss.” As for the Quartet’s Roadmap to Peace, Hamas’s long-term intentions can also be gleaned Mashal denounced it as “Sharon’s map, and Hamas will from its desire to join a “wider resistance front com- never accept it.” Hamas thus wants to replace the con- prised of Iran, Syria, and Hizballah,” according to cept of a comprehensive peace agreement based on the Mashal, and its refusal to consider disarming its Izz al- idea of mutual recognition and a two-state solution in Din al-Qassam Brigades. A more formal alliance with fi nalized borders with a long-term, indefi nite cessation Iran and Hizballah, which could include increased of hostilities. Iranian fi nancial support of a Hamas-controlled PA,

10 Policy Focus #53 Understanding the Hamas Agenda Mohammed Yaghi might lead Hamas to launch attacks against Israel ticularly in the West Bank, and will need to ensure they in response to international pressure against Iran to are not working against Hamas’s own interests. It will halt its nuclear program. In order to maintain such a try to reach a modus vivendi with the security services weapon, Hamas will not disarm or disband the Qas- either by buying the allegiance of specifi c commanders sam Brigades, whose role Mashal noted is to “confront or by appealing directly to individual soldiers to gain the occupation.” Hamas may even merge its military their loyalty. arm with those of other factions to form a more offi cial Hamas will also seek integration into the formal “popular army” with the mission of defending Palestin- institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization ians and liberating their land. (PLO), a process suggested in the March 2005 Cairo Agreement between Abbas and the Palestinian fac- Hamas’s Domestic Priorities tions. Th e newly elected legislative council members Hamas has denied being surprised by its victory in will automatically be considered part of the PLO’s the legislative elections, only admitting that it had broader representative base, the Palestinian National not anticipated the margin by which it won. Indeed, Council. Hamas will try to use the precedent of elec- Hamas wanted to secure at least some domestic author- tions to propel more of its members from outside the ity through the elections, which was the very reason PA into the ranks of the Palestinian National Coun- why it accepted the tahdiyya from Abbas in March cil. Because the PLO remains the “sole legal repre- 2005 in exchange for ensuring elections would pro- sentative” of the Palestinian people and the PLO, ceed. And while Hamas was using the last year to pre- not the PA, retains foreign recognition by more than pare its election campaign, Fatah was descending into 100 states, Hamas views joining the PLO as a means chaos and disarray. of obtaining international legitimacy. Furthermore, Within the PA, Hamas will attempt to produce now that Hamas has supplanted Fatah in the PA, its what Abbas failed to do in his first year in office. next step will be to accomplish the same objective in It will focus on securing law and order, primarily in the PLO—the very strategy Fatah itself employed in Gaza, by confronting local armed gangs responsible 1965 when it seized control of the PLO. for kidnapping foreigners and fomenting chaos in the past months. Hamas will attempt to purge corrup- Hamas and Violence tion from the PA by prosecuting those responsible for Hamas will retain the potential of attacking Israeli tar- embezzlement and misuse of funds and by publicly gets as a means of securing its domestic control over disclosing such activities. Based on the precedent of Palestinian politics. Initially, Hamas has no interest in how it has run the municipalities it has taken over in resuming violence because it can most easily begin to the past year, Hamas will trim government spending achieve its “change and reform” agenda when it is not at and try to create an environment more conducive to war with Israel. But should Hamas face a drastic reduc- economic investment and growth. tion in international aid and determine that it will not Politically, Hamas will begin to widen its base of be able to deliver the services and good governance support and fi rm up the allegiance of those who voted promised during its campaign, it may choose to provoke for its candidates in the districts. It will also try to iso- violence with Israel in order to rally Palestinians around late Fatah’s leadership from its base by reaching out a national agenda. Hamas may also use violence against to Fatah’s militant groups and those employed by the Israel as a means of preempting an internal confronta- bureaucracy of the PA. Th e most diffi cult institution tion with Fatah should Fatah resist the transfer of power for Hamas to co-opt will be the security forces, the vast when the next government is formed, or if the secu- majority of whom are Fatah members who voted for rity forces begin to obstruct Hamas’s agenda. Finally, Fatah in the election. Hamas will face a great challenge Hamas may play the card of violence to pressure Abbas trying to use these forces to keep internal order, par- to appoint a prime minister acceptable to Hamas if the

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 11 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy president attempts to challenge Hamas’s political ascen- of Fatah’s own base in the aft ermath of the elections dancy. In all scenarios, violence against Israel will remain and hopes to minimize the possibility of civil disor- an integral component of Hamas’s arsenal. der. Moreover, by off ering Fatah partial responsibility Hamas will not want to appear to grow soft and for the government, Hamas will maintain the politi- allow other groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad cal weakness and divisions within Fatah and prevent (PIJ) or the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, to assume a more Fatah from uniting in opposition. And fi nally, Fatah’s prominent role in the resistance. In the past year, PIJ presence in the government may enable Hamas to was responsible for almost all of the suicide bombings in oversee limited negotiations with Israel on issues con- Israel, and Hamas limited its attacks as part of its eff ort cerning Palestinian life without its members having to to ensure elections would proceed. However, depending deal directly with the Israelis. on the seriousness of the “Resistance Front” described If Fatah refuses to join a Hamas-led government, by Mashal, PIJ—infl uenced by Iranian and Syrian pres- then Hamas will likely try to gain the allegiance of sure—may possibly suspend its activities in the short the smaller Palestinian parties in order to isolate term to allow Hamas the space to achieve its domestic Fatah in opposition. Under any scenario, Hamas will agenda. Hamas will also attempt to gain the allegiance insist on controlling the ministries of health, educa- of the al-Aqsa brigades, a process it began months before tion, and social welfare in order to expand its already the election. prominent role as provider of social services to the Palestinian people. Hamas’s Approach to the Cabinet Th e margin of Hamas’s victory in the legislative coun- Conclusion cil gave its bloc more than enough votes to approve the Since its founding in 1987, Hamas has shown patience, next cabinet, assuming Abbas cooperates by nominat- strategic acumen, and organizational discipline. As it ing a prime minister to Hamas’s liking. But in order to approaches the issues of internal governance and rela- manage the transition of power, Hamas prefers a unity tions with the outside world—including the question government with Fatah for three reasons. First, Fatah’s of violence toward Israel—Hamas can be expected to presence in the government will increase the likeli- evince these same characteristics that have enabled it to hood that international donors will not cut off aid to displace Fatah and emerge as the dominant player on the PA. Second, Hamas wants to ensure the loyalty the Palestinian political landscape.

12 Policy Focus #53 PART II Political Implications of Hamas’s Victory

Israeli Policy and Politics in the Wake of Hamas’s Victory

By David Makovsky

HAMAS’S PARLIAMENTARY victory in the West defi ned by recognition of Israel and a two-state solu- Bank and Gaza has momentous policy implications tion. Israel will fear a creeping international acquies- for Israel, given that an organization sworn to Israel’s cence to a Hamas government that, should it occur, destruction has been legitimately empowered. More- would set back peacemaking by decades and delegiti- over, Hamas’s victory comes as Israel is in the midst of mize Israel in the process. an election season. Th e Hamas election could aff ect the Fift h, Israel is dealt an unenviable hand on how to Israeli elections, but even more important, it is likely apply the considerable economic leverage it wields over to shape the choices that Israeli political leaders make the Palestinians. If it does not use enough leverage, it beyond the elections. fears that it will be responsible for Hamas’s remaining in power. If it applies too much, it risks a backlash, with Policy Stakes and Debates for Israel Hamas seeking to galvanize public support in the West Hamas’s victory in the recent parliamentary elections Bank and Gaza against a putative campaign by Israel creates enormously high policy stakes for Israel. Israel to bring the PA to its knees. Aft er all, Israel would like has several fears about the formation of a Hamas-led to create as much political distance as possible between Palestinian Authority (PA). the leadership and the public, many whom may not First, Israel worries that a Hamas government could share Hamas’s objectives. Although applying the right radicalize Palestinian society beyond its current state. level of leverage is critical, there is no doubt that Israel Over time, this process would translate into greater ter- has more economic leverage than any other actor in ror and violence, plus the injection of resources from the world today. Virtually all Palestinian imports come inside and outside the West Bank to indoctrinate the either from or through Israel. Most Palestinian exports Palestinians along the path of greater radicalization. PA go to Israel, and Israel transfers $750 million per year territories could be a haven to radicals of all stripes and in customs and value-added tax on behalf of the Pal- attract support from extremist regimes in the region, estinians. Th is fi gure alone equals more than a third of most notably Iran. Left in power, Hamas not only may the PA budget. According to the World Bank, Pales- wage war against Israel but also might even succeed in tinian employment in Israel, while reduced from the killing the idea of a secular, nationalist alternative to late 1990s, still numbers 65,000 people. the Islamist model. Israel will view leverage of multiple sorts as critical Second, the success of Hamas could ripple across the in trying to isolate Hamas, because Israel is profoundly Arab world and aff ect the stability of Arab regimes on skeptical that mere experience in government will pro- Israel’s border, such as Egypt and Jordan. Over time, duce a more moderate Hamas anytime in the foresee- Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan could come able future. Instead, most Israelis believe that hatred of under increasing pressure, with the possible return to Israel stands at Hamas’s ideological core, meaning that active confrontation on Israel’s eastern and southern virtually no likelihood exists that Hamas will moderate fronts, a nightmare scenario. its core belief about the illegitimacy of Israel; in return, Third, a radicalization of the Palestinians in the Israel would find accommodating Hamas in any way West Bank and Gaza could also accentuate such trends impossible. According to this view, Hamas’s theocratic among Israel’s own Muslim minority. commitments exceed its democratic ones, meaning Fourth, a Hamas victory could have an internation- that Hamas may even cancel future elections to retain ally corrosive impact. Hamas rejects peacemaking as its hold on power. Israel’s objective will not be to per-

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 15 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy suade the ideological hard core, but rather to focus on a renunciation of violence, including the disarming of those “protest” voters against Fatah—who supported unlawful militias and terrorist groups. Israel puts a high Hamas for reasons other than ideology—or those who premium on the international commitment to these did not vote for Hamas at all. Given the stakes, Israel’s conditions, since most of the expenditure of the PA objective will be to use its leverage to isolate the regime comes from the international community. while avoiding blame for its downfall. Israel wants to Because maintaining international consensus is send a message to the plurality of Palestinians who essential if Palestinians are to be compelled to make voted for Hamas that policy consequences follow cast- tough choices, Israel is worried about the formation ing ballots for a party committed to Israel’s destruc- of a Palestinian cabinet that masks the real weight of tion. Israel believes that external pressure to compel Hamas and thereby off ers a way for some countries to political change within Palestinian politics is essential; declare their recognition of a new Palestinian govern- left alone, Israelis assess, Palestinians will fi nd a way to ment. In this regard, the most pessimistic scenario (an avoid making clear choices on these core issues. avowedly radical, Hamas-led PA) is not necessarily With such high stakes, Israelis are concerned about the most dangerous (a Hamas-controlled government the policy options at their disposal. Yet Israel has con- with a more mild and moderate public face). Th e lat- straints on its course of action. Specifi cally, three fac- ter could take several forms: a government of osten- tors are likely to weigh upon Israel: a desire to main- sible non-Hamas technocrats; the Hizballah model, in tain the international consensus as expressed by the which Hamas has a minority stake in the government Quartet, the potentially murky composition of the but retains its independent terror capabilities, perhaps next Palestinian government, and the political needs under the cloak of “national resistance”; or a Sinn Fein of the upcoming Israeli elections. It is hard to imagine situation, whereby the “Change and Reform” banner pivotal decisions being made without considering all under which Hamas campaigned actually evolves to three factors. the “Change and Reform” party, a political entity that Israeli officials want to maintain an international claims a separate identity from Hamas. Th e key will be consensus on conditions for dealing with Hamas. Th ey not only whether Hamas holds the reins of power in are keen to ensure that the international resolve to practice but also whether the international community demand that Hamas meets strict requirements for any chooses to see through various facades and remain vigi- international aid does not weaken. Both Washington lant in enforcing its conditions. and Jerusalem were pleased by the decision of the Quar- Some Israelis welcome the prospect that Hamas tet in London in the wake of the Palestinian election might be brazen enough to demand the creation of an according to which PA funding “would be reviewed openly Hamas-led PA. In that situation, the Palestin- by donors against [the] government’s commitment ian public would not be spared the consequences of its to the principles of nonviolence, recognition of Israel choice. At some point, even a weak-kneed international and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations community is likely to remain fi rm and deny assistance including the road map [to peace].”1 Th e key here is to to a government so openly defiant of international link funding to Hamas’s unambiguous acceptance of norms. In such a scenario, Israel retains maximum dip- conditions that would render it worthy of receiving lomatic maneuverability on the international stage and international support. Th ose conditions are recognition maximum “clarity” both at home and abroad. of Israel’s right to exist; acceptance of the continued Yet that approach is not without risks. First, even applicability of existing Israeli-Palestinian agreements with the most incendiary Hamas leadership in power, (the Oslo Accords and its follow-on agreements); and some European states might still let their sympathy

1. UN Press Release, January 30, 2006.

16 Policy Focus #53 Israeli Policy and Politics in the Wake of Hamas’s Victory David Makovsky for the Palestinian cause lead to an unraveling of the aid beyond even what Tehran provides its favorite ally, international consensus. Th ey could do so especially if Hizballah. Th erefore, Israel has said that even if it were a humanitarian crisis emerged in the West Bank and to implement measures against a Hamas-led PA, it would Gaza. The second risk of welcoming the clarity that take care to ensure such measures do not trigger a human- would come with an openly Hamas-led PA is the poten- itarian crisis. Beyond this assurance, Israel needs to hold tial for escalation. In such circumstances, Israel is likely discussions with the United States and other Quartet to want the United States to declare the PA a “terrorist countries about a variety of economic-related issues to entity,” with all the political, diplomatic, and economic maximize prospects that Hamas is held accountable by implications that status entails. Such a designation is, the Palestinian people for its nonperformance in govern- in turn, likely to bring an early end to whatever calm ment: (1) Nonfungible humanitarian provisions outside (tahdiyya) Hamas wants to maintain for its own tac- the PA budget need to be defi ned, including off setting tical reasons. The probable result will be a return to nongovernmental aid through the U.S. Agency for Inter- military confrontation, precisely at the moment when national Development, the United Nations, and the Israel has successfully rebounded from the economic European Union humanitarian arm. (2) Th ere is a need shock of the post–Camp David summit Palestinian to deal with massive Palestinian unemployment, which uprising. Th is approach does not mean that Israel seeks could result if budgetary assistance is not forthcoming military confrontation with Hamas, at least not now. for many of the PA’s 155,000 employees. Diff erent forms Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, also serving as of transitional funding need to be considered to prevent fi nance minister, said, “We will not play into the hands major chaos, which could trigger unrest. (3) Th ere may be of extremists who want to create a nonstop war here.”2 a need to enable more low-security-risk older workers to Olmert prefers a strategy toward Hamas that comple- work inside Israel. Th e bottom line is that Hamas should ments his own preference for disengaging from most be seen as not delivering the goods, while at the same of the West Bank (see below). Conflict would mean time, the Palestinian public does not endure a traumatic deeper Israeli involvement in the territories, not the 40 percent decline in national income—as it did during reverse, and might even compel Israel to resume full the 2000–2004 intifada when suicide bombing was very responsibility for the welfare of the Palestinian people. high. Hamas should be blamed for its failure, not Israel. Therefore, Olmert seems to prefer a strategy of con- A calibrated policy could achieve this result and limit taining a Hamas-led PA and denying it international prospects of unintended consequences. aid and legitimacy over a strategy of actively pursuing its collapse. Impact of the Hamas Victory on the Israel can aff ord a calibrated economic policy. Even if Political Platforms of Israeli Parties Hamas receives humanitarian provisions, Hamas is very All Israeli Zionist parties reject any political dia- likely to fail. The current Fatah government is leaving logue with Hamas, based on the principle that Israel Hamas a $750 million deficit out of a $2 billion bud- has nothing to talk about with a movement pledged get. Foreign investment is unlikely in such a shaky situ- to Israel’s destruction. Shortly after Hamas’s victory, ation, and Iran is unlikely to be able to make up a bud- Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert labeled Hamas getary shortfall that would require many multiples of “irrelevant,” a term that Ariel Sharon used for Yasser

2. Aluf Benn, “Olmert ‘Israel Will Deal with a Hamas-Free PA,’” Haaretz website, February 6, 2006. Olmert said such moves should not be interpreted as weakness, saying “anyone who tries to carry out terror attacks, fi re Qassams, send suicide bombers—we will reach him wherever he is and strike him everywhere.” A day earlier, he declared, “We have no intention, in any constellation, of maintaining contacts with Hamas. Nor will members of parlia- ment from Hamas enjoy any privileges, because someone who belongs to a terrorist organization remains as such even if he is elected to the Palestinian parliament. All Hamas members, everywhere and at every level, are members of a terrorist organization, and that is how they should be treated. Anyone involved in terror is a target, and we must act against him as we have to date. Th ere are no limitations on the operational echelon,” he said, referring to the Israeli security services. (Aluf Benn, “PA to Israel: I Keep the Powers,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), February 6, 2006.)

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 17 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy

Arafat at the height of the Palestinian uprising. In the as favoring a unilateral disengagement from the West policy debate over whether Israel can or cannot work Bank, reinforced this theme.5 Th e argument underlying with Hamas, the refusal of Zionist parties to negotiate this unilateralist position is that the Palestinian side is refl ects universal opposition to any formal relationship either dysfunctional, malicious, or both. If Israel holds with the terrorist group. itself hostage to Palestinian irresponsibility, it will be The unanimity of Israeli parties toward a ban on putting its future on hold and perpetuating the state of political dialogue with Hamas masks the contrast- limbo it has been in since 1967. Instead, so this argument ing views toward Israeli unilateralism, at least in the goes, Israel should take its future into its own hands and medium term. Th e three major parties running in this shape its borders in the West Bank—working as much as election have expressed different stances: Labor has possible in consultation with the Bush administration. explicitly voiced support for unilateralism, Kadima Although Hamas’s electoral success may be pinned has broadly hinted at it, and Likud has opposed it. Th e to public outrage with the corruption, excesses, and Hamas victory has changed Labor’s position, which misrule of Fatah, the rationale for voting Hamas is was previously based on the idea of bilateral negotia- less important than the outcome: the empowerment tions with the Palestinians. So far, it has not aff ected of the most radical elements of Palestinian society in the positions of the other two, but it could lead to a a position of legitimacy and authority. With Hamas in twist in the defi nition of unilateralism. power, Israeli skepticism about Palestinian intentions Olmert recently laid out the position of the new Kad- has increased and popular commitment to negotia- ima party, which was founded in late 2005 as a result of tions has shrunk. Even on the eve of elections, a much Sharon’s dissatisfaction with Likud’s position on Gaza publicized Dahaf poll revealed that 77 percent of Israe- disengagement. In comments made at the Herzliya Con- lis were pessimistic about prospects to end the confl ict ference just one day before the Hamas election, Olmert with the Palestinians.6 Th e sense that negotiations are said, “We would prefer an agreement. If our expected futile could propel unilateralism, but probably not partners in the negotiations in the framework of the along the Gaza model, in which Israel removed both Roadmap do not uphold their commitments, we will its military and civilian (settler) presence. Instead, the preserve the Israeli interest in every way.”3 “Every way” model of the northern West Bank—in which settle- is interpreted by Israelis to mean that Israel could opt ments were removed but Israel Defense Forces remain for unilateral separation. Although not using the word deployed—might be a more attractive way to disen- unilateral, Olmert broadly hinted that this indeed was gage from the Palestinians in the West Bank without his direction. In his fi rst major interview since coming turning the territory over to Israel’s enemies to use as a to office, Olmert delineated the settlement blocs that base for the next war. he wanted to keep. “Israel will separate from most of Labor’s standard-bearer, Amir Peretz, who earlier the Palestinian population that lives in the West Bank favored a comprehensive peace agreement with the Pal- and that will obligate us to separate as well from terri- estinians, has altered his stance to support unilateralism. tories where the State of Israel currently is.”4 A Haaretz In his speech to the Herzliya Conference, Peretz said, “If article published immediately aft er the Palestinian elec- we have to, we will implement unilateral moves. We will tion, which cited Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz not agree to a diplomatic stalemate. Th e changes in the

3. Speech of Olmert at Herzliya Conference, January 24, 2006. 4. Aluf Benn, “Olmert: Israel Will Separate from Most Palestinians,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), February 8, 2006. From a Channel 2 interview aired February 7. Olmert continued “Th e direction is clear,” adding “we are moving towards separation from the Palestinians towards setting Israel’s permanent border.” 5. Amos Harel, “Mofaz Allows for Unilateral Withdrawal,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), January 31, 2006. It is not surprising that Mofaz is a stalking horse for Olmert. Because Olmert is not a general like Sharon, nor does he have Sharon’s credentials in fi ghting terrorism, Olmert will need to demonstrate that he has the support of two key fi gures who are senior in his party: Mofaz and former head of the Shin Bet, Avi Dichter. Olmert may need to demonstrate before and aft er the elections that they are part of the leadership. 6. Amiram Barkat, “Poll: Israelis Downbeat about Chances for Middle East Peace,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), Janurary 24, 2006.

18 Policy Focus #53 Israeli Policy and Politics in the Wake of Hamas’s Victory David Makovsky

Palestinian Authority will not hold us hostage.”7 Peretz, position either as futile or as a ruse or both. More- whose party is polling in the low twenties for seats in over, Israel’s security barrier, whose construction the next Knesset, said that if Hamas won the Palestin- Olmert has accelerated (with completion due by the ian election, Israel would not accept political deadlock end of 2006), reinforces Israel’s psychological disen- and would instead examine the possibility of “physical, gagement from the Palestinians. political and military separation” between Israel and the Nevertheless, the Hamas victory has clearly ener- Palestinians.8 gized Netanyahu. An agile campaigner, the Likud Th e opposing view is put forward by Likud’s Ben- leader immediately shift ed from his current campaign jamin Netanyahu, who believes Israel should make slogan of “Forward (Kadima) to 1967,” a reference to territorial concessions only if it receives in return cor- his claim that Olmert will yield the entire West Bank, responding Palestinian security concessions. Th is view and replaced it with “Strong against Hamas: Only is sometimes called “reciprocity,” whereby Israel waits Likud/Netanyahu.”10 Likud is hoping the Israeli pub- years until a responsible Palestinian partner for negoti- lic will see Netanyahu as the natural successor to Sha- ations materializes. Likud, which is currently projected ron—a leader who will be tough against Hamas. How- to win fewer than fi ft een seats, believes disengagement ever, indications are that Kadima will seek to counter sends the wrong message, that is, retreat. Although this strategy by pointing out that it was Netanyahu many believe that Hamas defeated Fatah because of who was compelled to release jailed Hamas leader internal Palestinian issues, Netanyahu puts the blame Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from prison in 1997 in the aft er- at Olmert’s doorstep, insisting that the Gaza disengage- math of a bungled eff ort by Israel to assassinate senior ment was interpreted as weakness by Palestinians and Hamas offi cial Khaled Mashal. in turn emboldened Hamas, which viewed withdrawal Trailing badly in the polls, Likud may be focusing on as a victory achieved through the armed struggle of sui- second place. If it can edge out Labor and woo some dis- cide bombers. aff ected Likud voters back from Kadima, Netanyahu’s strategy may be to outvote Labor and force Olmert into Impact of Hamas Victory on a center-right coalition with Likud, instead of Olmert’s Contours of Israeli Election Race likely preference for a center-left government with Labor. Kadima is betting that the general contours of the A third-place fi nish for Netanyahu will bring calls for his Knesset race will not change with the Hamas victory. resignation or replacement as party leader. A Haaretz poll conducted a week aft er Hamas’s suc- Some believe that only a rash of terrorist attacks cess so far validates that view.9 Kadima is polling at could shake up the race and topple Kadima from 43 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. Kadima is counting on its commanding lead. In 1996, four Hamas bomb- Hamas’s victory confirming a sense of futility that ings in nine days changed the contour of that elec- the Palestinians will be a partner for peace anytime tion, as Netanyahu shot up about twelve points and soon and, therefore, that further West Bank disen- ultimately edged out Labor leader Shimon Peres.11 gagement is more important than ever. Moreover, So far, Hamas has kept its commitment to the calm, this view discounts the theme of mutuality favored but the situation could change in the event that more- by Netanyahu, because mutuality suggests a pretense radical groups (like the Iran-backed Palestinian Islamic of partnership that Israelis seem to be saying does not Jihad) begin to unleash widespread terrorist attacks or exist. In this case, Kadima is likely to view the Likud if Hamas reaches the conclusion that a resumption of

7. Gil Hoff man, “Politics: Podium Platforms,” Jerusalem Post, January 26, 2006. 8. Ibid. 9. Yossi Verter, “Poll: Hamas Victory Did Not Aff ect Kadima, but Weakened Likud,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), February 1, 2006. 10. Gil Hoff man, “Likud Accentuates the Positive,” Jerusalem Post, January 31, 2006. 11. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, eds., Th e Elections in Israel: 1996 (State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 11.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 19 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy terror could somehow be used as a lever to intimidate the alternative is containment, which Israel believes the international community into maintaining aid does not necessarily have to descend into armed con- fl ows to the PA. frontation—though that possibility certainly exists. Preventing a humanitarian crisis within the context of Conclusion containment is key to maintaining that international Israel under Kadima would like to synchronize its consensus. In short, Israel appears to be attempting a approach to a Hamas-led PA with its preference for balancing act whereby its policy objectives are designed unilateral disengagement. Its objective is to ensure to project fi rmness and clarity without sidetracking the international vigilance in support of the principle of potential for further disengagement. Numerous chal- conditionality for a Hamas-led PA to gain aid and legit- lenges from many directions will determine whether imacy. In the event Hamas does not meet those terms, Israel can maintain that balance in the months ahead.

20 Policy Focus #53 Hamas, Fatah, and Palestinian Politics after January 25

By Ben Fishman

DESPITE HAMAS’S decisive victory in the January president can start the process over by nominating a 25 legislative elections, Palestinian politics will remain diff erent prime minister. in fl ux until several issues surrounding the transition Abbas thus has more leverage over the formation of of power are resolved among President Mahmoud the next government than would be expected of a presi- Abbas, the leadership of Hamas, and those elements dent whose party just suff ered a major electoral defeat. of Fatah that currently hold the reins of the Palestin- Despite winning more than enough seats to approve the ian Authority (PA). Looking beyond short-term poli- next government on its own, Hamas still requires the tics, the election results may themselves trigger the collaboration of the president to form the next govern- much-needed transition of Fatah into a more modern, ment. Abbas, therefore, retains considerable ability to responsive political party—attributes the party sorely dictate the terms under which he will nominate a prime lacked on election day. Given Fatah’s past perfor- minister. mance and the existing fi ssures within the movement, To date, Abbas has been consistent, though not such a future will require a wholesale makeover whose explicit, in declaring that any new government must be likelihood is not great. However, a chance exists that based on acceptance of the Oslo agreements and the Hamas’s political triumph may shock the system so internationally backed Roadmap to Peace, both of which much that it gives rise to a liberal, secular, grassroots imply de facto recognition of Israel’s right to exist and political movement that advocates what neither endorsement of a two-state solution. He fi rst spelled out Hamas nor Fatah off ered voters—the option of toler- those conditions in a January 14 interview on al-Jazeera. ance, peace, and good governance. In a press conference following the announcement of the offi cial election results on January 26, he reiterated, The Role of President Abbas “I am committed to the implementation of the platform Because of the vagueness of the Amended Palestin- according to which you elected me, which is a program ian Basic Law, the fi rst key decision for the transfer of that the world and all those around us understand. It is a power aft er a legislative election resides with the presi- program that is based on the policy of negotiations and dent, who has a great deal of fl exibility in timing that a peaceful solution to the confl ict with Israel.” But the step. According to the law, Abbas has the responsibility most explicit set of criteria demanded of Hamas in order of nominating a prime minister, who is then charged for Abbas to agree to a government were detailed not by with forming a government that itself needs to win the president himself but by the frequent troubleshooter parliament’s confi dence. But no timeframe is specifi ed on Palestinian-related aff airs, Egyptian intelligence chief by which the president must decide on the appoint- Omar Suleiman. Aft er meeting Abbas in Cairo, Sulei- ment, and no criteria specify whom he can nominate. man announced, “Hamas has to be committed to three The prime minister does not have to come from the issues—fi rst, to stop violence, this should be its doctrine; party with the greatest number of seats, nor must that second, to be committed to all the agreements signed individual even be a member of parliament. Th e prime with Israel; third, to recognize the existence of Israel. If minister’s only requirement is to gain approval of the they don’t do this, Abu Mazen will not ask them to form next government in three weeks, with the possibility of the government ... If they don’t accept to commit them- a two-week extension. If fi ve weeks pass aft er the prime selves to these issues, nobody will deal with them.” minister’s nomination without the Palestinian Legis- Abbas has the legal authority to force this formula lative Council’s approval of the government, then the on Hamas. Moreover, he can limit the authority of the

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 21 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy next legislative council when it is seated by rewriting rity services? How will Hamas deal with the threat of any proposed legislation that violates his own pro- losing international aid? And will Hamas fi nd a way to gram. Procedurally, the president’s objections to any blur its ideological rejection of Israel in order to win legislation become law unless the Palestinian Legisla- favor from Arab and international actors without alien- tive Council (PLC) overturns them with a two-thirds ating its core constituency or losing its basic identity? vote, and Hamas’s seventy-eight-seat bloc, including How Hamas responds to these questions may be a four affi liated independents, is ten votes short of such a function of which branch of the organization emerges mandate. Abbas and his associates are well aware of this with the most infl uence, the extent to which those fac- dynamic. Nabil Sha’ath, the former deputy prime min- tions agree, and how Hamas forges a consensus among ister, has noted that Abbas “has the power to obstruct its leaders. For example, tension may exist between the any law approved in parliament and he has to make newly elected PLC representatives, who will want to sure that any constitutional change is voted by at least deliver tangible improvements to their constituents, two-thirds of parliamentarians, a quorum that Hamas and the commanders of Hamas’s terrorist apparatus, does not have. Th us any attempt to Islamize our society whose sole agenda is to wage war on Israel. Hamas will will see the president strongly opposed to such a move.” need to reconcile such competing priorities in order to Abbas is also the commander in chief of Palestinian deliver the improved governance promised during the security forces; so he has the legal standing to enforce campaign. his decisions through the use of force, though it would be out of character both for him to pursue a military Fatah’s Response to the Elections option and for security forces to respond to his orders. After suffering a resounding defeat in the elections, Strategically, Abbas must decide whether he wants Fatah must decide the extent to which it will cooper- to exert his legal authority as president and defi ne the ate with Hamas and facilitate a smooth transition of limits of Hamas’s infl uence or whether he will accom- power. Th at decision will be compounded by the fact modate himself to the new political reality of Hamas’s that Fatah is even more divided than it was before the ascendancy. Should he choose to wield his powers as elections. Although most of Fatah appears to recognize president in a way he has not done since assuming offi ce, the validity of the election results, whether it will yield he would need to convince all parties involved—includ- control of the PA’s bureaucracy, especially the security ing Hamas, Israel, and the international community— forces, remains to be seen. of the seriousness of his commitment. Given the cred- Much of Fatah’s authority over the last decade ibility defi cit he earned for himself aft er a troubled year stemmed from patronage, either by directly employ- in office and his many threats of resignation, gaining ing loyal members in the public sector or by using the confi dence and respect of all those actors will be an the resources of the PA to provide benefi ts to Fatah’s uphill battle. base. Over the past decade, Fatah members have grown used to receiving regular paychecks, and those hoping What Will Hamas Decide? to cling to their spoils may do everything possible to Regardless of Hamas’s long-term intentions, it, too, will prevent Hamas from taking over. Already, hundreds of be forced in coming days to make several key decisions Fatah members have led public demonstrations in the that will signal the extent of its role in the next Pales- aft ermath of the election, a possible precursor to fur- tinian government. Will Hamas insist on assuming a ther civil disorder that can be expected if Hamas moves leading position in the next cabinet, or will it agree to too quickly to sweep Fatah cadres out of their jobs and name loosely affi liated technocrats to head Palestinian perquisites. ministries and assume the premiership? How quickly, More signifi cant is the question of how Hamas will be if at all, will Hamas attempt to dislodge Fatah from the able to impose law and order on a lawless situation when bureaucracy of the PA and from the ranks of the secu- the Palestinian security services are controlled by Fatah

22 Policy Focus #53 Hamas, Fatah, and Palestinian Politics after January 25 Ben Fishman bosses. Jibril Rajoub, the former head of Preventive that has delayed the conference for months. More- Security in the West Bank and a losing candidate in the over, the external leadership of the movement, resid- legislative elections from the Hebron district, declared ing in Amman, Beirut, Tunis, and elsewhere, is sure to bluntly, “Hamas has no power to meddle with the secu- obstruct the reformist tendencies of the internal Fatah rity forces.” Similarly, Gaza police chief Ala Hosni said, leadership since their infl uence will weaken as part of “Th e security institution is a red line. We will not allow any restructuring. anyone to tamper with it.” Fatah’s domination of the If Fatah’s internal members are serious about redefi n- security forces is problematic to Hamas’s rule on sev- ing and revitalizing the movement after their election eral levels, not the least of which is the expense of their defeat, they must take the initiative on their own; purge salaries. Hamas will have to choose whether it wants corrupt offi cials from their midst; and defi ne a new sec- a slimmer budget or whether it will risk facing the ire ular, nationalist agenda for the Palestinian people in the of thousands of armed Fatah members. And although territories. Absent such a serious eff ort to redefi ne its mis- Hamas may have a smaller but highly motivated orga- sion, identity, and leadership, Fatah is unlikely to regain nized “popular army” to defend its interests in Gaza, it the confi dence of the Palestinian public, and its factions lacks similar resources in the West Bank. will only grow increasingly divided—and irrelevant. Politically, Fatah will have to decide whether it wants to regroup and revitalize its base in opposition Developing a ‘Third Way’? or whether it wants to retain some of its control of What Palestinian voters lacked in the January election the PA by joining a power-sharing government with was an organized, liberal, secular alternative to the cor- Hamas. Instinctively, most Fatah leaders rejected the rupt and inept rule of Fatah and the radical, Islamist possibility of a unity government, but when individu- agenda of Hamas—both of which advocated violence als are actually presented with the option of control- to achieve political ends. True, a “Third Way” list ling a ministry or facing joblessness for the indefi nite existed, headed by the respected former fi nance minis- future, they may see the matter diff erently. Moreover, ter Salam Fayad, but it gained fewer than 24,000 votes Fatah’s organizational leadership has suffered a sig- nationally and fielded no candidates in the districts. nifi cant internal defeat as a result of the election, with Most important, the “Th ird Way” lacked a grassroots several Fatah leaders calling for the resignation of the network of Palestinians advocating the values of peace, governing central committee and revolutionary coun- tolerance, and good governance, with credible local cil. Without a unifying organizational body to retain candidates taking this message to the streets. But aft er party discipline, decisionmaking will shift increasingly the public disgrace of Fatah, and with Hamas facing to individuals and factions. numerous practical challenges as it attempts to trans- Although Fatah is even more divided now than late its slogan of “change and reform” into policy, an before the election, the crushing defeat by Hamas may opportunity exists to mobilize Palestinians who are eventually spur a revitalization of the movement and both disillusioned with Fatah’s rule and opposed to force it to enact the thorough reforms and top-to-bot- Hamas’s Islamist agenda. tom kinds of housecleaning it neglected before the Though an imperfect measurement of Palestinian elections. Th e main vehicle for such rejuvenation may preferences, opinion polls suggest that Palestinians be the convening of the long-overdue Sixth General place the establishment of honest and good govern- Conference, a meeting of Fatah delegates representing ment at the top of their agenda rather than a particu- members both inside and outside the PA that sets the lar ideology, and a majority favors an “end of confl ict” policies, direction, and leadership of the Fatah move- fi nal status peace agreement with Israel—an approach ment. However, holding this conference would require antithetical to Hamas’s beliefs. A political movement reaching agreement on everything from the agenda to committed to such goals would likely find a natural the distribution of delegates, a complicated process constituency among those who object to Hamas’s hard-

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 23 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy line ideology now that Fatah will no longer monopo- followers. Palestinians have many vibrant, forward- lize the political space. Th e most diffi cult, but critical, thinking civil society organizations that benefi t from task will be organizing and mobilizing such a base as the largesse of international aid, particularly Ameri- Hamas attempts to establish a government and Fatah can economic assistance, but these nongovernmental struggles with its revitalization. organizations have yet to coalesce into a real political If the international community wants to help spur a movement. As donors reevaluate their aid programs long-term political transformation in Palestinian soci- to Palestinians in the aftermath of Hamas’s victory, ety that moves Palestinians away from both the dys- one option for them to consider is leveraging their functionality of Fatah and the rejectionism of Hamas, assistance to upgrade these nascent civil society bodies it could invest new efforts in cultivating the missing into a defi ned political movement that advocates those third way—a network of moderate, liberal voices in the moderate, peaceful, and progressive values, policies, West Bank and Gaza capable of connecting with com- and political programs that reverberate ever so faintly munities throughout the PA and attracting energized on the Palestinian political scene today.

24 Policy Focus #53 Hamas, Fatah, and Palestinian Politics after January 25 Ben Fishman

Final Results of 2006 Palestinian Legislative Elections

NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NATIONAL OF NATIONAL SEATS FROM DISTRICT TOTAL ELECTORAL LIST VOTES VOTES NATIONAL LIST SEATS SEATS Change and Reform (Hamas) 440,409 44.45% 29 45 74 Fatah 410,554 41.43% 28 17 45 Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa (PFLP) 42,101 4.25% 3 0 3 The Alternative (DFLP, People’s Party, FIDA) 28,973 2.92% 2 0 2 Independent Palestine (Headed by Mustafa Barghouti) 26,909 2.72% 2 0 2 The Third Way (Headed by Salam Fayad) 23,862 2.41% 2 0 2 Remaining fi ve lists 18,065 1.82% 0 0 0 Independents from districts —— 0 44 TOTAL 990,873 100% 66 66 132

Distribution of Seats by Party

132 Total Seats

74 45 3 2 22 4

Change and Reform (Hamas) The Alternative (DFLP, People’s Party, and FIDA)

Fatah Independent Palestine (Headed by Mustafa Barghouti)

Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa (PFLP) Independents from districts

The Third Way (Headed by Salam Fayad)

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 25 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy

Distribution of Seats by District

CHANGE AND REFORM (HAMAS) FATAH INDEPENDENTS Seats District Available Candidates Winners Candidates Winners Candidates Winners Jerusalem 64462*290 Jenin 44242240 Tulkarem 32230121 Tubas 1111070 Nablus 65561190 Qalqilya 2202260 Salfi t 1111090 Ramallah 54451*250 Jericho 1101130 Bethlehem 42242*260 Hebron 99990280 North Gaza 55550170 Gaza City 85580363 Deir al-Balah 33231120 Khan Younis 55352330 Rafah 3303360 Total 66 56 45 66 17 294 4 *Christian Quota

26 Policy Focus #53 Responses to Hamas’s Victory from Israel’s Arab and Muslim Neighborhood

By Soner Cagaptay

RESPONSES OF ARAB and Muslim countries to in its ability to “mediate between the sides,” because Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian elections ranged from “Turkey has always had good relations with both Israel Turkish, Jordanian, and Egyptian calls for integrating and Palestine.”4 On January 31, 2006, Turkey’s popu- Hamas into the Palestinian political system to caution lar centrist daily Hurriyet criticized Erdogan’s pro- from Saudi Arabia and jubilation in Syria and Iran.1 posal, citing it as premature: “For some reason, at every opportunity in recent times, we have been putting our- Turkey: ‘AKP Sees Its Past in Hamas’ selves forward as mediators and nothing very impor- Following Hamas’s sweep of Palestinian parliamentary tant has ensued. In diplomacy, always jumping forward elections, Turkey’s prime minister and leader of the rul- is not invariably useful; it can backfi re.”5 ing Justice and Development Party (AKP), Recep Tayyip Most Turkish newspapers suggested that Hamas’s Erdogan, maintained that the international community victory cannot be ignored. Whereas centrist daily Mil- must respect the decision of the Palestinian people. Infer- liyet wrote that “if the West were to cut economic aid ring from Turkey’s past experience with Islamist parties to punish Hamas, Hamas will turn to Iran and Tehran coming to power through elections, including the experi- will use this as an opportunity to increase its infl uence ence of his own party, Erdogan said, “Th e choice of the in the region,”6 pro-AKP Yeni Safak found Hamas’s people must be respected, whether or not one likes it . . . rise promising. On January 31, the paper argued that If we were to act with prejudice, that would harm democ- “since the period when the Palestine Liberation Orga- racy.”2 In placing Hamas in the context of the AKP’s nization [PLO] sat at the peace table with Israel, the model of the path to power, however, Erdogan overlooked ideological line that Hamas represents has been a ris- a significant difference between Hamas and Turkey’s ing trend. Don’t worry about the international system Islamist parties: Hamas specifi cally advocates violence to sending many threats [against Hamas] now. Th e PLO’s achieve its strategic aims, whereas Turkish parties operate and Arafat’s image in the West was no diff erent from solely within democratic politics. Indeed, despite insist- the one Hamas has now when the international system ing that the Palestinian vote must be respected, Erdogan began diplomatic contacts with them, first in secret called on Hamas to recognize Israel, give up its weapons, then openly . . .”7 and renounce violence in the hopes of reinvigorating an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. “We have also emphasized the Jordan: ‘Support a Two-State importance of leaving some of the old habits, in order for Solution, but Watch Hamas’ the democratic process to take its course,” said Erdogan. Aft er Hamas’s victory, Jordan underscored the strategic “We have talked about the importance of the acceptance objective of pursuing the peace process toward a two- of the existence of an Israeli state, as well as a Palestinian state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On state in the region.”3 January 27, King Abdallah said that the outcome of the Erdogan also suggested that Turkey has a special role elections does not alter the fact the “two-state solution

1. Th is article was prepared with assistance from research assistants Mark Nakhla and Navid Samadani-McQuirk and research intern Daniel Fink. 2. Associated Press, January 27, 2006. 3. Ibid. 4. BBC Monitoring Europe, January 27, 2006. 5. Hurriyet, January 31, 2006. 6. Milliyet, January 31, 2006. 7. Yeni Safak, January 31, 2006.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 27 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy will remain the logical and reasonable settlement to inclusion in the political process will lead to a radical realize stability and security in the region.”8 change in its thinking and ideology.” Abu al-Ghayt Jordan also inserted a caveat to cooperation with reasoned that “when a resistance movement joins a Hamas-led Palestinian government. Recently political and parliamentary work, this leads to radical appointed Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit said Jor- changes within it.”13 Abu al-Ghayt also prophesied that dan’s relations with Hamas would “depend on the “Hamas will recognize Israel” since “Hamas has already agenda of the future Palestinian government,” and agreed to a cooling off period with Israel in order to that Jordan would “thoroughly analyze the Palestin- negotiate.”14 ian government’s program, to see how harmonious it Egypt’s Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif echoed Abu al- is with Jordan’s higher interests and future coopera- Ghayt’s argument: “Th e fi rst thing is to make sure that tion will be dictated accordingly.”9 [Hamas] will work within that framework: the Oslo Meanwhile, Hamas received an unqualifi ed vote of agreements, the Roadmap, the idea of two states living support from the controller-general of the Jordanian in peace.”15 Just like Erdogan, who off ered Turkish ser- Muslim Brotherhood, Abd-al-Majid al-Dhunaybat, vices as a mediator, Nazif suggested, “Egypt can play an who declared that “the leaders of Hamas are now the important role, because probably Egypt is one of the few leaders of the Palestinian people in light of the demo- countries in the world today who can talk to the Israelis cratic choice which the people opted for.”10 and talk to the Palestinians in that format.”16 In contrast with most media reportage throughout the region, which characterized the Hamas victory as Syria: ‘Hail to Hamas’ a vote against America and Israel, the Jordan Times Syria’s responded to Hamas’s victory with unabashed wrote that the elections were “fi rst and foremost a vote glee, coupled with strong condemnation of a U.S.- for clean leadership. It was a vote against a leadership led peace process that had gone so far off course that that had burnt its bridges to its people by failing to numerous Palestinians had cast ballots against it. As address the widespread perception of misadministra- Syrian Arab Republic Radio, the offi cial radio station tion and cronyism, placing narrow self-interest over of the Syrian government, said on January 27, “Hamas’s national interest.”11 Th e newspaper added: “If Hamas victory raises a question, namely, the way the peace proves itself to be a liberal and moderate force, it will process attempted to impose unrealistic facts.”17 be a successful example for others in the region and Along similar lines, al-Ba’th, the newspaper of the a serious challenge to extremists who have painted ruling Baath Party, said Hamas’s victory “created a new Islamic political movements in only one color.”12 reality in the region that Israel, the United States, and the rest of the world will have to accept and deal with.”18 Egypt: ‘Include Hamas Making no reference to the corruption issue in explain- in the Political Process’ ing Hamas’s victory, the newspaper added that Hamas’s On January 22, Egyptian foreign minister Ahmed Abu “steadfastness, sacrifi ces, and adherence to the resistance al-Ghayt expressed the hopeful view that “Hamas’s option were among the direct reasons for its success in

8. Al-Ra‘y, January 27, 2006. 9. Al-Ra‘y, February 1, 2006. 10. Al-Dustur (Amman), January 29, 2006. 11. “Revolution by Ballot,” Jordan Times, January 29, 2006. 12. Ibid. 13. Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, January 22, 2006. 14. Ibid. 15. Newsweek, January 22, 2006. 16. Ibid. 17. Syrian Arab Republic Radio, 1215 GMT News program, January 27, 2006. 18. Al-Ba’th, January 27, 2006.

28 Policy Focus #53 Responses to Hamas’s Victory from Israel’s Arab and Muslim Neighborhood Soner Cagaptay winning a high percentage of the vote.”19 Th e paper also part of a ‘second wave’ of fundamentalism and anti- suggested that “those who are interested in stability in Americanism, the fi rst wave being the Iranian revolu- the region . . . need to deal with this new situation and tion.” Mohammadi added that anti-American forces the challenges it might produce, especially since Hamas are now using the Iranian revolution as a model and expressed willingness to engage in political work based that Iran should “become stronger in order to inspire on the higher interests of the Palestinian people . . . rep- and continue the second wave.” In another article, Kay- resented by the rejection of the occupation and the need han pointed out the need for Palestinian Islamic Jihad to remove it and establish the independent Palestinian to “step up its anti-Zionist attacks to give Hamas the state with Jerusalem as its capital.”20 chance to effectively manage the political scene and improve the lives of the Palestinian people.”23 Another Iran: ‘Another Victory against America’ newspaper, Jomhuri Islami, said that the United States Iran emerged as one of Hamas’s strongest backers aft er and Israel must “accept reality” and submit to the the group’s electoral victory. On January 26, the Ira- wishes of the Palestinian nation.24 nian government issued a foreign ministry statement on the election results that congratulated the Palestin- Saudi Arabia: ‘Will Hamas ian people and Muslims everywhere and stated that the Back Away from Militancy?’ Hamas victory would bring hope and solutions to the Unlike the case of Syria and Iran, Saudi Arabia’s problems facing Palestine. Tehran also argued that the response to Hamas victory has been rather cool and world “must face reality and accept the legitimacy of conditional. the ruling Hamas party.”21 In an interview with (Lebanese) LBC TV, Prince In addition to the foreign ministry statement, the Turki al-Faysal, Saudi ambassador to the United States state-controlled media ran many news stories on the and former head of Saudi intelligence, said that “the topic. By January 28, almost every major newspaper Palestinians have expressed their opinion and have was carrying the Hamas victory as its most promi- chosen who will represent them.” However, Turki also nent headline story. Kayhan, the semi-offi cial news- added that now the Palestinians “have to deal with the paper run by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, asserted responsibility and the consequences of their choice. that the Hamas victory was the “fourth in a series of Th ose who were chosen for power must also live up to Islamic fundamentalist victories worldwide this year: their responsibility toward the Palestinian people.”25 the others being Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq, lead- Along similar lines, on January 27, semi-offi cial Saudi ing to a defeat of American dreams for an American daily Arab News said that Hamas “faces a momentous Greater Middle East.” It also urged the Palestinians challenge: can it deliver peace and good government not to fall for plots to force them to recognize Israel to the Palestinians? Opinion polls in the run-up to the or lay down arms.22 election showed that the majority of Palestinians sup- Mehdi Mohammadi, a member of Kayhan’s edito- port a peace deal with Israel; Hamas most certainly rial board, noted that the “Hamas election victory is does not.”26 Shying away from the rhetoric of resistance

19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. “Iran welcomes Hamas’s success (translation from Farsi), BBC Persian (available online at www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2006/01/060126_mf_ iran_hamas.shtml). 22. Palestine votes for the Intifada (translation from Farsi), Kayhan, January 28, 2006 (available online at www.kayhannews.ir/841108/16.htm). 23. Mehdi Mohammadi, “Th e Second Wave of Fundamentalism” (translation from Farsi), Kayhan News, January 31, 2006 (available online at www.kayhan- news.ir/841111/2.htm). 24. “Hamas’s Victory Song” (translation from Farsi), Jomhuri Islami, January 28, 2006 (available online at www.jomhourieslami.com/1384/13841108/index. html). 25. Interview with LBC, January 29, 2006. 26. Arab News, January 27, 2006.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 29 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy in explaining Hamas’s victory, the paper added that government will back away from militancy once faced Palestinians voted against Fatah “because they had had with the responsibility of offi ce.” Th e paper added that enough of the cronyism, corruption and incompetence “at the moment, it [Hamas] insists there will be no over which it presided. In that sense, this was an anti- change. Th at is not surprising. No one would expect it vote; Palestinians voted against Fatah rather than for to do so overnight. But if it does not, the consequences Hamas.” Then, the paper asked whether “Hamas in could be frightening.”27

27. Ibid.

30 Policy Focus #53 PART III Security Implications of Hamas’s Victory

The New Palestinian Political Map and Its Security Implications

By Michael Herzog

WITH HAMAS’S VICTORY in legislative elections, (including negotiations) with Israel. He has added the Palestinian Authority (PA) has entered a murky weight in this regard given his status as chairman of the period of transition that could last from several weeks executive committee of the PLO, which is the signa- to several months, during which uncertainty will be tory on all peace agreements. the order of the day. As Hamas gains power and both Further complicating this picture is the declining for- the incumbent president and his Fatah party lose it, tune of the once dominant Fatah movement, which still the result of this reshuffl ing of the Palestinian political controls most of the apparatus and bureaucracy of the desk is likely to be even greater chaos and institutional government, including the security services (Fatah won fragmentation than ever before. over 85 percent of the votes in the security services). Divided and in disarray, Fatah leadership and its rank Divisions of Power and Responsibilities and fi le will not give up easily on their perquisites and Th e parliamentary elections left two offi cial sources of benefits. So far, Fatah has officially declined Hamas’s authority in the PA, advocating confl icting and con- invitation to join in a coalition government, and most tradictory policies. On the one hand, Hamas’s parlia- Fatah leaders believe it is in their interest to position mentary majority will enable it to enact legislation and themselves as the opposition to Hamas. will earn it the right to form a government. When it Abbas and Hamas present platforms confl icting with holds the levers of political power, it will gain control each other on three primary issues: the relationship with over—or at least access to—the security agencies, the Israel, the use of violence against Israel, and the status of PA budget, and the educational and social welfare ser- and control over armed capabilities within the PA. vices. Hamas also has plans to extend its reach by join- Abbas bases his policy on mutual recognition with ing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—the Israel, existing Palestinian-Israeli agreements, the Quar- pivotal source of authority on core political issues with tet’s roadmap to peace, and the vision of a two-state Israel and for diaspora Palestinians—claiming its right- solution. He has emphasized the need to pursue diplo- ful share of power within the PLO structure and steer- macy, not violence, as a means of dealing with Israel and ing it toward a new direction from its new base within achieving Palestinian national political goals. Further- the organization. more, Abbas has emphasized the necessity for the PA to On the other hand, Mahmoud Abbas retains con- enjoy a monopoly on the possession and use of arms. siderable powers under the Palestinian basic law, even In contrast, Hamas refuses to recognize Israel’s right aft er a Hamas victory. Only he can nominate a prime to exist. Following its electoral victory, it has expressed minister, who can be anyone he wishes; he has the willingness to engage Israel through a third party and power to sack a government, issue decrees, and amend even reach a long-term ceasefire (hudna) along the and veto laws—that can only be overridden by a two- 1967 borders, but without ever recognizing Israel’s thirds vote in parliament (which Hamas does not right to exist or giving up on the ultimate goal of its have). The president is also the commander in chief eradication. Hamas further contends that violence of all Palestinian armed forces and can declare a state is a legitimate political tool and should be the pri- of emergency when national security is threatened. mary means for dealing with Israel, thereby justifying Finally, Abbas carries the overall responsibility for Hamas’s armed militia and asserting that it should be all matters of an international nature, including the maintained and recognized as a legitimate “resistance” shaping and execution of foreign policy and relations force serving the greater national cause.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 33 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy

In the immediate postelection period, Abbas can estinian security services that he remains their com- draw strength from the initial confusion of Hamas’s mander in chief and they should report only to him. victory. Almost all elements—both domestic and Many Fatah activists within the leadership of the secu- international—currently need him. Hamas wants to rity services made it clear that they will not take orders exploit him as the PA’s moderate face to the outside from any Hamas government officials. In response, world, especially to handle necessary dealings with one of Hamas’s senior leaders, Ismail Haniyeh, stated Israel and to secure international economic assistance. that Hamas will not give up control over the security Fatah needs him to protect jobs, benefi ts, and assets. services after it forms a government, much as Abbas Th e international community needs him to block the himself had insisted when he was prime minister under full takeover of the PA by Hamas and is urging him to Arafat in 2003. hold fast and not resign in the face of the massive pop- Following these initial stated positions, the parties ular rejection of his platform and party. If he ultimately began discussing the possibility of dividing control does resign, Hamas could win the presidency and take over the security services. Abbas proposed that Hamas a giant leap toward a more effective control over the assume the day-to-day responsibility for public law PA and its security services. and order, a difficult task under any circumstances Abbas has announced that he will allow Hamas to and one in which Hamas will be continually tested form a government only after it meets three condi- by the populace. At the same time, Abbas suggested tions: it recognizes Israel, accepts all signed agreements that he retain control over the services tasked with with Israel, and renounces violence. Th e international checking terror activities. A key variable to watch is community as well as some Arab states (Egypt and Jor- whether Abbas cedes any control over the Preventive dan) has off ered public backing for those conditions. Security Service, which collects critical information Abbas may ultimately succumb to pressure by agreeing in both spheres of security responsibility and which to circumvent his conditions through such measures has always been the official spearhead confronting as the formation of a government of technocrats, the Hamas. Such action may indicate an inclination on ostensible separation of Hamas’s political and military Abbas’s part to compromise on the basic conditions wings, or even verbal acrobatics, but at least a chance he himself outlined. exists that he will hold his ground and compel Hamas Evaluating the security implications of Hamas’s to make a decision. Th at scenario depends also on the electoral victory cannot, therefore, be separated from international community holding fi rm on these condi- the background of an ongoing domestic power strug- tions. Should Hamas, in that case, reject these condi- gle and of the current dilapidated state of the Pales- tions, Abbas may turn to non-Hamas supporters to tinian security services. Abbas failed to deliver on form a government. If he fails to form an alternative his promises, which sometimes were translated into government (it requires a parliamentary vote of con- ineffectual decrees, to consolidate and reform the fidence by an absolute majority, which Hamas can corrupt and ineff ective Palestinian security services. block), Abbas may call for new elections. Deprived of Currently, numerous forces still exist with no clear the fruits of its electoral victory, Hamas is likely to react protocol or established hierarchal authority and insti- by exhibiting its muscle domestically and by abandon- tutional loyalties. Furthermore, an infl ated roster of ing the tahdiyya (partial and temporary ceasefi re) and some 76,000 individuals are on the official security launching a new terror off ensive against Israel. payroll, amounting to about 50 percent of the public sector. In practice, most of these people perform no Evaluating Security Implications actual service and simply benefi t from an employment The possibility of Hamas control over the security program operating under the guise of “security.” Any services is raising considerable domestic tensions. Fol- Hamas government will have to face this corrupt real- lowing the election, Abbas informed the heads of Pal- ity when striving to deliver on its promise to reform

34 Policy Focus #53 The New Palestinian Political Map and Its Security Implications Michael Herzog the Palestinian system, rid it of corruption, and stamp restraint. Given its discipline and ability to control its out lawlessness. cadres, Hamas will probably not initiate direct attacks, Hamas’s first and main goal will be to legitimize most signifi cantly suicide bombings and attacks inside its armed forces through the enactment of a new law Israel, but from time to time may allow or even sub- recognizing and granting legal status to all “resistance contract attacks to other Palestinian terror groups, as it forces” and incorporating them into the offi cial secu- has done during the past year. rity services. It is fair to assume that Hamas will want to When Hamas is in power it is likely to seek agree- legitimize its Popular Army (Murabitoun) militia force ment with other terrorist groups to subscribe to the as well as part of its terror arm—Izz al-Din al-Qassam tahdiyya, at least in de facto terms. Success in these Brigades—while maintaining part of its terror arm for eff orts is not guaranteed, especially given the tensions any future independent use against Israel. Chances of between Hamas and Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades passing such a law are high; even some Fatah parlia- and the external fueling of terror by Iran—directly mentarians may support it. Th e practical result would (primarily through the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which be to add several thousand men to the payroll of the rejects the tahdiyya) and indirectly (through Hizbal- security services. lah). Tensions that emerge between Hamas and those However, a Hamas government will face a severe chal- groups will be quickly submerged; Hamas will not lenge assuming eff ective control of and enacting reforms publicly condemn other groups for launching attacks within the security services. Taking over command and on Israel, prevent them from such attacks, nor punish control, cutting the number of forces, restructuring the them for these actions. As long as Hamas does not fully organizational system, and firing significant numbers control the security services, it will absolve itself of of servicemen are likely to spark violent reactions by responsibility for dealing with violations of the cease- the aff ected members of the services, mostly Fatah sup- fire; when Israel responds to terror attacks, Hamas porters and loyalists. For Hamas, the alternative is also will use that action to justify rocket and other attacks unpleasant: If Hamas chooses to leave the security ser- of its own, claiming that Israel violated the ceasefire vices intact, it will fi nd itself running a government with- and asserting its responsibility to defend the populace out controlling most of its security services and without against the aggressor. Furthermore, one can be sure holding true to its platform of reform. that Hamas will use the tahdiyya to smuggle, manufac- In any case, Hamas alone will not be able to rein in ture, and improve its weaponry in order to prepare for chaos and lawlessness, which itself is likely to increase violent confrontation with Israel in the future. when disgruntled Fatah activists begin to flex their Although a Hamas-controlled security apparatus muscles. Hamas does not have enough forces of its will end whatever remains of Israeli-Palestinian security own and cannot rely on the offi cial forces to do so. Th e coordination (primarily designed to tackle the threats problem will be compounded in the West Bank where of terrorism) and sever any links with the U.S. security the official forces are even weaker than in Gaza and mission (currently headed by a three-star U.S. army gen- where much of Hamas’s infrastructure was dismantled eral), one can expect a Hamas-led PA to establish secu- by Israel. rity relations with Iran. Such ties could take the form of Iranian fi nancial support for security purposes, intelli- Terrorism gence exchange and cooperation, training and the sup- As much as it is committed to a violent jihad against ply of technical know-how, and possible the smuggling Israel, Hamas needs a protracted period of calm to of weapon systems. Iran will be delighted at the prospect form a government, set up its administration, enact of enhancing its infl uence in this important arena and of reforms, and earn a measure of political legitimacy from compounding the threat to Israel from yet another front outside powers. When it is in government, Hamas is (added to Hizballah’s rockets in Lebanon) by introduc- likely to extend the tahdiyya, perhaps with some added ing new and dangerous weapon systems to the Palestin-

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 35 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy ian scene, such as longer-range rockets and anti-air mis- Israeli government decides on this question, it is siles. Iranian support to a Hamas-run PA will not come unlikely to relinquish Israeli security control over the without a price, however, including pressure tactics to West Bank, lest it open the way to the launching of a call for terror activities against Israel, at least by groups full-scale terror off ensive from the West Bank into the other than Hamas. vital heartland of Israel. Practical security contact with Iran could be main- On a practical level, Israel needs to fi gure out how tained through the Hamas external leadership in to prevent funds from reaching a Hamas-led PA but Damascus and the use of the land strip and the Rafah not trigger a humanitarian crisis for which it will be crossing on the Gaza-Egypt border, which are now held responsible in both political and practical terms free of Israeli control. Th e Egyptians have a key role to (averting a humanitarian crisis will necessitate Israeli- play in blocking the running of such a channel through Palestinian contacts in the municipal and local levels); their territory and border, and they should be encour- what is the best way to defend its security interests in aged to do so. the face of a buildup of Hamas’s armed capabilities For its part, Israel—currently in its own election under the cover of tahdiyya; and whether Hamas’s sta- season—will most likely refuse to engage a Hamas- tus as governing party aff ects the Israeli policy of tar- led or even a Hamas-tinged PA at least as long as geting its activists involved in terrorism. (In principle, Hamas refuses to recognize Israel’s right to exist and say the Israelis, no one involved in terrorism will enjoy to renounce violence in real terms. Israel will instead impunity. In practice, targeted killing of involved gov- focus on its own security interests in the territo- ernmental fi gures will have to be considered carefully). ries, including fi ghting against terror, increasing the pace of construction of the security barrier, restrict- Conclusion ing movement between the Gaza Strip and the West Th is analysis suggests that even if Hamas does form a Bank, and further closing Israel to the Gaza Strip. government and assumes control over the institutions But Israel, too, will face both strategic and practical of the PA, one can expect a period of instability both dilemmas: Can Israel eff ectively isolate a Hamas-led within the Palestinian arena and in Israeli-Palestinian PA, thereby undermining Hamas’s hold on power, or relations. A dysfunctional PA governed by Hamas may will it have to consider more aggressive and intrusive replace a dysfunctional PA run by Fatah, only with poi- means to that end? Will it decide to actively support soned relations with Israel and warmer ties with Iran. and embolden anti-Hamas Palestinian elements? Will In the face of this grim reality, it is therefore essential Israel’s response to the absence of a peace and secu- that the international community and key Arab states rity partner be to secure strategic interests in the ter- (Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) remain vigilant in ritories through additional unilateral disengagement keeping their conditions for recognizing or dealing measures in the West Bank or to hold onto the area in with a Hamas-run government—both before and aft er full so that unilateral withdrawal is not construed as its formation. A failure of common resolve—sustained further victory for the Islamists? Whatever the future over time—will only bolster Hamas.

36 Policy Focus #53 Maintaining the Tahdiyya: Hurdles for Hamas’s Postelection Military Strategy

By Christopher Hamilton, Jamie Chosak, and Joseph Solomon

SINCE HAMAS’S VICTORY in the Palestinian elec- suggests that whatever problems the new Hamas gov- tions, the rhetoric of the Hamas leadership suggests ernment encounters in the maintenance of the tahdiyya they have concluded that a resumption of military vio- are likely to come from outside the Hamas framework, lence on a scale of the past is to be avoided. For exam- rather than from among Hamas cadres themselves. For ple, two of Hamas’s senior leaders, Khaled Mashal and a number of reasons, Hamas will likely give these other Mahmoud al-Zahar, have both made it known that groups somewhat more freedom to operate than it will Hamas is interested not just in maintaining a tahdi- permit the Qassam Brigades, though Hamas will, at yya (calm) with Israel, but also in reaching a long-term the same time, extol the virtues of a cease fi re. hudna (truce) with the Jewish state. Of course, this decision on the part of Hamas is merely pragmatic; Control over other Palestinian Groups its long-term goal—the destruction of Israel—has not In the past, Palestinian terrorist organizations have changed. But given the problems that continued ter- given operational commanders tactical leeway to deter- rorist violence would bring to the new regime, a tem- mine exact timing and location of attacks, both as a porary reduction in violence is clearly in its short-term practical matter and to preserve some measure of deni- interest. To implement a truce successfully, Hamas ability by political leadership. In a Hamas-led Palestin- leaders will have to restrict not only the military activi- ian Authority (PA), this pattern will change. If Hamas ties of their own Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, but wants to prevent leadership attrition by means of Isra- also other terrorist groups in the region, most notably, el’s policy of targeted killings or even a reoccupation of Palestinian rejectionist groups such as al-Qaeda and the territories by the Israel Defense Forces, Hamas will Hizballah. Given the history of this confl ict, little rea- be required to demand greater scrutiny of its fellow son exists to believe Hamas will succeed in this eff ort, terrorist organizations. In particular, the new Hamas even if it wanted to, particularly in light of the asser- government will need to significantly moderate the tiveness of Iran’s new leadership. military operations of its two main terrorist allies in the confl ict, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Fatah’s Controlling the Qassam Brigades al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AAB), at least in the initial With the exception of one attack in August 2005, phases of its administration. which Israeli authorities do not believe was sanc- Unlike Hamas, each of these organizations has been tioned by Hamas’s military leadership in Damascus, conducting periodic terrorist attacks against Israeli tar- Hamas has adhered to the tahdiyya begun in March gets during the present ceasefi re. With regard to AAB, 2005. Although reports have indicated that some mili- Hamas cadres have maintained good relations at the tary cells were unhappy with the ceasefire, they have lower echelons, which has led to some joint operations elected either to leave the Hamas organization to join in the past. At the more-senior management level, other groups or to remain in Hamas and toe the line. however, relations have lately been contentious because Th e maintenance of this tahdiyya bolsters the percep- of AAB’s affi liation with Fatah. Additionally, AAB is tion that Hamas is a disciplined political and military well known to be partially funded by and, therefore, machine. The election victory will undoubtedly fur- partially controlled by, Iran. Given AAB’s frequent ther strengthen the status of the organization among violations of the tahdiyya and its refusal to conform its peers in the Middle East and, as a result, will further to the dictates of the previous Fatah-led government, increase the group’s internal cohesion. Th is reasoning and given the infl uence Iran has on AAB’s strategy, this

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 37 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy group appears less likely to readily adhere to requests and the Sunni Hamas declared that they represented a for a ceasefi re from Hamas. united front against their common enemy Israel, whom Hamas’s relations with PIJ have traditionally been both said they wish to “wipe off the map.” more cordial, and joint operations have been ongo- Iran clearly has an incentive to provide additional ing since the mid-1990s. However, PIJ is unlikely to funding and logistical support to Hamas, which may conform to a demand by a Hamas-led PA to suspend be looking for new donors to replace aid suspended attacks against Israel, especially since PIJ, like AAB, is by Western and moderate Arab governments. Iranian heavily funded and infl uenced by Iran. connections with Hamas have been well documented. An additional factor in Hamas’s ability to control As recently as 2003, the Israeli government estimated internal groups has to do with the inherently violent that Iran contributes approximately $3 million per year nature of these terrorist organizations. Unlike Hamas, to Hamas, while the Canadian Secret Intelligence Ser- other Palestinian terrorist groups are for the most part vice asserts that Palestinian police found documents military in orientation and lack a robust, and often that attest to the transfer of $35 million from the Ira- moderating, political element, closely attuned to pop- nian Intelligence Service (MOIS) to Hamas in 1999. ular moods and political winds. Th is sort of organiza- Th e peak of Iranian support for Hamas was reportedly tion is compelled to conduct terrorist operations or between 1995 and 1996, during which time Tehran risk losing funding and new recruits to other groups. gave Hamas between $25 million and $50 million. Hamas may not demand a total suspension of vio- The funding from Iran to the Palestinian groups lence, however. A certain, controlled level of attacks— will not come without strings attached. Of particular both in terms of scale and frequency—may be viewed concern is the fact that, since the election of Mah- by Hamas as desirable. Specifically, if attacks can be moud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s foreign policy has become maintained below a threshold that invites Israeli reoc- increasingly belligerent, especially toward Israel and cupation but still at a suffi ciently high level to demon- the United States. It can therefore be assumed that strate that terrorist attacks by groups other than Hamas Iran will exert pressure on Hamas and other Palestin- are a possibility, then Hamas leaders may allow other ian groups to institute an aggressive military strategy, groups wider tactical flexibility. The outcome may much as it has done with Hizballah. Because future ultimately be a replication in the West Bank and Gaza cooperation is in the mutual interest of both Hamas of the standoff that exists on Israel’s northern border and Iran, the new Hamas leadership is unlikely to want with Lebanon and the Hizballah militia. If such a to risk an early crisis with Tehran by refusing to acqui- confi guration were to emerge, albeit now in the form esce in violent, anti-Israel activities. of a three-sided stalemate among Hamas, the Palestin- ian groups supported by Iran, and the Israeli security The Al-Qaeda Network services, it would be exceedingly complex to maintain Although recent reports say that al-Qaeda has estab- and inherently unstable. Whether Hamas leaders have lished a base in Gaza and that, moreover, the two the resources, experience, and capabilities necessary to organizations have established a strategic alliance, at maintain such a strategy within both the West Bank present suffi cient credible intelligence does not exist and Gaza and among a wider variety of groups is very to verify either of these assertions. No terrorist attacks, much in doubt. for example, have yet been claimed by Gaza-based al- Qaeda cells. Additionally, Hamas activists are not yet The Iranians known to have planned or conducted joint operations Hamas’s success in supplanting the secular, nationalist with al-Qaeda as they have done with other Palestinian Fatah movement represents an alluring strategic oppor- terrorist groups. In fact, the two organizations seem to tunity for Iran to extend its sphere of influence into have chosen to keep each other at arm’s length. At least areas close to Israel. In January 2006, the Shiite Iran two reasons exist for this strategy.

38 Policy Focus #53 Maintaining the Tahdiyya: Hurdles for Hamas’s Postelection Military Strategy Christopher Hamilton

First, although the political cultures of both al- render any tactical or strategic decisionmaking author- Qaeda and Hamas are each based on Islamist prin- ity to al-Qaeda, which it believes to be a relative late- ciples, Hamas’s strategy is distinctively nationalist comer to the Palestinian cause. in focus, whereas that of al-Qaeda is global. As the These two sets of circumstances demonstrate that Hamas covenant states, its immediate objective is while significant centrifugal forces exist within this the dismantlement of Israel and the installation of an relationship, forces favoring rapprochement also exist. Islamic state on the territory taken by Israel in 1948 Th ey include the need for Hamas to replenish leader- and 1967 (what it calls the “near jihad”). For this rea- ship cadres lost in Israeli attacks in 2003 and 2004; son, Hamas, unlike the Palestine Liberation Organi- an abundance of trained and experienced al-Qaeda zation in the past, has avoided conducting terrorist operatives returning from Iraq and the Afghanistan; operations internationally, believing that such tac- the strategically vital geopolitical locus of the Palestin- tics divert resources from its ultimate objective. Al- ian territories relative to al-Qaeda’s grand strategy; and Qaeda, in contrast, in opting for a global strategy, has the vacuum resulting from Israel’s disengagement from directed its terrorist attacks toward the United States, Gaza. Clearly, a closer relationship between the Hamas Europe, and Asia (the “far jihad”). and al-Qaeda organizations would create synergies Evidence of Hamas’s opposition to the far jihad that would be mutually advantageous to both organi- strategy is abundant. For example, both Hamas and zations. Th e history of the Middle East is replete with its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, examples of such unlikely strategic alliances, suggesting have openly criticized al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks in that it is clearly a possibility. In view of the threat an Saudi Arabia in 2003, in London in 2004, and in alliance between Hamas and al-Qaeda would pose, the Amman in 2005. potential for this scenario cannot be ignored. Differing perceptions of the United States also highlight the cleavages that exist between Hamas and Summary al-Qaeda. Following the recent elections, Hamas’s Of the four problems confronting Hamas in terms of leader in Gaza, Mahmoud al-Zahar, stated that George how it manages its military strategy once in power, W. Bush “has the key to achieve peace in the region” the challenge from Iran is likely to be the most diffi - and that “[Hamas is] not considering America as [its] cult. Although Hamas has successfully resisted pres- enemy.” No two statements could more clearly demon- sure from Iran in the past, the new circumstances will strate the strategic and ideological distance that sepa- make this task problematic. The close connections rates Hamas and al-Qaeda. between Iran and other Palestinian groups, such as PIJ Th e diff erences are not one sided. In January, Abu and AAB, may render it all but impossible. If Hamas Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, posted a indeed wants to maintain the tahdiyya for its own pur- message on a jihadist website that condemned the Mus- poses, it would fi rst need to reach a consensus with its lim Brotherhood, the parent organization of Hamas, fellow Palestinian groups and, in so doing, negate any for pursuing what he called a peaceful jihad through infl uence the Iranians have on those groups. Regarding elections. In another instance, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Hamas’s relationship with al-Qaeda, available indica- number-two leader in al-Qaeda, accused the Muslim tions are that signifi cant diff erences in military strategy Brotherhood of serving Washington’s interests. This and tactics separate them and that an immediate alli- belligerent rhetoric, all of which is very recent, indi- ance is less likely. Even this scenario, however, should cates that fundamental diff erences continue to plague not be totally discounted. the Hamas and al-Qaeda relationship not only in the As Hamas tries to take the reins of power in the PA, it military sphere, but also in the political sphere. will fi nd itself in a position not unlike that of other revo- Second, as the dominant terrorist organization in lutionary governments that, at the moment of their fi rst the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, Hamas is loath to sur- political success, fi nd themselves vulnerable to disruptive

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 39 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy forces originating from deep within the revolution itself. ing principles of their cause. Whether Hamas succeeds Hamas may fi nd its ability to maintain political power in reaching a consensus on the tahdiyya—and, equally depends upon the willingness of its erstwhile allies in important, whether it can enforce it—will be among the the Islamist revolution to compromise on the underly- fi rst major tests of its experiment at government.

40 Policy Focus #53 Regional Security Implications of the Hamas Electoral Victory

By Michael Eisenstadt

THE ECHOES OF the Hamas electoral victory are IAF, which has largely displaced the traditionalist, East likely to reverberate well beyond the West Bank and Bank wing from the party leadership. Th e IAF is liable Gaza. Indeed, Hamas’s success at the polls could have to demand electoral reforms that would enhance its long-term implications for the domestic balance of political clout while seeking to broaden and deepen power in Jordan and Egypt, efforts by al-Qaeda and its ties with Hamas. (In the past, the IAF is believed its affiliates to establish a base of operations in the to have provided logistical assistance to Hamas and to Palestinian territories, the simmering confrontation have facilitated communications between that organi- between Syria and the West, and Iran’s role in the zation’s internal leadership in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli-Palestinian confl ict. and its external leadership in Damascus.) The Egyptian and Jordanian Brotherhoods might Headaches for Egypt and Jordan? also press their governments to increase direct aid to As a branch of the international Muslim Brotherhood the PA, should the United States or Europe reduce or movement, the Hamas victory is likely to energize and suspend financial assistance. Because of their special embolden fellow Brotherhood organizations in neigh- relationship with Hamas, the Egyptian and Jordanian boring Jordan and Egypt. And should Hamas’s experi- Brotherhoods will ensure that developments in the ment in Islamic governance be seen as a success, it is West Bank and Gaza receive greater attention in Egypt likely to enhance the appeal of the Islamic model in and Jordan than they have in recent years, potentially other Arab and Muslim countries. infl aming public opinion and complicating U.S. rela- In Egypt, the Brotherhood is outlawed, though tions with Cairo and Amman. members have run for parliament as independents, Finally, the Hamas victory might spur Cairo to increasing their share of seats from 17 of 444 in 2000 rethink security cooperation with the PA and its secu- to 88 of 454 in the November–December 2005 elec- rity posture along the Egypt-Gaza border. On the one tions. Th e Hamas victory is likely to intensify pres- hand, Cairo might recall its thirty or so officers that sure on the Mubarak regime to recognize the Muslim are training Palestinian security forces in Gaza to avoid Brotherhood as a legal party. Ironically, Cairo fi nds accusations that by assisting a Hamas-led PA, it is aid- itself in the uncomfortable situation of urging the ing a terrorist organization. On the other hand, Cairo world to deal with Hamas (widely recognized as a ter- might fi nally get serious about border security in order rorist group) while it refuses to accept the legality of to prevent the smuggling of weapons by radical Islamists the Egyptian Brotherhood (which it acknowledges and disrupt eff orts by al-Qaeda or its local affi liates to has not engaged in terror or violence for more than sink roots in the Sinai peninsula and Gaza. three decades). In Jordan, the Brotherhood is represented in politics Opportunities for Al-Qaeda? by the Islamic Action Front (IAF), which garnered 17 Al-Qaeda has long had a foothold in Lebanon of 104 seats in 2003 elections. (Th ose numbers prob- through its local, largely Palestinian affi liate, ‘Asbat ably understate the IAF’s popular appeal; Jordan’s elec- al-Ansar, whose activities have generally been con- tion laws favor tribal candidates and independents over fi ned to the Lebanese arena. In recent years, however, Islamists and Palestinians, who constitute a major share al-Qaeda, its affi liates, and local groups inspired by of the IAF’s voting bloc.) Th e Hamas victory is likely al-Qaeda have become increasingly active in Syria, to embolden the more radical, Palestinian wing of the Jordan, and Egypt.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 41 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy

■ In October 2002, Syria-based members of the Abu breach in the border barrier created by Palestinian gun- Musab al-Zarqawi group assassinated U.S. Agency men following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. for International Development official Lawrence How a Hamas government might aff ect the prospects Foley in Amman, Jordan. In April 2004, gunmen set of al-Qaeda is unclear. Continued chaos and violence off a bomb and had a running gun battle with police in Gaza and the West Bank are likely to create condi- in a residential neighborhood of Damascus, Syria. tions conducive to the growth of al-Qaeda (as it did Although no group took responsibility for the lat- in Afghanistan, and as it has in Iraq’s Sunni Triangle). ter operation, suspicions focused on a local al-Qaeda Th e failure of the PA or Egyptian government to secure affi liate, Jund Muhammad (Army of Muhammad). the border with Gaza from infi ltration from the Sinai (though both have good reason to do so) could likewise ■ In April 2004, an attempted attack by the Zarqawi create conditions favorable to the growth of al-Qaeda in group on Jordanian intelligence headquarters was Gaza. Finally, should Hamas continue the tahdiyya (the thwarted by Jordanian security; in August 2005, al- lull in terrorist attacks against Israel to which it agreed Qaeda in Iraq (the Zarqawi group’s new moniker) in early 2005) in order to garner international recogni- launched a rocket attack that targeted U.S. naval tion and financial assistance, some of its more radical vessels docked in Aqaba, Jordan, and Eilat airport members might join the nascent al-Qaeda organization in Israel; and in November 2005, the Zarqawi group in Gaza in order to continue along the jihadist path. For conducted simultaneous suicide bombings of three a variety of reasons, then, conditions in Gaza are likely hotels in Amman, killing dozens of Jordanians. to favor the further development of al-Qaeda there.

■ In October 2004 and July 2005, a local bedouin-Pal- A Lever for Syria? estinian jihadist cell based in the Sinai set off a series Syria has traditionally sought a central role in Pal- of car bombs in the Egyptian Red Sea resorts of Taba estinian politics to prevent Palestinian actions that and Sharm al-Sheikh, killing more than 100 Egyp- could harm Syrian interests (for example, provoking tians and foreigners. Although no evidence exists of a war or concluding a separate peace with Israel) and a formal al-Qaeda link, the group is believed to have to advance its interests in the Levant and in pan-Arab been inspired by al-Qaeda and its ideology of global forums. Syria has traditionally supported those Pales- Jihad. tinian groups that reject peace with Israel, including Hamas, whose external leadership is currently based in ■ In December 2005, al-Qaeda in Iraq took credit for Damascus. For both Syria and Hamas, the relationship the launch of ten katyusha rockets into the northern was borne of tactical necessity and not necessarily of a Israel town of Kiryat Shemona. common strategy or goals. Does the Hamas electoral victory provide Syria with In the past year, signs have indicated that al-Qaeda may new leverage in its ongoing confrontation with the be interested in setting up in Gaza in order to open international community over Lebanon or with Israel a new front against Israel. A new al-Qaeda affiliate, over the Golan? On the one hand, given Syria’s political Jundallah (Army of God) has reportedly been formed isolation and military weakness, and conditions in the in the Gaza strip by former Hamas and Palestinian Palestinian territories, it is hard to see how the Hamas Islamic Jihad (PIJ) activists disillusioned by the strate- connection provides Syria with the leverage needed to gic pragmatism of those groups, while a series of rocket compel Israel to restart negotiations over the Golan or attacks on Israeli villages prior to the disengagement to parry international calls to investigate the murder of from Gaza were claimed by Palestinians in the name the late Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Were of al-Qaeda. Finally, Israeli offi cials have claimed that Syria to close down the Hamas headquarters in Damas- al-Qaeda operatives infiltrated into Gaza through a cus, the organization’s activities in the West Bank and

42 Policy Focus #53 Regional Security Implications of the Hamas Electoral Victory Michael Eisenstadt

Gaza would not be significantly affected. Moreover, halt Hamas’s fundraising in the Persian Gulf and else- Syria lacks the ability to goad Hamas into actions that where. Hizballah has also helped Hamas develop and run counter to its vital interests. On the other hand, the extend the range and capability of its Qassam fam- likelihood that Syria will emerge as the Arab state with ily of homemade rockets, so that it could threaten the warmest relations with a Hamas-led PA will likely major population centers in Israel. Finally, Iran has boost Damascus’s regional and international infl uence attempted to recruit Hamas and PIJ militants to con- and standing at a moment when it is almost friendless duct mortar and rocket attacks against Israel from in the global arena. Jordan, though Jordanian security has repeatedly dis- rupted these eff orts. An Opening for Iran? With its victory at the polls, Hamas stands to become To preserve its autonomy, Hamas has always main- a major benefi ciary of Iranian largesse. Should interna- tained a discreet distance from Tehran, even when it tional fi nancial assistance to the PA dry up, Iran is liable has cooperated with the Islamic Republic. Initial con- to become the major fi nancial backer of a Hamas-run tacts between Hamas and the Islamic Republic date PA (for details, see the Clawson essay). Under such con- to the late 1980s; in the early 1990s, Hamas person- ditions, Hamas might abandon its aversion to working nel began attending Lebanese Hizballah and Iranian too closely with Tehran in order to ensure its survival as Revolutionary Guard training camps in Lebanon and a political movement and avoid failing in its fi rst chance Iran. As part of its eff orts to undermine the Oslo pro- at governing. Hamas’s short-term interest in preserving cess, Iran compensated the families of suicide bomb- relative calm, however, might clash with eff orts by Iran ers and transferred to Hamas cash bonuses worth and Hizballah to ratchet up the pressure on Israel, lead- tens of thousands of dollars for each successful ter- ing to tensions in the relationship and perhaps oppor- rorist attack against Israel (in addition to providing tunities for Iran and Hizballah to recruit disaffected millions of dollars’ worth of financial assistance to ultra-radical members of Hamas. Conversely, Iran Hamas annually). Th ose eff orts culminated in a series and Hizballah may view the potential embodied by a of suicide bombings in the fi rst three months of 1996 Hamas victory as so great—off ering a historic opportu- (three by Hamas, two by PIJ) that left more than nity to advance the anti-Zionist cause—that they may eighty Israelis dead and hundreds wounded. Those be willing to off er fi nancial support to Hamas without attacks further complicated Israeli-Palestinian nego- strings attached. Th is outcome could, in the long run, tiations and contributed to the defeat of the Israeli strengthen Hamas and further entrench the infl uence Labor government and the triumph of the Likud in of Hizballah and Iran within the Palestinian territories. elections in May of that year. And it could add an additional source of uncertainty Following the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising and risk for the region, should Iran eventually acquire in September 2000, Iran abandoned its policy of hos- nuclear weapons. tility toward Yasser Arafat’s PA and—working with the Lebanese Hizballah—sought to fan the fl ames of Conclusion violence by arming the PA. Iran also sought to exploit Although the success of a Hamas-led PA could the financial hardships created by the uprising by embolden Islamists in neighboring states and enhance recruiting and co-opting cash-strapped members of the appeal of their Islamist message, failure could ben- the violent, radical arms of Arafat’s Fatah movement, efit the extremists waiting in the wings—al-Qaeda, the Fatah Tanzim and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Hizballah, and Iran. In either case, the coming period More recently, Iran and Hizballah have had some is likely to witness increased instability in the Palestin- success recruiting members of Hamas, which was ian areas and beyond, a situation that will pose diffi cult fi nancially hard pressed as a result of U.S. and Saudi challenges to Israel, its partners in peace—Egypt and eff orts following the September 11, 2001, attacks to Jordan, and the United States.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 43

PART IV Responding to Hamas’s Victory: Options for External Actors

From Washington to Hamas: Change or Fail

By Dennis Ross

HAMAS’S STUNNING SUCCESS in the Palestinian of the realities we now face with both the Israelis and elections promises to redefine the Israeli-Palestinian Palestinians. relationship even as it confronts the United States with hard questions about its policy toward the broader Competing Political Earthquakes Middle East. Both Israelis and Palestinians are going through politi- On the most strategic level, the Hamas victory should cal transformations. In Israel, a new political center compel Washington to reconsider its current approach (the Kadima party) has emerged that threatens to to promoting democracy in the Middle East. At present, displace the parties that have traditionally dominated the administration clearly needs to take more account Israel’s politics. Th e Hamas electoral victory is creating of the potential for antidemocratic groups to use demo- a parallel reality for the Palestinians by sweeping aside cratic forms and mechanisms to seize power, especially Fatah, the predominantly secular national movement in environments where existing regimes are corrupt and that defi ned politics. Th ese twin political earthquakes, despised and where Islamists are the only organized though equally momentous, appear to be leading the alternative. Democracy promotion should remain a two sides in very diff erent directions. leading U.S. objective for the Middle East. But clearly For probably the fi rst time since David Ben-Gurion much more emphasis needs to be placed on building served as prime minister, Israel has a broad centrist con- the conditions for secular, liberal, or moderate alterna- sensus, particularly on how to deal with the Palestinians. tives to emerge—and trying to enhance their capabili- Th e public appears ready to disengage from the Pales- ties—than on continuing to focus such a heavy share tinians, withdraw extensively from the West Bank, and of our eff ort on holding elections as a priority. Such an get out of Palestinian lives. Ariel Sharon both shaped approach applies throughout the broader Middle East and refl ected this consensus and was determined to act and goes well beyond what the administration must now on it. And, even though Sharon is now incapacitated, consider as it deals with the Israelis and Palestinians. his political heirs—led by Ehud Olmert—appear deter- On the Israeli-Palestinian front, the administration’s mined to follow in his footsteps. policy has, since 2003, been defi ned by the “Roadmap By contrast, the Palestinians have now voted to remake to Middle East Peace.” Th e Hamas victory makes this a the Palestinian Authority (PA) by electing Hamas, a group problematic basis for shaping policy now. Aft er all, the that rejects the very concept of peace with Israel. Indeed, roadmap was designed to move from the existing real- Hamas may even reject a “negotiated divorce” of Israel ity to President Bush’s vision of two states, Israel and from the territories, which is how many Israelis view the Palestine, coexisting side by side in peace and security. essence of disengagement. Does the Hamas election mean Hamas not only rejects a two-state solution and Israel’s a consensus exists among Palestinians on how to deal with right to exist, but it is also highly unlikely to dismantle Israel—or, more likely, not deal with Israel? No one can its own infrastructure as mandated by the roadmap. answer that question with certainty. Many observers will Although value certainly exists in retaining the rhetori- argue with some justification that the Palestinian elec- cal guideposts embodied in the roadmap, it is probably tions were about corruption, lawlessness, chaos, jobless- time to admit what has long been the case: the road- ness, and the overall fecklessness of Fatah—a movement map is, at most, a declaratory posture off ering general that was not responsive to the Palestinian public’s needs guidelines for behavior; it is not an operational plan. and paid the price for its disdain of the electorate. But Should the Bush administration develop an opera- although Hamas campaigned under the banner of reform tional plan? Perhaps, but the starting point for such an and change, it never hid its basic principle of resistance to action-oriented policy needs to be an understanding and rejection of Israel.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 47 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy

In effect, we now face the paradox of having an Hamas may not want to deal with Israel, the reality of Israeli consensus for taking far-reaching steps to remove the situation is that Israel supplies much of the Pales- themselves from controlling Palestinians, which is cer- tinian electricity and water and collects taxes and cus- tainly what most Palestinians want, while at the same toms revenues that have provided much of the money time, on the Palestinian side, a dominant political for meeting the costs of the Palestinian administration. force is emerging that seeks not Israel’s removal from And outside of the Rafah passage to Egypt, Israel con- Palestinian life, but Israel’s eventual eradication. trols access into and out of Palestinian areas. Will the Hamas election alter the Israeli consensus? Hamas must face one other reality when in power: It Th is outcome is unlikely; consider that just prior to the ran on a platform of reform and change. To the extent Palestinian election, 77 percent of Israelis told pollsters that Palestinians voted for those twin concepts, their that there was no Palestinian partner for peace. Hamas’s presumption is that their quality of life would improve victory is likely to cement that belief and reinforce the under a Hamas government. But life is unlikely to Israeli impulse toward unilateral separation. Th e prob- improve unless Hamas has the quiet it needs to recon- lem, of course, is that separation or disengagement is struct society. From dealing with chronic corruption not a simple proposition, especially when it comes to and lawlessness to providing social services, to devel- the West Bank. Unlike the situation with Gaza, where oping an economy that offers jobs and promise for the distances from major Israeli cities were signifi cant, the future, Hamas needs calm, not confrontation with in the West Bank, proximity will breed Israeli security Israel. When Hamas leaders, including Mahmoud al- concerns. For example, can Israel count on short-range Zahar and Ismail Haniyeh declare that Hamas will Qassam rockets not being fi red from the West Bank at create a new social policy, a new health policy, and a Israeli cities and communities aft er Israel disengages? new economic and industrial policy, they raise expec- Even if Israel takes the painful step of evacuating settle- tations. Can they deliver on those expectations if they ments from a signifi cant part of the West Bank, will it are at war with Israel? feel the need to preserve a military presence to prevent The irony is that Hamas needs quiet for the near the fi ring of rockets? Will it also feel compelled to con- term in order to cement its political victory at the trol access into the West Bank to prevent smuggling of polls with popular success in government. On the one more dangerous weapons into the territory? If so, to hand, Hamas’s external leaders, like Khaled Mashal what extent will these requirements limit the practical and Mousa Abu Marzouk in Damascus, will push for and political impact of disengagement? a return to violence soon, especially with their backers Even though no simple answers exist to these ques- in Iran urging this action and perhaps tying increased tions, the Israelis are likely in time to proceed with funding to it. On the other hand, internal leaders like separation as a strategic option, given their widespread Zahar and Haniyeh, who live in Gaza and have to deal popular desire to address the growing demographic with the daily realities of life, may have diff erent priori- challenge to Israel’s character as a Jewish democratic ties. Th ey will be no diff erent than the external leaders state posed by continued control over the Palestinian in their rejection of Israel, but they may seek at least an population of the West Bank. A large majority of Israe- indirect dialogue with the Israelis on preserving calm. lis want to defi ne their borders and the country’s future As Zahar has already said, “If Israel has anything to without letting either be held hostage to Palestinian bring the Palestinian people, we will consider this. But dysfunction or outright rejection. we are not going to give anything for free.” The Israeli position and that of the United States Hamas’s Dilemma and the international community should be a mirror Although, given its rejection of Israel, Hamas’s instinct of that posture: Hamas gets nothing for free. Hamas may be to avoid any cooperation with it, Hamas will should be forced to prove it has changed fundamental find that governing presents dilemmas. As much as aspects of its policy at a time when its leaders will go

48 Policy Focus #53 From Washington to Hamas: Change or Fail Dennis Ross to great lengths to avoid any such change. Hamas may ways, wanting relations while avoiding any change in want quiet for its own needs, but it will try to trade its fundamental strategy of rejection of Israel and sup- calm for recognition from the outside and a de facto port for violence. On this score, Washington needs to be relationship with the Israelis. vigilant: No half-measures or vague formulations should Again, one other irony in the current situation be acceptable. Hamas must unconditionally recognize is that both Hamas and Israel may see the utility of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, reject violence, such a relationship. Israel gains calm and proceeds to end all acts of terror, and agree to disarm and dismantle complete the separation barrier. Hamas tolerates that its military/terrorist infrastructure; if the international situation so that it has the freedom to focus on internal community permits Hamas to escape accountability, its reform and reconstruction. Although such a de facto political doctrine acquires legitimacy, and the building arrangement sounds logical, it will only be sustainable blocks for coexistence will disappear. if Hamas is, at the same time, actively preventing terror Already, the United States has worked with the other attacks by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad or the al-Aqsa members of the Quartet (the European Union, Rus- Martyrs Brigades, stopping the smuggling of qualita- sia, and the UN) to insist that Hamas “be committed tively new weapons into Gaza and the West Bank, and to nonviolence, recognize Israel, and accept the previ- not building and amassing its own Qassam rockets and ous agreements and commitments” like the Oslo agree- bombs. ments and the roadmap. Th at is a good starting point, Israel will not go along with a calm with Hamas that but the central issue of conditioning assistance to the gives the latter all the benefi ts and yet requires nothing PA has essentially been deferred pending the selection of it. Calm punctuated by acts of terror (or a buildup of a new prime minister, the formation of a new cabinet, of capabilities for even greater acts of terror later on) and their approval by the new, Hamas-dominated Pales- will mean no calm to the Israelis, and they will act to tinian Legislative Council (PLC). preempt both the attacks and the buildup of the terror Th e easy choice is the one in which Hamas offi cials infrastructure. Whether one is talking about a de facto become prime minister and fi ll out the cabinet positions. relationship that has functional value for both sides or Th is choice is “easy” because if they do not meet Quar- broader policy changes that Hamas is asked to adopt, tet conditions for a relationship—at a minimum, recog- one can assume that Hamas will not only seek to do the nition of Israel and rejection of violence—the United minimum and gain the maximum, but also that it will States should be able to lead an international consensus offer clever formulations of moderation that suggest to break ties and cut off assistance to the Hamas-led PA. peaceful intent without actually committing the group But Hamas is unlikely to make the choice easy. to a change in its fundamental rejection of Israel’s right Hamas leaders are more likely to support candidates to exist. for prime minister and other cabinet posts who are One of the greatest mistakes would be to set up a not formally affiliated with Hamas. In this way, non- diplomacy that provides Hamas with a way to escape Hamas offi cials who ostensibly agree to Quartet condi- making choices. At some point, Israel may let some tions would be the public face of the PA, while Hamas non-Hamas Palestinians act as a go-between to deter- pulls the political strings and shapes policy from the mine whether a de facto relationship is possible, but PLC—and, of course, preserves its purity and its attach- Israel’s terms will be clear, particularly on security. ment to its principles of rejection and violence. In this circumstance, one option for the United States would U.S. Responses and Options be to mobilize the international community to insist Given Hamas’s near-term priorities, the United States that relations with, and continuing assistance to, the PA must be no less clear on what Hamas must do if a will depend on the prime minister and his cabinet com- Hamas-run PA is to have a relationship with the inter- mitting themselves to a platform that embodies inter- national community. Hamas will seek to have it both nationally recognized principles of a two-state solution

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 49 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy and rejection of violence—and the PLC must vote to hide behind fi ctions. Hamas must be seen as adjusting confi rm the government on that basis. to the world and not the other way around. For those To make this decision appear more Palestinian who believe that Hamas can be transformed, the only and less as an imposition from the outside, President possibility will be for pressures from within it and Mahmoud Abbas could say that he will only appoint from Fatah and independents to grow to the point a prime minister who accepts his platform of recogni- where Hamas changes, splits, or discredits itself before tion of Israel, rejection of violence, and adherence to the Palestinian public. Only clear and consistent con- all previous agreements made with Israel and endorsed ditions imposed from the outside, specifying what by the international community. (In fact, as of this Hamas must do, have any chance of building the neces- writing, that is what Abbas has publicly announced— sary pressures from the inside. going so far as to say in Cairo that Hamas must accept Here again, much may depend on whether a Pales- these conditions or he will not ask them to form a gov- tinian alternative to Hamas exists that preserves pres- ernment.) One way or the other, Hamas must be put in sure on it. Today, such pressure exists, insofar as the a position in which it must acknowledge these condi- president of the PA has considerable power both to tions, directly with Abbas and also in the PLC when initiate and to block actions. Th e administration has the prime minister and his cabinet are explicitly con- called on Abbas to stay on. So far, he has resisted any fi rmed on this basis. deal-making with Hamas leaders and has been clear on To be sure, Hamas may seek to limit the scope of what Hamas must do to form the government. In the the platform and make it more ambiguous. Such an transitional period before Hamas forms a government, approach would permit Abbas to claim that Hamas when Abbas remains the undisputed source of author- accepted his conditions and Hamas leaders to claim ity in the PA, the international community should they did not change their posture on Israel. (For exam- work with him to fi nd ways of providing fi nancial assis- ple, what if the platform makes a vague reference to tance to him, with appropriate safeguards and auditing Oslo and simply refers to acceptance of the principle procedures to ensure transparency on how the money of negotiations with Israel? Hamas might claim it has will be spent. One other condition for donors provid- never opposed negotiations with Israel, particularly if ing money directly to Abbas must be the creation of designed to meet only Hamas objectives.) implementing structures within the offi ce of the presi- No doubt, many in the international community dency to carry out his decisions. will look for a face-saving way to permit relations To date, Abbas has not distinguished himself by and assistance to continue to fl ow to the PA without making decisions. But now with his strategy of co- Hamas being forced to openly embrace the principles optation of Hamas having failed, perhaps he will be of peace and coexistence that it rejects. Already, Russ- more demanding. He has already been more assertive sian president Vladimir Putin has declared that aid to with the security forces, emphasizing that he is com- the Palestinians should not be cut off regardless of the mander in chief and that they will take orders from Hamas position, and notwithstanding the Quartet him and not Hamas. If the United States and others statement, Russia has announced it will invite Hamas want him to play that role, they must be prepared to leaders to Moscow. Regardless of what the Russians support him practically and not just rhetorically. Th ey say in the meeting, the meeting itself sends a message must find ways to meet his needs—where necessary, that the Russians, at least, will deal with a Hamas-led fi nancially—and also enable him to show he is deliver- government. Th e Japanese, too, have reportedly con- ing for the Palestinian people in contrast with Hamas, veyed to the Palestinians that they will not stop assis- which can only produce isolation of the Palestinians. tance in any circumstances. Such support for Abbas, however, must be tightly For its part, the Bush administration should make conditioned on his sticking to the demands he makes it as hard as possible for Hamas to avoid choices and of Hamas, on his following through on the decisions

50 Policy Focus #53 From Washington to Hamas: Change or Fail Dennis Ross he makes, and on his not becoming a front for Hamas. cial assistance from fl owing to Hamas, and, thereby, Th e worst possible outcome now would be for Hamas enabling it to guide the PA and its functioning with- to have a veneer of legitimacy that allows it to avoid out transforming its posture. Th ird, the Bush admin- choice and preserve its doctrine so that, as Mahmoud istration should coordinate closely with the Egyptians al-Zahar has said, Hamas precepts are taught in the and Jordanians to ensure that they reinforce Abbas’s schools, permeate every ministry, and shape the public demands on Hamas and also reinforce our messages Palestinian discourse. to the Gulf states on the consequences of providing So what must the Bush administration do now? even indirect fi nancial assistance to Hamas. Fourth, First, its policy should be to work intensively to the administration should assertively support lib- maintain a common front on the international and eral or moderate Palestinian groups as alternatives to regional scene to require Hamas or a Hamas-led PA Hamas to show a readiness exists to engage and help to meet clear conditions for any contact, relationship, Palestinians who believe in coexistence and nonvio- or assistance. Given the Russian defection on meeting lence. Finally, if Israel, in time, proceeds with separa- Hamas, the administration must redouble its eff orts tion, the United States needs to be clear that it will to hold the line internationally—and make clear to back Israel’s needs if Hamas has made meaningful the Russians that if they want to remain a member negotiations impossible. of the Quartet, they will stick to the policy adopted Ultimately, if any hope is to exist for the Israelis and by it. Second, Washington should make sure that the Palestinians in the future, U.S. policy must be guided Saudis and other Gulf states maintain strict controls by the principle that either Hamas must fundamentally on charities and nongovernmental organizations to transform itself and its program or we will do all we prevent so-called private monies and unoffi cial fi nan- can to isolate it and ensure it fails.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 51 European Policy Options toward a Hamas-Led Palestinian Authority

By Simon Henderson

THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) was particularly Israel’s right to exist. “If these conditions are met then shocked by the January victory of Hamas in the elections we stand ready to continue [to fund the Palestinian for the Palestinian Legislative Council. Th e Middle East Authority]. If [Hamas] do[es] not change, then it will peace process has been a key part of the EU’s collec- be very diffi cult.” tive foreign policy strategy, putting the EU on an equal footing with the United States in the so-called Quartet, History: Seizing a Role along with the United Nations and Russia. Th e key to Europe’s involvement in the Middle East peace process this policy was a two-state solution. Hamas’s rejection dates back to 1980, when its leadership (then repre- of that vision, repeated aft er the results were announced, senting just nine countries) met in Venice just over a jeopardizes years of careful and persistent diplomacy. year aft er the U.S.-orchestrated Camp David accords Nevertheless, the EU’s role could be salvaged, at least between Israel and Egypt. Th e region was in turmoil: in part. The electoral success of Hamas, for which the the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan, Islamic fanat- notion of two states is simply a transitory stage before ics had taken over the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and the establishment of an Islamic state in all of historic oil prices were soaring. Noting “growing tensions . . . Palestine, is, at least in the near term, a diff erent policy render[ing] a comprehensive solution . . . more neces- crisis for the EU than it is for the United States and sary and pressing than ever,” the European Community Israel. Unlike Washington and Jerusalem, the EU con- (as it was then called) considered that “traditional ties siders only the military wing of Hamas—the Izz al-Din and common interests . . . oblige them to play a special al-Qassam Brigades—as a terrorist organization. (The role.” The so-called Venice Declaration was particu- EU’s 2002 decision also included Palestinian Islamic larly notable for recognizing the right of Palestinian Jihad, the terrorist group that, unlike Hamas, makes no “self-determination”, that is, a state, and that the Pales- attempt to run a parallel social, charitable, and political tine Liberation Organization should have a role in the organization.) negotiations. While the United States and Israel have been try- By the EU’s own account (http://europa.eu.int/ ing to isolate Hamas, the EU (the twenty-five coun- comm/external_relations/mepp/index.htm), some of tries of western and central Europe, except Norway its declarations and ideas are regarded as milestones and Switzerland) has been trying to bring it into the in the peace process and developing relations with the mainstream, based on the fact that its reputation was Israelis and the Palestinians: growing among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, particularly among the young. Th e EU realizes, ■ Th e Essen Declaration of 1994 stated Israel should however, that having Hamas in power is diff erent from enjoy special status in its relations with the EU. having Hamas with a significant but minority repre- sentation in government. Following the election result, ■ The Berlin Declaration of 1999 introduced the EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana (who was criti- notion of a viable Palestinian state. cized in 2004 for authorizing clandestine EU contacts with Hamas), said it could take three months for a new ■ Th e Seville Declaration of 2002 said “a settlement Palestinian government to be formed, and by then he can be achieved through negotiation and only hoped to see progress by Hamas in terms of meeting negotiation . . . on the basis of the 1967 borders . . . conditions for engagement, including recognition of with minor adjustments agreed by the parties.”

52 Policy Focus #53 European Policy Options toward a Hamas-Led Palestinian Authority Simon Henderson

The EU’s growing influence has not been without of the result, senior ministerial-level representatives institutional setbacks. Spain (in its own right, though of Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the it was already an EU member) hosted the 1991 Madrid United States were meeting in London, along with peace conference, sponsored by the United States and UN offi cials, to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. Th ey the then Soviet Union. Th e conference tried to push took the opportunity to issue a statement on Hamas’s for diplomatic progress after the expulsion of Iraqi victory, read, signifi cantly, by UN Secretary-General forces from Kuwait. Again, in 1993, Norway (not an Kofi Annan himself: “Th e Quartet reiterates its view EU member) facilitated the Oslo Accords. that there is a fundamental contradiction between Since 1996, however, an EU Special Representative armed group and militia activities and the building of for the Middle East Peace Process has existed. (It is pres- a democratic state. A two-state solution to the confl ict ently Marc Otte, who has had the role since 2003.) Th e requires all participants in the democratic process to EU was also represented (by Solana) on the Mitchell renounce violence and terror, accept Israel’s right to Commission, the body established by President Clin- exist, and disarm, as outlined in the Road Map.” ton under the chairmanship of former Senator George British prime minister Tony Blair has been equally Mitchell aft er the Palestinian uprising erupted in Sep- clear. Quoted in Th e Independent on January 27, 2006, tember 2000. EU aid to the Palestinians now far exceeds he said: “I think it is also important for Hamas to under- what the United States gives. In 2005, the relative fi gures stand that there comes a point, and that point is now, were $600 million from the EU and EU member states, following that strong showing, where they have to decide compared with $400 million from the United States. between a path of democracy or a path of violence.” Th is approximate ratio has existed since 2003. A second chance timing was the visit to Israel and Th e EU is also proud of establishing the so-called Bar- the Palestinian territories, three days after the polls, celona Process. Following a conference of foreign minis- by the new German chancellor, Angela Merkel. She ters in 1995, Barcelona was established to form a “wide” said that “[continuing fi nancial] support for the Pal- framework of political, economic, and social relations estinian Authority was possible if the EU’s conditions between EU members and “partners” of the southern were met.” Her comments were echoed in Brussels at a Mediterranean. Currently, there are ten partners: Alge- meeting of EU foreign ministers. Merkel’s words carry ria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Pales- significant weight as a leader of one of the acknowl- tinian Authority (PA), Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. Libya edged main countries of the EU (the others are Britain has had observer status since 1999. Th e Barcelona Decla- and France). Although leading a coalition, Merkel has ration has three main objectives: establishing a common already taken a stand much more supportive of Israel area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of than that of the previous German government. a political and security dialogue, creating a zone of eco- nomic prosperity leading to gradual establishment of a Limited Options, Possibly free trade area, and encouraging understanding between Some Time to Spare cultures and exchanges between civil societies. It is the Th e EU’s fi nancial commitment to the PA is so large only multilateral forum in the world, apart from the that ceasing to fund it would have an immediate eff ect. United Nations, in which the different parties can all Initially, however, the political impact would be as meet. Th e potential for progress from such a low base is much or greater on Palestinian president Mahmoud arguably all upward—or at least it was until the recali- Abbas as it would be on Hamas. This consequence bration of expectations caused by Hamas’s victory. would not necessarily be desirable, especially if it brought about the resignation of Abbas with Hamas Immediate Reaction Is Indicative fi lling the political vacuum. The caution expressed by EU foreign policy chief EU aid is diverse, however, so possibilities exist that Solana is salutary. By chance timing, within three days the tap could be turned off for some commitments

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 53 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy while others continued. Indeed, EU budgetary support the Prophet Muhammad. A row had been steadily for the PA stopped in 2005 aft er the PA increased sala- developing since a Danish newspaper carried twelve ries of some of its staff by up to 50 percent, breaking diff erent cartoons depicting the Prophet in Septem- a commitment to fi scal restraint. Th e additional salary ber 2005, an act off ensive to many Muslims because payments and hiring of even more staff were reportedly Islamic tradition bans depictions of the Prophet. Th e a preelection inducement, ultimately unsuccessful, to initial publication prompted a diplomatic protest by win votes for Fatah candidates. Saudi Arabia, calls for a boycott of Danish goods, and A crucial area of EU support is the Palestinian secu- demonstrations by Muslims. On February 2, aft er the rity forces. It encompasses training and operational widespread publication of the cartoons by European support, including a British intelligence service pres- newspapers arguing a right of free speech, unidenti- ence in both the West Bank and Gaza at security head- fi ed gunmen in Gaza surrounded the local EU offi ce, quarters where cooperation to prevent suicide bomb- demanding an apology. Non-EU member Norway was ers is attempted. If Abbas and his loyalists lose control reported to have shut its aid offi ce in the West Bank of Palestinian security units to Hamas, then this assis- after receiving threats. Embassies of Denmark and tance would presumably come to a speedy halt. Indeed, several other European countries were subsequently EU security personnel on attachment would them- attacked in incidents across the Middle East. selves probably be at risk of their lives if they remained The cartoon row could have the effect of making within the Palestinian territories. (When EU observ- Europe’s dilemma over its relations with Hamas into ers, monitoring the immigration control center at the a domestic political issue for individual EU states. Egyptian-Gaza border, found themselves threatened in Comparisons have been made with the controversy December 2005, they quickly fl ed into Israeli territory surrounding the 1988 publication of Th e Satanic Verses for temporary sanctuary.) by Salman Rushdie. This controversy could alter the policy of individual countries toward assistance for the EU Decisionmaking PA, even though the European Commission, the Brus- Initial reports suggest that Abbas will delay, as he has sels-based bureaucracy of the EU, would still control done in the past, any confrontation with Hamas. He over half the annual total of aid. will also seek to put the best gloss on Hamas statements The overall initial effect of the Hamas victory, so as to avoid the need to respond in words or action. viewed from Europe, is that it represents a signifi cant Hamas itself appears anxious not to provoke any major development with potentially huge and largely unpre- cutoff aid from the EU and elsewhere, using the time dictable consequences. Such challenges are difficult to seek alternative sources. Th e crucial question for EU for the EU to deal with as an institution. Ultimately, decisionmakers and others would appear to be: when the EU problem will have to be resolved by discus- does the PA become Hamas-led? sion at the level of national political leadership. In In gauging its response, the EU is likely to moni- reality, any united front is likely to splinter, perhaps tor carefully the words and actions of senior U.S. and from pressures of national nongovernmental organi- Israeli officials, so EU action or inaction cannot be zations. Before the controversy over the publication regarded as unilateral. Th e Quartet’s statement com- of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad by a Danish mits the EU not to aid Hamas but leaves open the pos- newspaper, the Nordic EU members (Denmark, Swe- sibility of help to other Palestinian bodies and nongov- den, and Finland) might have been the weakest links. ernmental organizations. In other times, France could be expected to maximize External factors could complicate the crisis. In any U.S. discomfort but this time might be constrained the week after the elections, the EU faced an unan- by not wanting to boost President Assad of Syria, who ticipated problem when several European news- though ousted from Lebanon, still provides sanctuary papers published controversial cartoons depicting for Hamas leaders in exile. Britain, which normally

54 Policy Focus #53 European Policy Options toward a Hamas-Led Palestinian Authority Simon Henderson hews close to the United States on peace process issues, Th e EU’s uncertainty provides opportunities for U.S. has hinted of a soft er approach, with Foreign Secretary diplomacy. Once again, therefore, the key question for Jack Straw telling parliament, “We are not expecting international diplomacy is whether Washington has them [Hamas] to stand on their heads and abandon the ideas, the focus, and the stamina both to lead and every position they have held in the past overnight.” to follow through.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 55 Pressing the Palestinian Authority Financially: Not as Easy as It Looks

By Patrick Clawson

AT FIRST GLANCE, Palestinian Authority (PA) show up for work—not surprising, given that many have fi nances seem remarkably subject to foreign pressure. fi ctitious names. From the point of view of good gover- Aft er all, the PA collects only $40 million per month nance, much room exists to increase the savings on the in revenue on its own, while it spends $190 million per security wages from the $7 million a month proposed in month.1 Th at leaves a gap of $150 million per month the IMF program. that has to be fi lled with funds from elsewhere—sug- To be sure, Hamas would have to pay a political cost gesting that the PA could quickly be brought to its for economic reform. Th e main cost would come from fi nancial knees. In fact, the $40 million per month the the dismissed personnel, who would presumably be PA collects is nowhere near enough to pay its $100 the Fatah supporters who make up the overwhelming million monthly wages; without foreign funds, the PA majority of the security forces. Although their oppo- could not even meet its payroll. sition might be tempered if they received pensions, many of those dismissed could be unhappy at losing Problems with Pressing the PA the social prestige that comes with having a regular Nevertheless, using fi nancial pressure on the PA will in job—one that oft en authorizes carrying a gun, no less. fact be harder than it appears. Several reasons explain the Hamas may well prefer to avoid confrontation with PA’s likely resilience. the Fatah-dominated security forces, even if that reluc- tance complicates the PA’s fi nancial picture. Reform could generate substantial savings. PA An additional financial pressure will come from expenses are ridiculously high for the quality of the Hamas supporters who want to share in the budget pie services delivered. Th e International Monetary Fund through both jobs and greater social services. Absorb- (IMF) had recommended that the PA cut expenditures ing the existing Hamas personnel into the PA’s budget and increase revenue collection by a total of $20 million would not be that much of a strain, however, because per month, which does not seem particularly ambitious. Hamas’s structures are quite small. For instance, a gen- Consider the $40 million a month spent on the 76,000 erous estimate for all Hamas fi ghters would be 3,000, security personnel receiving wages. Indeed, in his June which is a small figure compared with the existing 30, 2005, testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 76,000 personnel on the PA security payroll. Committee, U.S. security envoy Lieutenant-General Furthermore, most U.S. and Israeli estimates of William Ward asserted that of the 58,000-plus employ- Hamas’s existing budget for social services range from ees on the PA security payroll at the time, only 20,000– $40 million to $75 million per year; including military 22,000 actually show up for work on a daily basis. Th e action does not appear to bring the total to more than PA’s program with the IMF calls for “retrenching 10,000 $10 million a month. A Hamas-led PA government inactive security employees in 2006”; quite possibly could have leeway to dispense favors to Hamas sup- many of those 10,000 names are fi ctitious, with some porters well in excess of what Hamas on its own could higher-up pocketing the salary. An all-out mobilization previously aff ord, even if at the same time that govern- for election day produced 13,000 security personnel on ment cut the PA budget from $190 million a month to active duty; even the PA acknowledges that 16,000 never $160 million a month.

1. On an annual basis, the International Monetary Fund forecast for 2006 under current policies is $0.46 billion in domestic revenue and $2.24 billion in expenditure and net lending, for a $1.78 billion gap.

56 Policy Focus #53 Pressing the Palestinian Authority Financially: Not as Easy as It Looks Patrick Clawson

Arab donors are unlikely to cancel aid. Arab donors consumers. The Israel Electric Corporation reports provided the PA with $17 million per month in budget that the PA owes it $47 million. Th e bills are likely to support in 2004, according to the IMF. Th e proposition remain unpaid, leading Israel to continue making the that they will cut back in response to Western pressure substantial deductions from the $70 million a month is, at best, arguable. Indeed, domestic pressure may exist it collects on behalf of the PA. Th e IMF estimates that, in those countries to increase aid, especially given the in the absence of policy changes, Israel’s cash transfer in fl ush fi nancial situation in the oil-rich countries (Saudi 2006 would average $42 million a month. Arabia has reported that its budget surplus in 2005 was The second problem is the political repercussions $57 billion, on revenues of $148 billion; its $46 million from halting the cash transfers. Such a cutoff would aid to the PA budget was equal to 0.03 percent of its rev- violate the Paris Protocol regulating economic rela- enue). Press reports suggest that Saudi Arabia and Qatar tions between Israel and the PA, an integral part of have pledged additional donations of $33 million so the the Oslo Accords. When Israel suspended the trans- caretaker PA government still under the total control of fer of funds to the PA aft er the violent uprisings that President Mahmoud Abbas could meet its payroll costs began in late 2000, the reaction from the international for January, although the record to date suggests that community, including the United States, was sharply skepticism is in order about whether promised aid will negative. European countries stepped in to fi ll much actually be paid. of the gap left by the shortfall in Israeli transfers. Th e argument was made that the money belonged to the Israel could face dilemmas in using economic PA rather than to Israel, and Israel’s interests were not leverage. By the IMF’s estimate, Israel owes the PA well served by undermining the Oslo Accords when it $70 million a month from tax money that Israel col- wanted the PA to live up to its obligations under those lects on behalf of the PA—customs duties, value-added same accords. tax, and tax deductions from the salaries of Palestin- During the 2000–2002 suspension of transfers, ians working in Israel (this latter component was once Israel was able to counterargue that PA corruption and much more important but has shrunk in line with the lax fi nancial procedures meant that some of the trans- reduced numbers of Palestinian workers in Israel). Th is ferred money was being diverted into bank accounts monetary control would seem to give Israel consider- controlled by Yasser Arafat personally. Indeed, Israel able leverage over the PA, but Israel would face two agreed to end the suspension only in late 2002, when signifi cant problems in using that leverage. Arafat appointed as fi nance minister a widely respected First, Israel already withholds much of the money to former IMF offi cial, Salam Fayad, with broad author- cover bills the PA does not pay. Almost $30 million is ity to impose strict fi nancial controls. Fayad resigned deducted each month to cover what the PA owes Israel in November 2005, upset that the PA was violating its for items like electricity, water, and health care—ser- fi nancial agreements with the World Bank and IMF— vices that Israel has not proposed cutting off , even in a step that led the World Bank to suspend its aid to the the advent of a Hamas-led government, because of PA budget in November 2005 and the European Union the immediate humanitarian crisis and international to withhold $42 million in January 2006, before the outrage that would ensue. As part of its economic Hamas election victory. As long as the World Bank sus- reforms, the PA was supposed to start paying for these pends its aid to the PA for economic reasons, Israel has services by forcing consumers to pay their bills, which a better argument for why it also is suspending its cash they rarely do. What little is collected is not enough to transfers. Th e challenge for a new Hamas-led govern- repair the electrical and water distribution systems in ment would be to return to the kind of strict fi nancial the West Bank and Gaza, much less to pay the Israeli controls and sound economic policies implemented by suppliers. Not surprisingly, the PA has been unin- Fayyad. Were it do so, then Israel would have more dif- terested in collecting from hard-pressed Palestinian fi culty justifying suspension of its cash transfers.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 57 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy

Iran may fi ll the fi nancing gap. If Arab aid contin- Many reports confuse aid to the Palestinians with aid ues at present levels and the PA carries through with to the PA. To make an analogy: Katrina victims in New the $20 million per month in savings envisaged in the Orleans are grateful for the aid they get from the Red IMF program, the remaining fi nancing gap would be Cross, or for that matter from the U.S. government, but $85 million per month without Israeli cash transfers, that aid does nothing to pay the bills of the city of New or $43 million per month with Israeli cash transfers. Orleans. When foreign donors provide funding for The obvious candidate to fill the remaining gap NGOs to build schools or run day care centers in Gaza would be Iran. To date, Iran has not provided aid to and the West Bank, that aid is a boon to Palestinians, the PA. The amount of aid the PA needs is extremely but it does nothing to help the PA meet its payroll. To small relative to the Iranian economy. Even $85 mil- be sure, if foreign donors fund maternity health-care lion a month is equivalent to only eighty cents on each clinics, that fi nancing reduces the pressure on the PA barrel of oil Iran exports—not exactly a crushing bur- to provide the same service, but foreign support for the den. Another telling comparison is that Iran has more clinics does nothing to help the PA pay the salaries of than $30 billion in foreign exchange reserves, which its own hospitals, schools, and police. is enough to provide $85 million per month for thirty In their respective reports to the December 2005 years. And Iran has provided considerable funding for donors’ conference, the World Bank estimated that in anti-Israel movements, including at least $10 million a 2005, aid to Palestinians from foreign governments month to Hizballah. To be sure, Iran is under consider- (that is, excluding aid from foreign individuals) was $1.1 able budget pressures from the populist spending prom- billion and the IMF estimated aid to the PA was $362 ised by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Iran has million—suggesting that $738 million in aid went to historically not fi nanced movements outside of its tight NGOs or was directly distributed by donors. Th ose fi g- grip. But powerful political pressure would exist inside ures may actually understate how much aid is distributed Iran for it to fund a Hamas-led PA. Not only does the outside the PA’s budget, because the World Bank fi gures Ahmadinejad faction put great importance on opposing do not include all of the several hundred millions dol- Zionism and supporting Palestine, but the Hamas elec- lars per year spent by the UN Relief and Works Agency tion victory also has been greeted by Iranian hardliners (UNRWA) in the West Bank and Gaza. as another indication the Muslim world is experiencing U.S. aid has only under the most limited cir- a new wave of Islamic revolution. cumstances gone directly to the PA. Since 1993 the In 2003, the Israeli government estimated that Iran United States has provided $2.5 billion for aid to Pal- provided Hamas with $3 million and individual Arab estinians (although some of the $1.2 billion given to donors in Gulf countries provided an additional $12 UNRWA was spent for refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, million, in addition to what Hamas raised in the West and Syria rather than in the West Bank and Gaza). Of Bank and Gaza and from other sources, such as dona- that, only $80 million has been available for the PA tions from individuals in the West or criminal activity. budget directly: $20 million in 1994 ($10 million for Presumably Hamas would continue to raise and spend the World Bank’s Holst Fund, $5 million for police money on its own, outside of the PA budget. salaries, and $5 million worth of weapons donated to the police); $20 million in summer 2003 (of which $9 Aid to Palestinians Rather million was for utility bills owed to Israel); and $20 than to the PA million in December 2004 (all for utility bills owed Part of the reason the PA is not as vulnerable to foreign to Israel). In August 2005, the U.S. Agency for Inter- fi nancial pressure as is commonly thought is that most national Development agreed to let the PA administer aid donors long ago gave up on the PA and have instead a $50 million program to build housing, which was a sent their aid to Palestinians through other channels, sign of confi dence in the PA but did nothing to help such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). the PA meet its payroll or other current expenses.

58 Policy Focus #53 Pressing the Palestinian Authority Financially: Not as Easy as It Looks Patrick Clawson

Some of the aid to NGOs is likely to continue fl ow- extraordinary aid fl ows that the West Bank and Gaza ing despite the new Hamas government. In part, the enjoy, most Palestinians work for private businesses, donors fund what are traditionally called humanitar- not the PA or aid-supported NGOs. ian activities, such as UNRWA’s food assistance to the Th e most likely outcome is that a Hamas-led gov- poor. A strong international consensus exists that such ernment will be a disaster for the economy. Th e prin- aid should be maintained, irrespective of the nature of cipal problems facing the Palestinian economy have the government ruling an area. Th us, for instance, the been the rampant insecurity and the Israeli-imposed United States long provided food aid to North Korea, barriers to free movement of people and goods, which stopping only when Washington became worried the are made necessary because the PA has not closed food was not reaching the intended recipients. On the down the terrorist infrastructure. It would take great basis of its record to date in running charitable activi- optimism to think those problems will attenuate under ties, every reason exists to think that Hamas would let a Hamas-led government. Th e most likely prospect is the humanitarian aid fl ow to recipients. In this circum- for tension between the Hamas-led government and stance, a cutoff of international humanitarian aid is the Fatah followers who predominate in the security highly unlikely. services—meaning that insecurity will continue to Foreign donors also fund what are usually called prevail, with armed gangs preventing any regular rule development activities, such as building schools and of law. Add to that scenario the likelihood that Hamas digging wells. Donors are more ready to cut such will take little action to rein in terrorists and that Pal- activities if they disapprove of the policies of the host estinian Islamic Jihad and the Fatah-linked al-Aqsa government. But the usual approach is to look at each Martyrs Brigades may wish to show that they are at project on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, statements by least as militant as Hamas—which means that Israel U.S., European, and World Bank officials since the may have every reason periodically to impose secu- Hamas election victory emphasize the importance of rity-related closures. With a dysfunctional police and continuing with aid that benefi ts the Palestinian peo- legal system plus periodic Israeli closures, businesses ple—which suggests that many of these projects may are not likely to risk major new investments. well continue. One development that would particularly hurt the In practice, the European and American decision Palestinian economy would be an end to the customs about whether to keep funding development projects union with Israel, which Hamas has called for and implemented by NGOs is likely to be influenced by Israel might also fi nd attractive to implement unilat- whether Israel keeps up the cash transfers to the PA. erally. Ending the customs union would mean that No matter how much lawyers and diplomats argue Palestinians would face more problems exporting to that Israel’s cash transfers are diff erent from aid—that the large Israeli market. At least initially, Palestinian is, that the transferred money belongs to the PA and imports would have to come through far-off ports Israel has a treaty obligation to make the transfers—if in Jordan and Egypt, where bureaucratic tangles can Israel transfers tax revenues to the PA, then politicians raise costs substantially. It would take years and hun- and the general public are more likely to ask why the dreds of millions of dollars to build a commercial port West should be tougher on the Hamas-governed PA in Gaza of any size and quality, rather than the small than the Israelis are. port planned now, and the port would operate at high cost. A Gaza airport would make more economic How Much Does Aid Matter? sense, but air transport is prohibitively expensive for But all this analysis on aid may miss the point. Palestin- almost all goods. ian popular attitudes toward a Hamas-led government A sudden end to the customs union, rather than one may be shaped more by how well the economy per- phased in over years, would throw trade patterns into forms than by how much aid fl ows. Even despite the disarray. Th e dislocation could be bad enough to cause

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 59 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy humanitarian problems. If no customs union existed, free goods that can then be smuggled into Israel; this presumably Gaza trade would go through Egypt, but scenario could become a multibillion-dollar business arranging that trade would require whole new net- with huge profi ts for Palestinian criminal gangs or works of importers, wholesalers, and truckers that terrorist groups. Just the easy-to-smuggle, high-duty would take many months to put in place even if all the items like alcohol and cigarettes could produce tens bureaucratic arrangements with the Egyptian authori- of millions of dollars in profi ts a year—not to men- ties were smoothly handled, which is not likely. Mean- tion income from smuggling electronics such as tele- while, West Bank trade would presumably go through visions. Plus, smuggling in cheap goods now kept out Jordan. Israel would want to inspect this trade, as it by trade restrictions (for example, clothing) could does at present, if for no other reason that to prevent negatively aff ect Israeli employment. arms imports. But unless Israel dramatically increases resources devoted to inspection—which to date it has ■ In the absence of the customs union, the taxes Israel had greatly difficulty organizing itself to do—or the would withhold from the paychecks of Palestinian trade process is dramatically changed, there could be a workers inside Israel would be insuffi cient to cover the serious problem: Israel is not set up to inspect enough cost of electricity, water, and health services Israel now trucks to bring in the minimal humanitarian needs. provides to Palestinians. Furthermore, the absence of Ending the customs union would pose several seri- trading relations could poison the economic atmo- ous problems for Israel as well as Palestinians: sphere, leading the PA to cut off payment for such services. Israel could face the diffi cult choice of either ■ Israel would have great difficulties exercising any providing the services free to the PA; cutting the ser- control over Gaza’s trade with Egypt. Israel would vices off , which would generate a humanitarian crisis; have no means in practice, or reason that would or asking the United States to foot the bill, which in withstand international scrutiny, to control the eff ect would mean that the United States fi nances the trade. Indeed, without a customs union, it is diffi- PA by paying its bills to Israel. cult to see the European Union agreeing to stay as observers. Under those circumstances, Egypt would In short, the West Bank/Gaza economic situation is be responsible for controlling trade on its side of the likely to be worse under a new, Hamas-led government border, which may become so porous that the PA (or than it was in the last year, irrespective ofaid fl ows. Pre- others) could easily traffi c in arms; indeed, the PA sumably, Hamas will blame the economic deterioration might begin to import its own heavy weapons, such on Israel and the West. To the extent that the impor- as antiaircraft missiles or long-range rockets. tance of aid for the West Bank/Gaza economy is exag- gerated, that argument will help Hamas pin the blame ■ In the past, Israel has strongly opposed the prospect for economic problems on foreigners rather than on its of Palestinians importing into the West Bank tax- own weaknesses and shortcomings.

60 Policy Focus #53 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Executive Committee Next Generation Leadership Council Jeff rey Abrams President David Eigen Howard P. Berkowitz Adam Herz Daniel Mintz, co-chairman Chairman Dimitri Sogoloff , co-chairman Fred S. Lafer Jonathan Torop

Chairman Emeritus Board of Advisors Michael Stein Warren Christopher Lawrence S. Eagleburger Founding President Alexander Haig Barbi Weinberg Max M. Kampelman Jeane Kirkpatrick Senior Vice Presidents Samuel W. Lewis Bernard Leventhal Edward Luttwak James Schreiber Michael Mandelbaum Robert C. McFarlane Vice Presidents Martin Peretz Charles Adler Richard Perle Benjamin Breslauer James Roche Robert Goldman, emeritus George P. Shultz Walter P. Stern Paul Wolfowitz* R. James Woolsey Secretary Mortimer Zuckerman Richard S. Abramson

Treasurer Martin J. Gross

Committee Members Richard Borow Maurice Deane, emeritus Gerald Friedman Leonard Goodman, emeritus Roger Hertog Fred Schwartz Merryl Tisch Gary Wexler

*resigned upon entry to government service, 2001

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 61 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy

Research Staff Visiting Fellows Samer Abu Libdeh Executive Director Emily Hunt, Soref Fellow Robert Satloff Mehdi Khalaji Martin Kramer, Wexler-Fromer Fellow Counselor and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow Dennis Ross Researcher and Special Assistant to Dennis Ross Ben Fishman Deputy Director for Research Patrick Clawson Research Assistants Jamie Chosak Counselor, Turkish Research Program Mark Nakhla Mark Parris Brooke Neuman Jonathan Powell Senior Fellows Eric Trager Soner Cagaptay Düden Yegenoglu, Dr. Marcia Robbins-Wilf Young Michael Eisenstadt Scholar Simon Henderson, Baker Fellow Elizabeth Young David Makovsky Cecile Zwiebach, Dr. Marcia Robbins-Wilf Young Scholar Associates Michael Knights Research Interns Zeev Schiff Daniel Fink Ehud Yaari Joshua Prober Navid Samadani-McQuirk Adjunct Scholars Joel Steinhaus Hirsh Goodman Avi Jorisch Joshua Muravchik Daniel Pipes Robert Rabil Harvey Sicherman Raymond Tanter

Distinguished Military Fellow Lt. Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon, Israel Defense Forces

Visiting Military Fellows Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog, Israel Defense Forces Col. (select) Mark Hicks, U.S. Air Force Jeff rey White, Berrie Defense Fellow

62 Policy Focus #53 Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy

Administrative Staff

Deputy Director for Administration Stephen Borko

DEVELOPMENT Director of Development Laura Milstein

Development Assistant Joanna Campione

ADMINISTRATION Administrative Assistant Gina Vailes

FINANCE Chief Financial Offi cer Laura Hannah

Financial Assistant Dawn Joseph

EXECUTIVE Executive Assistant Rebecca Saxton

PUBLICATIONS/WEBSITE Director of Publications Alicia Gansz

Publications Associate George Lopez

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 63 1828 L Street N.W., Suite 1050 ■ Washington, DC 20036 ■ www.washingtoninstitute.org