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The Strange Unity Gustáv Husák and Power and Political Fights Inside the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia As Exemplifi Ed by the Presidency Issue (1969–1975)1

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The Strange Unity Gustáv Husák and Power and Political Fights Inside the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia As Exemplifi Ed by the Presidency Issue (1969–1975)1 The Strange Unity Gustáv Husák and Power and Political Fights Inside the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia as Exemplifi ed by the Presidency Issue (1969–1975)1 Michal Macháček “He was walking through the castle rooms and he must have been savouring the stag- gering fact that it was he, a Slovak from Dúbravka with a dubious biography, who was now in the seat of the Czech kings.”2 This was how dissident Milan Šimečka tuned in to the mind of Gustáv Husák, three times (1975, 1980 and 1985) elected president and the only Czechoslovak president who held the offi ce for 14,5 years, the longest-serving president after Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. Seen from the per- spective of the then existing hierarchy of political power, it was Husák’s posi- tion as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia which was more important; however, he strove for the presidency nonetheless, for reasons of prestige, and mainly to strengthen his own political position and to prevent anyone else from rising to this offi ce. However, Prague Castle was the nexus of multiple lines of interest and the road to residency at this 1 The presented study was created under Charles University Research Development Scheme No. P12, “History in an Interdisciplinary Perspective,” Sub-programme “Society, Culture and Communication in Czech History.” A brief excerpt was published in the daily press: VLASÁK, Zbyněk (ed.): Historik Michal Macháček píše o Gustávu Husákovi: Boj o Hrad [Historian Michal Macháček Writes about Gustáv Husák: The Fight for the Castle]. In: Právo, supplement “Salon” (28 May 2015), p. 5. 2 ŠIMEČKA, Milan: Konec nehybnosti [The End of Immobility]. Praha, Lidové noviny 1990, p. 7. The Strange Unity 103 lucrative address was not as straight as it might have seemed then and may seem now. Šimečka’s quotation thus is not far from the truth. Husák, Svoboda, “Realists” and the “Healthy Core” Husák’s name had already appeared in connection with the presidential election after the fall of Antonín Novotný, in March 1968,3 when Army General Ludvík Svo- boda was ultimately elected; he and Husák had a cursory acquaintance with each other dating back to the fi rst postwar years.4 They also had other things in com- mon – their participation in the resistance movement and subsequent persecution during the 1950s. Early in April 1968, Svoboda appointed Husák as Deputy Prime Minister, although neither of them initially held a high post in the Party hierar- chy. “The fact is that Svoboda behaved well to me. Perhaps the best of the whole bunch,” recalled Husák in the early 1990s. “He was a rare, earnest and humane person, and he also had a good attitude to the Slovak issue. He trusted me and after January 1968, when he became the President of Czechoslovakia, he would have elevated me to top positions.”5 Svoboda then was instrumental in Husák’s participation in the Moscow negotiations in August 1968, during which the notori- ous Moscow Protocol was adopted, but he was also one of the principal supporters of Husák’s involvement in top-level politics6 and Husák’s election to the position 3 See FELCMAN, Ondřej (ed.): Vláda a prezident: Období pražského jara (prosinec 1967 – srpen 1968) [The Government and the President: The Prague Spring Period (Decem- ber 1967 – August 1968)]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. VIII/1 [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. VIII/1]) Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 2000, p. 160, Document No. 33 – Record of the speech of Alexan- der Dubček at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslo- vakia on 28 March 1968; Kdo do funkce presidenta? [Whom for the President?]. In: Rudé právo (28 March 1968), p. 6. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia Vasil Biľak reported to the Soviets that it was possible to expect the can- didacy of Ludvík Svoboda, and possibly of Josef Smrkovský and Gustáv Husák who “has the aura of a martyr and hero.” (Rossiyskiy gosudarstvennyi arkhiv social´noy i politicheskoy istorii, Moscow (hereinafter RGASPI), fund (f.) 495 (Komintern), opis (o. – inventory) 272, delo (d. – archival unit) 37, (personal fi le of Ludvík Svoboda), 2. tom (tome), part of the re- cord of the conversation between the Soviet General Consul in Bratislava Ivan S. Kuznetsov and Vasil Biľak, 15 March 1968, p. 78.) 4 See Archive of the Security Services, Prague (hereinafter ABS), f. Ministry of National Secu- rity, sign. 62/2, box (b.) 208, fi le (fl .) 1–3, New Year’s wish of Ludvík Svoboda to Gustáv Husák, 1 January 1949, p. 47. 5 PLEVZA, Viliam: Vzostupy a pády: Gustáv Husák prehovoril [The Rises and Falls: Gustáv Husák Speeches]. Bratislava, Tatrapress 1991, p. 93. In the 1970s and 1980s, Plevza was the offi cial historiographer of Gustáv Husák. In the early 1990s, they discussed the book – a cross be- tween a biography and memoirs – on several occasions. In the end, Husák disagreed with the text and did not authorise it; still, his statements seem to be authentic, as indicated by written records of the debates in the Personal Archive of Viliam Plevza in Bratislava. 6 See VONDROVÁ, Jitka – NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír (ed.): Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970: Září 1968 – květen 1970 [The Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970 in an In- 104 Czech Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. IV of leader of the Communist Party instead of Alexander Dubček in April 1969. He and Husák created a political duo and they allegedly promised each other that they would not allow the return of political trials or the onset of “ultra-leftists,” which was a term coined for radical Communists summarily rejecting any of the reform efforts of the Prague Spring.7 However, President Ludvík Svoboda was becoming increasingly isolated from the summer of 1969. He fully respected the alliance with the Soviet Union, but more than once found that he was unable to identify with domestic political de- velopments. Complaints by the “healthy forces” also targeted the advisory board of the president (in particular Svoboda’s daughter Zoe Klusáková-Svobodová), whose members were associated with the reformists and allegedly had a lot of infl uence on Svoboda. Moscow and Gustáv Husák were thus trying to exert infl uence on the president in times of uncertainty.8 ternational Context: September 1968 – May 1970]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IV/3 [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak crisis 1967–1970, Vol. IV/3]) Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 1997, p. 33, Document No. 177 – a despatch by First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Vassily V. Kuznetsov, and the Soviet Ambassador to Prague, Stepan V. Chervonenko, concerning their visit to Ludvík Svoboda on 7 September 1968; Rossiyskiy gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveyshey istorii, Moscow (hereinafter RGANI), f. 5 (Apparat CK KPSS), o. 109 (Mezhdunarodnyi otdel CK KPSS), d. 11 999 (personal fi le of Gustáv Husák), and from a recorded conversation with diplomat Milan Klusák, 10 September 1968, p. 130 (Klusák was also Svoboda’s son-in-law). Husák’s fi le kept at the Russian National Archives of Contemporary History comprises some 26 fold- ers, altogether some 3,500 pages, which cover the period from 1936 to 1991 (Soviet interest in Husák increased rapidly from 1968 and decreased from the mid-1980s). The fi le contains mainly press releases and excerpts from various reports (also, though rarely, complete re- ports) pertaining to Husák in one way or another. Their authors were mainly staff members of the Soviet Embassy in Prague or the Soviet Consular Offi ce in Bratislava. It is not always possible to exactly determine the author, the primary recipient or the date of the excerpts. (RGANI, f. 5, op. 109, d. 11997–12022.) 7 I use the term “ultra-left” to denote functionaries of the Communist Party of Czechoslova- kia grouped around organisations such as the Left Front, Tribuna Club or Kovarcs Group. The name is a purely auxiliary technical term. See also URBÁŠEK, Pavel: Jak “pancéřové divize” bránily socialismus: K úloze ultraradikální levice v letech 1968–1970 [How the “Panzer Divisions” Were Defending Socialism: On the Role of the Ultra-Radical Left in 1968–1970]. In: Listy, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2006), pp. 17–24. Also available online at: http:// www.listy.cz/archiv.php?cislo=064&clanek=040604. 8 See VONDROVÁ, Jitka (ed.): Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970: Dokumenty ÚV KSSS 1966–1969 [The Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970 in an Internatio- nal Context: Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1966–1969]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IV/4 [Sour- ces on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. IV/4]) Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 2011, p. 504, Document No. 165 – Minutes of a conversation between P. Ivashutin, diplomat from the Soviet Embassy in Prague, Václav Král, Director of the Cze- choslovak-Soviet Institute, and his deputy Čestmír Amort on 28 November 1969; Ibid., p. 481, Document No. 157 – Minutes of a conversation between Leonid M. Zamyatin, Head of the Press Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Bohuslav Chňoupek, Director of Czechoslovak Radio on 22 July 1969; MADRY, Jindřich: Sovětská okupace The Strange Unity 105 Husák started increasingly avoiding Svoboda and their relationship was getting colder. It is true that outwardly he demonstrated respect for Svoboda; however, there was also some contempt hidden beneath the offi cial façade, and Husák could not stop himself from making insinuating remarks concerning Svoboda’s advanced age.
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