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FY15FY16 TABLE OF CONTENTS DOT&E Activity and Oversight FY16 Activity Summary 1 Program Oversight 7 Problem Discovery Affecting OT&E 13 DOD Programs Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Best Practices 23 Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI) 29 Defensive Medical Information Exchange (DMIX) 33 Defense Readiness Reporting System – Strategic (DRRS-S) 37 Department of Defense (DOD) Teleport 41 DOD Healthcare Management System Modernization (DHMSM) 43 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 47 Global Command and Control System – Joint (GCCS-J) 107 Joint Information Environment (JIE) 111 Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) 115 Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) Increment 2 117 Next Generation Diagnostic System (NGDS) Increment 1 121 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Increment 2 123 Theater Medical Information Program – Joint (TMIP-J) 127 Army Programs Army Network Modernization 131 Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) 135 Abrams M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) Main Battle Tank (MBT) 139 AH-64E Apache 141 Army Integrated Air & Missile Defense (IAMD) 143 Chemical Demilitarization Program – Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (CHEM DEMIL-ACWA) 145 Command Web 147 Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A) 149 HELLFIRE Romeo and Longbow 151 Javelin Close Combat Missile System – Medium 153 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Family of Vehicles (FoV) 155 Joint Tactical Networks (JTN) Joint Enterprise Network Manager (JENM) 157 Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) 161 M109A7 Family of Vehicles (FoV) Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) 165 Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) 167 Near Real Time Identity Operations (NRTIO) 171 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) 173 Soldier Protection System (SPS) 177 Spider Increment 1A M7E1 Network Command Munition 181 Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) 183 Navy Programs Aegis Modernization Program 187 Table of Contents xix FY15FY16 TABLE OF CONTENTS AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) Program 191 Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) Survivability Upgrade (AAV-SU) 195 AN/APR-39D(V)2 Radar Signal Detection Set (RSDS) 197 AN/BLQ-10 Submarine Electronics Warfare Support System 199 AN/BQQ-10 Acoustic Rapid Commercial Off-the-Shelf Insertion (A-RCI) Sonar 201 AN/SQQ-89A(V)15 Integrated Undersea Warfare (USW) Combat System Suite 203 CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement Program 205 Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) – SeaRAM Variant 209 Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) 211 Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 215 Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 217 CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford Class Nuclear Aircraft Carrier 219 DDG 1000 Zumwalt Class Destroyer 225 DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer/Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)/Aegis Combat System 229 Department of the Navy Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (DON LAIRCM) 233 Distributed Common Ground System – Navy (DCGS-N) 235 E-2D Advanced Hawkeye 237 Expeditionary Transfer Dock (T-ESD) and Expeditionary Sea Base (T-ESB) 239 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler 243 Infrared Search and Track (IRST) 247 Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) 249 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) 251 LHA 6 New Amphibious Assault Ship (formerly LHA(R)) 253 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 257 MH-60S Multi-Mission Combat Support Helicopter 277 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Family of Vehicles (FoV) – Marine Corps 283 MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo and Its Upgrades Including High Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability 285 Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) 289 MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System 293 MQ-8 Fire Scout 295 MV-22 Osprey 299 Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) Increment 1 301 P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 303 Remote Minehunting System (RMS) 307 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 2 311 Ship Self-Defense for LHA(6) 313 Ship Self-Defense for LSD 41/49 317 Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC) 319 SSN 774 Virginia Class Submarine 321 Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) 323 Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 327 Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) System: Torpedo Warning System (TWS) and Countermeasure Anti-Torpedo (CAT) 329 Tactical Tomahawk Missile and Weapon System 333 VH-92A Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program 335 xx Table of Contents FY15FY16 TABLE OF CONTENTS Air Force Programs AC-130J Ghostrider 337 AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) 341 Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS) 343 Air Operations Center - Weapon System (AOC-WS) 345 B-2 Defensive Management System Modernization (DMS-M) 349 Battle Control System – Fixed (BCS-F) 351 CV-22 Osprey 353 Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) 355 E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Block 40/45 359 F-22A Advanced Tactical Fighter 363 Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) 367 Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) 369 Global Broadcast Service (GBS) System 371 Global Positioning System (GPS) Enterprise 375 Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS) 381 KC-46A 385 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) 389 Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD) and Miniature Air Launched Decoy – Jammer (MALD-J) 391 MQ-9 Reaper Armed Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) 393 QF-16 Full-Scale Aerial Target (FSAT) 397 RQ-4B Global Hawk High-Altitude Long-Endurance Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) 399 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) II 401 Space-Based Infrared System Program, High Component (SBIRS HIGH) 403 Ballistic Missile Defense Programs Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 405 Sensors / Command and Control Architecture 409 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) 413 Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 419 Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 421 Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) 425 Cybersecurity 439 Test and Evaluation Resources 449 Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E) 463 The Center for Countermeasures (CCM) 469 Table of Contents xxi Navy Programs FY16 NAVY PROGRAMS Aegis Modernization Program Executive Summary • The Navy is modernizing the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) installed on Baseline 3 USS Ticonderoga (CG 47)-class cruisers and Flight I USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) destroyers to the AWS Advanced Capability Build (ACB)-12 (Baseline 9A and 9C, respectively). New construction Flight IIA DDGs, beginning with USS John Finn (DDG 113), will be equipped with Baseline 9C as well. • Baseline 9A cruiser operational testing began in FY15 and continued through FY16. Baseline 9C destroyer operational testing began in FY16. Neither variant has completed all planned events. In particular, no live-firing events intended to demonstrate surface warfare performance have been executed on any Baseline 9 variant. Additionally, air defense events against supersonic sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missile surrogates have been deferred for reasons including GQM-163A aerial target availability, schedule constraints, and weather. Modernizations and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) will evaluate • In FY16, the SECDEF directed the Navy to fund long-lead the NIFC-CA FTS Increment II capability. items for an Aegis Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) to be used for testing of Aegis ACB-20, DDG 51 Flight III, the Air System and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR, a.k.a., AN/SPY-6), and • The Navy’s Aegis Modernization program provides updated Evolved SeaSparrow Missile (ESSM) Block II, and to produce technology and systems for existing Aegis-guided missile Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) updates outlining cruisers and destroyers. This planned, phased program the intended use of the test ship. The Navy has complied with provides similar technology and systems for new construction the funding portion of the directive, but has not complied destroyers. with the remainder of the direction to provide the TEMP or • The AWS integrates the following components: integrated test plan for Aegis ACB-20 and DDG 51 Flight III. - AWS AN/SPY-1 three-dimensional (range, altitude, and Additionally, the Navy has not funded the remainder of the azimuth) multi-function radar installation/integration cost for the test ship or the remaining - AN/SQQ-89 undersea warfare suite that includes the test resources to conduct the self-defense testing for AN/SQS-53 sonar, SQR-19 passive towed sonar array ACB-20/DDG 51 Flight III. (DDGs 51 through 78, CGs 52 through 73), and the • Testing completed to date is insufficient to make a SH-60B or MH-60R helicopter (DDGs 79 Flight IIA determination of operational effectiveness or suitability for and newer have a hangar to allow the ship to carry and Aegis Baseline 9A or 9C. maintain its own helicopter) • The lack of an adequate modeling and simulation (M&S) suite - Close-In Weapon System of the Aegis Combat System (ACS), as well as the lack of an - A 5-inch diameter gun Aegis-equipped SDTS where the ship’s full self-defense kill - Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles (DDGs 51 through 78, chain can be tested, precludes assessment of the Baseline 9 CGs 52 through 73) Probability of Raid Annihilation requirement self-defense - Vertical Launch System that can launch Tomahawk land mission. attack missiles, Standard surface-to-air missiles, ESSMs, • The Navy will not fully assess Aegis Integrated Air and and Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rocket missiles Missile Defense (IAMD) until a validated M&S test bed • The Navy is upgrading the AWS on USS Ticonderoga is developed and validated. The test bed is planned to be (CG 47)-class cruisers and Flight I USS Arleigh Burke available by FY20, but there is no agreed upon strategy to destroyers to Baseline
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