Strategic Choices and U.S. Foreign Policy by Jonathan Chanis

HEADLINE SERIES No. 335 FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION Winter 2018 Strategic Choices and U.S. Foreign Policy by Jonathan Chanis Introduction ................................................................... 3 1. Liberal Internationalism .....................................13 2. Liberal Interventionism .....................................21 3. Deep Engagement .............................................29 4. Restraint ............................................................39 5. Debate Summary ...............................................54 Talking It Over ..................................................61 Annotated Reading List .....................................63 Cover image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Carlos M. Vazquez II/Released Sailors prepare a national ensign on the flight deck of the guided-missile destroyer USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) in preparation for July 4 ceremonies in 2014. Arleigh Burke is deployed in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts. 1 Author JONATHAN CHANIS has worked in investment management, emerging markets finance, and commodities trading for over 25 years. Currently he manages New Tide Asset Management, a company focused on global and resource consulting. He previously worked at Tribeca Global Management and at Caxton Associates where he traded energy and emerging market equities, and commodities and currencies. Mr. Chanis holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Graduate School, CUNY, and a B.A. in economics from Brooklyn College. Over the last seven years, he has taught graduate and undergraduate courses on, among other subjects, energy security, international politics, and political economy. The Foreign Policy Association -The Foreign Policy Association is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan education al organization. Its purpose is to stimulate wider interest and more effective participation in, and greater understanding of, world affairs among American citizens. Among its activities is the continuous publication, dating from 1935, of the Headline Series. The author is responsible for factual accuracy and for the views expressed. FPA itself takes no position on issues of U.S. foreign policy. In keeping with FPA style, sources are not footnoted, but the author will be happy to supply references if requested. HEADLINE SERIES (ISSN 0017-8780) is published occasionally by the Foreign Policy As- sociation, Inc., 470 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016. Chairman, Gillian Sackler; President, Noel V. Lateef; Editor in Chief, Karen M. Rohan; Assistant Editor, Lillian Marx. Single copy price $8.99; double issue $14.99; special issue $12.99. Discount 15% on 10 to 99 copies; 20% on 100 and over. Payment must accompany all orders. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing ofﬁces. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to HEADLINE SERIES, Foreign Policy Association, 470 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016. Copyright 2018 by Foreign Policy Association, Inc. Printed at Unit- ed Book Press, Baltimore, MD. Published Winter 2018. Library of Congress Control Number: 2017953297 ISBN: 978-0-87124-260-0 2 Introduction or most of the period since World War II (WWII), there has been a broad, bipartisan consensus on basic principles or “grand strategies” underlying American foreign policy. This general agreement among those most responsible for shaping policy was built on opposition Fto the Soviet Union and support for the Liberal international order. While the precise degree of U.S. support waxed and waned, there was rarely dis- agreement among American policymakers that the Soviet Union needed to be contained and deterred. The global Liberal order consensus was the product both of the Soviet containment strategy and a deeper American commitment to Liberalism. Established in the aftermath of WWII by President Harry Truman and Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and George Marshall, the global Liberal order was a coalition of like-minded democracies cooperating and trading among themselves under an ever-larger set of mutually accepted rules and institutions. Among its most essential current elements are: commit- 3 ment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); maintenance of strong military alliances in Northeast Asia; continued U.S. involvement in the greater Middle East, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and unyielding economic globalization. The most critical element holding the post-WWII Liberal order togeth- er was the U.S. military guarantee to protect NATO coalition members from the Soviet Union. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union shattered this key rationale. While the underlying consensus favoring strong U.S. military and political support for the Liberal order has endured, the exact strategies used to maintain and extend it have shifted significantly with every new presidency since 1992. Each shift is intended to modify the pre-1991 strategy in ways that keep the global Liberal order alive, in spite of the fact that today’s circumstances are very different from those of the 1945–91 period. Among the more notable differences are: the absence of a second superpower; the rise of China; the diffusion of power to a wider number of states; and the new importance and destabilizing impact of sub-national actors due to changes in communications and weapons tech- SCOTT OLSON/GETTY IMAGES President Donald Trump speaks at a rally on June 21, 2017, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, about renegotiating NAFTA and building a border wall that would produce solar power. 4 nology. The United States has yet to find an enduring grand strategy that matches these new international threats and opportunities with domestic capabilities and values. The current period is particularly interesting because, verbally at least, President Donald Trump challenges the global Liberal order consensus. The 2016 election brought to the fore a series of differences related to alliances, trade and multilateral problem-solving. Long-standing relationships with Germany, Japan and others are being challenged; the basis for the movement of goods and services between the United States, and, for exam- ple, Canada and Mexico has become suspect; and multilateral solutions to such problems as climate change have been rejected. To a not insignificant portion of Americans, these actions appear completely warranted and there is a demand to reduce both U.S. global engagement and the impact of external events on American society. To others, however, this route represents an abnegation of U.S. responsibility both to solve important global problems and to structure the world in a way that maximizes U.S. advantage. This latter group clearly still dominates the consensus. This Headline Series will explore the forces and ideas behind the post-1991 consensus and their alternatives. Specifically, it will: l Introduce competing U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy positions. l Detail the positions of selected advocates. l Summarize the debate and review the present administration’s strategic orientation. l Raise questions for further discussion. Competing Positions Questioning the American foreign policy consensus is not about being pro- or anti-Trump, or for or against any recently serving president. It is about examining the grand strategy that has justified and guided policy since 1991. Many, especially outside the U.S. government, have examined the consensus and asked if the assumptions, goals and methods embodied in the global Liberal order best serve U.S. interests. The most vocal advocates questioning the consensus are found in academia and at the more conserva- tive policy institutes, and their views are grounded in political “Realism.” It is notable that this movement, such as it is, represents a de facto melding of 5 discontented university professors with libertarian think tank professionals. “Restraint” advocates would like to see the United States: l Fundamentally alter its relationship with NATO and make the Eu- ropean countries financially and militarily responsible for their own security. l Withdraw U.S. military forces from Afghanistan. l Limit the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, including in Iraq. l Not assume responsibility for spreading democracy and markets in countries such as Ukraine. l Avoid regime change policies in countries such as Syria and Libya. l Convert “special relationships” with states like Israel and Japan to normal relationships. l Focus U.S. attention and power on Asia, where they locate America’s most critical interests. Restraint advocates are not arguing for a withdrawal from the world or for isolation, but instead for a more judicious use of U.S. power—a husbanding of resources for a time when their employment (most likely in Asia) is truly necessary. The Restraint program would represent a radical change from the Unit- ed States’ post-Soviet grand strategy and foreign policy. In fact, not a single senior U.S. official active in constructing and running U.S. foreign policy since 1991 has supported such a program. Most senior U.S. officials from presidents through secretaries of state and defense, national security advis- ers, and U.S. representatives to the United Nations (UN) are strenuously opposed to a majority of the above program, especially its NATO compo- nent. These figures represent what are called the Liberal Internationalist or else the Liberal Interventionist wings of the consensus. And since this consensus reaches across Democratic

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