Strategic Choices and U.S. Foreign Policy by Jonathan Chanis

Headline Series No. 335 FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION Winter 2018

Introduction...... 3

1. Liberal Internationalism...... 13

2. Liberal Interventionism...... 21

3. Deep Engagement...... 29

4. Restraint...... 39

5. Debate Summary...... 54

Talking It Over...... 61 Annotated Reading List...... 63

Cover image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Carlos M. Vazquez II/Released Sailors prepare a national ensign on the flight deck of the guided-missile destroyer USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) in preparation for July 4 ceremonies in 2014. Arleigh Burke is deployed in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts.

1 Author JONATHAN CHANIS has worked in investment management, emerging markets finance, and commodities trading for over 25 years. Currently he manages New Tide Asset Management, a company focused on global and resource consulting. He previously worked at Tribeca Global Management and at Caxton Associates where he traded energy and emerging market equities, and commodities and currencies. Mr. Chanis holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Graduate School, CUNY, and a B.A. in economics from Brooklyn College. Over the last seven years, he has taught graduate and undergraduate courses on, among other subjects, energy security, international politics, and political economy.

The Foreign Policy Association

-The Foreign Policy Association is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan education al organization. Its purpose is to stimulate wider interest and more effective participation in, and greater understanding of, world affairs among American citizens. Among its activities is the continuous publication, dating from 1935, of the Headline Series. The author is responsible for factual accuracy and for the views expressed. FPA itself takes no position on issues of U.S. foreign policy. In keeping with FPA style, sources are not footnoted, but the author will be happy to supply references if requested.

Headline Series (ISSN 0017-8780) is published occasionally by the Foreign Policy As- sociation, Inc., 470 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016. Chairman, Gillian Sackler; President, Noel V. Lateef; Editor in Chief, Karen M. Rohan; Assistant Editor, Lillian Marx. Single copy price $8.99; double issue $14.99; special issue $12.99. Discount 15% on 10 to 99 copies; 20% on 100 and over. Payment must accompany all orders. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing ofﬁces. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, 470 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016. Copyright 2018 by Foreign Policy Association, Inc. Printed at Unit- ed Book Press, Baltimore, MD. Published Winter 2018. Library of Congress Control Number: 2017953297 ISBN: 978-0-87124-260-0

2 Introduction

or most of the period since World War II (WWII), there has been a broad, bipartisan consensus on basic principles or “grand strategies” underlying American foreign policy. This general agreement among those most responsible for shaping policy was built on opposition Fto the Soviet Union and support for the Liberal international order. While the precise degree of U.S. support waxed and waned, there was rarely disagreement among American policymakers that the Soviet Union needed to be contained and deterred. The global Liberal order consensus was the product both of the Soviet containment strategy and a deeper American commitment to Liberalism. Established in the aftermath of WWII by President Harry Truman and Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and George Marshall, the global Liberal order was a coalition of like-minded democracies cooperating and trading among themselves under an ever-larger set of mutually accepted rules and institutions. Among its most essential current elements are: commit-

3 ment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); maintenance of strong military alliances in Northeast Asia; continued U.S. involvement in the greater Middle East, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and unyielding economic globalization. The most critical element holding the post-WWII Liberal order together was the U.S. military guarantee to protect NATO coalition members from the Soviet Union. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union shattered this key rationale. While the underlying consensus favoring strong U.S. military and political support for the Liberal order has endured, the exact strategies used to maintain and extend it have shifted significantly with every new presidency since 1992. Each shift is intended to modify the pre-1991 strategy in ways that keep the global Liberal order alive, in spite of the fact that today’s circumstances are very different from those of the 1945–91 period. Among the more notable differences are: the absence of a second superpower; the rise of China; the diffusion of power to a wider number of states; and the new importance and destabilizing impact of sub-national actors due to changes in communications and weapons tech-

SCOTT OLSON/GETTY IMAGES President Donald Trump speaks at a rally on June 21, 2017, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, about renegotiating NAFTA and building a border wall that would produce solar power.

4 nology. The United States has yet to find an enduring grand strategy that matches these new international threats and opportunities with domestic capabilities and values. The current period is particularly interesting because, verbally at least, President Donald Trump challenges the global Liberal order consensus. The 2016 election brought to the fore a series of differences related to alliances, trade and multilateral problem-solving. Long-standing relationships with Germany, Japan and others are being challenged; the basis for the movement of goods and services between the United States, and, for example, Canada and Mexico has become suspect; and multilateral solutions to such problems as climate change have been rejected. To a not insignificant portion of Americans, these actions appear completely warranted and there is a demand to reduce both U.S. global engagement and the impact of external events on American society. To others, however, this route represents an abnegation of U.S. responsibility both to solve important global problems and to structure the world in a way that maximizes U.S. advantage. This latter group clearly still dominates the consensus. This Headline Series will explore the forces and ideas behind the post-1991 consensus and their alternatives. Specifically, it will: l Introduce competing U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy positions. l Detail the positions of selected advocates. l Summarize the debate and review the present administration’s strategic orientation. l Raise questions for further discussion.

Competing Positions Questioning the American foreign policy consensus is not about being pro- or anti-Trump, or for or against any recently serving president. It is about examining the grand strategy that has justified and guided policy since 1991. Many, especially outside the U.S. government, have examined the consensus and asked if the assumptions, goals and methods embodied in the global Liberal order best serve U.S. interests. The most vocal advocates questioning the consensus are found in academia and at the more conservative policy institutes, and their views are grounded in political “Realism.” It is notable that this movement, such as it is, represents a de facto melding of 5 discontented university professors with libertarian think tank professionals. “Restraint” advocates would like to see the United States: l Fundamentally alter its relationship with NATO and make the Eu- ropean countries financially and militarily responsible for their own security. l Withdraw U.S. military forces from Afghanistan. l Limit the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, including in Iraq. l Not assume responsibility for spreading democracy and markets in countries such as Ukraine. l Avoid regime change policies in countries such as Syria and Libya. l Convert “special relationships” with states like Israel and Japan to normal relationships. l Focus U.S. attention and power on Asia, where they locate America’s most critical interests. Restraint advocates are not arguing for a withdrawal from the world or for isolation, but instead for a more judicious use of U.S. power—a husbanding of resources for a time when their employment (most likely in Asia) is truly necessary. The Restraint program would represent a radical change from the Unit- ed States’ post-Soviet grand strategy and foreign policy. In fact, not a single senior U.S. official active in constructing and running U.S. foreign policy since 1991 has supported such a program. Most senior U.S. officials from presidents through secretaries of state and defense, national security advis- ers, and U.S. representatives to the United Nations (UN) are strenuously opposed to a majority of the above program, especially its NATO component. These figures represent what are called the Liberal Internationalist or else the Liberal Interventionist wings of the consensus. And since this consensus reaches across Democratic and Republican party lines, it is bipartisan and incredibly durable. A third consensus variant, Deep Engagement, seeks to amend and protect the U.S. role in the Liberal order by removing the “unnecessary” parts of U.S. policy, such as humanitarian interventions, nation-building and wars of choice. Liberal Internationalism and Deep Engagement are grounded primarily in classical and economic Liberalism. Liberal Interventionism mixes Liberalism with political Realism in a way that alienates it from both traditions. 6 (PHOTO BY THE ASAHI SHIMBUN VIA GETTY IMAGES) Russian President Boris Yeltsin addresses a crowd in front of the parliament building after a coup attempt failed on August 22, 1991, in Moscow, Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin became the first president of Russia.

Debate Antecedents The primary issue Restraint advocates have with the Liberal consensus concerns the degree of U.S. military and political engagement since the collapse of the Soviet Union. To Restraint advocates, the conclusion of the Cold War on terms highly favorable to the United States should have led to a reduction in global U.S. military and political commitments. But to Liberal advocates, the opportunity was right to redouble America’s efforts to transform the world into a safer, more democratic and prosperous place. The United States chose the latter path and significantly expanded its foreign policy objectives and increased its engagement, especially its military engagement, with the world. The hallmarks of the post-1991 order were: the expansion of NATO to include most Eastern and Central European states and three former Soviet republics; the pursuit of global “democratic enlargement” through invasion, occupation and attempts at nation-building; and the effort to spread market economics and to open and expand global trading relationships. The attacks on September 11, 2001, greatly increased the tempo of this activity. 7 To an extent, the pre-1991 U.S. strategy also focused on military alliances, trade agreements and multilateral governance. But it was less ambitious, more defensive, limited in geographic scope and designed to be, in U.S. diplomat George Kennan’s words, patient. Beginning with President Bill Clinton (1993–2001) and continuing under President George W. Bush (2001–09), the United States increasingly emphasized transforming other countries into “free-market democracies,” opening states to unrestricted flows of foreign capital, intervening abroad for humanitarian reasons, remaking other societies’ domestic political and economic systems, and ultimately using U.S. military forces to overthrow governments beyond America’s traditional sphere of interest in the Caribbean and Central America. While President Barack Obama (2009–17) modified some of these policies, especially in the Middle East, their essence did not change. The roots of the current debate reach back into American politics and the distinction between Realism and Liberalism in foreign policy. Realism sees the international system as characterized by “anarchy” (meaning the absence of hierarchy, not chaos), “self-help,” and fierce and nasty competition for power and security. Realism’s classical sources include Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli; prominent American Realists include Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel P. Huntington, Henry A. Kissinger, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. Realism is central to the Restraint position and in many ways the current debate is an attempt to revive it. In its “classic” form, Realism disputes Liberalism’s vision of people as inherently good. One of Realism’s most important tenets holds that the desire for power (animus dominandi) is a distinguishing feature of all politics, including international politics. Other import tenets are: l Sovereign states are the dominant global actors (as opposed to sub- or trans-national actors like individual consumers or multinational corporations). l Competition and conflict are inherent in a world without hierarchy. l A state’s definition of its national interest is key to how it conducts itself globally. l Every state has the right, if not the obligation, to protect its interests— by force if necessary.

8 l The struggle for power among states leads to various types of balances of power among them. l Diplomacy backed by military power is the most important tool for reducing tension and solving interstate conflict. The meaning of Liberalism has changed over the centuries and continues to change. Key current precepts include limited government (especially concerning economic regulation), rule of law, majority rule with protection of minority rights, and the sanctity of private property. The core foreign policy tents of Liberalism tend to be antithetical to those of Realism, and include: l Individuals, as opposed to states, are the most significant units for understanding international affairs. l A natural unity of mankind exists, and the primary struggle of society involves finding/constructing situations of mutual gain. l Society is founded on reason and faith in human progress. l Voluntary global institutions, education, and compassion and sym- pathy can reorder the world and limit destructive human conflict. The importance of representative government and trade in the Liberal tradition are especially notable. Thinkers from Immanuel Kant and Rich- ard Cobden through Joseph Schumpeter argued that democratic (or as it was previously called, republican) governments and free trade can tame international anarchy and eliminate war, and that human self-interest is best harnessed through trade. In order to create a peaceful world order, all states must become democratic and all people must pursue their self-interest, especially through exchange. War and international violence are seen as the product of poor domestic governance and wicked elites: People are by nature peace-loving and they are forced or tricked into war by unrep- resentative governments. Today, Liberal Internationalism seeks to create a world where the nation-state (including ultimately the United States) is less important. It en- visions a world where human affairs are more closely managed by international organizations and international law, and by globalized commerce and multinational corporations. Deep Engagement accepts much of Liberal Internationalism’s outlook, but sees the United States at the center of a global security community where these organizations, laws and multiple military 9 alliances work to secure U.S. dominance over the international system. Lib- eral Interventionism also seeks U.S. global dominance, but it disdains Deep Engagement’s calls for less reliance on military force and Liberal Internation- alism’s efforts to build a global international order.

Debate Parameters The primary differences between the four views concern the means and ends of policy. Is the goal of U.S. foreign policy to build a specific type of world order? What is the proper role of the U.S. military in building and maintaining an international order? Should the United States care about and attempt to change the domestic systems of other states? In order to an- swer these questions, governments often create grand strategies that order perceptions of the world and prioritize foreign policy actions. Whether it is an implicit or explicit theory, a grand strategy is the basis for all coherent foreign policy decisions. While the United State has consciously articulated grand strategies at various points, rarely if ever has it done so in advance of new circumstances or threats. Grand strategy provides a state’s decision-makers with a theoretical framework for understanding and reacting to the world, and it represents a theory for pursuing security. Security means preserving territorial integrity, physically protecting citizens (and occasionally others) living on that territory and safeguarding the ability to make uncontested decisions domestically. Narrowly defined, grand strategy is about how violence is utilized (if at all) in pursuit or defense of these goals. More broadly, it is about how states define international problems and rank threats, and how they marshal and manage resources to counter these threats. Grand strategy defines national and vital interests and provides a problem-solving framework for decision-makers. It conceptualizes when resort to force is warranted and when other means, such as diplomacy or economic pres- sure, are more suitable to the task at hand. Most current articulation of U.S. grand strategy comes from academia or the think tank community. (However, both of these groups contain a great many former military personnel and government employees.) For better or worse, the U.S. government rarely articulates coherent and enduring grand strategic visions. There are various national security memos, directives and reports, and “quadrennial defense reviews,” but these do not usually

10 approach the level of comprehensiveness and ubiquity produced by the non-government side. Notably, these non-government grand strategy discussions tend to be more abstract. They portray an almost idealized vision of U.S. strategic choices and potential policies. Consequently, government policymakers often go about their daily activities completely ignorant of this debate. In some cases, they would fail to understand it or might even reject the Internationalist or Interventionist labels. In spite of this, idealized grand strategic views are useful because they allow us to clearly contrast contend- ing paradigms and foreign policy preferences. They also construct historical narratives that provide context for better decision-making. Still, the end goal of articulating strategy is to push U.S. policy in a particular direction. Analysis of the current strategy debate is complicated by the fact that there is little agreement about how each of the four positions refers to the others. Deep Engagement advocates, for example, often refer to Restraint advocates as “Isolationists.” Restraint advocates call Deep Engagement advocates “Liberal Hegemonists.” To some extent, the mislabeling is pur- posely intended to discredit alternative views. It is also notable that one position, Liberal Interventionism (or what used to be called Neo-Conser- vatism) is unsure what it should call itself. (Opponents continue to refer to these advocates as “Neo-Cons.”) While it can be dangerous to put people in boxes with labels, the table on the next page attempts to distinguish various participants in the debate. Given the number of people involved, this should make it easier to make sense of who advocates what, and to keep track of the various positions. It should be noted that categorizing the various adherents can be complicated. First, views may evolve as circumstances change, or as people mature intellectually or exercise power. (For example, Don- ald Rumsfeld evolved from an anti-Vietnam War, Nixon White House staffer, to a patron of Liberal Interventionism as President G.W. Bush’s secretary of defense.) Second, even if views do not change, often people are not intellectually consistent, especially over long careers. And third, as will be shown below, the borders between the three non-Restraint schools can be vague, especially since an individual can approach the debate as a smorgasbord of policy options from which to pick and choose.

11 Contrasting Grand Strategies Self-Label Labels Used Affiliated Persons By Opponents (Association)

Liberal Engagement Plus Anne-Marie Slaughter Internationalism Liberal Hegemony (New America) Neo-Liberalism John Ikenberry Humanitarian Interventionism (Princeton University) Cooperative Security Primacy Liberal Hawks Liberal Universalism Muscular Liberalism

Liberal Neo-Conservatism Max Boot Interventionism Engagement Plus) (Council on Foreign Relations) Primacy Robert Kagan Benevolent Global Hegemony (Brookings Institution) Armed Liberalism Muscular Liberalism

Deep Liberal Hegemony Stephen G. Brooks (Dartmouth College) Engagement Open Door Hegemony Cooperative Security William C. Wohlforth Primacy (Dartmouth College)

Barry Posen Restraint Realism Retreat (MIT) Retrenchment John Mearsheimer Isolationism (University of Chicago) Stephen Walt (Harvard University)

12 1 Liberal Internationalism

s noted, the transformation of U.S. grand strategy from containment, deterrence and Liberalism to just Liberalism began with the decline of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By the time the Clinton administration came to office in 1993, the United AStates was confronted with a host of new problems and opportunities. Russia, other former Soviet states and Eastern Europe had to be stabilized, and political and economic transformation promoted; numerous violent border conflicts across Eurasia had to be curbed or resolved; without a dangerous adversary, NATO faced an existential crisis; decades of alliances and relationships in the Middle East had been upended and various So- viet client states such as Cuba, Nicaragua and Syria had been cast adrift. Without the Soviet Union as the primary adversary, U.S. grand strategy lost one of its two organizing principles. The country’s foreign policy was increasingly improvisational. In spite of the serious consequences, many thought that the Soviet collapse had provided the United States with a favorable opportunity to

13 remake the world. They also thought that the Westphalian age had ended and that geography, borders and sovereignty were increasingly irrelevant. As Jessica Mathews said in a 1997 Foreign Affairs article: The absolutes of the Westphalian system—territorially fixed states where everything of value lies within some state’s borders; a single, secular authority governing each territory and representing it outside its borders; and no authority above states—are all dissolving. Increasingly, resources and threats that matter, including money, information, pollution, and popular culture, circulate and shape lives and economies with little regard for political boundaries…Even the most powerful states find the marketplace and international public opinion compelling them more often to follow a particular course. In this new “unipolar” world (a world where no other country could rival the United States’ power), the country needed to and could shape the future. Liberal advocates thought that they had the winds of history at their backs. They set out to remake the globe, not necessarily in the image of the United States, but in accord with Liberal, i.e., universal, principles. In the early 1990s, it seemed obvious that Liberalism’s emphasis on civil society, individual rights and globalization was superior to Westphalia’s emphasis on sovereignty, realpolitik and Realism. The primary purpose of classical and economic liberalism was to increase individual liberty, especially by reducing the power of the state and increasing the power of markets. Historically in the West, as lords and then bankers wrestled more and more concessions from kings, queens and other sovereigns in order to finance wars, as businessmen freed themselves from state mercantilist control, and as individuals better secured their property against taking by the state, people became freer and democracy grew. President Woodrow Wilson was one of the most astute observers of this process, and Liberal Internationalism—especially as articulated by Anne-Marie Slaughter and John Ikenberry—represents a updating of Wilson’s understanding of Liberalism. Looking back over the 1990s’ experience, Anne-Marie Slaughter wrote in The Crisis of American Foreign Policy that there are three essential parts to Liberal Internationalism: 1) strengthening international organizations and international law; 2) promoting democracy in other states; and 3) when necessary, intervening militarily in cases of gross human rights violations

14 COURTESY RONALD REAGAN LIBRARY

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush in New York City, December 1988.

or genocide. Slaughter, Ikenberry and other Internationalists like to focus on the United States’ “hegemonic” role. In political science and economic jargon, a hegemon is a state with sufficient power and will to dominate the conduct of international affairs by defining and maintaining the rules governing inter-state relations. In plain English, a hegemon is a state that dominates all other states. Ikenberry, for example, writing in his 2012 book Liberal Leviathan, justified the United States’ global hegemonic role on the grounds that it successfully constructed a rules-based order promoting respect for human rights, economic freedom and prosperity. To Ikenberry, at some future point the strengthened Liberal order would be able to function even without the guiding hegemonic hand of the United States. The Clinton administration moved ahead on all three areas cited by Slaughter, and its view of the United States as the “indispensable superpower” (as then Secretary of State Madeline Albright was fond of saying)

15 fit very nicely with extending the “Liberal hegemonic” order. The administration worked to strengthen international organizations and international law by supporting such things as the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), European integration and NATO expansion. The latter, in particular, was an important way for the Clinton administration both to strengthen global institutions and support democratic development. (The actual enlargement discussions began in 1991/1992 and the Czech Repub- lic, Hungary and Poland were admitted in 1999. There were subsequent expansions in 2004, 2009 and 2017.) To some, NATO expansion remains one of the most contested decisions of the post-Cold War era. To supporters, which include(d) most all of the U.S. foreign policy community and military, expanding NATO was not only insurance against a resurgent Russian imperialism, but it also resolved the question of what to do with an alliance that lacked a primary adversary. Among other things, NATO could be repurposed to promote democratic development through the cultivation of better civilian governance of the military, and it could be used for out-of-area operations. The alliance’s detractors (who today are often found among those advocating Restraint), saw NATO expansion as a missed opportunity to construct a new and better European security community by matching Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe and (effective) disarmament with a corresponding reduction in NATO’s forces. Besides expanding international and multilateral organizations, the Clinton administration undertook direct actions designed to promote and enlarge democracies around the world. This notably included financial, advisory and political support for democratic and market reform in Rus- sia, other former Soviet states, and Central and Eastern Europe; political intervention to help reverse an anti-democratic coup in Guatemala; and leadership in efforts to strengthen UN sanctions on the military rulers of Haiti. While their aims are laudable, these efforts nevertheless led to hundreds of U.S. diplomats, and ultimately tens of thousands of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) employees and contractors, intervening in the domestic societies of the targeted countries. Moreover, this effort was supplemented by personnel from a host of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. This was particularly the case regarding economic reform in

16 Russia and Eastern Europe, where there were vigorous (and in many cases ultimately unsuccessful) efforts to promote civil society and create more durable democratic institutions.

Liberal Internationalism and Capitalism One of the more interesting aspects of this democratization effort was the centrality of promoting capitalism and the odd way this effort is now portrayed by Liberal Internationalism. (For precision, capitalism is an economic system where individuals and firms [not governments] are the primary decision-makers, where prices and markets are utilized for allo- cating goods and services, and where private property, not state property, constitutes the bulk of the means of production.) Liberal Internationalists (and to a lesser extent Deep Engagement supporters) seem to go out of their way to avoid the word capitalism. General discussion of capitalism as an economic system did decrease steadily beginning in the early 1980s, and really fell off after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But given capitalism’s central role in the Liberal model, its avoidance is peculiar. Internationalists frequently talk euphemistically of the “Liberal order,” “open markets,” “open system,” “market democracy” and occasionally “free trade,” but virtually never of “capitalism.” Liberal Interventionists, on the other hand, pay a great deal of attention to capitalism. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States expended significant financial and personnel resources, as well as diplomatic energy and political capital trying to build capitalism in the former Soviet states, Eastern Europe and East Asia. The promotion of what was then increasingly referred to as “market democracies” was (and remains) central to the Liberal vision of a “democratic transition.” Democratic transition is the notion that reconfiguring the domestic political character of states, including their economic orientation toward private property and enterprise, is critical for establishing a more peaceful and just world. In the 1990s, the United States (really the U.S. Treasury Department) primarily attempted to do this through the IMF and World Bank. These institutions often pressured participating countries into compliance with a set of principles embodied in what came to be known as the “Washington Consensus.” This set of reform prescriptions embodied the collective wisdom of the international financial community. The Consensus was described by John

17 Williamson, one of its chief architects, as including:

l Privatization of state assets l Enhanced property rights l Deregulation (easing entry and exit barriers) l Trade liberalization (i.e., low and uniform tariffs) l Market determined, positive (but moderate) real interest rates l Market determined, competitive exchange rates l Fiscal policy discipline l Tax reform (broadening the tax base institute moderate marginal tax rates) l Reorientation of public spending toward education, health and infrastructure investment All of the above principles seriously constrained a state’s ability to design its own domestic economic policies. They greatly contributed to financial crises and widespread hardship in places like Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Thailand and Ukraine. At the time, there were local politicians arguing that this approach was inimical to development, and ultimately many mainstream economists, such as Noble Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, concluded that this market uber alles approach was just bad economics. While elements of the austerity, privatization and financial liberalization model still persist, mainstream development economics, especially since the 2008 Financial Crisis, has moved on to more nuanced understandings of how economic reform should proceed. But the Wash- ington Consensus experience undermined American credibility to advance the Liberal agenda. Military intervention is the third component of Liberal International- ism. While Anne-Marie Slaughter took pains to limit the conditions under which military intervention should theoretically occur, in the 1990s the Clinton administration had a rather expansive view of how the United States should use military force. Notably, there was the military intervention in Somalia (1992–93), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). A telling incident even occurred in 1992 when then Secretary of

18 State Albright famously criticized then Joint Chief of Staff Colin Powell over his reluctance to use force in Bosnia. As related by Powell in his mem- oir, Albright asked him: “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” Powell made clear his disdain for this attitude when he later wrote that he “almost had an an- eurism,” and that “American GIs are not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board.” But to Liberal Internationalists, it is perfectly acceptable to use U.S. military force to support nation-building, democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention. As Ikenberry later said, why not “help history move forward…through the use of force”?

Liberal Internationalism and Policymakers It is often difficult to differentiate among the three consensus views since the boundaries between them can be porous, and since an individual can combine components from each view. The issue is particularly problematic when trying to separate Liberal Internationalists from Deep Engagement advocates. (The boundary with Liberal Interventionists is much sharper because views on the utility of military force and multilateralism tend to be clearer and more consistent over time.) Distinguishing features of Liberal Internationalism include an emphasis on human rights and humanitarian intervention, nation-building, regime change and international trade. While the individuals below may not perfectly meet these criteria, they can generally be viewed as Liberal Internationalists.

n Nicholas Burns, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard; former U.S. ambassador to NATO: Burns ardently supports international trade and is predisposed toward U.S. military interventions, including for humanitarian reasons. n Nicholas Kristof, columnist for The New York Times: Kristof argues consistently and passionately for extensive U.S. humanitarian intervention and nation-building. n John Kerry, former secretary of state in the Obama administration; 2004 Democratic presidential candidate: Kerry supported and helped design the Obama administration Syria regime change strategy. He was in favor of the April 2017 Trump administration attack

19 on Syria. Kerry is a strong supporter of international trade accords and deeply concerned about the global refugee crisis. n Nancy Pelosi, House minority leader: Pelosi has been a consistently strong supporter of global human rights. In 2013, she attempted to rally congressional support for authorizing President Obama’s attack on Syria. n Samantha Power, former U.S. ambassador to the U.N.: Power has been consistently and strongly supportive of U.S. intervention for democracy promotion and protecting civilians. She is an ardent supporter of the U.N. n James Stavridis, dean of Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; former supreme allied commander of NATO: Stavridis was in favor of the 2011 intervention in Libya, and has been highly critical of the lack of U.S. intervention in Syria.

20 2 Liberal Interventionism

ome Liberal Internationalists have linked the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq to the Clinton administration’s promotion of Liberal In- ternationalism and a permissive attitude toward the use of force. They see an emphasis on democracy expansion and a Wilsonian disdain forS sovereignty as having prepared the ground for the rise of International Interventionism, or what was then called Neo-Conservatism. The most salient feature of Neo-Conservatism and its later incarnation, Liberal In- terventionism, was extreme faith in, and reliance on, American military power for the attainment of foreign policy objectives. However, some Lib- eral Internationalists counter by arguing that President George W. Bush and the Neo-Conservatives did not appreciate the Wilsonian tradition, especially its emphasis on self-determination, security cooperation and multilateralism. When George W. Bush was campaigning for president in 2000, he

21 embraced a number of positions which were strongly aligned with the Liberal consensus, in particular, a fundamental commitment to NATO and other global alliances. He was also deeply committed to promoting market democracy and globalization. Speaking in November 1999 at the Reagan Presidential Library, he said: Dealing with Russia on essential issues will be far easier if we are dealing with a democratic and free Russia. Our goal is to promote, not only the appearance of democracy in Russia, but the structures, spirit, and reality of democracy…Real change in Russia—as in China —will come not from above, but from below. From a rising class of entrepreneurs and business people. But candidate Bush also held several positions that were at odds with the Liberal consensus. Among them were a distain for nation-building and a desire to withdraw U.S. troops from peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. Candidate Bush was concerned about “overcommitting” the U.S. military and he wanted to relieve the burden on it by having other NATO members deploy more of their own troops to the Balkans. In any event, none of these differences ultimately mattered after the 9/11 attacks, when the administration added a Manichean view of friend and foe and a doctrine of military preemption to a Liberal consensus whose core already included regime change and intervention. This modified view would later be rebranded as Liberal Interventionism. The turn toward intervention and nation building was clearly expressed by then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just before President Bush’s second inaugural. She told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: In these momentous times, American diplomacy has three great tasks. First, we will unite the community of democracies in building an international system that is based on our shared values and the rule of law. Second, we will strengthen the community of democracies to fight the threats to our common security and alleviate the hopelessness that feeds terror. And third, we will spread freedom and democracy throughout the globe. That is the mission that President Bush has set for America in the world—and the great mission of American diplomacy today. Two of the more prominent Liberal Interventionists outside government are Max Boot and Robert Kagan. As a group, Liberal Interventionists share a belief that the United States is not declining; that the country is

22 J. SCOTT APPLEWHITE/AP IMAGES President Bush declares the end of major combat in Iraq as he speaks aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln off the California coast, on May 1, 2003

“exceptional” and needs to spread its values, including democracy; that it has the central role in managing global peace; and that it is righteous and necessary to use American military power to accomplish these objectives. Unlike Liberal Internationalists, they also believe that the world cannot be reordered into a harmonious place and that war is a constant, if not regular, state of human affairs. The following review primarily utilizes Kagan’s ideas to illustrate the Interventionist position. In his book The World America Made,Kagan, like advocates of Liberal Internationalism and Deep Engagement, focuses on Liberal hegemony and its graceful acceptance by other states. In earlier work, Kagan would talk openly about “benevolent hegemony.” But over the last few years he has—as Les Gelb, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, would say—“coopted” the term “Liberal Order.” Kagan argues that the present world order—that is, the spread of democracy and prosperity, and the long peace between great powers—is a result of U.S. actions. He claims that widespread democracy, and future

23 peace and prosperity, would not survive a decline of U.S. power. The Liberal Order “will last only as long as those who imposed it retain the capacity to defend it.” In contrast, Liberal Internationalists such as Iken- berry see the Liberal order as self-sustaining, even without direct American management. While all three non-Restraint views are united on the virtues of the Liberal economic order, they differ when it comes to the degree or mo- tivation for use of military force. Kagan argues for the use of American military power even when vital interests are not threatened. This desire to reorder the world, by force if necessary, is based on a belief that American values are “exceptional,” and that the world would be better off if it were reconfigured to match American preferences. In particular, the existence of more democracies would make the United States safer since democracies tend not to make war against each other. Before the 2003 Iraq invasion

WIN MCNAMEE/GETTY IMAGES

Robert Kagan (R), senior fellow in the Brookings Institution’s Project on International Or- der and Strategy, testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee December 6, 2016, in Washington, DC. The committee heard testimony on the topic “Emerging U.S. Defense Challenges and Worldwide Threats.”

24 there was unrestrained enthusiasm for using American military power to pursue regime change. As Kagan and William Kristol said in their book Present Dangers: To many the idea of America using its power to promote changes of regime in nations ruled by dictators rings of utopianism. But in fact, it is eminently realistic. There is something perverse in declaring the impossibility of promoting democratic change abroad in light of the record of the past three decades. To this day, promotion of democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere remains central to Liberal Interventionism. Ultimately, this need to change the domestic system of non-democratic states extends to Russia and China. Writing in a 2017 Foreign Policy article Kagan explained: The mere existence of democracies on their borders, the global free flow of information they cannot control, the dangerous connection between free market capitalism and political freedom — all pose a threat to rulers who depend on keeping restive forces in their own countries in check. The continual challenge to the legitimacy of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported democratic order has therefore naturally made them hostile both to that order and to the United States. Consequently, America can never really be safe until all anti-democratic states, including China and Russia, are transformed. Where Liberal Internationalists see the possibility of a lasting and just accord between Russia, China and the United States (and Deep Engagement advocates see an uneasy balance of power buttressed by international alliances and organizations), Interventionists think such an accord contrary to human nature and geopolitical reality. As Kagan wrote: Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led postwar global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. While multilateral institutions are important tools and multipliers of power for battling Russia, China and other adversaries, they are not a substi-

25 LEE JIN-MAN/AP IMAGES Vice President Mike Pence at Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea, on April 17, 2017. tute for American leadership or decisive military action. The maintenance, if not extension, of American military “primacy” (or the possession of military forces so disproportionately large that no other country can challenge the United States) is central to this effort. Additionally, Interventionists think that very high defense spending is affordable.

Liberal Interventionists and Policymakers The distinguishing feature of Liberal Interventionism is its view on the use of military force. Another telling feature is a highly critical view of international organizations, especially the United Nations. In the present political context, the following individuals can be categorized as Liberal Interventionists: n Mike Pence, U.S. vice president and former Indiana governor: Pence has an impeccable reputation among the Interventionist wing of the Republican party where he is known as a “hawk’s hawk.” He was a strong supporter of the Iraq war and continues to push for higher defense spending. He has consistently endorsed NATO and other

26 alliances with states such as Korea, and is vocal about the superiority of American (and Christian) “values.” n John McCain, U.S. senator (R-AZ); 2012 Republican presidential candidate: When it comes to the use of American military forces, McCain is known to some as the “uber-hawk.” He is comfortable with preemptive war against “rogue regimes” (or “rogue rollback”) and has consistently been critical of U.S. policies toward North Korea and Iran that did not make more use of force. He is a strong supporter of human rights and democracy promotion, and is highly critical of the United Nations. Mc- Cain is also not keen on “nation-building.” n Marco Rubio, U.S. senator (R-FL) and 2016 Republican presidential candidate: In a Council on Foreign Relations speech on May 13, 2015, Rubio spoke of the “three pillars” of his foreign policy view. These are: preserving U.S. strength, protecting the U.S. economy and maintaining clarity on U.S. values. Among other things, this program entails higher military spending, promoting free trade, and championing democracy and human rights worldwide. n Paul Ryan, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (R-WI): While Ryan is known more for his fiscal hawkishness than his foreign policy hawkishness, he hues closely to Liberal Interventionist views on issues like intervention in Syria, staying in Iraq and Afghanistan, and confronting Russia. He is also firmly committed to American “exceptionalism” and “global leadership.” Other former government officials in this group include: Elliott Abrams (Council on Foreign Relations), John Bolton (American Enterprise Insti- tute), and Eliot Cohen (Johns Hopkins University). Not all Liberal Interventionists are Republicans. One of the most prominent Democratic examples is former Secretary of State and 2016 Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Secretary Clinton is well known for her 2002 vote in favor of the Iraq invasion, as well as her current hardline views on Russia, continuing the Iraq War and high defense spending. (Such “hawkish” views represented some of her main cleavages with Senator Ber- nie Sanders during the Democratic primary.) Just hours before President Trump’s April 2017 bombing of Syria, Clinton went so far as to call for the destruction of all of Syria’s military airfields.

27 In a telling affirmation, when then Secretary of State Clinton created the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board in 2011, Kagan was made a member. And as Kagan said of Clinton in a 2014 New York Times interview: “I feel comfortable with her on foreign policy…If she pursues a policy which we think she will pursue, it’s something that might have been called neocon, but clearly her supporters are not going to call it that; they are going to call it something else.”

28 3 Deep Engagement

n spite of Hillary Clinton’s Liberal Interventionist tendencies and her position as secretary of state, the Obama administration clearly cannot be categorized as Liberal Interventionist. When Obama ran for office in 2008, the United States was descending ever more rapidly into the financialI abyss, and voters were primarily concerned with economic issues. But weariness over the continuing wars in the greater Middle East and dismay at America’s eroding global standing also played a role in Obama’s election victory. As vice presidential candidate Joe Biden said at the 2008 Democratic Convention: …[O]ur country is less secure and more isolated than at any time in recent history. The Bush-McCain foreign policy has dug us into a very deep hole with very few friends to help us climb out. For the last seven years, this administration has failed to face the biggest forces shaping this century: the emergence of Russia, China and India as great powers; the spread of lethal weapons; the shortage of secure supplies of energy, food and water; the challenge of climate change; and

29 the resurgence of fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the real central front against terrorism... Barack Obama and I will end this neglect… and I can tell you in no uncertain terms: this administration’s policy has been an abject failure. America cannot afford four more years of this. The American people (or at least 53.7% of the electorate) were looking for an alternative strategy to that pursued by the Bush administration. This Obama-era “post-post-9/11 strategy” was to rely less on military coercion and more on making globalization work both for America and the rest of the planet. America was supposed to stop dividing the world into friends and enemies, and cease acting unilaterally. Global institutions such as the United Nations would once again be at the core of U.S. foreign policy. Voters wanted a transformative strategy and a transformative candidate. Rejecting Liberal Interventionism was central to this attempt at transformation, and a revised Liberal Internationalism—or the new Deep En- gagement—represented an effort to curb the excesses of the previous Bush strategy. As Obama would later say explicitly: “America is not the world’s policeman. Terrible things happen across the globe, and it is beyond our means to right every wrong.” Deep Engagement has many advocates, but this essay will reference the views of Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth as stated in their 2016 book, America Abroad. To Brooks and Wohlforth, Deep En- gagement’s central theme is that the United States will “long continue to be the only superpower” and that it should continue “to be deeply engaged in the world.” At Deep Engagement’s core are three objectives: 1) managing the external environment to reduce threats; 2) promoting a liberal economic order; and 3) creating, sustaining and revising the global institutional order. Managing the external environment means maintaining and expanding security commitments to allies and partners in three core regions: Europe, East Asia and the Middle East. It also means deploying American troops to these areas. Since they entail alliances with formal security guarantees, these relationships are by far the strategy’s most consequential element. These commitments are both costly and occupy a substantial portion of total U.S. military personnel. As the chart on the next page indicates, the overseas deployment of U.S. personnel is vast both in terms of number and geogra-

30 phy. There are over 120,000 personnel in Germany, Japan and Korea, and total overseas deployment occupies 9.6% of all U.S. military personnel, and 15.6% of all active duty personnel.

U.S. Active Duty, Reserve Service Members, and APF Civilians*

Rank Country Total Personnel 1 Germany 47,810 2 Japan 46,334 3 Unknown 40,186 4 Korea, South 26,878 5 Italy 14,653 6 Kuwait 13,445 7 Afghanistan 12,966 8 United Kingdom 9,904 9 Puerto Rico 9,643 10 Guam 7,726 11 Iraq 7,538 12 Bahrain 6,611 13 Qatar 5,214 14 Spain 3,682 15 Djibouti 3,676 16 Jordan 2,532 17 Turkey 2,360 18 United Arab Emirates 1,822 19 Belgium 1,522 20 Cuba 1,203 150 Other Countries 10,145 Total Overseas 275,850

NOTES: *AFP CIVILIANS ARE “AFLOAT PREPOSITIONED FORCES,” I.E., SHIP CREWS; SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER. NOVEMBER, 2016.

31 Promoting the liberal economic order includes keeping the global trading system open and maintaining U.S. financial dominance, including through the U.S. dollar’s role in global trade and capital flows. Like Liberal Internationalism and Liberal Interventionism, at its core Deep Engage- ment is about sustaining and furthering liberal economic arrangements, i.e., private property, markets and free trade (capitalism). This means constantly adapting the WWII Bretton Woods organizations; that is, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and the trading regime created and fostered by the agreement, which includes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Creating, sustaining and revising the global institutional order involves using international organizations and alliances to manage interstate conflicts and foster political, commercial and military interaction on terms favorable to the United States. The lists of relationships and international organizations the United States helped create and promote is large and skews toward the commercial and military spheres. To Deep Engagement advocates, it is important to recognize that the United States did not just help create these organizations, but that it continues to use them to shape the global agenda and promote Amer- ican interests. Brooks and Wohlforth warn of the dangers of isolationism. They reject declinist or imperial “overreach” arguments which contend that U.S. power is weakening and that the nation will have to curtail its international activities. Isolationism is unnecessary as they see it, because the military and technological gap between the United States and China (its only serious competitor) is so large that it will be “decades” before China can challenge the United States. While Deep Engagement argues for persistent and active U.S. interaction with the world, it rejects military intervention for humanitarian reasons, nation building or orchestrating regime change. True Deep Engagement entails distinguishing its “defining elements from optional choices it enables but does not necessitate.” The Iraq invasion “was not an expression of deep engagement’s core [values].” The invasion and other such tendencies are errors of Liberal Internationalism and/or Neo-Conservatism (or as Brooks and Wohlforth say, “Deep Engagement

32 Plus”). The point is that the United States should not to succumb to such “temptations.” In spite of this theoretical reluctance to preference military force, Deep Engagement is committed to the idea that the United States has the right to be the world’s “hegemon.” Brooks and Wohlforth contend that the world needs the United States to act as a hegemon: Some state must provide this leadership, and in taking on this role, the United States can “extract benefits for itself.” U.S. hegemonic policy must not become excessively predatory lest it incentivize other states to band together and “balance” against the United States. If policy does becomes excessively predatory, then others will abandon or resist U.S. hegemony. Consequently, U.S. hegemonic leadership shifts “both over time and across issues depending upon factors such as its relative competitiveness, the structure of the global economy, and the existence of crises.” Since the hegemonic order is predicated on the possession of unequal coercive power, the United States must spend large amounts of money supporting its military and their technical-industrial superiority. Some critics occasionally opine that high defense spending is “unaffordable” and that it “retards [U.S.] growth” by underfunding other important objectives such as education, infrastructure and scientific research. But Brooks and Wohlforth disagree. They want critics to remove funding for what they consider non-essential elements of much U.S. defense spending, including all Iraq war spending. Further, in a review of the economic literature, they see no evidence that “pursuing leadership impos- es significant growth-sapping opportunity costs for the United States.” Finally, they argue that the correct comparison is not with no defense spending, but with the alternative defense spending advocated by others. Since Restraint advocates still want to maintain a large military force “over the horizon” (see below), the “budgetary savings that a switch to retrenchment [Restraint] would yield are unclear.” When they “compare realistic replacement grand strategies with deep engagement, the budget cost differential shrinks dramatically.” Interestingly, all proponents in this strategy debate agree that the Unit- ed States can afford to continue to spend as much as it does on defense. Brooks and Wohlforth think U.S. budgetary savings under a Restraint scenario would be approximately $40 billion per year. Against a “back-

33 drop of a $3.5 trillion budget,” it is hard to see how this decisively makes a Deep Engagement strategy “fiscally unsustainable.” Restraint advocates agree that this level of spending is sustainable, though they argue that just because something is affordable does not mean it is good policy.

Affording Dominance? As the chart below indicates, the United States devotes a great deal of money to national defense. In 2017, the United States will spend an estimated $617 billion on its armed forces, and this does not count the $182 billion more it will spend on military veterans, nor substantial other sums spent through the Department of Homeland Security budget. In response to such criticism, many pro-spending advocates note that, as a percentage of GDP, U.S. defense spending is small historically. Since 2013, defense spending has been less than 4% of GDP and as a percentage of GDP the United States spends substantially less on defense than in almost all years since WWII. But what happens if there is a sharp reduction in entitlement spending in order to contain the U.S. deficit? How tolerant will the American public be of defense programs and foreign wars when their own health and retirement benefits are curtailed? Part of a strategy to reduce high defense spending might be to share this burden with the countries the United States now protects. The issue of allied “free riding” periodically arises, especially when the U.S. experiences fiscal stress. (Free riding occurs when a person, firm or state enjoys a benefit based on another’s actions, but contributes little or nothing to the effort.) Getting allies, particularly Germany and Japan, to pay their “fair share” for defense would clearly be helpful. President Trump has raised this issue on a number of occasions. But Brooks and Wohlforth think the benefits of the alliances far outweigh the disproportionate share of spending shouldered by the United States. Looking forward, Deep Engagement advocates want the United States to focus on the big and important threats. The country should maintain a “core of commitments” in the three critical regions, while shedding those commitments which are not necessary. Conceptually, Deep Engagement has an affinity for former President Barack Obama’s notion of “not doing stupid stuff”: Do not be tempted to intervene needlessly for humanitarian purposes or to rebuild nations; do not engage in wars of choice; maintain

34 SOURCE: OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. FEDERAL BUDGET TABLE 3.1—OUTLAYS BY SUPERFUNCTION AND FUNCTION: 1940–2017.

SOURCE: SIPRI. US MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE GDP, 1949–2016.

35 and nurture alliances, and keep U.S troops forward deployed; continue to use global organizations to shape international decisions. In short, the United States should keep doing what it has been doing. But it should do it smarter, and its military commitments should be undertaken with greater discretion.

Deep Engagement and Policymakers In order to identify policymakers with an affinity for Deep Engage- ment, a key task is to identify people dissatisfied with the International- ist/Interventionist consensus. These individuals do not want to overturn the consensus, only to modify it. Those who would be comfortable with Deep Engagement are people who like the global U.S. alliance structure and international trade, but who are opposed to policies promoting nation building and human rights though force of arms. They would be supportive of multilateralism and reluctant to use military force where vital interests are not at stake. While the people below may not fit this criteria perfectly, they can generally be viewed as Deep Engagement supporters: n Joseph Biden, former vice president, 2009–17; former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:Biden wants the U.S. to focus on “big threats” like nuclear proliferation, accidental nuclear war with Russia or China, and instability in North Korea and Pakistan. He does not see terrorism (or ISIS) as an existential threat, and he is a strong proponent of fairer international trade. While he is sympathetic to democracy promotion and human rights, he is skeptical of the use of force for regime change. Biden was often on the losing side in Obama administration policy arguments with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. n Tim Kaine, U.S. senator (D-VA) and 2016 Democratic vice presidential candidate: In a July/August 2017 Foreign Affairs article, Kaine called for replacing the out-of-date post-WWII Truman consensus. He opposes foreign interventions and excess reliance on military means. Kaine is cautious on globalization and multi-nation corporate power, and he rejects talk of the United States as the “indispensable nation” or as having exceptional values to spread. He wants the

36 United States to assert global leadership through cooperation when possible. n Brent Scowcroft, lieutenant general, United States Air Force (Ret.); The Scowcroft Group, Inc.; former national security adviser to Pres- ident George H.W. Bush: An early and important opponent of the Iraq War authorization in 2002, Scowcroft has since been consistently against intervention for regime change. n Rex Tillerson, secretary of state; former CEO of ExxonMobil: Tillerson is very supportive of traditional alliance structures, but holds more temperate views on the use of force and human rights promotion. Among rumored Democratic contenders for the 2020 presidential election, there are several who are uncomfortable with Liberal Internationalism and Interventionism, but who do not easily fit into the Deep Engagement

DREW ANGERER/GETTY IMAGES

(L to R) Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA) talks with Sen. Angus King (I-ME) during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing concerning the roles and responsibilities for defending the nation against cyber attacks, on Capitol Hill, October 19, 2017.

37 category. Part of the issue is that their real foreign policy views are still not fully known. Many (if not all) are committed to the U.S. alliance system, but some are critical of current U.S. defense priorities and/or the trade components of the liberal economic order. Senators Elizabeth Warren (D- MA) and Cory Booker (D-NJ), for example, have questioned open-ended military commitments to Afghanistan and the Middle East, respectively. Others, such as Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) and Kamala Harris (D-CA), tend to emphasize domestic threats emanating from abroad, such as unfair foreign economic competition or cyber security. As their views are better enunciated, their comfort or discomfort with Deep Engagement will become clearer.

38 4 Restraint

or eight years, the Obama administration strived to craft a new strategy that “did not do stupid stuff”— a strategy which in many ways aspired to be one of Deep Engagement. Nevertheless, many domestic critics found the administration’s policies weak, indecisive and Fdamaging to U.S. interests. Neither Internationalists nor Interventionists were happy with Obama-era foreign policy. Especially among the Inter- ventionists, there was an effort to cast these policies as neo-isolationist. Such critics thought the Obama administration abandoned allies and ac- commodated hostile powers like Russia, China and Iran. One can question the success or failure of Obama administration foreign policy but one should not confuse it with a policy of Restraint. In the core areas of commitment to NATO and the global alliance system, forward deployment of troops, and expansion of global trade, Obama was fully part of the Liberal policy consensus. The element of the administration’s policy that most closely resembled Restraint was the de-prioritization of the Middle East. But even this par-

39 tial de-emphasis did not, in the end, affect U.S. commitment to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It even allowed for an introduction and escalation of U.S. troops and activity in Syria. Advocates of Restraint include John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, Barry Posen of the Massachu- setts Institute of Technology, and Stephen Walt of Harvard University. None of them would confuse Obama polices with Restraint. Barry Posen’s views as expressed in his 2014 book Restraint will be utilized to demon- strate the contrast. Posen begins his argument by considering the incredibly favorable security position of the United States. The United States is bordered on two sides by great oceans, and on its other two sides are weak and non-belligerent neighbors. Physical invasion is extremely difficult, if not impossible, and this relative remoteness also makes the United States less threatening to others. The United States has a large population and favorable demographics. It is richly endowed with water and natural resources and it is a dominant energy and food producer. In spite of various economic difficulties, it still is a leader in technological innovation; it has the largest single economy in the world, and it will remain the most important economic power for years. It has large and extremely capable intelligence services; its conventional military forces are vastly superior to any combination of competitors, and its nuclear arsenal is more than sufficient. It also maintains “command of the commons” at sea, in the air, and in space (although not in cyberspace). (Command of the commons connotes unrestricted access to those parts of the air, sea or space which are outside national jurisdiction, and the ability to deny access to others.) In terms of being able to protect itself, the United States is incredibly well situated. On the threat side, the United States is also exceedingly fortunate because nothing today compares in scope and scale to the dangers faced during the Cold War. Even with Russia’s current, increasing militariza- tion and foreign policy activism, and China’s economic and military growth, the United States faces limited challenges. North Korea, mean- while, does not have, and may never have, a decisive “first strike” nuclear capability. In spite of this enhanced security, the United States by some accounts has been at war twice as often since the Cold War ended than it was during that period. And it has been at war continuously since 2001.

40 (The table below lists the major post-Cold War conflicts.) Why is this? What has caused the increased frequency of war given the lack of direct existential threats to the U.S. homeland? Posen answers that American efforts to maintain and further Liberal Hegemony are fundamentally expansionist and make the United States “drift regularly into military action.” He says the strategy: …makes enemies almost as fast as it dispatches them. [It] encourages less-friendly states to compete with the United States more intensively, while encouraging friendly states to do less than they should in their own defense, or to be more adventurous than is wise. …[H]egemony is a costly, wasteful, and self-defeating grand strategy. The strong inherent security position of the United States makes it unnecessary. The United States has spent vast sums to sustain…military superiority…It has waged war to reorganize the internal politics of other states, usually weak ones that constitute little threat…Liberal Hegemony is not making the United States more secure. A major part of the problem stems from the security guarantees the United States provides to other states. Posen thinks Americans should stop talking about “alliances” and refer to these relationships for what

Major U.S. Military Operations Since the End of the Cold War

Location Year(s) Operation Name

First Persian Gulf War 1991 Desert Storm Somalia 1992–93 Restore Hope Haiti 1994 Uphold Democracy Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 Deliberate Force Kosovo 1999 Allied Force; Joint Guardian Afghanistan 2001–14 Infinite Justice; Enduring Freedom Iraq 2003–11 Iraqi Freedom; New Dawn Iraq and Syria 2014–present Inherent Resolve Libya 2011 Odyssey Dawn; Unified Protector Afghanistan 2014–present Eagle 18, Wrath of the Storm, etc.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; NATO; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

41 they are, as he sees them: unidirectional security guarantees. By some calculations, the United States has legal obligations to defend more than 60 countries on five continents containing 25% of the world’s population and 75% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In order to secure these guarantees, the United States maintains approximately 800 bases in 80 countries. The need to be everywhere and settle all the world’s problems inherently predisposes the United States toward war and military intervention. The vast network of commitments and bases creates another problem, especially when combined with a strong aversion to incurring military casualties: The costs of running this global protection force are exceedingly high. Since the U.S. military substitutes capital for labor, U.S. style warfare—with its advanced technology and superior equipment—is extremely expensive. As the great American military strategist Bernard Brodie said in the 1950s (before U.S. warfare was even remotely this expensive), “strategy wears a dollar sign.” The United States continues to spend more on its military than most large defense spenders combined. In 2016, as the

PETER G. The United States spends more on defense than the next PETERSON FOUNDATION eight countries combined

DEFENSE SPENDING (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS) $700

$611 Billion $595 Billion $600

$500 China

$400 Russia $300 United States Saudi Arabia India $200 France

$100 United Kingdom Japan Germany $0

SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2017. Data are for 2016. Compiled by PGPF. NOTE: Figures are in U.S. dollaras, converted from local currencies using market exchange rates. © 2017 Peter G. Peterson Foundation PGPF.ORG

42 SGT. KEONAONA PAULO/DVIDS A U.S. Marine Corps Harrier “jump jet” at Camp Bastion, Helmand province, Afghanistan on September 1, 2012. On September 14, 2012, 15 Afghani insurgents armed primarily with automatic weapons and grenades, entered the facility, killed two marines and did over $200 million of damage. Six of the eight Harrier jets were damaged or destroyed. chart below indicates, it spent more than the next eight largest defense spenders combined. But Posen points out that this gap is narrowing: In 2011, the United States spent more than the next 13 spenders. This means the United States increasingly has to spend more to keep its military-technological advantage. Posen and Restraint advocates also focus on the diminishing utility and limits of military power. The United States utilizes more and more military power, yet it obtains less and less successful outcomes. In fact, the United States has not decisively won any of its last five major wars (Korea, Viet- nam, Persian Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan). Even the stunning overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and of the Taliban in Afghanistan, have not been translated into policy success. Once initial military operations end and societies have to be transformed, successful policy outcomes become much more difficult to achieve. In spite of more favorable demographics, Posen points out that the 43 United States does not have sufficient military age males to manage the occupation of many societies. There is no substitute for “boots on the ground,” and the United States is demographically disadvantaged in this area. Besides a high aversion to casualties, an estimated 71% of all Amer- icans of military service age are ineligible due to physical, behavioral or educational shortcomings. Post-WWII Japan and West Germany transformations cannot be duplicated. Among other reasons, “identity politics” and various forms of ethno-religious nationalism have created a more hostile environment for such transformations. Additionally, to simply obtain stalemates, the United States has to continually increase the amount by which it outspends its adversaries. The end of colonialism and the increase in group self-awareness has turned many efforts by the United States to assert dominance into nationalist struggles. This is exacerbated by globalization, or the “extension of market capitalism.” Identity politics, social dislocation caused by capitalism and new media technologies turn most countries into poor targets for U.S. domination and transformation. These countries are more likely to resist efforts to be controlled by outsider powers, and they are more likely to succeed. Moreover, when the United States sends its military to these far off locations, it invariably creates “pushback.” Pushback can range in form from hostility to Americans and American values to military resistance to efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Persistent U.S. intervention in the greater Middle East (including basing military forces there) is seen as particularly counterproductive. Posen and Restraint advocates do not minimize the importance of military power, but they occupy a middle ground between Liberal Internationalists, who think international violence can ultimately be transcended through international institutions and law, and Interventionists who think primacy and violence are necessary to ensure and promote American security. Central to the Restraint critique is the idea that many states do not, and never will, accept the Liberal agenda. “Benign hegemony,” as Kagan once called it, or “non-predatory hegemony” as Brooks and Wohlforth call it, may be accepted by a few states, especially those who benefit directly from a U.S. security guarantee and pay very little for it. But according to Restraint advocates, Russia and China have definitely not

44 BETTMANN/GETTY IMAGES General Douglas MacArthur and President Harry Truman at the Wake Island Conference, October 15, 1950. In April 1951, President Truman fired MacArthur for his unauthorized effort to expand the Korean War into China. accepted U.S. domination and the Liberal order. Even many smaller states see the U.S. Liberal order as just another manifestation Western imperialism. There are states which support the U.S. Liberal agenda, but Posen points out that many of these states (especially the major ones) do this by “cheap riding,” or because they want to “drive recklessly.” Cheap riding is similar to free riding, but it is modified to account for partial payments or other contributions by the states concerned. Not surprisingly, Posen is particularly critical of cheap riding by NATO allies, and especially by Japan. Reckless driving is when a U.S. ally or partner takes risky action, jeopardizing U.S. interests, because the U.S security guarantee protects it from suffering negative consequences should its action turn out badly. For Posen, three of the most reckless drivers are Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel.

45 Reckless driving is particularly bad for the United States because it may lead to “entanglement.” Entanglement occurs when an ally or partner state confronts a regional rival, and the United States—which has no national or vital interest in the confrontation—intervenes to help that ally or partner. Deep Engagement advocates recognize the potential for entanglement (because their strategy provides more opportunity for the use of force”) but they think the United States has largely avoided this problem. Interestingly, they acknowledge the Vietnam War as an example of entanglement example, yet are untroubled by its significance. Another problem cited by Restraint advocates is “temptation,” or the idea that when a state has disproportionate military power and sense of mission, it can become involved in conflicts which are of little strategic or vital interest. To Restraint advocates, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was the prime example of temptation. As Tony Smith, of Tufts University, said in a Washington Post op-ed: The nationalist conviction that we are indeed “the indispensable nation” will continue to tempt our leaders to overplay their hand. The danger lies in believing that our power is beyond challenge, that the righteousness of our goals is beyond question and that the real task is not to reformulate our role in the world so much as to assert more effectively a global American peace. Deep Engagement advocates accept that temptation is a problem, but they think its risks are exaggerated and that an alternative retrenchment is worse. Posen strikes a balanced position between Deep Engagement and Lib- eral Internationalism on humanitarian interventions. He would have the United States intervene more often on humanitarian grounds when such interventions are closely connected to U.S. national interests, and when non-military remedies have been exhausted. However, the employment of military force would have to yield some practical impact. That approach should not be confused with an open-ended mission to apply military power to “eliminate the political problems that gave rise to the humanitarian problem.” Finally, Restraint advocates think that pursuit of Liberal Hegemony leads to “threat mongering,” and that it is “corrosive” to democracy.

46 In order to procure the resources necessary for Liberal Hegemony and maintain public backing, the government and its supporters have to continually inflate threats and frighten people. This ultimately creates conditions wherein the U.S. government reduces civil liberties in order to continue extracting the necessary resources from society, and milita- rizes local policing. Since 1990, and especially since around 2012, the Department of Defense has transferred (at no cost other than trans- portation) approximately $5.4 billion of surplus military equipment to domestic U.S. police forces. This included tracked armored vehicles, weaponized vehicles, rifles and ammunition of .50-caliber or higher, and grenade launchers. There are academic and other studies which connect this equipment acquisition to cultural, organizational, and operational changes that make U.S. police forces needleless more violent. Continual war abroad and the domestic disposal of this equipment surplus make it increasingly likely that war abroad is transferred to the homeland.

Restraint Policy Prescriptions Restraint’s basic policy recommendation is that the United States “husband” its resources for a time in the future when a state may actually arise to challenge it. The United States should reduce its foreign security commitments and allow local states to carry the burden of balancing any regional power with hegemonic ambitions. If local states ultimately fail to balance a rising power, then the United States can re-engage to offset the failure. By “controlling the commons,” the United States can maintain “the bedrock military capability needed…to influence geopolitical events abroad, should that prove necessary.” Accordingly, the United States should gradually reduce or eliminate most of its foreign military bases and begin scaling-down or modifying most all of its security commitments. It should reduce the use of military power to promote the Liberal institutional order and transform other societies, and it should completely avoid resorting to force unless there is a clear idea as to what policy will look like after the violence stops. Central to the strategy is avoiding intervening to change the character of states or to protect particular regimes. While certain types of regimes are antithetical to American values, the domestic character of those states does not matter. What matters is how those states behave externally. By

47 avoiding counterproductive engagements, the United States can devote its energies to building its own power at home and be better prepared for the day when it might once again need to intervene abroad. Posen delineates a very clear program for enabling a Restraint strategy: The United States would bring most of it military personnel home, and substantially reduce its security guarantees to other states. The limited exception would be Northeast Asia, where a rising China may be beyond the ability of local states to contain. On a regional basis, the program is as follows:

Europe and NATO To Posen, Europe is the area where the parameters of U.S. Restraint are clearest. He argues that over the next ten years, the U.S. should withdraw most troops from Europe and reduce its security guarantee to a contingen- cy clause whereby it would act only after Europe did everything possible to protect itself. As part of the new agreement, a limited number of (largely unmanned) bases would be maintained in the event that the United States had to return troops to the region. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the success of post-WWII recon- struction efforts left the continent completely capable of defending itself. Of the four states which could theoretically obtain a hegemonic regional status—France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom—three are nuclear powers. This, in and of itself, brings a degree of security. Ger- many, the non-nuclear state, in many ways has the most power resources with which to work, and it is in a good position to negotiate a favorable security outcome. If Germany were dissatisfied with the evolving security environment, it could more substantially re-arm, or even develop its own nuclear deterrent. From a proliferation perspective, this is not particularly troubling to Restraint advocates, who tend to be comfortable with the spread of nuclear weapons to other states. The key for them is that there be a “return address” for retaliation. Deep Engagement advocates respond that reducing the U.S. presence in Europe would needlessly abdicate a carefully constructed global presence that is valuable in multiple ways, including in terms of gaining economic advantage. They also note that European counties might not be able to work out the right mix of balancing strategies without U.S. leadership,

48 and that this would leave them vulnerable to Russian domination. Addi- tionally, the cost of returning to Europe might be much higher than the cost of remaining.

Russia One of the greatest distinctions between Deep Engagement and Re- straint concerns Russia. Many Restraint advocates see Russian actions in the former Soviet states, Eastern Europe and the Middle East as a natural and, to a degree, inevitable course of events given the nature of the international system, Russian political and economic recovery, and U.S. behavior since 1991. Russia has substantially recovered from the collapse of the Soviet Union (although it is unlikely to ever achieve its former power capabilities) and it is dissatisfied with the European status quo. It is willing to use military power in order to surround itself with more friendly states. The United States, through pursuit of Liberal Hegemony, and specifically NATO expansion, has in many ways exacerbated problems with Russia. U.S. and NATO claims that their intentions are peaceful are hollow. The very fact that NATO has the capacity to do Russia harm is sufficient to provoke a reaction. As the old military-diplomatic quip goes: When a state has no capabilities, you can judge its intentions. When a state has capabilities, then these capabilities become its intentions. “Structural Realists” (who believe that conflict among great powers is inevitable and has nothing to do with virtue) such as John J. Mearsheimer, see Russia’s actions as a natural part of how the international system works. This does not excuse Russian policy, but simply frames Russia as a powerful state acting to better its position in an anarchic system. Moral indignation in response is hardly productive and represents a double standard that excuses historic U.S. aggression abroad. To Restraint advocates, Russian actions in Ukraine or Syria are not moral issues. They focus instead on the question of responsibility: Whose problems are these to solve? Deep Engagement answers: The United States’ problems. Restraint, on the other hand, wants the states most closely connected to a given problem to resolve it, or at least attempt to do so. According to this logic, if Ukraine is threatened by Russia, it should find some way to work with other European states to better its position. If it cannot, then some accommodation with Russia is inevitable. To Restraint

49 advocates, the U.S. should only get involved if there is a clear and direct threat to the European balance of power that would ultimately hurt the United States. A Ukrainian-Russian accommodation that is much less friendly to Ukraine, in and of itself, would not do this.

The Middle East To Posen, the Middle East is more complicated than Europe because of how deeply and directly the United States has involved itself in the region’s security affairs since 1979. But the program is still similar: Over time, the United States should reduce its military presence in the region to “the low- est level possible”; it should avoid intervention in local civil wars, including in Iraq, or even a theoretical conflict in Saudi Arabia; and it should remove all explicit or implicit security guarantees to all states, including Israel. The United States should abandon permanent and semi-permanent land bases in the region, and generally reduce direct military and security cooperation with everyone. Similar to Europe, the critical issue is that no single state emerge to dominate the area, and that U.S. naval power be the principle means of protecting regional U.S. interests. Such “offshore balancing” would avoid many of the negatives associated with the current U.S. basing policy. The goal is to return to the pre-1967 policy in the Levant, and the pre-1979 policy in the Persian Gulf. Given the distribution of power resources, Iran is the state with the greatest potential to dominate the region. A scaling down of the U.S. commitment would force other regional powers (Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and to an extent Iraq) to set aside differences and balance Iran’s power. If this balancing failed, then the U.S. could intervene. Re- garding Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons, Posen thinks that a preventive war would probably be far worse than the consequence of Iran acquiring such weapons. Pursuit of such a war should at least be predicated on proof that the Iranian government would act irrationally if it acquired a nuclear weapon. If not, then deterrence is sufficient to manage the situation. Posen acknowledges that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would escalate the threat to Israel. But again, the alternative of preventive war is less preferable. Deterrence and Israel’s second strike retaliatory capacity is the solution. Moreover, Posen thinks a removal of the U.S. security guaran-

50 tee and military aid to Israel would substantially curb its “reckless driving” (i.e., its West Bank settlement policy). While settlements are not the only, or even the primary, obstacle to peace, Posen thinks they make peace less likely, and that U.S. support helps Israel avoid hard choices. The United States should “go back” to pre-1967 policy when Israel “competed militarily with the Arab countries largely on its own nickel.” (Clearly, Posen recognizes that Iran is Persian, not Arab, and this is a rhetorical oversight.) Regarding the “free flow of oil” from the Persian Gulf, Posen thinks that the threat is overstated and that the oil flow is unlikely to be seriously disrupted. If it were, he argues, it would actually be easier for the U.S to adjust to the disruption than to intervene to reestablish the flow.

Northeast Asia Posen sees the potential for a single state (China) to emerge as a hegemonic power in Asia as significantly greater than in Europe or the Middle East. Consequently, complete U.S. withdraw from the region is inadvis- able. However, the nature of U.S. commitments, especially its ground force presence, should be reduced. The greatest challenge would be for Japan to substantially increase defense spending and change its defense posture, including by cooperating with Korea on intelligence and other security matters. This change is problematic because it could inadvertently cause China to seek to counterbalance or preempt Japan’s new defense policy. In all regions, but particularly in Asia, where the United States would maintain a higher level of involvement, the most pronounced interac- tions would involve naval forces. Restraint is a strategy that favors the U.S. Navy and Air Force. It reduces spending on land forces, especially the Army. (The Marines, insofar as they might return to their roots as an amphibious assault force, could fare better.) Command of the commons would allow the United States to intervene more quickly if the local balance of power tipped decidedly toward China (or any other state).

Restraint and Policymakers A policy of Restraint has never been enacted by the United States. It is virtually impossible to find actual policymakers who support it. In many ways, the recruiting patterns and career paths of those in the executive branch and military tend to weed out Restraint supporters. Advocating

51 for Restraint is not a career enhancer given that most bureaucratic incen- tives are for mission expansion and additional international engagement. There are other individuals involved in government—outside the executive branch, Foreign Service and military—who operate on the periphery of the Restraint-Engagement debate. Among them are people like Senator Rand Paul (KY-R), Bernie Sanders and Breitbart editor and former White House Chief Strategist Stephen Bannon. Rand Paul is an interesting figure for Restraint advocates because he diagnoses the problem in much the same way as they do, and because he shares many of their concerns about the deleterious impact of the expanding national security state on executive power, civil liberties and fiscal stability. Paul’s critique of Liberal Interventionism, in particular, is similar to that of Restraint advocates. In opposing Elliott Abrams’ nomination as deputy secretary of state to Rex Tillerson, for example, Paul said: Neoconservative interventionists have had us at perpetual war for 25 years. While President Trump has repeatedly stated his belief that the Iraq War was a mistake, the neocons (all of them Never-Trumpers) continue to maintain that the Iraq and Libyan Wars were brilliant ideas. These are the same people who think we must blow up half the Middle East, then rebuild it and police it for decades. But Restraint advocates and even a number of Paul’s Senate colleagues do not embrace him because they see him as tending toward isolationism. Paul vigorously denies this charge and cites support for stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Bernie Sanders has some affinity for Restraint positions, but in spite of his calls for military restraint, he does not fit squarely within its parameters (or within those of any of the other three views). On the pro-Restraint side, Sanders opposed military intervention in Syria, and he is concerned about “war without end in the Middle East” and about the impact of U.S. foreign and defense policies on domestic law enforcement behavior. In addition, he does not support regime change. Sanders calls for military restraint, rule-of-law-minded diplomacy and global economic justice. On the non-Restraint side, and in spite of being critical in the 1990s of NATO financing and expansion, Sanders now supports strengthening NATO in the face of Russian aggression. Most dramatically, Sanders sees climate change as the number one national security threat confronting the Unit-

52 ed States. None among the authors covered here (Restraint or otherwise) would place climate change at the top of the national security list. Hence, in spite of some affinity with the Restraint program, Sanders does not fit comfortably with their position. Stephen Bannon cannot be categorized as a supporter of Restraint or any of the other views. But if Bannon has any affinity, it is with Liberal Interventionism, which emphasizes the virtues of capitalism and the in- evitability of global violent conflict, and is skeptical about global alliances and organizations. Bannon rejects economic internationalism, especially through trade agreements and open immigration policies, because he views it as a restriction on American sovereignty. But he also rejects military interventionism, especially in places such as Afghanistan, on the grounds that it promotes nation-building. Bannon accuses the current American elite (Democrats and Republi- cans alike) of ruining capitalism through corruption and cronyism. “Big government, big business and big finance” are rapacious; the upcoming American generation is self-centered, narcissistic and uninterested in en- trepreneurialism. As Bannon sees it, the United States needs to return to its Judeo-Christian roots and restore the self-reliant and entrepreneurial culture of old. While Bannon shares some similarities with Interventionists (and he was said to be close with the prominent Interventionist John Bolton), in general his views are too extreme for most Interventionists, especially in regard to tearing down the architecture of the state, attacking the media, limiting immigration and waging perpetual war on Islam. Moreover, some prominent Interventionists, such as William Kristal, are deeply opposed to Bannon because he appeared to promote anti-Semitic views before joining the Trump administration.

53 5 Debate Summary

he lines between Deep Engagement, Liberal Internationalism and Liberal Interventionism can be vague. In order to more clearly to delineate the differences between the views, a summary table is offered below. One of the more telling contrasts is with Deep Engagement Tand Restraint as status quo policies, and Liberal Internationalism and Liberal Interventionism as revisionist strategies. The former two are conservative strategies, the latter two are revolutionary strategies. When positing a “central question” for each view in the table (see the final column), it is interesting that one response concerns “faith and skill,” one concerns “will,” and two concern “wisdom.” “Faith and skill” usually involve a suspension of belief and technical competency; “will” assumes a certainty of objective. Only “wisdom” raises issues of goals and self-control. After the United States acquired extreme military power in the 1950s, George Kennan often said that a more important job for Americans was not to contain the Soviet Union, but to contain ourselves. A foreign policy consensus is like a thermostat regulating behavior; if

54 der? the… tempation? have Central …will to leading? continue Does the not try and …faith and Questions: skill to build …wisdom to …wisdom to run the world? U.S. the global or avoid

Action eference: Multi- or Unilateral Unilateral Unilateral Multilateral Multilateral Pr

cut eignty national es, but critical but not e and more Y Building under dominate es, but cede sover Dominate or Often useful, & Institution Inter Organization Y mor

national engthen engthen Reduce dominate Maintain & str str Structur Inter Maintain but Maintain but organizations U.S. Alliance

Revisionist Revisionist Status quo Status quo Revisionist Status Quo or China/Russia—

Key Contrasts among the Views Contrasts among the Key U.S.— (compel/ (compel/ transform) transform) Revisionist Revisionist Status quo Status quo Revisionist (deter/contain) (deter/contain) Status Quo or

ever

es Y costly Adjust ends of Military policy to over time important make less es, but less and for Dominance Y Central, now

nationalism

Restraint

Deep Engagement Liberal Liberal Inter Interventionism

55 a policy or action strays too far from the accepted norms, it gets pulled back to the set-point. Is the United States foreign policy thermostat stuck somewhere between Internationalism and Interventionism? Are the issues primarily those of “faith and technical competency”? How confident are we that our objectives are righteous? Might we not want to consider the wisdom of our goals? Could we adopt a strategy of Deep Engagement or Restraint even if we tried?

Trump Administration Strategy Orientation Clearly, by the end of the Obama years, there were parts of the world, especially the Middle East, that were in much poorer condition than they were when Obama took office. While it is debatable how responsible the Obama administration was for this deterioration, some of the charges included: l Leading “from behind” in Libya. l The failure to act on the Syria “redline.” l The American troop drawdown in Iraq and ensuing power vacuum facilitating the rise of ISIS. l A general inability to formulate an effective response to the “Arab Spring,” and the head twisting policy accommodations in Egypt. l The simultaneous decline in elationsr with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. l Russia’s reentry into the Middle East. l Russia’s takeover and annexation of the Crimea, and its sponsorship of and participation in the war in eastern Ukraine. l China’s continuing development and modernization of its armed forces, its island building campaign and intimidation of other regional states, and the adoption of “area access denial” strategies determined to thwart U.S. military power. Many had a perception of American vacillation or retreat often followed by re-engagement on worse terms. All this fed into concern that the United States was losing its ability to shape global events, and that U.S. interests were not being protected. Into this mix arrived Donald Trump and his “America First” policy. But what is this American policy in practice?

56 According to the White House website, an “America First” foreign policy is focused on: l Interests and national security l Peace through strength l Defeating ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups l Rebuilding the American military l Embracing diplomacy Unfortunately, the above provide an insufficient basis for policy, and the White House offers no additional documentation about “America First” as a grand strategy. There is insufficient articulation of interests, threats, and priorities from which to infer a Whitehouse foreign policy—i.e., a predetermined set of preferences and procedures for making the outcome of future decisions more predictable. All policy is about process and personnel, and the Trump administration’s foreign policy process remains dysfunctional at the time of writing. Most senior level State Department appointments are still unfilled and the administration frequently works to sideline the State Department by attempting to run policy from the National Security Council. Even if the vast expanse of policy could be run from the White House (and it cannot), the National Se- curity Council itself has seen a remarkable level of personnel turnover. Many hope that the appointment of General John Kelly as chief of staff will stop the dysfunction, but it is just a hope. Any substantial and enduring change to U.S. foreign policy will depend on the administration’s ability to staff key administration positions and conform to established governance norms by working through traditional state agencies and departments. Consequently, if only by inertia, the old consensus continues to dominate, though with periodic and serious disruption in the wake of comments by the president that question key consensus points. But even if President Trump solved the execution problem, what would he want and how would it relate to the Liberal consensus and Restraint? During the campaign, and on occasion just after taking office, Donald Trump made statements supporting Restraint positions. Among them, he: l Questioned the utility of NATO and other U.S. alliances, and criticized allied free riding on U.S. defense spending. During his first

57 visit to Europe for a G-20 meeting, he even refused to reaffirm the Article V mutual security clause of NATO. l Repeatedly questioned the utility of remaining in Afghanistan and frequently said the U.S should “get out.” l Was highly critical of U.S. intervention in Iraq. l Did not want to get involved in Syria’s civil war. l Evidenced a higher tolerance for avoiding confrontation with Russia over its activities in Ukraine. But within several months of being in office, President Trump has effectively repudiated these positions and set U.S. policy in much closer accord with traditional Liberal International or Interventionist views. This includes: l Reaffirming support for NATO and other global U.S. alliances and reducing criticism of allies over defense spending inadequacies. l Increasing U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan and further delaying any American departure. l Maintaining, if not slightly escalating, the U.S. military presence and activities in Iraq. l Significantly expanding the U.S. military presence and activities in Syria and attacking the Assad regime with cruise missiles. l Continuing and reluctantly escalating the confrontation with Russia. Clearly, President Trump is not pursuing Restraint policies, regardless of any campaign promises. And insofar as he increasingly adopts traditional solutions to U.S. international problems, he seems to be leaning toward traditional Liberal Interventionist fixes. Depending on one’s view of the Liberal order, this is either a good or a bad thing. What is clear is that it is very hard to change the underlying consensus driving U.S. foreign policy. Thus far, we have a pattern of challenge and retraction whereby the president makes statements undermining part of the consensus only to reverse himself several weeks later. If Chief of Staff Kelly takes hold of the policy process, one can surmise that this vacillation will end, and that policy will advance to more traditionally Interventionist solutions. In an odd way, the May 2017 Wall Street Journal op-ed “America First

58 Doesn’t Mean America Alone,” by National Security and National Econom- ic Advisors H.R. McMaster and Gary Cohen, was a tribute to not dressing up global hegemony. As they wrote: “The world is not a ‘global community’ but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors, and businesses engage and compete for advantage. We bring to [the G-20 meeting] unmatched military, political, economic, cultural, and moral strength. Rather than deny this elemental nature of international affairs, we embrace it.” At its core, this view is more sympathetic to Interventionism, but it differs in that it lays bare the raw struggle for power. Interventionism tends to justify American dominance by “exceptionalism” and a need to spread “values.” America First makes no effort to disguise or justify efforts for dominance.

Conclusions Beyond the semantics of labels, there are real differences of view on the degree of global activism the United States should pursue. Are Liberal In- ternational and Liberal Interventionist strategies hopelessly utopian? Are these strategies simply beyond the power of the United States to implement? Might it be possible to find some balance between what Restraint advocates see as an over-ambitious and over-militarized foreign policy, and what Liber- als see as a never-ending opportunity to spread American values and remake the world? Can Realism’s concern for power and its emphasis on limited, defensive objectives be blended with Liberalism’s emphasis on international institutions and democracy promotion? Unfortunately, this seems unlikely, at least if one wants U.S. foreign policy to have any coherence. One really needs to pick from among the options. Do we maintain the global systems of alliances? Do we keep troops in Europe? Do we work to promote democracy and capitalism everywhere? Is global hegemony the best strategy, or not? Restraint asks: What form should vigilance take? Is it possible to reduce global commitments without jeopardizing American security? In fact, is such a reduction actually necessary in order to provide the United States with time to prepare for a future with even greater threats? Brooks and Wohlforth acknowledge that Restraint advocates are not isolationist and that all sides agree that U.S. global interests must be defended militarily. They also argue that a strategy that steps back and adopts a “wait and see” approach would be a huge and potentially dangerous global “experiment.” Posen responds that “Liberal Hegemony” is a revolutionary movement

59 that attempts to remake the world and that it seriously—perhaps ruinous- ly—damages the United States. In spite of confusion over labels, Restraint and Realism are about engaging the international system; Liberal Interna- tionalism and its related views are about transforming the system. Deep Engagement thinks it is splitting the difference between Internationalism and Interventionism—but is it just Liberalism “light”? Part of the issue is that the United States has built up a huge edifice of international cooperation, and this construction is enormously beneficial to the United States. But the edifice depends on the continuous appli- cation of American power. Deep Engagement proponents say Restraint would be the most radical change in U.S. grand strategy since 1945, and that it could endanger the nation by destroying years of carefully nurtured alliances. Once these alliances are destroyed, they argue, it would be very hard to restore them if needed. Instead, Deep Engagement advocates argue that they have long called for “restraint,” just not radical restraint. Liberal Interventionists like Kagan warn that any retrenchment would just embolden adversaries and undermine U.S. security. Therefore, reducing the U.S. footprint in the Middle East, for example, would be reckless. Kagan further argues that the United States will never be safe until China and Russia are democratic states. He thus sees the United States on a long road of conflict with these states, one that necessitates very high military preparedness and defense spending. The U.S. military is not infinitely large and it cannot protect against unlimited threats or fight multiple and perpetual wars. Since 1991, the United States has evidenced much overconfidence and miscalculation, and it has pursued policies which many argue undermined its security. This has imposed severe, though not disastrous, costs on the United States, and on the rest of the world. Inertia seems to want to carry the United States toward some variant of Liberal Internationalism or Interventionism. But can the United States afford—financially, socially or militarily—such a strategy? If not, Restraint and Deep Engagement are alternatives. But if Restraint advocates are correct and the United States fails to adopt their prescriptions, this policy will inevitably be forced upon the nation at some future point and under much less favorable circumstances.

60 Talking It Over A Note for Students and Discussion Groups

This issue of the Headline Series, like its predecessors, is published for every serious reader who takes an interest in the subject. Many of our readers will be in classrooms, seminars or community discussion groups. Particularly with them in mind, we present below some discussion questions—suggested as a starting point only—and references for further reading, as well as pertinent online resources.

Discussion Questions Given the range of views outlined, a series of questions should help the reader focus attention on several core issue. What are the fundamental differences between the Deep Engage- ment and Restraint policies? Is the primary U.S. debate really between Deep Engagement and more extreme strategies of global activism?

Should the United States continue to maintain security relationship and military commitments that currently exist? What are the benefits and risks of this global military presence? Are concerns over temptation, entanglement, cheap-riding, and reckless driving warranted? Can different strategies be adopted for the forward deployment of forces in the three 61 main regions (Europe, the Middle East and Northeast Asia)? What is the right regional balance for the strategy? Has NATO outlived its usefulness? Should the United States begin a ten-year wind-down of its European troop presence? Can the United States reduce its security commitments to, and troop presence in, the Middle East? Should U.S. concern for nuclear non-proliferation override any concerns about the need to change the current strategy?

How stable is the existing global order? Are China and Russia truly in- tegrated and committed to this order, or are they determined to overthrow it by breaking up U.S. political and military alliances? If the United States pursued an “offshore-balancing”/“command of the commons” strategy, would it be much more difficult and expensive to re-engage in Europe or the Middle East if the need arose? Might other outside powers align themselves with local states against the United States?

Is pursuit of Liberal Internationalism’s key tenants of democracy and markets worth the effort? Are these principles truly “universal?” Should the United States attempt to spread these values, including through attempts to transform the domestic economic structures of other states?

Is the current U.S. global engagement strategy financially prudent? How significantly do U.S. unfunded liabilities change the calculus? Are the non-security costs of continuing with the non-Restraint strategy, such as loss of personal liberties and accumulation of power in the executive, too high a price to pay for the current strategy?

62 Annotated Bibliography Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century. Oxford University Press, 2016. A well-written and clearly organized argument for Deep Engagement. The book benefits from being one of the latest essays on the topic and it is able to marshal arguments against a range of Restraint positions. Ikenberry, G. John and Thomas J. Knock, and Anne-Marie Slaugh- ter, and Tony Smith, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsoni- anism in the Twenty-first Century. Princeton University Press, 2009. Disagreement among Liberal Internationalists breaks out into the open when noted scholars (and former policymakers) debate who the real heirs of Wilsonianism are and what responsibility Liberal International- ism has for the rise of Neo-Conservatives and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Kaine, Tim. “A New Truman Doctrine.” Foreign Affairs. July/August, 2017. A clear statement from an important policymaker about how and why the post-1991 Liberal consensus is broken and how it can be repaired. While Kaine does not use the term “Deep Engagement,” his prescriptions are largely compatible with this view. Kagan, Robert. “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American De- cline.” New Republic. January 11, 2012. A streamlined and better-written version of Kagan’s 2012 book The World America Made. Kagan argues against American “decline” and explains why the world needs the United States to maintain the global order, including through the use of military force.

63 Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.W.W. Norton & Company, 2014. A clearly written and well-argued case for “Structural Realism,” or the notion that conflict among great powers is inevitable and has nothing to do with virtue. Realism forms the basis for the Restraint position, and Mearsheimer discusses, among other things, the Liberal order argument as ideological cover for U.S. policy actions. Nye, Joseph and David Welch. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History. Pearson, 2013. A superb combination of history and international relations theory, the book provides a comprehensive view of current global politics. While it is partial to Liberal interpretations and covers important current issue such as globalization, it does so without neglecting Realist interpretations. Given all that is covered, the latest edition, while nice to have, is not necessary. Posen, Barry R. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strat- egy. Cornell University, 2014. A detailed case for the Restraint position, complete with regional and issue area considerations of how to implement the strategy. The book specifically highlights weaknesses of the Deep Engagement argument, and offers alternative policies. The narra- tive is particularly useful for critiquing issues related to U.S. alliances, especially the free riding and cheap riding.

Rice, Condoleezza. Democracy: Stories from the Long Road to Free- dom. Twelve, 2017. Former Secretary of State Rice argues that democracy promotion should still be a core American policy. Through a collec- tion of personal stories involving her time in office and her observations on the U.S. civil rights movement, and scholarly analysis, Rice argues that democratic institutions are the “best hope for mankind” and pursuit of their expansion by the United States should be “reinvigorated.”