July–August 2012 Volume 26, No. 4 AFRP 10-1 International Feature Embracing the Moon in the Sky or Fishing the Moon in the Water? ❙ 4 Some Thoughts on Military Deterrence: Its Effectiveness and Limitations Sr Col Xu Weidi, Research Fellow, Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, People’s Liberation Army, China Features Toward a Superior Promotion System ❙ 24 Maj Kyle Byard, USAF, Retired Ben Malisow Col Martin E. B. France, USAF KWar ❙ 45 Cyber and Epistemological Warfare—Winning the Knowledge War by Rethinking Command and Control Mark Ashley From the Air ❙ 61 Rediscovering Our Raison D’être Dr. Adam B. Lowther Dr. John F. Farrell Departments 103 ❙ Views The Importance of Airpower in Supporting Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan ....................................... 103 Col Bernie Willi, USAF Whither the Leading Expeditionary Western Air Powers in the Twenty-First Century? .................................. 118 Group Capt Tim D. Q. Below, Royal Air Force Exchanging Business Cards: The Impact of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 on Domestic Disaster Response ........ 124 Col John L. Conway III, USAF, Retired 129 ❙ Historical Highlight Air Officer’s Education Captain Robert O’Brien 149 ❙ Ricochets & Replies 161 ❙ Book Reviews Stopping Mass Killings in Africa: Genocide, Airpower, and Intervention . .161 Douglas C. Peifer, PhD, ed. Reviewer: 2d Lt Morgan Bennett Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster . 164 Allan J. McDonald with James R. Hansen Reviewer: Mel Staffeld Allies against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan . 165 Nicholas Evan Sarantakes Reviewer: Lt Col John L. Minney, Alabama Air National Guard Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India, and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade . 168 Bill Emmott Reviewer: Capt Joe G. Biles, USAF The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America’s War in Afghanistan . 171 Michael Hastings Reviewer: Col Matthew C. Brand, USAF The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda . 174 Fawaz A. Gerges Reviewer: Dr. Mary N. Hampton Airpower for Strategic Effect . 177 Colin S. Gray Reviewer: Benjamin S. Lambeth, PhD Golden Nuggets: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Leadership, Management and Life . .180 Dr. Raymond A. Shulstad Reviewer: Dr. Amir S. Gohardani Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front—World War I . 181 Terrence J. Finnegan Reviewer: Dr. James Titus July–August 2012 Air & Space Power Journal | 2 Editorial Advisory Board Gen John A. Shaud, PhD, USAF, Retired, Air Force Research Institute Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Dr. J. Douglas Beason (Senior Executive Service and Colonel, USAF, Retired), Air Force Space Command Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy Lt Col Dave Mets, PhD, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus) Board of Reviewers Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland Department of Homeland Security Dr. Kendall K. Brown Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Burke, Virginia Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth US Army War College RAND Dr. Mark Clodfelter Mr. Douglas E. Lee National War College Air Force Space Command Dr. Conrad Crane Dr. Richard I. Lester Director, US Army Military History Institute Eaker Center for Professional Development Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Mr. Brent Marley USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Redstone Arsenal, Alabama (professor emeritus) Mr. Rémy M. Mauduit Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute Duke University Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Dr. Stephen Fought West Chicago, Illinois USAF Air War College (professor emeritus) Dr. Daniel Mortensen Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF Air Force Research Institute USAF Academy Dr. Richard R. Muller Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Westport Point, Massachusetts Dr. Bruce T. Murphy Col Mike Guillot, USAF, Retired Air University Editor, Strategic Studies Quarterly Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS Ohio State University The Pentagon Dr. Amit Gupta Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired USAF Air War College Pensacola, Florida Dr. Grant T. Hammond Dr. Steve Rothstein USAF Center for Strategy and Technology Colorado Springs Science Center Project Dr. Dale L. Hayden Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Air Force Research Institute Naval War College Mr. James Hoffman Dr. Barry Schneider Rome Research Corporation Director, USAF Counterproliferation Center Milton, Florida Professor, USAF Air War College Dr. Thomas Hughes Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Toffler Associates Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute CyberSpace Operations Consulting Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Dr. Christopher H. Toner LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education University of St. Thomas Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired Air Force Space Command Auburn University Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Col Mark E. Ware Navarre, Florida Twenty-Fourth Air Force Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Dr. Harold R. Winton USAF Air Command and Staff College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. Tom Keaney Johns Hopkins University July–August 2012 Air & Space Power Journal | 3 International Feature Embracing the Moon in the Sky or Fishing the Moon in the Water? Some Thoughts on Military Deterrence: Its Effectiveness and Limitations Sr Col Xu Weidi, Research Fellow, Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, People’s Liberation Army, China* eterrence as a military strategic concept came along after the debut of nuclear weapons. For more than 60 years, it has evolved into one of the most frequently used—and abused— Dconcepts in the games of international politics and military services. In the meantime, numerous related theories, ideas, and notions have branched out.1 Exactly what is deterrence—its nature, effectiveness, *This article is based on the author’s notes for a series of lectures given to officers at the Tanzanian National Defense College. A slightly different Chinese version appeared in the November 2010 issue of 中国战略观察 (China Strategic Review). The author wishes to thank Mr. Jiang Guocheng, editor of Air and Space Power Journal–Chinese, for his skillful draft English translation. July–August 2012 Air & Space Power Journal | 4 International Feature Xu Weidi Embracing the Moon in the Sky or Fishing the Moon in the Water? and limitations? How and why is the concept often miscomprehended and misinterpreted, and why has it evolved to become something mythical? What effects has it had on the global security environment? And how should the militaries of developing nations view and employ deterrence? This article tries to answer these questions. Three Components of Deterrence In international strategy studies, the general view on deterrence holds that it is a country’s threat to use force to prevent an adversary from taking damaging actions against it. Back in 1957, in his book Nu­ clear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger identified three com­ ponents of deterrence: “Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggres­ sor. Moreover, deterrence is the product of those factors and not the sum. If any one of them is zero, deterrence fails.”2 In the following de­ cades, Kissinger’s formula of deterrence has remained true and broadly appreciated. As such, this article adopts his formula. After ex­ ploring this line of thinking and focusing on the three components that Kissinger identified, one may arrive at three inferences.3 First, deterrence is not unilateral military actions; rather, it is a compli­ cated process of interactions between the opposing parties. Furthermore, unlike ordinary military actions, the success of deterrence—the pro­ duction of desired effects—does not depend on the superiority of the deterrer over the deterred. Second, deterrence inherently and tightly links to military threats. The deterring state implements deterrence via a threat to use force in an attempt to compel the adversary to give up conspired or construed hostile plans or actions. In this sense, so-called military deterrence is no less and no more than threatening the opponent with force. However, in an international society made up of sovereign states, the deterred nations often counter such military threats in kind, turning deterrence from unilateral to mutual, unequal as they may be. From what has happened July–August 2012 Air & Space Power Journal | 5 International Feature Xu Weidi Embracing the Moon in the Sky or Fishing the Moon in the Water? to date, to deem the deterrence concept a theoretical source of most of the international crises in the Cold War years is not an overstatement. Third, deterrence as a strategic concept is inherent in the gene of fail­ ure. In the face of military threats, if the state being deterred does not take the damaging actions presumed by the deterring state, the latter may assume that its deterrence strategy has worked. However, how can the deterring state be so sure that what has not happened is a positive result of its deterrence? Honest evidence won’t come from the deterred state; the deterring state may use some human intelligence or technical means to collect evidence, which is usually insufficient for the deterring state to measure the effectiveness of its deterrence strategy. In contrast, it is fairly easy to determine the failure of this same strategy: all one needs to know is that the deterred state ignores the military threats and keeps following its course of action.