CEU eTD Collection Second Reader: Professor Roumen Reader:Professor Daskalov Second Constantin Professor Iordachi Supervisor: Bulgarian Foreign Policy in the Context of the Prague Spring In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Central European University Central European History Department Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Metodi Metodi Metodiev Master of Arts Submitted to Submitted 2009 By CEU eTD Collection instructions may not be made without the written permission of the Author.” the of permission written the without be made not may instructions form copies must of madein such with made.Further accordance a part any such copies librarian.page beThis may the from obtained Library. Details lodged Central European inthe and Author the by given instructions the with accordance in only made be may part, or full “Copyrightin the text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies by any process, either in CEU eTD Collection Brezhnev Doctrine. Brezhnev political doctrine expressedbyBulgariaits contribution and the of process to of Elaboration the states” – East Germany, Poland and Hungary, and the place of Bulgaria in this context. “satellite called so the of behalf on motivation of terms in division internal in the represents it In addition WarsawPact. of the state-members the and Czechoslovakia between crisis in WarsawPact. the participant of a as Bulgaria process in decision-making the is involvement level onthe main accent the of The contribution of the thesis consists of the exploration of the evolution of the foreign the reform the of general development of the in thecontext isrepresented The process The thesis deals with the Bulgaria’s foreign policy during the Prague Spring 1968. The Spring policy the Prague foreign The theduring with Bulgaria’s thesis deals Abstract CEU eTD Collection ilorpy...... 47 Bibliography ...... 45 Conclusions 4. Bulgaria and the Normalization...... 34 Meeting...... 22 Action April Warsaw of Program the until the From in crisis:the 3. Bulgaria development the 2. Bulgaria’s foreign policy in the context of the meeting ...... 9 in Dresden 1. Theoretical Approaches...... 5 ...... 1 Introduction 4.3. The Elaboration of ...... 43 the Brezhnev Doctrine 4.2. Bulgaria in the “Normalization”...... 37 4.1. The closing period of the diplomatic ...... 34 efforts 3.2. The Warsaw Meeting...... 29 3.1. The Crisis’ Progression :April – July 1968...... 22 2.4. The political leaders...... 18 2.3. The meeting in Dresden ...... 13 and its aftermath 2.2. Bulgarian foreign policy doctrine...... 10 2.1. The situation in ...... 9 the Warsaw Pact 1.2. Two crises of Soviet Dominated Systems...... 6 1.1. The ...... 5 Khrushchev Legacy Table of Contents i CEU eTD Collection Jivkov during the firstmonths of strugglethe between Czechoslovakia andthe“Five”. state. The position of internal justification of the foreign the of function policy the and was thereform model the of proposedcontent the on by understanding their on Dubcek, Alexander model deviantthe Jivkov Thisresulted CPCZ. represented by inclashbetween and Todor the canintercept which model socialism, a system of successful as its ownsocio-political represent Block. Eastern the Stability of International endangered on existed secondly concerns two, firstly there were fears from the spread influence of the Prague Spring, in their countries and Soviettowards Union, buttheir policy hadinternalits also reasons, which could be divided into loyalty on mostly driven path, this followed GDR and Poland Hungary, Bulgaria, Sovereignty. “Restraint of anewdoctrine its place appeared toSocialism. In national roads and reforms of in terms legacy Khrushchev the of end the meant Spring Prague the of crush the Union, BrezhnevDoctrine. the of Elaboration the and in Czechoslovakia intervention military in the concluded end the at which Pact, intheWarsaw process in decision-making the role Bulgaria’s of case peculiar the explores andMovementmarked the rise Euro-Communismthe of inWestern ThisEurope. thesis Ideological also unity of Block. It Eastern the the aggravated division in the World Communist communist block during in Eastern Europe ColdWar, the which greatly the endangered Within the context of this crisis, the foreign policy strategy chosen by Bulgaria was to which In countrieswereunderpoliticalthe in Europe dominance of Eastern Sovietthe The reform policy of CPCZ, in 1968, generated one of the most several crises in the Introduction 1 CEU eTD Collection 23 related to the situation in Czechoslovakia and response in Bulgaria in terms of inof interms political Bulgaria andresponse situationin tothe Czechoslovakia 23 related before 1968.Afterwards itdeals with firstthe summit of in Warsawthe Pact on Dresden March level of benefits, based on foreign policy, which two satellites regimes can gain. Revolution and Bulgaria during The final thePragueSpring. outcome an provides onthe answer motivation, goals andpolitical of “satellite role two countries”,Romania - during Hungarian the content of crisisin the Eastern Block, by comparing the crisis of 1956 to that of 1968 in terms of “Five” in time. that during shaped the internalintervention which tensions the –negotiation,three period andNormalization. encompasses The division of in Spring history which Prague the of divides the framework, in the Historiography established the Warsaw Pact and the different roles of will find its place in version final of the Doctrine. the the leaders of provide enoughfacts, which concernsthewould illustrate and solutions expressed byJivkov which would be an overstatement tosay that Bulgaria was in the core of the doctrine, butmy thesisIt will Normalization. “The as Historiography the in known Intervention, the after period the during climaxed which Doctrine Brezhnev the of elaboration of process the into above, expressed motivation mingle political the managed to Bulgaria satellite”, of a“loyal role established The First Chapter presents the background of the political situation inPact the situation Warsaw presents political of background the the The FirstChapter The thesis consists of Four Chapters. In the introductory theoretical chapter Ifocus on the The chronology of the research traces the course of the events within The importance of despiteits by topic fact,that the revealed small size andwell-the an already 2 CEU eTD Collection Bulgarian Communist Party, is related to two main problems. Firstly the evaluation of the of evaluation the Firstly problems. main two to is related Party, Communist Bulgarian Historiography. in placedideas the realms the PragueSpring, about of arealready inestablished which the be will sources primary these methodology of terms In Archive. State Central the to belongs the first time. Mostly itincludes documentation of the Bulgarian Communist Party, which now intervention. elaboration the of outcome final the explore will thechapter part, last Inthe in Czechoslovakia. stationed of the BrezhnevNormalization, expressed bythe ArmyBulgarian Command were the Bulgarian during troops the in areas problematic the show will It process. doctrine, Normalization the and Intervention which was concluded in situation Czechoslovakia. in the contextconcerns about of thethe unity military of the Block, were enforced by the quickly changed context of the meeting 17 onJuly Warsaw Program the until ofthelaunch Action the andJuly April – from between crisis the of It thedevelopment covers member states. Warsawleaders Pact the of the among negotiations March. and January between Czechoslovakia in happened events the of resentment Bulgarian the of part measures The lack of historiography,Bulgarian on foreignthe policy in 1960s by conducted the formost arenowpublished of sources, which ismostly based primary The on research The Third and last Chapter follows the last diplomatic efforts before the military The Second Chapter traces the most intensive period of political meetings and meetings political of intensive period most the traces Chapter The Second th . In this period, the main ideas of mainideasmostly leadership, the based . Inthis of Bulgarian the period, on 3 CEU eTD Collection essays “Sofia between Paris and Prague”, Sofia :Siela 2009 3 2 1 his tokeep inorder Union power stay loyal Sovietto the idea arebasedonthe to actions Bulgaria’s Soviet supporttothe Union for economical advantages Jivkov “bargain”personal role as cleverusesthe statesmen situation of whoTodor – to contribution to define the decision-making model of Communist Bulgaria Communist of model decision-making the define to contribution and motivation its on based and Intervention, inthe participants the of attitude political of the the generaltrends with foreignplace Bulgaria interms policy of the view, aims to which revealitscan not ownargumentation massivethe spreadits of social political therefore and tension, position during the PragueSpring, Secondly Bulgaria as is conceptabout acountry there the in1968, by remained untouched which Luchezar Stoyanov, Luchezar Boyan Kastelanov, Boyan Iskra Baeva and Eugenia Kalinova, Eugenia and Baeva Iskra In this context my attempt is using the methodology stated above, to create different above,create mymethodology to is usingthe In thiscontextstated attempt Todor Jivkov: MitI Istina Svetut I Bulgaria prez 1968 Bulgarskite Prehodi 3 . ( Todor Jivkov: Myth and Truth), Sofia: 2005 Sofia: Truth), and Myth Jivkov: (Todor (The World and Bulgaria in1968) published collectionin a of ( The Bulgarian Transitions), Sofia : Tilia 2000 : Tilia Sofia Transitions), Bulgarian (The 4 1 , or as a political leader whose 2 . CEU eTD Collection ibid April.,1972 4 coordination. could be through differences overcome in which states” socialist of the “commonwealth develop wasthe wereto countries socialist the when1959 statement he publicly thevictory of announced Socialism Sovietthe Union. Theforeign by policy elaborated doctrine Khrushchev was revealedby his placetook in“neutral outside ground” of inEurope like places Vietnam and Third the World. Wall in mutual 1961. Dueto benefits the Doctrine was unchallenged by and West the the conflict systems which obey different rules. The material expression of this was the building of the political Berlin on based is division this that accepted also it but systems, rivalry two between division with a binding doctrine of “peaceful coexistence”.1.1. The Khrushchev Legacy In other words the doctrine recognized the of of like Institutions forAssistance, Council the Mutual and by division also exact on official role viewbroader in with Khrushchev’s bereestablished ideological the Therefore to was unity Stalinization, which inreflected Revolution Hungarian the and its independence.struggle for R.JudsonMitchel, The anatomy ofthe crisis: From Khrushchev’s Legacy to the The countries in the Socialist Block were very important for the geopolitical strategy of strategy geopolitical the for important very Block were in Socialist the The countries world “Capitalist” and the “Communist” the provided of De-Stalinization The process This ideological wasneededThis ideological framework in terms of misguidingmessagethe of De- the The Brezhnev DoctrineandCommunist Ideology, Elaboration of the Brezhnev Doctrine 1. Theoretical Approaches 5 5 The review of politics Vol 34,No 2, 4 . The framework inwhich framework The . CEU eTD Collection publishers, 1972 Countries,published “Thein Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia :Its EffectsEastern on Europe, New York : Praeger 7 6 framework. methodological them and under acommon theoretical study to us allowing similarities many exhibit interventions military two the motivation, and Union in torestore order unity the socialistthe of system. offoreign In terms policy reasoning 1.2. Two crises of Soviet Dominated Systems communism. the of gains historical recognition of the existence of different approaches to socialism and prohibited review of the Union in Central Europe. ideologicalmostly principles and thewhich predominantpositionendangered Sovietthe of leaders.Soviet BothKhrushchev wouldallowand not Brezhnev reforms which questioned andeconomy. Community in culture of European terms the to back be to Hungary and Czechoslovakia in demand the was point third The Union. Soviet the processthe ofmodernization includedwhich a desire cross to economic boundaries provided by was it Secondly, society. the and party the between unification of model new of establishment an into seen was that change the and authority its lost had regime the as legitimacy, in mainFirstlyCzechoslovakia. Hungary demandswhichwereproposed and crisisof the Ivan Volgyes, Ivan Hungarian The and Czechoslovak Revolutions : A Comparative study of Revolutions inCommunist TheSoviet Block inEvolution ch1 From Budapest to Prague, The scheme suggestedby Ivan Volyges These two events represented the most vivid act of aggression on behalf of the Soviet These three main concepts clashed with the understating of the reform on behalf of behalf on reform the thethe understatingof These clashed of with mainconcepts three 6 6 7 in his comparative research, focused on three on focused research, comparative inhis CEU eTD Collection 10 9 politics, Vol.13. No 2 (Jan1981) pp. 187-210. 8 after 1969 after Czechoslovakia with in difference Block, Socialist in the reformed most the of one was country the situation in Hungary after 1956 had not cut the reformssocialist solidarityandaway Khrushchev’s from acceptance ofseparateroads tosocialism and even on the eveprovidedoctrine which “ was to of 1968, the new a of elaboration for the stimulus thebasics provided crisis the Czechoslovakia, doctrine. In between 1953 and 1962, was personally supported by the Soviet leader by Soviet between 1953andsupported 1962, waspersonally the crisis was a motivation to become close to the Soviet leader on which was dependent. the in this respect Personality, of Cultthe of in denunciation face of the the conjuncture political new confronted was who period, Stalinist the from leader apolitical of example an was Dej Bulgaria in 1968. interestingrelations between the states which were under theto control of the Soviet Union. In this respect it isnotice the comparison between the attitude of Romania in 1956 and that of denunciation Khrushchev,of wasa inperiod which Bulgarian the leader,communist had to ibid See also Zvi Gitelman, “The politics of Socialist Restorationin Hungary Czechoslovakia,”and Comparative Boyan Kastelanov Todor Jivkov Todor Kastelanov Boyan That difference reflected in the situation of the two countries after the Invasion the after countries two the of in situation the reflected difference That In the case of Hungary, the military intervention was justified by the Khrushchev the by justified was intervention military the Hungary, of case the In Todor Jivkov became a protégé of Khrushchev. The road to power of Jivkov to power, ofKhrushchev.Jivkov to of topower The Jivkov becameaprotégé Todor road Firstly in situation the the political leadership resembled cases. the two In 1956, Gehorgiu internal the a casestudy of cases provided also both in of crisis The general atmosphere 9 . Mit IIstina adjustment born of necessity bornof tobesuredirectionof adjustment inthe (Todor Jivkov : Myth and Truth), Soifia 2005 Soifia Truth), and Myth : Jivkov (Todor 7 10 . After 1964and the 8 . In which ”. CEU eTD Collection 11 the Soviet leaders to rise of the delivery of Gas and Electro energy inSoviet feelings Romania. anti- the to connected regime, his for benefit internal an in gaining attempt the of example an most era,was for successful him. the Brezhnev becausethe successful representhis loyalty theto new demands comingfrom Moscow. In this respect Jivkov was again any consequences in terms of the stability of the political leadership or any turmoil in the society. Block,major without inthe survive Eastern crisis allowed second It to regime development. the by embracingwhile national-communism its represented concept, the Bulgaria static political Union. Soviet the without impossible found they which unity, its and regime of the conservation leaders the was for both main preoccupation thatbe the stated to has and main advocate solutionthe alsoto of it problemssocial concerning the stability. However they would try duringto acrisis based loyalty on they to reconfirmattempt its political future his into demands ideathe of withrapprochement theUnion. Soviet Iskra Baeva and Eugenia Kalinova, Eugenia and Baeva Iskra On international level Jivkov, attempted to calculate his inheloyalty, tocalculate asked 1973 when attempted levelJivkov, On international The task of Gehorgiu Dej to negotiate withdraw of the Soviet Army from Romania was However the situation in 1968, illustrated Romania its that political perspectives inillustrated changed situation However the 1968, which on demands the of nature the conclusions about two provide can strategies These Bulgarskite Prehodi(The Bulgarian Transitions), 8 11 . However, he also embodied Sofia : Tilia 2000 : Tilia Sofia CEU eTD Collection independence. The attempt was averted withmilitary attempt The independence. beginning In the Soviet intervention. of the establishment of the defenseand the of asmain proclaimed peace priority. Organization, Nations United itrecognize did In addition internal affairs”. intheirnon-interference andstate every of independence sovereignty and for the respect of principle the andrecognized postulates whenincludeideological not didHowever program the pact the Moscow. of of under leading role the Hungary tried to leaveRomania, and the Soviet Union. thePoland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, were which signed treaty the The states pact inin NATO. entering Germany West the to aresponse as also came pact The created. Union was pursuit European Western the BrusselsTreaty, andtherefore the which West addedinto Germany was for 2.1. The situation in the Warsaw Pact political experience. Jivkov andAlexanderin Dubcek, ideologicalterms of their differences background and common chapter will end with brief introduction communistof leaders two the in periodthis –Todor pact onthe Czechoslovakian place problem, inDresden took on March 19 which the of meeting first in until the Pact1955 Warsaw the of creation sincethe of Bulgaria place the 2. Bulgaria’s foreign policy in the context of the meeting in Dresden However, the “ideal” formula of the Pact was to be challengedIts creation onewas the firstyear act of officialafter unification the of the states from the Eastern Block by Paris tothe Agreements in response May 1955as a was created WarsawThe pact The chapter aims to introduce the international relations context in Eastern Europe, and Europe, in Eastern context relations international the introduce to aims chapter The 9 th 1968.The CEU eTD Collection 12 political field, the Balkan region, and in the relations to the Soviet Union. still under the Sovietaegis and finally, therecent signs Bulgaria’s willplay apositiveof to role in foreign although affairs, rather thanpassiverole, has played where Bulgariaanactive, wellas thoseareas this policy,as “ following: as a satellite, role of the of outside priority defined thesituation in the country’s foreign policy at endof in1967, establishan attempt to its policydoctrine Bulgarian foreign 2.2. communist ideology. Spring inindependence byits realm awaypredetermined doctrine in political was of of the its attitudeduring Prague the inSofia. Therefore, pact’smeeting to the boycotted 1967 Romania which meant Pact, in words theleading achallenge other towards role of Sovietthe Union. In an autonomous foreign policy. however,was most seriously threatened pact, in inaugurated half thesecond 1960s the of when in excluded this Albania“de-facto” from chance was and pact the of 1962. Theunity took gavesmall the opportunity to use members to the for situation gainingindependence.more Peking, and Moscow between tension the when Pact, the for challenge second a was there 1960s Brown, J In addition, there were three areas where Bulgaria played a role - the internationalJ.F Brown, the historian who dealt with Bulgarian history after the Second World War, of the centralization tothe opposed Ceausescu leader Nicolae communist The Romanian Bulgaria under Communist Rule. 12 New York, PreagerPublishers, 1970 10 Yet itisworth discussingthe motives, for CEU eTD Collection encourage the Sovietencourage the forUnion more direct likeactions against Tito. deviationists easily recognizableitas in torepresent order purposes, from firstly inPropaganda context, same the Yugoslavia keep the unity of the nation. In the period of the conflict, he would try putto Czechoslovakia to and conviction enemy certain with but abroad, aggressive being not as policy Bulgarian the represented of the CommunistJivkov War.Therefore, World after Second which started its after, of formation process but the on national handunity,other hea existenceMacedonian of the recognized consciousness, and which wouldforhistorical political space the existence of open Hedenied maneuvers. secondly to use the situation to Tito’s inTito’s duringYugoslavia. 1963 aplenum Therefore 14 Greece) in (today Egeia named populationthe Bulgaria, living around riverthe Vardar(todayMacedonia) thepopulationand in living the in region 13 policy and position its Czechoslovakia. towards Balkan between beinBulgaria’s must the correlation to beexplainedclarified Yugoslavia order and Bulgaria between situation The Union. Soviet the to loyal completely region the in state only Balkans. In the mid 1960s, especially after the partial defection of Romania, Bulgaria became the France. anti-NATO official line of De Gaulle, Bulgaria regained the traditionally good relations with andWest Germany. Also, the Bulgarian leaderJivkov Todor visited Parisin duetothe 1966, and States United with its relations reestablished aresult as and coexistence” “peaceful of doctrine ɐȾȺ Political term illustrating the attitude towards The Bulgarian population living in the mountain of Pirin(today in , In the 1960s, the “Macedonian question” “Macedonian In the1960s, Bulgaria wason the was active in concept where Brown’s place the Nevertheless Since themid-1950s, on internationalthe level Bulgaria newthe adopted Khrushchev ɮȻ , ɨɩ ..5,a.e. 567 (All translations from Bulgarian archival sources are mine) 11 13 continued to dominate the relations with 14 , Jivkov tried cometo up with a solution, CEU eTD Collection ch.6 Hungarianch.6 and Polish Attitudes on Czechoslovakia, 1968. 16 1968. So, polishthe leader communist had choice noother buttobecome strongly anti-Dubcek, instabilityin inin which from thatMarch concluded period Polandtheof regimethe events supposed tobe more understanding tothesituation in Czechoslovakia. Theproblem the was Czechoslovakia. “Five”and the between De-Stalinization of finish process the to attempts Dubcek by inhis he leadership.reforms, SovietPersonally Union the supported wereaccepted leaderKadar.communist of Janos His thecountry attempts stabilizing 1956,withmoderate after camp, although officially Jivkov denied such claims. an andloyalty, becomefor country created inopportunity the this to decisivefactor socialistthe perspective of unification between of perspective SovietUnion” Bulgariaandthe 15 of the Sovietplenum in Jivkov, which inTodor he aboutwhich the possibility spoke Bulgaria tobecome part Union Moscow. In BCP convoked a 1963, of neededofficial leadership recognition andwhich political There were two main reasons for these close relations - the complete dependence of the economy Czerwinski, E.J, Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz. ɐȾȺ , ɮȻ The case with the polish leader Gomulka was more peculiar at first glance heglancefirst was wasmore at peculiar polishThe caseleaderGomulka the with Hungarian wasthe Dubcek’s reforms towards understandable most Warsaw pactthe In readiness its testified hadalready meeting Bulgaria eveof the Dresden on the Therefore The relations with the Soviet Union were the third pillar of the Bulgarian foreign policy. , ɨɩ .5,a.e 568 .5,a.e 15 . “ about future involvement andindepthrapprochementabout future with the The Soviet Invasion ofCzechoslovakia: Itseffects onEastern Europe, 12 16 New York : Praeger Publisher . Therefore, Kadar became mediator became the Kadar . Therefore, . , 1972 CEU eTD Collection 19 1985 Press University 18 17 “Poland is waiting for her Dubcek” her for is waiting “Poland also having inmindthesongthatpolish were students singing the March during protests: against political the system in Eastern European countries and particularly in theSovietUnion. economicalthe andlife, social all of this bypublicly expressed attitude accompanied critical lostUnion, its patience on independence growingthe signsfor ideas and different of inchanges form with meetings of in leadersof Block.the Theleadership Eastern the countries Sovietthe of in Czechoslovakia. It came as a result of two months of political maneuvers by Dubcek in the like JanHusatthe council ofConstance wherewaswas facingatribunalthat allreadyforme.Ithough felt Iendedup?suddenly have Germany strategy and the attempt of Czechoslovakia to leave the door open in terms of relations with West 2.3. The meeting in Dresden and its aftermath domestic sphere. the on Dubcekreforms of the reflection the secondly and factor leading as state the of positions international endangered the between Sugar, Andras Mcadams, James. Mcadams, ibid The meeting in Dresden was the first official recognition about the existence of a problem The situation in GDR must be seen in the context of its fears from the “ The atmosphere of The atmosphere meeting of this was“ by described Dubcek: 18 . The case of the East- German communist leader Walter Ulbricht was mixture was leaderWalter Ulbricht German caseof . The East- the communist Dubcek speaks East Germany and Détente: Building Authority after the Wall. . London: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd 1990 17 . 19 ” 13 I satdown andsaw that I Cambridge :Cambridge Ostpolitic” CEU eTD Collection 21 Bulgarian foreign policy would bebased during the period. Czechoslovakia waspresentedbyStankoNedelchev,expressed key who onwhich points the in on inA Bulgaria who situation represented the report Dresden. member of Politburo, animportant Todorov, Stanko from beinformed, wasto Committee The Central hierarchy. 20 Agencyto be Affairsand provided Ministry Foreign by Telegraph Bulgarian of the has in situation thatbeon the Czechoslovakia firstly organizeddecided: observation detailed to discussedin political restricted circle. washeldon meeting March 26 This was problem the in which BCP, of organ political highest Politburo-the of meeting a was there at party hierarchy. highestthe thedecision-making process narrow deal communist possibility in countries, andpractically parties with problem the theirto to own statement of any not refer meetingthe did problems to inCzechoslovakia. Thisgave the official the So records. stenographic to betaken not meeting the decision, during suggested the the Czechoslovakian SocialistRepublic our community withof theuse press,of radio,television andother sources, abouttheevents in PropagandaCC of ofdepartment andAgitation of BCPtotakemeasures forproper clarification decided“ as a Politburo that the Propaganda. Secondly also for the toll to play an important role in the whole period as an informer and buffer of the information and ibid ɐȾȺ , On March 29 Firstly, parts. two has elite party the within policy official the correlating of method The which for from in public the secret waskept of problem existence the the However, ɮȻ , ɨɩ .,.35.a.e 127 th a plenum was convoked in which the second level of in the party ” 21 . 14 Under the control of the Under thecontrol of th 1968 anditwas 20 . BTA was CEU eTD Collection 26 25 24 23 now,when inEurope, the German militarism is preparing forrevenge and thewar inVietnam period completed struggle in spheres, against influence all bourgeoisie the from elements of pre-war the successfully with the satisfied leadership was party becausethe for Bulgaria, useful task socialist democracy. critic was given on “ antagonistic classes there arenoclass contradictions andclass struggle capitalistic and socialistic. Itisunthinkable that now in these new conditions when there areno world systems–the two thestruggle between areexamplefor events inCzechoslovakia communism of years 20 last the revisiting for Czechoslovakia a system which worked correctly in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR and the Soviet Union. introduction thebasic posed in question asked nextthe months itwhy needed was sucha in turn, 22 isn’t socialism andwhich ademocracy andwhatis liberalization, isitscontent happens under the sloganfordemocracy andliberalization, butinallofusrises one question – “ words the with speech his begun Todorov Czechoslovakia. what in of states comparedwas order existingthe happening in to WarsawPact the ɐȾȺ Ivailo Znepolski, ibid ibid ɐȾȺ , , 25 ɮȻ The ideological unity was also defended in informationalthis bulletin “ of Todorov. The protection the The in system of trends protection as unchangeable wasposedagainst also Stanko Todorov’s reconstitution of the meeting in Dresden begun with a general defense ageneral with begun Dresden in meeting the of reconstitution Todorov’s Stanko ɮȻ . , , ɨɩ ɨɩ ., 58, a.e3 58, a.e3 Bulgarksiat Comunisum 24 the talksofbringingbacktheMasaryk typeofdemocracy,the andnotthe Keeping the system in the sense of a global perspective was easy and (The Bulgarian Communism), Sofia :2008 15 23 and in this respect the following the respect in this and Everything inCzechoslovakia 26 . This is impossible 22 ”. This The CEU eTD Collection 27 also be part of Bulgaria’s main arguments against Czechoslovakia, pointing out the model model the out of pointing againstCzechoslovakia, main bepartof also Bulgaria’s arguments not been conducted system ideological workwith intelligentsia” the as lost party the control a from consequence mentioned by Todorov reestablishing thebourgeoisie theinter democratic republicwar from period by “ events organized about Czechoslovakian, the from information received had which Agency, Telegraph Bulgarian had diminished over the control of the social processes. In addition, he gave the example of The with system. drasticthis measuresdealing never when must take leader basic ground of a socialistof Czechoslovakian state. Communist PartyIt were wasposed by Todorov toas a greatshow thread and attackthat of the this changes madein the connection of Ministry andState Security the Foreign Affairs behalf on in order to keep the unity Security).In theState itwas version Bulgarian’s police (in andthe secret army relies on the state of the state its made by CPCZ in highlytwo areas important – policythe with cadresthe and the propaganda. work party internal inthe mistakes based on was Thecritical approach by Todorov. expressed implacable. was CPCZ of policy the in which, context and intheMiddleEastis still going”. ibid The lack of control over the social sector and especially the intelligentsia was also intelligentsia andespecially the social sector the over The lackof control party the role of leading the it expressed that clearly by deliveredTodorov, The report importanceoffor the each communistFirstly based ontheconceptthat internal security The inner party control theargumentof was strongest Bulgarianposition the and was the most extreme elements in the country, who had put the question of the question whohad put country, inthe elements mostextreme the This resume was supposed to describe an international an todescribe wassupposed This resume 16 “Obviously long years it has “Obviously longyears . This political line would line political This . 27 ”. CEU eTD Collection and Kosygin. In front of them the Bulgarian communist leader had demanded an immediate an demanded had leader communist Bulgarian the them of front In Kosygin. and did notinvolved the Army and State Security, as it was happening nowin Czechoslovakia. Personality, of cult the of abolishment the to related reforms the that claimed he respect this In order toimply Khrushchev’s reform. 30 29 28 1956 April of Plenum in the embodied De-Stalinization, the during made reforms in the BCP of experience the on relied he Afterwards Dubcek. be would months three next in the it of object the will tolead the party personal “ Dubcek of evaluation Thenhepolicy conductednowfrom byBulgaria, continued Politburo. the wereexpelled with mentioned during the plenum and sharpened the messages. of propaganda– Radio, Television, Cinematography” control over the information “ in the administration and now was part of the “ideological and cultural front”. And the lost its work continued intelligentsia” “liberal the out hethat pointed respect Inthis Czechoslovakia. work and cadrespolicy”work appropriate “ideological with intellectuals the over control complete whichhadachieved state asa Bulgaria The plenum of April was part of the process against the cult of personality, spread around Eastern Europe, in Europe, Eastern around spread of personality, cult the against process of the part was ofApril plenum The ibid ibid Jivkov also informed the Central Committee about his personal meeting with Brezhnev with meeting his personal about Committee Central the informed also Jivkov Firstly, the Bulgarian leader complained that the people the that leadercomplained the Firstly, inCPCZ,who hadsupported Bulgarian the Jivkov mainproblemsThe by the underlined speech delivered concluding Todor support Todorov’s of Nedelchev The report aimed from to Stanko speechwith examples ” Personal werepartqualifications of Jivkov’s political style andthe The so called progressive group has under its control all the tools controlall progressivehas underits socalled group The Dubcek himself does not have the experience, the intellect and the intellect does nothavetheexperience, himself Dubcek 28 17 29 30 . CEU eTD Collection 33 32 pact has to the same in Romania, and at end in Yugoslavia idea behind canbe found inhis afterproposition, that restoring the order in Czechoslovakia, the firstthe military political leader whointervention proposed as asolution problem.of the The illustrate the two personalities on the level of their belonging to the communist world. Such a Such world. communist the to belonging their of level the on personalities two the illustrate The politicalleaders 2.4. population.the appeared and language inthe through which political justified itsBCP foreign in frontpolicy of Party achievements.as a solid gave ground, Jivkov use opportunity the to italso in proclaiming Bulgarian Communist Thisin the foreign policy of Bulgaria duringwould the crisis. Nevertheless this representation of bethedomination regime visible of the party as a stronghold for the unityin wasendangeredstate The unity byCzechoslovakia. which spheres the of communist the of the regimethe was to be the mainnext argument period, when the problemwhile different departments of party the begun to transfer reportsdown the to party the hierarchy. officially 31 officials top Soviet two the to response tobe response “even ifwe risk”provided should take ibid ibid ɐȾȺ , The introduction of The introductionleaders, Jivkov two the of Todor Alexanderand Dubcek, would in meeting exemplified in Committee by Central the speakers presented the The concerns ineverything be finished kept to secret, that an agreement was with The officialpart ɮȻ , ɨɩ ., 58, a.e3 “We mustbereadywith toact ourarmies” 18 31 He even had gone further by suggesting by further gone had even He 33 . 32 . So Jivkov became Jivkov So . CEU eTD Collection church “Saint Nedelya” “Saint church 35 34 communism after 1925 ideology. the of cause just the and system the of efficiency the about doubts any him give industrial development in fascinationDubcek Soviet Union economical with the his and situation the retailed of tobepartofthebuilding hisambition with encompassed search forjobsopportunity his democrat and afterwards a founder of the CPCZ. He involved his family to travel in the Soviet Union, in explain partly politicalthe behavior of twothe leaders. it can also but process, of nature decision-making the because the of important mightbe parallel Presidium, Jivkov had already completed his road to power differed,in and 1962 when Dubcek his took position as a member of Czechoslovakthe Party of newthe communist elite, rooted in the domestic sphere communistof rule. However, the pace he often time. fightsfor wasresponsibleduring that which that themeant, street were happening actions. for street that Inpractice Union, success inwashead department Jivkov the of Soviet political attitude,in the early 1930s. In the time when Dubcek, was experiencing the communists left with workers its with popular house printing the in begun life, political His realization. After1925 the Bulgarian Communist Party was abolished, because of the organizationof a bomb assault in the William Shawcross –Dubcek andCzechoslovakia 1918 – 1990, London :The Hogarth Press, 1990 The case of Jivkov, on the other hand, was predetermined by the nature ofBulgarian nature hand, predetermined bythe was The Jivkov,on of other the case Ideologically both experiencedthesysteminaverydifferent ways.Dubcek’s fatherwasasocial- The road to power for both of them was part of the De-Stalinization andimplementation 34 35 . Even though, it coincided with the period of the great purges, it did not . He was a pupil with poor results who fled to the capital in search for 19 36 . socialism. CEU eTD Collection I.B Tauris, 1990 39 38 Istoria:2000 communistleader, thought that he could transfer the communism to the new realities. Czechoslovakian the while pragmatism, extreme on credo his political Jivkov based respect relation to the Soviet Union the on not was them of both between argument main the However, anti-Soviet. and revisionist be to considered was Dubcek, and principles communist orthodox the for stood Jivkov which considered Dubcek to be an Orthodox Communist, totally loyal to the Soviet Union course new political Khrushchev’s into the fit whocompletely communist” “domestic hewasa because andfrom Novotni, Brezhnev providedto that successful the Jivkov outcomefor and Dubcek. officialthe bless andof Moscow, itwas denial the of support from forKhrushchev Chervenkov happen had with to everything his Nevertheless shake authority. to managed they certain period, the whole gamut of methods included public discredit on the basis of the reformation “spirit”. support from youngthe jeopardizing generation without its positionin front oldthe party elite. In leaderscommunist Chervenkov,gain Antonin Novotni and– Vulko hadto confidence and presented avery threatening gamein whichboth of them,being inthe shadow of influential 37 For the positive attitude of Dubcek towards the Soviet Union see also Andras Sugar :Dubcek Speaks, William New York Shawcross,: Dubcek and… Ilyana Marcheva, 37 This background would completely change during the process of in Spring theThis background processof changeduring would completely Prague the In terms with the importance of the official ideology in the period, Jivkov was chosen into would-be circleleaders the leader two sneaked and the Meanwhile, the of a after The key to the success for both was in the hard work into the . On the other hand other Leadership . On his based the Soviet the during the Brezhnev Era, on past Todor Jivkov:Putyat kum Vlasta 39 , it was mostly about personal evaluation of the system. In this 20 (Todor Jivkov : The road to power), Sofia : Institut po Institut : Sofia power), to road The : Jivkov (Todor party 38 apparatus . . It CEU eTD Collection Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union Soviet the and Poland Hungary, 40 “Five” support the foreign policy. The mostimportant part of Bulgaria will bejustify to the policy of the all unleashed Party means which possiblethe Communist had established,to Bulgarian the have would months, two next in the process this of development The Czechoslovakia. around Termused the inperiod ofPrague Spring the to define the divisionbetween Czechoslovakia andBulgaria, GDR, 40 At the end of March, Bulgaria reminded of a participant in a sanitary cordon in stretchedAt asanitary March, Bulgariaaparticipant end the cordon of reminded of . 21 CEU eTD Collection 41 42 Books Ltd,1969 following: stated issuethe Onthe first program the stated. Program Security the Services, party and State communist leadership reforms social and economic during the plenum afterto adjustthe meeting inthe an attempt program was Dresden, This wasaccepted. Action Program April the Party Czechoslovakia, of communism namely the role ofto the the new reality :April–July1968 Progression The Crisis’ 3.1. Warsaw meeting. the after provided line general the into motivation for construction own its mingle will policy Union, and foreign Bulgarian between Czechoslovakia Soviet framework butin the the this conservative wing of the Pact. Its role in the following period will be a reflection on the relations most of the part role becoming important as an Bulgaria played and Czechoslovakia. Ibid – quotation from the Action Program, used in the same book same the in used Program, Action the from – quotation Ibid 3. Bulgaria inthedevelopment ofthe crisis: From the April Action Zeman, Zbinek. Zeman, In beginningthe of April, during ameeting of Central the of Committee Communistthe between “Five” the of relations the intensive of development a period traces The chapter ideas of veracity by the members, its of work the by but directives through its The party enforcedevelopment. lineits cannot progressive free, socialist practice its leading by role the society ruling but bymost devotedly serving The voluntary communist party enjoyssupport of it people; the does . Prague Spring:A ReportCzechoslovakia. on 42 . Program until the Warsaw Meeting 41 . In terms of two main preoccupations expressed by the Bulgarian 22 and to regain the authority of the party with Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin CEU eTD Collection 45 44 43 liberals core hard as be classified could members its of three only radical on the point of view of Bulgaria, the new membership of the Presidium was balanced and appear might it Although, minister. prime became Cernic Oldrich while Assembly National communist leaders took high positions. Josef Smurkovsky was elected as a speaker of the to serve in justifying the official position, rather than changing it. changing than rather position, official the justifying in serve to Army Israeli the to tanks selling were Czechoslovakians the arumorthat noted thereport thirdly “softened”, Security were State Yugoslavian and Romanian communists“and evenmore Secondly right”. Armythe and the which raises the possibility later both to be replaced and the country to take the same direction as revolutionaries, formightDubcekhave counter- been a cover Firstly, andSvoboda points. that 8 September on submitted Czechoslovakia tomeet Alexander Dubcek and Vasil Bilyak to visit anofficial on went Jivkov, Todor leader, communist Bulgarian the Program, Vasil Bilyak was considered to be mainopposition to Dubcek and totally loyal to Moscow ɐȼȺ Harry Schwartz, Harry , ɮ On the level of personal changes, two persons wereseverelycriticizedOn thelevelbyBulgarian personal changes,who two of its area: in Program, bynarrowing Security the was specified The position of State the On April 24 The first reaction by Bulgarian official was a secret report produced for Politburo and .24, internal political questions and controversies in the socialist society. socialist in the controversies and questions political internal solve andusedto be directed not should this apparatus that The party declares ɨɩɏ Prague’s 200 days: The struggle for Democracy ɚ , ɚɟ th .21 , one month after Dresden and two weeks after the launch of the Action the of launch the after weeks two and Dresden after month one , th by Dobri Djurov, the minister of National Defense. It had threemain 44 . Nevertheless, the role of that kind of reports might be seen as 23 . London: Pall Mall Press,1969 45 . 43 CEU eTD Collection to its geographical position. April Action the morerolehe important Program, suggested due forin Czechoslovakia Europe, Basedon states. Socialist of the rest andthe Union Soviet with the relations of the importance between theparty and government, the without giving details. applied existence,way tobe leading role we questioned butmostlythe never oftheparty, its thatithas our bloodburns theinternationalism “ words in the was concluded statement This Republic. the 50 tothe related euphoria the partof were period pre-war nostalgia and of onthe years anytrends last Communist power, of 20 no of denyingtrend the 46 Era of process rehabilitation beenand hadthat de-Stalinization not Novotni the accomplished during awakened activityof onbehalf communists, and lowest organization as “ January after in Czechoslovakia situation the CC of Hedescribed BCP. the of Plenum the during expressed those to and “Five” the of preoccupations the to indirectly ɐȾȺ 46 , On the international context the Czechoslovakian communist leader, reassured the reassured leader, communist Czechoslovakian the context international the On The leading of role party the was by underlined “ Dubcek The Czechoslovakian general secretary reassured the Bulgarian leadership, that there was there that leadership, theBulgarian reassured secretary general The Czechoslovakian Dubcek reconfirmed his position of loyalty to the Warsaw Pact states and answered states Warsaw the Pact loyalty to of his position Dubcek reconfirmed ɮ ”. However he mentioned that the reforms had raised questions about the relation .1 Ȼ , ɨɩ .60, ɚɟ .7 .” 24 th All of us here communists, are andin All of Anniversary Anniversary establishmentthe of of when we were talking about the ”, everything was part of waspart ”, everything spontaneous CEU eTD Collection renewed the one from renewed included onefrom the “ 1948. It Czechoslovakia. of role the about ideaDubcek, of to the compared be might which Balkans, in the dominate to Bulgaria of ambitions any denied also Jivkov, bringhad lackedrolein the unification of Leadership,which years. to the United the previous said “ 48 47 1956 April of Plenum the between was based on a parallel main concept plenum. His “ that had proven leadership, which elected newly andthe Culture of Congress last an examplethe “ Security. and State the army the – system the of immunity the endangering by De-Stalinization the of limits the cross to his power,in struggle of frontto Dubcek heof themas described policy which conductors aimed which people by was conducted two Yugovandwere Jivkov’s Chankov”. main The two in rivals major problem pointed out was the unity of the party, during that time. “There was unofficial line increased role of the public role of increased organization whole cultural front is now governed on state-public bases on state-public isnow governed whole culturalfront During this plenum was criticized the Cult of Personality, and it also opened the road to power for Jivkov. for power ɐȾȺ to road the opened also it and of Personality, Cult the criticized was plenum this During Our intelligentsiaOur marches inthesame line with theparty , Officially meetingthe concluded with signing the forof FriendshipTreaty which increased the was Bulgaria for priority main the situation, international the of terms In Jivkov based his arguments on concernsthe expressed during theCentral Committee However, Jivkov described his vision for democracy as the most important part wasthe important for most his vision as the democracy described Jivkov However, ɮ .1 Ȼ , ɨɩ .60, ɚɟ .7 ” 48 mutual respectmutual forthestatesovereignty andnon- . To testify it the Bulgarian general secretary used as 25 ”. To conclude it, conclude Jivkov proudly ”. To ” 47 . The . CEU eTD Collection of their own regimes. In connection with gradual fear of East Germany, about any development any about Germany, East of fear gradual with connection In regimes. own their of stability influence the political whichbegun calmto leaders asituation to two the motivation of 52 Soviet-CzechoslovakSummit meeting in Moscow,May 4-5, 1968(Excerpts) 51 50 49 Yugoslavia demonstration in May, was there a placard proclaiming Macedoniathat belonged to 6 May On campaign inPoland. anti-Semiticthe protest against support andto polish students the to order international scandals leaderBulgarian the wasnotaccidentally new itin situation represented expressed also two and Jivkov, and and Jivkov, the othersIcansay thisaswell theyareprepared for comrades Gomulka,Ulbricht of the views andbecause I know readytodothis, We are ourselves worldmovement. communist andtheentire butyourneighborsandallies, Czechoslovakia, itself, whatsocialism thecause canbe Thisquestion manner of defended. concerns notonly January in thecountry.final Inhis the leader,words Soviet said “ after situation the about CPCz, the criticized Brezhnev leadership. party Czechoslovakian intervention ininternal affairs its borders its Harry Swartz Prague’s 200 days… Prague 1968 ANational Security Archive Document Reader, Document No. 28Stenographic Record of the ibid ibid On the May 1 The first three names listed in the speech of the Soviet leader, the presence of the The beginning of The beginningmeetingMay wasmarked of by and between Sovietthe the ” th 52 50 the polish government officially protested against these incidents. During another During incidents. these against protested officially government polish the . Although the latter might be seen alsoas a provocation, it was enforcementfor the . st a demonstration took place in front of the Polish Embassy in Prague, in in Prague, Embassy Polish the of front in place took ademonstration ” 49 and the two states also were obliged to “ 26 The mainthingistodecide in ” 51 protect theimmunity of CEU eTD Collection 55 54 53 had much too publicity and was ruing the prestige of institutionthe found Action inApril At endProgram. the therewas personal description whoof Minster, the be could conclusion last The intelligence. foreign on mostly focused was Department the of thethat work out it agents andstaff. was pointed In addition disclosureSystem and of allowing having membersthe for from not his of in protected victimsbecoming department, of purges the internal was blamed of affairs minister Czechoslovakian the Jozef Pavel, devastation. complete office. in the forces” “healthy the The represented hemet, whom, the officials conclusions the Considering reportPolitburo Security.hismembersreport to State aboutwith meeting of Czechoslovakian the described the situation with the Czechoslovakian internal security as a healthy forceshealthy in party the and they have tobe “boldly supported”. no counter revolution in Czechoslovakia bywas there that still opposed insisted Kadar who were Jivkov, behalf of Gomulka and Dubcek, Pact. oftheWarsaw framework the in hadbeen created mini “alliance” West Germany, and between Czechoslovakia of relations the exercise to be held before the meeting the beheldbefore to exercise 16 Radio Free Europe f.805 ibid Prague 1968…Document No 31 Minutes of Secretthe Meeting of Fivethe in Moscow, May 8, 1968(Excerpts) On May 20 May On on attacks fierce The “Five”. the of meeting unofficial to led situation intensified This th the vice-chairman the of the Committee for State Security, Pavel Shopov, sent a 54 . The meeting concluded with the idea that there are 53 . Gomulka supported by . Gomulka supported Military Jivkov suggested 27 55 . CEU eTD Collection 57 in situation the towards severe critics, waveof for another served aspretext Manifesto, impactfrom the The “revival communism”. of as January inCzechoslovakia after 1968 leaders of the reform movementin the Czechoslovakian Writers Union. He announced the period tranquilized. concluded period the intensive of May and the firstweeks during June of situation the was This act spheres. “Five”different on the and Czechoslovakia between division deepest the Partythe and Intelligentsia,expressed from in frontJivkov Dubcek. On otherhand,the itproved between connection the exemplify could however, Djagarov, of the behavior The representative. Czechoslovakian of the marginalization of act asan expressed was situation the reports from Georgi Djagarov, the chairman of the Bulgarian Writers Union. and his attempt to explainCzechoslovakian the vision guest during the Congress in of Writers Union, the negative openly towardsthe attitude of ofthe the culturalforum, the freedomwriter Petr in CzechoslovakiaPuiman. His speech waswas victim after policy the January of itconducted hadand therefore decreasedits working capacity. notattacked broadcasted, of CPCz. However, the main bottom line of Shopov was to represent the State Security as a Manifesto His work “The Axe” was one of the most critical writings during Novotni era. The next step which enhanced the pace of the crisis was the publication of “ The scandal and by was popularized FreeRadio Europe the Belgrade Radio. Inthe level,reflected international on Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria between The contradictions April the madeafter Dobri Djurov resembledCongress by previously The report one the ” on June 27 th . The author, Luduvik Vaculikauthor, . The 28 57 , was devoted communist and one of the 56 2000 words CEU eTD Collection 59 58 all addition, In intervention. possible for a doctrine of build-up the allowed It Czechoslovakia. justification - adanger comingfrom outside andbased on strategicallythe position important of it inhis implied and the new was strongly of emphasized speech approach context international above,of words Gomulka exemplifiedthemeaning quoted this addedto meeting. The decideintoit The a trial which haddestiny Czechoslovakia. andof thisthe gatheringturned to meeting, the at representatives noCzechoslovakian were in There Dresden. meeting since the 3.2. The Warsaw Meeting fordecision another meeting which would behosted by Gomulka. inmembers their lose concluded would position, stabilize pro-Soviet the expected and to Dubcek CSSR andthe Soviet Union thegovernmentof ofthecommunism,CzechoslovakianCommunistParty, attack theidentity similar the 1956,appeals justbefore counterrevolutionfrom inHungary. Thementalinitiators “ passage in this lays article the of line bottom Delo “ intheparty official expressed in was Bulgaria reaction The Czechoslovakia. ɐȾȺ Rabotnichesko Delo Rabotnichesko ” (Workers affair) in “ affair) an called article ” (Workers , The Warsaw meeting was the next turning point which marked the change of the context the of change the marked which point turning next the was meeting Warsaw The The process, catalyzed also by the fact that the Extraordinary 14 Extraordinary the that fact by the also catalyzed The process, ɮ .1 Ȼ , card, the offace socialism and itspower depends onourunity” camp. NotCuba,notChina,Korea,butourcountries! We the are visit ofour weare thedrivingforce that, take intoconsideration “We must ɨɩ .58, ɚɟ July 4 1968 .8 ”. 2000 words or acallforcounter-revolution It was wenot so It long ago,so can those not forget 29 th Congress of CPCz was 59 Rabotnichesko ” 58 . The . CEU eTD Collection control over the mass information, toregain movements, restrain opposition must the CPCz Therefore states. socialist of interestall and unify the partydestroy counter-revolution” the to order on the bases of Marxist Ideology. This 61 60 situation. the control take of CPCzto towards was anultimatum duringmeeting and the stated positions the understanding of “Historical Mission” in the protection of the socialism. rightistthe – opportunism the that be underlined to must it and movement communist international the and alsobelieved thatpositive resultwouldin bestronger terms of“A against opportunismStrike the in the leftist, secretary general Bulgarian the strong opposition, mightcreate operation Although, the Pact. Warsaw from becomehelp the awareof the had forces” to him “healthy the theparty.For over takes control also took counterrevolutionaries the because Proletariat, of Dictatorship higherthe restored be must in Czechoslovakia proportions. that he claimed In addition situation”. can the change we Pact Warsaw the organs of power the solutionHis for him waswords that “Only by relying wereon the armed forces ofembodied the in the detach itself thesocialist from camp “ Czechoslovakia that declared Brezhnev asareality. now probable problemsin mentioned such Dresden, revisionism as capitalism, orturn to wereseen Rabotnichesko Delo, July 18 1968 ibid On July 18 whichreconfirmed “Warsaw Letter” the of edition the with concluded was The meeting and sector public the over CPCz of behalf on control of deficiency the emphasized Jivkov th “ Rabotnichesko Delo ” 60 61 . The main argument was the danger about the common ” published the “Warsaw Letter” under “In the “Warsaw Letter” title the ” published 30 is now onthe roadto dangerous is now CEU eTD Collection of the party leadershipof necessary workThis should aserious political beinthecenter to beconducted. the attention of workerssituation oninternational andintheinternational communistmovement, it level some the Festivalessential aspects of relatedtoitsemphatic politicalcontent, thecomplicated “ inperiod. thepreparation displayed importance which was political Festival,hosted the SofiarepresentedIX Youth in the division Movement. the Communist published, Dobri gave Djurov, an to order regimentthe12 for participation in jointexercises. was article the when day same the In intervention. eventual the in participation Bulgaria’s Bulgarian Army,in support of the Warsaw Letter. counterrevolution. sidein byside Hungary, fought the fraternal against how parties newspaper reminded internationalan is foundations its in socialism “The Internationalism the of idea the explained text The work. It Army would be treason if the other communist states did not respond. The 63 62 the Invasion. the before month one Party, Communist Bulgarian the of motivation official leading the expressed ɐȾȺ Narodna Armia, July 20 1968 ) , , published anarticle calledthe“ , published At the end of July, Bulgaria became arena for another international confrontation, which confrontation, international another for arena became Bulgaria July, of end the At The media would take more important role in order to explain the motivation of On July 23 ɮ .1 Ȼ , ɨɩ .36, ɚɟ 62 rd Few days later in statement of samenewspaperappearedofficial the the the official of the Ministry of National Defense, .140 ” 63 .It was .It organized aspecial of youngcorpus 500 communists, which The defense of the Socialismis an The defense of International work 31 Taking intoconsideration Narodna Armia( People’s ”. CEU eTD Collection Czechoslovakian response 65 64 motivation, for action. strategy lacked common in “Five” of different bedefending the concept had socialism The on done.Underthegeneral which to this aframework represented not abovehad portrayed process decision-making Czechoslovakia. The participants, which with made situation the in was happening Czechoslovakia, what of influence international the would addition In Party. the of behalf on country the in situation the also lack complete be over of illustrated which control in by were proven situation Czechoslovakia, the revealedleadership communist by given judgments Bulgarian the the “Five”.Therefore of the concerns in the period of theeffect”. “domino the of fear the on based intervention for motivation the underlined impact, international its leftists the French Communists. The incapability of sustaining conflictinto the whichreflected mostradical andthe Czechoslovaks even groupingbetween Yugoslavian, successful. It created wasnot Czechoslovakia of representatives the marginalize to The attempt Camp. Socialist manifestations shouldbe partof audiencethe during political discussions andhave isolate to and specific groups Fred.H. Eldin ibid The next period would test the capability of the Warsaw Pact to reestablish the order in order reestablish the to Pact theWarsaw of capability the test would The nextperiod The period established a situation in which Dubcek continued to neglect the intensified Despite those precautions the Festival proved as an implementation of the division in the division the of implementation an as proved Festival the precautions those Despite The logic“Normalization” of The Soviet Intervention inCzechoslovakia21 August of 1968 andthe 64 . . Columbia University Press : New York, 1980 65 This might also be answered on the basis of the different 32 CEU eTD Collection project for reuniting its closest allies. its closest for reuniting project Normalization. Insearch for this framework common Sovietthe Leadershipnew would develop 33 CEU eTD Collection 67 Cambridge University Press situation situation unstable. remained more than longeditingsession 66 Czechoslovakia. Five and be set implied political to infurther actions.represented words The obligation”. reasoning Czechoslovakia was denied by Brezhnev to be completely internal matter, because of of fate its “alignedThe system. the change to situation the use might forces counterrevolutionary otherwise mustitshappen of other hand,the control, thateverything CPCZ, buton heemphasized under andrecognized overcoming thatthe shortcomings mistakes wasasaninternal of work previous July 27 efforts ofthediplomatic The closingperiod 4.1. during its presence. The chapter closes with the withdrawing of the troops after October 26 main and it the problems was motivated Army, how Bulgarian therolethe of will describe it secondly and Intervention the of eve the on atmosphere general the of context the in Firstly processes.will in of two in attitude Bulgaria It represent the troops October. the of end the ibid KieranWilliams, th The results from in summitthe Bratislava, place which took August 3 on between meeting the agreedanother andCernik Dubcek after waslessened The tension Union Soviet the leadersand in of the The meetingon Cierna between Czechoslovakia dealsThe chapter withfrom period the August of until beginning the of withdrawing the was one of the last attempts for peaceful solution of the crisis. In his speech his Brezhnev, speech In of crisis. solution peaceful the for last attempts the wasoneof The Prague Spring anditsAftermath: Czechoslovak politics 1968-1970 pg103 4. Bulgaria and the Normalization 67 The resulting documentjustified the right of each state to follow its ” 66 . The joint draft kept the possibility for intervention if the if intervention for possibility the kept draft joint The . 34 rd were“ . Cambridge : nothing th . CEU eTD Collection 72 Publishers, 1972 pg 172-174 71 70 69 68 most anti-communist Romanian citizens of which hethrough earnedleader theeven support Ceausescu Nicolae Romanian communist unity” Community“step the Socialisttowards the consolidationof “ as such titles appeared, under Articles between other. each solve the problems inandachievement Bulgaria as for thecapabilitygreat an evidence to Socialistthe of States grow. to tension continued the diplomatic efforts, despite ofAugust, 10 days in first therefore these counterrevolution danger of was if there intervene to right the had states socialist other the also but Socialism, to path own Czechoslovakian leadership to continue leadershipCzechoslovakian to ownpolitical its path. the of decisiveness the reconfirmed moment, critical such at in Prague, visit their of fact the relations” inter-socialist and socialist of principles just sympathy for the people of Czechoslovakia, also by “our own experience from the struggle for from expressed guided support, except with anarticle newspaperwas published “Borba” Ibid pg 164-165 E.J. Cerwinski, ibid Narodna Armia August 6 1968 The Soviet Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring...pg 103 Invasion of Czechoslovakia :Its Efects on Eastern Europe. New York : Praeger 70 Despite its contradictory results the meeting in Bratislava, was illustrated from from media the illustrated was inBratislava, meeting the results its contradictory Despite On August 11 . th , Tito was accepted as a hero in Czechoslovakia and in the official 68 .At the end CPCZ had not provided.At the hadend CPCZ credibility not “Five”amongst the 72 . Despite the personal reasons of Tito and Ceausescu, and Tito of reasons personal the . Despite 35 71 . The wasalso support by expressed the 69 and “Our power laysinour “Our An important CEU eTD Collection 76 75 74 73 12 andregiment regiment22. “ military mission. OnAugust 19 a in participate fully to ready was Bulgaria finished, was game diplomatic the when respect intervention eventual for preparing would beimplied plenum agreements wouldbe and Central Committee that the responded convoked Bratislava of leader, Czechoslovakian the side other the on operation, military hinting, without facts, known previously leader repeated The Hungarian 17. on August Kadar inKomarno Dubcek Janos and between in ameeting situation, the reflected regain andto control over forces inCzechoslovakia resources, andresources, materials which by were indeficiency, provided SovietUnion the extremely difficult circumstances tosupport afailure thehealthy wouldforces cause the situation tobecome his commitments, thathehas of gone over completely totheside oftheRight,andthatinthese “ that conclusion the to had reached CPSU of the politburo justifiedin a speechin byBrezhnev, which after reviewing the situation, he confirmed that the ibid ȾȼɂȺ Prague Spring 1968...Document 92 Prague Spring 1968…Document No 86 In its last attempt to convince Dubcek to take actions against the counter-revolutionary the against actions take to Dubcek convince attempt to its last In During the period between between July 31 period During the The final decision was taken on August 18, during a meeting of the “Five”. It was , ɮ .24, ɨɩɏ 73 ɚ ” , 74 ɚɟ .22 To liquidatethecounter revolution Iorder the regiments to carry th Dobri Djurov, gave an official order for intervention of 75 . This included the equipment of militaryincluded the financial . This equipment of tools, st andAugust10 36 th Dubcek was isnotgoingtofulfillany , the Bulgarian army forces had been 76 . In this In . CEU eTD Collection 80 79 78 revolution alien countries “ to aresponse represented of Prague center brake into the needin of to case be prepared to and secondly States Capitalist of airplanes mainmilitary allowlanding takingof had –notto off or priorities center two of Prague. It the feeling that they were implying its Internationalism duty, and total belief that they were they that belief total and duty, Internationalism its implying were they that feeling the Bulgaria inthe“Normalization” 4.2. 77 from Warsaw states the Pact” the had be“in policy way andpopulation in to right conducted the party the with terms and state of push back the counter-revolution and torestore the order in the town. The relations with the local the debacle of the enemy elements the debacleof Forcesthe JointMilitary mission - of chief in bythecommander out theassignmentsascribed Government decree No 39 from August 20 1968 Ibid ȾȼɂȺ ȾȼɂȺ The political decision was announced on August 20 in the form of Government decree. It In his memoirs about the motivation of the Bulgarian solders, cornel Trifonov, described Trifonov, cornel solders, Bulgarian the of motivation the about memoirs his In watch hadRegiment 22 theover Ruzyn task to Regiment 12 was to take control over Banska Bystrica and to help the local authorities to The two military units stationed in Czechoslovakia, had the following tasks: , , ɮ ɮ 79 .24, .24, 80 . . ɨɩɏ ɨɩɏ ” to helpin peoplefight the counter- Czechoslovakian their” to against the ɚ ɚ , , ɚɟ ɚɟ .22 .22 the plea from partythe pleafrom and state officialstowards theUSSRandother 78 ” . 77 . 37 Č Airport, situated insituated Airport, fromthe 10 km CEU eTD Collection as a possible solution “imposition of military dictatorship” “alliance” Germany.with hisHe suggested Jivkov, inthe East Poland and participation proved Warsaw summit about workersWarsaw and governmentandabout summit peasants also “ the claimed that inevitable” “ leader that was communist Bulgarian Invasion the after been off scared not had forces right-wing the that meeting invasion. in the Brezhnev admitted participate “Five”after of obligedthe first to the Yugoslavian communist party criticized the policy of BCP and the Intervention. with its the inCzechoslovakia, “Borba”, of During period useof the official presence Bulgarian for whole and the consequencesin movementnegative extremely revolutionary world.”the “which willhavefar-reaching it the ofthe towards action “Five”qualifying asmeasures attitude 84 83 82 81 Yugoslavian communistleader, in his speech from August 22 campaign in Yugoslavia provided by andRadio Belgrade its “anti-Bulgarian” rhetoric negative as the such reality political international the alsodescribed It Intervention. act of the provide the party with the situation in the society, after the Invasion, claimed total support for the international instability, in which the Socialist system had to be kept united providing support for the Czechoslovakian people. Also it was seen as a response to the global ibid Ibid – document No 118 : Minutes of the First Post –Invasion meeting of the Warsaw Pact ibid in Moscow, August Informational report to Politburo edited on August 21 During these last days of August, Dubcekanddays lastDuring these Moscow were and ofAugust, Svoboda to taken On the other hand the internal propaganda, which can be seen in Secret reports issuedreports inbe to whichcan seen Secret internal On handpropaganda, the other the and Civil War was brewing in the country. He reconfirmed his theory from the Confrontation with the counter-revolutionaries was 38 nd officially expressed his negative 84 . The main argument of the of argument main The . 83 . During this meeting Todor Government 81 . The . 82 CEU eTD Collection Narodna 85 number our against of youth wasdeluded,were Whenwethehitlerists, fighting manyofthose “What the what wantcounterrevolutionaries want Iknow,but theastride Great compatriots. our local population, from the acceptance the show, to aimed which local people, with conversation Czechoslovakia: leader it appeared thattheBulgarian hadbeen intervention validated. visions communist military suggested who officially first he was the that the account into take also If we Dresden. included by document allmain stated in since points, Jivkov duringtheperiod meeting the the that isnoticeable It organizations. and clubs unacceptable eliminate party, the role of leading the andregaining apparatus theparty cleansing media, the full control over of restoration protesters. bethe usedagainst army to Czechoslovakian demanded the also Gomulka, must be established with Cernik,butwithout Dubcek ibid On September 1 On September On August 31 Czechoslovakia: imposed to meeting the whichconcluded “The protocol” Moscow Armia Czechoslovakian honest people. the win to struggling are you which through consciousness, class-party and but also with your attitude,with yourmoral – political power, communist belief, with the rest socialist armies you defendingare communismthe notonly with arms duty, send youvaliant as defendersof the achievements ofthe communism. TogetherInternational its accomplishing by government, and party our that realize You was published a report onthe including,situation expressedinpersonal areport waspublished opinions st Dobri Djurov sent a letter in order to motivate the Bulgarian solders in st under the title “We are protecting the gains of the Communism”, in 39 ” 85 . The by leadersBulgarian supported CEU eTD Collection 88 87 86 poisoned them. Onceagain I would liketoexpress mygratitude thatyoucame who todayraisedtheirvoiceofdissatisfaction were notevenisthePress born.Butit that normalization process was going slowly and „ In this situation we don’t have the right to leave to right the have don’t we situation this „ In and slowly going was process normalization Czechoslovakia. of services military the from support no and people, local the of behalf on – non-cooperation with inin motivation respect question reality the of wasput of soldiers the Intervention.the The counter-revolution Whyor, Yugoslavia hadsuch a position the against Army National the using not was Svoboda general Why as: such questions numerous asked solders Bulgarian of country. the for normalization decisions Moscow the of execution meaningthe of mission. the The reportclaimed that soldiersthe understood importancethe of the Bulgarian Army. National military political place,all in In meetingsunits, took toexplain order country and also did notapprove the presence of the Bulgarian soldiers inthe existence its denied they –„the counter-revolution” therewasacommon that enemy approved soldiers Czechoslovakian the that and Army, the with relations the of improvement of ȾȼɂȺ ɐȼȺ 1 1968 September Armia Narodna , ɮ Based on these facts, in the letter to Todor Jivkov, Dobri Djurov informed him that the that him informed Djurov Dobri Jivkov, Todor to letter in the facts, these on Based The check-up by colonel Genchev from 11 September first20 days the after the situation illustrated questions of type was perceptible the that It On September 8 , .3, ɮ .24, ɨɩ .VI, ɨɩɏ ɚɟ ɚ , ɚɟ .74 .22 th , check-up was issued, about the political work conducted from conducted work political the issued,about was , check-up 40 87 . th reconfirmed the fact that in spite 88 . 86 . CEU eTD Collection 90 89 must stay” troops our Therefore, still exists. state itas socialist losing of danger the until Czechoslovakia, was also strongwarning against revisionists the from West Germany intervention The failed. area inthis powers of balance the change to imperialist the of attempt was instabilized itunity”. situation the In that was said andthe conclusion Europe Central the „cemented that ideology Marxist-Leninist –the namely countries Socialist in the order social not „just common grouping of states” and it has deepest reasonsforce”. rooted in the character states members of with Pact, the all measuresof ,which itfoundincluding appropriate, military the the Unity, it has to provide infor :Incase country 4 of danger was quoted whichstated of Contract the Czechoslovakia. It immediate assistance, was which under real danger the about havebeen „Facts discovered – results, concluded andits individual or with an agreement with other politics. pre-January to the never return same timewill at Protocol, Moscow the but tothe would stick leadership Czechoslovakian the that announced National Army reported the condition at the end of September, which contradicted the official the contradicted which of endSeptember, the at condition the reported Army National f.321 ȾȼɂȺ The bulletin stressed also the character of the Warsaw Pact as an organization which was which as anorganization Pact Warsaw of the character the also stressed The bulletin On 30 September The logic of this was also confirmed by Dubcek’s statement on September 12 On October 3 , ɮ .24, 89 ɨɩɏ ɚ , ɚɟ rd .22 , coronel Mitev representative of the Central Command of the Bulgarian the of Command Central the of representative Mitev coronel , th Radio Sofia in a bulletin related to the justification of the Intervention the of justification the to related a bulletin in Sofia Radio 41 90 . th when he when CEU eTD Collection 93 92 91 in situation Czechoslovakia. rising of Brezhnev the doctrine, which had beencrystallized in of process the reacting to the leadershipBulgarian Communist its with political prepare itself managedattitudes to for the presence inof front localthe population. On otherhand,the political the leadership of the of its concepts the explaining of process had unsuccessful and the roleit minimal the illustrated Presidium, who were openly Pro-soviet were openly who Presidium, The Soviettroops remained whichwas there, for support themembers aserious of the country. Czechoslovakian whohadunderlined only into remain,representatives troops Soviet the appropriateto the report of Gromyko the Soviet Foreign Minister stated that on political reasons itwas not meetingitwas thatonly shouldin Soviet troops remain decided the country the such this During representatives. Czechoslovakian „Five” with of the Defense of the ministers an amount the between meeting the after taken decisions wasbased on report forces. The of Bulgarian the of troops to away” thrown not were still counter-revolution be keptstatements. He declaredin that the processCzechoslovakia of Normalization was very slow and the „forces of the and it was the ibid ȾȼɂȺ ȾȼɂȺ The Bulgarian army presence in Czechoslovakia, expressed in the documents cited abovein documents expressedthe inCzechoslovakia, The Bulgarian army presence 20 On October This was a political act which answered to this part of the period of Normalization. of the period the of this part which answeredto act This wasapolitical , , ɮ ɮ .24, .24, ɨɩɏ ɨɩɏ ɚ ɚ , , ɚɟ ɚɟ .22 .22 th Dobri Djurov sent a report to Todor Jivkov, withdrawing tothe Todor to related a report Djurovsent Dobri 93 . 91 42 . 92 . It was referred CEU eTD Collection 96 95 6 94 development. 6. The revolutionary basis of Sovereignty. of basis revolutionary The 6. development. capitalism. 4. The Vanguard role of the communist party 5.The common natural laws of socialist communism. 6conceptswhich he which stated contemplated articlethe ofKovalev.link 1.The weakest of the 2. Thewas followed by infinally elaborated a speech delivered by Brezhnev on November 12 contradictions of directly all affects socialist countries and they indifferentlycannot look upon this. Socialism. inargument: socialism importantof ofthe the links worldmost system Theweakeningany of 3. the stated article the respect Inthis principles. deviate from freeisthese it to not but country, The possibility each that party is apply free to principlesthe Marxism-Leninism of the and socialisminits own sovereignty of individualof countries can not be in contradictionThe before. restorationeven and with the world Normalization socialism.the during Also circulating were which theses reconfirmed by Kovalev in Sergei Pravda onSeptember 26 of the in text the appeared Doctrine the of wastheframework act,however important most The troops. The Elaborationofthe Doctrine 4.3. Brezhnev and then implemented into the Plenum of the Central Committee from March 29 majorthe concerns expressed by Todorov Stanko during the meetingin on Dresden March 23 R.Judson.Mitchel, ibid Mark Kramer, The article by Kovalev, which was the theoretical foundation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, it The process of the Normalization was not finished, after withdraw of the Bulgarian The principles such as the leading role of the party, the possibility of restoration, were in restoration, were possibility the of of party,the role leading The suchasthe principles Beyond The Brezhnev Doctrine The Brezhnev Doctrine , The Review of Politics Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr., 1972), pp. 190-202 International Security,14, No. 3(Winter, Vol. 1989-1990), pp. 25- 43 th 1968 96 94 . The principles which appeared which principles . The th 95 . The principles The . th 1968in rd CEU eTD Collection appropriate model in the Socialist Camp. Socialist inthe model appropriate proved the argument of Jivkov, in which he proposed tothem. his corresponded in internalBulgaria situation the that certainty with version of Communist party behalf communist of the alsodefended on were later conflict, the during which appeared, State, as the The outcome from the Normalization and the Elaboration of the Brezhnev Doctrine 44 CEU eTD Collection The problems were no more narrowed in discussion between political leaders. In situation leaders. inmore of no narrowed Insituation between The political problems were discussion control. political and liberalization of in terms regimes different most two the almost exemplified Bulgaria were in position him, tough and probably would support in situation the although Poland and communist leader Gomulka polish with the alignment The countries. socialist in theother resulted which Czechoslovakia was an example in control non-existingof system of its viewof represent wasto Bulgaria debate In inthis control. another quality of CPCZ was questiontowhichextendthe Jivkov,posed in also Five, policy the the and participants the of to find allies which in Czechoslovakia. happening concepts international and insocial revision about rumors the on Union, Soviet the of preoccupations general with terms in was contradiction This Jivkov. between April 1956 and AprilActionthe markedProgram the linegeneral of Motivation of conflict madeThe Bulgaria. in of De-Stalinization the bases on the inCzechoslovakia Reforms motivationthe and justification its foreign of policy. Thefirst period was interception the of the main principles of the Socialist Camp, which were challenged by Dubcek and his people. communistperfect social This wasorder. social imposedorder as in a of weapon defense the the build to managed had which State a Socialist of representation internal an represented Spring The final meeting in Warsaw was the last attempt to challenge the ambiguity of CPCZ. of ambiguity the challenge to attempt last the was Warsaw in meeting final The The nextperiod wasmarked byon side by openly expressed social opposition towards based andBulgaria duty internal international between In stability this deep correlation The during path thatBulgarianforeignpolitical policy took ofthe theprocess Prague Conclusions 45 CEU eTD Collection communist leader,communist whokepthis powerduring the whole reign Brezhnev. of situation the on of biggestachievement Bulgarian Brezhnevthe the This was the mingled into Doctrine. interpretations his plus months first the from Jivkov of motivation The Bulgaria. situation was uncertain and Dubcek was still in power. the while left, troops Bulgarian outcome. immediate establish to failed which in mission resulted and on relations problematic behalf of misunderstanding local the population and Army, the the Czechoslovakian becameintervention inevitable. between in Theduality argumentation termsto the of a response military failed, also the when attempts meetingsand these in leaders personal Czechoslovakian society” and the feeling its theory. toelaborate leaders in the reports forground speculation was on degreeof the crisis.the used by Communist It Bulgarian the from the Bulgarian solders parties, theFivecommunist European last of the one gave theirsigns. of in of Movementbehalf Communistandon support the complete Warsawdivided especially Pact, The most important outcome was the binding line between the Soviet Union Union and the linebetween Soviet important binding outcome wasthe The most The inthird period Soviet which problemthe the Union, posed infront of The party uncompromised in communist Czechoslovakian this second period provided 46 CEU eTD Collection Kramer, Mark. Jaroslaw. and Piekalkiewicz E. Czerwinski, Kastelanov, Boyan. Czechoslovakia,” and Hungary in Restoration Socialist of politics Zvi,“The Gitelman Eidlin, Fred. The logic of the Normalization, New York : Columbia University Press Brown, J. F. Baeva, IskraandEugeniaKalinova, Secondary literature ȾȼɂȺ ɐȼȺ ɐȼȺ ɐȾȺ ɐȾȺ ɐȾȺ ɐȾȺ ɐȾȺ ɐȾȺ ɐȾȺ Radio Free Europe f.805 Sources , (Central Army Archive), , , , , , , (Central State Archive), ɮ ɮ ɮȻ ɮ ɮ ɮȻ ɮȻ (State Army Archive), .24, .1 .1 .1 Ȼ Ȼ Ȼ : , , , , , , ɨɩ ɨɩ ɨɩ ɨɩɏ ɨɩ ɨɩ ɨɩ 1989-1990) Comparative politics, Vol.No 13. 2(Jan 1981) pp. 187-210 Tilia 2000 York: PraegerPublisherYork: Eastern Europe,HungarianandPolish ch.6 1968. AttitudesonCzechoslovakia, Bulgaria under Communist Rule. ., 58, a.e3 .,.35.a.e 127 .5,a.e 568 .60, .58, .36, Beyond the BrezhnevBeyond Doctrine ɚ , ɚɟ ɚɟ ɚɟ ɚɟ Todor Jivkov: MitIIstina .21 .7 .8 .140 ɮȻ ɮ ɮ .24, .3,(fond 3), ,(fond1B) ɨɩɏ , 1972 Bulgarskite Prehodi ɚ , Bibliography ɚɟ ɨɩ ɨɩ .22 .VI.(list), .(list) .5,a.e. 567 The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its effects on effects Its Czechoslovakia: Invasionof The Soviet ( Todor Jivkov: Myth and Truth), Sofia: 2005 International Security London: Pall Mall Press, 1970 47 ɚɟ .74 ( The Bulgarian Transitions), Sofia : , Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter, New CEU eTD Collection Znepolski, Ivailo, Znepolski, Zeman, Zbinek. Kieran. Williams, Volgyes, Ivan. The Hungarian and Czechoslovak Revolutions: A Comparative study of Press, : TheHogarth 1918–1990,London and William,Shawcross, Czechoslovakia Dubcek Mitchel R.Judson, McAdams,James. East Germany and Détente, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press Iliana. Marcheva, England: Ltd,Penguin Books 1969. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 Czechoslovakia : Its Effects on Eastern Europe, New York : Praeger publishers, 1972 Revolutions in Communist Countries, published in“The InvasionSoviet of 1990 34, No2,April.,1972 2000 Prague Spring: A Report on Czechoslovakia. Prague on Spring:AReport Todor Jivkov –Putyat kum vlasta (Theroad to Todor Jivkov–Putyatkumvlasta power). Bulgarksiat Comunisum The Brezhnev Doctrine and Communist Ideology, The BrezhnevDoctrineandCommunist The Prague Spring and its aftermath The PragueSpringandits (The Bulgarian Communism),Sofia :2008 48 : Czechoslovak 1968-1970. Politics, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, The review of politics Vol politics of review The Sofia: Institut po Istoria,