COURT of APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) LIM YEE LAN, BADARIAH SAHIMID and HARMINDAR SINGH JJCA CIVIL APPEAL NO W-02(NCVC)(A)-1747-10 of 2015 28 September 2016

SEARCH RES JUDICATA-1 COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) LIM YEE LAN, BADARIAH SAHIMID AND HARMINDAR SINGH JJCA CIVIL APPEAL NO W-02(NCVC)(A)-1747-10 OF 2015 28 September 2016

Civil Procedure -- Locus standi -- Applicant not party to originating summons -- Respondent filed for possession of land -- Appellants' application to be added as parties dismissed -- Appellant filed fresh action to set aside respondents' action -- Action dismissed by trial judge -- Whether fresh application to be added as parties filed by appellants -- Whether appellant had locus standi to file application to set aside -- Res judicata -- Decision, finality of earlier decision -- Whether doctrine of res judicata applied against appellants

Land Law -- Possession -- Recovery of -- Respondents filed action for possession of land against appellants -- Appellants' application to set aside respondents' action dismissed by trial judge -- Appellants appealed against decision -- Whether there was appealable error that warrant appellate intervention -- Rules of Court 2012 O 89

The respondents had filed originating summons ('encl 1') pursuant to O 89 of the Rules of Court 2012 for possession of lands known as Lots 448 and 449 which were occupied by the appellants. In response, the appellant had applied via encl 38 to set aside encl 1, and via encl 21 to be added as parties, nevertheless, encls 21 and 38 were both dismissed and encl 1 was allowed by the trial court. Subsequently, the appellants' appeal against the said decision was withdrawn and struck out without liberty to file afresh. The appellants then filed a fresh encl 38, however, similarly, the application was dismissed, hence this appeal. From the evidence, the affidavit in support for the fresh encl 38 was affirmed by one Viknesh a/l Krishnan on behalf of the sixth appellants. The issues for court's decision in the present appeal were with regard to whether appellant had locus standi to file encl 38 and whether the doctrine of res judicata applied against the appellants.

It is trite law that the res judicata principle is premised on giving finality to judicial decisions. The purpose of achieving finality in litigation will be undermined if parties can willy-nilly re-open litigation after a matter had been decided between the parties to a suit. In the present case, encl 21 was dismissed and the subsequent appeal thereof was withdrawn. The appellants could not therefore re-apply encl 21 as it would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In addition, the various other issues raised by the appellants in the present appeal could had been raised in the earlier proceedings, thus, they were also barred in the present appeal by res judicata. Based on the circumstances, there was no appealable error on the part of the High Court to warrant appellate intervention (see paras 25, 28, 30 & 32). Responden-responden memfailkan saman pemula ('lampiran 1') berikutan A 89 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 bagi milikan tanah yang dikenali sebagai Lot 448 dan 449 yang mana dihuni oleh perayu-perayu. Dalam menjawab, perayu telah memohon melalui lampiran 38 untuk mengetepikan lampiran 1, dan melalui lampiran 21 untuk dimasukkan sebagai pihak-pihak, walau bagaimanapun, lampiran 21 dan 38 kedua-duanya ditolak dan E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-2 lampiran 1 dibenarkan oleh mahkamah perbicaraan. Kemudiannya, rayuan perayu terhadap keputusan tersebut ditarik balik dan dibatalkan tanpa kebebasan untuk memfailkan yang baru. Perayu-perayu kemudiannya memfailkan lampiran 38 baru, tetapi, sama juga, permohonan ditolak, maka rayuan ini. Daripada keterangan, afidavit sokongan untuk lampiran 38 yang baru disahkan oleh seorang yang bernama Viknesh a/l Krishnan bagi pihak perayu keenam. Isu-isu bagi keputusan mahkamah dalam rayuan ini adalah berkaitan sama ada perayu mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan lampiran 38 dan sama ada doktrin res judicata digunapakai terhadap perayu-perayu.

Ia adalah undang-undang nyata bahawa prinsip res judicata adalah berdasarkan ke atas memberikan kemuktamadan kepada keputusan kehakiman. Tujuan mencapai kemuktamadan dalam litigasi akan menjadi lemah jika pihak-pihak suka atau tidak membuka semula litigasi selepas perkara telah diputuskan di antara pihak-pihak kepada guaman. Dalam kes ini, lampiran 21 ditolak dan rayuan kemudiannya ditarik balik. Perayu-perayu dengan itu tidak boleh memohon semula lampiran 21 kerana ia akan dihalang oleh doktrin res judicata. Selanjutnya, pelbagai isu yang lain dibangkitkan oleh perayu-perayu dalam rayuan ini sepatutnya boleh dibangkitkan di dalam prosiding sebelumnya, oleh itu, ia juga dihalang di dalam rayuan ini oleh res judicata. Berdasarkan keadaan, tidak terdapat kesilapan yang boleh dirayukan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi untuk mewajarkan campur tangan Mahkamah Rayuan (lihat perenggan 25, 28, 30 & 32).] the doctrine of res judicata applied against the defendants and their rights in respect of the said land had been heard and disposed of by the High Court. [20] The learned judicial commissioner found that this issue is barred by res judicata as the Nagakanni temple and another temple, Kuil Mahakarumariamman, had previously made an unsuccessful attempt to be added as parties. The learned JC also held that since they were not added as parties, the defendants have no locus standi in the proceedings. The court was also functus officio. The defendants are now appealing against this order.

OUR DECISION

application was dismissed. An appeal was filed but later withdrawn. The defendants/appellants could not therefore apply again as they would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. If they had wanted to be heard, the appellants ought to have pursued their rights in the appeal they had filed. Unfortunately that appeal was withdrawn. [28] The defendants/appellants have also raised various other issues in the appeal but similarly, these issues had already been raised or could have been raised in the earlier proceeding. They are now barred by res judicata as there must be some finality to litigation. [29] On the question of res judicata, this court in Hartecom JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 held that once a judge makes a ruling, substantive or procedural, final or interlocutory, it must be adhered to and may not be reopened. [30] It is trite law that the res judicata principle is premised on giving finality to judicial decisions. The purpose of achieving finality in litigation will be undermined if parties can willy-nilly re-open litigation after a matter had been decided between the parties to a suit. [31] The court may, however, in exceptional cases decline to apply the res judicata principle E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-3 if its application would lead to an unjust result (Chee Pok Choy & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 346). Unfortunately, this argument was not properly canvassed before the court. The appellants were instead focused substantially on non-legal arguments concerning the preservation of the Nagakanni temple as can be seen in the declarations sought and the grounds raised as set out earlier.

CONCLUSION

FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) ARIFIN ZAKARIA CHIEF JUSTICE, AHMAD MAAROP, RAMLY ALI, ZAHARAH IBRAHIM FCJJ AND AZIAH ALI JCA CIVIL APPEAL NO 01(i)-15-04 OF 2014(C) 2 February 2016

Civil Procedure -- Striking out -- Statement of claim -- Respondents sought to impeach and set aside judgment obtained by appellant on grounds of fraud or new evidence -- Whether respondents' statement of claim sufficiently pleaded all relevant particulars for action to impeach or set aside earlier judgment on grounds of fraud or new evidence not available in earlier trial -- Whether present case 'obviously unsustainable' case to be struck out summarily -- Res judicata -- Whether doctrine of res judicata applied to bar respondents from challenging earlier judgment of court -- Whether claim scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or abuse of process of court

that had prevented the respondents from placing their case before the court. The appellant also argued that in order to bring the action within the provisions of s 44 of the Act, the respondents had to show that the alleged fraud was in the nature of 'extrinsic fraud' as opposed to 'intrinsic fraud'. Subsequently, the appellant filed an application to strike out paras 22-29 of the respondents' statement of claim under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 ('the ROC') by relying on the principle of res judicata as found in s 40 of the Act. The appellant also contended that the exception to res judicata as found in s 44 of the Act, was not applicable in the present case. The trial judge found that based on the reliefs prayed for by the respondents the issue of res judicata did not arise and that the impugned judgment could be impeached or set aside. Thus the High Court dismissed the appellant's application to strike out paras 22-29 of the SOC. On appeal, the decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The appellant then applied for and obtained the leave of the Federal Court to proceed with the present appeal. In this appeal the appellant again submitted that the doctrine of res judicata applied to bar the respondents from challenging the earlier judgment of the court and that consequently the respondents' claim should be struck out. The appellant also submitted that in an action to impeach a previous judgment of a court, the respondents needed to pass through a much higher standard, which they had failed to do and that this in turn made the respondents' statement of claim frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process. The respondents, on the other hand submitted that this was not an appropriate case for paras 22-29 of the SOC to be struck out under O 18 r 19 of the ROC as this was not an 'obviously unsustainable' case to be struck out summarily.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-4

It is settled law that since the doctrine of res judicata was designed to achieve justice, a court could decline to apply it, if its application would lead to an unjust result. Thus, the Court of Appeal had rightly decided that the earlier judgment in question did not operate to bar the respondents from making an application to challenge and to set aside the said earlier judgment (see paras 50-55). Responden kedua telah memberikan perayu kelulusan untuk mengeluarkan kayu balak dari hutan 10,000 ekar yang terletak di Pahang ('kawasan konsesi'). Walau bagaimanapun, perayu mengadu bahawa responden kedua telah menghalangnya menjalankan pengeluaran kayu balak dari keseluruhan kawasan konsesi dan juga telah gagal untuk menghalang pengeluaran kayu balak oleh pihak ketiga yang menceroboh masuk ke dalam kawasan konsesi. Perayu mendakwa bahawa akibat daripada pelanggaran responden kedua, ia telah mengalami kerugian yang berjumlah RM36,339,030. Perayu oleh itu telah memulakan guaman terhadap responden-responden kerana kerugian yang dialaminya. Sepanjang perbicaraan perayu telah menenderkan sebagai keterangan pelan kawasan konsesi itu ('Pelan Biru'), yang mana saksi perayu mendakwa telahpun diluluskan oleh Exco Negeri Pahang. Dalam pembelaan mereka responden-responden mendakwa bahawa, berdasarkan rekod-rekod Jabatan Perhutanan Negeri, tiada kelulusan telah diberikan kepada perayu untuk mengeluarkan kayu balak dari kawasan yang digariskan dalam Pelan Biru itu. Hakim perbicaraan telah memutuskan menyebelahi perayu dan memasuki penghakiman terhadap responden-responden. Berikutan itu, responden-responden telah diperintahkan untuk membayar perayu sejumlah RM37,127,471.60 dengan faedah. Rayuan respnden-responden kepada Mahkamah Rayuan telah ditolak. Permohonan responden-responden selanjutnya untuk kebenaran untuk merayu kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan juga telah ditolak. Selepas itu, responden-responden telah memulakan guaman baru terhadap perayu untuk mencabar dan mengetepikan penghakiman yang diperoleh oleh perayu terhadap responden-responden atas alasan fraud dan/atau sumpah bohong yang dilakukan oleh saksi perayu sepanjang perbicaraan terdahulu tersebut. Dalam pembelaannya terhadap tuntutan ini perayu berhujah bahawa fraud yang dirujuk dalam s 44 Akta Keterangan 1950 ('Akta tersebut') adalah fraud sebenar dan bukan fraud konstruktif iaitu fraud yang melarang responden-responden daripada meletakkan kes mereka di hadapan mahkamah. Perayu juga berhujah bahawa bagi tujuan untuk memulakan tindakan dalam peruntukan s 44 Akta tersebut, responden-responden telah menunjukkan bahawa fraud yang dikatakan bersifat 'extrinsic fraud' berbanding dengan 'intrinsic fraud'. Berikutan itu, perayu telah memfailkan permohonan untuk membatalkan perenggan 22-29 penyataan tuntutan ('PT') responden-responden di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ('KM') dengan bergantung kepada prinsip-prinsip res judicata seperti didapati dalam s 40 Akta tersebut. Perayu juga telah menegaskan bahawa pengecualian kepada res judicata seperti didapati dalam s 44 Akta tersebut tidak boleh terpakai dalam kes ini. Hakim perbicaraan mendapati bahawa berdasarkan relief-relief yang dipohon oleh responden-responden isu res judicata tidak timbul dan bahawa penghakiman yang dipersoalkan boleh dicabar atau diketepikan. Oleh itu Mahkamah Tinggi menolak permohonan perayu untuk membatalkan perenggan 22-29 PT. Atas rayuan, keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. Perayu kemudian telah memohon untuk dan memperoleh kebenaran Mahkamah Persekutuan untuk meneruskan dengan rayuan ini. Dalam rayuan ini perayu sekali lagi telah berhujah bahawa doktrin res judicata terpakai untuk menghalang responden-responden daripada mencabar penghakiman terdahulu mahkamah dan E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-5 bahawa berikutan itu tuntutan responden-responden patut dibatalkan. Perayu juga berhujah bahawa dalam tindakan untuk mencabar penghakiman terdahulu mahkamah, responden-responden perlu melalui piawai yang lebih tinggi, yang mana mereka telah gagal untuk lakukan dan bahawa dengan ini telah membuat penyataan tuntutan responden-responden remeh, menyusahkan dan penyalahgunaan proses. Responden-responden, sebaliknya berhujah bahawa ini bukan kes sesuai untuk perenggan-perenggan PT dibatalkan di bawah A 18 k 19 KM kerana ia bukan kes yang 'obviously unsustainable' untuk dibatalkan terus.

Ia adalah undang-undang tetap bahawa sejak doktrin res judicata direka untuk menuntut keadilan, mahkamah boleh menolak untuk menerima pakai, jika permohonannya boleh mambawa kepada keputusan yang tidak adil. Oleh itu, Mahkamah Rayuan dengan betul telah memutuskan bahawa penghakiman terdahulu yang dipersoalkan tidak beroperasi untuk menghalang responden-responden daripada membuat permohonan untuk mencabar dan untuk mengetepikan penghakiman terdahulu tersebut (lihat perenggan 50-55). that based on the reliefs prayed for by the respondent the issues of res judicata or functus officio did not arise on the basis of trite law that an application to impeach or set aside a judgment on the ground of fraud can be made by way of a fresh action and the court has the jurisdiction to hear it; [16] In its application to strike out the relevant paras 22-29 of the statement of claim, the appellant relied on the principle of res judicata as found in s 40 of the Evidence Act 1950 ('the Act') and several cited authorities, including the Supreme Court's decision in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783. The appellant relied on the principle as ruled by Peh Swee Chin FCJ in that case where His Lordship stated: 'when a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgement becomes the truth between such parties or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation - interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium'. [17] The appellant contended that the exception to res judicata as found in s 44 of the Act, was not applicable in the present case as the respondents failed to bring their case within the exception and therefore the doctrine of res judicata applied to bar them from challenging the earlier judgment of the court and consequently the respondents' claim must be struck out. [22] The respondents further submitted that the court has the jurisdiction to impeach or set aside a previous judgment on ground of fraud by way of a fresh action filed by the respondents. Further, such impeachment of the judgment can also be done where there is fresh evidence which could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence to be adduced at the earlier trial. The learned High Court judge and the Court of Appeal were right in concluding that the principles of res judicata and/or functus officio did not apply in an impeachment or setting aside application on ground of fraud. [31] The law recognises this type of cause of action. Section 44 of the Act provides that 'Any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree which is relevant under ss 40, 41 or 42, and which has been proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a court not competent to deliver it or was obtained by fraud or collusion'. This provision is E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-6 an exception to the doctrine of res judicata as provided for under s 40 of the same Act.

[49] The appellant also relied on the case of Birch v Birch [1902] P 130 which was earlier quoted by Edgar Joseph Jr J in Seng Huat Hang in which His Lordship held that '... there must be a suggestion in the statement of claim, if it (sic) is to escape being struck out as being frivolous and vexatious, of such facts only discovered since the trial, as if proved, would render it reasonably probable that the judgment would be upset, though the facts suggested need not necessarily be such as would have been evidence at the trial'.

Res judicata

[50] The appellant raised the issue of res judicata and submitted that the doctrine applied in present case to bar the respondent from challenging the earlier judgment. [51] On this issue, the Court of Appeal in Chee Pok Choy had the opportunity to deal with the doctrine in an action to impeach or set aside an earlier judgment. In that case, the court elaborated on the provisions of s 44 of the Act and the scope and application of doctrine of res judicata. One of the issues determined in that case was whether the decision of the Supreme Court in an earlier judgment, as a matter of law precludes the appellants from seeking to set aside the judgment. [53] The Court of Appeal further ruled that '... it would be an affront to justice to permit the respondent to successfully plead res judicata in the second suit as that would tantamount to applying the editorial blue pencil across the mandatory provisions of s 260(2) of the Code'. [55] Consequently, we hold that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable in an action to impeach or to set aside an earlier judgment which has been obtained by fraud.

CONCLUSION

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) MOHAMAD ARIFF, MOHD ZAWAWI AND IDRUS HARUN JJCA CIVIL APPEAL NO W-02(IM)(NCVC)-994-06 OF 2014 26 December 2014

Civil Procedure -- Preliminary question of law -- Court's discretion -- Prerequisite conditions to be fulfilled -- Whether prerequisite conditions may be sidestepped -- Rules of Court 2012 O 14A

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Estoppel -- Issue estoppel -- Two different entities commencing two different suits to claim same monies -- Identical facts -- Whether issue estoppel applicable to prevent second suit -- Whether issue estoppel applies notwithstanding suits are between different parties

against the appellant, the respondent applied for a question of law to be determined pursuant to O 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 ('O 14A'). The questions proposed were in the following manner: whether in view of the HTF suit, the respondent's cause of action against the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-7 appellant was prohibited by the principle of estoppel, res judicata and doctrine of merger of cause of action. The learned judge answered the questions posed in the negative and proceeded to enter judgment against the appellant. The appellant appealed against the said decision. The HTF suit according to the respondent, was a cheque action based on the Bills of Exchange Act 1949. The claim arose when the cheque issued for the sum of RM2.3m to HTF by Cosmotine was dishonoured. The present claim by the respondent against the appellant, on the other hand, was also for the recovery of the said sum but premised on the breach of contract when the appellant and KAH were alleged to have breached the agreement.

Hassan ('KAH') telah berunding dengan LPPB dengan tujuan untuk mendapatkan perjanjian usahasama ('perjanjian US') antara LPPB dan responden untuk memajukan tanah tersebut menjadi projek perumahan ('projek tersebut'). Ia mengakibatkan perjanjian pemegang saham ('perjanjian tersebut') yang dimasuki oleh perayu, KAH, responden, Datuk Hoe Tze Fook ('HTF') dan Lee Fuei Siong ('LFS') yang kedua-duanya adalah pemegang saham dan pengarah responden. Perjanjian tersebut, menurut klausa 2.1, dinyatakan bersyarat selepas pelaksanaan perjanjian US antara LPPB dan responden. Klausa 2.1 perjanjian tersebut juga mengandungi ketetapan bahawa jika perjanjian US tidak dilaksanakan dalam cara yang ditetapkan, kedua-dua perayu dan KAH dikehendaki memulangkan kepada responden deposit yang boleh dikembalikan. Berikutan pelaksanaan perjanjian tersebut, HTF telah membayar Cosmotine Sdn Bhd ('Cosmotine') sejumlah RM2.3 juta iaitu deposit yang boleh dikembalikan terdiri daripada RM2.1 juta dan jumlah tambahan RM200,000. Sebagai balasan, Cosmotine mendepositkan cek CIMB Bank Bhdnya dalam jumlah sama ('cek tersebut') dengan HTF. Walau bagaimanapun, perayu dan KAH telah gagal mendapatkan perjanjian US antara LPPB dan responden dan HTF kemudian mengemukakan cek tersebut kepada bank tersebut untuk bayaran tetapi tidak laku. Responden menuntut dikembalikan jumlah tersebut. HTF oleh itu telah memulakan tindakan terhadap Cosmotine ('guaman HTF') untuk pengembalian jumlah RM2.3 juta dan memasuki penghakiman terus terhadap Cosmotine. Responden sementara itu, telah memulakan tindakan ini terhadap perayu dan KAH untuk pengembalian jumlah RM2.3 juta dan memperoleh penghakiman terus terhadap KAH. Berhubung tindakan terhadap perayu, responden telah memohon untuk persoalan undang-undang ditentukan menurut A 14A Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ('A 14A'). Persoalan yang dicadangkan adalah seperti berikut: sama ada berdasarkan guaman HTF, kausa tindakan responden terhadap perayu dilarang oleh prinsip estopel, res judicata dan doktrin penggabungan kausa tindakan. Hakim bijaksana menjawab persoalan yang dikemukakan secara negatif dan meneruskan dengan memasuki penghakiman terhadap perayu. Perayu telah merayu terhadap keputusan tersebut. Guaman HTF menurut responden, adalah tindakan cek berdasarkan Akta Bil Pertukaran 1955. Tuntutan yang timbul apabila cek tersebut dikeluarkan bagi jumlah RM2.3 juta kepada HTF oleh Cosmotine adalah tidak laku. Tuntutan oleh responden terhadap perayu, sebaliknya, adalah juga untuk pengembalian jumlah tersebut tetapi berasaskan pelanggaran kontrak apabila perayu dan KAH dikatakan telah melanggar perjanjian tersebut.

Whether in view of the cheque action taken out by Hoe Tze Fook against Cosmotine pursuant to KLHC Suit No 22 NCVC-1009-08 of 2012 and the judgment entered against the said Cosmotine Sdn Bhd in the said action, the plaintiff's cause of action E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-8 against the first defendant is prohibited by the principle of estoppel, res judicata and doctrine of merger of cause of action. [13] Having stated the law governing an application under O 14A of the Rules of Court 2012, it is perhaps convenient to mention briefly at this point the learned judge's decision in the court below. In Her Ladyship's judgment the learned judge held that the cause of action here was based on a breach of contract. The subject matter in this action is the shareholders' agreement but in the HTF suit the subject matter is the cheque and the rights and obligations of the drawer and the drawee of the cheque. The respondent instituted this suit by acting on its own rights. It is not acting as the privy of HTF. Similarly, in the HTF suit, HTF instituted the cheque action as the payee of the cheque. He did not sue Cosmotine as the respondent's privy. The respondent is entitled to bring successive actions in respect of the same circumstances which give rise to two different causes of action. The respondent's cause of action against the appellant is not prohibited by the principle of estoppel, res judicata and doctrine of merger of cause of action. [14] Before this court, for the appellant it was contended that the respondent had no cause of action against him and even if there was any actionable cause, which he denied, the respondent's cause of action against the appellant was prohibited by the principles of estoppel and res judicata as well as the doctrines of merger and election. We pause to observe that the appellant has never resiled from this line of defence right from the commencement of this suit until the instant appeal as clearly reflected in his statement of defence, the affidavits filed in relation to the O 14A application and his memorandum of appeal. A question has therefore arisen in consequence of the commencement of the present action, which is whether the respondent is precluded from recovering judgment in this action by reason of the judgment previously obtained by HTF against Cosmotine in the HTF suit on the basis of the doctrines of estoppel, res judicata, merger and election. [19] The next point raises questions which concern the issue of the application of the doctrine of estoppel and res judicata to the present appeal. In fact the substantial part of the argument before us turned on this critical issue which in our view will ultimately determine this appeal. The terms 'res judicata', 'issue estoppel' and 'cause of action estoppel' are sometimes used loosely but the modern tendency has been to use res judicata comprehensively to cover all those terms of estoppel (see North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners (a firm) [1990] 3 All ER 547 and OCBC Bank (M) Bhd v Kredin Sdn Bhd [1997] 2 MLJ 544; [1997] 2 CLJ 534). Res judicata simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatam. The res judicata rule dictates that when a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court, the matter may not be pursued further by the same parties and their privies because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, its application produces finality in litigation and one ought not to be vexed twice for the same cause of action. Since a res judicata creates an estoppel per rem judicatam, the doctrine of res judicata is really the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam (see Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189). [20] The plea of res judicata comprises two distinct forms of estoppel that is to say, cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. Drake J in North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners (a firm) stated that cause of action estoppel was confined to cases where the cause of action and the parties were the same in the second suit as they were in the first suit. In such a case the bar is absolute (OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Kredin Sdn Bhd). On the other hand, issue

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-9 estoppel would involve going over precisely the same issue or point already decided in the first action or refer to an issue that has been previously litigated and determined between the same parties and the same issue is raised in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties involving a different cause of action to which the same issue is relevant and one of the parties seeks to reopen the issue. The High Court decision in Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Badan Perhubungan UMNO Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur (via his secretary Dato' Ahmad Tajudin bin Sulaiman) [2010] 8 MLJ 57 clearly shows that the requirements of issue estoppel are that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised and that the same question had been decided. In Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd the Supreme Court succinctly explained that the term 'issue estoppel' literally meant simply an issue which a party was stopped from raising in subsequent proceeding. Issue estoppel prevents contradiction of a previous determination, whereas cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of the cause of action (see also Chemfert Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lim Hua [2010] 5 MLJ 228; [2010] 7 CLJ 491). [22] Having said that, we digress at this point from the above question to consider the nature of the claims in, and circumstances leading to the HTF suit and the present action and thus the plea of res judicata and estoppel. We will return later to the above question. The HTF suit according to the respondent, is a cheque action based on the Bills of Exchange Act 1949. The claim arose when the cheque dated 30 December 2011, issued for the sum of RM2.3m to HTF by Cosmotine was dishonoured. The present claim by the respondent against the appellant, on the other hand, was also for the recovery of the said sum but premised on the breach of contract when the appellant and KAH were alleged to have breached the agreement. Clearly the two actions were based on two different causes of action. However, upon careful study of the statement of defence of Cosmotine in the HTF suit and the affidavits in relation to HTF's application to enter summary judgment in respect of the HTF's suit, we have [25] In the present appeal, since the present action would undoubtedly involve going over precisely the same facts as in the previous HTF suit, and accepting the broader approach and the wider sense of res judicata as the preferred and correct legal position, the fact that the parties to this suit are different from the HTF suit does not disentitle the appellant to invoke the doctrine of issue estoppel to bar the respondent from relitigating a specific issue that had been decided in the prior separate action. The doctrine also applies to a non-party. It is therefore not necessary for parties to be the same in both actions. What the doctrine seeks to prevent is an abuse of the process of the court by attempting to make a double claim as well as allowing the plaintiff to relitigate its cause for the same relief and based on the same subject matter for which judgment had successfully been obtained in the HTF suit and to produce the same set of facts, the same witnesses and the same documents (see Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Badan Perhubungan UMNO Pahang Darul Makmur). [29] We would further add at this point that, even if there has been no actual decision as to the issues involved in the instant action, but if the respondent did not raise these issues in the earlier proceedings which it could and should have done so, in our view the plea of this doctrine of res judicata in its amplified and wider sense is available to the appellant to prevent an abuse of the process of the court. We would refer to the Supreme Court decision in Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 256:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-10 The second defence is one of 'res judicata'. There has, of course, been no actual decision in litigation between these parties as to the issue involved in the present case, but the appellants invoke this defence in its wider sense, according to which a party may be shut out from raising in a subsequent action an issue which he could, and should, have raised in earlier proceedings. The classic statement of this doctrine is contained in the judgment of Wigram V-C in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 and its existence has been reaffirmed by this Board in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155. A recent application of it is to be found in the decision of the Board in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581. It was, in the judgment of the Board, there described in these words:

[1997] 2 MLJ 544; [1997] 2 CLJ 534 and Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93). The plea of res judicata in this appeal is, without question, well taken and is supported by authority. In the end, we have no hesitation in accepting it. [34] In all the circumstances and for the reasons to which we have alluded, we come to the inevitable conclusion that the respondent's action under consideration in this appeal arises from the same facts and concerns the same amount, although the cause of action is different. However on the facts of the present case, the broader principles of issue estoppel and the wider doctrine of res judicata as well as the doctrine of election should apply to preclude the respondent's claim from being proceeded with against the appellant. Further, it must also be emphasised in our conclusion, that an obligation ought not to be imposed on the appellant to pay the respondent when there is no evidence that he had received the payment from the respondent under the agreement and that the respondent had suffered any loss or damage. The question of law framed pursuant to O 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 is therefore answered in the affirmative in favour of the appellant. The order of the High Court is set aside. We accordingly at the conclusion of the case allow the appeal with global costs here and below of RM30,000 to the appellant and deposit is refunded.

FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) ARIFIN ZAKARIA CHIEF JUSTICE, ABDULL HAMID EMBONG, ZAINUN ALI, APANDI ALI AND RAMLY ALI, FCJJ CIVIL APPEAL NO 02(I)-40-04 OF 2014 (W) 16 May 2016

Arbitration -- Agreement -- Interpretation of -- Arbitration agreement provided 'venue' of arbitration proceedings to be Kuala Lumpur unless parties otherwise agreed -- Whether in circumstances of case 'venue' meant juridical seat of arbitration or not geographical place for proceedings -- Whether arbitration agreement allowed parties to change juridical seat of arbitration -- Whether such change only required consent of parties to arbitration and not of all parties to underlying agreement in which arbitration agreement found -- Whether respondent not barred by res judicata or issue estoppel from raising in Malaysian courts issue whether juridical seat of arbitration shifted away from Kuala Lumpur as Indian Supreme Court's previous ruling/observation on that issue merely obiter dicta

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-11 no jurisdiction to hear any challenge to the partial award. The Court of Appeal ('COA') affirmed the decision but on different grounds. The COA held that: (a) as cl 34.12 of the PSC used the word 'venue', it was never intended for Kuala Lumpur to be the juridical seat of the arbitration but merely the geographical or physical place for the holding of the arbitration proceedings which could be shifted to any other location the parties desired; (b) the consent order did not have the effect of shifting the juridical seat of arbitration but merely reflected the agreement of the parties pursuant to cl 34.12 to move the venue of arbitration to London; and (c) that as the agreement did not state where the juridical 'seat' of the arbitration was to be, it had to be presumed that the 'seat' in this case was England as English law was the governing law of the arbitration agreement. In the meanwhile, the appellant had filed a petition ('OMP') before the Delhi High Court to declare that the juridical seat of arbitration was Kuala Lumpur. The respondent's preliminary objection that the Delhi High Court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter was dismissed resulting in an appeal against that dismissal to the Supreme Court of India which ruled that the Delhi High Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the OMP. However, in its grounds of judgment, the Supreme Court of India considered the issue of the juridical seat of the arbitration and held that it remained at Kuala Lumpur and did not shift to London by virtue of the consent order. In the instant appeal against the COA's decision, the appellant, inter alia, contended that by virtue of that finding by the Indian Supreme Court, the respondent was barred by res judicata and issue estoppel from relitigating the issue before the Malaysian courts.

The respondent was not barred either by res judicata or issue estoppel from raising in the Malaysian courts the contention that the juridical seat of the arbitration had shifted away from Kuala Lumpur. The primary issue before the Indian Supreme Court was whether the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the OMP and having answered that question in the negative, it was no longer necessary for the Indian Supreme Court to have delved into the issue of the seat of the arbitration. Accordingly, whatever ruling and/or observation made by the Indian Supreme Court on the latter issue was of no consequence and was mere obiter dicta, and did not have the effect of barring the respondent from re-agitating the issue before the Malaysian courts (see paras 48-49 & 55-56). pertama tribunal timbang tara yang dijadualkan bertempat di Kuala Lumpur telah tercetusnya wabak SARS dan tribunal beralih tempat persidangan pertamanya ke Amsterdam dan kemudian ke London. Melalui suatu perintah persetujuan ('perintah persetujuan') yang dibatalkan akibat dibuat di London, penimbang tara mencatatkan bahawa tempat timbang tara itu telah berpindah ke London. Selepas itu, timbang tara tersebut diteruskan dan tribunal menyampaikan anugerah separa. Perayu memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur untuk mengetepikan bahagian award separa atau, sebagai alternatif, mempunyai bahagian itu dirujuk semula ke tribunal timbang tara untuk dipertimbangkan semula responden membantah untuk memulakan langkah dengan berhujah bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar kes itu kerana Kuala Lumpur telah tidak lagi menjadi tempat timbang tara. Mahkamah Tinggi bersetuju dengan responden dan memutuskan bahawa menurut perintah persetujuan, kerusi perundangan timbang tara telah beralih ke London dan bahawa menurut s 23 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964, Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar apa-apa cabaran kepada E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-12 anugerah separa. Mahkamah Rayuan ('MR') mengesahkan keputusan itu tetapi atas alasan yang berlainan. MR memutuskan bahawa: (a) oleh kerana klausa 34.12 PSC menggunakan perkataan 'venue', ia tidak pernah diniatkan untuk Kuala Lumpur menjadi kerusi perundangan untuk timbang tara tetapi hanya tempat secara geografi atau fizikal bagi memutuskan prosiding timbang tara yang boleh dialih kepada mana-mana lokasi lain yang diingini oleh pihak-pihak; (b) perintah persetujuan tidak mempunyai kesan mengalih kerusi perundangan timbang tara tetapi hanya menggambarkan perjanjian pihak-pihak menurut klausa 34.12 bagi mengalih tempat timbang tara ke London; dan (c) bahawa oleh kerana perjanjian itu tidak menyatakan di mana 'seat' perundangan timbang tara itu sepatutnya, ia hendaklah dianggapkan bahawa 'seat' dalam kes ini adalah England kerana undang-undang Inggeris adalah undang-undang yang mengawal perjanjian timbang tara. Sementara itu, perayu telah memfailkan petisyen ('OMP') di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi Delhi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa kerusi perundangan timbang tara adalah Kuala Lumpur. Bantahan awal responden bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi Delhi mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar kes tersebut telah ditolak menyebabkan rayuan terhadap keputusan itu kepada Mahkamah Agung India yang memutuskan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi Delhi tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk melayan OMP itu. Walau bagaimanapun, dalam alasan penghakimannya, Mahkamah Agung India telah mempertimbangkan isu kerusi perundangan timbang tara dan memutuskan bahawa ia masih kekal di Kuala Lumpur dan tidak beralih ke London menurut perintah persetujuan itu. Dalam rayuan ini terhadap keputusan MT itu, antara lain, berhujah bahawa penemuan oleh Mahkamah Agung India itu, responden telah dihalang oleh res judicata dan isu estopel daripada membicarakan semula isu itu di hadapan mahkamah Malaysia.

Responden tidak dihalang sama ada oleh res judicata atau isu estopel daripada dibangkitkan dalam mahkamah Malaysia tentang hujah bahawa kerusi perundangan timbang tara telah beralih daripada Kuala whether the respondent is precluded by estoppel and res judicata following the judgment of the Indian Supreme Court from contending that the juridical seat has shifted away from Kuala Lumpur? [15] On 5 March 2012, the Delhi High Court declared, inter alia, that the juridical seat was put in issue before the Supreme Court by the respondent and the conclusion of the Supreme Court constituted res judicata between the parties. The Delhi High Court issued the anti-suit injunction against the respondent. The respondent appealed to a full bench on 23 March 2012.

COURT OF APPEAL

Whether the respondent is precluded by estoppel and res judicata following the judgment of the Indian Supreme Court from contending that the juridical seat has shifted away from Kuala Lumpur? tribunal in London on 14 November 2003 and 15 November 2003 merely had the effect of shifting the geographical seat of arbitration and not the juridical seat which remained at Kuala Lumpur. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that with that finding by the Indian Supreme Court, the respondent is now barred, by issue estoppel and res judicata, from relitigating the issue before the Malaysian court. [49] In light of the above, we hold that any ruling made by the Indian Supreme Court beyond the issue of jurisdiction must be taken as mere obiter dicta with no binding effect on the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-13 parties. Hence, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the respondent the observation of the Indian Supreme Court at paras 12 and 13 of its judgment could not be pleaded as res judicata barring the respondent from raising the same before the Malaysian courts. It is trite law that a decision of a court not clothed with the necessary jurisdiction would not give rise to res judicata (see Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam v K Gopalaswami Aiyangar 1964 SCR (3) 763; Hasham Abbas Sayyad v Usman Abbas Sayyad & Ors (2007) 2 SCC 355; Muthavalli of Sha Madhari Diwan Wakf, SJ Syed Zakrudeen and Another v Syed Zindasha and Another (2009) 12 SCC 280; and Syed Mohd Salie Labbai (dead) by LRs and Others v Mohd Hanifa (dead) by LRs and Others (1976) 4 SCC 780). Learned counsel for the plaintiff drew our attention to certain passages in the judgment of Siti Norma Yaakob JCA in which the merits of the case appear to have been discussed. The comments in these passages are mere obiter dicta and do not constitute the ratio of the case. It is only the ratio of the case which is binding between parties to a dispute or their successors ... Further, to constitute res judicata, 'the earlier judgment must, in terms of the Privy Council decision in Kok Hoon v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49 at p 53, 'necessarily and with precision' determine the point in issue' ... These issues were not at stake before this court in the earlier proceedings. It is therefore our judgment that the plea of res judicata cannot succeed. 19. Thus the sound legal position is this: if dismissal of the prior suit was on a ground affecting the maintainability of the suit any finding in the judgment adverse to the defendant would not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. But if dismissal of the suit was on account of extinguishment of the cause of action or any other similar cause a decision made in the suit on a vital issue involved therein would operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties. It is for the defendant in such a suit to choose whether the judgment should be appealed against or not. If he does not choose to file the appeal he cannot thereby avert the bar of res judicata in the subsequent suit. MAHKAMAH RAYUAN (PUTRAJAYA) ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHIM, PRASAD ABRAHAM DAN ZAMANI A RAHIM HHMR RAYUAN SIVIL NOS J-02(IM)(NCVC)-947-06 TAHUN 2015 DAN J-02(IM)(NCVC)-946-06 TAHUN 2015 22 March 2016

Prosedur Sivil -- Res judicata -- Isu estopel -- Hakim bijaksana menolak tuntutan deklarasi perayu -- Hakim bijaksana membenarkan permohonan pembatalan responden-responden -- Perayu merayu terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana -- Sama ada prinsip res judicata dan isu estopel terpakai -- Sama ada hakim bijaksana gagal mengambil kira keterangan penting perayu -- Sama ada terdapat pakatan untuk menipu di antara responden-responden terhadap perayu -- Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 A 18 k 19(1)

res judicata dan isu estopel terpakai dalam kes ini dan membenarkan permohonan responden-responden. Tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi, perayu merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Perayu berhujah bahawa res judicata tidak terpakai kerana surat bertarikh 4 Oktober 2010 yang telah dikeluarkan oleh responden kedua sebagai peguam kepada perayu ketika itu tidak dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah sebelum ini. Perayu mendakwa bahawa surat tersebut adalah keterangan penting bagi perayu dan berhujah jika E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-14 hakim yang bijaksana mengambil kira surat tersebut dan fakta bahawa responden kedua telah gagal untuk hadir dan memberi keterangan mengenai surat tersebut, tentunya 'irresistible conclusion' dapat dibuat bahawa responden kedua dan pertama telah membuat pakatan untuk menipu terhadap perayu.

Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa dari segi dasar awam, 'finality in litigation' adalah penting. Oleh itu prinsip res judicata hendaklah terpakai dalam kes-kes yang ternyata jelas seperti kes dalam rayuan ini. Sekiranya prinsip ini tidak dipatuhi maka akan membawa 'chaos in the conduct of civil proceedings'. Seterusnya, mahkamah menyatakan bahawa, kes rayuan ini adalah salah satu kes di mana fakta dan The appellant in this case appealed against the decision of the High Court in allowing the first and second respondent's application under O 18 of the Rules of Court 2012 ('the ROC 2012') to strike out the appellant's claim. In this case, the first respondent ('the land owner') filed an action in the Batu Pahat Sessions Court for an order that the appellant ('the purchaser') deliver vacant possession of a piece of land in Kluang ('the said land') after the first respondent concluded the sale and purchase of the land due to the appellant's failure to pay the purchase price amounting to RM200,000 in full in a period agreed to under the agreement. The appellant filed defence and counterclaim for specific performance and applied for the case to be transferred to the High Court. The application for transfer was allowed. At the High Court, the judge allowed the first respondent's claim and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim. Both the appellant's appeals to the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court were dismissed. On 20 October 2014, the appellant filed a civil suit against the first respondent, naming his former counsel as the second respondent. The appellant applied for a declaration that the appellant was the beneficial owner of the said land; the first respondent filed the application to the authorities of the state of Johor for the leave to transfer; and alternatively for damages. In the mean time, the claim against the respondent was based on the fiduciary situation to the plaintiff. The first and second respondent filed for the striking out application for the appellant's claim in this second civil suit. Having heard the contention of the parties, the judge agreed with the respondents that the principle of res judicata and estopel applied in this case allowed the respondent's application. Dissatisfied with the High Court's decision, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appellant submitted that res judicata was not applicable because the letter dated 4 October 2010 was issued by the second respondent in his capacity as the appellant's counsel was not considered by the court before this. The appellant alleged that the letter was an important evidence for the appellant and submitted that the judge erred in considering the letter and the fact that the second respondent failed to be present in court and gave evidence on the letter, surely invoked the irresistible conclusion that the first and second respondents conspired to cheat the appellant.

Public policy dictates that finality in litigation is important. Therefore, the principle of res judicata must be applied in clear-cut cases such as in this appeal. If the principle is not complied with, it would bring chaos to the conduct of civil proceedings. Next, the court held that this appeal was one one of the cases where the fact and circumstances could be decided through a simple procedure under O 18 r 19(1) of the ROC 2012 (see paras 25 & 27).] E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-15 tuntutan plaintif adalah remeh dan menyusahkan dan menyalahguna proses mahkamah kerana perkara-perkara yang dibangkitkan adalah res judicata; dan [3] Halijah bt Abbas J telah mendengar kedua-dua kandungan 17 dan 20 dan telah menolaknya. Hakim yang bijaksana telah bersetuju dan menerima hujah kedua-dua defendan bahawa prinsip res judicata dan isu estopel terpakai dalam kes ini. Tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan tersebut, plaintif telah merayu kepada kita di Mahkamah Rayuan. Inilah dia rayuan plaintif.

LATAR BELAKANG KES

[15] Peguam plaintif dalam rayuan telah berhujah bahawa res judicata tidak terpakai kerana surat bertarikh 4 Oktober 2010 yang telah dikeluarkan oleh defendan kedua selaku peguam kepada plaintif ketika itu tidak diberi pertimbangan oleh mahkamah sebelum ini. Beliau mengatakan surat itu adalah keterangan penting bagi plaintif; dan seterusnya berhujah jika Yang Arif Umi Kalthum H telah mengambilkira surat tersebut dan fakta bahawa defendan kedua gagal untuk hadir dan memberi keterangan di mahkamah mengenai surat tersebut tentunya satu 'irresistible conclusion' akan dapat dibuat bahawa defendan kedua dan defendan pertama telah membuat pakatan terhadap plaintif.

PENDAPAT DAN KEPUTUSAN KAMI

[16] Isu utama dalam rayuan ini ialah res judicata dan estopel. Persoalannya adakah tuntutan plaintif dalam kes ini sama daripada segi isu dan fakta atau berlainan dengan guaman sivil yang terdahulu (ie Saman No 52-1073 Tahun 2002 yang telah dipindahkan ke Mahkamah Tinggi Muar dan didaftarkan sebagai Guaman Sivil No 22-18 Tahun 2009) yang telah diputuskan oleh Yang Arif Umi Kalthum Abdul Majid H. Jika ianya sama, maka res judicata dan estopel akan terpakai. [17] Dalam Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189, Mahkamah Agung pada ketika itu telah mengatakan res judicata bermakna:

... a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. [19] Satu lagi prinsip berkaitan dengan res judicata yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Agung dalam kes Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd ialah: res judicata for this purpose is therefore not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. Issues which might have been and which were not brought forward before the court in a previous proceeding, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, though not E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-16 actually decided by that court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata, ie doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. [24] Berpegang kepada prinsip ini dan prinsip res judicata yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Agung dalam kes Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd dan dengan memberi pertimbangan yang sehalus-halusnya kepada fakta dan keadaan kes yang dirayu ini, kami berpendapat keputusan yang dibuat oleh hakim bicara yang bijaksana Halijah Abbas H adalah betul. [25] Pada pendapat kami adalah penting daripada segi dasar awam bahawa mesti ada 'finality in litigation'. Oleh itu prinsip res judicata hendaklah terpakai dalam kes-kes yang ternyata jelas seperti kes dalam rayuan ini. Sekiranya prinsip ini tidak dipatuhi maka akan membawa 'chaos in the conduct of civil proceedings' - lihat Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57. [12] In its defence, JMB claimed that it was lawfully constituted. JMB also pleaded res judicata and estoppel. JMB then counterclaimed for, inter alia, the following reliefs: [17] Before us learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the learned judge on the facts alluded to above had exercised her discretion correctly and in accordance with the established principles and Her Ladyship s decision does not warrant appellate intervention. It was argued that since this court had, by majority in the Menteri Besar s appeal, held that the judicial review was out of time, the learned judge was bound by the finding of fact of the delay in making the application. Thus it was argued that issue estoppel/res judicata in respect of the appellant s ability to challenge the finding on the commencement date and the fact that the second mandamus application was out of time in the circumstances applies here: see Wong Peng Yan Benjamin v Genting Bhd & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 713 North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners (a firm) [1990] 3 All ER 547 and Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783. [106] In reversing the decision of the High Court, the Court of Appeal held that the respondent had no duty to intervene in the judgment debtor's application before the senior assistant registrar on 15 November 2005 and appeal before Lau Bee Lan J as the dispute there was between the appellant and the judgment debtor and was premised on the Singapore judgment which the respondent was not a party. Secondly, the issue or cause of action between the appellant and the respondent was different as it was premised on the letter of set off and did not concern as to whether the judgment debtor held the garnished accounts on trust for the appellant. Accordingly the Court of Appeal held that the principle of res judicata did not apply against the respondent. [118] It was also contended by the respondent that the decision in the judgment debtor's application had not fully ventilated or fully adjudicated the issue on the respondent's right to set off the judgment debtor's six fixed deposit accounts. As such, the principle of res judicata raised by the appellant was not applicable to the respondent's case. The judgment debtor's application did not affect or take away the rights of the respondent which is provided under O 49 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 to dispute its liability as a garnishee separately against the appellant and/or show cause why the garnishee order nisi obtained by the appellant ought not to be absolute. [124] The question in the appeal before the Privy Council was whether it was open to the appellant to litigate in the action on the title to the lands in dispute. The question was whether the earlier finding precluded the appellant from now claiming title against the respondent. The respondent contended that the appellant was so precluded on one or other of the two grounds: E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-17 (1) estoppel by res judicata on the ground that a chieftain subordinate to the appellant was a party to the previous proceedings and the appellant was a privy to them; or alternatively, (2) estoppel by conduct on the ground that the appellant knowingly stood by whilst the title was fought out by their subordinate in the previous proceedings and it would be inequitable to allow them to bring up the question again. [39] An exposition of the relevant principles on judgment in rem is found in para 251 of Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley, the Doctrine of Res Judicata (3rd Ed, 1996). It reads:

To establish that a decision operates in rem and determines the status of a thing, all other conditions of a valid res judicata estoppel must be satisfied. [40] At para 19, the authors set out the constituents of res judicata estoppel. They are: COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) ABANG ISKANDAR, NALLINI PATHMANATHAN AND ZAMANI A RAHIM JJCA CIVIL APPEAL NO W-02(IM)(NCVC)(W)-1400-08 OF 2014 22 March 2016

Civil Procedure -- Appeal -- Appellate interference -- Appellate court slow to disturb findings of trial judge -- Whether lack of judicial appreciation of evidence rendering decision plainly wrong

Civil Procedure -- Compromise and settlement -- Settlement agreement -- Dispute between parties compromised through settlement agreement -- Whether rendering dispute not actionable

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Issue estoppel -- Claim and counterclaim for breach of contract -- Claim disposed through summary judgment -- Issues pertaining counterclaim conclusively decided during hearing of summary judgment -- Whether counterclaim barred by res judicata -- Prerequisites for establishing res judicata -- Whether operation of res judicata subject to correctness of earlier decision

settlement sum by virtue of the breaches and counterclaimed for a declaration that the plaintiff had breached the HMA and the defendant was entitled to claim for indemnity from the plaintiff pursuant to the HMA and MSSA. The plaintiff's application for summary judgment to obtain the payment of the balance settlement sum was heard on its merits and allowed by Singham J. The High Court allowed the counterclaim. The plaintiff thus brought the present appeal contending that the trial judge erred in allowing the defendant's counterclaim, inter alia, on the following grounds: (a) the defendant's counterclaim was barred by res judicata and/or estoppel by virtue of the summary judgment entered against the defendant; and (b) there was a compromise agreement and/or release and discharge between the defendant and the plaintiff.

Res judicata is a substantive rule of law. It means a decision on the 'merits' which disposes once and for all of the matters decided and the same becomes the truth between the parties, so that, except on appeal or other exceptional circumstances such E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-18 as fraud, it cannot be re-litigated between persons bound by the judgment. The doctrine of res judicata has developed over the years to extend to issue estoppel as well, the requirements of which are: (a) that the same question has been decided; (b) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and (c) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised. It must be shown that the earlier judgment necessarily and with precision determined the point in issues to constitute res judicata (see para 26(a)). The counterclaim arose and was as a direct consequence/result of the defence pleaded against the plaintiff's claim and therefore, the issues in both were one and the same. The issues in the counterclaim were identical with those that arose in the main claim. As such, the doctrine of estoppel/res judicata ought to be applied in dealing with the counterclaim (see para 26(c)). When res judicata is operational, the correctness of the said decision is not a relevant consideration. Even if the decision is not correct in law or fact, res judicata gives effect to the policy that the parties to a judicial decision cannot challenge the correctness of a previous decision, except on appeal. The previous decision, whether a determination of law, fact or mixed fact and law, will also form an issue estoppel. The parties cannot adduce any new evidence or advance any new arguments to contradict the previous decision (see para 26(h)). Even if res judicata was not applicable, the dispute between the parties that arose out of the HMA (the breaches) had been compromised by the MSSA and therefore, was not actionable. The parties intended and provided for termination of the HMA and a compromise of all matters arising therefrom. Hence, the breaches which constituted the basis for the counterclaim, could not have been a live issue before the trial judge (see para 32). didengar atas meritnya dan dibenarkan oleh Singham H. Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan tuntutan balas tersebt. Plaintif oleh itu telah memulakan rayuan ini dengan berhujah bahawa hakim perbicaraan terkhilaf kerana membenarkan tuntutan balas defendan, antara lain, atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) tuntutan balas defendan telah dihadkan oleh res judicata dan/atau estopel menurut penghakiman terus yang dimasuki terhadap defendan; dan (b) terdapat perjanjian kompromi dan/atau pembebasan dan pelepasan antara defendan dan plaintif.

Res judicata adalah rukun undang-undang substantif. Ia bermaksud suatu keputusan tentang 'merit' yang menyelesaikan sekali dan untuk semua perkara yang diputuskan dan yang sama menjadi kebenaran antara pihak-pihak, agar, kecuali atas rayuan atau keadaan luar biasa lain seperti penipuan, ia tidak boleh dilitigasi semula antara orang-orang yang terikat dengan penghakiman tersebut. Doktrin res judicata telah berkembang sejak beberapa tahun untuk meluaskan isu estopel juga, keperluan yang mana adalah: (a) bahawa persoalan sama telah diputuskan; (b) bahawa keputusan kehakiman yang dikatakan untuk menjadikan estopel itu muktamad; dan (c) bahawa pihak-pihak kepada keputusan kehakiman atu privy mereka adalah orang yang sama sebagai pihak-pihak kepada prosiding di mana estopel tersebut ditimbulkan. Ia perlu

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-19 ditunjukkan bahawa penghakiman awal memerlukan dan dengan tepat menentukan poin dalam isu-isu untuk membentuk res judicata (lihat perenggan 26(a)). Tuntutan balas yang timbul dan adalah akibat/hasil langsung pembelaan yang dipli terhadap tuntutan plaintif dan oleh itu, isu-isu kedua-duanya adalah satu dan sama. Isu-isu dalam tuntutan balas tersebut adalah sama seperti yang timbul dalam tuntutan utama. Oleh itu, doktrin estopel/res judicata patut terpakai dalam mengendalikan tuntutan balas tersebut (lihat perenggan 26(c)). Apabila res judicata beroperasi, ketepatan keputusan itu bukan pertimbangan yang relevan. Walaupun keputusan itu tidak betul dari segi undang-undang atau fakta, res judicata memberikan kesan kepada polisi tersebut bahawa pihak-pihak kepada keputusan kehakiman itu tidak boleh mencabar ketepatan keputusan sebelumnya, kecuali atas rayuan. Keputusan sebelumnya, sama ada suatu penentuan undang-undang, fakta atau campuran fakta dan undang-undang, juga akan membentuk satu isu estopel. Pihak-pihak tidak boleh mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan baru atau mengemukakan apa-apa hujah baru yang bercanggah dengan keputusan sebelumnya (lihat perenggan 26(h)). Jikapun res judicata tidak terpakai, pertikaian antara pihak-pihak yang timbul daripada PPH (pelanggaran tersebut) telah dikompromi oleh PPPB dan oleh itu, tidak boleh diambil tindakan. Pihak-pihak berniat dan memperuntukkan untuk penamatan PPH dan satu kompromi tentang semua perkara yang timbul daripadanya. Justeru, pelanggaran tersebut yang menjadi asas untuk tuntutan balas tersebut, tidak mungkin telah menjadi isu sebenar sebelum hakim perbicaraan tersebut (lihat perenggan 32).] [4] In this appeal, the trial judge had erred when she allowed the counterclaim and refused to be bound by the earlier judgment of Singham J. The trial judge ought to have applied the principle of estoppel/res judicata to the counterclaim as all the issues raised by the defendant in the counterclaim had been comprehensively addressed and determined by Singham J.

BACKGROUND FACTS

[17] The plaintiff on 25 October 2012 filed an application to summarily dispose the case on points of law pursuant to O 14A r 1 and/or O 33 r 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 ('O 14A application') whereby the plaintiff had amongst others, invited the High Court to dismiss the counterclaim based on the ground/issue of res judicata and/or estoppel. whether the defendant's counterclaim for the indemnity against the plaintiff is barred by res judicata and/or estoppel by virtue of the summary judgment entered against the defendant in the main suit on 14 September 2012 and/or the MSSA?

Whether res judicata/estoppel applicable

[26] The trial judge fell into error when Her Ladyship concluded that estoppel/res judicata did not apply and that Singham J's decision in encl 7 is obiter on the basis that the counterclaim is a separate action with different issues as compared to the main claim. On the facts and circumstances of this case, it is our view that: res judicata is a substantive rule of law. It means a decision on the 'merits' which disposes once and for all of the matters decided and the same becomes the truth between the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-20 parties, so that, except on appeal or other exceptional circumstances such as fraud, it cannot be re-litigated between persons bound by the judgment. The doctrine of res judicata has developed over the years to extend to issue estoppel as well, the requirements of which are (i) that the same question has been decided; (ii) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and (iii) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised. We are also mindful of the fact that it must be shown that the earlier judgment necessarily and with precision determined the point in issues to constitute res judicata; the parties cannot raise a second time in the same suit issues that have already been determined earlier expressly or by necessary implication. Additionally, where res judicata is not strictly established or where estoppel res judicatum is not made out but nevertheless, the circumstances are such as to render any re-agitation of the questions formerly adjudicated upon, a scandal and an abuse, the court would not hesitate to dismiss the action; the issues in the counterclaim are identical with those that arose in the main claim. As such, the doctrine of estoppel/res judicata ought to be applied in dealing with the counterclaim; the learned trial judge's views were patently wrong because when res judicata is operational, the correctness of the said decision is not a relevant consideration. Even if the decision is not correct in law or fact, res judicata gives effect to the policy that the parties to a judicial decision cannot challenge the correctness of a previous decision, except on appeal. The previous decision, whether a determination of law, fact or mixed fact and law, will also form an issue estoppel; (ii) Paragraph 1.03 at p 2 -- Spencer, Bower & Handley on Res Judicata (4th Ed); and [27] The defendant took the opposite stand. The defendant submitted that the issue of res judicata and/or estoppel did not apply in this instance because: [32] Be that as it may, the trial judge ought to have recognised that even if res judicata was not applicable, the dispute between the parties that arose out of the HMA (the breaches) had been compromised by the MSSA and therefore, is not actionable for reasons as follows: [33] To recap, the principle of res judicata is applicable to the facts in the present case. The rule of estoppel has, therefore, arisen which barred the defendant from raising all issues afresh. All matters and disputes are settled by the parties' clear intention and through a compromise by the execution of the MSSA.

CONCLUSION

To allow the judge in the court below to reopen the matter nine months after it was decided by himself would bring absolute chaos to the judicial system. A jurisdiction point is no less an issue than other issues in civil litigation. If not raised at the hearing in the court of first instance or on appeal, it could not be raised thereafter, for the doctrine of res judicata sets in (see p 11OD-F); MUI Bank Bhd v Cheam Kim Yu (Beh Sai Ming, intervener) [1992] 2 MLJ 642 and Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 followed and Muniandy a/l Thamba Kaundan & Anor v D & C Bank Bhd &Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 374 distinguished.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-21 First, a jurisdiction point is no less an issue than other issues in civil litigation. If not raised at the hearing in the court of first instance or on appeal, it cannot be raised thereafter, for the doctrine of res judicata sets in. Thus, in the absence of any special circumstances, a chargee who has obtained an order for sale is not barred by res judicata or any form of estoppel from pursuing actions in personam against the chargor or the surety. See Hua Realty Bhd ('the appellant'), suing on behalf of itself and all its shareholders, had initiated a derivative action for the benefit of See Hua News Holding Bhd ('SHNB'). This suit was based largely on the tort of conspiracy that allegedly existed between the first to fifth respondents and the provisional liquidators to commit fraud and injure SHNB by stripping it of its valuable assets. Although the provisional liquidators had been struck out as defendants, the plaintiff had proceeded with the conspiracy against the first to fifth defendants. The trial judge found neither direct nor inferential evidence to support the tort of conspiracy. The trial judge also found that the other claims, which included personal claims, should not have been the subject of a derivative action. In any case, the trial judge was also of the view that these claims were barred by res judicata. Hence the High Court dismissed the derivative action with costs. This was the appellant's appeal against that decision of the High Court.

See Hua Realty Bhd ('perayu'), menyaman bagi pihaknya dan kesemua pemegang-pemegang sahamnya, telah memulakan tindakan derivatif bagi kepentingan See Hua News Holding Bhd ('SHNB'). Tindakan ini adalah berdasarkan sebahagian besarnya atas tort pengkomplotan yang didakwa wujud di antara responden pertama hingga kelima dan penyelesai sementara melakukan fraud dan mencederakan SHNB dengan melucutkannya daripada aset berharganya. Walaupun penyelesai sementara telah dibatalkan sebagai defendan-defendan, plaintif telah meneruskan dengan pengkomplotan terhadap defendan pertama hingga kelima. Hakim bicara mendapati tiada keterangan terus atau berdasarkan inferens menyokong tort pengkomplotan. Hakim bicara juga mendapati bahawa tuntutan-tuntutan lain, yang termasuk tuntutan-tuntutan peribadi, yang tidak patut menjadi subjek tindakan derivatif. Walau bagaimanapun, hakim bicara juga berpandangan bahawa tuntutan-tuntutan ini dihalang oleh res judicata. Maka, Mahkamah Tinggi menolak tindakan derivatif dengan kos. Ini adalah rayuan perayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi.

There is no evidence to support the tort of conspiracy. Other claims, such as personal claims, are not subject of a derivative action and in any case are barred by res judicata. The bedrock of this suit is the tort of conspiracy between the 1st to 5th defendants and the provisional liquidators to commit fraud and injure the 8th defendant by stripping it of its valuable assets. Although the provisional liquidators had been struck out as defendants by the Court of Appeal, the plaintiff proceeded with the conspiracy against the 1st to 5th defendants. For reasons given earlier, I found neither direct nor inferential evidence to support the tort of conspiracy. The other claims include personal claims which should not be the subject of a derivative action and claims that are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The reason is that the issues raised in those claims were ventilated in previous proceedings and had been adjudicated up to the level of the Federal Court or the Court of Appeal. Counsel for plaintiff E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-22 argued that res judicata was not pleaded specifically. However, at the time of the pleadings in this case were filed, some of the earlier proceedings had not concluded and for that reason it would not be possible to include such a plea. The failure to plead the doctrine of res judicata is not fatal as the court possesses inherent jurisdiction to bar a claim on this ground. In the well known case of Badiadin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393, Peh Swee Chin FCJ opined that the court can rely on this doctrine even if it is not argued or pleaded:

Before dealing with the point on which the Court of Appeal relied, let me deal briefly first with the other point of view referred to by me earlier, that of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata would apply and bar the making of the order directly concerned, because the said previous order had become the truth between the landowners and the charge, and the order directly concerned would constitute a challenge to the truth or accuracy of the said previous order. It is true that the doctrine was not expressly argued or expressly relied on by the courts below. Changes of circumstances, in our view may be brought into the picture to reverse a previous decision of the same court ... In such a case the matter is never res judicata. A custody order is not final and conclusive. If any change has taken place in the circumstances of the parties which warrants a reconsideration of the matter, the court is not bound by a former order, but will use its discretion with respect to the altered conditions, always bearing in mind the fact that the welfare of the infants are the paramount consideration. HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) HADHARIAH SYED ISMAIL J SUIT NO 22NCVC-1383-11 OF 2012 10 June 2015

Civil Procedure -- Documents -- Without prejudice -- Exceptions -- When justice of the case requires it -- Whether without prejudice letters admissible to prove deceitful act

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Issue estoppel -- Application to strike out action dismissed -- Whether defendant can during trial raise again issue of res judicata which was raised during striking out application -- Whether ruling in striking out action finally determined rights and liabilities of parties -- Whether res judicata arose

Civil Procedure -- Striking out -- Application to strike out action -- Res judicata -- Application to strike out action dismissed -- Whether defendant can during trial raise again issue of res judicata which was raised during striking out application -- Whether ruling in striking out action finally determined rights and liabilities of parties -- Whether res judicata arose

Contract -- Breach -- Termination -- Innocent party's choice whether to accept repudiation or treat contract as still subsisting -- Innocent party not accepting repudiation by suing for specific performance -- Contracts Act 1950 s 40

Contract -- Tenancy agreement -- Breach -- Whether payment of rental conditional upon E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-23 delivery of vacant possession -- Whether vacant possession a condition for performance of contract -- Whether landlord in breach of tenancy agreement by refusing to hand over vacant possession -- Letting out demised property to third party when earlier tenancy still subsisting -- Whether purported termination by landlord wrongful -- Whether landlord liable to pay damages -- Assessment of damages payable

Evidence -- Without prejudice communications -- Admissibility -- Exceptions -- When justice of the case requires it -- Whether without prejudice letters admissible to prove deceitful act

The dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants arose from a tenancy agreement dated 12 August 2009 ('the agreement') entered into between the plaintiff and the first defendant. The agreement was for three years expiring on 11 August 2012. Under the agreement, the first defendant let out its property to the plaintiff at a monthly rental of RM250,000. The plaintiff was entitled to sublet the property to a third party and collect the rental proceeds. The second defendant was a director in the first defendant's company. The alleged breach related to delivery of vacant possession and payment of rental. The plaintiff claimed that the first defendant failed to give vacant possession for the entire property. The first defendant on the other hand claimed that the plaintiff failed to pay rental and refused to take vacant possession. The first defendant thus terminated the agreement. The plaintiff contended that the termination was invalid and sued the first defendant for breach of contract. Unknown to the plaintiff, whilst the agreement was still subsisting, the first defendant had entered into a tenancy agreement dated 14 January 2011 with the third defendant over the same subject property with monthly rental of RM116,099.25. Prior to that, the third defendant had entered into a subtenancy agreement dated 3 January 2011 with the fourth defendant with monthly rental agreed at RM1,486,070.40. The plaintiff alleged that the first and second defendants together with the third and fourth defendants had conspired to deprive the plaintiff of its rights under the agreement. As against all the defendants, the plaintiff alleged fraud, deceit and conspiracy to injure the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to enforce its rights under the agreement and be put to its original position as if the agreement was performed. The first defendant submitted the issues of fraud and conspiracy had been raised in earlier striking out proceedings which had been dismissed. As such, it was argued that the plaintiff was estopped from relitigating or reasserting the same issues on the grounds of res judicata. The admissibility of certain without prejudice correspondence was also objected to.

There was nothing in law to stop the first defendant from raising res judicata at the trial even though it was raised before during the hearing of striking out application. When the originating summons was dismissed, it only meant the plaintiff's claim which rested on fraud and conspiracy to injure was not suitable to be decided by way of affidavit evidence. The judge had not made any ruling which finally determined the rights and liabilities of the parties. Therefore, res judicata did not arise (see para 52). Pertikaian antara plaintif dan defendan-defendan berbangkit daripada perjanjian penyewaan bertarikh 12 Ogos 2009 ('perjanjian') yang dimasuki oleh plaintif dan defendan pertama. Perjanjian tersebut adalah bagi tempoh tiga tahun dan tamat pada 11 Ogos 2012. Di bawah perjanjian, defendan pertama menyewakan hartanahnya kepada plaintif dengan sewa bulanan RM250,000. Plaintif berhak untuk sewa semula hartanah tersebut kepada pihak ketiga dan E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-24 mengutip hasil sewaan. Defendan kedua adalah pengarah syarikat defendan pertama. Pelanggaran yang didakwa berkenaan dengan penyerahan milikan kosong dan bayaran sewa. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa defendan pertama gagal untuk memberi milikan kosong bagi keseluruhan hartanah. Defendan pertama, sebaliknya, mendakwa bahawa plaintif gagal membayar sewa dan enggan mengambil milikan kosong. Dengan itu, defendan pertama menamatkan perjanjian tersebut. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa penamatan tersebut tidak sah dan meyaman defendan pertama bagi pelanggaran kontrak. Tanpa pengetahuan plaintif, sementara perjanjian masih wujud, defendan pertama memasuki perjanjian sewa bertarikh 14 Januari 2011 dengan defendan ketiga ke atas hartanah yang sama dengan sewa bulanan sebanyak RM116,099.25. Sebelum itu, defendan ketiga telah memasuki perjanjian penyewaan semula bertarikh 3 Januari 2011 dengan defendan keempat dengan sewa bulanan yang dipersetujui sebanyak RM1,486,070.40. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa defendan pertama dan kedua bersama-sama dengan defendan ketiga dan keempat telah berkonspirasi untuk menafikan plaintif akan haknya di bawah perjanjian tersebut. Terhadap semua defendan, plaintif mendakwa penipuan dan konspirasi untuk mencederakan plaintif. Plaintif memohon untuk menguatkuasakan haknya di bawah perjanjian dan dikembalikan kepada kedudukan asal seolah-olah perjanjian dilaksanakan. Defendan pertama menghujahkan bahawa isu penipuan dan konspirasi telah dibangkitkan dalam prosiding pembatalan terdahulu telah ditolak. Dengan itu, dihujahkan bahawa plaintif diestop daripada melitigasikan atau menegaskan isu yang sama atas dasar res judicata. Kebolehterimaan surat-menyurat tanpa prejudis juga dibantah.

Tiada apa-apa di bawah undang-undang untuk menghalang defendan pertama daripada membangkitkan res judicata semasa perbicaraan walaupun ia dibangkitkan semasa perbicaraan permohonan pembatalan. Apabila saman pemula ditolak, ia hanya bermaksud bahawa tuntutan plaintif yang bersandarkan penipuan dan konspirasi untuk mencederakan tidak sesuai untuk diputuskan melalui keterangan afidavit. Hakim tidak membuat apa-apa penghakiman yang akhirnya memutuskan hak dan liabiliti pihak-pihak. Oleh itu, res judicata tidak berbangkit (lihat perenggan 52). [11] Two witnesses were called. Mr Mok Chew Yin ('DW1') is one of the two liquidators of the first defendant appointed by the court on 25 July 2011. He admits he had no personal knowledge of this case. His testimony is based purely on documents which he had access to. His evidence can be summarised as follows. The first defendant did not breach the tenancy agreement. The plaintiff cannot relitigated this case when its Originating Summons No 24-161 of 2011 has been dismissed by the court. Res judicata applies to the plaintiff. Vacant possession was given on 6 April 2010 and was acknowledged by the plaintiff vide its letter dated 9 November 2010. The plaintiff did not pay RM250,000 rental. Plaintiff acted unilaterally in paying RM59,456 rental, less than the agreed rent. This sum is not accepted by the defendant. By way of a letter dated 12 October 2010, the receiver and manager have informed the plaintiff that the second defendant had no authority to negotiate for and on behalf of the first defendant. When cross-examined by the plaintiff's counsel, DW1 admits he dealt with the second defendant. For this case, he says it is not necessary for him to call the second defendant. He denied seeing the three without prejudice letters dated 1 February 2011, 16 February 2011 and 18 March 2011 respectively. He agrees that the reason he raised res judicata is to avoid disclosing the nitty gritty of the case. He also agrees that the first defendant's application to strike out the plaintiff's suit was dismissed by the High Court E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-25 and Court of Appeal. His answers as to whether the first defendant had performed its obligations under the tenancy agreement is pertinent to note. In particular he agrees that the first defendant had breached the tenancy agreement. The acts of breach are:

RES JUDICATA

[50] Simply because the originating summons was dismissed, counsel for the first defendant submit res judicata principles as expounded in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 applied. [51] In response, counsel for the plaintiff submits that there is no res judicata for the following reasons: the first defendant had applied to strike out the plaintiff's current suit on the ground of res judicata and the application was dismissed by the High Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal. [52] Against this background, counsel for the first defendant refers me to the case of Tanalachimy a/p Thoraisamy & Ors v Jayapalasingam a/l Kandiah & Ors (sued as liquidators of the Great Alonioners Trading Corp Bhd) and another appeal [2014] 4 MLJ 85. In that case, the defendants/respondents had successfully strike out the plaintiff's/appellant's claim on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held the appellants' claim is not obviously unsustainable to be struck out under O 18 r 19(1). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal also held that the defendants/respondents can still introduce evidence and submit on the issues of res judicata during the trial. Based on Court of Appeal's decision in Tanalachimy's case, counsel for the first defendant submits the first defendant can still raise and argued on res judicata. My reply is this. There is nothing in iaw to stop the first defendant from raising res judicata at the trial even though it was raised before during the hearing of striking out application. What matters to the court is whether there is merit in the submission of res judicata, I find counsel for the first defendant had misunderstood the principles of res judicata. When the originating summons was dismissed, it only means the plaintiff's claim which rest on fraud and conspiracy to injure is not suitable to be decided by way of affidavit evidence. This is the finding made by the trial judge in the originating summons. The trial judge who hear the originating summons had not made any ruling which finally determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. The issues of whether the termination of the tenancy agreement dated 12 August 2009 is lawful or not; whether there is conspiracy to injure or not are live issues before this court. These issues were ventilated for the first time in this court. Therefore, it is misleading for the first defendant to say res judicata applies here. On the background facts, res judicata does not even arise. This issue is a non starter.

DAMAGES

HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU) GUNALAN MUNIANDY JC APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO 25 10 03 OF 2014 19 October 2014

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-26 Civil Procedure -- Judicial review (JR) -- Application for leave to file JR application to obtain certiorari -- Whether leave could not be granted as proposed JR application was frivolous, vexatious and unsustainable -- Whether there was no decision as such for review -- Whether applicants failure to disclose material facts to support grounds for application was fatal -- Whether courts dismissal of two previous JR applications concerning decision on same subject-matter barred re-litigation of matter on ground of res judicata -- Whether applicants lacked locus standi to apply for JR application as they did not represent numerous other parties affected by same decision who were not joined as parties to application

The applicants sought leave to file a judicial review (JR) application for an order of certiorari to quash the Johor state governments decision to relocate five Chinese cemeteries in Mukim Pengerang, Johor, to make way for an oil and gas project. The decision was a notice, signed by the first respondent and issued to the relevant association that managed the five cemeteries, to participate in a survey/census to determine who were the parties aggrieved/affected by the proposed relocation. Claiming to have family members or relatives buried in the cemeteries in question, the applicants contended that the decision contravened the law; that it was unjust and inequitable and prejudicial to the applicants vested interests and the historical value of the cemeteries. On behalf of the respondents, the attorney-generals chambers (AGC) objected to leave being granted on the grounds: (a) there was no decision that could be subject to judicial review as the respondents notice was simply to conduct a survey of parties whose interests would be affected by the proposed relocation; (b) the applicants failed to disclose material facts relevant to the grounds in support of the JR application, eg what was the relevant law that the decision had supposedly breached or whether the cemeteries were on state land or private land in order to determine whether the issue raised was a public law or a private law matter. The AGC also said that since the court had dismissed two previous similar applications by other parties to quash the same decision, the proposed JR application in the instant case was res judicata and an abuse of the courts process.

The issue of the relocation of the same cemeteries was the subject-matter of two previous JR applications by different parties. Those applications were adjudicated upon and dismissed by the court. The challenge in those proceedings was against the same decision on the same subjectmatter. The multiplicity of actions seeking certiorari on the same impugned decision was prima facie an abuse of process of court and could not be permitted. In the circumstances, res judicata applied to prevent the same issues on the same subjectmatter and against the same administrative decision being re-litigated (see para 23). Pemohon-pemohon memohon kebenaran untuk memfailkan permohonan semakan kehakiman (SK) untuk perintah certiorari bagi membatalkan keputusan kerajaan negeri Johor untuk memindahkan lima kubur Cina di Mukim Pengerang, Johor, untuk memberi laluan bagi projek minyak dan gas. Keputusan itu ialah notis, yang telah ditandatangani oleh responden pertama dan dikeluarkan kepada persatuan berkaitan yang menguruskan lima kubur itu, untuk terlibat dalam kajian/bancian bagi menentukan siapa pihak-pihak yang terkilan/terjejas oleh cadangan pemindahan itu. Dengan mendakwa mempunyai ahli keluarga atau sanak saudara yang dikebumikan di kubur yang dipersoalkan, perayu-perayu telah berhujah bahawa keputusan itu E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-27 bertentangan dengan undang-undang; bahawa ia adalah tidak adil dan tidak saksama dan prejudis kepada pemohon-pemohon yang berkepentingan dan nilai sejarah kubur itu. Bagi pihak responden-responden, jabatan peguam negara (JPN) telah membantah kebenaran itu diberikan atas alasan-alasan: (a) tidak terdapat keputusan yang boleh tertakluk kepada semakan kehakiman kerana notis responden-responden adalah hanya untuk menjalankan kaji selidik ke atas pihak-pihak yang mana kepentingan mereka mungkin terjejas akibat cadangan pemindahan itu; (b) pemohon-pemohon telah gagal menyatakan fakta penting yang berkaitan dengan alasan-alasan itu bagi menyokong permohonan SK itu, contohnya apakah undang-undang relevan yang dikatakan telah dilanggar oleh keputusan itu atau sama ada kubur itu di atas tanah kerajaan atau persendirian bagi menentukan sama ada isu itu ditimbulkan adalah suatu perkara tentang undang-undang awam atau undang-undang persendirian. JPN juga mengatakan oleh kerana mahkamah telah menolak dua permohonan sama sebelum ini oleh pihak-pihak lain untuk membatalkan keputusan sama, cadangan permohonan SK dalam kes ini adalah res judicata dan satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah.

Isu berhubung pemindahan kubur yang sama adalah hal perkara dua permohonan SK yang sebelumnya oleh pihak-pihak berbeza. Permohonan-permohonan tersebut telah diadili dan ditolak oleh mahkamah. Cabaran dalam prosiding tersebut adalah terhadap keputusan sama ke atas hal perkara sama. Penggandaan tindakan memohon certiorari tentang keputusan sama yang dipersoalkan adalah prima facie penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah dan tidak oleh dibenarkan. Dalam keadaan itu, res judicata dipakai untuk mengelakkan isu-isu sama berhubung hal perkara sama dan terhadap keputusan pentadbiran sama dibicarakan semula (lihat perenggan 23). res judicata is operative to bar the instant JR as there were at least two previous applications to quash the decision to relocate the same private cemeteries which have been dismissed by the court after the issues relating to the same subjectmatter have been ventilated and adjudicated upon. Multiple proceedings to quash the same decision on the same subjectmatter would be an abuse of the court process. An appeal had been lodged against the denial of leave by the High Court but the appeal was struck out. [10] With regard to res judicata and multiplicity of proceedings, s 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act (CJA) 1964 confers additional powers on the High Court as follows: Powers to dismiss or stay proceedings where the matter in question is res judicata between the parties, or by reason of multiplicity of proceedings ought not to be continues [11] In Manoharan a/l Malayalam v Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor [2009] 2 MLJ 660, the Federal Court in dealing with the issue of res judicata in respect of two successive applications arising out of the same detention order pronounced that: We are of the view that the points raised in the third application before us ought to have been raised in the second application. Therefore the doctrine of res judicata applies. We find that there are no special or exceptional circumstances shown by the appellant which would merit the preclusion of the doctrine of res judicata and the plea of an abuse of process. It is also to be noted that the appellant in the present case under appeal had filed three successive applications in respect of the same detention order dated 13 December 2007. Whatever the merits maybe in the second application it is our judgment that the points raised in the third application ought to be have been raised in the second application. On the facts of the case it has not been shown to us that the appellant had put forward in his second application the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-28 whole of the case which was then fairly available to him. For the reasons already stated, we dismiss the appeal. [16] Under s 25(2) of the CJA, the High Court is expressly conferred with powers to dismiss or stay proceedings where the matter is res judicata or to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. [18] The threshold issue for determination as regards whether leave should be granted in this instance is whether material facts fundamental to the JR have been disclosed by the applicant or that the application is an abuse of process of the court, frivolous or vexatious as no substance has been shown in the grounds advanced in support? Whether res judicata applies to the present facts is also an important consideration in view of the previous applications on the same subject-matter and decision. [23] Thirdly, on the issue of whether this application should be rejected in limine by operation of the doctrine of res judicata, the irrefutable fact is that the identical decision by the same authorities concerted to relocate the same five cemeteries has been the subject of previous JR applications wherein issues of law and fact have been ventilated by the aggrieved parties and have been adjudicated upon the court granted that the parties in this JR are different from the applicants in the previous JR proceedings. However, the common thread among all three proceedings is that the challenge is against the same decision on the same subjectmatter wherein the issues presently canvassed are being relitigated. The multiplicity of actions seeking certiorari on the same impugned decision is, as argued on behalf of the AGC, prima facie an abuse of process of the court and should not be permitted. Hence, under the circumstances adverted to, the doctrine of res judicata would come into operation to prevent the same issues on the same subjectmatter and against the same administrative decision from being relitigated and judicially considered all over again. HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) LEE HENG CHEONG JC ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO 24NCVC-633-03 OF 2013 10 February 2014

Equity -- Estoppel -- Res judicata -- Applicability of principle of ademption -- Matter earlier decided and resolved by Singapore High Court -- New proceeding clearly part of the subject matter of earlier litigation -- Whether present claim estopped by res judicata/issue estoppel

Succession -- Will -- Bequest -- Testator leaving estate to daughter and two sons -- Whether monies held in joint accounts of testator and daughter belonged to daughter solely -- Whether monies in joint accounts gifted to daughter inter vivos -- Whether monies in joint accounts to be considered an ademption by satisfaction of part of the daughter's entitlement under the will -- Whether presumption against double portions applied -- Whether principle of ademption applicable -- Whether presumption rebutted by express intention of the testator -- Whether matter earlier decided and resolved by Singapore High Court -- Whether present claim estopped by res judicata/issue estoppel double portions did not applies to this case and if the presumption against double portions applied to this case, the said presumption had been rebutted by the express intention of the deceased. The defendant further contended that the present suit was is an abuse of the court's process and that the plaintiffs were estopped by the principles of res judicata/issue estoppel E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-29 from raising this fresh issue of ademption by virtue of presumption of double portions.

Encik Ng Cheong Choy ('si mati') telah melaksanakan wasiat pada 15 Mac 2007 yang mana dia meninggalkan kesemua harta pusaka kepada ketiga-tiga anaknya. Si mati telah memberikan separuh daripada harta pusakanya kepada anak perempuannya, defendan di sini dan separuh lagi dibahagikan sama rata di antara dua anak lelakinya, plaintif-plaintif di sini. Si mati telah meninggal dunia pada 29 Mac 2007. Selepas kematian si mati, defendan berhujah bahawa semua wang yang dipegang dalam akaun bersama di Kuala Lumpur dan Singapura, adalah miliknya kerana ia telah 'gifted' kepadanya inter vivos oleh si mati sejurus sebelum dia meninggal dunia, pada 14 Mac 2007 dan satu hari sebelum si mati menandatangani wasiatnya. Pada 8 April 2008, plaintif telah memfailkan guaman di Mahkamah Tinggi Singapura memohon deklarasi agar wang yang dipegang dalam akaun HSBC tersebut membentuk sebahagian daripada harta pusaka si mati. Mahkamah Tinggi Singapura mendapati wang dalam akaun tersebut telah dihadiahkan oleh si mati kepada defendan dan menolak guaman itu. Empat tahun kemudian plaintif-plaintif telah memfailkan guaman ini memohon deklarasi agar semua wang yang dipegang dalam nama-nama bersama defendan dan si mati dianggap adempsi dengan penyelesaian sebahagian daripada hak defendan kepada pembahagian harta pusaka si mati menurut wasiat si mati, berdasarkan common law 'presumption against double portions'. Plaintif berhujah bahawa andaian terhadap bahagian dua kali ganda adalah terpakai. Defendan berhujah bahawa andaian terhadap bahagian dua kali ganda tidak terpakai kepada kes ini dan jika andaian terhadap bahagian dua kali ganda terpakai dalam kes ini, andaian tersebut telah pun dipatahkan oleh niat nyata si mati. Defendan selanjutnya berhujah bahawa guaman ini adalah penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah dan bahawa plaintif-plaintif diestopkan oleh prinsip res judicata/isu estopel daripada menimbulkan isu baru adempsi menurut andaian bahagian dua kali ganda.

For cases on res judicata, see 6 Mallal's Digest (4th Ed, 2014 Reissue) paras 2936-2937.

that res judicata/issue estoppel is not applicable as the issue before the Singapore High Court was simply for a declaration that the monies held by the defendant herein belonged to the estate of the deceased. Inconsequential ancillary orders were prayed for. The Singapore court held the monies belonged to the defendant herein Mei Ling as the deceased had given these to her. The issue before this court, based on the findings of the Singapore High Court, is whether the defendant herein is obliged to account for those monies gifted to her inter vivos when sharing the assets of the estate with the plaintiffs, her brothers and beneficiaries under the deceased's will. that this application by the plaintiffs is an abuse of the court's process; that the plaintiffs are estopped by the principles of res judicata/issue estoppel from raising this fresh issue of ademption by virtue of presumption of double portions. [25] Thus this court finds that the above showed that the deceased, at the time of executing his said will, was perfectly aware that he was giving the defendant, double portions. The deceased could have reduced the defendant's double entitlement under the said will, but intentionally chose not to do so. Thus this court finds that the presumption against double

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-30 portions, if applicable to this case, has been successfully rebutted by the above evidence that the deceased did in fact intend to give double portions to the defendant.

WHETHER RES JUDICATA/ISSUE ESTOPPEL APPLIES

[26] The plaintiff contends that res judicata/issue estoppel is not applicable herein as the issue before the Singapore High Court in the Singapore suit, was simply for a declaration that the monies held by the defendant herein belonged to the estate of the deceased. The Singapore court held the monies belonged to the defendant herein, as the deceased had given these to her whilst the issue before this court, based on the findings of the said Singapore High Court, is whether the defendant herein is obliged to account for those monies gifted to her inter vivos when sharing the assets of the estate with the plaintiffs, her brothers and beneficiaries under the deceased's said will. [27] The defendant contends that this application by the plaintiffs is an abuse of the court's process and that the plaintiffs are estopped by the principles of res judicata/issue estoppel from raising this fresh issue of 'ademption by virtue of presumption of double portions. [1] The significance of res judicata lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum, which may take the form of either cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel. The cause of action estoppel arises when rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court for a particular remedy are determined in a final judgment and such right of action, that is the cause of action, merges into the said final judgment. The issue estoppel, on the other hand, means simply an issue which a party is estopped from raising in a subsequent proceeding. [2] The doctrine of res judicata is not confined to causes of action or issues which the court is actually asked to decide or has already decided. It covers also causes of action or issues or facts which, though not already decided as a result of the same not heing brought forward due to negligence, inadvertence or deliberately, are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised, that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. (Emphasis added.), The plea of res judicata encompasses two distinct forms of estoppel, ie, 'cause of action estoppel' and 'issue estoppel'... 'Issue estoppel' represents an extension of the doctrine of res judicata to include a bar on the subsequent litigation not only of all decided issues whose resolution was essential to the determination of earlier proceedings but also 'to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) SU GEOK YIAM J CIVIL SUIT NO S7-22-1036 OF 2008 26 December 2013

Legal Profession -- Practice of law -- Application for sijil annual -- Sole-proprietor (plaintiff) sued Bar Council for damages for failing to issue her SA because she had not submitted accountant's report -- Whether Bar Council acted properly -- Whether requirement for accountant's report mandated by Legal Profession Act 1976 -- Whether plaintiff failed to apply E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-31 for exemption from requirement -- Whether plaintiff's reliance on 'legitimate expectation' she would be issued SA despite not submitting accountant's report untenable for being against public policy -- Whether plaintiff failed to prove fact and quantum of alleged losses suffered from being denied SA or that she had been victimised or discriminated against -- Whether res judicata/issue estoppel barred plaintiff from re-litigating issues concerning SA conclusively determined in previous judgment of court

The plaintiff was an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya. She began practising as a sole-proprietor in October 1998 and contended that she was issued a sijil annual ('SA') by the defendant for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 even though she did not submit an accountant's report when applying for the SA for those years because she had never maintained a client's account. When she made a similar application for the SA in 2002, the defendant refused to issue her one on the ground she had failed to submit an accountant's report as was required by its Circular No 19/2001 issued to all lawyers. The requirement for submission of an accountant's report was mandated under s 79(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ('LPA'), but an applicant for the SA could apply to the defendant for exemption from that requirement. Since the plaintiff was not issued with a SA for 2002, and consequently did not have a certificate to practise ('PC') during that year, the defendant lodged a complaint with the disciplinary board under the LPA that she was carrying on practice without a valid PC. On being notified of that complaint, the plaintiff applied to the High Court ('the OS') for an order directing the defendant to issue her a SA for 2002. In response, the defendant sought a declaration that she was carrying on practice illegally. The High Court dismissed the OS, holding that the defendant could not be compelled to issue her a SA because she had not only failed to submit an accountant's report as required by s 79 of the LPA but had also not obtained an exemption from that requirement. Although the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal against that decision, her appeal was struck out when she failed to attend the appeal hearing. Her application to have the appeal reinstated failed and she took no further steps to have the appeal revived. The plaintiff claimed the defendant had denied her of a SA for the years 2002 until 2006 and that she only obtained a SA for the year 2007. In late 2008, the plaintiff filed the instant suit claiming against the defendant, inter alia, exemplary damages for its 'oppressive behaviour' towards her, special damages for loss of earnings for being disallowed to practise as a lawyer for the five years she was denied of a SA, special damages for loss of opportunity to advance in her profession/career and for loss of interest on her savings and loss of use of her savings, and general damages for anxiety, distress and loss of self-esteem. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's failure to issue her a SA for the relevant years was actuated by malice and was a pre-meditated and deliberate witch-hunt. In its defence, the defendant submitted that it had acted properly and within the law for not issuing the plaintiff a SA in 2002 and 2006. It said the plaintiff was issued a SA for 2007 because her application that year was in order. The defendant contended that the plaintiff was barred by res judicata and issue estoppel from revisiting or re-litigating in the instant suit the same issues that were canvassed before and determined by the High Court when it dismissed the OS. Since the decision in those proceedings stood unchallenged, it remained final and binding on the parties.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-32 Res judicata and issue estoppel barred the plaintiff from filing the instant suit against the defendant to claim for loss and damage allegedly suffered by her in respect of the defendant's refusal to issue her a Sijil Annual ('SA') for the year 2002 because with the dismissal of the plaintiff's OS by the High Court, its decision on the issue whether the defendant was entitled to refuse to issue the plaintiff a SA for the year 2002 and the issue whether it was entitled to request for an accountant's report from her became final and binding upon the parties (see paras 66 & 77). Plaintif merupakan seorang peguamcara dan peguambela Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya. Beliau mula beramal sebagai pemilik tunggal pada Oktober 1998 dan menghujah bahawa sijil tahunan ('ST') beliau dikeluarkan oleh defendan untuk tahun 1999, 2000 dan 2001 walaupun dia tidak mengemukakan laporan akauntan apabila dia memohon untuk ST untuk tahun tersebut kerana dia tidak pernah mengekalkan akaun klien. Apabila dia membuat permohonan yang sama untuk ST pada 2002, defendan enggan untuk mengeluarkan kepadanya atas alasan dia gagal untuk mengemukakan satu laporan akauntan seperti yang diperlukan oleh pekeliling No 19/2001 yang dikeluarkan kepada semua peguam. Keperluan untuk permohonan laporan akauntan adalah dimandatkan di bawah s 79(1) Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1976 ('APU'), tetapi seorang pemohon untuk ST boleh memohon untuk pengecualian daripada keperluan tersebut. Memandangkan plaintif tidak dikeluarkan dengan ST untuk tahun 2002, dan sehubungan dengan itu tidak memiliki sijil untuk beramal ('SA') pada tahun itu, defendan membuat satu aduan dengan lembaga disiplin di bawah APU bahawa plaintif terus beramal tanpa SA yang sah. Apabila dimaklumkan mengenai aduan tersebut, plaintif memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi ('SP') untuk satu perintah mengarahkan defendan untuk mengeluarkannya ST untuk tahun 2002. Sebagai balasan, defendan menuntut satu deklarasi bahawa dia beramal secara tidak sah. Mahkamah Tinggi menolak SP, memutuskan bahawa defendan tidak boleh dipaksa untuk mengeluarkan ST kepadanya kerana dia bukan sahaja gagal untuk mengemukakan laporan akauntan seperti yang diperlukan oleh s 79 APU tetapi juga tidak mendapatkan pengecualian daripada keperluan tersebut. Walaupun perayu merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan tersebut, rayuannya ditolak apabila dia gagal menghadiri pendengaran rayuan. Permohonannya untuk rayuan tersebut dikembalikan gagal dan dia tidak mengambil langkah seterusnya untuk mengembalikan rayuan tersebut. Plaintif mendakwa defendan telah menafikan ST untuk tahun 2002 sehingga 2006 dan bahawa dia hanya memperoleh ST untuk tahun 2007. Pada penghujung tahun 2008, plaintif memfailkan guaman ini mendakwa terhadap defendan, antara lainnya, ganti rugi teladan untuk 'kelakuan menindas' defendan terhadapnya, ganti rugi khas untuk kehilangan pendapatan kerana tidak dibenarkan untuk beramal sebagai seorang peguam untuk tempoh lima tahun dia dinafikan ST, ganti rugi khas untuk kehilangan peluang untuk maju dalam profesion/kerjaya dan untuk kehilangan faedah ke atas simpanannya, kerugian menggunakan simpanannya dan ganti rugi am untuk kebimbangan, kerunsingan dan kehilangan harga diri. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa kegagalan defendan untuk mengeluarkan ST untuk tahun relevan tersebut didorong oleh busuk hati dan dirancang dan 'witch-hunt' yang disengajakan. Dalam pembelaannya, defendan menghujah bahawa dia telah bertindak sewajarnya dan dalam batasan undang-undang dengan tidak mengeluarkan plaintif ST pada tahun 2002 dan 2006. Defendan mengatakan bahawa plaintif dikeluarkan dengan ST pada tahun 2007 kerana permohonannya pada tahun tersebut adalah teratur. Defendan menegaskan bahawa plaintiff dihalang oleh res judicata dan isu estoppel daripada menyemak semula atau melitigasi semula guaman ini tentang isu yang sama yang telah dikemukakan di hadapan dan diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi apabila mahkamah E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-33 menolak SP. Memandangkan keputusan dalam prosiding tersebut kekal tidak dicabar, keputusan tersebut kekal muktamad dan mengikat ke atas pihak-pihak.

Res judicata dan isu estoppel menghalang plaintif daripada memfailkan guaman ini terhadap defendan untuk menuntut terhadap kerugian dan ganti rugi yang didakwa dialaminya berhubung keengganan defendan untuk mengeluarkan Sijil Tahunan ('ST') kepadanya pada tahun 2002 kerana dengan penolakan SP plaintif oleh Mahkamah Tinggi, keputusan mahkamah ke atas isu sama ada defendan berhak untuk enggan mengeluarkan plaintif ST untuk tahun 2002 dan isu sama ada mahkamah berhak untuk meminta laporan akauntan daripadanya menjadi muktamad dan mengikat ke atas pihak-pihak (lihat perenggan 66 & 77). [52] Therefore, the plaintiff is precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel from raising and re-litigating the same issues before this court. whether the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel are applicable to bar the plaintiff's present suit in respect of the defendant's refusal to issue to the plaintiff the sijil annual for the year 2002? [61] On 14 August 2013, the court agreed with and accepted the submissions of and the authorities cited by Mr Ang Hean Leng, learned counsel for the defendant, in support of his submissions that the plaintiff was estopped from re-agitating and re-litigating the refusal of the defendant to issue to her the sijil annual for the year 2002 and that the plaintiff's claims which were anchored on that ground and that the plaintiff's claims for loss and damage allegedly suffered by her in respect of the defendant's alleged oppressive conduct towards her in victimising her and subjecting her to a witch hunt from 1998-2002 ought to be dismissed based on the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel. [66] The doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel bar the plaintiff from filing the present suit against the defendant to claim for loss and damage allegedly suffered by the plaintiff in respect of the refusal of the defendant to issue to the plaintiff the sijil annual for the year 2002 because the decision of the High Court in the plaintiff's OS has become final and binding on the plaintiff. [77] Therefore, in my judgment, the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel are applicable because the decision of that High Court on the issue whether the defendant was entitled to refuse to issue to the plaintiff the ' sijil annual' for the year 2002 has already become final and binding upon the parties and the issue whether the defendant is entitled to request for an accountant's report from the plaintiff has also become final and binding upon the parties in respect of the plaintiff's application for the sijil annual for the year 2002. [84] This court further noted that it was against the decision and findings of that High Court as set out above that the plaintiff, being dissatisfied and aggrieved, filed a notice of appeal to the COA ('the plaintiff's appeal').

Doctrine of res judicata, doctrine of issue estoppel and doctrine of stare decisis

[85] I shall now deal with the doctrine of res judicata, the doctrine of issue estoppel and the doctrine of stare decisis since these three doctrines have been raised by both parties in their respective submissions to support their respective contentions. [86] In this regard, it was apparent to this court that the plaintiff had mistaken the doctrine of E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-34 res judicata and the doctrine of issue estoppel for the doctrine of stare decisis, which, in my judgment, is not applicable at all in this case. An 'affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of transactions and that could have been -- but was not -- raised in the first suit. The three essential elements are (1) an earlier decision on the issue, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the involvement of the same parties, or parties in privity with the original parties. Restatement (Second) of Judgments SS17, 24 (1982) -- Also termed res adjudicata; claim preclusion; doctrine of res judicata. CF. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. [Cases judgment 540, 584, 984(1)]. 'Res judicata' has been used in this section as a general term referring to all of the ways in which one judgment will have a binding effect on another. That usage is and doubtless will continue to be common, but it lumps under a single name two quite different effects of judgment. The first is the effect of foreclosing any litigation of matters that never have been litigated, because of the determination that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit. The second is the effect of foreclosing relitigation of matters that have once been litigated and decided. The first of these, preclusion of matters that were never litigated, has gone under the name, 'true res judicata,' or the names, 'merger' and 'bar'. The second doctrine, preclusion of matters that have once been decided, has usually been called 'collateral estoppel'. Professor Allan Vestal has long argued for the use of the names 'claim preclusion' and 'issue preclusion' for these two doctrines [ Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 St Louis U.L.J 29 (1964)], and this usage is increasingly employed by the courts as it is by Restatement Second of Judgments'. Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts S100A, at 722-23 (5th Ed 1994). [91] The principle that inferior courts are not bound to follow by way of precedent, the decisions that were made per incuriam by a superior court is inapplicable to the instant case. This principle is also known as the per incuriam principle. It is not a defence to the doctrine of res judicata. This principle relates to judicial decisions which have been wrongly decided. It is one exception to the rule of stare decisis. [93] Based on the meanings assigned to the expressions 'res judicata', 'per incuriam' and 'stare decisis' as set out above, it is clear that the legal principles contained in the two doctrines ie the doctrine of res judicata and the doctrine of stare decisis, are wholly different because they are actually based on different concepts in the law. [94] Hence, the court agreed with and accepted the defendant's submissions that the misconceived notion put forward by the plaintiff to this court ie that this court could override the judgment of that High Court merely because this court is of co-ordinate jurisdiction with that High Court, would go against the very premise of the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel, thereby allowing a litigant to re-litigate an issue already decided by a court of law and in the process open the floodgates to never ending litigation. This is because every unsuccessful litigant would then invariably contend that the judicial decision made earlier against the litigant had been wrongly decided. [95] In the instant case, bearing in mind that the parties in the plaintiff's OS are also the same parties in the instant case and the plaintiff is also raising the same issue before this court, the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel are, undoubtedly, applicable to estop or bar or prohibit the plaintiff from re-opening and re-agitating the same issue in this suit because the plaintiff's appeal at the COA is no longer pending resulting in the matter becoming final and binding as between the parties in the plaintiff's OS.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-35 [100] The following cases on the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel are also relevant, applicable to the facts of the instant case and binding on this court based on the doctrine of stare decisis: What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation -- interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action -- nemo debet bis vexari pro. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall be not adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter -- whether on a question of fact or a question of law -- has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in s 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where s 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct.

The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. [103] In my view, all matters in respect of the correctness or the validity or otherwise of the defendant's refusal to issue the sijil annual for the year 2002 to the plaintiff would also be res judicata, regardless of whether it was pleaded or raised in the plaintiff's OS, as long as it forms part of the matters which could and, therefore, should have been litigated in the plaintiff's OS. This is known as res judicata 'in the wider sense' or issue estoppel. [105] In the instant case, it is clear (1) that the same question on the refusal of issuance of the sijil annual for the year 2002 has been decided by the High Court in the plaintiff's OS; (2) that the High Court judgment in the plaintiff's OS is final given the two COA orders dated 30 November 2009 and 12 March 2013, respectively; and (3) that the parties are clearly the same. Hence, the matters in the instant suit are res judicata (see also Chan Tuck Seng v Chan Lee @ Chan Kong Chai & Ors [2004] 3 MLJ 62, at p 75). [14] However, it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs that the issue pertaining to ownership of the titles (Miss Tourism Malaysia and Miss Tourism International) could not have been ventilated at the originating summons action as the relief sought there was merely for an injunction. But the pertinent question is this: why were the prayers for declarations (which are now sought in the present writ action) not sought in the earlier originating summons action? After all the basic position taken by the first plaintiff in the present writ action is the same as that taken by him in the previous originating summons E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-36 action: that the titles belong to him. When the issues could have been raised in the earlier originating summons proceeding, they ought to have been so raised by the first plaintiff in that earlier proceeding. By reason of the principle of res judicata the first plaintiff could no longer raise the issues now in the present writ action. The principle is clearly laid down in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313 where Wigram VC said (at p 319) : [Where] a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. [110] Even assuming for a moment, that the plaintiff did not file the plaintiff's OS and hence there was no final and binding judgment of that High Court on this court by virtue of the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel, in my judgment, issue (2) ought still to be decided in the affirmative in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. [122] Firstly, this was an issue that had formed part of the decision in the plaintiff's OS proceedings. Hence, the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel were applicable to bar her from raising the same issue in the plaintiff's present suit against the defendant. [160] In any event, the issue of bad faith, etc surrounding the non-issuance of the sijil annual for the year 2002 to the plaintiff had already been raised by the plaintiff in the plaintiff's OS and decided upon by that High Court. Even if she had accidentally or inadvertently overlooked to raise it in her OS, it is fatal to her claim in this suit because she should have raised it then. Hence, the issue is res judicata and the plaintiff's attempt in this suit to raise it again must necessarily fail (see Datuk Ooi Han Eng & Anor v Soh Huang Siah (carrying on business through an organization known as Alaric's Productions Co)). thirdly, the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel were applicable against the plaintiff because the letter dated 26 November 2001 was exhibited in the plaintiff's OS proceedings (see p 21, para 9, Bundle E) and the plaintiff had in fact raised the same argument in her OS proceedings (see pp 21, 70, 71, Bundle E). HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) MARY LIM J CIVIL SUIT NO 22C-33-07 OF 2013 16 October 2013

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Issue estoppel -- Application to strike out action -- Whether case abuse of court process -- Whether issues raised same as issues determined in earlier suit -- Plaintiff attempting to revisit and impugn decision in earlier suit -- Document relied upon by plaintiff in present suit already considered and rejected by Federal Court during application for leave to appeal in earlier suit -- Whether need for finality in litigation -- Whether doctrine of res judicata engaged

Civil Procedure -- Striking out -- Application to strike out action -- Res judicata -- Whether E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-37 scandalous or abuse of court process -- Whether issues raised same as issues determined in earlier suit -- Plaintiff attempting to revisit and impugn decision in earlier suit -- Document relied upon by plaintiff in present suit already considered and rejected by Federal Court during application for leave to appeal in earlier suit -- Whether need for finality in litigation -- Whether doctrine of res judicata engaged

The defendants were owners of units in a residential project known as 'the Casa Vinca Apartments' in Kuah, Langkawi. Sometime in 2003, landslides occurred causing damage to certain units in the Casa Vinca Apartments. Consultants inspected the damaged units and recommended that various units including the defendants' units to be demolished and to be rebuilt. The local municipal council, Majlis Perbandaran Langkawi ('MPL') also issued a demolition notice dated 23 December 2003 ordering certain buildings of the Casa Vinca Apartments to be demolished as it was of the view that they were dangerous and unsafe to the occupiers. The order included the defendants' properties. The defendants' units were insured with the plaintiff under a fire 'Insurance Master Policy'. The defendants filed a claim with the plaintiff under the insurance policy. In dealing with the defendants' claims, the plaintiff proposed rectification or reinstatement works instead of demolishing the properties. MPL was prepared to retract the demolition notice if the plaintiff was prepared to guarantee that the affected units be reinstated properly and safely. Reinstatement works were carried out and a certificate of practical completion was issued. However, the defendants claimed that those works were not properly carried out and that the affected properties remained unsafe and structurally unstable. The defendants also asserted that the reinstatement works had been carried out without MPL's approval and while the demolition notice was still in force. The defendants refused to take possession of the properties or to occupy them. Instead, they insisted on payment under the insurance policies to which the plaintiff refused. An earlier suit was filed in 2005 premised on allegations of breaches of the insurance policy and for defective rectification or reinstatement works. The court in that suit allowed the defendants' claim on 18 June 2010 and that decision was upheld on appeal. Leave to appeal to the Federal Court was refused on 20 June 2013. On 4 June 2013, MPL had revoked the earlier demolition notice with immediate effect. The plaintiff claimed that such a revocation must necessarily mean that the MPL was satisfied that the affected units or properties had been properly and safely rectified. The plaintiff thus filed the present proceedings seeking declaration that the effect of the letter meant that it should not be liable to pay any costs of demolishing and rebuilding the affected units. According to the plaintiff, the withdrawal of the demolition notice was not before the court throughout the 2005 Suit proceedings. The defendants applied to strike out the plaintiff's claim under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012. The defendants argued that the matter was res judicata on the grounds that MPL's withdrawal letter was in existence at the time of the application before the Federal Court. Despite having seen the said letter, the Federal Court was not persuaded to grant leave.

From the papers related to the application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court, it was fairly evident that the plaintiff was attempting to make its case under s 96 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 by referring to the withdrawal letter issued by MPL. This letter was in fact exhibited and was referred to in the plaintiff's submissions before the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-38 Federal Court. The Federal Court must not have accepted this submission since the Federal Court refused to grant leave to appeal. Hence, the doctrine of res judicata was engaged. The material which the plaintiff sought to adduce here was the very same material which the plaintiff pivoted and pitched its case in its application for leave at the Federal Court. Justice demands that there is finality in litigation and the courts have a responsibility to prevent abuse of its process by checking such actions. The intention of the plaintiff was not only revisit but to impugn the decision in the 2005 Suit (see paras 29 & 33-34). Defendan-defendan merupakan pemilik kepada unit-unit projek perumahan yang dikenali sebagai 'Apartmen Casa Vinca' di Kuah, Langkawi. Sekitar tahun 2003, tanah runtuh berlaku menyebabkan kerosakan kepada beberapa unit di Apartmen Casa Vinca. Konsultan-konsultan memeriksa unit-unit yang rosak dan mencadangkan bahawa beberapa unit termasuk unit-unit defendan diruntuhkan dan dibina semula. Majlis perbandaran tempatan, Majlis Perbandaran Langkawi ('MPL') juga mengeluarkan notis perobohan bertarikh 23 Disember 2003 mengarahkan bangunan tertentu di Apartmen Casa Vinca dirobohkan memandangkan bangunan tersebut berbahaya dan tidak selamat kepada penghuni-penghuni. Perintah tersebut termasuk hartanah defendan-defendan. Unit-unit defendan diinsuranskan dengan plaintif di bawah 'Polisi Induk Insurans' kebakaran. Defendan-defendan memfailkan tuntutan terhadap plaintif di bawah polisi insurans. Dalam menguruskan tuntutan defendan-defendan, plaintif mencadangkan pembaikian atau pemuliharaan kerja-kerja daripada merobohkan hartanah. MPL bersedia untuk menarik balik notis perobohan sekiranya plaintif bersedia untuk menjamin bahawa unit-unit yang terjejas akan dipulihara sebaiknya dengan selamat. Kerja-kerja pemuliharaan dijalankan dan satu sijil siap kerja dikeluarkan. Walau bagaimanapun, defendan-defendan mendakwa bahawa kerja-kerja tersebut tidak dilaksanakan dengan betul dan bahawa hartanah yang terjejas kekal tidak selamat dan secara strukturnya tidak stabil. Defendan-defendan juga menegaskan bahawa kerja-kerja pemuliharaan telah dijalankan tanpa kelulusan MPL dan semasa notis perobohan masih berkuatkuasa. Defendan-defendan enggan untuk mengambil milikan hartanah atau mendiaminya. Sebaliknya, mereka mendesak untuk bayaran di bawah polisi-polisi insurans yang kemudiannya dinafikan plaintif. Guaman terdahulu difailkan pada tahun 2005 berpremiskan dakwaan pelanggaran polisi insurans dan untuk pembaikan kecacatan atau kerja-kerja pemuliharaan. Mahkamah dalam guaman tersebut membenarkan tuntutan defendan-defendan pada 18 Jun 2010 dan bahawa keputusan tersebut ditegakkan semasa rayuan. Kebenaran untuk merayu kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan dinafikan pada 20 Jun 2013. Pada 4 Jun 2013, MPL telah membatalkan notis perobohan terdahulu berkuat kuasa serta-merta. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa pembatalan tersebut semestinya bermaksud bahawa MPL berpuas hati bahawa unit-unit yang terjejas atau hartanah telah diperbetulkan dengan betul dan selamat. Plaintif dengan itu memfailkan prosiding ini menuntut deklarasi bahawa kesan surat tersebut bermaksud bahawa plaintif tidak bertanggungan untuk membayar apa-apa kos meroboh dan membina semula unit-unit yang terjejas. Menurut plaintif, pembatalan notis perobohan tidak dikemukakan di mahkamah sepanjang prosiding Guaman 2005. Defendan-defendan memohon untuk menolak tuntutan plaintif di bawah A 18 k 19(1)(a), (b), (c) dan (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. Defendan-defendan menghujahkan bahawa perkara tersebut adalah res judicata atas alasan bahawa pembatalan surat MPL telah wujud pada masa permohonan di hadapan Mahkamah Persekutuan. Walaupun telah melihat surat tersebut, Mahkamah Persekutuan tidak dipengaruhi untuk memberikan kebenaran.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-39

Daripada dokumen-dokumen berkenaan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu ke Mahkamah Persekutuan, adalah agak jelas bahawa plaintif cuba untuk membuktikan kesnya di bawah s 96 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 dengan merujuk kepada pembatalan surat yang dikeluarkan oleh MPL. Surat ini sebenarnya telah diekshibitkan dan dirujuk dalam hujahan plaintif di hadapan Mahkamah Persekutuan. Mahkamah Persekutuan tidak seharusnya menerima hujahan ini memandangkan Mahkamah Persekutuan enggan untuk membenarkan kebenaran untuk merayu. Oleh itu, doktrin res judicata digunakan. Material yang mana plaintif memohon untuk mengemukakan di sini adalah material yang sama di mana plaintif bergantung dan bersandarkan kesnya dalam permohonannya untuk kebenaran di Mahkamah Persekutuan. Keadilan menuntut bahawa terdapat kemuktamadan di dalam litigasi dan mahkamah mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk mengelak penyalahgunaan prosesnya dengan memeriksa tindakan tersebut. Niat plaintif bukan hanya untuk menilai semula tetapi untuk mencabar keputusan dalam Guaman 2005 (lihat perenggan 29 & 33-34). [16] Meanwhile, the defendants have filed an application for the plaintiff's claim to be struck out under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012. The defendants argued that the matter was res judicata and that the claim ought to be struck out for the reasons found in r 19(1)(a) -- (d). [18] The law on the striking out of claims etc under O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 is trite. The Supreme Court in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 has unequivocally held that the court should only allow this summary process in plain and obvious cases 'when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable'.

RES JUDICATA AND FRESH EVIDENCE

[19] Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783, the defendants have invoked the doctrine of res judicata. Having examined the cause papers before the Federal Court, especially the affidavit filed in support of the application for leave to appeal under s 96 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ('Act 91'); and having seen the submissions, the defendants pointed out that MPL's letter was in existence at the time of the application before the Federal Court. Despite having heard counsel and having seen the papers (including the recent letter from MPL) which are premised on the same arguments as presently made, the Federal Court was not persuaded to grant leave. The doctrine of res judicata applies to prevent abuse of court process and relitigation of the matter. [20] In response to the issue of res judicata, the plaintiff's short answer is that the principle is not engaged here because this fresh piece of evidence was never considered and determined by the court in the earlier proceedings. In those proceedings before the Federal Court, the test was one under s 96 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, whether leave to appeal ought to be granted; and not about fresh evidence. There is therefore no relitigation. [28] The plaintiff is therefore right when it submitted that a fresh action is required to relook the matters in the 2005 Suit. To that extent, its action is correct and this is consistent with of the Federal Court's observations in Serac Asia 's case as set out above. However, whether this fresh action is plagued by problems of duplicity, res judicata are matters properly and E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-40 appropriately taken up by the defendants in their application. [32] The Court of Appeal in Chee Pok Choy & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 346; [2001] 2 CLJ 321 explained that the doctrine of res judicata was not a rule of pleading but was a principle 'of substantial justice'. When applied, it 'precluded parties from re-agitating in subsequent proceedings a complaint or an issue that has, or could have fairly have been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties or their privies'. [33] Given the circumstances as explained earlier, it is safe and reasonable to say that the Federal Court must not have accepted this submission as despite these arguments and the reasons for how and why this letter from MPL came to pass, the Federal Court refused to grant leave to appeal and to revisit the earlier decision(s). In which case, the doctrine of res judicata is engaged. This material which the plaintiff seeks to adduce here was the very same material which the plaintiff pivoted and pitched its case in its application for leave at the Federal Court. Justice demands that there is finality in litigation and the courts have a responsibility to prevent abuse of its process by checking such actions as that presented today. As a principle of substantial justice, the principle of res judicata precludes all parties, not excepting the parties before the court today, from 're-agitating in subsequent proceedings a complaint or an issue that has ... been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties ...'. HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) S NANTHA BALAN JC CIVIL SUIT NO 21NCVC-24-05 OF 2012 21 March 2014

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Issue estoppel -- Sessions court in first suit held plaintiff wholly liable for medical negligence to patient and absolved defendants of negligence -- Defendants not parties or privies to first suit but only testified for patient during trial -- Subsequent action by plaintiff to seek contribution/indemnity from defendants -- Whether defendants could invoke res judicata/issue estoppel to strike out plaintiff's action -- Whether fact defendants not parties to first suit immaterial as issue of negligence determined finally as between plaintiff and defendants -- Whether plaintiff's action abuse of process

Was an issue that had been determined as between the parties herein by the sessions court in a previous suit ('the first suit') res judicata as between them even though the defendants were not parties or privies to the first suit? The defendants herein contended that the answer to that question was yes and that they were entitled to raise the plea of res judicata/issue estoppel in the instant suit to preclude the plaintiff from relitigating that issue. In the first suit, a patient ('Zalina') of the plaintiff ('Dr Aishah') had sued the latter for medical negligence for failing to remove the placenta after Zalina had delivered her first child at Dr Aishah's clinic. The day after the delivery, Zalina fell ill and she was eventually admitted to the Hospital Pulau Pinang ('HPP') where ultrasound investigation by the third defendant ('D3') found she had an unremoved placenta. The second defendant ('D2') performed a dilatation and curettage ('D&C') to remove the placenta but following the procedure Zalina started bleeding profusely necessitating an emergency hysterectomy which was done by the first defendant ('D1'). The first four defendants herein were all government servants at the time serving at HPP. The fourth defendant's role in the case was unclear from Dr Aishah's pleadings. In the first suit, Dr E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-41 Aishah denied negligence on her part, asserting that Zalina did not have a case of 'retained placenta', and blamed the first to the fourth defendants herein for negligently finding that she had that problem and then negligently performing the D&C procedure necessitating the hysterectomy. Despite her contentions, Dr Aishah did not add HPP or any of the defendants as parties to the first suit. D1, D2 and D3, however, testified for Zalina at the trial of the first suit and defended themselves against allegations that they were negligent in their treatment of her. Finding as a fact that Zalina did suffer from a retained placenta, the sessions court found Dr Aishah wholly liable and absolved the doctors at HPP of any negligence. The sessions court's decision was upheld on appeal by the High Court and Dr Aishah did not appeal the matter further. In the instant suit, Dr Aishah sought contribution and/or indemnity from the defendants premised on the decision in the first suit and further contended that HPP and its doctors gave false evidence and suppressed material facts during the trial of the first suit causing the decision to go against her. The defendants applied under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 to strike out Dr Aishah's instant action on the ground her claim was not only time barred under the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 ('the PAPA') but was an abuse of process for seeking to relitigate the issue of negligence already determined in the first suit. Dr Aishah argued that her suit was neither time barred under the PAPA nor an abuse of process as the allegations of fraud and perjury against the defendants should be allowed to be ventilated and determined. She also contended that the defendants were not entitled to raise the plea of res judicata/issue estoppel as they were not parties or privies to the first suit but only participated therein as witnesses.

Nothwithstanding the fact HPP and its doctors were neither parties nor privies to the first suit, the facts and circumstances were such that they had participated in that suit as witnesses and a ruling on the issue of liability was made in their favour. As such, a fresh suit against them based on essentially the same issue was an abuse of process and the plea of res judicata/issue estoppel succeeded. There had to be finality to the litigation. It was unjust and oppressive to allow Dr Aishah to drag HPP and its doctors through another round of litigation to re-litigate the same issue (see paras 77-78). It could not be said that merely because the defendants were not parties to the first suit they should be denied the right to raise the plea of res judicata. Certain compelling circumstances -- the present case being an example -- might warrant a departure from the requirement for privity of interest where to insist on it would be unfair or oppressive or even an abuse of process. In the first suit, HPP and its doctors were in pith and substance 'on trial' on the issue of their alleged negligence in the diagnosis, treatment and management of Zalina. Since the finding on that issue was in favour of HPP and its doctors, that issue was barred by issue estoppel from being resurrected in the present suit (see paras 71-72). The defendants' reliance on limitation under the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 was not tenable as time in respect of Dr Aishah's claim for indemnity and/or contribution only ran from the date she was found liable to Zalina by the sessions court. That fact, however, did not defeat the plea of res judicata taken by the defendants (see paras 33, 36 & 38). Adalah suatu isu yang telah ditentukan antara pihak-pihak di sini oleh mahkamah sesyen dalam guaman sebelum ini ('guaman pertama') res judicata antara mereka meskipun E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-42 defendan-defendan bukan pihak-pihak atau privi-privi kepada guaman pertama? Defendan-defendan di sini berhujah bahawa jawapan kepada persoalan itu adalah ya dan bahawa mereka berhak menimbulkan pli res judicata/isu estopel dalam guaman ini untuk menghalang plaintif daripada membicarakan semula isu tersebut. Dalam guaman pertama, pesakit ('Zalina') plaintif ('Dr Aishah') telah menyaman Dr Aishah untuk kecuaian perubatan kerana gagal mengeluarkan uri selepas Zalina melahirkan anak pertamanya di klinik Dr Aishah. Sehari selepas melahirkan anak itu, Zalina jatuh sakit dan dia akhirnya telah dimasukkan ke Hospital Pulau Pinang ('HPP') di mana penyelidikan gelombang bunyi ultra oleh defendan ketiga ('D3') mendapati dia mempunyai uri yang tidak dikeluarkan. Defendan kedua ('D2') telah melalakukan dilatasi dan pengkuretan ('D&C') untuk mengeluarkan uri itu tetapi berikutan prosedur itu Zalina mula mengalami pendarahan yang banyak sehingga histerektomi kecemasan perlu dilakukan oleh defendan pertama ('D1'). Keempat-empat defendan pertama di sini kesemuanya adalah kakitangan kerajaan pada masa berkhidmat di HPP. Peranan defendan keempat dalam kes ini adalah tidak jelas berdasarkan pliding Dr Aishah. Dalam guaman pertama, Dr Aishah menafikan kecuaian di pihaknya, dengan menegaskan bahawa Zalina tidak mempunyai kes 'retained placenta', dan menyalahkan defendan-defendan pertama hingga keempat di sini kerana dengan cuai mendapati bahawa dia mempunyai masalah tersebut dan kemudian dengan cuai melakukan prosedur D&C sehingga histerektomi diperlukan. Walaupun terdapat hujahannya, Dr Aishah tidak memasukkan HPP atau mana-mana defendan itu sebagai pihak-pihak dalam guaman pertama. D1, D2 dan D3, bagaimanapun, memberi keterangan untuk Zalina semasa perbicaraan guaman pertama dan membela diri mereka terhadap dakwaan-dakwaan bahawa mereka telah cuai dalam rawatan mereka terhadapnya. Dengan membuat penemuan fakta bahawa Zalina sememangnya mengalami uri yang tidak dikeluarkan, mahkamah sesyen mendapati Dr Aishah bertanggungjawab secara keseluruhannya dan membebaskan doktor-doktor di HPP daripada apa-apa kecuaian. Keputusan mahkamah sesyen telah dikekalkan atas rayuan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dan Dr Aishah tidak merayu perkara itu selanjutnya. Dalam guaman ini, Dr Aishah memohon sumbangan dan/atau ganti rugi daripada defendan-defendan berdasarkan keputusan dalam guaman pertama dan selanjutnya menegaskan bahawa HPP dan doktor-doktornya telah memberikan keterangan palsu dan menyembunyikan fakta penting semasa perbicaraan guaman pertama sehingga menyebabkan keputusan tidak menyebelahinya. Defendan-defendan memohon di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 untuk membatalkan tindakan Dr Aishah ini atas alasan tuntutannya bukan sahaja di luar had masa di bawah Akta Perlindungan Pihak-Pihak Berkuasa Awam 1948 ('APPPBK') tetapi adalah penyalahgunaan proses untuk memohon perbicaraan semula isu kecuaian yang telah pun ditentukan dalam guaman pertama. Dr Aishah berhujah bahawa guamannya tidak luput had masa di bawah APPPBK dan bukan suatu penyalahgunaan proses kerana dakwaan-dakwaan penipuan dan sumpah palsu terhadap defendan-defendan patut dibenarkan untuk dibicarakan dan ditentukan. Dia juga berhujah bahawa defendan-defendan tidak berhak menimbulkan pli res judicata/isu estopel kerana mereka bukan pihak-pihak atau privi-privi kepada guaman pertama tetapi hanya terlibat sebagai saksi-saksi.

Walaupun kenyataan bahawa HPP dan doktor-doktornya bukan pihak-pihak atau privi-privi kepada guaman pertama, fakta dan keadaan sedemikian sehinggakan mereka telah terlibat dalam guaman tersebut sebagai saksi-saksi dan satu keputusan berhubung E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-43 isu liabiliti telah dibuat menyebelahi pihak mereka. Oleh itu, guaman baru terhadap mereka berdasarkan pada asasnya isu yang sama adalah penyalahgunaan proses dan pli res judicata/isu estopel berjaya. Perlu ada kemuktamadan tindakan undang-undang. Adalah tidak adil dan bersifat menindas untuk membenarkan Dr Aishah mengheret HPP dan doktor-doktornya melalui satu lagi pusingan litigasi untuk membuat litigasi semula berhubung isu yang sama (lihat perenggan 77-78). Tidak boleh dikatakan hanya kerana defendan-defendan bukan pihak-pihak kepada guaman pertama maka mereka patut dinafikan hak untuk menimbulkan pli res judicata. Beberapa keadaan tertentu yang menarik -- sebagai contoh kes ini -- mungkin mewajarkan penyimpangan daripada keperluan untuk priviti kepentingan yang mana untuk berkeras untuknya adalah tidak adil atau bersifat menindas atau suatu penyalahgunaan proses. Dalam guaman pertama, HPP dan doktor-doktornya 'on trial' berhubung isu dakwaan tentang kecuaian mereka dalam diagnosis, rawatan dan pengendalian Zalina. Oleh kerana penemuan berhubung isu tersebut menyebelahi HPP dan doktor-doktornya, isu tersebut dihalang oleh isu estopel daripada dibangkitkan semula dalam guaman ini (lihat perenggan 71-72). Kebergantungan defendan-defendan kepada had masa di bawah APPPPBK tidak dapat dipertahankan kerana masa berkenaan tuntutan Dr Aishah untuk ganti rugi dan/atau sumbangan hanya bermula dari tarikh dia didapati bertanggungjawab kepada Zalina oleh mahkamah sesyen. Fakta tersebut, bagaimanapun, tidak menyangkal pli res judicata yang diambil oleh defendan-defendan (lihat perenggan 33, 36 & 38). [4] The outcome of the first suit was that the present plaintiff was found to be negligent whereas the defendants were exonerated of any negligence. The plaintiff now seeks to revisit the issue of the defendants' alleged negligence. In response, the defendants have raised the plea of res judicata (issue estoppel) with respect to the issue of negligence which had been previously raised and which the court had ruled in their favour. [5] The issue now is whether res judicata may be relied upon in a situation where the party raising the plea of res judicata was not a party to previous litigation but had participated in the previous litigation as a relevant witness and where they had faced an allegation of negligence in respect of which the court had ruled in their favour. [6] Put in another way, the issue in the present case is whether the plaintiff, as the unsuccessful party in the previous litigation, is entitled to commence fresh litigation against a witness who was embroiled in the issue of liability and raise the same issue of liability which had already been determined in the previous litigation. Since the defendants were not parties to the previous litigation, the core question is whether res judicata can apply, where parties are not the same and/or where there is no privity of interest. The context in which the issue has arisen can be gleaned from the background to the present litigation which is discussed below.

THE FIRST SUIT

[31] The defendants have applied to strike out the suit under O 18 r 19(1)(a) or (b) or (d) of the ROC. Essentially, the defendants maintain that the present suit is barred by limitation and is in any event an abuse of process in light of their plea of res judicata. [36] Following Mat Abu's case, it would appear that for purposes of limitation vis-a-vis a claim for contribution and/or indemnity against HPP and its doctors as joint tortfeasors, time runs from the date when Dr Aishah was found liable to Zalina. In my view, Mat Abu's case E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-44 only answers the limitation issue, whereas here the issue is res judicata, which precludes a party from raising the same issue which has already been adjucated upon in previous proceedings in circumstances where to allow such an issue to be raised would constitute an abuse of process. [38] Hence, inspite of the pronouncement made in Mat Abu's case I take the view that in certain circumstances if a party fails to add another party as a third party or co-defendant, then the fact that limitation has not begun to run will not necessarily defeat a plea of res judicata. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that it is not only expedient but may also be imperative that all necessary parties be included either as third parties or as co-defendants at the earliest possible opportunity and most certainly before the start of the trial so that the forensic trial process need not be duplicated later by way of fresh proceedings as is being attempted in this case. [40] Also, in my view, Dato' Abul Hassan's case does not denude the plea of res judicata as the independent nature and quality of a suit for indemnity or contribution (whether by way of a fresh suit or otherwise) is no answer to a plea of res judicata. [41] In the result, whilst I accept the principles enunciated in these cases, I do not see them as authorities capable of emasculating a plea of res judicata. As was rightly observed by the learned sessions judge, Dr Aishah took no steps to join HPP and its doctors as third parties to the first suit, in circumstances where it was or should have been obvious that HPP and its doctors ought to have been added as parties especially since Dr Aishah was making a direct attack on them and as the issue of their alleged negligence was a live issue at the trial in the first suit. [42] As I stated earlier, it was open to Dr Aishah to have joined HPP and its doctors either as third parties under O 16 or as co-defendants under O 15 of the Rules of the Subordinate Courts 1980. But Dr Aishah chose not to do so. Had she done so and brought HPP and its doctors into the first suit either as third parties or co-defendants, then she would have had every opportunity for seeking further and better particulars, discovery and to administer interrogatories so that all the cards are on the table in the first suit.

MEANING OF RES JUDICATA

[43] As I said earlier, the issue here is not one of limitation and the only ground that is tenable and which ought to be considered is the plea of res judicata. Before venturing further, it is apposite to remind ourselves as to the meaning of res judicata. In this regard, it is useful and necessary to refer to the lucid decision of the Federal Court in the case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783 at p 197 (MLJ); p 791 (CLJ) where res judicata was defined as follows:

Res judicata is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, (7th Ed), as follows: WHETHER RES JUDICATA APPLIES

[45] We may now examine whether res judicata applies to the fact of the present case. In this regard, it cannot be disputed that the issue of liability of HPP and its doctors for negligence was extant in the first suit and was adjudicated and ruled upon by the sessions judge in favour of HPP and its doctors. [49] Counsel for Dr Aishah maintains that the plea of res judicata is not sustainable as HPP and its doctors were merely witnesses and were not parties to the first suit by Zalina and neither were they privies to the suit. It was contended for Dr Aishah that the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel is only applicable between Dr Aishah and HPP and its doctors if they were all parties to the previous action.

PARTIES OR PRIVIES TO PREVIOUS LITIGATION

[50] In this regard, reference was made to Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783 where it was stated that for res judicata or issue estoppel to apply, identity of parties is an essential pre-requisite. [53] Next, counsel for Dr Aishah relied upon Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 54 ('Gleeson v J Wippell') where the scope of the doctrine of res judicata was explained. Gleeson v J Wippell concerned a case of copyright infringement in respect of a shirt, where one alleged infringer was unsuccessfully sued and a subsequent fresh action was commenced against another infringer. The fresh action was allowed to proceed. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that her designs of the shirt were copied by Wippell and Wippell's infringing design was in turn copied by Denne. Gleeson first sued Denne, where employees of Wippell testified in favour of Denne. The first suit was decided against the plaintiff. The plaintiff then brought a fresh action against Wippell who then applied to strike on the suit on a plea of res judicata. for res judicata to apply, it is not sufficient that the plaintiff was the same but the defendants in both actions must also have been the same or the initial defendant and the subsequent defendant were privies in interest; Teguh Consolidated Sdn Bhd v Talam Corp Bhd (Malayan Banking Bhd, third party) [1996] 5 MLJ 664 where the High Court referred to it for the proposition that res judicata only applies where there is identity of parties or their privies; and [61] But the point remains that a specific finding of no negligence was made in favour of HPP and its doctors.The question is not one of risk of liability being made against HPP and its doctors but the possibility of of a finding of negligence being made against them. That possibility was always there, except that in the first suit, that possibility dissipated or evaporated as the learned sessions judge made a finding of fact that Dr Aishah was negligent and that HPP and its doctors were not.

WHETHER RES JUDICATA APPLIES WHERE THE PARTIES ARE NOT THE SAME OR WHERE THERE IS NO PRIVITY OF INTEREST E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-46

[62] I accept that there is jurisprudence which supports the proposition that there must be privity of interest in order for a party to raise a plea of res judicata. On the other hand, senior federal counsel has correctly pointed out that there is a line of cases which have accepted that the plea of res judicata is also available in situations where the parties are not the same. [64] Counsel for Dr Aishah describes this as an incautious statement from the English High Court. On the other hand senior federal counsel submitted that the said passage was applied by Abdul Malek J in Wong Peng Yan Benjamin v Genting Bhd & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 713 at p 724. He also referred to other local cases which have adopted the jurisprudence which is suggestive of an extension of the doctrine of res judicata in the sense that for res judicata to apply, parties need not be the same. Even though the first and second defendants are not parties in the first suit, the crux of the matter in the second suit, where the intention of the plaintiff is to stop the arbitration from proceeding, effectively amounts to a substantial duplication of issues and reliefs sought in the first suit. For res judicata to apply, parties need not be the same (see Wong Peng Yan Benjamin v Genting Bhd & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 713). Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that this court must satisfy that the parties in the Tajudin's Suit and this instant case are the same parties. Even if the plaintiffs in the instant case and in the Tajudin's Suit are not the same parties, Abdul Malek Ahmad J (as the late President of the Court of Appeal) held in Wong Peng Yan Benjamin v Genting Bhd & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 713 that for res judicata to apply, the parties need not be the same. [68] Notwithstanding the above line of cases, counsel for Dr Aishah submitted that this court should follow the jurisprudence enunciated by the then Supreme Court in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783 and reject the plea of res judicata which was made by the present defendants. [69] But I do note that counsel for Dr Aishah has very properly stated that it is not his position that the law on res judicata and issue estoppel is cast in stone and is not subject to further development. However, he submits that such development must be approached cautiously with due regard to stare decisis.

EXTENSION OF RES JUDICATA

[70] For my part, I do not see the line of Malaysian High Court cases referred to above and which have followed the jurisprudence which is to be culled form Drake J's judgment in North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners (a firm) [1990] 3 All ER 547 as being in conflict with Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189. Rather I see them as a necessary extension to the general rule pertaining to the prerequisite for a plea of res judicata. It appears therefore that Drake J's judgment has been gradually assimilated into Malaysian jurisprudence on res judicata and the position now is that merely because parties are not the same or that there is no privity, does not necessarily or automatically bar a plea of res judicata. [71] In my view, certain compelling circumstances may warrant a departure from the requirement for privity of interest where to insist on it may be unfair or oppressive or may even constitute an abuse of process.The present case is a vivid example of a compelling case for res judicata to apply in favour of HPP and its doctors notwithstanding that they were not parties in the first suit but rather were only witnesses. The significant feature of the first suit is E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-47 that HPP and its doctors were in pith and substance on trial (If I may put it that way) vis-a-vis the issue of their (alleged) negligence in the diagnosis, treatment and management of Zalina. Since that issue has been found in favour of HPP and its doctors, I am of the view that it may not be resurrected by way of the present suit as that issue is now barred by issue estoppel.

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO JOIN HPP AND ITS DOCTORS AS THIRD PARTIES OR CO-DEFENDANTS

[72] So taking the present set of circumstances, where HPP and its doctors had participated at the trial of the first suit and had been challenged as to their competence and handling of Zalina and having had a ruling made in their favour that they had not been negligent (which was upheld on appeal) and where it was open to Dr Aishah to have them joined as parties to the first suit but chose not to, it cannot be said that merely because they were not parties to the first suit they should be denied the right to raise a plea of res judicata. [75] It is trite that in certain circumstances, a plea of res judicata would not be allowed as to do so may result in an injustice to the party facing a plea of res judicata. At the same time, it is also necessary to consider whether any injustice may be occasioned if a plea of res judicata is not allowed. In the present case, the injustice is not Dr Aishah but rather to HPP and its doctors, who after a lapse of 16 years from the time when the hysterectomy was conducted and several years after participating at the trial in the first suit are faced with a fresh suit where essentially the same issue is being relitigated coupled with a variety of other allegations made in order to challenge their competence and integrity. [78] In the circumstances, and for the reasons as stated above, I am impelled to the view that notwithstanding that HPP and its doctors were neither parties nor privies to the first suit, the facts and circumstances of this case are such that they had participated in the first suit and a ruling on the issue of liability had been made in their favour and as such, a fresh suit against them based on essentially the same issue constitutes an abuse of process and the plea of res judicata (issue estoppel) therefore succeeds.The defendants' application by way of encl 12 must therefore be allowed.

THE ORDER

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) S NANTHA BALAN JC ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO 24-2218-12 OF 2012 30 December 2013

Arbitration -- Award -- Setting aside -- Arbitration underwent two-stage process to determine liability first followed by quantum -- Finding at liability stage claimant achieved 93.43% progress of work -- Finding upheld by court -- Res judicata -- Whether finding meant value of work done 93.43% of contract value -- Whether claimant still had to prove that fact -- Whether arbitrator at quantum stage not precluded by 93.43% finding from considering respondent's counterclaim and other live issues to determine damages payable -- Whether arbitrator's conduct of proceedings caused substantial miscarriage of justice warranting setting aside of award -- Arbitration Act 1952 s 24

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-48

The plaintiff commenced arbitration proceedings to determine whether the defendant's termination of a building contract was lawful. The defendant, meanwhile, filed a counterclaim in the proceedings alleging defective or omitted work, set offs, payments the defendant made directly to the plaintiff's subcontractors, etc. The parties agreed to a two-stage arbitration process. The arbitrator ('the original arbitrator') was required to first determine whether the contract was validly terminated leaving the issue of damages or of determining the monetary value of work done to be dealt with at a later stage. The original arbitrator ruled that the contract was wrongly terminated as the plaintiff had completed 93.43% of the progress of work. The defendant sought to set aside that finding first by the High Court and then by the Court of Appeal but failed on both attempts. The original arbitrator's finding that the progress of work was 93.43% at the time of termination of the contract was argued before both the courts leading the plaintiff to contend that that finding was res judicata. When the second stage of the arbitration, to determine the damages due to the plaintiff, continued before a substitute arbitrator (the original arbitrator could not continue with the proceedings as he was appointed a judge), the issue framed for his determination was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover its pleaded sum of RM1,741,060.23 and, if not, what was the value of work done for which it was entitled to be paid. Before the substitute arbitrator, the plaintiff contended that as the finding of 93.43% progress of work was res judicata, the issue of quantum was implicitly determined and it did not have to prove its losses/damages. The plaintiff maintained that all that the substitute arbitrator needed to do was compute 93.43% of the contract sum and deduct therefrom the total payments that had been made to the plaintiff to arrive at the balance sum owing for work done. By two interim rulings, the substitute arbitrator ruled, inter alia, that the defendant's counterclaim for defective work, setoffs, etc, were live issues and accordingly, res judicata on the 93.43% finding could not preclude him from considering the evidence on all relevant undetermined issues relating to quantum to assess the final award for damages. The substitute arbitrator ruled that the law relating to assessment of damages required the plaintiff to prove its loss/damages and show that the sum it claimed in the proceedings was equivalent to 93.43% of the value of work done. Unhappy with the interim rulings, the plaintiff applied to the High Court to have the substitute arbitrator removed for misconduct and bias but when that attempt failed, the plaintiff did not appeal against the decision but continued to participate in the arbitration until its completion. In his final award, the substitute arbitrator ruled that the original arbitrator had not made any ruling on the issue of quantum which properly belonged to the stage of the proceedings before him. He also ruled that the plaintiff had failed to adduce evidence to prove that 93.43% in progress of works was equal to 93.43% in value of work actually done. On the other hand, the defendant had adduced evidence to show the value of work actually done was only 80.12% of the contract value. On that basis, the substitute arbitrator awarded the plaintiff RM313,052.90 as the balance of payment due to it. In its instant application under s 24 of the Arbitration Act 1952, the plaintiff sought to set aside the final award on the grounds the substitute arbitrator had committed misconduct and was biased. Inter alia, the plaintiff wanted the court to rule that it had completed 93.43% of the work and to allow its claim of RM1,741,060.23.

The plaintiff's unsuccessful challenge to the substitute arbitrator's interim rulings was material and significant to the validity of the procedural and substantive aspects of its E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-49 present challenge to the final award. By those rulings the substitute arbitrator opined that the parties had to discharge their burden of proving/disproving the damages/monetary claim made by the plaintiff. In dismissing the application to remove the substitute arbitrator, the High Court was not satisfied there was any bias or misconduct on his part. The plaintiff's failure to appeal against that decision meant it expressly or implicitly accepted the correctness of that decision, essentially carrying the interim rulings into effect when the arbitration continued before the substitute arbitrator. It was sufficient to render the interim rulings res judicata for the purpose of stage two of the arbitration (see paras 27, 28 & 48). All issues relating to how damages were to be assessed and what evidence was required to prove the damages claimed were within the jurisdiction of the substitute arbitrator to decide. It was not for the court to interfere with his assessment, appraisal, or even reception, of the evidence adduced. Even though the original arbitrator ruled that progress of works was 93.43% at termination, and that finding was res judicata, the burden remained on the plaintiff to prove on balance of probabilities that it had suffered loss due to wrongful termination of the contract and that the loss was equivalent to 93.43% of the contract value minus the amounts already paid by the defendant (see paras 54, 58 & 91). Taking into account all the circumstances, the substitute arbitrator did not commit any error of law. He correctly held that the issue of progress of work of 93.43% as found by the original arbitrator was res judicata, but that in and of itself did not absolve the plaintiff of the burden of proving the monetary value of the work done. The plaintiff could have, but chose not to tender evidence to establish that the monetary value of its claim was equivalent to 93.43% of the contract value. The substitute arbitrator could not be faulted for relying on the only tangible empirical evidence pertaining to quantum that was adduced by the defendant (see paras 70-72). Plaintif memulakan prosiding timbang tara untuk menentukan sama ada penamatan kontrak bangunan defendan adalah sah di sisi undang-undang. Defendan, sementara itu, memfailkan tuntutan balas kepada prosiding dengan dakwaan kecacatan atau peninggalan kerja, set offs, bayaran-bayaran yang dibuat secara terus oleh defendan kepada subkontraktor plaintif dan lain-lain. Pihak-pihak bersetuju kepada dua tahap proses timbang tara. Penimbang tara (penimbang tara asal) telah dikehendaki untuk pertama menentukan sama ada kontrak telah ditamatkan dengan sah meninggalkan isu ganti rugi atau untuk penentuan nilai kewangan untuk kerja yang disiapkan untuk ditangani pada tahap kemudiannya. Penimbang tara asal memutuskan bahawa kontrak telah ditamatkan secara salah kerana plaintif telah menyiapkan 93.43% progres kerja. Defendan meminta untuk mengetepikan dapatan itu pertama oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dan kemudian oleh Mahkamah Rayuan tetapi gagal terhadap kedua-dua percubaan. Penimbang tara asal mendapati kemajuan kerja adalah 93.43% sewaktu penamatan kontrak telah dihujahkan di hadapan kedua-dua mahkamah menyebabkan plaintif untuk menegaskan bahawa dapatan itu res judicata. Apabila tahap kedua timbang tara, untuk menentukan ganti rugi tertunggak kepada plaintif, diteruskan di hadapan penimbang tara ganti (penimbang tara asal tidak dapat meneruskan dengan prosiding kerana dia telah dilantik menjadi hakim), isu yang dikemukakan untuk penentuan adalah sama ada plaintif berhak untuk mendapatkan kembali jumlah diplid sebanyak RM1,741,060.23 dan, jika tidak, apakah nilai kerja yang disiapkan yang mana ia berhak dibayar. Di hadapan penimbang tara ganti, plaintif menegaskan bahawa dapatan 93.43% progress kerja adalah res judicata, isu kuantum adalah E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-50 ditentukan dengan mutlak dan ia tidak perlu untuk membuktikan kerugian/kerosakkannya. Plaintif menegaskan bahawa apa yang perlu dilakukan oleh penimbang tara ganti adalah mengira 93.43% daripada jumlah kontrak dan menolak dari situ bayaran penuh yang telah dibuat oleh plaintif untuk sampai kepada baki jumlah terhutang bagi kerja yang disiapkan. Melalui dua perintah, penimbang tara ganti memutuskan, antara lain, bahawa tuntutan balas defendan untuk kecacatan kerja, set offs, dan lain-lain adalah isu-isu langsung dan sewajarnya, res judicata terhapap dapatan 93.43% tidak boleh menghalangnya daripada mempertimbangkan keterangan pada semua isu-isu yang belum ditentukan berkaitan dengan kuantum untuk menilai award muktamad bagi ganti rugi. Penimbang tara ganti memutuskan bahawa undang-undang yang berkaitan dengan penilaian ganti rugi memerlukan plaintif untuk membuktikan kerugian/kerosakannya dan menunjukkan bahawa jumlah yang dituntut dalam prosiding adalah bersamaan dengan 93.43% kerja yang disiapkan. Tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan interim, plaintif telah memohon ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk menyingkirkan penimbang tara ganti untuk salah laku dan berat sebelah tetapi apabila cubaan itu gagal, plaintif tidak merayu terhadap keputusan itu tetapi tetap menuruti timbang tara sehingga selesai. Dalam award muktamadnya, penimbang tara ganti memutuskan bahawa penimbang tara asal tidak membuat apa-apa keputusan untuk isu kuantum yang mana sewajarnya dibuat di peringkat prosiding di hadapannya. Dia juga memutuskan bahawa plaintif gagal untuk mengemukakan keterangan untuk membuktikan bahawa 93.43% kerja dalam progres adalah sama dengan 93.43% nilai kerja yang sebenarnya disiapkan. Sebaliknya, defendan telah mengemukakan keterangan untuk menunjukkan nilai kerja yang sebenarnya disiapkan hanyalah 80.12% pada nilai kontrak. Atas dasar itu, penimbang tara ganti mengawardkan plaintif RM313,052.90 sebagai baki bayaran yang tertunggak. Dalam permohonan ini di bawah s 24 Akta Timbang Tara 1952, plaintif memohon untuk mengetepikan award muktamad atas alasan penimbang tara ganti telah melakukan salah laku dan berat sebelah. Antara lain, plaintif meminta mahkamah untuk memutuskan bahawa ia telah menyiapkan 93.43% kerja dan membenarkan tuntutannya sebanyak RM1,741,060.23.

Kegagalan plaintif mempertikaikan keputusan interim oleh penimbang tara ganti adalah material dan penting kepada kesahihan prosedur dan aspek substantif pertikaian ini untuk award muktamad. Dengan keputusan itu penimbang tara ganti berpendapat bahawa pihak-pihak perlu untuk melepaskan beban untuk membuktikan/tidak membuktikan ganti rugi/tuntutan kewangan dibuat oleh plaintif. Dalam menolalak permohonan untuk menyingkirkan penimbang tara ganti, Mahkamah Tinggi tidak berpuas hati terdapat sebarang berat sebelah atau salah laku pada bahagiannya. Kegagalan plaintif untuk merayu terhadap keputusan bermaksud ia secara nyata atas tersirat menerima ketepatan keputusan itu, pada dasarnya mengekalkan keputusan interim berkuat kuasa apabila timbangtara diteruskan di hadapan penimbang tara ganti. Adalah mencukupi untuk mewajarkan keputusan interim res judicata untuk tujuan peringkat kedua timbang tara (lihat perenggan 27, 28 & 48). Kesemua isu-isu berkaitan bagaimana ganti rugi sepatutnya dinilai dan keterangan apa yang diperlukan untuk membuktikan ganti rugi yang dituntut adalah dalam bidang kuasa penimbang tara ganti untuk memutuskan. Ia bukanlah untuk mahkamah untuk campur tangan dengan penilaian, penaksiran, ataupun penerimaan, keterangan yang dikemukakan. Walaupun penimbang tara asal memutuskan bahawa progres kerja E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-51 adalah 93.43% sewaktu penamatan, dan dapatan itu adalah res judicata, beban terletak di atas plaintif untuk membuktikan pada imbangan kebarangkalian yang ia telah mengalami kerugian kerana penamatan salah kontrak dan bahawa kerugian itu adalah bersamaan dengan 93.43% nilai kontrak ditolak dengan amaun-amaun yang telah dibayar oleh defendan (lihat perenggan 54, 58 & 91). Mengambil kira semua keadaan, penimbang tara ganti tidak melakukan apa-apa kesalahan undang-undang. Dia telah memutuskan dengan betul bahawa isu progress kerja sebanyak 93.43% sebagaimana yang didapati oleh penimbang tara asal adalah res judicata tetapi itu dan dengan sendirinya tidak melepaskan plaintif daripada beban membuktikan nilai kewangan kerja yang disiapkan. Plaintif boleh, tetapi memilih untuk tidak mengemukakan keterangan untuk membuktikan bahawa nilai kewangan tuntutannya adalah bersamaan dengan 93.43% nilai kontrak. Penimbang tara ganti tidak boleh dipersalahkan kerana bergantung pada satu-satunya keterangan empirikal ketara berkenaan kuantum yang telah dikemukakan oleh defendan (lihat perenggan 70-72). [2] The issues that lie at the heart of this application are whether in a truncated (or bifurcated) arbitration where it was agreed that liability and quantum of damages were to be dealt with separately, the principle of res judicata applies to a determination by the arbitrator as to the physical level or percentage of progress of works in the first stage or liability stage of the arbitration and if so, whether that in and of itself obviates or dispenses with need for the claimant to prove damages in the subsequent stage of the proceedings. [4] In this regard, the arbitrator, inter alia, held that the termination notice was invalid and this finding was in turn predicated on the plaintiff having achieved 93.43% physical progress of work. The plaintiff latched onto this finding and took the position that 93.43% physical progress of work was res judicata and that there was no necessity to adduce evidence of loss and damages at the assessment of damages stage in respect of value of work done. [18] To complete the narrative vis-a-vis stage one, I should add that the defendant applied to the High Court by way of Penang High Court Usul Pemula No 25-61 of 2006 to set aside the interim award. The application was dismissed on 7 March 2007.The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal by way of Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No P-02-299 of 2007 and the appeal was dismissed on 30 June 2010. The matter went no further. Thus the interim award was immune from any further legal challenge. But, it is important to emphasise that the original arbitrator's finding that progress of work was 93.43% at the time of termination of the contract was one of the issues ventilated in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal. In the circumstances, the plaintiff maintained that the issue of 93.43% progress of works could not be re-opened as it was res judicata.

STAGE TWO BEFORE THE SUBSTITUTE ARBITRATOR

[23] As I said, the proceedings before the substitute arbitrator were tumultuous. In particular, the plaintiff was not happy that the defendant's cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses and reliance upon their detailed measurement report, marked as exh 'RB3' amounted to a re-opening of the progress of works level of 93.43%. According to the plaintiff, the substitute arbitrator was conducting stage two in such a manner as would violate the principle of res judicata vis a vis the level of progress of works of 93.43%. The dispute between the plaintiff and defendant during stage two necessitated the handing down of two interim rulings dated 27 E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-52 April 2011 and 19 May 2011 by the substitute arbitrator. According to the claimant, the previous arbitrator had directly or indirectly determined the issue of quantum of damages they are entitled to receive. The claimant argued that because this issue of quantum of work done had been adjudicated by the previous arbitrator it is a closed issue according to Asia Commercial Finance Sdn Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd's, ie the principle of res judicata has set in and the respondent cannot now re-open the issue of quantum of work done. As such the respondent shall not be allowed to bring any evidence which will directly or indirectly reduce the work done from the percentage of work done from 93.43% to any lower value. This includes evidence for counterclaim from defective work, reconstruction of lots 105 and 106 and direct payment to Kasu Mega Electrical Engineering. In short, the claimant argued that the previous arbitrator had determined the liabilities of the various issues pleaded in the statement of claim and the statement of defence and counterclaim including liability for defective works etc. As a consequence, this tribunal's role is purely to mathematically compute the quantum of loss based on the previous arbitrator's decision on the preliminary issues. The claimant is of the view that 'with the determination of progress of work by the Claimant of 93.43%, the amount short paid and still owing by the Respondent will then be established. Thus, the amount short paid and still owing for work done by the Claimant will be the amount of progress of work less payment actually received (93.43% of the Contract amount less payment actually received by the Claimant). Nothing less than that'. I find the claimant cannot reasonably argue that the issue of quantum of loss including the counterclaim are issues or fact so clearly formed part of the first stage of the proceeding and should have been raised but did not raise. In the circumstances, res judicata should not operate to prevent the raising of pleaded issues necessary for a proper assessment of the final quantum of damages. To decide as averred by the claimant would tantamount to the acceptance that the first stage of the proceeding had determined all issues including the liability of the claimant for defective work, setoffs etc. Having said that I am of the view the previous learned arbitrator did rely on the state of physical progress of work to arrive at the decision in interim award, hence the progress of work of 93.43% at termination should not be re-opened. To allow the progress of work to be reduced to lower percentage than 93.43% would indirectly reverse the decision of the previous arbitrator. In the award the previous learned arbitrator said termination might have merit had the percentage of progress of work was 70% or even 80%. [48] In this regard, counsel for the plaintiff said that they did not take the matter up as the arbitration had already been delayed for too long and they wanted to get on with it. But that is only a practical answer and not a legal one. Legally, the failure to challenge the dismissal of Notice of Motion No 25-60 of 2011 would mean that the plaintiff has expressly or implicitly accepted the correctness of that decision. That in itself was sufficient to render the two rulings as res judicata for purposes of stage two of the arbitration. [50] In so far as the issue of damages is concerned, it is clear that it was not (and could not have been) dealt with by the original arbitrator as it was not within his jurisdiction to do so. As such, it was argued by the defendant that damages were at large and remained extant in stage two of the arbitration proceedings in respect of which both sides were given every opportunity of proving or disproving the quantum that was being claimed by the plaintiff. Hence, for the plaintiff to say that the damages claimed was a 'done deal' purely because of the original arbitrator's ruling in the interim award that the plaintiff had (implicitly) established that progress of works was 93.43% is contrary to the agreement of the parties vis a vis the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-53 jurisdiction or terms of reference conferred on the original arbitrator in stage one.

RES JUDICATA

[51] In this regard, the plaintiff contended that the findings and decision of the original arbitrator pertaining to 93.43% progress of work which was upheld and affirmed by the High Court and the Court of Appeal ought not to be revisited at stage two by the substitute arbitrator as that would be contrary to the principle of res judicata. In this regard reference was made to Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 at p 197, where it was said:

When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata ... [53] The substitute arbitrator's response to the plea of res judicata was dealt with in the final award. In this regard, he asked himself whether the plaintiff was entitled perse to the contractual value of 93.43% based on the physical progress of work. His analysis on this point was articulated as follows:

[70] When viewed as a whole and taking into account all the circumstances, it is my view that the substitute arbitrator did not commit any error of law, as he correctly held that the issue of progress of work of 93.43% which was determined by the original arbitrator was res judicata and cannot be re-opened or revisited but that in and of itself did not absolve the plaintiff of the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the substitute arbitrator the monetary value of the work that had been completed. [91] As such, despite the initial attractiveness of the plaintiff's argument predicated on res judicata vis a vis the finding by the original arbitrator that the plaintiff had accomplished 93.43% progress of works, I was ultimately impelled to the conclusion that the bifurcated nature of the arbitral proceedings and the agreement of the parties that damages was to be kept separate from liability, did not, in the present circumstances of this case, obviate the need for the plaintiff to prove by credible, cogent and convincing evidence that 93.43% progress of work equated to 93.43% of the contract value. All that the substitute arbitrator wanted was hard evidence from the plaintiff's side that 93.43% progress of work equated to 93.43% of the contract value. But that evidence was not forthcoming. Hence, although the finding of 93.43% progress of works was res judicata, the issue of quantum was a separate matter and the plaintiff could not take refuge in the principle of res judicata to avoid proving the value or quantum of damages in stage two. [92] As the substitute arbitrator had made a finding of fact as regards the plaintiff's failure to prove the amount of damages that was pleaded, the argument that the ruling in stage one that progress of work was 93.43% was one of res judicata was to my mind nothing but a disingenuous attempt to mitigate the failure on the plaintiff's part to measure up to the level of proof required to satisfy the substitute arbitrator that 93.43% progress of work was at par with 93.43% of the contract value. [93] In my view, even though the finding by the original arbitrator that progress of work was 93.43% and was res judicata, the principle of res judicata did not exempt the plaintiff from E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-54 discharging their burden and onus of proof during the assessment of damages at stage two of the arbitration. [94] On the other hand, I find that the plaintiff's attempt via the present application to indirectly revisit the validity of the two interim rulings made by the substitute arbitrator which were upheld by the High Court in Originating Motion No 25-60 of 2011 offends the principle of res judicata as the opportunity to challenge those rulings were taken up, ventilated and exhausted. The substitute arbitrator's rulings cannot be re opened in the way that the plaintiff is seeking to do in this case. Constitution ( FC ); whether the plaintiff was released from custody/adverse inference under s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950; whether there was contempt of court; whether there were elements of mala fide; whether the plaintiff s second arrest tantamount to res judicata; whether the proper party had been sued; and whether the plaintiff was entitled to damages.

the second detention order pursuant to s 4(1) of the POPOC. Therefore, res judicata was a non-issue (see para 54). yang timbul dalam tuntutan ini adalah sama ada plaintif boleh ditangkap dan ditahan berdasarkan alasan-alasan dan kenyataan-kenyataan yang sama seperti penangkapan dan penahanan pertamanya; sama ada terdapat pelanggaran perkara 5(3) dan (4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan ( PP ); sama ada plaintif dilepaskan daripada jagaan/anggapan bertentangan di bawah s 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950; sama ada terdapat penghinaan mahkamah; sama ada terdapat elemen-elemen mala fide; sama ada tangkapan kedua plaintif terjumlah kepada res judicata; sama ada pihak yang betul telah disaman; dan sama ada plaintif berhak ke atas ganti rugi.

Isu di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi adalah berkenaan ketidakpatuhan prosedur dan tidak menyentuh merit-merit kepuasan defendan ketiga untuk membentuk perintah penahanan kedua di bawah s 4(1) ODKAM. Oleh itu, res judicata bukanlah isu (lihat perenggan 54). as regards whether the plaintiff s second arrest tantamount to res judicata, learned federal counsel submitted that the challenge of the third defendant s decision by way of a habeas corpus only relates to non-compliance of procedural requirement stipulated in POPOC and did not affect the merits of the third defendant s satisfaction which justified the second detention order. Sections 7C and 7D had clearly ousted the court s jurisdiction to review the grounds of the third defendant s decision and/or satisfaction to make the detention order under s 4(1) of the POPOC. False imprisonment is not a remedy which takes the place of habeas corpus as it will not ordinarily be used to obtain immediate release from a restraint, but it does afford one means of redress for anyone who has been unlawfully imprisoned. The civil action in damages will only succeed where there has been absence or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, it by no means follows that success on habeas corpus, even on the grounds of jurisdictional error will afford the basis for an action in false imprisonment. The matter is not res judicata Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279 the court reiterated that the onus of proving mala fide on the part of the detaining authority is normally difficult to discharge as the applicant was required to prove improper or bad motive to invalidate the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-55 detention order. Based on the evidence adduced during the trial the plaintiff had not discharged the onus of proving mala fide on the part of the defendants.

Whether the plaintiff s second arrest tantamount to res judicata

[52] In order for a doctrine of res judicata to apply, the same issue must have been raised and decided in an earlier proceeding or action in which the parties were represented. It is not opened for the same issues to be litigated twice. This doctrine is based on public policy that there must be finality in judicial decisions. What amounts to res judicata had been well illustrated by the Federal Court in the case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783 where the court held that:

What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicature. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action nemo debit bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties exercising reasonable diligent, might have brought forward at the time. satisfaction to make the second detention order pursuant to s 4(1) of the POPOC. Therefore res judicata is a non-issue.

Whether the proper party had been sued

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) AMELIA TEE ABDULLAH J CIVIL SUIT NO 22NCVC-178 OF 2011 8 February 2013

Evidence -- Witness -- Competency and compellability -- Cross-examination of arbitrator on award -- Scope of questions that could be posed -- Whether arbitrator could only be questioned about matters concerning arbitration but not about grounds of decision -- Whether arbitrator a competent witness -- Final award of arbitrator registered as judgment of High Court without contest -- Attempt to set aside/vary award struck off by High Court -- Whether res judicata prevented validity of final award from being questioned

During the trial of the instant suit an issue arose as to the extent to which an arbitrator, who

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-56 was a witness, could be questioned with respect to a final award ('the award') he had made concerning the parties.The award, which was tendered as an exhibit in the trial,ordered the first defendant to pay the plaintiff a certain sum of money with interest. The plaintiff said the award had been registered as a judgment in the High Court without resistance from the defendants who neither appealed against the registration nor applied to stay the enforcement of the award. Instead, the defendants applied to a separate High Court to set aside or vary the award which application the plaintiff successfully applied to strike out. As a result, the plaintiff contended that the defendants were barred by res judicata from questioning the arbitrator on the same issues they had raised in their application to set aside/vary the award.

Res judicata applied in the instant case to estop the second defendant from raising issues that were already decided upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. No questions could be put to the arbitrator which had the effect of questioning the validity of the award. With the registration of the interim and final awards as judgments of the High Court and the striking out of the defendants' application to set aside or vary the awards, the issue of the validity of the awards had been decided with finality. Any unhappiness or dissatisfaction should be taken up at a higher court and not be re-ventilated in the High Court (see paras 45). Semasa perbicaraan tindakan ini isu berbangkit terhadap setakat mana penimbang tara, yang merupakan seorang saksi, boleh dipersoalkan berkaitan award muktamad ('award') yang dibuatnya berkenaan pihak-pihak. Award, yang dimasukkan sebagai ekshibit di dalam perbicaraan, memerintahkan responden pertama membayar kepada plaintif jumlah tertentu berserta faedah. Plaintif menyatakan award tersebut telah didaftarkan sebagai penghakiman di Mahkamah Tinggi tanpa bantahan daripada defendan-defendan yang tidak merayu terhadap pendaftaran ataupun memohon untuk penangguhan penguatkuasaan award tersebut. Sebaliknya, defendan-defendan memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi yang lain untuk mengetepikan atau mengubah award tersebut yang mana permohonan untuk pembatalan berjaya dipohon oleh plaintif. Hasilnya, plaintif berhujah bahawa defendan dihalang oleh res judicata daripada mempersoalkan penimbang tara atas isu yang sama yang dibangkitkan oleh mereka dalam permohonan mereka untuk mengetepikan/mengubah award tersebut.

Res judicata diguna pakai dalam kes ini untuk mengestop defendan kedua daripada membangkitkan isu-isu yang telah diputuskan oleh mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa berkompeten. Tiada soalan boleh ditujukan kepada penimbang tara yang mempunyai kesan mempersoalkan kesahan award. Dengan pendaftaran award interim dan award muktamad sebagai penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi dan membatalkan permohonan defendan-defendan untuk mengetepikan atau mengubah award-awarad tersebut, isu keesahan award-award telah diputuskan dengan muktamad. Apa-apa ketidakpuasan hati patut dibawa ke mahkamah lebih tinggi dan bukan disuarakan semula di Mahkamah Tinggi (lihat perenggan 45). [7] As such, the present issue before the court is this: How much can an arbitrator be questioned. A secondary issue is whether res judicata would apply res judicata. [11] On the second issue of res judicata, it was submitted that the first and second defendants E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-57 had filed an action in the Shah Alam High Court to set aside the interim and final awards. The plaintiff had applied to strike out the suit on grounds, inter alia, that the award had already been enforced. The plaintiff's action for striking out was allowed on 27 December 2012. As such, it was submitted that two competent High Courts had found it fit for the award of the arbitrator to be accepted. [17] In respect of the issue of res judicata, it is the second defendant's submission that res judicata does not apply. The question that is asked is this: was the Shah Alam case dismissed or was it struck off? To this question, learned counsel for the plaintiff had responded that there was an application to strike off which was allowed. However, during the hearing, all the merits of the case were before the judge who had the advantage of both written as well as oral submissions. Although counsel was unable to confirm if the judge had considered the merits, however he had reiterated that all the facts and arguments were before the judge. [41] The court thus takes the view that the arbitrator who had issued the final award in this case is a competent witness. He had been called as a witness by the plaintiff and had duly tendered the final award which is before the court. That final award which has been registered as a judgment of the High Court stands and speaks for itself. Whilst the arbitrator can be questioned as regards the scope of his jurisdiction, what claims were put forward by each side, which claims were admitted and which were rejected, what admissions were made by the parties, what evidence was adduced before him, however he cannot be questioned as to what went through his mind when he made his decision nor the grounds of his award. He cannot be asked to explain how he came by his decision. If such questions are asked of him, the court will have no hesitation in putting an instant stop to such questioning.

RES JUDICATA

[42] I now come to the issue of res judicata raised by the plaintiff. What is the significance of the striking out of the Shah Alam High Court OS No 25-73-04 of 2012 suit? The documents reveal that the plaintiff had filed an originating summons to strike out the defendants' motion to set aside or vary the arbitration awards. The two applications, the defendants' setting aside application and the plaintiff's striking out application were heard together. [44] The issue of res judicata was also a subject raised in the plaintiff's submissions in the Shah Alam suit. Reference was made to the case of Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 where the Court of Appeal had held as follows:

It follows that the Duke of Buccleuch's case can have no relevance when the award does not constitute a res judicata between the parties but is relied upon as evidence in other proceedings between strangers. In reliance on the above authority, learned counsel sought to suggest that res judicata would not apply in our instant case, inter alia, because the second defendant is a stranger to the arbitration proceedings between the plaintiff and the first defendant. [49] After carefully considering the issue before the court, the court agrees that in this case res judicata would apply and the second defendant would be estopped from raising issues which had already been decided upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. And now, relating the court's finding on the issue of res judicata with the first issue on the scope of questions that can be posed to the arbitrator in this case, the court finds that the general principle is that the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-58 arbitrator is a competent witness and, if called as a witness in respect of the arbitration that was conducted by him, may be asked such questions as to what had gone on during the arbitration before him, but cannot be questioned as to what had gone through his mind at the time when he made his decision nor the grounds of his decision. However, in this instant case, there is an additional issue of res judicata which would further reduce the scope of questions that can HIGH COURT (KOTA KINABALU) RAVINTHRAN J CIVIL SUIT NO K-22-249 OF 2009 21 October 2013

Civil Procedure -- Jurisdiction of court -- High Court -- Land dispute -- Interference of registered interest land by obtaining various ex parte orders from Shariah Court -- Orders set aside by Shariah Court -- Whether impugning orders obtained lawfully -- Whether present claim res judicata because impugned orders had been set aside -- Whether action academic -- Whether civil court had power to consider matter within exclusive jurisdiction of Shariah Court

The dispute in this case concerned the Karambunai land in Tuaran ('the said land') where the second plaintiff's resort was located on. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant had surreptitiously interfered with their registered interest in the land by obtaining various ex parte orders from the Shariah Court. The Shariah Court of Appeal had set aside the said orders. The defendant was also alleged to have improperly applied for a replacement title from the assistant collector of land ('ACLR') of Tuaran. The order of the ACLR was set aside by the Director of Lands and Surveys by the time of trial. The plaintiffs prayed for declarations that the Shariah Court orders would not bind them. In opposing the plaintiffs' claim, the defendant alleged that his act in obtaining the impugned orders was lawful and was not mala fide. The defendant claimed that the impugned orders were obtained in good faith in the course of the administration of the estate of Pg Siti Hapsah and that when he lodged a caveat on the said land, he was still the lawful administrator pursuant to the order of the Shariah Court. The defendant averred that the instant claim was res judicata because the impugned orders had been set aside and that the plaintiffs were attempting to circumvent the decision of the Shariah Court of Appeal. The defendant further averred that the civil court had no jurisdiction to decide on the division and inheritance of a deceased Muslim as it fell within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. The issues to be determined by the court were: whether the action was academic as all the said impugned orders had been set aside; whether the action was res judicata; and whether the civil court had the power to consider a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shariah Court.

The issue of the plaintiffs' registered interest in the said land had not been finally adjudicated by the Shariah Court. Even if the issue had been adjudicated by the Shariah Court, doctrine of res judicata could only be invoked in cases when a matter between two parties had been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. This dispute clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the High Court alone. In the premises, the Shariah E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-59 High Court and Shariah Subordinate clearly acted in excess of jurisdiction insofar as the impugned orders affected the registered interest of the second plaintiff in the said land (see para 11). Pertikaian dalam kes ini berkenaan dengan tanah Karambunai di Tuaran ('tanah tersebut') di mana terletaknya pusat peranginan plaintif. Plaintif-plaintif berhujah bahawa defendan telah secara senyap campur tangan dengan faedah berdaftar mereka pada tanah tersebut dengan memperolehi pelbagai perintah ex parte daripada Mahkamah Syariah. Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah telah mengetepikan perintah-perintah tersebut. Defendan juga telah didakwa telah dengan salah memohon untuk hak penggantian daripada pembantu pemungut tanah tuaran ('PPTT'). Perintah PPTT telah diketepikan oleh Pengarah Tanah dan Ukur pada masa perbicaraan. Plaintif-plaintif memohon untuk deklarasi bahawa mereka tidak terikat dengan perintah Mahkamah Syariah. Dalam membantah tuntutan plaintif-plaintif, defendan mendakwa bahawa tindakannya untuk mendapatkan perintah-perintah yang dipertikaikan adalah sah dan bukanlah mala fide. Defendan mendakwa bahawa perintah-perintah yang dipertikaikan telah diperolehi dengan niat baik dalam mentadbir estet Pg Siti Hapsah dan bahawa apabila dia memasukkan kaveat ke atas tanah tersebut, dia masih lagi pentadbir sah menurut perintah Mahkamah Syariah. Defendan menegaskan bahawa tuntutan ini adalah res judicata oleh kerana perintah-perintah yang dipertikaikan telah diketepikan dan bahawa plaintif-plaintif cuba memintas keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah. Defendan selanjutnya menegaskan bahawa mahkamah sivil tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk memutuskan bahagian ini dan warisan seorang Muslim yang telah meninggal dunia memandangkan ia terangkum dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah. Isu-isu untuk penentuan oleh mahkamah adalah: sama ada tindakan adalah akademik memandangkan kesemua perintah yang dipertikaikan telah diketepikan; sama ada tindakan adalah res judicata; dan sama ada mahkamah sivil mempunyai kuasa untuk mempertimbangkan perkara dalam bidang kuasa eksklusif Mahkamah Syariah.

Isu mengenai faedah berdaftar plaintif-plaintif terhadap tanah tidak diputuskan dengan muktamad oleh Mahkamah Syariah. Meskipun isu telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Syariah, doktrin res judicata hanya boleh diguna pakai dalam kes di mana perkara di antara kedua-dua pihak telah diputuskan oleh mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa kompeten. Pertikaian ini dengan jelas terangkum dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi sahaja. Dalam premis ini, Mahkamah Tinggi dan Bawahan Syariah dengan jelas bertindak melebihi bidang kuasa berkaitan dengan perintah-perintah yang dipertikaikan yang menjejaskan faedah berdaftar plaintif kedua terhadap tanah tersebut (lihat perenggan 11). [5] The defendant was the only witness on his behalf. He said he obtained three orders from the Shariah High Court, ie Perintah Pembahagian Harta/Tanah Pusaka under Kes Mal No 12100-040-0067 Tahun 2008 dated 6 March 2008, Perintah Deklarasi under Kes Mal No 12100-040-0070 Tahun 2008 dated 6 March 2008 and an ex parte injunction order under Permohonan No 12100-005-2009. He had applied for the above orders as the administrator and successor to the estate of Pg Siti Hapsah pursuant to the order dated 14 February 2007 by the Mahkamah Rendah Shariah Pantai Barat at Kota Kinabalu. He believed that his act in obtaining the impugned orders was lawful as the order of the Mahkamah Rendah Shariah Pantai Barat dated 14 February 2007 was only set aside by the Shariah High Court on 13 December 2011. He denied that he was actuated by mala fides as suggested by the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-60 plaintiffs. He said the impugned orders were obtained in good faith in the course of the administration of the estate of Pg Siti Hapsah. He said when he lodged a caveat on the Karambunai land, he was still the lawful administrator pursuant to the order of the Mahkamah Rendah Shariah Pantai Barat dated 14 February 2007. He lodged another two caveats pursuant to the ex parte injunction order granted by the Shariah High Court. He had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the original title deed at that time and that is the reason he applied for replacement copy under s 120 of the Sabah Land Ordinance (Cap 68). He said that the two Shariah High Court orders dated 6 March 2008 and the injunction order were set aside by the Shariah Court of Appeal. He said that the Shariah Court of Appeal ordered a retrial of the action (Kes Mal No 12100-040-0067). The Shariah Court of Appeal further ordered the two Pengiran Brothers, the Amanah Raya Bhd, the second plaintiff and others having an interest in the case to appear at the retrial. He said the instant claim is res judicata because the impugned orders had been set aside and that the plaintiffs are attempting to circumvent the decision of the Shariah Court of Appeal. He said he is the lawful beneficiary of the estate of Pg Siti Hapsah and that the civil court has no jurisdiction to decide on the division and inheritance of a deceased Muslim as it falls within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. He said that he was not a party to previous proceedings between the plaintiffs and the Pengiran brothers in respect the Karambunai land. Finally, the defendant challenged the right of the Pengiran brothers to succeed to the estate of Pg Siti whether the plaintiffs are estopped from bringing the action herein on ground of res judicata? The action is res judicata as the issues raised herein were decided in the Shariah courts. aside, in my opinion, the action is not academic. My reasons are as follows. It is common ground that the Shariah Court of Appeal had ordered a retrial of Kes Mai No 12100-040-0067. As counsel for the defendant submitted, this is the principal action before the Shariah Court. It must be noted that the defendant obtained orders to nullify the registered interest of the plaintiffs in this action. The Shariah Court of Appeal had not only ordered a retrial but also ordered interested parties including the second plaintiff to appear at the trial. Although, the retrial of the said action has not commenced for more than two years since the date of the order of the Shariah Court of Appeal, there is a possibility that it may proceed as the action has not been withdrawn by the defendant. Counsel for plaintiffs also correctly submitted that there is ample evidence that the defendant has not stopped asserting his purported claim to the Karambunai land by virtue of being the alleged heir to the estate of Pg Siti Hapsah and Pg Siti Fatimah. The defendant had been lodging caveats against the Karambunai land since 2007. The latest caveat he lodged was in October of 2010 when he used the order of the Shariah subordinate court which appointed him as the administrator of the estate of Pg Siti Hapsah. The defendant had also, as recently as on 14 August 2012, approached the Brunei Probate Court to obtain letters of administration in respect of the estate of Pg Siti Hamidah who is the sister of Pg Siti Hapsah. In the premises, although the impugned Shariah Court orders had been set aside, the action by the plaintiffs to protect their registered interest in the Karambunai land cannot be deemed academic by any stretch of the imagination as the defendant has not abandoned his main action before the Shariah court.

Res judicata

[10] Counsel for defendant submitted the issues that were raised in paras 14-22 of the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-61 statement of claim are res judicata because the second plaintiff was a party in the proceedings in the Shariah High Court and Shariah Court of Appeal when the impugned orders were set aside. Counsel for defendant then further argued that the second plaintiff was a proxy for the other defendants. Counsel for plaintiff cited the oft quoted passage on the subject of res judicata from the judgment of Peh Swee Chin SCJ in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 which is as follows:

JURISDICTION OF CIVIL HIGH COURT AND THE SHARIAH COURT PERTAINING TO LAND DISPUTES

The respondent, a wholly owned subsidiary of Metroplex Bhd, was the registered proprietor of a land ('Putra Place'). In August 1993, the respondent created a third party charge over Putra Place in favour of Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd ('BBMB') as security agent for a syndicate of banks, in consideration of credit facilities granted by the said syndicate of banks to Metroplex Bhd. The charge was then transferred to Commerce International Merchant Bank ('CIMB') which had assumed the role of security agent for the said syndicate of banks. However, Metroplex Bhd defaulted on the loan. In October 2005, CIMB filed a charge action E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-62 against the respondent, pursuant to s 256 of the National Land Code ('NLC'). The High Court ordered the sale of Putra Place by public auction and the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision. Putra Place was put on the auction block. Judicial sale was initially not successful. On 30 March 2011 Putra Place was successively sold to OSK Trustee Bhd. The appellant applied to strike out the action pursuant to O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980.The trial court held that in the charge action, the stand of the respondent was just to seek an extension of time to settle its debt which was admitted, and to seek a postponement of the charge action; that the instant action was founded on an alleged fact -- the charge was defective -- that should have been raised in the charge action of the judgment of the trial court; and that the issue of limitation which was raised by the appellant but not replied thereto by the respondent who filed no affidavit to oppose the instant striking out application, was deemed admitted by the respondent. The trial court concluded that the instant action for the said reliefs was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and by limitation. The Court of Appeal tacitly agreed with the trial court that the instant action was founded on the alleged fact that the charge was defective. The trial court held that all issue of the charge being defective belonged to the charge action and could not be raised in the instant action. The Court of Appeal disagreed. The Court of Appeal held that the respondent's action 'is predicated upon a cause of action that the charge created by the appellant over the land in favour of the respondent is not indefeasible within the meaning of s 340(2) of the NLC', that 'there was never a trust formed between the [Respondent] and BBMB with regard to the charge', and that 'the respondent came onto the register, as chargee of the land via a transfer from BBMB, according to the appellant, the transfer of the charge from BBMB to the respondent was obtained by means of an insufficient or void instrument. And it is this issue that should proceed for trial'. Hence, the present appeal.

Prior written approval of the state authority was clearly not required where the dealing a land charge. Since it was not required, it could not therefore be contended that 'the (instant) charge violated s 433B... in that six of the guarantors under the GFA were foreign companies which failed to obtain the requisite approval of the state authority'. In truth, the '2 strong grounds to impugn the charge' only panned out to no more than an alleged breach of cl 18(G) of the GFA, which, even if true, was not a contravention that defied an express statutory prohibition, which meant that the conditions for a collateral action were not met and that the respondent was therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata to bring the action below to attack the order for sale (see para 18). It was so plain and obvious that the instant action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Foreclosure proceedings result in the grant or refusal of an order for sale, and not in a judgment or decree. But an order for sale, once granted and unless set aside, is nonetheless a final order. When the appeal against the instant order for sale was dismissed and there was no further appeal, the stage was reached where the instant order for sale had been fully adjudicated and therefore could not be re-litigated. The instant order for sale could be re-litigated if it were a contravention that defied a substantive statutory prohibition. There was no such contravention as could have permitted the respondent to bring an action in rem, an action which raised only issues that should have been raised in the charge action. There was also no allegation that the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-63 order for sale was procured by fraud which could have permitted a fresh action. Under the doctrine of res judicata, the action below should have been struck out (see para 27). Responden, sebuah anak syarikat milik penuh Metroplex Bhd, adalah tuan punya berdaftar sebuah tanah ('Putra Place'). Pada bulan Ogos 1993, responden telah memasukkan gadaian pihak ketiga atas Putra Place atas nama Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd ('BBMB') sebagai ejen jaminan utuk sindiket bank, sebagai balasan untuk kemudahan kredit oleh sindiket bank tersebut kepada Metroplex Bhd. Gadaian itu kemudian telah dipindahkan kepada Commerce International Merchant Bank ('CIMB') yang mengambil alih peranan ejen jaminan untuk sindiket bank tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, Metroplex Bhd telah mengingkari pinjaman itu. Pada bulan Oktober 2005, CIMB telah memfailkan tindakan gadaian terhadap responden, menurut s 256 Kanun Tanah Negara ('KTN'). Mahkamah Tinggi memerintahkan jualan Putra Place melalui lelongan awam dan Mahkamah Rayuan mengesahkan keputusan itu. Putra Place telah diletakkan di blok lelongan. Jualan kehakiman pada mulanya tidak berjaya. Pada 30 Mac 2011 Putra Place telah berjaya dijual kepada OSK Trustee Bhd. Perayu telah memohon untuk membatalkan tindakan itu menurut A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980. Mahkamah perbicaraan memutuskan bahawa dalam tindakan gadaian itu, permohonan responden adalah hanya untuk memohon lanjutan masa bagi menyelesaikan hutangnya yang telah diakui, dan untuk memohon penangguhan tindakan gadaian itu; bahawa tindakan itu berasaskan fakta yang dikatakan -- pertuduhan itu adalah cacat -- yang patut telah ditimbulkan dalam penghakiman mahkamah perbicaraan untuk tindakan gadaian itu; dan bahawa isu had masa yang telah ditimbulkan oleh perayu tetapi tidak dijawab oleh responden yang tidak memfailkan afidavit untuk membantah permohonan pembatalan, adalah dianggap telah diakui oleh responden. Mahkamah perbicaraan membuat kesimpulan bahawa tindakan ini untuk relief-relief tersebut adalah dihalang oleh doktrin res judicata dan oleh had masa. Mahkamah Rayuan bersetuju dengan mahkamah perbicaraan bahawa tindakan ini adalah berasaskan fakta yang dikatakan bahawa pertuduhan itu adalah cacat. Mahkamah perbicaraan memutuskan bahawa kesemua isu berhubung gadaian menjadi itu cacat adalah berkaitan dengan tindakan gadaian itu dan tidak boleh ditimbulkan dalam tindakan ini. Mahkamah Rayuan tidak bersetuju. Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa tindakan responden 'is predicated upon a cause of action that the charge created by the appellant over the land in favour of the respondent is not indefeasible within the meaning of s 340(2) of the NLC', bahawa 'there was never a trust formed between the [Respondent] and BBMB with regard to the charge', dan bahawa 'the respondent came onto the register, as chargee of the land via a transfer from BBMB, according to the appellant, the transfer of the charge from BBMB to the respondent was obtained by means of an insufficient or void instrument. And it is this issue that should proceed for trial'. Justeru, rayuan ini.

Kelulusan bertulis terdahulu pihak berkuasa negeri dengan jelas tidak diperlukan dalam urusan gadaian tanah. Oleh kerana ia tidak diperlukan, ia tidak boleh dengan itu dihujahkan bahawa 'the (instant) charge violated s 433B... in that six of the guarantors under the GFA were foreign companies which failed to obtain the requisite approval of the state authority'. Sebenarnya, '2 strong grounds to impugn the charge' hanya menunjukkan tidak lebih daripada suatu pelanggaran klausa 18(G) GFA yang dikatakan, jikapun benar, bukan suatu percanggahan yang mengingkari larangan E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-64 statutori yang nyata, yang bermaksud bahawa syarat-syarat untuk tindakan kolateral tidak dipatuhi dan bahawa responden dengan itu dihalang oleh doktrin res judicata untuk memulakan tindakan tersebut untuk membantah perintah jualan itu (lihat perenggan 18). Adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa tindakan ini dihalang oleh doktrin res judicata. Prosiding melelong mengakibatkan pemberian atau penolakan suatu perintah jualan, dan bukan dalam suatu penghakiman atau dikri. Namun perintah jualan, setelah diberikan dan kecuali diketepikan, adalah perintah muktamad. Apabila rayuan terhadap perintah jualan ini ditolak dan tiada rayuan selanjutnya, tahap telah tercapai di mana perintah jualan ini telah diadili sepenuhnya dan oleh itu tidak boleh dilitigasi lagi. Perintah jualan ini tidak boleh dilitigasi semula jika terdapat percanggahan yang mengingkari larangan statutori yang substantif. Tiada percanggahan yang boleh membenarkan responden memulakan tindakan in rem, suatu tindakan yang membangkitkan hanya isu-isu yang patut dibangkitkan dalam tindakan gadaian. Tiada juga dakwaa bahawa perintah jualan telah dibuat secara fraud yang boleh membenarkan tindakan baru. Di bawah doktrin res judicata, tindakan itu patut dibatalkan (lihat perenggan 27). [5] The appellant applied to strike out the action pursuant to O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (since replaced by the Rules of Court 2012). That was not the first time that the appellant had applied to strike out an action for those said reliefs. The trial court related that in Kuala Lumpur 22-177 of 2011 ('Suit 177'), Metroplex Bhd sought reliefs identical to the reliefs sought in the instant action, that the appellant applied to strike out Suit 177 on the grounds, inter alia, that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and by limitation, that Suit 177 was struck out (by the same trial court) on those grounds, and that the appeal against the striking out order was discontinued by Metroplex Bhd on or about 25 February 2011. [6] As for the instant striking out application, the trial court held (i) that in the charge action, the stand of the respondent was just to seek an extension of time to settle its debt which was admitted, and to seek a postponement of the charge action (see paras 37 and 38 of the judgment of the trial court), (ii) that the instant action was founded on an alleged fact -- the charge was defective -- that should have been raised in the charge action (see paras 34 and 35 of the judgment of the trial court), and, (iii) that the issue of limitation which was raised by the appellant but not replied thereto by the respondent who filed no affidavit to oppose the instant striking out application, was deemed admitted by the respondent. The trial court concluded that the instant action for the said reliefs was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and by limitation. [10] The fact that the result in the charge action, with dismissal of the appeal, had reached its terminus, failed to impress the Court of Appeal who held (i) on the purported 'authority' of Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 per Mohd Azmi FCJ, United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd v Syarikat Perumahan Luas Sdn Bhd (No 2) [1988] 3 MLJ 352b per Edgar Joseph Jr J, as he then was, Harkness v Bell's Asbestos And Engineering Ltd [1967] 2 QB 729 per Diplock LJ, Eu Finance Berhad v Lim Yoke Foo [1982] 2 MLJ 37 per Abdoolcader J, as he then was, delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, and Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 77 per Gopal Sri Ram JCA, as he then was, delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, that the result in the charge action could be collaterally attacked, and, (ii) on the purported 'authority' of Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119 'that the order for sale was not a judgment or a decree, and that consequently, neither res judicata nor cause of action estoppel nor issue E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-65 estoppel could be invoked against the Respondent'. But what had those latter cases, particularly Badiaddin and Kandiah Peter, in fact espoused? In Badiaddin, the Federal Court 'dealt with the inherent jurisdiction of the court to set aside a final order' (Hong Leong Bank Bhd (formerly known as Hong Leong Finance Bhd) v Staghorn Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 622, per Abdul Hamid Mohamad Chief Justice). The facts there were as follows. On 21 March 1988, the High Court granted a declaration that a piece of Malay reservation land (land) had been charged in contravention of the Malay Reservations Enactment (FMS Cap 142) ('the Enactment'). On 8 October 1990, the High Court declared that the appellants had received an advantage or benefit directly from the respondent, and ordered sale of the land to settle the loan. The appellants commenced proceedings afresh to have the 8 October 1990 order declared null and void on the ground that it contravened s 13 of the Enactment. The appellants argued that they were entitled to the remedy ex debito justitiae without the need to comply with appeal procedure. The respondent argued that res judicata and estoppel precluded the appellants from questioning the validity of the 8 October 1990 order. The High Court held that it would be unjust to estop the appellants from challenging the 8 October 1990 order by reference to res judicata or any other branch of the doctrine of estoppel because the 8 October 1990 order was plainly invalid, it being made in contravention of an express provision of written law. The appeal to the Court of Appeal (see [1996] 3 MLJ 621) was allowed on the sole ground that the High Court was functus officio and had no jurisdiction to set aside the 8 October 1990 order irrespective of any illegality in the order. That decision was reversed by the Federal Court. Three judgments were delivered by Their Lordships. But it was the judgment of Mohd Azmi FCJ (Eusoff Chin CJ, and Wan Adnan FCJ, as he then was, concurring) that was the judgment of the Federal Court, where on the matter of inherent jurisdiction to set aside a final order, Mohd Azmi FCJ said as follows:

[18] Prior written approval of the state authority is clearly not required where the dealing a land charge. Since it was not required, it could not therefore be contended that 'the [instant] charge violated s 433B... in that six of the guarantors under the GFA were foreign companies which failed to obtain the requisite approval of the state authority'. Really, in truth, the '2 strong grounds to impugn the charge' only panned out to no more than an alleged breach of cl 18(G) of the GFA, which, even if true, was not a contravention that defied an express statutory prohibition, which meant that the conditions of Badiaddin for a collateral action were not met and that the respondent was therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata to bring the action below to attack the order for sale. [19] The Court of Appeal yet held that the respondent was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata to bring a fresh action against the appellant:

Proceedings under section 256 are not concerned with any contractual claims that the chargor may have against the chargee. They are concerned with the very narrow and limited question whether the chargor has adduced facts that establish cause to the contrary in the sense discussed herein. It follows that if the chargor is unable to sustain his opposition to the making of the order for sale vide a proceeding in rem, he may nevertheless sue the chargee in personam for breach upon the personal covenant or in equity. And it follows further that, E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-66 notwithstanding that the order for sale herein had been properly granted, the appellant may still bring an action in personam for breach of contract against the respondent upon the first and second grounds of his complaints. It is not open to the respondent, in such an action, to plead issue estoppel or res judicata. This is because the Judge who makes the order does determine an issue or a cause for an estoppel to operate, and secondly, an order for sale made under section 256 National Land Code is not a judgment. (1) A chargee who makes an application for an order for sale in foreclosure proceedings does not commence an action. He merely enforces his rights as a chargee by exercising his statutory remedy against the chargor in default. In order for the doctrines of res judicata, cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel to apply, the earlier proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment or decree. This requirement is not met by foreclosure proceedings which do not result or terminate in a final judgment or decree. (2) Where a chargor raises issues and relies upon facts to show 'cause to the contrary' in proceedings brought against him by the chargee, he is not barred from bringing a fresh action against the chargee (notwithstanding that an order for sale has been made) and raising in that action the same or similar facts and issues as those raised by him in the foreclosure proceedings. Neither res judicata nor cause of action estoppel nor issue estoppel are available to the chargee to meet the chargor's action. (3) The trial judge was in error when he held that the appellant was estopped by res judicata from raising in the subsequent action the identical issues which he had raised in the foreclosure proceedings. The appeal was therefore allowed and a retrial of the action was ordered. [20] The Court of Appeal then closed the issue of res judicata in the following manner:

With respect, the learned High Court judge also erred in law and in fact when Her Ladyship held that the appellant was estopped from raising the same issue in the current suit as it is caught by the doctrine of res judicata. It is trite that the order for sale made under s 256 of the NLC is not a judgment or a decree and, consequently, neither res judicata nor cause of action estoppel nor issue estoppel can be invoked in favour of the respondent to the detriment of the appellant. See Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd. The Latin phrase 'res judicata pro veritatem accipitur' expresses the meaning of 'the need for decisions of the Court, unless set aside or quashed, to be accepted as incontrovertibly correct' (Honourable Justice KR Handley, 'Res Judicata: General Principles and Recent Developments' [1999] 18(3) Aust Bar Rev 214). But, it must not be forgotten that res judicata only arises from a judgment obtained on the merits. And that no estoppel would arise from a final order which is not a judgment (Maganja v Arthur Trading as Shirley Arthur's Beauty Centre [1984] 3 NSWLR 561 at p 564). An interlocutory order (Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Limited (1963) 109 CLR 285) and an order which requires further action before it is enforceable (R v Rogers (No 2) (1992) 29 NSWLR 179 at p 182) are not final orders. Likewise here, the order for sale made pursuant to s 256 of the NLC is open to challenge by the appellant by way of a collateral proceeding as reflected in the current suit. [21] Kandiah Peter and Low Lee Lian are often cited but also often misunderstood as to have held that the doctrine of res judicata has no application whatsoever in foreclosure proceedings. [22] In Kandiah Peter, the facts were as follows. The chargor failed to set aside orders for sale of the charged lands. In his action brought to declare that the charge was null and void, the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-67 chargor raised and relied on facts and issues which the trial judge found to be identical to those raised by the chargor in the foreclosure proceedings. The trial judge dismissed the chargor's claim on the ground that the matter was covered by the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata. The Federal Court agreed with the trial judge that the issues raised by the chargor in the foreclosure proceedings and in the fresh action were identical. The question before the Federal Court was whether the doctrines of issue estoppel or cause of action estoppel or res judicata were applicable in the circumstances to bar the chargor's fresh action. The Federal Court answered that 'a chargee who makes an application for an order for sale in foreclosure proceedings under s 256 of the Code does not commence an action', that foreclosure proceedings result not in a judgment or decree but in the grant or refusal of an order for sale, and that for the doctrines of res judicata, cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel to apply, the earlier proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment or decree. In our judgment, where a chargor raises issues and relies upon facts to show 'cause to the contrary' in proceedings brought by the chargee under s 256 of the Code, he is not barred from bringing a fresh action against the chargee (notwithstanding that an order for sale has been made) and raising in that action the same or similar facts and issues as those raised by him in the foreclosure proceedings. Neither res judicata nor cause of action estoppel nor issue estoppel are available answers to the chargee to meet the chargor's action. [27] With respect, it was so plain and obvious that the instant action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Foreclosure proceedings result in the grant or refusal of an order for sale, and not in a judgment or decree. But an order for sale, once granted and unless set aside, is nonetheless a final order (see Mui Bank Bhd v Cheam Kim Yu (Beh Sai Ming, intervener) [1992] 2 MLJ 642, at p 649; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 222, at p 223, where it was held by the Federal Court that the order for sale, once drawn and perfected, was a final order). When the appeal against the instant order for sale was dismissed and there was no further appeal, the stage was reached where the instant order for sale had been fully adjudicated and therefore could not be re-litigated. The instant order for sale could be re-litigated if it were a contravention that defied a substantive statutory prohibition. But there was no such contravention as could have permitted the respondent to bring an action in rem, an action which raised only issues that should have been raised in the charge action. There was also no allegation that the order for sale was procured by fraud which could have permitted a fresh action. Under the doctrine of res judicata, the action below should have been struck out. COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) BALIA YUSOF , TENGKU MAIMUN AND VARGHESE GEORGE JJCA CIVIL APPEAL NO Q-02 2167 09 OF 2012 10 July 2014

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Principles -- Whether parties must be the same in both suits -- Merger of rights

The dispute concerned Lot 16, Block 3, Sangan Land District, Bintulu. In 1999, the same plaintiffs herein had commenced an action (the First Suit) where the plaintiffs had claimed native customary right (NCR) land at Sg Sekabai, Sg Tajem, Tatau, Bintulu, Sarawak. The High Court had given judgment in favour of the plaintiffs in the First Suit. Lot 16 clearly fell outside the boundary of the area which the plaintiffs claimed to have acquired NCR. On 18 E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-68 December 2008, the first defendant in the present action filed an originating summons (the OS) seeking to recover possession of Lot 16 under O 89 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (the RHC). The fourth plaintiff on behalf of himself and all the persons in occupation of Lot 16, opposed the OS. However, the affidavit in opposition of the fourth plaintiff was objected to by learned counsel for the first defendant on the ground of non-compliance with O 89 r 5 of the RHC. As the fourth plaintiff was not named as a defendant in the OS, it was contended by the first defendant that the fourth plaintiff should make a proper application to be joined as a defendant, which the fourth plaintiff had failed to do. On 20 November 2009, the High Court granted the possession order to the first defendant. The affidavit in opposition was not considered after all. Following the possession order, the first defendant applied for a writ of possession to enter Lot 16 and to execute the writ of possession. Consequently, vide the present action, the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, for a declaration that the issuance of the provisional lease by the second and/or the third defendants to the first defendant was unlawful and null and void as it impaired the plaintiffs NCR at the said lands. The first defendant applied under O 14A and O 18 r 19 of the RHC for determination whether the plaintiffs action herein was res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel as a result of the First Suit and the decision in the OS. The learned judicial commissioner held that as a result of the possession order and the writ of possession, the plaintiffs action herein was res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel. The plaintiffs writ of summons and the statement of claim was thus struck out and hence, this appeal. The plaintiffs contended that they failed to oppose the possession order purely on technical ground or procedural ground and since the issue or merits of the action had not been heard, the plea of res judiciata was not sustainable.

The plaintiffs were not specifically named in the writ of possession. However, the argument that the plaintiffs must be made a party in the writ of possession for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, was misconceived (see para 23). Applying the principle on the doctrine of res judicata as set out in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ and also in Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57, and based on the possession order and the writ of possession which remained valid and subsisting, the plaintiffs rights on Lot 16 had merged in the possession order made in the OS and in the execution of the same, vide the writ of possession (see para 26). Pertikaian adalah berkenaan Lot 16, Block 3, Sangan Land District, Bintulu. Pada tahun 1999, plaintif-plaintif yang sama di sini telah memulakan tindakan (Tindakan Pertama) di mana plaintif telah menuntut hak adat anak negeri (HAAN) tanah di Sg Sekabai, Sg Tajem, Tatau, Bintulu, Sarawak. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memberi penghakiman memihak kepada plaintif-plaintif dalam Tindakan Pertama. Lot 16 jelas terangkum di luar sempadan kawasan yang mana plaintif-plaintif mendakwa telah memperoleh HAAN. Pada 18 Disember 2008, defendan pertama dalam tindakan ini memfailkan saman pemula (SP) smemohon untuk mendapatkan semula milikan Lot 16 di bawah A 89 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (KMT). Plaintif keempat bagi pihak dirinya dan kesemua orang yang menduduki Lot 16, menentang SP. Walau bagaimanapun, afidavit menentang plaintif keempat telah dibantah oleh peguam bijaksana untuk defendan pertama atas alasan ketidakpatuhan terhadap A 89 k 5 KMT. Memandangkan plaintif keempat tidak dinamakan sebagai defendan dalam SP, ia dihujahkan oleh defendan pertama bahawa plaintif keempat patut membuat permohonan yang E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-69 betul untuk dimasukkan sebagai defendan, yang mana plaintif keempat gagal melakukannya. Pada 20 November 2009, Mahkamah Tinggi memberikan perintah milikan kepada defendan pertama. Afidavit membantah tidak dipertimbangkan langsung. Berikutan perintah milikan, defendan pertama memohon untuk writ milikan untuk memasuki Lot 16 dan untuk melaksanakan writ milikan tersebut. Akibatnya, melalui tindakan ini, plaintif-plaintif menuntut, antara lain, untuk perisytiharan bahawa pemberian pajakan sementara oleh defendan-defendan kedua dan/atau ketiga kepada defendan pertama adalah tidak sah dan batal kerana ia menjejaskan HAAN plaintif-plaintif di tanah tersebut. Defendan perrtama memohon di bawah A 14A dan A 18 k 19 KMT untuk penentuan sama ada tindakan plaintif-plaintif di sini adalah res judicata dan/atau dihalang oleh estopel akibat tindakan pertama dan keputusan dalam SP tersebut. Pesuruhjaya kehakiman yang bijaksana memutuskan bahawa akibat perintah milikan dan writ milikan, tindakan plaintif-plaintif di sini adalah res judicata dan/atau dihalang oleh estopel. Writ saman plaintif-plaintif dan pernyataan tuntutan oleh itu dibatalkan dan oleh itu, rayuan ini. Plaintif-plaintif berhujah bahawa mereka gagal untuk menentang perintah milikan semata-mata atas alasan teknikal atau alasan prosedur dan memandangkan isu atau merit tindakan tidak didengar, pli res judiciata tidak dapat diperthankan.

Plaintif-plaintif tidak dinamakan secara spesifik di dalam writ milikan. Walau bagaiamanapun, hujahan bahawa plaintif-plaintif mesti dijadikan pihak di dalam writ milikan untuk doctrin res judicata diguna pakai, adalah salah tanggap (lihat perenggan 23). Mengguna pakai prinsip atas doktrin res judicata seperti yang ditetapkan di dalam kes Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ dan juga di dalam kes Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57, dan berdasarkan perintah milikan yang kekal sah dan wujud, hak plaintif-plaintif ke atas Lot 16 telah bergabung dalam perintah milikan yang dibuat di dalam SP dan dalam perlaksanaannya, melalui writ milikan (lihat perenggan 26). whether the plaintiffs action is res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel as a result of the High Court Suit No 22 28 of 99 1 between Nor ak Nyawai & 3 Ors v Borneo Pulp & Paper Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors and the Court of Appeals decision in Civil Appeal Nos Q-1 42 of 2001 and Q-20 504 of 2001 and the decision in the OS; [16] The learned judicial commissioner held, in particular, that as a result of the possession order and the writ of possession, the plaintiffs action herein is res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel. Consequently, the plaintiffs writ of summons and the statement of claim was struck out, hence the plaintiffs appeal before us.

THE APPEAL

[17] There was only one ground of appeal raised by learned counsel for the plaintiffs ie that the learned judicial commissioner erred in finding that the plaintiffs action herein is res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel as a result of the possession or writ of possession. To invoke the doctrine of res judicata the respondent has to show that there was a former suit between the same parties for the same matter and upon the same cause of action, and also the matter directly and substantially in issue has been heard and finally decided by the court which heard it. E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-70 What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect or creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties had been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; The cause of action estoppel arises when rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court for a particular remedy are determined in a final judgment and such right of action, ie the cause of action, merges into the said final judgment, in laymans language, the cause of action has turned into the said final judgment. The said cause of action may not be relitigated between the same parties because it is res judicata. There is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary view that such issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata We are of the opinion that the aforesaid contrary view is to be preferred [23] We accepted that the plaintiffs were not specifically named in the writ of possession. However, we were of the view that the argument of learned counsel that the plaintiffs must be made a party in the writ of possession for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, is misconceived. [26] Applying the principle on the doctrine of res judicata as set out above and also in Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57; [1997] 2 CLJ 104, and based on the foregoing facts, in particular that the possession order and the writ of possession remains valid and subsisting, we were of the view that the plaintiffs rights on Lot 16 had merged in the possession order made in the OS and in the execution of the same, vide the writ of possession. COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) MOHAMAD ARIFF, DAVID WONG AND ABANG ISKANDAR JJCA CIVIL APPEAL NOS W-02(IM)(NCVC)-1635-07 OF 2013 AND W-02(IM)(NCVC)-1636-07 OF 2013 25 February 2014

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Issue estoppel -- Application to strike out action -- Whether case scandalous or abuse of court process -- Whether issues raised same as issues determined in earlier suit -- Whether present plaintiffs 'privies' or having 'privity in interest' with plaintiffs in earlier suit -- Whether overly rigid adherence to res judicata principle to be avoided

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Privity of interest -- Application to strike out action -- Whether issues raised same as issues determined in earlier suit -- Whether present plaintiffs 'privies' or having 'privity in interest' with plaintiffs in earlier suit -- Definition of privity of interest -- Plaintiffs made party to earlier suit without consent or authority -- Absence of privity of interest -- Whether res judicata applicable

Civil Procedure -- Striking out -- Application to strike out action -- Res judicata -- Whether E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-71 case was prima facie obviously unsustainable -- Whether scandalous or abuse of court process -- Whether issues raised same as issues determined in earlier suit -- Whether present plaintiffs 'privies' or having 'privity in interest' with plaintiffs in earlier suit -- Whether overly rigid adherence to res judicata principle to be avoided -- Rules of Court 2012 O 18 r 19 the offer was rejected. The 214 settlers then filed a representative action by way of originating summons in the High Court ('the OS action') in the name of one Mariayee. The 214 settlers who sued through Mariayee included 59 of the present appellants. These appellants however denied authorising Mariayee to commence the OS action. They claimed that the power of attorney purported granted to Mariayee by them was forged. The respondent in the OS action was Gatco. The settlers in the OS action had submitted that they had acquired a proprietary interest in the land through the initial payment made at the start of the scheme. The High Court dismissed the OS action and the matter was appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. The Federal Court also dismissed the further appeal made to it. After the dismissal of the appeal in the OS action by the Federal Court, the land was sold to Thamarai. The present writ action challenged the validity of the sale of the land to Thamarai by the Gatco's liquidators. The respondents in the present writ action applied to strike out the writ and statement of claim under O 18 r 19(1)(b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012. Both applications raised the issues of res judicata and issue estoppels. Thamarai raised an additional issue pertaining to indefeasibility of their title. The learned judicial commissioner ('JC') agreed with the respondents' contentions and struck out the writ and statement of claim on the grounds that the claim was barred by the doctrine of estoppel and res judicata. The JC held that the claim in the OS action was based on essentially the same issues. The appellants appealed against the JC's decision.

As regards res judicata and issue estoppel, where they clearly apply on the facts, a subsequent action filed can be struck out as being scandalous or an abuse of court process (see para 35). Res judicata is essentially an equitable doctrine founded on considerations of public policy. There could be situations when an overly rigid adherence to the doctrine can lead to oppression to a party, in which event it may be inequitable to apply it unquestioningly (see para 46). It was not plain and clear that the same issues were canvassed before the earlier courts or formed the basis of the earlier decision. On the contrary, on a prima facie basis, they did not appear to be so. When the JC concluded that the issue of constructive trust and its breach was decided in the earlier action and therefore res judicata and issue estoppel applied, there was a clear misdirection on the facts and the law by the court which invited appellate intervention (see para 50). dipalsukan. Responden dalam tindakan SP adalah Gatco. Peneroka-peneroka dalam tindakan SP menghujahkan bahawa mereka mengambil alih kepentingan pemilik ke atas tanah tersebut melalui bayaran asal yang dibuat pada permulaan skim. Mahkamah Tinggi menolak tindakan SP dan perkara tersebut dirayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan, yang menolak rayuan tersebut. Mahkamah Persekutuan juga menolak rayuan lanjut yang dibuat. Selepas menolak rayuan tersebut dalam tindakan SP oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan, tanah tersebut dijual kepada E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-72 Thamarai. Tindakan writ ini mencabar kesahan jualan tanah kepada Thamarai oleh pelikuidasi-pelikuidasi Gatco. Responden-responden dalam tindakan writ ini memohon untuk membatalkan writ dan penyata tuntutan di bawah A 18 k 19(1)(b),(c) dan (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. Kedua-dua permohonan membangkitkan isu-isu res judicata dan estopel. Thamarai membangkitkan isu tambahan berkenaan ketakbolehan disangkal hak milik. Pesuruhjaya kehakiman bersetuju dengan hujahan-hujahan responden-responden dan membatalkan writ dan penyata tuntutan atas alasan bahawa tuntutan tersebut terhalang oleh doktrin estopel dan res judicata. PK memutuskan bahawa tuntutan dalam tindakan PK pada dasarnya berdasarkan estopel dan res judicata. Perayu-perayu merayu terhadap keputusan PK.

Berkenaan res judicata dan isu estopel, yang mana terguna pakai kepada fakta, tindakan susulan yang difailkan boleh dibatalkan atas alasan bersifat skandal atau salahguna proses mahkamah (lihat perenggan 35). Secara asasnya, res judicata adalah doktrin ekuiti berdasarkan pertimbangan-pertimbangan polisi awam. Terdapat situasi-situasi yang mana pematuhan ketat kepada doktrin akan menyebabkan penindasan kepada satu-satu pihak, dalam keadaan yang mana tanpa soal lagi, tidak berekuiti untuk diguna pakai (lihat perenggan 46). Adalah tidak jelas bahawa isu-isu yang sama yang dipersoalkan di hadapan mahkamah atau membentuk asas dalam keputusan terdahulu. Sebaliknya, atas dasar prima facie, kesemuanya tidak kelihatan sedemikian. Apabila PK memutuskan bahawa isu amanah konstruktif dan pelanggarannya diputuskan dalam tindakan terdahulu dan oleh itu res judicata dan isu estopel terpakai, jelas terdapat salah arah fakta dan undang-undang oleh mahkamah yang mengundang campur tangan rayuan (lihat perenggan 50). [1] In these interlocutory appeals from the decision of the High Court which struck out the plaintiffs' writ and statement of claim under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court 2012, there are altogether 140 appellants ('the plaintiffs') with two sets of respondents, namely the first respondents comprising the liquidators of the company called The Great Alonioners Trading Corp Bhd ('Gatco') and the second respondent which is a company named Thamarai Holdings Sdn Bhd ('Thamarai'). One appeal is brought against the striking out application filed by the first respondents (encl 7), while the second appeal concerns the striking out application filed by the second respondent (encl 10). Both were allowed by the High Court. After hearing full submissions by counsel and appreciating the special circumstances of this case, and the issues of law which have been extensively submitted bearing on the exact perimeters of the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel (and their relationship), as well as the ramifications of the legal concepts of 'privies' or 'privies in interest', on the premise that res judicata binds not only the immediate litigants but also their 'privies', we reserved our decision to a later date. We now provide our full decision.

THE PARTIES

[3] We now turn to a narration of the underlying material facts to analyse the subject matter of the dispute, the position of the respective parties in relation thereto and the decisions of the several courts bearing on the issue of res judicata, issue estoppel, privies and privies in E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-73 interest, against a consideration of whether this appeal is a proper case for summary disposal under a striking out proceeding.

BACKGROUND FACTS

[8] It is the respondents' position that this earlier decision of the Court of Appeal (and that of the Federal Court on appeal) bind the present appeal as a matter of res judicata. The appellants maintain otherwise. This earlier decision will be analysed in detail shortly in this judgment. We now quote an excerpt of relevance to elucidate the background facts:

[20] The High Court, Seremban dismissed the originating summons, and the matter was appealed to the Court of Appeal, which also dismissed the appeal by the settlers. Given the importance of the arguments on res judicata and issue estoppel in this present appeal before us, we reproduce below in full that part of the appeal in the previous Court of Appeal judgment bearing on these issues. We quote pp 15-16 of the judgment below:

[27] The defendants in this writ action filed two separate applications (encls 7 and 10), under O 18 r 19(1)(b), (c) and (d), to strike out the writ and statement of claim. Both applications raised the issues of res judicata and issue estoppel, but the second defendant ('Thamarai') raised an additional issue pertaining to s 340(2) of the National Land Code, ie that Thamarai now possesses an indefeasible title to the land. It is argued the plaintiffs/appellants have not pleaded that the title is defeasible.

THE DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT IN THIS WRIT ACTION

[28] The learned judicial commissioner in the High Court below agreed with the defendants' contentions and thus struck out the writ and statement of claim. The claim was struck out as it was 'barred by the doctrine of estoppel and res judicata.' (see p 34 of the judgment of the judicial commissioner). In his finding, the judicial commissioner held that the claim in 2004 was based on essentially the same issues. It was then also submitted that the sale and purchase agreement with Thamarai was null and void, and that there was a constructive trust binding Gatco and Thamarai. See the following material excerpts from the judgment which appears at pp 11-20 (the paragraph numbers are retained): relying on equitable fraud. On the res judicata and issue estoppel point, counsel argues the issues between the 2004 suit and the present one are different, and in this light the learned judicial commissioner had misdirected himself when holding otherwise. The learned judicial commissioner should have looked only at the broad grounds of the Court of Appeal (the Federal Court not having provided written grounds) and it would be evident that the issue of constructive trust was not part of the broad grounds. In particular, what appears as para 21 in the judgment of the judicial commissioner is said to be a clear misdirection. To place the submission in context, para 21 is quoted below:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-74

THE RELEVANT LAW ON RES JUDICATA AND ISSUE ESTOPPEL

[35] As regards res judicata and issue estoppel, where they clearly apply on the facts, a subsequent action filed can be struck out as being scandalous or an abuse of court process. Counsel for the first respondent cites, inter alia, the House of Lords decision in Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands and another [1981] 3 All ER 727 as authority. Lord Diplock in that case, citing Lord Halsbury in Raichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665, held the view that 'it would be a scandal to the administration of justice' to allow a matter to be re-litigated. Acknowledging that a court should be slow to strike out a statement of claim, yet when 'identical questions' are sought to be raised, it ought to do so. [36] The determinative issue to be decided in this appeal is whether either res judicata or issue estoppel, or both, apply on the facts and circumstances of this case. [37] The present appellants, the plaintiffs in the High Court, were not all parties in the 2004 originating summons action, except possibly for 49 of them who now claim their signatures were forged on the power of attorney granting Mariayee the authority to institute the action on their behalf. However, as a matter of general principle of law, for res judicata or issue estoppel to apply, the [38] Typically, res judicata or estoppel per rem judicatem is identified with 'cause of action estoppel', and operates in a situation where there is an identity of parties, although this principle cannot be stated without qualification, for the principle extends to persons who are 'privies' or have a 'privity in interest' as well. Spenser Bower, Turner & Handley, Res Judicata (3rd Ed) explains the principle thus: [40] This appeal concerns more a question of issue estoppel rather than cause of action estoppel. The cause of action framed in the writ action, as seen earlier, is premised on breach of trust, invalidity of the sale and purchase agreement between Gatco and Thamarai and, as submitted, equitable fraud. The originating summons, on the other hand, was premised more on whether the settlers acquired a priority of interest. Nevertheless, the argument advanced by the parties being centred on issue estoppel, it becomes necessary to determine whether the same issues in both have been raised in the earlier action, and further, whether there have been final determinations in respect of these very issues. Spenser Bower, Turner & Handley, Res Judicata, addresses the problem in this way: [42] Spenser Bower, Turner & Handley, Res Judicata, also cited the opinion proffered by Diplock LJ in Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181, as follows: [46] We have to stress that for the purposes of this appeal, we make no determination on the substantive merits of the claim by the plaintiffs/appellants, nor of the defences of the defendants/respondents. Our primary concern is whether this claim is on its face an obviously unsustainable one, as the term is understood in law. The respondents argue that it is, since the matter is res judicata or barred by issue estoppel. It is said that the present appellants are 'privies' or have a 'privity in interest' with the originating summons plaintiffs, particularly when, it is alleged, 49 of the previous plaintiffs are also the plaintiffs in this present claim before us on appeal. The subject matter for both actions is the very same land and the very same land settlement scheme, the same indorsement on the title, and the same allegation that the land is subject to a constructive trust where Gatco is the constructive trustee and the settlers the beneficiaries. All the issues have, it is alleged, been decided by the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court in the earlier action. It is an accepted ground that the common E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-75 party in both actions are the liquidators of Gatco. There is a hotly contested dispute whether the 49 plaintiffs in this action had authorised Mariayee to act as their attorney in the origination summons action. They claim their signatures have been forged. In any case, they are just 49 out of the 140 litigants in this appeal as appellants. By comparison, the total number of plaintiffs in the originating summons action was 214. Can the 140 plaintiffs/appellants now be regarded in law as 'privies' or persons having a 'privity in interest' with the previous plaintiffs? For a start, when some parties are now disputing their inclusion as plaintiffs in the previous action and alleging forgery, it will be stretching the term 'privy' to regard them as 'privies'. Shortly put, no party can be compelled to accept a legal conclusion that he is a privy or share a privity in interest with another litigant by an alleged subterfuge -- in this case, forgery. Whether this allegation is true or false will be a finding of fact on the evidence to be fully ventilated by a trial process. It cannot be disposed of by a summary process. We cannot agree with the finding of the learned judicial commissioner that this fact is not material in relation to the ultimate outcome of the decision in the earlier action. Res judicata is essentially an equitable doctrine founded on considerations of public policy. 'In modern terms, it is against public policy, and oppressive to the individual, to re-agitate disputes which have been litigated to a conclusion.' (Spenser Bower, Turner & Handley, Res Judicata, p 4) There could be situations when an overly rigid adherence to the doctrine can lead to oppression to a party, in which event it may be inequitable to apply it unquestioningly. We have been referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chee Pok Choy & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 346, and the following passage in the judgment:

Now, there is a dimension to the doctrine of res judicata that is not always appreciated. It is this. Since the doctrine (whether in its narrow or broader sense) is designed to achieve justice, a court may decline to apply it where to do so would lead to an unjust result. (at p 357 of the report, per Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was)) [50] It is necessary to define with precision the exact issues which were determined by the earlier courts. We have done precisely that. At the present stage of the proceedings, which is limited to a consideration whether the case is obviously unsustainable, we are unable to conclude that it is plain and clear that the same issues were canvassed before the earlier courts or formed the basis of the earlier decision. On the contrary, on a prima facie basis, they do not appear to be so. In our view, when the learned judicial commissioner concluded that the issue of constructive trust and its breach was decided in the earlier action and therefore res judicata and issue estoppel applied, there was a clear misdirection on the facts and the law by the court which invites appellate intervention on our part. respondents. We are merely concluding in this appeal that in the totality of the circumstances, the facts and the applicable law, we do not find the claim of the present plaintiffs/appellants to be prima facie obviously unsustainable that it has to be summarily struck out under O 18 r 19(1). The defendants/respondents can still introduce evidence and submit on the issues of res judicata and issue estoppel during the trial, whilst giving the plaintiffs/appellants the full benefit of having their opportunity to fully ventilate their claim, including the allegation of equitable fraud involving the first and second respondents, and not be just summarily dismissed on contested affidavit evidence.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-76 CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

APPEAL BOARD (PULAU PINANG) YEO YANG POH CH, TEH THEAM SENG AND ERIC GOH APPEAL NO LR/PP/38 OF 2010 19 October 2011

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Appeal to Appeals Board -- Whether appeal to appeals board barred by res judicata -- Planning applicant's appeal to appeals board against rejection of planning permission heard without notifying objecting neighbouring land owners -- Whether objectors can file new appeal to appeals board regarding same planning permission -- Whether exceptions to res judicata rule based on 'jurisdictional error' applicable

Local Government -- Town and country planning -- Application for planning permission -- Appeal against granting of planning permission -- Whether matter res judicata -- Planning application rejected by planning authority -- Planning permission granted upon appeal by planning applicant to appeals board -- Objecting neighbouring land owners not aware of applicant's appeal to appeals board -- Whether objectors can now appeal to appeals board against granting of planning permission -- Whether exceptions to res judicata rule based on 'jurisdictional error' applicable

Prima facie, the subject matter of the present appeal was res judicata as far as the board was concerned. However, one of the recognised exceptions to the res judicata rule is where the court or tribunal, when arriving at the earlier decision now sought to be reopened, had committed a 'jurisdictional error' (see paras 35-37). The doctrines of res judicata and functus officio will not operate in the following situation, where: (a) a jurisdictional error had occurred in relation to the making of the earlier decision, of a nature that has left some (express or implied) function of the tribunal unperformed, or that has given rise to the 'presence of undischarged basic functions'; (b) the empowering statute either expressly or impliedly permits the tribunal to revisit a matter in such an event of a jurisdictional error; (c) the dictates of elementary justice and fairness warrant a re-visit of the matter; and (d) the person who is seeking to revisit an earlier decision has not conducted himself in such a way as to disentitle him from doing so, or which gives the tribunal reason to decline the exercise of this exceptional power or discretion (see para 67). Prima facie, perkara subjek rayuan ini adalah res judicata setakat ia berkaitan dengan lembaga. Walau bagaimanapun, satu daripada pengecualian yang diterima kepada prinsip res judicata ialah di mana mahkamah atau tribunal, apabila membuat keputusan terdahulu yang kini dipohon untuk dibuka semula, telah melakukan 'kesalahan bidang kuasa' (lihat perenggan 35-37). Doktrin res judicata dan functus officio tidak akan beroperasi di dalam situasi berikut, di mana: (a) satu kesalahan bidang kuasa berlaku mengenai keputusan yang dibuat sebelumnya, bersifat yang meninggalkan beberapa (tersurat atau tersirat) fungsi tribunal tidak dilaksanakan, atau yang membawa kepada 'kehadiran fungsi asas yang tidak dilaksanakan'; (b) statut yang memberi kuasa, sama ada secara tersurat atau E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-77 tersirat membenarkan tribunal untuk menyiasat semula perkara apabila berlaku kesalahan bidang kuasa; (c) Asas keadilan mewajarkan penyiasatan semula perkara tersebut; dan (d) orang yang memohon untuk mengkaji semula keputusan sebelumnya tidak berkelakuan secara yang tidak memberikan hak kepadanya berbuat demikian, atau yang memberikan tribunal alasan untuk menolak untuk menggunakan kuasa atau pertimbangan yang tersendiri ini (lihat perenggan 67). [24] The simple conclusion that may ensue is this. Once the board had made that 2009 decision, the board becomes functus, and it cannot revisit the matter. Expressed in another way, the matter is res judicata. If the present appellant feels that the board had erred in making the 2009 decision without hearing him, his proper remedy lies in seeking a judicial review of that 2009 decision (preceded by an application for extension of time where necessary). But the present appellant cannot come to the board, because this board cannot revisit the same subject matter. This, in a gist, is how the preliminary objection goes. [26] Learned counsel for the present appellant argues to the contrary. He submits that, for res judicata to apply, all of the following five conditions must be met: [35] Therefore, all five conditions for the operation of res judicata (as submitted by the present appellant himself) are met in the instant case. Prima facie, the subject matter of the present appeal is res judicata as far as this board is concerned. However, is the board's door completely shut to the present appellant, or are there any extraordinary circumstances in this case that could give rise to an exception to the res judicata rule?

ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RES JUDICATA OR FUNCTUS OFFICIO RULE?

[37] One of the recognised exceptions to the res judicata rule iswhere the court or tribunal, when arriving atthe earlier decision now sought to be re-opened, had committed a 'jurisdictional error'. What amounts to a 'jurisdictional error' is not exclusively defined. None of the parties referred the board to any authority explaining the meaning of this legal term of art. Learned counsel for the KM applicant submitted that it meant a decision that exceeded the power of the decision-maker, ie a decision which was not within its jurisdiction to make. No doubt that is an obvious example of a jurisdictional error, perhaps the most common one, but I do not understand it to be the only category of jurisdictional errors. undischarged basic functions on the part of a tribunal, in which event the doctrines of res judicata and functus officio do not apply. [64] Learned counsel for the present appellant tried another way of circumventing the res judicata rule, by arguing that the present appeal must be taken as properly lodged, since under s 23(1)(b) of the Act the present appellant has the right to appeal to the board against any KM granted by the respondent pursuant to s 22(3). According to him, the issue of res judicata does not arise, because the present appellant is simply exercising a statutory right. [67] The above analysis of the facts and the law applicable to this matter leads me to the conclusion that the doctrines of res judicata and functus officio will not operate in the following situation, where: [70] Another thing which I must make very clear is this. Holding that the matter is not res judicata, and that this board can reconsider the same, of course does not necessarily mean that it will come to a conclusion that is any different from the 2009 decision. That is something that remains to be seen (if the matter proceeds to full reconsideration).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-78 [71] This board has agonised over what is the correct decision to make with regard to the issue of res judicata. This decision is one of the most difficult ones that I have had to make, because there are good arguments and sound policy reasons both ways. I wish to thank all counsel for their invaluable assistance to the board, through their respective abled submissions and the authorities that they have produced. [75] Hence, after the delivery of the above decision, I propose to invite further arguments from all parties on whether or not the present appeal (ie Appeal No LR/PP/38/2010) should be struck out notwithstanding the decision that the matter is not res judicata. If the board, after hearing arguments, should come to a decision to strike out the present appeal, the present appellant will be at liberty to decide on his next course of action. HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) AZIZAH NAWAWI JC ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO D-24NCC-53 OF 2011 17 December 2012

Civil Procedure -- Interlocutory order -- Cross-examination of parties -- Issues of locus standi, debenture and money lending agreement raised in affidavits -- Cross examination of deponents of affidavits -- Whether issues could be raised at interlocutory stage for purposes of substantive application -- Whether res judicata -- Whether cross-examination barred -- Rules of Court 2012 O 28 r 4 & O 34 r 2 exchange of the affidavits for the purpose of the substantive hearing of the OS, the plaintiffs took offence to the issues of the locus standi, the debenture and a money lending agreement ('MLA') which were raised in the affidavits of the first and second defendants. Hence, the plaintiff filed the present application under O 28 r 4 and O 34 r 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 to bar the cross examination on the said issues. The main issue in this application was whether the issues of locus, the debenture and the MLA was res judicata and could not be raised during the cross examination of the affidavits filed in court.

The issues raised during interlocutory stage for injunctive reliefs are not res judicata for the purpose of the substantive application as they are not final in nature which decides on the rights of the parties. At the interlocutory stage for injunctive reliefs, the court is only to decide whether issues discloses a bona fide serious issue to be tried and it is not a trial on merits and that the courts were not deciding on the rights of the parties (see para 27). The issues of locus standi, the debenture and the MLA, which have been argued extensively during the interlocutory stage were not res judicata and could be raised during the cross examination for the purposes of the substantive application. Having decided the issue of locus by other courts, this issue was taken as a preliminary objection. As the matter was raised as a preliminary issue, the same did not bar the issue of locus from being raised in this main application, through the cross examination of the affidavits (see paras 28-29). ditolak dan oleh itu, defendan pertama dan kedua telah diinjunksi daripada bertindak untuk plaintif pertama sehingga pembatalan saman pemula ('SP'). Defendan pertama dan kedua E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-79 memohon untuk menukarkan SP kepada tindakan writ ('lampiran 50'), memandangkan plaintif-plaintif telah mendakwa fraud atau pengendalian yang salah di sisi undang-undang oleh defendan pertama dan kedua. Walau bagaimanapun, mahkamah tidak menukarkan SP kepada tindakan writ, tetapi sebaliknya memerintahkan bahawa: dakwaan-dakwaan fraud atau pengendalian tidak sah dipadamkan daripada afidavit-afidavit; dan plaintif-plaintif hendaklah meneruskan dengan SP daripada semua aspek. Mengenai isu pelantikan defendan pertama dan kedua yang mana dikatakan bercanggah dengan undang-undang; kebenaran telah diberikan kepada peguam untuk defendan pertama dan kedua untuk menyoal balas saksi sumpah afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan untuk dan bagi pihak plaintif-plaintif; kebenaran telah diberikan kepada peguam untuk plaintif-plaintif untuk menyoal balas saksi sumpah afidavit yang telah difailkan untuk dan bagi pihak defendan pertama dan kedua; dan tiada soal balas saksi sumpah afidavit-afidavit untuk defendan keempat tanpa kebenaran mahkamah. Dengan penukaran afidavit-afidavit untuk tujuan perbicaraan substantif SP, plaintif-plaintif 'took offence' terhadap isu locus standi, debentur dan perjanjian pinjaman kewangan '(PPK') yang mana telah dibangkitkan di dalam afidavit-afidavit defendan pertama dan kedua. Justeru, plaintif telah memfailkan permohonan ini di bawah A 28 k 4 dan A 34 k 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 untuk menghalang soal balas tentang isu-isu tersebut. Isu utama di dalam permohonan ini adalah sama ada isu-isu locus, debentur dan PPK adalah res judicata dan tidak boleh dibangkitkan semasa soal balas afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan di dalam mahkamah.

Isu-isu yang dibangkitkan semasa peringkat interlokutori untuk relief-relief injunktif bukanlah res judicata bagi tujuan permohonan substantif memandangkan ianya bukanlah bersifat muktamad yang mana menentukan hak pihak-pihak. Semasa peringkat interlokutori untuk relief-relief injunktif, mahkamah hanyalah perlu memutuskan sama ada isu-isu mengemukakan isu bona fide yang serius untuk dibicarakan dan ia bukanlah perbicaraan atas merit dan bahawa mahakmah tidak seharusnya membuat keputusan tentang hak pihak-pihak (lihat perenggan 27). Isu locus standi, debentur dan PPK, yang mana telah dipertikaikan secara meluas semasa peringkat interlokutori bukanlah res judicata dan boleh dibangkitkan semasa soal balas untuk tujuan permohonan substantif. Setelah memutuskan isu locus oleh mahkamah-mahkamah lain, isu ini diangggap sebagai bantahan awalan. Memandangkan perkara ini telah dibangkitkan sebagai isu awalan, ianya tidak menghalang isu locus have been ventilated in great detail on 2 November 2011. The court ruled to dismiss encl (9) and allowed encl (4). There are no appeals on both encls (4) and (9). The plaintiffs submit that these issues are already spent and are caught by the res judicata principle. [17] The issue in this application is whether the issues of locus, the debenture and the MLA is res judicata and cannot be raised during the cross-examination of the affidavits filed in court for the purposes of the substantive hearing, as the same had been raised and argued extensively in the interlocutory stage (for injunction) and in other cases (only on the issue of locus).

THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT

[21] Therefore, since the issues raised in the interlocutory applications do not decide the rights of parties, but are made for the purpose of keeping things in status quo till the rights can be E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-80 decided, the issue then is whether the issues raised during the interlocutory application can be considered as res judicata and the same cannot be raised for the purposes of the substantive hearing. [22] In Wong Lok Khiam v Dato Peter Lo Su Yin & Ors (No 3) [1972] 1 MLJ 176, the issue of res judicata was raised, in that whether the issue of locus standi, which was raised during the application of the interim injunction can be raised during the substantive hearing. Justice Lee Hun Hoe held as follow: Mr Loo, for the plaintiff, stressed that all points before the court was raised at the hearing on the motion to discharge the interim injunction. He submitted that the defendants should not have raised the same points on the ground of res judicata. He cited various authorities to show that since the questions have been raised and argued on previous occasions they should not be raised again. I am unable to agree with Mr Loo that res judicata applies. The points now raised were also raised in the support of the application for the discharge of the interim injunction. BTH Lee made clear that the sole question before him was the interim injunction and any issue to be tried must be by evidence at the trial. [23] In Florence Bailes v Dr Ng Jit Leong [1983] 2 MLJ 175, a preliminary objection was raised before Justice Ajaib Singh, that the issues in the substantive hearing should not be heard on the principle of res judicata and functus officio. The issues are said to be res judicata as the court had dealt with them in the application for an interim injunction and made findings which appear to cover all issues involved in the suit. In dismissing the preliminary objection, His Lordship said this: I think it may not be an unreasonable inference to draw from all the facts and circumstances leading to the interim injunction and subsequently to the order vacating the interim injunction that the parties had confined themselves to the issue only of the interim injunction and not to the suit as a whole. Thus the hearing and arguments during the interim injunction were not as exhaustive for the determination of the issues involved in the suit. In view of all these matters, it seems to me that the plea of res judicata should not prevail and that in the interest of justice there should be a full hearing of the suit itself .... (Emphasis added.) [24] The next case that I want to refer is the decision of Justice Edgar Joseph Jr in Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 where His Lordship dealt with the principle of res judicata and held that the issues raised at interlocutory stage are not res judicata and may be taken at the substantive stage. At p 93 His Lordship held: Firstly, it is trite law that for a judicial decision to operate as res judicata it must be final in the sense that it leaves nothing to be judicially determined or ascertained thereafter in order to render it effective and capable of execution, and is absolute, complete, and certain, and when it is not lawfully subject to subsequent rescission, review or modification by the tribunal which pronounced it. The true test of res judicata in its wider sense or issue estoppel may be stated thus: has there been a final determination of the issue? That is the crucial factor. The authorities show that for a determination there must be a final adjudication by the court:Langmead v Maple (1865) 18 CBNS 255. There must be a final and not an interlocutory order: Huntley (Marchioness) v Gaskell [1905] 2 Ch 656 (CA); Bozson v Altrincham Urban District Council [1903] 1 KB 547 (CA). therefore, the issues raised during the interlocutory stage for injunctive reliefs are not res

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-81 judicata for the purposes of the substantive application, as they are not final in nature which decides on the rights of the parties. [28] I am therefore of the considered opinion that the issues of locus standi, the debenture and the MLA, which have been argued extensively during the interlocutory stage, can be raised during the cross-examination for the purposes of the substantive application. The issues are not res judicata. As the defendants have raised the issue of limitation in the statement of defence, the defendants have the right to rely on that plea of limitation when the case proceeds for hearing notwithstanding the decision of the learned magistrate on the preliminary objection which is only an interlocutory order and not a final order. Consequently, it is the view of this court that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply against the defendants as the learned magistrate has not heard the evidence on the merits and the defendants are entitled to raise once again the plea of limitation as part of the defendants' case during the trial. Once a regularly obtained order or judgment had been perfected, the court was functus officio. The matter, as decided vide encl 6, was thus res judicata and could not be re-litigated. The order made under encl 6 was appealed and affirmed right up to the Federal Court. It could not now be revisited or re-asserted under any guise in a subsequent proceeding. The issues raised by the respondent in encl 29 could have been brought up during the appeal process. The law does not allow the respondent to have a second bite of the cherry and in the manner as it did (see para 44). The re-litigation of a regularly and properly concluded matter as determined by the court is prohibited by the wide doctrine of res judicata. The judicial process rests on the twin pillars of certainty and finality. A final order or a judgment must therefore be vigorously protected by this doctrine (see para 44). Setelah perintah atau penghakiman yang sering diperoleh telah menjadi sempurna, mahkamah adalah functus offio. Perkara itu, sebagaimana diputuskan melalui lampiran 6, dengan itu menjadi res judicata dan tidak boleh melalui litigasi semula. Perintah yang dibuat di bawah lampiran 6 telah dirayu dan disahkan sehingga ke Mahkamah Persekutuan. Ia tidak boleh kini disemak semula atau ditaksir semula di bawah apa-apa samaran dalam prosiding seterusnya. Isu-isu yang dibangkitkan oleh responden dalam lampiran 29 boleh dikemukakan semasa proses rayuan. Undang-undang tidak membenarkan responden melakukan sesuatu dua kali dan dalam cara yang dilakukannya (lihat perenggan 44). Litigasi semula untuk perkara yang sering dan betul diputuskan sebagaimana ditentukan oleh mahkamah adalah dilarang oleh doktrin res judicata. Proses kehakiman terletak pada dua tunggak iaitu kepastian dan kemuktamadan. Perintah atau penghakiman muktamad dengan itu patut dilindungi oleh doktrin ini (lihat perenggan 44). [21] It was the respondent's contention that the court in deciding encl 29 was not caught by the doctrines of functus officio and res judicata. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the door is not shut for the court to rehear the matter if special circumstances exist, as evinced by the following evidence, namely: [25] The appellant's conversely argued that a perfected judgment cannot be summarily struck out in the same action by way of a summons in chambers as was done for encl 29 here. A fresh suit needs to be filed to impeach the order, even for an allegation based on fraud. The principles of res judicata and functus officio must apply. It was strongly argued by learned

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-82 counsel that the court may exercise its inherent power to set aside a perfected order only in special circumstances limited to only one situation, namely, where the order was made in contravention of a statute. In support, this passage from Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Prorak Sdn Bhd & Anor [2000] 1 MLJ 479, was cited to impress upon us that even in Badiaddin itself, the final order was set aside, ex debito justitiae, for being in contravention of statute. That passage reads:

[26] It was thus submitted that the Court of Appeal in this case had erred in deciding that the plea of res judicata does not apply because of the 'existence of special circumstances'. The Court of Appeal here held that the respondent should be allowed to re-litigate this matter because it is a 'special case' due to the existence of fresh evidence. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the evidence put forth by the respondent, as we earlier mentioned, formed a good basis for there to exist special circumstances so as not to shut the court's door to allow for the re-adjudication of the matter. The Court of Appeal had also found that the issue of locus standi of the appellant was not raised before by reason of the fraud by the appellant in not disclosing a material fact, ie that it was not the owner of the Cessna aircraft. The matter before it was thus not caught by the res judicata principle (Government of Malaysia v Dato Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74 followed). The Court of Appeal in concluding that this was a 'special case' for which res judicata is not applicable also relied on this passage from Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, stating:

In trying this question, I believe I state the rule of the court correctly when i say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable, might have brought forward at the time. made in breach of written law. The ends of justice will not be met if such a power does not exist; and the procedural branch of the broad and flexible doctrine of estoppels known as res judicata finds no place in such a circumstance. Neither has the functus officio theory, which upon close examination is merely part and parcel of the doctrine of res judicata, any role to play in the case. [44] We conclude by saying that once a regularly obtained order or judgment has been perfected, the court is functus officio. The matter as decided vide encl 6 is thus res judicata and cannot be re-litigated. It needs to be emphasised that the order made under encl 6 was appealed and affirmed right up to the Federal Court. It cannot now be revisited or reasserted under any guise in a subsequent proceeding. The issues raised by the respondent in encl 29 could have been brought up during the appeal process. The law does not allow the There was no merit in the appellant's argument that the second application to set aside the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-83 default judgment was justified because it was based upon a different ground from that relied upon in the first application. The doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense was applicable in the present case. It was certainly open to the appellant to ground its first application on the basis that the default judgment was irregular. It was therefore an issue which properly belonged to the first application. But it chose not to rely upon that ground. Once the first application was dismissed, it was not open to the appellant to make a second application to set aside the judgment on a different ground. It would amount to presenting one's case in installment which the law does not permit. [45] In our judgment too, the re-litigation of a regularly and properly concluded matter as determined by the court is prohibited by the wide doctrine of res judicata. The judicial process rests on the twin pillars of certainty and finality. A final order or a judgment must therefore be vigorously protected by this doctrine, a position taken by the common law courts ever since Henderson (1843).

DUTY OF INSURANCE BROKERS

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) MOHD HISHAMUDDIN, ALIZATUL KHAIR AND ANANTHAM KASINATHER JJCA CIVIL APPEAL NO W-02(NCC)(W)-388-02 OF 2012 10 May 2013

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Earlier proceedings -- Matters could and should reasonably have been raised -- Recovery of amount in contract -- Allegation that goods unmerchantable and returned to appellant -- Appellant's claim in first suit allowed as respondent failed to prove return of goods -- Respondent's claim that goods unmerchantable was without merit as no evidence of rejection of goods -- Second suit based on alleged change in brand name caused goods to be unmerchantable -- Trial judge allowed respondent's claim -- Whether second suit similar to first suit in terms of facts, issues and substance -- Whether there was duplicity in claim pursued under second suit -- Whether doctrine of res judicata applied -- Whether special circumstances exists to justify commencement of second suit -- Whether trial judge erred when deciding in favour of respondent in second suit -- Whether warranted appellate intervention claim that the goods were unmerchantable. The respondent's appeal against the said decision to Court of Appeal was dismissed. The respondent's application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court was refused by the Federal Court. Whilst the respondent's appeal against the decision of the trial judge in the first suit was pending before the Court of Appeal, the respondent filed a fresh suit claiming for the return of the price allegedly because the change in the brand name had caused the goods to be unmerchantable. The trial judge, who incidentally was a same judge in the first suit, now ruled in favour of the respondent primarily because the products were of unmerchantable quality or had become obsolete. Further, in complete disregard of his earlier finding that the same goods had not been shipped for return by the respondent, the trial judge made a finding of fact that the appellant had unreasonably refused to accept the return of the goods on arrival in Hong Kong. Before this court, the appellant contended that the trial judge ought to have upheld the defence of res judicata and dismissed E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-84 the respondent's claim summarily.

The claim of the respondent in the second suit had all the ingredients of the defence of res judicata, if not in the classic sense in which that doctrine was understood, then, most certainly in the wider sense namely, that it became an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings. The learned trial judge ought to have struck out the respondent's claim in the second suit summarily under the doctrine of res judicata unless there were 'special circumstances' allowing for the claim to proceed (see paras 12 & 16). It was apparent that the respondent had knowledge of the joint venture between the appellant and 3Com and of the marketing of the H3C brand at the time of the hearing of the appellant's application for summary judgment in the first suit. Similarly, the defence of the goods having to be returned to Hong Kong was raised and formed the subject matter of a finding of fact by the trial judge in the first suit in favour of the appellant. For the aforesaid reasons, res judicata was an absolute defence to the respondent's claim in the second suit (see paras 16-17). Even if the causes of action were not identical so as to give rise to res judicata in the wider sense, there were no special circumstances to justify the commencement of the second suit by the respondent. The trial judge ought to have examined more closely the defence of res judicata raised by the appellant in their defence in the second suit. Failure to address this issue and the consequent finding of fact in the second suit that the goods had been rejected in Hong Kong, contrary to the trial judge's finding in sewajarnya menegakkan pembelaan res judicata dan menolak tuntutan responden secara ringkas.

Tuntutan responden dalam guaman kedua mempunyai inti pati pembelaan res judicata, jika tidak dalam erti kata klasik yang mana doktrin tersebut difahami, maka, tentunya dalam erti kata luas khususnya, bahawa adalah menjadi salah guna proses untuk membangkitkan dalam prosiding-prosiding seterusnya perkara yang boleh dan oleh itu, sepatutnya dilitigasikan dalam prosiding-prosiding terdahulu. Yang Arif hakim bicara sewajarnya membatalkan tuntutan responden dalam guaman kedua secara ringkas di bawah doktrin res judicata melainkan terdapat 'keadaan-keadaan khas' yang membenarkan tuntutan diteruskan (lihat perenggan 12 & 16). Adalah jelas bahawa responden mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai usaha sama antara perayu dan 3Com dan pemasaran jenama H3C semasa pendengaran permohonan penghakiman ringkas perayu dalam guaman pertama. Begitu juga, pembelaan bahawa barang-barang tersebut perlu dipulangkan ke Hong Kong dibangkitkan dan membentuk hal perkara dapatan fakta oleh hakim bicara dalam guaman memihak kepada perayu. Atas sebab-sebab yang dinyatakan, res judicata adalah pembelaan penuh bagi tuntutan responden dalam guaman kedua (lihat perenggan 16-17). Jikapun kausa-kausa tindakan adalah tidak sama untuk membangkitkan res judicata dalam erti kata luas, tiada hal-hal keadaan khas untuk menjustifikasikan permulaan guaman kedua oleh responden. Hakim bicara sewajarnya mempertimbangkan pembelaan res E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-85 judicata yang dibangkitkan oleh perayu dalam pembelaan guaman kedua mereka dengan lebih teliti. Kegagalan untuk mengutarakan isu ini dan dapatan fakta seterusnya dalam guaman kedua bahawa barang-barang tersebut telah ditolak di Hong Kong, bertentangan dengan dapatan hakim bicara dalam guaman pertama bahawa barang-barang tersebut belum dihantar ke Hong Kong bagi pemulangan, membenarkan campur tangan rayuan (lihat perenggan 17). [9] The claim of the respondent in the second suit proceeded to trial notwithstanding the appellant's defence of res judicata. The learned trial judge, who incidentally was a same judge who heard the application for summary judgment, now ruled in favour of the respondent. His Lordship's judgment in favour of the respondent was primarily because His Lordship was satisfied on the conclusion of the trial that:

[10] Before us, learned counsel for the appellant produced all of the pleadings before the High Court in the first and second suits; the cause papers filed by way of appeal in respect of the first suit to the Court of Appeal and the leave application to the Federal Court arising from the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeal. Based on the aforesaid documents, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned High Court judge ought to have upheld the defence of res judicata and dismissed the respondent's claim summarily.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT

[12] In our judgment, the claim of the respondent in the second suit has all the ingredients of the defence of res judicata, if not in the classic sense in which that doctrine is understood, then, most certainly in the wider sense. The meaning of the doctrine of res judicata and the circumstances under which it operates in the classic sense was discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 where the court held that:

... What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppels per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation -- ... where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-86 diligence, might have brought forward at the time. ... res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but ... It covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. [16] Accordingly, in our judgment, based on the contents of para 11 of this judgment, there is no doubt that the learned trial judge ought to have struck out the respondent's claim in the second suit summarily under the doctrine of res judicata unless there were 'special circumstances' allowing for the claim to proceed. We have examined the statement of defence and the affidavit filed by the respondent when resisting the application for summary judgment and it is apparent that the respondent had knowledge of the joint venture between the appellant and 3Com and of the marketing of the H3C brand at the time of the hearing of the appellant's application for summary judgment in the first suit. This is evident from paras 8 and 10 of the affidavit filed by the respondent resisting the application for summary judgment in the first suit in the following terms:

[17] For the reasons provided herein, res judicata was an absolute defence to the respondent's claim in the second suit. Even if the causes of action were not identical so as to give rise to res judicata in the wider sense, there are no special circumstances to justify the commencement of the second suit by the respondent. In our judgment, with utmost respect to the learned trial judge, he ought to have examined more closely the defence of res judicata raised by the appellant in their defence in the second suit. In our opinion, His Lordship's failure to address this issue and the consequent finding of fact in the second suit that the goods had been rejected in Hong Kong, contrary to His Lordship's finding in the first suit that the goods had not been shipped for return to Hong Kong warrants appellate intervention. insufficient or void instrument; (b) that on the strength of s 241(4) of the NLC read together with s 344(1) and (2) of the NLC, no charge may be granted to two or more persons or bodies otherwise than as trustees or representatives and since BBMB and later the respondent were both the sole chargee and security agent of the guarantors, neither BBMB nor the respondent was capable of entering upon the Instrument as trustee; (c) that in light of s 344 of the NLC, since no such trust had been formed between the appellant and BBMB or the respondent, neither BBMB nor the respondent could be so registered; (d) that since the respondent did not notify the appellant of the transfer of the charge in writing, it was not liable to the respondent for any amounts claimed. The respondent had in an earlier charge action obtained an order for the sale of the land pursuant to s 256 of the NLC but at the time of filing of the suit, the land was yet to be sold. The respondent applied to strike out the appellant's writ of summons and the statement of claim under O 18 r 19 and/or O 92 r 4 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 ('RHC'). The respondent argued that the suit had become academic because the land had since been sold at a public auction. The learned High Court judge ('judge') had struck out the appellant's suit based on the grounds that the suit was barred by the plea of res judicata; that the suit was time barred by limitation; and that the suit has become academic. Hence this appeal by the appellant.

The judge erred in holding that the appellant was estopped from raising the same issue in E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-87 the current suit as it was caught by the doctrine of res judicata. The order for sale made in the earlier charge action under s 256 of the NLC was not a judgment or a decree and, consequently, neither res judicata nor cause of action estoppel nor issue estoppel could be invoked in favour of the respondent to the detriment of the appellant (see para 46). gadaian dan agen sekuriti bagi penjamin-penjamin, BBMB ataupun responden tidak boleh memeterai instrumen sebagai pemegang amanah; (c) merujuk kepada s 344 KTN, memandangkan tiada amanah telah dibentuk antara perayu dan BBMB atau responden, BBMB atau responden tidak boleh didaftarkan; (d) bahawa memandangkan responden tidak memberitahu perayu mengenai pindak milik gadaian dalam bentuk tulisan, ia tidak bertanggungjawab kepada responden untuk sebarang amaun yang dituntut. Responden telah pada tindakan gadaian terdahulu memperoleh perintah untuk jualan tanah menurut s 256 KTN tetapi semasa memfailkan guaman, tanah tersebut belum lagi dijual. Responden memohon untuk membatalkan writ saman dan penyata tuntutan perayu di bawah A 18 k 19 dan/atau A 92 k 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 ('KMT'). Responden berhujah bahawa guaman menjadi akademik oleh kerana tanah tersebut telah dijual semasa lelongan awam. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang bijaksana ('hakim') telah membatalkan guaman perayu berdasarkan alasan-alasan bahawa guaman telah dihalang oleh rayuan res judicata; bahawa guaman telah dihalang oleh masa melalui had masa; dan bahawa guaman telah menjadi akademik. Justeru rayuan ini oleh perayu.

Hakim telah terkhilaf dalam memutuskan bahawa perayu telah diestop daripada menimbulkan isu yang sama dalam guaman ini memandangkan ia tertakluk kepada doktrin res judicata. Perintah jualan yang dibuat pada tindakan gadaian terdahulu di bawah s 256 KTN bukanlah suatu penghakiman atau dekri dan, selanjutnya, res judicata atau tindakan kausa estopel atau isu estopel tidak boleh digunakan bagi pihak responden tanpa menjejaskan perayu (lihat perenggan 46). that the current suit is barred by the plea of res judicata;

THE PLEA OF RES JUDICATA

(5) Proceedings under section 256 are not concerned with any contractual claims that the chargor may have against the chargee. They are concerned with the very narrow and limited question whether the chargor has adduced facts that establish cause to the contrary in the sense discussed herein. It follows that if the chargor is unable to sustain his opposition to the making of the order for sale vide a proceeding in rem, he may nevertheless sue the chargee in personam for breach upon the personal covenant or in equity. And it follows further that, notwithstanding that the order for sale herein had been properly granted, the appellant may still bring an action in personam for breach of contract against the respondent upon the first and second grounds of his complaints. It is not open to the respondent, in such an action, to plead issue estoppel or res judicata. This is because the Judge who makes the order does determine an issue or a cause for an estoppel to operate, and secondly, an order for sale made under section 256 National Land Code is not a judgment. A chargee who makes an application for an order for sale in foreclosure proceedings does not commence an action. He merely enforces his rights as a chargee by exercising his E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-88 statutory remedy against the chargor in default. In order for the doctrines of res judicata, cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel to apply, the earlier proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment or decree. This requirement is not met by foreclosure proceedings which do not result or terminate in a final judgment or decree. contrary' in proceedings brought against him by the chargee, he is not barred from bringing a fresh action against the chargee (notwithstanding that an order for sale has been made) and raising in that action the same or similar facts and issues as those raised by him in the foreclosure proceedings. Neither res judicata nor cause of action estoppel nor issue estoppel are available to the chargee to meet the chargor's action. The trial judge was in error when he held that the appellant was estopped by res judicata from raising in the subsequent action the identical issues which he had raised in the foreclosure proceedings. The appeal was therefore allowed and a retrial of the action was ordered. [46] With respect, the learned High Court judge also erred in law and in fact when Her Ladyship held that the appellant was estopped from raising the same issue in the current suit as it is caught by the doctrine of res judicata. It is trite that the order for sale made under s 256 of the NLC is not a judgment or a decree and, consequently, neither res judicata nor cause of action estoppel nor issue estoppel can be invoked in favour of the respondent to the detriment of the appellant. See Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd. [47] The latin phrase 'res judicata pro veritatem accipitur' expresses the meaning of 'the need for decisions of the Court, unless set aside or quashed, to be accepted as incontrovertibly correct' (Honourable Justice KR Handley, 'Res Judicata: General Principles and Recent Developments' [1999] 18(3) Aust Bar Rev 214). But, it must not be forgotten that res judicata only arises from a judgment obtained on the merits. And that no estoppel would arise from a final order which is not a judgment (Maganja v Arthur Trading As Shirley Arthur's Beauty Centre [1984] 3 NSWLR 561 at p 564). An interlocutory order (Somodaj v Australian Iron And Steel Limited (1963) 109 CLR 285) and an order which requires further action before it is enforceable (R v Rogers (No 2) (1992) 29 NSWLR 179 at p 182) are not final orders. Likewise here, the order for sale made pursuant to s 256 of the NLC is open to challenge by the appellant by way of a collateral proceeding as reflected in the current suit. We wish to add that interlocutory orders on matters of practice and procedure do not give rise to res judicata estoppels. And subject to the restraints of the abuse of process doctrine, a second application may be brought by the aggrieved party to set aside a default judgment, or to obtain an extension of the limitation period. See COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) SULONG MATJERAIE, ABDUL WAHAB PATAIL AND APANDI ALI JJCA CIVIL APPEAL NO P-02-1162 OF 2008 20 December 2012

Civil Procedure -- Res judicata -- Issue estoppel -- Trial judge setting aside order made by deputy registrar -- Appeal against -- Compensation for acquisition of land -- Fee agreement touched in petition of costs in the High Court and complaint to disciplinary board under Legal Profession Act 1976 -- Petition and complaint were dismissed and appellants did not appeal -- Whether appellants' action barred by res judicata and issue estoppel -- Rules of the High

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-89 Court 1980 O 18 r 19 & O 92 r 4

Petition of Costs No 26-13 of 2005 and the complaint made to the disciplinary board under the Legal Profession Act 1976 where the appellants had touched upon the fee agreement in both forums. Both the petition and the complaint were dismissed and the appellants did not appeal. Hence, the respondents stated that the appellants' action was barred by res judicata and issue estoppel.

In considering whether res judicata or issue estoppel applies because there had been earlier proceedings, it was necessary to examine: (a) the writ sought to be struck out to determine the causes of action being pursued; and (b) the previous proceedings to determine the nature of those proceedings and the remedies that were available under those proceedings. Otherwise, it risks injustice and that would be a failure to exercise judicial consideration objectively (see para 11). The remedies available and sought under the writ are not available under the disciplinary board proceedings. If a complaint to the disciplinary board acts as a bar to litigation, there would be no complaints to the disciplinary board. And vice versa, civil proceedings would become a bar to complaints to the disciplinary board. That is not the correct law. A person should not risk being barred from civil proceedings for personal remedies by lodging a complaint to the disciplinary board for disciplinary action to be taken but not pursuing the matter further when the disciplinary board dismisses it. Hence, the trial judge erred in holding that res judicata and issue estoppel arose from the determination of the complaint to the disciplinary board (see paras 12-13). Perayu-perayu telah merayu terhadap keputusan Yang Arif hakim dalam kamar kerana membenarkan rayuan oleh responden-responden dan kerana mengetepikan perintah yang dibuat oleh timbalan pendaftar. Timbalan pendaftar telah menolak permohonan responden-responden di bawah A 18 k 19 dan A 92 k 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 ('KMT') untuk membatalkan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan perayu-perayu. Perayu-perayu telah memohon di bawah writ tersebut, remedi-remedi terhadap peguambela dan peguamcara mereka, R Rajasingam dan firmanya R Rajasingam & Co. Ditegaskan bahawa responden telah mewakili perayu-perayu dalam rayuan mereka kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan berkenaan pampasan bagi pengambilan tanah mereka oleh Kerajaan Negeri Pulau Pinang pada atau kira-kira Disember 1991. Pampasan yang diberikan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seberang Perai Tengah Bukit Mertajam pada Jun 1992 adalah pada kadar RM0.90 setiap kaki persegi. Perayu-perayu telah dimaklumkan oleh responden kedua bahawa dia akan membuat penyerahan dan mendapatkan pampasan RM3.20 setiap kaki persegi. Responden kedua telah memujuk perayu-perayu untuk menandatangani surat bertarikh Mac 2000 untuk membayar kepada mereka 50% daripada sebarang peningkatan. Walau bagaimanapun, responden kedua telah memeterai perjanjian penyelesaian tanpa pengetahuan atau persetujuan perayu-perayu bagi peningkatan sebanyak RM0.70 setiap kaki persegi atau RM4.6 juta dan telah mengambil RM2.3 juta sebagai yuran. Perayu-perayu menegaskan bahawa mereka telah bersetuju dengan 50% dengan syarat responden-responden mendapatkan RM3.20 setiap kaki persegi dan tidak akan bersetuju untuk membayar 50% kepada responden-responden sekiranya mereka E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-90 mengetahui responden kedua telah memeterai perjanjian penyelesaian. Peningkatan sebanyak RM0.70 setiap kaki persegi yang timbul daripada perjanjian penyelesaian tersebut tidak dimaklumkan kepada perayu-perayu walaupun mereka telah diminta beberapa kali. Oleh itu, kausa-kausa tindakan yang disandarkan oleh perayu-perayu adalah, antara lain, perwakilan cuai dan penipuan dan pengkayaan tidak patut. Perayu-perayu menghujahkan antara lain, bahawa hakim bicara di Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengambil kira Petisyen Kos No 26-13 Tahun 2005 dan aduan yang dibuat kepada lembaga tatatertib di bawah Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1976 di mana perayu-perayu telah menyentuh mengenai perjanjian yuran dalam kedua-dua forum. Kedua-dua petisyen dan aduan telah ditolak dan perayu-perayu tidak membuat rayuan. Oleh itu, responden-responden menyatakan bahawa tindakan perayu-perayu telah terhalang oleh res judicata dan isu estopel.

Dalam mempertimbangkan sama ada res judicata atau isu estopel terpakai kerana prosiding telah berjalan sebelum ini, adalah perlu untuk memeriksa: (a) writ yang hendak dibatalkan untuk menentukan sebab-sebab tindakan yang diinginkan; dan (b) prosiding yang terdahulu untuk menentukan sifat prosiding tersebut dan remedi-remedi yang terdapat di bawah prosiding tersebut. Jika tidak, ia mempunyai risiko ketidakadilan dan itu akan menjadi satu kegagalan untuk melaksanakan pertimbangan kehakiman secara objektif (lihat perenggan 11). Remedi-remedi yang tersedia dan yang dipohon di bawah writ tersebut tidak terdapat dalam prosiding lembaga disiplin. Jika aduan kepada lembaga disiplin bertindak sebagai halangan kepada tindakan undang-undang, tidak akan ada aduan kepada lembaga disiplin. Dan sebaliknya, prosiding sivil akan menjadi penghalang kepada aduan kepada lembaga disiplin. Itu bukanlah undang-undang yang betul. Seseorang tidak perlu berisiko terhalang daripada prosiding sivil bagi remedi-remedi peribadi dengan membuat aduan kepada lembaga disiplin agar tindakan disiplin diambil tetapi tidak meneruskan perkara tersebut dengan lebih lanjut apabila lembaga disiplin menolaknya. Oleh itu, hakim bicara terkhilaf dalam memutuskan bahawa res judicata dan isu estopel timbul daripada pemutusan aduan kepada lembaga disiplin (lihat perenggan 12-13). the plaintiffs' action is barred by res judicata and issue estoppel; and [5] The first and the fourth grounds if accepted as grounds to strike out a writ would change the law. The second ground provides the factual foundations to the objections of res judicata and issue estoppel in the third ground. The question is whether the causes of action now raised could or ought to have been or had been raised in those earlier proceedings set out in ground 2. If they were, [7] Having directed himself correctly upon Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 that it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse could be had to the summary process under O 18 r 19 and the summary procedure can only be adopted when it can clearly be seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable', the learned judge concluded that the appellants' writ was a plain and obvious warranting a striking out because the grounds of res judicata and issue estoppel applied. The learned judge concluded these grounds applied on the following basis:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-91 The decision of the disciplinary board although being of an inferior tribunal was constituted and conferred jurisdiction by the Legal Profession Act 1976. As such the effect of such decision would constitute res judicata. The test to be applied in determining whether the decision of a tribunal, which is not a court, is capable of constituting res judicata is whether it has jurisdiction derived either from statute or from submission of parties, to decide finally a question arising between the parties before it (see Akitek Tenggara Sdn Bhd v Mid Valley City Sdn Bhd [2007] 5 MLJ 697). The disciplinary board proceedings were proceedings that took place pursuant to a complaint by the plaintiffs and therefore the investigative tribunal and the disciplinary board derived its jurisdiction from statutory provisions of ss 100-101 of the Legal Profession Act 1976. I therefore find that the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel apply. [11] We do not intend to go into a minute and protracted examination of the documents and facts of this case in order to see whether the appellants had a cause of action (see Mooney & Ors v Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co & Anor [1967] 1 MLJ 87 at p 88). It does not mean the court should simply conclude that because there were previous proceedings, res judicata and issue estoppel applies and therefore the writ is obviously unsustainable and should be struck out. In considering whether res judicata or issue estoppel applies because there had been earlier proceedings, it is necessary to examine (a) the writ sought to be struck out to determine the causes of action being pursued, and (b) the previous proceedings to determine the nature of those proceedings and the remedies that were available under those proceedings. Otherwise, it risks injustice by throwing out the grain with the chaff. That would be a failure to exercise judicial consideration objectively. [13] We find therefore that the learned judge erred in holding that res judicata and issue estoppel arose from the determination of the complaint to the disciplinary board. COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) RAMLY ALI, JEFFREY TAN AND ZAHARAH IBRAHIM JJCA CIVIL APPEAL NO W-02(IM)(NCVC)-2467-09 OF 2011 23 November 2011

Civil Procedure -- Disposal of case on point of law -- Action disposed of without trial -- Res judicata -- Whether principle of res judicata applied to facts of present case -- Whether earlier suit and present suit were subject to different causes of action -- Whether trial judge erred in ruling that present claim should have been made in first suit -- Whether case suitable for determination under O 14A of the Rules of the High Court 1980

The appellant filed an action against the respondent for loss of revenue occasioned by the alleged tampering of the electricity meter at the respondent's premises for the period 8 September 2004 to 11 May 2005. The respondent denied such alleged tampering and contended that the appellant's cause of action against the respondent was res judicata. The respondent submitted that prior to the present suit, there was an earlier suit ('the first suit') involving the same parties, in which the respondent had claimed for an order that the appellant be restrained from disconnecting the electricity supply to the respondent's premises. The appellant had then filed a defence and counterclaim against the respondent for loss of revenue occasioned by the alleged tampering of the electricity meter at the respondent's premises calculated from 27 January 2001 up to 28 September 2004 ('the counterclaim'). It was the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-92 respondent's case that the counterclaim estopped the appellant from proceeding by way of the present suit. The appellant argued that the counterclaim in the first suit dealt with losses sustained by the appellant up until 28 September 2004 before the second incidence of tampering on 11 May 2005. The respondent filed an application under O 14A of the Rules of the High Court 1980 ('RHC') to determine whether the appellant's present claim was res judicata. The respondent submitted that there was clear evidence that the alleged second tampering of the electric meter, which was the basis of the present suit, was apparent to the appellant when it filed the counterclaim in the first suit but it chose not to claim the same. Thus, the respondent contended that the appellant's failure to raise this issue in the first suit amounted to an abuse of process. The High Court judge ruled that the principle of res judicata applied to the facts of the present case and that the present claim should have been made in the first suit. The High Court judge thus allowed the respondent's O 14A application. This was the appellant's appeal against that decision. The appellant submitted that the present suit was unsuitable for summary disposal There were two separate events of illegal tampering of the electricity meter at the respondent's premises, namely the tampering of the meter committed and discovered on 6 September 2004, which was the subject matter of the counterclaim in the first suit, and the second tampering, which was the basis of the present suit. It was clear that these two events were distinct and separate, and were subject to different causes of action. Therefore the plea of res judicata was not applicable. The present suit was premised on the second act of the respondent in reinserting an illegal wire shunt device to deviate electricity for the purpose of deceiving the appellant by the under-registration of power usage. The evidence to be adduced in the present suit was therefore separate and distinct; and sourced from a subsequent investigation with new investigative documents and evidence. Thus, the facts and issues in the present suit had not been adjudicated by the court in the first suit and the rights and liabilities of both parties had not merged into the judgment of the earlier suit. As such, the present cause of action was not estopped by the principle of res judicata (see paras 13-15). Perayu memfailkan tindakan terhadap responden untuk kerugian hasil yang yang disebabkan oleh dakwaan pengusikan meter elektrik di premis responden untuk tempoh dari 8 September 2004 sehingga 11 Mei 2005. Responden menafikan dakwaan pengusikan sedemikian dan berhujah bahawa kausa tindakan terhadap responden adalah res judicata. Responden berhujah bahawa terdahulu daripada guaman tersebut, terdapat guaman terdahulu ('guaman pertama') melibatkan pihak yang sama, di mana responden telah menuntut untuk perintah bahawa perayu dihalang daripada tidak menyambungkan bekalan elektrik ke premis responden. Perayu kemudiannya memfailkan pembelaan dan tuntutan balas terhadap responden untuk kerugian hasil disebabkan oleh dakwaan pengusikan meter elektrik di premis responden dikira dari 27 Januari 2001 sehingga 28 September 2004 ('tuntutan balas'). Adalah kes responden bahawa tuntutan balas estop perayu daripada prosiding melalui guaman ini. Perayu berhujah bahawa tuntutan balas dalam guaman pertama berurusan kerugian yang dialami oleh perayu sehingga 28 September 2004 sebelum kejadian kedua pengusikan pada 11 Mei 2005. Responden memfailkan permohonan di bawah A 14A Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 ('KMT') untuk menentukan sama ada tuntutan perayu ini adalah res judicata. Responden berhujah bahawa terdapat keterangan jelas bahawa dakwaan pengusikan kedua meter elektrik, yang mana adalah asas guaman ini, adalah jelas kepada perayu apabila ia memfailkan tuntutan balas di dalam guaman pertama tetapi ia memmilih untuk menuntutnya. E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-93 Responden oleh itu berhujah bahawa kegagalan perayu untuk membangkitkan isu ini dalam guaman utama merupakan salah guna proses. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa prinsip res judicata beraplikasi kepada fakta kes ini dan bahawa tuntutan ini patut dibuat di dalam guaman pertama. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi oleh itu membenarkan permohonan A 14A responden. Ini adalah rayuan perayu terhadap keputusan tersebut. Perayu berhujah bahawa guaman ini tidak layak untuk pendengaran ringkas dan ia tidak patut diestop daripada prosiding atas alasan kejadian kedua pengusikan elektrik.

Terdapat dua kejadian berasingan pengusikan tidak sah meter elektrik di premis responden, iaitu pengusikan meter yang dilakukan dan didapati pada 6 September 2004, yang mana adalah subjek tuntutan balas guaman pertama, dan pengusikan kedua, yang mana adalah asas guaman ini. Adalah jelas bahawa kedua-dua kejadian ini adalah nyata dan berasingan, dan adalah tertakluk kepada kausa tindakan berasingan. Oleh itu rayuan res judicata tidak beraplikasi. Guaman ini adalah diasaskan ke atas tindakan kedua responden dalam memasukkan alat mengalihkan wayar yang haram untuk melencongkan elektrik bagi tujuan menipu perayu dengan penggunaan kuasa yang tidak dikesan. Keterangan untuk dikemukakan dalam guaman ini oleh itu berasingan dan nyata; dan diambil daripada siasatan lanjutan dengan siasatan baru dokumen-dokumen dan keterangan. Oleh itu, fakta dan isu dalam kes ini tidak diputuskan oleh mahkamah dalam guaman pertama dan hak dan liabiliti kedua pihak tidak digabungkan ke dalam penghakiman guaman pertama. Oleh itu, kausa tindakan ini tidak diestop oleh prinsip res judicata (lihat perenggan 13-15). [3] The respondent in its defence, inter alia, denied such alleged tampering and contended that the appellant's cause of action against the respondent was res judicata or that the appellant is estopped from claiming against the respondent. [4] On the question of res judicata the respondent's contention is that the issues of fact and law pertaining to the present suit filed with regard to a second or repeated incidence of electricity meter tampering was 'res judicata' on account of the facts and issues had been raised in a previous suit's counterclaim filed with regard to a prior incidence of electricity meter tampering and as such the respondent contended that the appellant was estopped from filing this present suit before the court. [8] The respondent filed a summons in chambers under O 14A of the RHC 1980, to determine the question of law as to whether by reason of the cause of action filed by the appellant in its earlier counterclaim against the respondent the appellants' present claim is res judicata or that the appellant is estopped from claiming against the respondent. [9] The respondent contended that there was clear evidence that the alleged second tampering (allegedly on 11 May 2005), which was the basis of the present suit, was apparent to the appellant when the appellant filed its counterclaim against the respondent in the earlier suit on 29 July 2005; but the appellant chose not to claim the same. The respondent submitted that the plea of res judicata applies as it covers facts which are clearly part of the subject matter of litigation and which could have been raised in that earlier proceeding, and thus it amounts to an abuse of the process to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of the same. [11] The learned High Court judge allowed the respondent's application pursuant to O 14A of the RHC 1980 and struck out the writ of summons and the statement of claim with costs. He ruled that the principle of res judicata applied to the facts of the present case; there are facts E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-94 and issues in the earlier suit which also appear to exist in the present suit; and the present claim should [13] The appellant had carried out two separate TNB investigations involving the respondent's premises, ie on 8 April 2004 and 11 May 2005. There were two separate police reports lodged by TNB officials. Clearly, there were two separate events of illegal tampering, which were distinct and separate, and are subject to different causes of action. Therefore the plea of res judicata is not applicable. [15] The facts and issues in the present suit have not been adjudicated by the court in the earlier suit. Therefore the present cause of action is not estopped by the principle of res judicata. The rights and liabilities of both parties had not merged into the judgment of the earlier suit, (see Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189).

CONCLUSION

Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issue estoppel — Purchaser seeking specific performance of contract for sale and purchase of land — Issue whether valid and binding contract existed — Separate originating summons (‘OS’) filed for removal of purchaser’s caveat — Finding made in OS suit that no valid contract existed — Consent order entered in appeal against decision in OS suit with liberty to submit on issue of whether valid contract existed — Whether purchaser prevented by res judicata from relitigating in main suit issue of whether valid contract existed Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Waiver, of — Whether parties may waive or ignore application of res judicata The defendant owned a piece of land (‘the said land’) which it intended to sell and the plaintiff intended to buy. The plaintiff’s representatives and the defendant’s representatives had a meeting on 20 February 2006 to discuss the sale and purchase of the said land. The plaintiff alleged that at this meeting, both parties had agreed to the fundamental terms of the sale and purchase ie the selling price at RM2,161,394.90, sale without vacant possession but with two squatter buildings, payment of compensation to the squatters and completion date of nine months. Vide a letter dated 23 February 2006, the defendant’s solicitors requested for earnest money in the sum of RM10,000 which was duly paid by the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that a contract had been concluded at this meeting itself. Thus when the defendant refused to sell the said land to the plaintiff subsequently, plaintiff took out this suit claiming, inter alia, for specific performance. The plaintiff also lodged a caveat on the said land. Defendant’s version was that there was no concluded contract at the meeting on 20 February 2006 but that it was subject to further consideration and particularly that the sale would need the approval of the EGM of the defendant’s company. It was emphasised that there would not be any concluded and binding agreement unless and until the sale and purchase agreement had been duly executed and that was expressed in their solicitors’ letters as well. On the request for the earnest money, the defendant averred that the purpose was to show its EGM the sincerity of the plaintiff to buy the said land for the consideration of its shareholders but the cheque was never cashed. Since the minority shareholders could come up with a better offer to buy the said land, defendant decided not to sell it to the plaintiff. The defendant filed an Originating Summons (‘OS’) to remove the plaintiff’s caveat on the ground that there was no binding

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-95 contract. The OS was heard separately and the defendant’s application to remove the caveat was allowed. The plaintiff appealed against that decision. Meanwhile, the defendant had also applied by way of summons in chambers to strike out the plaintiffs summons and statement of claim under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC’). This application was dismissed and the defendant appealed against that decision. Subsequently, both parties entered into a consent order wherein both parties agreed to withdraw their respective appeals and that they were at liberty to submit on the issues raised in the private caveat at the trial of this action. Relying on the decision of the learned judge in the OS application that there was no binding and concluded contract, the defendant submitted that res judicata would operate to estop the plaintiff from relitigating on this same issue. The plaintiff contended that there was no issue ||Page 126>> of res judicata as the parties had entered into the consent order which permitted the parties to ventilate the issues in the trial proper. The issues which arose for determination were: (i) the issue of res judicata; and (ii) whether there was a concluded contract arising from the meeting between the parties on 20 February 2006. The defendant also sought for costs to be borne by PW3, the director of the plaintiff personally.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim with costs:

(1) Issue estoppel would encompass issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation. Therefore res judicata applied to such matters as vacant possession, squatters, completion date and power of attorney which were so clearly part of the issue of whether there was a binding and concluded contract besides the price, the earnest money and the intention of the parties. Even if these clear related matters were not raised, issue estoppel still applied as it is not confined to issues raised but issues or matter so clearly related there with which are not raised (see paras 20–21); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (SC) referred; Chemfert Sdn Bhd & Anor v Urn Hua [2010] 5 MLJ 228 referred. (2) The OS ought to have been heard together in the trial of this suit to serve its purpose of the OS being consolidated with this suit. Since the parties chose to proceed with the OS which involved the issues and facts which were practically the same issues and facts of this trial, it must be construed that parties were prepared to accept the findings and decision of the OS and that such findings and decision would have determined the suit for reason that when the learned judge found that there was no binding and concluded contract, the whole basis of the plaintiff’s claim contending that there was such a binding and concluded contract failed (see para 21). (3) Applying the ‘Bozson’ test, when the learned judge had found that there was not in existence such a concluded and binding agreement that disposed of the rights of the parties herein and the whole crux of contention of the parties. Consequently, the judgment of the learned judge in the OS was a final and not interlocutory judgment (see para 22). (4) Res judicata is a legal doctrine. It is against public policy and not permissible for parties to waive or ignore its applicability by mutual consent or to contract out. Hence, the plaintiff could not rely on a term agreed upon by consent to oust the applicability of the law. Doctrine of res judicata was thus still applicable to estop the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-96 same issues which had already been litigated and decided by the learned judge in the OS proceeding from being reopened again (see para 24). (5) The defendant’s condition that they needed to get the consent or approval through an EGM of the company before they could conclude ||Page 127>> the sale and purchase agreement would place their offer or acceptance as equivocal or qualified. Hence, it could not be said that a contract had been concluded (see para 24). (6) When the issue of having to seek the approval of the EGM became a pre-condition to the defendant before they could formally enter into a contract with the plaintiff, it was untenable to argue that the defendant needed not obtain such approval but had to force through the EGM with the majority shareholding of the two directors in order to sell the said land to the plaintiff (see para 32). (7) On the facts of the case, the earnest money requested for did not constitute a contract within a contract as the offer was conditional which meant that an unqualified acceptance by the plaintiff would not render a contract to exist in such circumstances (see para 35); Jagathesan v Linggi Plantations Ltd [1969] 2 MLJ 253 referred; Low Kar Yit & Ors v Mohamed Isa & Anor [1963] MLJ 165 referred. (8) The intention of contracting parties to enter into a concluded contract must be ad idem and not unilateral. Intention can be inferred from the words of the parties, their conduct and from the surrounding circumstances (see para 40). (9) The intention of the defendant had been expressed unequivocally that there shall be no binding contract unless and until a binding written one had been duly executed by both parties herein. The fact that of the instant case was not one where parties had agreed on all essential terms and conditions but subject to a formal sale and purchase agreement to be drawn up or subject to further contract. There was no concluded contract for the sale and purchase of the said land between the plaintiff and the defendant on 20 February 2006 when the parties had not executed a binding written sale and purchase agreement. Moreover not all essential terms and condition of the alleged contract had been agreed upon (see para 40); Charles Grenier Sdn Bhd v Lau Wing Hong [1996] 3 MLJ 327 referred; Kam Mah Theatre Sdn Bhd v Tan Lay Soon [1994] 1 MLJ 108 referred. (10) Order 59 r 2 of the RHC gives the court the full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid. The court has the power to direct a non-party to pay costs of this suit. However, there was nothing culpable on the part of PW3 to justify any order for costs against him personally (see para 45); Takako Sakao (f) v Ng Peh Yuan (f) & Anor (No 3) [2010] 2 MLJ 141 (FC) referred. Defendan memiliki sebidang tanah (‘tanah tersebut’) yang mana dia berhasrat untuk menjual dan plaintif berniat untuk membeli. Wakil-wakil plaintif dan ||Page 128>> wakil-wakil defendan telah mengadakan perjumpaan pada 20 Februari 2006 untuk membincangkan jual beli tanah tersebut. Plaintif mendakwa pada perjumpaan tersebut, kedua-dua pihak telah bersetuju dengan terma penting jual beli iaitu harga jualan pada RM2,161,394.90, penjualan tanpa milikan kosong tetapi dengan dua bangunan rumah setinggan, pembayaran balasan kepada setinggan-setinggan dan tarikh penyempurnaan selama sembilan bulan. Melalui surat bertarikh 23 Februari 2006, peguam-peguam defendan meminta

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-97 wang cengkeram berjumlah RM10,000 yang mana telah dibayar oleh plaintif. Plaintif berhujah bahawa kontrak telah dicapai pada perjumpaan itu. Justeru apabila defendan enggan menjual tanah tersebut kepada plaintif berikutnya, plaintif telah membuat guaman menuntut, antara lain, perlaksanaan spesifik. Plaintif juga telah memasukkan kaveat ke atas tanah tersebut. Versi defendan adalah bahawa tidak terdapat kontrak yang dicapai pada perjumpaan pada 20 Februari 2006 tetapi adalah tertakluk kepada balasan selanjutnya dan terutamanya bahawa jualan tersebut memerlukan kebenaran EGM syarikat defendan. Adalah ditegaskan bahawa tidak terdapat perjanjian yang tercapai dan terikat melainkan dan sehingga perjanjian jual beli telah ditandatangani dan bahawa ianya juga telah dinyatakan di dalam surat-surat peguam mereka. Mengenai permintaan wang cengkeram, defendan menegaskan bahawa tujuannya adalah untuk menunjukkan EGM ketulusan plaintif untuk membeli tanah tersebut dengan pertimbangan pemegang-pemegang saham tetapi cek tersebut tidak pernah ditunaikan. Memandangkan pemegang-pemegang saham minoriti boleh memberikan tawaran yang lebih baik untuk membeli tanah tersebut, defendan memutuskan untuk tidak menjualkannya kepada plaintif. Defendan telah memfailkan saman pemula (‘SP’) untuk menarik balik kaveat plaintif atas dasar bahawa tidak terdapat kontrak yang terikat. SP telah didengar secara berasingan dan permohonan defendan untuk menarik balik kaveat telah dibenarkan. Plaintif membuat rayuan terhadap keputusan tersebut. Sementara itu, defendan juga telah memohon melalui saman dalam kamar untuk membatalkan saman-saman plaintif dan penyataan tuntutan di bawah A 18 k 19(1)(a), (b) dan (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’). Permohonan ini telah ditolak dan defendan membuat rayuan terhadap keputusan tersebut. Selanjutnya, kedua-dua pihak telah memeterai perintah kebenaran di mana kedua-dua pihak bersetuju untuk menarik balik rayuan masing-masing dan bahawa mereka bebas untuk mengemukakan isu-isu yang dibangkitkan dalam kaveat persendirian pada perbicaraan tindakan ini. Berdasarkan kepada keputusan hakim bijaksana dalam permohonan SP bahawa tidak terdapat kontrak terikat dan tercapai, defendan berhujah bahawa res judicata akan digunakan untuk mengestop plaintif daripada membuat litigasi semula isu yang sama. Plaintif berhujah bahawa tidak terdapat isu res judicata memandangkan pihak-pihak telah memasuki perintah kebenaran yang mana membenarkan pihak-pihak mengutarakan isu-isu di dalam perbicaraan wajar. Isu-isu yang timbul untuk penentuan adalah: (i) isu res judicata; dan (ii) sama ada terdapat kontrak yang tercapai berbangkit daripada perjumpaan antara ||Page 129>> pihak-pihak pada 20 Februari 2006. Defendan juga memohon untuk kos untuk ditanggung oleh PW3, pengarah plaintif secara peribadi.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos:

(1) Isu estopel merangkumi isu-isu atau fakta-fakta yang sangat jelas sebahagian daripada perkara subjek litigasi. Justeru res judicata diguna pakai terhadap perkara-perkara seperti milikan kosong, setinggan-setinggan, tarikh penyempurnaan dan surat kuasa wakil yang mana sangat jelas merupakan sebahagian daripada isu sama ada terdapat kontrak terikat dan tercapai selain daripada harga, wang cengkeram dan niat pihak-pihak. Meskipun perkara berkaitan yang jelas ini tidak dibangkitkan, isu estopel seharusnya diguna pakai memandangkan ianya tidak tertakluk kepada isu-isu berbangkit tetapi isu-isu atau perkara yang sangat jelas berkaitan yang mana tidak dibangkitkan (lihat perenggan 20–21); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-98 Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (MA) dirujuk; Chemfert Sdn Bhd & Anor v Urn Hua [2010] 5 MLJ 228 dirujuk. (2) SP seharusnya didengar secara bersama di dalam perbicaraan guaman ini untuk mencapai tujuan SP yang digabungkan dengan guaman ini. Memandangkan pihak-pihak memilih untuk meneruskan SP yang mana melibatkan isu-isu dan fakta-fakta yang mana sama dengan isu-isu dan fakta-fakta untuk perbicaraan, ia seharusnya ditafsir bahawa pihak-pihak bersedia untuk menerima dapatan-dapatan dan keputusan SP dan dapatan dan keputusan tersebut seharusnya menentukan guaman dengan sebab bahawa apabila hakim yang bijaksana mendapati bahawa tidak terdapat kontrak terikat dan tercapai, oleh itu asas keseluruhan tuntutan plaintif yang mendakwa bahawa terdapat kontrak yang terikat dan tercapai sedemikian telah gagal (lihat perenggan 21). (3) Menggunakan ujian ‘Bozson’, apabila hakim yang bijaksana telah mendapati bahawa tidak wujud perjanjian tercapai dan terikat yang mana menyatakan hak pihak-pihak dan keseluruhan intipati hujahan pihak-pihak. Selanjutnya, penghakiman hakim yang bijaksana SP adalah muktamad dan bukan penghakiman interlokutori (lihat perenggan 22. (4) Res judicata adalah doktrin perundangan. Ia bercanggah dengan polisi awam dan pihak-pihak tidak dibenarkan untuk melupuskan atau menghiraukan bahawa ia terpakai melalui kebenaran bersama atau untuk keluar dari kontrak. Justeru, plaintif tidak boleh bersandarkan kepada terma yang dipersetujui oleh kebenaran untuk menyingkirkan undang-undang terpakai tersebut. Doktrin res judicata oleh itu masih terpakai untuk mengestop isu-isu yang sama yang mana telah dilitigasi dan diputuskan oleh hakim yang bijaksana di dalam prosiding SP daripada dibuka semula (lihat perenggan 24). ||Page 130>> (5) Keadaan defendan bahawa mereka perlu mendapat kebenaran atau kelulusan melalui EGM syarikat sebelum mereka boleh mencapai perjanjian jual beli menempatkan tawaran atau penerimaan mereka sebagai tidak jelas atau bersyarat. Justeru, ia tidak boleh dikatakan bahawa suatu kontrak telah tercapai (lihat perenggan 24). (6) Apabila isu untuk mendapatkan kelulusan EGM menjadi pra-syarat untuk defendan sebelum mereka boleh memeterai kontrak secara formal dengan plaintif, hujahan bahawa defendan tidak perlu mendapatkan kelulusan sedemikian tetapi perlu dibentangkan melalui EGM dengan pegangan saham majoriti dua pengarah untuk menjual tanah kepada plaintif tidak dapat dipertahankan (lihat perenggan 32). (7) Berdasarkan fakta-fakta kes, wang cengkeram yang diminta tidak membentuk kontrak dalam kontrak memandangkan tawaran adalah dengan syarat yang mana bermaksud bahawa penerimaan tanpa syarat oleh plaintif tidak mewujudkan kontrak dalam keadaan sedemikian; (lihat perenggan 35); Jagathesan v Linggi Plantations Ltd [1969] 2 MLJ 253 dirujuk; Low Kar Yit & Ors v Mohamed Isa & Anor [1963] MLJ 165 dirujuk. (8) Niat pihak-pihak dalam kontrak untuk memeterai kontrak yang tercapai hendaklah ad idem dan bukan pada satu pihak. Niat boleh ditafsir daripada perkataan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-99 pihak-pihak, tindakan mereka dan daripada keadaan sekeliling (lihat perenggan 40). (9) Niat defendan telah dinyatakan dengan jelas bahawa tidak terdapat kontrak terikat melainkan dan sehingga kontrak bertulis yang terikat telah ditandatangani oleh kedua-dua pihak. Fakta bahawa kes ini bukanlah di mana pihak-pihak telah bersetuju dengan kesemua terma-terma dan syarat-syarat penting tetapi tertakluk kepada perjanjian jual beli formal yang harus ditulis atau tertakluk kepada kontrak selanjutnya. Tidak terdapat kontrak yang tercapai untuk jual beli bagi tanah tersebut antara plaintif dan defendan pada 20 Februari 2006 apabila pihak-pihak tidak menandatangani perjanjian jual beli bertulis yang terikat. Tambahan bukan semua terma dan syarat penting kontrak yang didakwa telah dipersetujui (lihat perenggan 40); Charles Grenier Sdn Bhd v Lau Wing Hong [1996] 3 MLJ 327 dirujuk; Kam Mah Theatre Sdn Bhd v Tan Lay Soon [1994] 1 MLJ 108 dirujuk. (10) Aturan 59 k 2 KMT memberikan mahkamah kuasa penuh untuk memutuskan setakat mana dan oleh siapa kos harus dibayar. Mahkamah mempunyai kuasa untuk memerintah parti yang tidak terlibat untuk membayar kos untuk guaman ini. Walau bagaimanapun, tidak terdapat kesilapan di pihak PW3 untuk menjustifikasikan apa-apa perintah untuk kos terhadapnya secara peribadi (lihat perenggan 45); Takako Sakao (f) v Ng Peh Yuan (f) & Anor (No 3) [2010] 2 MLJ 141 (MP) dirujuk. ||Page 131>> [9] Relying on the decision of the learned judge in Originating Summons No 24–912 of 2006 above that there was no binding and concluded contract, inter alia, other grounds for the plaintiff’s caveat on the said land to be removed, defendant submitted that res judicata would operate to estop the plaintiff from relitigating on this same issue. [10] The plaintiff contended that there is no issue of res judicata when the parties have entered into a court order on 16 June 2011 which permits the parties to ventilate the issues in the trial proper. [11] Since issue of res judicata has been raised in submission, it will be considered as the first issue hereunder.

Res judicata

[15] In other words, the issues raised in the removal of caveat proceeding as agreed can be submitted again in the trial proper. The defendant now submits that on a question of public policy and that there should be finality on litigation, res judicata which need not be pleaded ought to operate to bar the plaintiff from reopening the same issues citing the cases of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (SC); Goh Keat Poh & Ors v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd and other appeal [2009] 5 MLJ 449 (CA). This is despite the fact that there was a consent order with a reservation of the issues in a previous proceeding citing Prospective Management Services Sdn Bhd v Seganom Sdn Bhd [2004] 4 CLJ 466 (CA) which adopted the principle of law as held in SCF Finance Co Ltd v Mash (No 3) [1987] 1 All ER 194 (CA) which was cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Asia Commercial Finance’s case. [17] The comprehensive doctrine of res judicata has been well expounded by His Lordship Peh Swee Chin SCJ in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Asia

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-100 Commercial Finance. A good summary of the doctrine can be seen in the Court of Appeal case of Chemfert Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lim Hua [2010] 5 MLJ 228 at pp 236–239; [2010] 7 CLJ 491 at pp 501–504. Out of the 19 principles of law summarised from Asia Commercial Finance’s case by His Lordship Low Hop Bing JCA, I find it apt to reproduce the relevant ones applicable in the instant case as follows:

(i) Res judicata simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum; (ii) When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties who should accept it as the truth — res judicata pro veritate accipitur; (iii) The public policy of the law is that it is the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; … (vii) The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points ||Page 137>> upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time: per Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 at p 115; the ‘point’ should actually include causes of action, or all causes of action which one of the two parties has against the other, based on, or substantially on the same facts or issues, and not just all issues of law or of fact that are in dispute between the parties; … (x) There are in fact two kinds of estoppel per rem jusdicatum, the first relates to cause of action estoppel and the second, to issue estoppel, which is a development from the first; … (xiii) Issue estoppel literally means simply an issue which a party is estopped from raising in a subsequent proceeding. However, in law, issue estoppel means a lot more, ie that neither of the same parties or their privies in a subsequent proceeding is entitled to challenge the correctness of the decision of a previous final judgment in which they, or their privies, were parties; neither of such parties will be allowed to adduce evidence or advance any argument to contradict such decision; (xiv) Issue estoppel prevents contradiction of a previous determination, whereas cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of the cause of action: per Peter Gibson J in Lawlor v Gray [1984] 3 All ER 345 at p 350. … (xvii) Res judicata for this purpose is therefore not confined to the issue which the court is actually asked to decide, but covers issues of facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-101 them … … (xix) The court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action by applying the doctrine of res judicata against a party, even if it has not been pleaded, as estoppel is based on a question of public policy and there should be finality in litigation …

Held … (3) Issue estoppel also applies to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence though not actually decided by the court. Res judicata is therefore not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them … [21] Looking in that light, even though the learned judge hearing the said OS did not touch on the questions of vacant possession and squatters as well as the compensation, the completion date and power of attorney, all these are nevertheless matters relating to the same issue of whether there is a binding and concluded contract which was the principal issue and ground for determination in that application. As stated by the Court of Appeal above, issue estoppel would encompass issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation. Therefore res judicata will apply to such matters as vacant possession, squatters, completion date and power of attorney which are so clearly part of the issue of whether there was a binding and concluded ||Page 139>> contract besides the price, the earnest money and the intention of the parties. Even if these clear related matters were not raised, issue estoppel will still apply on the above two authorities of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal as it is not confined to issues raised but issues or matter so clearly related there with which are not raised. The ensuing question is whether the judgment of the learned judge given in OS 24–912 of 2006 which has been consolidated in this suit on 22 November 2007 is or is not a final judgment; bundle B pp 272–279 is the full ground of judgment. OS 24–912 of 2006 was filed separately from this suit but it was consolidated. With the consolidation with this suit, one would expect that the cause and issues raised in the OS would and ought rightly to have been heard and disposed of together in the trial of the suit itself. However, this OS was heard separately from this suit resulting in the aforesaid judgment. Parties ought to know when they proceeded to hearing of the said OS, the issues canvassed were directly the same issues of this trial ie whether there is a binding and concluded contract which is the basis for the lodging or removal of the caveat in that if there was such a concluded contract, the lodgment of the caveat would be proper and maintainable as the plaintiff would have the caveatable interest to do so but if there was no binding and concluded contract as the learned judge had held in the said OS, the caveat ought to be removed for want of caveatable interest. Similarly, if there was a binding and concluded contract, the plaintiff’s claim in this suit would have been succeeded, otherwise, it would fail. This outcome and effect of the hearing of the OS must have been clear to parties when they elected to proceed to hearing of the OS separately from the trial of this suit proper. If not, the OS ought to have been heard together in the trial of this suit to serve its purpose of the OS being consolidated with this suit. Therefore, since parties have chosen to proceed with the OS which involves the issues and facts which are practically the same issues and facts of this trial, it must be construed that parties were prepared to accept the findings and decision of the OS

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-102 and that such findings and decision would have determined the suit for reason that when the learned judge found that there was no binding and concluded contract, the whole basis of the plaintiff’s claim contending that there was such a binding and concluded contract would fail and the plaintiff’s case as the domino effect should fall. To determine whether a judgment is interlocutory or final, the Bozson test as laid down by Lord Alverstone CJ in Bozson v Alltrincham Urban District Council [1903] 1 KB 547 had been accepted and applied as a settled practice in our courts; see Ratnam v Cumarasamy & Anor [1962] 1 MLJ 330; Peninsular Land Development Sdn Bhd v K Ahmad (No 2) [1970] 1 MLJ 253; Hong Kim Sui v Malayan Banking Bhd [1971] 1MLJ 289; Arumugam Pillai v Government of Malaysia [1980] 2 MLJ 283; Ng Cheng Yoon v Mah binti Mat Isa [1981] 1 MLJ 218 and Haron bin Mohd Zaid v Central Securities (Holdings) Berhad [1982] 2 MLJ 94, at p 97. This test is as follows: [23] I shall now consider the effect of the subsequent order of court dated 16 June 2011 where parties have consented to the terms particularly on the relevant part where the parties have agreed that there are at liberty to submit on the issues raised in relation to the private caveat at the trial. The plaintiff strenuously contended that the defendant had so agreed and cannot resile from the agreed term. The defendant contented that there must be a clear reservation of the issue and even if it did, a reservation of an issue by a party in a previous proceeding was ineffective to prevent the estoppel from arising against the said party citing in supporting Prospective Management Services Sdn Bhd v Seganom Sdn Bhd. Referring to Goh Keat Poh & Ors v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd and other appeal [2009] 5 MLJ 449 where the Court of Appeal held that the decision of the Federal Court in an earlier case pertaining to removal of caveat which had decided that the ‘Farlim agreements’ were invalid would be binding on the parties to the Farlim agreements whereby by applying the doctrine of res judicata, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff’s suit for specific performance of the Farlim agreements failed, the defendant submitted that applying the said principle, the plaintiff’s claim should fail on this ground. In addition, the defendant also submitted that parties cannot by consent do away with res judicata and compell the court to re-open the issue which had been decided earlier contending that the term in a consent order which is against public policy will be void referring to Lian Mong Yee v Abdul Rashid bin Maidin & Ors [2001] 4 MLJ 38; [2001] 3 CLJ 905 (CA). [24] In the order of court dated 25 February 2010 (bundle C pp 268– 270) and the grounds of judgment of the learned judge hearing the said OS (bundle C pp 272–279), the crux of the dispute between the parties as to the existence of a concluded contract of sale and purchase had been decided upon a full ||Page 141>> hearing. It will be against public policy that in the existence of such an order and judgment, parties are permitted to ignore such judgment by consenting to relitigate the matter once again. To allow the parties to so do would tantamount to virtually permitting the parties to renege the decision or judgment of the learned judge and to bypass the appeal process so that parties can get a second bite at the cherry by opening the issues again before another judge despite the fact that those cause of action and/or issues have been decided earlier. In such circumstances, the order and judgment of the learned judge would have no meaning and no effect; similarly, the appeal process would also be redundant since parties can ignore the previous decision of the court relating to the same cause and same issues to relitigate the matters by consent instead of appealing against that order or judgment which is not favourable

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-103 to them. This can certainly by not be countenanced. The proper course that the party dissatisfied with or aggrieved by the said order or judgment is to proceed to appeal to the Court of Appeal to overrule that decision and it is not by way of seeking another judge of co-ordinating jurisdiction to reverse the earlier decision which the subsequent judge does not have that jurisdiction to do so. Res judicata is a legal doctrine and I must agree that it is against public policy and not permissible for parties to waive or ignore its applicability by mutual consent or to contract out, so to speak. I therefore hold that the plaintiff cannot rely on a term agreed upon by consent to oust the applicability of the law. Doctrine of res judicata is thus still applicable to estop the same issues which had already been litigated and decided by the learned judge in the OS proceeding from being reopened again. [43] Having considered the case as a whole and all submissions by both parties herein, I hold that the plaintiff’s claim will fail on the doctrine of res judicata. Alternatively, on a finding of facts and evidence before this court, I hold, for the reasons advanced above, that the plaintiff had failed to prove their case of a concluded and binding contract on a balance of probabilities. Consequently, the plaintiff’s claim is hereby dismissed with costs of RM15,000.

Held, dismissing encls 3 and 42 with costs, allowing encls 21 and 30 with costs and striking out the claims against the defendants:

(1) The court had no jurisdiction to set aside what was a perfectly regular and final order made by another court of competent concurrent jurisdiction (see paras 71 & 76). (2) The plaintiff’s pleaded case and evidence did not show that the OS order amounted to a contravention of some written law or rules of natural justice or that it defied a substantive statutory prohibition so as to render the order null and void for illegality or lack of jurisdiction (see para 77). (3) The arguments on breach of natural justice advanced in this court were the same ones made before the court that issued the OS order and they did not find favour with that court. That alone rendered the instant claim bad by reason of res judicata. The decision of the Court of Appeal affirming the High Court’s decision and the Federal Court’s refusal to grant leave to appeal, in a certain sense, fortified the application of res judicata here (see para 89). (4) It was open to the appellate courts to set aside the OS order for any of the reasons proffered by the plaintiff, which reasons were same ones relied on in the present claim. Yet, both the Court of Appeal and Federal Court declined to do so. The issue of the alleged invalidity of the OS order was well and fully determined and could not now be re-litigated (see para 51). (5) The justice of the case did not lie in granting an Erinford injunction. The conditions for maintaining status quo were not present. There had been no development since the dismissal of the application for an interim injunction to warrant the concerns of the plaintiff and no steps had been taken by any of the defendants towards execution of the OS order (see paras 68 & 67). (6) With the multiple suits filed, all in respect of the same complaint, the plaintiff’s action was akin to abuse of process. It was plainly and obviously an unsustainable claim which was bound to fail if it proceeded to trial (see paras 59 & 91).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-104

Diputuskan, menolak lampiran 3 dan 42 dengan kos, membenarkan lampiran 21 dan 30 dengan kos dan membatalkan tuntutan-tuntutan terhadap defendan-defendan:

(1) Mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mengenepikan apa yang adalah perintah biasa dan muktamad yang sempurna dibuat oleh mahkamah lain yang kompeten bidang kuasa bersama (lihat perenggan 71 & 76). (2) Kes yang diplid plaintif dan keterangan tidak menunjukkan bahawa ||Page 103>> perintah SP menyalahi beberapa undang-undang bertulis atau peraturan-peraturan keadilan asasi atau bahawa ia mengingkari larangan statutori substantif untuk membuatkan perintah tak sah dan terbatal kerana kepenyalahan undang-undang atau ketiadaan bidang kuasa (lihat perenggan 77). (3) Hujahan-hujahan atas kemungkiran keadilan asasi yang dikemukakan dalam mahkamah ini adalah sama seperti yang dibuat di hadapan mahkamah yang mengeluarkan perintah SP dan ia tidak disokong oleh mahkamah tersebut. Ini saja membuatkan tuntutan ini tidak kukuh atas alasan res judicata. Keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan mengesahkan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dan penolakan Mahkamah Persekutuan untuk memberikan izin untuk merayu, dari satu segi, mengukuhkan permohonan res judicata ini (lihat perenggan 89). (4) Ia terbuka kepada mahkamah-mahkamah rayuan untuk mengenepikan perintah SP untuk apa-apa alasan yang dikemukakan oleh plaintif, alasan-alasan yang mana adalah alasan-alasan yang sama yang digunakan dalam tuntutan ini. Tetapi kedua-dua Mahkamah Rayuan dan Mahkamah Persekutuan menolak daripada berbuat demikian. Isu ketaksahan yang didakwa terhadap perintah SP telah ditentukan dengan betul dan sepenuhnya dan sekarang ini tidak boleh dilitigasikan semula (lihat perenggan 51). (5) Keadilan kes ini tidak bergantung dalam memberikan injunksi erinford. Syarat-syarat untuk mengekalkan status quo tidak terdapat. Tidak terdapat perkembangan semenjak penolakan permohonan untuk injunksi interim untuk mewajarkan perkara yang membimbangkan plaintif dan langkah-langkah tidak diambil oleh mana-mana defendan terhadap pelaksanaan perintah SP tersebut (lihat perenggan 68 & 67). (6) Dengan pelbagai tindakan difailkan, kesemuanya berkaitan aduan yang sama, tindakan plaintif sama seperti penyalahgunaan proses. Ia adalah jelas tuntutan yang tidak boleh dikekalkan yang akan gagal jika ia diteruskan dengan perbicaraan (lihat perenggan 59 & 91). [29] The application was opposed. Miss Yoong and Mr Yap made separate but substantially similar submissions and they adopted one another’s submissions. I shall summarise those submissions. First and foremost, the defendants contended that the questions or issues identified had all been decided and cannot be reopened. In short, they relied on the application of the principle of res judicata. They further argued the following: [33] Both learned judges in those proceedings had also dealt with and disposed of those same issues, though not necessarily for the same reasons. The related memorandum of appeal further shows the reliance of the plaintiff on the same issues for consideration by the Court of Appeal which ended not in the plaintiffs favour. In such circumstances, it cannot be denied E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-105 that the principle of res judicata is indeed engaged in the facts of this case to prevent a re-litigation — Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189, Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57; [1997] 2 CLJ 104. [51] I must add at this opportune moment, though I will return to this aspect later, that it was open to the appellate courts to set aside the OS order for any of the reasons proffered by the plaintiff. Which reasons I have repeatedly pointed out are the same reasons relied on in the present claim. Both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court have the necessary or appropriate jurisdiction for setting aside that order. Yet, both courts declined. This aspect is extremely important as this adds another dimension to the operation of the principle of res judicata in that the issue of the invalidity of the OS order for the reasons put forth by the plaintiff has well and fully determined and cannot now be re-litigated. [70] I shall take both applications filed by both sets of the defendants together since the applications rely on the same facts and reasons. Those facts and substantive portions of the claim have already been set out earlier. The defendants principally rely on the application of the principle of res judicata. I shall deal with this issue shortly. [87] This brings me now to the issue of res judicata. As I had earlier said, the defendants have argued res judicata and the plaintiff have defended its application. Without resetting out the arguments, suffice to say that I wholly agree with the submissions of the defendants. When the learned judge dismissed the plaintiff’s application to intervene, His Lordship did so on the ‘merits’ as well. It was contended that since the court was of the view that it was functus officio, then the ensuing ruling of the court on the merits are all made obiter. That being so, the doctrine of res judicata did not operate. [89] I must add that the arguments on breach of natural justice in the manner and nature now advanced before me were the same arguments made before the OS court and which did not find favour with the learned judge in the OS proceedings. This is evident from the application and affidavits filed, including from the extensive written submissions filed by the plaintiff. Yet, Justice Hamid Sultan did not see or agree with the basis for revisiting and setting aside his own earlier order ex debito justitiae, that is, because of the presence of breaches of natural justice in the manner identified by the plaintiff. That alone renders the instant claim bad by reason of the application of the principle of res judicata. The decision of the Court of Appeal affirming the decision of the High Court, and the refusal of the Federal Court in a certain sense, fortifies the application of the principle of res judicata here. ||Page 130>> [90] Further, the principle of res judicata applied equally in relation to the decision in the Shah Alam court. In that suit filed against the trustee, the plaintiff sought for its removal on the basis of breach of duties and breach of the express terms of the trust deed. On an application of the principle of res judicata in the wider sense of issue estoppel, that decision in the Shah Alam court founded on the same facts suffice to bring into play the principle of res judicata. The decision in the Shah Alam Suit, though made in interlocutory proceedings, is nevertheless a final decision. Decisions made after arguments have been fully ventilated, especially when and where parties are represented are final as they can be. These decisions render the issues under consideration as adjudicated or judicata by the court. The plaintiffs had instructed the defendant, a legal firm, to represent them in a dispute. Based

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-106 on these instructions the defendant had filed a civil suit and collected the first portion of its agreed legal fees of RM100,000. Subsequently, the plaintiffs became dissatisfied with the defendant’s conduct of their case. The plaintiffs thus terminated the services of the defendant as their solicitors on record for the civil suit. The plaintiffs also agreed to treat the RM100,000 that they had already paid as ‘sufficient cover of all fees’. However, the defendant took the stand that it was only prepared to discharge itself as the plaintiffs’ solicitors provided the plaintiffs paid the agreed legal fees of RM22.96m, which was the sum the parties had allegedly agreed to as the defendant’s fees. In support of this claim, the defendant relied upon its warrant to act that provided that the plaintiffs agreed to pay the defendant the sum of RM100,000 and 50% of the proceeds of any recovered sum, which according to the defendant amounted to RM22.96m. However, in their next letter to the plaintiffs the defendant claimed that it had never agreed to a fee of 50% of the claim upon recovery as this would be a contingency fee and therefore illegal. Instead the defendant demanded full payment of RM50,000 or the allegedly outstanding legal fees and threatened legal action if this sum was not paid. The plaintiffs lodged a complaint to the Bar Council against the solicitor from the defendant firm. The Disciplinary Board found that the charging of contingency fees amounted to professional misconduct. However, on appeal this decision was reversed. Thereafter, the defendant issued notices under s 218 of the Companies Act 1965 to the plaintiffs, claiming the payment of the alleged outstanding amount of RM22.96m owed to the defendant by the plaintiffs as balance of the outstanding legal fees. The plaintiffs thus filed the present action seeking, inter alia, a permanent injunction against the defendant from filing any winding up petition against them and a declaration that the plaintiffs did not owe the defendant the sum of RM22.96m. At the trial the ||Page 709>> defendant submitted that it would not be proceeding with winding up proceedings but would instead be proceeding to file a bill of costs for the sum of RM22.96m. The defendant also raised the issue of res judicata with regard to the issues raised by the plaintiffs in this action.

Held, allowing the application with costs of RM30,000:

(1) The appeal from the decision of the Disciplinary Board to the High Court in the professional misconduct matter had little to do with the merits of the present contractual claims between the parties. To this extent, res judicata could not be held either relevant or applicable (para 22). (2) This court was of the opinion that the only important issue in this case was whether the defendant was using winding up proceedings oppressively and inequitably in violation of settled principles relating to a Fortuna injunction. The facts were crystal clear in establishing that the s 218 demands were not grounded on any genuine bona fide debt but were in fact grounded on spite and malice. The defendant was unhappy with the termination of its legal services by the plaintiffs and as a result had demanded the payment of RM22.96m as unpaid fees. On the evidence and the law, this was a case which clearly fell within the two limbs of the fortuna principles, namely where the presentation of the winding up petition would produce irreparable harm in a situation where the petition if presented would have no chance of success, and second, the defendant was choosing to assert a disputed claim by a procedure which would

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-107 produce irreparable harm to the plaintiffs instead of opting for a more suitable alternative procedure (see paras 26–28). (3) The evidence showed clearly that the RM22.96m claimed was a contingency fee claim, which the defendant itself admitted was illegal. Thus, in the interest of justice and for full and complete determination of this dispute, it was found that it was only proper that judgment be entered for the plaintiffs not only to injunct the filing of winding up proceedings but also to order a declaration that the sum of RM22.96m or any part thereof was not owed or owing by the plaintiffs to the defendant (see para 29). (4) Costs of RM30,000 were awarded to reflect the censure of the court with regard to the predominant issues in this case, namely mala fide and abuse of process (see para 30). Plaintif-plaintif telah mengarahkan defendan, sebuah firma guaman, untuk mewakili mereka dalam satu pertikaian. Berdasarkan arahan-arahan ini, defendan telah memfailkan guaman sivil dan memungut bahagian pertama yuran guaman yang dipersetujui sebanyak RM100,000. Seterusnya, ||Page 710>> plaintif-plaintif tidak berpuas hati dengan cara defendan mengendalikan kes mereka. Oleh itu, plaintif-plaintif menamatkan perkhidmatan defendan sebagai peguamcara mereka pada rekod untuk guaman sivil. Plaintif-plaintif juga bersetuju untuk menganggap RM100,000 yang telah dibayar oleh mereka sebagai ‘mencukupi untuk menampung semua yuran’. Walau bagaimanapun, defendan mengambil pendirian bahawa mereka hanya bersedia untuk melepaskan dirinya sebagai peguam cara plaintif sekiranya plaintif-plaintif membayar yuran guaman yang dipersetujui sebanyak RM22.96 juta, iaitu jumlah yang dikatakan dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak sebagai yuran defendan. Bagi menyokong tuntutan ini, defendan bergantung kepada waran untuk bertindak iaitu plaintif-plaintif bersetuju untuk membayar defendan sejumlah RM100,000 dan 50% daripada hasil daripada jumlah yang didapatkan kembali, menurut defendan berjumlah RM22.96 juta. Walau bagaimanapun, dalam surat mereka seterusnya kepada plaintif-plaintif, defendan mendakwa bahawa mereka tidak pernah bersetuju untuk yuran 50% daripada tuntutan selepas dapatan kembali kerana ini merupakan yuran kontigensi dan oleh itu menyalahi undang-undang. Sebaliknya defendan menuntut bayaran penuh RM50,000 atau yuran yang didakwa belum dibayar dan mengugut akan membuat tindakan undang-undang sekiranya jumlah ini tidak dibayar. Plaintif-plaintif membuat satu aduan kepada Badan Peguam terhadap peguam cara daripada firma defendan. Badan Disiplin mendapati bahawa mengenakan yuran kontigensi merupakan satu salah laku profesional. Walau bagaimanapun, semasa rayuan keputusan ini diubah. Selepas itu, defendan mengeluarkan notis-notis di bawah s 218 Akta Syarikat 1965 kepada plaintif-plaintif, mendakwa bahawa bayaran yang dikatakan belum dibayar berjumlah RM22.96 juta terhutang kepada defendan oleh plaintif-plaintif sebagai baki yuran guaman belum dibayar. Plaintif-plaintif oleh itu memfailkan tindakan ini dan menuntut, antara lainnya, satu injuksi tetap terhadap defendan daripada memfailkan sebarang petisyen penggulungan terhadap mereka dan satu pengisytiharan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak berhutang sejumlah RM22.96 juta kepada defendan. Pada perbicaraan, defendan menghujah bahawa mereka tidak akan meneruskan prosiding-prosiding penggulungan tetapi sebaliknya meneruskan untuk memfailkan bil kos bagi jumlah RM22.96 juta. Defendan juga mengemukakan isu res judicata berhubung isu yang ditimbulkan oleh plaintif-plaintif dalam tindakan ini.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-108

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dengan kos RM30,000:

(1) Rayuan daripada keputusan Badan Disiplin kepada Mahkamah Tinggi mengenai perkara salah laku profesional mempunyai kaitan yang sedikit dengan merit-merit tuntutan kontrak ini antara pihak-pihak. Setakat ini, res judicata tidak boleh diputuskan sama ada relevan atau terpakai (lihat perenggan 22). (2) Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa isu penting dalam kes ini hanyalah ||Page 711>> sama ada defendan menggunakan prosiding-prosiding penggulungan secara menindas dan tidak saksama dengan melanggar prinsip-prinsip yang ditetapkan berhubung injunksi fortuna. Fakta-fakta jelas membuktikan bahawa tuntutan s 218 tidak berdasarkan sebarang hutang tulen bona fide tetapi sebenarnya berdasarkan kezaliman dan niat jahat. Defendan tidak gembira dengan penamatan perkhidmatan undang-undang oleh plaintif-plaintif dan mengakibatkan tuntutan bayaran RM22.96 juta sebagai yuran tidak dibayar. Berdasarkan keterangan dan undang-undang, ini merupakan kes yang jelas terangkum di dalam dua bahagian prinsip-prinsip fortuna, iaitu pengemukaan petisyen penggulungan akan mengakibatkan kemudaratan yang tidak boleh diperbaiki dalam situasi di mana sekiranya petisyen tersebut yang dikemukakan tidak mempunyai peluang untuk berjaya, dan kedua, defendan memilih untuk menegaskan tuntutan yang dipertikaikan melalui prosedur yang akan menghasilkan kemudaratan yang tidak boleh diperbaiki kepada plaintif-plaintif daripada memilih prosedur alternatif yang lebih sesuai (lihat perenggan 26–28). (3) Keterangan menunjukkan dengan jelas bahawa RM22.96 juta yang dituntut merupakan tuntutan yuran kontigensi, di mana defendan sendiri mengakui adalah menyalahi undang-undang. Oleh itu, atas kepentingan keadilan dan untuk penentuan penuh dan lengkap pertikaian ini, didapati bahawa ia hanya betul sekiranya penghakiman dimasukkan untuk plaintif-plaintif bukan hanya untuk menginjunksikan pemfailan prosiding-prosiding penggulungan tetapi juga untuk mengarahkan satu pengisytiharan bahawa jumlah RM 22.96 juta atau mana-mana bahagian daripadanya tidak dihutang atau terhutang oleh plaintif-plaintif kepada defendan (lihat perenggan 29). (4) Kos RM30,000 diawardkan untuk mencerminkan kecaman mahkamah berhubung isu-isu utama kes ini, iaitu mala fide dan penyalahgunaan proses (lihat perenggan 30).

THE DEFENCE OF RES JUDICATA/ISSUE ESTOPPEL

[21] On these facts, the only substantive defence which could be considered was in relation to an alleged res judicata/issue estoppel point. This was raised in the affidavit in reply, and has to do with the successful appeal in R2–17–11 of 2011. See affidavit in reply (2) affirmed by Wong Chim Yearn and exh WCY-RR thereto. [22] The evidence discloses that the appeal from the decision of the Disciplinary Board under the Legal Profession Act in the professional misconduct matter succeeded on the basis that the Disciplinary Board had referred to, and decided on, the wrong standard of proof,

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-109 namely on a balance of probabilities instead of beyond reasonable doubt in a professional misconduct matter. This appeal has little to do with the merits of the present contractual claims between the parties. To this extent, res judicata/issue estoppel cannot be held either relevant or applicable.

The second issue raises a point of law which may be stated in this manner: Whether in the recovery action the question of liability of the tortfeasor which has been determined in the liability action may still be raised and argued to entitle the insurer to refuse satisfying the judgment. Learned counsel for the respondent had argued against the relitigation on the liability issue and that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable as a bar. The appellants’ counsel on the other hand, pointed out that the High Court in the recovery action had observed that the sessions court merely made a finding that the deceased was a passenger. There was no determination made below if the deceased was an employee to be covered under the policy. So, is res judicata applicable to bar the issue of liability from being raised again, this time by the insurer? Literally translated, res judicata is ‘the fact has been decided’. It expresses a general public interest policy that the same issue (or cause of action) should not be litigated more than once even if the parties are different. It prevents vexatious litigation and any abuse of the courts’ process on the premise that final judgments are binding and conclusive. (See Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100). The criminal law equivalent is the doctrine of double jeopardy. It is in the broader sense of res judicata that the Appellant submitted that the liability issue should now be precluded from being raised at the recovery stage since it has been adjudged in the previous liability action. It is our view that the liability and recovery actions are distinct from each other. The former is a claim founded on tort whereas the latter is based on a statutory right provided under the provisions of the RTA. For this reason alone it would be unjust to bar the insurers from raising afresh the issue of its liability even to the extent of adducing evidence on the same issue at the recovery action stage. In the liability action, the issue before the court would be to determine negligence whereas in the recovery action the issues include the construction of the terms in the insurance policy and the application of s 91 and s 96 of the RTA. It is upon this construction of the insurance policy that the insurers raised for the first time in the recovery action. In this appeal, P & O, as the insurers is thus seeking to declare that the policy as against the deceased, is unenforceable due to the exception in its terms. This issue remains alive and was brought up on appeal to the High Court and now before us. (per Abdul Hamid Embong JCA, as His Lordship then was, at pp 875–876) (Emphasis added.) [24] See also Akitek Tenggara Sdn Bhd v Mid Valley City Sdn Bhd [2007] 5 MLJ 697; [2007] 6 CLJ 93, where the Federal Court decided the res judicata ||Page 721>> doctrine did not necessarily apply in the context of a decision in a judicial review matter from the findings of a disciplinary tribunal, ie on the facts of the appeal, the Lembaga Arkitek Malaysia. The Federal Court drew a distinction between a finding on a disciplinary matter, such as professional misconduct, as opposed to a finding on the contractual rights of parties. The applicable principles are comprehensively analysed in the following passages in the judgment:

In order to determine whether the LAM decision is capable of amounting to res judicata by virtue of being a decision of the Supreme Court it is first necessary to ascertain the meaning of the term ‘res judicata’. The classic text Res Judicata by Spencer Bower and Turner (3rd Ed), defines it at p 1 as follows: E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-110 In English law a res judicata is a decision pronounced by a judicial tribunal having jurisdiction over the cause and the parties which disposes once and for all of the matters decided, so that except on appeal they cannot afterwards be relitigated between the same parties or their privies. It is thus clear that res judicata applies only in respect of a matter over which the court has pronounced a judgment. In this case the LAM decision was upheld by the Supreme Court pursuant to a proceeding for judicial review. It is settled law that judicial review is concerned with the process of decision making and not with the decision itself (see Chief Constable of North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155). In Tanjong Jaga Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1987] 2 CLJ 119; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 368Abdoolcader SCJ said: It is of considerable significance to bear in mind that judicial review is of the hearing and not of the decision … As a judicial review proceeding is concerned with the decision-making process and not with the decision itseifthe decision cannot constitute res judicata of the court upholding the decision making process. … In this case the Supreme Court did not pronounce any judgment on the decision made by LAM. It is therefore an error to describe the LAM decision as constituting res judicata by virtue of being a decision of the Supreme Court. Be that as it may, the conclusion just arrived at does not bring the matter to an end. The LAM decision is capable of constituting res judicata by reason of being a decision of LAM itself. LAM is not a court. What thus requires immediate consideration is the extent to which the doctrine of res judicata can extend to a tribunal which is not a court … It is clear that LAM is only empowered to hear and determine disputes relating to professional conduct. The section gives no power to LAM to hear disputes between an architect and his client. … ||Page 722>> As the dispute in this case is one that relates to the agreement between an architect and his client with regard to services rendered it has nothing to do with the professional conduct of the architect. The procedure laid down by law to be followed in respect of the dispute in this case is therefore as in r 21 … (per Augustine Paul FCJ at pp 12–123 of the report). (Emphasis added.) [26] Nevertheless, even assuming the defendant’s argument on res judicata has any merit, which with respect it does not, the single most important issue in this present case is whether the defendant is using winding up proceedings oppressively and inequitably in violation of settled principles relating to a Fortuna injunction. The facts are crystal clear. The s 218 demands were not grounded on any genuine bona fide debt. I agree with Encik Azhar that these demands were, on the evidence, grounded on ‘spite and malice’. It would appear that the defendant was particularly unhappy with the termination of the defendant’s legal services, and as a result demanded (in a rather scattered and disorganised manner) the payment of RM22.96m unpaid fees. This extraordinary figure is a record of sorts. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issue estoppel — Plaintiffs claimed native customary rights (‘NCR’) over land registered in name of provisional lease (‘PL’) holder — Whether default possession order and writ of possession obtained by PL holder against occupiers of disputed land barred plaintiffs from suing based on NCR issue — Whether issuance of PL not actionable wrong per se as it recognised pre-PL NCR claims during title survey — Whether time for purposes of limitation therefore did not run from issue of PL — Whether indefeasible title of PL holder subject to pre-PL NCR claims — Whether plaintiffs right to have filed writ action instead of judicial review

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-111 The first defendant was the registered proprietor of a provisional lease (‘PL’) over a parcel of land known as Lot 16. The plaintiffs sued the first defendant, and the second and third defendants for granting title to Lot 16 to the first defendant, on the ground Lot 16 covered land over which the plaintiffs and the persons they represented had native customary rights (‘NCR’). The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, for a declaration that the PL in so far as it infringed or impaired the plaintiffs’ NCR was unlawful and null and void and that Lot 16 should be excised out of the land area covered by the PL. The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that they were not bound by a possession order (‘the possession order’) the first defendant had obtained from court ordering all persons in occupation of Lot 16 to surrender possession of same to the first defendant. To enforce the possession order the first defendant had obtained a writ of possession. The possession order had been obtained in default as the plaintiffs and other interested parties were not made parties to the application for the order. For the same reason that they were not parties, the plaintiffs failed in their appeal to the Court of Appeal against the possession order. Prior to the instant suit, the plaintiffs had sued another party (‘the first suit’) claiming NCR over the same lands that formed the subject-matter of the current suit. In the first suit the plaintiffs had set out in a map — which became the judgment map — the area over which they claimed NCR (‘the original NCR land’). In the instant suit the plaintiffs annexed a similar map to their claim but the boundary of the land on which they claimed NCR had extended beyond the Original NCR Land to include almost the whole of Lot 16. In the Original NCR Land, ||Page 831>> Lot 16 was located outside the claimed NCR land boundary. The High Court in the first suit gave judgment for the plaintiffs but on appeal to the Court of Appeal, the defendants’ appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal was dismissed (‘the Appeals’). In the instant suit the first defendant applied, inter alia, under O 14A of the Rules of the High Court 1980 for four issues of law to be determined to dispose of the case summarily. The issues were (i) whether by reason of the decision in the first suit and the Appeals and the possession order, the plaintiffs’ action was res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel (ii) whether the plaintiffs’ claim and reliefs sought were time-barred by s 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (‘PAPA’) and/or Item 97 of the Schedule to the Limitation Ordinance and/or s 202 of the Land Code 1958 (iii) whether the plaintiffs’ action was procedurally wrong for not having been filed by way of judicial review and (iv) whether the plaintiffs’ claim was maintainable in view of the indefeasibility of title acquired by the first defendant. The plaintiffs had obtained an injunction to prevent the execution of the possession order and the writ of possession but the Court of Appeal set it aside on the ground res judicata and issue estoppel arising from the possession order and writ of possession precluded the grant of the injunction.

Held, striking out the action against the first defendant with costs:

(1) The plaintiff’s action was res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel as a result of the possession order and writ of possession. The court was bound not only by res judicata and issue estoppel but by stare decisis from the Court of Appeal’s decision setting aside the injunction from adjudicating upon the plaintiffs’ claim for their NCR in Lot 16 (see paras 54, 55 & 57). (2) There was no question the plaintiffs’ NCR claim could have been raised as a

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-112 defence to resist the application for the possession order to make it become a triable issue if the plaintiffs had been heard. Though the possession order was acquired without the plaintiffs being heard it nonetheless remained binding and enforceable until set aside. As the instant suit was filed after the possession order was granted and the appeal against the order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, res judicata and issue estoppel had set in (see para 51). (3) The first suit and the appeals were only concerned with deciding whether the plaintiffs had established their NCR over ‘the disputed area’ which was within the original NCR Land. The status of the plaintiffs’ claim over the original NCR Land less ‘the disputed area’ remained unadjudicated upon. Since the issues on the limits of and validity of the demarcation of the boundary of the original NCR Land was never adjudicated upon, res judicata based on the judgment map could not be used to bar another suit ||Page 832>> to claim for the rest of the original NCR Land or as enlarged, after proper survey, to include a part of the first defendant’s land (see paras 77, 82 & 83). (4) The plaintiffs’ claims were not time-barred under PAPA, the Limitation Ordinance or the Land Code. Limitation did not run from the date of the issuance of the PL since that was not an actionable wrong per se because a PL was a qualified title that recognised the plaintiffs’ rights to claim NCR over Lot 16 during the title survey. Limitation would run at the latest from the date of issuance of the lease to Lot 16 (which had not happened) or from the date the second and third defendants were shown to have denied the NCR claims of the plaintiffs as pre-PL rights (see para 91). (5) The plaintiffs could apply for or be entitled to the remedies, reliefs or orders prayed for in the statement of claim as against the first defendant’s title because the PL was not of the same calibre as a lease. The PL was subject to pre–PL claims which included the plaintiffs’ NCR claims. A PL holder therefore could not raise indefeasible rights through the PL as a defence against any valid pre-PL claim including NCR. The effect of the reservation for valid pre-PL claims on PL land by s 28(2) and (3) of the Land Code and the Special Condition (iii) effectively watered down the indefeasible right given by s 132(1) of the Land Code to the registered holder of a PL (see para 92). (6) The plaintiffs’ writ action was in order and maintainable because of the substantial issues of fact that arose from their NCR claims (see para 102). Defendan pertama merupakan pemilik berdaftar pajakan sementara (‘PS’) ke atas satu petak tanah yang dikenali sebagai Lot 16. Plaintif-plaintif telah menyaman defendan pertama dan defendan kedua dan ketiga kerana memberikan hakmilik Lot 16 kepada defendan pertama, atas dasar bahawa Lot 16 tertakluk dalam tanah di mana plaintif-plaintif dan pihak yang diwakili oleh mereka mempunyai hak adat anak negeri (‘HAAN’). Plaintif-plaintif menuntut, antara lain, untuk deklarasi bahawa PS yang mana telah mencanggah atau menjejas HAAN plaintif-plaintif adalah menyalahi undang-undang dan tidak sah dan terbatal dan bahawa Lot 16 seharusnya dieksais keluar daripada kawasan tanah yang dirangkumi oleh PS. Plaintif-plaintif juga memohon untuk deklarasi bahawa mereka tidak terikat oleh perintah milikan (‘perintah milikan tersebut’) yang telah diperoleh oleh defendan pertama daripada mahkamah yang mana memerintahkan kesemua yang menghuni Lot 16 untuk menyerahkan milikan yang sama

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-113 kepada defendan pertama. Untuk menguatkuasakan perintah milikan defendan pertama telah memperolehi writ milikan. Perintah milikan telah diperoleh secara ingkar memandangkan plaintif-plaintif dan pihak-pihak terlibat yang ||Page 833>> lain tidak dijadikan pihak-pihak kepada permohonan untuk perintah tersebut. Untuk alasan yang sama bahawa mereka bukanlah pihak-pihak, plaintif-plaintif telah gagal dalam rayuan mereka kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap perintah milikan tersebut. Sebelum guaman ini, plaintif-plaintif telah menyaman pihak yang lain (‘guaman pertama’) menuntut HAAN ke atas tanah-tanah yang sama yang membentuk perkara subjek guaman ini. Dalam guaman pertama plaintif-plaintif telah membentangkan di dalam sebuah peta — yang mana menjadi peta penghakiman — kawasan di mana mereka menuntut HAAN (‘tanah HAAN asal’). Dalam guaman ini plaintif-plaintif telah melampirkan peta yang serupa dengan tuntutan mereka tetapi kawasan tanah HAAN yang dituntut oleh mereka adalah melebihi tanah HAAN asal termasuk hampit kesemua Lot 16. Dalam tanah HAAN asal, Lot 16 terletak di luar kawasan tanah HAAN yang dituntut. Mahkamah Tinggi dalam guaman pertama telah memberi penghakiman bagi pihak plaintif tetapi dalam rayuan kepada Mahkamah Rayuan, rayuan defendan-defendan telah dibenarkan dan tuntutan balas plaintif-plaintif telah ditolak (‘rayuan-rayuan tersebut’). Dalam guaman ini defendan pertama telah memohon, antara lain, di bawah A 14A Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 untuk empat isu undang-undang untuk ditentukan untuk menyelesaikan kes itu secara ringkas. Isu-isu adalah (i) sama ada disebabkan keputusan guaman pertama dan rayuan-rayuan dan perintah milikan, tindakan plaintif-plaintif adalah res judicata dan/atau dihalang oleh isu estopel (ii) sama ada tuntuan plaintif-plaintif dan relief yang dipohon dihalang oleh had masa melalui s 2Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa Awam 1948 (‘APPBA’) dan/atau Item 97 Jadual kepada Ordinan Had Masa dan/atau s 202 Kanun Tanah 1958 (iii) sama ada tindakan plaintif-plaintif adalah salah secara prosedur kerana tidak memfailkan melalui semakan kehakiman dan (iv) sama ada tuntutan plaintif-plaintif boleh diteruskan melihatkan kepada ketidakboleh disangkal hakmilik yang diperoleh oleh defendan pertama. Plaintif-plaintif telah memperoleh suatu injunksi untuk menghalang perlaksanaan perintah milikan dan writ milikan tetapi Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengetepikannya atas dasar res judicata dan isu estopel yang berbangkit daripada perintah milikan dan writ milikan menghalang pemberian injunksi tersebut.

Diputuskan, menolak tindakan defendan pertama dengan kos:

(1) Tindakan plaintif adalah res judicata dan/atau dihalang oleh isu estopel hasil daripada perintah milikan dan writ milikan. Mahkamah terikat bukan sahaja oleh res judicata dan isu estopel tetapi oleh stare decisis daripada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan untuk mengetepikan injunksi daripada dikenakan terhadap tuntutan plaintif-plaintif untuk HAAN mereka dalam Lot 16 (lihat perenggan 54,55 & 57). (2) Tiada persoalan langsung tuntutan HAAN plaintif-plaintif boleh dibangkitkan sebagai pembelaan untuk menidakkan permohonan perintah milikan untuk menjadikannya isu yang boleh dibicarakan ||Page 834>> sekiranya plaintif-plaintif hendak didengar. Meskipun perintah milikan yang diperoleh tanpa plaintif-plaintif didengar walau bagaimanapun ia masih lagi mengikat dan berkuat kuasa sehingga ia diketepikan. Memandangkan guaman ini telah difailkan selepas perintah milikan telah diberikan dan rayuan terhadap perintah telah

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-114 ditolak oleh Mahkamah Rayuan, res judicata dan isu estopel telah bermula (lihat perenggan 51). (3) Guaman pertama dan rayuan-rayuan hanyalah berkaitan dengan memutuskan sama ada plaintif-plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan HAAN mereka terhadap kawasan yang dipertikaikan yang mana tertakluk dalam tanah HAAN asal. Status tuntuan plaintif-plaintif terhadap tanah HAAN asal tidak termasuk kawasan yang dipertikaikan masih lagi tidak dihakimi. Memandangkan isu-isu ke atas had-had dan keesahan pembatasan kawasan tanah HAAN asal masih belum dihakimi, res judicata berdasarkan peta penghakiman tidak boleh digunakan untuk menghalang lagi satu guaman untuk menuntut tanah HAAN asal yang selebihnya atau seperti yang diperbesarkan, selepas tinjauan yang wajar, untuk memasukkan sebahagian tanah defendan pertama (lihat perenggan 77, 82 & 83). (4) Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif tidak dihalang oleh masa di bawah APPBA, Ordinan Had Masa atau Kanun Tanah. Had masa tidak bermula daro tarikh pengeluaran PS memandangkan ia bukanlah tindakan yang salah oleh kerana PS merupakan hakmilik sementara yang mana mengenalpasti hak plaintif-plaintif untuk menuntut HAAN terhadap Lot 16 semasa tinjauan hakmilik. Had masa akan berjalan paling lewat dari tarikh pajakan dikeluarkan kepada Lot 16 (yang mana tidak terjadi) atau dari tarikh yang menunjukkan defendan kedua dan ketiga telah menafikan tuntutan HAAN plaintif-plaintif sebagai hak-hak pra-PS (lihat perenggan 91). (5) Plaintif-plaintif boleh memohon untuk atau berhak terhadap remedi-remedi, relief-relief atau perintah-perintah yang dipinta dalam penyataan tuntutan terhadap hakmilik defendan pertama oleh kerana PS bukanlah dalam kategori yang sama seperi pajakan. PS adalah tertakluk kepada tuntutan pra-PS yang mana termasuk tuntutan HAAN plaintif-plaintif. Pemegang PS oleh itu tidak boleh membangkitkan hak tak boleh sangkal melalui PS sebagai pembelaan terhadap mana-mana tuntutan pra-PS yang sah termasuklah HAAN. Efek penrizaban untuk tuntutan pra-PS yang sah terhadap tanah PS oleh s 28(2) dan (3) Kanun Tanah dan Syarat Khas (iii) telah dengan efektif mengalahkan hak tak boleh sangkal yang diberikan oleh s 132(1) Kanun Tanah untuk pemegang berdaftar PS (lihat perenggan 92). ||Page 835>> (6) Tindakan writ plaintif-plaintif adalah teratur dan boleh diteruskan oleh kerana isu-isu fakta substansial telah timbul daripada tuntutan HAAN mereka (lihat perenggan 102).

(a) whether the plaintiffs’ action herein is res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel as a result of the High Court Suit No 22–28–99-I between Nor Anak Nyawai & 3 Ors v Borneo Pulp & Paper Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors (‘the first suit’) and the Court of Appeal’s decision in Civil Appeals No Q-1–42 of 2001 and Q-20–504 of 2001 (‘the appeals’) and Originating Summons No 24–70 of 2008; (b) whether the plaintiffs’ claims and the reliefs sought are barred by reason of s 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (‘PAPA 1948’) and/or Item 97 of the Schedule to the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 49) and/or s 202 of the Sarawak Land Code (Cap 81) (‘Land Code’);

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-115 (c) whether the plaintiffs’ action is maintainable as the plaintiffs ought to have filed an action by way of judicial review of the administrative action of the issuance of the documents of title to Lot 16, Block 3, Sangan Land District; and (d) whether the plaintiffs could apply for or be entitled to the remedies, reliefs or orders prayed for in the statement of claim as against the first defendant’s title, which is indefeasible.

Res judicata and/or issue estoppel

[28] Learned counsel for the first defendant submitted that the plaintiffs’ action against the first defendant herein is res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel by reason of the judgment in the first suit, the Court of Appeal’s judgment in the appeals, the possession order and the writ of possession.Though it was accepted by the parties to the appeals in the first suit that the disputed area was only a portion of the original NCR land claimed by the plaintiffs to be under NCR based on the judgment map. The judgment map was then accepted and inserted in the High Court judgment and was again adopted and reproduced in the appeals judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Distinction between res judicata and issue estoppel

(1) When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, they and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, as the judgment becomes the truth between such parties. An estoppel per rem judicatum has been created as a result. (2) There are two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum, ie cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. The cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of a cause of action which has been determined in a final judgment by the same parties. On the other hand, the issue estoppel prevents contradiction of the correctness of a final judgment by the same parties in a subsequent proceeding. Further, the parties are also prevented from asserting a cause of action or issue which should have been brought forward in the earlier action, but was not, whether deliberately or inadvertently. (3) Unlike an ordinary estoppel which should be pleaded, the court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action by applying the doctrine of res judicata, which is an estoppel based on public policy, even if it has not been pleaded, as public policy requires that there should be finality in litigation. (Emphasis added.) [32] The boundary of the original NCR land claimed by the plaintiffs was an issue in the first suit and it would appear to the court applying the ratio of Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Badan Perhubungan UMNO Negri Pahang Darul Makmur (via his secretary Dato’ Ahmad Tajudin b Sulaiman) [2010] 8 MLJ 57 the findings on the boundary can by res judicata be applied to bind the plaintiffs in this suit even if the first defendant was not a party to it. [33] For res judicata to apply, it is necessary for the court to consider the judgment to see

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-116 what it actually decided according to The Pacific Bank Bhd v Chan Peng Leong [1998] 2 MLJ 613; [1998] 2 CLJ 440 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) had held as follows (pp 619–620; 448):

In my judgment, it is of the essence, in cases of this nature, when the plea of res judicata is taken, to identify with precision the issue that was decided in the earlier proceedings, which it is contended operates as a bar to relitigation because: … to constitute a res judicata, the earlier judgment must, in terms of the Privy Council decision in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kwong Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49, ‘necessarily and with precision’ determine the point in issue (per Chang Min Tat FJ in Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v Lee Yoke San [1978] 1 LNS 218; [1979] 1 MLJ 24, affirmed on appeal to the Privy Council in [1981] 1 MLJ 54).

At the hearing of the appeal, it was put to counsel for the appellants that to constitute a res judicata, the earlier judgment must, in terms of the Privy Council decision in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kwong Mines Ltd, ‘necessarily and with precision’ determine the point in issue, and he was asked to indicate to the court how the earlier judgment did necessarily and with precision determine the liability of the appellants to pay the respondent for work done for them at their request. He did not do so. We do not, with respect, see how he could succeed. (Emphasis added.) [37] Since the issues on the limits of and the validity of the demarcation of the boundary of the original NCR was never adjudicated on, res judicata based on the judgment map cannot be used to bar another suit to claim for the rest of the original NCR land or as enlarged after proper survey to include a part of the first defendant’s adjoining land. This however is different from using the conduct and admissions of the plaintiffs in the first suit on the boundary of the original NCR land to be used in evidence in this suit to discredit the plaintiffs’ claim herein to include the first defendant’s land. [38] The court finds that res judicata does not apply by reason of the judgment and the appeals or the judgment map demarcating the original NCR land of the plaintiffs to bar the plaintiffs from taking out another action to claim for the enlarged NCR land after proper survey to include the first defendant’s land in this suit. [41] The question to the court is: Can res judicata and issue estoppel be raised by the possession order and writ of possession to stop plaintiffs from claiming their NCR land when they have ‘lost’ possession of the area in the first defendant’s land that is in their NCR land? [48] It appears to the court that though some of the plaintiffs were present they were not given the opportunity to be heard or their affidavit used because of failure to formally join as defendants, though O 89 r 5 of the RHC 1980 allowed joinder at any stage of the proceedings and O 1 r 1A of the RHC 1980 required the court to have regard to the justice of the case and not only to technical non compliance of the rules. In considering the grant of the possession order the learned trial judge was led by the first defendant’s affidavit to treat the provisional lease as indefeasible as being on par with a lease which ||Page 849>> when considered later on in the context of being faced with an NCR claim is shown to be otherwise. The plaintiffs on the facts could have raised a triable issue on the first defendant’s application for possession. The issue of whether the defendants’ provisional lease would override the plaintiffs’ NCR in Lot 16 was never truly adjudicated upon. The title survey is not completed for issue of the lease and NCR claims are not extinguished by the issue of the provisional lease remain valid. Though the court finds that the merits should lie with the plaintiffs in their contention that they are not bound by res judicata and issue E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-117 estoppel by the peculiar facts of their case in the possession application of the first defendant, but the law on res judicata and issue estoppel is not in their favour.

Still, it could be said that with regard to the action itself, that the statement of claim merely raised matters which could and should have been litigated in 72–856–1995. But it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings. ‘The locus classicus of that aspect of res judicata is the judgment of Lord Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 115, where the judge says: ‘… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under certain circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward, only because they have from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. This plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time’ (Emphasis added.) [51] There is no question that the plaintiffs’ NCR claim could have been raised as a defence to resist the application for the possession order to make it become a triable issue if the plaintiffs had been heard. The fact that the possession order was acquired without the plaintiffs being heard nonetheless ||Page 850>> remains binding and enforceable until set aside. This suit was filed on the 22 January 2010 after the possession order was granted on 20 November 2009 and their appeal against it was dismissed by the Court of Appeal and on the cited authorities res judicata and issue estoppel had set in. [52] It may be different if the plaintiffs had included a prayer in this suit to set aside the possession order and writ of possession as being null and void on the basis that it being a PL, it has to recognise NCR claims and that had been represented otherwise before the learned trial judge. In other words this inclusion raises a different issue to be triable as part of this suit to prove their NCR in Lot 16 that was never adjudicated on to stall a plea of res judicata. If they can then prove their NCR land in Lot 16, it will have to be excised to reduce the land area of the provisional lease. In turn this would render the possession order over the NCR land based on the provisional lease to be declared null and void through this suit. [54] From the decision of the Court of Appeal on 17 November 2010 setting aside of the injunction against the first defendant in this case on the basis of res judicata and issue estoppel arising from the possession order and the writ of possession, this court would also find that it is similarly bound not only by res judicata and issue estoppel but by stare decisis from the Court of Appeal’s decision from adjudicating on the plaintiffs’ claim for their NCR in Lot 16.

Is there res judicata and issue estoppel?

[55] To the first question as to whether the plaintiffs’ action herein is res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel as a result of: [103] The court answers the first question as to whether the plaintiffs’ action herein is res judicata and/or barred by issue estoppel as a result of the possession order and writ of possession in the affirmative with the result that the court will order: E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-118 The plaintiff applied for a declaration that the transfer of a piece of land with a building thereon (‘the land’) by the second defendant (‘the company’) to the first defendant (‘Ooi’) was ineffective and void. The grounds for his application, however, differed as between his pleaded case and the case he presented in evidence. In his pleaded case, the plaintiff claimed the company gave him the land as compensation for vacating a certain premises he was occupying in 1974. However, in evidence, the plaintiff said he had bought the land from the company for RM2,900 and had moved to the land in 1974. He further claimed he had paid the purchase price in full but that the sale and purchase agreement and other relevant documents connected with the purchase of the land were lost in a flood. Ooi, on the other hand, became the registered owner of the land in 2004 after having bought it from the company for RM500,000. Prior to the instant suit, the plaintiff had sued the company (‘the first suit’) on a cause of action identical to the instant action. The first suit was struck out pursuant to an application under O 18 r 19(1)(b) and (d) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC’). The plaintiff did not appeal against that decision. The defendants contended, inter alia, that the instant suit was barred both by res judicata as well as by limitation; that while the plaintiff had alleged conspiracy and fraud in the transfer of the land, fraud was not specifically pleaded and that the plaintiff’s pleaded case was totally at variance with his evidence in the trial.

Held, dismissing the claim with costs:

(1) The court could not displace the plaintiff’s case in his pleadings, which narrated the fact of the company giving him the land as compensation, to give effect to an entirely new case he had not made out in his pleadings ie that he had bought the land from the company. The court had to reject ||Page 255>> the unpleaded case and since no evidence was led to prove the pleaded case, the plaintiff failed to prove his case against the defendants (see para 10). (2) Save for his bare assertion of a sale and purchase, there was no evidence to prove the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the company. He had thus failed to prove his ownership of or beneficial interest in the land (see para 11). (3) There was no evidence to show any collusion between the defendants. Nor were any particulars of fraud pleaded in compliance with O 18 r 12(1) of the RHC. This was a fundamental flaw. The evidence showed the sale and purchase between the defendants was proper (see para 14). (4) The plaintiff failed to prove any of the circumstances under s 340(2), particularly circumstances (a) of the National Land Code existed to defeat the indefeasible title that Ooi had acquired (see para 18). (5) Res judicata estopped the plaintiff, whether by way of cause of action and/or issue(s), from re-litigating against the company. The plaintiff’s filing of the current suit without having had the striking out of his first suit set aside or reversed on appeal, was (barred by) res judicata (see para 22). (6) The plaintiff’s action, whether based on contract or for recovery of land, was time barred under ss 6(1)(a) or 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 (see para 25). (7) By failing to prove his pleaded case, and giving evidence of an entirely different case which the court had to necessarily reject, the plaintiff gave up his right for his

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-119 evidence to be accepted as true as against a non-testifying second defendant. When the plaintiff had failed in his burden of proof, there was no onus upon the second defendant to rebut (see para 29). Plaintif memohon untuk satu deklarasi bahawa pindahmilik sebidang hartanah berserta bangunan di atasnya (‘hartanah’) oleh defendan kedua (‘syarikat’) kepada defendan pertama (‘Ooi’) adalah tidak berkuat kuasa dan tidak sah. Bagaimanapun, alasan-alasan untuk permohonannya berlainan dengan kes diplidkan olehnya dengan kes yang dihujahkan dalam keterangan. Dalam kes yang diplidkannya, plaintif mendakwa bahawa syarikat telah memberikan hartanah tersebut kepadanya sebagai ganti rugi untuk pengosongan beberapa premis yang didudukinya pada 1974. Walau bagaimanapun, dalam keterangan, plaintif mengatakan bahawa dia membeli hartanah tersebut daripada syarikat untuk RM2,900 dan telah berpindah ke hartanah tersebut pada 1974. Plaintif selanjutnya mendakwa bahawa dia telah membayar harga belian secara penuh tetapi perjanjian jual beli dan mana-mana ||Page 256>> dokumen relevan berkenaan pembelian hartanah tersebut telah hilang ketika banjir. Ooi, sebaliknya menjadi pemilik berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2004 selepas membelinya daripada syarikat untuk RM500,000. Sebelum guaman ini, plaintif telah mendakwa syarikat (‘guaman pertama’) atas kausa tindakan yang sama dengan tindakan ini. Guaman pertama ditolak menurut permohonan di bawah A 18 k 19(1)(b) dan (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’). Plaintif tidak merayu terhadap keputusan tersebut. Defendan menghujah, antara lainnya, bahawa guaman ini dihalang oleh res judicata dan had masa; bahawa meskipun plaintif mendakwa terdapat konspirasi dan penipuan dalam pindahmilik hartanah tersebut, penipuan tidak diplidkan secara khusus dan bahawa kes yang diplidkan plaintif berlainan sepenuhnya dengan keterangannya semasa perbicaraan.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan dengan kos:

(1) Mahkamah tidak dapat menggantikan kes plaintif dalam plidingnya, yang menceritakan fakta syarikat memberikan kepadanya hartanah tersebut sebagai ganti rugi, untuk memberikan kesan kepada sebuah kes baru sepenuhnya yang tidak disebut di dalam pliding-plidingnya iaitu dia telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada syarikat. Mahkamah terpaksa menolak kes yang tidak diplidkan dan memandangkan tidak terdapat keterangan membuktikan kes yang diplidkan, plaintif gagal untuk membuktikan kesnya terhadap defendan-defendan (lihat perenggan 10). (2) Melainkan penegasannya mengenai jualan dan belian, tidak terdapat keterangan untuk membuktikan kewujudan kontrak di antara plaintif dan syarikat. Oleh itu, plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan milikannya beliau atau kepentingan benefisial di dalam hartanah tersebut (lihat perenggan 11). (3) Tidak terdapat keterangan untuk menunjukkan sebarang pakatan sulit di antara defendan-defendan. Tidak terdapat sebarang bentuk penipuan diplidkan menurut A 18 k 12(1) KMT. Ini merupakan kecacatan utama. Keterangan menunjukkan bahawa jualan dan belian di antara defendan-defendan adalah sah (lihat perenggan 14). (4) Plaintif gagal untuk membuktikan mana-mana keadaan di bawah s 340(2), terutamanya keadaan-keadaan (a) Kanun Tanah Negara yang wujud untuk mencabar hakmilik mutlak yang diperolehi Ooi (lihat perenggan 18).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-120 (5) Res judicata menghentikan plaintif, sama ada melalui kausa tindakan dan/atau isu-isu, daripada membuat guaman semula terhadap syarikat. Pemfailan guaman ini oleh plaintif tanpa menolak pengetepian guaman pertamanya atau diubah semasa rayuan adalah (dihalang oleh) res judicata (lihat perenggan 22). ||Page 257>> (6) Tindakan plaintif, sama ada berdasarkan kontrak atau mendapatkan semula hartanah adalah terhalang oleh masa di bawah ss 6(1)(a) atau 9(1)Akta Had Masa 1953 (lihat perenggan 25). (7) Kegagalan membuktikan kes yang diplidkannya dan memberikan keterangan mengenai kes yang berlainan sepenuhnya di mana adalah penting bahawa mahkamah perlu menolak, plaintif telah mengetepikan haknya agar keterangan tersebut diterima sebagai benar terhadap defendan kedua yang tidak memberikan keterangan. Apabila plaintif gagal di dalam beban buktinya, tidak terdapat onus ke atas defendan kedua untuk membalas (lihat perenggan 29). [4] The second defendant did not testify by election contending that this action is res judicata on ground that the plaintiff had on 14 May 2004 instituted a civil action against the second defendant vide Civil Suit No 22–258 of 2004 in the Penang High Court (the first suit) with the cause of action which is identical to the present suit. The first suit was struck out on 15 March 2005 pursuant to an application under O 18 r 19(1)(b) and (d) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC’) dated 20 December 2004 and no appeal was filed by the plaintiff. It was further contended that the present suit is also barred by the Limitation Act 1953.

(a) whether the plaintiff had proved his claims against the defendants of the existence of a contract between himself and the first defendant in line with his pleaded case; (b) whether there was a collusion between the first and second defendants against the plaintiff in the sale and purchase of the said land between the first defendant and second defendant resulting in the registration of the first defendant as the sole proprietor; (c) whether the first defendant’s title over the said land is indefeasible; (d) in view of the plaintiff’s first suit against the second defendant arising out of the same cause of action, whether it is res judicata the present suit; and (e) whether the plaintiff’s action is barred by limitation. [19] The undisputed fact is that the plaintiff had filed the first suit with the cause of action identical to the current suit against the second defendant and that the first suit was struck out on 15 March 2005 by the High Court, Penang pursuant to O 18 r 19(1)(b) and (d) of the RHC without an appeal being filed against such order. The second defendant contended that the doctrine of res judicata applies to estop the plaintiff from resuscitating the same cause of action by filing a fresh suit against the second defendant citing in support the salutary case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 AMR 2559; [1995] 3 CLJ 783 on this doctrine. For this contention, the second defendant elected not to testify so as not to be construed that they were waiving their right on this issue. The plaintiff’s explanation was that in the first suit, there was no allegation of collusion (or fraud) being pleaded while it is so alleged in the present suit and the first suit was not heard on E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-121 its merit. Nevertheless, he admitted that the two suits bear the same cause of action and both involve fraud. [20] The doctrine of res judicata which has been extensively deliberated by His Lordship Peh Swee Chin SCJ in Asia Commercial Finance’s case is indeed well extracted by His Lordship Low Hop Bing JCA in Chemfert Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lim Hua [2010] 5 MLJ 228 at pp 236–237; [2010] 7 CLJ 491 (CA) at pp 501–504 therein from which I reproduce below the relevant few to the instant case:

(i) Res judicata simply means a matter adjudged and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judication; (ii) when a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties who should accept it as the truth — res judicata pro veritate accipitur, ||Page 266>> (iii) The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium; … (iv) The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time: per Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at p 115; the ‘point’ should actually include causes of action, or all causes of action which one of the two parties has against the other, based on, or substantially on the same facts or issues, and not just all issues of law or of fact that are in dispute between the parties; … (ix) The well-known relevancy of a previous judgment in barring a second suit is seen in s 40 of the Evidence Act 1950 … … (xii) In order to prevent a multiplicity of actions and also in order to protect the underlying rationale of estoppel per rem judicatum and not to act against them, such estoppel of cause of action has been extended to all other causes of action (based on the same facts and issues) which should have been litigated or asserted in the original earlier action resulting in the final judgment, and which were not, either deliberately or due to inadvertence …

(xii) Res judicata for this purpose is therefore not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them … [22] The effect of res judicata relevant to the instant case is two prongs ie it creats an estoppel of cause of action extending to all causes of action based on the same facts or issues E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-122 which should have been litigated or asserted in the original earlier action resulting in the final judgment and which were not, either deliberately or due to inadvertence; and secondly, an issue estoppel which is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide but covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. The cause of action in the first suit as in bundle C pp 7–8 as compared to the current suit as in bundle A pp 4–6 is substantially based on the same facts. The allegation of collusion or fraud which had not been so pleaded in the first suit should and ought to have been within the contemplation of the plaintiff. ||Page 267>> Hence whether he had deliberately or adventently failed to plead such a cause of action does not prevent the doctrine of res judicata from being invoked as such cause could have been brought forward at the first suit if the plaintiff had only exercised reasonable diligence. Similarly, if the fact in issue is collusion or fraud, such issue is clearly the same, basing on the facts, as the subject matter of the plaintiff’s case and could have been clearly raised. I find that res judicata applies squarely to estop the plaintiff in the cause of action and/or issue or issues from relitigation against the second defendant. On the question of merit of the plaintiff’s first suit not having been heard, I find that if the plaintiff did not accept the judgment or decision thereof, he should or ought to have taken action to file his appeal against the decision or to apply to set aside that decision before refiling the present suit. His failure can only be construed as his acceptance of the decision in the first suit as true and what had been deposed in the second defendant’s affidavit as the truth. Thus, I am inclined to hold that his filing of the current suit without having had the decision of the court in striking out of his first suit, set aside or reversed on appeal is res judicata. To echo the words of His Lordship Peh Swee Chin SCJ in Asia Commercial Finance’s case, the public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finally in litigation. It will be against public policy to allow the same cause of action to be relitigated on the face of an existing valid judgment or decision. [29] However, the second defendant in the instant case elected not to lead any evidence on the ground that they contended and maintained that this present case is res judicata because of the first suit of the same nature filed by the plaintiff which had been struck out with no appeal by the plaintiff. If the second defendant were to proceed to testify, that could be construed that they chose to waive their right over their pleadings that res judicata applied to estop the plaintiff from filing this second suit and by testifying, the second defendant might be estopped from raising the doctrine of res judicata. To this court, the choice is on the second defendant. The guiding principles laid down by the Federal Court above are still applicable if the second defendant should fail in their contention. However, the fact that a defendant elects not to testify, does not relieve the plaintiff from his burden of having to prove his case in accordance with the standard of proof required by the law and in line with his pleaded case. Since the plaintiff herein had given evidence of an entirely different version of his alleged acquisition of the said land from his pleaded case for which this court must necessarily reject, the plaintiff had deprived this court of its duty to presume his evidence to be true and to accept his evidence as true. By failing to prove his own pleaded case, the plaintiff had given up his right for his evidence to be presumed to be true and to be accepted as true as against a non-testifying second defendant. Similarly, an adverse inference drawn against the second defendant would have no effect in the circumstances. Therefore, when the plaintiff had failed

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-123 to prove his case, the second defendant was entitled to refrain from leading evidence but to submit of a no case to answer. When the plaintiff had failed in his burden of proof, I am of the view that there is no onus for the second defendant to rebut. [30] Having considered all the evidence and submission by both parties and even if this court were to err in holding that res judicata applies on ground that the actual merit of the case was not canvassed and argued, for the foregoing reasons, this court still holds that the plaintiff had glaringly failed to prove his case as he had pleaded. Consequently, the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs of RM7,000. ||Page 270>> Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Impeaching earlier judgment — Dispute as to undertaking — Contention of ‘suppressed evidence’ — Dispute addressed and adjudicated by highest court — Whether same arguments untenable on account of res judicata and issue estoppels

Held, allowing the defendants’ application with costs:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-124 (5) The assertion of collateral purpose for which the defendants had in bringing this claim as alleged by the plaintiff was negated by the conduct of the plaintiff himself when he did not dispute the claim by the first defendant which was premised on the unconditional and irrevocable letter of acknowledgment and undertaking to be responsible for the debts of Proasas and Dynaboost. If it was true that the first defendant with the connivance of the second and the third defendants were exerting pressure on the plaintiff surely he would have disputed the claim after receiving the first letter of demand from the first defendant and renounced the undertaking (see paras 93–94). (6) The plaintiff’s failure to plead any agreement or the particulars of the agreement, and further, the failure to plead with clarity of the alleged overt acts of each of the defendants in committing the alleged conspiracy in pursuance of their agreement proved fatal to the said allegation. Therefore, the bare allegation of conspiracy of the three defendants was a frivolous and vexatious one (see paras 105 & 107). (7) The serious allegations made by the plaintiff against the defendants with regards to fraud, deceit, conspiracy, connivance in the statement of claim as compared to the evidence adduced in court clearly showed that the claim by the plaintiff against the defendants are unsustainable and not likely to succeed. In any event, the plaintiff had already had his day in court where all the issues raised herein had been ventilated and adjudicated to its finality until the Federal Court. To allow this claim would be an abuse of process as the claim was clearly frivolous and vexatious (see paras 110–111).

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan defendan-defendan dengan kos:

(1) Cerita plaintif bahawa dia dipaksa, dipengaruhi atau diberi tekanan dan pengaruh tak wajar untuk menandatangani akujanji tersebut tidak boleh dipercayai kerana terdapat masa di mana plaintif berkali-kali memohon jasa baik defendan pertama dan lanjutan masa untuk menyelesaikan jumlah tertungak selepas notis tuntutan diberikan kepadanya berasaskan kepada surat pengakuan dan akujanji tersebut. Tidak sekalipun, pada masa itu, plaintif mempertikaikan surat tuntutan oleh defendan pertama ||Page 844>> yang dihantar kepadanya atau plaintif membangkitkan isu bahawa akujanji tersebut tidak ditandatanganinya atau bahawa dia dipaksa atau diberikan tekanan untuk menandatanganinya. Dakwaan oleh plaintif di sini terhadap defendan-defendan adalah helah dan tipu muslihat semata-mata untuk mengelakkan dan melambatkan pelaksanaan penghakiman terhadapnya yang telah diberikan oleh mahkamah tertinggi di negara ini (lihat perenggan 54 & 58). (2) Plaintif menafikan bahawa dia pernah menandatangani akujanji tersebut tetapi pada masa yang sama plaintif menyatakan dia menandatanganinya di bawah paksaan dan tekanan tak sah. Jika apa yang dinyatakan oleh plaintif adalah benar, iaitu dia tidak pernah menandatangani akujanji tersebut, dengan itu isu bahawa dia menandatanganinya di bawah ugutan, tekanan tidak sah dan paksaan tidak patut timbul langsung. Tidak boleh ada dua set fakta. Jelas, plaintif tidak bercakap benar di sini (lihat perenggan 61). E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-125 (3) Tindakan ini secara keseluruhannya berasaskan kepada hujahan ‘suppressed evidence’ untuk mempersoalkan kesahan penghakiman terus yang diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan, yang telah dibicarakan dan diputuskan. Hujahan yang sama tidak dapat dipertahankan atas alasan res judicata dan isu estoppel (lihat perenggan 62). (4) ‘Suppressed evidence’ yang didakwa tidak ditemui oleh kerana penghakiman yang diadukan telahpun dimasukkan. ‘Suppressed evidence’ ini adalah dalam rangkuman pengetahuan plaintif apabila ikatan dokumen tambahan diserahkan kepada peguamcara plaintif oleh peguamcara defendan pertama. Penghakiman yang diadukan oleh plaintif dimasukkan semula oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. Plaintif gagal membuktikan bahawa ‘suppressed evidence’ tersebut ditemui selepas penghakiman tersebut diadukan (lihat perenggan 87). (5) Hujahan tujuan kolateral yang mana defendan-defendan telah dalam membawa tuntutan seperti yang didakwa oleh plaintif dinafikan oleh tindakan plaintif sendiri apabila dia tidak mempertikaikan tuntutan oleh defendan pertama yang diasaskan atas surat pengakuan dan akujanji tersebut yang tidak bersyarat dan tidak boleh batal untuk bertanggungjawab terhadap hutang-hutang Proasas dan Dynaboost. Jika benar bahawa defendan pertama dengan kerjasama secara diam oleh defendan kedua dan ketiga memberikan tekanan kepada plaintif, sudah tentu dia akan mempertikaikan tuntutan selepas menerima surat tuntutan pertama daripada defendan pertama dan mengakui akujanji tersebut sebagai tidak benar (lihat perenggan 93–94). (6) Kegagalan plaintif memplid apa-apa perjanjian atau butiran perjanjian, dan selanjutnya kegagalan memplid dengan jelas tindakan terang-terangan yang didakwa terhadap setiap seorang defendan dalam ||Page 845>> melakukan konspirasi yang dinyatakan berikutan perjanjian mereka terbukti menjejaskan dakwaan tersebut. Dengan itu, dakwaan konspirasi semata-mata terhadap ketiga-tiga defendan adalah suatu yang remeh dan menyusahkan (lihat perenggan 105 & 107). (7) Dakwaan serius yang dibuat oleh plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan berkaitan dengan fraud, penipuan, konspirasi, kerjasama secara diam-diam di dalam pernyataan tuntutan berbanding dengan keterangan yang dikemukakan di mahkamah jelas menunjukkan bahawa tuntutan oleh plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan tidak boleh dikekalkan dan tidak mungkin berjaya. Walau bagaimanapun, plaintif telah pergi ke mahkamah di mana kesemua isu yang dibangkitkan di sini telah dikemukakan dan dibicarakan sehingga pemutusan terakhir di Mahkamah Persekutuan. Membenarkan tuntutan ini akan menjadi penyalahgunaan proses kerana tuntutan tersebut jelas remeh dan menyusahkan (lihat perenggan 110–111). Notes For a case on principles governing striking out, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed 2010 Reissue) para 7550. For cases on material facts, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed 2010 Reissue) paras 6091–6093. For cases on res judicata in general, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed 2010 Reissue) paras 6675–6808.

(a) the suit filed herein by the plaintiff is an attempt to relitigate issues which had E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-126 been adjudged to its finality until the Federal Court level. The principle of res judicata applies in this instance; and (b) the plaintiff’s attempt to impeach the judgment dated 19 May 2003 is frivolous and vexatious and/or an abuse of court’s process.

Whether the action herein is caught by res judicata

[48] The plaintiff already had his day from the High Court, Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. To allow the plaintiff to proceed with the suit herein would offend the principle of res judicata. The case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teilti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 is very clear on this, where Peh Swee Chin FCJ explained the principle as follows:

… when a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as truth: res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation-interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to ve vexed twice for the same cause of action-nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy … Thus, there are in fact two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum. The first type relates to cause of action estoppel and the second, to issue estoppel, which is a development from the first type. ||Page 853>> The cause of action estoppel arises when the rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court for a particular remedy are determined in a final judgment and such right of action, ie the cause of action has turned into the said final judgment. The said cause of action may not be relitigated between the same parties because it is res judicata. In order to prevent multiplicity of action and also in order to protect the underlying rationales or estoppel per rem judicatum and not to act against them, such estoppel or cause of action has been extended to all other causes of action (based on the same facts or issues) which should have been litigated or asserted in the original earlier action resulting in the final judgment, and which were not, either deliberately or due to inadvertence. [62] Therefore the present action which is brought before me is wholly premised on the contention of the ‘Suppressed Evidence’ to question the validity of the summary judgment which was ordered by the Court of Appeal, which had been addressed and adjudicated. These same arguments are untenable on account of res judicata and issue estoppels. These two principles were explained in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v Kawal teliti Sdn Bhd and Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57. The salient features of res judicata and issue estoppels are that res judicata and issue estoppels:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-127 (d) apply even though the reliefs sought in the subsequent action are different from the reliefs sought in the earlier one; (e) apply even though the defendant in the subsequent action/proceedings is not the same defendant in the earlier action/proceeding or even though there are additional defendants in the subsequent action/proceeding compared to the earlier action/proceeding; (f) even if the defendant in the subsequent action/proceeding is not the same defendant in the earlier action/proceeding, res judicata and issue estoppels can be invoked to defeat the subsequent action/proceeding if there is a privity of interest or common interest between the defendant in the subsequent action/proceeding and the defendant in the earlier action/proceeding; (g) mean that if the plaintiff could have, but did not claim in the earlier action/proceeding, whatever he is claiming in the subsequent action/proceeding, he would not be allowed to make such claims in the subsequent action/proceedings; and (h) therefore, the issues or the cause of action which the plaintiff has instituted against the defendants herein are issues which had been addressed and adjudicated in Suit 1869. [65] Clearly the present suit herein is caught within the principle of res judicata.

Held, allowing the petition to wind up the respondent and dismissing encls 50 and 52 with costs:

(1) Under both the plea of res judicata and the principle of issue estoppel, the respondent could not file a second application to strike out the petition based on the same ground in the same proceeding at a different and subsequent stage (see para 10). (2) The previous application to strike out the petition was dismissed and not struck out. In other words, rightly or wrongly, the judge had applied his mind to the application and had decided to dismiss it (see para 13). (3) Enclosure 50 did not state under which limb the respondent was ||Page 325>> proceeding other than that the petition ‘be struck out pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980’. Such an application was fatally flawed (see paras 18 & 19). (4) At no material time did the respondent dispute the petitioner’s claim. It just made a feeble attempt, without evidence, to create a dispute on the debt when there was none (see para 22). (5) No useful purpose was served by allowing the deponent of the affidavit to be cross-examined. All the necessary documents that needed to be exhibited had been exhibited. The respondent had nothing in terms of documentary evidence to contradict the deponent of the petitioner’s affidavit (see para 30). (6) Nowhere in the affidavit to oppose the petition did the respondent aver it was solvent and able to pay its debts, at least the part substantially not in dispute, assuming for a moment the dispute raised was bona fide (see para 41).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-128

Diputuskan, membenarkan petisyen untuk menggulung responden dan menolak lampiran-lampiran 50 dan 52 dengan kos:

(1) Di bawah kedua-dua pli res judicata dan prinsip isu estopel, responden tidak boleh memfailkan permohonan kedua untuk membatalkan ||Page 326>> petisyen tersebut berdasarkan atas alasan yang sama dalam prosiding yang sama pada peringkat lain dan berikutnya (lihat perenggan 10). (2) Permohonan sebelumnya untuk membatalkan petisyen tersebut ditolak dan bukan dibatalkan. Dalam perkataan lain, betul atau salah, hakim telah mempertimbangkan permohonan tersebut dan telah memutuskan untuk menolaknya (lihat perenggan 13). (3) Lampiran 50 tidak menyatakan di bawah bahagian yang mana permohonan responden dimulakan selain daripada bahawa petisyen tersebut ‘be struck out pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980’. Permohonan sedemikian adalah cacat (lihat perenggan 18 & 19). (4) Tidak pada mana-mana masa material defendan mempertikaikan tuntutan pempetisyen. Ia hanya membuat percubaan yang lemah, tanpa keterangan, untuk membentuk pertikaian atas hutang apabila ianya tidak wujud (lihat perenggan 20). (5) Tiada tujuan yang bermakna apabila membenarkan untuk deponen afidavit diperiksa balas. Kesemua dokumen yang perlu dikemukakan telah dikemukakan. Responden tidak mempunyai apa-apa dari segi keterangan dokumen untuk menentang deponen terhadap afidavit pempetisyen (lihat perenggan 30). (6) Sama sekali tidak terdapat di dalam afidavit untuk menentang petisyen responden menegaskan ia adalah solven dan dapat membayar hutang-hutangnya, sekurang-kurangnya bahagian tersebut sebahagian besarnya tidak dipertikaikan, dengan menganggap seketika bahawa pertikaian yang dibangkitkan adalah bona fide (lihat perenggan 41). [10] The principle of res judicata as applied by our courts have been expounded in a number of cases. His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ), in Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd, [1996] 2 MLJ 57 at p 63; [1997] 2 CLJ 104 at pp 110–111 recounted the brief facts as follows: [11] His Lordship proceeded to state rigourously the rationale for the principle of res judicata at pp 65–66 (MLJ); pp 113–114 (CLJ):

… The learned judge, on 13 October 1993, was faced with an objection as to the form of proceedings which had been adopted by the appellants. He came to the conclusion that the form chosen by the appellants was not irregular. Although that was a decision made on an interlocutory matter which was purely procedural in nature it was nevertheless binding on the court and on all parties to the lis until its reversal on appeal. In our judgment the decision of the learned judge overruling the ||Page 330>> respondent’s preliminary objection rendered the point taken res judicata. If authority is needed for the proposition which has commended itself to us, it is to be found in Government of Malaysia v Dato Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74; [1973] 1 LNS 35 which was drawn to the attention of counsel during argument and in which there appears the following passage in the judgment of Sharma J (at p 76): In Satyadhyan Ghosel and others v Sint Deorajin Dobi & Another AIR 1960 SC 941, the statement of the law on the subject is given thus: The principle of res judicata E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-129 is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall be not adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter — whether on a question of fact or a question of law — has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in s 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where s 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by Courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. A decision given by a court at one stage on a particular matter or issue is binding on it at a later stage in the same suit or in a subsequent suit (see Peareth v Marriott (1883) 22 Ch D 182, Hook v Administrator General of Bengal and Others LR 48 IA 187 and In the Matter of the Trusts of the Will of Tan Tye (Deceased) Yap Liang Neo v Tan Yew Ghee and Another [1936] MLJ 141–147–151; [1936] 1 LNS 23). Parties cannot raise a second time in the same suit an issue that has already been determined either expressly or by necessary implication (see Louis Dreyfus v Aruna Chalayya LR 58 IA 381). (Emphasis added.) A failure to adhere to the principle expressed in the judgment of Sharma J just quoted may lead to chaos in the conduct of civil proceedings. The facts of this very case afford a good illustration of such a consequence. We have here an earlier decision by the judge upon a procedural issue determining it in the appellants’ favour. Then along comes the respondent at the adjourned hearing and applies to the judge to re-open the issue and review his earlier decision. The judge obliged and reversed himself. What was there to prevent the appellants from proceeding with an application to the judge to re-review his decision reversing himself? On the assumption of the law made by counsel before us there would have been no bar to the judge undertaking such an exercise. The process could then be repeated ad infinitum with no conclusion. It would be a circular tail chasing exercise with no forward movement, proving to the man on the street that the maxim ‘the law is an ass’ is not without content. The absurd results that would ensue in accepting the contention of counsel demonstrates the inaccuracy of the proposition advanced. [13] Nothing could be clearer; the previous application to strike out the petition in encl 14 was dismissed and not struck out. In other words, rightly or wrongly the learned judge had applied his mind to the application and had decided to dismiss the application. The respondent had appealed but on the date of hearing the appeal, it had through the official receiver, withdrawn the appeal. It cannot now be allowed to file another application based on the same ground in the same proceeding at a different and subsequent stage for to do so would offend the principle of res judicata. It is to have the second bite at the cherry. [14] Likewise the respondent having filed a first application to strike out the petition and the petition having being dismissed, the respondent is estopped from filing the same application in the same proceeding or even a subsequent proceeding. The respondent was not precluded from exercise its prerogative to appeal which it did only to have the appeal withdrawn in the Court of Appeal. His Lordship Peh Swee Chin FCJ, in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd, [1995] 3 MLJ 189 at pp 197–198; [1995] 3 CLJ 783 at p 791 explained the link between res judicata and estoppel with such lucidity:

What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicature. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-130 court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy.

It is important to bear in mind the manner in which the issue estoppel operates in preventing such contradiction of the previous judgment. There is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence ||Page 332>> or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary view that such issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata ie, doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid contrary view is to be preferred; it represents for one thing, a correct even though broader approach to the scope of issue estoppel. It is warranted by the weight of authorities to be illustrated later. It is completely in accord or resonant with the rationales behind the doctrine of res judicata, in other words, with the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. It is particularly important to bear in mind the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and with the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation. It is further necessary at this stage to understand the import of the words in the said famous statement ie, ‘… every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation …’ which Somervell LJ explained in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255, 257 as follows:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-131

Held, allowing the defendants’ application with costs:

(1) The plaintiff’s story of being coerced, influenced or subjected to pressure and undue influence into signing the undertaking lacks credibility because there were occasions that the plaintiff repeatedly sought from the first defendant for indulgence and extension of time to settle the amount outstanding after notice of demand was issued to him premised on the letter of acknowledgement and undertaking. Not once, at that point in time did the plaintiff ever dispute the letters of demand by the first defendant which were sent to him nor did the plaintiff ever raise the issue that the undertaking were not signed by him or that he was coerced or pressured into signing the same. The allegation by the plaintiff against the defendants were nothing but a ploy and a tactical manoeuvre to avoid and delay the execution of the judgment against him which had been pronounced by the highest court in the land (see paras 54 & 58). (2) The plaintiff denied that he ever signed the undertaking but in the same breath the plaintiff said that he signed under duress and under illegitimate pressure. If what the plaintiff said was true ie, that he never signed the undertaking, then the issue that he signed under duress, illegitimate pressure and coercion should not arise at all. There cannot be two sets of facts. Clearly, the plaintiff was not telling the truth here (see para 61). (3) The present action was wholly premised on the contention of the ‘suppressed evidence’ to question the validity of the summary judgment ||Page 842>> which was ordered by the Court of Appeal, which had been addressed and adjudicated. These same arguments are untenable on account of res judicata and issue estoppels (see para 62). (4) The alleged ‘suppressed evidence’ was not discovered since the judgment complained off was entered. These ‘suppressed evidence’ was within the knowledge of the plaintiff when the supplementary bundle of documents were served on the plaintiff’s solicitors by the first defendant’s solicitors. The judgment complained of by the plaintiff was reinstated by the Court of Appeal. The plaintiff failed to prove that the ‘suppressed evidence’ was discovered after the judgment complained of (see para 87). (5) The assertion of collateral purpose for which the defendants had in bringing this claim as alleged by the plaintiff was negated by the conduct of the plaintiff himself when he did not dispute the claim by the first defendant which was premised on the unconditional and irrevocable letter of acknowledgment and undertaking to be responsible for the debts of Proasas and Dynaboost. If it was true that the first defendant with the connivance of the second and the third defendants were exerting pressure on the plaintiff surely he would have disputed the claim after receiving the first letter of demand from the first defendant and renounced the undertaking (see paras 93–94). (6) The plaintiff’s failure to plead any agreement or the particulars of the agreement, and further, the failure to plead with clarity of the alleged overt acts of each of the defendants in committing the alleged conspiracy in pursuance of their agreement proved fatal to the said allegation. Therefore, the bare allegation of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-132 conspiracy of the three defendants was a frivolous and vexatious one (see paras 105 & 107). (7) The serious allegations made by the plaintiff against the defendants with regards to fraud, deceit, conspiracy, connivance in the statement of claim as compared to the evidence adduced in court clearly showed that the claim by the plaintiff against the defendants are unsustainable and not likely to succeed. In any event, the plaintiff had already had his day in court where all the issues raised herein had been ventilated and adjudicated to its finality until the Federal Court. To allow this claim would be an abuse of process as the claim was clearly frivolous and vexatious (see paras 110–111).

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan defendan-defendan dengan kos:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-133 tuntutan seperti yang didakwa oleh plaintif dinafikan oleh tindakan plaintif sendiri apabila dia tidak mempertikaikan tuntutan oleh defendan pertama yang diasaskan atas surat pengakuan dan akujanji tersebut yang tidak bersyarat dan tidak boleh batal untuk bertanggungjawab terhadap hutang-hutang Proasas dan Dynaboost. Jika benar bahawa defendan pertama dengan kerjasama secara diam oleh defendan kedua dan ketiga memberikan tekanan kepada plaintif, sudah tentu dia akan mempertikaikan tuntutan selepas menerima surat tuntutan pertama daripada defendan pertama dan mengakui akujanji tersebut sebagai tidak benar (lihat perenggan 93–94). (6) Kegagalan plaintif memplid apa-apa perjanjian atau butiran perjanjian, dan selanjutnya kegagalan memplid dengan jelas tindakan terang-terangan yang didakwa terhadap setiap seorang defendan dalam ||Page 845>> melakukan konspirasi yang dinyatakan berikutan perjanjian mereka terbukti menjejaskan dakwaan tersebut. Dengan itu, dakwaan konspirasi semata-mata terhadap ketiga-tiga defendan adalah suatu yang remeh dan menyusahkan (lihat perenggan 105 & 107). (7) Dakwaan serius yang dibuat oleh plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan berkaitan dengan fraud, penipuan, konspirasi, kerjasama secara diam-diam di dalam pernyataan tuntutan berbanding dengan keterangan yang dikemukakan di mahkamah jelas menunjukkan bahawa tuntutan oleh plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan tidak boleh dikekalkan dan tidak mungkin berjaya. Walau bagaimanapun, plaintif telah pergi ke mahkamah di mana kesemua isu yang dibangkitkan di sini telah dikemukakan dan dibicarakan sehingga pemutusan terakhir di Mahkamah Persekutuan. Membenarkan tuntutan ini akan menjadi penyalahgunaan proses kerana tuntutan tersebut jelas remeh dan menyusahkan (lihat perenggan 110–111). Notes For a case on principles governing striking out, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed 2010 Reissue) para 7550. For cases on material facts, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed 2010 Reissue) paras 6091–6093. For cases on res judicata in general, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed 2010 Reissue) paras 6675–6808.

(a) the suit filed herein by the plaintiff is an attempt to relitigate issues which had been adjudged to its finality until the Federal Court level. The principle of res judicata applies in this instance; and (b) the plaintiff’s attempt to impeach the judgment dated 19 May 2003 is frivolous and vexatious and/or an abuse of court’s process.

Whether the action herein is caught by res judicata

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-134 … when a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as truth: res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation-interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to ve vexed twice for the same cause of action-nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy … Thus, there are in fact two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum. The first type relates to cause of action estoppel and the second, to issue estoppel, which is a development from the first type. ||Page 853>> The cause of action estoppel arises when the rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court for a particular remedy are determined in a final judgment and such right of action, ie the cause of action has turned into the said final judgment. The said cause of action may not be relitigated between the same parties because it is res judicata. In order to prevent multiplicity of action and also in order to protect the underlying rationales or estoppel per rem judicatum and not to act against them, such estoppel or cause of action has been extended to all other causes of action (based on the same facts or issues) which should have been litigated or asserted in the original earlier action resulting in the final judgment, and which were not, either deliberately or due to inadvertence. [62] Therefore the present action which is brought before me is wholly premised on the contention of the ‘Suppressed Evidence’ to question the validity of the summary judgment which was ordered by the Court of Appeal, which had been addressed and adjudicated. These same arguments are untenable on account of res judicata and issue estoppels. These two principles were explained in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v Kawal teliti Sdn Bhd and Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57. The salient features of res judicata and issue estoppels are that res judicata and issue estoppels:

(a) are operative so long as the issues (whether of fact or law or mixed fact and law) in the subsequent action/proceeding is the same, as that which arise or is related to the earlier action/proceeding; (b) apply even though the subsequent action is couched on a different cause of action from the earlier one; (c) apply even though the subsequent action is presented in a different way or on a different basis from the earlier one; (d) apply even though the reliefs sought in the subsequent action are different from the reliefs sought in the earlier one; (e) apply even though the defendant in the subsequent action/proceedings is not the same defendant in the earlier action/proceeding or even though there are additional defendants in the subsequent action/proceeding compared to the earlier action/proceeding; (f) even if the defendant in the subsequent action/proceeding is not the same defendant in the earlier action/proceeding, res judicata and issue estoppels can be invoked to defeat the subsequent action/proceeding if there is a privity of interest or common interest between the defendant in the subsequent action/proceeding and the defendant in the earlier action/proceeding;

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-135 (g) mean that if the plaintiff could have, but did not claim in the earlier action/proceeding, whatever he is claiming in the subsequent action/proceeding, he would not be allowed to make such claims in the subsequent action/proceedings; and (h) therefore, the issues or the cause of action which the plaintiff has instituted against the defendants herein are issues which had been addressed and adjudicated in Suit 1869. [65] Clearly the present suit herein is caught within the principle of res judicata.

Held, allowing the petition to wind up the respondent and dismissing encls 50 and 52 with costs:

Diputuskan, membenarkan petisyen untuk menggulung responden dan menolak lampiran-lampiran 50 dan 52 dengan kos:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-136 (3) Lampiran 50 tidak menyatakan di bawah bahagian yang mana permohonan responden dimulakan selain daripada bahawa petisyen tersebut ‘be struck out pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980’. Permohonan sedemikian adalah cacat (lihat perenggan 18 & 19). (4) Tidak pada mana-mana masa material defendan mempertikaikan tuntutan pempetisyen. Ia hanya membuat percubaan yang lemah, tanpa keterangan, untuk membentuk pertikaian atas hutang apabila ianya tidak wujud (lihat perenggan 20). (5) Tiada tujuan yang bermakna apabila membenarkan untuk deponen afidavit diperiksa balas. Kesemua dokumen yang perlu dikemukakan telah dikemukakan. Responden tidak mempunyai apa-apa dari segi keterangan dokumen untuk menentang deponen terhadap afidavit pempetisyen (lihat perenggan 30). (6) Sama sekali tidak terdapat di dalam afidavit untuk menentang petisyen responden menegaskan ia adalah solven dan dapat membayar hutang-hutangnya, sekurang-kurangnya bahagian tersebut sebahagian besarnya tidak dipertikaikan, dengan menganggap seketika bahawa pertikaian yang dibangkitkan adalah bona fide (lihat perenggan 41). [10] The principle of res judicata as applied by our courts have been expounded in a number of cases. His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ), in Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd, [1996] 2 MLJ 57 at p 63; [1997] 2 CLJ 104 at pp 110–111 recounted the brief facts as follows: [11] His Lordship proceeded to state rigourously the rationale for the principle of res judicata at pp 65–66 (MLJ); pp 113–114 (CLJ):

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-137 A decision given by a court at one stage on a particular matter or issue is binding on it at a later stage in the same suit or in a subsequent suit (see Peareth v Marriott (1883) 22 Ch D 182, Hook v Administrator General of Bengal and Others LR 48 IA 187 and In the Matter of the Trusts of the Will of Tan Tye (Deceased) Yap Liang Neo v Tan Yew Ghee and Another [1936] MLJ 141–147–151; [1936] 1 LNS 23). Parties cannot raise a second time in the same suit an issue that has already been determined either expressly or by necessary implication (see Louis Dreyfus v Aruna Chalayya LR 58 IA 381). (Emphasis added.) A failure to adhere to the principle expressed in the judgment of Sharma J just quoted may lead to chaos in the conduct of civil proceedings. The facts of this very case afford a good illustration of such a consequence. We have here an earlier decision by the judge upon a procedural issue determining it in the appellants’ favour. Then along comes the respondent at the adjourned hearing and applies to the judge to re-open the issue and review his earlier decision. The judge obliged and reversed himself. What was there to prevent the appellants from proceeding with an application to the judge to re-review his decision reversing himself? On the assumption of the law made by counsel before us there would have been no bar to the judge undertaking such an exercise. The process could then be repeated ad infinitum with no conclusion. It would be a circular tail chasing exercise with no forward movement, proving to the man on the street that the maxim ‘the law is an ass’ is not without content. The absurd results that would ensue in accepting the contention of counsel demonstrates the inaccuracy of the proposition advanced. [13] Nothing could be clearer; the previous application to strike out the petition in encl 14 was dismissed and not struck out. In other words, rightly or wrongly the learned judge had applied his mind to the application and had decided to dismiss the application. The respondent had appealed but on the date of hearing the appeal, it had through the official receiver, withdrawn the appeal. It cannot now be allowed to file another application based on the same ground in the same proceeding at a different and subsequent stage for to do so would offend the principle of res judicata. It is to have the second bite at the cherry. [14] Likewise the respondent having filed a first application to strike out the petition and the petition having being dismissed, the respondent is estopped from filing the same application in the same proceeding or even a subsequent proceeding. The respondent was not precluded from exercise its prerogative to appeal which it did only to have the appeal withdrawn in the Court of Appeal. His Lordship Peh Swee Chin FCJ, in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd, [1995] 3 MLJ 189 at pp 197–198; [1995] 3 CLJ 783 at p 791 explained the link between res judicata and estoppel with such lucidity:

It is important to bear in mind the manner in which the issue estoppel operates in preventing such contradiction of the previous judgment. There is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence ||Page 332>> or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary view that such E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-138 issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata ie, doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid contrary view is to be preferred; it represents for one thing, a correct even though broader approach to the scope of issue estoppel. It is warranted by the weight of authorities to be illustrated later. It is completely in accord or resonant with the rationales behind the doctrine of res judicata, in other words, with the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. It is particularly important to bear in mind the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and with the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation. It is further necessary at this stage to understand the import of the words in the said famous statement ie, ‘… every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation …’ which Somervell LJ explained in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255, 257 as follows:

… res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. [16] I hold that under both the plea of res judicata and the principle of issue estoppel, the respondent cannot file a second application to strike out the petition. [18] Whilst I have to reject this argument of the respondent’s counsel I am prepared to assume for a moment that the plea of res judicata and the principle of estoppel do not apply. Looking at the application to strike out the petition, it does not state under which limb the respondent is proceeding other than that the petition ‘be struck out pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (RHC) …’ ||Page 333>> Civil Procedure — Judgment — Res judicata — Plaintiff filed fresh action to impeach judgment in earlier suit dismissing his claim against defendant — Court in earlier suit accepted defendant’s expert evidence that plaintiff’s authorisation letters to defendant were genuine — Plaintiff failed to call rebuttal expert evidence to say letters forged — Plaintiff in fresh action produced report rehashing forgery issue — Whether plaintiff barred from re-litigating decided issue — Whether deliberate fraud or deception practised on court in earlier suit or material evidence suppressed — Whether plaintiff’s fresh action frivolous and vexatious The plaintiff sought to set aside by way of the instant impeachment action the High Court’s judgment in a previous suit (‘the 2001 suit’) between the parties dismissing the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant bank. In the 2001 suit, the plaintiff had sought to recover RM4.8m from the bank alleging the bank had transferred that sum from his personal account to a third party without his authorisation. The bank had contended that the plaintiff did authorise the transfer and relied upon two authorisation letters he had signed. Although the plaintiff disputed his signatures in the letters as forgeries he failed to call any expert witness at the trial to support that contention or to rebut an expert witness the defendant had called to testify that the signatures were his. Based on that witness’ evidence as well as on other grounds, the trial judge dismissed the 2001 suit. The plaintiff appealed against that decision to the Court of Appeal but discontinued the appeal when his attempt to adduce fresh evidence at the appeal

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-139 stage was refused. The plaintiff sought for a full trial of the instant action to impeach the decision in the 2001 suit by producing a signature verification Report which opined that the plaintiff’s signature in a photocopy of one of the authorisation letters was a ‘traced forgery’. The defendant applied under O 18 r 19(1)(b) and (d) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 and the court’s inherent powers to strike out the plaintiff’s suit on the ground of res judicata. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was precluded on the basis of cause of action and issue estoppel from reopening issues that had been finally determined in the 2001 suit.

Held, allowing the application to strike out the suit with costs:

(1) There was no basis to impeach the judgment in the 2001 suit as no prima facie material was produced to show the judgment was obtained as a ||Page 657>> result of a deliberate fraud perpetrated on the court or by reason of a deception on the court or by suppression of material evidence by the defendant (see para 24). (2) The plaintiff did not show any exceptional grounds for the court to depart from the application of the principle of res judicata. The plaintiff was not entitled to re-agitate or re-litigate the very same issues between the parties that had been determined conclusively in the 2001 suit (see para 20). (3) The excuse that the alleged ‘forgery’ was only now discovered was unacceptable. The photocopy of the authorisation letter in question (the original of which was tendered in evidence in the previous trial) was available to the plaintiff as early as 2001. The plaintiff had the opportunity and the right to adduce contrary expert evidence to resist the defendant’s case but he chose not to do so (see para 18). (4) The plaintiff’s instant action was frivolous and vexatious, unsustainable and doomed to failure. There was no merit in the contention that just because the action was grounded upon s 44 of the Evidence Act 1950, the mere suggestion of fraud or forgery was sufficient to have the plaintiff’s complaint fully tried. Allowing the matter to go to full trial would be tantamount to the court condoning the plaintiff’s abuse of process of the court (see paras 24–25). Plaintif memohon untuk mengetepikan melalui tindakan mencabar penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi dalam guaman yang sebelumnya (‘guaman 2001’) antara pihak-pihak yang menolak tuntutan plaintif terhadap bank defendan. Dalam guaman 2001, plaintif telah memohon untuk mendapatkan kembali RM4.8juta daripada bank dengan mendakwa bahawa bank telah memindahkan jumlah wang tersebut daripada akaun peribadinya kepada pihak ketiga tanpa kebenarannya. Bank telah menghujahkan bahawa plaintif telah membenarkan pemindahan dan bersandarkan kepada dua kuasa surat yang telah ditandatanganinya. Walaupun plaintif mempertikaikan tandatangan dalam surat tersebut sebagai pemalsuan, dia gagal untuk memanggil mana-mana saksi pakar ketika perbicaraan untuk menyokong hujahan tersebut atau mematahkan saksi pakar yang telah dipanggil oleh defendan untuk memberi keterangan bahawa tandatangan tersebut adalah miliknya. Berdasarkan keterangan saksi tersebut serta atas alasan lain, hakim perbicaraan menolak guaman 2001. Plaintif merayu terhadap keputusan tersebut ke Mahkamah Rayuan tetapi menghentikan rayuan tersebut apabila cubaannya untuk mengemukakan keterangan baru di peringkat rayuan telah ditolak. Plaintif memohon untuk

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-140 perbicaraan penuh tindakan ini untuk mencabar keputusan dalam guaman 2001 tersebut dengan menghasilkan laporan pengesahan tandatangan yang berpendapat bahawa tandatangan ||Page 658>> plaintif dalam salinan satu surat kebenaran adalah ‘traced forgery’. Defendan memohon di bawah A 18 k 19(1)(b) dan (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 dan kuasa sedia ada mahkamah untuk membatalkan saman plaintif atas alasan res judicata. Defendan menghujahkan bahawa plaintif telah terhalang atas sebab tindakan dan isu estopel daripada pembukaan semula isu-isu yang telah diputuskan yang telah diputuskan dalam guaman 2001.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan untuk membatalkan saman dengan kos:

(1) Tiada asas untuk mencabar penghakiman guaman 2001 tersebut kerana tidak ada material prima facie yang telah dihasilkan untuk menunjukkan penghakiman telah diperolehi sebagai hasil daripada penipuan yang sengaja dilakukan di mahkamah atau oleh sebab penipuan di mahkamah atau melalui sorokan keterangan material oleh defendan (lihat perenggan 24). (2) Plaintif tidak menunjukkan apa-apa alasan yang luar biasa untuk mahkamah menyimpang daripada pemakaian prinsip res judicata. Plaintif tidak berhak untuk mengganggu atau melitigasi semula isu-isu yang sama antara pihak-pihak yang telah diputuskan secara muktamad dalam guaman 2001 (lihat perenggan 20). (3) Alasan bahawa dakwaan ‘pemalsuan’ baru ditemui tidak boleh diterima. Salinan surat kebenaran berkenaan (yang mana salinan asal telah dikemukakan sebagai bukti dalam perbicaraan sebelumnya) adalah tersedia bagi plaintif, seawal tahun 2001. Plaintif mempunyai peluang dan hak untuk mengemukakan keterangan pakar yang berlawanan untuk menentang kes defendan tetapi dia memilih untuk tidak berbuat demikian (lihat perenggan 18). (4) Tindakan plaintif ini adalah remeh dan menyusahkan, tidak kekal dan gagal. Tidak ada merit dalam hujahan bahawa hanya kerana tindakan tersebut berasaskan s 44Akta Keterangan 1950, cadangan penipuan atau pemalsuan semata-mata adalah mencukupi untuk aduan plaintif dibicarakan sepenuhnya. Membenarkan perkara tersebut untuk dibicarakan penuh akan dianggap sebagai mahkamah membiarkan plaintif menyalahgunakan proses mahkamah (lihat perenggan 24–25). Notes For cases on res judicata, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2010 Reissue) paras 4358–4360. [2] Enclosure 13 was an application by the defendant brought pursuant to O 18 r 19(1)(b) and (d) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 and the inherent powers of the court, to strike out the plaintiff’s amended writ and amended statement of claim. The defendant relied on the doctrine of ‘res judicata’, and contended that the plaintiff was precluded, on account of both cause of action and issue estoppels, from reopening the issues that had been determined in the 2001 suit and that the plaintiff had no longer any ‘actionable cause of action’ in the dispute between the parties. [16] There was none here brought to the attention of the court and neither was there any material which remotely would even support any such inference to be drawn. To the contrary

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-141 the discussion on the issue of ‘res judicata’, below in this grounds of decision, all pointed to the contrary conclusion.

RES JUDICATA

[15] In Chee Pok Choy Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 346; [2001] 2 CLJ 321, the doctrine of res judicata was laid out in the following words:

Now res judicata is not merely a technical rule of pleading. It is a doctrine of substantial justice. It is a process whereby justice is achieved procedurally by precluding a party from re-agitating in subsequent proceedings a complaint or an issue that had, or could fairly have, been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties or their privies. It is merely equity in action in the procedural arena. It is sometimes referred to as the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 Er 313. In that case, Wigram V-C said: In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matters which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applied, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form on opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. The doctrine may thus be seen to encompass several categories. In its narrowest sense, res judicata, I think, refers to estoppels by record. It refers to the actual decision the earlier action or proceedings. In its wider sense, it encompasses issued, ||Page 665>> and cause of action that could justly and fairly have been equally adjudicated in the earlier suit or proceedings. This wider operation of the doctrine is sometimes referred to ‘constructive res judicata’. It houses the twin concepts of issue estoppels and cause of action estoppels. Like the tree of which they form the branches, they are designed to ensure that there is finality in litigation.

The wide reach of the doctrine of res judicata have found favour in the numerous decisions of the courts including in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Prorak Sdn Bhd [2000] 1 MLJ 479; Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; Everise Hectares Sdn Bhd v Citibank Bhd [2011] 2 CLJ 25; S & M Shopping Arcade Sdn Bhd v CH Williams, Talhar & Wong Sdn Bhd [2007] 7 MLJ 468; [2007] 10 CLJ 738. [17] Undergirding the doctrine of ‘res judicata’ are: [20] In my finding, no ‘exceptional’ grounds were shown by the plaintiff for this court to depart from the application of the jealously applied doctrine of res judicata by the courts to ensure substantial justice between the parties. The plaintiff was not entitled in this case to reagitate or relitigate the very same issues between the parties that had been determined conclusively in the 2001 suit. The excuse that such alleged ‘forgery’ was only now discovered was not acceptable at all definitely in the factual context of this case. The plaintiff had the opportunity, and for that matter, the plaintiff was never denied the right to adduce any contrary expert evidence. It must be reiterated that it was the plaintiff who chose not to.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-142 [23] It is trite that a defendant can invoke the court’s jurisdiction to strike out an action either under O 18 r 19(1)(a)–(d), or under the court’s inherent powers to do justice, where the plaintiff’s case is plainly and obviously unsustainable on the facts or in law. Such instances of unsustainable action ||Page 668>> include where ‘limitation’ in respect of any alleged claim had set in or on the grounds that such action is precluded based on the doctrine of ‘res judicata’. In Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Berhad [1993] 3 MLJ 36, the Supreme Court had occasion to caution as follows: [24] The question whether to strike out the action or not will have to be decided in the particular factual context of each case. After having given due regard to the aforestated principles of law that had to be applied in an application to strike out an action as at hand here before me, the plaintiff’s instant action was in my assessment most definitely a plain and obvious case that was doomed to failure and unsustainable. ||Page 669>> As elaborated above the plaintiff was on the grounds of res judicata precluded from reopening the issue determined in the 2001 suit to the effect that the plaintiff was indeed the author of the letter of authorisation of 3 January 1996 (1997). There was no basis for an impeachment of the judgment of 26 August 2010 in the 2001 suit either, as there was no prima facie material produced to show that the sought to be impugned judgment was obtained as a result of a deliberate fraud perpetrated on the court in the 2001 suit or by reason of a deception on the court or by suppression of any material evidence by the defendant. [25] The plaintiff’s instant action was, to say the least, a frivolous and vexatious one. If this court was to allow the matter to go to full trial, ignoring the above material considerations adverted to (res judicata, no evidence of deliberate fraud), it would be tantamount to the court condoning the plaintiff’s abuse of the process of court in furtherance of the plaintiff’s mala fide intentions to escape the implications on him of the judgment in the 2001 suit which had been properly obtained by the defendant. The judgment debtor (‘debtor’) applied to strike out the judgment creditor’s (‘creditor’) bankruptcy petition on the ground it was null and void in that it was presented before the expiry of six months from the date of the alleged act of bankruptcy. Under s 5(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 (‘the Act’), a creditor was not entitled to present a bankruptcy petition against a debtor unless the act of bankruptcy on which the petition was grounded had occurred within six months before the presentation of the petition. The debtor argued that as his act of bankruptcy was allegedly committed on 12 December 2009, the creditor had to wait until after the expiry of six months from that date before the petition could be presented. The petition was in fact presented on 24 May 2010. In opposing the debtor’s application, the creditor also raised the ground of res judicata arguing that the s 5(1)(c) issue should have been raised during the debtor’s earlier attempt to set aside the petition. The creditor also submitted that the debtor had fatally breached r 117 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969 which required a notice of intention to show cause against the petition to be filed and served at least three days before the hearing of the petition. The debtor appealed to the judge in chambers against the senior assistant registrar’s dismissal of his application.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-143

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs:

(1) Although s 5(1)(c) of the Act did not expressly say the petition must be presented within six months from the date of the act of bankruptcy, the fact that a six-month cut-off period was stipulated meant the petition must be presented within six months from that date and not six months thereafter (see para 5). (2) For the breach of r 117 alone, the debtor’s application ought to be ||Page 867>> dismissed. The failure to file a notice under r 117 could not be treated as a formal defect or an irregularity which could be cured (see para 13). (3) The debtor’s application also failed on the ground of res judicata (see para 7). Penghutang penghakiman (‘penghutang’) memohon untuk membatalkan petisyen kebankrapan pemiutang penghakiman (‘pemiutang’) atas alasan ia adalah terbatal dan tak sah di mana ia dikemukakan sebelum tamat enam bulan dari tarikh tindakan kebankrapan yang didakwa tersebut. Di bawah s 5(1)(c)Akta Kebankrapan 1967 (‘Akta’), pemiutang tidak berhak untuk mengemukakan petisyen kebankrapan terhadap penghutang kecuali tindakan kebankrapan atas mana petisyen tersebut didasarkan berlaku dalam masa enam bulan sebelum pengemukaan petisyen tersebut. Penghutang berhujah bahawa memandangkan tindakan kebankrapannya didakwa dilakukan pada 12 Disember 2009, pemiutang terpaksa menunggu sehingga selepas tarikh tamat enam bulan dari tarikh tersebut sebelum petisyen dapat dikemukakan. Petisyen sebenarnya dikemukakan pada on 24 Mei 2010. Dalam menentang permohonan penghutang, pemiutang juga membangkitkan alasan res judicata dengan berhujah bahawa isu s 5(1)(c) patut dibangkitkan semasa percubaan sebelumnya oleh penghutang untuk mengenepikan petisyen tersebut. Pemiutang juga berhujah bahawa penghutang telah secara serius memungkiri kaedah 117 Kaedah-Kaedah Kebankrapan 1969 yang mengkehendaki notis niat untuk menunjukkan kausa terhadap petisyen untuk difailkan dan diserahkan sekurang-kurangnya tiga hari sebelum pendengaran petisyen tersebut. Penghutang merayu kepada hakim dalam kamar terhadap penolakan permohonannya oleh timbalan kanan pendaftar.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos:

(1) Walaupun s 5(1)(c) Akta tidak secara nyata menyatakan petisyen tersebut mesti dikemukakan dalam masa enam bulan dari tarikh tindakan kebankarapan, fakta bahawa tempoh pemotongan enam bulan ditetapkan bermaksud petisyen mesti dikemukakan dalam masa enam bulan dari tarikh tersebut dan bukan enam bulan selepasnya (lihat perenggan 5). (2) Untuk kemungkiran kaedah 117 semata-mata, permohonan penghutang patut ditolak. Kegagalan untuk memfailkan notis di bawah kaedah 117 tidak boleh dianggap sebagai kecacatan formal atau ketaksekataan yang boleh diperbaiki (lihat perenggan 13). (3) Permohonan penghutang juga gagal atas alasan res judicata (lihat perenggan 7). ||Page 868>> [7] The striking out application was also opposed by the judgment creditor on the ground

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-144 of res judicata. It was argued that the issue of s 5(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act should have been raised at the time the judgment debtor first attempted to set aside the creditor’s petition and not now. I am inclined to agree with the judgment creditor. The doctrine of res judicata has its origin in the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313 where the learned judge laid down the following rule at p 319:

Where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. [8] Closer to shore Sharma J in dealing with the issue of res judicata in Government of Malaysia v Dato’ Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74 cited the Indian case of Satyadhyan Ghosel and Others v C Sint Deorajin Dobi and Another AIR 1960 SC 941where the following observations were made:

The principle of res judicata is based on the need to giving a finality to judicial decisions … The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. [9] The learned judge went on to hold that res judicata is also applicable to issues which were not made issues but which ought to have been made issues. This is how the learned judge expressed his view at p 76:

The rule is that a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence becomes a matter which was constructively in issue. A matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence is for the ||Page 871>> purposes of the plea of res judicata deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former application, that is to say, though it may not have been directly and substantially in issue it is still regarded as, having been constructively, directly and substantially in issue. There can be no distinction between a claim that was actually made and a claim which might and ought to have been made. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases …It is only where the plea which is sought to be raised in the subsequent proceedings was not available to the party at the time of the previous proceedings that the decision cannot be constructively res judicata. The rule of constructive res judicata is really a rule of estoppel.

The appellants plead res judicata in this regard and we think the point is well taken and is supported by authority, and we would refer to the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Hoystead & Ors v Commissioner of Taxation and a catenation of cases to the like effect, namely, that the plea of res judicata applies, except perhaps where special circumstances may conceivably arise of sufficient merit to exclude its operation, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. Civil Procedure — Summary judgment — Triable issues — Whether defendants had raised triable issues — Res judicata — Raising same issues — Whether defence raised was basis of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-145 defendants’ claim in earlier suit — Whether defendants permitted to raise same issue again Arahektar Bina Sdn Bhd (‘ABSB’) had entered into two industrial hire purchase agreements (‘the HPAs’) with Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Bhd (‘MIDF’) for the financing of the purchase of heavy vehicles for the construction industry. The second and third defendants were the guarantors for the two HPAs. Under the terms of the two HPAs, ABSB was to pay MIDF monthly installments with interest, and a default interest to be imposed in the event of a default in repayment of the monthly installment. When ABSB defaulted in its monthly installments, MIDF had issued a notice of demand to terminate the two HPAs and to claim the outstanding amounts with interest. Notices of demand were also sent to the second and third defendants, as guarantors under the guarantee and indemnity agreement signed by them in favour of MIDF. Subsequently, MIDF filed the present writ action against ABSB and the second and third defendants for the balance outstanding under both the HPAs. However, sometime in 2008, ABSB had commenced an action against MIDF and four others for a conspiracy to defraud ABSB (‘the 2008 suit’). In the 2008 suit, ABSB had claimed that there was collusion or conspiracy among two of the officers of MIDF and the directors of a company known as Iron Module Sdn Bhd, which was the supplier of the heavy vehicles that were the subject matter of the first HPA. The 2008 suit was dismissed with costs after the court found that ABSB had not proved its allegations of fraud beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, when MIDF commenced the present action, ABSB and the second and third defendants had applied to strike out MIDF’s claim on the grounds of res judicata. However, the defendants’ application to strike out MIDF’s action was dismissed with costs. Subsequently, MIDF commenced the present application for summary judgment under O 14 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 against ABSB and the other two defendants. ABSB and the other defendants opposed the summary judgment application and argued that there were triable issues. ABSB again raised the defence of the conspiracy to defraud between two of the officers of MIDF and the directors of a company known as Iron Module Sdn Bhd, which was the supplier of the ||Page 154>> heavy vehicles that were the subject matter of the first HPA. MIDF claimed that this issue had already been raised in the 2008 suit. However, MIDF admitted that the second HPA was not the subject of the 2008 suit.

Held, allowing the application in part with half the fixed costs for summary judgment:

(1) There was a triable issue raised by the defendants with respect to the second HPA, which would justify the claim being set down for trial. This court was entitled to allow summary judgment for that part of the claim where there were no triable issues. As such, this court dismissed MIDF’s application for summary judgment with respect to the second HPA but allowed summary judgment to be entered in respect of the first HPA (see paras 6–7). (2) ABSB and the other two defendants should not be allowed to raise the defence of a conspiracy to defraud, which was in substance the basis of their claims in the 2008 suit, to raise the same issues again in the present action by MIDF. To allow this would be to offend the principle of res judicata. ABSB and the defendants had not appealed against the decision of the trial judge in the 2008 suit, when he dismissed their claim with costs. Thus the judgment passed in the 2008 suit was final, conclusive and binding and ABSB and the other two defendants should not be allowed to re-litigate the same

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-146 issue of a conspiracy to defraud them in the present case. As such, there were no triable issues that would justify MIDF’s claim going to trial. Thus, MIDF’s application for summary judgment for claims under the first HPA should be allowed (see para 17). Arahektar Bina Sdn Bhd (‘ABSB’) memasuki dua perjanjian sewa beli perindustrian (‘PSB’) dengan Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Bhd (‘MIDF’) untuk pembiayaan pembelian kenderaan-kenderaan berat untuk industri pembinaan. Defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga adalah penjamin-penjamin untuk kedua-dua PSB. Di bawah terma-terma kedua-dua PSB, ABSB dikehendaki membayar MIDF bayaran ansuran bulanan dengan faedah, dan faedah ingkar akan dikenakan jika pengingkaran pembayaran bayaran ansuran bulanan. Apabila ABSB mengingkari bayaran ansuran bulanannya, MIDF mengeluarkan notis tuntutan untuk menamatkan kedua-dua PSB dan menuntut jumlah tertunggak dengan faedah. Notis-notis tuntutan juga dihantar kepada defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga, sebagai penjamin-penjamin di bawah jaminan dan perjanjian indemniti yang ditandatangani oleh mereka memihak MIDF. Kemudiannya, MIDF memfailkan tindakan writ ini terhadap ABSB dan defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga untuk baki tertunggak di bawah kedua-dua PSB tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, pada satu masa pada tahun 2008, ABSB telah memulakan tindakan terhadap MIDF dan empat orang lain untuk konspirasi untuk ||Page 155>> menipu ABSB (‘tindakan 2008’). Dalam tindakan 2008, ABSB telah menuntut bahawa terdapat pengetahuan atau konspirasi di antara dua pegawai MIDF dan pengarah-pengarah syarikat yang dikenali sebagai Iron Module Sdn Bhd, yang mana adalah pembekal kenderaan-kenderaan berat yang menjadi perkara subjek PSB pertama. Tindakan 2008 ditolak dengan kos selepas mahkamah mendapati bahawa ABSB tidak membuktikan dakwaan-dakwaannya mengenai fraud melampaui keraguan munasabah. Oleh itu, apabila MIDF memulakan tindakan ini, ABSB dan defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga telah memohon untuk membatalkan tuntutan MIDF atas alasan-alasan res judicata. Walau bagaimanapun, permohonan defendan-defendan untuk membatalkan tindakan MIDF ditolak dengan kos. Kemudiannya, MIDF memulakan permohonan ini untuk penghakiman terus di bawah A 14 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 terhadap ABSB dan dua defendan lain. ABSB dan defendan-defendan lain membantah permohonan penghakiman terus dan berhujah bahawa terdapat isu yang boleh dibicarakan. ABSB sekali lagi membangkitkan pembelaan konspirasi untuk menipu di antara dua pegawai MIDF dan pengarah-pengarah syarikat yang dikenali sebagai Iron Module Sdn Bhd, yang mana adalah pembekal kenderaan-kenderaan berat yang menjadi perkara subjek PSB pertama. MIDF mendakwa bahawa isu ini telah dibangkitkan di dalam tindakan 2008. Walau bagaimanapun, MIDF mengaku bahawa PSB kedua bukan subjek tindakan 2008.

Diputuskan, membenarkan sebahagian permohonan dengan setengah kos yang ditetapkan untuk penghakiman terus:

(1) Terdapat isu yang boleh dibicarakan dibangkitkan oleh defendan-defendan berkaitan PSB kedua, yang akan menjustifikasikan tuntutan yang ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan. Mahkamah ini berhak membenarkan penghakiman terus untuk bahagian tuntutan tersebut di mana tidak terdapat isu yang boleh dibicarakan. Oleh itu, mahkamah ini menolak permohonan MIDF untuk penghakiman terus berkaitan PSB kedua tetapi membenarkan penghakiman terus dimasukkan berkaitan PSB pertama

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-147 (lihat perenggan 6–7). (2) ABSB dan dua defendan lain tidak patut dibenarkan membangkitkan pembelaan konspirasi untuk menipu, yang mana merupakan bahan asas tuntutan mereka di dalam tindakan 2008, tuntuk membangkitkan isu yang sama di dalam tindakan ini oleh MIDF. Untuk membenarkan ini akan melanggar prinsip res judicata. ABSB dan defendan-defendan tidak merayu terhadap keputusan hakim perbicaraan di dalam tindakan 2008, apabila dia menolak tuntutan mereka dengan kos. Oleh itu penghakiman yang dijatuhkan dalam tindakan 2008 adalah muktamad, konklusif dan mengikat dan ABSB dan dua defendan lain tidak patut dibenarkan untuk melitigasi isu yang sama konspirasi untuk menipu mereka di dalam kes ini. Oleh itu, tidak terdapat isu yang boleh dibicarakan yang akan ||Page 156>> menjustifikasikan tuntutan MIDF untuk dibicarakan. Oleh itu, permohonan MIDF untuk penghakiman terus untuk tuntutan-tuntutan di bawah PSB pertama patut dibenarkan (lihat perenggan 17). [3] When the plaintiff commenced the action herein the defendants had earlier applied to strike out the action under O 18 r 19(1)(d) and under O 92 r 4 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC’) on ground that the doctrine of res judicata applies. After having considered the arguments, I had on 8 February 2012 dismissed with costs the defendants application and I gave a full written judgment setting forth my reasons for dismissing the application to strike out. [17] The defendants here should not be allowed to raise the defence of a conspiracy to defraud which was in substance the basis of their claims in the 2008 suit and which claims there had failed. To allow the plaintiffs here to raise the same issues again would be to offend the principle of res judicata. They had not appealed against the decision of the learned judge dismissing their claims with costs in the 2008 suit. The said judgment is final, conclusive and binding and the plaintiffs there who are the defendants here should not be allowed to relitigate again the whole same issue of a conspiracy to defraud them. To allow them to do so in the current action by way of opposing the summary judgment application would be to allow them a second bite at the proverbial cherry. There must be an end to all litigation involving the same issue. [18] In Government of Malaysia v Dato Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74 at p 76 there is a helpful passage quoted by His Lordship Sharma J on the meaning of and motivation for the res judicata principle:

In Satyadhyan Ghosel and others v Sint Deorajin Dobl and another AIR 1960 SC 941, the statement of the law on the subject is given thus: The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall be not adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter — whether on a question of fact or a question of law — has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in s 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where s 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-148 as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. (Emphasis added.) [23] The affidavits filed by the defendants to oppose the summary judgment application seem to confine themselves to the assertion that the principle of res judicata applies in that the current claims of the plaintiff could have been raised by way of a counterclaim in the 2008 suit but as it was not raised then when it could have been raised, it cannot be raised now by way of a separate suit and much less seeking to enter summary judgment against the defendants here for the claims under the first HPA. The defendants here had applied to strike out the plaintiff’s claim on ground of res judicata in the broader sense of issue ||Page 163>> estoppel and I had dismissed the said application and had given my written judgment on it. I do not wish to repeat myself save to quote the following from the judgment:

I can do no better than refer to the Court of Appeal case of Chee Pok Choy v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 346; [2001] 2 CLJ 321 where His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) held at p 358 (MLJ), pp 332–333 (CLJ) as follows: Now, there is a dimension to the doctrine of res judicata that is not always appreciated. It is this. Since the doctrine (whether in its narrow or broader sense) is designed to achieve justice, a court may decline to apply it where to do so would lead to an unjust result. And there is respectable authority in support of the view I have just expressed. In Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd and Others (No 2) [1966] 2 All ER 532, 573, Lord Upjohn said: As my noble and learned friend, Lord Reid, has already pointed out there may be many reasons why a litigant in the earlier litigation has not pressed or may even for good reasons have abandoned a particular issue. It may be most unjust to hold him precluded from raising that issue in subsequent litigation (and see Lord Maugham LC’s observations in the New Brunswick case [1938] 4 All ER at p 755; [1939] AC at p 21). All estoppels are not odious but must be applied so as to work justice and not injustice, and I think that the principle of issue estoppel must be applied to the circumstances of the subsequent case with this overriding consideration in mind. (Emphasis added.) In Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93, 109, Lord Keith of Kinkel expressed the following view: In my opinion Your Lordships should affirm it to be the law that there may be an exception to issue estoppel in the special circumstance that there has become available to a party further material relevant to the correct determination of a point involved in the earlier proceedings, whether or not that point was specifically raised and decided, being material which could not by reasonable diligence have been adduced in those proceedings. One of the purposes of estoppel being to work justice between the parties, it is open to courts to recognise that in special circumstances inflexible application of it may have the opposite result, as was observed by Lord Upjohn in the passage which I have quoted above from his speech in the Carl-Zeiss case [1966] 2 All ER 536 at p 573; [1967] 1 AC 853 at p 947. (Emphasis added.) In a later passage, I find Lord Keith saying: Estoppel per rem judicatam, whether cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel, is essentially concerned with preventing abuse of process.

The second defence is one of ‘res judicata.’ There has, of course, been no actual decision in litigation between these parties as to the issue involved in the present case, but the appellants invoke this defence in its wider sense, according to which a party may be shut out from raising in a subsequent action an issue which he could, and should, have raised in earlier proceedings. The classic statement of this doctrine is contained in the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson, 3 Hare 100

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-149 and its existence has been reaffirmed by this Board in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155. A recent application of it is to be found in the decision of the Board in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581. It was, in the judgment of the Board, there described in these words: is ‘there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings:’ at p 590. This reference to ‘abuse of process’ had previously been made in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 per Somervell LJ and Their Lordships endorse it. This is the true basis of the doctrine and it ought only to be applied when the facts are such as to amount to an abuse: otherwise there is a danger of a party being shut out from bringing forward a genuine subject of litigation. (Emphasis added.) [26] Having then a more proper perspective of the plea of res judicata and especially that of issue estoppel, can it be honestly said that the plaintiff’s claim here is an abuse of the court’s process. Certainly not! The plaintiff is validly and legitimately at liberty to bring this claim for breach of contract in the hire purchase agreements and in the guarantee and indemnity and indeed more so after the defendants who as plaintiffs in the previous 2008 suit had been dismissed even after a no case to answer submission. The plaintiff should not be shut and stopped from pursuing a genuine claim which claim is now more easily disposed of as the earlier allegations of a conspiracy to defraud had been dealt with and dispose of in the earlier suit. If the earlier 2008 suit had ended in favour of the plaintiffs there, it would have been pointless to bring another claim for breach of the hire purchase agreement. Under such a circumstance if ||Page 165>> the plaintiff here were to bring such a claim then the defendants may well be entitled to raise the plea of res judicata and apply to strike out the suit. However the reverse is true here: the plaintiffs’ claim in the previous 2008 suit had been dismissed and D5 there who is the plaintiff here is entitled to proceed unimpeded to claim for breach of contract. There is no harassment of the defendants here as the issues are totally different. It would be a grave injustice to the plaintiffs if it now cannot proceed and prosecute its claim eventhough the allegations of fraud against it had been dismissed. This is an example if I may say where the strict application of the plea of issue estoppel would yield an unjust result and undermine the very rationale for the doctrine of res judicata and in particular issue estoppel. [28] In essence what the defendants had raised in their defence, affidavits and in their submission through their counsel, Mr Lim Yew Hock, to oppose the summary judgment application is a question of law. The question of law being whether the defendants can use the principle of res judicata in the broader sense of issue estoppel to deny the plaintiff’s claim here and by so doing to deny the plaintiff of its summary judgment application? The correct approach has been set out in the Supreme Court case of Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400 where at p 407 His Lordship Mohamed Azmi SCJ held: Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Principles for — Earlier suit discontinued without liberty to file afresh and consent judgment entered — Issues raised and reliefs sought in second suit same as earlier action — Estoppel for rem judicatum — Whether second suit abuse of process of the court and ought to be struck off Civil Procedure — Striking out — Abuse of process of court — Issues raised and reliefs sought in second suit same as earlier action — Second suit barred by res judicata — Estoppel for rem judicatum — Second suit also time barred — Whether suit vexatious, frivolous, scandalous and abuse of process of the court — Whether ought to be struck out The plaintiff/appellant was a company that had taken over the assets of the Co-operative E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-150 Central Bank Ltd. The defendants/respondents were partners and advocates and solicitors practising under the firm M/s Nordin Hamid & Co. The appellant claimed against the respondent for the return of auction proceeds allegedly kept by M/s Nordin Hamid & Co pursuant to a foreclosure proceeding. On 27 November 2002, the appellant brought an action against the respondents to recover the auction proceeds (‘the first suit’). On 25 August 2003, the appellant withdrew the first suit. Later, the plaintiff on 21 October 2004 filed the present action (‘the second suit’) against the partners of the firm to recover the same auction proceeds. The appellant’s claims in both the first and second suits were identical. The respondents applied to strike out the second suit under O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 on the ground of res judicata and limitation period. The learned judge struck out the second suit and hence these appeals.

Held, dismissing the appeals:

(1) In determining whether a statement of claim discloses a reasonable cause ||Page 220>> of action or itself constitutes an abuse of process, the state of affairs to which the court must have regard is that which prevailed at the date the action is filed. The court is entitled to look at the history of the case, where there is likelihood of the action being res judicata, to determine if there is a cause of action. The plea of res judicata applies not only to points which the court was required to form an opinion on but also to every point in the litigation which the parties could have brought up at the time (see para). (2) When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, they and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata as the determination or judgment becomes the truth between such parties. An estoppel for rem judicatum will be created as a result. The cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of a cause of action which has been determined in a final judgment by the same parties in a subsequent proceeding. The court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss or strike out an action on the ground of res judicata (see para). (3) The statements of claim filed in the first suit and the second suit were in substance identical, resting on the same facts and issues. In respect of the first suit, the appellant and the respondent entered into a consent judgment or order dated 25 August 2003. The first suit was withdrawn by the appellant ‘without liberty to file afresh’ with a notice of discontinuance to be filed within one week from the date of the consent order. A consent order could give rise to a plea of res judicata. The doctrine of estoppel as expounded in Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysia Merchant Bank [1995] 3 MLJ 331 applied. To allow the appellant to file the second suit based on the same facts or substantially the same facts was unjust and grossly prejudicial to the respondents particularly when the counterclaim against the appellant had been withdrawn by the respondents (see para). (4) The appellant’s claim against the respondents both in the first and second suits was founded on contract. The second suit was filed after a period of more than six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. Thus the second suit was time barred and should be struck out as being an abuse of the process of the court (see E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-151 para). Plaintif/perayu adalah sebuah syarikat yang telah diambil alih aset-aset Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. Defendan/responden merupakan rakan kongsi dan peguambela dan peguamcara yang beramal di bawah firma Tetuan Nordin Hamid & Co. Perayu menuntut terhadap responden untuk mendapat balik hasil lelongan yang dikatakan telah disimpan oleh Tetuan Nordin Hamid & Co berikutan prosiding halang tebus. Pada 27 November 2002, perayu telah ||Page 221>> memulakan tindakan terhadap responden untuk mendapat balik hasil leongan itu (‘guaman pertama’). Pada 25 Ogos 2003, perayu telah menarik balik guaman pertama itu. Kemudian, pada 21 Oktober 2004 plaintif telah memfailkan tindakan ini (‘guaman kedua’) terhadap rakan kongsi firma itu untuk mendapat balik hasil lelongan yang sama. Tuntutan perayu dalam kedua-dua guaman pertama dan kedua adalah sama. Responden telah memohon untuk membatalkan guaman kedua di bawah A 18 k 19(1)Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 atas alasan res judicata dan tempoh had masa. Hakim yang bijaksana telah membatalkan guaman kedua dan justeru itu rayuan-rayuan berikut.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan-rayuan:

(1) Dalam menentukan sama ada penyataan tuntutan menunjukkan kausa tindakan munasabah atau ia sendiri membentuk penyalahgunaan proses, keadaan urusan yang mana mahkamah perlu mengambilkira adalah yang berlaku pada tarikh tindakan itu difailkan. Mahkamah berhak melihat sejarah kes di mana terdapat kebarangkalian tindakan itu res judicata, bagi menentukan jika terdapat kausa tindakan. Pli res judicata bukan sahaja terpakai untuk poin-poin yang mana diperlukan mahkamah untuk membentuk pendapat pada dan setiap poin dalam litigasi yang mana mungkin boleh dibangkitkan oleh pihak-pihak pada masa itu (lihat perenggan). (2) Apabila suatu perkara antara dua pihak telah diadili dan ditentukan oleh mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa kompeten, mereka dan mereka yang bersubahat tidak dibenarkan untuk membuat litigasi sekali lagi res judicata itu kerana penentuan atau penghakiman itu telah menjadi suatu kebenaran antara pihak-pihak. Estopel untuk rem judicatum akan terbentuk akibat daripada ini. Kausa tindakan estopel menghalang desakan penegasan semula kausa tindakan yang telahpun ditentukan dalam penghakiman akhir oleh pihak-pihak yang sama dalam prosiding seterusnya. Mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa sedia ada untuk menolak atau membatalkan tindakan atas alasan res judicata (lihat perenggan). (3) Penyaaan tuntutan yang difailkan dalam guaman pertama dan guaman kedua pada dasarnya adalah sama, berasaskan fakta-fakta dan isu-isu yang sama. Berhubung guaman pertama, perayu dan responden telah memasuki penghakiman persetujuan atau perintah bertarikh 25 Ogos 2003. Guaman pertama itu telah ditarik balik oleh perayu ‘without liberty to file afresh’ dengan notis pemberhentian untuk memfailkan dalam satu minggu daripada tarikh perintah persetujuan itu. Perintah persetujuan boleh menimbulkan pli res judicata. Doktrin estopel sebagaimana diputuskan dalam Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysia Merchant Bank [1995] 3 MLJ 331adalah terpakai. Dengan ||Page 222>> membenarkan perayu memfailkan guaman kedua berdasarkan fakta-fakta sama atau sebahagian besar merupakan fakta-fakta sama adlah tidak adil dan amat E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-152 memudaratkan responden-responden khususnya apabila tuntutan balas terhadap perayu telah ditarik balik oleh responden-responden (lihat perenggan). (4) Tuntutan perayu terhadap responden-responden dalam kedua-dua guaman pertama dan kedua berasaskan kontrak. Guaman kedua telah difailkan selepas tempoh lebih daripada enam tahun dari tarikh kausa tindakan terakru. Oleh itu guaman kedua telah luput had masa dan patut dibatalkan kerana merupakan satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah (lihat perenggan). [6] On 18 February 2005, the respondents filed applications to strike out the second suit under O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980, on the ground of res judicata. The respondents in the first appeal (Appeal No W-02–1094 of 2008) also relied on limitation period in applying to strike out the second suit. On 29 August 2008, the learned judge struck out the second suit. Hence the present appeals. [7] The appellant argued that the second suit is not barred by res judicata as it was withdrawn without the merits being heard or adjudicated by the court. To the appellant, cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel do not apply on the facts of this matter. [9] The respondents on the other hand, took the position that since the first suit was withdrawn by the appellant by way of a consent order, this fact by itself has given rise to two grounds for striking out ie res judicata or issue estoppel and limitation period which are legal issues arising from the same set of facts. The respondents claimed that the appellant’s own pleadings state that their cause of action arose on or about the 1 December 1997 and would therefore have expired on the 30 November 2003, whereas the second suit was filed on 21 October 2004.

(a) res judicata; and ||Page 225>> (b) limitation.

ISSUE OF RES JUDICATA

[12] In determining whether a statement of claim discloses a reasonable cause of action or itself constitutes an abuse of process, the state of affairs to which the court must have regard is that which prevailed at the date the action is filed (see Court of Appeal decision in Gasing Heights Sdn Bhd v Aloyah bte Abdul Rahman & Ors [1996] 3 MLJ 259). The court is entitled to look at the history of the case, where there is likelihood of the action being res judicata, to determine if there is a cause of action (see Jamir Hassan v Kang Min [1992] 2 MLJ 46 and Abdul Hamid bin Hj Rahmat & Anor v Development & Commercial Bank Bhd & Anor [1993] 1 MLJ 306). [13] The plea of res judicata applies not only to points which the court was required to form an opinion on but also to every point in the litigation which the parties could have brought up at the time (see Othman & Anor v Mek [1971] 2 MLJ 214). [15] When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, they and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata as the determination or judgment becomes the truth between such parties. An estoppel for rem judicatum has been created as a result (per Peh Swee Chin FCJ in Asia

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-153 Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189). The cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of a cause of action which has been determined in a final judgment by the same parties in a subsequent proceeding. The court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss or strike out an action on the ground of res judicata. [23] It is trite that a consent order could give rise to a plea of res judicata. There are a number of authorities on this point. Among them are: Palmer and another v Durnford Ford (a firm) and another [1992] 2 All ER 122; Cohen v Jonesco [1926] 1 KB 119; In re South American and Mexican Company; Ex parte Bank of England [1895] 1 Ch 37; and Malaysian National Insurance Sdn Bhd v Lim Tiok [1997] 2 MLJ 165. ||Page 227>> [28] Based on the above considerations, the court is satisfied that on this ground of res judicata alone, the present appeals are clearly without merit and ||Page 228>> thus ought to be dismissed. A motor lorry insured by the respondent was involved in an accident in which a passenger (‘the deceased’) in the lorry was killed. A civil suit (‘the liability action’) filed in the sessions court found the owner of the lorry (‘the company’) 100% vicariously liable for the negligence of its driver in the accident and damages was awarded. The appellant then filed a recovery action in the same court to enforce the damages award against the respondent under s 96(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (‘RTA’). The respondent repudiated liability to pay on the grounds the deceased was a mere passenger in the lorry and not an employee of the company. The respondent relied on an exception of the liability clause in its insurance policy that said the respondent would not be liable for the death of or bodily injury to any person ‘other than a passenger carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment’. The sessions court allowed the appellant’s claim but the High Court reversed the decision on appeal holding that under the exception clause the deceased was not in a contract of service with the company. The appellant appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal where it was argued, inter alia, that res judicata barred the respondent in a recovery action from re-litigating the issue of liability which had been determined in the liability action.

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs:

(1) (per Abdull Hamid Embong JCA) The deceased was not under a contract of service with the company but a mere passenger. The respondent was thus not liable for his death (see para 13). (2) (per Abdull Hamid Embong JCA) The deceased was merely a freelance ||Page 790>> worker whose wages were paid by the cement purchaser at the destination where the cement bags were loaded off the motor lorry. He merely helped the driver unload the cement bags from the lorry and was paid on that basis. Apart from that, the company had no control over the deceased (see paras 10 & 11). (3) (per Abdull Hamid Embong JCA) The liability and recovery actions were distinct from each other. The former was founded on tort, to determine negligence; the latter was based on a statutory right under the RTA which included the construction of the terms of the insurance policy and the application of s 91 and s 96 of the RTA. For this reason alone it was unjust to bar the respondent from raising afresh the issue of its

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-154 liability even to the extent of adducing evidence on the same issue in the recovery action (see paras 20 & 21). (4) (per Abdull Hamid Embong JCA) The respondent was not a party in the liability action. Thus a final determination of the issue of liability could not be said to have been made by the trial judge in the liability action (see para 22). (5) (per Abdull Hamid Embong JCA) A dogmatic approach in applying the res judicata principle as a bar would be unjust to the respondent who did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. This factor must be met before res judicata could be binding on the parties. It was founded on justice and common sense (see para 22). (6) (per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA) What was raised by the respondent with regard to the construction of the insurance policy was not decided on its merits in the liability action. Being a live issue in the recovery action, the doctrine of res judicata should not apply (see para 57). (7) (per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA) Since the appellant was a mere passenger in the motorlorry and not working for the company, the High Court was right in holding the respondent not liable in the recovery action (see para 49). Sebuah motolori yang diinsuranskan oleh responden telah terlibat dalam kemalangan yang mana penumpang (‘si mati’) di dalam lori telah terbunuh. Satu guaman sivil (‘tindakan liabliti’) yang difailkan dalam mahkamah sesyen mendapati pemilik lori (‘syarikat’) adalah 100% bertanggungan secara vikarius bagi kecuaian pemandunya dalam kemalangan dan ganti rugi diawardkan. Perayu kemudiannya memfailkan tindakan mendapatkan balik di dalam mahkamah yang sama untuk menguatkuasakan award ganti rugi terhadap responden di bawah s 96(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 (‘APJ’). Responden membatalkan liabiliti untuk membayar atas alasan bahawa si mati hanya penumpang lori dan bukan pekerja syarikat. Responden bersandarkan pada ||Page 791>> pengecualian dalam klausa liabiliti dalam polisi insurans yang menyatakan bahawa responden tidak akan bertanggungan bagi kematian atau kecederaan diri ke atas mana-mana orang ‘other than a passenger carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment’. Mahkamah sesyen membenarkan tuntutan perayu tetapi Mahkamah Tinggi mengakas keputusan rayuan bahawa di bawah klausa pengecualian, si mati tidak berkontrak servis dengan syarikat. Perayu merayu keputusan kepada Mahkamah Rayuan di mana menjadi pertikaian, antara lain, bahawa res judicata menghalang responden dalam tindakan mendapatkan balik dari menglitigasi semula isu liabiliti yang telah diputuskan dan tindakan liabiliti.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos:

(1) (oleh Abdull Hamid Embong HMR) Si mati tidak berada dalam kontrak servis dengan syarikat tetapi hanya seorang penumpang. Dengan itu, responden tidak bertanggungan ke atas kematiannya (lihat perenggan 13). (2) (oleh Abdull Hamid Embong HMR) Si mati hanyalah seorang pekerja bebas yang gajinya dibayar oleh pembeli simen di tempat beg-beg simen diturunkan daripada motolori. Dia hanya menolong pemandu menurunkan beg-beg simen daripada lori dan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-155 dibayar berdasarkan itu. Selain itu, syarikat juga tiada kawalan terhadap si mati (lihat perenggan 10 & 11). (3) (oleh Abdull Hamid Embong HMR) Tindakan liabiliti dan mendapatkan semula adalah berbeza daripada satu sama lain. Tindakan liabiliti adalah berasaskan tort, untuk menentukan kecuaian; tindakan mendapatkan semula adalah berasaskan daripada hak statutori di bawah APJ yang memasukkan pembentukan terma-terma polisi insurans dan pemakaian s 91 dan s 96 APJ. Untuk tujuan ini sahaja, adalah tidak adil untuk menghalang responden daripada membangkitkan isu liabilitinya walaupun hingga ke tahap mengemukakan bukti bagi isu yang sama dalam tindakan mendapatkan semula (lihat perenggan 20 & 21). (4) (oleh Abdull Hamid Embong HMR) Responden bukan pihak dalam tindakan liabiliti. Dengan itu, suatu pemutusan akhir isu liabiliti tidak boleh dikatakan sebagai telah dibuat oleh hakim bicara dalam tindakan liabiliti (lihat perenggan 22). (5) (oleh Abdull Hamid Embong HMR) Satu pendekatan dogmatik dalam menggunapakai prinsip res judicata sebagai halangan adalah tidak adil kepada responden yang tidak mempunyai peluang sepenuhnya dan adil untuk melitigasikan isu tersebut. Faktor ini mestilah dipenuhi sebelum res judicata boleh mengikat pihak-pihak. Ia berasaskan keadilan dan kenyataan munasabah (lihat perenggan 22). (6) (oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR) Apa yang dibangkitkan oleh responden ||Page 792>> berkaitan dengan pentafsiran polisi insurans tidak diputuskan atas merit dalam tindakan liabiliti. Sebagai isu utama dalam tindakan mendapatkan semula (recovery action), doktrin res judicata tidak boleh beraplikasi (lihat perenggan 57). (7) (oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR) Oleh sebab perayu adalah penumpang lori sahaja dan bukan bekerja untuk syarikat, Mahkamah Tinggi adalah betul dalam memutuskan bahawa responden tidak bertanggung jawab dalam tindakan mendapatkan semula (lihat perenggan 49). Editorial Note: This case supersedes the previous publication of the same in [2011] 4 MLJ 541. [15] Learned counsel for the respondent had argued against the relitigation on the liability issue and that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable as a bar. [17] So, is res judicata applicable to bar the issue of liability from being raised again, this time by the insurer? [18] Literally translated, res judicata, is ‘the fact has been decided’. It expresses a general public interest policy that the same issue (or cause of action) should not be litigated more than once even if the parties are different. It prevents vexatious litigation and any abuse of the courts’ process on the premise that final judgments are binding and conclusive (see Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100). The criminal law equivalent is the doctrine of double jeopardy. [19] It is in the broader sense of res judicata that the appellant submitted that ||Page 797>> the liability issue should now be precluded from being raised at the recovery stage since it has been adjudged in the previous liability action. [22] It needs to be mentioned that P&O was not a party in the liability action. Thus, a final determination of this issue cannot be said to have been made by the trial judge in the liability E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-156 action. A dogmatic approach applying the res judicata principle as a bar would be most unjust to P&O who does not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. This factor must be met before res judicata can be binding on the parties. It is founded on justice and common sense. [49] A final issue to consider is in regard to the doctrine of res judicata. It is correct to say that the insurers P&O raised for the very first time the issue of the construction of the insurance policy in the recovery action bearing in mind that P&O was not a party in the liability action. P&O is entitled, in this appeal, to seek a declaration that the insurance policy does not cover the deceased who was a mere passenger in the motorlorry No WT 1835. It is a live issue before this court and it was also a live issue before the High Court. The doctrine of res judicata cannot be invoked against P&O in this appeal. [50] According to Yeldham J in the case of Maganja v Arthur (t/a Shirley Arthur’s Beauty Centre) (1984) 3 NSWLR 561, at p 564, that a res judicata only arises from a judgment on the merits. And no estoppel arises from a final order which is not a judgment. ||Page 804>> [52] It is trite law that res judicata prevents the re-agitation of the same cause of action in later proceedings (Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446, at p 447; and Ramsay v Pigram (1967—1968) 118 CLR 271, at p 280). [53] Brennan J in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Proprietary Limited (1980—1981) 147 CLR 589, at p 611 said that the phrase ‘res judicata’ is used to refer to: [55] Sir James Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, at pp 115–116; 67 ER 313, at pp 319–320, stated the res judicata rule in this way. That the court:

requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. ||Page 805>> The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time…. It is plain that litigation would be interminable if such a rule did not prevail.

The rule is not based on the doctrine of res judicata in a narrow sense, nor even on any strict doctrine of issue or cause of action estoppel. It is a rule of public policy based on the desirability, in the general interest as well as that of the parties themselves, that litigation should not drag on for ever and that a defendant should not be oppressed by successive suits when one would do. [57] All these authorities are certainly thought provoking. In the context of the present appeal, what was raised by P&O in regard to the construction of the insurance policy was not decided on its merits in the liability action by the sessions court. Being a live issue in the recovery action, the doctrine of res judicata should not apply. Civil Procedure — Estoppel — Res judicata — Relitigation of matter adjudicated by court of competent jurisdiction — Earlier petition under s 218(1) of the Companies Act 1965 involving same facts and allegations — Whether subsequent petition under s 181 should be dismissed

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-157 Companies and Corporations — Members’ rights — Oppression — Petition for relief — Res judicata — Earlier petition under s 218(1) of the Companies Act 1965 involving same facts and allegations — Whether subsequent petition under s 181 should be dismissed The second appellant (Phuar Kong Seng) and the respondent were the only shareholders and directors of the first appellant (‘the company’). Subsequently Lim Hua was removed as director of the company and he consequently presented a petition (‘the first petition’) under s 218(1)(f) and (i) of the Companies Act 1965 (‘the Act’), seeking to wind up the company. On 19 May 2005, pursuant to a consent order, the first petition was struck out with no liberty to file afresh (‘the consent order’). On 20 December 2005, Lim Hua presented the present petition seeking to be reinstated to the company’s board of directors under s 181 of the Act. The instant petition and the first petition were based on the same facts and allegations. Pursuant to the instant petition, Lim Hua reapplied for and obtained orders for the appointment of interim receivers and managers and ancillary reliefs, which were the subject matter in the instant appeal lodged by Phuar Kong Seng and the company. The appellants claimed that the instant petition was caught by the doctrine of res judicata by reason of the first petition.

Held, allowing the appeal with costs:

(1) Although s 218(1)(f) and s 181(1) are differently worded, the effect is very similar if not the same (see para 21). (2) When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties who should accept it as the truth (see para 23(b). ||Page 229>> (3) Res judicata is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them (see para 23(q). (4) Lim Hua’s first petition under the wider scope in s 218(1)(f) and (i) had been adjudged upon and the result was the recording of a consent order with no liberty to file afresh. In the first petition, there was nothing to prevent Lim Hua from including a prayer which he attempted to obtain in the instant petition. His presentation of the instant petition under the narrower scope in s 181 was based on the same facts and allegations as in the first petition, which might have been but were not brought forward in the first petition either deliberately, negligently or inadvertently. That clearly attracted the application of the doctrine of res judicata, more specifically where the consent order, which had not been set aside, was binding on Lim Hua and acted as an estoppel against him. The doctrine of res judicata was therefore applicable (see para 24). Perayu kedua (Phuar Kong Seng) dan responden merupakan pemegang-pemegang saham dan pengarah-pengarah kepada perayu pertama (’syarikat’). Kemudiannya, Lim Hua telah dilucutkan jawatan sebagai pengarah syarikat dan dia selanjutnya mengemukakan petisyen

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-158 (‘petisyen pertama’) di bawah s 218(1)(f) dan (i) Akta Syarikat 1965 (‘Akta’), memohon untuk penggulungan syarikat. Pada 19 Mei 2005, berikutan satu perintah persetujuan, petisyen pertama telah dibatalkan tanpa kebebasan untuk difailkan semula (‘perintah persetujuan’). Pada 20 Disember 2005, Lim Hua telah mengemukakan petisyen ini untuk dikembalikan jawatannya kepada lembaga pengarah syarikat di bawah s 181 Akta. Petisyen ini dan petisyen pertama adalah berdasarkan fakta dan tuduhan yang sama. Berikutan petisyen ini, Lim Hua memohon semula untuk mendapatkan perintah-perintah bagi pelantikan penerima-penerima dan pengarah-pengarah interim dan relief-relief sampingan, yang merupakan perkara subjek dalam rayuan yang diserahkan oleh Phuar Kong Seng dan syarikat. Perayu-perayu mendakwa bahawa petisyen ini tertakluk kepada doktrin res judicata disebabkan petisyen pertama.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dengan kos:

(1) Walaupun s 218(1) dan 181 disusun kata-katanya dengan berbeza, kesannya adalah sangat serupa biarpun tidak sama (lihat perenggan 21). (2) Apabila satu perkara antara dua pihak diputuskan oleh mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa kompeten, pihak-pihak tersebut dan privi-privi mereka tidak dibenarkan untuk membuat litigasi res judicata ||Page 230>> tersebut kerana penghakiman tersebut menjadi benar di antara pihak-pihak tersebut yang mana patut menerimanya sebagai apa yang benar (lihat perenggan 23(b). (3) Res judicata tidak terbatas kepada isu-isu di mana mahkamah perlu membuat penghakiman sahaja tetapi juga meliputi isu-isu dan fakta-fakta yang jelas adalah sebahagian daripada perkara subjek litigasi dan boleh dibangkitkan bahawa adalah menjadi salah guna proses mahkamah untuk membenarkan prosiding baru dimulakan berkaitan dengannya (lihat perenggan 23(q). (4) Petisyen pertama Lim Hua di bawah skop yang lebih luas s 218(1)(f) dan (i) telah diputuskan dan keputusannya adalah perintah persetujuan dicatat tanpa kebebasan untuk difailkan semula. Dalam petisyen pertama, tiada apa yang menghalang Lim Hua daripada memasukkan permohonan yang ingin diperolehi dalam petisyen ini. Pemfailan petisyen ini di bawah skop yang lebih sempit s 181 adalah berdasarkan fakta dan tuduhan yang sama dengan petisyen pertama, yang mungkin, akan tetapi tidak dikemukakan dalam petisyen pertama sama ada dengan sengaja, cuai atau dengan tidak sengaja. Ini jelas membuka ruang bagi permohonan doktrin res judicata, terutamanya di mana perintah persetujuan, yang tidak diketepikan, adalah mengikat ke atas Lim Hua dan bertindak sebagai estopel terhadapnya. Doktrin res judicata oleh itu terpakai (lihat perenggan 24). Notes For cases on oppression, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2010 Reissue) paras 496–543. For cases on res judicata, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 2630–2642. [12] The first question was whether the instant petition is caught by the doctrine of res judicata by reason of the first petition. ||Page 233>>

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-159

RES JUDICATA

[14] Learned counsel Mr Conrad Young (Mr CM Loo and Mr K Thavanesan with him) submitted that the instant petition is caught by the doctrine of res judicata as Lim Hua had previously presented the first petition based on the same facts and allegations and that the first petition had by consent been struck out on 19 May 2005 with no liberty to file afresh. They made reference, inter alia, to Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 at pp 198–199; Kinch v Walcott and others [1929] AC 482 at pp 493–494 and Kannappa Chettiar v Vellasamy Pillai [1977] 1 MLJ 255 at pp 255–256 (HC). [15] Lim Hua’s learned counsel Mr Harjinder Singh, assisted by Mr Hoo Lin Coln, argued that the doctorine of res judicata was inapplicable. [16] It is pertinent for us to examine the first petition and the instant petition presented by Lim Hua, in the light of the doctrine of res judicata. [23] In the light of these principles, we shall now consider the landmark decision in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd. First, the facts there revealed that a fixed loan of RM750,000 (‘the loan’) for housing development was granted by the finance company to the borrower, on the security of several pieces of land. On the borrower’s default, the finance company successfully obtained an order for sale from the land administrator. The borrower then filed an originating motion in the High Court against the finance company, seeking, inter alia, to set aside the order for sale and damages in connection with the failure of the borrower’s housing project. The High Court and the (then) Supreme Court dismissed the borrower’s originating motion and appeal respectively. Subsequently, the borrower brought a writ action against the finance company on the same ground as the originating motion. The finance company applied to strike out the borrower’s statement of claim on a plea of res judicata but it was dismissed. The finance company’s appeal was allowed by the (then) Supreme Court. Peh Swee Chin SCJ (as he then was) gave a comprehensive and scholarly account of the doctrine of res judicata, ||Page 236>> the relevant principles of which we gratefully extract and apply as follows:

(a) Res judicata simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. (b) When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties who should accept it as the truth — res judicata pro veritate accipitur. (c) The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. (d) It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. (e) Both the aforesaid maxims in (c) and (d) are the rationale for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy. (f) Since a res judicata creates an estoppel per rem judicatum, the doctrine of res judicata is really the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum which archaically was E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-160 described as estoppel by record. (g) The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time: per Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at p 115; the ‘point’ should actually include causes of action, or all causes of action which one of the two parties has against the other, based on, or substantially on the same facts or issues, and not just all issues of law or of fact that are in dispute between the parties. (h) One of the exceptional special cases is the effect of a default judgment in subsequent proceedings between the same parties because a default judgment is different from a final judgment on the merits. (i) The well known relevancy of a previous judgment in barring a second suit is seen in s 40 of the Evidence Act 1950, which provides as follows:

||Page 237>> (j) There are in fact two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum, the first relates to cause of action estoppel and the second, to issue estoppel, which is a development from the first. (k) The cause of action estoppel arises when rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court for a particular remedy are determined in a final judgment and such right of action ie cause of action, merges into the final judgment; in layman’s language, the cause of action has turned into the final judgment. The cause of action may not be relitigated between the same parties because it is res judicata. (l) In order to prevent a multiplicity of actions and also in order to protect the underlying rationale of estoppel per rem judicatum and not to act against them, such estoppel of cause of action has been extended to all other causes of action (based on the same facts or issues) which should have been litigated or asserted in the original earlier action resulting in the final judgment, and which were not, either deliberately or due to inadvertence; see Public Trustee v Kenward [1967] 2 All ER 870; [1967] 1 WLR 1062; Conquer v Boot [1928] 2 KB 336; Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 62 ALJR 324 and LE Walwin & Partners Ltd v West Sussex County Council [1975] 3 All ER 604. (m) Issue estoppel literally means simply an issue which a party is estopped from raising in a subsequent proceedings. However, in law, issue estoppel means a lot more, ie that neither of the same parties or their privies in a subsequent proceeding is entitled to challenge the correctness of the decision of a previous final judgment in which they, or their privies, were parties; neither of such parties will be allowed to adduce evidence or advance any argument to contradict such decision. (n) Issue estoppel prevents contradiction of a previous determination, whereas cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of the cause of action: per Peter Gibson J in Lawlor v Gray [1984] 3 All ER 345 at p 350.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-161 (o) In preventing such contradiction of the previous judgment, one school of thought holds that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary view that such issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata, ie the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. (p) Our Federal Court prefers the aforesaid contrary view, which represents a correct, even though broader, approach to the scope of issue estoppel ||Page 238>> and is warranted by the weight of authorities being completely in accord or resonant with the rationale behind the doctrine of res judicata, particularly the question of public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation. (q) Res judicata for this purpose is therefore not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them: per Somervell LJ in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 at p 257 and quoted with approval in the Privy Council in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd and another [1975] AC 581; [1975] 2 WLR 690 (see also SCF Finance Co Ltd v Masri and another (No 3) [1987] QB 1028; [1987] 1 All ER 194 (CA); Bell v Holmes [1956] 3 All ER 449; [1956] 1 WLR 1359 and Hoystead and others v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155. (r) The words ‘exercising reasonable diligence’ in Henderson: (i) necessitate a mental exercise of making a finding as to whether there was diligence, or reasonable diligence, in the earlier failure to bring in at the previous trial the issues which should have been brought in the earlier action and which were not, or in asserting all other causes of action arising out of the same facts in the earlier action and which were not; (ii) ought to be understood as a gentle rebuke for the failure aforesaid despite the fact that the party had the opportunity of bringing forward all such issues or asserting all such causes of action; and (iii) are not meant to impose a precondition for applying the doctrine of res judicata, but are meant to say that the non-bringing of the issues would count in any event irrespective of whether the failure was or was not deliberate or due to inadvertence or negligence. (s) The court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action by applying the doctrine of res judicata against a party, even if it has not been pleaded, as estoppel is based on a question of public policy, and there should be finality in litigation: Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 at p 498 per Abdoolcader SCJ (as he then was). See also Chong Kew v Leow Lay & Ors [2008] 6 E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-162 MLJ 781 at pp 787–790 (CA). [24] Reverting to the mainstream of this appeal, it is noteworthy that Lim Hua’s first petition under the wider scope in s 218(1)(f) and (i) has been adjudged upon and the result was the recording of a consent order with no liberty to file afresh. In the first petition, there was nothing to prevent Lim Hua from including a prayer which he attempted to obtain in the instant petition. His presentation of the instant petition under the narrower scope in s 181 was based on the same facts and allegations as in the first petition, which might have been but were not brought forward in the first petition either deliberately, negligently or inadvertently. That clearly attracts the application of the doctrine of res judicata, more specifically where the consent order, which has not been set aside, is binding on Lim Hua and acts as an estoppel against him. See eg Kinch v Walcott and others at p 482 and applied by Mohamed Azmi J (later FCJ) in Kannappa Chettiar at p 256. A fortiori, when we take into consideration the broader approach set out in para [23] (o) and (p) above, there is absolutely no doubt that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable. Civil Procedure — Appeal — Striking out — Application to strike out writ of summons and statement of claim allowed — Appeal against decision — Whether plaintiffs estopped from commencing instant writ action against defendant by reason of res judicata in light of first plaintiff’s earlier originating summons action against defendant — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19 On 22 November 2007, the first plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant vide an originating summons. In his originating summons action the first plaintiff claimed that he was the first person to organise a local beauty competition called Miss Malaysia Tourism since 1994 and that since 1994 the trademark titles of ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ and ‘Miss Tourism International’ (‘the trademark titles’) belonged to him, having been used every year in competitions organised by the first plaintiff. The first plaintiff therefore sought to restrain the defendant from using the titles ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ and ‘Miss Tourism International’ in a competition organised by the defendant and scheduled to be held on 22 November 2007. This originating summons action against the defendant was dismissed with costs on 7 December 2007. Then on 28 December 2007, the first plaintiff commenced the present writ action against the defendant. In this writ action the second plaintiff, a company owned by the first plaintiff to organise the Miss Malaysia Tourism and Miss Tourism International beauty pageants was brought in by the first plaintiff as a nominal co-plaintiff. In his statement of claim the first plaintiff again claimed that he had been using the trademarks ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ and ‘Miss Tourism International’ since 1994; that he had organised beauty pageants since 1994 to 2005/2006; that the trademarks ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ and ‘Miss Tourism International’ belonged to him and that the defendant in holding the Miss Tourism Pageant 2007 had committed an act of passing off the first plaintiff’s trademark titles. The defendant applied to strike out the plaintiffs’ writ of summons and statement of claim pursuant to O 18 r 19 (1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 on the grounds that the plaintiffs were estopped from commencing the instant writ action against the defendant by reason of res judicata in the light of the first plaintiff’s originating summons action against the defendant; and that the first plaintiff did not have exclusive right to the usage of the words ‘Miss Malaysia’, ‘Tourism’ and ‘International’. In opposing the O 18 r 19 application the plaintiffs submitted that in the originating summons application the first plaintiff had prayed for injunctions but that in the writ action, which contained additional prayers, the plaintiffs had sought declarations

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-163 pertaining to the ownership of the titles. The application to strike out was heard by the same High Court judge who heard the originating summons action. The judge held that the principle of res judicata applied and that the plaintiffs were stopped from instituting the present writ action which was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court. The judge also held that the first plaintiff could and should have sought the declarations pertaining to the ownership of the titles in his earlier originating summons action. This was the plaintiffs’ appeal against that decision. The plaintiffs submitted that the injunction application vide the originating summons was interlocutory in nature and that the decision of the court in that action was also interlocutory. As such the plaintiffs argued that the principle of res judicata did not apply to the present writ action.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) The basic position taken by the plaintiffs in the present writ action was the same as that taken by the first plaintiff in the previous originating summons ie that the trademark titles belong to him. The averments in the affidavit supporting the earlier originating summons action and the averments in the statement of claim of the present writ action are substantially the same. As such, the issues pertaining to the ownership of titles could have been raised by the first plaintiff in the earlier originating summons proceeding and they ought to have been so raised. By reason of res judicata they could no longer be raised by the plaintiffs in the present writ action. Thus, the present writ action was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court on this ground alone and there is no need to consider the second ground advanced by the defendant in his O 18 r 19 application (see paras 4 & 14). (2) The plaintiffs’ submission that the decision of the court in the originating summons action was interlocutory in nature and that as such the principle of res judicata did not apply to the present writ action, cannot be factually true or legally right. As originating summons is an originating process like a writ action and could not be utilised as an interlocutory application. Further, there was nothing in the prayers that the injunction sought in the originating summons action was interlocutory in nature pending disposal of a main action (see paras 19–20). (3) The fact that the first plaintiff had filed a summons in chambers application, on the same day as the originating summons action, wherein he applied for the same injunctions as in the originating summons action showed that the summons in chambers was an interlocutory application. As such the first plaintiff could not have intended the originating summons to be interlocutory as well (see para 21). Pada 22 November 2007, plaintif pertama telah memulakan tindakan terhadap defendan melalui saman pemula. Dalam saman pemulanya plaintif pertama mendakwa bahawa dialah orang pertama yang menganjurkan pertandingan ratu cantik tempatan dipanggil Miss Malaysia Tourism sejak tahun 1994 dan bahawa sejak tahun 1994 gelaran-gelaran tanda dagangan ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ dan ‘Miss Tourism International’ (‘gelaran tanda dagangan tersebut’) adalah miliknya kerana telah menggunakannya setiap tahun dalam pertandingan-pertandingan yang dianjurkan oleh plaintif pertama. Plaintif pertama dengan itu memohon untuk menyekat defendan daripada menggunakan gelaran-gelaran ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ dan ‘Miss Tourism International’ dalam pertandingan yang dianjurkan oleh defendan dan dijadualkan untuk E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-164 diadakan pada 22 November 2007. Tindakan saman pemula ini terhadap defendan telah ditolak dengan kos pada 7 Disember 2007. Maka pada 28 Disember 2007, plaintif pertama telah memulakan tindakan writ ini terhadap defendan. Dalam tindakan writ ini plaintif kedua, sebuah syarikat yang dimiliki oleh plaintif pertama untuk menganjurkan pertandingan ratu cantik Miss Malaysia Tourism dan Miss Tourism International telah dimasukkan oleh plaintif pertama sebagai plaintif nominal bersama. Dalam penyataan tuntutan plaintif pertama sekali lagi mendakwa bahawa dia telah menggunakan tanda dagangan ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ dan ‘Miss Tourism International’ sejak tahun 1994; bahawa dia telah menganjurkan pertandingan ratu cantik tersebut sejak tahun 1994 hingga tahun 2005/2006; bahawa tanda dagangan ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ dan ‘Miss Tourism International’ adalah miliknya dan bahawa defendan yang mengadakan Miss Tourism Pageant 2007 telah melakukan tindakan kelirupaan gelaran tanda dagangan plaintif pertama. Defendan telah memohon untuk membatalkan writ saman dan penyataan tuntutan plaintif-plaintif menurut A 18 k 19(1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 atas alasan-alasan bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah diestop daripada memulakan tindakan writ ini terhadap defendan oleh sebab res judicata berdasarkan tindakan saman pemula plaintif pertama terhadap defendan; dan bahawa plaintif pertama tidak mempunyai hak eksklusif terhadap penggunaan perkataan-perkataan ‘Miss Malaysia’, ‘Tourism’ dan ‘International’. Dalam membantah permohonan A 18 k 19 plaintif-plaintif berhujah bahawa dalam permohonan saman pemula itu plaintif pertama telah memohon untuk injunksi-injunksi tetapi dalam tindakan writ, yang mengandungi permohonan tambahan, plaintif-plaintif telah memohon deklarasi berkaitan pemilikan gelaran-gelaran tersebut. Permohonan pembatalan itu telah didengar oleh hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang sama mendengar tindakan saman pemula. Hakim itu telah memutuskan bahawa prinsip-prinsip res judicata terpakai dan bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah dihalang daripada memulakan tindakan writ ini yang remeh, menyusahkan dan merupakan penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. Hakim itu juga telah memutuskan bahawa plaintif pertama boleh dan patut memohon deklarasi-deklarasi berkaitan pemilikan gelaran-gelaran tersebut dalam tindakan saman pemula yang lebih dahulu. Ini adalah rayuan plaintif-plaintif terhadap keputusan tersebut. Plaintif-plaintif telah berhujah bahawa permohonan injunksi melalui saman pemula bersifat interlokutori dan bahawa keputusan mahkamah dalam tindakan tersebut adalah juga interlokutori. Oleh itu plaintif-plaintif berhujah bahawa prinsip-prinsip res judicata tidak terpakai dalam tindakan writ ini.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan:

(1) Kedudukan asas yang diambil oleh plaintif-plaintif dalam tindakan writ ini adalah sama dengan yang telah diambil oleh plaintif pertama dalam saman pemula sebelum ini iaitu bahawa gelaran-gelaran tanda dagangan adalah miliknya. Penegasan-penegasan dalam afidavit yang menyokong tindakan saman pemula yang lebih dahulu itu dengan penegasan-penegasan dalam penyataan tuntutan kepada tindakan writ ini adalah sama. Oleh itu, isu-isu berkaitan pemilikan gelaran-gelaran mungkin boleh ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama dalam prosiding saman pemula sebelum itu dan ia patut telah dibangkitkan. Oleh sebab res judicata ia tidak lagi dibangkitkan oleh plaintif-plaintif dalam tindakan writ ini. Dengan itu, tindakan writ ini adalah remeh, menyusahkan dan satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah atas alasan ini sahaja dan tiada keperluan untuk mempertimbangkan alasan kedua yang dikemukakan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-165 oleh defendan dalam permohonannya di bawah A 18 k 19 (lihat perenggan 4 & 14). (2) Hujahan plaintif-plaintif bahawa keputusan mahkamah dalam tindakan saman pemula bersifat interlokutori dan bahawa dengan itu prinsip res judicata tidak terpakai kepada tindakan writ ini, tidak benar secara faktual atau sebenarnya sah. Oleh sebab saman pemula adalah proses pemula seperti tindakan writ dan tidak boleh digunakan sebagai permohonan interlokutori. Bahkan tiada apa-apa dalam permohonan bahawa injunksi yang dipohon dalam tindakan saman pemula bersifat interlokutori sementara menunggu tindakan utama selesai (lihat perenggan 19–20). (3) Hakikat bahawa plaintif pertama telah memfailkan permohonan saman dalam kamar, pada hari yang sama dengan tindakan saman pemula, di mana dia memohon untuk injunksi-injunksi yang sama seperti dalam tindakan saman pemula bahawa saman dalam kamar itu adalah permohonan interlokutori. Oleh itu plaintif pertama tidak mungkin berniat yang saman pemula itu bersifat interlokutori juga (lihat perenggan 21).

(a) that the plaintiffs were estopped from commencing the present writ action against the defendant by reason of the principle of res judicata in the light of the first plaintiff’s previous originating summons action against the defendant; and (b) that the first plaintiff’s application for the registration of the title ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism' and ‘Miss Tourism International’, which has been granted by the Intellectual Property Corporation of Malaysia (Perbadanan Harta Intelek Malaysia) to the first plaintiff, was without exclusive right to the usage of the words ‘Miss Malaysia’, ‘Tourism’ and ‘International’.

We have dismissed the appeal on 13 August 2009. We now give our grounds. We agree with the learned High Court judge that, in the light of the first plaintiff’s earlier originating summons action filed in the High Court (Commercial Division) of Kuala Lumpur, which had been heard and disposed of by the same learned judge, the principle of res judicata applies, and hence the plaintiffs are estopped from instituting the present writ action against the defendant; and that the present writ action is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of court. We consider that on this ground alone it is sufficient for us to dispose of this appeal, and that there is no need for us to consider the second ground advanced by the defendant in his O 18 r 19 application. We shall now elaborate our grounds. The present writ action was filed on 28 December 2007. According to para 2 of the statement of claim, the second plaintiff is a company ‘owned by the First Plaintiff to organize the Miss Malaysia Tourism, Miss Malaysia Pageant and Miss Tourism International beauty pageants’. It is not clear from the statement of claim as to the second plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant. It would appear that in the present writ action the second plaintiff has been brought in by the first plaintiff merely as a nominal co-plaintiff. The second plaintiff in the present writ action is not a party in the previous originating summons action. Earlier on, the first plaintiff had on 22 November 2007 commenced in the High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division) an action against the defendant vide an Originating Summons No D5-(IP)-24–348 of 2007. By this originating summons action, the first plaintiff

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-166 in the present writ action (being the sole plaintiff in the originating summons action) sought to restrain the defendant in the present writ action (being the sole defendant in the originating summons action) from using the titles ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ and ‘Miss Tourism International’ in a competition organised by the defendant and scheduled to be held on 22 November 2007. The alleged cause of action in the originating summons action is grounded on the following claims. The first plaintiff, in his originating summons action, claims that he is the first person to organise a local beauty competition called Miss Malaysia Tourism and had successfully organised the Miss Malaysia Tourism beauty competition since 1994. The first plaintiff further claims that since 1994 the trademark titles of Miss Malaysia Tourism and Miss Tourism International belonged to him; that these titles have been used and have been crowned to the winners of local and international beauty pageant competitions organised by him; that since then the titles of Miss Malaysia Tourism and Miss Tourism International have been used every year in competitions organised by the first plaintiff; and that the title Miss Tourism International has been franchised by him to organisers of beauty pageants in more than 60 countries. This originating summons action was heard by the same learned judge who has now heard and ruled on the respondent’s/defendant’s O 18 r 19 application (the subject-matter of the present appeal). The learned judge had dismissed the originating summons action of the first plaintiff with costs on 7 December 2007. Now, upon comparing the prayers in the statement of claim of the present writ action with the prayers in the previous originating summons action, we note that the prayers are substantially the same. The prayers in the present writ action read:

Of course, we do note that in the statement of claim of the present writ action there are additional prayers, namely, prayers (a) and (b) seeking declarations as to the ownership of the titles (Miss Malaysia Tourism and Miss Tourism International). But the subject matter of these prayers seeking the declarations are the same as those of the subsequent two prayers (ie prayers (c) and (d) seeking the injunctions, namely, the titles Miss Malaysia Tourism and Miss Tourism International. We are in agreement with the learned High Court judge that the first plaintiff could and should have sought these declarations pertaining to the ownership of the titles in his earlier originating summons action. However, it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs that the issue pertaining to ownership of the titles (Miss Tourism Malaysia and Miss Tourism International) could not have been ventilated at the originating summons action as the relief sought there was merely for an injunction. But the pertinent question is this: why were the prayers for declarations (which are now sought in the present writ action) not sought in the earlier originating summons action? After all the basic position taken by the first plaintiff in the present writ action is the same as that taken by him in the previous originating summons action: that the titles belong to him. When the issues could have been raised in the earlier originating summons proceeding, they ought to have been so raised by the first plaintiff in that earlier proceeding. By reason of the principle of res judicata the first plaintiff could no longer raise the issues now in the present writ action. The principle is clearly laid down in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313 where Wigram VC said (at p 319):

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-167 [Where] a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.

This principle have been applied from time to time by our courts (see for example Government of Malaysia v Dato Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74 , Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Prorak Sdn Bhd & Anor [2000] 1 MLJ 479; [2000] 1 CLJ 553 and Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783 ). Further, we observe that the averments in the supporting affidavit of the previous originating summons action and the averments in the statement of claim of the present writ action are substantially the same. The averments relate to the same facts. The gist of the contents of the affidavit and the statement of claim can be summarised as follows: that the first plaintiff has been using the trademarks ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ and ‘Miss Tourism International’ since 1994; that he has organised local and international beauty pageants since 1994–2005/2006; that the trademarks ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ and ‘Miss Tourism International’ belong to the first plaintiff; and that the title ‘Miss Tourism International’ has been franchised by him to organisers of beauty pageants in more than 60 countries. The averments in the affidavit and the statement of claim raise the same issues. They refer to the usage of the title of Miss Tourism Malaysia by the defendant without the first plaintiff’s permission, as discovered by the first plaintiff in an advertisement in the 29 June 2005 issue of The Star newspaper showing one Goey Yuthing wearing a sash carrying the words ‘Miss Tourism Malaysia’. The averments in the affidavit and statement of claim also refer to the holding of the Miss Tourism Pageant 2007 by the defendant commencing 22 November 2007 with the grand finals on 7 December 2007; and the averments make the allegation that the defendant in holding the event had committed an act of passing off the first plaintiff’s trademark titles of ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ and ‘Miss Tourism International’. In opposing the defendant's O 18 r 19 application, the plaintiffs’ counsel submitted that the injunction application vide the originating summons action is ‘interlocutory’ in nature, and that the application ‘was merely to preserve the status quo until the case can be tried’ (to quote the words of learned counsel). Since the originating summons was ‘interlocutory’ in nature, therefore, the decision of the court in the originating summons action was also ‘interlocutory’ in nature. And therefore the principle of res judicata does not apply to the present writ action. With respect, this argument cannot be factually true or legally right. Firstly, an originating summons is an originating process like a writ action or an originating motion or a petition; and it could not be utilised as an interlocutory application. It is not an interlocutory application like a summons in chambers or a notice of motion. Secondly, we note that there is nothing in the prayers of the originating summons that states that the injunction sought was interlocutory in nature pending disposal of a main action. Indeed neither the prayers nor the supporting affidavit make any mention of a pending action. E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-168 It could not have been that the plaintiffs, when filing the originating summons, had in mind their present writ action. This is because the present writ action was not in existence yet at the time of the filing of the originating summons action. The originating summons was filed on 22 November 2007 whereas the present writ action was only filed on 28 December 2007, that is to say filed more than a month later. In any event, to reiterate what has been said earlier, the originating summons makes no mention of any pending or intended writ action. What the first plaintiff had in mind in filing the earlier originating summons action was merely to restrain the defendant from using the title Miss Malaysia Tourism and Miss Tourism International in the Miss Tourism Pageant 2007 organised by the defendant and scheduled to be held on 22 November 2007. Hence, with respect, it is misleading for learned counsel for the plaintiffs to say in his written submission that the originating summons was ‘to preserve the status quo until the case can be tried’. What ‘case’ to ‘be tried’ is counsel having in mind? This is not made clear either in the originating summons or in the supporting affidavit or in the submissions. Thirdly, the first plaintiff, after having filed the originating summons, had on the very same day filed a summons in chambers. The summons in chambers unfortunately is not in the appeal record. However, according to the notes of proceedings and the grounds of judgment of the learned judge, the summons in chambers contained the same prayer as in the originating summons (that is to restrain the defendant from using the titles ‘Miss Malaysia Tourism’ and ‘Miss Tourism International’ in the Miss Tourism Pageant 2007). Clearly the summons in chambers was meant to seek an interlocutory injunction — an interlocutory injunction pending the hearing of the originating summons action. If this was — and, indeed, it must be so since a summons in chambers is an interlocutory application — then the first plaintiff could not have intended the originating summons to be interlocutory in nature as well. Legally and procedurally it does not make sense for both the main action (ie the originating summons) and the summons in chambers to be interlocutory in nature. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issues, similarity of — Prayers in striking out application repeated in setting aside application — Judge in setting aside application dismissing similar prayers on basis of similarity and/or duplicity — Prayers not determined or adjudicated upon — Whether such prayers res judicata at subsequent hearing of striking out application — Whether striking out application ought to be dismissed on grounds of res judicata The defendant’s law firm represented the plaintiff and two others in an earlier suit against their business associates. In that earlier suit, the said firm successfully obtained for the plaintiffs an ad interim injunction on an ex parte basis. However, at the inter partes hearing, the High Court refused to continue the injunction. The plaintiff thus filed the instant suit against the defendant for, inter alia, a refund of the retainer fee paid and to recover the amounts claimed against the business associates in the earlier suit. The plaintiff pleaded that there was an oral contract that the defendant would refund the retainer fee of RM200,000 if he was unsuccessful in obtaining the interlocutory injunction. After the plaintiff’s writ was served on the defendant, the defendant applied to strike out the suit (encl 7). However, before encl 7 was heard, the plaintiff entered default judgment against the defendant for failure to file the defence. The defendant thus filed an application to set aside the default judgment (encl 29). In encl 29, the defendant repeated the prayers made in encl 7. When encl 29 came up for hearing the judicial commissioner ('JC') allowed the defendant to set aside the default judgment but dismissed the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-169 similar prayers for striking out as made in encl 7. At the subsequent hearing of encl 7 the plaintiff argued that the application was res judicata because the JC had dismissed the similar prayers when determining encl 29.

Held, allowing the defendant’s application with costs:

(1) The JC’s judgment in the setting aside application (encl 29) led to the irresistible conclusion that the prayers sought in the instant striking out application (encl 7) were not adjudicated. The striking out prayers were not adjudged in the setting aside proceedings. Even if it was argued that the striking out prayers properly belonged to the setting aside application (encl 29), the court would dismiss such argument since the issues in a setting aside application are: (i) whether a judgment is irregular; and (ii) if irregular, whether the judgment discloses a defence on the merits. In the instant case, there was no justification for the striking out application (encl 7) to be dismissed on the basis of res judicata (see paras 7–8). (2) The words of the written retainer were categorical and unequivocal in respect of the immediate and outright entitlement of the defendant’s legal firm to the fee of RM200,000. The retainer made it clear that such fee was not contingent on the outcome of the litigation. The plaintiff’s oral contract contravened s 15 of the Advocates Ordinance of Sarawak that, inter alia, required agreements for fees to be in writing in order to be valid, as evidenced by the written retainer in the instant case. Further, s 92(d) of the Evidence Act 1950 barred the admission of oral evidence to contradict an agreement required by law to be in writing. On this ground alone, the plaintiff’s claim should be struck out (see para 12). (3) The alleged oral agreement was champertous, illegal and against public policy. The plaintiff thus could not maintain its action. It was pointless to allow the plaintiff’s claim to proceed to full trial as the plaintiff would not be able to enforce the oral collateral agreement, even if proved (see para 14); Otech Pakistan Pvt Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd and another [2006] SGCA 46 [2007] 1 SLR 989 followed; In re Attorney and Solicitor Act, 1870 (1875) 1 Ch D 573 followed; Mokhtar Ngah & Co lwn Yee Seng Plantations Sdn Bhd [2009] 1 LNS 823 referred; Quill Construction Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng @ Tan Tien Chi & Anor [2003] 6 MLJ 279 referred. (4) Although the plaintiff’s inter partes application to continue its injunction against its former business associates had been dismissed, its suit against them was still pending. Thus the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant for the amounts owing by its former business associates was premature and speculative (see para 15). Firma guaman defendan mewakili plaintif dan dua yang lain di dalam guaman terdahulu terhadap rakan seniaga mereka. Di dalam guaman terdahulu tersebut, firma tersebut berjaya memperoleh injunksi ad interim bagi plaintif atas dasar ex parte. Walau bagaimanapun, pada pendengaran inter partes, Mahkamah Tinggi menolak untuk meneruskan dengan injunksi tersebut. Plaintif oleh itu memfailkan guaman ini terhadap defendan untuk, antara lain, pemulangan fi retainer yang dibayar dan untuk mendapatkan semula jumlah yang dituntut terhadap rakan seniaga di dalam guaman terdahulu. Plaintif merayu bahawa tidak ada kontrak lisan bahawa defendan akan memulangkan fi retainer sebanyak RM200,000 jika dia berjaya memperoleh injunksi interlokutori. Selepas writ plaintif diserahkan kepada defendan, defendan E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-170 memohon untuk membatalkan guaman tersebut (lampiran 7). Walau bagaimanapun, sebelum lampiran 7 didengar, plaintif memasukkan penghakiman ingkar terhadap defendan atas kegagalan memfailkan pembelaan. Defendan oleh itu memfailkan permohonan untuk mengetepikan penghakiman ingkar tersebut (lampiran 29). Di dalam lampiran 29, defendan mengulangi permohonan yang dibuat di dalam lampiran 7. Apabila lampiran 29 didengar pesuruhjaya kehakiman ('PK') membenarkan defendan mengetepikan penghakiman ingkar tersebut tetapi menolak permohonan yang serupa untuk pembatalan seperti yang dibuat di dalam lampiran 7. Pada perbicaraan lampiran 7, plaintif menghujah bahawa permohonan tersebut adalah res judicata kerana PK telah menolak permohonan serupa apabila memutuskan lampiran 29.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan defendan dengan kos:

(1) Penghakiman PK dalam permohonan mengetepikan (lampiran 29) membawa kepada kesimpulan tidak boleh sangkal bahawa permohonan yang dipohon di dalam permohonan pembatalan ini (lampiran 7) tidak dibicarakan. Permohonan untuk pembatalan juga tidak dibicarakan di dalam prosiding pengetepian. Walaupun ia dihujahkan bahawa permohonan pembatalan adalah di bawah permohonan pengetepian (lampiran 29), mahkamah akan menolak hujahan sedemikian kerana isu-isu di dalam permohonan pengetepian adalah: (i) sama ada penghakiman adalah tidak cacat; dan (ii) jika cacat, sama ada penghakiman tersebut mendedahkan pembelaan atas merit. Di dalam kes ini, tidak ada justifikasi untuk permohonan pembatalan (lampiran 7) ditolak atas dasar res judicata (lihat perenggan 7–8). (2) Perkataan-perkataan retainer bertulis adalah mutlak dan jelas berkaitan dengan hak terus dan nyata firma guaman defendan kepada fi RM200,000. Retainer menjadikannya jelas bahawa fi sedemikian bukan bergantung kepada keputusan litigasi tersebut. Kontrak lisan plaintif bertentangan s 15 Ordinan Peguam Bela (Sarawak) (Cap 110) bahawa, antara lain, memerlukan perjanjian untuk fi dibuat dalam bentuk bertulis untuk menjadikannya sah, seperti yang dibuktikan oleh retainer bertulis di dalam kes ini. Selanjutnya, s 92(d) Akta Keterangan 1950 dihadkan oleh kebolehterimaan keterangan lisan untuk menyangkal perjanjian yang diperlukan oleh undang-undang untuk ditulis. Atas alasan ini sahaja, tuntutan plaintif harus dibatalkan (lihat perenggan 12). (3) Perjanjian lisan yang didakwa adalah ‘champertous’, tidak sah dan bertentangan dengan polisi awam. Plaintif oleh itu tidak boleh mengekalkan tindakan ini. Adalah tidak wajar untuk membenarkan tuntutan plaintif diteruskan ke perbicaraan penuh kerana plaintif tidak akan boleh melaksanakan perjanjian kolateral lisan, walaupun dibuktikan (lihat perenggan 14); Otech Pakistan Pvt Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd and another [2006] SGCA 46 [2007] 1 SLR 9 diikut; In re Attorney and Solicitor Act, 1870 (1875) Ch D 573 diikut; Mokhtar Ngah & Co v Yee Seng Plantations Sdn Bhd [2009] 1 LNS 823 dirujuk; Quill Construction Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng @ Tan Tien Chi & Anor [2003] 6 MLJ 279 dirujuk. (4) Walaupun permohonan inter partes plaintif untuk meneruskan injunksi terhadap rakan seniaga lamanya telah pun ditolak, guamannya terhadap mereka masih menunggu perbicaraan. Oleh itu tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan untuk jumlah yang terhutang

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-171 oleh rakan seniaga lamanya adalah pramatang dan spekulatif (lihat perenggan 15).

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the striking out application (encl 7) should not be dismissed outright because of the principle of res judicata. The res judicata argument arose in this way. After the writ was served by the plaintiff, the defendant filed this application to strike out the claim. Before the application was heard, the plaintiff entered default judgment against the defendant for failure to file the statement of defence. The defendant filed an application (encl 29) to set aside the judgment in default. The defendant repeated the prayers and grounds for striking out the writ of summons and statement of claim in the setting aside application. As the res judicata argument is based on the decision of the learned judicial commissioner, I find it necessary to reproduce the relevant excerpts from her written ruling. The learned judicial commissioner made the following observation at the outset:

Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the instant striking out application is res judicata because of the above holding of the learned judicial commissioner. Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah and Sarawak) in the oft-quoted case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783 distilled the law on the principle of res judicata as follows:

The excerpts that I cited from the judgment of the learned judicial commissioner leads to the irresistible conclusion that the prayers sought in this application were not adjudicated. She clearly said that the defendant should not have included the striking out prayer in the application for setting aside judgment in default as the same had been included in the instant application. She found that this amounted to duplicity of proceedings. Therefore, she dismissed the striking out prayer. In view of her observation that this enclosure would be heard in due course and her direction to fix it for hearing before me after she set aside the judgment in default, it is as plain as pike staff that she declined to adjudicate on the striking out prayer. The striking out prayer was therefore not adjudged in that proceeding. In the premises, there is no justification for the argument that the matter is res judicata. Even if the defendant had submitted that the matter is res judicata, because it properly belonged to the subject matter of the setting aside application, I would have no hesitation in dismissing this argument. The issues in a setting aside application are whether:

Therefore, it cannot be argued that the striking out prayer of the defendant 'belonged' to the setting aside application. In the premises, the submission of counsel for the plaintiff that the instant application should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata is without merit. Prosedur Sivil — Estopel — Res judicata — Kemalangan jalan raya — Sama ada responden membangkitkan isu yang telah dilitigasikan — Sama ada res judicata tidak timbul kerana kes lebih awal tidak mempertimbangkan isu kerugian total

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-172 Responden/plaintif selaku pentadbir harta pusaka si mati, telah menuntut terhadap perayu/defendan ganti rugi berpunca daripada suatu kemalangan jalan raya yang membabitkan kenderaan si mati dan motokar perayu. Tindakan yang lebih awal oleh pihak responden bagi pihak dirinya dan tanggungan si mati akibat kemalangan yang sama telah difailkan melalui Saman No 53–33 Tahun 1994 terhadap perayu yang sama. Kes terbabit telah dibicarakan sepenuhnya dan perayu telah didapati bertanggungan 100%. Bagi kes yang dirayukan ini, hakim bicara telah memberikan ganti rugi khas sebanyak RM25,000 untuk ‘total loss’ bagi kenderaan si mati dan RM1,500 bagi kos mengambil surat kuasa. Perayu telah merayu berdasarkan empat isu ||Page 404>> utama seperti berikut: (i) bahawa oleh sebab tuntutan di sini adalah sama dengan tuntutan di dalam kes 53–33 Tahun 1994, wujudnya isu res judicata; (ii) bahawa pihak insurans bagi kenderaan motor van si mati iaitu Sime Axa Assurance telah membuat bayaran kepada pemilik kenderaan tersebut iaitu Mayban Finance dan oleh itu responden tidak berhak membuat tuntutan di dalam kes ini; (iii) isu subrogasi; dan (iv) bahawa Akta Sewa Beli 1967 terpakai dalam tuntutan ini.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dengan kos:

(1) Isu res judicata yang dibangkitkan oleh pihak perayu tidak timbul di dalam tuntutan responden ini. Hakim yang mengendalikan kes Saman No 53–33 Tahun 1994, tidak memberikan pertimbangan ke atas isu sama ada untuk membenarkan atau tidak tuntutan ganti rugi khas atas kehilangan ‘total loss’ kenderaan si mati. Tuntutan responden bagi ganti rugi berkenaan telah ditarik balik pada peringkat awal lagi. Oleh itu, prinsip res judicata tidak boleh diguna pakai untuk menghalang responden daripada mengemukakan tuntutannya. Prinsip res judicata adalah terpakai bila mana sesuatu isu yang dibawa ke hadapan mahkamah telah pun diputuskan atau dihakimi sepenuhnya oleh hakim bicara setelah mendengar dan menimbang akan penghujahan-penghujahan berserta nas undang-undang dan autoriti-autoriti kes di atas isu terbabit oleh kedua-dua belah pihak (lihat perenggan 18); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 dan Tong Lee Hua v Lee Yoke San [1981] 1 MLJ 54 diikut. (2) Pihak insurans responden iaitu Sime Axa Assurance telah menjelaskan jumlah kerugian yang dialami akibat ‘total loss’ motor van terbabit kepada Mayban Finance selaku pemilik di bawah perjanjian jual beli dan pada masa yang sama, hak untuk mendakwa oleh Mayban Finance telah diserahkan kepada Sime Axa Assurance di bawah doktrin subrogasi. Maka, doktrin subrogasi terpakai di dalam tindakan ini dan oleh sebab tiada arahan daripada pihak insurans untuk responden mendapatkan kembali jumlah wang yang telah dibayar, responden tidak layak untuk memfailkan tuntutan ini (lihat perenggan 26). (3) Kos mengambil surat kuasa sebanyak RM1,500 tidak harus dibenarkan kerana tiada bukti dikemukakan oleh responden bagi menunjukkan bahawa beliau telah mengeluarkan perbelanjaan tersebut untuk pengambilan surat kuasa (lihat perenggan 28). (4) Peruntukan di bawah Akta Sewa Beli 1967 masih terpakai bagi menentukan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-173 hak milik sebenar kenderaan si mati tersebut memandangkan ia masih lagi di dalam perjanjian sewa beli dengan ||Page 405>> pihak bank. Mahkamah tidak boleh mengenepikan peruntukan Akta ini hanya semata-mata tuntutan yang dibuat adalah di bawah tort yang dikatakan tidak melibatkan isu hak milik. Selagi kenderaan itu masih lagi di bawah pembiayaan pihak bank, isu hak milik sebenar masih lagi relevan dan penting. Oleh itu, peruntukan di bawah Akta Sewa Beli 1967 adalah terpakai dalam keadaan ini (lihat perenggan 29). The respondent/plaintiff as the administrator of the deceased’s estate claimed against the appellant/defendant for damages arising from a road accident involving the deceased’s vehicle and the appellant’s car. An earlier action by the respondent on behalf of himself and the deceased’s dependant due to the same accident was filed by way of Summons No 53–33 of 1994 against the same appellant. The said case was tried exclusively and the appellant was found 100% liable. In this appeal case, the trial judge had awarded special damages of RM25,000 for the total loss of the deceased’s car and RM1,500 for the cost of extraction of the letter of administration. The appellant appealed based on four main issues which as follows: (i) that since this claim was a similar claim as that of case 53–33 of 1994, there existed an issue of res judicata; (ii) that the insurer for the deceased’s van ie Sime Axa Assurance had made payment to the owner of the vehicle ie Mayban Finance, therefore the respondent had no right to make a claim in this case; (iii) the issue of subrogation; and (iv) that the Hire Purchase Act 1967 was applicable in this claim.

Held, allowing the appeal with costs:

(1) The issue of res judicata raised by the appellant was not raised in this claim by the respondent. The judge who conducted the case of Summons No 53-33 of 1994 did not consider the issue on whether or not to allow the special damages claim for the total loss of the deceased’s car. The respondent’s claim for the said damages had been duly retracted at the preliminary stage. Therefore, the principle of res judicata could not be applied in restricting the respondent from making his claim. The principle of res judicata is applicable when an issue brought to the court had been decided upon or adjudicated exclusively by the trial judge upon hearing and considering the submissions and facts of law and case authorities on the issues involving both parties (see para 18); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 dan Tong Lee Hua v Lee Yoke San [1981] 1 MLJ 54 followed. ||Page 406>> (2) The respondent’s insurer ie Sime Axa Insurance had settled the amount of loss suffered due to the total loss of the van involved with Mayban Finance, the owner under the sale and purchase agreement and at the same time, the right to sue by Mayban Finance had been subrogated to Sime Axa Assurance under the doctrine of subrogation. Thus, the doctrine of subrogation was applicable in this action and as there was no instruction from the insurer for the respondent to recover the amount paid, the respondent had no right to file this claim (see para 26). (3) The cost to extract the letters of administration amounting to RM1,500 should not be allowed as there was no evidence produced by the respondent to show that he had incurred the said cost to extract the letters of administration (see para 28). E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-174 (4) The provision under the Hire Purchase Act 1967 was still applicable to determine the rightful ownership of the deceased’s car since there was still a hire purchase agreement with the bank. The court should not ignore the provisions of this Act merely because the claim made was under tort which allegedly did not involve the issue of ownership. As long as the vehicle was under the finance of the bank, the issue of rightful ownership was still relevant and important. Therefore, the provision under the Hire Purchase Act 1967 was applicable in this circumstance (see para 29). Nota-nota Untuk kes mengenai kerugian atau kerosakan ke atas kereta, lihat 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2006 Reissue) perenggan 320. Untuk kes-kes mengenai kecuaian, lihat 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2005 Reissue) perenggan 208–226. Untuk kes-kes mengenai res judicata, lihat 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) perenggan 2630–2642. Untuk kes-kes mengenai subrogasi secara amnya, lihat 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2006 Reissue) perenggan 349–354.

(a) isu res judicata; (b) responden/plaintif tidak mempunyai hak untuk membuat tuntutan di dalam kes ini kerana tuntutan telah diselesaikan; (c) isu subrogasi terpakai, dan (d) Akta Sewa Beli 1967 juga terpakai dalam tuntutan ini. [6] Di atas isu res judicata, pihak perayu menghujahkan bahawa oleh kerana tuntutan di dalam tindakan ini adalah sama dari segi fakta-faktanya dengan tuntutan responden di dalam kes 53–33 tahun 1994 yang telah diputuskan sepenuhnya, wujudnya isu res judicata apabila pihak responden mengemukakan tuntutan bagi kehilangan ‘total loss’ motor van di sini. Di atas isu ini, rujukan dibuat kepada beberapa autoriti kes yang mana antaranya adalah kes Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 dan John D’Silva v Anthony Moses [2002] 3 MLJ 306. Turut dihujahkan bahawa apabila peguam cara responden menarik balik tuntutan ke atas kehilangan motor van tanpa kebebasan memfailkan semula di dalam kes 53–33 Tahun 1994, responden tidak seharusnya diberi peluang mengaut keuntungan daripada kesilapan peguam caranya. [7] Bagi menjawab kepada penghujahan pihak perayu di atas isu ini, pihak responden menegaskan bahawa res judicata tidak timbul di dalam tuntutan responden memandangkan hakim bicara tidak ‘deliberate’ atas isu sama ada kos kehilangan van adalah di dalam kategori tuntutan estet ataupun tuntutan ||Page 409>> tanggungan. Alasannya adalah kerana peguam cara plaintif telah menarik balik tuntutan untuk kehilangan van sebelum keputusan untuk menolak tuntutan tersebut dibuat oleh hakim bicara. [17] Mahkamah setelah meneliti dan menimbang akan penghujahan-penghujahan yang telah dikemukakan oleh peguam cara bagi kedua-dua belah pihak (hujah bertulis responden/plaintif yang difailkan pada bulan Januari dan Februari 2008 dan hujah bertulis perayu/defendan yang difailkan pada bulan Februari 2007 dan Disember 2008) serta mengambilkira akan keseluruhan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-175 isi kandungan rekod rayuan dan rekod rayuan tambahan mendapati bahawa isu res judicata yang dibangkitkan oleh pihak perayu adalah tidak timbul di dalam tuntutan responden ini. [18] Adalah jelas melalui rekod dan keterangan yang ada di hadapan mahkamah ini bahawa hakim bicara yang mengendalikan perbicaraan dan kemudiannya membuat keputusan bagi kes Saman No 53–33 Tahun 1994, Allahyarham Dato’ Mohamad bin K Abd Rahman tidak pernah memberikan pertimbangan atau ‘adjudicate’ ke atas isu sama ada untuk membenarkan atau tidak tuntutan responden/plaintif di dalam kes terbabit berkenaan ganti rugi khas kehilangan ‘total loss’ motor van CAE 7085 tersebut. Ini kerana tuntutan plaintif/responden bagi ganti rugi berkenaan telah pun ditarik balik oleh peguam cara responden pada peringkat awal lagi. Di dalam keadaan ini, tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa prinsip res judicata tidak boleh diguna pakai untuk menghalang responden daripada mengemukakan tuntutannya. Prinsip res judicata adalah terpakai bila mana sesuatu isu yang dibawa ke hadapan mahkamah telah pun diputuskan atau dihakimi sepenuhnya oleh hakim bicara setelah mendengar dan menimbang akan penghujahan-penghujahan berserta nas undang-undang dan autoriti-autoriti kes di atas isu terbabit oleh kedua-dua belah pihak. Ini adalah sepertimana yang telah digariskan oleh Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 yang berbunyi:

Apabila sesuatu perkara di antara dua pihak telahpun dihakimi dan diputuskan oleh sesuatu mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa yang kompeten, mereka dan privi mereka adalah tidak dibenarkan untuk membuat litigasi sekali lagi res judicata itu, kerana penghakiman itu menjadi kebenaran di antara pihak tersebut. Sebagai hasilnya, suatu ‘estoppel per rem judicatum’ telah dibentuk. [19] Situasi berlainan berlaku di dalam kes ini bila mana tuntutan terbabit telah ditarik balik oleh responden/plaintif sebelum ianya dibicarakan dan di dalam memutuskan bahawa isu res judicata tidak terpakai terhadap tuntutan ||Page 412>> responden di sini, saya mengguna pakai keputusan Privy Council di dalam kes Tong Lee Hua v Lee Yoke San [1981] 1 MLJ 54 yang memutuskan bahawa: [20] Saya berpuas hati bahawa keadaan yang sama berlaku di dalam tindakan ini apabila hakim bicara di dalam kes 53–33 Tahun 1994 hanya membenarkan tuntutan responden/plaintif untuk kerugian motor van terbabit dibatalkan di atas permohonan responden sendiri yang ingin menarik balik tuntutan tersebut. Berdasarkan kepada alasan yang telah dinyatakan tadi, saya memutuskan bahawa isu res judicata adalah tidak terpakai terhadap tuntutan plaintif yang difailkan melalui tindakan baru, kes No 53–146 Tahun 1996. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issues, similarity of — Certain issues raised and decided in two earlier suits — Whether plaintiffs’ present cause of action sought proprietary remedy and was different to cause of action in two earlier suits — Whether new evidence discovered during cross-examination in two earlier suits supported plaintiffs’ claim Civil Procedure — Striking out — Application to strike out action — Whether plaintiff’s cause of action res judicata — Whether plaintiffs’ claim time barred — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19 (1)(b) & (c) The plaintiffs’ cause of action in the present case was premised on evidence adduced from two other suits which the plaintiffs had started in 1979. In the first suit the plaintiffs and one Sinsuran Sdn Bhd had claimed against Datuk Syed Kechik (‘DSK’) and Zara Sdn Bhd (‘the Zara suit’) on the grounds that DSK as a director of the first plaintiff had acted in breach of his E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-176 fiduciary duties by locating the Sabah Foundation Building on Zara’s land. In the second suit which was instituted by the plaintiffs against DSK and Banita (‘the Banita suit’), the plaintiffs cause of action was that DSK had acted in breach of his fiduciary duty to the first plaintiff when he failed to apply for a special timber licence for the Wallace Bay Area for the plaintiffs. As a consequence the plaintiffs claimed for all profits from the extraction of timber from the Wallace Bay Area pursuant to the special timber licence. The two suits were jointly heard by the High Court which held that DSK had breached his fiduciary duties as the plaintiff’s officer and employee. In the Zara suit DSK was found liable to the plaintiffs for RM10,375,504 as compensation for loss of profits with interest. In the Banita suit the court awarded a restitutionary award of RM6,417,915 with compound interest at 8% from 1 January 1978 and interest at 8%pa from the date of judgment and a compensatory award of RM23,050,000. When the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal the judgment of the High Court in the Zara suit was set aside but the restitutionary award of RM6,417,915 in the Banita suit was affirmed except that the compound interest element of 8%pa was set aside and replaced with a simple interest of 6%pa. However the compensatory ||Page 655>> award in the Banita suit was set aside. Although appeals were lodged to the Federal Court, the decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by the Federal Court. The plaintiffs then instituted an action to trace the money that DSK made from his capacity as a director of the first plaintiff, which rightfully belonged to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs submitted that this process of backwards tracing which gave them the right to follow the money that rightfully belonged to them was a proprietary remedy which was different to the cause of action in the Zara suit and the Banita suit. It was the plaintiffs’ stand that new evidence discovered from DSK’s brother at the trial during cross-examination gave support for the tracing remedy. The defendant had now applied to strike out this action commenced by the plaintiffs pursuant to O 18 r 19(1)(b) and/or (c) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 or alternatively under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The defendant’s application raises two issues, namely, whether the plaintiff’s cause of action was res judicata on account of the appeals to the Federal Court in the Zara suit and/or the Banita suit; and whether the plaintiffs’ claim was time barred.

Held, allowing the application with costs:

(1) Both this suit and the Banita suit referred to the same breach of fiduciary duty committed by DSK as found by the Federal Court and to the same exploitation of the timber concession in the Wallace Bay Area in which the plaintiffs were awarded restitutionary damages of RM6,417,915. As such this case was nothing but an attempt to litigate the same issue of law and facts which had been fully adjudicated. To allow this suit to proceed amounted to an attack on the judgment of the Federal Court which in law was not allowed unless the same had been obtained by fraud. Further, from the interchanges during the Zara suit and the Banita suit it was clear that the plaintiffs had tried to raise the same allegations in the two suits (see paras 14–15 & 17). (2) The plaintiffs’ attempt to use evidence arising from the cross-examination in the Zara and Banita trials did not entirely change any aspect of the case. The plaintiffs’ present claim was nothing but an attempt to relitigate issues which had been adjudicated and the suit was thus barred by the principle of res judicata (see paras

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-177 23–24). (3) There was no dispute that the plaintiffs’ action was based on what happened in the 1970s, that is, 39 years ago. The plaintiffs were seeking an equitable remedy in this suit, and the rule of equity demands a plaintiff to prosecute his claim without undue delay. Due to the lapse of the long period of time the defendant had been prejudiced beyond repair in its ability to defend this suit. Further, there was no explanation by the plaintiffs as to why they had taken so long to prosecute their case in the manner they want to do now (see paras 26 & 28–29). ||Page 656>> Kausa tindakan plaintif-plaintif dalam kes ini berdasar kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan daripada dua tindakan lain yang telah dimulakan plaintif-plaintif pada 1979. Dalam tindakan pertama, plaintif-plaintif mendakwa terhadap Datuk Syed Kechik (‘DSK’) dan Zara Sdn Bhd (‘tindakan Zara tersebut’) atas alasan-alasan bahawa DSK sebagai pengarah plaintif pertama telah bertindak melanggar kewajipan fidusiarinya dengan membangunkan Sabah Foundation Building di atas tanah Zara. Dalam tindakan kedua yang mana dimulakan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap DSK dan Banita (‘tindakan Banita tersebut’), kausa tindakan plaintif-plaintif adalah bahawa DSK telah melanggar kewajipan fidusiarinya kepada plaintif pertama apabila dia gagal memohon lesen khas pembalakan di kawasan Wallace Bay bagi plaintif-plaintif. Akibatnya, plaintif-plaintif menuntut kesemua keuntungan daripada pembalakan di kawasan Wallace Bay berikutan daripada lesen khas pembalakan tersebut. Kedua-dua tindakan tersebut didengar bersama oleh Mahkamah Tinggi yang memutuskan bahawa DSK telah melanggar kewajipan fidusiarinya sebagai pegawai dan pekerja plaintif-plaintif. Dalam tindakan Zara tersebut, DSK didapati bertanggungan ke atas plaintif-plaintif sebanyak RM10,375,504 sebagai pampasan bagi kehilangan keuntungan bersama dengan faedah. Dalam tindakan Banita mahkamah memberikan award restitusi sebanyak RM6,417,915 dengan faedah kompaun sebanyak 8% dari 1 Januari 1978 dan faedah sebanyak 8% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman dan award pampasan sebanyak RM23,050,000. Apabila defendan-defendan merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan, penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi bagi tindakan Zara diketepikan tetapi award restitusi sebanyak RM6,417,915 dalam tindakan Banita disahkan kecuali elemen faedah kompaun 8% setahun diketepikan dan digantikan dengan faedah ringkas sebanyak 6% setahun. Tetapi award pampasan dalam tindakan Banita diketepikan. Walaupun rayuan-rayuan dimasukkan ke Mahkamah Persekutuan, keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan disahkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan. Plaintif-plaintif kemudiannya memulakan tindakan untuk mengesan wang yang dihasilkan oleh DSK dalam kapisitinya sebagai pengarah plaintif pertama, yang merupakan hak plaintif-plaintif. Plaintif-plaintif berhujah bahawa proses mengesan yang membolehkan mereka mengesan wang milik mereka merupakan remedi keempunyaan dan berlainan dengan kausa tindakan dalam tindakan Zara dan juga tindakan Banita. Adalah menjadi pendirian plaintif-plaintif bahawa keterangan baru yang ditemui oleh saudara DSK semasa pemeriksaan balas menyokong remedi pengesanan tersebut. Defendan kini memohon untuk pembatalan tindakan yang dimulakan oleh plaintif-plaintif ini berikutan dengan A 18 k 19(1)(b) dan/atau (c) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 atau alternatifnya di bawah bidang kuasa sedia ada mahkamah. Permohonan defendan membangkitkan dua isu iaitu sama ada kausa tindakan ||Page 657>> plaintif-plaintif adalah res judicata atas dasar rayuan-rayuan ke Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam tindakan Zara dan/atau tindakan Banita; dan sama ada tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dihalang oleh had masa.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-178

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan dengan kos:

(1) Kedua-dua tindakan ini dan juga tindakan Banita merujuk kepada pelanggaran kewajipan fidusiari yang sama oleh DSK seperti yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dan juga ke atas eksploitasi konsesi balak di kawasan Wallace Bay yang mana plaintif-plaintif diawardkan ganti rugi restitusi sebanyak RM6,417,915. Oleh itu, kes ini adalah percubaan untuk membicarakan isu perundangan dan fakta-fakta yang sama yang telah diputuskan. Membenarkan tindakan ini diteruskan bermakna membenarkan bidasan terhadap penghakiman Mahkamah Persekutuan yang tidak dibenarkan kecuali jika keputusan tersebut adalah disebabkan oleh fraud. Malah daripada persilangan tindakan Zara dan Banita tersebut adalah jelas bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah cuba membangkitkan dakwaan-dakwaan yang sama dalam kedua-dua tindakan tersebut (lihat perenggan 14–15 & 17). (2) Percubaan plaintif-plaintif untuk menggunakan keterangan yang berbangkit daripada pemeriksaan balas dalam perbicaraan tindakan Zara dan Banita tidak menukar mana-mana aspek kes tersebut. Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif kini hanyalah percubaannya untuk membicarakan semula isu-isu yang telah diputuskan dan oleh itu dihalang atas prinsip res judicata (lihat perenggan 23–24). (3) Tidak dipertikaikan bahawa tindakan plaintif-plaintif adalah berdasarkan apa yang telah berlaku pada 1970an, 39 tahun yang lalu. Plaintif-plaintif memohon remedi ekuiti dalam tindakan ini, dan peraturan ekuiti mendesak plaintif memulakan tuntutannya tanpa berlengah-lengah. Berikutan dengan kelewatan masa yang melampau itu, defendan telah diprejudiskan untuk membela atas tindakan ini. Selanjutnya, tiada penjelasan oleh plaintif-plaintif mengapa mereka mengambil masa yang begitu lama untuk membicarakan kes mereka ini seperti sekarang ini (lihat perenggan 26 & 28–29). Notes For cases on application to strike out action, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 6696–6702. For cases on issues, application of res judicata, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 6076–6078. ||Page 658>>

(a) Whether the plaintiffs’ statement of claim is ‘res judicata’ on account of the outcome of the appeals to the Federal Court in either or both Zara and Banita suit? ||Page 659>> (b) Whether irrespective of the answer to (a), the plaintiffs’ statement of claim claims in this case is time barred?

Issue 1: Whether the plaintiffs’ statement of claim is ‘res judicata’ on account of the outcome of the appeals to the Federal Court in either or both Zara and Banita suit?

[3] What amounts to ‘res judicata’ is stated in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189, by Peh Swee Chin FCJ:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-179 What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lie in its effect creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted again to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between them, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth, res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action.

The appellant then applied to strike out the respondent’s claim pursuant to RHC O 18 r 19. It relied on several grounds. These included a plea of res judicata and an assertion that the action constituted an abuse of the court’s process. As a matter of law, the latter ground is much wider than the former. A party to any proceedings may be unable to establish the requirements of the doctrine of res judicata. Yet, he may succeed in demonstrating that the particular suit or other proceeding or a step taken in a proceeding is an abuse of process and successfully apply to have it struck out on that ground. This was made clear by the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494; [1986] 1 CLJ 548; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 256. Abdoolcader SCJ who delivered the judgment of the court said: There is moreover the inherent jurisdiction of the court in cases where res judicata is not strictly established, and where estoppels per rem judicatam has not been sufficiently pleaded, or made out, but nevertheless the circumstances are such as to render any re-agitation of the questions formally adjudicated upon a scandal and an abuse, the court will not hesitate to dismiss the action, or stay proceedings therein, or strike out the defence thereto, as the case may require. It would suffice in this regard to refer to the judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Wilberforce in Brisbane City Council and Myer Shopping Centres Pty Ltd v Attorney-General for Queensland [1979] AC 411, at p 425. ||Page 660>> The second defence is one of ‘res judicata’. There has, of course, been no actual decision in litigation between these parties as to the issue involved in the present case, but the appellants invoke this defence in its wider sense, according to which a party may be shut out from raising in a subsequent action an issue which he could, and should, have raised in earlier proceedings. The classic statement of this doctrine is contained in the judgment of Wilgram VC in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 and its existence has been reaffirmed by this board in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155. A recent application of it is to be found in the decision of the board in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581. It was, in the judgment of the board, there described in these words: … there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings (p 590). The attempt by way of the instant proceedings to relitigate and reopen the earlier action clearly reflects the appositeness of the caption suggested for this matter in the prelude to this judgment and would appear to us to be as clear an instance of an abuse of the process of the court as one can find within the connotation thereof enunciated in the speech of Lord Diplock in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police & Ors [1982] AC 529, at p 542 … One manifestation of this power was to be found in RSC O 18 r 19, which empowered the court, at any stage of the proceedings, to strike out any pleading which disclosed no reasonable cause of action or defence, or which was scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or which was otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Where an abuse of process is alleged in reliance upon or in relation to any previous litigation

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-180 between the parties or their privies, it is the duty of the court to undertake a minute examination of the history of the prior litigation. To do this does not offend O 18 r 19 in this particular context. As Peh Swee Chin SCJ said in Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & Ors v British-American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606, another abuse of process case: However, the learned judge in the court below, who is very experienced and very able, and who referred very much to the same issues, appears to be much exercised by the fact that the application was made under O 18 r 19, in reversing the learned registrar’s decision, in holding, on the facts of this case I consider that O 18 r 19 is not appropriate to shut out the plaintiffs from pursuing their claims. The cautionary words are words which have been frequently employed in connection with an application under O 14. It was unfortunate that the case of Tractors Malaysia Bhd v Tio Chee Hing [1975] 2 MLJ 1, a Privy Council case was not cited in the court below, though it was cited to us here. In Tractors, defendants applied to set aside the pleadings there on the grounds that they were frivolous and vexatious. The High Court allowed the application holding that the action was bound to fail. The Federal Court, on appeal, regarded themselves as precluded from examining the evidence for ||Page 661>> determining whether the action was bound to fail. The Privy Council held that the Federal Court was in error for not examining the evidence and deciding as to whether the action there was bound to fail, though the power to dismiss an action summarily was a drastic power. The Privy Council went through the evidence with a fine-tooth comb and decided to agree with the learned judge at the first instance and restored the High Court’s decision. It is to be remembered that the High Court always has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its process irrespective of whether it is expressly called for or not in an application under O 18 r 19 unless such application is limited solely to the ground that any pleading does not disclose a reasonable cause of action or defence as the case may be. (Emphasis added.) The present case, as we have already said, has a long history. Part of that history includes an earlier action in which the respondent mounted a claim based on fraud against the appellant. It was titled as Suit No S 117/1982. An application to strike out that action failed at first instance. But it succeeded on appeal. In the Supreme Court, Wan Suleiman SCJ examined the preceding history of the litigation between the parties. See Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v Tio Chee Hing [1987] 1 CLJ 531; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 81. The relevant passage in the judgment of His Lordship reads as follows: Appellants registered the first charge on August 14 1968 (Memorial No 92666) and the second charge on August 13 1986. Tio complains that the appellants had fraudulently obtained the first charge. In paras 9 and 10 of his statement of claim he set out the particulars of his charge of fraud alleging that the appellants had no intention of providing money under that charge, no account was opened for it and no money was paid under it. Appellants had, he added, consistently refused to provide evidence of money allegedly provided under the first charge, and had tricked him into executing the two charges and the appellants had made dishonest use of the first charge and purported to realise it even though no loan had been made under it. His Lordship noted that para 11 of the statement of claim alleged that appellants took unfair advantage of Tio’s financial difficulties in executing the first and second charge and struck an unconscionable bargain. His Lordship then concluded the opinion of the court in the following terms: Having therefore given careful consideration to the whole history of this unfortunate affair we must, with respect, say that the learned judge had erred in not holding that this suit brought by the respondent Tio discloses no reasonable cause of action and is vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court. (Emphasis added.) A comparison of the respondent’s pleaded case in Suit S 117/1982 and in the present action reveals that they are in essence the same. What the respondent is attempting to do in the present case is to avoid liability in respect of the charge dated 14 August 1968 registered under Memorial No 92666 on the ground that he never received the funds promised by the appellant bank. If you read Wan Suleiman SCJ’s judgment in Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v Tio

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-181 Chee Hing, you will find that the respondent had by that time made several similar attempts in other proceedings. [19] Two reasons were given by Court of Appeal for refusing the application to reamend and they are that the plaintiffs had been guilty of delay in making the application to reamend and in any event the cause of action sought to be introduced is time barred. This Court of Appeal’s decision not only binds me, it demands of me not to allow this suit to proceed as it offends the principle of res judicata. This is despite the fact that Zara was not a party in the Banita suit. It is undisputed that DSK is if you will the ‘body, soul and mind’ behind both Banita Sdn Bhd and Zara Sdn Bhd, hence they can be considered as his privies. It should not be forgotten that the plaintiffs had tried to include the defendant here in their application to re amend in 1999 which was rejected. Authority for my view can be found in the ||Page 669>> judgments of Peh Swee Chin FCJ in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd and Abdoolcader SCJ in Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 (SC). [21] A case with similar factual matrix on such evidence is the case of North West Water Ltd v Binnie ua Partners (a firm) [1990] 3 All ER 547. The facts as set out in the head notes of the report were these. A water authority commissioned a firm of consultant engineers to design and supervise the construction by contractors of an underground tunnel link and valve house to take water from one river to another by means of 12km tunnel and pumping system. The scheme prompted protests from local residents which caused the plaintiff to arrange a meeting of the local residents at the valve house in order to demonstrate the operation of the scheme. During the meeting an explosion occurred because, unknown to anyone, the valve house had filled with methane gas which ignited. Six people were killed and the rest injured. A number of victims or their personal representatives brought an action (the first action) claiming damages for personal injury or death against the water authority, the contractors who constructed the system and the consultant engineers. By their defence the water authority claimed that the explosion had been caused by the consultant engineers’ negligence. At the trial of the action the judge held that all three defendants were to blame and apportioned liability between them as to 55% against the consultant engineers, 30% against the water authority and 15% against the contractors. All three defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed the appeals of the water authority and the contractors and held that the consultant engineers were wholly to blame. In separate proceedings (the second action) the water authority issued proceedings against the consultant engineers seeking to recover the damage to the tunnel system caused by the explosion, estimated to be £2m. The water authority alleged that the damage had been caused by the consultant engineers’ negligence and/or breach of ||Page 670>> contract in designing and/or constructing and/or supervising the link system and further alleged that as between the water authority and the consultant engineers the issue of negligence had been decided in the first action and was res judicata and that the consultant engineers’ defence denying negligence was an abuse of process should be struck out. The question whether the consultant engineers were estopped from denying negligence and whether their defence should be struck out was tried as a preliminary issue. [24] For reasons stated above I find that the plaintiffs’ claim is nothing but an attempt to relitigate issues which had been adjudicated and hence hold the plaintiffs’ suit is barred by the principle of res judicata and/or issue estoppel and an abuse of court process.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-182 Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Abuse of process of court — Issues raised and reliefs sought same as earlier action — Whether there was privity of interest between defendants in both suits to invoke doctrine of res judicata — Whether suit abuse of process of the court

Held, allowing the defendant’s application and striking out the plaintiff’s writ of summons with costs:

(1) Although not all affidavit require an affidavit in opposition, on the set of the facts in the instance case an affidavit in opposition was required of the plaintiff. However, as there was no affidavit in reply filed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff was deemed to have admitted the facts and the exhibits therein (see para 4). (2) Although the cause of action in the present suit is for breach of contract of the said agreement and the cause of action in the first civil suit was for negligence, the fact remained and admittedly, the relief claimed was the same and in respect of the same subject matter and consequent to ||Page 58>> the same agreement. This fact was further supported by the plaintiff’s own admission in the affidavit evidence filed in support of encl 62. Further, the witnesses who had been called in the first civil suit and the present suit and the document produced were the same. Therefore, it would be most unjust to permit the plaintiff to make a double claim arising out of the same transaction and this would amount to abusing the process of the court, frivolous and scandalous as the claim of relief is wholly unnecessary (see paras 11 & 16). (3) The fact that the defendant in this civil suit was not the same defendant as in the first civil suit did not disentitle the defendant in this civil suit to apply to invoke the doctrine of issue estoppel as the defendant in both civil suits need not necessarily be the same and each case was decided in its own set of facts and circumstances. In any event there was a privity of interest between the defendants in both civil suits filed by the plaintiff to successfully invoke the doctrine of res judicata (see para 19). (4) In the circumstances and having considered the established principles in striking out application of the pleadings or the claim of the plaintiff, the courts was of the considered view that this was an appropriate case for invoking the powers of the court to strike out the plaintiff’s claim (see para 24); Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 followed.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan defendan dan membatalkan writ saman plaintif dengan kos:

(1) Walaupun bukan kesemua afidavit memerlukan afidavit menentang, atas fakta kes ini plaintif dikehendaki memfailkan afidavit menentang. Walau bagaimanapun, memandangkan tiada afidavit jawapan, plaintif dianggap telah mengakui fakta dan ekshibit yang terkandung di dalamnya (lihat perenggan 4). ||Page 59>> (2) Walaupun kausa tindakan di dalam tindakan ini adalah untuk kemungkiran kontrak perjanjian tersebut dan kausa tindakan di dalam tindakan sivil pertama adalah

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-183 untuk kecuaian, fakta adalah kekal dan telah diperakui, relief yang dituntut adalah yang sama dan berkaitan perkara yang sama dan berikutan perjanjian yang sama. Fakta ini selanjutnya disokong oleh pengakuan plaintif sendiri dalam keterangan afidavit yang difailkan untuk menyokong lampiran 62. Selanjutnya, saksi-saksi yang dipanggil di dalam tindakan sivil pertama dan tindakan ini dan dokumen yang dikemukakan adalah yang sama. Oleh itu, ia akan menjadi tidak adil untuk membenarkan plaintif membuat tuntutan berganda yang berbangkit daripada transaksi yang sama dan ini akan mengakibatkan penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah, remeh dan menyusahkan memandangkan tuntutan relief tersebut sesungguhnya tidak perlu (lihat perenggan 11 & 16). (3) Fakta bahawa defendan di dalam tindakan sivil ini bukan defendan yang sama seperti di dalam tindakan sivil pertama tidak menjejaskan hak defendan dalam tindakan sivil ini untuk memohon untuk membangkitkan doktrin isu estoppel kerana defendan di dalam kedua-dua tindakan sivil tidak semestinya defendan yang sama dan setiap kes diputuskan mengikut fakta dan keadaan kes tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, terdapat priviti kepentingan di antara defendan-defendan di dalam kedua-dua tindakan sivil yang difailkan oleh plaintif untuk berjaya membangkitkan doktrin res judicata (lihat perenggan 19). (4) Dalam keadaan ini dan setelah mempertimbangkan prinsip-prinsip yang ditetapkan di dalam membatalkan permohonan pliding tersebut atau tuntutan plaintif tersebut, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa kes ini adalah kes yang wajar untuk menggunakan kuasa-kuasa mahkamah untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif (lihat perenggan 24); Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 diikut.

RES JUDICATA

[9] In civil cases, a previous judgment or order is relevant when it is tendered in evidence in support of a plea of res judicata and which was a fact in issue see Ram Ranjan Chakerbati v Ram Narain Singh 22 C 533; 22 IA 60 (PC); Dinomoni v Brojo Mohini 29 C 187; 29 IA 24 (PC). It is in the interest of the public at large that there should be an end to litigation (interest ripublicae ut sit finis litium). In other words there should be finality to the binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction.

It is equally settled law that in order for the doctrine of res judicata, cause of action or issue estoppel to apply, the earlier proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment or decision (see Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119 at p 123; Government of Malaysia v Dato’ Chong Kok Lim [1993] 2 MLJ 74).

The word ‘scandalous’ means wholly unnecessary or irrelevant. Frivolous or vexatious means, where it is obviously unsustainable, eg where the petition is res judicata or without merit and unjustified (see Boey Oi Leng (trading as Reka Construction & Trading) v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2001] MLJU 566). [12] This court is mindful of the fact that the cause of action in the first civil suit was for negligence and that it was against the State Government of Pahang and the State Director of the Forestry Department, Pahang who were named as the defendants. Whereas the cause of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-184 action in this civil suit is for breach of contract and is against Badan Perhubungan UMNO Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur. Nevertheless, this court is of the considered view that on the facts, background and the circumstances and taking into the account the relevant documents exhibited to the defendant’s affidavit in support (encl 103A), the plaintiff cannot divide their case into separate compartments and proceed by way of installments in order to suit their own convenience where the relief applied in this civil suit admittedly has been included and claimed in the first civil suit where judgment had already been granted in favour of the plaintiff. This court is of the considered view that the cause of action in both the civil suits are interrelated and intertwined as part and parcel of the same one and only transaction and the plaintiff cannot be permitted to make double claim by filing two separate actions for the same relief. In fact, the basis of the plaintiff’s claim in the first civil suit has the similarity to the plaintiff’s claim in this civil suit which is based on an agreement dated 2 October 2000 entered into between the plaintiff and a person Tn Hj Abdullah bin Hj Rahman purported to act on behalf of the defendant. It was pursuant to the said agreement that the claim in both the civil suits were filed as without the said agreement dated 2 October 2000, there could have been no link to implicate the defendant’s named in both the civil suits. This finding by this court is made solely and only for the purpose of deciding this application (encl 103) and the application of the doctrine of res judicata and is not to be construed as having had decided the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. [16] It is the considered view of this court that this civil suit is in the strictest sense of the words vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court and an appropriate case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent any relitigation of the same subject matter and applying the wider sense of res judicata.

… the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine, but a fundamental doctrine based on the view that there must be an end of litigation.

In Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley, The Doctrine of Res Judicata (Butterworths, 3rd Ed, 1996) (‘Spencer Bower’), it is stated at para 19 as follows: A party setting up res judicata by way of estoppel as a bar to this opponent’s claim, or as the foundation of his own, must establish the constituent elements, namely:

The argument is attractive but the fundamental question is: on what basis can the plaintiff be estopped, in her claim against the third defendant, from alleging that the driver was in fact not he second defendant but rather the first defendant. Mr Chong could cite no authority. It would appear that the only possible basis is that of res judicata. It is necessary to remind oneself how the doctrine of issue estoppel by res judicata would arise. Lord Guest in Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at p 935A stated that The requirements of issue estoppel still remain (1) that the same question has been decided; (2) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and (3) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies. The nature of a judgment in default is discussed at n13/1/6 of the Supreme Court Practice 1997 Vol 1: ‘By making default in giving notice of intention to defend, the defendant admits all the allegations in the statement of claim endorsed on the writ’ (Cribb v Freyberger [1919] WN 22). [18] Be that as it may, the fact that the defendant in this civil suit is not the same defendant as in the first civil suit does not disentitled the defendant in this civil suit to apply to invoke the doctrine of issue estoppel as the defendant in both the civil suits need not necessarily be the same and each case is decided on its own set of facts and circumstances. The fact that the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-185 defendant in both the civil suits are not the same party is not necessarily fatal to this application in order to invoke the doctrine of issue estoppel as the parties in this civil suit named as the defendant, need not necessarily be the same party or parties (see North West Water Ltd v Binnie ua Partners (a firm) [1990] 3 All ER 547 followed in Wong Peng Yan Benjamin v Genting Bhd & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 713 at pp 721–725, 729; Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581; Boey Oi Leng (trading as Reka Construction & Trading) v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2001] MLJU 566). In any event and admittedly, there is a privity of interest between the defendant in both the civil suits filed by the plaintiff to successfully invoke the doctrine of res judicata. [20] As for the doctrine of res judicata or issue of estoppel, this court would not be able to set out an exhaustive list of relevant factors for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in order to decide whether the process of the court is being abused or where the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel is invoked. This court would ensure that the jurisdiction of the court to strike out the action will only be activated where an injustice is caused, to prevent an abuse, to prevent the dignity of the court being misused so as to facilitate the administration of justice.

It is appropriate to note that there is a distinction between cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause of action in the later proceedings is identical to that in the earlier proceedings, the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject matter. In such a case, the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is alleged, such as to justify setting aside the earlier judgment. In Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853, the following requirements of issue estoppel were laid down; (i) that the same question has been decided; (ii) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and (iii) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies. One of the purpose of estoppel being to work justice between the parties, it is open to courts to recognise that in special circumstances inflexible application of it may have the opposite result, as was observed by Lord Upjohn in the Carl Zeiss’ case [1967] 1 AC at p 947. To create an estoppel by record, the finding must be part of the ratio decidendi (see Sanders (orse Saunders) v Sanders (orse Saunders) [1952] 2 All ER 767). Equally an estoppel per rem judicata can only be based on the issues actually decided in the ||Page 78>> former proceedings and not on what are called ‘collateral issues’ (see Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd) (No 3) [1970] 1 Ch 506 and it should be specifically pleaded but it may be pleaded by way of estoppel to an entire cause of action rather to a single matter in issue (see 16 Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Ed) para 1527). To raise res judicata a defendant has to produce the pleadings and record of proceedings and judgment. The party replying on res judicata giving rise to an estoppel should be able to show that the matter had been determined by a judgment in its nature final (see Turley v Dew (1906) 94 LT 216; Bynoe v Bank of England [1902] 1 KB 467; Land v Land [1949] 2 All ER 218). The word ‘final’ is used here as opposed to ‘interlocotury’ (see Allnutt v Mills (1925) 42 TLR 68) and the record of the court’s act on which the estoppel by res judicata is founded must be forthcoming, or some valid reason given why it cannot be produced’ (see The Annie Johnson; Kok Ken Seng v Siti Zaliha bt Mohd Nor & Anor [1993] 1 AMR 74 at p 77). [22] The doctrine of res judicata has been explained in detail in Asia Commercial Finace (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 at pp 197–202 and under what circumstances or facts, the doctrine shall apply:

What is judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-186 an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgement becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro in law a lot more, ie that neither of the same parties or their privies in a subsequent proceeding is entitled to challenged the correctness of the decision of a previous final judgment in which they, or their privies, were parties. This sounds like explaining a truism, but it is the corollary from that statement that is all important and that could have been given birth to the controversies alluded above; the corolarry being that neither of such parties be allowed to adduce evidence or advance any argument to contradict such decision. In this respect, we respectfully agree with Peter Gibson J in Lawlor v Gray [1984] 3 All ER 345 at p 350, who said: ‘Issue estoppel … prevents contradiction of a previous determination, whereas cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of the cause of action. There is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary view that such issues which might have been decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata, ie doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid contrary view is to be preferred; it represents one thing, a correct even though broader approach to the scope of issue estoppel. It is warranted by the weight of authorities to be illustrated later. It is completely in accord or resonant with the rationales behind the doctrine of res judicata, in other words, with the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. It is particularly important to bear in mind the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and with the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation. It is further necessary at this stage to understand the import of the words in the said famous statement, ie ‘… every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation …’ which Somervell LJ explained in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 at p 257 as follows: … res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but … it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. ||Page 80>> The explanation of Somervell LJ was also quoted with approval in the Privy Council in Yat Tung Investment Co v Dae Heng Bank & Anor [1975] AC 581; [1975] 2 WLR 690 (see also the majority decision in The Pacific Bank Bhd v Chan Peng Leong [1998] 2 MLJ 613 at pp 622–626, [1998] 2 CLJ 440 at pp 451–456). [23] In the circumstances and having considered the established principles in a striking out application of the pleadings or the claim of the plaintiff, in particular, the decision in Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 4 CLJ 7 this court is of the considered view that this is an appropriate case for invoking the powers of the court to strike out the plaintiff’s claim. Justice and fair play between the parties must present an underlining principle of the extended doctrine of res judicata. While in seeking to prevent abuse of its process, the court is to exercise a form of discipline over the parties (see Ulser Bank Ltd v Fisher & Fisher [1999] N1 68 (Ch D); C (a minor) v Hacknery London Borough Council [1996] 1 FLR 427; [1996] 1 All ER 973; [1996] 1 WLR 789 (CA); Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd (No 2) [1998] 1 HKC 192; Ooi Bee Tat @ Ooi Bee Lee v Ooi Bee Tat & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 5 E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-187 MLJ 10). The court finds that the reliefs or prayers in this suit is substantially the same as in the first civil suit. In any event, if there are two suits with substantially the same question or issue, it is only just and proper that the issue should be determined in only one of the suits. [26] In conclusion, this court finds that after having taken all the factors together which has a cumulative effect, the defendants have satisfied this court that this is an appropriate case in which justice requires that res judicata, in particular, issue estoppel should be invoked against the plaintiff. Accordingly, to allow the plaintiff to proceed on with this civil suit would be an abuse of the process of the court. Prosedur Sivil — Res judicata — Kehendak pli res judicata — Sama ada elemen-elemen untuk pemakaian doktrin res judicata dibuktikan — Sama ada wujud keadaan khas untuk pengecualian pemakaian doktrin res judicata Plaintif, Rimba Mentari Development Sdn Bhd telah memfailkan saman terhadap defendan, Riviera Bay Resort & Condo Management Sdn Bhd di Mahkamah Sesyen 1 Melaka (‘tindakan kedua’). Kausa tindakan plaintif dalam tindakan ini berasaskan kepada ‘tort’ akibat kerosakan yang timbul selepas tamatnya perjanjian sewaan di antara plaintif dan defendan. Plaintif di dalam penyataan tuntutannya menyatakan bahawa selepas perjanjian tersebut tamat defendan telah bertindak membuat pemotongan atas segala utiliti seperti bekalan air dan elektrik sehingga menyebabkan plaintif mengalami kerugian. Defendan telah memasukkan kehadiran terhadap saman plaintif dalam tindakan kedua ini dan telah memfailkan penyata pembelaan berserta penolakan dan tuntutan balas. Plaintif kemudiannya memberi jawapan kepada pembelaan defendan dan membuat pembelaan terhadap tuntutan balas dan penolakan defendan tersebut. Tetapi kemudian, plaintif memfailkan notis permohonan (‘lampiran 6’) untuk membatalkan pembelaan dengan penolakan dan tuntutan balas defendan menurut A 14 k 21(d) dan A 53 k 11 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Rendah 1980 atas alasan res judicata, estoppel dan/atau duplicity. Pihak defendan pula memasukkan satu notis permohonan (‘lampiran 14’) untuk meminda pembelaan dengan penolakan dan tuntutan balas. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen 1 Melaka membenarkan notis permohonan plaintif di lampiran 6 dan seterusnya menolak notis permohonan defendan di lampiran 14. Defendan memfailkan rayuan ini kerana terkilan dengan keputusan tersebut. Isu yang perlu diputuskan di dalam rayuan ini adalah: (i) sama ada doktrin res judicata yang dibangkitkan oleh plaintif terpakai terhadap pliding yang dimasukkan oleh ||Page 282>> defendan dalam tindakan kedua ini; dan (ii) sama ada defendan boleh meminda pembelaan dan tuntutan balas dengan tolakan bagi memperbaiki kecacatan dalam plidingnya.

Diputuskan, menolak notis permohonan plaintif di lampiran 6 dengan kos dan membenarkan notis permohonan defendan di lampiran 14 dengan kos:

(1) Untuk membolehkan doktrin res judicata terpakai plaintif perlu menunjukkan bahawa wujud satu tindakan yang terdahulu, wujud satu keputusan yang mempunyai elemen muktamad dalam tindakan terdahulu yang telah didengar dan diputuskan berdasarkan merit oleh mahkamah dan fakta tindakan yang terdahulu melibatkan pihak-pihak, kausa tindakan serta isu-isu yang sama dengan tindakan kedua ini dan kausa tindakan atau isu-isu tersebut telah pun didengar dan diputuskan atau dihakimi oleh mahkamah dalam tindakan terdahulu. Defendan pula perlu menyangkal kewujudan perkara-perkara tersebut atau menunjukkan keadaan khas (lihat perenggan 34–35). Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (MA) E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-188 diikut. (2) Dari rekod rayuan jelas wujud satu tindakan yang terdahulu di Mahkamah Sesyen Melaka. Plaintif juga telah mengekshibitkan penghakiman dan alasan penghakiman hakim mahkamah sesyen bagi menunjukkan bahawa satu keputusan telah dibuat. Ini menunjukkan tuntutan plaintif telah didengar dan diputuskan secara muktamad dalam tindakan terdahulu. Tetapi tiada keputusan muktamad yang mana meritnya telah didengar dan dihakimi oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen berkaitan dengan tuntutan balas defendan dalam tindakan pertama. Oleh itu pli res judicata yang dibangkitkan oleh plaintif dalam notis permohonannya tidak bermerit. Juga, berdasarkan pliding dalam kedua-dua tindakan, jelas bahawa pihak-pihak yang terlibat dalam tindakan terdahulu adalah sama dengan pihak-pihak dalam tindakan kedua ini (lihat perenggan 36(a), (b) & (c). (3) Keadaan khas bagi mengecualikan pemakaian doktrin res judicata dalam kes ini merujuk kepada keputusan hakim mahkamah sesyen yang menolak tuntutan balas defendan dalam tindakan pertama atas isu locus standi sahaja yang merupakan isu awalan dan teknikal bentuknya. Keputusan hakim mahkamah tersebut bukan dibuat atas dasar merit. Ini merupakan satu keadaan istimewa atau khas yang mengecualikan pemakaian doktrin res judicata terhadap perayu (lihat perenggan 37 & 40). (4) Defendan telah memfailkan pembelaan dan membuat tuntutan balas dengan penolakan. Soal sama ada pembelaannya bermerit atau ||Page 283>> peluangnya untuk berjaya seharusnya ditentukan di dalam satu forum yang lain. Tindakan defendan memfailkan notis permohonan untuk pindaan adalah wajar bagi memulihkan kecacatan yang wujud dalam tuntutan balas yang asal (lihat perenggan 42 & 45). The plaintiff, Rimba Mentari Development Sdn Bhd filed a summons against the defendant, Riviera Bay Resort & Condo Management Sdn Bhd at the Malacca Sessions Court 1 (‘the second action’). The plaintiff’s cause of action in this case was based on tort for damages caused by the expiration of the tenancy agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff in its statement of claim stated that after the expiration of the agreement, the defendant had disconnected all the utilities such as water and electricity supply causing losses to the plaintiff. The defendant entered appearance against the plaintiff’s summons in the second action and had filed its statement of defence and set off and counterclaim. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a reply to the defendant’s defence and defence to the defendant’s counterclaim and set off. However, subsequently the plaintiff filed a notice of application (‘encl 6’) to strike out the defence and set off and the defendant’s counterclaim according to O 14 r 21(d) and O 53 r 11 of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 on the grounds of res judicata, estoppel and/or duplicity. The defendant, on the other hand, filed a notice of application (‘encl 14’) to amend the defence and set off and the counterclaim. The Malacca Sessions Court 1 judge allowed the plaintiff’s notice of application in encl 6 and further dismissed the defendant’s notice of application in encl 14. The defendant filed this appeal, being aggrieved with the decision. The issues for determination in this appeal were: (i) whether the doctrine of res judicata raised by the plaintiff was applicable against the pleading filed by the defendant in the second action; and (ii) whether the defendant could amend the defence and counterclaim and set off to cure the defects in the pleadings.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-189

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s application with costs and allowing the defendant’s application with costs:

(1) To enable the doctrine of res judicata applicable the plaintiff had to show that there existed a prior action, there was a decision with the element of conclusiveness in the prior action which was heard and disposed on merits by the court and the facts of the prior action involved the same parties, the same cause of action and the same issues as the second action and the cause of action or issues had been heard or disposed by the court in the prior action. Whereas the defendant had to deny the existence of the matters or show there existed a special ||Page 284>> circumstances (see paras 34–35). Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (SC) followed. (2) From the record of appeal it was clear that there was a prior action at the Malacca Sessions Court. The plaintiff had also exhibited the judgment and the grounds of judgment by the sessions court judge to show that a decision had been made. This showed that the plaintiff’s claim had been heard and finally disposed in the prior action. However, there was no final decision which had been heard on merit and disposed by the sessions court judge with regards to the defendant’s counterclaim in the first action. Thus the plea of res judicata which was raised by the plaintiff in his notice of application had no merit. Also, based on the pleadings in both actions, it was clear that the parties involved in the earlier action were the same as the parties in the second action (see paras 36(a), (b) & (c). (3) The special circumstances to exclude the application of the doctrine of res judicata in this case referred to the decision of the sessions court judge dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim in the first action merely on the issue of locus standi which was a preliminary issue and technical in nature. The judge’s decision was not on merit. This constituted a special circumstance to exclude the application of the doctrine of res judicata against the appellant (see paras 37 & 40). (4) The defendant had filed a defence and counterclaim and set off. The question of whether the defence had merit or opportunity to succeed should be determined in another forum. The defendant’s action of filing the notice of application for amendment was proper to cure the defect in the original counterclaim (see paras 42 & 45). Nota-nota Untuk kes–kes mengenai pliding, lihat 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) perenggan 5264–5285. Untuk kes–kes mengenai res judicata, lihat 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) perenggan 5981–6110. [7] Pada 8 September 2006 plaintif memfailkan notis permohonan lampiran 6 untuk membatalkan pembelaan dengan penolakan dan tuntutan balas defendan menurut A 14 k 21(d) dan A 53 k 11 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Rendah 1980 atas alasan res judicata, estopel dan/atau duplicity (ms 18–70 rekod rayuan).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-190 (a) Notis permohonan plaintif lampiran 6 Plaintif memohon untuk membatalkan penyata pembelaan dengan penolakan (set off) dan tuntutan balas menurut A 14 k 21(d) dan kuasa-kuasa sedia ada mahkamah menurut peruntukan Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Rendah 1980. Alasan permohonan adalah res judicata, estopel dan duplicity yang merupakan penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. Plaintif juga memohon agar penghakiman terhadap tuntutan di dalam saman dimasukkan terhadap defendan. Plaintif membangkitkan isu res judicata. Menurut plaintif perkara yang dibangkitkan dalam pembelaan bagi kes 52–87 Tahun 2006 (tindakan kedua) ini telah dibangkit dan diputuskan oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen dalam kes Saman No (2)–52–648 Tahun 2001 (tindakan pertama). Dari itu defendan dihalang untuk membangkitkannya semula di dalam tindakan yang lain atas doktrin res judicata. (b) Notis permohonan defendan lampiran 14 Hakim mahkamah sesyen juga telah menolak notis permohonan pihak defendan untuk meminda tuntutan balas. Tujuan pindaan adalah untuk memasukkan tarikh tempoh dari bulan September 2001 sehingga bulan Januari 2006. Jangka masa yang diplidkan ini adalah tempoh selepas kes ‘tindakan pertama’ difailkan pada 7 ||Page 288>> September 2001.

(i) sama ada doktrin res judicata yang dibangkitkan oleh plaintif/responden terpakai terhadap pliding yang dimasukkan oleh defendan dalam tindakan kedua ini; dan (ii) sama ada defendan boleh meminda pembelaan dan tuntutan balas dengan tolakan (set off) bagi memperbaiki kecacatan dalam plidingnya dalam tindakan kedua ini. [17] Plaintif/responden dalam penghujahannya menyatakan doktrin res judicata terpakai dalam kes ini. Alasannya adalah, sebelum tindakan kedua ini (52–87 Tahun 2006) Mahkamah Sesyen 2 Melaka telahpun mendengar dan memutuskan dua kes terdahulu pada 5 Julai 2004 di mana telah diperintahkan: [21] Oleh itu segala isu yang dibangkitkan oleh defendan dalam tindakan ini menjadi res judicata. Defendan diestop membangkitkannya dan tindakan defendan membangkitkannya lagi dalam tindakan ini terjumlah kepada ||Page 289>> penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. Dari itu wajarlah pembelaan dan tuntutan balas dengan tolakan defendan dibatalkan dengan kos dan penghakiman dimasukkan berpihak kepada plaintif atas terma-terma dalam saman. [22] Defendan/perayu pula berhujah yang doktrin res judicata tidak terpakai terhadap pembelaan dan tuntutan balas dan penolakan yang difailkan dalam tindakan kedua ini. Dalam hujah peguam terpelajar beliau menegaskan tuntutan dalam tindakan terdahulu tidak diputuskan secara substantial tetapi hanya secara preliminary dan teknikal. Hujah beliau ini disokong dengan alasan penghakiman dalam kes terdahulu yang memutuskan (ms 61 rekod rayuan lampiran 3): [24] Selanjutnya defendan membuat perbandingan di antara tindakan kedua ini dengan tindakan pertama bagi melihat sama ada doktrin res judicata terpakai.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-191 [28] Berdasarkan perkara di atas defendan berhujah tidak wujudnya persamaan antara kes terdahulu dengan sekarang. Dari itu tidak timbul persoalan res judicata. [29] Sebagaimana dinyatakan di awal tadi terdapat dua isu yang telah mahkamah kenal pasti untuk diputuskan dalam rayuan ini. Isu pertama berkaitan pemakaian doktrin res judicata. [30] Pada hemat saya doktrin res judicata tidak terpakai dalam kes rayuan ini. Saya juga bersetuju dengan penghujahan yang diberikan oleh peguam defendan yang terpelajar bahawa doktrin res judicata tidak terpakai. [31] Apakah doktrin res judicata? Terdapat banyak kes yang telah memberi pengertian tentang prinsip ekuiti ini. Umpamanya, ingin saya merujuk satu petikan dalam kes Carl-Zeiss-Stiffung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1966] 1 All ER 536 ms 564 oleh Lord Guest yang mengatakan:

The rule of estoppel by res judicata, which is a rule of evidence, is that where a final decision has been pronounced by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction over parties the parties to and the subject-matter of the litigation, any party or privy is estopped in any subsequent litigation from disputing or questioning such decision on the merits.

… To invoke the doctrine of res judicata the respondent has to show that there was a former suit between the same parties for the same matter and upon the same cause of action, and also that the matter directly and substantially in issue has been heard and finally decided by the court which heard it. [33] Akhir sekali dalam satu keputusan Mahkamah Agung Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783, Hakim Peh Swee Chin telah membincangkan dengan panjang lebar berkaitan dengan doktrin res judicata. Eloklah saya perturunkan petikan yang berkaitan:

What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicature. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and ||Page 291>> their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth, res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation —interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro aedem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy. Since a res judicata creates an estoppel per rem judicatum, the doctrine of res judicata is really the docrine of estoppel per rem judicatum, the latter being described sometimes in a rather archaic way as estoppel by record. Since the two doctrines are the same, it is no longer of any practical importance to say that res judicata is a rule of procedure and that an estoppel per rem judicatum is that of evidence. Such dichotomy is apt to give rise to confusion.

The starting point ought to be the celebrated passage by Wigram VC, in the case of Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 115 which is: The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-192 [36] Berdasarkan di atas, di dalam penghakiman, saya akan membuat analisa sama ada perkara-perkara yang telah dinyatakan di butiran (a)–(d) berjaya ditunjukkan oleh plaintif/responden ataupun dapat disangkal oleh perayu/defendan dan akhirnya menilai dan memutuskan sama ada doktrin res judicata terpakai ataupun tidak.

(a) Wujudnya satu tindakan yang terdahulu Saya telah meneliti rekod rayuan di lampiran 3 terutamanya di ms 45–46 dan berpuashati yang wujudnya satu tindakan yang terdahulu di Mahkamah Sesyen Melaka iaitu Saman No (2) 52–1225 Tahun 2003 dan Saman No (2) 52–648 Tahun 2001. Kedua-dua saman telah digabung dan didengar bersama oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen yang sama selaras dengan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka bertarikh 10 Jun 2003 (b) Wujudnya satu keputusan yang mempunyai elemen muktamad dalam tindakan terdahulu yang telah didengar dan diputuskan berdasarkan merit oleh mahkamah yang berwibawa Plaintif perlu menunjukkan yang terdapatnya keputusan yang muktamad yang telah diputuskan di mahkamah yang lain. Dalam hal demikian plaintif telah mengeksibitkan (eksh LWP1D) penghakiman dan alasan penghakiman hakim mahkamah sesyen bagi menunjukkan yang satu keputusan telah dibuat. Saya telah meneliti alasan penghakiman di ms 45–62 rekod rayuan lampiran 3 iaitu eksh LWP1D yang mana saya mendapati hakim mahkamah sesyen telah memutuskan tuntutan saman plaintif atas merit selepas proses perbicaraan penuh dijalankan. Penghakiman kepada plaintif berserta kos telah dibenarkan (ms 56 rekod rayuan). Pada pendapat saya, ianya menunjukkan tuntutan plaintif dalam penyata tuntutan telah didengar dan diputuskan secara muktamad dalam tindakan terdahulu. Maksudnya terdapat keputusan muktamad. Namun begitu, perlu ditegaskan di sini, ianya hanya berkaitan dengan tuntutan saman plaintif sahaja. Berkaitan dengan tuntutan balas defendan dalam kes pertama saya mendapati isu berkaitan dengannya masih belum diputuskan secara muktmad oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen. Adalah jelas berdasarkan penghakiman hakim mahkamah sesyen bertarikh 14 Ogos 2004 di ms 61 rekod rayuan yang memutuskan defendan tidak mempunyai locus standi bagi mengemukakan tindakan dan seterusnya beliau telah menolak tuntutan balas defendan dengan kos. Berdasarkan kepada perkara di atas saya mendapati tiadanya keputusan muktamad yang mana meritnya telah didengar dan dihakimi oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen berkaitan dengan tuntutan ||Page 293>> balas defendan dalam tindakan pertama. Oleh itu saya berpendapat pli res judicata yang dibangkitkan oleh plaintif dalam notis permohonannya tidak bermerit. (c) Melibatkan pihak-pihak perkara-perkara serta isu-isu yang sama Berdasarkan pliding dalam kedua-dua tindakan, saya berpuashati pihak-pihak yang terlibat dalam tindakan terdahulu adalah sama dengan pihak-pihak dalam tindakan kedua ini. Berkaitan dengan perkara atau isu-isu, di dalam tindakan terdahulu, sebagaimana telah

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-193 dinyatakan oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen dalam penghakimannya di ms 50 rekod rayuan: (i) sama ada terdapatnya persetujuan bagi lanjutan tempoh sewaan dan jika jawapannya adalah positif, berapakah kadar sewanya. Isu dalam tindakan terdahulu ini timbul berdasarkan kausa tindakan plaintif atas pemecahan syarat-syarat dan terma perjanjian sewaan yang telah dimasuki oleh pihak-pihak. Berbeza dengan tindakan kedua ini, kausa tindakan plaintif sebagaimana yang diplid adalah berdasarkan kepada tort manakala pembelaan pula adalah semata-mata jawapan tentang isu tort berkaitan pengataan-pengataan yang terdapat dalam perenggan 10, 11 dan 12 penyataan tuntutan. Isu ini sama sekali tidak dibangkitkan dalam tindakan terdahulu. Saya telah meneliti pliding bagi kes pertama dan mendapati dan bersetuju yang isu tanggungan dari segi tort tidak langsung ditimbulkan. Sebagaimana dinyatakan tadi, dalam kes tersebut isunya berkisar kepada pemecahan syarat-syarat dan terma perjanjian sewaan. Berkenaan dengan tuntutan balas defendan isunya adalah: (ii) sama ada defendan mempunyai locus standi membawa tindakan terhadap plaintif kerana mereka perlu buktikan Riviera Bay Resort Condominium Sdn Bhd telah memberi kuasa untuk membawa tindakan bagi pihaknya. Isu ini telah diputuskan oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen dalam tindakan terdahulu. Manakala isu dalam tindakan kedua adalah berkaitan dengan soal pemotongan bekalan utiliti yang mana belum lagi diputuskan oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen dalam tindakan pertama. Berdasarkan perkara di atas, saya berpendapat tiadanya persamaan berkaitan isu-isu di dalam kedua-dua tindakan itu secara perbandingan. ||Page 294>> (d) Perkara atau isu-isu tersebut telahpun didengar dan diputuskan atau dihakimi oleh mahkamah dalam tindakan terdahulu Saya mendapati yang isu-isu berkaitan masih belum didengar dan diputuskan terutamanya berkaitan dengan tuntutan balas asal defendan ataupun tuntutan balas yang terpinda sekiranya pindaan dibenarkan. [37] Saya berpendapat terdapatnya satu keadaan khas bagi mengecualikan pemakaian doktrin res judicata dalam kes rayuan ini. Keadaan istimewa itu adalah merujuk kepada keputusan hakim mahkamah sesyen yang menolak tuntutan balas defendan dalam tindakan pertama atas isu locus standi sahaja. Pada hemat saya isu locus standi merupakan isu awalan dan begitu teknikal bentuknya. Ianya bukanlah satu isu yang substantif. Keadaan ini dijelaskan dalam penghakiman dalam kes terdahulu yang mana hakim tersebut menyatakan: [40] Berdasarkan petikan di atas saya berpendapat keputusan hakim mahkamah sesyen menolak tuntutan balas defendan atas isu locus standi bukanlah satu keputusan muktamad E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-194 yang diputuskan berdasarkan pada merit. Dalam kes tersebut jelas menyatakan salah satu keadaan khas adalah penghakiman yang diperolehi secara ingkar oleh kerana ianya bukanlah penghakiman berdasarkan merit. Begitu jua halnya di dalam kes rayuan ini. Keputusan hakim mahkamah sesyen menolak tuntutan balas defendan bukanlah dibuat atas dasar merit iaitu setelah ianya didengar dan diputuskan melalui perbicaraan. Kesan yang serupa dalam kedua-dua situasi ini, dalam penghakiman saya merupakan satu keadaan istimewa atau khas yang boleh diambil kira dan dipertimbangkan dalam menentukan sama ada doktrin res judicata boleh beroperasi terhadap defendan. Dalam hal demikian saya memutuskan bahawa telah wujudnya satu keadaan khas bagi mengecualikan pemakaian doktrin res judicata terhadap perayu. Civil Procedure — Estoppel — Res judicata — Settlement between parties and consent judgment recorded — Subsequent action by plaintiff to claim balance moneys payable — Whether action could have been disposed in earlier proceedings — Whether plaintiff estopped from commencing present action — Whether res judicata applicable — Whether action ought to be struck out for abuse of process — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19(1)(d) In consideration of the plaintiff securing a government contract, the defendant, vide a letter of undertaking, agreed to pay the plaintiff 4% of the total project value. The agreed mode of payment was by three tranches/installments. The first tranche for the sum of RM100,000 was due upon the issuance of the letter of intent (‘LOI’) by the government. The second tranche, for the amount of 50% of the remaining amount, was due upon receipt of mobilisation fee from the government. The third tranche ie, 50% of the remaining amount, was due upon receipt of the first progress payment from the government. As the defendant had failed to pay the plaintiff the sums agreed under the said agreement, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant in the sessions court. The defendant disputed the plaintiff’s entire claim. During the trial at the sessions court, the plaintiff and the defendant reached a settlement and recorded a consent judgment, wherein without admission of liability the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiffs the sum of RM65,000 as full and final settlement of the plaintiff’s claim which was based on the said agreement. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant based on the same agreement wherein the plaintiff now alleged that since the value of the government contract awarded was RM11,700,000 the 4% of the value of the project would be RM486,000. In the present action, the plaintiff was claiming for the sum of RM368,000 which represented the second and third tranches due under the said agreement after deducting the sum of RM100,000 for the first tranche claimed in the sessions court. The defendant contended that since the sums claimed had ||Page 841>> arisen from the said agreement, the plaintiff ought to have claimed all of the sums due in its first action wherein a consent judgment was recorded. Hence, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was estopped entirely from commencing the present action against them due to the doctrine of res judicata and also in view of the consent judgment entered in the sessions court action. The plaintiff however submitted that the present suit between the parties was in respect of the breach of the said agreement by the defendant in respect of claims for the second and third installments. Further, the consent judgment was entered without admission of liability and on a without prejudice basis. The deputy registrar allowed the defendant’s application to strike out the plaintiff’s claim as it was an abuse of the process of the court. Against the said decision, the plaintiff appealed to this court and the only issue for consideration of this court was whether or not the plaintiff’s claim was an abuse of process.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-195

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal with costs:

(1) The principle of res judicata applies in the present case. The plaintiff had failed to bring forward its whole case and instead appeared to have brought part of its case in the sessions court now attempted to bring the rest of its case in the High Court although the same could fairly have been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties. This court must be vigilant in precluding a party from re-agitating in subsequent proceedings a complaint which could fairly have been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties in the sessions court (see para 17). (2) It is clear on the face of the consent judgment and from the plain and ordinary reading that it is expressed to be a full and final settlement. There was nothing expressed in the terms of the consent judgment stating that the plaintiff had reserved the right to pursue the claim under paras 2 and 3 of the said agreement (see para 24). (3) The terms of the consent judgment must be read and understood as it stands and the plaintiff ought not to be allowed to add words or vary the terms of the said consent judgment. It is trite law that a consent order is evidence of the contract between the parties and is binding on all parties to the order (see para 25). Sebagai ganjaran plaintif mendapatkan kontrak kerajaan, defendan, menerusi surat akujanji, bersetuju membayar plaintif 4% daripada jumlah nilai projek. Cara pembayaran yang dipersetujui adalah dengan tiga kali ansuran/tranche. Tranche pertama berjumlah RM100,000 terakru dengan keluarnya surat niat (‘LOI’) oleh kerajaan. Tranche kedua sejumlah 50% daripada jumlah yang berbaki, terakru apabila yuran pengerahan diterima daripada kerajaan. Tranche ||Page 842>> ketiga, iaitu 50% daripada jumlah berbaki, terakru apabila pembayaran ikut kerja pertama diterima daripada kerajaan. Disebabkan defendan gagal membayar plaintif jumlah yang dipersetujui di bawah perjanjian tersebut, plaintif memulakan tindakan ini terhadap defendan di mahkamah sesyen. Defendan mempertikaikan keseluruhan tuntutan plaintif. Semasa perbicaraan di mahkamah sesyen, plaintif dan defendan mencapai persetujuan dan merekodkan penghakiman persetujuan, di mana tanpa pengakuan terhadap liabiliti, defendan bersetuju membayar plaintif sebanyak RM65,000 sebagai pembayaran penuh dan muktamad terhadap tuntutan plaintif yang mana adalah berdasarkan perjanjian tersebut. Kemudiannya, plaintif memulakan tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas dasar perjanjian yang sama di mana plaintif kini mendakwa bahawa memandangkan nilai kontrak kerajaan yang diberikan ialah RM11,700,000 maka 4% daripada nilai projek tersebut ialah RM486,000. Dalam tindakan ini, plaintif menuntut jumlah RM368,000 yang merupakan tranche kedua dan ketiga yang terakru di bawah perjanjian tersebut setelah menolak sejumlah RM100,000 bagi tranche pertama yang dituntut di mahkamah sesyen. Defendan menghujah bahawa memandangkan jumlah yang dituntut berbangkit daripada perjanjian tersebut, plaintif sepatutnya menuntut keseluruhan jumlah terakru dalam tindakan pertamanya di mana penghakiman persetujuan direkodkan. Oleh itu, defendan menghujah bahawa plaintif diestop sepenuhnya daripada memulakan tindakan ini terhadap mereka disebabkan doktrin res judicata dan juga berikutan dengan penghakiman persetujuan yang telah dimasukkan dalam tindakan di mahkamah sesyen. Plaintif walau bagaimanapun menghujah bahawa guaman ini di antara pihak-pihak adalah berkaitan kemungkiran perjanjian tersebut oleh defendan berkaitan tuntutan-tuntutan ansuran kedua dan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-196 ketiga. Selanjutnya, penghakiman persetujuan dimasukkan tanpa pengakuan ke atas liabiliti dan tanpa prejudis. Timbalan pendaftar membenarkan permohonan defendan membatalkan tuntutan plaintif kerana merupakan penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. Menentang keputusan tersebut, plaintif merayu ke mahkamah ini dan satu-satunya isu untuk dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah ini adalah sama ada tuntutan plaintif merupakan penyalahgunaan proses.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan plaintif dengan kos:

(1) Prinsip res judicata terpakai dalam kes ini. Plaintif gagal mengemukakan keseluruhan kesnya, malah sepertinya telah membawa sebahagian kesnya di mahkamah sesyen dan cuba membawa kes yang selebihnya ke Mahkamah Tinggi walaupun kes yang sama boleh diselesaikan secara adil dalam prosiding yang terdahulu antara pihak yang sama. Mahkamah ini mestilah berjaga-jaga dalam menghalang satu pihak daripada mendesak semula dalam prosiding berikutnya aduan yang boleh diselesaikan secara adil dalam prosiding terdahulu antara pihak-pihak yang sama di mahkamah sesyen (lihat perenggan 17). ||Page 843>> (2) Adalah jelas pada penghakiman persetujuan tersebut dan daripada pembacaan biasa menunjukkan bahawa penghakiman tersebut adalah penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad. Tidak dinyatakan di dalam terma-terma penghakiman persetujuan tersebut menyatakan bahawa plaintif diperuntukkan hak untuk meneruskan tuntutan di bawah perenggan 2 dan 3 perjanjian tersebut (lihat perenggan 24). (3) Terma-terma penghakiman persetujuan mestilah dibaca dan difahami seperti yang dinyatakan dan plaintif tidak harus dibenarkan menambah ayat-ayat atau mengubah terma-terma penghakiman persetujuan itu. Adalah menjadi undang-undang tetap bahawa perintah persetujuan merupakan keterangan kontrak antara pihak-pihak dan mengikat kesemua pihak kepada perintah tersebut (lihat perenggan 25). Notes For cases on consent order, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2010 Reissue) paras 4513–4531. For cases on res judicata, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2010 Reisssue) paras 2890–2906. [8] The defendant submitted that since the sums claimed herein arose from ||Page 845>> the said agreement, the plaintiff ought to have claimed all of the sums due in its first action wherein a consent judgment was recorded in 2006. The plaintiff is not entitled to commence litigation in installment against the defendant. The plaintiff is estopped entirely from commencing this present action against the defendant due to the doctrine of res judicata and also in view of the consent judgment entered in the sessions court action. [10] The learned deputy registrar allowed the defendant’s application after relying on the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783 which is based on the doctrine of res judicata. The learned deputy registrar is of the opinion that the doctrine of res judicata applied in this case as the claim for 50% of the remaining amount upon receipt of mobilisation fee from the government and 50% of the remaining amount upon receipt of the first progress E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-197 payment from the government and the claim for the sum of RM100,00 for breach of a contract in the previous action in the sessions court were clearly identical, resting as they were on the same facts or issue and that both claims were based on the same letter of undertaking (the said agreement). [13] The law on the doctrine of res judicata had been laid down in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 3 CLJ 783. In that case, the court explained as follows:

What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicature. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy. [14] In the case of Simpang Empat Plantation Sdn Bhd v Ali bin Tan Sri Abdul Kadir & Ors [2006] 1 MLJ 193; [2006] 1 CLJ 41 which explains the law on res judicata extensively and which I gratefully adopt. In that case the learned Court of Appeal Judge Dato’ Gopal Sri Ram (now FCJ) stated as follows:

The first point that has to be decided is whether res judicata applies here. In order to do that, it is, I think, desirable to remind myself of the nature and ambit of the doctrine. In Chee Pok Choy & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 346; [2001] 2 CLJ 321, this court had occasion to discuss these points. ||Page 847>> And I quote:

Thus, there are in fact two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum. The first type relates to cause of action estoppel and the second, to issue estoppel, which is a development from the first type. The cause of action estoppel arises when rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court for a particular remedy are determined in a final judgment and such right of E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-198 action ie the cause of action, merges into the said final judgment; in layman’s language, the cause of action has turned into the said final judgment. The said cause of action may not be relitigated between the same parties because it is res judicata. In order to prevent multiplicity of actions and also in order to protect the underlying rationales of estoppel per rem judicatum and not to act against them, such estoppel of cause of action has been extended to all other causes of action (based on the same facts or issues) which should have been litigated or asserted in the original earlier action resulting in the final judgment and which were not either deliberately or due to inadvertence … [16] In the case of Simpang Empat, we are also reminded that action estoppel/res judicata being a rule of equity is not absolute. The Court of Appeal ||Page 848>> therefore quoted the following passage to state that where there are special circumstances, then the estoppel rule may be disregarded by the court: [17] I am of the opinion that the above principle of res judicata applies in the present case. The plaintiff had failed to bring forward its whole case and instead appears to have brought part of its case in the sessions court and now attempts to bring the rest of its case in the High Court although the same could fairly have been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties. This court must be vigilant in precluding a party from re-agitating in subsequent proceedings a complaint which could fairly have been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties in the sessions court. [18] The plaintiff submits that their claim in the sessions court only concerned para 1 of the said agreement whereas their claim in the High Court concerns paras 2 and 3 of the said agreement and therefore the principle of res judicata was inapplicable in the circumstance of the case (presumably since there is no decision in respect of paras 2 and 3 of the said agreement). I do not agree with the contentions.

||Page 849>> The doctrine may thus be seen to encompass several categories. In its narrowest sense, res judicata, I think, refers to estoppel by record. It refers to the actual decision of the earlier action or proceedings. In its wider sense, it encompasses issues and causes of action that could justly and fairly have been equally adjudicated in the earlier suit or proceedings. This wider operation of the doctrine is sometimes referred to ‘constructive res judicata’. It houses the twin concepts of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. Like the tree of which they form the branches, they are designed to ensure that there is finality in litigation. [20] In the present case, the plaintiff has failed to show any special circumstances necessary as required in the Simpang Empat case to escape the consequences of the res judicata rule. Having carefully read through the affidavits filed by the plaintiff (encls 11 and 14), I found that there are no averments explaining why the plaintiff did not bring the entire case before the court from the beginning and no special circumstances which would show why the claim on paras 2 and 3 of the said agreement could not by reasonable diligence have been adduced in the earlier proceedings. It must be borne in mind that the consent judgment was recorded in 2006, therefore the plaintiff had ample time to bring its claim for the balance under paras 2 and 3 of the said agreement after the government contract was awarded in 2001. It is trite law that there must be material before this court in order to make a finding especially in a case where the court needs to find special circumstances.

‘It is further necessary at this stage to understand the import of the words in the said famous statement ie ‘… every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation … ’ which Somervell LJ explained in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 at p 257 as follows: … res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. Administrative Law — Remedies — Habeas corpus — Three successive applications for writ of habeas corpus determined and dismissed by court — Whether doctrine of res judicata applicable to bar subsequent applications Preventive Detention — Detention — Application for habeas corpus — Three successive applications filed by applicant — Grounds raised in third application available but not raised during second application — Whether applicant failed to put forward whole case in second application — Whether doctrine of res judicata would apply to bar third application — Whether common law doctrine of res judicata incorporated in Malaysian statute law — Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25(2) The appellant was detained under the Internal Security Act 1960 (‘ISA’) pursuant to a detention order dated 13 December 2007. He filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the High Court at Kuala Lumpur on 19 December 2007 (‘the first application’). The application was dismissed on 26 February 2008. The appellant appealed to the Federal Court which dismissed his appeal on 14 May 2008. On 30 May 2008, the appellant filed for a second writ of habeas corpus (‘the second application’), which application was subsequently dismissed by the High Court at Ipoh on 8 September 2008. On 8 August 2008, the appellant filed his third application for the writ. In his grounds he submitted, inter alia, that after the issuance of the detention order by the first respondent on 13 December 2007 and after the dismissal of the appellant’s first application for a writ of habeas corpus by the High Court on 26 February 2008, he had been elected as an ADUN to the Selangor State Legislative Assembly. This was one of the appellant’s new grounds in filing his third application. The appellant contended that being an ADUN he would not have committed any act that caused a threat to the national security and that due to his continuous detention he could not carry out his responsibilities to the people who had voted him in as ADUN. At the outset of the hearing of the third application, the senior federal counsel (‘SFC’) raised a preliminary objection that none of the grounds raised fell under the ||Page 661>> ambit of an application for habeas corpus of a person detained under the ISA. The High Court allowed the preliminary objection and dismissed the appellant’s third

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-200 application for the writ of habeas corpus. The appellant thus filed the instant appeal to the Federal Court. At the appeal, the Federal Court directed counsel and the SFC to submit whether the common law doctrine of res judicata applied to the appellant’s case.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) The common law doctrine of res judicata has been incorporated into the statute law in Malaysia as s 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘CJA’) which confers additional powers to the High Court as set out in item 11 of the Schedule to the CJA. The inclusion of the common law doctrine of res judicata in item 11 of the Schedule under s 25(2) of the CJA reflects the intention of legislators in formulating a policy to address the issue of multiplicity or overlapping of legal proceedings (see paras 8 & 15). (2) There would be exceptional cases where matters which should have been raised were not, but when raised in subsequent proceedings would not amount to an abuse of process and the plea of res judicata would not appear to be correctly taken as illustrated recently in Rakesh a/l Ram Tawar v Timbalan Menteri Keselamatan Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2008] 4 MLJ 97 (distinguished) (see para 17). (3) In the instant case, the second application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed by the appellant after he became an ADUN on 8 March 2008. The points raised in the third application ought to have been raised in the second application. Therefore the doctrine of res judicata would apply. There were no special or exceptional circumstances shown by the appellant which would merit the preclusion of the doctrine of res judicata and the plea of an abuse of process. On the facts of the case, the appellant had not shown that he had put forward in his second application the whole of the case which was then fairly available to him (see para 18). Perayu telah ditahan di bawah Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 (‘ISA’) menurut perintah tahanan bertarikh 13 Disember 2007. Perayu telah memfailkan writ habeas corpus di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur pada 19 Disember 2007 (‘permohonan pertama’). Permohonan tersebut telah ditolak pada 26 Februari 2008. Perayu telah merayu ke Mahkamah Persekutuan yang juga telah menolak rayuannya pada 14 Mei 2008. Pada 30 Mei 2008, perayu telah memfailkan writ habeas corpus kedua (‘permohonan kedua’), yang ||Page 662>> mana permohonan tersebut kemudiannya ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh pada 8 September 2008. Pada 8 Ogos 2008, perayu telah memfailkan permohonan ketiganya bagi writ tersebut. Dalam alasannya, dia menghujahkan, antara lain, bahawa selepas pengeluaran perintah tahanan oleh responden pertama pada 13 Disember 2007 dan selepas penolakan permohonan pertama perayu untuk writ habeas corpus oleh Mahkamah Tinggi pada 26 Februari 2008, dia telah dipilih sebagai ADUN kepada Majlis Undangan Negeri Selangor. Ini adalah salah satu alasan baru perayu di dalam memfailkan permohonan ketiganya. Perayu menegaskan bahawa dengan menjadi seorang ADUN dia tidak akan melakukan apa-apa tindakan yang menyebabkan ancaman kepada keselamatan negara dan disebabkan penahanannya yang berterusan, dia tidak dapat menjalankan tanggungjawabnya kepada orang ramai yang mengundinya sebagai ADUN. Pada permulaan pendengaran permohonan ketiga, peguam kanan persekutuan membangkitkan bantahan awal bahawa alasan-alasan yang dibangkitkan tidak termasuk di dalam lingkungan permohonan habeas corpus bagi seseorang E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-201 yang ditahan di bawah ISA. Mahkamah Tinggi membenarkan bantahan awal dan menolak permohonan ketiga perayu bagi writ habeas corpus. Perayu kemudiannya memfailkan rayuan ini ke Mahkamah Persekutuan. Ketika rayuan, Mahkamah Persekutuan mengarahkan peguam dan peguam kanan persekutuan untuk menghujahkan sama ada doktrin res judicata dalam common law terpakai dalam kes perayu.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan:

(1) Doktrin res judicata common law telah digabungkan ke dalam undang-undang statut di Malaysia sebagai s 25(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (‘AMK’) yang mengurniakan kuasa tambahan kepada Mahkamah Tinggi seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam butiran 11 Jadual AMK. Kemasukan doktrin res judicata common law di dalam butiran 11 Jadual di bawah s 25(2) AMK, menggambarkan keinginan penggubal undang-undang dalam merumuskan polisi untuk menumpukan isu kepelbagaian atau pertindihan prosiding perundangan (lihat perenggan 8 & 15). (2) Akan terdapat kes-kes luar biasa di mana perkara yang sepatutnya dibangkitkan tidak dilakukan, tetapi apabila dibangkitkan di dalam prosiding seterusnya tidak akan menyebabkan penyalahgunaan proses dan rayuan res judicata tidak dirumus secara betul seperti yang dijelaskan baru-baru ini di dalam kes Rakesh a/l Ram Tawar v Timbalan Menteri Keselamatan Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2008] 4 MLJ 97 (dibeza) (lihat perenggan 17). (3) Dalam kes ini, permohonan kedua untuk writ hebeas corpus telah difailkan oleh perayu selepas dia menjadi ADUN pada 8 Mac 2008. ||Page 663>> Perkara tersebut dibangkitkan di dalam permohonan ketiga sepatutnya telah dibangkitkan di dalam permohonan kedua. Oleh itu doktrin res judicata adalah terpakai. Tidak terdapat keadaan khas atau luar biasa ditunjukkan oleh perayu yang memeritkan penggunaan doktrin res judicata dan alasan penyalahgunaan proses. Berdasarkan fakta kes, perayu tidak menunjukkan yang dia telah mengemukakan di dalam permohonan keduanya keseluruhan kes yang diperolehi keseluruhannya (lihat perenggan 18).

RES JUDICATA

[5] At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal before us, we directed learned counsel for the appellant and senior federal counsel for the respondents to submit whether the common law doctrine of res judicata applies to the appellant’s case. We took this stand having noted that there are successive applications for a writ of habeas corpus made by the appellant after the Federal Court had dismissed the appellant’s appeal under the first application. [6] Res judicata is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Ed, as follows:

[literally in Latin ‘a thing adjudicated] 1 An issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision. 2 An affirmative defence barring parties from litigating a second lawful lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transactions and that could have been — but was not raised in the first suit. The three essential elements are (1) an earlier decision on the issue (2) a final judgment E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-202 ||Page 666>> on the merits, and (3) the involvement of the same parties, or parties in privity with the original parties. Restatement (Second) of Judgments ss 17, 24 (1982) — Also termed res adjudicata, claim preclusion. Cf COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. Res Judicata has been used in this section as a general term referring to all new ways in which one judgment will have a binding effect on another. That usage is and doubtless will continue to be common, but it lumps under a single name two quite different effects of judgments. The first is the effect of foreclosing any litigation of matters that never been litigated, because of the determination that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit. The second is the effect of foreclosing relitigation of matters that have once been litigated and decided. The first of these, preclusion of matters that were never litigated, had gone under the name, ‘true res judicata’ or the names ‘merger’ and ‘bar’. The second doctrine, preclusion of matters that have once been decided, has usually been called ‘collateral estoppel’ Professor Alan Vestal has long argued for the use of the names ‘claim preclusion’ and ‘issue preclusion’ for these two doctrines [Vestal, Raitonale of Preclusion, 9 St Louis U LJ 29 (1964)], and this usage is increasingly employed by the Courts as it is by Restatement Second of Judgment. Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts s 100A, at 722–723 (5th Ed 1994). [7] George Spencer Bower and Sir Alexander Kingcome Turner in their book The Doctrine of Res Judicata, 2nd Ed at p 1 defined res judicata, inter alia, as follows:

21 In English jurisprudence a res judicata, that is to say a final judicial decision pronounced by a judicial tribunal having competent jurisdiction over the cause or matter in litigation, and over the parties thereto, disposes once and for all of the matters decided, so that they cannot afterwards be raised for re-litigation between the same parties or their privies. [8] The common law doctrine of res judicata has been incorporated into the statute law in Malaysia as can be found in s 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘CJA’) which confers additional powers to the High Court as set out in item 11 of the Schedule to the CJA as follows:

11 Power to dismiss or stay proceedings where the matter in question is res judicata between the parties, or by reason of multiplicity of proceedings in any Court or Courts the proceedings ought not to be continued. [9] Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that a writ of habeas corpus is a public law remedy and it is a prerogative writ just as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The grant of habeas corpus is therefore as of right and not in the discretion of the court. It was contended for the appellant that as a general rule the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to public law ||Page 667>> remedies. On the issue of whether the doctrine of res judicata or constructive res judicata is applicable when successive habeas corpus petitions or applications are filed, learned counsel for the appellant referred to us the position under the Constitution of India and case laws in India. In India it is enshrined in their Constitution that a detained person is at liberty to file application for habeas corpus to the Supreme Court irrespective of whether he had exhausted such right in the High Court by virtue of art 32(2) which states as follows: [11] Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that based on the above case law authority from India the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The appellant contended that he is raising new grounds under the third application on the basis that he is now an ADUN. To the appellant his applications for a writ of habeas corpus under the first application and the second application were dismissed by the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-203 High Court on different grounds. ||Page 668>> [13] Learned senior federal counsel for the respondents further submitted that we should not readily rely on the law of other jurisdictions in relation to the application of the doctrine of res judicata in Malaysia and that it is imperative for us to look into our own laws. On this point learned senior federal counsel referred us to the case of Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914 wherein Abdul Hamid bin Mohamad FCJ (as he then was) at p 932 had this to say: [15] It is our judgment that the inclusion of the common law doctrine of res judicata in item 11 of the Schedule under s 25(2) of the CJA reflects the intention of our legislators in formulating a policy to address the issue of multiplicity or overlapping of legal proceedings. In this regard reference may be made to Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 256 where Abdoolcader SCJ, said at pp 498–499 (MLJ), p 261 (CLJ):

The earlier action instituted by the respondent on 2 July 1985 and which was struck out sought relief on the ground of discrimination in breach of art 8 of the Constitution but in the present proceedings the grounds for relief have been augmented and declarations sought to the effect we have indicated earlier. The appellants plead res judicata in this regard and we think the point is well taken and is supported by authority, and we would refer to the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Hoystead & Ors v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155 (at pp 165–166) and a catenation of cases to the like effect, namely, that the plea of res judicata applies, except perhaps where special circumstances may conceivably arise of sufficient merit to exclude its operation, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time … The attempt by way of the instant proceedings to relitigate and re-open the earlier action clearly reflects the appositeness of the caption suggested for this matter in the prelude to this judgment and would appear to us to be as clear an instance of an abuse of the process of the court as one can find within the connotation thereof enunciated in the speech of Lord Diplock in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police and Ors [1982] AC 529 (at p 542). [17] In arriving at our decision we do recognise the fact that there would be exceptional cases where matters which should have been raised were not, but when raised in subsequent proceedings would not amount to an abuse of process and the plea of res judicata does not appear to be correctly taken, (see the case of Re Tarling [1979] 1 All ER 981). This point was considered in our ||Page 670>> local case of Rakesh a/l Ram Tawar v Timbalan Menteri Keselamatan Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2008] 4 MLJ 97 wherein Nallini Pathmanathan JC said that given the somewhat exceptional facts of the case, the application of the doctrine of res judicata should be precluded. The learned JC in her well reasoned judgment said that the question that arises for consideration is whether the applicant ‘held back’ the arguments relating to mandatory procedural non-compliance, which he seeks to raise in the second application after having filed the first application for a writ of habeas corpus that had been dismissed. In that case, the applicant’s first set of solicitors failed to raise in the first application any such issues, which if raised and found to be true, would have had some possibility of success. As drafted and put forward, the first application contained no merits warranting the issuance of an order of habeas corpus. This is because the entire basis for the first application was a challenge to

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-204 the discretion exercised by the minister without any reasonable basis in arriving at his decision to issue the order of detention. The law in this area is clear, particularly since the decision of the Federal Court in Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors. In that case it was held that with the amendments to the Emergency Ordinance (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) 1969, the ISA 1960 and Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measure) Act 1985 made by Act A740, Act A739 and Act A738 respectively, which came into force on 24 August 1989, challenges to the minister’s detention order could only be based on one ground namely non-compliance with procedural requirements. Accordingly, the first application filed by the applicant was misconceived, in that it was premised on legal arguments that were doomed to failure under the law as it stands. To that extent the applicant was prejudiced in his first application by the failure of his first set of solicitors to appreciate the current position in law. The learned JC in her judgment took the view that from the facts it is clear that it cannot be said that the applicant ‘held back’ arguments that were available to him. On this point we wholly agree with the view expressed by the learned JC. The fact that the applicant’s solicitors were not apprised of the current position in law on this issue cannot be attributed to the applicant as he relied entirely on their legal expertise. [18] Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and learned senior federal counsel for the respondents we are satisfied that the second application for a writ of habeas corpus was also filed by the appellant after he became an ADUN on 8 March 2008. We are of the view that the points raised in the third application before us ought to have been raised in the second application. Therefore the doctrine of res judicata applies. We find there are no special or exceptional circumstances shown by the appellant which would merit the preclusion of the doctrine of res judicata and the plea of an abuse of process. It is also to be noted that the appellant in the present case under appeal had filed three successive applications for a writ of habeas application in respect of the same detention order dated 13 December 2007. ||Page 671>> Whatever the merits may be in the second application it is our judgment that the points raised in the third application ought to have been raised in the second application. On the facts of the case it has not been shown to us that the appellant had put forward in his second application the whole of the case which was then fairly available to him. For the reasons already stated we dismissed this appeal. Civil Procedure — Estoppel — Res judicata — Effect of earlier decision of Federal Court — Wider concept of issue estoppel — Whether plaintiff estopped from claiming that defendants had agreed to sell their alleged spes successionis when it did not raise issue of spes successionis before Federal Court The three appeals which were the subject matter of this judgment concern various parcels of land in the Ayer Itam estate (‘the lands’), which were registered in the name of Choong Lye Hock Estates Sdn Bhd (Choong estates). Choong estates held the land as trustees for the Estate of Chor Bah Say (‘Chor’s estate’). It held 1/4 of the undivided shares in the lands as the registered and beneficial proprietor and the remaining 3/4 of the undivided shares in the lands for Chor’s estate. The first to sixth defendants were the beneficiaries of Chor’s estate. Chor Phaik Har (‘Phaik Har’) and her sister, Chor Phaik Sim (‘Phaik Sim’) were the remaining direct beneficiaries of Chor’s estate. The first to sixth defendants, Phaik Har and Phaik Sim, as beneficiaries of Chor’s estate, and Choong Estates entered into two separate sale and purchase agreements with Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd (‘the plaintiff’) to sell their shares in the lands

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-205 (‘the Farlim agreements’). Although Phaik Har and Phaik Sim were named in both the Farlim agreements they did not execute both agreements because they did not agree with the purchase price. Despite this setback the plaintiff invoked a clause of both the Farlim agreements which allowed it to proceed with both agreements. Subsequently Phaik Har entered a caveat on the whole of the lands. The plaintiff then applied to the High Court for the removal of the caveat under s 327 of the National Land Code (‘NLC’) (Chor Phaik Har’s case). The High Court the plaintiff’s application for the removal of the caveat on the grounds that the plaintiff was a person aggrieved by the entry of the caveat in respect of the lands. When Phaik Har appealed to the Federal Court, one of the issues that ||Page 450>> was considered and decided by that court was whether a beneficiary under an intestacy had any interest in the property of a deceased person before the estate had been fully administered. The Federal Court held that until the estate had been fully administered by the administrators and distribution made according to law, the beneficiaries had no interest or property in Chor’s estate so as to give them any title to the lands. Hence, the Federal Court held that in the circumstances the plaintiff was not a person aggrieved under s 327 of the NLC and the caveat was restored. Finally when the distribution and/or vesting order in respect of Chor’s estate was made, Choong estates was allowed by the High Court to execute and deliver to the first to sixth defendants a valid and registrable transfer of the lands in proportion to their entitlement. The first to sixth defendants then gave notices to the plaintiff alleging that the latter had delayed completion and was in breach of the fundamental terms of the Farlim agreements and that if the breaches were not remedied the agreements would be terminated. The plaintiff denied being in breach and confirmed that it was ready and willing to complete the sale. Thereafter the first to sixth defendants proceeded to sell their interest in the lands to the seventh defendant. The plaintiff then commenced this action against the first to sixth defendants wherein it prayed, inter alia, for a declaration that the sale and purchase agreement that the first to sixth defendants had entered into with the seventh defendant was null and void, specific performance of the Farlim agreements and damages. Subsequently, the defendants filed an application to strike out the plaintiff’s claim under O18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (the Goh Keat Poh’s case). The application which was dismissed by the deputy registrar was allowed on appeal by the High Court. The High Court struck out the plaintiff’s claim on the grounds of, inter alia, res judicata and issue estoppel. Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal which allowed the plaintiff’s appeal. After hearing the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants the High Court held that the plaintiff had, on a balance of probability, proven its claim against the first to sixth defendants. The High Court also held that the seventh defendant was guilty of fraud when it conspired with the first to sixth defendants to deprive the plaintiff from enforcing its rights on the lands. This was the defendants’ appeal against that decision by the High Court. At this appeal the parties agreed that should the court agree with the defendants’ appeal in this case there would be no necessity to hear the other two appeals.

Held, allowing the appeal with costs here and court below:

(1) In Chor Phaik Har’s case when the Federal Court, had decided whether the plaintiff was a person aggrieved within the meaning of s 327 of the NLC, it had considered the validity of the Farlim agreements. When the Federal Court held that a

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-206 beneficiary under an intestacy had no interest ||Page 451>> or property in the personal estate of a deceased person prior to the administration and distribution it meant that the first to sixth defendants as the beneficiaries had no interest in the lands to be able to give the plaintiff any title to the lands (see para 35). (2) The plaintiff’s submission that the defendants had intended to sell their home to succeed the lands, ie their spes successionis, because Chor’s Estate had yet to be administered and distributed could not stand. This was because in Chor Phaik Har’s case the Federal Court had made a finding that in the Farlim agreements the first to sixth defendants had agreed to sell their rights, title and interest in the lands and not their spes successionis. In any case the term spes successionis was not used in the Farlim agreements. Further, applying the principles of res judicata or issue estoppel, which applied not only to the issues that the court was actually required to decide but also to every issue which the parties exercising reasonable diligence might have raised at that time, the plaintiff was estopped from claiming that the defendants had agreed to sell their alleged spes successionis (see paras 36–37). (3) The issue of the validity of the Farlim agreements had been conclusively decided by the Federal Court in the Chor Phaik Har’s case. The decision of the court that the beneficiaries did have interest or property in the lands and could not have covenanted to convey any title to the plaintiff was binding on parties to Farlim agreements and anyone who sought to rely on the agreements to enforce their rights. It was also binding on this court and every court in this country because of the doctrine of stare decisis (see paras 38–39). Ketiga-tiga rayuan yang menjadi perkara pokok penghakiman ini berkaitan pelbagai bidang tanah di Estet Ayer Itam (‘tanah-tanah tersebut’), yang telah didaftarkan atas nama Choong Lye Hock Estates Sdn Bhd (Estet-estet Choong). Estet-estet Choong memegang tanah tersebut sebagai pemegang amanah untuk harta pusaka Chor Bah Say (‘harta pusaka Chor’). Ia memegang 1/4 daripada bahagian tidak dibahagikan dalam tanah-tanah tersebut untuk harta pusaka Chor. Defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam merupakan benefisiari harta pusaka Chor. Chor Phaik Har (‘Phaik Har’) dan kakaknya, Chor Phaik Sim (‘Phaik Sim’) merupakan benefisiari secara langsung yang masih kekal dalam harta pusaka Chor. Defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam, Phaik Har dan Phaik Sim, sebagai benefisiari-benefisiari harta pusaka Chor, dan harta pusaka Choong telah memasuki dua perjanjian jual beli berasingan dengan Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd (‘plaintif’) untuk menjual bahagian-bahagian mereka dalam tanah-tanah tersebut (‘perjanjian-perjanjian Farlim’). Meskipun Phaik Har ||Page 452>> dan Phaik Sim dinamakan dalam kedua-dua perjanjian Farlim mereka tidak menyempurnakan kedua-dua perjanjian tersebut kerana mereka tidak bersetuju dengan harga belian. Meskipun halangan ini plaintif membangkitkan di dalam kedua-dua perjanjian Farlim yang membenarkannya meneruskan dengan kedua-dua perjanjian tersebut. Berikutan itu Phaik Har telah memasukan kaveat atas keseluruhan tanah-tanah tersebut. Plaintif kemudian telah memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk pembatalan kaveat di bawah s 327 Kanun Tanah Negara (‘KTN’) (kes Chor Phaik Har). Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan permohonan plaintif untuk pembatalan kaveat atas alasan-alasan bahawa plaintif merupakan seorang yang terkilan dengan kemasukan kaveat berkaitan tanah-tanah tersebut. Apabila Phaik Har merayu kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan, salah satu isu yang perlu dipertimbangkan dan diputuskan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-207 oleh mahkamah tersebut adalah sama ada benefisiari dalam kematian tak berwasiat mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan dalam hartanah si mati sebelum harta pusaka tersebut ditadbirkan. Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa sehingga harta pusaka ditadbirkan sepenuhnya oleh pentadbir-pentadbir dan pembahagian dibuat menurut undang-undang, benefisiari-benefisiari tiada kepentingan atau harta dalam harta pusaka Chor untuk memberikan mereka apa-apa hak milik ke atas tanah-tanah tersebut. Justeru itu, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa dalam keadaan berikut plaintif bukan seorang yang terkilan di bawah s 327 KTN dan kaveat dikekalkan. Akhirnya apabila pembahagian dan/atau perintah pemberian berkaitan harta pusaka Chor dibuat, harta pusaka Choong dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi untuk menyempurnakan dan menyerahkan kepada defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam pemindahan sah dan boleh didaftarkan tanah-tanah tersebut mengikut hak pembahagian mereka. Defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam kemudian memberikan notis-notis kepada plaintif mengatakan bahawa plaintif telah melengahkan penyempurnaan dan melanggar terma-terma penting perjanjian-perjanjian Farlim dan bahawa jika pelanggaran-pelanggaran tersebut tidak diremedi perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut akan ditamatkan. Plaintif menafikan telah membuat pelanggaran dan mengesahkan bahawa ia bersedia dan ingin menyempurnakan jualan tersebut. Berikutan itu defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam terus menjual kepentingan mereka dalam tanah-tanah tersebut kepada defendan ketujuh. Plaintif kemudian telah memulakan tindakan ini terhadap defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam di mana ia memohon, antara lain, untuk deklarasi bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang ditandatangani oleh defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam dengan defendan ketujuh adalah terbatal dan tidak sah, pelaksanaan spesifik perjanjian-perjanjian Farlim dan ganti rugi. Berikutan itu, defendan-defendan telah memfailkan permohonan untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (kes Goh Keat Poh). Permohonan ini yang ditolak oleh timbalan pendaftar telah dirayu dan dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Mahkamah ||Page 453>> Tinggi telah membatalkan tuntutan plaintif atas alasan-alasan, antara lain, res judicata dan isu estopel. Berasa tidak puas hati dengan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi, plaintif merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan yang membenarkan rayuan plaintif. Selepas perbicaraan tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan, Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa plaintif telah, atas imbangan kebarangkalian, membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam. Mahkamah Tinggi juga memutuskan bahawa defendan ketujuh bersalah atas raud apabila bersubahat dengan defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam untuk menafikan plaintif daripada menguatkuasakan haknya ke atas tanah-tanah tersebut. Ini adalah rayuan defendan-defendan terhadap keputusan tersebut oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Dalam rayuan ini pihak-pihak bersetuju bahawa sekiranya mahkamah bersetuju dengan rayuan defendan-defendan dalam kes ini tiada keperluan untuk mendengar dua rayuan lain.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dengan kos di mahkamah ini dan Mahkamah Tinggi:

(1) Dalam kes Chor Phaik Har apabila Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan sama ada plaintif merupakan seorang yang terkilan dalam maksud s 327 KTN, ia telah mempertimbangkan kesahan perjanjian-perjanjian Farlim tersebut. Apabila Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa benefisiari dalam kematian tak berwasiat tiada kepentingan atau harta dalam harta pusaka peribadi si mati sehingga pentadbiran dan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-208 pengagihan ia bermaksud bahawa defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam sebagai benefisiari-benefisiari tiada kepentingan dalam tanah-tanah tersebut untuk membolehkan plaintif diberikan apa-apa hak milik ke atas tanah-tanah tersebut (lihat perenggan 35). (2) Hujahan plaintif bahawa defendan-defendan berniat untuk menjual rumah mereka untuk mendapatkan tanah-tanah tersebut, iaitu spes successionis mereka, oleh sebab harta pusaka Chor masih belum ditadbirkan dan diagihkan, tidak boleh kekal. Ini adalah kerana dalam kes Chor Phaik Har Mahkamah Persekutuan telah membuat penemuan bahawa dalam perjanjian-perjanjian Farlim defendan-defendan pertama hingga keenam telah bersetuju untuk menjual hak, milikan dan kepentingan mereka dalam tanah-tanah tersebut dan bukan spes successionis mereka. Walau bagaimanapun terma spes successionis tidak boleh digunakan dalam perjanjian-perjanjian Farlim. Bahkan, dengan menggunakan prinsip-prinsip res judicata atau isu estopel, yang terpakai bukan hanya untuk isu-isu yang mahkamah perlu memutuskan tetapi juga untuk setiap isu yang mana pihak-pihak menggunakan usaha wajar mereka yang mungkin timbul pada masa ||Page 454>> tersebut, plaintif diestopkan daripada mendakwa bahawa defendan-defendan telah bersetuju untuk menjual spes successionis yang dikatakan mereka (lihat perenggan 36–37). (3) Isu kesahan perjanjian-perjanjian Farlim telah diputuskan secara muktamad oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Chor Phaik Har. Keputusan mahkamah tersebut bahawa benefisiari-benefisiari mempunyai kepentingan atau harta dalam tanah-tanah tersebut dan tidak mungkin dikatakan menyerahkan apa-apa hak milik kepada plaintif yang mengikat pihak-pihak kepada perjanjian-perjanjian Farlim dan sesiapa yang ingin bergantung kepada perjanjian-perjanjian untuk menguatkuasakan hak-hak mereka. Ia juga mengikat ke atas mahkamah ini dan setiap mahkamah dalam negara ini kerana doktrin stare decisis (lihat perenggan 38–39). [21] One of the issues argued and decided in the High Court was whether both the Farlim agreements were valid and subsisting. Under this issue the learned High Court judge had to decide whether res judicata was applicable to the case in respect of the decision of the Federal Court in Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188 (‘the Chor Phaik Har’s case’). The learned High Court judge held that res judicata did not apply and he relied on the judgment of this court in the Goh Keat Poh’s case. [23] The preliminary issues of law argued before us at the outset of the hearing of these appeals are the issues of res judicata and stare decisis. Learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the learned High Court judge erred when he found that the validity of both the Farlim agreements and their enforceability was not res judicata as having been decided by the Federal Court in the Chor Phaik Har’s case. The defendant also raised the issue of stare decisis and submitted that the learned High Court judge was bound by the decision in the Chor Phaik Har’s case. [24] Learned counsel for the defendants further submitted that based on the principles of res judicata/issue estoppel the plaintiff was estopped from claiming that the first to sixth defendants had agreed to sell their ‘alleged spes successionis’. In the Chor Phaik Har’s case the Federal Court had decided that in the Farlim agreements the beneficiaries have agreed to

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-209 sell their rights, title and interest of their respective shares in the said lands. ||Page 459>> [25] In response to that learned counsel for the plaintiff referred to the decision of this court in the Goh Keat Poh’s case where this court had considered the issue of res judicata by reason of the Federal Court’s decision in the Chor Phaik Har’s case. In that case this court held that the plea of res judicata was inapplicable. Leave to appeal against that decision was refused by the Federal Court. The plaintiff also contended that the defendants could not relitigate the same issue that was determined by a previous coram of this court as it amounted to an abuse of process. [32] The defendants in the instant case applied for the striking out of the plaintiff’s action under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court. The defendants’ application was dismissed by the learned assistant registrar. The defendants then appealed to the judge in chambers against the decision. The defendants’ appeal was allowed by the High Court judge. The High Court judge struck out the plaintiff’s claim on the ground of, inter alia, res judicata and issue estoppel. [33] Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court judge the plaintiff then appealed to this court against the decision. This court then allowed the plaintiff’s appeal. On the issue of res judicata this court, through Mohd Noor Ahmad JCA (as he then was) said at p 666 (MLJ); p 516 (CLJ):

To us, it is indeed clear from the judgment in Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd, that the Federal Court did not at all consider on the validity of the 1992 agreements. The issue was only raised by learned counsel for the appellant in the case in his submission before the court. However, the court merely held that as the administration of the deceased’s estate was not completed at that point of time the ||Page 461>> beneficiaries had no title to pass to the plaintiff and as such, the plaintiff was not ‘a person or body aggrieved’ for the purpose of removal of the private caveat. Whatever it is, res judicata can never be applied in favour of the defendants because res judicata only prohibits a cause of action from being re-litigated between the same parties but in that case the defendants were never a party. [36] We are unable to agree with the contention that the subject matter of the Farlim agreements was the spes successionis the defendant had in the said lands for the simple reason that the Federal Court has made a finding that in the Farlim agreements the beneficiaries have agreed to sell their rights title and interest of their respective shares in the said lands. Furthermore the term ‘spes successionis’ was never mentioned in the Farlim agreements. As such the question of disposing a spes successionis did not arise. The plaintiff did not raise the issue of spes successionis before the Federal Court. The plaintiff must abide by the decision as res judicata applies not only to issues the court was actually required to decide but also to every issue which the parties exercising reasonable diligence might have raised at that time (Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189). [37] Applying the principles of res judicata/issue estoppel the plaintiff was therefore estopped from claiming that the defendants had agreed to sell their ‘alleged spes successionis’. As such we are of the view that the learned High Court judge has erred in coming to the decision that what the first to sixth defendants had intended to sell was their spes successionis. [38] We are also of the view that the issue of the validity of the Farlim agreements has been conclusively decided by the Federal Court in the Chor Phaik Har’s case when it held that the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-210 beneficiaries did not have interest or property in the estate of Chor Bah Say and they could not have covenanted to convey any title to the plaintiff. The decision of the Federal Court is binding on the parties to the Farlim agreements and anyone who seeks to rely on them to enforce their rights. It is to be noted that the plaintiff in the instant case was also the plaintiff in that case. On this issue we would refer to the observation made by Peh Swee Chin FCJ in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd where the learned judge, after considering a host of authorities on the doctrine of res judicata, stated:

On the other hand, issue estoppel literally means simply an issue which a party is estopped from raising in a subsequent proceeding. However, issue estoppel, in a nutshell, from a consideration of case law, means in law a lot more ie that neither of the same parties or their privies in a subsequent proceeding is entitled to challenge the correctness of the decision of a previous final judgment in which they, or their privies, were parties. This sounds like explaining a truism, but it is the corollary from that statement that is all important and that could have given birth to the controversies alluded to above, the corollary being that neither of such parties will be allowed to adduce evidence or advance any argument to contradict such decision … It is important to bear in mind the manner in which issue estoppel operates in preventing such contradiction of the previous judgment. There is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issue actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary ||Page 463>> view that such issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata ie doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid contrary view is to be preferred; it represents for one thing, a correct even though broader approach to the scope of issue estoppel. It is warranted by the weight of authorities to be illustrated later. It is completely in accord or resonant with the rationales behind the doctrine of res judicata, in other words, with the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. It is particularly important to bear in mind the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and with the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation. Civil Procedure — Estoppel — Res judicata and issue estoppel — Plaintiff’s claim for return of originals of dishonoured bills of exchange — Claim part of litigation in previous suit — Whether claim estopped by principle of res judicata Civil Procedure — Striking out — Abuse of process of court — Res judicata — Whether subject matter ought to have been raised in previous suits — Whether plaintiff barred from claiming any other ancillary or alternative reliefs which he could and should have claimed in previous suits

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal with costs:

(1) It could not be denied that the plaintiff’s present claim against the bank for the return of the originals of the dishonoured bills was so inextricably linked to the bank’s right to debit his account after the bills were dishonoured and it was also clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation in the consolidated suit thereby giving rise to only one conclusion and it would be that the plaintiff’s claim must be barred by the doctrine of res judicata (see para 42).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-211 (2) The plaintiff having claimed for the return of the dishonoured bills of exchange in the originating summons could not do so again in the present action. The plaintiff would also be barred from claiming for any other ancillary or alternative reliefs or prayers which he could and should have claimed in the originating summons but did not. Thus, the plea of res judicata would definitely be invoked against the plaintiff (see paras 51 & 57). (3) The facts of this instant case fell squarely in the ambit of the doctrine of issue of estoppel as applied in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581. In the circumstances, there was no room for the plaintiff to aver that he could come within the narrow scope of ‘special circumstances’ so as to avoid the applicability of the doctrine of issue estoppel to his claim (see para 59). ||Page 342>> (4) An action based on a dishonoured bill of exchange was an action founded on contract. Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953 provides that actions founded on a contract shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. The plaintiff’s account was debited, upon the dishonour of the bills of exchange in 1974/1975. The limitation period for any suit against Mathew on the dishonoured bills would have expired at the latest in 1981 (see paras 60–61). (5) The relationship between the plaintiff and the bank could be described as customer and banker and, in the instant case, the bank was merely acting as the collecting agent on behalf of the plaintiff in respect of the collection of the bills of exchange in question. It is trite law that the relationship between the bank and its customer in relation to the current account and in the collection of the bills of exchange on behalf of a customer is in contract (see para 70). (6) The bank was not and was never a trustee in relation to the dishonoured bills of exchange. The bank had never had title in the bills of exchange vested in them as held by the learned High Court judge in the consolidated suit and the bank claimed no interest in the dishonoured bills of exchange. Because of the judgment in the originating summons wherein the court held expressly that it found no evidence that the originals of the dishonoured bills of exchange were in the possession of the bank or its correspondent, the plaintiff was estopped by the doctrine of res judicata from saying that the documents were in the possession of the bank or its correspondent or that the documents were technically in the possession of the bank (see para 70(g).

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan plaintif dengan kos:

(1) Ia tidak boleh dinafikan bahawa tuntutan plaintif terhadap pihak bank untuk pengembalian bil-bil asal yang tidak laku berkait rapat dengan hak-hak pihak bank untuk mendebit akaunnya selepas bil-bil tersebut tidak laku dan ianya juga jelas sebahagian daripada perkara yang dilitigasi di dalam guaman yang telah digabungkan, yang hanya membangkitkan satu kesimpulan dan ia adalah tuntutan plaintif yang semestinya dihalang oleh doktrin res judicata (lihat perenggan 42). (2) Plaintif setelah menuntut pengembalian bil-bil pertukaran yang tidak laku dalam saman pemula, tidak lagi boleh berbuat demikian dalam tindakan ini. Plaintif juga

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-212 dihalang daripada menuntut relief sampingan atau alternatif yang lain atau memohon yang mana beliau boleh dan sepatutnya menuntut di dalam saman pemula tetapi tidak melakukannya. Oleh itu rayuan res judicata secara jelas akan dibangkitkan terhadap plaintif (lihat perenggan 51 & 57). (3) Fakta kes ini terangkum secara tepat di dalam lingkungan doktrin isu estopel seperti yang diaplikasikan di dalam kes Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581. Dalam keadaan ini, tidak terdapat ruang untuk plaintif berhujah bahawa dia terangkum di dalam skop sempit (keadaan khusus) untuk mengelak pemakaian doktrin isu estopel terhadap tuntutannya (lihat perenggan 59). ||Page 344>> (4) Tindakan yang berdasarkan bil pertukaran yang tidak laku adalah tindakan yang didapati dalam kontrak. Seksyen 6(1)(a) Akta Had Masa 1953 memperuntukkan bahawa tindakan-tindakan yang didapati dalam kontrak seharusnya tidak dibawa selepas tempoh luput enam tahun daripada tarikh kausa tindakan bermula. Akaun plaintif telah didebitkan apabila bil pertukaran tidak laku pada 1974/1975. Tempoh had masa bagi mana-mana guaman terhadap Mathew berkenaan bil-bil yang tidak laku seharusnya luput selewat-lewatnya pada 1981 (lihat perenggan 60–61). (5) Hubungan di antara plaintif dan pihak bank bolehlah digambarkan sebagai pelanggan dan bank dan dalam kes ini, pihak bank hanya bertindak sebagai ejen pengutipan bagi pihak plaintif berkenaan dengan pengutipan bil pertukaran yang dipersoalkan. Adalah undang-undang nyata bahawa hubungan di antara pihak bank dan pelanggannya berkenaan dengan akaun semasa dan dalam pengutipan bil pertukaran bagi pihak pelanggan adalah di dalam kontrak (lihat perenggan 70). (6) Pihak bank bukan dan tidak pernah menjadi pemegang amanah berkenaan dengan bil pertukaran yang tidak laku. Bank tidak sama sekali mempunyai milikan terhadap bil-bil pertukaran yang terletak hak ke atas mereka yang mana telah diputuskan oleh hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang bijaksana dalam menggabungkan guaman dan pihak bank telah menyatakan tidak berminat dalam bil-bil pertukaran yang tidak laku. Kerana penghakiman dalam saman pemula yang mana mahkamah memutuskan bahawa ianya didapati tiada keterangan bahawa bil-bil pertukaran yang tidak laku yang asal adalah dalam milikan pihak bank atau wakilnya, plaintif diestop oleh doktrin res judicata daripada menyatakan bahawa dokumen-dokumen adalah dalam milikan pihak bank atau wakilnya atau dokumen-dokumen secara teknikalnya di dalam milikan pihak bank (lihat perenggan 70(g). Notes For a case on abuse of process of court, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) para 6654. For a case on defendant raising defence of time bar against plaintiff’s claim, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) para 4640. For cases on bills of exchange generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2005 Reissue) paras 2023–2026. For cases on res judicata and issue estoppel, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 2644–2647.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-213 [27] The bank relied primarily on two main grounds. Firstly, the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel in the wider sense. Secondly, the question of limitation. I will now examine these issues based on the authorities and the facts of the present appeal.

RES JUDICATA OR ISSUE ESTOPPEL

[28] The law books are replete with authorities on this issue. Lord Kilbrandon in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581, PC, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, had this to say in regard to the doctrine of res judicata at pp 590–591 of the report:

But there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings. The locus classicus of that aspect of res judicata is the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100, at p 115, where the judge says: … where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. The shutting out of a ‘subject of litigation’ — a power which no court should exercise but after a scrupulous examination of all the circumstances – is limited to cases where reasonable diligence would have caused a matter to be earlier raised; moreover, although negligence, inadvertence or even accident will not suffice to excuse, nevertheless ‘special circumstances’ are reserved in case justice should be found to require the non-application of the rule. For example, if it had been suggested that when the counterclaim in No 969 came to be answered Mr Lai was unaware, and could not reasonably have been expected to be aware, of the ||Page 352>> circumstances attending the sale to Choi Kee, it may be that the present plea against him would not have been maintainable. But no such averment has been made. The Vice-Chancellor’s phrase ‘every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation’ was expanded in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255, at p 257, by Somervell LJ: … res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but … it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. Again, a phrase used by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in delivering the opinion of the Board in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155, at p 171, ‘the present point was one which, if taken, went to the root of the matter on the prior occasion’, appears precisely apposite to the failure, in answer to the counterclaim in No 969, to raise the matters founded on in No 534 which, if then substantiated, would have been then decisive. An instance of a hard case in which the rule was applied is In re Koenigsberg [1948] Ch 727. Their Lordships are, accordingly, of opinion that the Full Court was right in ordering that the statement of claim in No 534 be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court; they will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-214 Any series of concerted acts damaging to a plaintiff can give rise to only one cause of action for conspiracy. The unlawfulness resides in the fact of combination. A plaintiff who believes he has a cause of action in conspiracy must, therefore, decide whether he is going to say either (i) that the purpose was unlawful but not that the means were unlawful, or (ii) that the means were unlawful but not that the purpose was unlawful, or, that both purpose and means were unlawful. If he has chosen to put his case in one of the first two ways, he cannot, thereafter, bring the same transactions before the court, put his case in the other way, and say he is relying on a new cause of action. In such circumstances he can be met with a plea of res judicata, or the statement of claim may be struck out on the ground that the action is frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court.

(1) When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, they and their privies are not permitted to ||Page 353>> litigate once more the res judicata, as the judgment becomes the truth between such parties. An estoppel per rem judicatum has been created as a result. (2) There are two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum, ie cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. The cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of a cause of action which has been determined in a final judgment by the same parties. On the other hand, the issue estoppel prevents contradiction of the correctness of a final judgment by the same parties in a subsequent proceeding. Further, the parties are also prevented from asserting a cause of action or issue which should have been brought forward in the earlier action, but was not, whether deliberately or inadvertently. (3) Unlike an ordinary estoppel which should be pleaded, the court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action by applying the doctrine of res judicata, which is an estoppel based on public policy, even if it has not been pleaded as public policy requires that there should be finality in litigation. (4) The borrower’s case was a classical case for the application of the doctrine of res judicata by way of a cause of action estoppel. The causes of action of both the first proceeding and the present statement of claim were indentical, as both claimed damages for failure of the finance company to allow the borrower to utilize in full the loan of RM750,000, causing loss consequent upon the failure of the housing development to be proceeded with further. All rights and liabilities of both parties had merged into the judgment of the first proceeding and the effect of a cause of action estoppel was absolute.

(1) It was clear that the parties were the same in both actions, and both actions were grounded on the same issue, ie whether the option had lapsed. Therefore, the subject matter was the same. The court had, in the former action, made a final decision on this and, on the doctrine of res judicata, the plaintiff was completely barred from agitating the matter again. His remedy was simply to appeal against the former decision. This he failed to do. Therefore, he was barred from instituting this suit based on the same cause of action. (2) Even though the so-called new issue was not to be found in the plaintiff’s statement of claim in the former action, nevertheless the plaintiff did raise this issue in a disguised manner in the striking out ||Page 354>> proceedings. In any event, the so-called new issue could and should have been raised in an earlier action. Matters which could have been raised in an earlier

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-215 action should have been raised then and this is the doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense. On the facts of this case, both the narrow and wider sense of the doctrine of res judicata applied and the plaintiff was completely barred from instituting the present action based on the same cause of action and same reliefs being sought.

It has been stated in the Supreme Court that even where res judicata is not strictly established or where estoppel per rem judicatum has not been sufficiently pleaded or made out but nevertheless the circumstances are such as to render any reagitation of the question formally adjudicated upon a scandal and an abuse, the court will not hesitate to dismiss the action. See the judgment of Abdoolcader SCJ in Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494, wherein His Lordship considered that it would suffice in that regard to refer to the judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Wilberforce in Brisbane City Council and Myer Shopping Centres Pty Ltd v A-G for Queensland [1979] AC 411.

(2) For res judicata to apply, the parties need not be the same and there had to be privity of interest between the defendants in both actions by the plaintiff. As it was not disputed that the second defendant was the registrar and agent of the first defendant, the liability of first and second defendants were merged. After making the option to leave the first defendant out of the 1988 action, the plaintiff was estopped from dragging the first defendant in for relief similar to that which he had obtained in the 1988 action. As a result, having sued the agent, the plaintiff was not in a position to sue the principal for the same transaction. (3) Although the prayers in this action may appear different by the ancillary claim for bonus shares, rights issue shares and dividends, the relief claimed was substantially the same as the relief obtained in the 1988 action. The plaintiff could not now be allowed to ask for ancillary prayers that he had left out in the 1988 action. As the relevant relief had already been obtained, the writ and statement of claim disclosed no ||Page 355>> reasonable cause of action, was scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, and a blatant abuse of the process of the court.

On appeal to the Judicial Committee: Held, dismissing the appeal, that there was no reason why a defence impugning the bona fides of the sale by the bank to the second respondent could not have been pleaded as a counterclaim to the counterclaim in action No 969; that accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense applied and it would be an abuse of the process of the court to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and should have been litigated in the earlier proceedings.

Having said so much by way of explanatory introduction, it becomes possible to go straight to the clear and valuable statement made by McMullin J in the Full Court of the real substance of the present appeal. The real issue to be decided is whether it be true to say that the allegation of fraud and the voidability of the sale to Choi Kee were matters available for litigation in 969 and that Mr Lai chose not to rely on them and whether they are to be regarded as res judicata in the sense that they ought to have been so litigated. There arise there from two questions: (a) whether there was any procedure by which, in No 969, Yat Tung could have pleaded as a reply to the bank’s counterclaim what was to be the basis of their own claim in No 534, and (b) if there was, what consequences flow from their failure to have done so. [36] It was rightly submitted that Yat Tung was on all fours with the present appeal. In the Yat Tung’s case, Yat Tung had brought suit No 969 against the bank on the basis that the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-216 mortgage was a sham and a nullity. The bank counterclaimed against Yat Tung on the basis that the mortgage was valid. After Yat Tung lost its case against the bank and after the bank succeeded in its counterclaim, Yat Tung commenced Suit No 534 and in its statement of claim in Suit No 534 Yat Tung pleaded that in accepting the decision in suit No 969 as correct (that is, that the mortgage was valid), Yat Tung claimed against the bank on the basis that the bank had acted in concert with Choi Kee with a common design calculated to obtain the said property at a low price and to extinguish the plaintiff’s interest therein. The Privy Council held that the issues raised by Yat Tung in Suit No 534 could and should have been raised in Suit No 969 and Yat Tung was therefore precluded from bringing Suit No 534 by the doctrine of res judicata in a wider sense.

Whether it be true to say that any claim by the plaintiff for the return of the originals of the dishonoured bills of exchange was a matter available for litigation in the consolidated suit and that the plaintiff chose not to raise the matter and whether the matter was to be regarded as res judicata in the sense that it ought to have been litigated in the consolidated suit? [40] In answering the second question, I have this to say. That the plaintiff must be estopped by the principle of res judicata from bringing the present action herein. [42] It cannot be denied that the plaintiff’s present claim against the bank for the return of the originals of the dishonoured bills was so inextricably linked to the bank’s right to debit his account after the bills were dishonoured and it was also clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation in the consolidated suit thereby giving rise to only one conclusion and that would be that the plaintiff’s claim must be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. [45] At para 5.1.2.21 of the plaintiff’s affidavit in reply in encl 9 that was affirmed on 5 December 1997, the plaintiff challenged the applicability of the principle of res judicata and it was framed in this way:

Even if the principle of res judicata applies in respect of the decision of the consolidated suit, which I have been advised by my solicitors and which I verily believe it does not, I humbly urge this honourable court to disregard it due to the special circumstances of this case namely that the findings made were merely obiter dictum and in any event, erroneous and goes against the weight of evidence given and causes severe and unjust hardship on me. [46] The plaintiff, with respect, cannot blow hot and cold. His present action was brought on the basis that the decision of the learned judge in the consolidated suit (to the effect that the bank had not purchased the bills of exchange unconditionally) was correct. So, the plaintiff cannot, on the one hand, say that the decision of the learned judge in the consolidated suit was wrong, and, at the same time, filed this action on the basis that, that decision was correct. If the plaintiff is now alleging that the doctrine of res judicata should not apply and the decision of the learned judge in the consolidated suit was wrong, then he should not have commenced this action. He should instead commence an action claiming that the bank had purchased the bills of exchange unconditionally and attempt (if he can) to re-litigate the identical issues litigated with finality in the consolidated suit. Any criticism by the plaintiff of the correctness or the binding effect of the consolidated judgment is out of place and should be disregarded. [52] The case of Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502; (1988) 78 ALR 271 is quite illustrative of the principle of res judicata. There, the deputy commissioner issued a writ in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory to recover some $25,000 in unpaid

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-217 ||Page 360>> income tax, naming Chamberlain as the defendant. Chamberlain owed the deputy commissioner ten times the amount claimed in the writ. He consented to judgment and paid the judgment debt. Four days later, the deputy commissioner issued a second writ claiming the balance of the debt. The High Court unanimously held that the deputy commissioner’s cause of action had merged in the earlier judgment, raising a res judicata which estopped him from vexing Chamberlain with another suit on the same cause of action. The causes of action in both proceedings were the same: the deputy commissioner sued on a debt established by the same income tax assessments and the same penalties for late payment. [55] ‘Issue estoppel’ is another form of res judicata. A res judicata is a final judicial decision pronounced by a judicial tribunal which disposes of the matter, once and for all. The doctrine of res judicata rests on two broad ||Page 361>> principles. Firstly, it is a general rule of public policy that there should be finality in litigation. Secondly, an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. [56] Now, there can be no doubt that the judgment of Abdul Aziz bin Mohamad J (now FCJ) can operate as an estoppel or res judicata notwithstanding that the proceedings in question were in the form of an originating summons and was not a writ action. It was the plaintiff himself who elected to proceed by way of an originating summons and the originating summons was not struck out on a technicality or on the basis that the plaintiff should have filed a writ instead. The originating summons was heard on its merits and the plaintiff could have applied to cross-examine any deponent on behalf of the bank if he had wished to. [57] It must be emphasised that the plaintiff in this case had chosen, with the benefit of legal advice at all times, to put his case against the bank in the consolidated suit before VC George J (later JCA) in only one way, namely, that the bank had purchased the bills of exchange without recourse when he could easily have pleaded in the alternative for the return of the dishonoured bills of exchange if he had wanted to. He cannot thereafter, after he has failed in his case, go back and bring the same transaction before the court and put his case the other way round, namely, that the bank had not purchased the bills of exchange, and say that he is relying on a new cause of action. The plea of res judicata would definitely be invoked against the plaintiff. [58] I will now apply the following latin phrase vigorously for the benefit of the bank. Res judicata pro veritatem accipitur. It means this. The need for decisions of the court, unless set aside or quashed, to be accepted as incontrovertibly correct.

(e) Now, having sued the drawer who is the person liable on the dishonoured bills of exchange for the balance sum of £77,484.94 (and there is no evidence as to what had happened to that suit — the allegation in the plaintiff’s submission that it was discontinued is another instance of the plaintiff giving evidence in his submission. Even if Mathew had discontinued his action against the plaintiff the latter still had his counterclaim against Mathew), and having obtained the benefit of all the sale proceeds of his consignment of prawns to Mathew and having sued the latter for the balance outstanding under his contract of sale to Mathew, the plaintiff is now suing the bank for the exact principal amount of RM1,083,171.56 which is the sum which the bank had debited his account with and obtained judgment for in the consolidated suit and which judgment sum has not yet been satisfied by the plaintiff, and arising out of that the question to pose is this: who is the one who is trying to have his cake and eat it, is

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-218 it the bank or is it the plaintiff? The answer is quite obvious. It is the plaintiff. (f) The originals of the bills of exchange are not ‘security’ as alleged by the plaintiff. They have no intrinsic value to constitute them as ‘security’. The bills of exchange were not given to the bank as security. As contended by the plaintiff, they were purchased by the bank outright. And as held by the learned High Court judge in the consolidated suit, the bank was merely a collecting agent in respect of the bills of exchange. That being the case, the plaintiff is estopped by the doctrine of res judicata from re-litigating the decision of the learned High Court judge in the consolidated suit. (g) The bank is not and was never a trustee in relation to the dishonoured bills of exchange. One does not hold pieces of paper as a trustee. The bank has never had title in the bills of exchange vested in them as held by the learned High Court judge in the ||Page 367>> consolidated suit and the bank claims no interest in the dishonoured bills of exchange. Because of the judgment in the originating summons wherein the court held expressly that it found no evidence that the originals of the dishonoured bills of exchange were in the possession of the bank or its correspondent, the plaintiff is estopped by the doctrine of res judicata from saying that the documents are in the possession of the bank or its correspondent or that the documents are technically in the possession of the bank whatever that means. Criminal Procedure — Habeas corpus — Application — Detention under Emergency Ordinance (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) 1969 — First application for habeas corpus dismissed — Second application for habeas corpus on identical facts but different grounds — Preliminary objection — Plea of res judicata — Whether plea of res judicata correctly invoked — Whether res judicata applies to criminal matters and habeas corpus applications On 13 October 2006, the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs (‘the first respondent’) issued an order of detention for a period of two years (‘the detention order’) against Rakesh a/l Ram Tawar, the detainee/applicant (‘the applicant’), under s 4(1) of the Emergency Ordinance (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) 1969 (‘the Ordinance’). In or around 13 April 2007, the applicant filed an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in the High Court. In this application the applicant sought relief against two respondents, namely the officer in charge of the detention centre in Simpang Renggam, Johor and the Ministry of Home Affairs rather than the Minister of Home Affairs. By way of this application the applicant challenged the validity of the detention order on the grounds that there was no reasonable or plausible basis for the Minister to issue such a detention order as there was no evidence that the applicant was involved in armed gang robbery. He substantiated this by contending, inter alia, that none of the victims of the crime had identified him; that as he suffered from diabetes, high blood pressure and chronic sinusitis his health would be compromised by his continued detention; and that the detention would preclude him from continuing his education in engineering. The application was heard and dismissed by the High Court and the applicant did not file an appeal against that decision to the Federal Court. Subsequently on 6 November 2007, the detainee filed this second application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus (‘the second application’), through different solicitors. In this second application, the applicant had alleged, inter alia, that there had been non-compliance with the provisions of rr 3(2), 5(1) and 5(2) of the Ordinance; that the advisory board failed to comply with the procedure provided in art 15(2) of the Federal Constitution (‘Constitution’),

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-219 ||Page 98>> in that the chairman does not possess requisite qualifications; that the provisions of art 5(1) of the Constitution were breached. The respondents had lodged a preliminary objection to this second application contending that this second application ought not to be heard by reason of the application of the principle of res judicata whereby the present proceedings amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. It was the respondents’ contention that the proper course to have been adopted by the applicant when his first application was dismissed on 18 October 2007 was to appeal directly to the Federal Court and that the filing of the second application was an attempt by the applicant to attempt to circumvent such an appeal. The respondents therefore sought an order dismissing this second application. In the circumstances, the main issue for consideration by this court was whether the plea of res judicata had been correctly invoked by the respondents.

Held, dismissing the preliminary objection:

(1) Upon a comparison of the first and second habeas corpus applications it was notable that in his first application the applicant had omitted to allude to any allegations of a failure to comply with mandatory procedural requirements under the provisions of the Ordinance or the Constitution. A perusal of the chronology of facts showed that while the factual matrix for the first and second applications were identical, as was the detention order sought to be invalidated, the grounds for the two applications differ. The second application challenged the validity of the detention order on the basis that there was a procedural non-compliance with the provisions of the Ordinance, the Emergency Rules 1972 and the Constitution whereas the first application relied on the ground that there was no evidential basis or reason for the issuance of the detention order. In addition, the three elements required for invoking the plea of res judicata had all been satisfied in this case, in that, the issue of whether the detention of the applicant was unlawful had been definitively settled by judicial decision; there was also a final order dated 18 October 2007 handed down after the first application had been heard on its merits; the parties involved were the same. In the instant case, the applicant had made a second application in respect of the same detention order and this was because he had failed to put forward legal arguments relating to non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements in the first application. Therefore, prima facie the respondents in this case had pleaded res judicata and an abuse of process correctly (see paras 5–11 & 19). ||Page 99>> (2) Section 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 expressly recognises the doctrine of res judicata and provides that it is applicable and relevant in criminal proceedings, including applications for habeas corpus, in as much as it is so in civil proceedings (see para 12). (3) Although the doctrine of res judicata seeks to exclude or prohibit a litigant from taking up in a subsequent litigation matters which he should properly have advanced in the earlier litigation, there exists an equally clear provision that allows for the non-operation of this doctrine where there are special circumstances which merit such preclusion of the principle. Whereas it is clear that a litigant may be correctly penalised under this doctrine for holding back arguments that could have been made in

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-220 the first application, the courts had recognised, that in cases where special or exceptional circumstances arise which merit the preclusion of the doctrine then the plea of an abuse of process may be rejected. This is particularly so where the liberty of a person, as in this case, is in issue. From the facts it was clear that the applicant did not ‘hold back’ arguments that were available to him. In fact, the applicant was prejudiced in his first application by the failure of his first set of solicitors to appreciate the current position of the law. However, this failure could not now be attributed to the applicant as he relied entirely on their legal expertise. As such, the instant case warranted special consideration as the applicant could not be faulted for taking an erroneous legal path in his first application (see paras 16, 19–21). Pada 13 Oktober 2006, Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri (‘responden pertama’) telah mengeluarkan satu perintah penahanan untuk tempoh dua tahun (‘perintah penahanan tersebut’) terhadap Rakesh a/l Ram Tawar, orang tahanan/pemohon (‘pemohon’) di bawah s 4(1) Ordinan Darurat (Ketenteraman Awam dan Mencegah Jenayah) 1969 (‘Ordinan’). Pada atau sekitar 13 April 2007, pemohon telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk pengeluaran writ habeas corpus di Mahkamah Tinggi. Dalam permohonan ini pemohon memohon relief terhadap dua responden, iaitu pegawai bertugas di pusat tahanan di Simpang Renggam, Johor dan Kementerian Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri dan bukan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri. Melalui permohonan ini pemohon telah mencabar kesahan perintah penahanan tersebut atas alasan tiada asas munasabah untuk Menteri mengeluarkan perintah penahanan sebegini kerana tidak ada keterangan bahawa pemohon terlibat dalam rompakan berkumpulan bersenjata. Beliau mengesahkan ini dengan menegaskan, antara lain, bahawa tiada seorangpun daripada mangsa jenayah itu yang telah mengecamnya; bahawa disebabkan dia mengalami penyakit kencing manis, darah tinggi dan resdung yang kronik kesihatannya akan terjejas oleh penahanannya yang berterusan; dan ||Page 100>> bahawa penahanan tersebut akan menghalangnya daripada menyambung pelajarannya dalam bidang kejuruteraan. Permohonan tersebut telah didengar dan ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dan pemohon tidak memfailkan rayuan terhadap keputusan tersebut ke Mahkamah Persekutuan. Kemudian pada 6 November 2007, orang tahanan itu telah memfailkan permohonan kedua ini untuk pengeluaran writ habeas corpus (‘permohonan kedua’), melalui peguamcara-peguamcara berbeza. Dalam permohonan kedua ini, pemohon telah mendakwa, antara lain, bahawa terdapat ketidakpatuhan dengan peruntukan kk 3(2), 5(1) dan 5(2) Ordinan; bahawa lembaga penasihat gagal untuk mematuhi prosedur yang diperuntukkan dalam perkara 15(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan’), di mana pengerusi tidak mempunyai kelayakan yang diperlukan; bahawa peruntukan perkara 5(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan telah dilanggari. Responden-responden telah membuat bantahan awal terhadap permohonan kedua ini dengan menegaskan bahawa permohonan kedua ini tidak patut didengar atas alasan permohonan prinsip-prinsip res judicata di mana prosiding semasa membentuk penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. Adalah hujah responden-responden bahawa jalan sewajarnya yang patut digunakan oleh pemohon semasa permohonan pertamanya ditolak pada 18 Oktober 2007 adalah untuk merayu terus ke Mahkamah Persekutuan dan bahawa pemfailan permohonan kedua merupakan percubaan oleh pemohon untuk cuba memintas rayuan sebegini. Responden-responden oleh itu memohon perintah untuk menolak permohonan kedua ini. Dalam keadaan ini, isu utama untuk dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah ini adalah sama ada

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-221 rayuan res judicata telah digunakan dengan betul oleh responden-responden.

Diputuskan, menolak bantahan awal:

(1) Dengan membandingkan permohonan-permohonan habeas corpus pertama dan kedua adalah ketara bahawa dalam permohonan pertamanya pemohon telah tertinggal untuk menyentuh tentang apa-apa dakwaan suatu kegagalan untuk mematuhi keperluan prosedur mandatori di bawah peruntukan-peruntukan Ordinan atau Perlembagaan. Penelitian kronologi fakta menunjukkan bahawa meskipun matriks faktual untuk permohonan-permohonan pertama dan kedua adalah sama, dan begitu juga dengan perintah penahanan yang ingin dibuktikan ketidakbenarannya, alasan-alasan untuk kedua-dua permohonan tersebut adalah berbeza. Permohonan kedua mencabar kesahan perintah penahanan atas dasar bahawa terdapat ketidakpatuhan prosedur dengan peruntukan Ordinan, Kaedah-Kaedah Darurat 1972 dan Perlembagaan manakala permohonan pertama bersandarkan kepada alasan bahawa tiada bukti asas atau alasan untuk mengeluarkan permohonan pertama. Tambahan pula, ketiga-tiga elemen yang diperlukan untuk menggunakan rayuan res judicata ||Page 101>> kesemuanya telah dipenuhi dalam kes ini, yang mana, isu sama ada penahanan pemohon yang menyalahi undang-undang pasti diselesaikan oleh keputusan kehakiman; terdapat juga perintah muktamad bertarikh 18 Oktober 2007 yang diputuskan selepas permohonan pertama telah didengar atas meritnya; pihak-pihak terlibat adalah sama. Dalam kes ini, pemohon telah membuat permohonan kedua berkaitan perintah penahanan yang sama dan ini adalah kerana dia telah gagal mengemukakan hujah-hujah di sisi undang-undang berkaitan ketidakpatuhan keperluan prosedur yang mandatori. Oleh itu, prima facie responden-responden dalam kes ini telah merayu res judicata dan penyalahgunaan proses dengan betul (lihat perenggan 5–11 & 19). (2) Seksyen 25(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 dengan jelas mengenali doktrin res judicata dan memperuntukkan bahawa ia terpakai dan relevan dalam prosiding jenayah, termasuklah permohonan-permohonan untuk habeas corpus, begitu juga dalam prosiding sivil (lihat perenggan 12). (3) Meskipun doktrin res judicata ingin mengecualikan atau menghalang litigan daripada memulakan perkara-perkara lain dalam litigasi yang mana patut dikemukakan dengan betul olehnya dalam litigasi terdahulu, wujud peruntukan yang jelas membenarkan doktrin ini untuk tidak beroperasi dalam keadaan khas yang mewajarkan halangan prinsip sebegini. Manakala ia adalah jelas bahawa litigan boleh didenda sewajarnya di bawah doktrin ini kerana menangguhkan hujah-hujah yang boleh dibuat dalam permohonan pertama, mahkamah menyedari, bahawa dalam kes-kes di mana keadaan khas atau luar biasa timbul yang memerlukan halangan doktrin itu maka rayuan untuk penyalahgunaan proses boleh ditolak. Terutamanya apabila kebebasan seseorang, seperti dalam kes ini, menjadi isu. Atas fakta, adalah jelas bahawa pemohon tidak ‘hold back’ hujah-hujah yang sedia ada dengannya. Bahkan, pemohon diprejudiskan dalam permohonan pertamanya oleh kerana kegagalan kumpulan pertama peguamcara-peguamcaranya untuk menyedari kedudukan semasa undang-undang. Walau bagaimanapun, kegagalan ini sekarang tidak boleh dianggap

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-222 berpunca daripada pemohon kerana dia bergantung sepenuhnya kepada kepakaran undang-undang mereka. Oleh itu, kes ini memerlukan pertimbangan khas kerana pemohon tidak boleh dipersalahkan kerana mengambil langkah perundangan yang salah dalam permohonan pertamanya (lihat perenggan 16, 19–21). [2] Subsequently, on 6 November 2007, the detainee filed a second application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in this court in respect of the same detention order through different solicitors (‘the second habeas corpus application’). In response to this, the respondents lodged a preliminary objection contending that the second habeas corpus application should not be heard or determined by this court by reason of the application of the principle of res judicata whereby it is argued that the present proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the court. The respondents contend that the proper course to have been adopted by the detainee when his first application was dismissed on 18 October 2007 should have been an appeal to the Federal Court. The filing of the second habeas corpus application in ||Page 103>> this court, it was maintained, amounted to an attempt to circumvent such an appeal. Finally the respondents contend that this court has no jurisdiction to decide on the second habeas corpus application before it because the subject matter of the detainee’s complaint lies within the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and not this court. The respondents therefore seek an order dismissing this second application for habeas corpus at this stage.

THE PLEA OF RES JUDICATA

[3] Res judicata is defined in Black’s Dictionary as follows:

res judicata [Latin a thing adjudicated] 1. An issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision. 2. An affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of transactions and that could have been — but was not — raised in the first suit. The three essential elements are (1) an earlier decision on the issue, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the involvement of the same parties, or parties in privity with the original parties. Res judicata has been used in this section as a general term referring to all of the ways in which one judgment will have a binding effect on another. That usage is and doubtless will continue to be common, but it lumps under a single name two quite different effects of judgments. The first is the effect of foreclosing any litigation of matters that have never been litigated, because of the determination that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit. The second is the effect of foreclosing relitigation of matters that have once been litigated and decided. The first of these, preclusion of matters that were never litigated has gone under the name ‘true res judicata’ or the names, ‘merger’ and ‘bar’. The second doctrine, preclusion of matters that have once been decided has usually been called ‘collateral estoppel’. [4] The issue that falls for consideration at the outset is whether the plea of res judicata is correctly taken, and if so, which form of the plea applies, ie, whether it is the foreclosure of the relitigation of matters that were taken up and adjudicated upon in the first habeas corpus application or whether it is a preclusion of the litigation of matters that could have been, but were never litigated in the first habeas corpus application. This in turn requires a thorough examination and comparison of the two applications.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-223

A comparison of the first and second habeas corpus applications — Does the plea of res judicata apply?

[9] As such it would appear that the plea of res judicata in the wider sense is relevant in the context of the instant case. The plea is taken in the context that the issues raised in the second habeas corpus application ought to have been advanced and litigated in the first application.

Is the principle of res judicata applicable to criminal matters and habeas corpus applications?

[12] Section 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘the CJA’) which confers additional powers to the High Court as set out in the Schedule to the CJA, expressly recognises the doctrine of res judicata and provides that the High Court is empowered to… dismiss or stay proceedings where the matter in question is res judicata between the parties. The doctrine of res judicata should therefore be applicable and relevant in criminal proceedings, including applications for habeas corpus, in as much as it is so in civil proceedings. [13] The applicability of the principle of res judicata in criminal matters is comprehensively set out in Superintendant of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 where Eusoffe Abdoolcader J (as he then was) explained the position thus (at pp 498–499): ||Page 106>>

… The appellants plead res judicata in this regard and we think the point is well taken and is supported by authority, and we would refer to the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Hoystead & Ors v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155 and a catenation of cases to the like effect, namely that the plea of res judicata applies, except perhaps where special circumstances may conceivably arise of sufficient merit to exclude its operation, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. There is moreover the inherent jurisdiction in cases where res judicata is not strictly established, and where estoppels per rem judicatam has not been sufficiently pleaded, or made out, but nevertheless the circumstances are such as to render a reagitation of the questions formally adjudicated upon a scandal and an abuse, the court will not hesitate to dismiss the action, or stay proceedings therein, or strike out the defence thereto, as the case may require. It would suffice in this regard to refer to the judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Wilberforce in Brisbane City Council and Myer Shopping Centres Pty Ltd v Attorney-General for Queensland [1979] AC 411 (at p 425): The second defence is one of ‘res judicata’. There has, of course, been no actual decision in litigation between these parties as to the issue involved in the present case, but the appellants invoke this defence in its wider sense, according to which a party may be shut out from raising in a subsequent action an issue which he could, and should, have raised in earlier proceedings. The classic statement of this doctrine is contained in the judgment of Wigram V-C in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 and its existence has been affirmed by this board in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155. A recent application of it is to be found in the decision of the Board in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581. It was in the judgment of the board, there described in these

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-224 words: there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings. [14] Accordingly it follows that any issues of non-compliance with mandatory procedural rules ought to have been advanced and litigated in the first habeas corpus application and that any attempt to do so in the second application would be correctly resisted by a plea of res judicata in the wider sense, unless there exist exceptional or special circumstances of sufficient merit to warrant the exclusion of the operation of the principle. [15] In the Privy Council decision of Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd Lord Kilbrandon explained the extent of the principle of res judicata thus:

||Page 107>> … The second question depends on the application of a doctrine of estoppel, namely res judicata. Their Lordships agree with the view expressed by McMullin J that the true doctrine in its narrower sense cannot be discerned in the present series of actions, since there has not been, in the decision in No 969, any formal repudiation of the pleas raised by the appellant in No 534… But there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings. The locus classicus of that aspect of res judicata is the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 115, where the judge says: … where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matters which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. The shutting out of a ‘subject of litigation’ a power which no court should exercise but after a scrupulous examination of all the circumstances is limited to cases where reasonable diligence would have caused a matter to be earlier raised; moreover, although negligence, inadvertence or even accident will not suffice to excuse, nevertheless special circumstances are reserved in case justice should be found to require the non-application of the rule… (Emphasis added.) [16] It is apparent from all the foregoing cases on the doctrine of res judicata that notwithstanding the clear power of the court to exclude or prohibit a litigant from taking up in a subsequent litigation matters which he should properly have advanced in the earlier litigation, there exists an equally clear provision allowing for the non-operation of the doctrine where there are special circumstances which merit such preclusion of the principle. In Superintendant of Pudu Prison v Sim Kie Chin too, this exception to the applicability of the doctrine was expressly recognised by Eusoffee Abdoolcadeer LJ. [17] In Re Tarling [1979] 1 All ER 981 the applicant, as in this case, sought a renewed application for habeas corpus to secure his discharge from prison where he had been committed for return to Singapore where several charges had been brought against him by the Singapore Government. Peter Gibson J set out the position which relates to the position of an

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-225 applicant who makes ||Page 108>> a second application for habeas corpus in respect of the same detention. It should be noted that the position in law in the United Kingdom is specifically provided for by statute in s 14(2) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. It stipulates expressly that no repeated application for habeas corpus may be made in respect of the same person on the same grounds. While there is no equivalent provision in Malaysia, the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 containing the additional powers of the High Court nonetheless empowers the court to dismiss or stay proceedings where the matter is res judicata between the parties. Accordingly the statement of the law relating to res judicata in Re Tarling is relevant. Peter Gibson J in delivering the judgment of the court summarised the position thus:

… Before dealing with the questions of jurisdiction it is to be noted that, on two important principles, which bear on the position of an applicant for habeas corpus who seeks to make a second application in respect of the same detention, there is no substantial dispute between the parties in the case. Firstly it is clear to the court that an applicant for habeas corpus is required to put forward on his initial application the whole of the case which is then fairly available to him. He is not free to advance an application on one ground, and to keep back a separate ground of application as a basis for a second or renewed application to the court. The true doctrine of estoppel known as res judicata does not apply to the decision of this court on an application for habeas corpus; we refer to the words of Lord Parker CJ, delivering the judgment of the court in Re Hastings (no 2) nl. There is, however, a wider sense in which the doctrine of res judicata may be applicable, whereby it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could, and therefore should, have been litigated in earlier proceedings: see the judgment of the Privy Council (Lord Morris, Lord Cross and Lord Kilbrandon) in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 68. In our judgment, that principle is applicable to proceedings for habeas corpus, whether under the 1967 Act or under the general jurisdiction of the court although, no doubt, the stringency of the application of the principle may be different in cases concerning the liberty of the subject from that in cases concerning such matters as disputes on property …. (Emphasis added.) [19] In the instant case, as in Re Tarling, the applicant makes a second application in respect of the same detention order. In the first habeas corpus application he could have, but failed to put forward legal arguments relating to non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements, that he now seeks to do in this second application. Prima facie, the plea of res judicata and ||Page 109>> an abuse of process appear to be correctly taken. However it is equally clear that while a litigant may be correctly penalised under this doctrine for holding back arguments that could have been taken in the first application, the courts have recognised, albeit rarely, that in cases where special or exceptional circumstances arise which merit the preclusion of the doctrine, then the plea of an abuse of process may be rejected. This is particularly so where the liberty of a person is in issue, as is the case here. [20] The question that next arises for consideration is whether the applicant ‘held back’ the arguments relating to mandatory procedural non-compliance, which he seeks to raise in the present proceedings. As discussed earlier the applicant’s first set of solicitors failed to raise any such issues, which if raised and found to be true, would have had some possibility of success. As drafted and put forward, the first application contained no merits warranting the issuance of an order of habeas corpus. This is because the entire basis for the first application was a challenge to the effect that the Minister had exercised his discretion without any basis or

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-226 any reasonable basis in arriving at his decision to issue the order of detention. The law on this area has been clear, particularly since the decision of the Federal Court in Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 631. In that case it was held that with the amendments to the Ordinance, ISA 1960 and DD(SPM) Act 1985 made by Act A740, Act A739 and Act A738 respectively, which came into force on 24 August 1989, challenges to the Minister’s detention order under s 4(2) of the Ordinance could only be based on one ground, namely non-compliance with procedural requirements. Accordingly the first application filed by the applicant was misconceived, in that it was premised on legal arguments that were doomed to failure under the law as it stands. To that extent the applicant was prejudiced in his first application by the failure of his first set of solicitors to appreciate the current position in law. From these facts it is also clear that it cannot be said that the applicant ‘held back’ arguments that were available to him. The fact that his solicitors were not apprised of the current position in law on this issue cannot be attributed to him as he relied entirely on their legal expertise. The question that then arises for consideration is whether, given the somewhat exceptional facts of this case, the application of the doctrine of res judicata should be precluded in this instance. Civil Procedure — Preliminary issue — Application for issues or questions raised in pleadings to be tried on preliminary basis — Whether plaintiff’s application under O 14A of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) contemptuous of or contradictory to earlier order made under O 14 of the RHC — Whether plaintiff’s application barred by res judicata — Whether application under O 14A of the RHC appropriate to determine issues raised Sime Bank Bhd granted four loan facilities to certain borrowers (‘initial borrowers’) that were secured by a corporate guarantee of Melewar Leisure Sdn Bhd (‘the first defendant’) and the personal guarantees of the second and third defendants. Later, all rights and interests in respect of the initial borrowers’ loan vested in Danaharta Managers Sdn Bhd (‘the plaintiff’) pursuant to vesting certificates under s 14 of the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998. Thereafter, when the initial borrowers defaulted in their loan facilities, by joint agreement of the initial borrowers, the balance of the outstanding debts were assumed by the first defendant. On request, the plaintiff also allowed the initial borrowers’ debt to be restructured whereby a portion was repaid by the initial borrowers and the balance was novated to the first defendant whereupon the initial borrowers were released from all their obligations to the plaintiff. The novated debt was then restructured to give time to the first defendant to repay. The second and third defendants then became guarantors to the novated debts. When the first defendant defaulted in making monthly payment pursuant to the novation and ||Page 449>> restructuring agreements, the plaintiff issued a notice of demand for payment. The plaintiff proceeded with letters of demand to the second and third defendants as guarantors when no payments were made. The plaintiff then commenced an action against the three defendants to recover the outstanding loan. The plaintiff’s application under O 14 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) was dismissed and the defendants were given unconditional leave to defend this action. This is the plaintiff’s application under O 14A of the RHC seeking the court’s determination on the validity of the agreements between the parties for want of consideration; the validity of the interest charges; and the conclusiveness of the certificate of indebtedness. The first defendant raised preliminary issues to this application on the grounds that the plaintiff’s O 14A application was an abuse of process because it was

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-227 contemptuous of, or contradictory to the earlier order made by the court under O 14 of the RHC; that the plaintiff’s application is barred by res judicata or multiplicity of proceedings; that O 14A of the RHC is inappropriate to determine the issues raised in this action. In effect, the main issue for consideration in this O 14A application was whether there were any merits in the objections raised by the defendants, for, in the absence of any merits judgment could be entered against all the defendants upon the terms of the application.

Held, allowing the application with costs:

(1) In deliberating on an application under O 14 of the RHC, the court needs to only be satisfied whether or not the defendant had raised any sustainable defence which deserves a trial. Whereas, under O 14A of the RHC, the court will determine the issues of laws upon the construction of documents whenever it appears to the court that the determination of any questions of law will lead to a final conclusion of the action because there are no facts in dispute. Therefore, even if the plaintiff in this case had failed in its application to enter summary judgment under O 14 there was nothing to stop the plaintiff from proceeding with an O 14A application when facts were not disputed and the determination of issues would dispose of the case finally (see paras 7–8). (2) The unconditional leave to defend granted under the O 14 application was not a judgment but only a decision. It is settled law that in order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the earlier proceeding must have resulted in a final judgment. In any event, issues for determination under the O 14A application could not have been brought up in the earlier O 14 application because under O 14, the court was not able to make the kind of finding that was sought under an O 14A application. Thus, the plaintiff’s O 14A application was not barred by res judicata (see paras 10–12). ||Page 450>> (3) It was evidently clear upon a perusal of the application and the documents filed in support that the disputes raised in this case pertained to questions of law, the validity of the agreements and construction of its various clauses. It is trite law, that agreements when signed would bind the parties in the absence of fraud and misrepresentation. In the circumstances, an application under O 14A of the RHC is the most appropriate mode to employ (see paras 15–16). (4) In the instant case, the consideration to the first defendant could be summed up as the agreement by the plaintiff to release and discharge the initial borrowers from all claims in respect of the novated debts, the forbearing to exercise the plaintiff’s rights against the defendants’ guarantee of the initial borrowers’ debts and the time indulgence to resolve the novated debt by the restructuring agreements. Further to that, the release of the initial borrowers from the novated debts was good consideration to the second and third defendants. Thus, the defendants’ argument that these agreements were void for want of consideration was not sustainable (see paras 17–18). (5) The plaintiff had, in charging interest, acted within the terms of the restructuring agreements and thus the first defendant was barred from denying the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-228 agreed terms. In the same way the second and third defendants were also bound by the terms of their guarantees in guaranteeing the amount owed by the first defendant. Thus, the defendants’ contention that the computation of the interest was without basis was wrong, as the interest charged by the plaintiff was within the contractual terms (see paras 20–21). (6) The defendants, by agreeing in the restructuring agreements that a statement issued by the plaintiff showing indebtedness was binding and conclusive between them, were contractually bound by it. Moreover, although the plaintiff is not a financial institution it is nevertheless a regulated entity under an Act of Parliament, the Danaharta Act. In any case, the plaintiff had also produced the statements of accounts on which the certificate of indebtedness was raised for the defendants and the latter had not established any manifest error to dispute it. Therefore, the certificate of indebtedness was conclusive proof of the amount indebted by the defendants under the novation agreement, restructuring agreements as well as the guarantees (see paras 23–24). Sime Bank Bhd memberikan empat kemudahan pinjaman kepada peminjam-peminjam tertentu (‘peminjam-peminjam awal’) yang dijamin oleh jaminan korporat oleh Melewar Leisure Sdn Bhd (‘defendan pertama’) dan jaminan peribadi oleh defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga. Kemudian ||Page 451>> kesemua hak-hak dan kepentingan-kepentingan berkaitan dengan pinjaman peminjam-peminjam awal terletak hak kepada Danaharta Managers Sdn Bhd (‘plaintif’) menurut sijil meletak hak di bawah s 14 Akta Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad 1998 (‘Akta Danaharta’). Selepas dari itu, apabila peminjam-peminjam awal gagal membayar balik kemudahan pinjaman, melalui perjanjian bersama di antara peminjam-peminjam awal, baki tertunggak hutang diambil alih oleh defendan pertama. Atas permintaan, plaintif juga membenarkan hutang-hutang peminjam-peminjam awal disusun semula di mana sebahagiannya telah dibayar oleh peminjam-peminjam awal dan bakinya dinovasi kepada defendan pertama di mana peminjam-peminjam awal dilepaskan daripada kesemua tanggungjawab mereka terhadap plaintif. Hutang yang dinovasi tersebut kemudian disusun semula untuk memberikan defendan pertama masa untuk membayar balik. Defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga kemudian menjadi penjamin kepada hutang-hutang yang dinovasi tersebut. Apabila defendan pertama gagal membuat pembayaran bulanan menurut perjanjian-perjanjian novasi dan penyusunan semula, plaintif mengeluarkan notis tuntutan untuk pembayaran. Plaintif meneruskan dengan surat-surat tuntutan kepada defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga sebagai penjamin-penjamin apabila tiada pembayaran dibuat. Plaintif kemudian memulakan tindakan terhadap ketiga-tiga defendan untuk mendapatkan semula pinjaman yang tertunggak. Permohonan plaintif di bawah A 14 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) ditolak dan defendan-defendan diberikan kebenaran tanpa syarat untuk membela tindakan tersebut. Ini adalah permohonan plaintif di bawah A 14A KMT memohon keputusan mahkamah terhadap kesahan perjanjian-perjanjian tanpa balasan; kesahan bayaran faedah; dan kemuktamadan sijil keberhutangan. Defendan pertama membangkitkan isu awalan terhadap permohonan ini atas alasan-alasan bahawa permohonan A 14A plaintif adalah penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah kerana ia adalah menghina atau bertentangan dengan perintah terdahulu yang dibuat oleh mahkamah di bawah A 14 KMT; bahawa permohonan plaintif dihalang oleh res judicata atau kepelbagaian prosiding; bahawa A 14A KMT tidak sesuai untuk menentukan isu-isu yang

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-229 dibangkitkan di dalam tindakan ini. Pada dasarnya, isu utama untuk dipertimbangkan di dalam permohonan A 14A ini adalah sama ada terdapat merit di dalam bantahan yang dibangkitkan oleh defendan-defendan, kerana, jika tidak ada merit, penghakiman boleh dimasukkan terhadap kesemua defendan-defendan atas terma-terma permohonan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dengan kos:

(1) Dalam mempertimbangkan permohonan di bawah A 14 KMT, mahkamah hanya perlu memenuhi sama ada atau tidak defendan telah membangkitkan pembelaan yang mencukupi yang patut dibicarakan. ||Page 452>> Manakala, di bawah A 14A KMT, mahkamah akan memutuskan isu-isu undang-undang atas pentafsiran dokumen-dokumen apabila ia kelihatan kepada mahkamah bahawa penentuan apa-apa persoalan undang-undang akan membawa kepada kesimpulan muktamad tindakan tersebut kerana tidak ada fakta yang dipertikaikan. Oleh itu, walaupun plaintif di dalam kes ini gagal di dalam permohonannya untuk memasukkan penghakiman terus di bawah A 14 tidak ada apa-apa yang menghalang plaintif daripada meneruskan dengan permohonan A 14A apabila fakta-fakta tidak dipertikaikan dan pemutusan isu-isu akan memutuskan kes tersebut secara muktamad (lihat perenggan 7–8). (2) Kebenaran tanpa syarat untuk membela yang diberikan di bawah permohonan A 14 bukan suatu penghakiman tetapi hanya satu keputusan. Ia adalah undang-undang mantap bahawa, untuk doktrin res judicata beraplikasi, prosiding sebelumnya sepatutnya menghasilkan penghakiman yang muktamad. Walau bagaimanapun, isu-isu untuk dipertimbangkan di bawah permohonan A 14A tidak mungkin boleh dikemukakan di bawah permohonan A 14 sebelum ini kerana di bawah A 14, mahkamah tidak boleh membuat penemuan seperti yang dipohon di bawah permohonan A 14A. Oleh itu, permohonan A14A plaintif tidak dihalang oleh res judicata (lihat perenggan 10–12). (3) Ia adalah cukup jelas daripada penelitian permohonan dan dokumen-dokumen yang difailkan untuk menyokong bahawa pertikaian yang dibangkitkan di dalam kes ini adalah mengenai persoalan undang-undang, kesahan perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut dan pentafsiran berbagai klausa di dalamnya. Ia adalah undang-undang nyata bahawa perjanjian apabila ditandatangani akan mengikat pihak-pihak jika tidak melibatkan fraud atau salah nyata. Dalam hal keadaan ini, permohonan di bawah A 14A KMT adalah cara yang paling sesuai untuk digunakan (lihat perenggan 15–16). (4) Di dalam kes ini, balasan untuk defendan pertama boleh diringkaskan sebagai perjanjian oleh plaintif untuk membebaskan dan melepaskan peminjam-peminjam awal daripada semua tuntutan yang berkaitan dengan hutang-hutang yang dinovasi, menahan daripada melaksanakan hak-hak plaintif terhadap jaminan defendan-defendan untuk hutang-hutang peminjam-peminjam awal dan kelonggaran masa untuk menyelesaikan hutang yang dinovasi melalui perjanjian-perjanjian yang disusun semula. Selanjutnya, pelepasan peminjam-peminjam awal daripada hutang-hutang yang dinovasi adalah balasan yang baik untuk defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga. Oleh itu, hujahan defendan-defendan bahawa perjanjian-perjanjian ini adalah batal kerana ketiadaan balasan, tidak boleh diterima (lihat perenggan 17–18). E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-230 ||Page 453>> (5) Plaintif telah, dalam mengenakan faedah, bertindak dalam lingkungan terma-terma perjanjian-perjanjian susun semula dan oleh itu defendan pertama dihalang daripada menafikan terma-terma yang telah dipersetujui. Dalam keadaan yang sama, defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga juga terikat oleh terma-terma jaminan dalam menjamin jumlah yang terhutang oleh defendan pertama. Oleh itu, hujahan defendan-defendan bahawa pengiraan faedah adalah tanpa asas adalah salah, kerana faedah yang dikenakan oleh plaintif adalah dalam lingkungan terma-terma kontrak (lihat perenggan 20–21). (6) Defendan-defendan, dengan bersetuju dalam perjanjian penyusunan semula, bahawa penyata yang dikeluarkan oleh plaintif menunjukkan keberhutangan adalah mengikat dan muktamad di antara mereka, adalah terikat secara kontrak dengannya. Tambahan, walaupun plaintif bukan sebuah institusi kewangan, ia adalah sebuah entiti yang dikawal melalui Akta Parlimen, iaitu Akta Danaharta. Walau bagaimanapun, plaintif juga telah mengemukakan penyata akaun di atas mana sijil keberhutangan telah dibangkitkan untuk defendan-defendan dan mereka tidak membuktikan sebarang kesilapan untuk mempertikaikannya. Oleh yang demikian, sijil keberhutangan adalah bukti muktamad mengenai jumlah yang terhutang oleh defendan-defendan di bawah perjanjian novasi, perjanjian-perjanjian disusun semula dan juga jaminan-jaminan (lihat perenggan 23–24). [9] Encik Yap also raised and relied on the argument that the application of the plaintiff in encl 25 is barred by res judicata or multiplicity of proceeding. He further submitted that the plaintiff’s application under O 14A RHC has been dismissed by this court and the plaintiff’s appeal on that decision is pending at the Court of Appeal. The application by the plaintiff according to him tantamount to re-litigating the same issues hence should not be allowed, citing in authority the case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189. [10] In response Encik Tan argued that unconditional leave to defend granted under O 14A is not a judgment. Relying on the case of United Commercial Bank v Yap Cheng Hai & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 207, Encik Tan contends that for res judicata to apply there must be a judgment on that issue before the court. Both the cases of Dato’ Mohamed Anuar bin Embong v ING Merchant Bank (Singapore) Ltd (formerly known as Internationale Nederlanden Merchant Bank (Singapore) Ltd & Anor [2000] 6 MLJ 461 and Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Berhad [1994] 1 MLJ 119 are also good authorities on the ||Page 457>> point that the doctrine of res judicata will apply only if the earlier proceeding result in final judgment or final determination of a particular issue in question. [11] Res judicata has been defined by Sinnathuray J, in the Singapore case of United Commercial Bank. In that case Sinnathuray J had broadly defined res judicata as to refer to a situation where there is already judgment on the issues that are before the court. Would there be judgment made in the dismissing of O 14A application, one may asks. The answer is no because an order granting leave to defend is not a judgment but it is only a decision. This is the legal point stated in the United Commercial Bank. Also, in the case of Kandiah Peter, the Supreme Court states that it is settled law that in order for the doctrine of res judicata, cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel, to apply, the earlier proceeding must have resulted in a

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-231 final judgment. [12] I have also considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 cited by Encik Yap. He pointed out that the Supreme Court hold that the doctrine of res judicata is not only confined to causes of action or issues which the court is actually asked to decide or has already decided, but also covers cause of action or issues or facts which, though not already decided as a result of the same had not being brought forward. Be that as it may, issues for determination under this O 14A application could not have been brought up in that O 14A application for obvious reason. Under O 14A application the court is not able to make the finding sought under this O 14A application. Hence, I do not find this argument relevant to the issues at hand. I hold that the application of the plaintiff in encl 25 is not barred by res judicata. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issues, similarity of — Test to be applied — Whether plea of res judicata can succeed Airport Auto Centre Sdn Bhd, the first third party in the court below (Airport Auto) and beneficial owner of an undivided share in a piece of land held under Lot 28 (the property), entered into an agreement on 10 June 1993 to sell the property to the defendant/respondent (respondent) at a purchase price of RM200,000. Later, on 9 December 1994, Mdm Chun, the second third party, transferred the property to the appellant. Thereafter the plaintiff/appellant (appellant) brought an action in the High Court against the respondent to recover vacant possession of the property and consequential relief. The respondent delivered a counterclaim seeking specific performance against the appellant and an order against Mdm Chun that she caused the appellant to specially transfer the property to the respondent and damages for breach of contract against Airport Auto. The trial judge dismissed the appellant’s claim and entered judgment on the counterclaim against the appellant and Mdm Chun. These appeals were based on that judgment. The first appeal by the appellant and the second by Mdm Chun which arose from the same civil suit were heard together. The appellant’s main grounds of appeal were that the counterclaim was barred by res judicata, that the remedy of specific performance was not available to the defendant and that the trial judge had erred because he had not undertaken a judicial appreciation of the evidence before him and in consequence had misdirected himself.

Held dismissing the appeals with costs:

(1) The plea of res judicata in this case was based on an earlier summons for an interlocutory mandatory injunction by the respondent against a company called Jaytra Sdn Bhd. To constitute res judicata, the ‘earlier judgment must necessarily and with precision determine the point in issue’. When this test is applied to the facts in this present case, it would appear that the decision in the injunction application did not necessarily and with precision determine the point in issue in this appeal. The points in issue before the trial judge in the present instance were whether the agreement of 10 June 1993 was a true sale and purchase agreement or a guarantee or security agreement to enforce a loan made by the respondent to Airport Auto and whether Airport Auto had repaid the sum of RM282,000 to the respondent. These issues were not at stake in the earlier proceedings and therefore the plea of res judicata could not succeed (see paras 5 & 6). E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-232 (2) The appellant contended that the respondent had abandoned its remedy of specific performance and in support, thereof relied on cl 5 of the agreement of 10 June 1993, and claimed that the respondent had opted for monetary compensation in lieu of specific performance. The said clause 5 stipulates that the sale and purchase agreement shall be void on the happening of an event which Airport Auto can by its own act or omission bring about. If this clause was to be given effect, it would mean that Airport Auto could rely on its own failure to complete the sale and thereby defeat the respondent’s claim for specific relief. To do so would be to permit Airport Auto to take advantage of its own wrong. Settled authority has held that a party cannot rely on its own wrong to defeat the opponent’s claim (see paras 7 & 8). (3) In any case, cl 5 on its true construction does not amount to an abandonment by the respondent of its right to the remedy of specific performance. In fact, there is nothing in the agreement of 10 June 1993 from which such an abandonment may be inferred. To succeed on a plea of abandonment it must be shown that the innocent party has either expressly or by necessary implication abandoned the remedy of specific performance. In the absence of an express abandonment, cogent evidence is necessary to support a plea of implied abandonment. There is no evidence of express or implied abandonment in this case (see para 9). (4) The appellant’s argument that the remedy of specific performance cannot be had against the appellant because it was not a party to the agreement of 10 June 1993 was without merit. There is a specific finding by the trial judge, based on para 23 of Madam Chun’s defence, that at all material times the appellant was Madam Chun’s nominee and that Airport Auto was her agent. The evidence on record fairly supports ||Page 841>> the inference that the transfer of the property by Mdm Chun to the appellant was an attempt to evade the contractual obligations that Airport Auto owed to the respondent under the agreement dated 10 June 1993. The trial judge accordingly pierced the corporate veil of the appellant and Airport Auto as he was clearly entitled to base on established authority. It therefore transpired that Mdm Chun by taking advantage of the transfer to the appellant was evading the contractual obligations she (in effect being the alter ego of Airport Auto) owed the defendant under the agreement of 10 June 1993. Accordingly there is no bar for the decree of specific performance being enforced against the appellant (see paras 10 & 11). (5) The argument advanced by the appellant that there was a change of the shareholders of the appellant company since the events giving rise to the present litigation and it could not be held responsible for what the earlier shareholders had done is without merit. This is because a company is a separate and distinct entity from its shareholders and a change in the latter does not effect a change in the identity of the former (see para 13). (6) The final submission by the appellant that the judge did not judicially appreciate the evidence before him when adjudicating upon the issues in dispute also cannot be supported. A critical examination of the judge’s evaluation disclosed that the trial judge had not misdirected himself upon any material particular. As such, it is the duty of this court to defer to the finding of fact by the trial judge on the issues presented to him for decision (see paras 14-16).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-233 Airport Auto Centre Sdn Bhd, pihak ketiga pertama di Mahkamah Tinggi (‘Airport Auto’) dan pemilik benefisial bahagian yang tak dibahagi di dalam sebidang tanah yang dipegang di bawah Lot 28 (‘harta tanah’), telah memasuki satu perjanjian pada 10 Jun 1993 untuk menjual harta tanah tersebut kepada defendan/responden pada harga belian sebanyak RM200,000. Kemudian, pada 9 Disember 1994, Puan Chun, pihak ketiga kedua, telah memindahkan harta tanah tersebut kepada plaintif/perayu. Seterusnya perayu membawa tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap responden untuk mendapatkan milikan kosong harta tanah tersebut dan relif yang berkaitan. Responden telah menyerahkan tuntutan balas memohon perlaksanaan spesifik terhadap perayu dan perintah terhadap Puan Chun bahawa beliau yang menyebabkan perayu secara spesifiknya memindahkan harta tanah kepada responden dan ganti rugi bagi perlanggaran kontrak terhadap Airport Auto. Hakim bicara telah menolak tuntutan perayu dan telah memasukkan penghakiman terhadap tuntutan balas terhadap perayu ||Page 842>> dan Puan Chun. Rayuan ini adalah berdasarkan kepada penghakiman tersebut. Rayuan pertama oleh perayu dan kedua oleh Puan Chun yang timbul daripada guaman sivil yang sama telah didengar bersama. Alasan rayuan utama perayu adalah tuntutan balas adalah terhalang oleh prinsip res judicata, yang mana tiada remedi perlaksanaan spesifik bagi defendan dan hakim bicara telah terkhilaf kerana beliau tidak menghargai secara kehakiman keterangan di hadapannya dan menyebabkan beliau telah tersalah arah.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan-rayuan dengan kos:

(1) Rayuan bagi res judicata dalam kes ini adalah berdasarkan kepada saman terdahulu bagi injunksi mandatori interlokutori oleh responden terhadap sebuah syarikat yang dikenali sebagai Jaytra Sdn Bhd. Untuk membentuk res judicata, ‘penghakiman awal mestilah berkepentingan dan dengan penentuan yang tepat terhadap perkara di dalam isu’. Apabila ujian ini digunakan terhadap fakta dalam kes ini, ianya menunjukkan bahawa keputusan di dalam permohonan injunksi tidak perlu dan dengan tepat menentukan perkara di dalam isu rayuan ini. Perkara dalam isu di hadapan hakim bicara di dalam kes ini adalah, sama ada perjanjian 10 Jun 1993 adalah perjanjian jual beli yang sebenar atau satu jaminan atau perjanjian sekuriti untuk menguatkuasakan pinjaman yang telah dibuat oleh responden kepada Airport Auto; dan sama ada Airport Auto telah membayar semula sejumlah RM282,000 kepada responden. Isu-isu ini tidak dinyatakan di dalam prosiding awal dan oleh itu rayuan berkenaan dengan res judicata tidak boleh berjaya (lihat perenggan 5-6). (2) Perayu menegaskan bahawa responden telah mengabaikan remedi perlaksanaan spesifiknya dan dalam menyokongnya bergantung kepada klausa 5 perjanjian bertarikh 10 Jun 1993, dan menyatakan bahawa responden telah memilih untuk pampasan kewangan menggantikan perlaksanaan spesifik. Klausa 5 tersebut menyatakan bahawa perjanjian jual beli akan terbatal apabila Airport Auto dengan sendirinya melakukan atau tidak melakukan sesuatu perkara. Jika klausa ini diberikan kesan, ianya membawa maksud bahawa Airport Auto boleh bergantung kepada kegagalannya sendiri untuk melengkapkan penjualan dan oleh itu menggagalkan tuntutan responden bagi relief spesifik. Untuk melakukannya, Airport Auto perlu dibenarkan untuk mengambil kesempatan atas kesalahannya sendiri. Autoriti yang telah ditetapkan memutuskan bahawa sesuatu pihak tidak boleh bergantung kepada kesalahannya sendiri untuk

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-234 menggagalkan tuntutan pihak lawan (lihat perenggan 7-8). (3) Walau bagaimanapun, klausa 5 di atas tafsiran sebenarnya tidak merupakan pengguguran oleh responden terhadap remedi perlaksanaan ||Page 843>> spesifik. Sesungguhnya, tidak terdapat apa-apa di dalam perjanjian bertarikh 10 Jun 1993 di mana pengguguran tersebut boleh disimpulkan. Untuk berjaya dalam rayuan pengguguran ianya mestilah menunjukkan bahawa pihak yang tidak bersalah telah sama ada secara jelas atau implikasi menggugurkan remedi perlaksanaan spesifik. Dalam ketiadaan pengguguran yang jelas, keterangan yang meyakinkan adalah penting untuk menyokong rayuan bagi pengguguran secara tersirat. Tidak terdapat keterangan pengguguran yang jelas atau tersirat dalam kes ini (lihat perenggan 9). (4) Pernyataan perayu bahawa remedi perlaksanaan spesifik tidak boleh dikenakan terhadap perayu kerana ia bukanlah pihak kepada perjanjian bertarikh 10 Jun 1993 adalah tidak bermerit. Terdapat dapatan spesifik oleh hakim bicara berdasarkan kepada perenggan 23 pembelaan Puan Chun bahawa pada keseluruhan masa yang material perayu adalah penama Puan Chun dan Airport Auto adalah agennya. Keterangan yang direkodkan secara adilnya menyokong kesimpulan bahawa pemindahan harta tanah oleh Puan Chun kepada perayu adalah satu cubaan untuk mengelak tanggungjawab kontrak bahawa Airport Auto terhutang terhadap responden di bawah perjanjian bertarikh 10 Jun 1993. Hakim bicara dengan sewajarnya menembusi tirai korporat perayu dan Airport Auto yang mana beliau secara jelasnya adalah berhak untuk mendasarkan kepada autoriti yang kukuh. Oleh itu, ianya diketahui bahawa, Puan Chun dengan mengambil kesempatan terhadap pemindahan kepada perayu cuba mengelak kewajipan kontraknya (sebagai alter ego (personality kedua) Airport Auto) yang berhutang kepada defendan di bawah perjanjian bertarikh 10 Jun 1993. Sewajarnya, tidak terdapat halangan bagi dekri perlaksanaan spesifik untuk dikuatkuasakan terhadap perayu (lihat perenggan 10-11). (5) Pernyataan yang dikemukakan oleh perayu bahawa terdapat pertukaran pemegang saham perayu memandangkan kejadian yang timbul hingga litigasi sekarang ini dan ianya tidak boleh dikatakan bertanggungjawab bagi apa yang dilakukan oleh pemegang saham yang dahulu adalah tidak bermerit. Ini adalah kerana, sebuah syarikat adalah entiti yang berlainan dan berbeza daripada pemegang sahamnya dan pertukaran kemudiannya tidak memberikan kesan pertukaran identiti yang terdahulu (lihat perenggan 13). (6) Hujahan terakhir oleh perayu bahawa hakim tidak menghargai secara kehakiman keterangan di hadapannya apabila membuat keputusan terhadap isu-isu yang dipertikaikan juga tidak boleh disokong. Pemeriksaan kritikal atas penilaian hakim mendedahkan bahawa hakim bicara tidak menyalah arahkan dirinya terhadap mana-mana butiran yang penting. Oleh yang demikian, adalah tugas mahkamah ini untuk ||Page 844>> mengikut dapatan fakta oleh hakim bicara berkenaan dengan isu-isu yang dikemukakan kepadanya untuk diputuskan (lihat perenggan 14-16). Notes For cases on fact, finding of appeal, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 898–1004

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-235 For cases on issues, similarity of res judicata, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 6076–6078 For cases on specific performance in general, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2006 Reissue) paras 5081–5153 [4] Before us, the plaintiff relied on three grounds in support of its appeal. First, that the counterclaim was barred by res judicata. Second, that the remedy of specific performance was not available to the defendant. Third, that the learned judge had erred in not undertaking a judicial appreciation of the evidence led before him in consequence of which he misdirected himself. We will deal with each of these points in turn. [5] To appreciate the argument raised on the plea of res judicata, it is necessary to narrate some of the factual background on which the plea is based. After the commencement of proceedings, the defendant took out a summons for an interlocutory mandatory injunction. Its application was based on an agreement dated 20 October 1991 between itself and a company called Jaytra Sdn Bhd. Under that agreement the defendant was given the right to extract sand from the subject property. At the date of that agreement ||Page 846>> Jaytra had been wound up. However, Madam Chun’s husband, Wu Soo Hwa purported to act as the general manager of Jaytra. He appointed himself and Madam Chun as its directors. Tribute on the sand mined from the subject property was paid by the defendant to Madam Chun. All this was, of course, wholly illegal. The judge who heard the defendant’s application for an injunction dismissed it. An appeal to this court failed. The judgment of this court is reported in [2000] 4 MLJ 737. It is clear from a reading of the judgments of Siti Norma Yaakob and Abu Mansor JJCA that the issue that was dealt with upon that occasion was the validity of the mining agreement which the defendant had with Jaytra. To illustrate the point we need do no more than quote the following sentence from the judgment of Siti Norma Yaakob JCA: [6] It is also pertinent to note that in an application for an interlocutory injunction; whether mandatory or prohibitory; the primary question for the court is whether the justice of the case warrants the grant of relief. See, Keet Gerald v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193. It is upon that issue that this court made its pronouncement in its earlier decision. Learned counsel for the plaintiff drew our attention to certain passages in the judgment of Siti Norma Yaakob JCA in which the merits of the case appear to have been discussed. The comments in these passages are mere obiter dicta and do not constitute the ratio of the case. It is only the ratio of the case which is binding between parties to a dispute or their successors. See, Carl - Zeiss v Rayner & Keeler [1967] 1 AC 853. Further, to constitute res judicata, ‘the earlier judgment must, in terms of the Privy Council decision in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49 at p 53, ‘necessarily and with precision’ determine the point in issue’. See, Tong Lee Hwa v Lee Yoke San [1979] 1 MLJ 24, per Chang Min Tat FJ. If you apply that test to the facts here, the decision of this court in the earlier case did not necessarily and with precision determine the point in issue in this appeal. The points at issue before the trial judge in the present instance were:

These issues were not at stake before this court in the earlier proceedings. It is therefore our judgment that the plea of res judicata cannot succeed. ||Page 847>>

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-236 Civil Procedure — Appeal — Record of appeal — Res judicata — Whether earlier decision by magistrate’s court on notice by association was res judicata — Whether issues in magistrate’s court and High Court were identical — Whether doctrine of res judicata applicable The association (‘Persatuan Chung Loong’) was registered under the Societies Act 1961 and had been the owner of the land held under Lot No 12713 Siputeh Road, in the district of Kinta, Tronoh town (‘the land’) since 1950. On 28 May 1950, the association passed a resolution authorising the trustees to subdivide the land and lease the lots to, members, including the plaintiff/appellant’s father. In the 1960s the plaintiff’s father erected a small building thereon. In 1985, the association, by another resolution, issued a notice to the plaintiff offering him an option to purchase the property. The plaintiff had never accepted the offer and was also in arrears of rental, which caused the association issuing a summons against him seeking vacant possession. The association stated that it had issued a notice to quit dated 28 November 1985 (‘the notice’) which was duly served on the plaintiff. On the other hand, the plaintiff raised the defence that the notice was bad in law and had no legal effect, which was upheld by the magistrate. The association’s appeal was subsequently withdrawn. In 1991, the plaintiff filed an action that by contract he had bought the land from the association sometime in 1965 for RM1,000. The association’s defence against it included counterclaim for vacant possession. However, the plaintiff asserted that the notice was bad in law and that the association’s claim had already been decided by the magistrates court and that the association was estopped from raising it by reason of the doctrine of res judicata. The association argued that res judicata did not apply as the issues in the magistrate’s court and the High Court were different. The trial judge held that res judicata did not apply. Hence this appeal by the plaintiff.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s appeal and dismissing the association’s counterclaim: ||Page 782>>

(1) Res judicata is a matter adjudged and it created an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties had already been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties who should accept it as the truth — res judicata pro veritate accipitur. It is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium (see para 8). (2) In the magistrate’s court, the association’s prayer for vacant possession was against the plaintiff as its tenant and was based on its capacity as landlord. Hence, the finding by the magistrate’s court that the notice was bad in law and had no legal effect was, in view of the withdrawal of the appeal by the association, final, conclusive and binding on the association and the plaintiff. Likewise, in the High Court, the association’s counterclaim was founded on the title to the land so as to recover vacant possession thereof against the plaintiff, clearly in the plaintiff’s capacity as tenant, relying on the same notice. Thus, there was no doubt that the issues were identical (see paras 16–17).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-237 (3) The learned trial judge had erred in holding that the doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable. That was an error of law (see para 18). Persatuan Chung Loong didaftarkan di bawah Akta Persatuan 1961 dan telah menjadi pemilik tanah yang dipegang di bawah Lot No 12713 Jalan Siputeh, dalam daerah Kinta, bandar Tronoh (‘tanah tersebut’) sejak tahun 1950. Pada 28 Mei 1950, persatuan tersebut telah meluluskan satu resolusi memberi kuasa kepada pemegang amanah untuk membahagikan tanah tersebut dan menyewakan lot-lot itu kepada, ahli-ahli, termasuk bapa plaintif/perayu. Dalam tahun 1960an, bapa plaintif telah membina bangunan kecil di atasnya. Dalam tahun 1985, persatuan tersebut, melalui resolusi lain, mengeluarkan notis kepada plaintif menawarkannya pilihan untuk membeli hartanah itu. Plaintif tidak pernah menerima tawaran itu dan juga tertunggak dalam sewaannya, yang menyebabkan persatuan mengeluarkan saman terhadapnya meminta milikan kosong. Persatuan tersebut menyatakan bahawa ia telah mengeluarkan notis untuk keluar bertarikh 28 November 1985 (‘notis tersebut’) yang telah disampaikan ke atas plaintif. Sebaliknya, plaintif telah menimbulkan pembelaan bahawa notis tersebut adalah salah di sisi undang-undang dan tidak berkuat kuasa secara sah, yang telah disahkan oleh majistret. Rayuan persatuan tersebut kemudiannya telah ditarik balik. Dalam tahun 1991, plaintif telah memfailkan tindakan bahawa melalui kontrak dia telah membeli tanah tersebut daripada persatuan tersebut sekitar tahun 1965 sejumlah RM1,000. Pembelaan persatuan tersebut terhadapnya ||Page 783>> termasuklah tuntutan balas untuk milikan kosong. Walau bagaimanapun, plaintif menegaskan bahawa notis tersebut salah di sisi undang-undang dan tuntutan persatuan tersebut telahpun diputuskan oleh mahkamah majistret dan persatuan tersebut diestopkan daripada menimbulkannya oleh sebab doktrin res judicata. Persatuan tersebut berhujah bahawa res judicata tidak terpakai kerana isu-isu di mahkamah majistret dan Mahkamah Tinggi adalah berbeza. Hakim perbicaraan memutuskan bahawa res judicata tidak terpakai. Justeru itu rayuan ini dikemukakan oleh plaintif.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan plaintif dan menolak tuntutan balas persatuan tersebut:

(1) Res judicata adalah perkara yang diadili dan ia membentuk estopel per rem judicatum. Apabila perkara antara dua pihak telahpun diadili oleh mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa yang kompeten, pihak-pihak dan privi mereka tidak dibenarkan melitigasi sekali lagi kerana penghakiman telah menjadi kebenaran antara pihak-pihak tersebut yang patut menerimanya sebagai yang benar — res judicata pro veritate accipitur. Ia adalah demi kepentingan awam maka patut ada kemuktamadan dalam litigasi — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium (lihat perenggan 8). (2) Di mahkamah majistret, permohonan persatuan tersebut untuk milikan kosong adalah terhadap plaintif sebagai penyewanya dan adalah berdasarkan kapasitinya sebagai tuan punya tanah. Justeru itu, penemuan oleh mahkamah majistret bahawa notis tersebut tidak sah di sisi undang-undang dan tiada penguatkuasaan sah adalah, berdasarkan penarikan balik rayuan oleh persatuan tersebut. Begitu juga, di Mahkamah Tinggi, tuntutan balas persatuan tersebut berdasarkan hak milik tanah tersebut untuk mendapat balik milikan kosong terhadap plaintif, jelas dalam kapasiti plaintif sebagai penyewa, bergantung kepada notis sama. Oleh itu, tiada keraguan bahawa isu-isu tersebut adalah sama (lihat perenggan 16–17). E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-238 (3) Hakim perbicaraan yang bijaksana terkhilaf dalam memutuskan bahawa doktrin res judicata adalah tidak terpakai. Terdapat kesilapan undang-undang di sini (lihat perenggan 18).

(1) the notice is bad in law and has no legal effect; and (2) the association’s claim for vacant possession has been raised and decided in the magistrate’s court action against the member, and so the association is by reason of the doctrine of res judicata estopped from raising it again in the High Court.

RES JUDICATA

[14] Learned counsel, Mr KL Choy submitted for the member that, in the High Court and the magistrate’s court, the association has relied on the same notice to recover vacant possession of the land from the member. Since the magistrate’s court has dismissed the association’s claim for vacant possession based on the notice and the association has withdrawn the appeal against that decision, the plea of res judicata applies, citing Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (SC). [15] Mr A Iruthaya Raj, learned counsel for the association, disagreed and supported the High Court decision, contending that the principle of res judicata does not apply, as the issues before the magistrate’s court and the High Court were entirely different; and that the issue in the High Court is in relation to title and final adjudication of the rights of the parties, while that in the magistrate’s court revolves around tenancy. He referred to, inter alia: [16] The learned trial judge agreed with the association’s submission and held that res judicata is inapplicable. ||Page 787>>

In the light of the pleadings in the magistrate’s court and in the High Court, and on the above finding of facts, was the learned trial judge correct in holding that the doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable? [18] The answer to the above question may be ascertained by embarking on a detailed discussion of the doctrine of res judicata. Peh Swee Chin FCJ (as he then was) in delivering the judgment of the Federal Court in Asia Commercial Finance, gave an excellent exposition on this doctrine at pp 197–203, which may be extracted and enumerated as follows:

(1) Res judicata simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum; (2) When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties who should accept it as the truth — res judicata pro veritate accipitur; (3) The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium; (4) It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa;

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-239 (5) Both the aforesaid maxims in (3) and (4) are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy; (6) Since a res judicata creates an estopel per rem judicatum, the doctrine of res judicata is really the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum which archaically was described as estoppel by record; (7) The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time: per Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at p 115; the ‘point’ should actually include causes of action, or all causes of action which one of the two parties has against the other, based on, or substantially on the same facts or issues, and not just all issues of law or of fact that are in dispute between the parties; ||Page 788>> (8) One of the exceptional special cases is the effect of a default judgment in subsequent proceedings between the same parties because a default judgment is different from a final judgment on the merits; (9) The well-known relevancy of a previous judgment in barring a second suit is seen in s 40 of the Evidence Act 1950, which provides as follows:

(10) There are in fact two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum, the first relates to cause of action estoppel and the second, to issue estoppel, which is a development from the first; (11) The cause of action estoppel arises when rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court for a particular remedy are determined in a final judgment and such right of action ie cause of action, merges into the final judgment; in layman’s language, the cause of action has turned into the final judgment. The cause of action may not be relitigated between the same parties because it is res judicata; (12) In order to prevent multiplicity of action and also in order to protect the underlying rationales of estoppel per rem judicatum and not to act against them, such estoppel of cause of action has been extended to all other causes of action (based on the same facts or issues) which should have been litigated or asserted in the original earlier action resulting in the final judgment, and which were not, either deliberately or due to inadvertence; see Public Trustee v Kenward [1967] 2 All ER 870; [1967] 1 WLR 1062; Conquer v Boot [1928] 2 KB 336; Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 62 ALJR 324; and LE Walwin & Partners Ltd v West Sussex County Council [1975] 3 All ER 604; (13) Issue estoppel literally means simply an issue which a party is estopped from raising in a subsequent proceeding. However, in law, issue estoppel means a lot more, ie that neither of the same parties or their privies in a subsequent proceeding is entitled to challenge the correctness of the decision of a previous final judgment in which they,

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-240 or their privies, were parties; neither of such parties will be allowed to adduce evidence or advance any argument to contradict such decision; (14) Issue estoppel prevents contradiction of a previous determination, whereas cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of the cause of action: per Peter Gibson J in Lawlor v Gray [1984] 3 All ER 345 at p 350; ||Page 789>> (15) In preventing such contradiction of the previous judgment, there is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary view that such issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata, ie the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum; (16) Our Federal Court prefers the aforesaid contrary view, which represents a correct, even though broader, approach to the scope of issue estoppel and is warranted by the weight of authorities being completely in accord or resonant with the rationales behind the doctrine of res judicata, particularly the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation; (17) Res judicata for this purpose is therefore not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them: per Somervell LJ in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 at p 257; and quoted with approval in the Privy Council in Yat Tung Investment Co v Dae Heng Bank & Anor [1975] AC 581; [1975] 2 WLR 690 (see also SCF Finance Co Ltd v Masri & Anor (No 3) [1987] QB 1028; [1987] 1 All ER 194 (CA); Bell v Holmes [1956] 3 All ER 449; [1956] 1 WLR 1359; and Hoystead v Taxation Commissioner [1962] AC 155); (18) The words ‘exercising reasonable diligence’ in Henderson: (a) necessitate a mental exercise of making a finding as to whether there was diligence, or reasonable diligence, in the earlier failure to bring in at the previous trial, the issues which should have been brought in the earlier action and which were not, or in asserting all other causes of action arising out of the same facts in the earlier action and which were not; (b) ought to be understood as a gentle rebuke for the failure aforesaid despite the fact that the party had the opportunity of bringing forward all such issues or asserting all such causes of action; and ||Page 790>> (c) are not meant to impose a pre-condition for applying the doctrine of res judicata, but are meant to say that the non-bringing of the issues would count in any event irrespective of whether the failure was or was not deliberate or due E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-241 to inadvertence or negligence; and (19) The court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action by applying the doctrine of res judicata against a party even if it has not been pleaded, as estoppel is based on a question of public policy, and there should be finality in litigation: Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 at p 498, per Abdoolcader SCJ (as he then was). [19] Where the wording of the earlier originating motion and the content of the supporting affidavit, and the statement of claim in the later action, reveal identical causes of action claiming only one relief in substance, and all the rights and liabilities of both parties have merged into the judgment delivered in the originating motion and the judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court, it is final, and represents a classical case for the application of the doctrine of res judicata by way of a cause of action estoppel: see Asia Commercial Finance. [20] The plea of res judicata, however, does not apply where: [21] In considering the authorities cited for the association, I am of the view that the plaintiff’s reliance on the judgment of Ajaib Singh J (later SCJ) in Florence Bailes in the High Court is unsustainable, because the ratio decidendi there ie that where the plea of res judicata had not been pleaded by the defendant, it could not be raised as a preliminary objection to the hearing of the plaintiff’s suit, is no longer good law as it has now been overruled, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sim Kie Chong to the contrary. In any event, in the instant appeal, the plea of res judicata has been clearly pleaded. ||Page 791>> [26] That being the case, the member’s plea of res judicata is well conceived and justified, being within the scope of the principles set out in Asia Commercial Finance, generally, and enumerated in para [17](1), (2), (10), (13), (14), (15), (16) and (17) the same notice. That plea ought to have been upheld by the learned trial judge. [27] The learned trial judge had erred in holding that the doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable. That was an error of law. The question for determination is therefore answered in the negative. Civil Procedure — Stay of execution of judgment — Application for — Notice of appeal filed — Fresh evidence had emerged — Evidence not in existence at the time of hearing — Whether defendant entitled to rely on fresh evidence to support its application for stay — Whether doctrine of res judicata applied

Held:

(1) Both the reports may be regarded as fresh evidence that was not introduced when the plaintiff advanced its application for the said order (see the conditions set out in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745). Firstly, both the reports were the plaintiff’s documents and they had been commissioned by the plaintiff’s financier and/or by the plaintiff and they were, at all material times, in the possession of the plaintiff. It was the plaintiff who for the very first time disclosed both the reports during the hearing of the assessment of damages before the learned senior assistant registrar on 29 November

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-242 2006 and that was after the said order was granted. Secondly, the fresh evidence was relevant and it would have an important influence in regard to the outcome of the case because as both the reports showed that the plaintiff did renovation and upgrading works and not merely repair works as alleged in order to re-instate the property to its original condition as at the date of the sale and purchase agreement. Thirdly, the fresh evidence was also credible because they were written documents prepared by professionals and tendered in court by the plaintiff itself in support of its claim for an assessment of damages(see para 17). (2) The plaintiff did not disclose and/or omitted to disclose a crucial page in the sale and purchase agreement. That would be page 24 and in that page a material clause Part 12 relating to the date of delivery of possession. Part 12 read together with clauses 6 and 10 of the sale and purchase agreement would reveal that the date of delivery of possession of the property was on 15 December 2002 and the plaintiff averred that vacant possession was delivered on 1 May 2003. Pursuant to cl 10 of the sale and purchase agreement, the defendant would only be liable if on the date of delivery of possession, that is, on 15 December 2002, the property was not in the same condition as on the date of execution of the sale and purchase agreement on 22 March 2002. In fact, there was no such averment or allegation by the plaintiff and therefore liability could not be attached to the defendant. The plaintiff’s allegations that when vacant possession was delivered on 1 May 2003, the property was not substantially in the same condition as on the date of the sale and purchase agreement was certainly irrelevant (see paras 27 & 30). (3) In considering the stay application, the absence of an affidavit in reply by the defendant to challenge encl 1 and to rebut the affidavit in support in encl 2 would not and could not dispense with the legal requirement of proving the damages by the plaintiff to the hilt. But, it must also be borne in mind, that in considering encl 1, all the averments in the affidavit in support in encl 2 stood alone, unrebutted and deemed to be admitted (see para 36). (4) On the available evidence, in adjudicating the stay application the doctrine of res judicata had no application. Public policy considerations dictate that the doctrine do not apply because it is a separate application pending the appeal to the Court of Appeal. It would be perverse to argue that the stay application ||Page 643>> had been decided by this court in the first judgment. Here, if the stay was not granted, the appeal, if successful, would be rendered nugatory. It must be emphasised that the defendant’s contention of the presence of the fresh evidence in the form of both the reports could not be ignored. This fresh evidence constituted special circumstances (see para 45).

Diputuskan:

(1) Kedua-dua laporan boleh dianggap sebagai keterangan baru yang tidak dikemukakan apabila plaintif membuat permohonannya untuk perintah tersebut (lihat syarat-syarat yang dinyatakan dalam Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 ||Page 644>> All ER 745). Pertamanya, kedua-dua laporan adalah dokumen-dokumen plaintif dan mereka telah ditugaskan oleh pembiaya plaintif dan/atau plaintif dan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-243 laporan-laporan tersebut, pada kesemua masa yang material, berada di dalam milikan plaintif. Ia adalah plaintif yang pertama kali mengemukakan kedua-dua laporan tersebut ketika pendengaran taksiran ganti rugi di hadapan penolong kanan pendaftar yang bijaksana pada 29 November 2006 dan selepas perintah tersebut diberikan. Keduanya, keterangan baru adalah relevan dan ia akan mempunyai pengaruh penting berhubungan dengan hasil kes tersebut oleh kerana kedua-dua laporan menunjukkan bahawa plaintif telah menjalankan kerja-kerja ubahsuai dan peningkatan dan bukan hanya kerja-kerja pembaikan seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam perintah untuk mengembalikan semula hartanah tersebut kepada keadaan asalnya pada tarikh perjanjian jual beli tersebut. Ketiga, keterangan baru juga boleh dipercayai oleh kerana mereka adalah dokumen-dokumen bertulis yang disediakan oleh pakar-pakar dan dikemukakan ke mahkamah oleh plaintif sendiri untuk menyokong tuntutannya untuk taksiran ganti rugi (lihat perenggan 17). (2) Plaintif tidak mendedahkan dan/atau gagal mendedahkan satu mukasurat yang penting di dalam perjanjian jual beli tersebut. Ia adalah mukasurat 24 dan di mukasurat tersebut satu klausa material Bahagian 12 yang berkaitan dengan tarikh penyerahan milikan kosong. Bahagian 12 dibaca bersama kl 6 dan 10 perjanjian jual beli akan mendedahkan tarikh penyerahan milikan hartanah tersebut adalah pada 15 Disember 2002 dan plaintif menyatakan bahawa milikan kosong diserahkan pada 1 Mei 2003. Mengikut kl 10 perjanjian jual beli, defendan hanya bertanggungjawab sekiranya pada tarikh penyerahan milikan, iaitu, pada 15 Disember 2002, hartanah tersebut tidak di dalam keadaan yang sama seperti pada tarikh perjanjian jual beli ditandatangani pada 22 Mac 2002. Sebenarnya, tiada penegasan atau pengataan oleh plaintif dan dengan itu liabiliti tidak boleh dikaitkan dengan defendan. Pengataan plaintif bahawa milikan kosong diserahkan pada 1 Mei 2003, hartanah tersebut tidak berada di dalam keadaan yang sama seperti pada tarikh perjanjian jual beli adalah tidak relevan (lihat perenggan 27 & 30). (3) Dalam menimbang permohonan penggantungan, ketiadaan afidavit jawapan oleh defendan untuk mempertikaikan lampiran 1 dan juga mematahkan afidavit sokongan di lampiran 2 tidak akan dan tidak boleh mengetepikan dengan keperluan undang-undang untuk membuktikan kerugian oleh plaintif dengan sepenuhnya. Akan tetapi, ia harus diingati juga, dalam menimbang lampiran 1, segala penegasan di dalam afidavit sokongan di lampiran 2 berdiri dengan sendirinya, tanpa dipatahkan dan dianggap diakui (lihat perenggan 36). (4) Berdasarkan bukti yang ada, dalam mengadili permohonan penggantungan doktrin res judicata tidak terpakai. Pertimbangan polisi awam memerlukan supaya doktrin tersebut tidak terpakai oleh kerana ia adalah permohonan berlainan sementara menunggu rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Ia adalah berlawanan untuk berhujah bahawa permohonan penggantungan tersebut telahpun diputuskan oleh mahkamah ini di penghakiman pertama. Di sini, sekiranya penggantungan tidak diberikan, rayuan sekiranya berjaya akan menjadi tidak berguna. Ia mesti ditekankan bahawa penegasan defendan akan ||Page 645>> kehadiran keterangan baru ini dalam bentuk laporan-laporan tersebut tidak boleh diketepikan. Keterangan baru ini membentuk keadaan khas (lihat perenggan 45).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-244

RES JUDICATA

[40] The learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendant was ventilating issues that run counter to the doctrine of res judicata and to allow the defendant to proceed along those lines would be wrongful, unlawful and an abuse of the process of the court. What is res judicata? The answer can be found in the judgment of Sharma J, (as he then was) in the case of Government of Malaysia v Dato Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74. At p 76 of the report, his Lordship Sharma J (as he then was) aptly said:

In Satyadhyan Ghosel & Ors v Sint Deorajin Dobi and another AIR 1960 SC 941, the statement of the law on the subject is given thus: The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall be not adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter — whether on a question of fact or a question of law — has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in s 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where s 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. A decision given by a court at one stage on a particular matter or issue is binding on it at a later stage in the same suit or in a subsequent suit. (See Peareth v Marriott (1883) 22 Ch D 182, Hook v Administrator-General of Bengal & Ors LR 48 IA 187 and Re Trusts of the Will of Tan Tye (Deceased) Yap Liang Neo v Tan Yew Ghee and Another (1936) MLJ 141 at pp 147–151). Parties cannot raise a second time in the same suit an issue that has already been determined either expressly or by necessary implication. (See Louis Dreyfus v Aruna Chalayya LR 58 IA 381). [41] Basically, the doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine. It is a simple doctrine and it is applicable to all the courts in the country in that there must be an end to litigation (Re May (1885) 28 ChD 516 at p 518 (CA); Re Graydon, ex p Official Receiver (1896) 1QB 417; Philips v Bury (1696) Holt KB 715; Badar Bee v ||Page 661>> Habib Merican Noordin (1909) AC 615 (PC); Hoystead v Taxation Comr (1926) AC 155 at p 165 (PC); R v Middlesex Justices, ex p Bond (1933) 2 KB 1 (CA); Eastmure v Laws (1839) 5 Bing NC 444; Danks v Farley (1853) 1 WR 291; Webster v Armstrong (1885) 54 LJQB 236; Mac dougall v Knight (1890) 25 QBD 1 (CA); and Green v Weatherill (1929) 2 Ch 213) provided that the whole legal rights and obligations of the parties to the action are concluded by the earlier judgment which judgment may have decided questions of law as well as findings on a set of facts (Collier v Walters (1873) LR 17 Eq 252; and Marriot v Hampton (1797) 7 Term Rep 269). [42] The principle of res judicata will not apply in a situation where the party is relying on a piece of fresh evidence in the form of a DNA genetic finger-printing evidence that was not

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-245 available at the time of the earlier proceeding (see Hager v Osborne (1992) Fam 94; [1992] 2 All ER 494). It will also not apply in an affiliation proceeding as envisaged in the case of R v Sunderland Justices, ex p Hodgkinson [1945] KB 502; [1945] 2 All ER 175, DC. [43] In a libel claim where judgment is given in favour of the defendant in regard to certain parts of a publication, that judgment would constitute a defence of res judicata to a second claim against the same defendant even though it relates to other parts of the same publication because the subject matter of both claims are the same (Macdougall v Knight). Here, before me, the plaintiff’s claim was not grounded on libel. Again, where judgment is obtained against a lady defendant for payment of a sum of money misapplied by her as a trustee, that judgment would estop the plaintiff from obtaining in another action on practically the same facts in a different form for payment into court of the money proved to have reached the hands of the lady defendant as a trustee (Green v Weatherill). [44] I have read quite a number of the old cases and I found that the judges in those cases used varying terms to describe the same thing. Thus, terms like ‘res judicata’, ‘issue estoppel’, ‘cause of action estoppel’, ‘estoppel by record’, and ‘collateral estoppel’ have often been used. The modern tendency, according to some text book writers, is to use the phrase ‘res judicata’ in a comprehensive manner so as to cover all those terms of estoppel used by the judges in the old cases. And may I add that the doctrine of res judicata will remain an area of interest to the academicians in many years to come. The doctrine will always be invoked where the cause of action is the same (see Hills v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd [1940] 2 KB 435; [1940] 3 All ER 233 (CA)) and the cause of action has been determined on the merits (DSV Silo-und Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbtt v Owners of the Sennar, The Sennar [1985] 2 All ER 104 at p 106, [1985] 1 WLR 490 at p 494 (HL); Charm Maritime Inc v Minas Xenophon Kyriakou and David John Mathias [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 433 (CA); Livesey v Harding (1855) 21 Beav 227; AG v Rochester Corpn (1833) 6 Sim 273; Glasgow and South-Western Rly Co v Boyd and Forrest (1918) SC (HL) 14; Long v Gowlett (1923) 2 Ch 177; Alfred Rowntree & Sons Ltd v Frederick Allen & Sons (Poplar) Ltd (1935) 41 Com Cas 90; and Matuszczyk v National Coal Board (1955) SLT 101). [45] Here, on the available evidence, in adjudicating the stay application the doctrine of res judicata has no application. I even venture to say that the doctrine ||Page 662>> does not apply to any application for a stay. Public policy considerations dictate that the doctrine do not apply because it is a separate application pending the appeal to the Court of Appeal. It would be perverse to argue that the stay application has been decided by me in the first judgment. Here, if the stay was not granted, the appeal, if successful, would be rendered nugatory. It must be emphasised that the defendant’s contention of the presence of the fresh evidence in the form of both the reports cannot be ignored. This fresh evidence constitutes special circumstances. And the nature of the special circumstances may be conveniently encapsulated in these salient words: it is the gross abuse of process of non-disclosure of both the reports when this court heard and adjudicated the originating summons in encl 1 as seen in the first judgment bearing in mind that both the reports would prove that the plaintiff’s claim for special damages may constitute an unjust enrichment for the benefit of the plaintiff. It is now clear beyond per adventure that the invoices do not represent repair works to reinstate the property as at the date of execution of the sale and purchase agreement but in fact it is renovation works which improved and upgraded the property. The timber floor board on the first floor has been upgraded to concrete. If that is not an upgrading,

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-246 I do not know what is. It is certainly within the inherent jurisdiction of this court to invoke O 94 r 4 of the RHC and ‘make such order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court’. A judicial discretion was exercised by me in granting the stay of execution in the case of Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd v Wexcel Holdings Sdn Bhd & Ors and I am inclined to do so in this case. Civil Procedure — Estoppel — Res judicata — Effect of earlier decision of Supreme Court in judicial review proceedings — Whether plaintiff precluded from raising issue in subsequent civil proceedings Civil Procedure — Estoppel — Res judicata — Effect of earlier decision of tribunal — Whether LAM empowered to determine disputes between architect and client — Whether plaintiff precluded from raising issue in subsequent civil proceedings The defendant (respondent to the appeal) was the registered proprietor and beneficial owner of certain pieces of land. The plaintiff (appellant to the appeal) was appointed to prepare a comprehensive development plan for a township encompassing the lands and surrounding lands belonging to the State. By a letter dated 1 November 1998 the defendant purported to discharge the plaintiff as the architect for the project as the defendant intended to utilize the services of the architect of its new majority shareholder. The plaintiff maintained that its discharge was bad in law and of no effect. The matter was referred to Lembaga Akitek Malaysia (‘LAM’). LAM made a decision that the defendant had the right to terminate the services of the plaintiff with or without assigning any reason. The plaintiff commenced certiorari proceedings against LAM in the High Court. The High Court quashed the LAM decision. But, on appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the High Court against the defendant for professional fees and disbursements under the contract. The High Court gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal centred on two issues: (1) whether the defendant can terminate the plaintiff’s services under the contract; and (2) the quantum of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff. On the first issue, the Court of Appeal ruled that the question of termination of the services of the plaintiff was res judicata and thus ||Page 699>> cannot be relitigated. On the second issue, the Court of Appeal set aside the award of damages made by the High Court. The plaintiff was granted leave to appeal to the Federal Court on the following questions of law: (1) Is LAM competent to decide on the lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of an architect by his client; and (2) if the answer to question (1) is in the negative, was the termination of the plaintiff by the defendant lawful.

Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) (per Augustine Paul FCJ) Res judicata applies only in respect of a matter over which the court has pronounced a judgment. In this case the LAM decision was upheld by the Supreme Court pursuant to a proceeding for judicial review. It is settled law that judicial review is concerned with the process of decision making and not with the decision itself. As a judicial review proceeding is concerned with the decision-making process and not with the decision itself the decision cannot constitute res judicata of the court upholding the decision making process (see paras 25–26 & 28).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-247 (2) (per Augustine Paul FCJ) What thus requires immediate consideration is the extent to which the doctrine of res judicata can extend to a tribunal which is not a court. The test to be applied in determining whether the decision of a tribunal, which is not a court, is capable of constituting res judicata is whether it has jurisdiction, derived either from statute or from the submission of parties, to decide finally a question arising between the parties before it. A final decision in this sense means that it leaves nothing to be judicially determined or ascertained thereafter in order to render it effective and capable of execution, and is absolute, complete, and certain, and when it is not lawfully subject to subsequent rescission, review or modification by the tribunal which pronounced it. The LAM decision will therefore constitute res judicata as a decision of LAM only if it had jurisdiction to render a final decision on the dispute (see paras 30–32);.Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90; Kandiah Peter a/l Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119 followed. (3) (per Augustine Paul FCJ) It is clear that LAM is only empowered to hear and determine disputes relating to professional conduct. The section gives no power to LAM to hear disputes between an architect and his client. It follows that LAM had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the parties. Where a tribunal makes a decision which is outside its jurisdiction it is null and void. The LAM decision is thus in that position and is of no effect (see paras 36–37); Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 657 followed. (4) (per Augustine Paul FCJ) In any event the LAM decision is not final in the sense that it is not complete as no decision was made on the claim for fees thereby making it incapable of operating as res judicata. It can at best be described as a decision relating to the letter of release which may well be a matter of professional conduct. The LAM decision cannot constitute a res judicata between the parties even as a decision of LAM. The LAM is not competent to decide on the lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of an architect by his client (see paras 37–38). ||Page 700>> (5) (per Augustine Paul FCJ) The lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of the services of the plaintiff by the defendant would, in the first place, depend on whether the agreement between them contains a right to terminate. The agreement between the parties does not prescribe any express right of termination. The question of whether such a term can be implied would depend upon the intention of the parties as collected from the words of the agreement and the surrounding circumstances. It must be presumed that the plaintiff had knowledge of the Conditions of Engagement in the Fourth Schedule. He is bound to adopt them. The defendant was under the impression that it was entitled to terminate the agreement at any time. This, in substance, is the right contained in r 7. A right to terminate the agreement on any ground is therefore the obvious, but unexpressed, intention of the parties thereby making it into an implied term. The Conditions of Engagement in the Fourth Schedule also constitute implied terms in order to give business efficacy to the agreement by virtue of being a custom or practice of the architectural profession. It follows that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant may be terminated at any time by

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-248 either party upon reasonable notice being given (see paras 41–42, 48–49). (6) (per Augustine Paul FCJ) The reason given by the defendant for the termination of the services of the plaintiff is subject to review by the court. The fact that IGB wished to utilise the services of its own architect does not indicate any fault on the part of the plaintiff. The termination was due solely for the reason that the new majority shareholders of the defendant wanted to use the services of their own architect with a new development plan. It was a reason brought about by the act of the defendant itself. The result is that the services of the plaintiff was terminated for reasons brought about by the acts of the defendant itself. In other words the defendant had disabled itself from performing the contract (see paras 52–53). (7) (per Augustine Paul FCJ) The defendant cannot disable itself from performing a contract brought about by its own acts. The reason for the termination of the services of the plaintiff by the defendant is thus not valid. There is therefore a constructive breach of contract by the defendant. Where a party by his own act makes it impossible for him to perform his contract at the due date, there is a constructive breach of contract, and the other party is entitled forthwith to enforce his rights as on a breach (see paras 56–57). (8) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad FCJ and Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ) The Practice Committee and LAM were not concerned with the question whether the termination of the plaintiff’s services was a ‘wrongful’ one entitling the plaintiff to damages or compensation for breach of contract, that is to say, they were not concerned with the justice of the termination. They were concerned only to satisfy themselves that the defendant had in fact terminated the plaintiff’s services, which to them the defendant had the ‘basic right’ to do. To the Practice Committee and LAM, a client has the basic right not to want to continue retaining the services of his architect and cannot be compelled to continue the relationship if it is no longer desired. A termination ends the relationship; whether or not the termination of the relationship is wrongful is a separate question. If the termination is wrongful, then damages would ensue. ||Page 701>> That is what the Practice Committee must have meant when it said in its letter of 15 March 1989 that there was no question that the defendant had the right to terminate the plaintiff’s services with or without giving any reason (see para 105). (9) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad FCJ and Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ) LAM had all along been consistent in its stand that in deciding that the defendant had the right to terminate the plaintiff’s services, it was not deciding that the services were validly terminated, which to it was a separate question and one on which the question of damages depended. It took that stand in the certiorari proceedings in the High Court and it took that stand in the appeal to the Supreme Court. Even the defendant, in the certiorari action, took the stand that LAM did not decide on the validity of the termination. LAM’s decision of 14 March 1989 was essentially a decision to waive the requirement for the letter of release and it was made on its previous finding that the plaintiff’s services had been actually terminated (see para 133). (10) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad FCJ and Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ) Even if the Supreme Court also decided that LAM had jurisdiction to decide that the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-249 defendant had the right to terminate the plaintiff’s services, which the Court of Appeal said the Supreme Court did, the Supreme Court ought not in the present appeal to be taken to have meant the defendant’s right to be in a higher sense than what LAM, the successful party, and even the defendant itself, contended, which was merely a right to effect an actual termination. In deciding as it did, the Court of Appeal had overlooked the sense in which LAM must have spoken of ‘right to terminate’ and LAM’s insistence that it did not decide that the plaintiff’s services had been validly terminated. The Supreme Court cannot be taken to have decided that LAM’s decision was that the plaintiff’s services had been validly terminated and that LAM had jurisdiction to make such a decision. That was the basis on which the court found that the Supreme Court’s decision in the certiorari action does not constitute res judicata, as being a decision that LAM did make such a decision and had jurisdiction to make it (see para 134). (11) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad FCJ and Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ) By the manner of its wording, r 28 of the Architects (Scale of Minimum Fees) Rules 1986 imposes a duty on an architect to enter into an engagement only upon the conditions in the Conditions of Engagement. If he fails to do so and enters into an engagement otherwise than upon the conditions in the Conditions of Engagement, he acts in breach of the rule and is liable to suffer the consequences of breaching the rule, but the engagement remains an engagement that is not in accordance with the conditions in the Conditions of Engagement. The Conditions of Engagement, therefore, will apply to an engagement of an architect only through observance by the architect of r 28 by incorporating them in the contract. If the architect does not observe r 28, the Conditions of Engagement are not incorporated into the contract. Rule 28 is not worded as a provision that makes the Conditions of Engagement directly applicable to every engagement of an architect (see para 143). (12) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad FCJ and Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ) LAM is a creature of statute, the Architects Act 1967. What it may or may not do is ||Page 702>> to be found only in the Act and the rules made under s 35. There is no provision that gives LAM the competency to decide the lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of the services or engagement of an architect by his client, which is a question that arises only in a dispute between the client and an architect about their contractual relationship. The disputes that LAM is empowered by para (e) of s 4 of the Act to hear and determine are disputes relating to professional conduct or ethics of architects. LAM is not competent to decide the lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of an architect by his client. Only the Act can give it that competence and the Act does not give it (see paras 148 & 151). Defendan (responden dalam rayuan) merupakan tuanpunya berdaftar dan pemilik benefisiari beberapa bidang tanah tertentu. Plaintif (perayu dalam rayuan) telah dilantik untuk menyediakan satu pelan pembangunan yang komprehensif untuk satu perbandaran yang meliputi tanah-tanah dan tanah sekeliling milik Kerajaan Negeri. Melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 1 November 1998 defendan dikatakan bertujuan untuk melucutkan plaintif sebagai arkitek untuk projek tersebut kerana defendan berhasrat untuk menggunakan khidmat arkitek kepada pemegang saham majoritinya yang baru. Plaintif menegaskan bahawa pelucutannya adalah salah di sisi undang-undang dan tiada kesan. Lembaga Akitek Malaysia (‘LAM’). LAM telah membuat satu keputusan bahawa defendan mempunyai hak untuk menamatkan khidmat

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-250 plaintif dengan atau tanpa memberikan apa-apa alasan. Plaintif telah memulakan prosiding certiorari terhadap LAM di Mahkamah Tinggi. Mahkamah Tinggi telah membatalkan keputusan LAM. Namun, selepas mengemukakan rayuan, Mahkamah Agong telah mengenepikan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi. Berikutan itu, plaintif telah memulakan prosiding di Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap defendan untuk yuran profesional dan wang pendahuluan di bawah kontrak. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memberikan penghakiman menyebelahi plaintif. Defendan telah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Rayuan tersebut berkisarkan dua isu: (1) sama ada defendan boleh menamatkan khidmat plaintif di bawah kontrak itu; dan (2) kuantum ganti rugi yang patut diawardkan kepada plaintif. Berhubung isu pertama, Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan bahawa persoalan penamatan perkhidmatan plaintif adalah res judicata dan oleh itu tidak boleh dilitigasikan semula. Berhubung isu kedua, Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengenepikan award ganti rugi yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Plaintif telah diberikan kebenaran untuk merayu ke Mahkamah Persekutuan berdasarkan persoalan undang-undang berikut: (1) adakah LAM kompeten untuk memutuskan tentang kesahihan atau sebaliknya penamatan arkitek oleh anak guamnya; dan (2) jika jawapan kepada persoalan (1) adalah negatif, adakah penamatan plaintif oleh defendan sah di sisi undang-undang.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut:

(1) (oleh Augustine Paul HMP) Res judicata hanya terpakai berkaitan perkara yang mana mahkamah telah menyampaikan satu penghakiman. Dalam kes ini keputusan LAM telah dikekalkan oleh Mahkamah Agong berikutan satu prosiding untuk semakan kehakiman. Adalah undang-undang tetap bahawa ||Page 703>> semakan kehakiman adalah berkaitan proses membuat keputusan dan bukan keputusan itu sendiri. Oleh kerana suatu prosiding semakan kehakiman adalah berkaitan dengan proses membuat keputusan dan bukan keputusan itu sendiri maka keputusan tersebut tidak membentuk res judicata mahkamah yang mengekalkan proses membuat keputusan itu (lihat perenggan 25–26 & 28). (2) (oleh Augustine Paul HMP) Apa yang perlu dipertimbangkan segera adalah setakat mana doktrin res judicata boleh meliputi suatu tribunal yang bukan suatu mahkamah. Ujian yang terpakai untuk menentukan sama ada keputusan satu tribunal, yang bukan satu mahkamah, mampu membentuk res judicata adalah sama ada ia mempunyai bidang kuasa, yang wujud sama ada daripada statut atau penghujahan pihak-pihak, untuk akhirnya memutuskan suatu persoalan yang timbul antara pihak-pihak di hadapannya. Suatu keputusan muktamad dalam erti kata ini bermaksud tiada yang perlu ditentukan atau dipastikan secara kehakiman bagi tujuan menjadikannya efektif dan dapat dilaksanakan, dan adalah mutlak, lengkap, dan pasti, dan apabila ia tidak tertakluk dari segi undang-undang untuk seterusnya dibatalkan, disemak atau diubah oleh tribunal yang mengisytiharkannya. Keputusan LAM oleh itu akan membentuk res judicata sebagai keputusan LAM hanya jika ia mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membuat keputusan muktamad yang dipertikaikan (lihat perenggan 30–32); Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90; Kandiah Peter a/l Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119 diikut. (3) (oleh Augustine Paul HMP) Adalah jelas bahawa LAM hanya diberi kuasa

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-251 untuk mendengar dan menentukan pertikaian berkaitan perlakuan profesional. Seksyen tersebut tidak memberikan LAM untuk mendengar pertikaian antara arkitek dan pelanggannya. Berikutan itu LAM tiada bidang kuasa untuk mendengar pertikaian antara pihak-pihak tersebut. Di mana suatu tribunal membuat suatu keputusan yang di luar bidang kuasanya ia adalah terbatal dan tidak sah. Keputusan LAM oleh itu berada dalam kedudukan itu dan tidak berkuat kuasa (lihat perenggan 37 & 39); Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 657 diikut. (4) (oleh Augustine Paul HMP) Dalam apa keadaan keputusan LAM tidak muktamad dalam erti kata ia tidak lengkap kerana tiada keputusan telah dibuat tentang tuntutan yuran yang mana menjadikannya tidak dapat beroperasi sebagai res judicata. Sebaiknya ia digambarkan sebagai satu keputusan berkaitan Surat Pelepasan yang mana suatu perkara tentang perlakuan professional. Keputusan LAM tidak boleh membentuk suatu res judicata antara pihak-pihak jikapun sebagai suatu keputusan LAM. LAM tidak kompeten untuk memutuskan kesahihan atau sebaliknya penamatan akitek oleh pelanggannya (lihat perenggan 37–38). (5) (oleh Augustine Paul HMP) Kesahihan atau sebaliknya penamatan khidmat plaintif oleh defendan akan, terlebih dahulu, bergantung kepada sama ada perjanjian antara mereka mengandungi hak penamatan. Perjanjian antara pihak-pihak tidak menetapkan apa-apa hak nyata tentang penamatan. Persoalan sama ada terma sedemikian boleh diandaikan tersirat bergantung kepada niat pihak-pihak seperti yang terangkum dalam perkataan-perkataan perjanjian dan keadaan sekeliling. Adalah diandaikan bahawa plaintif ||Page 704>> mempunyai pengetahuan tentang Syarat-Syarat Pelantikan dalam Jadual Keempat. Beliau terikat dengannya. Defendan mengandaikan bahawa ia berhak untuk menamatkan perjanjian itu pada bila-bila masa. Ini, secara substantif, adalah hak yang terkandung dalam k 7. Suatu hak untuk menamatkan perjanjian atas apa-apa alasan yang jelas, tetapi tidak dinyatakan, niat pihak-pihak yang menjadikannya suatu terma tersirat. Syarat-Syarat Pelantikan dalam Jadual Keempat juga membentuk terma-terma tersirat bagi tujuan memberikan kesan perniagaan kepada perjanjian itu menurut kebiasaan atau amalan profesion seni bina. Berikutan itu perjanjian antara plaintif dan defendan boleh ditamatkan pada bila-bila masa oleh mana-mana pihak sekiranya notis munasabah diberikan (lihat perenggan 41–42, 48–49). (6) (oleh Augustine Paul HMP) Alasan yang diberikan oleh defendan untuk penamatan khidmat plaintif adalah tertakluk kepada semakan mahkamah. Hakiakt bahawa IGB berhasrat untuk menggunakan khidmat arkiteknya sendiri tidak menunjukkan apa-apa kesalahan di pihak plaintif. Penamatan itu semata-mata disebabkan pemegang-pemegang saham baru defendan yang ingin menggunakan khidmat arkitek mereka sendiri dengan satu pelan pembangunan baru. Ia merupakan alasan yang dikemukakan melalui tindakan defendan sendiri. Akibatnya adalah khidmat plaintif ditamatkan atas sebab-sebab akibat tindakan defendan sendiri. Dalam erti kata lain defendan telah menunjukkan ketidakmampuannya sendiri daripada melaksanakan kontrak tersebut (lihat perenggan 52–53). (7) (oleh Augustine Paul HMP) Defendan tidak boleh melepaskan diri daripada melaksanakan satu kontrak yang dimulakan oleh tindakannya sendiri. Alasan untuk penamatan khidmat plaintif oleh defendan oleh itu tidak sah. Terdapat penamatan E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-252 kontrak secara konstruktif oleh defendan. Di mana suatu pihak melalui tindakannya sendiri menjadikannya mustahil untuk melaksanakan kontraknya pada tarikh yang ditetapkan, terdapat pelanggaran kontrak yang konstruktif, dan pihak satu lagi berhak menguatkuasakan haknya berdasarkan pelanggaran itu (lihat perenggan 56–57). (8) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMP dan Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMP) Jawatankuasa Amalan dan LAM tidak mengendahkan persoalan sama ada penamatan khidmat plaintif adalah ‘wrongful’ yang memberikan plaintif hak untuk mendapat ganti rugi atau pampas an kerana pelanggaran kontrak, di mana dikatakan, ia tidak mementingkan keadilan penamatan itu. Ia hanya mementingkan kepuasan mereka yang defendan telahpun menamatkan khidmat plaintif, yang mana kepada mereka defendan mempunyai ‘basic right’ untuk berbuat demikian. Kepada Jawatankuasa Amalan dan LAM, seorang pelanggan mempunyai hak asas untuk tidak meneruskan khidmat arkiteknya dan tidak boleh memaksa hubungan itu berterusan jika ia tidak lagi diingini. Suatu penamatan mengakhirkan hubungan, sama ada atau tidak penamatan hubungan itu salah adalah persoalan berasingan. Jika penamatan itu adalah salah maka ganti rugi wujud. Inilah yang dimaksudkan oleh Jawatankuasa Amalan dalam suratnya 15 Mac 1989 bahawa tidak boleh dipersoalkan lagi bahawa defendan mempunyai hak untuk menamatkan khidmat plaintif dengan atau tanpa memberikan apa-apa alasan (lihat perenggan 105). ||Page 705>> (9) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMP dan Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMP) LAM sentiasa konsisten dengan pendiriannya bahawa dalam memutuskan bahawa defendan mempunyai hak untuk menamatkan khidmat plaintif, ia tidak memutuskan bahawa khidmat itu telah ditamatkan dengan sah, yang mana ianya satu persoalan berasingan dan yang mana persoalan ganti rugi bergantung kepadanya. Ia mengambil pendirian itu dalam prosiding certiorari di Mahkamah Tinggi dan ia mengambil pendirian itu dalam rayuan ke Mahkamah Agong. Jikapun defendan, dalam tindakan certiorari, mengambil pendirian bahawa LAM tidak membuat keputusan berdasarkan kesahan penamatan, keputusan LAM bertarikh 14 Mac 1989 merupakan keputusan penting untuk mengenepikan keperluan untuk surat pelepasan dan ia dibuat dalam penemuan sebelumnya bahawa khidmat plaintif telahpun ditamatkan (lihat perenggan 133). (10) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMP dan Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMP) Meskipun Mahkamah Agong juga telah memutuskan bahawa LAM mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk memutuskan bahawa defendan mempunyai hak untuk menamatkan khidmat plaintif, yang mana Mahkamah Rayuan mengatakan Mahkamah Agong ada, Mahkamah Agong tidak sepatutnya dalam rayuan semasa dianggap telah memberi maksud yang hak defendan lebih tinggi daripada apa yang LAM, pihak yang berjaya, dan defendan sendiri, menegaskan, yang hanya suatu hak untuk menguatkuasakan penamatan sebenar. Dalam membuat keputusan sedemikian, Mahkamah Rayuan terlepas perhatian maksud yang dinyatakan oleh LAM tentang ‘right to terminate’ dan kesungguhan LAM yang mana ia tidak memutuskan bahawa khidmat plaintif telahpun ditamatkan secara sah. Mahkamah Agong tidak boleh dianggap telah membuat keputusan bahawa keputusan LAM adalah bahawa khidmat plaintif telahpun ditamatkan dengan sah dan bahawa LAM mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membuat

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-253 keputusan sedemikian. Itulah asas yang mahkamah ini dapati bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Agong dalam tindakan certiorari tidak membentuk res judicata, sebagai satu keputusan bahawa LAM sememangnya telah membuat keputusan sebegitu dan mempunyai bidang kuasa membuatnya (lihat perenggan 134). (11) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMP dan Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMP) Menurut susun katanya, k 28 Kaedah-Kaedah Arkitek (Skala Yuran Minimum) 1986 meletakkan satu kewajipan ke atas seorang arkitek untuk memasuki satu ikatan hanya berdasarkan syarat-syarat dalam Syarat-Syarat Pelantikan. Jika beliau gagal berbuat demikian dan memasuki satu ikatan sebaliknya tanpa menurut syarat-syarat dalam Syarat-Syarat Pelantikan, beliau bertindak melanggar kaedah itu dan bertanggungjawab untuk mengalami akibat melanggar kaedah itu, namun pelantikan itu tetap satu pelantikan yang tidak menurut syarat-syarat dalam Syarat-Syarat Pelantikan. Syarat-Syarat Pelantikan itu, oleh demikian, akan terpakai kepada pelantikan arkitek hanya melalui penelitian oleh arkitek menurut k 28 dengan memasukkannya dalam kontrak. Jika arkitek itu tidak mematuhi k 28, Syarat-Syarat Pelantikan tidak dimasukkan dalam kontrak itu. Kaedah 28 tidak dimasukkan sebagai satu peruntukan yang membuat Syarat-Syarat Pelantikan secara langsung terpakai kepada semua pelantikan arkitek (lihat perenggan 143). ||Page 706>> (12) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMP dan Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMP) LAM adalah perkara statut, Akta Arkitek 1967. Apa yang ia bolah dan tidak bolah laksanakan hanya termaktub dalam Akta tersebut dan kaedah-kaedah yang digubal di bawah s 35. Tiada peruntukan yang memberikan LAM kompetensi untuk memutuskan kesahan atau sebaliknya penamatan khidmat atau pelantikan arkitek oleh pelanggannya, yang merupakan satu persoalan yang timbul hanya dalam pertikaian antara pelanggan dan arkitek tentang hubungan kontraktual mereka. Pertikaian yang LAM diberi kuasa oleh perenggan (e) kepada s 4 Akta tersebut untuk mendengar dan menentukan adalah pertikaian berkaitan perlakuan profesional atau etika arkitek. LAM tidak kompeten untuk memutuskan kesahan atau sebaliknya penamatan arkitek oleh pelanggannya. Hanya Akta tersebut memberikan kekompetenan itu dan Akta tidak memberikannya (lihat perenggan 148 & 151). Notes For cases on performance of contract, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2006 Reissue) paras 2674–2680. For cases on res judicata, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 2630–2642. For cases on right to terminate, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2006 Reissue) paras 5197–5203. Augustine Paul FCJ: This appeal raises for consideration the extent to which decisions of the Lembaga Akitek Malaysia (‘LAM’) can operate as res judicata and the effect of a contract where one party disables himself from performing his part. ||Page 708>> [18] With regard to the first issue the Court of Appeal ruled that the question of the termination of the services of the plaintiff was res judicata and thus cannot be

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-254 ||Page 714>> re-litigated. As Abdul Kadir Sulaiman JCA (as he then was) in writing for the court said (at pp 233–234 in Midvalley City Sdn Bhd & Anor v Arkitek Tenggara Sdn Bhd [2005] 6 MLJ 222):

[21] LAM/PAM being dissatisfied with the High Court order then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court (comprising of YAA Tun Dato’ Abdul Hamid bin Hj Omar LP, Dato Ajaib Singh SCJ and Dato Hj Mohd Jemuri bin Serjan SCJ) unanimously allowed the appeal of LAM/PAM and set aside the High Court order. We have carefully scrutinised the appeal record before the Supreme Court which is found in the supplementary appeal record. We hold that the issue of the validity of the appellants’ termination of the respondent’s services under the contract was considered and determined by the High Court and the Supreme Court. [22] The effect of the Supreme Court order was that the LAM/PAM decision was restored and was hence valid and binding on the parties. The Supreme Court Order had in fact upheld and affirmed the LAM/PAM decision and is binding on all the parties including the appellants before us. We therefore reject the respondent’s submission that the Supreme Court Order only dealt with the issue of the letter of release and did not deal with the issue whether the appellants had the right to terminate the respondent’s services under the contract. [23] The trial judge had in his grounds of judgment stated that the appellants had submitted that the issue of the termination of the contract was already dealt with by the Supreme Court Order and the issue was res judicata (record of appeal volume 1 at p 32). However, the trial judge did not deal with this critical issue before arriving at his finding. We are aware that the appeal record before the Supreme Court which was made available to us in the supplementary appeal records was not available to the trial judge. The failure of the judge to deal with the Supreme Court Order and the doctrine of res judicata was a serious misdirection that justifies our appellate intervention. [24] Having examined the effect of the Supreme Court Order, it is clear to us that the three decisions made by LAM/PAM have been conclusively adjudicated and decided with finality by the Supreme Court. The matter is now clearly res judicata and it cannot be re-opened and re-litigated by the parties or their privies. It is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation and the sanctity and validity of the Supreme Court order being the decision of the highest court in our country must be respected and obeyed by all other courts. InAsia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 at pp 197–198 the Supreme Court held that: What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the re judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. [23] The Court of Appeal had ruled that as the LAM decision had been conclusively adjudicated and decided with finality by the Supreme Court it had become res judicata and cannot therefore be reopened and re-litigated by the parties. Accordingly, it was contended by the defendant, the lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of an architect by his client is res judicata and thus cannot be raised now as it ought to have been raised in the course of the earlier proceeding. This submission brings into focus the question of whether the LAM decision constitutes res judicata by reason of being a decision of the Supreme Court or, if not, by reason of being a decision of LAM. If the answer to both or either one of the questions is in the affirmative then the issue raised by the plaintiff cannot be entertained as it ought to have been raised in the earlier proceeding. In this regard reference may be made toAsia E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-255 Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 where Peh Swee Chin FCJ referred to Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 where Wigram VC said at p 115:

In English law a res judicata is a decision pronounced by a judicial tribunal having jurisdiction over the cause and the parties which disposes once and for all of the matters decided, so that except on appeal they cannot afterwards be relitigated between the same parties or their privies. [25] It is thus clear that res judicata applies only in respect of a matter over which the court has pronounced a judgment. [28] As a judicial review proceeding is concerned with the decision-making process and not with the decision itself the decision cannot constitute res judicata of the court upholding the decision making process. Thus in R v Secretary of State for the Environment; ex parte Hackney LBC & Anoer [1983] 3 All ER 358 May LJ in adopting a statement from Wade on Administrative Law (5th Ed) said at p 367:

… in these procedures the Court ‘is not finally determining the validity of the tribunal’s order as between the parties themselves’ but ‘is merely deciding whether there has been a plain excess of jurisdiction or not’. They are a special class of remedies designed to maintain due order in the legal system, nominally at the suit of the Crown, and they may well fall outside the ambit of the ordinary doctrine of res judicata. [29] In this case the Supreme Court did not pronounce any judgment on the decision made by LAM. It is therefore an error to describe the LAM decision as constituting res judicata by virtue of being a decision of the Supreme Court. [30] Be that as it may, the conclusion just arrived at does not bring the matter to an end. The LAM decision is capable of constituting res judicata by reason of being a decision of LAM itself. LAM is not a court. What thus requires immediate consideration is the extent to which the doctrine of res judicata can extend to a tribunal which is not a court. This is resolved by the judgment of the High Court of Australia in The Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea & Anor v Daera Guba (1973–1974) 130 CLR 353 where Gibbs J said at p 453:

In many of the authorities that discuss this form of estoppel, it is said that the estoppel is brought about by a judicial decision, pronounced by a judicial tribunal. Thus in a recent case, Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at p 933, Lord Guest said: The rule of estoppel by res judicata, which is a rule of evidence, is that where a final decision has been pronounced by a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of the litigation, any party or privy to such litigation as against any other party or privy is estopped in any subsequent litigation from disputing or questioning such decision on the merits (Spencer Bower on Res Judicata, p 3. E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-256 The use of the phrase ‘judicial tribunal’ in this context is convenient as indicating that an estoppel of this kind does not result from a mere administrative decision, but the question whether such an estoppel is raised is not answered by inquiring to what extent the tribunal ||Page 719>> exercises judicial functions, or whether its status is judicial or administrative: see Caffoor v Commissioner of Income Tax, Colombo, per Lord Radcliffe [1961] AC 584, at pp 597–599. A fairly obvious example is the case of a court-martial, whose sentence might in some circumstances be pleaded as an estoppel (Hannaford v Hunn (1825) 2 C & P 148, at p 155), although not made in the exercise of judicial power (cf R v Bevan; Ex parte Elias and Gordon (1942) 66 CLR 452, at pp 466–468; R v Cox; Ex parte Smith (1945) 71 CLR 1, at p 23). The doctrine of estoppel extends to the decision of any tribunal which has jurisdiction to decide finally a question arising between parties, even if it is not called a court, and its jurisdiction is derived from statute or from the submission of parties, and it only has temporary authority to decide a matter ad hoc: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Ed) Vol 15, pp 212–214; Spencer Bower & Turner on Res Judicata (2nd Ed, 1969), pp 21–28. [31] It follows that the test to be applied in determining whether the decision of a tribunal, which is not a court, is capable of constituting res judicata is whether it has jurisdiction, derived either from statute or from the submission of parties, to decide finally a question arising between the parties before it. As Thomson CJ (as he then was) said in Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd v Kok Hoong [1962] MLJ 224at p 226:

Res judicata in the strict sense arises where a matter has been litigated between parties and litigated to a final decision. [32] A final decision in this sense means that it leaves nothing to be judicially determined or ascertained thereafter in order to render it effective and capable of execution, and is absolute, complete, and certain, and when it is not lawfully subject to subsequent rescission, review or modification by the tribunal which pronounced it (see Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90; Kandiah Peter a/l Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119). The LAM decision will therefore constitute res judicata as a decision of LAM only if it had jurisdiction to render a final decision on the dispute. [35] As the dispute in this case is one that relates to the agreement between an architect and his client with regard to services rendered it has nothing to do with the professional conduct of the architect. The procedure laid down by law to be followed in respect of the dispute in this case is therefore as in r 21. It is an established principle that a tribunal created by statute has only such powers as are conferred by the statute which creates it (see Lee Wah Bank Ltd v National Union of Bank Employees [1981] 1 MLJ 169). It has no inherent jurisdiction unlike the High Court (see Bank Pusat Kerjasama Bhd (in liquidation) v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 537). It follows that LAM had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the parties. Where a tribunal makes a decision which is outside its jurisdiction it is null and void (see Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 657). The LAM decision is thus in that position and is of no effect. In any event the LAM decision is not final in the sense that it is not complete as no decision was made on the claim for fees thereby making it incapable of operating as res judicata. It can at best be described as a decision relating to the letter of release which may well be a matter of professional conduct within the meaning of s 4(e). [36] The corollary is that the LAM decision cannot constitute a res judicata between the parties even as a decision of LAM. The rationale underlying this conclusion is sufficient to answer the first question which is that LAM is not competent to decide on the lawfulness or E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-257 otherwise of the termination of an architect by his client in view of the specific procedure contained in r 21. [89] The facts, events and matters that follow are mostly pertinent to the question of res judicata which is related to one of the issues in the present appeal. On 29 November 1988 the defendant’s solicitors wrote to the plaintiff to say, inter alia, that the project had been aborted and that the defendant wished to appoint new architects ‘for a new project at the same site’ to enable which the plaintiff was required to let the defendant have the plaintiffs’ letter of release. The plaintiff, by its solicitors, replied on 6 December 1988 that it was still the defendant’s architect for the project and therefore the defendant was not entitled to the letter of release, and that the project had not been aborted. The plaintiff also objected to any attempt by the defendant to appoint new architects for the project. So on 13 December 1988 the defendant’s solicitors wrote to LAM to seek its assistance in obtaining a letter of release from the plaintiff and also in arbitrating the fee dispute. The letter gave the defendant’s version of the facts. In response to LAM’s request for clarification, on 5 January 1989 the plaintiff gave its version of the facts and said, inter alia, that the project had not been aborted, abandoned or delayed indefinitely, that the plaintiff had been carrying out its duty diligently and that the question of a letter of release did not arise at all as the plaintiff was still legally the appointed architect. [114] The defendant raised three defences in its statement of defence. In paragraph 8 it averred, firstly, that the right to terminate ‘is implied by law’ and, secondly, that it could be inferred from the appointment letter that the plaintiff’s services may be terminated if the project was aborted, abandoned or delayed. This was a reliance on para 3 of the appointment letter. In para 10 the defendant raised the defence of res judicata, contending that the decision of the Supreme Court in the certiorari action that LAM’s waiver of the requirement for a letter of release was correct in law implied that the plaintiff’s services ‘is terminable and the termination thereof was correctly made’ and that therefore ‘the issue as to the propriety of the termination … may not be raised anymore’. The defendant counterclaimed a sum of RM131,636.31, being an alleged overpayment for work done. This sum was revised during the trial to RM121,677.20. [115] In its reply, the plaintiff contended, as to the defence of res judicata, that the proceedings in the Supreme Court were concerned with the validity of LAM’s decision about the letter of release and that the Supreme Court did not rule on the validity or otherwise of the termination of the plaintiff’s services. As to the defence that relied on para 3 of the appointment letter, the plaintiff contended that the project had not been aborted, abandoned or delayed indefinitely. [117] In his written submission in the High Court, the plaintiff’s counsel developed the plaintiff’s case along the lines of the reamended statement of claim and reply. As to the defence of res judicata, the plaintiff’s counsel submitted that it had been abandoned because it had not been seriously pursued during the trial. [118] In his written submission in reply the defendant’s counsel did not submit on the defence of res judicata or deny that the defence had been abandoned. As to the other two defences, he submitted, firstly, that the letter of 1 November 1998 effected a valid termination as it was based on para 3 of the appointment letter and there was evidence that the project had been abandoned, aborted or delayed indefinitely. Secondly, as regards the defence that the right to terminate was implied by law, he advanced reasons for contending that there ought to

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-258 be implied, as a term of the contract, Clause 1.4.1 of PAM’s Conditions of Engagement, which states:

An engagement entered into between a Client and the Architect may be terminated at any time by either party on the expiry of reasonable notice’. It should be noted that the term that was contended to be an implied term was not paragraph 7 of the Conditions of Engagement in the Rules. The High Court judgment is reported in Akitek Tenggara Sdn Bhd v Mid Valley City Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 2 MLJ 625. The learned trial judge, Kamalanathan Ratnam J, cursorily mentioned the defence of res judicata but did not decide on it, probably because he considered that it had been abandoned or had not been seriously pursued. As to the defence of termination based on paragraph 3 of the appointment letter, the learned judge found that there was no proof that the project had been abandoned or aborted. This is what he said (from the original text): What is important to note however is that the letter of termination of the plaintiff’s services is premised solely on the ground that IGB was at the date thereof the majority shareholder of the defendant and hence intended to utilise the architects on the panel of IGB for the said Project. I have been shown no evidence that the Project has been abandoned. I find that the defendant’s contention that the said Project was abandoned was raised for the first time in the letter dated 26.1.89 from the defendant. In any case this reason is inconsistent with the reason advanced by the defendant in its letter dated ||Page 746>> 1.11.88 and from the evidence of DW2, the Project Manager of IGB Corporation Sdn Bhd. I also note that there has been no complaint by the defendant in respect of the services rendered by the plaintiff. I reject the defendant’s reason that IGB being the majority shareholder, intended to use its own architects on the basis that this was never envisaged or agreed to by the parties when terms were agreed upon. In any case under cross-examination, DW2 clearly admitted that the JVA was not terminated but was varied. He also conceded that it was incorrect to say that the plaintiff’s services were terminated because the Project was abandoned. He also confirmed that the JVA between the defendant and Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur was still ongoing. It is interesting to observe that after the plaintiff was discharged as the architect of the said Project, the defendant contended that new amended layout plans and amended building plans were submitted. However, DW2 did not produce any of the alleged new amended layout plans and amended building plans or even a fresh JVA between the defendant, IGB and Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur. There was not even produced to the Court, a new development order. I therefore find that as admitted by DW2, the defendant is still continuing with development of the said Project under the existing JVA. Even if the concept of the Project had been varied (which I find is not the case) the Project nevertheless remains the same and is still ongoing. It is clear to me that the defendant has been labouring under an erroneous misconception that an alteration or variation of the concept of the development is synonymous with the Project being abandoned. In any case DW2 had admitted that the plaintiff’s services were terminated not because the Project was aborted, but because IGB wanted to use their own architects. He who asserts, proves. The defendant has in my judgment failed to discharge the burden of proving that the Project had been abandoned or aborted. [123] On 1 October 2001 the Court of Appeal gave the defendant leave to amend the memorandum of appeal. One amendment was to include the res judicata point. In the paragraph for this point, the new para 2, it was stated that LAM’s ruling that the Supreme Court upheld was that the plaintiff’s services ‘were terminable (and had been terminated)’. Another amendment was to include the question of ‘delay of the original project’. The other amendments related to the question of abortion or abandonment of the project.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-259 [126] The Court of Appeal decided the appeal only on the question of res judicata and upheld the defence of res judicata. It found in paragraph 21 of its judgment that the Supreme Court did determine the issue of ‘validity’ of the termination of the plaintiff’s services. In para 22, it rejected the plaintiff’s submission that the Supreme Court did not deal with the issue whether the defendant had the ‘right to terminate’ the plaintiff’s services but dealt only with the issue of the letter of release. As to what the Court of Appeal found the Supreme Court’s decision to be on the question of termination, this may be seen in para h 27, where the Court of Appeal said that the Supreme Court upheld the Practice Committee’s decision in para 1 of its letter dated 15 March 1989, which was a decision that the defendant had the ‘right to terminate’ the plaintiff’s services, and in para 36, where the Court of Appeal said that its finding was ‘that the Supreme Court had determined that the appellants had the right to terminate the respondent’s services with or without assigning any reason’. The Court ||Page 748>> of Appeal therefore set aside the award of damages of RM7,705,382 for breach of contract, but allowed the claim of RM2,006,373 for work done up to the date of termination. But since, after the High Court judgment, the defendant had paid RM2 million, it was ordered to pay the balance of RM6,373 only, with interest. [127] Leave was granted to the plaintiff to appeal to this court on two questions. The first question is: ‘Is the Lembaga Akitek Malaysia competent to decide the lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of an architect by his client?’. It is a general question the answer to which, if given, will bind LAM in the exercise of its functions. It might have been thought that the answer to this question would also answer the question whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the Supreme Court decision in the certiorari appeal constituted res judicata which barred the plaintiff from bringing its action for damages for breach of the contract by its unlawful termination, which is a question that is specific to this case and the question that really needs to be answered to decide this appeal. The answer depends on the actual circumstances of this case. In the memorandum of appeal, the paragraph that is related to the general question is para 2, where it is stated that the Practice Committee does not have the requisite jurisdiction to decide the lawfulness of the plaintiff’s termination as architect. So was it argued by the plaintiff’s counsel in this appeal, but it is not clear how, even if the general question were answered in the negative, the answer would help to answer the res judicata question. If it was sought to argue – and if the plaintiff’s counsel did so argue I have forgotten or overlooked it — that if there was no such jurisdiction the Supreme Court could not have decided that the Practice Committee decided that the termination was unlawful and that it had jurisdiction to so decide, that would be assuming that the view as to jurisdiction that we take today — that is if we were to take the view that LAM had no jurisdiction to decide the question — must have been the view that the Supreme Court took, whereas the Supreme Court might have taken the view that the Practice Committee did have jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the termination. [131] LAM succeeded in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that LAM had jurisdiction to decide as it did. The essential decision was the waiver decision. Even if the Supreme Court also decided that LAM had jurisdiction to decide that the defendant had the right to terminate the plaintiff’s services, which the Court of Appeal said the Supreme Court did, the Supreme Court ought not in the present appeal to be taken to have meant the defendant’s right to be in a higher sense than what LAM, the successful party, and even the defendant itself, contended, which was merely a right to effect an actual termination. In

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-260 deciding as it did, the Court of Appeal had overlooked the sense in which LAM must have spoken of ‘right to terminate’ and LAM’s insistence that it did not decide that the plaintiff’s services had been validly terminated. The Supreme Court cannot be taken to have decided that LAM’s decision was that the plaintiff’s services had been validly terminated and that LAM had jurisdiction to make such a decision. That is the basis on which I find that the Supreme Court’s decision in the certiorari action does not constitute res judicata, as being a decision that LAM did make such a decision and had jurisdiction to make it. Although this point is taken up by the plaintiff in its memorandum of appeal as an estoppel point, that is that the defendant, having itself maintained that LAM did not decide that the plaintiff’s services had been validly terminated, it should be estopped from arguing otherwise, I go a step further in finding on the facts that LAM ||Page 750>> in fact did not so decide and therefore the Supreme Court could not have decided that LAM had so decided and had jurisdiction to so decide. [132] Deciding the res judicata question with that approach and on that basis, the general question as to LAM’s competence need not be answered in order to dispose of this aspect of the appeal. I shall, however, endeavour to answer that question, but after dealing with the next issue on which leave to appeal to this court was granted, namely: ‘If the answer to question (a) above is in the negative, was the termination of the applicant herein by the respondent lawful?’. With the approach that I have taken to the res judicata question, the conditional opening words to the question become inapplicable. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Elements to satisfy criteria for finding of res judicata — Whether impeachment proceedings an attempt to relitigate the matter

Held, allowing encl 87 with costs in the cause:

(1) The order dated 5 October 1993 ('the First Order') and the order dated 1 September 1994 ('the Second Order') are not relevant considerations in considering whether these present proceedings should be stayed. The tests for a stay may be stated in this way: it is whether the impeachment proceedings would be rendered nugatory if these present proceedings were not stayed or if there were special circumstances justifying the stay of the present proceedings. (2) The test for impeaching orders made by a Judge is quite different from deciding whether or not a matter is res judicata. It is now trite law that where judgments or orders are obtained by fraud or collusion, the court has the jurisdiction to set aside the tainted judgment and the proper remedy in these situations would be to file a fresh action and not a re-hearing of the original action (see para 12). (3) It is settled law that if the plaintiff can show special circumstances in support of its application for stay of proceedings or execution or for some other interim preservation under section 44(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, then this court will grant a stay of the proceedings (see para 40). (4) It is, with respect, wrong to say that the decision of RK Nathan J, in that case is null and void. The fact of the matter is that there is a decision of His Lordship and that decision states that there is a reasonable cause of action to be tried in the impeachment proceedings. Had the impeachment proceedings been struck out, there

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-261 would not be any need for this application in these present proceedings (see para 39). (5) The basis of the impeachment proceedings is that the defendants in the impeachment proceedings had committed fraud on the court and the plaintiff in these present proceedings. As rehearsed earlier, RK Nathan J in Citibank Berhad v ND Chandrasegaran Nee & Ors has found that sufficient allegations of fraud had been raised in the impeachment proceedings and that the defendant clearly had a case to answer. This is a serious allegation made against the defendants in the impeachment proceedings in relation to their conduct in this case. If these present proceedings were to proceed, there is a real danger of the alleged fraud being perpetuated against this court and the plaintiff. This is a special circumstance that should weigh in favour of this court granting a stay of these present proceedings (see para 49). (6) The deponent is the fourth defendant (Siva Kumar a/l Subramaniam) in the impeachment proceedings and the issue of the defendant’s lawful attorney goes to the root of the impeachment proceedings and that would be the fraud that is being alleged by the plaintiff. Thus, there is a real danger that the plaintiff will not be able to recover its money if it makes payment to the defendant and is later successful in the impeachment proceedings. This, by itself, constitutes a special circumstance in allowing a stay of these present proceedings (see para 49). (7) The basis of the impeachment proceedings is completely different from that of the stay application. The impeachment proceedings cannot be said to be an attempt at re-visiting the same issues as the present proceedings but rather it is to see whether or not the present proceedings should be stayed (see para 69).

Diputuskan, membenarkan lamp 87 dengan kos dalam kausa.

(1) Perintah bertarikh 5 Oktober 1993 (‘Perintah Pertama’) dan perintah bertarikh 1 September 1994 (‘Perintah Kedua’) adalah tidak relevan untuk membuat pertimbangan sama ada prosiding sekarang harus digantung. Ujian untuk penggantungan mungkin dinyatakan sebegini; sama ada prosiding pencabaran menjadi tidak berguna jika prosiding sekarang tidak digantung atau jika ada keadaan khas memberikan alasan yang kuat terhadap penggantungan prosiding sekarang. (2) Ujian untuk mencabar perintah-perintah yang dibuat oleh Hakim adalah berbeza dari memutuskan sama ada perkara tersebut adalah res judicata atau tidak. Ia sekarang ini adalah undang-undang yang mantap lama bahawa bila penghakiman-penghakiman atau perintah-perintah diperolehi melalui penipuan atau pakatan sulit, mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mengenepikan perintah yang cacat dan remedi yang betul dalam situasi-situasi ini adalah dengan memfailkan tindakan baru dan bukannya melalui pendengaran semula tindakan asal (lihat perenggan 12). (3) Ianya adalah undang-undang yang telah diperuntukkan/ditetapkan jika plaintif dapat menunjukkan keadaan-keadaan khas untuk menyokong jika permohonannya untuk penggantungan prosiding-prosding atau perlaksanaan atau untuk lain-lain pemeliharaan sementara di bawah s 44 (1) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964, barulah mahkamah ini akan memberikan penggantungan kepada prosdiding-prosiding (lihat

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-262 perenggan 40). (4) Dengan rasa hormatnya, adalah salah untuk mengatakan bahawa keputusan YA RK Nathan, dalam kes itu adalah sebagai batal dan tidak sah. Fakta dalam perkara itu adalah ia adalah keputusan Yang Arif Hakim dan keputusan menyatakan bahawa terdapat kausa tindakan yang munasabah untuk dibicarakan dalam prosiding pencabaran. Jika prosiding pencabaran dibatalkan, tidak ada sebarang keperluan bagi permohonan ini dalam prosiding-prosiding ini (lihat perenggan 39). (5) Asas kepada pencabaran prosiding adalah defendan-defendan dalam prosiding pencabaran telah melakukan penipuan kepada mahkamah dan plaintif dalam prosiding-prosiding sekarang. Sebagaimana yang diulang-ulang sebelum ini, Yang Arif RK Nathan, dalam Citibank Berhad v ND Chandrasegaran Nee & Ors mendapati bahawa dakwaan-dakwaan yang cukup untuk penipuan telahpun dibangkitkan dalam prosiding pencabaran dan defendan secara jelasnya mempunyai kes untuk dijawab. Ini adalah satu dakwaan serius yang dibuat terhadap defendan-defendan dalam prosiding pencabaran berkaitan dengan kelakuan mereka dalam kes ini. Jika prosiding-prosiding sekarang ini hendak diteruskan, terdapat bahaya sebenar untuk dakwaan penipuan dikekalkan terhadap mahkamah ini dan plaintif. Ini merupakan keadaan khas yang perlu dipertimbangkan yang mendorong kepada mahkamah ini untuk memberikan penggantungan prosiding-prosiding sekarang ini (lihat Perenggan 49). (6) Saksi bersumpah adalah defendan keempat (Siva Kumar a/l Subramaniam) dalam prosiding pencabaran dan persoalan mengenai peguam defendan yang sah kembali kepada punca prosiding pencabaran dan itu adalah penipuan sebagaimana dakwaan plaintif. Dengan itu, terdapat bahaya sebenar bahawa plaintif tidak akan mendapat kembali wangnya jika ia membuat bayaran kepada defendan dan kemudiannya berjaya dalam prosiding pencabaran. Ini, dengan sendirinya, akan membentuk keadaan khas dalam membenarkan penggantungan dalam prosiding-prosiding sekarang ini (lihat Perenggan 49). (7) Asas kepada prosiding pencabaran adalah berbeza sama sekali dengan penggantungan perlaksanaan. Prosiding pencabaran tidak boleh dikatakan sebagai percubaan untuk merujuk kembali isu-isu pertikaian sama seperti prosiding sekarang tetapi lebih melihat kepada sama ada prosiding sekarang perlu digantung atau tidak (lihat Perenggan 69). Notes For cases on application for stay of proceedings, see 2(2) Mallal's Digest (4th Ed, 2004 Reissue) paras 2401–2424. For cases on order for sale, see 2(2) Mallal's Digest (4th Ed, 2004 Reissue) paras 376–379. For the case on elements to satisfy criteria for finding of res judicata, see 2(3) Mallal's Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) para 6043.

THE BASIS OF THE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

Essentially, after reading the statement of claim, it can be said that the basis of the impeachment proceedings lies in the fact that all the actions taken by the defendant in these proceedings after July 1993 were not taken by the defendant personally but rather by her E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-263 purported Powers of Attorney. These present proceedings were brought by the plaintiff against the default of an overdraft facility given by the plaintiff to the defendant. As consideration, for the overdraft facility, the defendant had charged her Bangsar property to the plaintiff. After the default by the defendant, the plaintiff started these present proceedings and obtained an order for sale dated 1 December 1992 of the defendant’s property. The public auction of the defendant’s property was fixed on 18 August 1993. Two days before the public auction, the sum of RM256,408.49 was paid to the plaintiff as part payment of the amount due under the overdraft by one JR Gopinath @ JR Jaya Jaegauby who purported to be the attorney of the defendant. This payment was accepted by the plaintiff on a without prejudice basis and the public auction was adjourned on condition that the entire amount due by the defendant to the plaintiff was settled. It is a matter of record that there was a dispute between JR Gopinath @ JR Jaya Jaegauby and the plaintiff in respect of the amount still due and owing to the plaintiff. The said JR Gopinath @ JR Jaya Jaegauby apparently derived his powers from the defendant to deal with the defendant’s property from a Power of Attorney dated 30 July 1993 ('the First PA'). It has since been discovered that the said JR Gopinath @ JR Jaya Jaegauby was a bankrupt and was therefore not entitled to be an attorney. As mentioned earlier, the said JR Gopinath @ JR Jaya Jaegauby has been named as the third defendant in the impeachment proceedings. After the discovery of the fact that JR Gopinath @ JR Jaya Jaegauby was a bankrupt, the defendant quickly appointed one Siva Kumar a/l Sundram as her new attorney by way of a Power of Attorney dated 5 May 1994 ('the Second PA'). This individual has been named as the fourth defendant in the impeachment proceedings. It must be borne in mind that this new appointment was not made before JR Gopinath @ JR Jaya Jaegauby, purportedly acting as the defendant’s attorney, had filed an application in the name of the defendant to set aside the order for sale dated 1 December 1992 and claiming for damages from the plaintiff and filing a counterclaim alleging that the charge over the defendant’s property be discharged. On 5 October 1993, his Lordship Anuar J, (who later rose to be the Chief Judge of Malaya) ordered that the order for sale dated 1 December 1992 be set aside. Again, on 1 September 1994, his Lordship Anuar J, also allowed the defendant’s counterclaim and ordered that the plaintiff discharge the charge over the defendant’s property. The defendant is also making a grave issue out of the fact that the plaintiff apparently did not appeal against those two orders. The order dated 5 October 1993 ('the First Order') and the order dated 1 September 1994 ('the Second Order') are not relevant considerations in considering whether these present proceedings should be stayed. The tests for a stay may be stated in this way; it is whether the impeachment proceedings would be rendered nugatory if these present proceedings were not stayed or if there were special circumstances justifying the stay of the present proceedings. The impeachment proceedings are proceedings to set aside the orders made after July 1993 on the grounds of fraud, that is, but for the fact that there was fraud committed in respect of the two PAs, the court would not have made any of the orders that it did. Even if the plaintiff had appealed against both of the orders, those appeals would automatically fail if the impeachment proceedings were successful as the whole substratum of the appeals would have been impeached. And if the plaintiff was not successful in the impeachment proceedings then the status quo remains. E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-264 The defendant held onto the notion that the plaintiff is taking the so-called second bite at the proverbial cherry by filing the impeachment proceedings and not appealing. With respect, this argument by the defendant is in fact misplaced. The test for impeaching orders made by a Judge is quite different from deciding whether or not a matter is res judicata. It is now trite law that where judgments or orders are obtained by fraud or collusion, the court has the jurisdiction to set aside the tainted judgment and the proper remedy in these situations would be to file a fresh action and not a re-hearing of the original action (Cheah Wong Nyan and Cheah Sin Kee v (1) K.A.L.R.M. Palaniappa (2) Cheah Lean Guan (3) Official Assignee Of The Property Of Cheah Lean Guan a bankrupt [1935] 1 MLJ 31 ; and Hock Hua Bank Bhd. v Sahari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143 ). Chang Min Tat F.J writing for the Federal Court in Hock Hua Bank Bhd. v Sahari bin Murid aptly said at p 144 of the report:

The impeachment proceedings have been found to contain sufficient allegations of fraud, that if proved, would clearly impeach the judgments obtained in these present proceedings. This was so held by his Lordship RK Nathan J, in Citibank Bhd v ND Chandrasegaran Nee & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 440 when dismissing the defendant’s application to strike out the plaintiff’s claim. However, it must be emphasised that the impeachment proceedings have yet to be disposed of. The learned counsel for the defendant took exceptions to the judgment of RK Nathan J in Citibank Bhd v ND Chandrasegaran Nee & Ors. The learned counsel for the defendant submitted that a complaint was made to the then Chief Justice stating that RK Nathan J, should not have heard the case because he was closely related to one of the parties to the case. The learned counsel for the defendant submitted that RK Nathan J had disqualified himself or in other words admitted that he was a biased party. According to the learned counsel for the defendant, a decision by a judge who was biased or in other words who had breached the rules of natural justice is a nullity order. In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 ALL ER 577 , a landmark decision of the House of Lords, is a classic example of the law of biasness. There a second Committee of the House of Lords set aside the extradition order made by the first Committee of the House of Lords where one of the law Lords was a dormant but nevertheless a member of a charity closely sharing its objects with Amnesty International and Amnesty International was a party to the appeal supporting the extradition of Pinochet, a retired general and dictator of Chile, from Britian to Chile. The second Committee also ordered that the appeal be heard by another Committee of the House of Lords. At the local scene, there is a decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Rowstead Systems Sdn Bhd v Bumicrystal Technology (M) Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 MLJ 132 where the court stated that a judge cannot decide on an allegation thrown at him whether he is bias or not for that will contravene the rules of natural justice. In Citibank Bhd v ND Chandrasegaran Nee & Ors, the fourth defendant applied to strike out the case against him and RK Nathan J decided against the fourth defendant. It seems that the fourth defendant did not appeal on the matter and has dropped out from the case. Nevertheless, the learned counsel for the defendant is still of the view that the decision of RK Nathan J is null and void because his Lordship had, on his own accord, discharged himself on the ground of breach of the rules of biasness. The learned counsel for the defendant laments that it is unfortunate that the fourth defendant did not appeal nor apply to

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-265 expunge the judgment of RK Nathan J. It is also the submission of the learned counsel for the defendant that the decision of RK Nathan J is unworthy of any merit. It has been urged upon me to disregard the decision of RK Nathan J in Citibank Bhd v ND Chandrasegaran Nee & Ors in view of the fact that it is an interlocutory decision and not a final decision and therefore it does not act as res judicata nor can it give rise to an estoppel issue (see Pride-Mould (M) Sdn Bhd v Jemco Sdn Bhd [2001] 3 MLJ 65 , which applied Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd [1988] 3 MLJ 90 and Peninsular Land Developmet Sdn Bhd v K Ahmad (No 2) [1970] 1 MLJ 253). Notwithstanding the fact that RK Nathan J had recused himself from hearing Citibank Bhd v ND Chandrasegaran Nee & Ors , yet his Lordship had made a decision in the case and that decision had been reported. In that case his Lordship held that there was a reasonable cause of action to be tried and that the matter should not be struck out. It is, with respect, wrong to say that the decision of RK Nathan J in that case is null and void. The fact of the matter is that there is a decision of his Lordship and that decision states that there is a reasonable cause of action to be tried in the impeachment proceedings. Had the impeachment proceedings been struck out, there would not be any need for this application in these present proceedings. It must be borne in mind that the plaintiff did, in fact, start fresh proceedings vide Kuala Lumpur High Court originating summons no: S5-24-415-94 ('the S5 matter'). But the S5 matter had to be withdrawn on 28 April 1995 because his Lordship Anuar J had ordered that the charge on the defendant’s property be discharged on 1 September 1994. After the charge was discharged on 1 September 1994, the plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal out of time vide Civil Appeal No: W-08-65-94 but the application was not allowed. And in respect of the Second Order dated 1 September 1994 which discharged the charge over the defendant’s property, the defendant’s allegation that the plaintiff did not appeal was incorrect. In reality, the plaintiff did file an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the order dated 1 September 1994 and that application was refused. Be that as it may, whether or not the plaintiff appealed against the 'First Order' and the 'Second Order' are irrelevant considerations in deciding whether or not to grant a stay of these proceedings pending the disposal of the impeachment proceedings. It was later discovered, and it was said, that the First PA and the Second PA are not valid, unlawful and void ab initio and cannot be used in any court proceedings and/or dealings with the defendant’s property. This forms part and parcel of the particulars of fraud pleaded by the plaintiff in the impeachment proceedings. The First PA was apparently affirmed before the notary public in India by the name of Gorakhsnath N. Kale. The latter stated that the serial number of the First PA did not correspond with his notary register and he cancelled this purported notarial certificate for the First PA. Now, the second PA was said to be a fraudulent PA. The second PA was purportedly affirmed before the notary public by the name of Sivaram S. Nadkarni. However, there is no registered notary public in the State of Maharashtra of that name. I must emphasise that encl 87 is not an application for a stay pending an appeal but rather it is an application for a stay pending the disposal of the impeachment proceedings. Enclosure 87 is focussed on the plaintiff’s application for a stay of the proceedings and not the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-266 hearing of the merits of the impeachment proceedings. A lot of materials were raised by the defendant and these materials may be relevant during the hearing of the impeachment proceedings but they are of no relevance in adjudicating encl 87. The merits of the impeachment proceedings have been raised by the learned counsel for the defendant and out of deference to him, I have alluded to it in this judgment. The merits of the case is not a relevant matter for consideration in deciding whether or not to grant a stay of the present proceedings. It has not been the plaintiff’s contention that there is res judicata or an issue estoppel of the impeachment proceedings. It is the plaintiff’s submission that should the court be minded to follow the reasoning of Brown J in Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Ang Keng [1953] 19 MLJ 116 and decide to consider the merits of the impeachment proceedings in deciding whether or not there are special circumstances, then the fact that an attempt to strike out the impeachment proceedings was unsuccessful would be of assistance to the court.

It is the submission of the defendant that on the facts, his Lordship Anuar J ruled that the plaintiff’s loan has been fully satisfied and his Lordship then granted an order in terms by setting aside the auction. His Lordship further ordered that damages to be assessed against the plaintiff. All these constituted the orders made by his Lordship on 5 October 1993 and this constitutes the First Order. At this time, the plaintiff’s solicitors was Messrs Azim Ong and Krishnan. It is said that the plaintiff had changed its solicitors twice. First to Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co, and currently to Messrs Skrine. It is said that the present solicitors cannot affirm or submit on these facts as they were not the parties to the proceedings. The defendant’s solicitors then were Messrs Khana & Co. There was no appeal against the First Order. More than thirty days passed and although Anuar J had ruled that the plaintiff’s loan has been repaid, the plaintiff still refused to discharge the charge and refused to return the issue document of title to the defendant. This compelled, so the submission goes, the defendant to make an application to the court to compel the plaintiff to discharge its charge and return the issue document of title to the plaintiff. This application was heard on 1 September 1994. And, again on this date, it is said that the plaintiff’s counsel took objection to the effect that the power of attorney was fraudulent. On this date too, the defendant’s counsel submitted that the parties were bound by the earlier ruling that the plaintiff’s loan has been fully settled and therefore res judicata applies in that a decision made at one stage of the proceeding binds the parties in a subsequent application of the same proceeding (Government of Malaysia v Dato Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74 ) and the defendant’s counsel also asked for costs. It is submitted that his Lordship Anuar J accepted the plea of res judicata and granted an order in terms and further ordered that damages to be assessed against the plaintiff. This constitutes the Second Order and it is said that there was no appeal against it. It is also said that the Second Order contained a penal clause to the effect that if the plaintiff does not comply with this order, the plaintiff shall be liable to and be exposed to contempt proceedings. Thereafter, it is said that the plaintiff voluntarily discharged the charge and returned the title to the defendant’s solicitors. The discharge was registered on 27 September 1994 and, consequently, it is said that the plaintiff’s interest in the defendant’s property was extinguished. It is said that the costs of discharging a charge is normally borne by the borrower pursuant to the contract in the loan agreement. It is also said that since his Lordship Anuar J had ordered the plaintiff to discharge the charge and return the issue document of title to the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-267 defendant, the costs of the discharging of the charge was borne by the plaintiff. After the plaintiff’s charge was discharged on 27 September 1994, the defendant’s property was transferred to Ratnasamy a/l Subramaniam, the fifth defendant in the impeachment proceedings. And it is also said that the transfer of the defendant’s property to Ratnasamy a/l Subramaniam was done pursuant to the Penang High Court Originating Summons No: MT4-24-88-95 and the order was dated 16 February 1995. It is said that the defendant’s solicitors Messrs Khana & Co shifted their office and became the tenant to Ratnasamy a/l Subramaniam. The defendant’s solicitors Messrs Khana & Co executed two orders for assessment of damages and the SAR concluded a viva voce trial where the plaintiff called three witnesses and the defendant also called three witnesses. That viva voce trial was conducted in 1997. On 4 February 1997, the SAR gave judgment to the defendant for a sum of RM250,000 with interest at 8% per annum from 27 July 1994 to the date of full realisation. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff filed an appeal on 4 February 1997 to the judge in chambers and this appeal can be found in encl 39B and it is still pending before this court. Two weeks after judgment on the assessment of damages, the plaintiff through its solicitors Messrs Azim Ong & Krishnan filed the impeachment proceedings. This was on 18 February 1997. That impeachment proceedings alleged fraud. On 17 February 1997, the plaintiff lodged a police report against the defendant’s solicitor by the name of Mr. Kanawagi a/l Seperumaniam alleging that the latter had cheated the plaintiff and had transferred the defendant’s property to Ratnasamy a/l Subramaniam whom the plaintiff’s claim is the brother of Mr Kanawagi a/l Seperumaniam. It is submitted that following all these events, the plaintiff, a financial giant, has been engaging leading legal firms in Kuala Lumpur and invoking every known law, rule or regulation in order to reverse the SAR’s decision on damages. On 28 April 1999, the plaintiff then filed the application in encl 87 to stay all the proceedings before this court until the outcome of the impeachment proceedings.

(E) RES JUDICATA

Adrian Clark J In The Matter Of The Trusts Of The Will of Tan Lye Deceased, Yap Liang Neo v Tan Yew Ghee & Anor [1936] MLJ Rep 113 , in fine language, sets out the law pertaining to res judicata in these words (see p 121 of the report):

What is then the position when a Court proceeds to adjudicate upon an issue between parties before it and does so in ignorance, shared by all the parties, that it has already previously adjudicated? All the advocates who have argued the present case admitted that it would at least have been in the discretion of the Court if, during the hearing, the true position had come to light, to have struck out the second proceedings as an abuse of the process of the Court. I think it would have been more than a matter of discretion. I think it would have been the duty of the Court to have struck out the proceedings. The object of the rule of res judicata,’ said Lord Blackburn, in the case of Lockyer v Ferryman, (1876) 2 App. Cas. at p. 530, ‘is always put upon two grounds, the one public policy, that it is the interest of the State that there should be an end of litigation, and the other, the hardship on the individual, that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.’ It is on the second ground that the rule of pleading is based: if a defendant wishes to complain that he is being twice vexed in the same cause then he must plead this plea and not let it take his opponents by surprise. The first ground, however,

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-268 is much wider and one which, in my view, goes rather to the jurisdiction of the Court. When there is res judicata,’ said Lord Selborne in the same case (at p 528 of the report), ‘the original cause of action is gone and can only be restored by getting rid of the res judicata.’ If an action be brought,’ said Lord Kenyon in Greathead v Bromley, (1798) 7 T.R. 455, 101 E.R. 1073, ‘and the merits of the question discussed between the parties, and a final judgment obtained by either, the parties are concluded, and cannot canvass the same question again in another action, although perhaps some objection or argument might have been urged upon the first trial, which would have led to a different judgment.’ ‘I apprehend,’ said Willes J in the case of Langmead v Maple, 18 C.B.N.S. at p 271; 144 E.R. at p 447, ‘that if the same matter or cause of action has already been finally adjudicated on between the parties by a Court of competent jurisdiction the plaintiff has lost his right to put it in suit either before that or any other Court.’ ‘It is not competent for the Court,’ said Lord Macnaghten in the case ofBadar Bee v Habib Merican Noordin [1909] App. Cas at p 623, ‘in the case of the same question arising between the same parties, to review a previous decision not open to appeal.’ ‘Parties are not permitted,’ said Lord Shaw in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation, [1926] App. Cas. at p 165, ‘to begin fresh litigations because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case……

… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.

All these principles of law are thought provoking and they have withstood the test of time. But, with respect, the defendant’s arguments on res judicata are misplaced. The defendant is proceeding on the wrong assumption that the impeachment proceedings are attempts to re-litigate the matters, once again, before this court. In reality, the impeachment proceedings are to decide whether or not both the orders made by Anuar J were obtained by fraud. The test is whether there was fraud committed on this court, and if so, how it had affected and influenced this court in making its decision. Fraud by a litigant is quite rare. It does happen. It rears its ugly head in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v Jagannath and others [1994] AIR SC 853 at 855. There, Kuldip Singh J had this to say: Undang-Undang Perlembagaan — Habeas corpus — Perintah tahanan pertama yang dikeluarkan di bawah s 4(1) Ordinan Darurat (Ketenteraman Awam dan Mencegah Jenayah) 1969 — Permohonan bagi habeas corpus telah diperuntukkan oleh mahkamah — Pemohon-pemohon ditahan di bawah perintah penahanan kedua atas fakta-fakta dan tujuan penahanan perintah pertama — Sama ada penahanan perintah kedua adalah penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah atau penghinaan mahkamah perintah terdahulu habeas corpus — Sama ada prinsip-prinsip res judicata berkaitan dengan penahanan perintah kedua — Sama ada perintah penahanan kedua adalah tidak sah bagi ketidakpatuhan atau motif tidak baik Kelima-lima pemohon telah diperintahkan ditahan di bawah s 4(1)Ordinan Darurat (Ketenteraman Awam dan Mencegah Jenayah) 1969 (‘Ordinan’) di bawah perintah tahanan yang telah dibuat oleh Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia (ketika itu), iaitu yang bertarikh 10 Disember 2003, bagi pemohon pertama dan 20 Oktober 2003 bagi pemohon E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-269 kedua, ketiga, keempat dan kelima (‘Perintah Pertama’). Kelima-lima pemohon telah membuat permohonan untuk mendapat writ habeas corpus daripada Mahkamah Tinggi dan pada 10 September 2004 kelima-lima permohonan itu telah dibenarkan dan kelima-lima pemohon diperintahkan supaya dilepaskan dan dibebaskan. Namun demikian, pada 8 Oktober 2004, kelima-lima pemohon telah ditahan semula menurut perintah Timbalan Menteri Keselamatan Dalam Negeri yang bertarikh 7 Oktober 2004 yang memerintahkan pemohon-pemohon ditahan selama dua tahun bermula dari 8 Oktober 2004 (‘Perintah Kedua’). Alasan bagi perintah kedua itu dibuat serta pengataan-pengataan fakta yang padanya perintah kedua itu diasaskan adalah sama dengan alasan dan pengataan fakta bagi perintah pertama. Di hadapan mahkamah, terdapat dua isu utama, iaitu (a) penahanan semula pemohon-pemohon di bawah perintah kedua merupakan penyalahgunaan kuasa mahkamah atau penghinaan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi yang terdahulu; dan (b) prinsip res judicata terpakai dalam hal perintah kedua.

Diputuskan:

(1) Tiada rayuan telah dibuat terhadap perintah pertama. Perintah pembebasan yang dibuat oleh mahkamah berkaitan dengan perintah pertama telah dipatuhi. Perintah kedua hanya dibuat selepas 28 hari pemohon-pemohon dibebaskan. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah tidak nampak bagaimanakah dapat dikatakan bahawa penahanan semula pemohon-pemohon di bawah ||Page 364>> perintah kedua itu merupakan satu penghinaan kepada perintah Mahkamah Tinggi yang terdahulu (lihat perenggan 13). (2) Di bawah s 7C Ordinan hanya semakan kehakiman boleh dibuat bagi ketidakpatuhan tatacara yang diperuntukkan dalam Ordinan itu berkenaan dengan tindakan atau keputusan Menteri atau Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Oleh sebab kepuasan hati Yang di-Pertuan Agong atau Menteri tidak boleh dicabar atau disemak semula secara kehakiman, maka mahkamah hanya boleh meneliti dan membuat keputusan berkenaan dengan tatacara penahanan itu sahaja. Ini bererti bahawa seandainya seseorang yang telah dilepaskan daripada tahanan berdasarkan writ habeas corpus diperintahkan ditahan semula kemudiannya atas alasan yang sama dengan alasan bagi penahanan pertama, mahkamah tiada kuasa untuk menggunakan hakikat kesamaan alasan itu sebagai asas untuk memutuskan bahawa penahanan kedua atas alasan yang sama itu tidak sah selagi Menteri masih berpendapat bahawa alasan itu mewajarkan penahanan orang yang berkenaan. Oleh sebab mahkamah tiada kuasa sedemikian, maka penahanan yang berikutnya itu tidaklah menjadi penghinaan mahkamah atau penyalahgunaan kuasa mahkamah semata-mata kerana alasan bagi penahanan yang berikutnya itu sama dengan alasan penahanan yang terdahulu (lihat perenggan 15). (3) Mahkamah tidak nampak bagaimana ketidakpatuhan tatacara semata-mata, walaupun ketidakpatuhan itu merupakan ketidakpatuhan yang sama seperti dalam pembuatan perintah pertama, dapat dijadikan alasan untuk mengatakan wujud mala fide dalam pembuatan perintah kedua, tanpa apa-apa keterangan lain yang menunjukkan bukti wujud ‘improper or bad motive’ (lihat perenggan 22); Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279 dan Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals [2002] 4

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-270 MLJ 449 diikut. (4) Pemohon-pemohon telah tidak mengemukakan alasan mahupun nota presiding bagi permohonan terhadap perintah pertama. Yang dikemukakan hanyalah afidavit-afidavit yang telah dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah bagi permohonan habeas corpus berkaitan dengan perintah pertama. Oleh itu, tidaklah diketahui apakah sebenarnya alasan bagi Mahkamah membenarkan permohonan itu. Namun, oleh sebab penahanan Pemohon-pemohon di bawah perintah kedua merupakan penahanan baru yang berasingan daripada penahanan di bawah perintah pertama, maka isu kepatuhan atau ketidakpatuhan tatacara dalam penahanan kedua tidak mungkin dapat dikatakan telah diputuskan semasa Mahkamah terdahulu menimbangkan dan membuat keputusan tentang tatacara penahanan di bawah perintah pertama. Oleh yang demikian, isu kepatuhan atau ketidakpatuhan tatacara yang diperuntukkan dalam ordinan bagi penahanan di bawah perintah kedua bukanlah suatu perkara yang sudah menjadi res judicata (lihat perenggan 34 & 35). (5) Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tiada ketidakpatuhan tatacara yang diperuntukkan dalam ordinan telah berlaku dalam hal penahanan pemohon-pemohon di bawah perintah kedua. Jika telah berlaku apa-apa ||Page 365>> ketidakpatuhan dalam proses penahanan di bawah perintah pertama, jelaslah bahawa ketidakpatuhan itu tidak berulang dalam proses penahanan di bawah perintah kedua (lihat perenggan 113). All five applicants were ordered to be arrested under s 4(1) of the Emergency Ordinance (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 (‘Ordinance) under the detention order carried out by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs (at that time) dated 10 December 2003 for the 1st Applicant and 20 October 2003 for the second, third, fourth and fifth applicant (‘first applicant’). All five applicants made an application to obtain a writ of habeas corpus from the High Court and on 10 September 2004, all five applications were allowed and all five applicants were ordered to be released. However, on 8 October 2004, all five applicants were re-arrested according to the order of the Deputy Minister of the Internal Home Affiars dated 7 October 2004 which ordered that the applicants be arrested for two years from 8 October (‘second order’). Reason for the second order made, as well as factual statements upon which the second order was based was the same with the reason and factual statement for the first order. The two main issues before the court: (a) re-detention for the applicants under the 2nd order was an abuse of the court’s power or a humuliation of the High Court’s earlier order; and (b) the principle of res judicata in the matter of the second order.

Held:

(1) No appeal was made against the first order. The freedom order made by the court in relation to the first order was obeyed. The second order was only made after 28 days of the release of the applicants. Therefore, the court cannot say that the re-detention order of the applicants under the second order was a humiliation to the earlier High Court order (see para 13). (2) Pursuant to s 7C of the Ordinance, a judicial review can only be made for the non-compliance of procedure provided in the Ordinance as regards the action or the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-271 decision of the Minister or the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Since the satisfaction of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister cannot be challenged or juducially reviewed, the court can only analyze and make a decision regarding the detention procedure. This means assuming a person released from detention based on the writ of habeas corpus is ordered to be put in detention later upon the similar reason as regards the first detention, the court has no power but to use the similar reason as a basis to decide that the second detention upon the same reason is not valid so long as the Minister is still of the opinion that such reason requires a detention of the person concerned. Because the court has no such powers, the subsequent detention is not a humiliation to the court or an abuse of the court powers for the very reason that the sunsequent detention was similar to that of the earlier detention (see para 15). ||Page 366>> (3) The court had not seen how the non-compliance of the procedure eventhough the non-compliance was a similar one as to the make of the first order can be a reason to state the existence of mala fide because the second order without any other evidence to show that there exist improper or bad motive (see para 22); Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279 danMohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals [2002] 4 MLJ 449 diikut. (4) Applicants did not produce any reason or even notes of proceeding for the application against the first order. The affidavits were presented before the court for the application of habeas corpus related as regards the first order. Therefore there was no reason as to why the court would allow the application. However, due to the fact that the detention of the applicants under the second order is a new and separate detention under the first order therefore the issue of compliance and non-compliance the second detention may not possibly be decided when the earlier court considered and made the decision about the detention procedure under the first order. Therefore, the issue of compliance and non-compliance in the Ordinance for the detention under the second order is not a res judicata matter (see para 34 & 35). (5) The court was satisfied that there was no non-compliance procedure provided in the Ordinance which took place in the detention of the applicants under the second order. If there were any non-compliance which happened in the detention process under the first order, it was clear that the non-compliance did not repeat in the detention process under the second order (see para 113).] [7] Di hadapan mahkamah, peguam yang mewakili pemohon-pemohon telah berhujah dengan panjang lebar tentang dua isu utama, iaitu — (a) penahanan semula pemohon-pemohon di bawah perintah kedua merupakan penyalahgunaan kuasa mahkamah atau penghinaan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi yang terdahulu (b) prinsip res judicata terpakai dalam hal perintah kedua.

Isu kedua: Res judicata

[24] Isu kedua yang dibangkitkan ialah bahawa prinsip res judicata terpakai dalam hal perintah kedua.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-272 [25] Peguam perayu telah mengemukakan kepada mahkamah ini dua kes sebagai autoriti bagi hujahnya tentang res judicata ini. Kes-kes itu ialah Abdul Hamid bin Jamal v Public Prosecutor [1934] MLJ 46 dan kes In re May 28 Ch D 516. 26.

The doctrine of res judicata is… a very substantial doctrine, and it is one of the most fundamental doctrines of all Courts, that there must be an end of litigation, and that the parties have no right of their own accord, after having tried a question between them and obtained a decision of a court, to start that litigation over again on precisely the same question [28] Saya telah juga merujuk kepada kes Government of Malaysia v Dato’ Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74 kerana dalam kes itu prinsip res judicata telah dibincangkan dengan panjang lebar oleh YA Sharma HMT. Antara lain, beliau telah memetik apa yang dikatakan dalam kes Satyadhyan Ghosel and others v Sint Deorajin Dobi and another AIR 1960 SC 941, iaitu bahawa:

The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall be not adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter — whether on a question of fact or a question of law - has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. [29] Yang membezakan kes ini daripada kes-kes yang dirujuk di atas ialah prinsip res judicata ini tidak dibangkitkan oleh responden tetapi oleh pemohon. dan pihak yang membawa isu yang dikatakan isu yang sama ini ke mahkamah semula ialah pemohon sendiri. [30] Berpandukan kes-kes itu, maka pada hemat saya, sekiranya benar isu dalam kes di hadapan saya ini merupakan isu yang sama dengan isu dalam kes yang berkaitan dengan perintah pertama, maka isu itu sudah res judicata dan pemohon sendiri terhalang untuk membangkitkan isu itu sekali lagi. [35] Oleh yang demikian, isu kepatuhan atau ketidakpatuhan tatacara yang diperuntukkan dalam Ordinan bagi penahanan di bawah perintah kedua bukanlah suatu perkara yang sudah menjadi res judicata. [36] Oleh sebab saya mendapati hujah pemohon-pemohon bahawa kes ini sudah res judicata tidak berasas maka saya boleh dan perlu sekarang meneliti notis usul dan afidavit sokongan yang dikemukakan oleh pemohon-pemohon bagi menentukan sama ada telah berlaku ketidakpatuhan tatacara yang diperuntukkan dalam Ordinan tentang perintah kedua terhadap pemohon-pemohon. Acara Sivil — Res judicata — Prosiding yang sama — Sama ada prinsip res judicata boleh diterima pakai dalam kes yang sama Acara Sivil — Res judicata — Prosiding yang sama — Sama ada prinsip estoppel boleh diterima pakai dalam kes yang sama Mahkamah melalui perintah bertarikh 23 Jun 2004 memerintahkan antara lain responden suami membayar nafkah bulanan sebanyak 25% daripada pendapatan kasarnya kepada pempetisyen isteri untuk nafkah penyaraannya. Perintah itu bermula dari tarikh dekri nisi diumumkan. Selepas perintah tersebut responden memfailkan saman dalam kamar ini dalam prosiding yang sama untuk mendapatkan dua kereta (Honda Civic dan Perodua Kancil) yang didaftarkan atas

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-273 nama pempetisyen atas alasan kereta-kereta itu adalah kepunyaan responden. Isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah adalah sama ada prinsip res judicata dan estopel terpakai dalam keadaan ini. Pihak responden telah berhujah bahawa prinsip estopel dan res judicata adalah tidak terpakai di sini kerana di sini responden tidak memfailkan dua prosiding atau proses pemula berlainan yang melibatkan pihak-pihak dan kausa tindakan yang sama untuk perintah berbangkit. Via order dated 23 June 2004, the court ruled, inter alia, that the respondent contributes 25% of his monthly gross income to the petitioner for maintenance. The order began from the date the decri nisi was announced. After the said order, the respondent filed the originating summons in the similar proceeding to obtain both cars (Honda Civic and Perodua) registered under the petitioner’s name based upon the reason that the cars belonged to the respondent. The issue that must be held by the court is whether principles of res judicata and estoppel are applicable herein. However, the respondent argued that the estoppel and res judicata principles were not applicable herein because the respondent did not file two proceedings or due to different originating processes which involved various parties and similar cause of action for a consequential order. [2] Pihak responden telah berhujah bahawa prinsip estopel dan res judicata seperti dalam kes Asia Commercial (M) Sdn Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 adalah tidak terpakai di sini kerana dalam kes tersebut plaintif telah memfailkan ‘dua prosiding berlainan’ yang melibatkan pihak-pihak dan kausa tindakan yang sama. Dalam kes Kanawagi s/o Seperumaniam v Penang Port Commission [2001] 5 MLJ 433, pihak plaintif juga telah memfailkan ‘dua prosiding berlainan’ di mana plaintif telah memfailkan suatu proses pemula (‘originating process’) iaitu Saman Pemula No R2–24–5 tahun 2000 untuk memohon perintah berbangkit (‘consequential order’) dari perintah dalam Guaman Sivil No S1–22–208 tahun 1987 iaitu kes asas (‘the main case’). Dapat diperhatikan di dalam kes kita tiada proses pemula dan/atau prosiding/tindakan berlainan (‘separate action’) yang telah difailkan oleh pihak responden untuk memohon perintah berbangkit (‘consequential order’). Saya berpendapat dalam kes Government of Malaysia v Dato’ Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74, YA Hakim Sharma telah memutuskan seperti berikut:

Held: The defendant was estopped on the principle of res judicata from making the application and therefore the application must be dismissed.

… The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. A decision given by a court at one stage on a particular matter or issue is binding on it at a later stage in the same suit or in a subsequent suit. … … The rule is that a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence becomes a matter which was constructively in issue. A matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence in the former application but which was not alleged as such as a ground of attack or defence is for the purposes of the plea of res judicata deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former application, that is to say, though it may not have been actually directly and substantially in issue it is still regarded as, having been constructively, directly and substantially in issue. There can be no distinction between a claim that was actually made and a claim which might and ought to have been made. The plea of res judicata applies, except in

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-274 special cases, not only to points on which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and to pronounce its judgment thereupon but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties exercising reasonable diligence ||Page 501>> might have brought forward at the time. It is only where the plea which is sought to be raised in the subsequent proceedings was not available to the party at the time of the previous proceedings that the decision cannot be constructively res judicata. The rule of constructive res judicata is really a rule of estoppel. The question now raised has already been heard and finally decided. It constitutes but a part of the prayer in the former application. It was not collaterally or incidentally but directly and substantially in issue when encl 9 was heard and decided. The answer to the matter is simple. The defendant’s only remedy was by way of an appeal against the decision of Mr Justice Chang Min Tat. The matter was heard on merits and finally decided. It is not capable of readjudication by the same court in the same suit. The defendant could certainly re-agitate the matter before the Federal Court if the Plaintiff finally succeeds in obtaining judgment and an appeal is filed against that judgment. The law, as I understand it, is that the defendant is precluded from filing a second application in respect of a matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier application (encl 9) in this very court. If a decision has been given with respect to a matter or part of a matter in controversy between the parties by a court of competent jurisdiction it remains binding in the subsequent stages of the same proceedings in the same court and cannot be re-opened in that court. In my view an erroneous decision irrespective of whether it is on a question of law or fact operates as res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision seems to have no bearing upon the question whether it operates as res judicata or not. Until that decision is reversed or set aside on appeal its finality and binding force remain operative on the parties.

‘Issue estoppel’ represents an extension of the doctrine of res judicata to include a bar on the subsequent litigation not only of all decided issues whose resolution was essential to the determination of earlier proceedings but also ‘to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. Thus ‘issue estoppel’ has been extended to cover not only the case where a particular point has been raised and specifically determined in the earlier proceedings, but also that where in the subsequent proceedings it is sought to raise a point which might have been but was not raised in the earlier.’ Companies and Corporations — Liquidators — Removal of — Application for — Earlier application filed by interveners dismissed — Earlier application supported by applicant in the instant application — Whether instant application barred by res judicata — Res judicata, application of in wider sense The applicant a contributory and creditor of the respondent company (‘the respondent’) applied to remove the liquidator of the respondent pursuant to s 232 of the Companies Act 1965 (‘the Act’). The interveners to the instant application (encl 117) had previously filed an application (encl 95) for the same liquidator’s removal. The applicant had then appeared by counsel and had supported the interveners’ application in encl 95. Enclosure 95 was however dismissed and was under appeal. The instant application, encl 117, was based on the following grounds: (i) the liquidator had failed to prepare accounts as required; (ii) the liquidator had selectively made a payment to a creditor of the respondent; (iii) the liquidator was biased against the applicant; (iv) the liquidator did not have the confidence of the majority of the respondent’s contributories and creditors; and (v) there was an appeal lodged by the interveners with regard to the dismissal of encl 95. The High Court had to decide: (a) whether the applicant was barred from raising any of the grounds on the basis of issue estoppel and/or res judicata; and (b) whether the applicant had shown cause for the removal of the liquidator.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-275

Held, dismissing the application with costs:

(1) The interveners who had filed the earlier application (encl 95) and who were supporting the instant application (encl 117) were bound by the decision of the court in encl 95 and were thus prevented based on the principle of res judicata from filing and/or supporting a similar application (encl 117) (see paras 7–8). (2) The fact that the applicant had actively supported the application in encl 95 made him equally bound by the decision in encl 95 (see para 10); Nana Ofori Atta II v Nana Abu Bonsra II [1957] AC and Tradium Sdn Bhd v Zain Azahari Zainal Abidin & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 668 followed. ||Page 29>> (3) Whereas issue estoppel refers to issues actually decided, res judicata in its wider sense applies to issues/matters which could have been raised in earlier proceedings but which were not, and which properly belonged to the subject matter of the earlier proceedings(see para 12); Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 and Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 followed. The principle of res judicata also applies as between two stages in the same litigation such that a decision by the court at one stage on a particular matter is binding on it at a later stage (see para 15); Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 referred. (4) In considering the grounds submitted by the applicant, the High Court had to ask the following questions: (i) whether the issue had been raised and actively decided upon in the earlier proceedings thus giving rise to an issue estoppel; and (ii) if not, whether it could have been raised in the earlier proceedings (res judicata in the wider sense) (see para 16). On the facts, all the issues raised in the instant application (encl 117) could have been brought before the court during the hearing of the earlier application vide encl 95. It was an abuse of process for the applicant to seek to re-litigate these matters (see para 47). (5) A liquidator may be removed if it is in the interest of all those who are interested in the company being liquidated. However, in the instant application, the applicant had not shown that all the contributories and creditors supported his application (see paras 48–49). (6) In the instant case, it was clear that there was no cause shown by the applicant warranting the removal of the liquidator. The liquidator was in fact in his final stages of liquidation with the real property recently sold. There was thus no merits in the instant application and it ought to be dismissed with costs (see paras 51–53). Pemohon adalah penyumbang dan juga pemiutang kepada syarikat responden (‘responden’) memohon untuk menyingkirkan penyelesai responden berdasarkan kepada s232 Akta Syarikat 1965 (‘akta’). Pencelah melalui permohonan ini (lampiran 117) telah sebelum itu menfailkan permohonan (lampiran 95) untuk perkara yang sama untuk penyingkiran penyelesai. Pemohon telah hadir melalui peguamcaranya dan menyokong permohonan pencelah di dalam lampiran 95. Walau bagaimanapun, lampiran 95 telah ditolak dan masih dalam rayuan. Permohonan ini, lampiran 117, adalah berdasarkan sebab-sebab berikut: (i) penyelesai telah gagal untuk

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-276 menyediakan akaun seperti yang diminta; (ii) penyelesai telah membuat pemilihan dalam pembayaran kepada pemiutang responden; (iii) penyelesai adalah berat sebelah terhadap pemohon; (iv) penyelesai tidak mempunyai keyakinan terhadap penyumbang dan pemiutang majoriti responden; dan (v) terdapatnya rayuan oleh pencelah berkenaan dengan penyingkiran iaitu lampiran 95. Mahkamah tinggi perlu membuat keputusan (a) sama ada pemohon telah dihalang daripada menimbulkan sebarang sebab atas dasar isu estopel dan/atau res judicata dan (b) sama ada pemohon dapat menunjukkan sebab penyingkiran penyelesai.

Diputuskan, permohonan ditolak dengan kos:

(1) Pencelah yang telah memfailkan permohonan sebelum ini (lampiran 95) dan yang juga menyokong permohonan ini (lampiran 117) adalah terikat dengan keputusan mahkamah di lampiran 95 dan adalah terhalang berdasarkan kepada prinsip res judicata daripada memfailkan dan/atau menyokong permohonan yang sama (lampiran 117) (lihat perenggan 7–8). (2) Fakta yang menunjukkan pemohon secara aktif menyokong permohonan di dalam lampiran 95 membuatkan beliau bersamaan terikat dengan keputusan di lampiran 95 (lihat perenggan 10); Nana Ofori Atta II v Nana Abu Bonsra II [1957] AC dan Tradium Sdn Bhd v Zain Azahari Zainal Abidin & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 668 diikut. (3) Manakala isu estopel merujuk kepada isu yang telah diputuskan, res judicata dalam kesan yang lebih meluas diguna pakai dalam isu/perkara yang sepatutnya dibangkitkan di dalam prosiding terdahulu tetapi tidak dan sebaik-baiknya merujuk semula kepada kandungan prosiding terdahulu (lihat perenggan 12); Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 dan Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 diikut. Prinsip res judicata juga diguna pakai di antara dua peringkat di dalam litigasi yang sama di mana keputusan mahkamah di satu peringkat ke atas satu perkara tertentu adalah mengikat ke atasnya pada peringkat seterusnya (lihat perenggan 15); Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 dirujuk. (4) Dalam mempertimbangkan sebab-sebab yang dihujahkan oleh pemohon, mahkamah tinggi perlu bertanyakan soalan-soalan berikut: (i) sama ada isu yang dibangkitkan dan secara aktifnya diputuskan ke atas prosiding terdahulu akan membangkitkan isu estopel, dan (ii) jika tidak, sama ada ia seharusnya dibangkitkan di dalam prosiding terdahulu (res judicata dalam kesan yang meluas) (lihat perenggan 16). Berdasarkan kepada kesemua isu yang dibangkitkan di dalam permohonan ini (lampiran 117) sepatutnya dibangkitkan di mahkamah semasa pendengaran permohonan terdahulu iaitu lampiran 95. Ini adalah satu penyalahgunaan proses untuk pemohon meminta untuk melakukan litigasi semula ke atas perkara ini (lihat perenggan 47). (5) Penyelesai boleh disingkirkan jika ini demi kepentingan semua yang mengingini syarikat tersebut dibubarkan. Tetapi dalam permohonan ini, pemohon tidak menunjukkan yang kesemua penyumbang dan pemiutang menyokong permohonannya (lihat perenggan 48–49). (6) Di dalam permohonan ini, adalah jelas tiada sebab ditunjukkan oleh pemohon

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-277 yang mewajarkan penyingkiran penyelesai. Penyelesai sesungguhnya berada di peringkat akhir pembubaran dengan penjualan hartanah baru-baru ini. Oleh yang demikian, tiada merit di dalam permohonan ini dan seharusnya ditolak dengan kos (lihat perenggan 51–53).

RES JUDICATA/ISSUE ESTOPPEL

[8] These intervenes are bound by the decision of the court in encl 95 and are now prevented based on the principle of res judicata from filing/supporting a similar application and hence re-litigating the same issues. [9] The object of the rules of res judicata as set out in the case of Lockyer v Ferryman (1877) AC 519 at p 530 is put upon two grounds:

The general rule of law undoubtedly is that no person is to be adversely affected by a judgment in an action to which he was not a party, because of the injustice of deciding an issue against him in his absence. But this general rule admits two exceptions: one is that a person who is in privity with the parties, a ‘privy’ as he is called, is bound equally with the parties, in which case he is estopped by res judicata: the other is that a person may have so acted as to preclude himself from challenging the judgment, in which case he is estopped by his conduct… This conduct sometimes consists of active participation in the previous proceedings… [12] Whilst issue estoppel refers to issues which were actually decided, res judicata in its wider sense applies to issues/matters which could have been raised in the earlier ||Page 33>> proceedings but which were not, and which properly belong to the subject matter of that earlier litigation. This principle was first enunciated in the very old case of Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 where it was stated that:

… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies… to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. [14] All the above cases on res judicata in the wider sense were accepted and followed by the Supreme Court in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189. [15] The principle of res judicata also applies as between two stages in the same litigation such that a decision by the court at one state on a particular matter is binding on it at a later stage (see Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57).

(a) Was the issue raised and actively decided on the earlier proceedings thus giving rise to an issue estoppel? (b) If not, as the cause of complaint already in existence, and could it has been raised in the earlier proceedings (res judicata in the wider sense)? [24] This issue is therefore caught by the principle of res judicata in the wider sense and cannot be canvassed as a ground in the present application. E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-278 [26] This issue is therefore also clearly caught by the principle of res judicata and therefore must be ignored. [45] In any event, this issue is clearly res judicata as it was adjudicated upon in the previous application as clearly be seen at p. 8 of the grounds of judgment of the learned judge. Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Striking out claims and action — Whether pleading disclosed triable issue — Whether issue res judicata This was an appeal filed by the fourth defendant against the decision of the learned registrar who had dismissed the fourth defendant’s application in seeking to strike out the plaintiff’s writ and statement of claim, under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) or (d) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC 1980’). The plaintiff had commenced this action pursuant to a power of attorney given to him as attorney for his principal, DYMM Tuanku Ja’afar Ibni Almarhum Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Yang Di Pertuan Besar Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus (‘the principal’) who had authorised the plaintiff to commence this action against all the four defendants. It was submitted that it was too late for the fourth defendant to invoke O 18 r 19 of the RHC 1980 as it had entered an unconditional appearance. It was also argued for the plaintiff that, at the hearing of the application filed by the plaintiff to continue an inter partes injunction, and the application filed by the defendants to set it aside, the fourth defendant had raised the issues on the plaintiff’s locus standi and the jurisdiction of the court, and that, Muhamad Ideres J had allowed the application of the plaintiff and dismissed the application by the defendants. The fourth defendant’s appeals are now pending in the Court of Appeal and that, in so far as the High Court was concerned, the issues viz locus standi and jurisdiction were res judicata and the fourth defendant was estopped from raising them in this case. Finally, it was argued that the plaintiff lacked locus standi as the action must be commenced in the principal’s name in the Special Court established under art 182(2) of the Federal Constitution. ||Page 507>> Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The fourth defendant having entered unconditional appearance had deprived itself of the right to invoke O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) or (d) of the RHC 1980 (see para 22); Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 followed. (2) It was clear that Muhamad Ideres J had considered and determined whether or not there was a bona fide triable issue or a bona fide serious issue to be tried, ie whether the plaintiff had the locus standi or whether the court had jurisdiction in this action. This was binding on all parties to this case until its reversal on appeal (see para 40). Since the issue whether the plaintiff had locus standi or whether the court had jurisdiction in this action had been dealt with and disposed of by Muhamad Ideres J, this issue was res judicata and the fourth defendant was estopped from reventilating it before this court in the exercise of co-ordinate jurisdiction (see para 42). (3) Article 181(1) of the Federal Consitution would include the Rulers’ prerogative in granting a power of attorney to any person of legal capacity in order to authorise the donee of the power of attorney to act as his lawful attorney to do E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-279 all things in accordance with the law, eg in the instant case to commence legal proceedings for and on behalf of the principal. Had this action been commenced by the principal in this court in his personal capacity, there can be no doubt this court would have no jurisdiction at all and the suit ought to be struck out (see para 59).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Ini adalah rayuan yang difailkan oleh defendan keempat terhadap keputusan pendaftar yang bijaksana yang telah menolak permohonan defendan keempat yang memohon untuk membatalkan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan plaintif, di bawah A 18 k 19(1)(a), (b) atau (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’). Plaintif telah memulakan tindakan ini menurut satu surat kuasa wakil yang diberikan kepada beliau sebagai wakil untuk prinsipalnya, DYMM Tuanku Ja’afar Ibni Almarhum Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Yang Di Pertuan Besar Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus (‘prinsipal’) yang telah memberi kuasa kepada plaintif untuk memulakan tindakan ini terhadap kesemua empat defendan. Ia telah dihujahkan bahawa ia sudah terlambat untuk defendan keempat menggunakan A 18 k 19 KMT kerana ia telah memasuki kehadiran tanpa syarat. Ia juga dihujahkan bagi pihak plaintif bahawa, semasa perbicaraan permohonan tersebut difailkan oleh plaintif untuk menyambung injunksi inter partes, dan permohonan tersebut difailkan oleh defendan- defendan untuk mengetepikannya, defendan keempat telah menimbulkan persoalan-persoalan tentang locus standi plaintif dan bidang kuasa mahkamah, dan bahawa, Muhamad Ideres H telah membenarkan permohonan plaintif ||Page 508>> dan menolak permohonan oleh defendan-defendan. Rayuan-rayuan defendan sekarang masih belum selesai di Mahkamah Rayuan dan oleh itu, setakat Mahkamah Tinggi adalah berkaitan, persoalan-persoalan tersebut mengenai locus standi dan bidang kuasa tersebut adalah res judicata dan defendan keempat diestopkan daripada menimbulkan perkara-perkara berikut dalam kes ini. Akhirnya, ia telah dihujahkan bahawa plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi kerana tindakan tersebut hendaklah dimulakan atas nama prinsipal di mahkamah khas yang ditubuhkan di bawah per 182(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Defendan keempat yang telah memasuki kehadiran tanpa syarat telah kehilangan haknya untuk menggunakan A 18 k 19(1)(a), (b) atau (d) KMT (lihat perenggan 22); Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 diikut. (2) Adalah jelas bahawa Muhamad Ideres H telah menimbang dan menentukan sama ada atau tidak terdapat persoalan bona fide yang serius yang perlu dibicarakan, iaitu sama ada plaintif mempunyai locus standi atau sama ada mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa dalam tindakan ini. Ini mengikat semua pihak dalam kes ini sehingga pengakasan kes ini semasa rayuan (lihat perenggan 40). Memandangkan persoalan sama ada plaintif mempunyai locus standi atau sama ada mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa dalam tindakan ini telah diteliti dan diputuskan oleh Muhamad Ideres H, persoalan ini adalah res

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-280 judicata dan defendan keempat diestopkan daripada mengemukakannya di hadapan mahkamah dengan menggunakan bidang kuasa sama taraf (lihat perenggan 42). (3) Perkara 181(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan membenarkan hak Pemerintah memberi surat kuasa wakil kepada sesiapa yang mempunyai kapasiti sah bagi tujuan memberi kuasa kepada penerima surat kuasa wakil untuk bertindak sebagai wakil beliau yang sah di sisi undang- undang, contohnya dalam kes semasa untuk memulakan prosiding sah untuk dan bagi pihak prinsipal. Jika tindakan ini telah dimulakan oleh prinsipal dalam mahkamah ini dalam kapasiti peribadi beliau, maka tidak diragukan lagi bahawa mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa langsung dan guaman ini hendaklah dibatalkan (lihat perenggan 59).]

IV RES JUDICATA

[23] It was argued for the plaintiff that, at the hearing of encl 9 filed by the plaintiff to continue the inter paries injunction, and enclosure (12) filed by the defendant to set it aside, D4 has raised plaintiff’s locus standi and the jurisdiction of the court, and that on 19 June 2002, Muhamad Ideres J had allowed encl 9 and dismissed encl 12 (‘the two decisions’). D4’s appeals against the two decisions are now pending in the Court of Appeal and that, in so far as the High Court is concerned, the issues viz locus standi and jurisdiction are res judicata and D4 is estopped from raising them here. The following cases were cited : [25] At this juncture, it is appropriate for me to put in place the relevant principles relating to ‘ res judicata’ and ‘issue estoppel’ which I shall refer to interchangeably.

The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall be not adjudged again ||Page 518>> The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. [29] Parties are therefore bound by the doctrine of res judicata from re- agitating an issue that had been resolved in earlier proceedings. [31] The judgment of Abdul Hamid CJ(M) (later CJ Malaysia) in Si Rusa does not concern the application of res judicata. [32] Similarly, res judicata also does not form any part of the judgment of Hashim Yeop A Sani J (later CJ (M)) in Mohamed Zainuddin.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-281 [33] The judgment of the Federal Court delivered by Wan Suleiman FJ (as he then was) in Tara Rajaratnam shows that res judicata does not apply to the case of striking out an indorsement to the writ and the statement of claim with liberty to file afresh. [34] In Lee Sem Yoong the relevant facts reveal that the former suit between the parties in the sessions court for the same matter and upon the same cause of action, has not been decided by that court. In another action before Gill J (later CJ(M)), the defendant set up the defence of res judicata, but the learned judge held that it was not available to the defendant. [36] In another case, Perumahan Farlim no question of res judicata was ventilated. [37] The judgment of Megarry VC in Mothercare did not decide the question as to whether the consideration and determination of the serious questions to be tried at the hearing of the interlocutory injunction can give rise to the plea of res judicata in a striking out proceeding under O 18 r 19(1). [42] In my judgment, since the issue whether the plaintiff has locus standi or whether the court has jurisdiction in this action has been dealt with and disposed of by the learned judge in the two decisions, this issue is res judicata and D4 is estopped from reventilating it before me in the exercise of co- ordinate jurisdiction (see also Kewangan Utama per Tee Ah Sing J). Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Estoppel — Application for removal of caveat — Whether earlier decisions of Federal Court and Court of Appeal had decided with precision the point in issue in the present suit Held, allowing the appeal: (1) When the plea of res judicata is raised it is necessary to identify with precision the issue that was decided in the earlier proceedings. To constitute a res judicata, the earlier judgment must ‘necessarily and with precision’ determine the point in issue: Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49 followed. It was clear from the judgment in Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188 that the Federal Court did not at all consider on the validity of the 1992 Agreements. The issue was only raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case in his submission before the court. The Federal Court merely held that as the administration of the deceased’s estate was not completed at that point of time the beneficiaries had no title to pass to the plaintiff and as such, the plaintiff was not ‘a person or body aggrieved’ for the purpose of removal of the private caveat. Res judicata can never be applied in favour of the defendants because res judicata only prohibits a ||Page 656>>cause of action from being re-litigated between the same parties but in that case, the defendants were never a party. In Gerak Indera Sdn Bhd lwn Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd although the defendants were a party, res judicata, whether in the narrow sense or the wider sense, cannot apply because the matter involved in the case was in respect of an interlocutory order relating to injunctions. It is trite law that for res judicata to apply the proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment or decree, that is to say, the one which adjudges the ultimate rights of the parties or finally puts the case out of court (see p 666E–G).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-282 (2) The circumstances had changed since the decision of the Federal Court in the aforesaid case. The administration of the deceased's estate was completed sometime in 1995 after distribution order was obtained from the High Court by CLHE. That was the position when the present action came before the High Court. A beneficiary to a deceased’s estate can enter into a contract of sale of land involving a subject matter which is not subsisting in the sense that the land is still in the deceased’s name. However, when the beneficiary comes to be in a position to pass on the title to the purchaser he can be compelled by the purchaser to make good the contract out of that interest. Although in the present appeal, cl 1.1 of the relevant 1992 Agreements stated that the sale was in respect all the rights, title and interest and shares of all the beneficiaries in the said lands, having regard to the fact that the administration of the deceased’s estate had not been completed at the time of its execution, the subject matter involved in the transaction was none other than the sale of spec successionis. As specific performance of the 1992 Agreements as prayed for by the plaintiff in the action is an equitable relief, the court will look at the substance rather than the form(see p 667A–C). (3) The doctrine of res judicata has its roots in equity and hence, retains its discretionary nature that is common to all equitable doctrines. Further, since the purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to achieve justice, a court may decline to apply it where do so would lead to an unjust result. And further, whether res judicata in the wider sense should be permitted to bar a claim is a matter that is to be determined on the facts of each case, always having regard to where the justice of the case lies (see p 668E–F). Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Apabila pli res judicata dibangkitkan, ia menjadi wajib untuk memastikan isu yang telah diputuskan dalam prosiding-prosiding yang lebih awal. Untuk membentuk res judicata, penghakiman yang terdahulu mestilah ‘wajib dan secara tepat’ memutuskan perkara yang menjadi isu: Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49 diikut. Ia jelas dari penghakiman Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188 bahawa Mahkamah Persekutuan tidak langsung mempertimbangkan keesahan Perjanjian-perjanjian 1992. Isu tersebut hanyalah dibangkitkan oleh peguam perayu dalam kes ini dalam penghujahannya di hadapan mahkamah. Mahkamah Persekutuan hanya memutuskan bahawa oleh kerana pentadbiran harta pusaka simati belum selesai pada ketika itu, benefisiari-benefisiari tersebut tidak mempunyai hakmilik untuk dipindah kepada plaintif dan oleh itu, plaintif bukanlah ‘suatu pihak yang terkilan’ bagi tujuan membuang kaveat persendirian. Res judicata tidak boleh dipakai bagi kepentingan defendan-defendan kerana res judicata cuma menghalang suatu kausa tindakan daripada dilitigasikan semula oleh pihak-pihak yang sama, tetapi dalam kes ini, defendan-defendan tidak pernah menjadi pihak. Dalam Gerak Indera Sdn Bhd lwn Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd, walaupun defendan-defendan merupakan pihak, res judicata, samada dalam erti yang sempit atau yang lebih luas, tidak boleh dipakai kerana E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-283 ||Page 659>> perkara tersebut melibatkan perintah interlokutori berkenaan injunksi. Ia pengetahuan ramai bahawa untuk membolehkan pemakaian res judicata, prosiding-prosiding tersebut mestilah membawa akibat suatu penghakiman muktamad atau dekri, iaitu, sesuatu yang menhukum hak terakhir pihak-pihak atau secara muktamad mengakhiri dan mengeluarkan kes tersebut dari mahkamah (lihat ms 666E–G). (2) Hal keadaan telah berubah sejak keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes tersebut. Pentadbiran harta pusaka simati telah selesai pada tahun 1995 selepas perintah pembahagian telah diperoleh daripada Mahkamah Tinggi oleh CLHE. Begitulah kedudukannya semasa tindakan ini tiba di Mahkamah Tinggi. Suatu benefisiari kepada harta pusaka simati boleh melaksanakan kontrak penjualan tanah ke atas suatu perkara yang tidak wujud, dalam ertikata tanah tersebut masih di bawah nama simati. Walau bagaimanapun, apabila benefisiari mencapai kedudukan di mana beliau boleh memindah hakmilik kepada seorang pembeli, benefisiari tersebut boleh dipaksa oleh pembeli tersebut untuk menepati kontrak tersebut atas kepentingan tersebut. Walaupun dalam rayuan ini, perkara 1.1 Perjanjian-perjanjian 1992 menyatakan bahawa jualan tersebut adalah ke atas semua hak, hakmilik, kepentingan dan bahagian semua benefisiari ke atas tanah-tanah tersebut, memandangkan bahawa pentadiran harta pusaka simati belum selesai pada masa perlaksanaannya, perkara yang dilibatkan dalam transaksi ini merupakan jualan spec successionis. Oleh kerana perlaksanaan spesifik Perjanjian-perjanjian 1992 seperti yang dipinta oleh plaintif dalam tindakan ini adalah suatu relif ekuiti, mahkamah akan mempertimbangkan kebenaran dan bukannya tatacara (lihat ms 667A–C). (3) Doktrin res judicata mempunyai asal-usul dalam ekuiti dan oleh itu, membendung sifat budibicara yang terdapat di dalam semua doktrin ekuiti. Selain itu, oleh kerana tujuan doktrin res judicata adalah untuk memastikan keadilan, mahkamah boleh menolak pemakaiannya sekiranya penerimaannya akan menyebabkan suatu akibat yang tidak adil. Juga, samada res judicata dalam maksud yang lebih luas patut diterima untuk menghalang suatu tuntutan adalah suatu perkara yang perlu diputuskan atas fakta-fakta setiap kes, dan dengan mempertimbangkan keadilan kes tersebut (lihat ms 668E–F). For cases on estoppel, res judicata, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 5129–5133.

(a) the Federal Court in the aforesaid case did not make any pronouncement on the validity of the 1992 Agreements. What was decided in the case is merely that because at the date of the execution of the 1992 Agreements the administration of the deceased's estate had not been completed the beneficiaries had no interest or property in the estate so as to give them any title to the lands to pass to the plaintiff. In the result, the plaintiff could not rely on the 1992 Agreements to justify its status as ‘a person aggrieved’ under s 327 of the National Land Code for the removal of the caveat. In short, the Federal Court did not determine with precision on the validity of the 1992 Agreements. The Court of Appeal in the aforesaid case also did not determine as such. It was an interlocutory proceeding before the Court of Appeal.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-284 Hence, the decision of the Court of Appeal cannot be res judicate; (b) The Federal Court case was decided in 1992. Since then there had been changed circumstances. Firstly, on the conduct of the defendants. Previously, the beneficiaries did not quarrel about the validity of the 1992 Agreements. Only in 1995, at the time when the aforesaid Court of Appeal case was decided, they changed their stance and conspired by the seventh defendant they wrongfully terminated the 1992 Agreements. Yet, they retained the deposit including the additional sums paid by the plaintiff under the 1992 Agreements and used the money to pay the arrears of quit rent on the said lands for the relevant years. The seventh defendant was not a bona fide purchaser. Hence, res judicata does not apply. The learned judge should have considered the causes of action in the statement of claim in the light of contract law. Secondly, the administration of the deceased's estate was completed by then. As such, although the beneficiaries had no title to the estate they could enter into the relevant 1992 Agreements, ||Page 664>>which is not void but only unenforceable. Once they had acquired the title after the administration of the estate was completed they can be compelled to perform the contract under s 17 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 (‘the SRA’); and (c) on the facts of the case, res judicata should not be applied because it will result in injustice to the plaintiff.

(a) the learned judge applied res judicata in the wider sense, that is to say, issue estoppel. By necessary reasoning, the Federal Court in the aforesaid case would have decided on the validity of the 1992 Agreements though no specific finding was made on the issue. For the court to decide whether the plaintiff was an aggrieved party it invited the court to decide on the validity of the 1992 Agreements. The issue on s 17 of the SRA was before the High Court judge and the Federal Court in the aforesaid case. Hence, the matter cannot be relitigated; (b) the relevant 1992 Agreements was in respect of the purchase of the beneficiaries’ shares in the estate, but not the right of inheritance and spes successionis. Hence, s 17 of the SRA is not relevant; and (c) the learned judge had exercised her discretion correctly in making the decision. Therefore, the decision should not be disturbed. A lucid exposition on the doctrine of res judicata, that is to say, doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum can be found in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189. In that case, the finance company granted certain fixed loan to the borrower to finance a housing project. As a security for the loan, the borrower charged several pieces of land to the finance company. The borrower defaulted in his payments and the finance company obtained an order for sale of the charged lands from the land administrator. As a consequence of the borrower being unable to utilize the balance of the loan, the borrower had difficulty in completing the housing project. Then, the borrower filed an originating motion in the High Court (‘the first action’) against the finance company to set aside the order for sale and for damages suffered by the borrower in consequence of the failure of the housing project. The borrower alleged that the finance company was in breach of the loan agreement in withdrawing the loan facilities because the dates of the drawdown of the loan were extended or had been waived by the finance company. The High Court dismissed the borrower's E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-285 application. On appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The borrower then brought another action (‘the second action’) against the finance company in the High Court, claiming for damages on the same grounds as that in the first action. The finance company applied to strike out the borrower’s statement of claim on a plea of res judicata. The High Court dismissed the application of the finance company. The finance company appealed to the Federal Court. ||Page 665>> Peh Swee Chin FCJ, having distilled from a host of authorities on the doctrine of res judicata stated:

What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadam cause. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy. Since a res judicata creates an estoppel per rem judicatum, the doctrine of res judicata is really the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum, the latter being described sometimes in a rather archaic way as estoppel by record. Since the two doctrines are the same, it is no longer of any practical importance to say the resjudicata is a rule of procedure and that an estoppel per rem judicatum is that of evidence. Such dichotomy is apt to give rise to confusion. ... there are in fact two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum. The first type relates to cause of action estoppel and the second, to issue estoppel, which is a development from the first type. The cause of action estoppel arises when rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court of a particular remedy are determined in a final judgment and such right of action ie the cause of action, merges into the said final judgment; in laymen’s language, the cause of action has turned into the said final judgment. The said cause of action may not re-litigated between the same parties because it is res judicata. In order to prevent multiplicity of actions and also in order to protect the underlying rationales of estoppel per rem judicatum and not to act against them, such estoppel of cause of action has been extended to all other causes of action (based on the same facts or issues) which should have been litigated or asserted in the original earlier action resulting in the final judgment, and which were not, either deliberately or due to inadvertence. On the other hand, the issue estoppel literally means simply an issue which a party is estopped from raising in a subsequent proceeding. However, the issue estoppel, in a nutshell, from a consideration of case law, means in law a lot more, ie that neither of the same parties or their privies in a subsequent proceeding is entitled to challenge the correctness of the decision of a previous final judgment in which they, or their privies, were parties. This sounds like explaining a truism, but it is the corollary from that statement that is all important and that could have given birth to the controversies alluded to above; the corollary being that neither of such parties will be allowed to adduce evidence or advance any argument to contradict such decision. ||Page 666>> It is important to bear in mind the manner in which the issue estoppel operates in preventing such contradiction of the previous judgment. There is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and NOT to issues which might have been and which were not brought E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-286 forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary view that such issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata ie doctrine of estoppel per remjudicatum. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid contrary view is to be preferred; it represents for one thing, a correct even though broader approach to the scope of issue estoppel. It is warranted by the weight of authorities to be illustrated later. It is completely in accord or resonant with the rationales behind the doctrine of res judicata, in other words, with the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. It is particularly important to bear in mind the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and with the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation. The plea of res judicata succeeded and the appeal was allowed. When the plea of res judicata is raised, it is necessary to identity with precision the issue that was decided in the earlier proceedings. In Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v Lee Yoke San [1979] 1 MLJ 24, Chang Min Tat FC held that to constitute a res judicata, the earlier judgment must, in terms of the Privy Council decision in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49, ‘necessarily and with precision’ determine the point in issue. The decision was affirmed by the Privy Council in [1981] 1 MLJ 54. To us, it is indeed clear from the judgment in Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd that the Federal Court did not at all consider on the validity of the 1992 Agreements. The issue was only raised by the learned counsel for the Appellant in the case in his submission before the Court. However, the Court merely held that as the administration of the deceased’s estate was not completed at that point of time the beneficiaries had no title to pass to the plaintiff and as such, the plaintiff was not ‘a person or body aggrieved' for the purpose of removal of the private caveat. Whatever it is res judicata can never be applied in favour of the defendants because res judicata only prohibits a cause of action from being re-litigated between the same parties but in that case the defendants were never a party. And in Gerak Indera Sdn Bhd lwn Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd although the defendants were a party, res judicata, whether in the narrow sense or the wider sense, cannot apply because the matter involved in the case is in respect of an interlocutory order relating to injunctions. It is trite law that for res judicata to apply the proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment or decree, that is to say, the one which adjudges the ultimate rights of the parties or finally puts the case out of court. ||Page 667>> The plaintiff alleged that, besides the deposit of RM1.2m, it had paid additional sums to the defendants (re-para 39(ix) of the amended statement of claim at p 51 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1). However, the defendants merely made a general denial of the allegation (re-para 35 of the amended statement of defence at p 109 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1). And it is evident that the arrears of quit rent on Lot 1561 and the quit rent on the other lots for 1993 were settled out of the deposit paid by the plaintiff under the 1992 Agreements (re-para 16 at p 489 Rekod Rayuan Jilid II). Further, the deposit and the additional sums paid by the plaintiff are being kept by the defendants. And further, the defendants changed their stance only after having obtained title to the said lands. On those facts, the learned judge ought not to have applied the doctrine of res judicata because to do so would lead to an unjust result. We are in complete agreement with the statement of this court in Chee Pok Choy & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 346, to the effect that the doctrine of res judicata has its roots in equity

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-287 and hence, retains its discretionary nature that is common to all equitable doctrines. Further, since the purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to achieve justice, a court may decline to apply it where do so would lead to an unjust result. And further, whether res judicata in the wider sense should be permitted to bar a claim is a matter that is to be determined on the facts of each case, always having regard to where the justice of the case lies. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Estoppel — Argument not raised by defendant in appeal — Whether defendant was now precluded from advancing argument — Whether there was an abuse of process

(i) the procedure adopted by the plaintiff was correct; (ii) the objections and/or issues raised by the defendant (now the respondent) were res judicata; (iii) the defendant’s conduct was mala fide.

The res judicata argument

Res judicata Power to dismiss or stay proceedings where the matter in question is res judicata between the parties, or where by reason of multiplicity of proceedings in any court or courts the proceedings ought not to be continued. Counsel for the appellant/plaintiff had argued that the objections or issues raised by the respondent/defendant are res judicata. This point has been dealt with in OCBC Bank (M) Bhd v Kredin Sdn Bhd [1997] 2 MLJ 544. In that case, the respondent/chargor had sought to raise the issue of interest which was payable — a matter which was not raised before the judge who granted the order for sale in a second auction. While the respondent/chargor had appealed against that decision (ie the order for sale) that appeal was subsequently withdrawn. Instead, the respondent/chargor made an application to set aside the order for sale.

… the amount claimed by the appellant in the charge action in which interest is levied has to be deposed to on affidavit. All other relevant documents, namely the statutory notice, the originating summons, the affidavit in support and the affidavit filed under O 83 of the RHC had raised and sought the interest. This was, therefore, a material issue in the course of the charge action and the respondent should have stated their stand then or at the appeal which they subsequently withdrew. Learned counsel for the respondent, with his usual candour, remarked that they were not the solicitors in charge when the order for sale and when the withdrawal of the appeal in the second action took place. He reiterated that none of the issues now submitted were raised then and the third action had nothing to do with the issue they were raising now for the first time which was unjust enrichment. In that earlier action, he stressed, the action was for damages for fraud and other grounds, different from the one raised now, and one of the remedies was to set aside the order for sale. He argued that res judicata is only as regards cause of action estoppel, not remedy estoppel as an order for sale is not a judgment as decided in Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119 and since this was an application under O 18 r 19 of the RHC, he added, as long as the respondent can show an arguable case, the action should remain. He also submitted that the order for sale had since been stayed. ||Page 220>> He had cited para 73 of the judgment of the Federal Court in Loh Holdings Sdn Bhd v Peglin Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1984] 2 MLJ 105 at p 113 which was actually an extract of the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-288 judgment from the Australian case of Brisbane City Council & Anor v A-G for Queensland [1978] 3 All ER 30; [1979] AC 411. Wan Sulaiman FJ had said: ‘The defence of res judicata was considered and disposed of at p 425 [of Brisbane City Council & Anor v A-G for Queensland [1979] AC 411], and we cite:“The second defence is one of res judicata. There has, of course, been no actual decision in litigation between these parties as to the issue involved in the present case, but the appellants invoke this defence in its wider sense, according to which a party may be shut from raising in a subsequent action an issue which he could, and should, have raised in earlier proceedings. The classic statement of this doctrine is contained in the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 and its existence has been reaffirmed by This Board in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155. A recent application of it is to be found in the decision of the Board in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581. It was, in the judgment of the Board, there described in these words:‘… there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings.’This reference to ‘abuse of process’ had previously been made in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 per Somervell LJ and their Lordships endorse it. This is the true basis of the doctrine and it ought to be applied when the facts are such as to amount to an abuse: otherwise there is a danger of a party being shut from bringing forward a genuine subject of litigation. In their Lordships’ opinion there is no room for application of this doctrine here.”’ Learned counsel had also quoted a passage from Kerajaan Malaysia v Jasanusa Sdn Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 105 at p 117H-I which states: ‘It is well settled law that the exercise of such a discretion will be interfered with by an appellate court only in exceptional circumstances; for example, where it has been demonstrated that the decision of the judge below is shown to have depended on an erroneous basis of law or fact or where no reasonable explanation is open save that the decision depended on an erroneous basis of law or fact. More particularly, the fact that we as an appellate court might have exercised the discretion differently is beside the point and will not therefore constitute a sufficient ground for overturning the judge’s decision to grant the limited stay.’ In reply, learned counsel for the appellant likened a situation where a client sues a solicitor for negligence. There are two causes of action, he said, in contract and in tort. What if the client sues the solicitor in contract and the action is dismissed. Can he file another action on the same facts in tort? Similarly here, he pointed out, the grounds in the fourth action to set aside the order for sale may be different but this cause of action could have been framed in the third action. ||Page 221>> He relied on C (A Minor) v Hackney London Borough Council [1996] 1 WLR 789 at pp 792 and 793 where Simon Brown LJ said: ‘Before turning to consider these reasons and counsel’s arguments upon the appeal, it is convenient first to indicate something of the law governing this issue. From the several authorities referred to during the course of argument, I derive these central principles: (1) The consideration of public policy underlying the plea of res judicata are enshrined in two Latin maxims, nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa and interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. (2) The plea of res judicata encompasses two distinct forms of estoppel: cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. (3) “Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause of action in the later proceedings is identical to that in the earlier proceedings, the latter having been between the same

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-289 parties or their privies and having involved the same subject matter. In such a case, the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is alleged, such as to justify setting aside the earlier judgment”: See Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] AC 93 at p 104. (4) Issue estoppel represents an extension of the doctrine of res judicata to include a bar on the subsequent litigation not only of all decided issue whose resolution was essential to the determination of earlier proceedings but also “to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time”: see Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630 at p 643, per Diplock LJ, quoting from Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 p 115. As Lord Keith of Kinkel put it in Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93, 106:“Issue estoppel, too, has been extended to cover not only the case where a particular point has been raised and specifically determined in the earlier proceedings, but also that where in the subsequent proceedings it is sought to raise a point which might have been but was not raised in the earlier.” (5) “The point” which might have been but was not raised in the earlier proceedings may itself be a cause of action. In Talbot v Berkshire County Council [1994] QB 290 at p 301, Mann LJ spoke of the rule as “a salutary one”, observing that “it prevents prolixity in litigation and encourages the earliest resolution of disputes”. (6) In issue estoppel cases, the plea of res judicata will not be applied where to do so would cause injustice. The “special circumstance” (the phrase used in several of the authorities) justifying the non-application of the rule ordinarily arise where further material becomes available which could not by reasonable diligence have been adduced in the earlier proceedings, or where (as in Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93) there has been a change or changed perception of the law. (7) The plea of res judicata applies only where the cause of action or issue was and remains between the same parties or their predecessors in title. The single exception to this rule is to be found in the Privy Council decision in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581, where the party held estopped in the subsequent proceedings had not itself been a party to the earlier action. It was, ||Page 222>>however, a closely related company with common directors and shareholders.’ Learned counsel also referred to the latest Malaysian authority on this point. In Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank [1997] 1 MLJ 77, it was propounded at p 92 that: ‘When properly understood, there is therefore nothing in the decision in Kandiah that permits a chargor in a subsequent action to set aside an order for sale granted by the court inter partes. That may not be done in the absence of an allegation of fraud in the procurement of the order. See Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Sahari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143. If a chargor is unhappy with an order for sale made inter partes, his only remedy is to appeal against it as has been done in the present case. All that Kandiah decides is that the making of an order for sale does not bar an action in personam between the same parties.’ Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Low’s case contradicted O 83 r 3 of the RHC. He said there was special circumstances here, citing Richland Trade & Development Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd [1996] 4 MLJ 233 as a case on point. The Federal Court in Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 77 explained the decision of Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994]1 MLJ 119 where the latter decision is to the effect that doctrine of res judicata cannot apply where the previous proceedings were E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-290 only charge action which did not result in a final judgment or order. With reference to this, the clarification that was given in Low Lee Lian by Gopal Sri Ram JCA is as follows (at p 92):

We must confess our inability to discern any ‘wider proposition’ that Kandiah establishes. All that case did was to reaffirm well-established principles. At the risk of repetition, we emphasize that, by their very nature, proceedings under s 256 are not concerned with any contractual claims that the chargor may have against the chargee. They are concerned with the very narrow and limited questions whether the chargor has adduced facts that establish cause to the contrary in the sense we have earlier discussed. If the chargor is unable to sustain his opposition to the making of an order for sale — a proceeding in rem — he may nevertheless sue the chargor in personam for breach upon the personal covenant or in equity for such relief as may be appropriate. The issue in the latter action is whether facts emerge that reasonably support a breach of contract or an equitable remedy such as an action for an account. Such an action will, of course, be subject to all available defences, at law and in equity, and to the wide discretion of the court to refuse specific relief in the exercise of discretion according to settled principles. When properly understood, there is therefore nothing in the decision in Kandiah that permits a chargor in a subsequent action to set aside an order for sale granted by the court inter partes. That may not be done in the absence of an allegation of fraud in the procurement of the order. See Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Sahari bin Murid [1991] 1 MLJ 143. If a chargor is unhappy with an order for sale made inter partes, his only remedy is to appeal against it as has been done in the present case. All that Kandiah decides is that the making of an order for sale does not bar an action in personam between the same parties. In our judgment, the problem fails to be resolved by reference to the doctrine of estoppel. It matters not what form the estoppel takes. It may take ||Page 223>>the form of a plea of res judicata or cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel in the sphere of adjectival law. It may appear in some other form to affect rights that may exist under substantive law. Whatever its label, there are certain basic features that are inextricably woven into the fabric of the doctrine. One such feature is mutuality or reciprocity. For estoppel to apply, it must bind both parties to a dispute. If, for any reason, only one party will be estopped but not the other, if their roles were reversed, then the doctrine does not bite. See Gaunt v Wainman (1836) 132 ER 335; Foster v Mentor Life Assurance Co (1854) 118 ER 1058; Concha v Concha (1886) 11 App Cas 541 at p 553, per Lord Herschell LC; Simm v Anglo-American Telegraph Co (1879) 5 QBD 188 at p 203, per Bramwell LJ. An examination of the legal position reveals that the requirement of reciprocity is not met in relation to proceedings under s 256 of the Code. Now, it is trite that a chargee/creditor may pursue any or all remedies to recover monies lent by him. He may enforce his statutory charge against the chargor by way of proceedings in rem under s 256 of the Code. He may sue the principal debtor (who may or may not be the chargor) upon the personal covenant contained in any loan agreement that was entered into between the parties. He may proceed against the surety who has guaranteed the loan. And he may pursue all of these courses simultaneously, contemporaneously or successively. See China and South Sea Bank Ltd v Tan [1989] 3 All ER 839 at p 842. Thus, in the absence of any special circumstances, a chargee who has obtained an order for sale is not barred by res judicata or any other form of estoppel from pursuing actions in personam against the chargor or the surety. The test of mutuality or reciprocity is, accordingly, not met. Consequently, no legitimate ground may be advanced to bar the chargor from mounting an action in personam against the chargee, eg for breach of contract or for failure to furnish proper accounts. When viewed from this standpoint, it is plain that the decision in Kandiah is not only correct but also just. Where an order for sale is made in the absence of the chargor, then, the court is not functus officio for the purposes of hearing an application by the chargor to set it aside. See United Malayan Banking

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-291 Corp Bhd v Syarikat Perumahan Luas Sdn Bhd (No 2) [1988] 3 MLJ 352. We are not prepared to — indeed we cannot — predict all the issues that may arise upon such an application. Each case depends on its own facts. However, we will go so far as to say that one of the issues that will certainly arise upon such an application will be whether the chargor has established cause to the contrary. Once these elementary propositions of law are understood, there need be no fear of confusion or of floodgates.

The doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine applicable only to records; it is a fundamental doctrine of all courts that there must be an end of litigation. It will therefore be convenient to follow the ordinary classification and treat it as a branch of the law of estoppel. Where res judicata is pleaded by way of estoppel to an entire cause of action, rather than to a single matter in issue, it amounts to an allegation that the whole legal rights and obligations of the parties are concluded by the earlier judgment, which may have involved the determination of questions of law as well as findings of fact. Res judicata has also been considered in the case of Chee Pok Choy & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 346 in which Gopal Sri Ram JCA in delivering the decision of the Court of Appeal stated (at pp 356–358):

Now, res judicata is not merely a technical rule of pleading. It is a doctrine of substantial justice. It is a process whereby justice is achieved procedurally by precluding a party from re-agitating in subsequent proceedings a complaint or an issue that has, or could fairly have, been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties or their privies. It is merely equity in action in the procedural arena. It is sometimes referred to as the rule in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 67 ER 313. In that case, Wigram VC said: ‘In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.’ The doctrine may thus be seen to encompass several categories. In its narrowest sense, res judicata, I think, refers to estoppel by record. It refers to the actual decision the earlier action or proceeding. In its wider sense, it ||Page 225>>encompasses issues, and causes of action that could justly and fairly have been equally adjudicated in the earlier suit or proceeding. This wider operation of the doctrine is sometimes referred to ‘constructive res judicata’. It houses the twin concepts of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. Like the tree of which they form the branches, they are designed to ensure that there is finality in litigation. Pausing for a moment, I think that it is essential to bear in mind that Wigram VC spoke these words in the Court of Chancery and that the court he referred to was that court, of which he was the Vice-Chancellor at the time. I make mention of these matters in order to demonstrate that the doctrine of res judicata has its roots in equity and hence retains its discretionary nature that is common to all equitable doctrines. Now, there is a dimension to the doctrine of res judicata that is not always appreciated. It is this. Since the doctrine (whether in its narrow or broader sense) is designed to achieve justice, a court may decline to apply it where to do so would lead to an unjust result. And there is respectable authority in

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-292 support of the view I have just expressed. In Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Kee/er Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1966] 2 All ER 532, 573, Lord Upjohn said: ‘As my noble and learned friend, Lord Reid, has already pointed out there may be many reasons why a litigant in the earlier litigation has not pressed or may even for good reasons have abandoned a particular issue. It may be most unjust to hold him precluded from raising that issue in subsequent litigation (and see Lord Maugham LC’s observations in the New Brunswick case ([1938] 4 All ER at p 755; [1939] AC 1 at p 21). All estoppels are not odious but must be applied so as to work justice and not injustice, and I think that the principle of issue estoppel must be applied to the circumstances of the subsequent case with this overriding consideration in mind.’ (Emphasis added.) In Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93, 109, Lord Keith of Kinkel expressed the following view: ‘In my opinion your Lordship should affirm it to be the law that there may be an exception to issue estoppel in the special circumstance that there has become available to a party further material relevant to the correct determination of a point involved in the earlier proceedings, whether or not that point was specifically raised and decided, being material which could not by reasonable diligence have been adduced in those proceedings. One of the purposes of estoppel being to work justice between the parties. It is open to courts to recognize that in special circumstances inflexible application of it may have the opposite result, as was observed by Lord Upjohn in the passage which I have quoted above from his speech in the Carl-Zeiss case [1966] 2 All ER 536 at p 573, [1967] 1 AC 853 at 947.’ (Emphasis added.) In a later passage, I find Lord Keith saying: ‘Estoppel per rem judicatam, whether cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel, is essentially concerned with preventing abuse of process. In the present case I consider that abuse of process would be favoured rather than prevented by refusing the respondents permission to reopen the disputed issue.’ These views were very recently reaffirmed by the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (2000) (Unreported, speeches published on 14 December ||Page 226>>2000). See, in particular the speech of Lord Bingham of Cornhill, at pp 8-10 of the transcript. On the authorities discussed thus far, the principle comes to this. Whether res judicata in the wider sense should be permitted to bar a claim is a matter that is to be determined on the facts of each case, always having regard to where the justice of the individual and particular case lies. The judgment of Low Bee Lian has amply covered the aspect of res judicata. I find therefore that the respondent/defendant has failed to show that it has not exhausted whatever avenues in relation to the implementation of the original order and this leads me to the final contention of the appellant/plaintiff that the conduct of the respondent/defendant resulting in the deputy registrar in arriving at a decision that he has no jurisdiction was mala fide.

The owners of a property borrowed money from the first respondent (the bank) which loan was charged upon the property. The owners defaulted on payment of the loan interest due to the bank and absconded. The bank, in exercise of its rights, sold the property to the appellant. The bank assigned the property, pursuant to the sale, to the appellant and the appellant borrowed money from the bank on the security of a mortgage of the property. The appellant defaulted on the payment of interest under the mortgage and the bank exercised its right of sale thereunder and sold the property to the second respondent. The appellant brought an action against the bank (no 996 of 1969) claiming that the sale of the property to it was a sham; that the property had been conveyed to it as trustee for the bank and the mortgage was accordingly a nullity. The bank denied that the sale was a sham and counterclaimed for the loss suffered on the re-sale of the property to the second respondent. The court dismissed the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-293 appellant’s claim and upheld the bank’s counterclaim. One month after that judgment the appellant brought an action against the bank and the second respondent (no 534 of 1972) claiming that the sale by the bank to the second respondent was void or voidable as fraudulent in that the bank and the second respondent ‘were in fact essentially one certain interest and/or alternatively acting in concert with a common design calculated to obtain the … property at a low price and to extinguish the plaintiff’s interest therein.’ The bank and the second respondent applied by summons for an order that the statement of claim be struck out as (inter alia) being vexatious, frivolous and/or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The judge held that the allegation of fraud and the voidability of the sale by the bank to the second respondent were matters which were available for litigation in action no 969, and ordered that the statement of claim be struck out. The order striking out the statement of claim was affirmed by the Full Court. On appeal to the judicial committee: Held, dismissing the appeal, that there was no reason why a defence impugning the bona fides of the sale by the bank to the second respondent could not have been pleaded as a counterclaim to the counterclaim in action no 969; that, accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense applied and it would be an abuse of the process of the court to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and should have been litigated in the earlier proceedings. In the course of the judgment delivered by Lord Kilbrandon reference was made to the application of a doctrine of estoppel namely res judicata. The part of his Lordship’s ruling which is material for the purposes of the present case is as follows (at p 696):

Their Lordships agree with the view expressed by McMullin J that the true doctrine in its narrower sense cannot be discerned in the present series of action, since there has not been, in the decision in no 969, any formal repudiation of the pleas raised by the appellant in no 534. Nor was Choi Kee, a party to no 534, a party to no 969. But there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings. The locus classicus of that aspect of ||Page 229>>res judicata is the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, 115, where the judge says: ‘… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.’ The shutting out of a ‘subject of litigation’ — a power which no court should exercise but after a scrupulous examination of all the circumstances — is limited to cases where reasonable diligence would have caused a matter to be earlier raised; moreover, although negligence, inadvertence or even accident will not suffice to excuse, nevertheless ‘special circumstances’ are reserved in case justice should be found to require the non-application of the rule. For example, if it had been suggested that when the counterclaim in no 969 came to be answered Mr Lai was unaware, and could not reasonably have been expected to be aware, of the circumstances attending the sale to Choi Kee, it may be that the present plea against him would not have been maintainable. But no such averment has been made. The Vice-Chancellor’s phrase ‘every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation’ was expanded in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255, 257, by Somervell LJ: ‘… res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but … it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-294 of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.’

… the abuse in question need not involve the reopening of a matter already decided in proceedings between the same parties, as where a party is estopped in law from seeking to re-litigate a cause of action or an issue already decided in earlier proceedings, but (as Somervell LJ put it in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 at p 257) may cover — ‘issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.’ A series of cases, mostly in recent years, has explored this form of abuse. Reference need not be made to all of them. In the Yat Tung case abuse was found where a claimant who had unsuccessfully sued a bank on one ground brought a further action against the same bank and another party on a different ground shortly thereafter. Giving the advice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Lord Kilbrandon said: ‘The second question depends on the application of a doctrine of estoppel, namely res judicata. Their Lordships agree with the view expressed by McMullin J that the true doctrine in its narrower sense cannot be discerned in the present series of actions, since there has not been, in the decision in no 969, any formal repudiation of the pleas raised by the appellant in no 534. Nor was Choi Kee, a party to no 534, a party to no 969. But there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings.’ (See [1975] AC 581 at pp 589-590, [1975] 2 WLR 690 at p 696.)’ Lord Bingham of Cornhill also cited with approval, the advice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as stated by Lord Kilbrandon as ||Page 231>>cited above. Lord Bingham of Comhill also referred to ‘what is now taken to be the rule in Henderson v Henderson has diverged from the ruling which Wigram VC made, which was addressed to res judicata’ where his Lordship stated (at p 498): Syarikat Sin Hwa Plantations Sdn Bhd (‘the company’) had been voluntarily wound up on 12 May 1996 and the respondent was appointed the liquidator. On 6 May 1997, the appellant affirmed a proof of debt for a sum of RM618,394.67 with the respondent. The proof of debt was rejected by the respondent on the basis that the amount stated in the proof of debt had not been proven as the claim therein was the subject matter of Civil Suit No 796 of 1982 (‘the civil suit’) which had yet to be decided by the High Court. Being dissatisfied with the rejection of the proof of debt, the appellant filed an originating summons in the High Court at Ipoh moving the court to make an order that the proof of debt filed by it with the respondent be accepted and that the respondent do pay the appellant the sum stated in the proof of debt. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s application on the grounds of res judicata and laches and the appellant appealed. In 1982, the appellant had filed a claim against the company vide the civil suit in the High Court at Ipoh. The claim was for the sum due in respect of assessment for the years of assessment 1979 and 1980, which was the same sum that the appellant was claiming in the proof of debt. The appellant then proceeded to obtain final judgment against the respondent under O 14 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 and in that process, the appellant filed the requisition notice under s 108 of the Income Tax Act 1967 (‘the Act’) to prove that the amount claimed was due and payable from the company. The ||Page 267>>appellant succeeded in obtaining final judgment against the company. The E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-295 company then appealed to the Federal Court and on 21 January 1986, the Federal Court allowed the appeal by the company whereby the company was given unconditional leave to defend and the summary judgment was accordingly set aside. The civil suit was then remitted back to the High Court but the same had not been heard yet. Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The High Court judge had erred in coming to the conclusion that res judicata applied in the instant case. The only point that the learned judge came to that conclusion was that the solicitors for both parties had signed a notice of discontinuance to discontinue the civil suit. The mere signing of the notice of discontinuance was not sufficient as that document had to be filed in court and the court had to make the necessary order to strike out the civil suit. As such, the civil suit had not been terminated and for that reason the learned judge erred in coming to the conclusion that the principle of res judicata applied because there was no final decision in respect of the civil suit (see p 274D–G). (2) The proof of debt was affirmed by the appellant on 6 May 1997 and the respondent rejected the proof of debt on 29 May 1999. On 21 June 1999, the appellant filed the present originating summons. Therefore, the appellant had not committed any laches in respect of the present application to warrant the dismissal of its application. The laches referred to by the learned High Court judge may be in respect of the civil suit where the Federal Court had on 21 January 1986 ordered that the case be remitted back to the High Court. However, no evidence had been adduced to show what had happened to the parties and there was no determination as to who was guilty of laches in respect of the civil suit. In any case, even assuming that the appellant was guilty of laches, it should be raised in the civil suit and not in the present application. Therefore, the learned High Court judge had erred when he dismissed the appellant’s application due to the laches (see pp 274H–275A–D, H). (3) It was not disputed that the proof of debt filed by the appellant was the same amount as the claim, which was the subject matter of the civil suit. Since the Federal Court had ruled that the civil suit be remitted back to the High Court for full trial, this meant that the appellant had to prove to the satisfaction of the court what the actual amount owed by the company was. Accordingly, the certificate issued under s 108 of the Act was not conclusive proof of the sum due and payable by the company (see p 276A–B). (4) Under the Companies (Winding Up) Rules 1972, the debt must be proved. Since the appellant had yet to prove the amount due and payable from the company in court as ordered by the Federal ||Page 268>>Court, it was obvious that the proof of debt filed had not been proven yet. Accordingly, the respondent was correct in rejecting the appellant’s proof of debt (see p 277A–B).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-296 Syarikat Sin Hwa Plantations Sdn Bhd (‘syarikat tersebut’) telah digulung secara sukarela pada 12 May 1996 dan responden telah dilantik sebagai penyelesai. Pada 6 Mei 1997, perayu telah mengikrarkan bukti hutang bagi jumlah sebanyak RM618,394.67 dengan responden. Bukti hutang itu telah ditolak oleh responden atas dasar bahawa jumlah yang dinyatakan di dalam bukti hutang itu masih belum dibuktikan kerana tuntutan adalah merupakan hal perkara Guaman Sivil No 796 Tahun 1982 (‘guaman sivil tersebut’) yang masih belum diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Oleh kerana tidak berpuas hati dengan penolakan bukti hutang itu, perayu telah memfailkan satu saman pemula dalam Mahkamah Tinggi di Ipoh yang mengusul mahkamah supaya membuat satu perintah bahawa bukti hutang itu yang telah difailkan olehnya dengan responden hendaklah diterima dan bahawa responden hendaklah membayar kepada perayu jumlah yang dinyatakan di dalam bukti hutang itu. Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak permohonan perayu atas alasan res judicata dan kelewatan dan perayu telah merayu. Pada tahun 1982, perayu telah memfailkan satu tuntutan terhadap syarikat tersebut melalui guaman sivil tersebut dalam Mahkamah Tinggi di Ipoh. Tuntutan tersebut adalah untuk jumlah yang kena dibayar berhubung dengan taksiran bagi tahun-tahun taksiran 1979 dan 1980, yang mana merupakan jumlah sama yang dituntut oleh perayu di dalam bukti hutang tersebut. Perayu kemudiannya meneruskan usaha untuk mendapatkan penghakiman muktamad terhadap responden di bawah A 14 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 dan dalam usaha itu, perayu telah memfailkan notis rekuisisi di bawah s 108 Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967 (‘Akta tersebut’) untuk membuktikan bahawa jumlah yang dituntut kena dibayar dan terhutang oleh syarikat tersebut. Perayu telah berjaya mendapatkan penghakiman muktamad terhadap syarikat tersebut. Syarikat tersebut kemudiannya merayu kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan dan pada 21 Januari 1986, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah membenarkan rayuan oleh syarikat tersebut di mana syarikat tersebut telah diberikan kebenaran tidak bersyarat untuk membela dan penghakiman terus tersebut telah sehubungan itu diketepikan. Guaman sivil tersebut telah kemudiannya diserahkan kembali kepada Mahkamah Tinggi tetapi ia masih belum didengar sehingga kini. Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Mahkamah Tinggi telah tersalah pertimbangan dalam mencapai kesimpulan bahawa res judicata terpakai di dalam kes ini. Satu- ||Page 269>>satunya perkara yang menyebabkan hakim yang arif membuat kesimpulan itu adalah bahawa peguamcara bagi kedua-dua pihak telah menandatangani satu notis pemberhentian untuk memberhentikan guaman sivil tersebut. Hanya dengan menandatangani notis pemberhentian itu sahaja adalah tidak mencukupi kerana dokumen itu haruslah difailkan dalam mahkamah dan mahkamah tersebut haruslah membuat perintah yang perlu untuk membatalkan guaman sivil tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, guaman sivil tersebut masih belum ditamatkan dan atas alasan itu hakim yang arif telah tersalah pertimbangan dalam mencapai kesimpulan tersebut bahawa prinsip res judicata terpakai kerana tidak terdapat keputusan muktamad berhubung dengan guaman sivil tersebut (lihat ms 274D–G).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-297 (2) Bukti hutang tersebut telah diikrarkan oleh perayu pada 6 Mei 1997 dan responden telah menolak bukti hutang itu pada 29 Mei 1999. Pada 21 Jun 1999, perayu telah memfailkan saman pemula ini. Oleh itu, perayu telah tidak melakukan sebarang kelewatan berhubung dengan permohonan tersebut bagi mewajarkan penolakan permohonan ini. Kelewatan masa yang dirujuk oleh hakim Mahkamah Tinggi mungkin berhubung dengan guaman sivil tersebut di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah pada 21 Januari 1986 memerintahkan supaya kes tersebut dikembalikan semula kepada Mahkamah Tinggi. Walau bagaimanapun, tiada keterangan telah dikemukakan bagi menunjukkan apa yang telah berlaku kepada pihak-pihak tersebut dan tidak terdapat penentuan berhubung dengan siapa yang bersalah atas kelewatan masa berhubung dengan guaman sivil tersebut. Dalam sebarang keadaan, meskipun menjangkakan bahawa perayu bersalah kerana kelewatan masa, ia haruslah dibangkitkan di dalam guaman sivil tersebut dan bukan dalam permohonan semasa ini. Oleh itu, hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah tersalah pertimbangan apabila beliau menolak permohonan perayu kerana kelewatan masa tersebut (lihat ms 274H–275A–D, H). (3) Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa bukti hutang yang telah difailkan oleh perayu adalah jumlah yang sama dengan tuntutan, yang mana merupakan hal perkara guaman sivil tersebut. Oleh kerana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan bahawa guaman sivil tersebut hendaklah dikembalikan semula kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk perbicaraan penuh, ini bermakna bahawa perayu terpaksa membuktikan mengikut kepuasan mahkamah apakah jumlah sebenar yang terhutang oleh syarikat tersebut. Sehubungan itu, sijil yang dikeluarkan di bawah s 108 Akta tersebut bukannya bukti muktamad akan jumlah yang kena dibayar dan terhutang oleh syarikat tersebut (lihat ms 276A–B). (4) Di bawah Kaedah-Kaedah (Penggulungan) Syarikat 1972, hutang tersebut mestilah dibuktikan. Oleh kerana perayu masih belum membuktikan jumlah yang terhutang dan kena dibayar oleh syarikat tersebut di dalam mahkamah seperti mana yang ||Page 270>>diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan, adalah jelas bahawa bukti hutang yang telah difailkan masih belum dibuktikan lagi. Sehubungan itu, responden telah bertindak dengan betul apabila menolak bukti hutang perayu (lihat ms 277A–B).]

1 The revenue is estopped from pursuing its claim further (through winding up proceedings) by the legal principle of res judicata because it seeks ‘to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and should have been litigated in earlier proceedings’: The Federal Court in Civil Appeal No 335 of 1984 had ordered on 21 January 1986 that the alleged debtor (the said company) be given leave to defend in High Court Civil Suit No 796 of 1982, after having considered the statement of claim of the revenue, the statement of defence of the alleged debtor, and the affidavits in O 14 proceedings.

Alternatively, 2 the revenue by seeking to enforce its claim in winding up proceedings is committing an

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-298 abuse of process of law by trying to relitigate the dispute over the alleged debt although there is no longer a dispute, because:

(1) unconditional leave to defend was given to the alleged debtor by the Federal Court in Federal Court Civil Appeal No 335 of 1984; (2) the revenue as plaintiff in High Court Civil Suit 796/1982 (and applicant under O 14 proceedings for summary judgment) has now withdrawn its claim; (3) laches on the part of the revenue — plaintiff in pursuing its claim since January 1986 (the date of the order of the Federal Court granting unconditional leave to defend) whether by way of civil suit, or by winding up proceedings.

Alternatively, 3 the revenue is guilty of laches: the protracted and inordinate delay in pursuing its claim pursuant to the order of the Federal Court in Civil Suit No 335 of 1984 amounts to approximately twelve and a half years; this represents a vexatious course of action.

Alternatively, 4 the revenue is committing an abuse of process of law by seeking to sideline the order of the Federal Court having previously filed a statement of claim in High Court Civil Suit No 796 of 1982.

Alternatively, 5 the revenue has not furnished proof of the debt allegedly owing to it by the alleged debtor although it was given the opportunity to do so by the Federal Court. ||Page 272>> For the abovementioned reasons either singly or in combination, I as liquidator hereby reject the revenue’s claim. In the High Court, the respondent pleaded res judicata. The respondent claimed that when Civil Suit No 796 of 1982 was remitted back to the High Court, the case was not fixed for hearing. The appellant then prepared a notice of discontinuance dated 26 November 1998 in respect of Civil Suit No 796 of 1982 and sent it to the solicitors for the company who ||Page 273>>duly signed the document signifying the company’s consent. This document was produced at the trial. For some reasons, the appellant changed their mind and did not file the notice of discontinuance. The respondent relied on this notice even though it was not filed in court and contended that the appellant is estopped from bringing up the present action because of res judicata. Apparently, this found favour with the learned judge when in his judgment he said:

Sin Hwa telah digulungkan pada 12 May 1996. Pada 13 June 1998, LHDN telah menulis kepada responden menyatakan bahawa LHDN akan menarik balik tuntutannya (lihat eksh CBH-3 di kandungan 10). Notis pemberhentian kesnya juga telah ditandatangani oleh kedua-dua pihak (lihat eksh CBH-2 di kandungan 8). Bagaimanapun, LHDN juga menyatakan hasratnya untuk tidak menarik balik bukti hutang yang telah disampaikan ke atas responden, dan memberi pandangan bahawa bukti hutang itu tidak bergantung kepada sesuatu penghakiman mahkamah (lihat eksh CBH-3).

Peguam responden, Encik James Loh telah berhujah bahawa dengan adanya notis pemberhentian oleh LHDN, maka tuntutannya adalah dianggap telah selesai, dan oleh itu, keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan pada 21 Januari 1986 adalah muktamad. Permohonan ini, hujah peguam merupakan E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-299 helah LHDN untuk menghidupkan balik tuntutannya yang sudah selesai. Tambah lagi, dalam keadaan Sin Hwa telahpun digulung, LHDN tidak sepatutnya dibenarkan membuat tuntutannya. Encik James Loh juga berhujah bahawa di peringkat rayuan ke atas penghakiman terus, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mempertimbang tuntutan LHDN dan telah membenarkan perayu/defendan membela kes ini.

LHDN telah gagal mengambil apa-apa tindakan selama 13 tahun dan selain daripada prinsip mencegah kelewatan (laches), LHDN juga terikat dengan doktrin res judicata dan tidak boleh dengan permohonan ini cuba mengungkit kembali tuntutannya.

Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujah peguam responden di atas isu res judicata in … …

Berdasarkan keputusan mahkamah-mahkamah tertinggi di atas, saya memutuskan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan pada 21 Januari 1986 untuk mengetepikan penghakiman terus yang diperolehi JHDN, dan seterusnya kegagalannya untuk meneruskan pendakwaan kesnya, serta keputusan LHDN untuk memberhentikan tindakan ini (walaupun notis pemberhentian telah tidak difailkan) telah menimbulkan keadaan di mana penghakiman Mahkamah Persekutuan tersebut menjadi satu kebenaran yang kini muktamad dan terikat kepada LHDN mengikut doktrin res judicata.

Mahkamah juga memutuskan bahawa kesepian LHDN untuk bertindak dan mendakwa kesnya selama 13 tahun ini juga memprejudiskan kedudukan pemohon. Seharusnya LHDN meneruskan tuntutannya selepas keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan itu. Tiada pula penjelasan diberi mengapa LHDN telah gagal berbuat demikian. Bagaimanapun setelah meneliti latar belakang permohonan ini, adalah jelas kepada mahkamah ini bahawa sebenarnya LHDN telah berniat untuk tidak meneruskan dengan tuntutan asalnya melalui writ samannya. Kini di peringkat penggulungan syarikat Sin Hwa, LHDN telah cuba menghidupkan kembali tuntutan asal dengan cara jalan yang lain iaitu dengan menggunakan bukti hutang. Kelewatan untuk bertindak oleh LHDN selama ini bagi saya, membawa kesimpulan bahawa ||Page 274>>LHDN telah menerima keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dan mengakui bahawa defendan (Sin Hwa) mempunyai pembelaan terhadap tuntutan asal LHDN. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini telah mengambilkira faktor kelewatan melampau oleh LHDN dan memutuskan bahawa permohonannya sekarang merupakan satu proses yang disalahgunakan, dan harus dibatalkan. (Lihat Cheah Kim Tong & Anor v Taro Kaur [1989] 3 MLJ 252).

Relief yang diminta oleh LHDN dalam permohonan ini adalah sebenarnya agar mahkamah ini membuat satu deklarasi yang LHDN berhak menuntut jumlah wang yang dinyatakan dalam bukti hutangnya. Dalam melaksanakan kuasa budi bicaranya untuk membenarkan relief sebegini, mahkamah boleh mengambilkira keadaan sekeliling kes ini dan menolak permohonan ini dalam keadaan di mana telah didapati sebagai fakta yang tidak dicabar, bahawa LHDN telah bersalah dengan kelewatan melampau dan telah berdolak-dalik tanpa munasabah (guilty of inordinate delay and unreasonable vaccillation — lihat kes Mahkamah Agung, Haji Hussin bin Haji Ali & Ors v Datuk Hj Mohamed bin Yaacob & Ors [1983] 2 MLJ 227). From the above passages, it is clear to us that the learned judge relied on res judicata and laches to dismiss the appellant’s application. With the greatest respect to the learned judge, we are of the view that the learned judge has erred in coming to the conclusion that res judicata applied in the present case. The only point that the learned judge came to that conclusion is that the solicitors for both parties signed the notice of discontinuance. For that reason, Civil Suit No 796 of 1982 is deemed to be

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-300 discontinued. In our view, the mere signing of the notice of discontinuance is not sufficient. That document has to be filed in court and the court has to make the necessary order to strike out Civil Suit No 796 of 1982. Apparently, this part of the action never came into being because the appellant changed their mind and did not file the notice of discontinuance. This fact is confirmed by the legal officer appearing before us. What is the consequences of the refusal by the appellant to file the notice of discontinuance? In our view, at the most there was a breach of etiquette on the part of the appellant but it is not sufficient to show that the Civil Suit No 796 of 1982 has been discontinued. Since the appellant did not proceed further than obtaining the consent of the company, Civil Suit No 796 of 1982 is still pending and alive in the High Court. It has not been terminated yet unless action has been taken by either party to terminate it. For that reason, the learned judge erred in coming to the conclusion that the principle of res judicata applies in the present action because there is no final decision in respect of Civil Suit No 796 of 1982 yet. As we have said earlier, the decision in Civil Suit No 796 of 1982 should have great repercussions to the present application. Assuming that the company or the respondent succeeded in striking out the appellant’s claim in Civil Suit No 796 of 1982 due to laches or otherwise, then that decision could be used as a defence to the present application, such as estoppel because of res judicata. Until that is done, the present application should be treated separately from the civil suit. Any defence to the present application should be confined within the perimeter of this application. In our view, the appellant has not committed any laches in the present application. In fact, from the chronology of events in the present application, the appellant has acted promptly. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Nature and scope of doctrine — Approach of court in applying the doctrine The writ in this case was served on 9 March 1999. Defence was delivered on 23 November 1999 and the reply on 17 February 2000. An application for security for costs taken out on 5 August 1999 was heard and refused by the judge on 25 October 1999. The action by then had gone into case management. On 23 May 2000 — some one year and two months after the issuance of the writ, the defendants (appellants) applied to strike out the statement of claim. The judge however dismissed the application on the grounds of: (i) res judicata; and (ii) delay in making the application. The defendants (appellants) appealed to the Court of Appeal. Held, dismissing the appeal. All costs in the Court of Appeal and the court below to follow the event of the trial: (1) The judge erred when he thought that he was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from dealing with the point raised. The doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine. It is an illustration of the operation of equity in the field of procedure. It matters not whether it is called issue estoppel, cause of action estoppel or res judicata. A court is not to apply any of these branches of estoppel in a staccato and straight-jacket fashion. The court is bound to weigh the merits of the case and determine where justice lies. However in the instant case, the error of the judge did not produce any unfavorable consequence in the case (see pp 308F–G, 309A). (2) Although the judge had expressed the view that the application had merits, he

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-301 refused to grant it in the exercise of his discretion. There was no misdirection in law by the learned judge. He did not take into account irrelevant considerations nor did he omit relevant considerations. He had not asked himself the wrong question. There was no manifest miscarriage of justice. The order of the judge should be upheld (see p 309B–D). ||Page 307>>

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Writ dalam kes ini telah disampaikan pada 9 Mac 1999. Pembelaan telah dikemukakan pada 23 November 1999 dan jawapannya pada 17 Februari 2000. Satu permohonan sebagai jaminan untuk kos yang dipohon pada 5 Ogos 1999 telah didengar dan ditolak oleh hakim pada 25 Oktober 1999. Tindakan tersebut pada ketika itu telahpun dikemukakan untuk pengurusan kes. Pada 23 Mei 2000 — lebih kurang satu tahun dan dua bulan selepas pengeluaran writ tersebut, defendan-defendan (perayu-perayu) telah memohon untuk membatalkan pernyataan tuntutan. Hakim bagaimanapun telah menolak permohonan tersebut atas alasan: (i) res judicata; dan (ii) kelewatan dalam membuat permohonan tersebut. Defendan-defendan (perayu-perayu) telah membuat rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut. Semua kos di Mahkamah Rayuan dan di mahkamah bawahan mengikut peristiwa perbicaraan: (1) Hakim telah terkhilaf apabila beliau sangka beliau telah dihalang oleh doktrin res judicata daripada berbincang tentang perkara yang diutarakan. Doktrin res judicata bukan satu doktrin yang teknikal. Ia adalah satu gambaran tentang operasi ekuiti dalam bidang prosedur. Yang penting bukanlah sama ada ia dipanggil persoalan estopel, kausa tindakan estopel atau res judicata. Mahkamah tidak seharusnya menggunakan mana-mana cabang estopel tersebut secara staccato dan terkongkong. Mahkamah terikat untuk menimbangkan merit-merit kes dan menentukan di mana terletaknya keadilan. Namun begitu dalam kes ini, kekhilafan hakim tidak menyebabkan apa-apa akibat yang tidak menggalakkan dalam kes tersebut (lihat ms 308F–G, 309A). (2) Walaupun hakim telah menyatakan pandangan bahawa permohonan tersebut mempunyai merit-merit, beliau telah menolak untuk membenarkannya dalam menggunakan budi bicara beliau. Tiada salah arah dalam undang-undang yang dilakukan oleh hakim yang bijaksana. Beliau tidak mengambilkira pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang tidak relevan mahupun telah beliau meninggalkan pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang relevan. Beliau tidak bertanyakan persoalan yang salah. Tidak terdapat kesalahan pelaksanaan keadilan yang manifes. Perintah hakim tersebut hendaklah dikekalkan (lihat ms 309B–D).] For cases on judges, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 3156–3160. For cases on the nature and scope of the doctrine of res judicata, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 5165 ||Page 308>>

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-302 The learned judge advanced two reasons for dismissing the application. First, he thought that he was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from dealing with the point raised. In this, he fell into error. The doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine. It is an illustration of the operation of equity in the field of procedure, that is to say adjectival law. Whether you call it issue estoppel, cause of action estoppel or res judicata matters not. A court is not to apply any of these branches of estoppel in a staccato and straight-jacket fashion. The court is bound to weigh the merits of the case and determine where justice lies. If upon an examination of all the circumstances of the case, the court concludes that it would be unjust for a party in a given case to reventilate a point, or to ventilate a fresh point which he could fairly have raised in earlier proceedings, then it may no doubt be justified in coming to the conclusion that it would be unjust to permit the plaintiff to succeed. It would accordingly admit, as successful, a plea of procedural estoppel, be it cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel or res judicata. On the other hand, if the judge comes to the opposite conclusion on the facts, then of course, the plea of procedural estoppel may not succeed. Or to put it more accurately, the court will not permit the plea to succeed. This much is clear in the speech of Lord Upjohn in the case of Carl-Zeiss Stiflung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1966] 2 All ER 536. That view of the matter was affirmed and followed by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in his speech in Johnson v Gore Wood ||Page 309>>& Co (a firm) [2001] 1 All ER 481. It is noteworthy that in Johnson, the plea of res judicata was not permitted to succeed. This court has applied these cases in Chee Pok Choy & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 346. But, for the reasons which we will state in a moment, our differing with the judge on this point produces no unfavorable consequence in the case. Held, dismissing the application with costs: (1) The right to grant a lien holder’s caveat belongs only to the registered proprietor of the property — in the present case, the registered proprietor being the auction purchaser. Only the registered proprietor had the power or the right to deposit the title deed for the purpose of creating a lien holder’s caveat (see p 492D–E); Perwira Habib Bank (M) Bhd v Loo & Sons Realty Sdn Bhd [1996] 3 MLJ 409 followed. There was no satisfactory evidence before the court to show that the auction purchaser had deposited his title with RMBB as a security for any loan to the auction purchaser. There was also no evidence before the court as to whether RMBB or its solicitor had written and obtained the consent from the auction purchaser for RMBB to have a lien holder’s caveat over the said land. The court was of the view that the said RMBB’s lien holder’s caveat was therefore invalid in law (see p 493B, D–F). (2) RMBB’s lien holder’s caveat was also invalid in law on the ground that the said caveat was registered on 2 September 1992, when in fact the defendant’s private caveat had been registered earlier and was still in force. Section 322(2)(c) of the NLC expressly prohibited the entry of any lien holder’s caveat over the land so long as there was private caveat in force (see p 493G). (3) Although O 15 r 6(2) of the RHC stated that such an application could be made ‘at any stage of the proceedings’, this did not mean that such an application could be made after the final judgment or order had been entered

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-303 and perfected (see p 495A); Tai Choi Yu v Syarikat Tingan Lumber Sdn Bhd [1998] 4 MLJ 275 followed. Order 15 r 6 of the RHC only applied to proceedings where the substitution of any of the parties to the cause or matter was made before the final judgment (see p 495B); Shell Malaysia Trading Sdn Bhd v Leong Yuet Yeng & Ors [1990] 3 MLJ 254 followed. It might be permitted at any stage of the proceedings. This meant it should be applied ‘before the final order was made, not after it had been perfected and extracted’ (see p 495C); United Asian Bank Bhd v Personal Representative of Roshammah (decd) & Ors [1994] 3 MLJ 327 followed. (4) There did not exist any question or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the suit which remains to be determined between the plaintiff and the defendant and the intervenor. The plaintiff’s action had been adjudicated upon, the action had been determined by the court (see p 495E–F). (5) The intervenor’s intention was to enforce their purported lien over the said land and in order to enforce the judgment obtained against Fana Gading and the guarantors. The intervenor had not secured any judgment against the auction purchaser under the purported lien holder’s caveat. The intervenor had no direct legal interest in the subject matter of the proceedings, only commercial interest. A mere commercial interest did not entitled the intervenor to intervene (see pp 495H–496A); Tohtonku Sdn Bhd v Superace (M) Sdn Bhd [1992] 2 MLJ 63, Moser v Marsden [1892] 1 Ch 487 and re IG Forbenindustrie AG [1944] 1 Ch 41 followed. (6) It must be noted that the 18 November 1997 order was final and binding on all parties. To allow the intervenor to intervene would mean to ask the court to reopen and relitigate the issues. The auction purchaser had been added as party prior to the order. The mere fact that the auction purchaser did not participate in the proceedings or that the intervenor had not been informed of the proceedings by the auction purchaser did not alter the legal position as notice to the auction purchaser was binding on the intervenor (see p 496E–H) Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Sahari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143 and Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75 followed. There had to be finality of litigation and the principle of issue estoppel and res judicata clearly applied given the circumstances of this case (see p 498A). (7) It was submitted by the intervenor that the defendant was estopped from objecting to the intervenor’s application to intervene since the defendant had knowledge of the intervenor’s lien holder’s caveat. The defendant entered his private caveat on 27 May 1992 and even at the point of time the defendant filed the application to set aside the 8 January 1992 order, the defendant could not possibly have been aware of the intervenor’s alleged interest in the said land for the simple reason that the intervenor’s lien holder’s caveat was entered on 2 September 1992 (see p 499B–C). (8) The intervenor had failed to provide sufficient evidential material before the court to show that the intention and the conduct of the parties, particularly that

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-304 of the auction purchaser, that he intended to create a lien holder’s caveat in respect of the said land. In the circumstances, the court was of the view that the intervenor had no equitable charge over the said land (see p 499H–I). Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut dengan kos: (1) Hak untuk memberikan kaveat pemegang lien terletak hanya kepada tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut — dalam kes semasa, tuanpunya berdaftar merupakan pembeli lelongan. Hanya tuanpunya berdaftar mempunyai kuasa atau hak untuk mendepositkan hak milik bagi tujuan mewujudkan kaveat pemegang lien (lihat ms 492D–E); Perwira Habib Bank (M) Bhd v Loo & Sons Realty Sdn Bhd [1996] 3 MLJ 409 diikut. Tidak terdapat keterangan yang meyakinkan di hadapan mahkamah untuk menunjukkan bahawa pembeli lelongan telah mendepositkan hak milik beliau dengan RMBB sebagai jaminan untuk sebarang pinjaman kepada pembeli lelongan tersebut. Tidak juga terdapat sebarang keterangan di hadapan mahkamah berhubung dengan sama ada RMBB atau peguamcaranya telah menulis dan mendapatkan kebenaran daripada pembeli lelongan untuk RMBB memasukkan kaveat pemegang lien ke atas tanah tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa kaveat pemegang lien RMBB tersebut adalah dengan itu tidak sah di sisi undang-undang (lihat ms 493B, D–F). (2) Kaveat pemegang lien RMBB adalah juga tidak sah di sisi undang-undang atas alasan bahawa kaveat tersebut telah didaftarkan pada 2 September 1992, sedangkan pada hakikatnya kaveat persendirian defendan telah didaftarkan lebih awal dan masih berkuatkuasa. Seksyen 322(2)(c) KTN secara nyatanya melarang kemasukan sebarang kaveat pemegang lien ke atas tanah tersebut asalkan terdapat kaveat persendirian yang masih berkuatkuasa (lihat ms 493G). (3) Meskipun A 15 k 6(2) KMT tersebut menyatakan bahawa permohonan yang sedemikian boleh dibuat ‘at any stage of the proceedings’, ini tidak bermakna bahawa permohonan sedemikian boleh dibuat selepas penghakiman muktamad atau perintah telah dimasukkan dan disempurnakan (lihat ms 495A); Tai Choi Yu v Syarikat Tingan Lumber Sdn Bhd [1998] 4 CLJ 293 diikut. Aturan 15 k 6 KMT tersebut hanya terpakai kepada prosiding di mana penggantian mana-mana pihak kepada kausa atau perkara tersebut dibuat sebelum penghakiman muktamad (lihat ms 495B); Shell Malaysia Trading Sdn Bhd v Leong Yuet Yeng & Ors [1990] 3 MLJ 254 diikut. Ianya mungkin dibenarkan di mana-mana peringkat prosiding tersebut. Ini bermakna bahawa ianya mestilah dipakai ‘before the final order was made, not after it had been perfected and extracted’ (lihat ms 495C); United Asian Bank Bhd v Personal Representative of Roshammah (decd) & Ors [1994] 3 MLJ 327 diikut. (4) Tidak terdapat sebarang persoalan atau isu yang berbangkit daripada atau berhubung dengan atau berkaitan dengan mana-mana relif atau remedi yang dituntut dalam guaman tersebut yang kekal untuk ditentukan antara plaintif dan defendan dan pencelah tersebut. Tindakan plaintif telah dihakimi, tindakan tersebut telah ditentukan oleh mahkamah (lihat ms 495E–F). (5) Niat pencelah ialah untuk menguatkuasakan lien mereka yang dimaksudkan ke

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-305 atas tanah tersebut dan demi untuk menguatkuasakan penghakiman yang diperolehi terhadap Fana Gading dan penjamin-penjamin. Pencelah tersebut telah tidak mendapatkan sebarang penghakiman terhadap pembeli lelongan di bawah kaveat pemegang lien yang dimaksudkan. Pencelah tersebut tidak mempunyai kepentingan sah secara langsung dalam hal perkara prosiding tersebut, hanya kepentingan komersial. Kepentingan komersial sahaja tidak memberikan hak kepada pencelah tersebut untuk mencelah (lihat ms 495H–496A); Tohtonku Sdn Bhd v Superace (M) Sdn Bhd [1992] 2 MLJ 63, Moser v Marsden [1892] 1 Ch 487 dan re IG Forbenindustrie AG [1944] 1 Ch 41 diikut. (6) Harus diperhatikan bahawa perintah 18 November 1997 tersebut adalah muktamad dan mengikat kesemua pihak. Untuk membenarkan pencelah mencelah, akan bermaksud meminta mahkamah membuka semula dan melitigasikan semua isu-isu tersebut. Pembeli lelongan tersebut telah dimasukkan sebagai satu pihak sebelum perintah tersebut. Hakikat semata-mata bahawa pembeli lelongan tidak menyertai dalam prosiding tersebut atau bahawa pencelah telah tidak dimaklumkan mengenai prosiding tersebut oleh pembeli lelongan tidak mengubah kedudukan undang-undang kerana notis kepada pembeli lelongan adalah mengikat pencelah tersebut (lihat ms 496E–H) Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Sahari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143 dan Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 diikut. Haruslah terdapat kemuktamadan litigasi dan prinsip isu estopel dan res judicata jelas terpakai memandangkan keadaan kes ini (lihat 498A). (7) Adalah dihujahkan oleh pencelah tersebut bahawa defendan diestopkan daripada membantah permohonan pencelah untuk mencelah oleh kerana defendan mengetahui tentang kaveat pemegang lien pencelah tersebut. Defendan telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian beliau pada 27 Mei 1992 dan meskipun pada waktu itu defendan telah memfailkan permohonan untuk mengenepikan perintah 8 Januari 1992, defendan tidak mungkin telah mengetahui mengenai kepentingan pencelah yang dikatakan di dalam tanah tersebut hanya kerana kaveat pemegang lien tersebut telah dimasukkan pada 2 September 1992 (lihat ms 499B–C) (8) Pencelah tersebut telah gagal untuk memberikan bahan keterangan yang mencukupi di hadapan mahkamah untuk menunjukkan bahawa niat dan perlakuan pihak-pihak tersebut, khususnya niat dan perlakuan pembeli lelongan tersebut, bahawa beliau berniat untuk mewujudkan satu kaveat pemegang lien berhubung dengan tanah tersebut. Dalam keadaan tersebut, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa pencelah tersebut tidak mempunyai gadaian ekuiti ke atas tanah tersebut (lihat ms 499H–I).]

Issue of functus officio and res judicata

In our present case, the intervenor’s case does not fall within any of the above mentioned exceptions and hence the principle of functus officio precludes this court from allowing the intervenor in its attempt to set aside the 18 November 1997 order. There has to be finality of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-306 litigation and the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata clearly apply given the circumstances of this case.

The doctrine of finality, which is the doctrine of res judicata, states that an adjudicated matter cannot be readjudicated. It applies where a judgment has been regularly entered on a thing or matter after final adjudication on its merit by a tribunal of final result having competent jurisdiction on the subject matter of the litigation. A given decision cannot be revisited even though it is overruled subsequently by a higher court. In Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581, Lord Kilbrandon, speaking for the Privy Council, declared by referring to the doctrine of res judicata at p 590: Correctness of the decision or judgment is irrelevant to the doctrine of res judicata. On this issue, I would like to quote a relevant passage from The Doctrine of Res Judicata by Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley, (3rd Ed 1996) at para 189 which says:

It is not necessary to prove that the decision relied on is correct in law or fact: if it is a final decision, by a tribunal having jurisdiction as to the same question, and between the same parties, it will be binding on them, until upset on appeal. Res Judicata ... gives effect to the policy of the law that the parties to a judicial decision should not afterwards be allowed to relitigate the same question, even though the decision may be wrong. This rests on the fact that a competent tribunal has jurisdiction to decide wrongly, as well as correctly, and if it makes a mistake, its decision is binding unless corrected on appeal. Applying the above principles and authorities to the facts of the present case, the court is satisfied that this court is functus officio in dealing with the present application by the intervenor and that the doctrine of res judicata applies. Therefore the intervenor’s application to intervene and to set aside the 18 November 1997 order (as in encl 124) must fail.

(i) this court is functus officio in dealing with the present application by the intervenor (vide encl 124) and the doctrine of res judicata applies; (ii) there is no legal basis for the intervenor to be allowed to intervene at this stage of the proceedings; (iii) the 18 November 1997 order is valid in law and binding on all parties; and shall not be set aside. Held, allowing the application: (1) From the available evidence, it would be correct to say that Asialand had no valid licence issued under the 1966 Act and that being the case, Asialand was opened to prosecution under s 18 of the same Act. The plaintiff had deceived the Comptroller of Housing appointed under s 4 of the 1966 Act by E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-307 undertaking development without a licence. This was certainly a case where the court would not lend its aid to the plaintiff who had founded his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act (see p 89D–E). (2) It would be gross fraud on the first defendant to allow the plaintiff — being the chargor of the subject security and a self confessed ‘alter-ego’ of Asialand (the principal borrower) who, having taken the loan facility from the first defendant and had used that loan for the subject development project to build and sell bungalow houses, and had defaulted in all their repayments thereto — to now come before this court pleading their own very act of ‘illegality’ for ||Page 50>>having infringed the 1966 Act for the sole purpose of asking and imploring the court to set aside the loan facility and to strike down the order for sale without having to make any repayment to the first defendant nor to return the relevant land titles to the third to fifteen defendants, the right interveners (see p 95F–G). (3) When an issue could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding, one was precluded from raising it again in a subsequent action. The present plaintiff was estopped from taking out the present suit purportedly on a further and different cause of action which was available to him at the outset. The conduct and the inaction of the plaintiff must be construed against him. The illegality issue was raised too late in the day. The plaintiff’s claim must be struck out on the ground of res judicata (see pp 97I–98A, 100D, 101B, E). (4) The rights of the first defendant and the purchasers (third to fifteen defendants) had been prejudiced for more than 20 years after taking into account the first sale of the land which took place in 1973. In order to obstruct the settlement reached between the first defendant and the purchasers, the plaintiff had filed this suit and applied to stay the auction of those lands. The plaintiff’s conduct showed that his claim was mala fide and it was abuse of the process of the court (see pp 102G–H, 103A). Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan tersebut: (1) Berdasarkan keterangan yang sedia ada, adalah betul untuk mengatakan bahawa Asialand tidak mempunyai lesen sah yang dikeluarkan di bawah Akta 1966 tersebut dan dalam keadaan ini, Asialand, terbuka untuk pendakwaan di bawah s 18 Akta yang sama. Plaintif telah memperdayakan Pengawal Perumahan yang dilantik di bawah s 4 Akta 1966 tersebut dengan menjalankan pembangunan tanpa lesen. Ini sememangnya satu kes di mana mahkamah tidak boleh membantu plaintif yang telah memulakan kausa tindakan beliau berdasarkan satu tindakan yang tidak bermoral atau menyalahi undang-undang (lihat ms 89D–E). (2) Adalah fraud yang melampau ke atas defendan pertama jika plaintif — sebagai penggadai jaminan yang diperkatakan dan mengaku sendiri adalah ‘alter ego’ Asialand (peminjam utama) yang, setelah mengambil kemudahan pinjaman daripada defendan pertama dan telah menggunakan pinjaman tersebut untuk projek pembangunan yang diperkatakan untuk membina dan menjual rumah-rumah bungalow, dan telah gagal dalam semua pembayaran balik

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-308 mereka — sekarang menghadap mahkamah ini memplikan tindakan mereka sendiri yang ‘menyalahi undang-undang’ kerana telah melanggar Akta 1966 tersebut semata-mata bagi tujuan memohon dan mendesak mahkamah untuk mengetepikan kemudahan pinjaman tersebut dan membatalkan perintah jualan tanpa perlu membuat apa-apa pembayaran balik kepada defendan pertama mahupun mengembalikan hakmilik-hakmilik tanah yang relevan kepada defendan-defendan ketiga hingga kelima-belas, yang merupakan pencelah-pencelah yang sebenarnya (lihat ms 95F–G). (3) Apabila satu persoalan boleh dan patut ditimbulkan di dalam prosiding yang terdahulu, seseorang itu dihalang daripada menimbulkannya lagi di dalam tindakan berikutnya. Plaintif sekarang ini diestopkan daripada memulakan guaman sekarang atas kausa tindakan kemudian yang berbeza, di mana kausa tersebut telah sedia ada untuk beliau pada permulaannya. Kelakuan dan ketiadaan apa-apa tindakan daripada plaintif mesti ditafsirkan menentang beliau. Persoalan tentang kepenyalahan undang-undang telah lambat ditimbulkan. Tuntutan plaintif mestilah dibatalkan atas alasan res judicata (lihat ms 97I–98A, 100D, 101B, E). (4) Hak-hak defendan pertama dan pembeli-pembeli (defendan-defendan ketiga hingga kelima-belas) telah diprejudiskan lebih ||Page 52>>daripada 20 tahun setelah mengambilkira jualan pertama tanah tersebut dalam tahun 1973. Bagi menghalang penyelesaian dicapai antara defendan pertama dan pembeli-pembeli, plaintif telah memfailkan guaman ini dan memohon untuk menggantung lelongan tanah-tanah tersebut. Perbuatan plaintif menunjukkan bahawa tuntutan beliau adalah mala fide dan ini adalah penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah (lihat ms 102G–H, 103A).]

The grounds of the application are that this honourable court is functus officio and the issues raised are res judicata and also on the further grounds as stated in the affidavit of YEO KHAY ANN filed herein.

The grounds of the application are that this honourable court is functus officio, that is the court has no jurisdiction to decide on the issues in the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim and the issues raised are res judicata, that is the plaintiff is estopped from further raising any issues pertaining to the charges and other interests lodged (on) the same subject land vide the five master titles hereinafter set out, and also on the further grounds as stated in the affidavit in support of GOON GOOI CHENG (f) filed herein. Next, I will consider Badiaddin’s case. In that case, the facts may be stated as follows. There the appellants were the registered co-owners of a piece of Malay reservation land (‘land’). The appellants’ business associate by the name of Ismail bin Omar (‘Ismail’) was in need of some funds. The appellants agreed to assist Ismail and they did so by charging their land to the respondent to secure a loan advanced by the respondent to Ismail. It was a simple transaction. But Ismail breached the loan agreement and the respondent foreclosed the third party security and obtained an order for sale of the land. The appellants applied to the High Court for a declaration that the charge as well as the order of sale were invalid because it contravened the Malay Reservations Enactment (FMS Cap 142) (‘the Enactment’). In due course, to be exact, on 21 March 1988, the High Court granted the declaration sought for and in respect of the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-309 respondent’s summons filed in the same proceedings where s 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 (‘the Act’) was invoked, the learned judge also made an order directing the appellants to repay all monies lent to Ismail (‘the 1988 order’). On 8 October 1990, the same learned judge made another order declaring that the appellants had received an advantage or benefit directly from the respondent and the learned judge also ordered that the land be sold and the proceeds of sale be utilized to pay the balance outstanding on the loan made to Ismail (‘the 1990 order’). The appellants then proceeded afresh to have the 1990 order declared null and void and to have it set aside on the ground that it contravened s 13 of the Enactment. The appellants argued that they were entitled to the remedy ex debito justitiae without the need to comply with the appeal procedure. The respondent argued that res judicata and estoppel precluded the appellants from questioning the validity of the 1990 order. Another learned judge ruled on 22 September 1995 that it would be unjust to estop the appellants from challenging the 1990 order by reference to res judicata or any other branch of the doctrine of estoppel because the 1990 order was plainly invalid, it having been made in contravention of an express provision of the written law (‘the 1995 order’). The respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeal (see [1996] 3 MLJ 621) and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the sole ground that the High Court was functus officio and had no jurisdiction whatsoever to set aside the 1990 order irrespective of any illegality in the order. The appellants appealed. The Federal Court allowed the appeal and upheld the 1995 order. Mohd Azmi FCJ writing a separate judgment had this to say at pp 410–411 of the report:

(1) that the plaintiff’s claim was tainted with illegality; (2) that the plaintiff’s claim was governed and constrained by the doctrine of res judicata; and (3) that the plaintiff’s claim was mala fide and an abuse of the process of the court.

Res judicata

Factually speaking the averments in encls 44, 81 and 104 brought to the fore the doctrine of res judicata. Once the matter has been litigated between the parties, it should be regarded as forever decided. It must be recalled that the order for sale for master title Grant 7188 for Lot 94 was granted by NH Chan J (as he then was) more than ten years ago in the presence of the plaintiff’s counsel in Kuala Lumpur Civil Suit No S5–31–1641–87. Subsequently, the SAR gave consequential orders pursuant to the order for sale and this was also done in the presence of the plaintiff’s counsel. The plaintiff was contented and did not appeal against these orders. It would be interesting to note that the order for sale dated 5 September 1988 that was granted by NH Chan J (as he then was) showed that the plaintiff who was the defendant in Civil Suit No S5–31–1641–87 was represented by a counsel in the person of Mr P Rajasingham. As I see it, the matter would now be governed by the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff could have raised all the issues in the amended statement of claim in encl 31 in the hearing before NH Chan J (as he then was) on 5 September 1988. Even the issue in regard to the illegality of the charges because the borrowing company, namely, Asialand had no development licence could have been raised in the hearing before NH Chan J (as he then was). The issue of illegality was known and could, with due diligence, come to the knowledge of the plaintiff who was the defendant in Civil Suit No S5–31–1641–87. Surprisingly, the plaintiff did

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-310 not deny the arguments of the first defendant in regard to the issue of res judicata. In so far as the third to the fifteen defendants were concerned, the plaintiff too did not allude to the issue of res judicata in his affidavit in reply in encl 98 even though there were averments of the relevant facts in encl 81 indicating the existence of res judicata. ||Page 96>> The sum total of it all would be this: that the plaintiff’s claim should be struck out on the ground of res judicata.

Now, what we are concerned with in the present case is the particular sort of estoppel that arises from previous litigation between the same parties, ‘estoppel by record’, the circumstances in which previous litigation gives rise to admissions evidence to controvert which is inadmissible. Any inquiry into this subject must inevitably commence from the following well-known passage from the judgment of De Grey CJ almost two hundred years ago in the Duchess of Kingston’s case: ‘From the variety of cases relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suits, these two deductions seem to follow as generally true: first, that the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another court; secondly, that the judgment of a court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another court, for a different purpose. But neither the judgment of a concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction, nor of any matter incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from the judgment.’ Much the same thing was said by Henn Collins J in the case of Robinson v Robinson [1943] P 43 at p 44. The phrase ‘res judicata’, he said: ‘... is used to include two separate states of things. One is where a judgment has been pronounced between parties and findings of fact are involved as a basis for that judgment. All the parties affected by the judgment are then precluded from disputing those facts, as facts, in any subsequent litigation between them. The other aspect of the term arises where a party seeks to set up facts which, if they had been set up in the first suit, would or might have affected the decision.’ The same distinction was observed by Lush J in the case of Ord v Ord: ‘The words “res judicata” explain themselves. If the res — the thing actually and directly in dispute — has been already adjudicated upon, of course by a competent court, it cannot be litigated again. There is a wider principle … often treated as covered by the plea of res judicata, that prevents a litigant from relying on a claim or defence which he had an opportunity of putting before the court in the earlier proceedings and which he chose not to put forward.’ The Court of Appeal in OCBC Bank (M) Bhd v Kredin Sdn Bhd, applied vigorously the doctrine of res judicata and held, inter alia, that when an ||Page 97>>issue could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding, one was precluded from raising it in a subsequent action. Likewise in the present case, the plaintiff — Tan Ah Tong, could and should have raised the issue of illegality of the charge at the hearing before NH Chan J (as he then was) in Civil Suit No S5–31–1641–87 and since the plaintiff did not do so he was precluded from raising it in the present suit. It would be pertinent, at this juncture, to refer to some cases. In Air Conditioning Systems Design Sdn Bhd v Chuah Teong Hooi & Anor (as receiver and managers of the property of Atlas Intek (M) Sdn Bhd) [1998] 4 MLJ 633 (CA), the court penalized the plaintiff there for

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-311 being inordinate in prosecuting his action, which action was dismissed, and the court too upheld the plea of res judicata in favour of the defendant in regard to the second suit which the plaintiff instituted against the defendant. Likewise here, the present plaintiff was estopped from taking out the present suit purportedly on a further and different cause of action which was available to him at the outset. For the reasons adumbrated above, the plaintiff’s claim must be struck out on the ground of res judicata. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issue estoppel — Issue arose due to enlargement of fiscal jurisdiction of sessions court — Whether res judicata applied in case On 3 February 1993, the plaintiff filed a claim against the defendant in the High Court at Ipoh for a sum of RM132,363.75 for services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant in a project in Mentakab, Pahang. Subsequent to the filing of the defence, the defendant applied to the judge to transfer the civil suit to the High Court at Kuala Lumpur. The reasons were that the agreement between the parties was made in Kuala Lumpur and the defendant’s registered office was in Kuala Lumpur. The trial judge dismissed the defendant’s application and there was no appeal filed against this decision. On 13 March 1995, the High Court of Ipoh transferred the civil suit to the Sessions Court of Ipoh, due to the enlargement of fiscal jurisdiction of the sessions court. Once the action reached the Ipoh Sessions Court, the defendant filed the application to stay the proceedings, or alternatively, to transfer the matter to the Sessions Court of Kuala Lumpur. Among the grounds were: (a) the defendant’s registered address was in Kuala Lumpur; (b) witnesses of both parties in the action were in Kuala Lumpur; (c) the facts on which the plaintiff’s case was based had no relationship or connection with Ipoh; and (d) even the plaintiff’s place of business was believed to be in Kuala Lumpur. The plaintiff opposed the application on grounds of res judicata to which the defendant argued that res judicata, in the form of issue estoppel did not arise in the present set of circumstances and that by virtue of s 59(2) of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 (‘SCA’) to be read with the High Court of Malaya’s Practice Direction No 4 of 1993, the Sessions Court of Ipoh had no territorial jurisdiction to hear matters arising outside its territorial limits. The issues were: (i) whether the Ipoh Sessions Court had territorial jurisdiction; (ii) whether the application to transfer the action was res judicata; and (iii) whether the sessions court judge had power to transfer the action to the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur. The sessions judge rejected the defendant’s application and the defendant appealed. ||Page 322>> Held, allowing the appeal: (1) ‘Local limits’ was set out in the High Court Practice Direction 4 of 1993. There, the then Chief Justice of Malaya assigned to the Ipoh Sessions Court the territorial jurisdictional areas of Ipoh, Batu Gajah, Parit, Kampar, Sitiawan, Lumut, and Pantai Remis. These areas designated to the Ipoh Sessions Court were certainly not the places where the cause or matter in this action arose. It was in either Mentakab or Kuala Lumpur. Unlike the High Court of Malaya, the sessions courts throughout the country did not enjoy concurrent territorial jurisdiction of each other. Though they were set up by His Majesty, the Yang

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-312 di-Pertuan Agong under s 59(1) of the SCA, territorial jurisdictional boundaries were allocated to them. This was declared in s 59(2) of the SCA (see p 327A–C). (2) The plaintiff had raised issue estoppel, ie where a party was estopped from raising in a subsequent proceeding an issue decided before. However, the territorial jurisdiction limitation of the subordinate court was a new factor that emerged and thus it was a new matter and not one that could have been contemplated previously. Res judicata did not apply in this case (see pp 327H–I, 328C–D). (3) By the reading of O 93 r 3A(3) of the Rules of the High Court 1980, the entire process for consideration of a transfer of a case from one court to another, be that the High Court or subordinate court, was taken over by the Chief Judges of the High Courts. Once consent was obtained from or refused by the respective Chief Judges, the presiding judge or magistrate of the case would only need to complete the mechanical process of either ordering or refusing an application for transfer before him. As consent from the Chief Judge in this action had not been obtained, the sessions court had no authority, presently, to entertain the prayer for transfer of the action to Kuala Lumpur. The application for transfer must be referred to the Chief Judge of Malaya (see p 329A–B, E–F). (4) The situation of this case justified and warranted a stay of proceedings to be granted pending the defendant’s application to the Chief Judge of Malaya to transfer the action from the Sessions Court in Ipoh to the Sessions Court in Kuala Lumpur, or to which ever place the Chief Judge thinks fit and proper. Otherwise, the decision of the Chief Judge, if favorable, may be rendered nugatory and the defendant would be prejudiced (see p 329H–I).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pada 3 Februari 1993, plaintif memfailkan satu tuntutan terhadap defendan di Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh bagi jumlah RM132,363.75 bagi ||Page 323>>perkhidmatan yang diberikan oleh plaintif kepada defendan bagi satu projek di Mentakab, Pahang. Setelah memfailkan pembelaan, defendan memohon kepada hakim untuk memindahkan guaman sivil tersebut ke Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. Sebab yang diberikan ialah bahawa perjanjian di antara dua pihak tersebut berlaku di Kuala Lumpur dan pejabat berdaftar defendan juga berada di Kuala Lumpur. Hakim perbicaraan menolak permohonan defendan dan tiada rayuan difailkan untuk menentang keputusan ini. Pada 13 Mac 1995, Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh memindahkan guaman sivil tersebut ke Mahkamah Sesyen Ipoh, disebabkan peningkatan bidang kuasa fiskal Mahkamah Sesyen. Sebaik sahaja tindakan tersebut tiba di Mahkamah Sesyen Ipoh, defendan memfailkan satu permohonan untuk penggantungan prosiding, atau, sebagai alternatif, memindahkan perkara tersebut ke Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur. Antara sebab-sebabnya ialah: (a) alamat berdaftar defendan adalah di Kuala Lumpur; (b) saksi-saksi bagi kedua-dua pihak bagi tindakan tersebut berada di Kuala Lumpur; (c) fakta-fakta yang menjadi asas kepada kes plaintif tidak mempunyai

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-313 apa-apa hubungan atau kaitan dengan Ipoh; dan (d) perniagaan plaintif juga dipercayai berada di Kuala Lumpur. Plaintif menentang permohonan tersebut atas alasan res judicata dan defendan membalas bahawa res judicata, dalam bentuk isu estoppel tidak bangkit dalam keadaan ini dan menurut s 59(2) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 (‘AMR’) yang dibaca bersama Arahan Amalan Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya No 4 tahun 1993, Mahkamah Sesyen Ipoh tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa wilayah untuk membicarakan hal-hal yang dibangkitkan di luar batasan wilayahnya. Isu-isu dalam kes ini ialah: (i) sama ada Mahkamah Sesyen Ipoh mempunyai bidang kuasa wilayah; (ii) sama ada permohonan untuk memindahkan tindakan tersebut adalah res judicata; dan (iii) sama ada hakim mahkamah sesyen mempunyai kuasa untuk memindah tindakan tersebut ke Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur. Hakim mahkamah sesyen menolak permohonan defendan. Maka defendan merayu. Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) ‘Pembatasan tempatan’ dijelaskan dalam Arahan Amalan Mahkamah Tinggi No 4 tahun 1993. Dalam Arahan tersebut, Ketua Hakim Malaya pada ketika itu memperuntukkan kepada Mahkamah Sesyen Ipoh bidang kuasa wilayah ke atas kawasan-kawasan Ipoh, Batu Gajah, Parit, Kampar, Sitiawan, Lumut dan Pantai Remis. Kawasan-kawasan yang diperuntukkan kepada Mahkamah Sesyen Ipoh sememangnya bukan kawasan-kawasan di mana kausa atau perkara tindakan ini berasal. Ia berasal sama ada dari Mentakab atau Kuala Lumpur. Berbeza daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya, mahkamah-mahkamah sesyen di seluruh negara tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa wilayah bersama. Walaupun ia ditubuhkan oleh Seri Paduka Baginda Yang di-Pertuan Agong di bawah s 59(1) AMR, sempadan bidang kuasa ||Page 324>>wilayah telah diuntukkan kepadanya. Ini diisytiharkan di dalam s 59(2) AMR (lihat ms 327A–C). (2) Plaintif telah membangkitkan isu estoppel, yakni di mana satu pihak diestop daripada membangkitkan dalam prosiding berikutan satu isu yang telah diputuskan sebelumnya. Walau bagaimanapun, batasan bidang kuasa wilayah mahkamah rendah adalah suatu faktor yang baru wujud dan oleh itu, ia merupakan satu perkara baru dan bukannya satu perkara yang pernah difikirkan. Res judicata tidak dipakai dalam kes ini (lihat ms 327H–I, 328C–D). (3) Melalui pembacaaan A 93 k 3A(3) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980, seluruh proses mempertimbangkan pemindahan kes dari satu mahkamah ke satu mahkamah yang lain, baik Mahkamah Tinggi mahupun mahkamah rendah, telah diambil alih oleh Ketua-Ketua Hakim Mahkamah-Mahkamah Tinggi. Sebaik sahaja keizinan dibenarkan atau ditolak oleh Ketua Mahkamah masing-masing, hakim atau majistret yang mempengerusi kes tersebut hanya perlu melengkapkan proses mekanikal sama ada mengarahkan atau menolak permohonan untuk pemindahan di hadapannya. Oleh kerana keizinan daripada Ketua Hakim dalam tindakan ini tidak diperolehi, mahkamah sesyen tidak mempunyai kuasa, pada ketika ini, untuk melayan permohonan untuk pemindahan tindakan ini ke Kuala Lumpur. Permohonan untuk pemindahan tersebut hendaklah dirujuk kepada Ketua Hakim Malaya (lihat ms 329A–B, E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-314 E–F). (4) Situasi dalam kes ini dijustifikasi dan mewajarkan penggantungan prosiding dibenarkan sementara menunggu permohonan defendan kepada Ketua Hakim Malaya untuk memindahkan tindakan tersebut dari Mahkamah Sesyen Ipoh ke Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur, atau ke mana-mana mahkamah yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Ketua Hakim. Jika tidak, keputusan Ketua Hakim akan disebabkan menjadi tidak bermakna dan defendan akan diprejudiskan (lihat ms 329H–I).] The defendant opposed to this application on the ground of res judicata that the matter had been litigated and decided previously in the High Court at Ipoh. Anticipating this objection from the plaintiff, the defendant now argues that res judicata, in the form of issue estoppel does not arise in the present set of circumstances. Here the defendant is claiming that the Ipoh Sessions Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to hear this action. Miss Goh, counsel for the defendant, explained that by virtue of s 59(2) of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 (‘SCA’), to be read with the High Court of Malaya’s Practice Direction number 4 of 1993, the Sessions Court in Ipoh has no territorial jurisdiction to hear matters arising outside its territorial limits. It can only try civil, as well as criminal, matters within the vicinity of Ipoh and certain designated areas. Since the subject matter occurred in either Mentakab or Kuala Lumpur and the defendant’s registered office is in Kuala Lumpur, the action ought to be transferred to Kuala Lumpur. This approach, accordingly to Ms Goh, was not taken up before, nor was this issue considered and determined by Justice Mohtar Abdullah at the High Court at Ipoh. She added that the jurisdictional limits of the subordinate courts could not even have been anticipated during the previous hearing in the High Court. It was only when the case was transferred to the Ipoh Sessions Court that this matter became apparent.

(1) has the Sessions Court in Ipoh territorial jurisdiction to try the action, which subject matter took place in Pahang and the defendant’s registered office is in Kuala Lumpur?; (2) is the application by the defendant to transfer the action res judicata?; (3) even if the Ipoh Sessions Court has no territorial jurisdiction, and the application to transfer is not res judicata, has the sessions court judge power and authority to transfer the action to the Sessions Court in Kuala Lumpur? The law on res judicata is succinctly analyzed and set out by Justice Peh Swee Chin in the Federal Court judgment of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 where two categories of res judicata were classified: issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. Obviously what is raised before me by the plaintiff to ward off this appeal, is issue estoppel. This is where a party is estopped from raising in a subsequent proceeding an issue decided before. The test to be applied for determination of such matter, in my view, is the broader approach accepted by the Federal Court in Asia Commercial Finance where the dictum of ||Page 328>>Sommervell LJ in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 was adopted. It is:

… res judicata for this purpose is not confined to issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but …it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-315 proceeding to be started in respect of them. By these reasons, I am of the view that res judicata does not apply in this case. The Supreme Court in the case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189, speaking through Peh Swee Chin FCJ had this to say on the doctrine of res judicata (see p 200 of the report):

It is important to bear in mind the manner in which the issue estoppel operates in preventing such contradiction of the previous judgment. There is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, while another school of ||Page 374>>thought holds the contrary view that such issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata ie doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid contrary view is to be preferred; it represents for one thing, a correct even though broader approach to the scope of issue estoppel. It is warranted by the weight of authorities to be illustrated later. It is completely in accord or resonant with the rationales behind the doctrine of res judicata, in other words, with the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. It is particularly important to bear in mind the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and with the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation. Using these authorities as leverages, the learned counsel for the defendant strenuously argued that the second plaintiff being a party to Civil Suit No S2–22–263–97 was certainly barred by res judicata. It was also argued that the first plaintiff was privy to that suit but sought not to intervene and the first plaintiff too was said to be barred by res judicata. But by way of a rebuttal, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the issues raised in Civil Suit No S2–22–263–97 were never adjudicated on its merits and, consequently, it was vigorously submitted that the doctrine of res judicata could not apply to the consent judgment that was entered in that action. The case of Wong Sai Tack v Chien Hon Keong [2000] 5 MLJ 74 was cited in support of that proposition. In that case, I had this to say at p 77 of the report:

Tun Salleh Abas, with vigour and vitality, summarized the law on res judicata in this way. It was his submission that there must be three pre-requisites before the doctrine of res judicata can come into play: (1) there must be identity of parties; ||Page 381>> (2) the issue must be the same; and (3) the same issue was already finally determined with precision.

In my judgment, the doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine. It is a simple doctrine which ensures that there must be an end to litigation (Webster v Armstrong (1885) 54 LJ QB 236; MacDougall v Knight (1890) 25 QBD 1, CA; and Green v Weatherill [1929] 2 Ch 213). Here, the defendant raised the doctrine of res judicata by way of an estoppel to the present action. The defendant was in fact saying that the whole legal rights and obligations of the parties have been concluded in the first action by the SAR. I am entitled to look at the decision of the SAR as well as to the notes of evidence (exh ‘CHK 7’ of encl 7) to arrive at a just decision as to whether the doctrine of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-316 res judicata can be invoked in favour of the defendant (Randolph v Tuck [1962] 1 QB 175, [1961] 1 All ER 814; Marginson v Blackburn Borough Council [1939] 2 KB 426 and Sterling Engineering Co Ltd v Patchett [1955] AC 534, [1955] 1 All ER 369). The case of Re Bullen (No 2) (1972) 29 DLR ((3d) 257 (BC)) allows this court to have regard to the reasons for the judgment of the SAR in order to determine the question of law decided in the first action and having done so, it was my judgment that the decision of the SAR in the first action was not conclusive and was not binding in regard to the present action. In short, the cause of action had not been determined on the merits (Badar Bee v Habib Merican Noording [1909] AC 615; Livesey v Harding (1855) 21 Beav 227; AG v Rochester Corpn (1833) 6 Sim 273 and Glasgow and South-Western Railway Co v Boyd and Forrest (1918) SC 14). In the local scene, Chang Min Tat FJ had this to say of the doctrine in the case of Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v Lee Yoke San [1979] 1 MLJ 24: ‘At the hearing of the appeal, it was put to counsel for the appellants that to constitute a res judicata, the earlier judgment must, in terms of the Privy Council decision in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49 ‘necessarily and with precision’ determine the point in issue, and he was asked to indicate to the court how the earlier judgment did necessarily and with precision determine the liability of the appellants to pay the respondent for work done for them at their request. He did not do so. We do not, with respect, see how he could succeed.’ Using these submissions as springboards, it was urged upon me to hold that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata and that this court had no jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ claims and that the writ of summons and the statement of claim were claims that were frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court. It was also urged upon me to hold that the first plaintiff had not come with clean hands and, consequently, was disqualified from claiming equitable relief by way of an injunction. Having come to court with unclean hands, it was submitted that the first plaintiff was not even competent to claim rescission of the statutory declaration that was sworn by her in relation to Civil Suit No S2–22–263–97. For all these reasons, it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiffs’ ex parte injunction must be set aside with costs and an inquiry as to damages must be ordered. Likewise, it was also submitted that the application that was made inter partes for an interim injunction must also be dismissed with costs. It is said that a statutory declaration is a sworn ||Page 384>>statement of facts and it ranks as evidence and it is not an instrument that can be cancelled midway. All these germane submissions were noted by me in adjudicating encl 11.

(i) that the plaintiffs have not shown a serious question to be tried; (ii) that there was no proof that the plaintiffs have any legal right to occupy the house wherein the property stood; (iii) that after the notice to vacate the property had been given, the plaintiffs were considered as trespassers on the property and can be forcibly evicted without seeking the aid of the court if the plaintiffs refused to move out; (iv) that even if the plaintiffs have any claim to the property, damages were said to be an adequate remedy; (v) that the second plaintiff’s claim was barred by res judicata; (vi) that the first plaintiff who did not merely stand by in Civil Suit No S2–22–263–97 but had actually participated was also barred by res judicata; (vii) that the first plaintiff who had executed a deed of renunciation in favour of her late

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-317 mother in the petition for letters of administration proceedings and who had executed a statutory declaration stating that the first plaintiff had no beneficial interest in the property which statutory declaration was meant to be used in Civil Suit No S2–22–263–97, was certainly hard put to prove her claim hinged on a beneficial interest concept; (viii) that the plaintiffs have not shown any evidence to establish their legal right to occupy the said property; (ix) that the defendant’s title to the property is said to be indefeasible on the basis of the Torrens system; (x) that the registration of the defendant as the sole proprietor of the property was said to be conclusive proof of her legal and beneficial ownerships; (xi) that the balance of convenience was against the granting of the injunction; (xii) that the plaintiffs must show their ability to meet their undertaking to pay damages in the event it was later found out that the injunction on an inter partes basis should not have been given; (xiii) that the plaintiffs as mere licensees were not tenants that would be protected by s 7 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 (as amended by Act A811 in 1992); and (xiv) that the plaintiffs have not come to court with clean hands.

(1) that the plaintiffs have, at an ex parte stage, disclosed all the material facts within their knowledge; (2) that the plaintiffs have also anticipated the likely defence at the ex parte stage when it alluded to Civil Suit No S2–22–263–97; ||Page 410>> (3) that the doctrine of res judicata has no application to the factual matrix of the present case because of the very nature of the terms of the consent judgment that was reached in Civil Suit No S2–22–263–97 and this was confounded by the fact that the merits of that civil suit were not explored at all; (4) that even if the plaintiffs failed to make the full disclosure to this court of all the facts at the ex parte stage, yet this court at the inter partes stage has the discretion to either grant the continuation of the ex parte injunction or to grant a fresh injunction, bearing in mind that there is no absolute right to have an ex parte order that was obtained without full disclosure to be set aside automatically (Dormeuil Freres SA and Anor v Nicolian International (Textiles) Ltd); (5) that at an inter partes stage, this court is empowered to either allow the continuation of the ex parte injunction or to grant a fresh injunction notwithstanding the failure to disclose all the relevant facts at the ex parte stage; (6) that the plaintiffs have given an undertaking as to damages in encl 4 and even if the plaintiffs were poor — here there was no evidence of that, the plaintiffs would still get a shot at that injunction; (7) that the reasons to proceed ex parte have been set out in encl 4; (8) that ‘as a matter of convenience’ and after ‘balancing one side against the other’

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-318 (borrowing the words of Lord Denning & Ors in Allen & Ors v Jambo Holdings Ltd & Ors), the injunctions sought in encl 11 should be granted in favour of the plaintiffs; and (9) that there were serious questions to be tried and these were amply set out in this judgment. Reverting to the case at hand, the consent judgment entered into in Civil Suit No S2–22–263–97 was not a consent judgment between the parties on the issue of trust because it was specifically agreed by consent that the parties would revert to the 1992 status in respect of the said property. Incidentally, the defendant must be estopped from alleging that res judicata ‘applied to the present case because she herself had consented that the parties would revert to their original positions in relation to the trust property, wherein each party would preserve its right to the trust property. It was the stand of the plaintiffs that the defendant was now precluded from raising the doctrine of res judicata as an answer to the plaintiffs’ claim. It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that the defendant having consented to the parties reverting to the original status in regard to the said property under the consent judgment, was now making an attempt to ||Page 413>>unlawfully evict the plaintiffs from the said property. It must be borne in mind that the defendant was not asking for vacant possession of the said property in Civil Suit No S2–22–263–97 and it must also be remembered that before, during and after the subsistence of that suit, the parties were all residing in the said property. As far as the doctrine of res judicata was concerned, the first plaintiff was not a party to Civil Suit No S2–22–263–97, and so the first plaintiff cannot be governed by the doctrine. In regard to the second plaintiff, the doctrine also had no application because by consent it was agreed that the parties would revert to their 1992 status in relation to the said property. It must be recalled that after the property was transferred to the defendant’s name, the plaintiffs continued to reside in the said property and all these would strengthen the status of the property as trust property. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Conditions for application of doctrine — Issues, similarity of — Whether issues in fresh action similar to those in earlier action — Whether decision of earlier action a final judgment There were two applications before the court in respect of the same award made by the arbitrator on 20 September 1999, which were being heard together. Transfield Projects (M) Sdn Bhd and Bina Logamaya Sdn Bhd (‘TBL’) and Malaysian Airline System Bhd (‘MAS’) pursuant to a Joint Reference Agreement dated 19 November 1998 between them had appointed an arbitrator to arbitrate overall disputes, questions and differences between them. MAS objected to paras 16, 17 and 19 in TBL’s points of claim contending that the three paragraphs were outside the scope of the reference as: (i) the said paragraphs were the subject matter of actions before the High Court; (ii) the issues raised in the said paragraphs were res judicata; and (iii) the claim made in the reference in relation to the said paragraphs amounted to a multiplicity of proceedings. The arbitrator in an interim award ordered paras 16 and 19 of the points of claim to be struck out and allowed para 17 to remain. In originating motion No R1–25–108–1999 (‘the R1 case’), TBL were the applicants with MAS as respondent wherein TBL applied for the award or those parts relating to paras 16 and 19 of the points of claim to be set aside or to be remitted to the arbitrator for

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-319 reconsideration on the ground that the arbitrator had acted in excess of jurisdiction when he entertained the application by MAS to review paras 16, 17 and 19 of the points of claim and that there was uncertainty in the award and also error of law on the face of the award. In Originating Motion No R2–25–115–1999 (‘the R2 case’) MAS was the applicant and TBL the respondents wherein MAS had applied for that part of the award in respect of para 17 of the points of claim to be set aside or remitted for reconsideration on the ground that there was error on the face of the award and that the arbitrator had erred in law or misconducted himself. Paragraph 16 pleaded that a variation cum compromise was reached between the parties on 27 February 1998 (‘the February 1998 Agreement’). Paragraph 19 raised issues relating ||Page 404>>to the eviction of TBL from a site and the consequences thereof. The learned judge in the Kuala Lumpur High Court originating summons No D1–24–75–1998 made certain observations on the application by MAS for an injunction to evict TBL from the site (‘the eviction proceedings’). MAS contended that in view of those observations of the judge, the issues sought to be raised under paras 16 and 19 of the points of claim were res judicata. However, in the judgment on the eviction proceedings, the judge stated that ‘for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this judgment shall be construed as in any way affecting the rights of the parties in relation to arbitration proceedings under the contract, …’. MAS also contended that by virtue of an appeal against the decision of those proceedings, issues raised under paras 16 and 19 of the points of claim amounted to a multiplicity of proceedings. Paragraph 17 pleaded facts surrounding the call made by MAS on the performance bond wherein TBL sought inter alia, a full refund of the sums called under the performance bond. MAS argued that the issues raised under para 17 of the points of claim were the subject matter of another action in the High Court (‘the performance bond proceedings’) and were equally caught by res judicata. In the performance bond proceedings, the High Court dismissed the application of TBL for an injunction to protect the proceeds of the performance bond called upon by MAS. An appeal was lodged by TBL and MAS contended that reliance on para 17 of the points of claim by TBL amounted to a multiplicity of proceedings. The issues for determination were: (i) whether the arbitrator acted in excess of jurisdiction when he entertained the application by MAS to review paras 16, 17 and 19 of the points of claim; (ii) whether there was uncertainty in the award; and (iii) whether there was error of law on the face of the award. Held, setting aside the award of the arbitrator in respect of paras 16, 17 and 19 with costs to TBL: (1) The arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction having regard to the scope and ambit of the reference in entertaining the plea at the threshold stage as there was nothing in the terms of the reference restricting the arbitrator’s power to entertain issues at the threshold stage (see pp 411H, 412A). (2) An award, in order to be valid must be final, certain, consistent and possible and must decide the matters submitted, and no more than the matters submitted (see p 412B); Re Brown & Croydor Canel Co (1839) 9 A & E 522; 8 LJQB 92 followed. (3) The arbitrator allowed paragraph 17 to remain. By his own findings, the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-320 arbitrator accepted that in order for TBL to prove the performance bond issue as part of the claim in the reference and recover the refund of the proceeds, TBL would have to place reliance on the February 1998 Agreement, and for that matter, any breach of, inter alia, the February 1998 Agreement arising out of the eviction from the site. The net effect on the other hand, of the arbitrator’s exclusion of paragraphs 16 and 19 of the points of ||Page 405>>claim from the scope of the reference, which in effect ruled that the matters relating to the February 1998 Agreement and the eviction from the site and all claims thereunder were not arbitrable, left considerable uncertainty as regards the award and its enforcement. The reasoning adopted by the arbitrator does not allow the parties to proceed with the reference with sufficient certainty as to whether reliance or reference could be made to the February 1998 Agreement. There was indeed uncertainty in the award with consequences which render the said award null and void (see p 413B–D). (4) It could be seen that by reference to the judgment on the eviction proceedings, there was an omission on the part of the arbitrator to make reference to the final paragraph in the judgment. This final paragraph of the learned judge, an important proviso in the eviction proceedings, clearly removed beyond doubt as to any res applying to matters raised therein for the purposes of future arbitration proceedings. The expressed proviso in the judgment completely escaped the consideration of the arbitrator (see p 414B, D–E). (5) A prerequisite of any objection of res judicata or multiplicity of proceedings must be that the same or identical issues raised in paragraphs 16, 17 and 19 of the points of claim have been raised and finally determined by the High Court in the eviction proceedings. The judgment in the eviction proceedings only dealt with the issue of licence to occupy the site and provided for injunctive and other relief relating thereto. As opposed to the issue that arose for consideration by the learned judge in the eviction proceedings, the issues raised in the reference vis a vis paragraphs 16 and 19 were clearly distinct and different. In the reference, TBL sought to rest their rights vis a vis wrongful repudiation and breach of contract of the February 1998 Agreement and consequences flowing therefrom. TBL were not seeking to test the issue as to whether they had a licence to occupy the site which was quite different from seeking to enforce their contractual rights under the original main contract or the February 1998 Agreement as varied (see pp 414F, H, 415B–D). (6) The other crucial distinction that does not make paragraphs 16 and 19 of the points of claim res judicata was that the determination by the High Court in the eviction proceedings vis a vis the February 1998 Agreement was not a necessary step to the decision or a matter which it was necessary to decide; the issue relating to the February 1998 Agreement was not fundamental to what the High Court had decided in the eviction proceedings and if anything, was merely incidental or collateral to it. In fact, the judgment in the eviction proceedings did not determine the issue relating to the February 1998 Agreement. In any event, the judgment in the eviction proceedings was interlocutory and limited in nature and not final vis a vis the main issue

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-321 concerning ||Page 406>>the legality of determination of the main contract or the February 1998 Agreement between the parties, and subsequent events arising therefrom (see p 415F–H).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Dua permohonan dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah mengenai award yang sama yang diberikan oleh penimbangtara pada 20 September 1999, yang dibicarakan bersama-sama. Transfield Projects (M) Sdn Bhd dan Bina Logamaya Sdn Bhd (‘TBL’) dan Malaysian Airline System Bhd (‘MAS’) berekoran satu Perjanjian Rujukan Bersama bertarikh 19 November 1998 di antara mereka telah melantik seorang penimbangtara untuk menimbangtarakan segala pertikaian, soalan dan perbezaan di antara mereka. MAS membantah perenggan-perenggan 16, 17 dan 19 dalam alasan tuntutan TBL dan berhujah bahawa tiga perenggan tersebut berada di luar lingkungan rujukan kerana: (i) perenggan-perenggan tersebut merupakan perkara tindakan-tindakan di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi; (ii) perkara-perkara yang dibangkitkan dalam perenggan-perenggan tersebut adalah res judicata; dan (iii) tuntutan yang dibuat dalam rujukan tersebut berkenaan perenggan-perenggan tersebut merupakan satu kepelbagaian prosiding. Penimbangtara tersebut dalam satu award interim memberi perintah agar perenggan 16 dan 19 alasan tuntutan dibatalkan dan membenarkan perenggan 17 dikekalkan. Dalam usul pemula No R1-25-108-1999 (‘kes R1 tersebut’), TBL merupakan pemohon dengan MAS sebagai responden di mana TBL memohon agar award tersebut ataupun bahagian-bahagian yang berkaitan dengan perenggan 16 dan 19 alasan tuntutan diketepikan atau dikembalikan kepada penimbangtara untuk pertimbangan semula atas alasan bahawa penimbangtara tersebut telah bertindak di luar bidangkuasanya apabila beliau melayan permohonan MAS untuk mengkaji semula perenggan-perenggan 16, 17 dan 19 alasan tuntutan dan bahawa tedapat keraguan dalam award tersebut dan juga kekhilafan undang-undang pada zahir award tersebut. Dalam usul pemula No R2-25-115-1999 (‘kes R2 tersebut’) MAs merupakan pemohon dan TBL merupakan responden di mana MAS telah memohon agar bahagian award berkenaan perenggan 17 alasan tuntutan tersebut diketepikan atau dikembalikan untuk pertimbangan semula atas alasan bahawa terdapat kekhilafan pada zahir award tersebut dan bahawa penimbangtara tersebut telah khilaf atau tersalahlaku. Perenggan 16 merayu agar satu variasi atau kompromi dicapai di antara pihak-pihak pada 27 Februari 1998 (‘Perjanjian Februari 1998 tersebut’). Perenggan 19 membangkitkan perkara-perkara berkenaan pengusiran TBL dari suatu tapak dan akibat tindakan tersebut. Hakim yang alim dalam Usul Pemula No D1–24–75–1998 Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur membuat beberapa pemerhatian terhadap permohonan MAS untuk satu injunksi untuk mengusir TBL dari tapak tersebut (‘prosiding pengusiran tersebut’). MAS berhujah bahawa memandangkan pemerhatian hakim tersebut, perkara-perkara yang ingin dibangkitkan di bawah perenggan 16 dan ||Page 407>>19 alasan tuntutan tersebut adalah res judicata. Walau bagaimanapun, dalam penghakiman prosiding pengusiran tersebut, hakim menyatakan bahawa ‘untuk mengelakkan keraguan, tiada apa-apa dalam penghakiman ini akan ditafsirkan sebagai

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-322 dapat menjejaskan hak pihak-pihak dalam prosiding timbangtara di bawah kontrak, ...’. MAS juga berhujah bahawa disebabkan satu rayuan terhadap keputusan prosiding tersebut, perkara-perkara yang dibangkitkan di bawah perenggan 16 dan 19 alasan tuntutan tersebut dianggap sebagai satu kepelbagaian prosiding. Perenggan 17 mengemukakan fakta-fakta yang mengelilingi permintaan MAS terhadap bon pelaksanaan tersebut. MAS berhujah bahawa perkara-perkara yang dibangkitkan di bawah perenggan 17 alasan tuntutan tersebut merupakan intipati satu tindakan yang lain di Mahkamah Tinggi (‘prosiding bon pelaksanaan tersebut’) dan juga tertakluk kepada res judicata. Dalam prosiding bon pelaksanaan tersebut, Mahkamah Tinggi menolak permohonan TBL untuk satu injunksi untuk melindungi hasil bon pelaksanaan yang dituntut MAS. Satu rayuan dikemukakan oleh TBL dan MAS berhujah bahawa pergantungan TBL kepada perenggan 17 alasan tuntutan tersebut dianggap sebagai satu kepelbagaian prosiding. Perkara-perkara untuk diputuskan adalah: (i) sama ada penimbangtara tersebut telah bertindak di luar bidangkuasanya apabila beliau melayan permohonan MAS untuk mengkaji semula perenggan 16, 17 dan 19 alasan tuntutan tersebut; (ii) sama ada terdapat kekhilafan pada zahir award tersebut. Diputuskan, mengenepikan award penimbangtara tersebut berkenaan perenggan 16, 17 dan 19 dengan kos kepada TBL: (1) Penimbangtara tersebut tidak melampaui bidangkuasanya memandangkan skop dan lingkungan rujukan tersebut dalam melayan rayuan tersebut pada peringkat ambang kerana tidak terdapat apa-apa dalam terma-terma rujukan yang menghadkan kuasa penimbangtara tersebut untuk melayan perkara-perkara pada peringkat ambang (lihat ms 411H, 412A). (2) Suatu award, supaya sah, mestilah muktamad, jelas, konsisten dan tidak mustahil dan mestilah memutuskan perkara-perkara yang dikemukakan, and tidak lebih dari perkara-perkara yang dikemukakan (lihat ms 412B); Re Brown & Croydor Canel Co (1839) 9 A & E 522; 8 LJQB 92 diikut. (3) Penimbangtara tersebut membenarkan perenggan 17 kekal. Melalui keputusannya sendiri, penimbangtara tersebut menerima hakikat bahawa agar TBL dapat membuktikan pengeluaran bon pelaksanaan tersebut sebagai sebahagian daripada tuntutan dalam rujukan tersebut dan mendapatkan balik pemulangan bayaran hasil pemerolehan, TBL mestilah bergantung kepada Perjanjian Februari 1998, dan kerana itu, apa jua pelanggaran, antara lain, Perjanjian Februari 1998 yang berpunca dari pengusiran dari tapak tersebut. Akibat pengecualian perenggan 16 dan 19 alasan tuntutan tersebut oleh penimbangtara, yang sebenarnya mengarahkan agar perkara-perkara yang berkaitan dengan ||Page 408>>Perjanjian Februari 1998 dan pengusiran dari tapak dan semua tuntutan berkenaannya tidak boleh ditimbangtara, meninggalkan keraguan yang ketara mengenai award tersebut dan penguatkuasaannya. Taakulan yang digunakan oleh penimbangtara tidak membenarkan pihak-pihak meneruskan rujukan tersebut dengan kejelasan yang mencukupi mengenai sama ada pergantungan atau rujukan boleh dibuat terhadap Perjanjian Februari 1998. Memang terdapat ketidakjelasan dalam award tersebut dan akibatnya award tersebut boleh menjadi batal dan tidak sah (lihat ms 413B–D). E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-323 (4) Ia dapat dilihat bahawa melalui rujukan terhadap penghakiman ke atas prosiding pengusiran, terdapat satu peninggalan oleh penimbangtara untuk merujuk kepada perenggan terakhir dalam penghakiman tersebut. Perenggan terakhir oleh hakim yang alim ini merupakan satu proviso yang penting dalam prosiding pengusiran tersebut dan dengan jelas menyingkirkan melampaui keraguan apa-apa res yang digunakan dalam perkara-perkara yang dibangkitkan di dalamnya bagi tujuan prosiding timbangtara kelak. Proviso yang dinyatakan dalam penghakiman tersebut tidak dipertimbangkan oleh penimbangtara tersebut langsung (lihat ms 414B, D–E). (5) Satu prasyarat apa-apa bantahan res judicata atau kepelbagaian prosiding adalah bahawa perkara-perkara yang serupa atau sama yang dibangkitkan dalam perenggan 16, 17 dan 19 alasan tuntutan tersebut telah dibangkitkan dan diputuskan secara muktamad oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dalam prosiding pengusiran tersebut. Penghakiman dalam prosiding pengusiran tersebut hanya mengendalikan isu izin untuk menghuni tapak tersebut dan memberikan injunksi dan relif-relif lain yang berkaitan. Berbeza dengan perkara yang dibangkitkan untuk pertimbangan oleh hakim yang alim dalam prosiding pengusiran tersebut, perkara-perkara yang dibangkitkan dalam rujukan melalui perenggan 16 dan 19 jelas berbeza dan berlainan. Dalam rujukan tersebut, TBL ingin menegaskan hak mereka melalui penolakan yang salah dan pelanggaran kontrak Perjanjian Februari 1998 dan akibatnya. TBL bukannya ingin menguji persoalan sama ada mereka mempunyai izin menghuni tapak tersebut yang agak berlainan dari ingin menegaskan hak mereka di bawah kontrak di bawah kontrak asal utama atau Perjanjian Februari 1998 seperti yang dipelbagaikan (lihat ms 414F, H, 415B–D). (6) Satu lagi perbezaan yang penting yang tidak menjadikan perenggan 16 dan 19 alasan tuntutan tersebut res judicata adalah bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam prosiding pengusiran tersebut melalui Perjanjian Februari 1998 bukannya satu langkah yang perlu dalam mencapai keputusan tersebut atau satu perkara yang perlu diputuskan; perkara berkaitan Perjanjian Februari 1998 tersebut tidak asasi kepada apa yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dalam prosiding pengusiran tersebut dan ia hanya satu perkara sampingan. Tambahan pula, ||Page 409>>penghakiman dalam prosiding pengusiran tersebut tidak memutuskan perkara mengenai Perjanjian Februari 1998 tersebut. Dalam apa jua keadaan, penghakiman dalam prosiding pengusiran tersebut bersifat interlokutori dan terhad dan bukan muktamad berkenaan perkara utama yang melibatkan keesahan keputusan kontrak utama atau Perjanjian Februari 1998 di antara pihak-pihak tersebut, dan kejadian lain yang diakibatkannya (lihat ms 415F–H). For cases on setting aside award by an arbitrator, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 957–979. For cases on jurisdiction of arbitrator, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 899–900.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-324 For cases on res judicata generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para 3959–4032.

(1) the said paragraphs were the subject matter of actions before the High Court; (2) the issues raised in the said paragraphs were res judicata: and (3) the claim made in the reference in relation to the said paragraph amounted to a multiplicity of proceedings. The learned judge in the Kuala Lumpur High Court Originating Summons No D1–24–75–1998 made certain observations on the application by MAS for an injunction to evict TBL from the site (‘the eviction proceedings’). MAS contended before the arbitrator that in view of these observations of the judge, the issues sought to be raised under paras 16 and 19 of the points of claim are res judicata. MAS also contended that by virtue of an appeal lodged in the Court of Appeal against the decision in these proceedings, issues raised under paras 16 and 19 of the points of claim amounted to a multiplicity of proceedings. ||Page 411>> TBL had contended, inter alia, that MAS had acted in breach of the main contract and in breach of the February 1998 agreement in making the call. MAS argued that the issues raised under para 17 of the points of claim are the subject matter of another action in the High Court Kuala Lumpur, High Court Originating Summons No–Dl–24–75–1998 (‘the performance bond proceedings’) and are equally caught by res judicata. Having regard to the extrinsic evidence relating to the drafting of the joint reference agreement dated 19 November 1998, which the court is permitted to look into, (see Christopher Brown Ld v Genossenschaft [1954] KGB 10) especially MAS’s letter through the solicitors dated 2 September 1998 that ‘[our] clients are of the view that the arbitrator’s authority to decide should not be restricted and should be left to issues pleaded by either party…’, it seems clear enough that the reference is worded widely. But having said that, it has to be noted that there is, on the other hand, nothing in the terms of the reference restricting the arbitrator’s power to entertain issues at the threshold stage. TBL had raised issues in paras 16, 17 and 19 in their points of claim, and MAS’s defence to that is that the issues are barred by res judicata. The issues can in fact be dealt with at the trial, or an attempt made to have the offending issues struck out (see Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Ed Reissue) Vol 16, p 862, para 977). MAS had decided to bring the issues up at the threshold stage instead of dealing with them later in the proceedings. ||Page 412>> In deciding whether paras 16 and 19 of the points of claim are res judicata, the arbitrator referred to the pleadings in the eviction proceedings and the grounds of judgment therein. The affidavits filed in the eviction proceedings were reviewed and he concluded that the contents were more or less identical to the statements contained in para 16 of the points of claim. The arbitrator also relied on the judgment in the eviction proceedings and concluded that the learned judge in the eviction proceedings did not avoid the issues placed before him in making a finding that the February 1998 agreement was not breached. On this basis, and on the ground that para 19 of the points of claim also made reference to the February 1998 agreement, the arbitrator was satisfied that both paras 16 and 19 are res judicata, that there was a multiplicity of proceedings and that they were liable to be struck out together with

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-325 consequential prayers. A pre-requisite of any objection of res judicata or multiplicity of proceedings must be that the same or identical issues now raised in paras 16, 17 and 19 of the points of claim have been raised and finally determined by the High Court in the eviction proceedings. The next obvious question would be what are the issues that were determined by the High Court in the eviction proceedings and what are the issues that are now being sought to be arbitrated by TBL under the reference? The other crucial distinction that does not make paras 16 and 19 of the points of claim res judicata is that the determination by the High Court in the eviction proceedings, vis a vis the February 1998 agreement, was not a necessary step to the decision or a matter which was necessary to be decided; the issue relating to the February 1998 agreement was not fundamental to what the High Court had decided in the eviction proceedings, and if anything, was merely incidental or collateral to it (see Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler, Ltd & Ors at p 584; Spens v IRC [1970] 3 All ER 295 at p 301). No doubt TBL had filed an appeal against the decision of the learned judge in the eviction proceedings, but this was in order to protect their position arising from the comments made by the judge in the judgment in the eviction proceedings on the basis that the learned judge, in all the circumstances, should not have had made such a finding. There cannot be a multiplicity of proceedings where the same issues are not raised. If the plea of res judicata does not apply, then paras 16, 17 and 19 of the points of claim equally cannot be objected to on the grounds of multiplicity. In all the circumstances of the case, on the face of the said award, the arbitrator had made an error in arriving at the legal conclusion that paras 16 and 19 of the points of claim were res judicata and therefore were liable to be struck out. For the same reason, the arbitrator had misconducted himself and the proceedings in the sense were used technically under s 24(2) of the Arbitration Act 1952 (Act 93). The defendant was the registered proprietor of a piece of land (‘the land’). By a deed of compromise, the defendant agreed to pay Safuan Daito (JV) Sdn Bhd (‘SDJV’) a sum of RM7,224,300. In order to secure the repayment of the sum of RM7,224,300, the defendant charged the land in favour of SDJV. By way of a deed of assignment, SDJV assigned absolutely all its rights, title and interests under the deed of compromise to the plaintiff. Pursuant to cl 3(1) of the deed of compromise the defendant consented to a transfer of the said charge over the land to the plaintiff as evidenced by the defendant’s director’s circular resolution. The defendant failed to repay the debt and ignored the plaintiff’s letter of demand. The plaintiff applied for an order for sale of the said land vide Originating Summons No 24-459-90 (‘the foreclosure proceedings’). The High Court granted the order for sale of the land. The nett proceeds of the sale of the land came up to RM11,114,975. The plaintiff claimed against the defendant the balance sum of RM5,585,086.12. The plaintiff’s application for a summary judgment was allowed by the senior assistant registrar. The defendant appealed. The defendant resisted the summary judgment, on the grounds, inter alia: (i) the defendant had not at any time received a written request from SDJV for the defendant’s consent to assign the principal sum of RM7,224,300 or the transfer of the said charge to the plaintiff; and (ii) the defendant agreed to execute the deed of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-326 compromise on condition that SDJV gave its assurance that its parent company namely Daito Kogyo Co Ltd will finance the reclamation project until its completion. The plaintiff submitted that both issues (i) and (ii) were similar to the ones raised by the defendant in the foreclosure proceedings and thus the doctrine of res judicata was applicable. Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) A perusal of the defendant’s directors’ resolution would clearly show that the transfer of the said charge from SDJV to the plaintiff was with the full knowledge and consent of the defendant. Further, the signatures of the signatories that appeared in the deed of assignment were the same ones as those appeared in the relevant form for the charge (Borang 16A). The signatures of these signatories conclusively showed that the defendant knew of the existence of the deed of assignment and its effect (see pp 548H, 550H, 551A). ||Page 532>> (2) The validity of the deed of compromise was beyond question. In the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, the defendant’s signatures appearing on the deed of compromise sealed the fate of the defendant once and for all. Those signatures were sufficient to bind the defendant to the deed of compromise (see p 554C–D). (3) The affidavits filed the respective parties in the foreclosure proceedings together with the grounds of judgment conclusively showed that the rule of res judicata should be applied to the factual matrix of the present case (see p 552A–B). (4) This was a perfect case for summary judgment. All the documents were in favour of the plaintiff. There was no triable issue shown by the defendant to warrant a trial. The entire appeal revolved on the facts rather than the law and the defendant had failed to show a bona fide defence to the plaintiff’s claim (see pp 552D, 559I).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Defendan adalah tuan punya sekeping tanah yang berdaftar (‘tanah tersebut’). Melalui satu suratikatan kompromi, defendan telah bersetuju untuk membayar kepada Safuan Daito (JV Sdn Bhd (‘SDJV’) wang sejumlah RM7,224,300. Bagi menjamin pembayaran balik jumlah RM7,224,300 tersebut, defendan telah mencagarkan tanah tersebut atas nama SDJV. Melalui satu suratikatan penyerahhakkan, SDJV telah menyerahhakkan secara mutlak semua hak-hak, hakmilik-hakmilik dan kepentingan-kepentingan di bawah suratikatan kompromi tersebut kepada plaintif. Menurut kl 3(1) suratikatan kompromi tersebut, defendan telah membenarkan satu pemindahmilikan terhadap cagaran ke atas tanah tersebut kepada plaintif sebagaimana yang diterangkan oleh pekeliling resolusi pengarah defendan. Defendan telah gagal untuk membayar balik hutang tersebut dan tidak menghiraukan surat tuntutan plaintif. Plaintif telah memohon satu perintah jualan ke atas tanah tersebut melalui Saman

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-327 Pemula No 24–459–90 (prosiding perampasan harta tersebut’). Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan perintah jualan tanah tersebut. Hasil kutipan bersih jualan tanah tersebut adalah sebanyak RM1,114,975. Plaintif telah menuntut daripada defendan baki jumlah RM5,585,086.12. Permohonan plaintif untuk satu penghakiman terus telah dibenarkan oleh penolong kanan pendaftar. Defendan telah membuat rayuan. Defendan telah menentang penghakiman terus tersebut, atas alasan-alasan, antara lain: (i) defendan tidak pada bila-bila masa menerima permintaan bertulis daripada SDJV untuk kebenaran defendan untuk menyerahhak wang pokok berjumlah RM7,224,300 atau pemindahanmilik cagaran tersebut kepada plaintif; dan (ii) defendan telah bersetuju untuk menyempurnakan suratikatan kompromi tersebut dengn syarat bahawa SDJV telah memberikan jaminannya bahawa syarikat ||Page 533>>induknya terutamanya Daito Kogyo Co Ltd akan membiayai projek penebusgunaan sehingga ianya selesai. Plaintif telah menghujahkan bahawa kedua-dua persoalan (i) dan (ii) adalah sama seperti yang telah ditimbulkan oleh defendan di dalam prosiding perampasan harta tersebut dan oleh itu doktrin res judicata adalah terpakai. Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Penelitian resolusi pengarah defendan akan dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa pemindahmilikan cagaran tersebut daripada SDJV kepada plaintif adalah dengan pengetahuan penuh dan kebenaran defendan. Tambahan pula, tandatangan-tandatangan penandatangan-penandatangan yang terdapat pada suratikatan penyerahhakkan adalah sama seperti yang terdapat pada borang berkatan tentang cagaran tersebut (Borang 16A). Tandatangan-tandatangan penandatangan-penandatangan tersebut dengan kukuh menunjukkan bahawa defendan mengetahui tentang kewujudan suratikatan penyerahakkan tersebut dan kesannya (lihat ms 548H, 550H, 551A). (2) Kesahihan suratikatan kompromi tersebut tidak boleh dipersoalkan. Dengan ketiadaan fraud atau salah nyata, tandatangan-tandatangan defendan yang timbul atas suratikatan kompromi tersebut telah sekaligus memeteraikan takdir defendan. Tandatangan-tandatangan tersebut telah mencukupi untuk mengikat defendan kepada suratikatan kompromi tersebut (lihat ms 554C–D). (3) Afidavit-afidavit yang telah memfailkan pihak-pihak yang berkaitan di dalam prosiding perampasan harta tersebut bersama dengan alasan-alasan penghakiman yang kukuh menunjukkan bahawa ujian res judicata hendaklah terpakai kepada faktual matrix kes sekarang ini (lihat ms 552A–B). (4) Ini adalah kes yang bagus untuk penghakiman terus. Kesemua dokumen-dokumen menyebelahi plaintif. Tiada persoalan yang boleh dibicarakan yang ditunjukkan oleh defendan untuk mewarankan satu perbicaraan. Keseluruhan rayuan tersebut berkisar atas fakta-fakta yang lebih daripada undang-undang dan defendan telah gagal untuk menunjukkan satu pembelaan bona fide kepada tuntutan plaintif (lihat ms 552D, 559I).] Teh deposed in encl 11 at para (iii) thereof to the effect that the defendant’s allegation that it had executed the deed of compromise on condition that it was wholly untrue was inconsistent and against the express terms of the deed of compromise and the said charge. In fact, Teh

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-328 deposed at para 7 of encl 11 that both issues (1) and (2) were similar to the ones raised by the defendant in the foreclosure proceedings that was filed by the plaintiff against the defendant vide Originating Summons No 24–459–90 in the High Court at Seremban. Since the issues have been finally adjudicated upon, the doctrine of res judicata was said to be applicable. Now, res judicata or a plea of former judgment is a growing doctrine that sees its development moulded through the years by judges from all over the world. In England as well as in America, the plea of res judicata is usually dealt with under the category of the law of evidence. In India, res judicata is considered to be procedural in nature. Once the court is satisfied that the ground of legal right on which the plaintiff sues was finally dealt with by the judgment of the court, then the plea of res judicata would come into play (Udaiya v Katama 2 Mad HC 131 which was affirmed on appeal vide 10 WR1 PC; Parsotam v Narbada 26 IA 175, 21 A 505; Dhani Ram v Bhagirashi 22 C 692; and Sheosagar v Sitaram 24 IA50). Bowen LJ in Brunsden v Humphrey (1884) 14 QBD 146 aptly said that: The rule of res judicata is founded upon the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (no person should be twice vexed for the same course) — a maxim which is itself an outcome of the wider maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. Bluntly put, a matter which has been put in issue, tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be re-opened between those who were parties to such adjudication. It is essential that the court must be competent (Abdul v Doolanbibi (1913) 37 B 563). The crucial test would be not whether the decision was explicit but rather whether the issue was an issue upon which the judgment of the former suit was based (Sri Gopal v Pirthi 24 A 429 PC, Kali v Bidhu (1912) 16 CLJ 89; Beni Pershad v Raj Kumar (1912) 16 CLJ 124). Res judicata would also be ||Page 552>>applied to the grounds of decision as well as to the decision itself (Krishna v Bunwari (1875) 2 IA 283). Indeed the affidavits filed by the respective parties in the foreclosure proceedings as seen in exhs ‘BH-E’ to ‘BH-K’ at pp 21–98 of Teh’s affidavit in encl 11 together with the certified true copy of the grounds of judgment of Mohd Noor bin Haji Abdullah J dated 9 October 1995 as seen in exh ‘BH-L’ at p 100 of Teh’s affidavit in encl 11 conclusively showed that the rule of res judicata should be applied to the factual matrix of the present case. This was my judgment and I so hold accordingly. Reverting back to the doctrine of res judicata, it was part and parcel of my judgment that the defendant ought not be permitted to re-litigate the same issues that have been litigated in the foreclosure proceedings before ||Page 555>>the Seremban High Court. The foreclosure proceedings was distinctly determined and finally adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction presided over by my brother judge Mohd Noor Abdullah J sitting in the Seremban High Court and his Lordship had on 9 October 1995 granted an order for sale of the land on the application of the plaintiff and the defendant withdrew its appeal against the order for sale on 14 June 1999. The affidavits filed by the defendant in regard to the foreclosure proceedings revealed, as a fact, that there were identical issues raised by the defendant in the foreclosure proceedings as well as in the present proceedings. I need only refer to two affidavits affirmed by Mohd Shamlan bin Ahmad to buttress my points. The first affidavit of Mohd Shamlan bin Ahmad was affirmed on 7 February 1991 in relation to the foreclosure proceedings as seen at p 21 of encl 11 at paras 7–22 thereof, while the second affidavit of the same individual was affirmed on 21 May

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-329 1991 in relation to the foreclosure proceedings as seen at p 41 of encl 11 at paras 3–6 and 10 thereof. These two affidavits affirmed in relation to the foreclosure proceedings showed that the doctrine of res judicata must be vigorously applied to the factual matrix of the present appeal. The law journals are replete with authorities on the doctrine of res judicata. These authorities serve as excellent guidelines in understanding the said doctrine. I must now refer to these authorities in succession. For starters, it would be the case of Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494, where that brilliant judge in the person of Abdoolcader SCJ had this to say at pp 498–499 of the report:

The earlier action instituted by the respondent on 2 July 1985 and which was struck out sought relief on the ground of discrimination in breach of article 8 of the Constitution but in the present proceedings the grounds for relief have been augmented and declarations sought to the effect we have indicated earlier. The appellants plead res judicata in this regard and we think the point is well taken and is supported by authority, and we would refer to the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Hoystead & Ors v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155 and a catenation of cases to the like effect, namely, that the plea of res judicata applies, except perhaps where special circumstances may conceivably arise of sufficient merit of exclude its operation, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. There is moreover the inherent jurisdiction of the court in cases where res judicata is not strictly established, and where estoppel per rem judicatum has not been sufficiently pleaded, or made out, but nevertheless the circumstances are such as to render any reagitation of the questions formally adjudicated upon a scandal and an abuse, the court will not hesitate to dismiss the action, or stay proceedings therein, or strike out the defence thereto, as the case may require. It would suffice in this regard to refer to the judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Wilberforce in Brisbane City Council and Myer Shopping Centres Pty Ltd v Attorney-General for Queensland (1979) AC 411, at p 425. ||Page 556>> The second defence is one of ‘res judicata’. There has, of course, been no actual decision in litigation between these parties as to the issue involved in the present case, but the appellants invoke this defence in its wider sense, according to which a party may be shut out from raising in a subsequent action an issue which he could, and should, have raised in earlier proceedings. The classic statement of this doctrine is contained in the judgment of Wilgram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 and its existence has been reaffirmed by this Board in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155. A recent application of it is to be found in the decision of the Board in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581. It was, in the judgment of the Board, there described in these words: ‘…there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings’. (p 590)

But is that issue to be treated as having been decided by virtue of the order dismissing Mrs Masri’s application to discharge the Mareva injunction? Before Leggatt J and on this appeal counsel for SCF relied on the principles restated in this court in Khan v Goleccha International Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 259, [1980] 1 WLR 1482. In that case an order by consent had been made by the Court of Appeal on the basis of an express acceptance by counsel for the plaintiff borrower that a transaction was not one of moneylending and was outside the scope of the Moneylenders Act 1929. Later the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant company claiming that the debt was statute barred by s 13(1) of that Act. In his judgment, with which Cumming-Bruce and Bridge LJJ agreed, Brightman LJ referred to the express acceptance by counsel before the Court of Appeal that the transaction was not a lending of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-330 money, and to the dismissal of the appeal on that basis, and asked ‘Does that admission and the consent order so made give rise to estoppel, more particularly to the brand of estoppel sometimes called issue estoppel?’ He then continued ([1980] 2 All ER 259 at pp 264–265, [1980] 1 WLR 1482 at pp 1488–1489): ‘First, for the general principle (Ord v Ord [1923] 2 KB 432 at p 439, [1923] All ER Rep 206 at p 210 per Lush J; (I need not narrate the facts): ‘The words ‘res judicata’ explain themselves. If the res — the thing actually or directly in dispute — has been already adjudicated upon, of course by a competent Court, it cannot be litigated again. There is a wider principle, to which I will refer in a moment, often as covered by the plea of res judicata, that prevents a litigant from relying on a claim or defence which he had an opportunity of putting before the court in the earlier proceedings and which he chose not to put forward …’ I turn straight to the wider principle ([1923] 2 KB 432 at p 443, [1923] All ER Rep 206 at 212): ‘The maxim ‘Nemo debet bis vexari’ prevents a litigant who has had an opportunity of proving a fact in support of his claim or defence and chosen not to rely on it from afterwards putting it before another tribunal. To do that would be unduly to harass his opponent, and if he endeavoured to do so he would be met by the objection that the judgment in the former action precluded him from raising that ||Page 557>>contention. It is not that it has been already decided, or that the record deals with it. The new fact has not been decided; it has never been in fact submitted to the tribunal and it is not really dealt with by the record. But it is, by reason of the principle I have stated, treated as if it had been’. After a reference to the opinion of Lord Wilberforce in Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1966] 2 All ER 536 at p 584, [1967] 1 AC 853 at pp 964–965 as to the material at which the court may look in order to identify the issue — ‘not merely at the record of the judgment relied on, but at the reasons for it, the pleadings, the evidence … and if necessary other material to show what was the issue decided …’

The principle of the decision of this court in Khan’s case is, in our judgment, applicable to this case: a litigant who has had an opportunity of proving a fact in support of his claim or defence and has chosen not to rely on it is not permitted afterwards to put it before another tribunal. In this case, Mrs Masri had her opportunity to establish the case on which her application was based; and she chose not to establish her alleged ownership of the dollar account. Her counsel on her instructions acknowledged that her application must be dismissed. His attempt to reserve the issue was, in our judgment, ineffective. In Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581 the Privy Council upheld the application by the Supreme Court of Hong Kong of the doctrine of res judicata in the wider sense, namely that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and should have been litigated in earlier proceedings. Lord Kilbrandon, giving the judgment of their Lordships, gave warning (at 590): ‘The shutting out of a ‘subject of litigation’ [was] a power which no court should exercise but after scrupulous examination of all the circumstances [the exercise of such a power] is limited to cases where reasonable diligence would have caused a matter to be earlier raised; moreover, ||Page 558>>although negligence, inadvertence or even accident will not suffice to excuse, nevertheless ‘special circumstances’ are reserved in case justice should be found to require the non-application of the rule.’ Peh Swee Chin FCJ in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189, explained the meaning and purport of res judicata in some detail. At pp 197–198 of the report, his Lordship had this to say:

What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-331 creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy. Since a res judicata creates an estoppel per rem judicatum, the doctrine of res judicata is really the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum, the latter being described sometimes in a rather archaic way as estoppel by record. Since the two doctrines are the same, it is no longer of any practical importance to say the res judicata is a rule of procedure and that an estoppel per rem judicatum is that of evidence. Such dichotomy is apt to give rise to confusion. The starting point ought to be the celebrated passage by Wigram VC in the case of Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at p 115 which is: ‘The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time.’ It is correct to say and I so say that all the courts in the world adhere to the principle that there must be an end to litigation: interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. Cases like Re May (1885) 28 Ch D 516 at p 518 (CA); Re Graydon; Ex parte Official Receiver (1896) 1 QB 417; Philips v Bury (1696) Holt KB 715; Badar Bee v Habib Merican Noordin & Ors (1909) AC 615 (PC); Hoystead & Ors v Commissioner of Taxation(1926) AC 155 at p 165 (PC); R v Middlesex JJ, ex parte Bond (1933) 2 KB 1 (CA); and Danks v Farley (1853) 1 WR 291 subscribed to the time honoured principle of putting an end to litigation. The plea of res judicata should succeed where the cause of action is the same (Hills v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd [1940] 2 KB 435, [1940] 3 All ER 233 (CA)) and that cause of action has been determined on its merits (Glasgow and South-Western Rly Co v Boyd and Forrest (1918) SC 14; Long v Gowlett (1923) 2 Ch 177 and Alfred Rowntree & Sons Ltd v Frederick Allen & Sons (Poplar) Ltd (1935) 41 Com Cas 90). ||Page 559>> Broadly stated, the doctrine of res judicata can easily be stated and it too can readily be applied to a given situation. For instance, if evidence is led in the second application which is exactly the same as that led in the previous application then the doctrine of res judicata would be vigorously invoked (Re F(W) (An Infant) [1969] 2 Ch 269, [1969] 3 All ER 595). Again, if the defendant obtains judgment in a libel action in respect of certain parts of a publication that constitutes a defence of res judicata in respect to a second action especially when the subject matter of both actions were the same (Macdougall v Knight (1890) 25 QBD 1 (CA)), then the defence of res judicata would apply. Having said all these, the present appeal in encl 13 must be governed by the principle of res judicata and that can never be doubted. Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Defect in jurisdiction — Supreme Court allowed foreclosure order despite lack of jurisdiction — Whether jurisdictional issue could be raised in subsequent suit — Whether res judicata applied Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issue estoppel — Issue litigated at Supreme Court —

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-332 Supreme Court decision found to be contrary to established authority — Whether respondent should be allowed to plead res judicata to preclude appellant from re-agitating issue in later suit The respondent was a licensed moneylender. The appellants took a loan from the respondent whereby the respondent took a charge over a piece of land belonging to the appellants, held under a land office title. The appellants fell into arrears and the respondent proceeded to enforce the charge. An originating summons for foreclosure was taken out whereby the High Court made an order of foreclosure under which the land was to be sold by public auction. The appellants appealed to set aside the order for foreclosure on the ground that the High Court had no jurisdiction over the matter. The High Court set aside the order. The respondent then appealed to the Supreme Court. The court allowed the appeal. It was held that the judge was functus officio as the summons for foreclosure had been determined inter partes after a contest. The court found merit in the appellants argument that the High Court had no jurisdiction to make the order for foreclosure. But the court held the point to be no longer open to the appellants because of res judicata (see Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd (In receivership) v Chee Pok Choy & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 105 (‘Scotch Leasing (No 1)’)). While the respondent’s appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, the appellants filed an action. The statement of claim was later amended as a result of decision of the Supreme Court. A plea of fraud was added. At the trial of the action, the appellants led evidence in support of their claim. The respondent did not call any evidence and was content to rest on a submission of no case to answer. The evidence of the appellants on the critical issues of fact in particular the obtaining of the order of foreclosure by fraudulent means remained unrebutted. The High Court dismissed the appellants’ claim. The appellants appealed. It was submitted that the judge failed to undertake a judicial appreciation of the evidence and ||Page 347>>was wrong in law to treat himself as bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Scotch Leasing (No 1). The appellants’ argument raised two principal issues in this appeal: (i) whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Scotch Leasing (No 1) as a matter of law precludes the appellants from seeking to set aside the order of foreclosure; and (ii) irrespective of the answer upon the first issue, whether the appellants had made out grounds upon which the order for foreclosure may be set aside. Held, allowing the appeal: (1) Whether res judicata in the wider sense should be permitted to bar a claim is a matter that is to be determined on the facts of each case, always having regard to where the justice of the individual and particular case lies. The court found that the justice of the present case demands that the decision in Scotch Leasing (No 1) ought not, in the interests of justice, to bar the appellants from re-agitating the issue of the jurisdiction of the High Court to make the order for sale in the initial foreclosure proceedings (see p 358E–F). (2) It is obvious that the two propositions established by Scotch Leasing (No 1) are contrary to established authority. It would be most unjust to preclude the appellants to re-agitate the jurisdictional point purely on the strength of that case. The decision in Scotch Leasing (No 1) has for all practical purposes been E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-333 overruled by the majority judgment in Badiaddin v Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393. It was therefore unjust that the malignant effects of that decision should be visited upon the heads of the appellants (see pp 358G, 359A–B). (3) The effect of the order of the Supreme Court in Scotch Leasing (No 1) was to reinstate an order of the High Court that had earlier been set aside. This was because the respondents’ appeal to the Supreme Court was merely a continuation of the proceedings before the High Court. Hence it was the jurisdictional competence of the High Court as the court of the first instance and not that of the Supreme Court with which the court was concerned in relation to the doctrine of res judicata. If the High Court lacked jurisdiction at the time it made the order for sale, it continued to lack that jurisdiction despite the views expressed by the Supreme Court. As such, it would be an affront to justice to permit the respondent to successfully plead res judicata in the second suit as that would tantamount to applying the editorial blue pencil across the mandatory provisions of s 260(2) of the National Land Code 1965 (see p 359B–C, F). (4) A judgment may be impeached for deliberate fraud practised upon the court. The present instance was not a case where the trial judge negatived fraud after a thorough investigation of the allegation. The appellants’ complaints were never looked into at ||Page 348>>al1. The appellants’ evidence was not challenged by the respondent. This was therefore a kind of case very exceptionally seen at the appellate level. It was therefore incumbent upon the court to draw such inferences as the undisputed facts admit (see pp 361B, 362F). (5) The documentary evidence produced by the appellants revealed flagrant breaches of the Moneylenders Act 1957. There were also non-compliance with O 79 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. Since the respondent did not comply with O 79, it followed that its originating summons was fatally flawed. These matters, in particular the breach of the statute had the effect of rendering the respondent’s originating summons a nullity (see pp 354I, 363B–C). (6) The vital point in the whole case was that the respondent actively concealed all the relevant matters from the High Court when it applied for the order of sale. As a litigant moving the court, it was incumbent for the respondent to display uberrimae fides. The respondent having actively practised a serious deception upon the court ought not to have benefit of the judgment it had obtained. The respondent should not be permitted to profit from the fraud it perpetrated on the court (see p 366D–F). (7) The judge had ample jurisdiction to act upon the evidence and to set aside the order for sale on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. It was plain upon the undisputed documents in this case that the respondent deliberately misled the court into making the order for sale. Of equal clarity was the fact that the court would have declined the order for sale if it had been appraised of the true state of affairs. The appellants had succeeded in proving their case

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-334 beyond a reasonable doubt (see pp 366H, 367F–G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Responden adalah pemberi pinjaman wang berlesen. Perayu-perayu mengambil pinjaman daripada responden di mana responden telah mengambil satu gadaian ke atas sebidang tanah kepunyaan perayu-perayu di bawah pegangan hakmilik pejabat tanah. Perayu-perayu telah berada dalam keadaan tertunggak dan responden mula meneruskan untuk menguatkuasakan gadaian tersebut. Satu saman pemula untuk halangtebus telah dikeluarkan di mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat satu perintah halangtebus di mana tanah tersebut haruslah dijual melalui perlelongan awam. Perayu-perayu telah membuat rayuan untuk mengetepikan perintah untuk halangtebus tersebut atas alasan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi tiada bidang kuasa ke atas perkara tersebut. Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengetepikan perintah tersebut. Responden kemudian merayu kepada Mahkamah Agong. Mahkamah tersebut telah membenarkan rayuan itu. Telah diputuskan bahawa hakim adalah functus officio kerana saman untuk halangtebus telah diputuskan secara inter partes ||Page 349>>selepas satu perbicaraan. Mahkamah mendapati adanya merit di dalam hujahan-hujahan perayu-perayu tersebut bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membuat perintah untuk halangtebus. Tetapi mahkamah telah memutuskan perkara tersebut tidak lagi terbuka kepada perayu-perayu kerana res judicata (lihat Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd (In receivership) v Chee Pok Choy & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 105 (‘Scotch Leasing (No 1)’)). Sementara rayuan responden masih menunggu penyelesaian di hadapan Mahkamah Agong, perayu-perayu telah memfailkan satu tindakan. Pernyataan tuntutan tersebut telah kemudiannya dipinda akibat dari keputusan Mahkamah Agong. Satu rayuan fraud telah ditambah. Di perbicaraan tindakan tersebut, perayu telah mengemukakan keterangan bagi menyokong tuntutan mereka. Responden tidak memberi sebarang keterangan dan berpuashati dengan penghujahan tiada kes untuk dijawab. Keterangan perayu-perayu mengenai isu-isu fakta yang kritikal khususnya perolehan perintah halangtebus melalui cara-cara fraud kekal tidak disangkal. Mahkamah Tinggi menolak tuntutan perayu-perayu. Perayu telah merayu. Telah dihujahkan bahawa hakim tersebut telah gagal memberi pertimbangan kehakiman akan keterangan tersebut dan adalah salah di sisi undang-undang untuk menganggap diri beliau sebagai terikat oleh penghakiman Mahkamah Agong dalam Scotch Leasing (No 1). Hujahan perayu-perayu telah membangkitkan dua isu utama dalam rayuan ini: (i) sama ada keputusan Mahkamah Agong dalam Scotch Leasing (No 1) sebagai satu perkara undang-undang menghalang perayu-perayu daripada cuba untuk mengetepikan perintah halangtebus tersebut; dan (ii) tidak menghiraukan jawapan bagi isu pertama tersebut, sama ada perayu-perayu telah membuat alasan-alasan di atas yang mana perintah untuk halangtebus boleh diketepikan. Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Sama ada res judicata mengikut maksud yang lebih luas haruslah dibenarkan untuk menghalang sesuatu tuntutan merupakan perkara yang mesti ditentukan mengikut fakta-fakta setiap satu kes, selepas menimbangkan di mana letaknya

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-335 keadilan kepada individu dan kes tertentu tersebut. Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa keadilan kes semasa ini menuntut supaya keputusan dalam Scotch Leasing (No 1) tidak seharusnya, demi kepentingan keadilan, menghalang perayu-perayu daripada menghujahkan semula isu bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi untuk membuat perintah untuk jualan dalam prosiding permulaan halangtebus tersebut (lihat ms 358E–F). (2) Ianya jelas bahawa kedua-dua proposisi yang ditetapkan oleh Scotch Leasing (No 1) adalah bertentangan dengan autoriti yang mantap. Adalah amat tidak adil bagi menghalang perayu-perayu untuk menghujahkan semula perkara bidang kuasa semata-mata atas sifat kukuh kes tersebut. Keputusan dalam Scotch Leasing ||Page 350>>(No 1) telah bagi semua tujuan praktikal telah ditolak oleh penghakiman majoriti dalam Badiaddin v Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393. Adalah dengan itu tidak adil bahawa kesan tidak baik keputusan itu diletakkan pada perayu-perayu (lihat ms 358G, 359A–B). (3) Kesan perintah Mahkamah Agong dalam Scotch Leasing (No 1) adalah untuk menghidupkan semula satu perintah Mahkamah Tinggi yang telah diketepikan pada awalnya. Ini adalah kerana rayuan responden-responden kepada Mahkamah Agong adalah hanya suatu penyambungan prosiding di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi. Oleh itu mahkamah tersebut berhadapan dengan doktrin res judicata berhubung dengan keupayaan bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi sebagai mahkamah pertama dan bukan Mahkamah Agong. Jika Mahkamah Tinggi ketiadaan bidang kuasa pada waktu ia membuat perintah untuk jualan, ia terus ketiadaan bidang kuasa meskipun pendapat yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Agong tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, ia akan merupakan suatu penghinaan kepada keadilan untuk membenarkan responden merayu res judicata dengan jayanya dalam guaman kedua kerana ini adalah sama dengan mengenakan ‘editorial blue pencil’ terhadap peruntukan-peruntukan mandatori s 260(2) Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 (lihat ms 359B–C, F). (4) Sesuatu penghakiman boleh dicabar kerana amalan fraud yang sengaja ke atas mahkamah. Keadaan semasa bukannya satu kes di mana hakim perbicaraan menidakkan fraud selepas penyiasatan teliti akan pendakwaan tersebut. Aduan perayu-perayu tidak pernah diberikan perhatian sama sekali. Keterangan perayu-perayu telah tidak dicabar oleh responden. Ini adalah dengan itu satu jenis kes yang jarang sekali dilihat di peringkat rayuan. Ianya adalah dengan itu terserah kepada mahkamah untuk membuat inferens yang sedemikian seperti mana yang diakui oleh fakta-fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan (lihat ms 361B, 362F). (5) Keterangan dokumentari yang dikemukakan oleh perayu-perayu mendedahkan kemungkiran nyata akan Akta Pemberi Pinjaman Wang 1957. Terdapat juga ketidak-patuhan A 79 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980. Oleh kerana responden tidak mematuhi A 79, didapati bahawa saman pemulanya adalah tidak sempurna dengan cara yang memudaratkan. Perkara-perkara ini, khususnya kemungkiran statut tersebut mempunyai kesan menjadikan saman pemula responden suatu pembatalan (lihat ms 354I, 363B–C). E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-336 (6) Perkara penting di dalam keseluruhan kes tersebut adalah bahawa responden telah secara aktif menyembunyikan semua perkara yang relevan daripada Mahkamah Tinggi ketika ia memohon untuk mendapatkan perintah jualan. Sebagai litigan yang mengusul mahkamah, adalah tanggungjawab responden untuk menunjukkan uberrimae fides. Responden tersebut setelah ||Page 351>>mengamalkan dengan aktifnya suatu perdayaan yang serius ke atas mahkamah tidak seharusnya mendapat manfaat dari penghakiman yang telah pun diperolehi. Responden tidak seharusnya dibenarkan untuk mendapat keuntungan daripada fraud yang dilaksanakan olehnya ke atas mahkamah (lihat ms 366D–F). (7) Hakim mempunyai bidang kuasa yang secukupnya untuk bertindak atas keterangan tersebut dan mengetepikan perintah untuk jualan atas alasan bahawa ia telah diperolehi secara fraud. Adalah jelas pada dokumen-dokumen yang tidak dipertikaikan dalam kes ini bahawa responden telah dengan sengaja memperdayakan mahkamah bagi membuat perintah untuk jualan. Hakikat yang sama jelas juga adalah bahawa mahkamah mungkin akan menolak perintah untuk jualan itu jika ia telah dinilaikan dari keadaan hal-perkara yang sebenarnya. Perayu-perayu telah berjaya dalam membuktikan kes mereka di luar keraguan yang wajar (lihat ms 366H, 367F–G).] For cases on judgments and orders generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 3438–3593.For cases on defect of jurisdiction, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 3684–3685 and 3814.For cases on res judicata generally, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 5076–5181. Gopal Sri Ram JCA (delivering judgment of the court): This appeal raises several interesting points of law. In the main, it has to do with the role of equity in adjectival law. At the heart of the appeal is the scope and application of the doctrine of res judicata. To resume the narrative, sometime after the order for foreclosure was made, the appellants applied to set it aside on the jurisdictional ground. On 17 September 1992, the High Court set aside its order. The respondent then appealed to the Supreme Court. That court allowed the appeal. Peh Swee Chin SCJ, who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court, held that the judge was functus officio as the summons for foreclosure had been determined inter partes after a contest. He found merit in the instant appellants’ argument that the High Court had no jurisdiction to make the order for foreclosure, but he held the point to be no longer open to the appellants because of res judicata. His judgment has been reported in Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd (In receivership) v Chee Pok Choy & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 105. I will refer to that case as Scotch Leasing (No 1). This is how Peh Swee Chin SCJ dealt with the jurisdictional point:

First, a jurisdiction point is no less an issue than other issues in civil litigation. If not raised at the hearing in the court of first instance or on appeal, it cannot be raised thereafter, for the doctrine of res judicata sets in. Res judicata has been explained before, eg see Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (SC). When the jurisdiction point in question was not raised before the learned judge before he made the first order, when he heard the matter inter ||Page 354>>parties, or at any rate, if it was not raised for review before the said order was perfected,

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-337 the requirements of a proceeding in an adversarial system were complied with and satisfied, unless the learned judge exceptionally took the jurisdiction point on his own initiative, if he so minded, before the said order of sale was made. We mentioned the adversarial system because in it, a court generally would leave it to the parties in litigation to conduct their respective cases as best as they could without interference. It is to be remembered in this connection that a superior court like the High Court is ‘a court of unlimited jurisdiction in the course of contentious litigation’ as stated by Lord Diplock in Issacs v Robertson [1984] 3 All ER 140 at p 143, when referring to a High Court as such a court in connection with the requirement that a High Court’s order must be obeyed and could only be challenged in a direct application to set it aside. This was followed by the Supreme Court in Puah Bee Hong & Anor v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor (Teo Keng Tuan Robert, Intervener) and another appeal [1994] 2 MLJ 601 (SC). We may add that under s 114(e) of the Evidence Act 1950, one can presume that the High Court has such attributed jurisdiction unless rebutted. We say this in connection with our description of such a jurisdiction point as being ordinarily an issue in litigation. If the learned judge had no jurisdiction on 17 September 1992 to hear the application dated 8 June 1992 to set aside the first order, the application to set aside could not have been entertained by the court in the first place. Thus, any legal argument in support of such application to set aside — should it proceed — ex necessitate could not have been entertainable, lying, as it did, outside the threshold of the court. As a necessary consequence, this appeal is not properly before us — it being an appeal from an order made at a hearing which was an exercise in futility. Let me take the first issue. This has to do with two aspects of the decision in Scotch Leasing (No 1): its value and its effect. Now, to recall, the Supreme Court there held that although the issue as to the High Court’s jurisdiction was one that had merit, it was no longer open to the appellants to rely on it. I am aware that I have already reproduced what Peh Swee Chin SCJ said in Scotch Leasing (No 1), but the point is of such importance that it is necessary to recall in a gist what was there said. It amounted to this. The appellants had not raised the jurisdictional point at the inter partes hearing of the summons for foreclosure. The order for foreclosure had been ||Page 356>>perfected. The High Court was functus officio and therefore could not reopen the order on an application to set aside its earlier order. The doctrine of res judicata therefore applied to preclude the appellants from relitigating the issue of jurisdiction by way of an application to set aside the foreclosure order. If the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant the order, it did not have jurisdiction to set it aside. A perusal of the record of appeal reveals that a sustained submission was made before the learned judge on the impact of Badiaddin’s case on Scotch Leasing (No 1). However, the learned judge, without assigning any reasons, failed to deal with this point. Instead, he took a rather over simplistic view of the matter and treated the decision of the Supreme Court in Scotch Leasing (No 1) as irrevocably binding upon the appellant. The approach of the learned judge necessitates a discussion of the doctrine of res judicata. Now, res judicata is not merely a technical rule of pleading. It is a doctrine of substantial justice. It is a process whereby justice is achieved procedurally by precluding a party from reagitating in subsequent proceedings a complaint or an issue that has, or could fairly have been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties or their privies. It is merely equity in action in the procedural arena. It is sometimes referred ||Page 357>>to as the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313. In that case,

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-338 Wigram VC said:

In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. The doctrine may thus be seen to encompass several categories. In its narrowest sense, res judicata, I think, refers to estoppel by record. It refers to the actual decision of the earlier action or proceeding. In its wider sense, it encompasses issues and causes of action that could justly and fairly have been equally adjudicated in the earlier suit or proceeding. This wider operation of the doctrine is sometimes referred to ‘constructive res judicata’. It houses the twin concepts of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. Like the tree of which they form the branches, they are designed to ensure that there is finality in litigation. Pausing for a moment, I think that it is essential to bear in mind that Wigram VC spoke these words in the Court of Chancery, and that the court he referred to was that court of which he was the Vice Chancellor at the time. I make mention of these matters in order to demonstrate that the doctrine of res judicata has its roots in equity and hence retains its discretionary nature that is common to all equitable doctrines. Now, there is a dimension to the doctrine of res judicata that is not always appreciated. It is this. Since the doctrine (whether in its narrow or broader sense) is designed to achieve justice, a court may decline to apply it where to do so would lead to an unjust result. And there is respectable authority in support of the view I have just expressed. On the authorities discussed thus far, the principle comes to this. Whether res judicata in the wider sense should be permitted to bar a claim is a matter that is to be determined on the facts of each case, always having regard to where the justice of the individual and particular case lies. I now turn to the third and final reason. The effect of the order of the Supreme Court in Scotch Leasing (No 1) was to reinstate an order of the High Court that had earlier been set aside. This is because the respondents’ appeal to the Supreme Court was merely a continuation of the proceedings before the High Court. Hence, it is the jurisdictional competence of the High Court, as the court of first instance, and not that of the Supreme Court with which we are concerned in relation to the doctrine of res judicata. That much is clear from the authority of Shibo Raut v Baban Raut (1908) 35 ILR Cal 353, at p 359, where Stephen J said:

It was faintly suggested, however, on behalf of the appellants that as in the previous litigation the decision of the court of first instance was subsequently affirmed by this court, and as in the present litigation also the matter has been carried before this court, the plea of res judicata ought to be allowed, or in other words, that the true criterion is the competency of the court of appeal to decide the question. In my opinion this contention is not well founded. It is now firmly settled that it is the competency of the original court which decided the former suit that must be looked to and not that of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-339 the appellate court in which the suit was ultimately decided on appeal: Bharasi Lal Chowdhry v Sarat Chunder Dass (1895) ILR 23 Cal 415, Koylash Chandra De v Tarak Nath Mandal (1897) ILR 25 Cal 571 and Ram Gopal Mazumdar v Prasunna Kumar Sanial (1905) 10 CWN 529. If the High Court lacked jurisdiction at the time it made the order for sale, it continued to lack that jurisdiction despite the views expressed by Peh Swee Chin SCJ. As such, it would be an affront to justice to permit the respondent to successfully plead res judicata in the second suit as that would be tantamount to applying the editorial blue pencil across the mandatory provisions of s 260(2) of the Code. For myself, I must confess my own inability to rush in where angels fear to tread and to defy the doctrine of separation of powers so well entrenched in the Constitution. Civil Procedure — Trial — Further evidence — Fresh evidence — Admission of — Evidence available and could be obtained earlier — Application for leave to adduce further evidence by filing affidavits — Introduction of evidence by non resident witnesses, whether witnesses could be compelled to attend court in Malaysia — Issues of non convenience and res judicata not before court earlier, whether introduction of fresh evidence should be allowed — Whether requirements in Ladd v Marshall satisfied The respondent caused a notice of writ of summons and the writ itself to be issued and served on the appellants out of jurisdiction for breach of an oral representation made on behalf of the first appellant. The appellants entered conditional appearance and filed a summons in chambers to set aside the notice and the writ on the ground that the court here had no jurisdiction to try the action brought against them. As an alternative, they sought a stay of all further proceedings in the action on the ground that the court was not the forum conveniens. The summons in chambers was dismissed by the senior assistant registrar. The appellants’ appeal to the High Court was also dismissed. The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal. While waiting for the appeal to be heard, the appellants filed a notice of motion praying that the appellants be given leave to adduce further evidence at the hearing of the appeal by way of the filing and reading of two affidavits. In the proposed affidavit, in support of forum non-conveniens issue, it was deposed that the two witnesses for the appellants who are citizen and residents of Singapore, have since left the service of the first appellant. Therefore they could not be instructed by the first appellant to give evidence and that no subpoena issued by a court in this jurisdiction may be affected against them in Singapore. The proposed affidavit also raised the issue of res judicata contending that the same issues and matters in the respondent’s suit against the appellants had already been raised, litigated and finally decided upon in the first appellant’s suit brought against the respondent in the Singapore High Court. The second proposed affidavit was deposed by the solicitor of the first appellant in the Singapore suit wherein he expressed his views as to the finality of the judgment obtained against the respondent in the Singapore court. Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The fresh evidence was not admissible since it did not fall within the principle laid down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. The evidence could have been obtained earlier and could have ||Page 462>>been brought before the senior assistant registrar. It was too late to proffer that evidence relating the two persons by way of fresh evidence. Further, even if the trial is conducted in Malaysia, the arm of the law is long E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-340 enough to compel their attendance to give evidence in the Malaysian court notwithstanding they are citizens and residents of Singapore. The respresentations alleged against the appellants were made by their representatives while in Malaysia and the respondent had never visited the appellants’ office in Singapore. The course of action was clearly in Malaysia and therefore the claim of the respondent ought properly to be tried in Malaysia and it followed that the forum conveniens could never be anywhere else than in Malaysia. It was not the convenience of the two persons that the court were concerned here (see pp 466I–467A, C–D, F–I). (2) The application of the appellants before the senior assistant registrar did not seek to set aside the notice and the writ on the ground of res judicata. The grounds given for the seeking of the relief however include the mention of res judicata. These so called grounds could not form the basis to treat the application as an application to set aside the notice and the writ on the ground of res judicata because there was no prayer for such in the application before the senior assistant registrar. Raising it now through the intended affidavit was indeed an attempt to introduce new evidence. But this new evidence would not satisfy the requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall (see pp 468E–F, I–469A). (3) Being solicitor for the first appellant in the Singapore suit, the deponent was not an independent person whose evidence as contained in the proposed affidavit could be taken into consideration by the court. Further, the issue of res judicata was not before the senior assistant registar or the judge and this new evidence was one which fell outside the ambit of the principle in Ladd v Marshall. So this proposed affidavit of the deponent would not be of any assistance to the court dealing with the substantive appeal of the appellants (see p 469D, G–H). (4) The appellants’ application arose out of the conditional appearance granted to the appellants by the court for the sole purpose of the appellants challenging the juridiction of the court. The appellants were excluded from bringing in the issue of forum non-conveniens for to allow them to do so would amount to allowing them to pursue on matter wherein no prior leave was sought or granted as a condition for entering conditional appearance in the suit (see p 470A–C).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Responden telah menyebabkan satu notis writ saman dan writ dikeluarkan dan telah menyampaikan notis writ and writ tersebut ||Page 463>>kepada perayu di luar bidangkuasa untuk kemungkiran representasi lisan yang dibuat bagi pihak perayu pertama. Perayu telah memasukkan kehadiran bersyarat dan telah memfailkan saman dalam kamar untuk mengetepikan notis dan writ tersebut kerana mahkamah di sini tiada bidangkuasa untuk mendengar tindakan terhadap mereka. Sebagai alternatif, perayu-perayu telah memohon untuk penggantungan prosiding-prosiding seterusnya dalam tindakan tersebut oleh kerana mahkamah ini E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-341 bukan merupakan forum conveniens. Saman dalam kamar tersebut telah ditolak oleh penolong kanan pendaftar. Rayuan perayu kepada Mahkamah Tinggi juga telah ditolak. Perayu merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan. Sementara menunggu rayuan tersebut didengar, perayu telah memfailkan satu notis usul memohon supaya perayu dibenarkan mengemukakan keterangan selanjutnya semasa rayuan tersebut didengar, melalui pemfailan dan pembacaan kedua-dua affidavit tersebut. Di dalam afidavit yang dicadangkan, ia telah dideposkan bahawa dua orang saksi untuk perayu-perayu yang merupakan warganegara dan penetap Singapura, telahpun berhenti bekerja untuk perayu, bagi menyokong isu forum conveniens. Oleh itu, mereka tidak boleh diarahkan oleh perayu pertama untuk memberi keterangan dan tiada sepina yang dikeluarkan oleh sebarang mahkamah dalam bidangkuasa ini boleh digunakan terhadap mereka. Afidavit yang dicadangkan juga membangkitkan isu res judicata yang mempertikaikan isu-isu yang sama yang telah dibangkitkan, dilitigasikan dan akhirnya diputuskan di dalam guaman perayu pertama terhadap responden di dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Singapura. Afidavit kedua yang dicadangkan telah dideposkan oleh peguamcara perayu pertama di dalam guaman Singapura, di mana beliau telah mengemukakan pandangan beliau mengenai kemuktamadan penghakiman yang diperoleh terhadap responden di dalam mahkamah Singapura. Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Keterangan yang baru tidak boleh diterima kerana ia tidak termasuk di dalam prinsip Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. Keterangan tersebut boleh dibawa dan dikemukakan lebih awal kepada penolong kanan pendaftar. Ia adalah terlambat untuk mengemukakan keterangan tersebut yang berkait dengan dua orang tersebut melalui keterangan yang baru. Jika perbicaraan tersebut dibicarakan di Malaysia, undang-undang boleh mendesak kehadiran mereka untuk memberi keterangan di mahkamah di Malaysia, walaupun mereka merupakan warganegara dan penetap Singapura. Representasi yang dikatakan dibuat terhadap perayu-perayu dibuat oleh wakil-wakil mereka semasa berada di Malaysia, dan responden tidak pernah melawat pejabat perayu-perayu di Singapura. Kausa tindakan jelas berada di Malaysia, dan oleh itu tuntutan responden sepatutnya dibicarakan di Malaysia. Oleh itu, forum conveniens mestilah di Malaysia. Kemudahan kedua-dua orang tersebut ||Page 464>>bukanlah apa yang patut dihiraukan oleh mahkamah di sini (lihat ms 466I–467A, C–D, F–I). (2) Permohonan perayu di hadapan penolong kanan pendaftar tidak meminta supaya notis dan writ tersebut diketepikan kerana res judicata, akan tetapi satu daripada alasan yang diberi untuk memohon relif adalah res judicata. Memandangkan ini, alasan-alasan tersebut tidak boleh diambil sebagai dasar untuk menjadikan permohonan tersebut sebagai permohonan untuk mengetepikan notis dan writ oleh kerana res judicata, sebab tiada permohonan sebegitu di hadapan penolong kanan pendaftar. Jika ia dibangkitkan, ini merupakan percubaan untuk mengemukakan keterangan baru, tetapi keterangan baru sebegini tidak akan memenuhi keperluan Ladd v Marshall (lihat ms 468E–F, I–469A). (3) Deponen merupakan peguamcara perayu pertama di Singapura, dan oleh itu E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-342 beliau bukan merupakan seorang yang boleh memberi keterangan di dalam afidavit yang dicadangkan yang dapat diberi pertimbangan oleh mahkamah. Lagipun, isu res judicata tidak dikemukakan di hadapan penolong kanan pendaftar atau hakim dan keterangan baru ini tidak memenuhi keperluan prinsip Ladd v Marshall. Jadi, afidavit yang dicadangkan tersebut tidak dapat membantu mahkamah dalam rayuan perayu tersebut (lihat ms 469D, G–H). (4) Permohonan perayu-perayu bangkit daripada kehadiran bersyarat yang diberi kepada perayu-perayu oleh mahkamah bagi perayu mencabar bidangkuasa mahkamah. Perayu-perayu telah di-kecualikan daripada membangkitkan isu forum non conveniens kerana jika perayu-perayu dibenarkan sedemikian, ini akan membawa kepada membenarkan perayu-perayu memulakan satu perkara di mana tiada kebenaran dipohon ataupun diberi sebagai syarat memasukkan kehadiran bersyarat di dalam guaman tersebut (lihat ms 470A–C).] As for Evelyn Teah, she responded over the phone that she would not attend court in Malaysia as a witness. The proposed affidavit of Tan Hin Huat also raises the issue of res judicata contending the same issues and matters in the respondent’s suit against the appellants have already been raised, litigated and finally decided upon in the first appellant’s Suit No 454 of 1998 brought against the respondent in the Singapore High Court. On 7 October 1998 the Singapore High Court granted leave to the respondent to defend the action upon provision of security in the sum of RM2m by way ||Page 466>>of a banker’s guarantee drawn in favour of the first appellant’s solicitors or nominees in Malaysia by 4 November 1998. In the event of the respondent’s failure to comply with the aforesaid order, the defence be struck out and interlocutory judgment be entered without further order against the respondent with damages to be assessed. The respondent failed to comply with the terms of the said order and on 13 November 1998, an interlocutory judgment was entered against him by having his defence struck out and he was ordered to pay the first appellant damages to be assessed and interest at 2%pa above the first appellant’s cost of funds from 11 November 1997 to the date of actual payment and solicitor and client costs. On 13 April 2000 a final judgment was entered against the respondent in the sum of RM9,412,742.98, interest at 2%pa above the first appellant’s cost of funds on the sum at monthly rest from 1 November 1997 to 31 August 1998 amounting to RM1,168,716.65, interest at 6%pa on the above capital sum from 1 September 1998 to the date of judgment ie 13 April 2000 amounting to RM912,907.12 and the solicitor — client costs to be taxed or agreed. The respondent, however, appealed only against the award of the 6% interest mentioned above. His appeal was allowed. On those grounds the appellants contend that the present suit of the respondent filed in Malaysia is res judicata as the Singapore proceedings have finally decided and disposed of the matters between the parties. Next on the issue of res judicata, Tan Hin Huat by his proposed affidavit, to be filed and read at the hearing of the appeal proper, reiterates that the same issues and matters in the respondent’s suit in question has already been raised, litigated and finally decided upon in the first appellant’s suit against the respondent in the Singapore case. He listed out the events respecting the interlocutory judgment obtained against the respondent as mentioned earlier. However, looking at the application of the appellant before the learned senior assistant registrar, it sought for the setting aside of the notice and the writ of the respondent for no or lack of jurisdiction of the court to hear the suit and, in the alternative, it sought that the matter

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-343 be adjourned on the ground of forum non conveniens. The said application did not seek to set aside the notice and the writ on the ground of res judicata. The grounds given for the seeking of the relief, however, include the mention of res judicata. They are to be found at paras (b) and (c) thereof as follows:

(b) The plaintiff (the respondent) has filed his defence in the case High Court Civil Suit No 454 Year 1998 which was filed in the Republic of Singapore in which the first and second defendants have obtained an interlocutory judgment on 13 November 1998 in respect of/arose from the same transaction and due to that the Plaintiff has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore, therefore matter is res judicata; (c) It is an abuse of the process of the court to file a proceeding in this honourable court and to raise similar issues which have already been dealt with in High Court Civil Suit No 454–1998 which has been filed in the Republic of Singapore which is the ‘forum conveniens’; ... . These so called grounds, therefore, cannot form the basis to treat the application of the respondent as an application to set aside the notice and the writ of the respondent on the ground of res judicata because there is no prayer for such in the application before the senior assistant registrar. ||Page 469>>Raising it now through the intended affidavit of Tan Hin Huat is indeed an attempt to introduce new evidence. But this new evidence would not satisfy the requirements laid down by Ladd v Marshall, because this piece of evidence was available even at the time when the hearing of the summons before the learned senior assistant registrar but it did not form part of the prayers in the summons which concern only the issue of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. In any event, res judicata would not apply to the second appellant because he was not a party in the Singapore suit brought against the respondent. Secondly, for the reason given earlier, the issue of res judicata was not before the learned senior assistant registrar or the learned judge and this new evidence was one which falls outside the ambit of the principle in Ladd v Marshall, as explained earlier when dealing with the proposed affidavit of Tan Hin Huat. So, this proposed affidavit of the deponent would not be of any assistance to this court dealing with the substantive appeal of the appellant. Also, before us the learned counsel for the appellants conceded that the procedure adopted in filing the summons in chambers for the setting aside of the notice and the writ of the respondent was wrong in the sense that in one breath it is an attack on the jurisdiction of the court and in another breath it is an attack on the forum to try the action. However, he said there is no question that the parties and the court were under the impression that it was on the ground of res judicata or forum non conveniens. Again, we are not impressed by this submission. The appellants should have confined ||Page 471>>themselves on the issue for which the conditional appearance was granted instead of approbating and reprobating in the matter. For that reason we unanimously agree that this appeal be dismissed on procedural ground with costs. We also ordered that the deposit be credited to the account of taxed costs. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Judgment — Drawn up and perfected — Plaintiff’s application for consequential relief to give effect to judgment — Judgment drawn up and perfected operated as res judicata for defendant to challenge — Whether plaintiff’s application an attempt to reopen original case — Whether on the facts the court ought to invoke principle of res judicata E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-344 Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issue estoppel — Plaintiff’s application for consequential relief — Whether issue of estoppel applies Civil Procedure — Summary judgment — Final judgment — Dispute as to entitlement of remedy under judgment — Judgment final and indisputable, res judicata The plaintiff was dismissed by the defendant in 1985. He filed an action against the defendant and filed an O 14 summary judgment application. The application had three main prayers. In prayer one, the plaintiff sought for a declaration that the defendant’s action in terminating the plaintiff’s services was ultra vires the Penang Port Commission Act and therefore, null and void and invalid. On 18 July 1994, the High Court gave an order in terms for prayers one and three. There was no appeal filed on these orders of the High Court. The plaintiff filed the present originating summons seeking the consequential reliefs to enable him to retain his employment and continue eligibility to be paid his salaries and all other emoluments and allowances from the date of the court order dated 18 July 1994. The plaintiff submitted that even though the court had given a declaration that his dismissal by the defendant in 1985 was null and void and invalid and which order require the defendant to reinstate the plaintiff, the defendant refused to reinstate the plaintiff and by that refusal the plaintiff had come to this court for redress to compel the defendant to reinstate the plaintiff as a consequent to the order made by the court on 18 July 1994. The defendant resisted the plaintiff’s claim and relied upon the following grounds: (i) plaintiff was reopening the original case and should not be permitted as it would result in multiplicity of proceedings applying the law of res judicata and issue of estoppel; (ii) plaintiff’s action was barred by limitation; ||Page 434>>and (iii) the plaintiff was approbating and reprobating in that the plaintiff having elected to claim damages for wrongful termination and having been awarded over RM2m, could not now seek reinstatement. Held: (1) The defendant had conceded that they did not appeal against prayer one. That being so the dispute in prayer one between the plaintiff and the defendant was final, the plaintiff’s cause of action forming the subject matter of prayer one having merged into the order of the court dated 18 July 1994. That order operated as res judicata and closed the door to the defendant to challenge this decision in any manner whatsoever. As long as this court was concerned, the decision given by the court on 18 July 1994 was final. The order stands and the plaintiff can give effect to it (see pp 450E–F, 451B, C). (2) This was not an application by the plaintiff to reopen the original case and vary, alter or amend the order made by the court on 18 July 1994. The present action arose as a result of the defendant’s obstinate disobedience to give effect to that order made on 18 July 1994 that the plaintiff was compelled to seek consequential orders to give effect to it. Thus, the rules of res judicata, issue estoppel and functious officio were not applicable (see p 454F–G). (3) The plaintiff in the present action was not relying on any new cause of action and which fact is vital for the operation of the law of limitation. For limitation in a case of contract like the present case time runs from the date of the breach.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-345 The plaintiff’s cause of action had already been adjudicated and it had merged into the order of the court dated 18 July 1994. Therefore, there was no cause of action involved in this case to attract the law of limitation (see p 455C–D). (4) If the defendant wanted to dispute that the plaintiff was only entitled to one remedy between prayers one and three then the defendant should have taken up that argument in the earlier trial and not at this forum for by this time the judgment given in the form of prayer one and prayer three is now final and indisputable by the law of res judicata. This means that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of both prayer one and prayer three (see p 455F–G). (5) The defendant had dismissed the plaintiff from his employment and the court had declared that the dismissal was null and void and since the law is that employment is a fundamental right within the expression of art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution, it is imperative that the function of the court to ensure that the plaintiff gets back his job and together with his arrears of salaries and all other emoluments (see p 467C). (6) By law the defendant was under duty to give effect to the order of the court dated 18 July 1994. Though the order made was a ||Page 435>>declaratory order it is still an order of the High Court and carries the command that it should be given effect. This is particularly so when there was no challenge that the order made was without jurisdiction and/or the order was irregular or a nullity order (see p 467F–G). (7) Since the defendant had not given effect to the declaratory order, the plaintiff was entitled to apply to the court under the ‘liberty to apply rule’ for the purpose of implementing and give effect to that order. The court of first instance hearing an application for consequential relief has the powers to dispense appropriate remedies under the heading of ‘other relief the honourable court deems fit’. Since the plaintiff in the main case had asked for ‘any other relief that the honourable court thinks fit’, the consequential relief sought by the plaintiff in substance emanates from the plaintiff’s prayers of ‘further or other relief that the honourable court deems fit’ in the main action (see pp 468H, 469C–D).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah dipecatkan oleh defendan pada tahun1985. Beliau telah memfailkan satu tindakan terhadap defendan dan memfailkan A 14 permohonan penghakiman terus. Permohonan tersebut mempunyai tiga permohonan utama. Di dalam permohonan satu, plaintif telah memohon satu deklarasi bahawa tindakan defendan menamatkan khidmat plaintif adalah ultra vires Akta Suruhanjaya Pelabuhan Pulau Pinang dan oleh itu, adalah batal dan tak sah. Pada 18 Julai 1994, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memberikan satu perintah seperti dipohon untuk permohonan satu dan tiga. Tiada rayuan telah difailkan terhadap perintah-perintah Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut. Plaintif telah memfailkan saman pemula sekarang ini memohon relief berbangkit untuk membolehkan beliau mengekalkan pekerjaan beliau dan meneruskan kelayakan untuk dibayar gaji beliau dan semua emolumen dan elaun yang lain daripada tarikh perintah mahkamah bertarikh 18 E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-346 Julai 1994. Plaintif telah menghujahkan bahawa walaupun mahkamah telah memberikan satu deklarasi bahawa pemecatan beliau oleh defendan pada tahun 1985 adalah batal dan tak sah dan perintah yang mana yang dipelukan oleh defendan untuk mengembalikan jawatan plaintif, defendan enggan untuk mengembalikan jawatan plaintif dan disebabkan keengganan tersebut plaintif telah datang ke mahkamah ini untuk membetulkan keadaan agar mendesak defendan untuk mengembalikan jawatan plaintif sebagai satu akibat langsung daripada perintah yang dibuat oleh mahkamah pada 18 Julai 1994. Defendan menentang tuntutan plaintif dan bergantung kepada alas-alasan berikut: (i) plaintif telah membuka semula kes asal dan tidak sepatutnya dibenarkan keran ia akan membawa kepada kepelbagaian prosiding dengan menggunakan undang-undang res judicata dan isu estopel; (ii) tindakan plaintif dihalangkan oleh had masa; dan (iii) plaintif antara membenarkan dan ||Page 436>>tidak di mana plaintif setelah dilantik untuk menuntut ganti rugi kerana pemecatan salah dan telahpun diawardkan lebih RM2j, untuk sekarang tidak memohon pengembalian jawatan. Diputuskan: (1) Defendan telah mengaku bahawa mereka tidak membuat rayuan terhadap permohonan satu. Jika demikian halnya pertikaian di dalam permohonan satu antara plaintif dan defendan adalah muktamad, kausa tindakan plaintif yang membentuk perkara pokok permohonan satu setelah bergabung di dalam perintah mahkamah bertairkh 18 Julai 1994. Perintah tersebut berfungsi sebagai res judicata dan menutup peluang kepada defendan untuk mencabar keputusan ini dalam apa cara sekalipun. Selagi mahkamah ini berkaitan, keputusan yang diberikan oleh mahkamah pada 18 Julai 1994 adalah muktamad. Perintah tersebut dikekalkan dan plaintif boleh bertindak atasnya (lihat ms 450E–F, 451B, C). (2) Ini bukan merupakan satu permohonan oleh plaintif untuk membuka semula kes asal tersebut dan mengubah atau meminda perintah yang telah dibuat oleh mahkamah pada 18 Julai 1994. Tindakan sekarang ini timbul akibat daripada keingkaran yang ketegar defendan untuk bertindak atas perintah yang dibuat pada 18 Julai 1994 bahawa plaintif didesak untuk memohon perintah-perintah penting untuk bertindak atasnya. Oleh itu peraturan res judicata, isu estopel dan functious officio tidak terpakai (lihat m 454F–G). (3) Plaintif di dalam tindakan sekarang ini tidak bergantung kepada mana-mana kausa tindakan yang baru dan atas hakikat itu adalah penting bagi fungsi undang-undang had masa. Bagi had masa di dalam kes kontrak seperti di dalam kes sekarang ini masa bermula daripada tarikh pelanggaran. Kausa tindakan plaintif telahpun diadili dan telah bergabung di dalam perintah mahkamah bertarikh 18 Julai 1994. Oleh itu tiada kausa tindakan yang wujud di dalam kes ini yang menggunakan undang-undang had masa (lihat ms 455C–D). (4) Jika defendan ingin mempertikaikan bahawa plaintif hanya berhak kepada satu remedi antara permohonan 1 dan 3 maka defendan sepatutnya telah bertindak terhadap hujah di dalam perbicaraan terdahulu dan bukan di dalam forum ini kerana menjelang masa ini penghakiman yang diberikan dalam bentuk

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-347 permohonan satu dan tiga sekarang adalah muktamad dan tidak boleh dipertikaikan oleh undang-undang res judicata. Ini bermakna bahawa plaintif berhak untuk mendapat faedah daripada permohonan satu dan tiga (lihat ms 455F–G). (5) Defendan telah memecat plaintif daripada pekerjaan beliau dan mahkamah telah mengisytiharkan bahawa pemecatan tersebut adalah batal dan tak sah dan memandangkan adalah undang- ||Page 437>>undang bahawa pekerjaan adalah hak asas dalam ungkapan perkara 5(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, adalah imperatif bahawa fungsi mahkamah untuk menentukan bahawa plaintif mendapat balik pekerjaan beliau dan juga tunggakan gaji beliau dan semua emolumen yang lain (lihat ms 467C). (6) Melalui undang-undang defendan di bawah kewajipan untuk bertindak atas perintah mahkamah bertarikh 18 Julai 1994. Walaupun perintah yang dibuat merupakan satu perintah deklarasi ia masih satu perintah Mahkamah Tinggi dan membawa arahan bahawa ia hendaklah bertindak ke atasnya. Ini terutamanya adalah apabila tiada cabaran bahawa perintah yang dibuat adalah tanpa bidang kuasa dan/atau perintah tersebut adalah di luar aturan atau satu perintah yang tidak sah (lihat ms 467F–G). (7) Memandangkan defendan tidak bertindak ke atas perintah deklarasi tersebut, plaintif berhak untuk memohon kepada mahkamah di bawah ‘kebebasan untuk menggunakan peraturan tersebut’ bagi tujuan pelaksanaan dan bertindak ke atas perintah tersebut. Mahkamah yang pertama kali mendengar satu permohonan untuk relief berbangkit mempunyai kuasa untuk melaksanakan remedi-remedi yang sesuai di bawah tajuk ‘relif lain yang mahkamah yang bijaksana fikirkan suaimanfaat’. Memandangkan plaintif di dalam kes utama telah menanyakan untuk ‘apa-apa relief lain yang mahkamah yang bijaksana fikirkan suaimanfaat’, relief berbangkit yang dipohon oleh plaintif pada mana datang daripada permohonan plaintif di mana ‘relief selanjutnya dan lain yang mahkamah yang bijaksana fikirkan suaimanfaat’ di dalam tindakan utama tersebut (lihat ms 468H, 469C–D).] For cases on res judicata generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3959–4032. For cases on accrual of cause of action, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 1740–1742. For cases on summary judgment generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 4372–4778. For cases on enforcement of judgment generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 2581–2582. As this originating summons is for consequential remedies arising from prayer one of the summary judgment, I will confine myself to prayer one of the summary judgment, and not deal with other prayers. The defendant has conceded that they did not appeal against prayer one. That being so, the dispute in prayer one between the plaintiff and defendant is final, the plaintiff’s cause of action forming the subject matter of prayer one having merged into the order of the court dated 18 July 1994. That order now operates as res judicata and closes the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-348 door to the defendant to challenge this decision in any manner whatsoever, including attacking that decision in the same proceedings subsequently or in any new or collateral proceedings between the same parties or their privies. Gopal Sri Ram JCA in the Court of Appeal case of Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 affirmed this point of law and again reaffirmed this law in the case of Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Prorak Sdn Bhd & Anor [2000] 1 MLJ 479 at p 490 quoting Sharma J in the case of Government of Malaysia v Dato Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74:

(1) the plaintiff is reopening and should not be permitted as it will result in multiplicity of proceedings applying the law of res judicata and issue of estoppel; (2) the plaintiff’s action is barred by limitation; (3) the plaintiff, having received damages, has elected or alternatively is estopped by approbation and reprobation in seeking reinstatement. It is my observation that the defendant’s case throughout was punctured with mistake for whatever reasons, but nevertheless having disastrous effects on the defendant’s case. If the defendant did not want to reinstate the plaintiff then they should have appealed against the decision of Anuar J (as he then was) given on 18 July 1994, and not choose this forum to lodge an attack on that decision which is now final and can be given effect. Further to compound their predicament, the defendant in the assessment of damages trial did not produce any witnesses and virtually surrendered to the plaintiff. Yet the defendant did not appeal against the oral application for stay of execution made by the deputy registrar after the judge, no further application for stay can be made to the same court as the matter is res judicata (Government of Malaysia v Dato Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74). Lastly, after the garnishee had paid out the garnished sums, they did not apply for an injunction at the High Court as mandated by s 43 of the CJA but instead applied for the same at the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal initially gave the injunctions on 3 January 1995 and 2 August 1995, but subsequently on 6 September 1996 set aside these two injunctions. The defendant firstly submits that the plaintiff’s present application is to reopen the original case, which should not be permitted as it will result in multiplicity of proceedings, applying the law of res judicata and the issue of estoppel. In my mind, this is not an application by the plaintiff to reopen the original case and vary, alter or amend the order made by the court on 18 July 1994. This present action arises as a result of the defendant’s obstinate disobedience to give effect to that order made on 18 July 1994 that the plaintiff is compelled to seek consequential orders to give effect to it. Therefore, this case is not to reopen and/or vary, alter or amend the order made by the court on 18 July 1994 to attract the rule of res judicata and corollary to it, the rule of issue of estoppel and functus officio. And neither is the plaintiff’s application made under the slip rule which is possible under O 20 r 11 of the RHC. The giving of consequential orders by the court is not a rehearing or reopening the case (see Fritz v Hobson (1880) 14 Ch D 542, at p 561). In this case, Fry J at p 561 said: The defendant’s last ground is that the plaintiff is approbating and reprobating, in that the plaintiff, having elected to claim damages for wrongful termination and having been awarded over RM2m cannot now seek reinstatement. As I had stated earlier that the declaration declaring the defendant’s action of dismissing the plaintiff as null and void was given pursuant

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-349 to prayer two and the assessment of damages was given pursuant to prayer three and against which two prayers there was no appeal. If the defendant wanted to dispute that the plaintiff was only entitled to one remedy between prayer one and three then the defendant should have taken up that argument in the earlier trial before Anuar J (as he then was) and not at this forum, for by this time the judgment given in the form of prayer one and prayer three is now final and indisputable by the law of res judicata. This means that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of both prayer one and prayer three and the authors of this situation is the defendant itself in not having appealed against the decision of the court dated 18 July 1994 and thereby allowing the order to become final. Again this is an established principle which the defendant cannot overcome. Senior counsel for the defendant also submitted, as an ancillary issue, that the deputy registrar was wrong in awarding RM2m under distress, anguish, anxiety, inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation for the law does not permit such damage and relied on the case of Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd (1909) AC 488. Though I rule that prayer three is now res judicata, and not before me, and should have been taken up before either the deputy registrar who made the award and/or on appeal from his decision and which was not done, for the interest of justice I have looked into this ||Page 454>>aspect of law. It is indeed true that in Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd, the House of Lords took the view that a dismissed employee could not claim damages for injured feelings. The 1909 decision in Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd being that of the then imperial court was binding on all the colonial courts and were followed by the courts in the colonies including Malaysia. However, the decision in Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd did not have smooth sailing for it could not stand the test of time and was later not followed as being unsound. Lord Denning in Heywood v Wellers [1976] 1 All ER 300 though not making a direct attack on the ratio of Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd said that the ratio of Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd had to be reconsidered and that the proper test for damages arising out of breach of a contract would be the reasonable forseeability test pronounced in Hedley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341; 156 ER 145 and the court did not follow Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd. Not surprisingly in the case of Cox v Phillips Industries Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 683, a breach in employment case for claim of mental distress, the English High Court of Queens Bench division, although bound to follow the House of Lords decision of Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd, elected not to follow Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd but instead followed the Court of Appeal case of Jarvis v Swan Tours Travel [1973] 1 All ER 171, a holiday which turned sour case and awarded damages for mental distress. Lawson J in the Cox v Phillips Industries Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 683 said: The first and second plaintiffs made an application for the continuination of an ex parte injunction order restraining the first defendant, who was the managing director of the third plaintiff, from dealing in any manner the assets and funds held by Towry Law Asset Management Sdn Bhd. The first defendant applied to set aside the ex parte order on the following grounds: (i) the failure of the plaintiffs to disclose the restraining order where the plaintiffs were restrained from interfering with the management and affairs of the third plaintiff company; (ii) the plaintiffs had failed to comply with O 3 r 6 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 for failing to give notice of intention to proceed before moving for the ex parte injunction; (iii) there was an abuse of process when the plaintiffs ignored the undertaking given through a consent order and initiated multiple proceedings involving the same funds; (iv) the principles of res judicata prevented the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-350 plaintiffs from making and obtaining injunctive order as they had earlier made final orders on the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs have any say in management matter of the third plaintiff; and (v) the plaintiffs had no locus as director of the third plaintiff to claim interest in the assets of the company.

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif-plaintif pertama dan kedua telah membuat satu permohonan untuk meneruskan satu perintah injunksi ex parte menyekat defendan pertama, pengarah urusan plaintif ketiga, daripada berurusan dalam apa-apa cara aset-aset dan wang yang dipegang oleh Towry Law Asset Management Sdn Bhd. Defendan pertama memohon untuk mengetepikan perintah ex parte tersebut berdasarkan alasan-alasan berikut: (i) kegagalan plaintif-plaintif untuk mendedahkan perintah ||Page 419>>sekatan di mana plaintif-plaintif telah disekat daripada campur tangan dalam pengendalian dan pengurusan syarikat plaintif ketiga; (ii) plaintif-plaintif telah gagal untuk mematuhi A 3 k 6 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) kerana gagal untuk memberikan notis niat untuk meneruskan prosiding sebelum memohon injunksi ex parte; (iii) terdapat penyalahgunaan proses apabila plaintif-plaintif tidak menghiraukan akuan sumpah yang diberikan melalui satu perintah persetujuan dan menyebabkan prosiding yang berganda yang melibatkan wang yang sama; (iv) prinsip-prinsip res judicata menyekat plaintif-plaintif daripada membuat dan mendapat perintah injunksi kerana mereka telah terlebih dahuku membuat perintah-perintah muktamad tentang persoalan sama ada atau tidak plaintif-plaintif mempunyai hak bersuara dalam perkara pengurusan plaintif ketiga; dan (v) plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai locus sebagai pengarah plaintif ketiga untuk menuntut kepentingan dalam aset-aset syarikat tersebut.

Res judicata

The defendant’s complaint under this head is that the principles of res judicata prevents the first and second plaintiffs herein from making and obtaining the injunctive order herein as they had earlier failed to obtain an injunctive order in Suit 195 of 1991 to restrain the third plaintiff company, and further the Court of Appeal in OS No 1141 of 1997 had on 22 September 2000 decided on the issue of the first plaintiff having no interest whatsoever in the Towry Law funds. The cumulative effect of the two orders made in the above suits, it is submitted, are final orders on the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs have any say in management matter of the third plaintiff, and as such are final and binding unless and until reversed on appeal, and in support thereof relies on Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Prorak Sdn Bhd [2000] 1 MLJ 479. The plaintiffs, in opposing the res judicata argument, submit that for res judicata to apply, there must be a final judgment — Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1966] 2 All ER 536, and if there is no final decision there can be no estoppel — Schlieske v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (G 324 of 1987) Schilieske v Robilliard (G361 of 1987) (1988) 79 ALR 554. The facts herein do not disclose that there has been a final judgment on any issues here or other related civil suits on issue estoppel as res judicata.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-351 The question of what res judicata is has been appropriately set out in the Supreme Court case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd, where Peh Swee Chin FCJ at pp 197–198 described it as follows:

What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro vertitate accipitur. The public ||Page 437>>policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest res publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexdri pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy. (Emphasis added.) After carefully considering the submissions and authorities preferred by the respective counsels for the first and second plaintiffs and the defendants, I have come to the conclusion that issue estoppel as res judicata applies in this case. In the light of my finding of issue estoppel, the plaintiffs’ counsel’s submission that there must be a final judgment on the issues before res judicata applies must surely fail. As was stated by Lord Guest in Carl Zeiss Stiftung’s case at p 565: Though the Federal Court of Australia in Schlieske’s case held that if there was only an interlocutory decision both in form and substance, there could be no estoppel. Nevertheless, that case cannot be cited for the proposition that res judicata has no application in every interlocutory decisions. What is of importance is the determination of whether the decision in question was a final one on the merits or the issue in dispute. In point of fact, Beaumount J in Schlieske’s case acknowledged that there was no hard and fast rule in the application of res judicata principles in interlocutory decisions when he stated at p 574: Even if I were to embark upon an inquiry as to the balance of convenience and justice, it would still be in the defendant’s favour. This is because no matter which way one looks at it, the subject matter of the injunction herein is the core assets of the third plaintiff company, and hence it would be detrimental to the third plaintiff company to be unable to utilize the funds for its business just because of the plaintiffs’ apprehension or misapprehension that there may be misapplication of the funds by the defendants. In the absence of cogent evidence (and none exists here) the defendants who are both de jure and de facto directors of the third plaintiff, as officers of the company, should not have their hands tied in the management of the company and its funds. The balance of justice in the light of my finding of serious abuses of process, material non-disclosure and the operation of the principles of res judicata would clearly tilt in the defendant’s favour. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Application to set aside judgment — First application to set aside default judgment dismissed —Second application based on different grounds — Grounds available at first application stage — Whether res judicata Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The limitations upon the exercise of the power in a court to recall a judgment or order that has not been perfected are of no relevance to the facts that lay before the judge at the relevant point in time. That is because the default

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-352 judgment entered by the judge was defective and therefore irregular. It was irregular because it had been entered in breach of the express understanding reached between counsel and sanctioned by the court that only the issue of liability was to be tried. The assessment of quantum was postponed. It was plain that this agreement was overlooked all round when the court entered judgment (see p 485E–F). (2) An order by the judge dispensing with a formal written application would have been perfectly in keeping with the spirit and intendment of O 92 r 4 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. Equally, he would have been well within his powers to set aside the default judgment he had entered earlier that morning (see p 487B). (3) The order of the judge dismissing the appellant’s summons to set aside the default judgment was a final order. So was his order refusing to reinstate the dismissed summons. The inherent jurisdiction in a court to set aside final orders made by it is one that must be exercised with much circumspection. It may be exercised in the case of an order made in contravention of an Act of Parliament. But the jurisdiction does not extend to a final order that is procedurally defective and hence merely irregular (see pp 487I–488B). (4) There was no merit in the appellant’s argument that the second application to set aside the default judgment was justified because it was based upon a different ground from that relied upon in the first application. The doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense was applicable in the present case. It was certainly open to the appellant to ground its first application on the basis that the default judgment was irregular. It was therefore an issue which properly belonged to the first application. But it chose not to rely upon that ground. Once the first application was dismissed, it was not open to the appellant to make a second application to set aside the judgment on a different ground. It would amount to presenting one’s case in instalment which the law does not permit (see pp 489F–H, 492C–D). Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Had terhadap pelaksanaan kuasa mahkamah untuk memanggil semula penghakiman atau perintah yang belum lagi disempurna-kan adalah tidak berkaitan kepada fakta-fakta di hadapan mahkamah pada masa berkenaan. Ini adalah kerana penghakiman ingkar yang dimasukkan oleh hakim adalah defektif dan dengan itu tidak teratur. Ia adalah tidak teratur kerana ia telah dimasuki bertentangan dengan persefahaman nyata yang dicapai antara peguam dan telah dibenarkan mahkamah bahawa hanya isu berkenaan liabiliti yang patut dibicarakan. Penaksiran kuantum telah ditangguhkan. Adalah jelas bahawa perjanjian ini tidak dipertimbangkan langsung apabila mahkamah memasukkan penghakiman (lihat ms 485E–F). (2) Suatu perintah oleh hakim yang melepaskan keperluan untuk suatu permohonan rasmi adalah selaras dengan niat dan prinsip A 92 k 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980. Dan adalah juga dalam bidang kuasanya untuk mengetepikan penghakiman ingkar yang dimasukinya terdahulu

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-353 pada pagi tersebut (lihat ms 487B). ||Page 482>> (3) Perintah mahkamah menolak saman perayu untuk mengetepikan penghakiman ingkar adalah suatu perintah muktamad. Begitu juga perintah beliau yang enggan menghidupkan semula saman yang telah ditolak. Bidang kuasa inheren mahkamah untuk mengetepikan perintah muktamad yang dibuat olehnya adalah sesuatu yang mesti dilaksanakan dengan penuh hati-hati. Ia boleh dilaksanakan di dalam kes di mana suatu perintah dibuat bertentangan dengan Akta Parlimen. Tetapi bidang kuasa tersebut tidak diluaskan kepada suatu perintah muktamad yang defektif secara prosedur dan dengan itu hanyalah tidak teratur (lihat ms 487I–488B). (4) Tiada merit di dalan hujahan perayu bahawa permohonan kedua untuk mengetepikan penghakiman ingkar boleh dijustifikasikan oleh kerana ia adalah berdasarkan alasan yang berbeza daripada yang digantung di dalam permohonan yang pertama. Doktrin res judicata di dalam makna luasnya adalah terpakai di dalam kes ini. Adalah terbuka untuk perayu untuk mengasaskan permohonan-nya atas dasar bahawa penghakiman ingkar adalah tidak teratur. Dengan itu, ia adalah suatu isu milik permohonan pertama. Tetapi ia memilih untuk tidak bergantung kepada alasan tersebut. Selepas permohonan pertama ditolak, adalah tidak terbuka kepada perayu untuk membuat permohonan yang kedua untuk mengetepikan penghakiman tersebut di atas alasan yang berbeza. Ia akan terjumlah kepada mengemukakan kes seseorang secara berperingkat-peringkat yang tidak dibenarkan oleh undang-undang (lihat ms 489F–H, 492C–D).] For cases on application to set aside a judgment, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 2493, 2645–2715. For cases on res judicata generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3959–4032. With respect we are of the view that there is no merit in this argument. In our judgment, the doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense provides a complete answer to counsel’s submission. It is sometimes referred to as ‘constructive res judicata’ ‘issue estoppel’ or ‘cause of action estoppel’, depending upon the particular subject matter to which it is to be applied. It is a doctrine of great antiquity and reflects the role of equity in the field of adjectival law. The most authoritative statement of the doctrine is to be found in the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson [1843] All ER Rep 378 at pp 381–382: ||Page 490>>

[W]here a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-354 The rule in Henderson v Henderson applies not only to separate proceedings but also to subsequent stages of the same proceeding. In Government of Malaysia v Dato Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74 the defendant applied to strike out the plaintiffs statement of claim on certain grounds. That application was dismissed by Chang Min Tat J (as he then was). Later, the defendant took out another application to strike out the action based on grounds different from those relied upon in his earlier summons. It was held that the defendant’s second application was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Sharma J, when dismissing the second summons said (at p 76):

The rule is that a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence becomes a matter which was constructively in issue. A matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence in the former application but which was not alleged as such a ground of attack or defence is for the purposes of the plea of res judicata deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former application, that is to say, though it may not have been actually directly and substantially in issue it is still regarded as, having been constructively, directly and substantially in issue. There can be no distinction between a claim that was actually made and a claim which might and ought to have been made. The ||Page 491>>plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points on which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and to pronounce its judgment thereupon but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time. It is only where the plea which is sought to be raised in the subsequent proceedings was not available to the party at the time of the previous proceedings that the decision cannot be constructively res judicata. The rule of constructive res judicata is really a rule of estoppel. The question now raised has already been heard and finally decided. It constitutes but a part of the prayer in the former application. It was not collaterally or incidentally but directly and substantially in issue when encl 9 was heard and decided. The answer to the matter is simple. The defendant’s only remedy was by way of an appeal against the decision of Mr Justice Chang Min Tat. The matter was heard on merits and finally decided. It is not capable of re-adjudication by the same court in the same suit. The defendant could certainly reagitate the matter before the Federal Court if the plaintiff finally succeeds in obtaining judgment and an appeal is filed against that judgment. The law, as I understand it, is that the defendant is precluded from filing a second application in respect of a matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier application (encl 9) in this very court. If a decision has been given with respect to a matter or part of a matter in controversy between the parties by a court of competent jurisdiction it remains binding in the subsequent stages of the same proceedings in the same court and cannot be reopened in that court. In my view an erroneous decision irrespective of whether it is on a question of law or fact operates as res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision seems to have no bearing upon the question whether it operates as res judicata or not. Until that decision is reversed or set aside on appeal its finality and binding force remain operative on the parties. (Emphasis added.) We may add that the doctrine of functus officio is, upon closer examination, really part and parcel of the wider doctrine of res judicata. See Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd . It is merely another way of saying that it is not open to the court to countenance the particular cause or matter because it has already been finally disposed of. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Action against co-defendant after having allowed judgment in default to be entered against itself — No cause of action or issue between parties in earlier proceedings — Allegations in subsequent suit related to matters not determined in default judgment — Default judgment to be given restricted operation — Whether res judicata apply to estop institution of subsequent proceedings against co-defendant

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-355 In February 1986, one Nadarajah commenced proceedings (‘the earlier proceedings’) against the appellant and the respondent as co-defendants for loss allegedly caused to him by their negligence and fraud. The summons was duly served on the appellant who failed to enter an appearance. The respondent however, on being served, entered an appearance and filed a defence. Nadarajah then obtained a judgment in default of appearance against the appellant. Subsequently, Nadarajah obtained a garnishee order against the appellant whereupon the appellant settled the judgment sum. Upon being paid the judgment sum by the appellant, Nadarajah discontinued the earlier proceedings against the respondent. In March 1989, the appellant commenced proceedings against the respondent to recoup from the respondent the sum paid to Nadarajah. It was alleged that the respondent had been guilty of fraud or negligence in opening a saving account in the name of Nadarajah and in negotiating the warrant issued by the appellant through that account and thereafter paying out the proceeds to persons other than Nadarajah. The respondent raised the following preliminary objections: (i) the appellant in having allowed a judgment in default to be entered against it, the doctrine of res judicata would operate to estop the appellant from bringing this action; (ii) the action was statute-barred; and (iii) the appellant had been guilty of laches, acquiescence and delay in bringing this action. The magistrate upheld the preliminary objections and struck out the appellant’s summons and statement of claim. The appellant appealed. Held, allowing the appeal: (1) The position of the appellant and respondent to each other in the earlier proceedings was that of co-defendants. They did not occupy the position of plaintiff and defendant respectively so that it could be said there was a cause of action or issue between them. Thus, the submission of the respondent that the matter directly and substantially in issue between the parties had been heard and finally decided was incorrect (see p 519F–H). (2) The default judgment against the appellant must be given a restricted operation and regarded as a decree that adjudged that ||Page 513>>Nadarajah was entitled to recover the loss from the appellant being the value of the warrant issued in Nadarajah’s name. The judgment would estop the appellant from denying such fact and nothing more. But what the appellant alleged in this suit against the respondent related to the matters not determined in the default judgment (see p 520B–D). (3) The default judgment was not a judgment obtained by the respondent against the appellant. Since it was obtained by Nadarajah, it was doubtful if it can now be claimed by the respondent that that judgment decided the very same issues that is now raised between the appellant and the respondent (see p 520D–E). (4) On the particular facts of the case, the court found that it would be inappropriate to apply the full rigours of the doctrine of res judicata. The default judgment was to be given a restricted operation. Accordingly the court held that the appellant was not estopped from bringing the claim against the respondent (see p 520F–G). (5) Damage was caused to the appellant when the savings account was allegedly

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-356 opened by an unauthorized person on 24 October 1978 and completed when the last withdrawal was made on 17 November 1978. At the latest, the appellant’s cause of action accrued from that date. Having commenced the proceedings in negligence on 31 March 1989, the appellant’s claim was barred by s 6(1) of the Limitation Act (see pp 520I–521A, D). (6) In so far as the appellant’s action based on fraud was concerned, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff had discovered the fraud. When the preliminary objection was taken, there was no evidence regarding the state of knowledge of the appellant. The question as to when the appellant discovered the fraud was not suitable for determination as a preliminary objection on the basis of the evidence before the court and should have been tried (see pp 521E, 522B–C). (7) The defence of laches and acquiescence being equitable remedies must give way to the statutory bar found in the Limitation Act and so would not apply in this case. Further, whether the respondent had by passage of time suffered prejudice through difficulty in gathering witnesses and evidence was a question of fact that was necessary to be proved by evidence which was not available when the preliminary objection was taken (see p 523A–C).]

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pada Februari 1986, seorang bernama Nadarajah memulakan prosiding-prosiding (‘prosiding-prosiding terdahulu tersebut’) terhadap perayu dan responden sebagai defendan bersama untuk kerugian yang dikatakan diakibatkan kepadanya melalui kecuaian dan ||Page 514>>fraud mereka. Saman tersebut telah disampaikan kepada perayu yang gagal untuk memasuki kehadiran. Namun responden selepas disampaikan, memasuki kehadiran dan memfailkan pembelaan. Kemudian Nadarajah memperoleh penghakiman ingkar kerana tidak hadir terhadap perayu. Kemudian Nadarajah memperoleh perintah garnis terhadap perayu di mana perayu menyelesaikan jumlah penghakiman. Selepas dibayar jumlah penghakiman oleh perayu, Nadarajah tidak meneruskan prosiding-prosiding terdahulu terhadap responden tersebut. Pada bulan Mac 1989, perayu tersebut telah memulakan prosiding-prosiding terhadap responden untuk mendapatkan kembali daripada responden jumlah yang dibayar kepada Nadarajah. Dikatakan bahawa responden adalah bersalah kerana fraud dan kecuaian dalam membuka akaun simpanan di dalam nama Nadarajah dan dalam merundingkan waran yang dikeluarkan oleh perayu melalui akaun tersebut dan kemudian membayar kepada orang lain yang selain daripada Nadarajah. Responden telah membangkitkan bantahan-bantahan awal yang berikut: (i) perayu dalam membenarkan penghakiman ingkar dimasuki terhadapnya, doktrin res judicata akan beroperasi untuk menghalang perayu daripada membawa tindakan ini; (ii) tindakan tersebut adalah dihalang oleh statut; dan (iii) perayu telah bersalah kerana lalai melaksanakan hak, akuiesens dam kelengahan di dalam membawa tindakan ini. Majistret telah menerima bantahan-bantahan awal tersebut dan membatalkan saman-saman perayu dan pernyataan tuntutan. Perayu telah merayu.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-357 Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Kedudukan perayu dan responden sesama sendiri di dalam prosiding-prosiding terdahulu adalah sebagai defendan bersama. Mereka tidak mengambil tempat plaintif dan defendan masing-masing sehingga ia boleh dikatakan bahawa terdapat kausa tindakan atau isu antara mereka. Dengan itu, hujahan responden bahawa perkara tersebut secara terus dan sebahagian besar adalah berkenaan isu antara pihak-pihak yang telah didengar dan akhirnya diputuskan adalah tidak betul (lihat ms 519F–H). (2) Penghakiman ingkar terhadap perayu mestilah diberikan operasi yang terhad dan dianggap sebagai suatu dikri yang memutuskan bahawa Nadarajah berhak untuk mendapat kembali kerugian tersebut daripada perayu yang merupakan nilai waran yang dikeluarkan dalam nama Nadarajah. Penghakiman tersebut akan menghalang perayu daripada menafikan fakta sedemikian dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Tetapi apa yang dikatakan oleh perayu dalam guaman ini terhadap responden adalah berkaitan dengan perkara-perkara yang tidak ditentukan di dalam penghakiman ingkar (lihat ms 520B–D). (3) Penghakiman ingkar tersebut bukanlah penghakiman yang diperoleh oleh responden terhadap perayu. Oleh kerana ia diperoleh oleh Nadarajah, ia adalah disangsikan jika ia sekarang ||Page 515>>boleh dihujahkan oleh responden bahawa penghakiman tersebut memutuskan isu-isu sama yang dibangkitkan antara perayu dan responden (lihat ms 520D–E). (4) Di atas fakta-fakta tertentu kes, mahkamah mendapati bahawa ia adalah tidak sesuai untuk memakai doktrin res judicata sepenuhnya dengan ketat. Penghakiman ingkar tersebut patutlah diberikan operasi yang terhad. Dengan itu, mahkamah memutuskan bahawa perayu tidak diestop daripada membawa tuntutan tersebut terhadap responden (lihat ms 520F–G). (5) Kerugian telah diakibatkan kepada perayu apabila akaun simpanan dikatakan telah dibuka oleh seorang yang tidak diberi kuasa pada 24 Oktober 1978 dan ditamatkan apabila pengeluaran terakhir dibuat pada 17 November 1978. Paling lewat pun, kausa tindakan perayu terakru dari tarikh tersebut. Oleh kerana prosiding-prosiding dalam kecuaian telah dimulakan pada 31 Mac 1989, tuntutan perayu dihalang oleh s 6(1) Akta Had Masa (lihat ms 520I–521A, D). (6) Sejauh mana tindakan perayu yang berdasarkan fraud adalah berkenaan, tempoh had masa tidak mula dikira sehingga plaintif telah mengetahui mengenai fraud tersebut. Apabila bantahan awal diterima, tiada keterangan berkenaan dengan keadaan pengetahuan perayu. Persoalan bila perayu mengetahui fraud tersebut tidak sesuai untuk ditentukan sebagai bantahan awal di atas dasar keterangan di hadapan mahkamah dan sepatutnya dibicarakan (lihat ms 521E, 522B–C). (7) Pembelaan lalai melaksanakan hak dan akuiesens yang merupakan remedi ekuiti mestilah membuka jalan kepada halangan statutori yang terdapat di dalam Akta Had Masa dan dengan itu tidak terpakai kepada kes ini. Selanjutnya, sama ada responden telah melalui perjalanan masa mengalami E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-358 prejudis melalui kesukaran untuk mengumpulkan saksi-saksi dan keterangan adalah persoalan fakta yang perlu dibuktikan melalui keterangan yang tidak terdapat semasa bantahan awal diterima (lihat ms 523A–C).] For cases on res judicata generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3959–4032.

(a) the appellant in having allowed a judgment in default to be entered against it, the doctrine of res judicata would operate to estop the appellant from bringing this action; (b) the action is statute barred; (c) the appellant has been guilty of laches, acquiescence and delay in bringing this action.

Res judicata

The submission of Mr Silvanathan of counsel for the respondent is that ‘there were earlier proceedings between the same parties on the same subject matter and upon the same cause of action; the matters directly and substantially in issue had been heard and finally decided by the court and execution proceeded with’. It was counsel’s submission that having failed to put forward its claim in the earlier proceedings due to its own fault and negligence, the doctrine of res judicata would operate to estop the appellant from ‘raising the same cause of action and the same issues in this suit.’ Counsel for the appellant on the other hand submitted that the doctrine of res judicata had no application to the facts of this case as the judgment in the earlier proceedings did not decide the issues now raised in this suit between the appellant and respondent. In any event, submits counsel for the appellant, a judgment in default cannot give rise to an estoppel as such a judgment constitutes an exception to the doctrine of res judicata. The authorities cited to me show that the public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be a finality to litigation. No one should be vexed twice for the same cause of action; there should not be multiplicity of proceedings. Therefore, where a given matter between two parties has been adjudicated upon by a court, the doctrine of res judicata, in its wider application, will operate to prevent the parties or their privies from reagitating not only the points actually decided by the court but also issues which might have been but which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertance. See the Supreme Court decision in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189. However, the authorities also show that there are exceptions to the application of the doctrine of res judicata. In the course of his judgment in the Asia Commerclal Finance case, Peh Swee Chin SCJ, stated that a default judgment may constitute such an exception. In so stating, Peh Swee Chin SCJ, made reference first to the passage in the judgment of Wigram VC in the celebrated case of Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at p 115 which reads:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-359

It may be of interest to point out that one of the exceptional special cases is the effect of a default judgment in subsequent proceedings between the same parties, a default judgment is different from a final judgment on the merits, ... Please see the finer points of law in regard to default judgments from the position of the doctrine of res judicata in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49. In Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49, their Lordships of the Privy Council discussed the operation of the doctrine of res judicata in the context of a judgment in default. They opined that while from one point of view a default judgment can be looked on as a judgment by consent and therefore capable of giving rise to all the consequences of a judgment obtained in a contested action or with the consent or acquiescence of the parties, yet, from another point of view, a default judgment might be regarded as nothing more than establishing as a fact that a defendant has for unascertained reasons, negligence, ignorance or indifference, allowed judgment to be entered against him in a particular suit in question. Given these two views, their Lordships went on to say that: My understanding of the decision in Kok Hoong’s case is that, while a default judgment is capable of giving rise to an estoppel, it would be wrong to apply the full rigours of the doctrine of res judicata to every case involving a default judgment, without reference to the particular facts before the court. In an appropriate case, where the facts warrant it, a much more restricted operation will be given to any estoppel arising from a default judgment. Such a judgment will only estop what must ‘necessarily and with complete precision’ have been decided by that judgment, from being reopened before the court on another occassion. Accordingly, on the particular facts of this case, I find that it would be inappropriate to apply here the full rigours of the doctrine of res judicata. The default judgment is to be given a restricted operation. I accordingly hold that the appellant is not estopped from bringing this claim against the respondent. Secondly, in so far as the respondent seeks to rely on acquiescence to defeat the appellant’s claim by way of an estoppel, I believe the appellant is not so estopped for the reasons already given when discussing res judicata. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Senior assistant registrar dismissed first action as right defendant was not cited — Sole issue was not determined yet — Whether res judicata can be pleaded The defendant applied to strike out the plaintiff’s action. Counsel for the defendant argued that the subject matter of the action was res judicata as it was related to a previous action filed before another branch of the High Court in Kuala Lumpur vide Civil Suit No S1–22–141–1996 (‘the first action’) which was struck out summarily by the senior assistant registrar (‘the SAR’). Counsel for the defendant submitted that the same issues was finally determined by the SAR when the latter struck off the first action. Held, dismissing the application: The issue in the first action and this present action was whether the properties in both the suits were held on trust for the Association of Chha Yong Fay Kuan Selangor and Wilayah Persekutuan or for the descendants of the estate of Wong Chi Siu @ Ong Chee Siew. The SAR ruled that the public officer of the Association of Chha Yon Fay

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-360 Kuan Selangor should be the right defendant and should be sued and for that reason the SAR struck out the first action. Thus the present action was filed citing the right defendant (see pp 77I–78B). The sole issue has not been adjudicated by the SAR. There was no finality, no conclusiveness, no final determination with precision of the issue in the first action. The doctrine of res judicata can never be applied by the defendant in this action (see p 83F–G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Defendan telah memohon untuk membatalkan tindakan plaintif. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa perkara pokok di dalam tindakan tersebut adalah res judicata kerana ia berkaitan dengan satu tindakan terdahulu yang telah difailkan di hadapan cabang lain Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur melalui Guaman Sivil No S1–22–141–1996 (‘tindakan pertama’) yang telah dibatalkan secara terus oleh penolong pendaftar kanan (‘SAR tersebut’). Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa isu-isu yang sama akhirnya telah ditentukan oleh SAR tersebut apabila beliau membatalkan tindakan pertama tersebut.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut:

Isu di dalam tindakan pertama tersebut dan tindakan sekarang ini adalah sama ada harta-harta di dalam kedua-dua tindakan guaman tersebut dipegang atas amanah untuk Persatuan Chha Yong Fay ||Page 75>>Kuan Selangor dan Wilayah Persekutuan atau untuk waris-waris harta pusaka Wong Chi Siu @ Ong Chee Siew. SAR tersebut telah memberi perintah bahawa pegawai awam bagi Persatuan Chha Yong Fay Kuan Selangor patut dijadikan defendan yang sebetulnya dan patut disaman dan oleh sebab itulah SAR tersebut telah membatalkan tindakan pertama tersebut. Oleh itu, tindakan ini telah difailkan dengan menyaman defendan yang betul (lihat ms77I–78B). Satu-satunya isu itu telah tidak dibuat keputusan oleh SAR tersebut. Terdapat ketiadaan kemuktamadan, ketiadaan pertikaian yang kukuh, ketiadaan penentuan muktamad yang tepat tentang isu di dalam tindakan pertama tersebut. Doktrin res judicata tidak mungkin boleh digunakan oleh defendan di dalam tindakan ini (lihat ms 83F–G).] For cases on res judicata, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3959–4032. This was an application by way of a summons in chambers filed by the defendant in encl 8 for the plaintiffs action to be struck out on the grounds that the action filed by the plaintiff constituted an abuse of the process of the court and particularly that the subject matter of ||Page 77>>the action was said to be res judicata. Enclosure 8 was supported by an affidavit of Chiew Hon Keong that was affirmed on 14 July 1998 and which was filed on 17 July 1998 as seen in encl 7. There was no affidavit in reply to encl 7 and this was agreed by both parties. Tun Salleh Abas, learned senior counsel for the plaintiff, rightly pointed out that there was no necessity to file an affidavit in reply to that of encl 7 as the whole matter revolved on a question of law. Tun Salleh Abas, with vigour and vitality, summarized the law on res judicata in this way. It E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-361 was his submission that there must be three pre-requisites before the doctrine of res judicata can come into play: I do not propose to examine the merits of the whole case. Enclosure 8 revolved entirely on the doctrine of res judicata and it was the submission of Mr Chin Yew Meng that the same issue was finally determined by the SAR when the latter struck off the first action. Was he correct? Certainly not. The doctrine of res judicata is based on public convenience. Lord Blackburn in Lockyer v Ferryman (1877) 2 App Cas 519 (HL) had this to say at p 530 of the report :

The object of the rule of res judicata is always put upon two grounds the one public policy, that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of litigation, and the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.

The plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine, but a fundamental doctrine based on the view that there must be an end to litigation. The philosophical background of the doctrine of res judicata was appropriately put by Diplock LJ in Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181 (CA) at p 197 in these fine words: A res judicata is nothing more than a judicial decision, pronounced by a judicial tribunal having competent jurisdiction to adjudicate and arrive at a final judicial decision. Thus, judgments, orders, decrees, sentences, declarations, etc, of judicial tribunals have been held and considered to be res judicata — meaning conclusive and unimpeachable on the merits. The case of Francis, Times & Co v Carr [1900] 82 LT 698 (CA) is an example ||Page 81>>of a decision which did not amount to res judicata. In that case, the defendant set up, by way of estoppel, the report of a commission appointed by the Sultan of Muscat. That report was meant to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the seizure by the defendant when the defendant was in command of one of Her Majestys gunboats. The report of the commission was submitted to and subsequently adopted by the Sultan in toto. In that report, the commission reported that the seizure was lawful. Vaughan Williams LJ delivering the judgment of the court held that the inquiry and the report were made for the information and guidance of the Sultan and, consequently, the report by the commission was not a judicial decision. To augment the defence of res judicata, it would be necessary to show that the subject matter in dispute was the same (Hoystead v Taxation Comr [1926] AC 155 (PC); Moss v Anglo-Egyptian Navigation Co (1865) 1 Ch App 108; Re Hilton; ex p March (1892) 67 LT 594; Worman v Worman (1889) 43 Ch D 296 at p 306; Re Surfleets Estate, Rawlings v Smith [1911] 105 LT 582; Bradshaw v McMullan (1920) 2 IR 412 at p 423 (HL); and Re Waring, Westminster Bank v Burton-Butler (1948) Ch 221, (1948) 1 All ER 257). Next, it would also be necessary to show that the matter came before a court of competent jurisdiction (A-G for Trinidad and Tobago v Eriche [1893] AC 518 at p 522, 523 PC; Eastwood and Holt v Studer (1926) 31 Com Cas 251; IRC v Sneath [1932] 2 KB 362 at p 380, 388 (CA)) . It is germane to mention that a judgment of a court which has no jurisdiction to pronounce it, is said to be void and cannot, in law, give rise to an estoppel. Finally, it would be necessary to show that the judicial tribunal came to a conclusive decision binding on every other court (Behrens v Sieveking (1837) 2 My & Cr 602 at p 603; Eastwood and Holt v Studer (1926) 31 Com Cas 251; and Bradshaw v McMullan (1920) 2 IR 412 at pp 423, 424 (HL)). In my judgment, the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-362 doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine. It is a simple doctrine which ensures that there must be an end to litigation (Webster v Armstrong (1885) 54 LJ QB 236; MacDougall v Knight (1890) 25 QBD 1 (CA); and Green v Weatherill [1929] 2 Ch 213). Here, the defendant raised the doctrine of res judicata by way of an estoppel to the present action. The defendant was in fact saying that the whole legal rights and obligations of the parties have been concluded in the first action by the SAR. I am entitled to look at the decision of the SAR as well as to the notes of evidence (exh CHK 7 of encl 7) to arrive at a just decision as to whether the doctrine of res judicata can be invoked in favour of the defendant (Randolph v Tuck [1962] 1 QB 175, [1961] 1 All ER 814; Marginson v Blackburn Borough Council ; and Sterling Engineering Co Ltd v Patchett [1955] AC 534, [1955] 1 All ER 369). The case of Re Bullen (No 2) (1972) 29 DLR ((3d) 257 (BC) allows this court to have regard to the reasons for the judgment of the SAR in order to determine the question of law decided in the first action and having done so, it was my judgment that the decision of the SAR in the first action was not conclusive and was not binding in regard to the present action. In short, the cause of action had not been determined on the merits (Badar Bee v Habib Merican Noording [1909] AC 615 (PC); Livesey v Harding (1855) 21 Beav 227; A-G v Rochester Corp (1833) 6 Sim ||Page 82>>273; and Glasgow and South-Western Railway Co v Boyd and Forrest [1918] SC 14).

I think it may not be an unreasonable inference to draw from all the facts and circumstances leading to the interim injunction and subsequently to the order vacating the interim injunction that the parties had confined themselves to the issue only of the interim injunction and not to the suit as a whole. Thus the hearing and arguments during the interim injunction stage were not exhaustive for the determination of the issues involved in the suit. In view of all these matters it seems to me that the plea of res judicata should not prevail and that in the interest of justice there should be a full hearing of the suit itself. For this reason too I hold that the presiding judge who would now hear this suit is not functus officio and therefore not precluded from hearing the case.

To invoke the doctrine of res judicata the respondent has to show that there was a former suit between the same parties for the same matter and upon the same cause of action, and also that the matter directly and substantially in issue has been heard and finally decided by the court which heard it.

The next point which I had to consider was the defence of res judicata set up by the defendant. For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, a defendant has to show that there was a former suit between the same parties for the same matter and upon the same cause of action, and also that the matter directly and substantially in issue has been heard and finally decided by the court which heard it. To see what was decided in the previous case it is necessary to look at the judgment itself (per Ismail Khan J in Andavan v Thong Nyik Lin [1966] 1 MLJ 57.

The doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam is reflected in two Latin maxims, (i) interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium; and (ii) nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa. The former is public policy and the latter is private justice. The rule of estoppel by res judicata, which is a rule of evidence, is

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-363 that where a final ||Page 83>>decision has been pronounced by a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of the litigation, any party or privy to such litigation as against any other party or privy is estopped in any subsequent litigation from disputing or questioning such decision on the merits (Spencer Bower on Res Judicata, p 3). As originally categorized, res judicata was known as `estoppel by record. But as it is now quite immaterial whether the judicial decision is pronounced by a tribunal which is required to keep a written record of its decisions, this nomenclature has disappeared and it may be convenient to describe res judicata in its true and original form as ‘cause of action estoppel’. This has long been recognized as operating as a complete bar if the necessary conditions are present. Within recent years the principle has developed so as to extend to what is now described as ‘issue estoppel’, that is to say where in a judicial decision between the same parties some issue which was in controversy between the parties and was incidental to the main decision has been decided, then that may create an estoppel per rem judicatam Lord Denning too in Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v v/o Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630 had this to say of the doctrine of res judicata and issue estoppel at p 640 of the report: At the end of the day, it was up to me to decide whether the doctrine of res judicata can be called to the aid of the defendant. The sole issue has not been adjudicated by the SAR. There was no finality, no conclusiveness, no final determination with precision of the issue in the first action. That being the case, the doctrine of res judicata can never be applied by the defendant in the context of the present action. For these varied reasons, encl 8 should be dismissed with costs. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Commencement of suit after interlocutory judgment entered against plaintiff — Earlier interlocutory judgment entered not on merits, whether res judicata apply — Whether plaintiff had raised present claim either by way of counterclaim or separate suit in earlier proceedings The first defendant was a Singapore merchant bank carrying on business in Singapore. The second defendant was the first defendant’s management arm with a place of business in Singapore. Relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants began in 1993 with the execution of three agreements between them. There was no dispute that the plaintiff did avail himself of the banking facilities given by the first defendant and went into default. The first defendant applied for summary judgment against the plaintiff in the Singapore High Court. The plaintiff was granted conditional leave to defend. The condition was that the plaintiff had to deposit RM2m into court. The plaintiff failed to do that and accordingly the defence was struck out and interlocutory judgment entered against the plaintiff. Subsequently the plaintiff commenced this suit against the defendants in the Kuala Lumpur High Court. The defendants applied to set aside the notice of writ on the grounds of res judicata and forum non convenience. The plaintiff submitted that the suit was grounded upon a series of dealings which transpired between the defendants’ representatives and the plaintiff in Malaysia. The plaintiff had never visited the defendants’ offices in Singapore. The entire dealings were concluded in Malaysia. The plaintiff also submitted that his cause of action in Malaysia was distinct and independent of the Singapore proceedings. The senior assistant registrar dismissed the defendants’ application. The defendants appealed. Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The proceedings in Singapore based on the three agreements was solely to E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-364 recover a debt due and owing from the plaintiff to the first defendant only. The plaintiff had not at any point of time raised his present claim either by way of counterclaim or by a separate suit in the Singapore proceedings. The plaintiff had merely averred these matters amongst others in his affidavit to oppose the application for summary judgment. It was not a claim for redress as such and no adverse findings ought to be made against the plaintiff simply because he had averred these matters in his affidavit in Singapore (see p 470G–H). ||Page 462>> (2) The interlocutory judgment was obtained against the plaintiff not on the merits of the proceedings in Singapore but merely because the plaintiff failed to provide the security of RM2m. In the circumstances there was no question of res judicata arising at all (see p 471B–C). (3) For res judicata to arise there must be a judgment on the issues that are before the court and an order giving leave to defend is not a judgment. It is a decision that there should not be judgment for the plaintiff. An order giving leave to defend as granted to the plaintiff by the Singapore High Court was not a judgment but a decision (see p 471E–F); United Commercial Bank v Yap Cheng Hai & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 207 followed. (4) In order to obtain summary judgment in Singapore, the first defendant admitted that the plaintiff’s cause of action, if any, for alleged breaches of the agreement was a ‘completely different entity’ and was ‘completely distinct’. Having contended in like manner, it did not behove the defendants to now contend that all these matters pleaded in the present statement of claim should have been raised in the proceedings in Singapore. Clearly the defendants were guilty of approbation and reprobation and the court would not condone it (see p 474A–D). (5) Since the plaintiff’s claim filed in this court was based on the representations made between the first defendant’s representatives and the plaintiff and since a new party, namely the second defendant was also being included and since all the representations were made in Malaysia and since the plaintiff had never visited the defendants’ offices in Singapore, this claim ought properly to be heard in Malaysia and this court was the proper forum conveniens. The plaintiff resided in Malaysia and the shares complained of were all quoted in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange which were within this court’s jurisdiction. Further, the witnesses for the plaintiff would be from Malaysia and the defendants’ main witnesses were all too familiar with Malaysia (see p 474E–H).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Defendan pertama adalah bank perdagangan Singapura yang menjalankan perniagaan di Singapura. Defendan kedua adalah bahagian pengurusan defendan pertama dengan tempat perniagaan di Singapura. Hubungan antara plaintif dan defendan-defendan bermula pada tahun 1993 dengan pelaksanaan tiga perjanjian antara mereka. Tiada pertikaian bahawa plaintif menggunakan kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan yang

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-365 diberikan oleh defendan pertama dan ingkar untuk membayar. Defendan pertama memohon untuk penghakiman terus terhadap plaintif di Mahkamah Tinggi Singapura. Plaintif diberikan kebenaran bersyarat untuk membuat pembelaan. ||Page 463>>Syaratnya adalah bahawa plaintif mestilah mendepositkan RM2 juta di mahkamah. Plaintif gagal untuk berbuat demikian dan dengan itu pembelaan tersebut dibatalkan dan penghakiman interlokutori dimasukkan terhadap plaitnif. Kemudian plaintif memulakan tindakan ini terhadap defendan-defendan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. Defendan-defendan memohon untuk mengetepikan notis writ atas alasan-alasan res judicata dan forum non convenience. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa tindakan tersebut adalah berdasarkan siri-siri urusan yang berlaku antara wakil defendan-defendan dan plaintif di Malaysia. Plaintif tidak pernah melawat pejabat defendan di Singapura. Keseluruhan urusan telah disempurnakan di Malaysia. Plaintif juga menghujahkan bahawa kausa tindakannya di Malaysia adalah berasingan dan bebas dari prosiding-prosiding di Singapura. Penolong kanan pendaftar menolak permohonan defendan. Defendan merayu. Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Prosiding-prosiding di Singapura berdasarkan tiga perjanjian tersebut adalah bertujuan semata-mata untuk mendapat kembali hutang yang tertunggak dan kena dibayar daripada plaintif kepada defendan pertama sahaja. Plaintif tidak pada sebarang masa sekali pun membangkitkan tuntutan ini sama ada melalui tuntutan balas atau melalui tindakan yang berasingan di dalam prosiding-prosiding di Singapura. Plaintif hanya mengesahkan perkara-perkara ini antara lain di dalam afidavitnya untuk menentang permohonan untuk penghakiman terus. Ia bukanlah tuntutan untuk tebus rugi dan tiada penemuan bertentangan patut dibuat terhadap plaintif semata-mata kerana beliau menegaskan perkara perkara tersebut di dalam afidavitnya di Singapura (lihat ms 470G–H). (2) Penghakiman interlokutori telah diperoleh terhadap plaintif bukan atas merit prosiding-prosiding di Singapura tetapi hanya semata-mata plaintif gagal untuk memberikan jaminan RM2 juta. Di dalam keadaan-keadaan tersebut, tidak terdapat persoalan res judicata yang timbul langsung (lihat ms 471B–C). (3) Untuk res judicata berbangkit mestilah terdapat penghakiman atas isu-isu di hadapan mahkamah dan suatu perintah memberikan kebenaran untuk membela bukanlah suatu penghakiman. Ia adalah keputusan bahawa tidak sepatutnya terdapat penghakiman untuk plaintif. Suatu perintah memberikan kebenaran untuk membela seperti yang diberikan kepada plaintif oleh mahkamah Singapura bukanlah suatu penghakiman tetapi suatu keputusan (lihat ms 471E–F); United Commercial Bank v Yap Cheng Hai & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 207 diikut. (4) Untuk memastikan agar penghakiman terus diperolehi di Singapura, defendan pertama telah mengaku bahawa kausa ||Page 464>>tindakan plaintif, jika ada, untuk pengataan-pengataan pelanggaran perjanjian adalah ‘entiti yang langsung berasingan’ dan ‘berbeza sepenuhnya’. Oleh kerana telah menegaskan dengan cara tersebut, adalah tidak

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-366 terbuka kepada defendan-defendan untuk sekarang menegaskan bahawa perkara-perkara tersebut yang diplidkan di dalam pernyataan tuntutan sekarang sepatutnya dibangkitkan di dalam prosiding-prosiding di Singapura. Dengan jelas defendan-defendan menerima apa yang baik saja dan mengetepikan yang buruk dan mahkamah tidak akan membenarkannya (lihat ms 474A–D). (5) Oleh kerana tuntutan plaintif yang difailkan di mahkamah ini adalah berdasarkan representasi-representasi yang dibuat antara wakil-wakil defendan pertama dan plaintif dan oleh kerana pihak yang baru iaitu, defendan kedua juga dimasukkan dan oleh kerana semua representasi-representasi adalah dibuat di Malaysia dan oleh kerana plaintif tidak pernah melawat pejabat defendan-defendan di Singapura, tuntutan ini sepatutnya didengar di Malaysia dan mahkamah ini adalah forum conveniens yang sesuai. Plaintif telah tinggal di Malaysia dan saham-saham yang diadukan semuanya dinyatakan di dalam Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur yang di bawah bidang kuasa mahkamah. Selanjutnya, saksi-saksi untuk plaintif akan datang dari Malaysia dan saksi-saksi utama defendan adalah amat biasa dengan Malaysia (lihat ms 474E-H).] For cases on res judicata generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3959–4032. Dr Das for the defendants argued that this suit before me is premised on the very same transactions that were in issue in the Singapore proceedings, namely, the two facility agreements and the management agreement and matters relating thereto. Dr Das further argued that the said notice of writ ought to have been set aside under O 11 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) on grounds of jurisdiction, namely, that this court is forum non conveniens. He also urged the court to consider res judicata in the wider sense on the ground that all issues ought to have been brought out and litigated at one go in the proceedings in Singapore.

Res judicata

Hence the interlocutory judgment was obtained against the plaintiff, not on the merits of the proceedings in Singapore but merely because the plaintiff failed to provide the security of RM2m. It was because of this failure to provide the required security that the plaintiff’s defence was struck out and interlocutory judgment entered. In the circumstances, it is my judgment that there is no question of res judicata arising at all. I am fortified in holding this view by relying on the decision in United Commercial Bank v Yap Cheng Hai & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 207 where the plaintiffs claimed against the defendants on a document which they alleged was either an indemnity given by the defendants to the plaintiffs or alternatively that the document was a guarantee. In an earlier action, the plaintiffs had claimed against the defendants on the same document but solely on the ground that the document was a guarantee. In that action only the second defendant had been served with the proceedings. The plaintiffs then took out an O 14 application for summary judgment against him. Leave to defend was granted. The next event in that action was that the plaintiffs discontinued it and brought the present action in which the claim was in the alternative against the defendants. The issue before the court was whether the plea of res judicata did apply. The court held that E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-367 for res judicata or estoppel by record to arise, putting the matter broadly, there must be a judgment on the issues that are before the court, and an order giving leave to defend is not a judgment. It is a decision that there should not be judgment for the plaintiffs. In 1954 the petitioner, who was born in Belgium and resided there until 1954, went through a ceremony of marriage in London with the respondent, who was a domiciled Englishman. On 12 March 1970, the petitioner went through another ceremony of marriage in Italy with M who died that day leaving real property in England. If the petitioner’s marriage to M was valid she was entitled to share in that property. By a petition dated ||Page 472>>29 May 1970 filed in the Family Division of the High Court, the petitioner prayed for a declaration that her marriage to the respondent was null and void on the ground that she had not consented to it because she was ignorant of the true nature of the ceremony. A member of M’s family intervened in the proceedings to contest the relief sought. On 7 May 1971, Ormrod J dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner knew that the 1954 ceremony was a marriage ceremony and had consented to it. On 6 December 1971, the petitioner, who had returned to Belgium in May 1970 and been resident there for 18 months, began proceedings in a Belgian court seeking a declaration that the 1954 marriage was a nullity ab initio on the alternative pleas that: (i) she had not consented to the marriage through ignorance of the true nature of the ceremony; or (ii) it was a mock marriage, or mere formality, not accompanied by the parties’ intention to cohabit, and was contracted solely to enable the petitioner to acquire British nationality and avoid deportation from England. In the Belgian proceedings the respondent admitted the second plea. The intervener again intervened to oppose the relief sought, on the ground that the matter was res judicata by virtue of Ormrod J’s decision and that the validity of the 1954 marriage was governed by English law and therefore the same conclusion would be reached in the Belgian court as had been reached by Ormrod J. On 7 March 1972, the petitioner’s appeal to the English Court of Appeal from Ormrod J’s decision was dismissed by consent. On 9 June 1972 the Belgian Court decreed that the 1954 marriage was void ab initio on the ground that, although the parties had consented to it, it was a mock marriage not intended to constitute a lifelong community between them and, as such, was invalid under Belgian law. The court rejected the petitioner’s plea of lack of consent to the marriage. The intervener appealed to a Belgian Appeal Court, which on 27 April 1973 dismissed the appeal, holding that the plea of lack of consent to the marriage was barred by the res judicata afforded by Ormrod J’s decision but that the plea of a mock marriage was not res judicata since it had not been argued before Ormrod J. The court accordingly upheld the latter plea, thus rendering the marriage invalid under Belgian law. By a petition in the High Court in England dated 7 September 1973 the petitioner sought as against the respondent a declaration under O 15 r 16 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (England) that the Belgian decree was entitled to recognition in the English courts and by a further petition the petitioner applied under s 45(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (‘the Act’) for a declaration that her marriage to M was valid and subsisting at the date of his death. Members of M’s family intervened in both petitions to oppose the relief claimed in them. On 8 May 1979, Waterhouse J dismissed both petitions and his decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The petitioner appealed to the House of Lords. The appeal failed in limine with the House of Lords holding that the decision of Ormrod J that the English marriage was not rendered invalid on the ground of absence of consent was a decision on the point at issue in the Belgian courts, that is, the question of the right to have the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-368 English marriage declared void, and therefore, since the matter in dispute in the Belgian proceedings had, prior to the date of the Belgian judgment, been the subject ||Page 473>>of a final conclusive judgment by a court having jurisdiction (that is the English court), the issue was then res judicata and the Belgian judgment could not be recognized by the English courts, on the ground of cause of action estoppel. With respect to the petitioner’s application under s 45 of the Act for a declaration that the Italian marriage was valid, although she only was debarred by Ormrod J’s judgment by what was technically ‘issue estoppel’ rather than ‘cause of action estoppel’ from asserting in an English court that the English marriage was void, she was still precluded from relying on the Belgian judgment that the English marriage was invalid, since the validity of the English marriage went to the root of the question which she had to prove in order to establish the validity of the Italian marriage, that is, that the Italian marriage was not contracted at a time when the English marriage was still subsisting. It is clear therefore that this is a case resting more on res judicata and on that basis it was appropriate to apply the comity principle. The defendants therefore in my view had to cross the res judicata hurdle before seeking to apply the comity principle. I had already found that the principle of res judicata cannot apply to this case as notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff herein had in his affidavit raised some of the issues he had raised here, the first defendant, being the plaintiff in the Singapore suit had in effect muzzled this plea before me by arguing in the Singapore Court that these issues ought not to have been raised in the Singapore suit. Since I do not have the benefit of a written judgment from the assistant registrar of the High Court of Singapore, I do not know if the court had or had not accepted this submission by the first defendant. In any case, it is my judgment that the first defendant cannot approbate and reprobate. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Cause of action estoppel — Negligent misrepresentation and breach of collateral warranty — Respondent argued both causes of action already litigated — Burden on respondent to establish that both causes of action adjudicated upon — Whether respondent established this — Whether res judicata applied The first appellant (‘Kluang Wood’) was a licensed housing developer and the registered proprietor of a piece of land in Johor (‘the land’). The second appellant (‘Chew’) was a director of the first appellant. Chew was introduced to one WP Pang (‘Pang’) who was the southern regional manager of the first respondent (‘Hong Leong’). In early 1983, the appellants negotiated with Hong Leong for banking facilities to enable them to develop the land into a housing estate. A formal application was made, seeking RM4.5m as a bridging loan and RM21m as end-finance. According to Chew, during the negotiation between him and Pang, Pang agreed that Hong Leong would furnish Kluang Wood with a bridging loan and a syndicated end-finance. Pang had represented to him in the course of their ||Page 194>> negotiation that for a finance company of Hong Leong’s repute, the amounts of the end-finance and the bridging loan would not be a problem. On 26 October 1983, the first respondent approved the application vide a letter of approval. By that letter, Hong Leong had expressly or impliedly represented to Kluang Wood that a bridging loan of RM3.5m and an end-finance facility of RM26m had been approved, with Hong Leong’s share of the end-finance being RM5m. Kluang Wood pleaded that Hong Leong had further represented that the initial drawdown of the said

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-369 end- finance facility would be in the first quarter of 1984. As security for the bridging loan, Kluang Wood created a charge over the land in Hong Leong’s favour, and Chew and the other directors executed a letter of guarantee. In January 1984, Hong Leong prepared a placement memorandum for syndication of the end-finance of RM26m. However, no end-finance at all, including Hong Leong’s RM5m, was made available to Kluang Wood though the bridging loan of RM3.5m had been fully utilized by Kluang Wood. Hong Leong then took out a writ against the guarantors including Chew for recovery of the bridging loan (‘the Johor Bahru suit’). A final judgment under O 14 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 was obtained against Chew and other guarantors. Hong Leong was also granted an order for sale of the land, which was later sold to the second respondent, a wholly owned subsidiary of Hong Leong. On this, the appellants alleged that Hong Leong had acted in bad faith and/or fraudulently in the exercise of its power of sale in that it had at all times formed the intention to purchase the land by itself or through the agency of another. However, the part of the appeal was abandoned by the appellants. The appellants claimed that Hong Leong’s failure to provide the end- finance of RM26m as represented in its letter of 26 October 1983 caused the failure of the project and also disabled Kluang Wood from servicing the interest on the bridging loan. They further alleged that Hong Leong was negligent and acted in breach of its duty when it represented to Kluang Wood that the end-finance of RM26m would be made available to house buyers and that the first drawdown would be in the first quarter of 1984. They also pleaded that the representations of Hong Leong constituted a collateral warranty and in breach of the said warranty, Hong Leong had caused them loss and damage. The respondents argued that they owed no duty of care to the appellants on the alleged representation. They contended that the appellants were estopped from litigating the principal cause of action in the suit on the ground of res judicata, as the issues raised by the appellants have already been litigated by Hong Leong in the Johor Bahru suit. The trial judge had found that Hong Leong had represented to Kluang Wood that availability of the end-finance was certain, that the first drawdown thereof would be in the first quarter of 1984, and that ||Page 195>> Pang had been negligent in making the representations. Pang’s oral representations were held to constitute a collateral warranty which was breached when no part of the end-finance came from Hong Leong. The trial judge also held that Hong Leong’s plea of res judicata succeeded in that the claims of Kluang Wood and Chew in this action on negligent misrepresentations and alternatively for breach of collateral warranty could not be litigated upon because there was privity of interest between Kluang Wood and Chew in the Johor Bahru suit, Chew being a director and agent of Kluang Wood. The trial judge dismissed the appellants’ action, against which the appellants appealed. Hong Leong cross-appealed against the trial judge’s findings that Kluang Wood’s inability to service the interest on the bridging loan was due to Hong Leong’s failure to secure and provide the end-finance; the agreement between Hong Leong and Kluang Wood contained in the letter placed upon Hong Leong an obligation to secure and provide the end- finance; Pang had represented the provision of end-finance and that it would be a certainty; and the representations were

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-370 negligently made and/or were capable in law of giving rise to a collateral warranty. Held, allowing Kluang Wood’s appeal and dismissing Hong Leong’s cross- appeal: (1) (Per Lamin PCA) Since the management committee clearly approved both the bridging loan and the end-financing, the clear wording of the approval must be given effect to. The condition that stated that the ‘total end-financing facilities to be syndicated by HLFB’ must be capable of conveying the meaning that the first respondent undertook to organize and to make available the said facilities. Pang’s oral representation substantiated by the certainty of availability of the end-finance conveyed by the letter of 26 October 1983 together with the undisputed fact that no end-finance at all was available must constitute a fundamental breach by the first respondent that went to the root of the contract (see p 210D–H). (2) (Per Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)) Hong Leong’s contractual obligations could properly be ascertained from its letter of offer which Kluang Wood had accepted. This letter showed Hong Leong’s commitment to the end-finance of RM26m as it stated that Hong Leong had ‘approved’ the end-finance of RM26m. There was nothing in the letter indicating the approval being subject to any condition precedent or to Hong Leong being able to get the syndicated loan. In the circumstance, all such terms and conditions in the letter relating to the management of the end-finance by Hong Leong, the total amount of the end-finance to be syndicated and Hong Leong’s participation therein reinforced the stipulation that the end- finance would be furnished (see pp 220I and 221A–C). ||Page 196>> (3) (Per Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)) The representations contended to have been made by Pang to Chew were that for a financial institution like Hong Leong to procure a syndicated end- finance of RM21m would present no problem and that the availability of the syndicated loan was not qualified. Relying on the aforesaid representations, Kluang Wood applied for and obtained approval of the facilities including the availability of the syndicated end-finance. Since Chew was not challenged about Pang making the representations and Pang did not give evidence, the learned trial judge was justified in concluding that Pang had made the representations and that they were ‘unrebutted and unchallenged’ (see p 221D–H). (4) (Per Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) and Mohamed Dzaiddin FCJ) It was stipulated that the end-finance would be ‘drawdown in proportion to the work-in-progress as certified by the project’s architect’. However, there was no evidence to show that the architect’s certificate required under the said letter had been issued. On the evidence, the first drawdown might have been furnished had the requisite certificate been issued. Therefore, no blame ought to be attributed to Hong Leong.This, however, did not apply to Hong Leong’s total failure of making available the end-finance after the first quarter of 1984. In this respect, there had been a fundamental breach by Hong Leong that went to the root of the contract. The trial judge rightly found that failure of the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-371 project was not due to any poor planning and mismanagement thereof. Hong Leong could not use the lack of architect’s certificates as an excuse for its own fundamental failure (see pp 221I and 222A–F). (5) (Per Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)) Although the notes of evidence did not show that Chew had used the word ‘certainty’ in his testimony, it was not unfair or unreasonable for the trial judge to conclude that what Pang had represented to Chew gave the latter the impression of certainty of the availability of the end-finance. The facts and the circumstances and the manner in which the trial judge treated the representations showed that she was fully aware that a case of making statements negligently had to be made out. The trial judge was right in finding that Pang had been negligent in making the statements upon which Kluang Wood had acted (see pp 223A–C and 225E); Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 followed. (6) (Per Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)) If additional evidence on the collateral warranties fall within the scope of proviso (b) to s 92 of the Evidence Act 1950, it may be admitted in evidence. In considering whether the proviso applies, the nature of the written agreement and its surrounding ||Page 197>> circumstances must be considered. The matters about certainty of the end-finance and Pang’s utterances giving rise to the impression of such certainty are not in the letter. Further, the utterance about the timing of the first drawdown was admissible as no time-frame about the first drawdown was given in the said letter. As a result of breach of the collateral warranty by Hong Leong, the trial judge rightly held that the failure of the project was due to unavailability of the end-finance (see p 226D–H). (7) (Per Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)) Hong Leong’s plea was in fact a plea of res judicata by way of estoppel to the two entire causes of actions. In the face of such allegations by Hong Leong, the trial judge and this court were entitled to look at the reasons for the decision and the notes of evidence of the trial judge in the Johor Bahru suit to determine whether the two questions constituting the causes of actions had been determined. However, the grounds or reasons for the decision in the Johor Bahru suit were not exhibited in this case. Hence, it had not been established that the two questions or causes of action had been adjudicated upon, the burden of which lies on the party who alleges it, ie Hong Leong (see p 228D–G). (8) (Per Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)) The point on whether Kluang Wood and Chew were estopped from raising the second claim of fraudulent or improper exercise of power of auction sale on the ground that such claim could have been raised as a counterclaim in the charge action commenced by Hong Leong against Kluang Wood need not be dealt with. The auction sale under which the fraudulent or improper exercise of the power of sale was alleged to have arisen took place after the making of the sale order. Therefore, the allegations could not possibly be raised in the charge action. Further, the trial judge had held that the allegations constituting the second claim failed; and the appeal relating to this second claim had been abandoned. Therefore, the contention had no merit and must fail (see p 230D–G). E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-372 (9) (Per Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)) Whether there is sufficient connection to constitute privity of interest would depend on an examination of the interests of the parties and the fairness of binding them by a decision in which they were not represented. With regards to Kluang Wood, there was no valid ground for holding that Kluang Wood was in privity of interest with Chew in the Johor Bahru suit or that they were so linked as to make the doctrine of res judicata applicable (see p 232D–E). (10) (Per Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)) An agent who has contracted for a disclosed and named principal cannot sue on the contract. This is so even if he is the real principal, unless the other party has affirmed the contract with knowledge of that ||Page 198>> fact. In the instant case, Chew, to the knowledge of Hong Leong, negotiated for Kluang Wood throughout. The right of action to which the collateral warranty gives rise is personal as between the two contracting parties concerned. As between them, breach of the warranty may form the basis of an action for damages, but it does not normally entitle a non- contracting party to sue thereon. Therefore, Chew could not sue on the two causes of action (see pp 232H–I and 233A). Cases referred to (majority judgments) Antonio Dias Caldeira v Frederick Augustus Gray [1936] MLJ 110 (refd) Benmax v Austine Motor Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 326 (refd) Bickerton v Burrell (1816) 5 M & S 383 (refd) Box v Midland Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 391 (refd) Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 (refd) Chin Sin Motor Works Sdn Bhd & Anor v Arosa Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 23 (refd) Chow Yee Wah & Anor v Choo Ah Pat [1978] 2 MLJ 41 (refd) Clarke v Edinburgh Tramways Co 1919 AIR SC 35 (refd) Collins v Hopkins [1923] 2 KB 617 (refd) Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] 2 All ER 5 (refd) Evans v Hooper [1875] 1 QBD 45 (refd) Fairlie v Fenton (1870) LR 5 Exch 169 (refd) Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 54 (refd) Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (folld) House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite & Ors [1991] 1 QB 241 (refd) Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119 (refd) Miller v Cannon Hill Estates Ltd [1931] 2 KB 113 (refd) Neogh Soo Oh & Ors v G Rethinasamy [1984] 1 MLJ 126 (refd) Otto v Bolton [1936] 2 KB 46 (refd) Randolph v Tuck [1961] 1 All ER 814 (refd)

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-373 Rayner v Grote (1846) 15 M & W 359 (refd) TP Jordeson & Co and Kahn v London Hardwood Co Ltd (1913) 110 LT 666 (refd) Tan Chong & Sons Motor Co Ltd v Yang Chin Lang [1967] 1 MLJ 123 (refd) Tan Chong & Sons Motor Co (Sdn) Bhd v Alan McKnight [1983] 1 MLJ 220 (refd) Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC 484 (refd) (11) (Per Mohamed Dzaiddin FCJ, dissenting) The first appellant was not a party to the Johor Bahru suit, whereas the second appellant was a party in both proceedings. The real question was the interest which the first appellant had in the subject matter of the Johor Bahru suit. The first appellant was the ||Page 199>> principal debtor under the bridging loan. The second appellant was a director of the first appellant as well as one of the guarantors of the bridging loan upon which he was sued in the Johor Bahru High Court. Clearly, the first appellant must not only be well aware of the proceedings, but also have special interest in the outcome of the said proceedings. Hence, there was a privity of interest between the first and second appellants in the Johor Bahru suit (see pp 243H–I and 244A). (12) (Per Mohamed Dzaiddin FCJ, dissenting) Since the second appellant was personally involved in the negotiations for the banking facilities on behalf of the first appellant, there was no excuse for him not to give proper and adequate instructions to the solicitors regarding the alleged representations made by Pang about the end- financing. No compelling reason had been advanced to show that the issue could not have been pleaded in the Johor Bahru suit except to contend that since the first appellant was not a party to the Johor Bahru suit, they were not estopped from bringing a separate action against the respondents for negligent misrepresentation. The subject matter of the appellants’ claim in the present proceedings could and should have been pleaded in the defence in the Johor Bahru suit or raised as a triable issue under the O 14 application in the Johor Bahru suit. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow the first appellant to bring a new proceeding in respect of the same issue. As such, the appeal should be dismissed (see pp 245I and 246A–D). (13) (Per Mohamed Dzaiddin FCJ) The approval of end-finance of RM26m to the first appellant must be subject to the participation of the other financial institutions in the syndication of the said end- finance. Since the said syndication did not materialize and no participation agreement was executed between the first respondent as syndicate leader and the other lenders, it is wrong for the court to hold the first respondent liable to the first appellant under the agreement. The finding of the trial judge that the conduct of the first respondent in preparing the placement memorandum and using it to invite potential financial institutions to participate in the syndication of the end-finance facility amounted to giving an unqualified commitment to the first appellant to make available the end-finance loan subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement was misconceived. The trial judge failed to appreciate the legal concept of loan syndication, especially the purpose of a placement memorandum. The preparation of a placement memorandum is a E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-374 condition precedent to a commitment to lend by the participating financial institutions (see p 249C–F). ||Page 200>> (14) (Per Mohamed Dzaiddin FCJ) The trial judge misdirected herself in the appreciation of Chew’s evidence. Nowhere in the evidence was it said that Pang had represented to him about the first respondent securing the end-finance for the first appellant and the first drawdown would be on the first quarter of 1984. Pang never represented to Chew about the certainty of the first respondent securing the end-finance for the first appellant. The impression formed by Chew did not amount to a representation, nor could it be implied that a warranty had been given by Pang (see pp 252I and 253A–E).Even if Chew’s evidence was accepted, such statement or representation could not be promissory in nature. For the representation to be converted into a promise, there ought to be clearer evidence from Chew on what Pang actually said during the course of their discussion. It was unlikely for Pang, being an experienced banker, to give an assurance or promise that the first defendant would secure the end-financing facility. The trial judge had erred in finding that Pang’s statement amounted to a warranty and there was a breach of it (see pp 254F–H and 256A). Cases referred to (dissenting judgment) Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (refd) Brisbane City Council & Myer Shopping Centres Pty Ltd v Attorney- General for Queensland [1978] 3 WLR 299 (refd) Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 (refd) Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 (refd) Dick Bentley Productions Ltd & Anor v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 65 (refd) Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119 (refd) Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 54 (refd) Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 (refd) Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 (refd) House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite & Ors [1991] 1 QB 241 (refd) JJ Savage & Sons Pty Ltd v Blakney (1970) 119 CLR 435 (refd) Ross v Allis-Chalmers Australia Pty Ltd (1980) 55 ALJR 8 (refd) Tan Chong & Sons Motors Co (Sdn) Bhd v Alan McKnight [1983] 1 MLJ 220 (refd) Tan Swee Hoe Co Ltd v Ali Hussain Bros [1980] 2 MLJ 16 (refd) Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 229 (refd) Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581 (refd) ||Page 201>> [Bahasa Malaysia summary

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-375 Perayu pertama (‘Kluang Wood’) adalah pemaju perumahan yang berlesen dan tuan punya berdaftar sebidang tanah di Johor (‘tanah tersebut’). Perayu kedua (‘Chew’) adalah pengarah perayu pertama. Chew telah diperkenalkan kepada seorang bernama WP Pang (‘Pang’) yang merupakan pengurus serantau selatan penentang pertama (‘Hong Leong’). Pada awal tahun 1983, perayu-perayu telah berunding dengan Hong Leong untuk mendapatkan kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan bagi membolehkan mereka membangunkan tanah tersebut menjadi sebuah kawasan perumahan. Satu permohonan rasmi telah dibuat, memohon RM4.5 juta sebagai pinjaman penyambungan dan RM21 juta sebagai pembiayaan akhir. Menurut Chew, ketika perundingan antara beliau dan Pang, Pang telah bersetuju bahawa Hong Leong akan memberikan Kluang Wood pinjaman penyambungan dan pembiayaan akhir bersindiket. Pang telah membuat representasi kepada beliau semasa perundingan mereka bahawa bagi sebuah syarikat kewangan yang mempunyai reputasi seperti Hong Leong, jumlah pembiayaan akhir dan pinjaman penyambungan tidak akan menjadi masalah. Pada 26 Oktober 1983, defendan pertama telah meluluskan permohonan tersebut melalui sepucuk surat kelulusan. Melalui surat tersebut, Hong Leong telah dengan nyata atau secara tersirat membuat representasi kepada Kluang Wood bahawa satu pinjaman penyambungan sebanyak RM3.5 juta dan kemudahan pembiayaan akhir sebanyak RM26 juta telah diluluskan, dengan bahagian Hong Leong bagi pembiayaan akhir tersebut sebanyak RM5 juta. Kluang Wood memplidkan bahawa Hong Leong telah selanjutnya membuat representasi bahawa penggunaan pinjaman awal kemudahan pembiayaan akhir tersebut adalah pada suku tahun pertama bagi tahun 1984. Sebagai jaminan bagi pinjaman penyambungan tersebut Kluang Wood telah mewujudkan satu gadaian ke atas tanah tersebut atas nama Hong Leong dan Chew serta pengarah- pengarah lain telah menyempurnakan surat gerenti. Dalam bulan Januari 1984, Hong Leong telah menyediakan memorandum penempatan untuk pensindiketan pembiayaan akhir sebanyak RM26 juta. Walau bagaimanapun, tiada pembiayaan akhir sama sekali, termasuk RM5 juta daripada Hong Leong telah diadakan bagi Kluang Wood sungguhpun pinjaman pembiayaan sebanyak RM3.5 juta telah digunakan sepenuhnya oleh Kluang Wood. Hong Leong kemudiannya mengeluarkan satu writ terhadap penggerenti-penggerenti termasuk Chew untuk mendapatkan kembali pinjaman penyambungan tersebut (‘guaman Johor Bahru’). Penghakiman muktamad di bawah A 14 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 telah diperolehi terhadap Chew dan penggerenti- penggerenti yang lain. Hong Leong telah juga diberikan satu perintah untuk jualan tanah tersebut, yang kemudiannya telah dijualkan kepada penentang kedua, sebuah anak syarikat yang dimiliki sepenuhnya oleh Hong Leong. Berdasarkan perkara ini, perayu-perayu mendakwa bahawa ||Page 202>> Hong Leong telah bertindak dengan niat jahat dan/atau secara fraud dalam melaksanakan kuasa jualannya iaitu ia telah pada setiap masa berniat untuk membeli tanah tersebut dengan sendirinya atau melalui ejensi pihak yang lain. Walau bagaimanapun, bahagian rayuan tersebut telah ditinggalkan oleh perayu- perayu. Perayu-perayu menuntut bahawa kegagalan Hong Leong untuk menyediakan pembiayaan akhir sebanyak RM26 juta sepertimana yang dikemukakan dalam suratnya bertarikh 26 Oktober 1983 menyebabkan kegagalan projek tersebut dan juga membuat

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-376 Kluang Wood tidak dapat membayar faedah ke atas pinjaman penyambungan tersebut. Mereka selanjutnya mendakwa bahawa Hong Leong adalah cuai dan bertindak dalam kemungkiran akan kewajipannya apabila ia membuat representasi kepada Kluang Wood bahawa pembiayaan akhir sebanyak RM26 juta akan disediakan kepada pembeli-pembeli rumah dan bahawa penggunaan pinjaman yang pertama akan dilakukan pada suku tahun yang pertama tahun 1984. Mereka juga memplidkan bahawa representasi Hong Leong membentuk satu waranti kolateral dan dalam kemungkiran waranti tersebut, Hong Leong telah menyebabkan kerugian dan kerosakan kepada mereka. Penentang-penentang berhujah bahawa mereka tidak terhutang sebarang kewajipan berjaga-jaga kepada perayu-perayu mengenai representasi yang dikatakan. Mereka menghujahkan bahawa perayu-perayu telah diestop daripada melitigasikan kausa tindakan utama dalam guaman atas alasan res judicata, kerana isu-isu yang dibangkitkan oleh perayu-perayu telah pun dilitigasikan oleh Hong Leong dalam guaman Johor Bahru. Hakim perbicaraan telah mendapati bahawa Hong Leong telah membuat representasi kepada Kluang Wood bahawa mengadakan pembiayaan akhir tersebut adalah suatu kepastian, bahawa penggunaan pinjaman yang pertama daripada pembiayaan akhir itu akan dapat dilakukan pada suku pertama tahun 1984, dan bahawa dalam membuat representasi itu Pang telah bertindak cuai. Representasi lisan Pang telah diputuskan sebagai membentuk satu waranti kolateral yang telah dimungkiri apabila tiada apa- apa bahagian pembiayaan akhir diberikan oleh Hong Leong. Hakim perbicaraan juga memutuskan bahawa hujah res judicata Hong Leong berjaya iaitu tuntutan-tuntutan Kluang Wood dan Chew dalam tindakan ini atas salah nyata cuai dan secara alternatifnya bagi kemungkiran waranti kolateral tidak boleh dilitigasikan kerana terdapatnya kepentingan privity antara Kluang Wood dan Chew dalam guaman Johor Bahru, yang mana Chew merupakan seorang pengarah dan ejen bagi Kluang Wood. Hakim perbicaraan telah menolak tindakan perayu-perayu, terhadap yang mana perayu-perayu telah merayu. Hong Leong telah membuat rayuan balas terhadap keputusan hakim perbicaraan bahawa ketidakupayaan Kluang Wood untuk membayar faedah ke atas pinjaman penyambungan adalah disebabkan oleh kegagalan Hong Leong untuk mendapatkan dan ||Page 203>> menyediakan pembiayaan akhir tersebut; perjanjian antara Hong Leong dan Kluang Wood yang terkandung di dalam surat tersebut telah meletakkan ke atas Hong Leong suatu kewajipan untuk mendapatkan serta menyediakan pembiayaan akhir tersebut; Pang telah membuat representasi bagi peruntukan pembiayaan akhir tersebut dan bahawa ia adalah suatu kepastian; dan representasi tersebut telah dibuat secara cuai dan/atau di sisi undang-undang berkeupayaan membangkitkan satu waranti kolateral. Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan perayu pertama dan menolak tindakan perayu kedua dan rayuan balas penentang pertama: (1) (Oleh Lamin PMR) Oleh kerana jawatankuasa pengurusan dengan jelasnya telah meluluskan kedua-dua pinjaman penyambungan dan pembiayaan akhir, penyusunan kata kelulusan tersebut yang nyata haruslah dikuatkuasakan. Syarat yang menyatakan bahawa ‘total end- financing facilities to be syndicated by HLFB’ semestinya berkeupayaan untuk menyampaikan maksud bahawa

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-377 defendan pertama telah mengakujanji untuk menganjurkan dan mengadakan kemudahan- kemudahan tersebut. Representasi lisan Pang yang disokong oleh kepastian mengenai ketersediaan pembiayaan akhir yang disampaikan melalui surat bertarikh 26 Oktober 1983 bersama-sama dengan fakta yang tidak dapat dipertikaikan bahawa tiada pembiayaan akhir sama sekali telah disediakan sudah pasti membentuk satu kemungkiran asas oleh defendan pertama yang sampai sehingga kepada dasar kontrak tersebut (lihat ms 210D–H). (2) (Oleh Chong Siew Fai HB (Sabah & Sarawak)) Kewajipan kontraktual Hong Leong boleh dikatakan suatu kepastian berdasarkan surat tawarannya yang telah diterima oleh Kluang Wood. Surat ini menunjukkan komitmen Hong Leong kepada pembiayaan akhir sebanyak RM26 juta kerana ia menyatakan bahawa Hong Leong telah ‘meluluskan’ pembiayaan akhir sebanyak RM26 juta. Tidak terdapat apa-apa pun dalam surat itu yang menunjukkan kelulusan ini adalah tertakluk kepada sebarang syarat terdahulu atau kepada kebolehan Hong Leong untuk mendapatkan pinjaman bersindiket tersebut. Dalam keadaan ini, kesemua terma dan syarat sedemikian dalam surat tersebut berhubung dengan pengurusan pembiayaan akhir oleh Hong Leong, jumlah penuh pembiayaan akhir untuk disindiketkan dan penyertaan Hong Leong di dalamnya memperkukuhkan syarat bahawa pembiayaan akhir tersebut akan diberikan (lihat ms 220I dan 221A–C). (3) (Oleh Chong Siew Fai HB (Sabah & Sarawak)) Representasi yang dihujahkan sebagai telah dibuat oleh Pang kepada Chew adalah bahawa untuk memperolehi pembiayaan akhir bersindiket ||Page 204>> sebanyak RM21 juta bagi sebuah institusi kewangan seperti Hong Leong tidak merupakan sebarang masalah dan bahawa ketersediaan pinjaman bersindiket adalah tidak bersyarat. Bergantung pada representasi tersebut, Kluang Wood telah memohon bagi mendapatkan dan telah memperolehi kelulusan bagi kemudahan-kemudahan tersebut termasuk ketersediaan pembiayaan akhir bersindiket. Oleh kerana Chew tidak dicabar mengenai representasi yang dibuat oleh Pang dan Pang tidak memberi keterangan, hakim perbicaraan yang arif berjustifikasi dalam memutuskan bahawa Pang telah membuat representasi tersebut dan bahawa ia ‘tidak dipatahkan dan dicabar’ (lihat ms 221D–H). (4) (Oleh Chong Siew Fai HB (Sabah & Sarawak) dan Mohamed Dzaiddin HMP) Ia telah ditetapkan bahawa pembiayaan akhir tersebut adalah ‘drawdown in proportion to the work-in-progress as certified by the project’s architect’. Walau bagaimanapun, tidak terdapat keterangan bagi menunjukkan bahawa sijil arkitek yang diperlukan di bawah surat tersebut telah dikeluarkan. Menurut keterangan, penggunaan pinjaman pertama mungkin telah diberikan sekiranya sijil yang diperlukan itu telah dikeluarkan. Dengan itu, Hong Leong tidak seharusnya dipersalahkan.Walau bagaimanapun, ini tidak terpakai kepada kegagalan Hong Leong yang sepenuhnya bagi menyediakan pembiayaan akhir selepas suku tahun yang pertama tahun 1984. Sehubungan dengan perkara ini, terdapat kemungkiran asas oleh Hong Leong yang menjejaskan dasar kontrak tersebut. Hakim perbicaraan dengan tepatnya mendapati bahawa kegagalan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-378 projek tersebut bukannya disebabkan oleh perancangan yang lemah serta salah pengurusannya. Hong Leong tidak boleh mempergunakan ketiadaan sijil arkitek sebagai alasan bagi kegagalannya yang asas itu (lihat ms 221I dan 222A–F). (5) (Oleh Chong Siew Fai HB (Sabah & Sarawak)) Walaupun nota-nota keterangan tidak menunjukkan bahawa Chew telah menggunakan perkataan ‘certainty’ dalam keterangannya, ia bukanlah tidak adil atau tidak munasabah untuk hakim perbicaraan memutuskan bahawa apa yang telah digambarkan oleh Pang kepada Chew telah memberikan Chew tanggapan kepastian mengenai ketersediaan pembiayaan akhir tersebut. Fakta-fakta dan keadaan-keadaan serta cara bagaimana hakim perbicaraan telah menghuraikan representasi tersebut menunjukkan bahawa beliau amat mengetahui bahawa sesuatu kes membuat pernyataan-pernyataan dengan cuainya hendaklah diandaikan. Hakim perbicaraan telah bertindak dengan betul dalam memutuskan bahawa Pang cuai ketika membuat pernyataan-pernyataan atas yang mana Kluang Wood telah mengambil tindakan (lihat ms 223A–C dan 225E); Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 diikut. ||Page 205>> (6) (Oleh Chong Siew Fai HB (Sabah & Sarawak)) Jika keterangan tambahan mengenai waranti-waranti kolateral jatuh di dalam lingkungan proviso (b) s 92 Akta Keterangan 1950, ia boleh dimasukkan sebagai keterangan. Dalam mempertimbangkan sama ada proviso tersebut terpakai, sifat perjanjian bertulis dan keadaan-keadaan di sekelilingnya haruslah dipertimbangkan. Perkara-perkara mengenai kepastian pembiayaan akhir dan pernyataan Pang yang membangkitkan tanggapan mengenai kepastian yang sedemikian tidak terdapat dalam surat tersebut. Selanjutnya, pernyataan mengenai masa penggunaan pinjaman yang pertama boleh diterima kerana tiada tempoh masa mengenai penggunaan pinjaman yang pertama telah diberikan dalam surat tersebut. Akibat kemungkiran waranti kolateral tersebut oleh Hong Leong, hakim perbicaraan telah memutuskan dengan betulnya bahawa kegagalan projek tersebtut adalah disebabkan ketidaksediaan pembiayaan akhir (lihat ms 226D–H). (7) (Oleh Chong Siew Fai HB (Sabah & Sarawak)) Rayuan Hong Leong pada hakikatnya merupakan satu penghujahan res judicata melalui estopel kepada kedua-dua kausa tindakan secara menyeluruh. Memandangkan pengataan-pengataan sedemikian oleh Hong Leong, hakim perbicaraan serta mahkamah ini berhak untuk melihat alasan- alasan bagi keputusan tersebut dan nota-nota keterangan hakim perbicaraan dalam guaman Johor Bahru bagi menentukan sama ada dua persoalan tersebut yang membentuk kausa-kausa tindakan telah diputuskan. Walau bagaimanapun, alasan atau sebab bagi keputusan dalam guaman Johor Bahru tidak diekshibitkan dalam kes ini. Dengan itu, ia telah tidak ditentukan bahawa dua persoalan atau kausa tindakan tersebut telah pun dihakimi, beban terletak pada pihak yang mendakwanya, iaitu Hong Leong (lihat ms 228D–G). (8) Oleh Chong Siew Fai HB (Sabah & Sarawak)) Perkara mengenai sama ada Kluang Wood dan Chew telah diestop daripada membangkitkan tuntutan kedua E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-379 mengenai fraud atau pelaksanaan kuasa jualan lelong yang tidak wajar atas alasan bahawa tuntutan sedemikian mungkin telah dibangkitkan sebagai satu tuntutan balas dalam tindakan gadaian yang dimulakan oleh Hong Leong terhadap Kluang Wood tidak perlu diuruskan. Jualan lelong di bawah yang mana perbuatan fraud atau pelaksanaan kuasa jualan yang tidak wajar didakwa telah berbangkit berlaku selepas perintah jualan dibuat. Dengan itu, tohmahan tersebut tidak mungkin boleh dibangkitkan dalam tindakan gadaian tersebut. Selanjutnya, hakim perbicaraan telah memutuskan bahawa dakwaan-dakwaan yang membentuk tuntutan kedua telah gagal; dan rayuan berhubung tuntutan kedua ini telah ditinggalkan. Dengan itu, penghujahan tersebut tidak mempunyai merit dan pasti gagal (lihat ms 230D–G). ||Page 206>> (9) (Oleh Chong Siew Fai HB (Sabah & Sarawak)) Sama ada terdapatnya perkaitan yang memadai untuk membentuk kepentingan privity akan bergantung pada pemeriksaan kepentingan pihak-pihak dan keadilan mengikat mereka dengan satu keputusan dalam mana mereka tidak diwakili. Berhubung Kluang Wood, tidak terdapat alasan yang sah untuk memutuskan bahawa Kluang Wood berada dalam kepentingan privity dengan Chew dalam guaman Johor Bahru atau mereka dikaitkan sedemikian sehingga menjadikan doktrin res judicata terpakai (lihat ms 232D–E). (10) (Oleh Chong Siew Fai HB (Sabah & Sarawak)) Ejen yang telah mengikat kontrak bagi pihak utama yang didedahkan dan dinamakan tidak boleh mendakwa atas kontrak tersebut. Ini adalah sedemikian walaupun jika beliau adalah pihak utama yang sebenarnya, melainkan pihak yang lain itu telah mengikrarkan kontrak tersebut dengan mengetahui fakta sebenarnya. Dalam kes ini, Chew, dengan pengetahuan Hong Leong, telah berunding untuk Kluang Wood sepanjang masa. Hak tindakan yang dibangkitkan oleh waranti kolateral tersebut adalah persendirian antara kedua-dua pihak berkenaan yang mengikat kontrak tersebut. Antara mereka, kemungkiran waranti tersebut boleh membentuk dasar sesuatu tindakan untuk ganti rugi, tetapi biasanya ia tidak membenarkan pihak yang tidak mengikat kontrak untuk membuat dakwaan ke atasnya. Dengan itu, Chew tidak boleh mendakwa atas kedua-dua kausa tindakan tersebut (lihat ms 232H–I dan 233A). (11) (Oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin HMP, menentang) Perayu pertama bukannya satu pihak kepada guaman Johor Bahru, sedangkan perayu kedua adalah pihak dalam kedua-dua prosiding. Persoalan sebenar adalah kepentingan perayu pertama dalam hal perkara guaman Johor Bahru. Perayu pertama merupakan penghutang utama di bawah pinjaman penyambungan tersebut. Perayu kedua adalah seorang pengarah perayu pertama dan juga salah seorang penggerenti bagi pinjaman penyambungan di atas yang mana beliau didakwa dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bahru. Jelasnya, perayu pertama bukan sahaja perlu mengetahui sesungguhnya mengenai prosiding tersebut, tetapi juga mempunyai kepentingan khas dalam keputusan prosiding tersebut. Justeru itu, terdapat kepentingan privity antara perayu-perayu pertama dan kedua dalam guaman Johor Bahru (lihat ms 243H–I dan 244A).

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-380 (12) (Oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin HMP) Oleh kerana perayu kedua terlibat secara peribadi dalam perundingan-perundingan bagi kemudahan- kemudahan perbankan bagi pihak perayu pertama, tiada sebarang alasan bagi beliau untuk tidak memberikan arahan yang wajar dan secukupnya kepada peguamcara berhubung dengan reprsentasi yang dikatakan yang dibuat oleh Pang mengenai pembiayaan akhir tersebut. Tiada alasan mendorong telah dikemukakan bagi menunjukkan bahawa isu tersebut tidak ||Page 207>> mungkin telah diplidkan dalam guaman Johor Bahru kecuali untuk menghujahkan bahawa oleh kerana perayu pertama bukannya merupakan satu pihak kepada guaman Johor Bahru, mereka tidak diestop daripada memulakan satu tindakan berasingan terhadap defendan-defendan bagi salah nyata cuai. Hal perkara tuntutan perayu- perayu dalam prosiding semasa boleh dan seharusnya diplidkan dalam pembelaan dalam guaman Johor Bahru atau dibangkitkan sebagai isu yang boleh dibicarakan di bawah permohonan A 14 dalam guaman Johor Bahru. Ia merupakan satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah untuk membenarkan perayu pertama memulakan prosiding baru berhubung dengan isu yang sama. Oleh yang demikian, rayuan seharusnya ditolak (lihat ms 245I dan 246A–D). (13) (Oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin HMP) Kelulusan pembiayaan akhir sebanyak RM26 juta kepada perayu pertama semestinya tertakluk kepada penyertaan institusi-institusi kewangan yang lain dalam pensindiketan pembiayaan akhir tersebut. Oleh kerana pensindiketan tersebut tidak menjadi kenyataan dan tiada perjanjian penyertaan telah disempurnakan antara penentang pertama sebagai ketua sindiket dan pemberi-pemberi pinjaman yang lain, adalah salah bagi mahkamah untuk memutuskan penentang pertama bertanggungan kepada perayu pertama di bawah perjanjian tersebut. Keputusan hakim perbicaraan bahawa perlakuan penentang pertama dalam menyediakan memorandum penempatan dan menggunakannya untuk menjemput bakal institusi-institusi kewangan supaya menyertai pensidiketan kemudahan pembiayaan akhir sama seperti memberikan komitmen yang tidak bersyarat kepada perayu pertama untuk mengadakan pinjaman pembiayaan akhir itu tertakluk kepada terma dan syarat perjanjian tersebut adalah disalah-tafsirkan. Hakim perbicaraan gagal untuk mempertimbangkan konsep undang-undang pensindiketan pinjaman tersebut, khasnya tujuan sesuatu memorandum penempatan. Penyediaan memorandum penempatan adalah syarat terdahulu kepada komitmen untuk memberikan pinjaman oleh institusi-institusi kewangan yang menyertai (lihat ms 249C–F). (14) (Oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin HMP) Hakim perbicaraan telah tersalah arah dirinya sendiri dalam penilaian keterangan Chew. Tidak di mana- mana pun dalam keterangan yang menyatakan bahawa Pang telah membuat representasi kepada beliau mengenai penentang pertama memperolehi pembiayaan akhir tersebut untuk perayu pertama dan penggunaan pinjaman pertama akan dapat dilakukan pada suku tahun pertama tahun 1984. Pang tidak pernah membuat representasi kepada Chew mengenai kepastian penentang pertama untuk memperolehi pembiayaan akhir tersebut bagi perayu pertama. Tanggapan yang

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-381 dibentuk oleh Chew tidak sama seperti suatu representasi, dan ia juga tidak tersirat bahawa satu waranti telah diberikan oleh Pang (lihat ms 252I dan 253A–E). ||Page 208>> Sungguhpun jika keterangan Chew diterima, pernyataan atau representasi yang sedemikian tidak boleh mempunyai sifat janji. Untuk menukar representasi tersebut supaya menjadi satu janji, haruslah terdapat keterangan yang lebih jelas daripada Chew mengenai apakah sebenarnya yang diperkatakan oleh Pang semasa perundingan mereka. Ia tidak mungkin bagi Pang, sebagai seorang jurubank yang berpengalaman, untuk memberikan kepastian atau janji bahawa penentang pertama akan memperolehi kemudahan pembiayaan akhir. Hakim perbicaraan telah tersalah pertimbangan dalam memutuskan bahawa pernyataan Pang sama seperti satu waranti dan terdapat kemungkiran atasnya (lihat ms 254F–H dan 256A).] With regard to the defence of res judicata, I say nothing more as I am in complete agreement with my learned brother Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak). So also in regard to the costs of this appeal. However, despite the above findings, the learned trial judge held that Hong Leong’s plea of res judicata succeeded in that the claims of Kluang Wood and Chew in this action on negligent misrepresentations and alternatively for breach of collateral warranty could not be litigated upon because there was privity of interest between Kluang Wood and Chew in the ||Page 217>> Johor Bahru suit, Chew being a director and agent of Kluang Wood. She held that res judicata applied ‘to put an end to any further proceedings between the same parties based on the same facts which had already been litigated before or could have been raised and litigated in the earlier civil suit’ (ie the Johor Bahru suit). The learned trial judge accordingly dismissed the action by Kluang Wood and Chew with costs.

(1) the existence or otherwise of Hong Leong’s contractual obligation to provide the end-finance; (2) were there negligent misrepresentations, collateral warranties, and breach thereof by Hong Leong?; and (3) availability of res judicata or issue estoppel as a defence. (3) Res judicata As stated earlier, the learned trial judge dismissed the claims of both plaintiffs, holding that res judicata applied in that there was privity of ||Page 227>> interest between Kluang Wood and Chew. After alluding to the fact that Chew was a director of Kluang Wood and was ‘involved in the conduct of the affairs of’ Kluang Wood as agent for Kluang Wood, the learned trial judge continued:

The first plaintiff (ie Kluang Wood) must be presumed to be privy to all matters conducted by PW1 (ie Chew) on behalf of the first plaintiff including all matters giving rise to the cause of action in the earlier civil suit (ie Johor Bahru suit). As the second plaintiff (Chew) was sued as a guarantor in the earlier suit in respect of the bridging loan that had been granted by the first defendant (Hong Leong) to the first plaintiff, there is therefore ample evidence to show that there is a privity of interest between the first plaintiff in these proceedings before me and the second plaintiff in the earlier civil suit and to that end, res judicata is applicable to put an end to any further proceedings between the same parties based on the same facts which had already been litigated before or could have been E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-382 raised and litigated in the earlier civil suit (pp 107 and 108 of the appeal record). By paras 24 to 27 of the amended defence, Hong Leong alleged in effect that the questions of negligent misrepresentation and breach of collateral warranty had already been litigated in the Johor Bahru suit and therefore, Kluang Wood and Chew were estopped from raising them in this action. The two questions constitute the two causes of action in this suit. Hence, such a plea is in fact a plea of res judicata by way of estoppel to the above two entire causes of actions (as opposed to a point in issue). It amounts to an allegation that the whole legal rights and obligations of Kluang Wood and Chew had been concluded by an earlier judgment in the Johor Bahru suit. In the face of such allegations by Hong Leong, the learned trial judge and this court would be entitled to look at the reasons for the decision and the notes of evidence of the trial judge in the Johor Bahru suit to determine whether the two questions constituting the causes of actions herein had been determined (see Randolph v Tuck [1961] 1 All ER 814). Unfortunately, the grounds or reasons for the decision in the Johor Bahru suit are not exhibited in this case. Hence, it has not been established that the two questions or causes of action had been adjudicated upon, the burden of which lies on the party who alleges it, ie Hong Leong in this case.

The second requirement for res judicata is identity of subject matter. As to this it has become common to distinguish between cause of action and issue estoppel. There is certainly no cause of action estoppel here. The question before the German court was whether the Council for Gera were the legal representatives of the Stiftung at one date. The question here is whether at a different date the solicitors had the authority of the Stiftung to raise the action. An answer, yes or no, to the first question does not necessarily imply a similar answer to the second. Another point of contention on res judicata is whether Kluang Wood and Chew were estopped from raising the second claim of fraudulent or improper exercise of power of auction sale on the ground that such claim could have been raised as a counterclaim in the charge action (Originating Summons No 210/85 in Johor Bahru) commenced by Hong Leong against Kluang Wood. In this regard, the learned trial judge, relying on Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119, concluded (p 106 of the appeal record):

Thus, based on the authority of Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd, the defendants cannot rely on the plea of res judicata or issue estoppel either in its narrow or broader application as the answer to the plaintiffs’ second claim in the proceedings before me. In any event, I have already decided that plaintiffs’ second claim has not been substantiated. Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 54 was a case on striking out an action under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, it involved the questions of issue estoppel and the existence of privity of interest between present and former defendants. In that case, the plaintiff, a shirt designer, unsuccessfully brought an earlier action against some shirt manufacturers for breach of copyright, the allegation being that the shirt manufacturers had copied a shirt supplied to them by the defendants in the present action which had itself been copied from shirts which were copies of the plaintiff’s drawing. Having lost in that earlier suit, the plaintiff commenced the instant action against the defendants who were also shirt manufacturers, alleging infringement of copyright in relation to the same shirt. The defendants sought to strike out the plaintiff’s action on the ground that as the central issue raised in the statement of claim ie whether the defendants’ shirts were indirect reproductions of the plaintiff’s drawing had already been determined in the previous action, it was frivolous, vexatious and otherwise an abuse of the process of the court for the plaintiff to relitigate what E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-383 had already been decided against her. It was held that the defendants could not invoke the doctrine of issue estoppel against the plaintiff. The defendant had not been a party to the previous action and there was no ground for holding that they were in privity of interest with the defendants in that action or that they were linked in such a way as to make any doctrine of res judicata applicable. There was a trade relationship between them but that was all. The court refused to strike out the action. Megarry VC in his judgment said (at p 60): Therefore, so far as concerning Kluang Wood, for the reasons given above, including that it was not a party to the Johor Bahru suit, there is, in my opinion, no valid ground for holding that Kluang Wood was in privity of interest with Chew in the Johor Bahru suit or that they were so linked as to make the doctrine of res judicata applicable. Furthermore, the grounds for the decision in the Johor Bahru suit were not available in evidence in the present suit and accordingly unknown.

The learned trial judge was justified in holding that there had been negligent misrepresentation about certainty of the end-finance and breach of collateral warranty; and contrary to the learned trial judge’s finding, there is no res judicata or action estoppel. Kluang Wood was entitled to maintain this action, and the appeal by Kluang Wood be allowed. The order of the learned trial judge dated 18 April 1994 to the extent of dismissing Kluang Wood’s claims be set aside. There be an order for damages to be assessed; The defendants, in their amended defence, denied the plaintiffs’ allegations that they were guilty of negligent misrepresentation and/or breach of collateral warranty in respect of the end-financing. They averred that they owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs on the alleged representation and further denied that the said representation, if any, was negligently made. By way of further defence, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs were estopped from litigating the principal cause of action in the suit on the ground of res judicata, which are pleaded in paras 24 to 27 of the amended defence. In essence, the defendants alleged that the issues raised by the plaintiffs in paras 6 to 14 of the re-re-amended statement of claim have already been litigated by the first plaintiff in Johor Bahru High Court Civil Suit No 354 of 1985. The Johor Bahru suit was commenced by the first defendant against, inter alia, the second plaintiff in this suit in respect of a letter of guarantee dated October 1983 executed by, inter alia, the second plaintiff in this suit to secure the loan of RM3.5m made by the first defendant to the plaintiffs. The High Court at Johor Bahru entered judgment against the defendants on March 1986 after hearing arguments from counsel.

(1) that the plaintiffs have succeeded on their principal claim against the first defendant for negligent misrepresentation with respect to the end-finance of RM26m and the representations made on behalf of the first defendant regarding its availability constituted a collateral warranty which had been a breach when no part of the money was made available to the first plaintiff; and (2) that the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel in the broader sense applies to the proceedings before her. To that end, the plaintiffs’ principal claim and the alternative cause of action cannot be re-litigated. The appeal is against the finding of the learned trial judge that the plaintiffs’ principal cause of action on the tort of negligent misrepresentation and alternatively for breach of collateral warranty could not be litigated again in the proceedings before her on the ground of res judicata or issue estoppel in its broader sense. In her grounds of decision (AR Vol I

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-384 Bahagian A & B at p 102), her Ladyship gave the following reasons:

This plea (of res judicata or issue estoppel in its broader application) stems from separate proceedings commenced by the first defendant against the plaintiffs prior to the filing of this suit. In Johor Bahru Originating Summons No 210/85, the first defendant as chargees of the property commenced foreclosure proceedings against the first plaintiff to recover the outstanding amount due on the bridging loan and on 17 July 1985, obtained an order of court to sell the property by way of public auction. The first plaintiff did not contest the proceedings and neither the second defendant nor the second plaintiff were cited as parties. The filing of the foreclosure proceedings was followed, on 8 May 1985, by the first defendant filing Johor Bahru Civil Suit No 354/85, seeking to enforce the guarantee dated 29 October 1983, executed by the second plaintiff and the other directors of the first plaintiff. This guarantee and the charge executed by the first plaintiff were the securities provided by the plaintiffs for the bridging loan. Following a contested O 14 proceedings, the first defendant obtained final judgment against the second plaintiff for the sum of RM3,673,051.50 together with interest and costs on 5 March 1986. Neither the second defendant nor the first plaintiff were parties to this earlier civil suit. ||Page 241>> It is the defendants’ contention that since all the issues raised in the proceedings before me have been pleaded as defences and argued extensively by the second plaintiff in the O 14 proceedings in the earlier civil suit, firstly before the senior assistant registrar and secondly before the judge in chambers on appeal, and both had found the issues to be unconvincing, there had already been a final decision on those issues for which the plaintiffs are estopped from raising them again in these proceedings before me. The defendants also rely on the broader application of res judicata that the issues now raised by the plaintiffs to support their causes of action on negligent misrepresentation and breach of a collateral warranty could and should have been raised and litigated upon in the earlier civil suit. On the same token, the defendants maintain that the same issues could and should have been raised in the foreclosure proceedings before the Johor Bahru High Court.

The plea of res judicata is founded on the basis that since a decision has been made in any case or matter, there should be a finality in that decision and the parties affected by the decision or their privies are estopped from litigating the same cause or matter in subsequent proceedings before the same or another forum. It is now settled law that for the plea to succeed, the following requirements must be present: (1) The same issues must have been decided in both proceedings; (2) The judicial decision said to create the estoppel was final; and (3) The parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised. It is only in respect of requirement (3) that the plaintiffs questioned the applicability of res judicata on the ground that there is no unity of parties or interest as the first plaintiff were not cited as a party in the earlier civil suit. That is very true but it must be remembered that as a director of the first plaintiff and the person actually involved in the conduct of the affairs of the first plaintiff, PW1 is an agent of the first plaintiff and as the principal, the first plaintiff must be presumed to be privy to all matters conducted by PW1 on behalf of the first plaintiff including all matters giving rise to the cause of action in the earlier civil suit. As the second plaintiff was sued as a guarantor in the earlier civil suit in respect of the bridging loan that had been granted by the first defendant to the first plaintiff, there is therefore ample evidence to show that there is a privity of interest between the first plaintiff in these proceedings before me and the second plaintiff in the earlier civil suit and to that end, res judicata is applicable to put an end to any further proceedings between the same parties based on the same facts which had already been litigated before or could have been raised and litigated in the earlier civil suit. To that end, the plaintiff’s principal cause of action on the tort of negligent misrepresentation and the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-385 alternative cause of action for breach of a collateral warranty cannot be litigated again in this court and on that finding I dismiss: (1) the plaintiffs’ principal and alternative claims on the ground of res judicata or issue estoppel in its broader sense; and (2) the second claim on the ground that it has not been substantiated. ||Page 242>> Encik Manjit, for the plaintiffs, submitted that the learned trial judge erred in holding that the plaintiffs’ action was barred by res judicata or issue estoppel in its broader sense. Counsel submitted that firstly, her Ladyship ought to have recognized that neither the first plaintiff nor the second defendant was a party to the Johor Bahru suit, which was a suit brought by the first defendant against guarantors. Such being the case, the first plaintiff could not possibly have raised the cause of action of negligent misrepresentation and breach of collateral warranty as a defence or counterclaim in the Johor Bahru suit. No doubt, the first plaintiff could have raised these issues in their affidavit to show ‘cause to the contrary’ against the first defendant’s application for order for sale in Johor Bahru OS No 210 of 1985. However, since foreclosure proceedings do not result in a final judgment ( Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119), res judicata did not apply to the first plaintiff here. The plaintiffs should not, therefore, be estopped from raising the issues which they could have raised in the foreclosure proceedings in the present action. Further, the Johor Bahru suit was concerned with the recovery of the amount owed under the bridging loan for which the second plaintiff in this suit was one of the guarantors, whereas the present action was a tortious action of negligent misrepresentation made with respect to end- financing. There were thus two distinct actions. Since the first plaintiff could not have raised the present cause of action as a counterclaim in the Johor Bahru suit, they were therefore not precluded from bringing the present claim as a separate action. In this appeal, we are concerned with the doctrine of res judicata which has been extended to what is now described as issue estoppel in its wider sense. In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at pp 933– 934, Lord Guest explained what is issue estoppel:

As originally categorized, res judicata was known as ‘estoppel by record’. But as it is now quite immaterial whether the judicial decision is pronounced by a tribunal which is required to keep a written record of its decision, this nomenclature has disappeared and it may be convenient to describe res judicata in its true and original form as ‘cause of action estoppel’. This has long been recognized as operating as a complete bar if the necessary conditions are present. Within recent years the principle has developed so as to extend to what is now described as ‘issue estoppel’, that is to say, where in a judicial decision between the same parties, some issue which was in ||Page 243>> controversy between the parties and was incidental to the main decision has been decided, then that may create an estoppel per rem judicatam. For requirement (iii), the judgment should have been between the same parties or their privies. According to Lord Guest, before a person can be a privy to a party, there must be community or privity of interest between them. His Lordship added that it was essential that he who is later to be held estopped must have had some kind of interest in the previous litigation or its subject matter. Spencer-Bower and Turner on Res Judicata (2nd Ed) at p 209 states that estoppel per rem judicatam operates for, or against, not only the parties, but also those who are privy to them in blood, title, or interest (see also 16 Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Ed) at p 874 paras 990–991). E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-386

… res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but … it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issue estoppel — Abuse of process — Unconditional appearance — Notice of counterclaim and affidavit on merits filed — Whether constitute fresh step in proceedings that debarred defendant from challenging claim — Whether estoppel or waiver apply in matters of public policy The plaintiff was the main contractor and the defendant was the sub-contractor in respect of 13 work orders. Disputes arose between the parties on the work orders and were referred to arbitration. An arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate the dispute covering all the 13 work orders. The plaintiff challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in respect of eight work orders. The court ruled that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to arbitrate the eight work orders. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an originating summons (‘the second OS’) seeking for a declaration that the arbitrator did not possess the jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute in respect of the remaining four work orders. The defendant raised a preliminary objection that the plaintiff was barred by res judicata and issue estoppel in the wider sense from bringing the second OS when the plaintiff could have included the four work orders in the first OS on the ground that the present four work orders form the subject matter of the same arbitration as the eight work orders which were the subject matter of the first OS. It was submitted that the second OS was an abuse of process and ought to be dismissed in limine. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant could not raise the plea as the defendant had taken another step in that: (i) the defendant had filed unconditional appearance; (ii) the defendant had filed a notice of counterclaim; and (iii) the defendant had filed an affidavit on merits before filing the affidavit raising the plea of res judicata. [Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif merupakan kontraktor utama dan defendan merupakan subkontraktor berkenaan dengan 13 pesanan-pesanan kerja. Pertikaian timbul antara pihak-pihak di atas pesanan-pesanan kerja tersebut dan dirujuk kepada timbang tara. Seorang penimbang tara dilantik untuk menghakimi pertikaian tersebut yang meliputi kesemua 13 pesanan-pesanan kerja tersebut. Plaintif mencabar bidang kuasa penimbangtara berkenaan dengan lapan pesanan-pesanan kerja. Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa penimbangtara tersebut tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk menimbang tara lapan pesanan- pesanan kerja tersebut. Kemudiannya plaintif memfailkan saman pemula (‘SP

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-387 kedua tersebut’) memohon deklarasi bahawa penimbang tara tersebut tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk menimbang tara pertikaian tersebut berkenaan dengan baki empat pesanan-pesanan kerja tersebut. Defendan membangkitkan bantahan awal bahawa plaintif adalah dihalang oleh res judicata dan isu estopel di dalam maksud yang lebih luas daripada membawa SP kedua tersebut apabila plaintif boleh memasukkan empat pesanan-pesanan kerja tersebut di dalam SP pertama atas alasan bahawa empat pesanan-pesanan kerja tersebut yang kini daripada perkara subjek timbang tara yang sama memandangkan lapan pesanan-pesanan kerja tersebut adalah perkara subjek SP pertama tersebut. Adalah dihujahkan bahawa SP kedua tersebut adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses dan sepatutnya ditolak secara limine. Plaintif berhujah bahawa defendan tidak boleh menimbulkan rayuan tersebut memandangkan defendan telah mengambil satu lagi langkah iaitu: (i) defendan telah memfailkan suatu kehadiran tidak bersyarat; (ii) defendan telah memfailkan suatu notis tuntutan balas; dan (iii) defendan telah memfailkan suatu afidavit atas merit-merit sebelum memfailkan afidavit tersebut yang membangkitkan rayuan res judicata. ||Page 419>> For cases on res judicata generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3959–4032. Mr RR Sethu, learned counsel for the defendant, in his preliminary objection to the second OS contends that the plaintiff is barred by res judicata or issue estoppel in the wider sense from bringing the present second OS in respect of the four work orders when the plaintiff could have included these four work orders in the first OS on the ground that the present four work orders form the subject matter of the same arbitration as the eight work orders which were the subject matter of the first OS. Counsel submitted that the second OS is an abuse of process and ought to be dismissed in limine and cited the rule in Henderson v Henderson [1843–60] All ER Rep 378 in support.

(i) the defendant had filed unconditional appearance; (ii) the defendant had filed a notice of counterclaim; and (iii) the defendant had filed an affidavit on merits before filing the affidavit raising the plea of res judicata in the wider sense. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel in the wider sense is not applicable in this case because the second OS is based on subject matter and facts which are materially different from those of the first OS. The second OS relates to four work orders which are separate and distinct contracts with different causes of action from the eight work orders in the first OS. The subject matter is entirely different. There is no duty on the plaintiff to bring all its causes of action in one proceeding. Further, counsel argues that the doctrine can only be invoked against the litigant who lost the first proceeding. As the plaintiff won the first OS, the said doctrine cannot apply to the plaintiff.

… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-388 accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. (Emphasis added.)

…res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but ... it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. (Emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Asia Commercial Finance extended res judicata in the wider sense to apply even to different causes of action. Peh Swee Chin FCJ in delivering the judgment of the court said at p 199B: ||Page 423>> The plaintiff’s counsel says the above statement in Asia Commercial Finance was obiter. I do not agree. The issue of res judicata by way of a cause of action estoppel formed the crux of the decision of the appeal in Asia Commercial Finance. This can be seen clearly in the opening paragraph of the judgment where the Supreme Court restates the law on res judicata. Having regard to the two OSs it is crystal clear that the four work orders in the second OS are based on the same issue concerning arbitration between the same parties: the defendant and the plaintiff. The President of PAM appointed the arbitrator Mr John L Lim for all the 13 work orders (PRP-A-008, first OS eight work orders and second OS four work orders) under a single letter of appointment. If the eight work orders which are separate contracts could be litigated in one proceeding under the same subject matter of arbitration in the first OS, I fail to understand why the four work orders in the second OS, even though they are claimed to be separate contracts and therefore separate causes of action, could not also be included in the first OS. The plaintiff had expressly referred the four work orders in the first OS yet it failed to claim any relief for these four work orders and no reason was offered for the failure. These four work orders had emerged during the hearing of the first OS. Thus, the inclusion of the four work orders in the plaintiff’s affidavit in the first OS is conclusive that the plaintiff treated the four work orders as forming part of the same subject matter of the first OS. Therefore, since the four work orders had arisen in the earlier proceedings, they should have been brought forward and grafted in the first OS, and the relief should have been claimed accordingly. In Divine-Bortey v Brent London Borough Council The Gazette, 3 June 1998 at p 29, the applicant brought industrial tribunal proceedings against the council alleging that he had been unfairly selected for redundancy. In the course of the tribunal proceedings it emerged that the applicant’s African accent might have had a bearing on his dismissal. The tribunal dismissed the claim for unfair dismissal so the applicant made a fresh complaint alleging racial discrimination. That claim was dismissed by a tribunal chairman on the ground that the matter was res judicata. The applicant’s appeal was allowed on the ground that there was no issue of estoppel because the first tribunal had not addressed the racial issue and the second tribunal had not considered the special circumstances of the case. The council appealed. The appeal was allowed. It was held that the rule in Henderson that parties to litigation must bring forward their whole case and would not, except in special circumstances, be permitted to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been litigated but had been omitted due

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-389 ||Page 424>> to negligence, inadvertence or even accident, applied to industrial tribunal proceedings; that there were no special circumstances in this case because the tribunal had found that the redundancy procedures were fair, leaving little room for a finding of racial discrimination; and that when the racial issue had arisen in the first proceedings it should have been grafted onto the original application. At the outset, the plaintiff contends that the doctrine of res judicata in the wider sense does not apply to the present case as the four work orders in the second OS are different contracts and causes of action from the eight work orders in the first OS and quoted New Brunswick Railway Co v British and French Trust Corp Ltd [1939] AC 1 in support. There, the first proceeding concerned the construction of a bond, whereas the second proceeding concerned the construction of other similar bonds. The court held that res judicata did not apply. On a closer scrutiny of the case, I agree with counsel for the defendant that the case concerns res judicata in the narrow sense and therefore distinguishable from the present case. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issue estoppel — Issues raised on sale agreement and assignment should have been canvassed in appeal before Federal Court — Recanvassing of same issues was an abuse of process of court — Whether plaintiff could prove exception that order from High Court of concurrent jurisdiction was null and void Civil Procedure — Striking out — Action — Appeal struck out by Federal Court — Same reliefs sought in this action — No reasonable cause of action disclosed — Whether court was functus officio to hear action — Whether issues were res judicata — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19 & O 92 An action (Suit No 449–81) was filed against OBT (the plaintiff) for breach of a sale agreement by TAC & Sons (the second defendant). In that action, OBT counterclaimed against TAC & Sons for specific performance of the sale agreement, whilst OBT & Sons (the first defendant), who intervened as the second defendant, counterclaimed against TAC & Sons for specific performance of the same sale agreement. At the trial, the High Court dismissed both TAC & Sons’ claim and OBT’s counterclaim against TAC & Sons, and ordered TAC & Sons to specifically perform the sale agreement and permit OBT & Sons, as successor-in-title/assignee of OBT, to carry out the sale agreement. An injunction sought by OBT & Sons was granted and TAC & Sons was ordered to pay damages and interest to OBT & Sons. Subsequently, TAC & Sons and OBT lodged their appeals which were then struck out by the Federal Court. The plaintiff in this action sought to undo the final result in Suit No 449–81; and to review, reverse, alter or change the judgment that is final and binding on all parties and that was not open to appeal. On the other hand, the first defendant applied under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’), the inherent jurisdiction of the court and O 92 of the RHC to strike out this action, on the grounds that: (i) the plaintiff had not disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the first defendant; (ii) the action was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of court; (iii) the court had no jurisdiction, because it was functus officio, to hear the instant action; and (iv) the issue in this action was res judicata as the reliefs sought by the plaintiff had been exhaustively dealt with in Suit No 449–81. [Bahasa Malaysia summary

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-390 Satu tindakan (Guaman No 449–81) telah difailkan terhadap OBT (plaintif), untuk kemungkiran perjanjian jual beli, oleh TAC & Sons (defendan kedua). Di dalam tindakan tersebut, OBT telah membuat tuntutan balas terhadap TAC & Sons untuk pelaksanaan spesifik bagi perjanjian jual beli tersebut, manakala OBT & Sons (defendan pertama), yang mencelah sebagai defendan kedua, membuat tuntutan balas terhadap TAC & Sons untuk pelaksanaan spesifik bagi perjanjian jual beli yang sama. Semasa perbicaraan, Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak kedua-dua tuntutan TAC & Sons dan tuntutan balas OBT tehadap TAC & Sons dan memerintahkan TAC & Sons, untuk melaksanakan secara spesifik perjanjian jual beli tersebut dan membenarkan OBT & Sons, sebagai pengganti hakmilik/ pemegang serahhak kepada OBT, untuk melaksanakan perjanjian jual beli tersebut. Injunksi yang dipohon oleh OBT & Sons telah diberikan dan TAC & Sons telah diperintahkan membayar ganti rugi dan faedah kepada OBT & Sons. Berikutan daripada itu, TAC & Sons dan OBT telah membuat rayuan yang kemudiannya telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan. Plaintif di dalam kes ini cuba untuk mengubah keputusan akhir di dalam Guaman No 449–81; dan untuk mengkaji semula, ||Page 12>> mengakaskan, mengubah atau menukar penghakiman yang muktamad dan mengikat kesemua pihak dan yang tidak boleh dibuat rayuan. Defendan pertama sebaliknya telah memohon di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’), bidang kuasa sedia ada mahkamah dan A 92 KMT untuk membatalkan tindakan ini atas alasan-alasan: (i) plaintif telah tidak mendedahkan kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap defendan pertama; (ii) tindakan tersebut adalah remeh, menyusahkan dan menyalahgunakan proses mahkamah; (iii) mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa kerana ia adalah functus officio untuk mendengar tindakan tersebut; dan (iv) isu di dalam tindakan tersebut adalah res judicata kerana relief-relief yang dipohon oleh plaintif telah dibicarakan secara menyeluruh di dalam Guaman No 449–81. For cases on res judicata, issue estoppel, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 4004–4010. For a case on striking out an action, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para 4335. JEFFREY TAN J : This is the first defendant’s application (encl 9) under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’), the inherent jurisdiction of the court and O 92 of the RHC, to strike out the action on grounds that: (i) the plaintiff had not disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the first defendant; (ii) the action is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of court; (iii) the court has no jurisdiction because it is functus officio to hear the instant action; and (iv) the issues in this action are res judicata. ||Page 14>> The pleadings in Suit No 449–81, eminently relevant to the instant application, particularly on the issues of functus officio and res judicata, should be, and so it is, set out in detail as follows. ||Page 15>> Touching on the law, Ms Lim submitted that this court of co-ordinate jurisdiction with the trial court cannot grant the reliefs sought. What more, she said, as that judgment was

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-391 affirmed by the Federal Court. Producing Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v Jervis [1944] 1 All ER 469 at p 471 (where the House of Lords held that ‘it is an essential quality of an appeal fit to be disposed of by the House of Lords that there exist between the parties a matter in actual controversy which the House undertakes to decide as a living issue’), Ms Lim submitted that there was no live issue with the striking out of TAC & Sons’ appeal between OBT and OBT & Sons. The Courts of Judicature Act 1964 empowers the court to dismiss or stay any proceedings where the subject is res judicata. In any event, on the doctrine of res judicata, the court has the inherent jurisdiction to strike out any proceedings. The issues now raised on the sale agreement and assignment should have been canvassed before the Federal Court. The recanvassing of the same issues is an abuse of the process of court. This court is functus officio. It cannot set aside a final judgment of another High Court. Citing Tai Chai Yu v The Chief Registrar of the Federal Court [1998] 2 CLJ 358, Ms Lim said ‘even the Federal Court cannot review its own decision’. This court cannot expunge the consequential reliefs granted by the trial court. ||Page 20>> In view of the admissions in the aforesaid affidavits that there was no issue between OBT and OBT & Sons, ‘this court has jurisdiction’, Mr Yeoh assured the court after having said that impeaching a judgment and appealing against a judgment are two different judicial processes, to consider this action and to impeach the judgment affected by those admissions. On his proposition that a judgment could be impeached, he directed the court’s attention to Insas Bhd & Anor v Ayer Molek Rubber Co Bhd & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 833 (where the Federal Court expunged certain remarks of the court below). Then, pointing to Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 (where the Federal Court held, inter alia, that one High Court may exercise judicially its inherent jurisdiction to set aside a final judgment of another High Court where that final judgment was proved to be null and void on ground of illegality or lack of jurisdiction), Mr Yeoh contended that this court is not functus officio on a matter that is null and void. When TAC & Sons’ appeal was struck off, he said, the foundation and substratum of OBT’s appeal were lost and OBT could not canvass before the Federal Court the matters now canvassed before this court, matters which strike at the very core of this proceeding. The proper forum to raise the present complaint is the High Court and not the Federal Court by an appeal. The doctrines of functus officio and res judicata do not afflict the present complaint. Now, reminiscent of the instant case, although not exactly on all fours, the appellant commenced proceedings afresh to have the order of 8 October 1990 declared null and void and to have it set aside on the ground that it contravened the Malay Reservation Enactment. The appellant argued that they were entitled to the remedy ex debito justitiae without the need to comply with the appeal procedure. The respondent argued that res judicata and estoppel precluded the appellant from questioning the validity of the order of 8 October 1990. Mohd Noor Abdullah J held that it would be unjust to estop the appellants from challenging the order of 8 October 1990 by reference to res judicata or to any other branch of the doctrine of estoppel, as the order of 8 October 1990 was plainly invalid. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the High Court was functus officio and had no jurisdiction whatsoever to set aside the order of 8 October 1990, regardless of any illegality in the order. Mr Yeoh argued that OBT’s appeal was struck out on a technicality. This argument brings to mind the case of Syarikat Perkhidmatan Bas Sibuga Sdn Bhd v Sykt Bas Jalan Leila

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-392 Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ 614. In that case, the sessions court struck out the action that it held was statute barred. The High Court struck out the appeal as the appeal record was not filed within the prescribed period. The plaintiff then filed a fresh but identical action. The sessions court held, on the defendant’s application to strike out the fresh action, that the striking out order in the first action was a final decision and that the doctrine of res judicata precluded the fresh action. On appeal to the High Court, the plaintiff argued that the doctrine of res judicata should not be invoked as the first appeal was struck out on a technicality without a decision on the merits. Richard Malanjum J who extensively surveyed the doctrine of res judicata before hand but would have none of the appellant’s argument that the doctrine of res judicata should not be invoked because the first appeal was struck out on a technicality, had this to say (at pp 623–624): ||Page 26>> Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Inherent jurisdiction of court — Setting aside final and perfected order on the ground that order null and void for contravening express provision of written law — Whether court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside order of court which contravened any written law ex debito justitiae — Whether such order may only be corrected on appeal — Whether res judicata and functus officio applicable Civil Procedure — Judgments and orders — Setting aside, application for — Setting aside final and perfected order on the ground that order null and void for contravening express provision of written law — Whether court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside order of court which contravened any written law ex debito justitiae — Whether such order may only be corrected on appeal — Whether res judicata and functus officio applicable The appellants were the registered co-owners of a piece of Malay reservation land (‘the land’). Their business associate, one Ismail bin Omar (‘Ismail’) was in need of funds. The appellants agreed to assist Ismail and they charged the land to the respondent to secure a loan advanced to Ismail. Ismail committed a breach of the loan agreement whereupon the respondent foreclosed the third party security and obtained an order of sale of the land. The appellants applied to the High Court for a declaration that the charge as well as the order of sale were invalid as being in contravention of the Malay Reservations Enactment (FMS Cap 142) (‘the Enactment’). On 21 March 1988, the High Court granted the declaration sought and upon the respondent’s summons filed in the same proceedings in which s 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 was invoked, the judge also made an order directing the appellants to repay all monies lent to Ismail (‘the first order’). On 8 October 1990, the judge made another order declaring that the appellants had received an advantage or benefit directly from the respondent and it was also ordered that the land be sold and the ||Page 394>> proceeds of sale be utilized to pay the balance outstanding on the loan made to Ismail (‘the second order’). The appellants then commenced proceedings afresh to have the second order declared null and void and to have it set aside on the ground that it contravened s 13 of the Enactment. The appellants argued that they were entitled to the remedy ex debito justitiae without the need to comply with appeal procedure. The respondent argued that res judicata and estoppel precluded the appellants from questioning the validity of the second order. The judge held that it

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-393 would be unjust to estop the appellants from challenging the second order by reference to res judicata or any other branch of the doctrine of estoppel because the second order was plainly invalid, it having been made in contravention of an express provision of written law (‘the third order’). The respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeal (see [1996] 3 MLJ 621), which allowed the appeal on the sole ground that the High Court was functus officio and had no jurisdiction whatsoever to set aside the second order irrespective of any illegality in the order. The appellants appealed. Held, allowing the appeal: (1) (Per Mohd Azmi FCJ) In setting aside the third order, the Court of Appeal missed completely to appreciate the central argument on the availability of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to exercise its discretion to set aside what was obviously an illegal attempt by the respondent to subvert and effectively reverse the original March 1988 final and perfectly legitimate order as a special exception to the doctrine governing the finality of court orders notwithstanding the absence of any appeal.It is settled law that one High Court cannot set aside a final order regularly obtained from another High Court of concurrent jurisdiction. But one special exception to this rule is where the final judgment of the High Court could be proved to be null and void on ground of illegality or lack of jurisdiction. Apart from breach of rules of natural justice, in any attempt to widen the door of the inherent and discretionary jurisdiction of the superior courts to set aside an order of court ex debito justitiae to a category of cases involving orders which contravened ‘any written law’, the contravention should be one which defies a substantive statutory prohibition so as to render the defective order null and void on ground of illegality or lack of jurisdiction. The discretion to invoke the inherent jurisdiction should also be exercised judicially in exceptional cases where the defect is of such a serious nature that there is a real need to set aside the defective order to enable the court to do justice. In all cases, the normal appeal procedure should be adopted to set aside a defective order, unless the aggrieved party could bring himself within the special exception. ||Page 395>> In allowing the respondent’s appeal, it was obvious from the judgment of the Court of Appeal that the learned judges had failed to direct their minds sufficiently or at all to the fundamental issue of whether the appellants’ application before the High Court came within the category of cases that attracts ex debito justitiae. Clearly, the second order which had the effect of an attachment in execution of a judgment was null and void being in violation of the prohibition imposed by s 13 of the Enactment. Therefore, it must necessarily follow that the High Court should have the necessary inherent jurisdiction to set aside the second order on the basis of the ex debito justitiae principle (see pp 408F–H, 409A–B, H–I and 410A–D, F); Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97 and Eu Finance Bhd v Lim Yoke Foo [1982] 2 MLJ 37 followed. (2) (Per Mohd Azmi FCJ) Since the appellants were not party to the loan agreement, s 66 could not be invoked against them. Under that section, the party who is bound to restore any advantage received or to make compensation

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-394 for such advantage should be construed as ‘any person’ who is a party to the agreement and has received any advantage pursuant to the terms or conditions of the invalid contract, but not otherwise. To extend the meaning of ‘any person’ in s 66 to strangers to the agreement would be in violation of the elementary principle of contract. Since the loan agreement was strictly between the respondent and Ismail, the court had no jurisdiction to order the appellants to pay under s 66 merely because he had received a fraction of the loan money from Ismail. The fact that Ismail had used the loan money received from the respondent to pay other people, including the appellants, could not make them parties or privies to the contract so as to enable the court to bring them within the ambit of s 66. The appellants were not a party to the loan agreement and as such there was no question of repayment by them either by way of restitution of benefit or compensation. Moreover, the appellants as third party chargors did not receive any ‘benefit’ within the meaning of s 66, either under the charge or the loan agreement. In the circumstances, the remedy ordered in the second order was invalid as it was made without or in excess of jurisdiction. Since the judgment under s 66 was invalid, it followed that the order of sale of the land to satisfy the said judgment must equally fall to the ground, apart from being in violation of the prohibition imposed by s 13 of the Enactment (see pp 411E–I and 412B–C). (3) (Per Peh Swee Chin FCJ) The doctrine of res judicata would apply in this case and bar the making of the third order directly concerned, because the said previous order had become the truth between the landowners and the chargee, and the order directly concerned would constitute a challenge to the truth or accuracy of the said previous order. Although the doctrine was not expressly argued or expressly relied on by the courts below, the High Court could still exercise its inherent jurisdiction by relying on ||Page 396>> the said doctrine even though it was not pleaded by any of the parties (see p 417A–C). (4) (Per Peh Swee Chin FCJ) When a judgment in the High Court has been perfected, a party to the judgment generally, apart from any appeal, cannot reopen the matter finalized in the judgment by seeking to alter it or amend it for the court would be functus officio by virtue of the ratio of Hock Hua Bank v Sahari bin Murid. Once perfected, a judgment of the High Court is also entitled to the obedience and respect from the parties to it on the basis of a command from a superior court of unlimited civil jurisdiction in the course of contentious litigation. It is also long established that one can apply to set aside an order of a superior court only in direct proceedings filed for the very purpose of having it set aside on valid grounds, but without doing so, one cannot attack its invalidity laterally by raising an objection to its invalidity in any other proceedings, without filing proceedings for applying to have it set aside first. When one wishes to file such proceedings to so set it aside, one must do so within the same proceedings or action in which the same order was obtained and not in a separate fresh proceeding or new action on any ground other than those mentioned in the quoted passage from Hock Hua Bank v

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-395 Sahari bin Murid (see pp 417G–I and 418A–B); Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Sahari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143 followed. (5) (Per Peh Swee Chin FCJ) If a party complains of an illegality in a contract, he must plead it or the court itself takes judicial notice of it when the contract is ex facie illegal or evidence about it clearly emerges in court. All these presupposedly must take place and must have taken place either at the trial of the first instance, or in any direct appeal to a higher court therefrom as the case may be. The court, if it did not deal with the illegality in any way aforesaid, would be functus officio and cannot take the point after a judgment is perfected. Further, a point of illegality could not be reserved by a litigant for future use without deploying it at the trial or in an appeal therefrom. A court cannot outside the scope of such trial and such appeal therefrom at any time thereafter take judicial notice of such point pleaded as an afterthought in a later action filed also as an afterthought. The doctrine of res judicata, it having been based, inter alia, also on the high policy of interest rei publicae ut finis litium, would prevent these afterthoughts (see p 419E–H) . (6) (Per Peh Swee Chin FCJ) The second order of sale was in substance and in truth the same as the order of sale of the land which was set aside by the same court in the same originating summons. The second order was therefore a resuscitation of the order of sale of the land under the thinnest disguise which the same court had set aside earlier by its judgment given on 21 March 1988 in the same originating summons. The resuscitation had the effect of invalidating or subverting the said judgment dated 21 March 1988 given on account of the Enactment. Such resuscitation in these circumstances was an abuse of process of ||Page 397>> the kind for which this court ought not to fold its arms and do nothing about it.However, the second order should not in form be set aside as it would directly repudiate the relevant ratio in Hock Hua Bank v Sahari bin Murid. Nevertheless, the court was persuaded to do so on the ground of illegality on the argument based on the Enactment. In other words, the second order should not be reopened and heard again on merits vide the ratio of Hock Hua Bank after it was perfected and also on the ground of res judicata. The second order of sale had to be got rid of, but only if there was some other legal basis for doing so.In this case, the second order of sale was an order of execution (which includes a writ of seizure and sale) stated in the form of and as part of a court’s order. Any judgment debtor if dissatisfied is entitled to file an application within such time frame to set aside or stay any order of execution or writ of seizure and sale. The court which makes an order since perfected is functus officio about reopening the matter and rehearing the parties on merits about the order, but it is not functus officio to hear a subsequent application to set aside an order of execution or order of seizure and sale. Normally, the landowners would have been perfectly in order to set aside such an order of execution but for the fact that the said order of execution which was made was part of a perfected court’s order. But if the court could not grant an order outright in the form of setting aside the said order of execution

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-396 because it was part of a perfected order and also because it was res judicata, then the court could still otherwise grant a relief or order which could be consistent with any prayer sought by the second originating summons. The court could therefore grant a stay of the said order of execution — a relief consistent with the prayer of the second originating summons if the court had the inherent jurisdiction to do so. An order of execution is also a proceeding and the inherent jurisdiction to stay any proceeding which is an abuse of process exists undoubtedly. The second order of sale was a misuse of the court machinery and was therefore an abuse of process (see pp 420E–I and 421A–I).Therefore, the appeal was allowed and the order of the Court of Appeal set aside, and since this court could make any additional consequential order, a further order was made that the third order be substituted with another order to the effect that execution of the second order of sale be stayed permanently without any right of removal of such stay (see p 422E). (7) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) As a general rule, orders of a court of unlimited jurisdiction may not be impugned on the ground that they are void in the sense that they may be ignored or disobeyed. However, it is well settled that even courts of unlimited jurisdiction have no authority to act in contravention of written law. Of course, so long as an order of a court of unlimited jurisdiction stands, irregular though it may be, it must be ||Page 398>> respected. But where an order of such a court is made in breach of statute, it is made without jurisdiction and may therefore be declared void and set aside in proceedings brought for that purpose. It is then entirely open to the court, upon the illegality being clearly shown, to grant a declaration to the effect that the order is invalid and to have it set aside. It is wrong to assume that such an order may only be corrected on appeal. It is clear in light of the principles established by high authority that a court of unlimited jurisdiction, even in the absence of an express enabling provision, has inherent power to set aside its orders made in breach of written law. The ends of justice will not be met if such a power did not exist. And the procedural branch of the broad and flexible doctrine of estoppel known as res judicata finds no place in such a circumstance. Neither has the functus officio theory any role to play in the case. It followed that the High Court had ample power and jurisdiction to grant the third order and to set aside the second order. The Court of Appeal therefore fell into error by declining to enter upon the merits of the case and in deciding the appeal before it entirely on the ground that the High Court was functus officio (see pp 425G, 426E–G and 429F–I); Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97, Meenakshi Naidoo v Subramaniya Sastri LR 14 IA 160, Chief Kofi Forfie v Barima Kwabena Seifah [1958] 1 All ER 289 and Eu Finance Bhd v Lim Yoke Foo [1982] 2 MLJ 37 followed; Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd (In receivership) v Chee Pok Choy & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 105 not followed. (8) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) What became void in consequence of a breach of the Enactment was the charge that the appellants had created over the land. With it fell the annexure that contained the contract between the appellants and the respondent. The contract of loan between Ismail and the respondent

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-397 continued to be perfectly valid since it did not offend the provisions of the Enactment. But, no benefit whatsoever passed from the respondent to the appellants under either contract. The appellants were not parties to the loan agreement. Neither did they receive any benefit under the annexure to the charge. Indeed, what they suffered was a detriment because they put their property at risk. The benefit of which s 66 speaks is one that is received under the very contract which, to quote the words of the section, ‘is discovered to be void’ or ‘becomes void’. The benefit in question passed from the respondent to Ismail under the contract of loan which neither became void nor was discovered to be void. Section 66 did not come into play in so far as that contract was concerned. With regard to the contract that was discovered to be void, namely the annexure to the charge, the appellants did not receive any benefit under it.Based on authority, the words ‘or any other person’ appearing in s 2(d) of the Contracts Act 1950 are not to be wide enough to exclude the doctrine of privity of contract. It follows, by parallel reasoning, that the identical words used by s 66 do not include ||Page 399>> persons who are not parties to a contract under which a benefit passed. There is no justification, in principle or policy, to extend the terms of the section by means of an interpretation that runs counter to settled jurisprudence. It follows that only the parties to a contract may claim or become liable to make restitution under that section. Any other construction would produce an anomaly because, while only parties to a contract may sue upon it, yet, when the very same contract is discovered to be void, anyone, including persons who cannot enforce it may recover any benefit received by one of the parties thereto. Accordingly, the words ‘any person’ appearing in s 66 must refer only to parties to the original contract that either becomes or is discovered to be void (see pp 430G–I, 431A, H–I and 432A); Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v Schmidt [1968] 1 MLJ 170 followed; Giraj Baksh v Kazi Hamid Ali (1886) ILR 9 All 340 and Devi Prasad v Mehdi Hasan AIR 1940 Pat 81 not followed. [Bahasa Malaysia summary Perayu-perayu adalah pemilik bersama berdaftar sebidang tanah rizab Melayu (‘tanah tersebut’). Rakan perniagaan mereka, seorang bernama Ismail bin Omar (‘Ismail’) memerlukan bantuan kewangan. Perayu-perayu bersetuju untuk menolong Ismail dan mereka menggadaikan tanah tersebut kepada penentang bagi menjamin pinjaman yang diberikan kepada Ismail. Ismail telah memungkiri perjanjian pinjaman yang mana penentang telah menutup gadai janji pihak ketiga dan memperolehi perintah ke atas jualan tanah tersebut. Perayu-perayu memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk suatu perisytiharan bahawa gadaian serta perintah jualan adalah tak sah kerana mereka melanggar Enakmen Rizab Melayu (NMB Bab 142) (‘Enakmen tersebut’). Pada 21 Mac 1988, Mahkamah Tinggi memberikan perisytiharan yang dipohon dan atas saman penentang yang difailkan dalam prosiding yang sama dalam mana s 66 Akta Kontrak 1950 digunakan, hakim juga membuat perintah mengarahkan perayu-perayu membayar semula semua wang yang dipinjam kepada Ismail (‘perintah pertama’). Pada 8 Oktober 1990, hakim telah membuat perintah lain yang mengisytiharkan bahawa perayu-perayu

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-398 telah menerima kelebihan atau faedah secara langsung daripada penentang dan ia juga diperintahkan bahawa tanah tersebut dijual dan hasil jualan digunakan bagi membayar baki yang masih terhutang atas pinjaman yang dibuat kepada Ismail (‘perintah kedua’). Perayu-perayu kemudiannya memulakan prosiding baru agar perintah kedua diisytiharkan batal dan tak sah dan untuk mengetepikannya atas alasan bahawa ia melanggar s 13 Enakmen tersebut. Perayu-perayu menghujahkan bahawa mereka berhak mendapatkan remedi ex debito justitiae tanpa keperluan untuk mematuhi prosedur rayuan. Penentang menghujahkan res judicata dan estopel menghalang perayu-perayu daripada mempersoalkan kesahihan perintah kedua. Hakim memutuskan bahawa ia tidak adil untuk mengestop perayu-perayu daripada mencabar perintah kedua dengan merujuk kepada res ||Page 400>> judicata atau mana-mana cabangan lain doktrin estopel kerana perintah kedua adalah tidak sah, disebabkan ia telah dibuat bertentangan dengan peruntukan nyata undang-undang bertulis (‘perintah ketiga’). Penentang kemudiannya merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan (lihat [1996] 3 MLJ 621), yang membenarkan rayuan atas alasan tunggal bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi adalah functus officio dan tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mengetepikan perintah kedua tanpa mengira apa-apa kepenyalahan dalam perintah. Perayu-perayu membuat rayuan. Dputuskan, membenarkan rayuan: (1) (Oleh Mohd Azmi HMP) Dalam mengetepikan perintah ketiga, Mahkamah Rayuan langsung gagal menilai hujah utama tentang terdapatnya bidang kuasa sedia ada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk melaksanakan budi bicaranya untuk mengetepikan apa yang jelasnya adalah percubaan yang tak sah oleh penentang untuk menjatuhkan dan mengakas secara berkesan perintah Mac 1988 yang asal yang muktamad dan betul-betul sah sebagai kekecualian yang istimewa kepada doktrin yang menguasai kemuktamadan perintah mahkamah tanpa mengira ketiadaan sebarang rayuan.Adalah undang-undang mantap bahawa sebuah Mahkamah Tinggi tidak boleh mengetepikan perintah muktamad yang diperolehi mengikut aturan daripada Mahkamah Tinggi yang lain yang mempunyai bidang kuasa bersama. Tetapi satu-satunya kekecualian istimewa kepada rukun ini ialah di mana penghakiman muktamad Mahkamah Tinggi boleh dibuktikan adalah batal dan tak sah atas alasan kepenyalahan undang-undang atau kekurangan bidang kuasa. Selain daripada kemungkiran rukun keadilan asasi, dalam sebarang percubaan untuk meluaskan gerbang bidang kuasa sedia ada dan budi bicara mahkamah atasan bagi mengetepikan perintah mahkamah ex debito justitiae kepada kategori kes yang melibatkan perintah yang melanggar ‘mana-mana undang-undang bertulis’, pelanggaran haruslah merupakan sesuatu yang mengingkari larangan statutori yang substantif supaya menyebabkan perintah cacat itu menjadi batal dan tak sah atas alasan kepenyalahan undang-undang atau kekurangan bidang kuasa. Budi bicara untuk menggunakan bidang kuasa sedia ada juga patut dilaksanakan secara adil dalam kes-kes luar biasa di mana kecacatan adalah amat serius hinggakan terdapat keperluan untuk mengetepikan perintah yang cacat bagi membolehkan mahkamah bertindak adil. Dalam semua kes, prosedur rayuan yang biasa patut diterima-pakai untuk mengetepikan perintah cacat, melainkan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-399 pihak terkilan boleh membawa dirinya dalam lingkungan kekecualian istimewa.Dalam membenarkan rayuan penentang, adalah nyata daripada penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa hakim-hakim yang arif telah gagal sama sekali atau dengan secukupnya untuk mengambil kira isu asas tentang sama ada permohonan perayu-perayu di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi dirangkumi oleh kategori ||Page 401>> kes-kes yang menarik ex debito justitiae. Jelasnya, perintah kedua yang mempunyai kesan penahanan melaksanakan penghakiman adalah batal dan tak sah kerana ia melanggar larangan yang dikenakan oleh s 13 Enakmen tersebut. Maka, ia mesti secara perlu bermakna bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi harus mempunyai bidang kuasa sedia ada yang perlu untuk mengetepikan perintah kedua atas dasar prinsip ex debito justitiae (lihat ms 408F–H, 409A–B, H–I dan 410A–D, F); Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97 dan Eu Finance Bhd v Lim Yoke Foo [1982] 2 MLJ 37 diikut. (2) (Oleh Mohd Azmi HMP) Oleh kerana perayu-perayu tidak merupakan pihak kepada perjanjian pinjaman, s 66 tidak boleh digunakan terhadap mereka. Di bawah seksyen tersebut, pihak yang terikat untuk mengembalikan apa-apa faedah yang diterima atau membuat pampasan untuk faedah begitu patut ditafsirkan sebagai ‘sesiapa jua’ yang adalah pihak kepada perjanjian dan telah menerima sebarang faedah menurut terma atau syarat kontrak yang tak sah, tetapi bukan sebaliknya. Untuk melanjutkan makna ‘sesiapa jua’ dalam s 66 kepada orang yang tidak dikenali kepada perjanjian akan melanggar prinsip dasar kontrak. Oleh kerana perjanjian pinjaman adalah di antara penentang dan Ismail, mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk memerintah perayu-perayu membayar di bawah s 66 semata-mata kerana mereka telah menerima sebahagian kecil wang pinjaman daripada Ismail. Hakikat bahawa Ismail telah menggunakan wang pinjaman yang diterima daripada penentang untuk membayar orang lain, termasuk perayu-perayu, tidak mungkin menjadikan mereka pihak atau privi kepada kontrak bagi membolehkan mahkamah membawa mereka dalam lingkungan s 66. Perayu-perayu tidak merupakan pihak kepada perjanjian pinjaman dan dengan itu tiada persoalan tentang bayaran balik oleh mereka sama ada menerusi restitusi faedah atau pampasan. Tambahan pula, perayu-perayu sebagai pemegang gadaian pihak ketiga tidak menerima sebarang ‘faedah’ dalam lingkungan maksud s 66, sama ada di bawah gadaian atau perjanjian pinjaman. Dalam keadaan ini, remedi yang diperintahkan dalam perintah kedua adalah tidak sah kerana ia dibuat tanpa atau melampaui bidang kuasa. Oleh kerana penghakiman di bawah s 66 adalah tak sah, ini bermakna bahawa perintah jualan tanah tersebut bagi memenuhi penghakiman itu mestilah sama-sama gagal, selain daripada mencabuli larangan yang dikenakan oleh s 13 Enakmen tersebut (lihat ms 411E–I dan 412B–C). (3) (Oleh Peh Swee Chin HMP) Doktrin res judicata akan terpakai dalam kes ini dan menghalang pembuatan perintah ketiga yang berkaitan secara langsung, kerana perintah sebelumnya yang tersebut telah menjadi kebenaran di antara pemilik tanah dan pemegang gadaian, dan perintah yang berkaitan secara langsung akan membentuk cabaran kepada kebenaran atau kejituan perintah

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-400 sebelumnya yang tersebut. Walaupun doktrin itu tidak dihujahkan secara nyata atau digunakan secara nyata oleh mahkamah di bawah, Mahkamah Tinggi masih boleh ||Page 402>> melaksanakan bidang kuasa sedia adanya dengan bergantung kepada doktrin tersebut meskipun ia tidak diplidkan oleh mana-mana pihak (lihat ms 417A–C). (4) (Oleh Peh Swee Chin HMP) Apabila sesuatu penghakiman di Mahkamah Tinggi telah disempurnakan, sesebuah pihak kepada penghakiman pada umumnya, selain daripada apa-apa rayuan, tidak boleh membuka semula perkara yang dimuktamadkan dalam penghakiman dengan meminta supaya ia ditukar atau dipinda kerana mahkamah functus officio disebabkan ratio Hock Hua Bank v Sahari bin Murid. Selepas disempurnakan, penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi juga berhak kepada kepatuhan dan hormat daripada pihak-pihak kepadanya berdasarkan suatu perintah daripada sebuah mahkamah atasan yang tidak terhad bidang kuasa sivilnya semasa litigasi yang menimbulkan perbalahan. Adalah juga mantap bahawa seseorang boleh memohon untuk mengetepikan suatu perintah mahkamah atasan hanya dalam prosiding terus yang difailkan untuk tujuan mengetepikannya atas alasan yang sah, tetapi tanpa berbuat demikian, seseorang tidak boleh menyerang ketaksahan secara lateral dengan membangkitkan bantahan tentang ketaksahannya dalam mana-mana prosiding lain, tanpa memfailkan prosiding untuk memohon supaya ia diketepikan terlebih dahulu. Apabila seseorang ingin memfailkan prosiding begitu untuk mengetepikannya, dia mestilah berbuat demikian dalam prosiding atau tindakan yang sama dalam mana perintah yang sama diperolehi dan bukan dalam prosiding atau tindakan baru yang berasingan berdasarkan alasan selain daripada apa yang disebut dalam petikan yang diambil daripada Hock Hua Bank v Sahari bin Murid (lihat ms 417G–I dan 418A–B); Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Sahari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143 diikut. (5) (Oleh Peh Swee Chin HMP) Andainya sesebuah pihak mengadu tentang kepenyalahan dalam kontrak, dia mestilah memplidkannya atau mahkamah sendiri mengambil notis kehakiman mengenainya apabila kontrak ex facie menyalahi undang-undang atau keterangan mengenainya berbangkit di mahkamah. Semua ini diandaikan mesti berlaku dan mesti telah berlaku sama ada di perbicaraan pertama, atau dalam apa-apa rayuan terus kepada mahkamah yang lebih tinggi daripadanya mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan. Sekiranya mahkamah tidak menguruskan kepenyalahan dalam apa-apa cara yang disebut, ia adalah functus officio dan tidak boleh mengambil hujah itu selepas sesuatu penghakiman disempurnakan. Selanjutnya, suatu hujah atas kepenyalahan tidak boleh dikhaskan oleh pihak litigan untuk kegunaan masa depan tanpa mengaturkannya di perbicaraan atau dalam suatu rayuan atasnya. Sebuah mahkamah tidak boleh di luar rangkuman perbicaraan sebegitu dan rayuan atasnya mengambil notis kehakiman atas hujah yang diplidkan sebagai sesuatu yang difikirkan kemudian dalam tindakan ||Page 403>> berikutnya yang juga difailkan sebagai tambahan. Oleh kerana doktrin res judicata adalah berdasarkan, antara lain, polisi kepentingan rei

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-401 publicae ut finis litium, ia akan menghalang tambahan ini (lihat ms 419E–H) . (6) (Oleh Peh Swee Chin HMP) Perintah jualan yang kedua adalah pada dasarnya dan sebenarnya sama dengan perintah jualan atas tanah tersebut yang diketepikan oleh mahkamah yang sama dalam saman pemula yang sama. Maka perintah yang kedua merupakan kebangkitan perintah jualan atas tanah tersebut di bawah samaran yang paling nipis yang telah diketepikan terlebih dahulu oleh mahkamah yang sama melalui penghakimannya yang diberikan pada 21 Mac 1988 dalam saman pemula yang sama. Kebangkitan mempunyai kesan menyebabkan penghakiman bertarikh 21 Mac 1988 menjadi tak sah atau dijatuhkan yang diberikan memandangkan Enakmen tersebut. Kebangkitan dalam keadaan ini adalah penyalahgunaan proses yang tidak patut diabaikan oleh mahkamah.Namun demikian, perintah kedua dalam bentuknya tidak patut diketepikan kerana secara terus ia akan menolak ratio yang relevan dalam Hock Hua Bank v Sahari bin Murid. Walau bagaimanapun, mahkamah dipujuk untuk berbuat begitu atas alasan kepenyalahan undang-undang atas hujah yang berdasarkan Enakmen tersebut. Dalam ertikata lain, perintah kedua tidak patut dibuka semula dan didengar sekali lagi atas merit disebabkan ratio Hock Hua Bank selepas ia telah disempurnakan dan juga atas alasan res judicata. Perintah jualan kedua terpaksa disingkirkan, tetapi hanya jika terdapat dasar sah yang lain dalam berbuat demikian.Dalam kes ini, perintah jualan kedua adalah perintah pelaksanaan (yang termasuk writ penyitaan dan penjualan) yang dinyatakan dalam bentuk dan sebagai sebahagian perintah mahkamah. Sekiranya tidak puas hati mana-mana penghutang penghakiman adalah berhak memfailkan permohonan dalam jangkamasa untuk mengetepikan atau menggantung sebarang perintah pelaksanaan atau writ penyitaan dan penjualan. Mahkamah yang membuat perintah yang telah pun disempurnakan adalah functus officio tentang membuka semula perkara dan mendengar semula pihak-pihak atas merit mengenai perintah itu, tetapi ia tidak functus officio untuk mendengar permohonan seterusnya untuk mengetepikan perintah pelaksanaan atau perintah penyitaan dan penjualan. Biasanya, pemilik tanah membuat sesuatu yang teratur untuk mengetepikan perintah jualan demikian kalau tidak kerana perintah pelaksanaan yang dibuat adalah sebahagian daripada perintah mahkamah yang disempurnakan. Tetapi sekiranya mahkamah tidak dapat memberikan perintah secara terus terang dalam bentuk mengetepikan perintah pelaksanaan tersebut kerana ia adalah sebahagian perintah yang disempurnakan dan juga kerana ia ||Page 404>> adalah res judicata, maka mahkamah masih boleh memberikan relief atau perintah yang konsisten dengan mana-mana permohonan yang diminta oleh saman pemula kedua. Maka mahkamah boleh memberikan penggantungan pelaksanaan perintah tersebut — suatu bentuk relief yang konsisten dengan permohonan dalam saman permula kedua sekiranya mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa sedia ada untuk berbuat demikian. Suatu perintah pelaksanaan juga adalah prosiding dan bidang kuasa sedia ada untuk menggantung mana-mana prosiding yang merupakan penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah wujud tanpa keraguan. Perintah jualan kedua adalah

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-402 penyalahgunaan fungsi mahkamah dan dengan itu adalah penyalahgunaan proses (lihat ms 420E–I dan 421A–I).Maka, rayuan dibenarkan dan perintah Mahkamah Rayuan diketepikan, dan memandangkan mahkamah ini boleh membuat apa-apa perintah berbangkit tambahan, perintah lanjut dibuat bahawa perintah ketiga diganti dengan perintah lain dengan kesan bahawa pelaksanaan perintah jualan kedua digantung secara tetap tanpa apa-apa hak untuk membatalkan penggantungan sedemikian (lihat ms 422E). (7) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Sebagai rukun am, perintah-perintah mahkamah yang tidak terhad bidang kuasanya tidak boleh dipersoalkan atas alasan bahawa mereka adalah tak sah dalam ertikata mereka boleh diabaikan atau diingkari. Walau bagaimanapun, adalah mantap bahawa mahkamah yang tidak terhad bidang kuasa pun tidak mempunyai kuasa untuk bertindak bertentangan dengan undang-undang bertulis. Sudah tentu, selagi sesuatu perintah mahkamah yang tidak terhad bidang kuasa kekal, walaupun luar aturan, ia mestilah dihormati. Tetapi di mana suatu perintah mahkamah begitu dibuat melanggari statut, ia adalah dibuat tanpa bidang kuasa dan dengan itu boleh diisytiharkan tak sah dan diketepikan dalam prosiding yang dimulakan untuk tujuan itu. Seterusnya, secara keseluruhan ia adalah terbuka kepada mahkamah, selepas kepenyalahan ditunjukkan dengan jelas, untuk membenarkan perisytiharan dengan kesan bahawa perintah adalah tak sah dan untuk mengetepikannya. Adalah salah untuk mengganggap bahawa perintah sedemikian hanya boleh dibetulkan atas rayuan. Adalah jelas memandangkan prinsip yang diwujudkan oleh autoriti mantap bahawa sebuah mahkamah yang tidak terhad bidang kuasanya, walaupun dalam ketiadaan peruntukan yang nyata, mempunyai kuasa sedia ada untuk mengetepikan perintahnya yang dibuat bertentangan dengan undang-undang bertulis. Keadilan tidak akan tercapai sekiranya kuasa sedemikian tidak wujud. Dan bahagian prosedur doktrin estopel yang luas dan fleksibel yang dikenali sebagai res judicata tidak berkaitan dalam keadaan begitu. Teori functus officio juga tidak mempunyai apa-apa peranan dalam kes ini. Ini bermakna bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai kuasa dan bidang kuasa ||Page 405>> yang luas untuk memberikan perintah ketiga dan untuk mengetepikan perintah kedua. Maka Mahkamah Rayuan terkhilaf dalam keengganan untuk mengambil kira merit kes dan dalam memutuskan rayuan di hadapannya secara keseluruhan berdasarkan alasan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi adalah functus officio (lihat ms 425G, 426E–G dan 429G–I); Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97, Meenakshi Naidoo v Subramaniya Sastri LR 14 IA 160, Chief Kofi Forfie v Barima Kwabena Seifah [1958] 1 All ER 289 dan Eu Finance Bhd v Lim Yoke Foo [1982] 2 MLJ 37 diikut; Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd (In receivership) v Chee Pok Choy & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 105 tidak diikut. (8) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Apa yang menjadi tak sah akibat kemungkiran Enakmen tersebut adalah gadaian yang telah diwujudkan oleh perayu-perayu atas tanah tersebut. Tambahan yang mengandungi kontrak di antara perayu-perayu dan penentang juga telah terjejas. Kontrak pinjaman di antara Ismail dan penentang terus menjadi sah kerana ia tidak melanggar peruntukan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-403 Enakmen tersebut. Akan tetapi, tiada apa-apa faedah beralih daripada penentang kepada perayu-perayu di bawah mana-mana kontrak. Perayu-perayu tidak merupakan pihak kepada perjanjian pinjaman. Mereka tidak juga menerima apa-apa faedah di bawah tambahan kepada gadaian. Malah, apa yang dialami adalah suatu penjejasan kerana mereka telah meletak harta mereka dalam bahaya. Faedah yang dikatakan oleh s 66 adalah sesuatu yang diterima di bawah kontrak yang mana, untuk memetik kata-kata seksyen, ‘didapati batal’ atau ‘menjadi batal’. Faedah berkenaan beralih daripada penentang kepada Ismail di bawah kontrak pinjaman yang tidak pun menjadi tak sah atau didapati tak sah. Seksyen 66 tidak terlibat sejauh mana kontrak itu adalah berkenaan. Berhubung dengan kontrak yang didapati tak sah, iaitu tambahan kepada gadaian, perayu-perayu tidak menerima apa-apa faedah di bawahnya.Berdasarkan autoriti, perkataan-perkataan ‘atau siapa sahaja’ yang menonjol dalam s 2(d) Akta Kontrak 1950 tidak cukup luas untuk mengecualikan doktrin privity kontrak. Ini bermakna bahawa, menerusi penaakulan selari, perkataan-perkataan serupa yang digunakan oleh s 66 tidak termasuk orang yang bukan pihak kepada suatu kontrak di bawah mana faedah telah mengalih. Tiada justifikasi, dalam prinsip atau polisi, untuk melanjutkan terma seksyen melalui tafsiran yang bercanggahan dengan jurisprudens mantap. Ini bermakna bahawa cuma pihak-pihak kepada kontrak boleh menuntut atau bertangggungjawab membuat restitusi di bawah seksyen itu. Apa-apa tafsiran lain akan menghasilkan kejanggalan kerana, sedangkan hanya pihak kepada kontrak boleh mendakwa atasnya, namun, apabila kontrak yang sama didapati tak sah, sesiapa, termasuk orang yang tidak boleh menguatkuasakannya boleh mendapat balik sebarang faedah yang diterima oleh mana-mana pihak kepadanya. Oleh itu, ||Page 406>> perkataan-perkataan ‘siapa sahaja’ yang menonjol dalam s 66 mestilah merujuk hanya kepada pihak-pihak kontrak asal yang sama ada menjadi tak sah atau didapati tak sah (lihat ms 430G–I, 431A, H–I dan 432A); Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v Schmidt [1968] 1 MLJ 170 diikut; Giraj Baksh v Kazi Hamid Ali (1886) ILR 9 All 340 dan Devi Prasad v Mehdi Hasan AIR 1940 Pat 81 tidak diikut.] ||Page 407>> The question that arose immediately for me were: (a) whether the High Court could set aside its earlier order made and perfected about four years previously in a fresh subsequent proceeding (ie Originating Summons No 24–110/95) from the point of view of the perfection of the order and another point of view of res judicata; and (b) whether illegality could be a ground for doing so when it could not do so by virtue of what is stated in (a) above. Before dealing with the point on which the Court of Appeal relied, let me deal briefly first with the other point of view referred to by me earlier, ||Page 417>> that of res judicata The doctrine of res judicata would apply and bar the making of the order directly concerned, because the said previous order had become the truth between the landowners and the chargee, and the order directly concerned would constitute a challenge to the truth or accuracy of the said previous order. It is true that the doctrine was not expressly argued or expressly relied on by the courts below.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-404 If a party complains of an illegality in a contract, eg when the consideration or object of the agreement is forbidden by statute and therefore unlawful, he must plead it or the court itself takes judicial notice of it when the contract is ex facie illegal or evidence about it clearly emerges in court. All these presupposedly must take place and must have taken place either at the trial of the first instance, or in any direct appeal to a higher court therefrom as the case may be. The court if it did not deal with the illegality in any way aforesaid, would be functus officio and cannot take the point after a judgment is perfected, the point not being one of the exceptions covered by, eg the ratio of Hock Hua Bank v Sahari bin Murid. Further, a point of illegality could not be reserved by a litigant for future use without deploying it at the trial or in an appeal therefrom. A court cannot outside the scope of such trial and such appeal therefrom at any time thereafter take judicial notice of such point pleaded as an afterthought in a later action filed also as an afterthought. The doctrine of res judicata, it having been based, inter alia, also on the high policy of interest rei publicae ut finis litium, would prevent these afterthoughts (see Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 and Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd (In receivership) v Chee Pok Choy & Ors) . I had considered and decided that the clear ratio in the Hock Hua Bank’s case ought, on no account, to be departed from for dealing with this most unsatisfactory situation even though we were persuaded to do so on the ground of illegality on the argument based on the said Enactment. In other words, the said previous order should not be reopened and heard again on merits vide the ratio of Hock Hua Bank v Sahari bin Murid after it was perfected and also on the ground of res judicata in any event. The second order of sale had to be got rid of, but only if there was some other legal basis for doing so. There was happily such a basis as follows. Normally, the landowners would have been perfectly in order to set aside such an order of execution but for the fact that the said order of execution which was made was part of a perfected court’s order, ie of the said previous order. But if the court could not grant an order outright in the form of setting aside the said order of execution because it was part of a perfected order and also because it was res judicata, then the court could still otherwise grant a relief or order which could be consistent with any prayer sought by the second originating summons (see the case of Khaw Poh Chhuan v Ng Gaik Peng & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 761 at p 785). The court could therefore grant a stay of the said order of execution — a relief consistent with the prayer of the second originating summons if the court had the inherent jurisdiction to do so. In the proceedings before Mohd Noor Abdullah J, the respondent argued that res judicata and estoppel precluded the appellants from questioning the validity of the second order. The learned judge, however, rejected this argument principally on the ground that it would be unjust to estop the appellants from challenging the second order by reference to res judicata or any other branch of the doctrine of estoppel because the impugned order was plainly invalid: it having been made in contravention of an express provision of written law.

To allow the learned judge in the court below to reopen the matter nine months after it was decided by himself (and for that matter, any other judge), a court would have to allow, equally, another judge exercising a co-ordinate jurisdiction to set it aside on the same jurisdiction point after, say, 20 years, in the same case, for food for a goose is also food for a gander. This would bring absolute chaos to our judicial system which does not carry on in such fanciful way as contended by learned counsel for the chargors. E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-405 Such chaotic condition is prevented by several things. First, a jurisdiction point is no less an issue than other issues in civil litigation. If not raised at the hearing in the court of first instance or on appeal, it cannot be raised thereafter, for the doctrine of res judicata sets in. Res judicata has been explained before, eg see Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (SC). When the jurisdiction point in question was not raised before the learned judge before he made the first order, when he heard the matter inter parties, or at any rate, if it was not raised for review before the said order was perfected, the requirements of a proceeding in an adversarial system were complied with and satisfied, unless the learned judge exceptionally ||Page 429>> took the jurisdiction point on his own initiative, if he so minded, before the said order of sale was made. We mentioned the adversarial system because in it, a court generally would leave it to the parties in litigation to conduct their respective cases as best as they could without interference. It is to be remembered in this connection that a superior court like the High Court is ‘a court of unlimited jurisdiction in the course of contentious litigation’ as stated by Lord Diplock in Isaacs v Robertson [1984] 3 All ER 140 at p 143, when referring to a High Court as such a court in connection with the requirement that a High Courts order must be obeyed and could only be challenged in a direct application to set it aside. This was followed by the Supreme Court in Puah Bee Hong & Anor v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur Anor (Teo Keng Tuan Robert, Intervener) and another appeal [1994] 2 MLJ 601 (SC). We may add that under s 114(e) of the Evidence Act 1950, one can presume that the High Court has such attributed jurisdiction unless rebutted. We say this in connection with our description of such a jurisdiction point as being ordinarily an issue in litigation. If the learned judge had no jurisdiction on 17 September 1992 to hear the application dated 8 June 1992 to set aside the first order, the application to set aside could not have been entertained by the court in the first place. Thus, any legal argument in support of such application to set aside — should it proceed — ex necessitate could not have been entertainable, lying, as it did, outside the threshold of the court. As a necessary consequence, this appeal is not properly before us — it being an appeal from an order made at a hearing which was an exercise in futility. It is therefore clear, in light of the principles established by high authority, that a court of unlimited jurisdiction, even in the absence of an express enabling provision, has inherent power to set aside its orders made in breach of written law. The ends of justice will not be met if such a power did not exist. And the procedural branch of the broad and flexible doctrine of estoppel known as res judicata finds no place in such a circumstance. Neither has the functus officio theory, which, upon close examination is merely part and parcel of the doctrine of res judicata, any role to play in the case. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Decision, finality of earlier decision — Appellant sued respondent on a guarantee — High Court held demand to be bad and struck out action — Failure by respondent to make payment under fresh demand — Second action struck out under res judicata — Whether appellant could have brought fresh demand — Whether judge was wrong in striking out second action On 4 October 1988, the appellant commenced an action against the respondent and five other defendants for the recovery of monies owed it (‘the first action’). The respondent was sued on a guarantee he had given which was enforceable on demand. The appellant obtained judgment against all the other defendants in the first action. The respondent, however, applied to strike out the bank’s statement of claim on the ground

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-406 that no proper demand had been made of him. He attacked the contents of the letter which made the demand. The High Court held the demand to be bad and the first action was accordingly struck out. On 26 March 1994, the appellant made a fresh demand of the respondent. The respondent did not make payment and the appellant sued him again (‘the second action’). The respondent applied to strike out the second action as well. He did not question the validity of the new demand but argued that the decision in the earlier action had rendered the dispute res judicata so that the bank could not re-agitate its claim against him under the guarantee he had given. The judge agreed with this argument and struck out the second action. The appellant appealed against that decision. The issue in this appeal is whether the bank, having given a demand, which, by judicial determination, was found to be defective, can issue a fresh demand in order to enforce the guarantee given it by the respondent. Counsel for the respondent argued that the position would have been different if the bank had withdrawn the first action with liberty to file afresh. He contended that in such an event the bank could have brought the second action based upon a fresh letter of demand. It could not do so in the present circumstances since it went forward with its case in the first action. Held, allowing the appeal: (1) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) It is of the essence, in cases of this nature, when the plea of res judicata is taken, to identify with precision the point in issue that was decided in the earlier proceedings, which it is contended operates as a bar to relitigation. In the present instance, the point in issue in the first action that was determined necessarily and with precision was that the ||Page 614>> demand upon which that action was based was invalid. There was, in other words, no demand. The first action had, therefore, been commenced prematurely. If one action on the guarantee is dismissed because no demand was made, this does not bar recovery of the same amounts under the guarantee in a second action. The bank was accordingly at liberty to issue a proper demand and to institute proceedings to enforce the guarantee based upon that demand. Neither res judicata, nor issue estoppel, nor cause of action estoppel operated to bar the second action. It cannot be dismissed on the basis that it is brought in respect of the same cause because, in the absence of a demand, no cause of action arose when the first proceedings were issued. The judge was wrong in striking out the second action as it was based upon an entirely fresh demand which is not under attack (see pp 619I and 620B–E); Anglo-Canadian Mortgage Investment Corp v Shaw (1921) 59 DLR 152 and Ruben v Royal Bank of Canada (1980) 110 DLR 501 followed. (2) (Per Ahmad Fairuz JCA) In this case, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to obstruct the appellant in his action. The appellant also contended that substantive issues put forward by the appellant in his affidavit in reply in the proceedings to strike out his statement of claim were not considered by the High Court. The principle that courts exist to do justice according to the law as applied to the substantial merits of a particular case should be the basis of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-407 consideration by the courts in whatever case. Justice can only be obtained by all parties if substantive merit are given consideration (see pp 620I and 621A–D); Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 followed. (3) (Per Mokhtar Sidin JCA, dissenting) The claim by the appellant in the present appeal is the same and identical claim by the appellant against the respondent in the first action. When the first action was heard, the appellant, on discovering that the notice of demand was bad, could ask to withdraw the claim against the respondent with liberty. The appellant did not do so but went on to defend that the notice of demand was good. Once he chose that course, then he took the risk of the doctrine of res judicata being applicable to subsequent actions on the same amount (see p 626G); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 followed. (4) (Per Mokhtar Sidin JCA) The appellant took an action against the respondent who raised the objection on the defect of the notice of demand. This objection that the notice of demand was bad was the only defence available to him. By allowing the appeal, the effect would be to demolish the only defence available to the respondent and judgment has to be entered against him. From the facts given, the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to the present appeal. The judge was right when he struck out the appellant’s claim on this ground (see pp 626I and 627A). ||Page 615>> [Bahasa Malaysia summary Pada 4 Oktober 1988, perayu telah memulakan tindakan terhadap penentang dan lima defendan lain untuk mendapat balik wang yang terhutang kepadanya (‘tindakan pertama’). Penentang telah didakwa atas suatu gerenti yang diberikannya yang boleh dikuatkuasakan atas tuntutan. Perayu telah memperolehi penghakiman terhadap kesemua defendan lain dalam tindakan pertama. Walau bagaimanapun, penentang memohon untuk membatalkan pernyataan tuntutan bank atas alasan bahawa tiada tuntutan yang wajar telah dibuat terhadapnya. Dia mempersoalkan kandungan surat yang membuat tuntutan itu. Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan tuntutan adalah tidak elok dan dengan itu tindakan pertama telah dibatalkan. Pada 26 Mac 1994, perayu telah membuat tuntutan yang baru terhadap penentang. Penentang tidak membuat bayaran dan perayu telah mendakwanya sekali lagi (‘tindakan kedua’). Penentang juga memohon untuk membatalkan tindakan kedua. Dia tidak mempersoalkan kesahan tuntutan yang baru tetapi berhujah bahawa keputusan dalam tindakan yang lebih awal telah menyebabkan pertikaian menjadi res judicata hinggakan mahkamah tidak boleh membentangkan semula tuntutan terhadapnya di bawah gerenti yang telah diberikannya. Hakim bersetuju dengan hujah ini dan membatalkan tindakan kedua. Perayu merayu terhadap keputusan itu. Isu dalam rayuan ini adalah sama ada, setelah mengeluarkan tuntutan yang didapati defektif melalui penentuan kehakiman, bank tersebut boleh mengeluarkan tuntutan baru bagi menguatkuasakan gerenti yang diberikan oleh penentang. Peguam penentang menghujahkan bahawa kedudukan akan berbeza andainya bank

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-408 tersebut telah menarik balik tindakan pertama dengan kebebasan untuk memfailkan tindakan baru. Beliau menghujahkan bahawa dalam keadaan sedemikian bank tersebut sepatutnya boleh membawa tindakan kedua berdasarkan surat tuntutan yang baru. Ia tidak dapat berbuat demikian dalam keadaan ini oleh kerana ia telah meneruskan kesnya dalam tindakan pertama. Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan: (1) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Adalah menjadi intipati, dalam jenis kes ini, apabila hujah res judicata diambil, untuk mengenal pasti dengan kejituan hujah yang menjadi isu yang diputuskan dalam prosiding lebih awal, yang dihujahkan bertindak sebagai halangan kepada litigasi semula. Di sini, hujah utama dalam tindakan pertama yang ditentukan semestinya dan dengan ketepatan ialah bahawa tuntutan yang menjadi asas tindakan itu adalah tidak sah. Dalam perkataan lain, tiada apa-apa tuntutan. Maka, tindakan pertama telah dimulakan pramasa. Andainya satu tindakan atas gerenti ditolak kerana tiada tuntutan dibuat, ini tidak menyekat usaha mendapat balik amaun yang sama di bawah gerenti dalam tindakan yang kedua. Dengan itu, bank tersebut bebas untuk mengeluarkan tuntutan yang wajar dan ||Page 616>> untuk memulakan prosiding bagi menguatkuasakan gerenti tersebut berdasarkan tuntutan itu. Baik res judicata, mahupun estopel isu, dan tidak juga estopel kausa tindakan bertindak untuk menghalang tindakan kedua. Ia tidak boleh ditolak atas dasar bahawa ia dibawa berhubung dengan kausa yang sama kerana, dalam ketiadaan satu tuntutan, tiada kausa tindakan berbangkit ketika prosiding pertama dikeluarkan. Hakim adalah salah dalam membatalkan tindakan kedua kerana ia berdasarkan tuntutan yang baru pada keseluruhannya yang tidak dipersoalkan (lihat ms 619I dan 620B–E); Anglo-Canadian Mortgage Investment Corp v Shaw (1921) 59 DLR 152 dan Ruben v Royal Bank of Canada (1980) 110 DLR 501 diikut. (2) (Oleh Ahmad Fairuz HMR) Dalam kes ini, doktrin res judicata tidak terpakai untuk menyekat perayu dalam tindakannya. Perayu juga menghujahkan bahawa isu-isu substantif yang dibentangkan oleh perayu dalam afidavit jawapan dalam prosiding untuk membatalkan pernyataan tuntutan tidak dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Prinsip bahawa mahkamah wujud untuk mencapai keadilan menurut undang-undang sepertimana yang terpakai kepada merit substantial suatu kes tertentu haruslah dijadikan dasar pertimbangan oleh mahkamah dalam apa-apa kes sekalipun. Keadilan hanya boleh didapati oleh semua pihak sekiranya merit substantif diberikan prtimbangan (lihat ms 620I dan 621A–D); Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 diikut. (3) (Oleh Mokhtar Sidin HMR, menentang) Tuntutan oleh perayu dalam rayuan ini sama dan serupa dengan tuntutan oleh perayu terhadap penentang dalam tindakan pertama. Apabila tindakan pertama didengar, setelah mendapati bahawa notis tuntutan adalah tidak elok, perayu boleh meminta supaya tuntutan terhadap penentang ditarik balik dengan kebebasan. Perayu tidak berbuat demikian tetapi terus mempertahankan bahawa notis tuntutan adalah elok. Sebaik sahaja dia memilih cara itu, kemudiannya dia mengambil risiko doktrin E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-409 res judicata dijadikan terpakai kepada tindakan yang berikutnya atas amaun yang sama (lihat ms 626G); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 diikut. (4) (Oleh Mokhtar Sidin HMR) Perayu telah mengambil tindakan terhadap penentang yang membangkitkan bantahan tentang kecacatan notis tuntutan. Bantahan bahawa notis tuntutan adalah tidak elok adalah satu-satunya pembelaan yang ada padanya. Dengan membenarkan rayuan, kesan adalah untuk memusnahkan satu-satunya pembelaan yang ada kepada penentang dan penghakiman hendaklah dimasukkan terhadapnya. Daripada fakta-fakta yang diberikan, doktrin res judicata terpakai kepada rayuan ini. Hakim adalah betul apabila beliau membatalkan tuntutan perayu atas alasan ini (lihat ms 626I dan 627A).] ||Page 617>> This appeal concerns the application of the doctrine of res judicata. It is a point of some importance. It gives rise to difficulty in particular cases from time to time. This is one such case. That is why we decided to reserve judgment at the close of argument. The respondent applied to strike out the second action as well. He did not question the validity of the new demand. But he argued that the decision in the earlier action had rendered the dispute res judicata so that the bank could not re-agitate its claim against him under the guarantee he had given. The judge agreed with this argument and struck out the second action. The bank has now appealed against that decision. The propositions formulated in these cases by the Courts of Appeal of both provinces of Canada have not only the merit of logic in their support but also truly represent the law upon the subject. In my judgment, it is of the essence, in cases of this nature, when the plea of res judicata is taken, to identify with precision the issue that was decided in the earlier proceedings, which it is contended operates as a bar to relitigation because:

… to constitute a res judicata, the earlier judgment must, in terms of the Privy Council decision in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49, ||Page 620>> ‘necessarily and with precision’ determine the point in issue (per Chang Min Tat FJ in Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v Lee Yoke San [1979] 1 MLJ 24, affirmed on appeal to the Privy Council in [1981] 1 MLJ 54). In the present instance, the point in issue in the first action that was determined necessarily and with precision was that the demand upon which that action was based was invalid. There was, in other words, no demand. The first action had therefore been commenced prematurely. The bank was accordingly at liberty to issue a proper demand and to institute proceedings to enforce the guarantee based upon that demand. In my judgment, neither res judicata, nor issue estoppel, nor cause of action estoppel operated to bar the second action. In my judgment, the learned judge was clearly wrong in striking out the second action on the ground that it was barred by res judicata, when it was based, not upon the earlier invalid demand, but upon an entirely fresh demand which, as I earlier observed, is not under attack. He should have dismissed the respondent’s application to strike out and permitted the second action to proceed. Saya telah berpeluang meneliti penghakiman-penghakiman Gopal Sri Ram dan E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-410 Mokhtar Sidin HHMR. Penghakiman-penghakiman itu bersetuju bahawa rayuan ini melibatkan pemakaian doktrin res judicata. Fakta-fakta yang relevan kepada rayuan ini telah dihuraikan oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR dalam penghakimannya. Mengenai pemakaian doktrin res judicata, saya berpegang kepada kes yang sama yang dirujuk oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR dalam penghakimannya — iaitu kes Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v Lee Yoke San [1979] 1 MLJ 24. Kes ini dan kes Ruben v Royal Bank of Canada (1980) 110 DLR 501 (yang juga dirujuk oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR dalam penghakimannya) telah menyebabkan saya bersetuju dengan Gopal Sri Ram HMR bahawa doktrin res judicata tidak boleh menghalang tindakan perayu dalam Guaman Sivil No 22–80–94. ||Page 621>> It is clear from the facts that the appellant has in the first action gone all the way until a decision was made by the court. The issue in the first action was whether the notice of demand in that action was bad. The court held that the notice of demand was bad and the appellant’s action was dismissed. There was no appeal against that decision. It is to be noted that the first action was commenced against the respondent with five others. It is clear to me that when the first action was heard the appellant has the opportunity of withdrawing the action against the respondent when the issue of improper service of notice of demand was raised. He elected not to do it but went all the way until the court made its decision. The appellant did not appeal but proceeded to issue a new notice of demand on the same amount under which the first action was dismissed. The appellant then proceeded to file another writ for the same amount. This is the action for which the appeal is before us. It is apparent to me that the second notice of demand upon which the appeal is pending is good because the respondent did not raise any objection. In the High Court, the respondent applied to strike out the second ground that the doctrine of res judicata applied. It is common ground that the cause of action in both the first and the second writs are the one and the same, viz the amount owed by the ||Page 622>> respondent to the appellant under a guarantee. That is the subject matter of both actions. Was the learned judge right when he allowed the application by the respondent to strike out the appellant’s claim on the ground of res judicata? Before us, it was the contention of the appellant that the principle of res judicata cannot apply because in the first action the appellant’s claim was dismissed on the ground of technicality and the merit had not been argued. The respondent on the other hand contended that when the appellant went all the way to argue his case before the court and at the end a decision was made, then the doctrine of res judicata should apply. The doctrine of res judicata has been explained by Peh Swee Chin FCJ in the case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189. From the judgment, it is clear to me that his Lordship had done a thorough research on this and it serves as a good guide as to the application of the doctrine of res judicata. The explanation is so exhaustive so much so there is no necessity for me to refer to other authorities. At pp 197–202, his Lordship said:

What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effects of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdication, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-411 parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy. Since a res judicata creates an estoppel per rem judicatum, the doctrine of res judicata is really the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum, the latter being described sometimes in a rather archaic way as estoppel by record. Since the two doctrines are the same, it is no longer of any practical importance to say the res judicata is a rule of procedure and that an estoppel per rem judicatum is that of evidence. Such dichotomy is apt to give rise to confusion. The starting point ought to be the celebrated passage by Wigram VC in the case of Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at p 115 which is: ‘The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to point upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time.’ It may be of interest to point out that one of the exceptional special cases is the effect of a default judgment in subsequent proceedings between the ||Page 623>> same parties, a default judgment is different from a final judgment on the merits, the latter is the category to which the judgment in the said originating motion given before the filing of the action as concerned directly herein below belongs. Please see the finer points of law in regard to default judgments from the position of the doctrine of res judicate in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49. We have thus mentioned this question of default judgment in passing as it has sometimes been a small source of confusion to the litigants. To revert to that famous passage set out above, the next step is to state our view on its scope of operation or approach towards such scope which has given rise to certain controversial aspects referred to earlier. Bearing in mind the well-known relevancy of a previous judgment in barring a second suit, eg see s 40 of the Evidence Act 1950, it will be readily understood that when Wigram VC spoke of ‘points’, the points should actually include causes of action, or all causes of action which one of the two parties has against the other, based on, or substantially on the same facts of issues, and not just all issues of law or of fact that are in dispute between the parties. The relevant case law revolves itself into this understanding. Lack of this understanding causes, in our view, a fair share of the confusion in connection with the famous passage of Wigram VC which Shaw in Hoystead v Taxation Commissioner [1962] AC 155 at p 170 spoke of as ‘settled law’ in the Privy Council. Thus, there are in fact two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum. The first type relates to cause of action estoppel and the second, to issue estoppel, which is a development from the first type. The cause of action estoppel arises when rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court for a particular remedy are determined in a final judgment and such right of action, ie the cause of action, merges into the said final judgment; in layman’s language, the cause of action has turned into the said final judgment. The said cause of action may not be relitigated between the same parties because it is res judicata. In order to prevent multiplicity of action and also in order to protect the underlying rationales of estoppel per rem judicatum and not to act against them, such estoppel of cause of action has been extended to all other causes of action (based on the same facts or issues) which should have been litigated or asserted in the original earlier action resulting in the final judgment, and which were not, either deliberately or due to inadvertence. A few cases below will illustrate the point. On the other hand, the issue estoppel literally means simply an issue which a party is estopped from raising in a subsequent proceeding. However, the issue estoppel, in a nutshell, from a consideration of case law, means in law a lot more, ie that neither of the same parties or their privies in a subsequent proceeding is entitled to challenge the correctness of the decision of a previous final judgment in which they, or their privies, were parties. This sounds like explaining a truism, but it is the corollary

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-412 from that statement that is all important and that could have given birth to the controversies alluded to above; the corollary being that neither of such parties will be allowed to adduce evidence or advance any argument to contradict such decision. In this respect, we respectfully agree with Peter Gibson J in Lawlor v Gray [1984] 3 All ER 345 at p 350, who said: ‘Issue estoppel … prevents contradiction of a previous determination, whereas cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of the cause of action.’. ||Page 624>> It is important to bear in mind the manner in which the issue estoppel operates in preventing such contradiction of the previous judgment. There is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary view that such issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata, ie doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid contrary view is to be preferred; it represents for one thing, a correct even though broader approach to the scope of issue estoppel. It is warranted by the weight of authorities to be illustrated later. It is completely in accord or resonant with the rationales behind the doctrine of res judicata, in other words, with the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. It is particularly important to bear in mind the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and with the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation. It is further necessary at this stage to understand the import of words in the said famous statement, ie ‘… every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation …’ which Somervell LJ explained in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 at p 257 as follows: ‘… res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but … it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.’ This explanation of Somervell LJ was also quoted with approval in the Privy Council in Yat Tung Investment Co v Dae Heng Bank & Anor [1975] AC 581; [1975] 2 WLR 690. In Yat Tung’s case itself, the bank sold some property to Yat Tung which mortgaged the same property back to the bank. Yat Tung defaulted on payment of interest on the mortgage and the bank exercising its right of sale, sold the same property to the second respondent. After such sale to the second respondent, in 1969, Yat Tung sued the bank on the ground that the bank’s sale of the property to Yat Tung in the first place was a sham and therefore a nullity and the bank counterclaimed for loss on resale to the second respondent, denying the alleged nullity. Yat Tung failed in this first action and the bank succeeded. After the judgment, Yat Tung sued in 1972 once more in a second action on the ground that the subsequent sale by the bank to the second respondent of the same property was fraudulent, etc on the ground of some collusion between the bank and the second respondent. It will be remembered that the sale to the second respondent took place before Yat Tung filed the earlier action. On appeal, and even further appeal to the judicial committee, the order was confirmed on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata applied. Thus, in SCF Finance Co Ltd v Masri & Anor (No 3) [1987] QB 1028; [1987] 1 All ER 194, the English Court of Appeal held that even a reservation of an issue by a party in a previous proceeding was ineffective to prevent the ||Page 625>> estoppel from arising against the said party, where the said party had pleaded that issue but elected not to proceed on the issue in the previous proceeding. It was held she was not entitled to assert that issue afresh in subsequent proceedings, even if that issue was not heard and determined and it was even ‘reserved’.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-413 In Bell v Holmes [1956] 3 All ER 449; [1956] 1 WLR 1359, that the issue of the plaintiff’s own liability for contributory negligence, when suing the defendant, was the same issue of both their respective liabilities towards a third person arising from the same collision in an earlier action, and the learned judge held that, after comparing the pleadings of the action before him and the pleadings in the previous county court proceedings, that the issues of fact and the evidence to support them were identically the same. The plaintiff was estopped from denying that he was 5/6 to blame as was adjudged in the previous county court action. In Hoystead v Taxation Commissioner [1962] AC 155, in assessment for financial year 1918–1919, the trustees of a deceased person’s estate claimed, by virtue of a certain section of a certain statute, a deduction of £5,000 in respect of each daughter of the deceased as the annual income was divisible among the testator’s daughters. The claim was disputed and a case was stated for the High Court — which then decided that such deductions could be made for all the six surviving daughters. Subsequently, upon the assessment for the financial year 1920–1921, the commissioner this time allowed only one deduction contending that the daughters were not ‘joint owners’ within the meaning of that certain statute. The Privy Council held that though in previous litigation, no express decision was given whether the daughters were such joint owners, it being assumed and admitted they were, the admission that they were joint owners having been fundamental to the previous decision, the commissioner was estopped from asserting before the judicial committee that the daughters were not joint owners. A word of caution is required about the words ‘exercising reasonable diligence’ in the said famous passage [in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100]. The words do not, in our view, necessitate a mental exercise of making a finding as to whether there was diligence, or reasonable diligence, in the earlier failure to bring in at the previous trial, the issues which should have been brought in the earlier action and which were not, or in asserting all other causes of action arising out of the same facts in the earlier action and which were not. The words ought to be understood as a gentle rebuke for the failure aforesaid, ie despite the fact that the party had the opportunity of bringing forward all such issues or asserting all such causes of action; and the words are not meant to impose a pre-condition for applying the doctrine of res judicata but are meant to say that the said non-bringing of the issues would count in any event irrespective of whether the said failure was or was not deliberate or due to inadvertence or negligence. Otherwise, the words would have virtually all but destroyed the efficacy of estoppel per rem judicatum. Another source of small confusion is the rule that generally an estoppel, of which an estoppel per rem judicatum is a kind, as the name implies, has to be pleaded. But in Superintendent of Pudu Prison v Sim Kie Chong [1986] 1 MLJ 494 at p 498, Abdoolcader SCJ held to the effect that the court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action by applying the doctrine of res judicata against a party even if it has not been pleaded. We venture to think ||Page 626>> the reason for the ratio is that an estoppel or exclusion of evidence based on a question of public policy, ie in this case, the question of public policy that there should be finality in litigation, is more vigorous in excluding evidence and need not be pleaded, unlike an ordinary estoppel which should be pleaded. We think we have dealt with certain parts of the doctrine of res judicata sufficiently for the purpose of determining the instant appeal. (Emphasis added.) His Lordship in the above passages have explained in detail on what facts the doctrine of res judicata shall apply. His Lordship has also given illustrations on how the doctrine shall operate. His Lordship also had distinguished the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel. I do not think there is anything clearer than what had been said by his Lordship. Applying what had been said by his Lordship, let me now examine the facts of the present appeal. It is common ground that the respondent was one of the several guarantors to a loan given by the appellant to a company. The appellant took up action against all the guarantors including the respondent. The respondent was the only guarantor who challenged E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-414 the validity of the notice of demand given by the appellant. It appears that the appellant succeeded in obtaining judgment against the other guarantors. The respondent took up a summons in chambers to strike out the appellant’s claim against him on the ground that the notice of demand was bad. The respondent succeeded in striking out the claim against him. The appellant did not appeal against that decision but instead served a new notice of demand on the same amount as under the guarantee and then proceeded to file a fresh writ based on the second notice. The respondent again took up a summons in chambers to strike out the appellant’s claim on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to the second action. The learned judge allowed the respondent’s summons in chambers and again struck out the plaintiff’s claim. Hence the present appeal. In my view, the claim by the appellant in the present appeal is the same and identical claim by the appellant against the respondent in the first action. When the first action was heard and as the respondent had stated, the appellant, on discovering that the notice of demand was bad, could ask to withdraw the claim against the respondent with liberty. The appellant did not do so but went on to defend that the notice of demand was good. In my view, once he chose that course, then he took the risk of the doctrine of res judicata being applicable to subsequent actions on the same amount. Thus from the facts given, I am of the view that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to the present appeal. In my view, the learned judge was right when he struck out the appellant’s claim on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata applied. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Earlier action withdrawn before any argument or decision — Whether plaintiff barred from filing subsequent action The plaintiff was the owner of a project. Pembinaan Gedong Sdn Bhd (‘Gedong’) and Ingeback (M) Sdn Bhd (‘Ingeback’) were engaged as contractor and subcontractor respectively. The defendant entered into a performance bond with the plaintiff and Gedong to guarantee the due performance of the construction by Ingeback (‘the performance bond’). Based on this, Gedong entered into a building contract with Ingeback for the construction of the project. Meanwhile, Gedong entered into a deed of assignment with the plaintiff whereby Gedong absolutely assigned its rights to receive from the defendant all monies payable under the performance bond. Ingeback breached the provisions of the building contract. Gedong therefore terminated the building contract (‘the first breach’). The plaintiff and Gedong then by way of their solicitors’ letter dated 23 April 1990 made a claim against the defendant on the performance bond. Ingeback made an application through a writ of summons D5-22-1025-1990 (‘the 1025-90 suit’) to obtain an injunction to restrain the defendant from paying out on the performance bond which was granted on 6 July 1990. The plaintiff intervened in the 1025-90 suit. Subsequently, Ingeback withdrew the 1025-90 suit with the consent of the plaintiff and Gedong. The parties then wish to complete the project and Gedong entered into an agreement with Ingeback (‘the supplemental agreement’) whereby Ingeback was allowed to recommence work in the project as subcontractor. In spite of extensions given, Ingeback was unable to complete the project.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-415 The plaintiff claimed from the defendant under the performance contract by way of its letter dated 23 April 1990 because of the breach by Ingeback of the terms of the building contract which ||Page 234>> resulted in the termination of the contract. The defendant filed an application to strike out the plaintiff’s claim on several grounds: (i) the letter dated 23 April 1990 only constituted a mere notification and not a demand; that a letter of demand must request the guarantor to pay within specified time and a guarantor must be given reasonable time to meet its obligation; (ii) res judicata and estoppel — by consenting to the withdrawal of the 1025-90 suit which action was based on the same claim as the present suit, the plaintiff had relinquished its claim against the defendant and was therefore estopped from filing the same claim against the defendant by way of this present action; and (iii) the claim on the guarantee was bad as the guarantee had lapsed — by entering into the supplemental agreement, the plaintiff had waived the first breach. Having waived the first breach and having reinstated Ingeback as the contractor, the demand on the guarantee for the first breach upon the defendant had lapsed. The application was dismissed by the senior assistant registrar. The defendant appealed. Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) Clause 2(i) of the performance bond rendered the performance bond an on-demand performance bond which was only conditional upon the beneficiary asserting the basis of the claim upon the issuer of the bond contending that there had been a breach of contract. Upon such a demand being made, the liability of the defendant to pay under the performance bond was immediately attracted. Therefore, the defendant’s contention that the letter dated 23 April 1990 only constituted a mere notification and not a demand was rejected (see p 243D-E); Esso Petroleum Malaysia Inc v Kago Petroleum Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 149; Esal (Commodities) Ltd v Oriental Credit Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 546 and Teknik Cekap Sdn Bhd v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 449 followed.There was no necessity to request the guarantor in the letter of demand to pay within a specified time. Once a demand has been served, the beneficiary should give a reasonable time to the guarantor to meet the obligation. The defendant had been given a reasonable time to meet its obligations. The defendant could have paid the monies so demanded by the letter dated 23 April 1990, ||Page 235>> at any time after that and up till 6 July 1990 when the injunction to stop the defendant from paying out on the performance bond was granted to Ingeback. The defendant had more than two months to make payment but it did not do so (see pp 243I and 244A-C); United Prime Corp Bhd v Q-Built Construction (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1987] 1 CLJ 50 distinguished. (2) The performance bond provided that the defendant was not discharged/released from the bond by the reinstatement of Ingeback as the subcontractor for the project. A release of the principal debtor by the creditor will not discharge the surety if he has expressly agreed to remain liable, so that there is then no ||Page 236>> ground for the presumption that he is impliedly discharged. The liability of the defendant had already accrued since 23 April 1990 when the E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-416 letter of demand was issued and the breach was in the end not remedied by the defendant, notwithstanding the supplemental agreement. As a result, the entry of Ingeback and Gedong into the supplemental agreement did not constitute a waive which would entitle the defendant to escape liability under the performance bond (see pp 245A and 248C-H); Perry v National Provincial Bank of England [1910] 1 Ch 464, Cowper v Smith (1838) 150 ER 1534, Union Bank of Manchester v Beech (1865) 159 ER 695 and Bank of Adelaide v Lorden (1971-72) 127 CLR 185 followed; Commercial Bank of Tasmania v Jones [1893] AC 313 not followed.Further, the supplemental agreement was between Ingeback and Gedong. The plaintiff was not a party to the supplemental agreement and the terms thereof should not bind the plaintiff and having divested itself beneficially of the right to claim under the performance bond, Gedong’s acts could not possibly affect the right of the plaintiff to claim under the performance bond from the defendant. In addition, the terms of the supplemental agreement itself showed that there was no waiver of the breach (see pp 248I and 249A-B). (3) Although the plaintiff had consented to the defendant withdrawing the earlier suit, the discontinuance of an action or the withdrawal of part of a claim without leave is no bar to a subsequent action for the same cause of action. The effect is the same where the discontinuance is with leave, unless the order giving the leave expressly prohibits the commencement of a fresh action. The plaintiff may therefore commence a new action for the same cause, to which such discontinuance will be no defence; but unless he does so in good time, his laches may be a bar. The plaintiff herein filed this present suit five days after the withdrawal of the 1025-90 suit. As such, laches was not an issue. Further, this court did not prohibit the plaintiff from filing afresh.In any case, it was crystal clear that the merits of the plaintiff’s claim were never considered and decided upon by the court in the earlier suit and that there was never a final decision in respect of the merits of the plaintiff’s case against the defendant. The existence of a previous judgment is the very essence, and sine qua non of the doctrine of res judicata. Without a previous judgment on the merits of the cause of action or issue, there is simply no res judicata, for ‘res’ simply means ‘a thing’ and ‘judicata’ means ‘adjudicated’. Having held that res judicata could not apply to the instant case, it followed therefore that the plea of estoppel must perforce equally fail (see pp 249I and 250A-C, E-G). Obiter: Notwithstanding the fact that s 87 of the Contracts Act 1950 states that a surety is discharged by any contract between the creditor and ||Page 237>> the principal debtor by which the principal debtor is released, or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor, yet in practice, the effect of this section is rendered nugatory by the use of other clauses designed to preserve the surety’s liability despite the release of the principal debtor in contracts or guarantee (see p 248F-G). [Bahasa Malaysia summary

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-417 Plaintif adalah pemilik suatu projek. Pembinaan Gedong Sdn Bhd (‘Gedong’) dan Ingeback (M) Sdn Bhd (‘Ingeback’) telah digaji sebagai kontraktor dan sub-kontraktor masing-masing. Defendan telah mengikat suatu bon pelaksanaan dengan plaintif dan Gedong untuk menjamin pelaksanaan pembinaan oleh Ingeback (‘bon pelaksanaan tersebut’). Berdasarkan ini, Gedong telah mengikat kontrak pembinaan dengan Ingeback untuk pembinaan projek tersebut. Sementara itu, Gedong telah mengikat suratikatan penyerahhakan dengan plaintif di mana Gedong telah menyerahhak secara mutlak kesemua hak untuk menerima daripada defendan segala wang yang harus dibayar di bawah bon pelaksanaan tersebut. Ingeback memungkir peruntukan kontrak pembinaan. Dengan itu Gedong menamatkan kontrak pembinaan (‘kemungkiran pertama’). Plaintif dan Gedong menerusi surat peguamcara mereka bertarikh 23 April 1990 kemudiannya membuat tuntutan defendan atas bon pelaksanaan tersebut. Ingeback membuat permohonan melalui writ saman D5-22-1025-1990 (‘guaman 1025-90’) untuk memperolehi suatu injunksi bagi menahan defendan daripada membayar bon pelaksanaan tersebut yang diberikan pada 6 Julai 1990. Plaintif telah mencelah dalam guaman 1025-90. Berikutnya, Ingeback menarik balik guaman 1025-90 dengan izin plaintif dan Gedong. Pihak-pihak kemudiannya ingin menyelesaikan projek tersebut dan Gedong mengikat suatu perjanjian dengan Ingeback (‘perjanjian tambahan’) yang mana Ingeback dibenarkan memulakan kerja semula dalam projek tersebut sebagai subkontraktor. Meskipun pelanjutan yang diberikan, Ingeback tidak dapat menyelesaikan projek tersebut. Plaintif menuntut daripada defendan di bawah kontrak pelaksanaan menerusi suratnya bertarikh 23 April 1990 disebabkan kemungkiran oleh Ingeback atas terma kontrak pembinaan yang mengakibatkan penamatan kontrak. Defendan memfailkan suatu permohonan untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif atas beberapa alasan: (i) surat bertarikh 23 April 1990 hanya membentuk suatu pemberitahuan dan bukan tuntutan; bahawa suatu surat tuntutan mestilah meminta penggerenti membayar dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan dan seseorang penggerenti mestilah diberikan masa yang munasabah untuk memenuhi obligasinya; (ii) res judicata dan estopel — dengan menyetujui penarikan balik guaman 1025-90 yang tindakannya adalah berdasarkan tuntutan yang sama dalam guaman ini, plaintif telah meninggalkan tuntutannya terhadap defendan dan dengan itu diestop daripada memfailkan tuntutan yang sama terhadap ||Page 238>> defendan melalui tindakan ini; dan (iii) tuntutan atas gerenti adalah tidak elok kerana gerenti telah luput — dengan mengikat perjanjian tambahan, plaintif telah mengenepikan kemungkiran pertama. Setelah mengenepikan kemungkiran pertama dan mengembalikan Ingeback sebagai kontraktor, tuntutan atas gerenti untuk kemungkiran pertama telah luput. Permohonan ditolak oleh penolong kanan pendaftar. Defendan merayu. Diputuskan, menolak rayuan: (1) Fasal 2(i) bon pelaksanaan tersebut menjadikan bon itu suatu bon pelaksanaan ‘atas tuntutan’ yang hanya bersyarat atas penegasan asas tuntutan oleh benefisiari atas dasar tuntutan apabila pengeluar bon berhujah bahawa terdapat kemungkiran kontrak. Apabila tuntutan demikian dibuat, liabiliti defendan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-418 untuk membayar di bawah bon pelaksanaan tersebut membangkit dengan segera. Maka, hujah defendan bahawa surat bertarikh 23 April 1990 cuma membentuk suatu pemberitahuan dan bukan tuntutan ditolak (lihat ms 243D-E); Esso Petroleum Malaysia Inc v Kago Petroleum Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 149; Esal (Commodities) Ltd v Oriental Credit Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 546 dan Teknik Cekap Sdn Bhd v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 449 diikut.Tiada keperluan untuk meminta penggerenti dalam surat tuntutan supaya membayar dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan. Sebaik sahaja tuntutan disampaikan, benefisiari patut memberi masa yang munasabah kepada penggerenti untuk memenuhi obligasi. Defendan telah diberikan masa yang munasabah untuk memenuhi obligasinya. Defendan boleh membayar jumlah yang dituntut oleh surat bertarikh 23 April 1990, pada bila-bila masa selepas itu dan sehingga 6 Julai 1990 apabila injunksi untuk mencegah defendan daripada membuat bayaran atas bon pelaksanaan diberikan kepada Ingeback. Defendan mempunyai masa lebih daripada dua bulan untuk membuat bayaran tetapi ia tidak berbuat demikian (lihat ms 243I dan 244A-C); United Prime Corp Bhd v Q-Built Construction (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1987] 1 CLJ 50 dibeza. (2) Bon pelaksanaan tersebut memperuntukkan bahawa defendan tidak dilepaskan/dibebaskan daripada bon itu melalui pengembalian kedudukan Ingeback sebagai subkontraktor untuk projek tersebut. Suatu pembebasan penghutang utama oleh si piutang tidak melepaskan penjamin sekiranya beliau telah bersetuju kekal bertanggungjawab, supaya kemudiannya tiada alasan untuk anggapan bahawa beliau dilepaskan secara tersirat. Liabiliti defendan telah pun terakru sejak 23 April 1990 apabila surat tuntutan dikeluarkan dan kemungkiran akhirnya tidak dipulihkan oleh defendan, tanpa mengira perjanjian tambahan. Akibatnya, kemasukan Ingeback dan Gedong kepada perjanjian tambahan tidak boleh membentuk penepian yang akan membolehkan defendan melepaskan diri daripada liabiliti di bawah bon pelaksanaan tersebut (lihat ms 245A dan 248C-H); Perry v National Provincial Bank of England [1910] 1 Ch 464, ||Page 239>> Cowper v Smith (1838) 150 ER 1534, Union Bank of Manchester v Beech (1865) 159 ER 695 dan Bank of Adelaide v Lorden (1971-72) 127 CLR 185 diikut; Commercial Bank of Tasmania v Jones [1893] AC 313 tidak diikut.Selanjutnya, perjanjian tambahan adalah di antara Ingeback dan Gedong. Plaintif tidak merupakan suatu pihak kepada perjanjian tambahan dan terma dalamnya tidak harus mengikat plaintif dan setelah meletakhak dirinya secara benefisial atas hak menuntut di bawah bon pelaksanaan tersebut, perbuatan Gedong tidak mungkin menjejaskan hak plaintif untuk menuntut di bawah bon pelaksanaan daripada defendan. Tambahan pula, terma perjanjian tambahan sendiri menunjukkan bahawa tidak terdapat penepian kemungkiran (lihat ms 248I dan 249A-B). (3) Walaupun plaintif teleh menyetujui penarikan balik tindakan yang lebih awal oleh defendan, penghentian sesuatu tindakan atau penarikan balik sebahagian daripada tuntutan tanpa kebenaran tidak menghalang tindakan berikutnya untuk kausa tindakan yang sama. Kesannya adalah sama di mana penghentian adalah

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-419 dengan kebenaran, melainkan perintah yang memberikan kebenaran melarang permulaan tindakan baru secara nyata. Dengan itu plaintif boleh memulakan tindakan baru untuk kausa yang sama, yang mana penghentian sebegitu tidak menjadi pembelaan; tetapi melainkan dia berbuat demikian dalam tempoh, kelewatannya mungkin menjadi penghalang. Plaintif di sini memfailkan guaman ini lima hari selepas penarikan balik guaman 1025-90. Oleh itu, kelewatan bukanlah suatu isu. Seterusnya, mahkamah ini tidak melarang plaintif daripada memfailkan tindakan baru.Walau bagaimanapun, adalah amat jelas bahawa merit tuntutan plaintif tidak sekali-kali dipertimbangkan dan diputuskan oleh mahkamah dalam guaman yang lebih awal dan bahawa tidak sekali-kali terdapat keputusan muktamad berkenaan dengan merit kes plaintif terhadap defendan. Kewujudan penghakiman yang lebih awal adalah intipati dan sine qua non doktrin res judicata. Tanpa penghakiman yang lebih awal atas merit kausa tindakan atau isu, tiadanya res judicata, kerana ‘res’ bermaksud ‘sesuatu benda’ dan ‘judicata’ bermaksud ‘yang dihakimi’. Setelah memutuskan bahawa res judicata tidak terpakai kepada kes ini, ia bermakna bahawa hujah estopel mestilah gagal dalam cara yang sama (lihat ms 249I dan 250A-C, E-G). Obiter: Walaupun s 87 Akta Kontrak 1950 menyatakan bahawa penjamin adalah diperlepaskan oleh sebarang kontrak di antara si piutang dan si penghutang utama dengan mana si penghutang utama dilepaskan, atau oleh sebarang perbuatan atau peninggalan si piutang, yang akibatnya di sisi undang-undang ialah pelepasan si penghutang utama, namun dalam amalan, kesan seksyen ini dijadikan tidak berguna oleh ||Page 240>> penggunaan fasal lain yang bertujuan mengekalkan liabiliti penjamin meskipun penghutang utama dalam kontrak atau gerenti dilepaskan (lihat ms 248F-G).] For a case on performance bond, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) para 1708. For cases on res judicata, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 2892-2939. This application to strike out the plaintiff’s claim is launched on two grounds, namely, (a) res judicata and estoppel; and (b) that the claim on the guarantee is bad as the guarantee had lapsed. The defendant contends that by entering into the supplemental agreement, the plaintiff had waived the first breach. Therefore, having waived the first breach and having reinstated Ingeback as the contractor, the demand on the guarantee for the first breach upon the defendant had lapsed. Since no further claim was made on the guarantee, the guarantee expired on 31 May 1990. It is obvious from the facts that Ingeback had defaulted again in their obligations under the supplemental agreement thereby committing a second breach. The defendant argues that if res judicata and estoppel do not apply, then the claim on the guarantee itself is bad as the guarantee had lapsed due to the plaintiff and Gedong waiving the breach by Ingeback and due to the guarantee expiring on 31 May 1990. With regard to the plea of res judicata, the defendant relied on Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 wherein the Federal Court held

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-420 that the parties are also prevented from asserting a cause of action or issue which should have been brought forward in the earlier action but was not, whether deliberately or inadvertently. Res judicata/estoppel not applicable The defendant argued that the doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense ought to have been applied in this case and that it was an abuse of the process of the court to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and should have been litigated in the earlier proceedings. See Asia Commercial Finance. In the present case, the plaintiff and Gedong had intervened successfully in the 1025-90 suit and were ready to proceed with the application for dissolution of the injunction and for an order that the injuncted money be paid out to them. However, the defendant raised a procedural objection in the 1925-90 suit in that before the plaintiff and Gedong proceeded to dissolve the injunction obtained by Ingeback against the defendant, the plaintiff and Gedong must first file a cause of action against the defendant in the 1025-90 suit and that the defendant be allowed to file a defence to that cause of action. It was a fact that the plaintiff had not filed a claim against the defendant in the 1025-90 suit. When counsel for the official receiver acting for Ingeback withdrew the 1025-90 suit, the defendant herein contends that present plaintiff consented to the withdrawal whereas the plaintiff contends that it merely made no objections to the said request to withdraw the suit. On this basis, the defendant argues that res judicata has set in and therefore the plaintiff is estopped from filing this suit. In any case, it is crystal clear that the merits of the plaintiff’s claim were never considered and decided upon by the court in the earlier suit and that there was never a final decision in respect of the merits of the plaintiff’s case against the defendant. In fact, the very case relied on by the defendant, namely, Asia Commercial affirms this point. The court in that case defined the doctrine of res judicata as ‘a matter adjudged’ and the rationale of the doctrine is that it creates an estoppel per rem judicatum. In other words, when ‘a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth’ (per Peh Swee Chin FCJ at p 197). It is evident therefore that the existence of a previous judgment is the very essence, and sine qua non of the doctrine of res judicata. Without a previous judgment on the merits of the cause of action or issue, there is simply no res judicata, for ‘res’ simply means ‘a thing’ and ‘judicata’ means ‘adjudicated’. Having held that res judicata cannot apply to the instant case, it follows therefore that the plea of estoppel must perforce equally fail. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Separate actions to set aside order for sale — Actions raised same basic remedy — Issue could have been raised in earlier proceedings — Whether doctrine of res judicata applied — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19 Land Law — Sale of land — Order for — Application to set aside order — Whether hearing of application for order for sale was proper forum to raise issue on interest payable — Whether application was barred by res judicata The appellant as lender had executed a loan agreement with the respondent granting the latter a loan which was secured by a charge over a few pieces of land (‘the charged properties’). Upon the default of the respondent on the loan, the appellant commenced an action against the respondent and two guarantors (‘the first action’). Subsequently, E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-421 a charge action to have the charged properties sold by public auction (‘the second action’) was initiated and an order for sale of the charged properties was granted. The respondent appealed to the Supreme Court but subsequently withdrew its appeal. Later, the respondent filed a civil action against the appellant (‘the third action’) to set aside the order for sale ganted in the second action. However, the third action was subsequently set aside. The respondent then filed another action in the High Court (‘the fourth action’) to set aside the order for sale on the ground that the liability for interest imposed by it was not sanctioned by the charge agreement. Accordingly, the appellant applied to strike out the fourth action under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 or under its inherent jurisdiction. The appellant’s application was dismissed. The appellant appealed and pleaded res judicata. Held, allowing the appeal: The proper forum for the respondent to raise the issue on interest payable was before the judge who granted the order for sale in the second action. This the respondent did not do. The respondent also had the opportunity to do the same at the appeal level; instead it withdrew the appeal, depriving itself of its right to raise the same point. Again, in the third action, it did not raise this although the prayer was to set aside the order for sale as in the fourth action albeit on different grounds. The doctrine of res judicata would apply here as both the third and fourth actions sought the same basic remedy and the respondent should have raised the issue in the third action and not in the fourth action as was the case here. ||Page 545>> Hence the respondent should be shut out from raising in a subsequent action an issue which it could, and should, have raised in earlier proceedings. In any case, the respondent could still sue the appellant direct without having to set aside the order for sale (see pp 553D–F, H–I and 554G); Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 and Brisbane City Council & Anor v A-G for Queensland [1979] AC 411 followed. Bahasa Malaysia summary Perayu sebagai pemberi pinjaman telah melaksanakan suatu perjanjian pinjaman dengan penentang yang memberikan penentang pinjaman yang dijamin oleh gadaian atas beberapa bidang tanah (‘harta yang digadai’). Apabila penentang ingkar atas pinjaman itu, perayu memulakan tindakan terhadap penentang dan dua penggerenti (‘tindakan pertama’). Ekoran itu, suatu tindakan gadaian bagi membolehkan harta yang digadai dijual melalui lelong awam (‘tindakan kedua’) dimulakan dan satu perintah jualan ke atas harta yang digadai diberikan. Penentang merayu kepada Mahkamah Agung tetapi kemudiannya menarik balik rayuannya. Selepas itu, penentang memfailkan suatu tindakan sivil terhadap perayu (‘tindakan ketiga’) bagi mengetepikan perintah jualan yang diberikan dalam tindakan kedua. Namun demikian, tindakan ketiga kemudiannya diketepikan. Penentang kemudiannya memfailkan tindakan lain di Mahkamah Tinggi (‘tindakan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-422 keempat’) bagi mengetepikan perintah jualan atas alasan bahawa liabiliti untuk faedah yang dikenakan ke atasnya tidak dibenarkan oleh perjanjian gadaian. Lantaran itu, perayu membuat permohonan untuk membatalkan tindakan keempat di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 atau di bawah bidang kuasa sedia ada. Permohonan perayu ditolak. Perayu membuat rayuan dan memplidkan res judicata. Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan: Forum yang wajar bagi penentang menimbulkan isu tentang faedah yang harus dibayar adalah di hadapan hakim yang memberikan perintah jualan dalam tindakan kedua. Ini tidak dilakukan oleh penentang. Penentang juga berpeluang untuk berbuat demikian di tahap rayuan; sebaliknya ia menarik balik rayuan, justeru itu melucutkan haknya untuk menimbulkan hujah yang sama. Sekali lagi, dalam tindakan ketiga, ia tidak menimbulkan perkara ini walaupun permohonan adalah untuk mengetepikan perintah jualan seperti dalam tindakan keempat meskipun atas alasan yang berbeza. Doktrin res judicata terpakai di sini kerana kedua-dua tindakan ketiga dan keempat menghendaki remedi asas yang sama dan penentang sepatutnya telah menimbulkan isu itu dalam tindakan ketiga dan bukannya dalam tindakan keempat seperti dalam kes ini. ||Page 546>> Maka penentang harus dihalang daripada menimbulkan dalam tindakan yang berturut suatu isu yang ia boleh, dan sepatutnya telah, timbulkan dalam prosiding yang lebih awal. Walau bagaimanapun, penentang masih boleh mendakwa perayu secara terus tanpa keperluan untuk mengetepikan perintah jualan (lihat ms 553D–F, H–I dan 554G); Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 dan Brisbane City Council & Anor v A-G for Queensland [1979] AC 411 diikut.] For cases on res judicata, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 2892–2939. For cases on res judicata, see 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 2605–2670. ABDUL MALEK AHMAD JCA (delivering the judgment of the court): The doctrine of res judicata has been expounded in many an authority but, like other legal doctrines, continues to be argued before the courts as each case must depend on its particular facts. In this appeal before us, despite a well reasoned judgment, we could not, having carefully considered the arguments ||Page 547>> canvassed before us, agree with the learned trial judge who held that the doctrine was not applicable. We, therefore, allow the appeal with costs here and below and order that the deposit be refunded to the appellant. He argued that res judicata is only as regards cause of action estoppel, not remedy estoppel as an order for sale is not a judgment as decided in Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119 and since this was an application under O 18 r 19 of the RHC, he added, as long as the respondent can show an arguable case, the action should remain. He also submitted that the order for sale had since been stayed.

The defence of res judicata was considered and disposed of at p 425 [of Brisbane City Council & Anor v A-G for Queensland [1979] AC 411], and we cite:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-423 ‘The second defence is one of res judicata. There has, of course, been no actual decision in litigation between these parties as to the issue involved in the present case, but the appellants invoke this defence in its wider sense, according to which a party may be shut out from raising in a subsequent action an issue which he could, and should, have raised in earlier proceedings. The classic statement of this doctrine is contained in the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson[1843] 3 Hare 100 and its existence has been reaffirmed by this Board in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155. A recent application of it is to ||Page 550>> be found in the decision of the Board in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581. It was, in the judgment of the Board, there described in these words:“… there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings.”This reference to “abuse of process” had previously been made in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 per Somervell LJ and their Lordships endorse it. This is the true basis of the doctrine and it ought to be applied when the facts are such as to amount to an abuse: otherwise there is a danger of a party being shut from bringing forward a genuine subject of litigation.In their Lordships’ opinion there is no room for application of this doctrine here.’

Before turning to consider these reasons and counsel’s arguments upon the appeal, it is convenient first to indicate something of the law governing this issue. From the several authorities referred to during the course of argument, I derive these central principles: (1) The considerations of public policy underlying the plea of res judicata are enshrined in two Latin maxims, nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa and interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. (2) The plea of res judicata encompasses two distinct forms of estoppel: cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. (3) ‘Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause of action in the later proceedings is identical to that in the earlier proceedings, the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject matter. In such a case, the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is alleged, such ||Page 551>> as to justify setting aside the earlier judgment’: see Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] AC 93 at p 104. (4) Issue estoppel represents an extension of the doctrine of res judicata to include a bar on the subsequent litigation not only of all decided issues whose resolution was essential to the determination of earlier proceedings but also ‘to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time’: see Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630 at p 643, per Diplock LJ, quoting from Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 at p 115. As Lord Keith of Kinkel put it in Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93, 106: ‘Issue estoppel, too, has been extended to cover not only the case where a particular point has been raised and specifically determined in the earlier proceedings, but also that where in the subsequent proceedings it is sought to raise a point which might have been but was not raised in the earlier.’ (5) ‘The point’ which might have been but was not raised in the earlier proceedings may itself be a cause of action. In Talbot v Berkshire County Council [1994] QB 290 at p 301, Mann LJ spoke of the rule as ‘a salutary one,’ observing that ‘it prevents prolixity in litigation and encourages the earliest resolution of disputes’. (6) In issue estoppel cases, the plea of res judicata will not be applied where to do so would cause injustice. The ‘special circumstance’ (the phrase used in several of the authorities)

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-424 justifying the non-application of the rule ordinarily arise where further material becomes available which could not by reasonable diligence have been adduced in the earlier proceedings, or where (as in Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93) there has been a change or changed perception of the law. (7) The plea of res judicata applies only where the cause of action or issue was and remains between the same parties or their predecessors in title. The single exception to this rule is to be found in the Privy Council decision in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581, where the party held estopped in the subsequent proceedings had not itself been a party to the earlier action. It was, however, a closely related company with common directors and shareholders.

But there is a wider sense in which the doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings. The locus classicus of that aspect of res judicata is the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 at p 115 where the judge says: ‘… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.’ The shutting out of a ‘subject of litigation’ — a power which no court should exercise but after a scrupulous examination of all the circumstances — is limited to cases where reasonable diligence would have caused a matter to be earlier raised; moreover, although negligence, inadvertence or even accident will not suffice to excuse, nevertheless ‘special circumstances’ are reserved in case justice should be found to require the non-application of the rule. For example, if it had been suggested that when the counterclaim in No 969 came to be answered Mr Lai was unaware, and could not reasonably have been expected to be aware, of the circumstances attending the sale to Choi Kee, it may be that the present plea against him would not have been maintainable. But no such averment has been made. The Vice-Chancellor’s phrase ‘every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation’ was expanded in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 at p 257 by Somervell LJ: ‘… res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but … it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.’ Again, a phrase used by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in delivering the opinion of the Board in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155 at p 171, ‘the present point was one which, if taken, went to the root of the matter on the prior occasion’, appears precisely apposite to the failure, in answer to the counterclaim in No 969, to raise the matters founded on in No 534 which, if then substantiated, would have been then decisive. An instance of a hard case in which the rule was applied is Re Koenigsberg [1948] Ch 727. ||Page 553>> Their Lordships are, accordingly, of opinion that the Full Court was right in ordering that the statement of claim in No 534 be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court; they will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

(3) That the basis of the defence of res judicata in its wider sense, by which a party was precluded from raising an issue which he could and should have raised in earlier

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-425 proceedings, was that to raise such an issue was an abuse of process and that (even assuming that in the present case the existence of the trust was known at the time of the earlier proceedings and that there was the necessary identity of parties), since it would have been inappropriate to assert the existence of the trust either in the planning consent appeals or in the 1971 action against the council, the bringing of the present action was not an abuse of process and the defence failed. Although the Supreme Court decision in Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119 is to the effect that the doctrine of res judicata would not apply where the previous proceedings were only charge actions which did not result in a final judgment or order, as has been pointed out earlier, a clarification had been made on this point by the Federal Court in Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank [1997] 1 MLJ 77 . In any case, in Kandiah Peter’s case, the chargor was not seeking to impeach the earlier order for sale but was only seeking to challenge the validity of the charge documents and the subsequent civil proceedings in which the doctrine was raised was the first after the order for sale. Here, it is the second, as the first was the third action where there was the similar prayer to set aside the order for sale in the second action as in the fourth action. Surely and certainly, the doctrine of res judicata would apply here as both the third and the fourth actions seek the same basic remedy and we consider that the respondent should have raised the issue in the third action and not in the fourth action as they had done. Accordingly, the respondent should be shut out from raising in a subsequent action an issue which he could, and should, have raised in earlier proceedings as per the Supreme Court decision in Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 whilst approving the decision reached in Brisbane City Council’s case. ||Page 554>> In Spencer Bower and Turner’s The Doctrine of Res Judicata (2nd Ed) at Ch 11 at p 20, it is stated as follows:

Introduction (21) A res judicata is a judicial decision, pronounced by a judicial tribunal. It is of no avail to prove that the allegedres judicata was a decision, or even that it was a judicial one, in the sense that it was pronounced according to judicial principles, unless it be also established that it emanated from a judicial tribunal in the exercise of its judicial functions; nor, on the other hand, is it sufficient to shew that it was pronounced by a judicial tribunal, unless it be also shewn that it was a decision, and a judicial one, as distinguished from a termination of the proceedings otherwise than by a judicial decision. It is vital, therefore, to the present inquiry to fix at the outset the proper definition, first, of ‘judicial tribunal’, and then, of ‘judicial decision.’

What is a judicial decision? (30) In order to establish a res judicata on which an estoppel may be founded, it must appear, not only that the person, or body of persons, pronouncing the deliverance constituted a judicial tribunal, but also that what was pronounced amounted to a judicial decision. There must have been both a judex, and a judicium, Bradshaw v M’Mullan [1920] 2 IR 412 (HL) per Lord Shaw at pp 424 and 425 which, for purposes of estoppel, means a decision or determination or adjudication of some question of law or fact, whether such decision takes the form of an express judicial declaration, or is necessarily involved in the command or prohibition which constitutes the judgment or judicial act in its coercive or operative aspect. Everything which answers to this description, by whatever name it may be called (for different phraseology in this respect has been adopted by different tribunals, or by the same tribunal, at different E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-426 stages in the history of our jurisprudence) is deemed a judicial decision; and nothing which falls short of it (again, irrespective of nomenclature) is so deemed. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issue estoppel — Whether issues which might have been and which were not brought forward before the court in a previous proceeding, though not actually decided by that court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata — Whether on the facts the court ought to invoke the principle of res judicata The plaintiff brought a civil suit against his wife (‘the defendant’) and applied for a declaration that six pieces of land held jointly between them or registered solely in the name of the defendant were held in trust by the defendant for the beneficial interest of the plaintiff. In an earlier suit — Originating Summons No 24–46–92 (‘the earlier suit’) — it was held that the plaintiff had no interest over two pieces of the land (‘the two lots’). As a result, the plaintiff withdrew the prayers against the two lots. The defendant, in the earlier suit, apart from touching on the two relevant lots, had also explained her position vis-a-vis the other four unconnected lots (‘the four lots’). The defendant’s explanation was not denied by the plaintiff. The defendant raised a preliminary objection, submitting that as the plaintiff was presumed to acquiesce to her assertion by his non-reply or denial, the court ought to invoke the principle of res judicata on the plaintiff’s claim of the four lots. Held, dismissing the preliminary objection: (1) Issues which might have been and which were not brought forward before the court in a previous proceeding, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, though not actually decided by that court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata, ie doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. The court is subject to this broader view by reason of the principle of stare decisis. To put into effect the principle of res judicata, there must be a permissible situation which will enable it to be operative (see pp 391F–G and 392B–C); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 followed. (2) To give judgment against the plaintiff over the four lots for not replying to the defendant’s affidavit in the earlier suit when the lots were not even in issue and when the allegations were not sufficiently necessary or required to be replied would be outrageous and unfair. It would lead to penalizing the plaintiff for not having the foresight to anticipate the absorption of the broader view of the principle of res judicata. Further, if the broader principle of res judicata was applicable to the case, the outcome of the case would certainly have resulted in lopsidedness in the parties’ present economic and financial position. Also, from the notes of evidence and the notes of proceeding, it would appear that the earlier suit was geared towards the issue ||Page 387>> of caveats and not on whether the plaintiff had actual or equitable rights over the land based on the limited material before the court. Similarly, the defeat suffered by the plaintiff did not result in the striking out of the main suit. Regarding the issue of interest in the main suit, the outcome would perhaps be at total variance with that application, as in a full trial a new set of rules applies whereby oral testimony may also be adduced. On the facts,

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-427 the preliminary objection that the broader view of the principle of res judicata applied was dismissed (see pp 393B–F, I and 394A–B, H–I); Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 followed. Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif memulakan guaman sivil terhadap isterinya (‘defendan’) dan memohon suatu perisytiharan bahawa enam bidang tanah yang dipegang sesama antara mereka atau didaftarkan atas nama defendan sahaja dipegang atas amanah oleh defendan untuk kepentingan benefisial plaintif. Dalam guaman yang lebih awal — Saman Pemula No 24–46–92 (‘guaman terdahulu’) — ia diputuskan bahawa plaintif tidak mempunyai kepentingan dalam dua bidang tanah (‘dua lot tersebut’). Akibatnya, plaintif menarik balik permohonan terhadap dua lot tersebut. Dalam guaman terdahulu, selain daripada menyebut dua lot tersebut yang berkenaan defendan juga telah menjelaskan kedudukannya tentang empat lot yang tidak berkaitan yang lain (‘empat lot tersebut’). Penjelasan defendan tidak disangkal oleh plaintif. Defendan membangkitkan bantahan permulaan, dengan berhujah bahawa oleh kerana plaintif dianggap bersetuju kepada penegasannya disebabkan keengganan menjawab atau penyangkalan, mahkamah patut menggunakan prinsip res judicata atas tuntutan plaintif terhadap empat lot tersebut. Diputuskan, menolak bantahan permulaan: (1) Isu-isu yang mungkin dikemukakan dan yang tidak dikemukakan di mahkamah dalam prosiding yang lebih awal, sama ada dengan sengajanya atau disebabkan kecuaian atau kelalaian, walaupun tidak sebenarnya diputuskan oleh mahkamah itu, masih dirangkumi oleh doktrin res judicata, iaitu doktrin estopel per rem judicatum. Mahkamah adalah tertakluk kepada pandangan yang lebih luas ini disebabkan prinsip stare decisis. Bagi memberi kesan kepada prinsip res judicata, mestilah adanya keadaan yang membenarkannya berfungsi (lihat ms 391F–G dan 392B–C); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd[1995] 3 MLJ 189 diikut. (2) Penghakiman terhadap plaintif atas empat lot tersebut kerana tidak menjawab afidavit defendan dalam guaman terdahulu walaupun lot tersebut tidak menjadi isu dan pengataan tidak perlu secukupnya atau tidak perlu dijawab adalah melampau dan tidak adil. Ia akan membawa kepada penghukuman plaintif kerana dia gagal menjangkakan penyerapan pandangan res judicata yang ||Page 388>> lebih luas. Selanjutnya, jika prinsip res judicata yang lebih luas adalah terpakai kepada kes, keputusannya tentunya akan menyebabkan ketidakseimbangan dalam kedudukan ekonomi dan kewangan pihak-pihak sekarang. Juga, dari nota keterangan dan nota prosiding, ia kelihatan bahawa guaman terdahulu adalah terhadap isu kaveat dan bukan tentang sama ada plaintif mempunyai hak sebenar atau ekuiti atas tanah berdasarkan material yang terhad di hadapan mahkamah. Begitu juga, ketewasan yang dialami oleh plaintif tidak mengakibat dalam pembatalan guaman utama. Berhubung dengan isu kepentingan dalam guaman utama, keputusan mungkin akan bertentangan dengan permohonan itu, kerana dalam perbicaraan penuh suatu set kaedah

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-428 terpakai di mana keterangan lisan boleh juga dikemukakan. Atas fakta, bantahan permulaan bahawa pandangan yang lebih luas prinsip res judicata adalah terpakai ditolak (lihat ms 393B–F, I dan 394A–B, H–I); Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors[1988] 3 MLJ 90 diikut.] In open court whilst in the process of sorting out the arguments of both parties, the plaintiff withdrew the prayer against Lot 3704 HS (D) 2858 together with the building known as 789-B Taman Kerjasama Bukit Bruang, 75450 Melaka and Lot 3773 HS (D) 2924 Mukim Bukit Baru Daerah Melaka Tengah, Melaka. The reason for the withdrawal of the two lots in this civil suit is a direct consequence of the decision of Mohd Noor J in Originating Summons No 24–46–92. Mohd Noor J as per encl 28 p 336 in that case had declared that the plaintiff in this current case and the applicant in Originating Summons No 24–46–92 had no interest over Lots 3704 and 3773. There was no appeal against this decision; and pursuant to the finalization of that order, the plaintiff wisely withdrew the prayers against them. Despite the withdrawal of the two lots, the defendant was still left dissatisfied. She posed a preliminary objection over the rest of the properties, viz Lots 619, 30, 153 and 154 founded on the doctrine of res judicata. I was initially surprised with this turn of events as Mohd Noor J in Originating Summons No 24–46–92 in that summons in chambers application had merely made a final order with regard to Lots 3704 and 3773 but never the other four. The learned counsel for the defendant, Mr Low Kiang Kiau brought my attention to the notes of proceeding as well as certain findings of facts made by the judge. The relevant notes of proceeding is found in encl 30 where the same counsel were recorded to have similarly represented their respective clients in that summons in chambers application. In support of his assertion of the doctrine of res judicata, Mr Low especially emphasized ground 3 of the findings of the court which reads: Counsel relied largely on the last sentence in that finding, in that the issue regarding the four relevant lots had been discussed in detail, and if it was not already res judicata, it could be construed as res judicata bearing in mind the comprehensiveness of the hearing. Of course, in the process of ||Page 390>> propping up the defendant’s case he clinically identified relevant portions of the relevant affidavits as well as the notations made in the notes of proceeding. The legal basis of his argument of extending the concept of res judicata emanated from two case laws. He began with the case of Southern Finance Co Bhd v Saffron Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 CLJ 1867, where Lim Beng Choon J said at p 1870:

Now there is a distinction between ‘cause of action estoppel’ which is the simplest estoppel per rem judicatum and ‘issue estoppel’. In Spencer Bower and Turner Res Judicata (2nd Ed), it is stated at pp 150–151 that: ‘Cause of action estoppel is applicable solely to the case where the same cause of action is alleged in successive proceedings. It is a reciprocal estoppel, and operates both as an estoppel per rem judicatumand conversely by way of merger. The maxim transit in rem judicatumprevents a successful plaintiff from re-asserting in a second proceeding the cause of action which he has already made the subject of a judgment in the first. This is the operation of the doctrine of merger. On the other hand the maxim interest rei publicae sit finis litiumdenies the unsuccessful defendant the opportunity of relitigating a case which he has already lost. This is estoppel per rem judicatum (and the case of plaintiff and defendant may be reversed when the opposite circumstances obtain). But where one cause of action has been E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-429 the subject of final adjudication between parties, those determinations of particular issues which are its essential foundation, without which it could not stand, may be used as the basis of issue estoppels between the same parties when another cause of action altogether is set up.’ To support his statements, the learned author cited the following passage of Diplock LJ in Thoday v Thoday [1964] Law Reports 181 at p 198: ‘The second species, which I will call “issue estoppel”, is an extension of the same rule of public policy. There are many causes of action which can only be established by proving that two or more different conditions are fulfilled. Such causes of action involve as many separate issues between the parties as there are conditions to be fulfilled by the plaintiff in order to establish his cause of action; and there may be cases where the fulfilment of an identical condition is a requirement common to two or more different causes of action. If in litigation upon one such cause of action any of such separate issues as to whether a particular condition has been fulfilled is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, either upon evidence or upon admission by a party to the litigation, neither party can, in subsequent litigation between one another upon any cause of action which depends upon the fulfilment of the identical condition, assert that the condition was fulfilled if the court has in the first litigation determined that it was not, or deny that it was fulfilled if the court in the first litigation determined that it was.’ [The case of Malayan United Finance Bhd v Noormurni Sdn Bhd & Anor [1988] 1 CLJ 149 was also considered.]

On the other hand, the issue estoppel literally means simply an issue which a party is estopped from raising in a subsequent proceeding. However, the issue estoppel, in a nutshell, from a consideration of case law, means in law a lot more, ie that neither of the same parties or their privies in a subsequent proceeding is entitled to challenge the correctness of the decision of a previous final judgment in which they, or their privies, were parties. This sounds like explaining a truism, but it is the corollary from that statement that is all important and that could have given birth to the controversies alluded to above; the corollary being that neither of such parties will be allowed to adduce evidence or advance any argument to contradict such decision. In this respect, we respectfully agree with Peter Gibson J in Lawdor v Gray [1984] 3 All ER 345 at p 350, who said: ‘Issue estoppel … prevents contradiction of a previous determination, whereas cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of the cause of action’. It is important to bear in mind the manner in which the issue estoppel operates in preventing such contradiction of the previous judgment. There is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary view that such issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata, ie doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. (Emphasis added.) We are of the opinion that the aforesaid contrary view is to be preferred; it represents, for one thing, a

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-430 correct even though broader approach to the scope of issue estoppel. It is warranted by the weight of authorities to be illustrated later. It is completely in accord or resonant with the rationales behind the doctrine of res judicata, in other words, with the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. It is particularly important to bear in mind the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and with the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation. It is further necessary at this stage to understand the import of the words in the said famous statement, ie ‘… every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation …’ which Somervell LJ explained in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 at p 257 as follows: ‘… res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but … it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.’ ||Page 392>> It is especially that last sentence which was relied upon by the learned counsel, in that the facts adduced during the hearing of Originating Summons No 24–46–92 were sufficient to cover issues or facts which were part of the subject matter of the litigation and which could have been raised. Since I am subject to that broader view by reason of the principle of stare decisis — ie the principle of following previous cases — I cannot but seriously consider the preliminary objection ( Wisma Sime Darby Sdn Bhd v Wilson Parking Malaysia Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 81 and Periasamy a/l Sinnappan v PP [1996] 2 MLJ 557). To put into effect ‘this second school of thought contrary view’ (the term used by Peh Swee Chin FCJ), which I shall henceforth refer to as ‘the broader view’, there must be a permissible situation which will enable it to be operative. Without attempting to curb the applicability of this broader view, conversely it would be an exercise in futility to attempt to invoke the principle of ||Page 393>> res judicata if the facts do not warrant it. For the current case, due to insufficient material as it was a summons in chambers matter inundated by conflicting evidence, my task of applying the broader view of res judicata was not made any easier. The wife, through her counsel, consistently impressed on me as to their poverty when they began their life together, but lost out substantially when they became estranged. By scrutinizing all the land grants of the controversial lots, I detected chinks in the defendant’s assertion as for a fact I found her name to have been registered in all the grants either recorded as the sole owner (of three lots) or a joint owner of the other three. The supporting affidavit (encl 28 p 6) of Chua Bah Bee for the ex parte summons in chambers highlighted down in detail the particulars of the properties bought by them when they were still under one roof. Why the other four properties were mentioned by the applicant when the summons in chambers targeted only Lots 3704 and 3773 is quite difficult for me to fathom. In response to this elucidation of the properties bought by them during the duration of their marriage, the respondent wife in her reply in the said Originating Summons No 24–46–92 — apart from touching on the two relevant lots — also explained her position vis-a-vis the other four unconnected lots. Unfortunately, the explanation of the wife was not denied by the applicant and this led Mohd Noor J to be convinced of her entitlement over the two lots. Why the applicant failed to deny vide an affidavit-in-reply is also a mystery but currently, due to the lack of that response, Mr Low for the respondent wants me to invoke the principle of res judicata over the four lots in the light of the non-rebuttal as to how she obtained those

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-431 properties. It is legally sound to give judgment against the husband for not replying to the wife’s affidavit in Originating Summons No 24–46–92 as he was presumed to acquiesce to her assertion by his non-reply or denial. To equate the outcome regarding the other four lots on the same footing when they were not in issue and not sufficiently necessary or required to be replied would be outrageous to our sense of fair play. As experience has shown, it is not uncommon for contending parties to be satisfied with specific replies to specific allegations whilst leaving many other issues untouched on the then correct view that it was unnecessary to reply. The shock wave will only be felt later when the broader view of the principle of res judicata is applied when the future presiding judge decides to adjudge the supposed previously unnecessary issues as res judicata. For the purposes of our case, I was not inclined to apply the broader principle of res judicata as it would lead to penalizing the husband for not having the foresight to anticipate the absorption of the contrary view of the principle of res judicata. Had he been able to predict the expansion of the law towards the present direction, he would have probably replied accordingly and come out with a reasonable and logical answer. Whilst the proceeding was in session, I mentally observed the striking contrast between the two personalities involved. The ex husband spoke absolutely no English but was inclined to speak in Bahasa Malaysia (the Indonesian version) whilst the wife appeared sophisticated and spoke very good English though not in control of her emotions. I also took note, as mentioned above, of what the lady stressed that when they were initially married they were poverty-stricken resulting in them migrating to another country in search of employment so as to improve their lot. If I had agreed with what was ventilated by Mr Low, ie that the broader principle of res judicata was applicable to the case, the outcome of the case would certainly have resulted in lopsidedness in their present economic and financial position. It would have meant that out of the six pieces of land, three lots would belong to her completely, with the other three to be held under their joint names. Surely for two persons who started with nothing financially, such an outcome would smack of unfairness especially on the flimsy and unreasonable ground that no reply was forthcoming from him in Originating Summons No 24–46–92 when Lots 619, 30, 153 and 154 were not in issue and not required to be replied.

The true test of res judicata in its wider sense or issue estoppel may be stated thus: has there been a final determination of the issue? That is the crucial factor. The authorities show that for a determination there must be a final adjudication by the court: Langmead v Maple(1865) 18 CBNS 255. There must be a final and not an interlocutory order: Huntley (Marchioness) v Gaskell[1905] 2 Ch 656 and Bozson v Altrincham Urban District Council[1903] 1 KB 547. Secondly, it is also trite law that the hearing of an application for an interlocutory injunction is not a trial on the merits. This is understandable for in such proceedings there is usually no oral evidence and no opportunity for cross-examination. Nor, for that matter, would there have been the full pre-trial process of discovery and inspection of documents at that stage. The relevant criteria applicable must, of necessity, be materially different as compared to that applicable to the trial of an action since at the interlocutory stage neither party’s case can be said to be ‘proved’. Having said that, it is true to say, as Lord Denning pointed out in Fellowes v Fisher [1976] QB 122 at p 129G: ‘Nearly always, however, these cases do not go to trial. The parties accept the prima facie view of the court or settle the case. At any rate, in 99 cases out of 100 it goes no further.’ To summarize, to bring myself within the ambit of the broader view of res judicata, I adopted these guidelines:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-432 After having considered all the above factors, I dismissed the preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the defendant that the broader view of the principle of res judicata applied to Lots 619, 30, 153 and 154. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Different cause of action and issues — Judgment in default entered against different defendants and arose out of distinct and separate causes of action — Whether plaintiff was estopped from commencing the action — Whether there was duplicity of actions By a factoring agreement dated 24 November 1994 (‘the agreement’), the plaintiff had agreed to factor and be assigned the debts and invoices (the debt receivables) due to the first defendant from one Sistem Kenderaan Negara Sdn Bhd (‘SKN’). The second and third defendants were the guarantors pursuant to a letter of guarantee and indemnity executed in order to secure the agreement. Upon the default of SKN, the plaintiff, pursuant to cl 15 of the agreement, sent a notice to the first defendant, requiring the first defendant to repurchase the debts outstanding from SKN. Notices of demand were also issued to the second and third defendants as well as SKN. The plaintiff claimed against the defendants jointly and severally for the outstanding sum together with interest and factoring charge. However, having commenced this action (‘the D5 suit’), the plaintiff also commenced a civil suit against SKN vide Kuala Lumpur High Court Civil Suit No D2–22–632–1995 (‘the D2 suit’) in which default judgment was entered against it. By consent, three issues arose for determination, namely: (i) whether the plaintiff was entitled to commence this suit in the light of the D2 suit, that is, on the ground of duplicity; (ii) whether res judicata applies; and (iii) if res judicata applied, was the plaintiff estopped from proceeding with this case since judgment in default had been entered in respect of the D2 suit. Held, judgment against the first, second and third defendants jointly and severally: (1) On the first issue, as the present D5 suit was in respect of different defendants and also arose out of distinct and separate causes of action from the D2 suit, there was no reason why the plaintiff was not entitled to commence the D5 suit. Clause 15 of the factoring agreement was clearly enforceable against the first defendant (see pp 406B–H, 407I and 408A); Amanah Factors Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Chem Credit Sdn Bhd) v Polycom Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 1 CLJ 121 and Re Charge Card Service Ltd[1986] 3 All ER 289 followed. ||Page 403>> (2) Since cl 1 of the guarantee stipulated that the second and third defendants were to jointly and severally guarantee, undertake and agree irrevocably and unconditionally not merely as sureties but as principal debtors to pay the plaintiff on demand all monies due from the first defendant pursuant to the factoring agreement, the guarantee was enforceable against the second and third defendants and there was nothing to disentitle the plaintiff from commencing the present D5 suit against them (see p 408E–F); Chong Yoong Choy v UOL Factoring Sdn Bhd[1996] 1 MLJ 421 followed.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-433 (3) On the second and third issues, since the defendants in the present suit were not the same as in the D2 suit and neither was one the privy of the other, and as the cause of action and the issues in the present suit were different from those in the D2 suit, the issue of estoppel giving rise to an estoppel simply did not arise (see p 409F–G); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 followed and Wong Peng Yan Benjamin v Genting Bhd & Anor[1993] 3 MLJ 713 distinguished. (4) On the evidence, the default judgment against SKN in the D2 suit did not involve judicial determination of the matter in issue between the parties therein. This was another factor that militated against the application of res judicata to the present case (see pp 409H–I and 410A–B); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 followed. Bahasa Malaysia summary

Melalui suatu perjanjian pemfaktoran bertarikh 24 November 1994 (‘perjanjian tersebut’), plaintif telah bersetuju untuk memfaktorkan dan diserahhakkan hutang-hutang dan invois-invois (hutang yang boleh diterima) yang terhutang kepada defendan pertama dari Sistem Kenderaan Negara Sdn Bhd (‘SKN’). Defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga adalah penggerenti-penggerenti menurut suatu surat gerenti dan tanggung rugi yang disempurnakan untuk menjamin perjanjian tersebut. Atas kemungkiran SKN, plaintif, menurut fasal 15 perjanjian tersebut, telah menghantar suatu notis kepada defendan pertama, menghendaki defendan pertama membeli kembali hutang-hutang yang belum dilunaskan itu dari SKN. Notis-notis tuntutan telah juga dikeluarkan kepada defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga serta SKN. Plaintif telah menuntut terhadap defendan-defendan secara bersesama dan berasingan untuk jumlah yang belum dilunaskan serta faedah dan bayaran pemfaktoran. Namun begitu, setelah memulakan tindakan ini (‘guaman D5’), plaintif juga telah memulakan suatu guaman sivil terhadap SKN melalui Guaman Sivil No D2–22–632–1995 Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur (‘guaman D2’) dalam mana penghakiman ingkar telah dimasukkan terhadapnya. Dengan persetujuan, tiga isu berbangkit untuk diputuskan, iaitu: (i) sama ada plaintif adalah berhak untuk memulakan guaman ini ||Page 404>> memandangkan guaman D2, yakni, atas alasan pertindihan; (ii) sama ada res judicata terpakai; dan (iii) jika res judicata terpakai, adakah plaintif diestopkan dari meneruskan kes ini oleh kerana penghakiman ingkar telah dimasukkan dalam hal guaman D2. Diputuskan, penghakiman terhadap defendan-defendan pertama, kedua dan ketiga bersesama dan berasingan: (1) Atas isu pertama, oleh sebab guaman D5 sekarang adalah mengenai defendan-defendan yang berlainan dan juga berbangkit dari kausa-kausa tindakan yang berbeza dan berasingan dari guaman D2, tiada sebab mengapa plaintif tidak berhak untuk memulakan guaman D5. Fasal 15 perjanjian tersebut

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-434 jelas boleh dikuatkuasakan terhadap defendan pertama (lihat ms 406B–H, 407I dan 408A); Amanah Factors Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Chem Credit Sdn Bhd) v Polycom Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 1 CLJ 121 dan Re Charge Card Service Ltd[1986] 3 All ER 289 diikut. (2) Oleh kerana fasal 1 gerenti tersebut menetapkan bahawa defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga bersesama dan berasingan menggerenti, mengakujanji dan bersetuju tanpa boleh ditarikbalik dan tanpa syarat bukan sahaja sebagai sureti tetapi sebagai penghutang-penghutang prinsipal untuk membayar plaintif atas tuntutan kesemua wang yang kena dibayar dari defendan pertama menurut perjanjian pemfaktoran tersebut, gerenti tersebut boleh dikuatkuasakan terhadap defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga dan tidak ada apa-apa yang menafikan hak plaintif dari memulakan guaman D5 kini terhadap mereka (lihat ms 408E–F); Chong Yoong Choy v UOL Factoring Sdn Bhd[1996] 1 MLJ 421 diikut. (3) Atas isu-isu kedua dan ketiga, oleh kerana defendan-defendan dalam guaman sekarang tidak sama dengan yang dalam guaman D2 dan kedua-duanya bukanlah privi kepada yang lain, dan oleh kerana kausa tindakan tersebut dan isu-isu dalam guaman sekarang adalah berlainan dari yang dalam guaman D2 tersebut, isu estopel yang membangkitkan sesuatu estopel tidak berbangkit (lihat ms 409F–G); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 diikut dan Wong Peng Yan Benjamin v Genting Bhd & Anor[1993] 3 MLJ 713 dibeza. (4) Atas keterangan, penghakiman ingkar terhadap SKN dalam guaman D2 tidak membabitkan pemutusan kehakiman terhadap perkara yang menjadi isu antara pihak-pihak dalamnya. Ini adalah satu lagi faktor yang menghalang pemakaian res judicata kepada kes sekarang (lihat ms 409H–I dan 410A–B); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 diikut.] For cases on res judicata, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 2892–2939. ||Page 405>>

(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to commence this suit in the light of the D2 suit, that is, on the ground of duplicity. (2) Whether res judicata applies in this case. (3) If res judicata applies, is the plaintiff estopped from proceeding with this case since judgment in default has been entered in respect of the D2 suit. Whether res judicata applies in this case

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-435 finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy.

Thus, there are in fact two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum. The first type relates to cause of action estoppel and the second, to issue estoppel, which is a development from the first type. The cause of action estoppel arises when rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court for a particular remedy are determined in a final judgment and such right of action, ie the cause of action, merges into the said final judgment; in layman’s language, the cause of action has turned into the said final judgment. The said cause of action may not be relitigated between the same parties because it is res judicata. … On the other hand, the issue estoppel literally means simply an issue which a party is estopped from raising in a subsequent proceeding. However, the issue estoppel, in a nutshell, from a consideration of case law, means in law a lot more, ie that neither of the same parties or their privies in a subsequent proceeding is entitled to challenge the correctness of the decision of a previous final judgment in which they, or their privies, were parties. This sounds like explaining a truism, but it is the corollary from that statement that is all important and that could have given birth to the controversies alluded to above; the corollary being that neither of such parties will be allowed to adduce evidence or advance any argument to contradict such decision. In this respect, we respectfully agree with Peter Gibson J in Lawlor v Gray [1984] 3 All ER 345 at p 350, who said: ‘Issue estoppel … prevents contradiction of a previous determination, whereas cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of the cause of action.’ It is to be noted that in the present case, the defendants are not the same as the defendants in the D2 suit. Neither is one the privy of the other. Moreover, it is my finding that the cause of action in the present suit is distinct and separate from that in the D2 suit. Likewise, the issues in this D5 suit are different form the issues in the D2 suit. Therefore, the issue of res judicata giving rise to an estoppel simply does not arise. The defendants relied on Wong Peng Yan Benjamin v Genting Bhd & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 713 to support their contention that res judicata would apply in this case. To my mind, that case can be easily distinguished on the principle of agency. Abdul Malek Ahmad J (as he then was) held that as it was not disputed that the second defendant was the registrar and agent of the first defendant, the liability of the first and second defendants had merged. Another factor that militates against the application of res judicata to this case is that, a default judgment had been entered against the defendant SKN in the D2 suit. In so far as a default judgment is concerned and whether such a judgment could give rise to the doctrine of res judicata, I rely on Asia Commercial Finance ’s case wherein Peh Swee Chin FCJ said at p 198:

If may be of interest to point out that one of the exceptional special cases is the effect of a default judgment in subsequent proceedings between the same parties, a default judgment is different from a final judgment on the merits, the latter is the category to which the judgment in the said originating motion given before the filing of the action as concerned directly herein below belongs. Please see the finer points of law in regard to default ||Page 410>> judgments from the position of the doctrine of res judicata in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49. We have thus mentioned this question of default judgment in passing as it has sometimes been a small source of confusion to the litigants. Civil Procedure — Estoppel — Res judicata — Whether allegations already raised in previous suit — Whether there was cause of action estoppel — Whether there was issue E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-436 estoppel — Whether res judicata giving rise to estoppel arose The first plaintiff had purchased a flat unit through a financing loan from the defendant bank. The second and third plaintiffs were guarantors for the financing loan. Upon default of the first plaintiff in instalment payment, the defendant issued a demand notice and commenced two legal actions to recover the sum owed. Upon obtaining judgment, recovery proceedings were filed and six auction attempts were made but were abortive. The plaintiffs filed the current suit against the defendant on 15 September 1993 alleging that despite the fact that the auctions were abortive, the defendant had by its failure to respond and negligent misrepresentations to prospective purchasers secured by the plaintiffs, precluded the first plaintiff from disposing of the flat unit by private sale to repay the loan. The defendant had also refused to respond categorically to several requests from the plaintiffs and prospective purchasers for information on the outstanding amount then due on the loan. On 24 February 1994, the defendant made an application to strike out the second plaintiff on the ground that she had been declared a bankrupt on 17 October 1993 (‘encl 13’). Later the defendant applied under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘encl 37’) to strike out the writ and indorsement of claim on two grounds, which were: (i) that the statement of claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action; and (ii) that the second plaintiff was caught by estoppel and res judicata as she had raised some of the allegations in the statement of claim in Civil Suit No 22(23)–238–88 (‘the other suit’). Held, dismissing the defendant’s applications: (1) In view of the fact that the second plaintiff was made bankrupt only after the service of the summons on the defendant, there was no necessity for her to withdraw the action, but only to ||Page 234>> obtain the sanction of the Official Assignee, which she subsequently secured on 22 April 1994. However, had the second plaintiff taken any further step or action in the proceedings against the defendant pending the said sanction, such step could be nullified. The word ‘maintain’ in s 38(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 does not mean that a bankrupt cannot keep alive any action without the previous sanction of the Official Assignee as such interpretation would work injustice on the bankrupt to require him or her to withdraw the action and file afresh upon obtaining sanction. As the Official Assignee had confirmed that the second plaintiff had complied with the terms specified when the sanction was given, the defendant’s application in encl 13 was devoid of any merit and ought to be dismissed (see p 242C–E). (2) In considering whether the plaintiffs had a reasonable cause of action, the court must decide whether the defendant was justified in keeping the plaintiffs and potential purchasers on a perpetual guessing game to determine the actual amount due to the defendant at the material time. It is settled law that when an order for sale is made, the chargor does not abrogate all his rights to the chargee; until a bid is accepted, the chargor still retains the right to tender payment of the amount due to the chargee and to call off the sale. Further, it is the duty of a creditor, where he has security available for the payment and satisfaction of the debt, to do whatever is necessary to make that security properly available. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ statement of claim discloses a E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-437 prima facie case and reasonable cause of action against the defendant and it would not justify the striking out of their claim at this stage summarily (see p 245C–H; M & J Frozen Food Sdn Bhd & Anor v Siland Sdn Bhd & Anor [1994] 1 MLJ 294 and Wulff v Jay (1872) LR 7 QB 756 followed). (3) In the interest of justice, the various estoppel principles have to be viewed through the looking-glass cardinal principle that no party should be readily driven from the judgment seat, though the onus is on he who sues to show the court that he has a prima facie cause of action upon the optimum evaluation test. Here, the plaintiffs have successfully discharged the onus upon the optimum evaluation test (see pp 248I, 249A–B; Suppuletchimi a/p Karpaya v Palmco Bina Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 368 followed; Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581 distinguished). (4) As the cause of the action in the present suit and that in the other suit were different, there was no ‘cause estoppel’ and as the issues were also different there was no ‘issue estoppel’. Further, even though issue estoppel and res judicata were pleaded in the defence against the second and third plaintiffs, the question of tortious misrepresentation was not even raised or decided in the other suit and the defendant did not produce any court records thereof. Thus, res judicata giving rise to an estoppel did not ||Page 235>> arise. Even if the various pleas on estoppel and res judicata could validly be raised, in the present circumstances, as justice prescribes that the res judicata or estoppel principles should not be applied on a party who has suffered from the alleged conduct of another, the plaintiffs should not be prevented or shut out from re-opening the issue when it later arose in these proceedings (see p 249E–H; Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 and Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581 followed). [ Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif pertama telah membeli satu unit flat melalui pinjaman kewangan dari bank defendan. Plaintif kedua dan ketiga adalah penggerenti pinjaman kewangan itu. Apabila plaintif pertama gagal membuat bayaran ansuran, defendan telah mengeluarkan notis tuntutan dan memulakan dua tindakan undang-undang untuk mendapatkan balik jumlah yang dihutang itu. Setelah mendapat penghakiman, prosiding mendapat kembali telah difailkan dan enam percubaan untuk melelong telah dibuat tetapi telah gagal. Plaintif memfailkan guaman ini terhadap defendan pada 15 September 1993 dengan mengatakan bahawa walaupun lelongan itu telah gagal, defendan akibat kegagalannya untuk menjawab dan salah nyata yang cuai kepada pembeli prospektif yang dicarikan oleh plaintif, telah menghalang plaintif pertama dari menjual flat itu melalui jualan peribadi untuk membayar pinjaman itu. Defendan juga gagal menjawab secara mutlak beberapa pertanyaan daripada plaintif dan pembeli prospektif untuk maklumat berkaitan dengan hutang yang belum dijelaskan ke atas pinjaman itu. Pada 24 Februari 1994, defendan membuat satu permohonan untuk membatalkan plaintif kedua atas alasan bahawa dia telah diisytiharkan seorang bankrap pada 17 Oktober 1993 (‘kand 13’). Selepas itu defendan memohon di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘kand 37’) untuk membatalkan writ dan pengindorsan tuntutan atas dua E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-438 alasan, iaitu: (i) bahawa pernyataan tuntutan itu tidak memperlihatkan kausa tindakan yang munasabah; dan (ii) bahawa plaintif kedua ditahan oleh estopel dan res judicata kerana dia telah membangkitkan beberapa pengataan dalam pernyataan tuntutan di dalam Guaman Sivil No 22(23)–238—88 (‘guaman yang lagi satu’). Diputuskan, menolak permohonan-permohonan defendan: (1) Memandangkan fakta bahawa plaintif kedua telah dijadikan seorang bankrap hanya selepas penyampaian saman ke atas defendan, tiada keperluan untuknya menarik balik tindakan itu, tetapi beliau hanya perlu mendapatkan kebenaran Pegawai Pemegang Harta, yang telahpun didapati pada 22 April 1994. Walau bagaimanapun, jika plaintif kedua mengambil langkah atau tindakan lanjut dalam prosiding terhadap defendan sebelum mendapatkan kebenaran itu, langkah sedemikian boleh dibatalkan. Perkataan ‘maintain’ dalam s 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 ||Page 236>> tidak bermaksud bahawa seseorang bankrap tidak boleh mengekalkan sebarang tindakan tanpa kebenaran terdahulu dari Pegawai Pemegang Harta kerana tafsiran sebegini akan menyebabkan ketidakadilan ke atas si bankrap dalam mengkehendakinya menarik balik dan memfailkan samannya semula setelah memperolehi kebenaran. Oleh kerana Pegawai Pemegang Harta telah mengesahkan bahawa plaintif kedua telah mematuhi syarat-syarat yang dinyatakan semasa kebenaran itu diberikan, permohonan defendan dalam kand 13 tidak mempunyai merit dan patut ditolak (lihat ms 242C–E). (2) Dalam mempertimbangkan sama ada plaintif mempunyai satu kausa tindakan yang munasabah, mahkamah mesti membuat keputusan sama ada defendan berjustifikasi ketika membiarkan plaintif dan bakal pembeli dalam satu permainan meneka yang berpanjangan untuk menentukan jumlah sebenar yang masih terhutang kepada defendan pada masa yang berkenaan. Ia adalah undang-undang tetap bahawa apabila sesuatu perintah jualan dibuat, penggadai tidak melepaskan segala haknya kepada pemegang gadaian; sehingga satu tawaran diterima, penggadai masih mengekalkan haknya untuk membayar jumlah yang masih terhutang kepada pemegang gadaian dan membatalkan jualan tersebut. Lagipun, si piutang mesti, di mana beliau memegang sekuriti yang boleh dijual untuk membayar dan menyelesaikan hutang itu, membuat apa-apa yang perlu untuk menyediakan sekuriti itu. Maka, pernyataan tuntutan plaintif menunjukkan kes prima facie dan kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap defendan dan ini tidak menjustifikasikan pembatalan tuntutan pada peringkat ini secara terus (lihat ms 245C–H; M & J Frozen Food Sdn Bhd & Anor v Siland Sdn Bhd & Anor [1994] 1 MLJ 294 dan Wulff v Jay (1872) LR 7 QB 756 diikut). (3) Demi kepentingan keadilan, prinsip estopel yang pelbagai mesti dilihat melalui prinsip utama bahawa tiada pihak yang patut dipaksa meninggalkan tempat penghakiman, walaupun tanggungjawab terletak pada orang yang membuat guaman untuk menunjukkan mahkamah bahawa dia mempunyai kausa tindakan prima facie di atas ujian penilaian optima. Di sini, plaintif telah berjaya menjelaskan tanggungjawabnya di atas ujian penilaian optima (lihat ms 248I, E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-439 249A–B; Suppuletchimi a/p Karpaya v Palmco Bina Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 368 diikut; Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581 dibeza). (4) Oleh kerana kausa tindakan dalam guaman ini dan kausa tindakan dalam guaman yang satu lagi adalah berlainan, tidak terdapat ‘estopel kausa’ dan oleh kerana isu-isu juga berlainan tidak terdapat ‘estopel isu’. Tambahan lagi, biarpun estopel isu dan res judicata dijadikan pliding dalam pembelaan terhadap plaintif kedua dan ketiga, persoalan salah nyata tort tidak dibangkitkan atau diputuskan di dalam guaman yang satu lagi dan defendan tidak mengemukakan sebarang rekod mahkamah mengenainya ||Page 237>> sebagai bukti. Maka, res judicata yang membawa kepada estopel tidak timbul. Sekalipun pelbagai rayuan mengenai estopel dan res judicata boleh dibangkitkan dengan sah, dalam keadaan kes ini, oleh kerana keadilan memperuntukkan bahawa prinsip-prinsip res judicata atau estopel tidak patut dipakai terhadap satu pihak yang terjejas akibat kelakuan pihak yang satu lagi yang dikatakan itu, plaintif tidak patut disekat atau dihalang dari membuka semula isu itu apabila ia kemudiannya timbul dalam prosiding ini (lihat ms 249E–H; Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 dan Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581 diikut).] Editorial note: The defendant has appealed to the Court of Appeal vide Civil Appeal No P–02–636–95.] For cases on capacity of a bankrupt, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1995 Reissue) paras 1277–1283. For cases on striking out writ and statement of claim in pleadings, see 2 Mallal’s Digest(4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 2754–2765. For cases on estoppel and res judicata, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 1225–1238.

(i) the statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action and it is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court; and (ii) the second plaintiff is caught by the estoppel and res judicata principles — as pleaded in para 10 of the defence. Issue estoppel, too, has been extended to cover not only the case where a particular point has been raised and specifically determined in the earlier proceedings, but also that where in the subsequent proceedings it is sought to raise a point which might have been but was not raised in the earlier proceedings. (See Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630 at p 642.) Issue estoppel can arise even where a plea of res judicata cannot be established because the causes of action are not the same. To raise res judicata a defendant has to produce the pleadings and record of proceedings and judgment. The party replying on res judicata giving rise to an estoppel should be able to show that the matter had been determined by a judgment in its nature final (see Turley v Daw (1906) 94 LT 216; Bynoe v Bank of England [1902] 1 KB 467; Land v Land [1949] 2 All ER 218). The word ‘final’ is used here as opposed to ‘interlocutory’ (see

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-440 Allnutt v Mills (1925) 42 TLR 68) and the record of the court’s act on which the estoppel by res judicata is founded must be forthcoming, or some valid reason given why it cannot be produced (see The ‘Annie Johnson’ (1921) 91 LJP 64). Closer home, this aspect of the law was discussed in Kok Kan Sang v Siti Zaliha bte Mohd Noor & Anor [1993] 1 AMR 74 at p 77 where Lim Beng Choon J had this to say:

In any event counsel did not produce the judgment of the Supreme Court, neither did he produce the record of the proceeding. Failure to do so is fatal to his reliance on the res judicata principle (see The ‘ Annie Johnson’ 91 LJP 64) since there is nothing to indicate that the issues in dispute in the present case had indeed been considered and determined by the Supreme Court. ||Page 248>> It has been held that so long as a statement stands, and the record of the act of the court is forthcoming (see The ‘Annie Johnson’), no one who was a party thereto can reopen that litigation (see Huffer v Allen (1867) LR 2 Ex 15). And, in order that a defence of res judicata may succeed it is necessary to show not only that the cause of action was the same but also that the plaintiff has had an opportunity of recovering (see Re Hilton, ex p March (1892) 67 LT 594), or but for his own fault might have recovered in the first action, eg through counterclaim, what he seeks to recover in the second (see Re A Debtor (No 472 of 1950)[1958] 1 All ER 581).

The second plaintiff had raised the allegation made in paras 8–15 of the statement of claim in Penang High Court Civil Suit No 22(23)–238–88 on the application to strike out the defence of the second plaintiff and Tan Yew Nam and to enter summary judgment against them by the defendant but judgment was entered against her on 23 May 1991 and she never appealed against the said judgment. Hence, the first and second plaintiffs are estopped from raising this issue herein as issue estoppel and res judicata applies. Learned counsel for the defendant strongly relied on the case of Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor[1975] AC 581. The case of Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the current case. In that case, the Privy Council upheld the decision of the full court of the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, which in turn confirmed the decision of the High Court, ordering that the statement of claim filed subsequently by the appellant/borrower against the respondent/lender bank, be struck out, upon the application of the doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense, and also as it would be an abuse of the process of the court to raise in subsequent proceedings, matters which clearly could have and should have been litigated in the earlier proceedings. The Hong Kong High Court had found that the bank’s counterclaim in the earlier suit had squarely put before the court the correctness of the bank’s manner of accounting for the sum which it said was owed to it by the borrower. And, it held that as no compelling reason had been advanced to show why the borrower’s complaint of the bank’s erroneous manner of accounting (besides the complaint concerning the bogus nature of the mortgage between the bank and the second respondent) could not have been pleaded by way of a defence to counterclaim in the earlier suit, the borrower’s subsequent suit ought to be struck out. The ratio in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd enlarging the application of the doctrine of res judicata may be applied only with caution. It is pertinent to note that, as the issue (concerning accounts) raised by the borrower in his subsequent action was pointedly and directly related to the issue squarely put before the court in the lender/bank’s earlier counterclaim, the judge in the Hong Kong High Court would appear to have been driven to E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-441 ground his decision upon a wider application of the principle of res judicata. Thus, this decision was confirmed by the Privy Council largely upon facts peculiar to that case. The court must not lose sight of the requirement, in the interest of justice, that the various estoppel principles ||Page 249>> discussed above have to be viewed through the looking-glass cardinal principle that no party should be readily driven from the judgment seat, though the onus is on he who sues to show the court that he has a prima facie cause of action, upon the test that I have applied in Suppuletchimi a/p Karpaya v Palmco Bina Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 368 . In the current case, the plaintiffs have successfully discharged the onus upon the optimum evaluation test. The cause of the action of the matters in Suit No 22(23)-238-88 and that in the present suit being different there is no ‘cause estoppel’. The issues being different there is no ‘issue estoppel’ and finally, though issue estoppel and res judicata were pleaded in the defence against the second and third plaintiffs, the question of tortious misrepresentation was not even remotely raised, pleaded in issue or decided in proceeding No 22(23)–238–88 (being an action to enforce a guarantee), and neither did the defendant produce before this court, any court records thereof. Thus, res judicata giving rise to an estoppel does not arise. Furthermore, even if the various plea of estoppel and/or res judicata could validly be raised (which I have held otherwise), in the present circumstances, as it is now trite law that justice required the non-application of the estoppel or res judicata principles on a party who suffered from the alleged conduct of the other, the plaintiffs should not be prevented or shut out from re-opening the issue when it arose in later proceedings. Be it noted that, both in Carl Zeiss case as well as in Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd,the courts have expressed its reluctance for too wide an application of the various estoppel and res judicata principles and made clear that ‘nevertheless, “special circumstances” are reserved in case justice should be found to require the non-application of the rule.’ For all the above reasons, I held that the plaintiffs have a reasonable cause of action against the defendant and they are not in any way caught by any of various estoppel or res judicata principles and I decided to dismiss encl 37 with costs to the plaintiffs. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Cause of action estoppel — Two similar causes of action between similar parties in two different proceedings — Final judgment given in first proceeding — Whether prevented by cause of action estoppel A fixed loan of RM750,000 (‘the loan’) was granted by the appellant (‘the finance company’) to the respondent (‘the borrower’) for the purpose of financing a housing project. As security, several pieces of land were charged by the borrower to the finance company. The terms and conditions of the loan were contained in a letter of offer (‘the letter of offer’) dated 14 November 1985 (‘the date of offer’) which provided, inter alia, that the first drawdown must be made within three months from the date of offer and that the loan would be available for 15 months from the date of offer, ie until 14 February 1987, during which time, the borrower must draw upon the loan completely or the undrawn balance would be cancelled. The time for the first drawdown was subsequently extended by the finance company to 31 March 1986. The borrower, however, failed to utilize the loan completely by 14 February 1987, and on 4 May 1987, the finance company informed the borrower that it could no longer draw down

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-442 on the unused balance of RM400,000. The borrower went into financial difficulty and could not carry out the housing project. The borrower later defaulted, and the finance company successfully obtained an order of sale from the land administrator. On 22 January 1988, the borrower filed an originating motion in the High Court against the finance company, praying for, inter alia, an order to set aside the order for sale and damages in connection with the failure of the housing project due to the denial of the right to use the balance of the loan (‘the first proceeding’). The borrower argued that when the date for the first drawdown was extended, the availability period as stipulated in the letter of offer had also been waived accordingly. The High Court dismissed the borrower’s application and its appeal to the Supreme Court was also dismissed. The borrower then brought an action against the finance company in the High Court for damages on the same ground as the first proceeding. The finance company’s application to strike out the borrower’s statement of claim on a plea of res judicata was dismissed. The finance company has appealed. ||Page 190>> Held, allowing the appeal: (1) When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, they and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, as the judgment becomes the truth between such parties. An estoppel per rem judicatum has been created as a result. (2) There are two kinds of estoppel per rem judicatum, ie cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. The cause of action estoppel prevents reassertion of a cause of action which has been determined in a final judgment by the same parties. On the other hand, the issue estoppel prevents contradiction of the correctness of a final judgment by the same parties in a subsequent proceeding. Further, the parties are also prevented from asserting a cause of action or issue which should have been brought forward in the earlier action, but was not, whether deliberately or inadvertently. (3) Unlike an ordinary estoppel which should be pleaded, the court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action by applying the doctrine of res judicata, which is an estoppel based on public policy, even if it has not been pleaded, as public policy requires that there should be finality in litigation. (4) The borrower’s case was a classical case for the application of the doctrine of res judicata by way of a cause of action estoppel. The causes of action of both the first proceeding and the present statement of claim were identical, as both claimed damages for failure of the finance company to allow the borrower to utilize in full the loan of RM750,000, causing loss consequent upon the failure of the housing development to be proceeded with further. All rights and liabilities of both parties had merged into the judgment of the first proceeding and the effect of a cause of action estoppel was absolute. [ Bahasa Malaysia summary Suatu pinjaman tetap sejumlah RM750,000 (‘pinjaman itu’) telah diberikan oleh perayu (‘syarikat kewangan’) kepada penentang (‘peminjam’) untuk tujuan pembiayaan suatu projek perumahan. Sebagai cagaran, beberapa bidang tanah telah dicagarkan oleh

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-443 peminjam kepada syarikat kewangan itu. Terma dan syarat pinjaman itu adalah terkandung di dalam sepucuk surat tawaran (‘surat tawaran itu’) bertarikh 14 November 1985 (‘tarikh tawaran itu’) yang memperuntukkan, antara lain, bahawa pengeluaran pertama harus dibuat dalam tempoh masa tiga bulan dari tarikh tawaran dan bahawa pinjaman itu boleh didapatkan dalam masa 15 bulan dari tarikh tawaran, iaitu sehingga 14 Februari 1987, di mana peminjam harus mengeluarkan kesemua pinjaman tersebut, jika tidak, baki yang belum dikeluarkan akan dibatalkan. Masa untuk pengeluaran pertama kemudiannya dilanjutkan oleh syarikat kewangan ke 31 Mac 1986. Walau bagaimanapun, peminjam gagal untuk menggunakan kesemua ||Page 191>> pinjaman pada 14 Februari 1987, dan pada 4 Mei 1987, syarikat kewangan telah memaklumkan kepada peminjam bahawa ia tidak boleh lagi mengeluarkan baki yang belum digunakan sejumlah RM400,000. Peminjam mengalami kesulitan kewangan dan tidak dapat menjalankan projek perumahan tersebut. Peminjam kemudiannya ingkar, dan syarikat kewangan tersebut berjaya mendapatkan suatu perintah jualan daripada pentadbir tanah. Pada 22 Januari 1988, peminjam memfailkan suatu saman pemula di Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap syarikat kewangan, yang memohon untuk, antara lain, suatu perintah untuk mengenepikan perintah jualan dan ganti rugi yang berkaitan dengan kegagalan projek perumahan itu akibat penafian hak mereka untuk menggunakan baki pinjaman itu (‘prosiding pertama’). Peminjam itu berhujah bahawa apabila tarikh untuk pengeluaran pertama dilanjutkan, tempoh terdapatnya pinjaman seperti yang telah dinyatakan di dalam surat tawaran itu juga telah diketepikan. Mahkamah Tinggi menolak permohonan peminjam dan rayuannya kepada Mahkamah Agung juga telah ditolak. Peminjam kemudiannya telah membawa suatu tindakan terhadap syarikat kewangan itu di Mahkamah Tinggi untuk ganti rugi atas alasan yang sama seperti prosiding pertama. Permohonan syarikat kewangan itu untuk membatalkan penyataan tuntutan peminjam atas alasan res judicata telah ditolak. Syarikat kewangan membuat rayuan. Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan itu: (1) Apabila sesuatu perkara di antara dua pihak telahpun dihakimi dan diputuskan oleh sesuatu mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa yang kompeten, mereka dan privi mereka adalah tidak dibenarkan untuk membuat litigasi sekali lagi res judicata itu, kerana penghakiman itu menjadi kebenaran di antara pihak tersebut. Sebagai hasilnya, suatu ‘estoppel per rem judicatum’ telah dibentuk. (2) Terdapat dua jenis ‘estoppel per rem judicatum’ iaitu estopel kausa tindakan dan estopel isu. Estopel kausa tindakan menghalang penegasan semula suatu kausa tindakan yang telahpun diputuskan dalam suatu penghakiman muktamad di antara pihak yang sama. Sebaliknya, estopel isu menghalang penyangkalan kebetulan suatu penghakiman muktamad oleh pihak yang sama di dalam suatu prosiding yang berikut. Selanjutnya, pihak-pihak yang berkenaan juga dihalang daripada membangkitkan sesuatu kausa tindakan atau isu yang seharusnya dibangkitkan tetapi tidak dibangkitkan di dalam prosiding yang terdahulu, sama ada dengan sengaja atau tidak sengaja. (3) Tidak seperti estopel biasa yang harus dinyatakan di dalam pliding, mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa sedia ada untuk menolak suatu tindakan dengan menggunakan doktrin res judicata, yang merupakan suatu estopel berdasarkan E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-444 polisi awam, walaupun ia tidak dinyatakan dalam pliding, oleh kerana polisi awam mengkehendaki supaya terdapat kemuktamadan di dalam litigasi. ||Page 192>> (4) Kes peminjam adalah suatu kes klasik untuk penggunaan doktrin res judicata secara estopel kausa tindakan. Kausa tindakan kedua-dua usul pemula dan penyataan tuntutan ini adalah serupa, kerana kedua-duanya menuntut ganti rugi untuk kegagalan syarikat kewangan untuk membenarkan peminjam menggunakan dengan sepenuhnya pinjaman RM750,000 itu, yang mengakibatkan kerugian akibat projek perumahan itu tidak dapat dilaksanakan selanjutnya. Kesemua hak dan tanggungan kedua-dua pihak telah bercantum dengan penghakiman prosiding pertama dan kesan suatu estopel kausa tindakan adalah mutlak.] For cases on res judicata, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 2892–2939. PEH SWEE CHIN FCJ (DELIVERING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT) This appeal once again raises the question of the plea of res judicata which has arisen quite frequently, eg for the sitting of the Federal Court for the week commencing on 17 July 1995, three separate appeals, inclusive of the instant appeal, were listed for hearing, all involving and depending on the decision of such a plea. The frequency with which this plea has surfaced could have been caused by certain controversial aspects in the law relating to it, so that it behoves us to state our point of view on those aspects. In the instant appeal, the High Court below had earlier dismissed an application under O 18 r 19 from the defendant (hereinafter called ‘the finance company’) to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim on grounds, inter alia, of a plea of res judicata, ie in turn, it being an abuse of process of the court (the plaintiff is hereinafter called ‘the borrower’). The learned judge dismissed the application, holding, inter alia, and in effect that the plea of res judicata was not successful stating that there was ‘no question of the plaintiff’s statement of claim being frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court’; hence this appeal. His Lordship felt bound also by the decision of Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd The borrower’s statement of claim claims special damages for loss of profit in the sum of RM1,015,700 and general damages in connection with a housing development or proposed housing development which could not get off the ground on account of the finance company allegedly refusing to disburse completely an agreed loan of RM750,000. The said statement of claim, in so far as it relates to the defendant’s plea of res judicata, appears to be based primarily on a letter of offer dated 14 November 1985 to grant the said loan to the borrower from the finance company, the material provisions of which are set out below: The finance company in an affidavit supporting an application filed in the court below, under O 18 r 19 to strike out the statement of claim, has pleaded res judicata, and referred to the particulars of the earlier affidavit of the borrower in respect of the earlier originating motion. The learned judge in the court below however, in effect dismissed the plea of res judicata, and consequently also the finance company’s application under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 as described earlier, hence the appeal before us. To determine if the action concerned herein below is doomed to failure (for if so, the application under O 18 r E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-445 19 would have been wrongly dismissed) one has to deal with the certain controversial aspects of the plea of res judicata referred to in the beginning. What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro ||Page 198>> eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy. Since a res judicata creates an estoppel per rem judicatum, the doctrine of res judicata is really the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum, the latter being described sometimes in a rather archaic way as estoppel by record. Since the two doctrines are the same, it is no longer of any practical importance to say the res judicata is a rule of procedure and that an estoppel per rem judicatum is that of evidence. Such dichotomy is apt to give rise to confusion.

The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time. It may be of interest to point out that one of the exceptional special cases is the effect of a default judgment in subsequent proceedings between the same parties, a default judgment is different from a final judgment on the merits, the latter is the category to which the judgment in the said originating motion given before the filing of the action as concerned directly herein below belongs. Please see the finer points of law in regard to default judgments from the position of the doctrine of res judicata in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49 . We have thus mentioned this question of default judgment in passing as it has sometimes been a small source of confusion to the litigants. The cause of action estoppel arises when rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in court for a particular remedy ||Page 199>> are determined in a final judgment and such right of action, ie the cause of action, merges into the said final judgment; in layman’s language, the cause of action has turned into the said final judgment. The said cause of action may not be relitigated between the same parties because it is res judicata. In Conquer v Boot [1928] 2 KB 336 , the plaintiff obtained judgment after a contest in respect of a breach of warranty to build a house in a good and workmanlike manner. Subsequent to the judgment, the plaintiff suffered further loss or further loss emerged by virtue of the same breach of warranty. Such further loss might not have been apparent at the time of first action. It was held that the cause of action was res judicata and he was estopped from asserting for the second time the same breach of warranty. It is interesting to note that in the second action, the same breach was described differently but this did not prevent the estoppel from operating.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-446 In Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 62 ALJR 324, the High Court of Australia applied the doctrine of res judicata to prevent recovery of the balance of understated tax as a result of previously omitting a last digit of zero. There is one school of thought that issue estoppel applies only to issues actually decided by the court in the previous proceedings and not to issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, while another school of thought holds the contrary view that such issues which might have been and which were not brought forward as described, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata, ie doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid contrary view is to be preferred; it represents for one thing, a correct even though broader approach to the scope of issue estoppel. It is warranted by the weight of authorities to be illustrated later. It is completely in accord or resonant with the rationales behind the doctrine of res judicata, in other words, with the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum. It is particularly important to bear in mind the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and with the expanding resources of the courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation.

… res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but … it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. In Yat Tung’s case itself, the bank sold some property to Yat Tung which mortgaged the same property back to the bank. Yat Tung defaulted on payment of interest on the mortgage and the bank exercising its right of ||Page 201>> sale, sold the same property to the second respondent. After such sale to the second respondent, in 1969, Yat Tung sued the bank on the ground that the bank’s sale of the property to Yat Tung in the first place was a sham and therefore a nullity and the bank counterclaimed for loss on resale to the second respondent, denying the alleged nullity. Yat Tung failed in this first action and the bank succeeded. After the judgment, Yat Tung sued in 1972 once more in a second action on the ground that the subsequent sale by the bank to the second respondent of the same property was fraudulent, etc on the ground of some collusion between the bank and the second respondent. It will be remembered that the sale to the second respondent took place before Yat Tung filed the earlier action. On appeal, and even further appeal to the Judicial Committee, the order was confirmed on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata applied. The words ought to be understood as a gentle rebuke for the failure aforesaid, ie despite the fact that the party had the opportunity of bringing forward all such issues or asserting all such causes of action; and the words are not meant to impose a pre-condition for applying the doctrine of res judicata but are meant to say that the said non-bringing of the issues would count in any event irrespective of whether the said failure was or was not deliberate or due to inadvertence or negligence. Otherwise, the words would have virtually all but destroyed the efficacy of estoppel per rem judicatum.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-447 Another source of small confusion is the rule that generally an estoppel, of which an estoppel per rem judicatum is a kind, as the name implies, has to be pleaded. But in Superintendent of Pudu Prison v Sim Kie Chong [1986] 1 MLJ 494 at p 498, Abdoolcader SCJ held to the effect that the court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action by applying the doctrine of res judicata against a party even if it has not been pleaded. We venture to think the reason for the ratio is that an estoppel or exclusion of evidence based on a question of public policy, ie in this case, the question of public policy that there should be finality in litigation, is more vigorous in excluding evidence and need not be pleaded, unlike an ordinary estoppel which should be pleaded. We think we have dealt with certain parts of the doctrine of res judicata sufficiently for the purpose of determining the instant appeal. We now revert to the factors in the instant appeal. Again all rights and liabilities of both parties had merged into the judgment delivered on the said originating motion and the judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court and it is therefore final. The cause of action estoppel applies unquestionably against the borrower and the borrower’s case represents a classical case for the application of the doctrine of res judicata by way of a cause of action estoppel; the cause of action being the action for damages for refusal of the finance company to allow ||Page 203>> the borrower to utilize or borrow completely the total sum of the agreed loan. The effect of a cause of action estoppel is so absolute that it is really unnecessary to delve further into the issues of law or of fact. What we just said however is subject to what is to be said further below. Besides the question of res judicata raised by the finance company, the finance company also pleads a point of limitation against the borrower. Having held that the cause of action estoppel applies, it will be unnecessary to decide on this, unless the borrower’s further submission of the applicability to the instant appeal of the Supreme Court case of Kandiah Peter, succeeds; that case will presently be looked into. The ratio decidendi of that case is that a chargee in an originating summons in the High Court who makes an application for an order of sale in a foreclosure proceeding does not commence an action or suit, but merely enforces his rights by exercising a statutory remedy against the chargor in default. Such foreclosure proceedings do not result in a final judgment; so that the doctrine of res judicata cannot apply to subsequent proceedings between the same parties as one of the essential requirements of the said doctrine is the existence of a final judgment in the previous proceeding and in a foreclosure proceeding, such a final judgment is missing. The equivalent of the said foreclosure proceeding of a charge action in High Court for the statutory remedy of an order of sale commenced by an originating summons should be the application to the land administrator of the relevant land office for a similar order of sale in respect of a land office title. The said originating motion in the High Court cannot be described as a foreclosure proceeding, neither is it one, for among other things, the order of sale had already been granted (some time before the separate and distinct originating motion was filed) in an earlier foreclosure proceeding before the land administrator in question. The refusal by the High Court of the said relief, ie the claim for damages for not being allowed to draw completely the said loan in the said originating motion, was upheld by the Supreme

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-448 Court. It will be otiose to attempt to treat the said originating motion as a foreclosure proceeding. The borrower cannot rely on the case of Kandiah Peter. The plea of res judicata therefore still succeeds. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Issue estoppel — Difference in applicable laws — Orders of sale of land made against chargor in foreclosure proceedings — Subsequent application by chargor for declaration that charges were null and void — Whether action was barred by res judicata and estoppel The appellant had charged certain lands to the respondent. The respondent later obtained orders for sale of the appellant’s land. The appellant unsuccessfully applied to set aside the orders and subsequently brought an action for a declaration that the charges and annexures relating to the land were null and void and for consequential relief. In his statement of claim, the appellant raised and relied on facts and issues which the trial judge found to be identical to those raised by the appellant in the foreclosure proceedings. The trial judge therefore dismissed the appellant’s claim on the ground that the matter was covered by the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata. The appellant appealed. Held, allowing the appeal: (1) A chargee who makes an application for an order for sale in foreclosure proceedings does not commence an action. He merely enforces his rights as a chargee by exercising his statutory remedy against the chargor in default. In order for the doctrines of res judicata, cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel to apply, the earlier proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment or decree. This requirement is not met by foreclosure proceedings which do not result or terminate in a final judgment or decree. (2) Where a chargor raises issues and relies upon facts to show ‘cause to the contrary’ in proceedings brought against him by the chargee, he is not barred from bringing a fresh action against the chargee (notwithstanding that an order of sale has been made) and raising in that action the same or similar facts and issues as those raised by him in the foreclosure proceedings. Neither res judicata nor cause of action estoppel nor issue estoppel are available to the chargee to meet the chargor’s action. (3) The trial judge was in error when he held that the appellant was estopped by res judicata from raising in the subsequent action the identical issues which he had raised in the foreclosure proceedings. The appeal was therefore allowed and a retrial of the action was ordered. ||Page 120>> [ Bahasa Malaysia summary Perayu telah menggadaikan tanah tertentu kepada responden. Responden kemudiannya telah mendapat perintah jualan untuk tanah perayu itu. Perayu gagal dalam permohonannya untuk mengetepikan perintah itu, dan kemudiannya telah membawa suatu tindakan untuk mendapat deklarasi bahawa gadaian dan lampiran berkenaan dengan tanah itu adalah batal dan tidak sah dan untuk relief berbangkit. Di dalam pernyataan tuntutannya, perayu telah menimbul dan bersandarkan kepada fakta dan isu

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-449 yang hakim perbicaraan berpendapat adalah serupa dengan fakta dan isu yang telah ditimbulkan oleh perayu itu di dalam prosiding sekat-tebusan itu. Oleh itu, hakim perbicaraan telah menolak tuntutan perayu atas alasan bahawa doktrin estoppel dan res judicata terpakai dalam perkara itu. Perayu telah membuat rayuan. Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan itu: (1) Seseorang pemegang gadaian yang membuat permohonan untuk mendapat perintah jualan di dalam prosiding sekat-tebusan tidak memulakan suatu tindakan. Beliau hanya menguatkuasakan haknya sebagai pemegang gadaian dengan menggunakan remedi statutori terhadap penggadai yang ingkar. Sebelum doktrin res judicata, estopel kausa tindakan atau estopel isu boleh terpakai, prosiding yang terlebih awal itu mesti menghasilkan suatu penghakiman atau dekri muktamad. Keperluan ini tidak dipenuhi oleh prosiding sekat-tebusan yang tidak terjumlah atau tamat dengan suatu penghakiman atau dekri muktamad. (2) Di mana seorang penggadai menimbulkan isu dan bergantung kepada fakta untuk menunjukkan ‘sebab sebaliknya’ di dalam prosiding yang di bawa terhadapnya oleh pemegang gadaian, beliau tidak dihalang daripada membawa tindakan baru terhadap pemegang gadaian itu (meskipun suatu perintah jualan telah dibuat) dan menimbulkan di dalam tindakan itu fakta dan isu yang sama atau seakan-akannya sama dengan yang telah ditimbulkan olehnya di dalam prosiding sekat-tebusan. Res judicata atau estopel kausa tindakan atau estopel isu tidak boleh digunakan oleh pemegang gadaian untuk menjawab tindakan penggadai itu. (3) Hakim perbicaraan telah tersilap apabila beliau memutuskan bahawa perayu telah diestop oleh res judicata daripada menimbulkan isu yang sama di dalam tindakan kemudiannya seperti yang telah ditimbulkan olehnya di dalam prosiding sekat-tebusan itu. Oleh itu, rayuan itu dibenarkan dan suatu perbicaraan semula tindakan itu diperintahkan.] Notes For a case on res judicata on the ground of difference in applicable laws, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) para 1962. ||Page 121>> Having failed, the appellant, on 23 November 1989, took out the writ in the present action claiming, inter alia, for a declaration that the charges and annexures relating to the appellant’s lands are null and void, and for consequential relief. In his statement of claim, the appellant raised and relied upon facts and issues which the learned judge found to be identical to those raised by the appellant in the foreclosure proceedings under s 256 of the Code. In the circumstances, the learned trial judge, after hearing oral evidence and submissions, dismissed the appellant’s claim mainly, if not solely, on the ground that the matter was covered by the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata. Having read the cause papers in the foreclosure proceedings and having compared them with the statement of claim, all of which are contained in ||Page 122>> the record of appeal, we are in agreement with the learned judge on his finding that the issues raised by the appellant in the foreclosure proceedings and in the present action are indeed identical. The only question that remains is whether the doctrines of issue estoppel

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-450 or cause of action estoppel or res judicata are applicable in these circumstances to bar the appellant’s present action. It is equally settled law that in order for the doctrines of res judicata, cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel to apply, the earlier proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment or decree; 16 Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Ed) para 1519. This requirement is not met by foreclosure proceedings which, as we have observed earlier, do not result or terminate in a final judgment or decree. In our judgment, where a chargor raises issues and relies upon facts to show ‘cause to the contrary’ in proceedings brought by the chargee under s 256 of the Code, he is not barred from bringing a fresh action against the chargee (notwithstanding that an order for sale has been made) and raising in that action the same or similar facts and issues as those raised by him in the foreclosure proceedings. Neither res judicata nor cause of action estoppel nor issue estoppel are available answers to the chargee to meet the chargor’s action. Accordingly, we find that the learned judge was in error when he held that the appellant was estopped, inter alia, by res judicata, from raising in the subsequent action the identical issues which he had raised in the foreclosure proceedings. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Similar issues already adjudicated upon in previous action — Whether new issues should have been raised in former action — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19 Held, striking out the plaintiff’s writ and statement of claim: (1) It was clear that the parties were the same in both actions, and both actions were grounded on the same issue, ie whether the option had lapsed. Therefore, the subject matter was the same. The court had, in the former action, made a final decision on this and, on the doctrine of res judicata, the plaintiff was completely barred from agitating the matter again. His remedy was simply to appeal against the former decision. This he failed to do. Therefore, he was barred from instituting this suit based on the same cause of action. (2) Even though the so-called new issue was not to be found in the plaintiff’s statement of claim in the former action, nevertheless the plaintiff did raise this issue in a disguised manner in the striking out proceedings. In any event, the so-called new issue could and should have been raised in the earlier action. Matters which could have been raised in an earlier action should have been raised then and this is the doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense. On the facts of this case, both the narrow and wider sense of the doctrine of res judicata applied and the plaintiff was completely barred from instituting the present action based on the same cause of action and same reliefs being sought. ||Page 344>> Diputuskan, membatalkan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan plaintif: (1) Memanglah jelas bahawa pihak kepada kedua-dua tindakan itu adalah sama dan kedua-dua tindakan itu berdasarkan isu yang sama, iaitu sama ada opsyen itu telah luput. Oleh itu, perkara subjeknya adalah sama. Mahkamah telah, dalam tindakan dahulu, membuat suatu keputusan muktamad mengenainya, dan atas doktrin res judicata, plaintif dihalang sepenuhnya daripada menimbulkan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-451 perkara itu semula. Remedinya hanya untuk membuat rayuan terhadap keputusan terdahulu itu. Beliau gagal berbuat demikian. Oleh itu, beliau dihalang daripada memulakan tindakan ini berdasarkan kausa tindakan yang sama. (2) Walaupun isu yang dikatakan isu yang baru itu tidak didapati di dalam pernyataan tuntutan plaintif dalam tindakan terdahulu itu, plaintif telah menimbulkan isu itu dalam bentuk yang tersamar dalam prosiding membatalkan pliding. Bagaimanapun, isu yang dikatakan baru itu boleh dan patut ditimbulkan dalam tindakan terdahulu itu. Perkara yang mungkin ditimbulkan dalam suatu tindakan yang lebih awal seharusnya ditimbulkan pada masa itu dan ini merupakan doktrin res judicata mengikut maksudnya yang lebih luas. Pada fakta kes ini, res judicata mengikut kedua-dua maknanya yang terhad dan luas terpakai dan plaintif dihalang sama sekali daripada memulakan tindakan ini berdasarkan kausa tindakan yang sama dan menuntut relief yang sama.] For cases on res judicata based on similarity of issues, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) paras 1957–1959. ||Page 345>> In the former proceedings, one main issue was canvassed, ie whether the option had lapsed and if so, no cause of action had arisen. The court agreed that the option had lapsed and therefore no cause of action had arisen and thereby allowed the defendant’s application to strike out the plaintiff’s writ and statement of claim. In that application to strike out, the plaintiff filed an affidavit-in-reply to the defendant’s affidavit in support of their application. The plaintiff’s own affidavit was affirmed on 1 November 1990. On perusing this affidavit, one cannot help perceiving that it is identical to the plaintiff’s present statement of claim, almost paragraph by paragraph, eg paras 3, 4(a), 4(b), 5 and 6, etc, of that affidavit are identical almost word for word with paras 3, 4.1, 4.2, 5 and 6, respectively, of the statement of claim in the present action. What has been done appears to be that the contents of the affidavit had been converted into the present statement of claim. The present action also prays for specific performance of the same option. As I stated earlier the court had, in the former case, decided that the option had lapsed and therefore no cause of action had arisen. In the light of this, it seems clear to me and I agree with the submission of the counsel for the defendant that the doctrine of res judicata applies in the present action. In Southern Finance Co Bhd v Lee Geok Lim 1 , it was established that the defendant, one L, being the registered owner of land, had charged her property to the plaintiff, S, as security for a loan. Due to default in payment by the defendant, the plaintiff sought an order for sale of the said land by public auction under s 256 of the National Land Code 1965 (‘the NLC’). The defendant contended, firstly, that the plaintiff had charged interest at 4% over and above the prescribed rate of interest and, secondly, that this charge action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata as there was an earlier charge action between both parties on the same subject matter invoking the same issue of excessive penalty interest. That earlier action was dismissed when the court held that the penalty interest charged was contrary to s 256(3) of the NLC. The court agreed and held that ‘cause of action estoppel’ operated as a complete bar against the second action of the plaintiff on the ground that the cause of action in the second action was said to be the same because it emanated from the same charge and the reliefs prayed for were the same. In Mensa Mercantile (Far East) Pte Ltd v Elkobina (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors 2 , the court held that for the doctrine of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-452 res judicata to apply there must also be priority of interest between the parties in the first action and the parties in the subsequent action. In the present case, it is as clear as daylight that the parties are the same in both actions, and both actions are grounded on the same issue, ie whether the option had lapsed. Therefore, the subject matter is the same. The court had, in the former action, made a final decision on this and, on the doctrine of res judicata, the plaintiff is completely barred from agitating the matter again. His remedy was simply to appeal against the decision of Siti Norma Yaakob J striking out his writ of summons and statement of claim. This he failed to do. Therefore, he is barred from instituting this suit based on the same cause of action. The learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that this present suit is of a different character. He says that in the earlier suit, the issue was whether the ||Page 347>> plaintiff had exercised the option or whether the option had lapsed and since the court then held that the option had lapsed it struck out the writ. In the present action, however, the issues are whether the plaintiff was induced by representations made by the defendant into leaving his previous employment and entering into the defendant’s employment. With respect, even though this so-called new issue is not to be found in the plaintiff’s statement of claim in the former action, nevertheless the plaintiff did raise this issue in a disguised manner in the striking out proceedings. In his affidavit, he did raise this issue though not exactly in similar words (see para 5 of the affidavit). Be that as it may, even if I am wrong on this, it is my view that this so-called new issue could and should have been raised in the earlier action. Matters which could have been raised in an earlier action should have been raised then. This is the doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense. In Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor 3 , in regard to the doctrine of res judicata, Lord Kilbrandon said at p 590: It seems clear to me that on the facts of this case, both the narrow and wider sense of the doctrine of res judicata applies and the plaintiff is completely barred from instituting the present action based as it were, on the same cause of action and same reliefs being sought. Therefore, I am satisfied that this is a fit and proper case for me to exercise my discretion under O 18 r 19 to strike off the plaintiff’s writ of summons and statement of claim and I so do. Civil Procedure — Res judicata — Parties — Not party to earlier suit — Whether parties must be the same for res judicata to apply — Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25(2) — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19 and O 92 r 4 The plaintiff was the registered owner of 5,000 shares (‘the shares’) in the first defendant. The plaintiff had entrusted the shares to one Chia Tay Huat (‘CTH’) who fraudulently disposed of them by forging transfer deeds bearing the plaintiff’s signature. Relying on the forged transfers, the second defendant (MIDF Consultancy and Corporate Services Sdn Bhd), as registrar and agent of the first defendant (Genting Bhd), transferred the shares to Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (Singapore) Nominees Pte Ltd (‘HSB’). The plaintiff sought to have HSB’s name removed from the register of members of the first defendant and to be reinstated as the registered holder of the shares and all bonus shares, rights issue shares and dividends issued since 1984. The plaintiff had already obtained the same relief in 1988 (‘the 1988 action’) against HSB and the second defendant in respect of the shares, not including the bonus

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-453 shares, rights issue shares and dividends. The first defendant applied to strike out the plaintiff’s writ and statement of claim under O 18 r 19 and O 92 r 4 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) and s 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 stating, inter alia, that: (i) the doctrine of res judicata applied as the same issues and cause of action were being relitigated; (ii) if the first defendant, as principal of the second defendant, owed a similar obligation as the second defendant to the plaintiff, that obligation had lapsed by virtue of the order obtained by the plaintiff against the second defendant in the 1988 action; and (iii) the plaintiff should have included the first defendant in the 1988 action. The plaintiff, however, argued that for res judicata to apply: (i) the subject matter and the cause of action had to be the same; (ii) it should be between the same parties; and (iii) they had to sue and be sued in the same capacities. He added that res judicata did not apply here as: (i) the first defendant was not a party to the 1988 action; and (ii) the cause of action was different. ||Page 714>> Held, allowing the first defendant’s application: (1) It was actually the fault and negligence of the plaintiff to hand over the relevant shares to CTH in the first place. This, and the subsequent forgery by CTH and the registration of the said shares in HSB by the second defendant was never on the instructions, and beyond the knowledge, of the first defendant. On this score, the first defendant should not be held to be liable and strictly speaking, there appears to be no cause of action against them by the plaintiff. (2) For res judicata to apply, the parties need not be the same and there had to be privity of interest between the defendants in both actions by the plaintiff. As it was not disputed that the second defendant was the registrar and agent of the first defendant, the liability of the first and second defendants were merged. After making the option to leave the first defendant out of the 1988 action, the plaintiff was estopped from dragging the first defendant in for relief similar to that which he had obtained in the 1988 action. As a result, having sued the agent, the plaintiff was not in a position to sue the principal for the same transaction. (3) Although the prayers in this action may appear different by the ancillary claim for bonus shares, rights issue shares and dividends, the relief claimed was substantially the same as the relief obtained in the 1988 action. The plaintiff could not now be allowed to ask for ancillary prayers that he had left out in the 1988 action. As the relevant relief had already been obtained, the writ and statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, and a blatant abuse of the process of the court. [ Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif adalah tuanpunya berdaftar 5000 saham (‘saham itu’) di dalam defendan pertama. Beliau telah mengamanahkan saham itu kepada Chia Tay Huat (‘CTH’) yang telah melakukan fraud dan menjual saham itu dengan memalsukan borang pemindahan yang mempunyai tandatangan plaintif. Berdasarkan borang pemindahan palsu itu, defendan kedua (MIDF Consultancy and Corporate Services Sdn Bhd), sebagai

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-454 pendaftar dan ejen defendan pertama (Genting Bhd), telah memindahkan saham itu kepada Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (Singapore) Nominees Pte Ltd (‘HSB’). Plaintif menuntut supaya nama HSB dikeluarkan daripada buku pendaftaran ahli defendan pertama dan supaya beliau dimasukkan semula sebagai pemegang berdaftar saham itu bersama dengan semua saham bonus, saham keluaran hak dan dividen yang telah dikeluarkan sejak 1984. Plaintif telahpun memperolehi relief yang sama pada tahun 1988 (‘tindakan tahun 1988 itu’) terhadap HSB dan defendan kedua berkenaan dengan saham itu, tetapi tidak termasuk saham bonus, saham keluaran hak dan dividen. Defendan pertama telah memohon untuk membatalkan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan plaintif di bawah A 18 k 19 dan A 92 k 4 ||Page 715>> Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘Kaedah itu’) dan s 25(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 dengan menyatakan, antara lain, bahawa: (i) doktrin res judicata terpakai memandangkan isu dan kausa tindakan yang sama dilitigasi semula; (ii) jika defendan pertama, sebagai prinsipal defendan kedua, mempunyai obligasi yang sama seperti defendan kedua terhadap plaintif, obligasi itu telah luput disebabkan perintah yang telah diperolehi oleh plaintif terhadap defendan kedua dalam tindakan tahun 1988 itu; (iii) plaintif sepatutnya memasukkan defendan pertama di dalam tindakan tahun 1988 itu. Plaintif walau bagaimanapun, berhujah bahawa supaya res judicata terpakai: (i) bahan perkara dan kausa tindakan hendaklah sama; (ii) ia hendaklah melibatkan pihak yang sama; dan (iii) mereka hendaklah mendakwa dan didakwa di dalam kedudukan yang sama. Beliau juga berhujah bahawa res judicata tidak terpakai di sini oleh kerana: (i) defendan pertama tidak menjadi pihak di dalam tindakan tahun 1988 itu; dan (ii) kausa tindakan adalah berlainan. Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan defendan pertama: (1) Adalah merupakan kesalahan dan kecuaian plaintif kerana memberi saham-saham itu kepada CTH. Perkara ini, dan pemalsuan yang telah dilakukan oleh CTH dan pendaftaran saham-saham itu dalam nama HSB oleh defendan kedua tidak pernah diarahkan, dan tidak diketahui defendan pertama. Oleh itu, defendan pertama tidak boleh dipersalahkan dan sememangnya plaintif tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan terhadap mereka. (2) Untuk res judicata terpakai, pihak tidak semestinya sama dan mesti terdapat priviti kepentingan di antara defendan dalam kedua-dua tindakan yang dibawa oleh plaintif itu. Oleh kerana tidak dipertikaikan bahawa defendan kedua adalah pendaftar dan agen defendan pertama, liabiliti defendan pertama dan defendan kedua dicantumkan. Selepas membuat pilihan untuk tidak memasukkan defendan pertama dalam tindakan tahun 1988 itu, plaintif diestop daripada melibatkan defendan pertama di dalam tindakan ini untuk relief yang sama seperti yang telah diperolehinya di dalam tindakan tahun 1988 itu. Sebagai akibatnya, selepas mendakwa agen itu, plaintif tidak berada dalam kedudukan untuk mendakwa prinsipal atas transaksi yang sama. (3) Walaupun permohonan di dalam tindakan ini mungkin kelihatan lain kerana tuntutan sampingan untuk saham bonus, saham keluaran hak dan dividen, relief yang dituntut adalah sebahagian besarnya serupa dengan relief yang diperolehi di dalam tindakan tahun 1988 itu. Plaintif tidak boleh dibenarkan sekarang

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-455 untuk memohon permohonan sampingan yang tidak termasuk dalam tindakan tahun 1988 itu. Oleh kerana relief yang relevan telahpun diperolehi, writ dan pernyataan tuntutan tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah, adalah mengaibkan, remeh dan menyusahkan serta satu penyalahgunaan nyata proses mahkamah.] ||Page 716>> [ Editorial Note: The plaintiff has appealed to the Supreme Court vide Civil Appeal No 02–405–93.] For cases on res judicata, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) paras 1957–1959 and 1963. For cases on striking out pleadings, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) paras 1780–1831. ABDUL MALEK J Essentially, the only question to consider here is the issue of res judicata, defined in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionaryand reproduced here for convenience as:

Res judicata (1) The phrase ‘res judicata’ is used to include two separate states of things. One is where a judgment has been pronounced between parties and findings of fact are involved as a basis for that judgment. All the parties affected by the judgment are then precluded from disputing those facts, as facts, in any subsequent litigation between them. The other aspect of the term arises when a party seeks to set up facts which, if they had been set up in the first suit, would or might have affected the decision. This is not strictly raising any issue which has already been adjudicated, but it is convenient to use the phrase res judicata as relating to that position ( Robinson v Robinson [1943] P 43 at p 44, per Henn-Collins J). (2) This plea cannot be entertained but on the production of the record of the court on which it is founded or on some valid reason being given for its non-production. See The Annie Johnson 91 LJP 64.

(a) that it discloses no reasonable cause of action; (b) that it is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious; (c) that it is an abuse of the process of the court; and (d) that res judicata applies from the order made on 14 March 1988 in Originating Motion No D3–32–19–87 relating to the same issues and cause of action. Learned counsel for the plaintiff had rightfully reminded the court as regards the principles of the doctrine of res judicata. For the doctrine to apply, he stated that the subject matter and the cause of action had to be the same, it should be between the same parties as a matter of fact and that they had to sue and be sued in the same capacities. In his view, res judicata did not apply in this situation as the first defendant was not a party in the originating motion which was against the transferee who forged the shares and the second defendant who was the registrar of the relevant shares, and that the cause of action was different. He added that the relevant order on 14 March 1988 as regards the originating motion had no effect as the numbers of the missing share certificates were no longer in existence. Tied in with the question of res judicata is the issue of agency and it is therefore worthwhile and appropriate to look into the question of principal and agent. It is not disputed that the second defendant is the registrar and agent of the first defendant. 1(2) Halsbury’s Laws of England(4th Ed, Reissue) at p 100 states:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-456 Some cases where the doctrine of merger has been held to operate should probably be explained by the proposition that where claims are made against principal and agent in the alternative, on the basis that the facts justify the liability of one or the other, but not both, judgment against one, unless set aside, involves res judicata in favour of the other. Following from that, it now necessary to cite two pertinent passages from The Doctrine of Res Judicata(2nd Ed) originally authored by George Spencer Bower with the second edition by Sir Alexander Kingcome Turner. The first, at para 46 at p 42 states:

In Green v Weatherill [1929] 2 Ch 213 at p 221, Maugham J quoted some observations by Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at p 114: ‘I believe I state the rule of the court correctly, when I say, that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.’ Maugham J goes on to refer to the fact that that passage had been approved by the Privy Council in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155 at p 170. Applying that principle here, and, perhaps, having particular regard to the second sentence in it, it seems to me that one could not find an issue or a way of putting a case which more clearly came within the principle as there laid down.

The essence of any claim is the fact of combination. If, therefore, in any case conspiracy is alleged, the subject of the litigation consists, in my view, of the acts done in combination, and whether it is alleged that these acts, lacking justification in their object, have caused damage to the plaintiff, or that, notwithstanding a legitimate purpose, unlawful means have been employed and the plaintiff has been consequently damaged, both the cause of action and the damage flowing therefrom are the same in each case. In my view, therefore, and without the need for further analysis, if in one action for damages for conspiracy acts done in combination are alleged, it is an abuse of the process of the court, and contrary to the principle that in the public interest there should be an end to litigation which may be regarded as an extension of the strict rule of res judicata, to rely in the second action on the same concerted acts, even though in the first action the claim was formulated on the basis of absence of justification in the end only, without regard, or particular regard, to the means, and in the second action the means are impugned as unlawful without challenge to the legitimacy of the end or purpose. For these reasons, in addition to those given by Somervell LJ, I think this appeal should be allowed. Sharma J had pragmatically pronounced the principles of res judicata in Government of Malaysia v D ato Chong Kok Lim 3 by first saying:

In Satyadhyan Ghosel & Ors v Sint Deorajin Dobi & AnorAIR 1960 SC 941, the statement of the law on the subject is given thus: ‘The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall be not ||Page 724>> adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter — whether on a question of fact or a question of law — has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-457 canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in s 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where s 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings.’

It has been stated in the Supreme Court that even where res judicata is not strictly established or where estoppel per rem judicatam has not been sufficiently pleaded or made out but nevertheless the circumstances are such as to render any reagitation of the question formally adjudicated upon a scandal and an abuse, the court will not hesitate to dismiss the action. See the judgment of Abdoolcader SCJ in Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 , wherein his Lordship considered that it would suffice in that regard to refer to the judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Wilberforce in Brisbane City Council and Myer Shopping Centres Pty Ltd v A-G for Queensland [1979] AC 411. Upon a perusal of the pleadings and the evidence led in the first action and the pleadings, affidavit evidence and argument of counsel in this action and particularly in view of the fact that Mensa’s chief executive officer knew that the equipment had been transferred to Edogawa and the director of the two companies were the same, I consider that there is privity of interest between the defendants in this action and Eikobina the defendants in the first action to the end that Mensa should be precluded from bringing this action and in this regard I place reliance on the cases referred to above. Mensa in answer to the defendants’ application offered this court no reason why it (Mensa) could not with reasonable diligence have claimed in the first action the relief it was claiming against the defendants in this action. On the evidence before me it was clear that Mensa at the time material to the first action knew of the nexus between Eikobina and the defendants in this action and by exercising reasonable diligence could have sought in the first action the relief it was claiming in this action. It seems to me that Mensa having claimed but failed to obtain specific relief in the first action was seeking a proverbial second bite of the cherry in this action. In Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor 6 , the facts were these. The owners of a property borrowed money from the first respondent (the bank) which loan

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-458 was charged upon the property. The owners defaulted on payment of the loan interest due to the bank and absconded. The bank, in exercise of its rights, sold the property to the appellant. The bank assigned the property, pursuant to the sale, to the appellant and the appellant borrowed money from the bank on the security or a mortgage of the property. The appellant defaulted on the payment of interest under the mortgage and the bank exercised its right of sale thereunder and sold the property to the second respondent. The appellant brought an action against the bank (No 969 of 1969) claiming that the sale of the property to it was a sham; that the property had been conveyed to it as trustee for the bank and the mortgage was accordingly a nullity. The bank denied that the sale was a sham and counterclaimed for the loss suffered on the resale of the property to the second respondent. The court dismissed the appellant’s claim and upheld the bank’s counterclaim. One month after that judgment, the appellant brought an action against the bank and the second respondent (No 534 of 1972) claiming that the sale by the bank to the second respondent was void or voidable as fraudulent in that the bank and the second respondent ||Page 726>> ‘were in fact essentially one certain interest and/or alternatively acting in concert with a common design calculated to obtain the … property at a low price and to extinguish the plaintiff’s interest therein’. The bank and the second respondent applied by summons for an order that the statement of claim be struck out as, inter alia, being vexatious, frivolous and/or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The judge held that the allegation of fraud and the voidability of the sale by the bank to the second respondent were matters which were available for litigation in action No 969, and ordered that the statement of claim be struck out. The order striking out the statement of claim was affirmed by the full court. On appeal to the Judicial Committee [of the Privy Council], it was held, dismissing the appeal, that there was no reason why a defence impugning the bona fides of the sale by the bank to the second respondent could not have been pleaded as a counterclaim to the counterclaim in action No 969; that, accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense applied and it would be an abuse of the process of the court to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and should have been litigated in the earlier proceedings. Learned counsel for the plaintiff had referred the court to Townsend v Bishop 7 where the plaintiff, who was the driver of a motor car belonging to his father, claimed damages for personal injuries sustained by reason of a collision between that car and a motor lorry. The claim was based on the negligent driving of the lorry and the defence was one of contributory negligence. The father had claimed damages in a previous action against the present defendant for damage to the motor car, and that action was founded on the same alleged negligence of the defendant, and the defence relied upon was a plea of contributory negligence in the same terms as those in the present action. That action was duly tried and judgment given. It was contended that the doctrine of res judicata applied in this action as, in driving the car, the son was acting as his father’s agent. It was held that as the present action was not one between the same parties as those in the earlier action, the plea of estoppel failed, although the negligence and contributory negligence pleaded in each action were the same. However, I must emphasize here that I did not find favour with this finding for two reasons. Firstly, because of the overwhelming pronouncements in the other authorities cited earlier and secondly, by the unconvincing reasoning of the trial judge himself as to how he arrived at his decision. For convenience, the conclusion of the relevant judgment states [at p 808]:

(i) The plaintiff was estopped from bringing a personal claim for damages, as that point E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-459 had been decided in the earlier litigation. (ii) The plaintiff was not estopped from bringing his other claims, as he was making them in a representative capacity, whereas the third-party claims against him in the earlier case were against him in his personal capacity only. (iii) In deciding the plea or res judicata, the court is entitled to look at the judge’s reasons for his decision, and is not restricted to the record. It is most interesting to note that this was an appeal against the decision of Lewis J who, by sheer coincidence, had also decided in Townsend’s case7 less than a month later. It is more than apparent from these two cases that Lewis J was not very much in favour of the doctrine of res judicata.

The most usual manner in which questions of estoppel have arisen on judgments inter partes has been where the defendant in an action raised a defence of res judicata, which he could do where former proceedings for the same cause of action by the same plaintiff had resulted in the defendant’s favour, by leading the former judgment by way of estoppel. In order to support that defence it was necessary to show that: (1) the subject matter in dispute was the same, namely, that everything that was in controversy in the second suit as the foundation of the claim for relief was also in controversy or open to controversy in the first suit; (2) it came in question before a court of competent jurisdiction; and (3) the result was conclusive so as to bind every other court.

the doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine applicable only to records; it is a fundamental doctrine of all courts that there must be an end of litigation. It will therefore be convenient to follow the ordinary classification and treat it as a branch of the law of estoppel. Where res judicata is pleaded by way of estoppel to an entire cause of action, rather than to a single matter in issue, it amounts to an allegation that the whole legal rights and obligations of the parties are concluded by the earlier judgment, which may have the determination of questions of law as well as findings of facts. To decide which questions of law and fact were determined in the earlier judgment the court is entitled to look at the judge’s ||Page 728>> reasons for his decision and his notes of the evidence, and is not restricted to the record; but, as a general rule, the judge’s reasons cannot be looked at for the purpose of excluding from the scope of his formal order any matter which, according to the issues raised on the pleadings and the terms of the order itself, is included in it.

In order that a defence of res judicata may succeed it is necessary to show not only that the cause of action was the same but also that the plaintiff has had an opportunity of recovering, and but for his own fault might have recovered in the first action that which he seeks to recover in the second. A plea of res judicata must show either an actual merger, or that the same point has been actually decided between the same parties. Relying on the facts of the matter, the principles of principal and agent, the sequence of the three causes of action, the reliefs claimed in each, the parties in each, and the authorities cited, both from textbooks and case law, I can only come to the conclusion that res judicata applies as the relief claimed in the originating motion is substantially the same as the relief claimed here. Since the relevant relief has already been obtained, it is also my view that this writ and statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, and is a blatant abuse of the process of the court. Landlord and Tenant — Tenancy of land used for general farming — Houses constructed

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-460 on part of land — Developers entering on land and destroying vegetable plots — Tenancy terminated by notice to quit — Application for injunction — Interim injunction granted — Subsequently application for injunction dismissed — Application to add parties and for injunction — Injunction granted — Estoppel — Res Judicata Civil Procedure — Discharge of interim prohibitory injunction — Application for — Addition of defendant — Plea of res judicata or issue estoppel — Distinction between interlocutory injunction and final injunction — Altered circumstances — Risk of breach of peace — Whether judicial decision with parties can bind third persons or strangers — Serious question to be tried — Balance of convenience — Undertaking as to damages — Rules of the High Court 1980, O 89

Firstly, it is trite law that for a judicial decision to operate as res judicata it must be final in the sense that it leaves nothing to be judicially determined or ascertained thereafter in order to render it effective and capable of execution, and is absolute, complete, and certain, and when it is not lawfully subject to subsequent rescission, review or modification by the tribunal which pronounced it. The defendants submitted that Edgar Joseph Jr J was wrong as res judicata applied also to interlocutory injunction. Before Edgar Joseph Jr J the defendants also raised a preliminary point on the question of plea of res judicata in its wider sense or issue estoppel. The learned judge went into some detail over these matters. He came to the conclusion that the plea of res judicata or issue estoppel did not apply in the case before him. Even if the plea of res judicata or issue estoppel were to apply on the evidence such plea would fail. We would like to point out that there is a distinction between, on the one hand, res judicata and, on the other hand, estoppel or issue estoppel. This distinction was made clear in the recent Australian case of Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1987] 62 ALJR 324. The respondent had claimed a sum of $25,557.92 in respect of certain assessment and for additional tax. By agreed terms of settlement, judgment was given for the respondent in that sum. Shortly after, the respondent issued a further writ in the same court, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, in respect of the identical assessments and identical additional tax, claiming $230,021.28 with interest and costs. The defence was couched in the language of estoppel but which the High Court took as signifying that the defendant was relying upon a plea of res judicata. In fact, the argument in the High Court touched on the applicability of res judicata. The primary judge, Kelly J had ruled that there were special circumstances making the operation of res judicata inapplicable on the ground that the commissioner had no power to excuse taxpayers from the statutory duty of paying taxes unless he was expressly authorized to do so by the statute. The Federal Court of Australia (Full Court) dismissed the appeal on different grounds, namely, that the public policy requiring payment of debts due to the government overrode the underlying public policy underlying res judicata. The High Court did not accept these views. It affirmed that there was nothing in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 or arising from the respondent’s position as a public officer that precluded the operation of res judicata. It held that the matter was not one for the discretion of the court, for by operation of law the cause of action relied upon by the respondent had ceased to exist, because the cause of action had merged into the judgment in such a manner as to lose its independent existence.

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-461 Res judicata is quite distinct from estoppel or issue estoppel. There are some judicial dicta to the effect that by a plea of res judicata the other party is estopped from rekindling the earlier cause of action on which judgment was given. Res judicata cannot be treated simply as a branch of the law of estoppel. While it is true that an estoppel operates as a bar, this does not mean in reverse that all bars are estoppels. For instance, the bar due to statutes of limitation has nothing to do with estoppel and the same is true of the bar due to res judicata. Civil Procedure — Discharge of interim prohibitory injunction — Application for — Addition of defendants — Plea of res judicata or issue estoppel — Distinction between interlocutory order and final order — Altered circumstances — Risk of breach of the peace — Judicial decision inter partes operates as an estoppel, in favour of, and against parties and privies only, not third persons or strangers — Burden of proof — Serious questions to be tried — Distinction between the doctrine of res judicata and the doctrine of judicial precedent — Balance of convenience — Sufficiency of the plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages — Rules of the High Court 1980, O 89 On 21 July 1982, Mustapha J had granted an ex parte interim prohibitory injunction restraining the first and second defendants, their servants or agents, from proceeding with any development work on a plot of land (‘the said plot’) pending the determination of an application by the plaintiffs for extension of their injunction. However, after a lengthy inter partes hearing, the learned judge dismissed the plaintiffs’ application for extension of the injunction. The court, upon an opposed ex parte application by summons-in-chambers, though unsupported by affidavit, by the first and second plaintiffs (the third plaintiff being dead) as occupiers of the said plot, had, on an urgent basis, heard argument by counsel on both sides and being satisfied that there was a prima facie case of real emergency where time was of the essence, granted an ex parte interim prohibitory injunction the effect of which was to restrain the first and second defendants, their servants or agents, as developers and contractors, from entering the said plot. In the event, the first defendant applied by summons-in-chambers for discharge of the interim injunction. At the same time, there was also an application by summons-in-chambers by the plaintiffs to add Perumahan Farlim (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd and Thean Tatt Construction Sdn Bhd as the third and fourth defendants on the ground that it was they and not the first and second defendants who, as developers and contractors, were working on the plot at the material time and for an interlocutory injunction directed against them the effect of which was to restrain their entry therein. The court subsequently added and substituted the third and fourth defendants for the first and second defendants in the interim injunction and discharged the interim injunction insofar as it was directed against the first and second defendants, their servants or agents. Furthermore, the court would treat the first defendant’s application for the discharge of the interim injunction as one for the discharge of the interim injunction directed against the third and fourth defendants, their servants or agents. A preliminary point of law was raised by counsel for the defendants, being a plea of res judicata in its wider sense or issue estoppel. Held:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-462 (1) The order of Mustapha J refusing the plaintiffs’ interlocutory injunction insofar as the vegetable plot was concerned, on the ground that damages would be an adequate remedy, was merely a prima facie view and lacked the essential element of finality since it is always open to the High Court, at the final hearing, to review the question involved and to arrive at an opposite conclusion in the light of all the evidence both oral and documentary should the circumstances so require. Accordingly, the legal effect of the refusal of the interlocutory injunction was simply that, at the interlocutory stage, based on the limited material then available, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the injunction relief claimed. (2) The law invests the High Court, after dismissing the application for interlocutory injunctive relief, with continuous authority thenceforth to entertain any application by the disappointed party for the like relief, on proof of altered circumstances and to grant such relief if it appears to be warranted by the evidence. (3) In all the circumstances the court was thoroughly convinced that the plea of res judicata and/or issue estoppel was devoid of substance and it was accordingly dimissed. (4) In all the circumstances, on the usual undertaking as to damages, the court had, in the exercise of its discretion, granted to the plaintiffs an interlocutory injunction restraining the third and fourth defendants whether by themselves or their servants or agents or otherwise howsoever from entering, trespassing and/or carrying out works on the said plot until the final determination of this suit or until further order. (5) The balance of convenience lay in favour of the plaintiffs. The application for discharge of the interim injunction directed against the third and fourth defendants, the servants or agents and for consequential orders was dismissed with costs. (6) An early trial of the suit is ordered. I must now turn to consider a preliminary point of law raised by counsel for the defendants being a plea of res judicata in its wider sense or issue estoppel, as it is sometimes known, which can only be understood if I refer to certain introductory matters. Counsel’s submission on res judicata was four-pronged and may be summarized thus: Firstly, the grounds relied upon for extension of the present interim injunction were substantially the same as those upon which the ex parte interim injunction of 21 July 1982 had been granted by Mustapha J. In particular, his lordship’s judgment dismissing the application for extension of that ex parte interim injunction remains in full force and effect and so the plaintiffs’ claims herein are barred by res judicata or issue estoppel. But, it seemed to me, that the submissions of counsel overlooked two fundamental factors. Firstly, it is trite law that for a judicial decision to operate as res judicata it must be final in the sense that it leaves nothing to be judicially determined or ascertained thereafter in order to render it effective and capable of execution, and is absolute, complete, and certain, and when it is not lawfully subject to subsequent rescission, review or modification by the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-463 tribunal which pronounced it. The true test of res judicata in its wider sense or issue estoppel may be stated thus: has there been a final determination of the issue? That is the crucial factor. The authorities show that for a determination there must be a final adjudication by the court: Langmead v Maple (1865) 18 CBNS 255. There must be a final and not an interlocutory order: Huntley (Marchioness) v Gaskell [1905] 2 Ch 656 (CA); Bozson v Altrincham Urban District Council [1903] 1 KB 547 (CA). For the purposes of ruling on the plea of res judicata, at this preliminary stage, I did not and indeed could not make any finding, even on a prima facie basis, as to whether there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace in ||Page 95>> the event of the interlocutory injunction not being granted. Nevertheless, it is, I consider, relevant for me to have referred to the portions of the affidavit aforesaid as showing that the plaintiffs were alleging altered circumstances since the date of the order of Mustapha J dismissing their application for interlocutory injunctive relief and this is a crucial factor for purposes of investing this court with the jurisdiction to entertain a fresh application for the like relief. I would, however, emphasize that whether or not the plaintiffs should be granted such relief was a separate matter which I could only determine after hearing counsel on both sides on the merits of the plaintiffs’ application. For the foregoing reasons, I was of the view that the plea of res judicata or issue estoppel did not apply in this case. On a further ground also the plea of res judicata or issue estoppel must fail. In all the circumstances I was thoroughly convinced that the plea of res judicata and/or issue estoppel was devoid of substance and it was accordingly dismissed. I shall now consider the plaintiffs’ application on the merits, regard being had to the principles enunciated by Lord Diplock in the oft quoted case of American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396. Firstly, are there serious questions to be tried? I need hardly say that the case of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi (Penang) Registered & Ors v Poh Swee Siang [1987] 2 MLJ 611 (‘the 1987 decision of the Supreme Court in Poh’s case’), where similar if not the same issues were involved as in the present case, does not operate as res judicata to preclude the plaintiffs herein from raising the same issues for the simple reason that the plaintiffs herein were not parties in that case: see Re Waring, Westminster Bank Ltd v Burton-Butler [1948] Ch 221. But the question arises, whether the 1987 decision of the Supreme Court in Poh’s case aforesaid binds the plaintiffs herein. To answer this question, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between the doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense or estoppel per rem judicatam as it is sometimes known, on the one hand, and the doctrine of judicial precedent on the other. It is right to say, at the risk of being trite, that unlike the doctrine of res judicata the doctrine of judicial precedent depends not on the maxim interest republicae sit finis litium, but simply upon the desirability of certainty and uniformity in the law. In particular, res judicata is concerned with a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction on concrete issues between parties, which will forever bar a party thereto from raising the same issue against the other party to the decision, whether before the same court, or before any court exercising a higher or lower jurisdiction. This is well illustrated by the following passage in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Marginson v Blackburn Borough Council [1939] 2 KB 426 (at p 438):

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-464 But, the doctrine of judicial precedent has nothing to do with concrete issues between the parties. Its effect is to declare the law, not the facts, and to declare it so as to be binding upon all persons; it matters not whether they were parties to the proceedings or not, in all courts of inferior jurisdiction, and in some cases of the same jurisdiction but not to be binding on courts of higher jurisdiction in which the ratio decidendi of the former decision is open to review. Having stated the essential distinction between the two doctrines of res judicata and judicial precedent, I must return to consider the question whether the 1987 decision of the Supreme Court in Poh’s case is binding upon all the persons including, of course, the plaintiffs herein. Practice and Procedure — Res Judicata — Orders granting appellant liberty to file a fresh action — No final decision made — Plea of res judicata must fail — RSC 1957, O 19 r 15 The appellant had brought an action in which she prayed for a declaration that the transfers relating to land of which she was the registered proprietress was null and void. She alleged undue influence and breach of trust and fraud. The respondents applied by summons in chambers to have the appellant’s claim dismissed on the ground that the matter was res judicata as it was alleged that the issues had been determined and adjudicated upon in a previous action between the parties. It appeared that the appellant had filed an earlier suit but on application by the respondents the indorsement to the writ and the statement of claim were ordered to be struck out but liberty was given to the plaintiff to file a fresh action. The learned trial judge allowed the application of the respondents and dismissed the action on the ground of res judicata. The appellant appealed. Held: the orders in the earlier case in granting the appelland liberty to file a fresh action showed that no final decision had been pronounced so as to estop the appellant in a subsequent litigation from disputing or questioning such decision on the merits. Therefore the plea of res judicata must fail. The respondents applied by way of summons-in-chambers to have the appellant’s claim dismissed on the ground that the matter is res judicata, the issues, it was alleged having been determined and adjudicated upon in a previous action between the parties. The appellant objected on the ground that there was no provision in the Rules of the Supreme Court for this plea to be brought in this manner, but was promptly overruled by the learned judge. Since the objection was not repeated before us, possibly because counsel for the appellant was not taken by surprise in the court below, we need only remark that the proper course where a party claims that he is being vexed twice for the same cause is to plead this — see Order 19 rule 15 and the notes on Res Judicata in Mallal’s Supreme Court Practice at page 261. Appellant filed the writ in Johore Bahru High Court Civil Suit No. 284 of 1979 on September 10, 1979, and the respondents filed a summons-in-chambers praying that the action be dismissed on grounds of res judicata.

“In my opinion having heard the argument of both counsel in the case the principle of res judicata would apply and in the circumstances I allowed the defendants’ application and dismissed the plaintiff’s action with costs. The plaintiff had earlier filed an action against the 3 defendants in JB HC C.S. 261/77. On March 19, 1979 the court made an Order striking out the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim with liberty for the plaintiff to file afresh within 2 months from the date thereof. The matter was fully argued in open

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-465 court and finally decided. It was decided that the Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, was frivolous and vexatious, an abuse of the process of the court and may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial. In that case the same counsel appeared before the court. The plaintiff was given leave to file a fresh suit but not on the same cause of action as the one which the court had earlier dismissed. Again on April 25, 1979 in the same suit on the application by the defendants the plaintiff’s action was dismissed. Same counsel appeared before the court. In this second Order the plaintiff was given leave to file a fresh action. A fresh action here meant an action not based on the same cause of action as the previous one.”

“The rule of estoppel by res judicata, which is a rule of evidence, is that where a final decision has been pronounced ||Page 234>> by a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject-matter of the litigation, any party or privy is estopped in any subsequent litigation from disputing or questioning such decision on the merits.”

“To invoke the doctrine of res judicata the respondent has to show that there was a former suit between the same parties for the same matter and upon the same cause of action, and also the matter directly and substantially in issue has been heard and finally decided by the court which heard it.” per Ismail Khan J. (as he then was) in Andavan v Thong Nyik Lin [1966] 1 MLJ 57. In Parsotan Gir v Narbada Gir (1898–99) LR 26 IA 175, a Privy Council decision on an appeal from the High Court at Allahabad, their Lordships held that where a former suit between the same parties in the same court and for the same relief resulted in a decree of dismissal, the judgment leaving it open to the plaintiffs to bring a fresh suit and “leaving untouched and undecided” all matters affecting the rights of the parties, such a decree does not constitute res judicata, not being a final decision of the suit. Another decision cited to us which is of assistance is that in Pople v Evans [1968] 2 All ER 743 wherein it was held that estoppel by res judicata could not be maintained merely by reason of the dismissal of an action for want of prosecution, for the estoppel by res judicata was intended to be limited to the decision of issues on their merits e.g. when orders were made on trial or on admission or by way of compromise. Two other proceedings, Sessions Court (J.B.) Civil Action 146 of 1976, and Johore Bahru Originating Motion No. 46 of 1977 were raised for the first time in 2nd respondent’s written submissions, in support of the plea of res judicata, but were not raised in the court below as the judgment and records make abundantly clear. We agree with counsel for the appellant that respondents cannot raise these new grounds, regarding which nothing was mentioned in the court below to support their contention that res judicata applies. We are of the view that the two orders in granting the appellant liberty to file a fresh action can only mean that no final decision has been pronounced so as to estop the appellant “in any subsequent litigation from disputing or questioning such decision on the merits”, so that the plea of res judicata must fail. Practice and Procedure — Res judicata — Interlocutory judgment — Binding upon parties in every proceeding in suit — RSC 1957, O 25 r 4 and O 19 r 27 Held: the defendant was estopped on the principle of res judicata from making the application and therefore the application must be dismissed. This can only mean that there is no cause of action disclosed in paragraph 3 of the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-466 statement of claim in so far as that claim relates to the tax and penalties for the years of assessment 1961 to 1967. I drew Mr. Chin’s attention to prayer 1(b) in Enclosure 9 and asked him whether the matter was not already res judicata. Mr. Chin was of the view that the judgment of Mr. Justice Chang Min Tat on Enclosure 9 dismissing the entire application with costs could not in law constitute a bar to his making a fresh application under Order 25 rule 4 and that no question of res judicata arose under the circumstances of the case. He quoted the case of Russian Commercial And Industrial Bank v Le Comptoir D’escompte De Mulhouse And Others [1924] All ER Rep 381, 390 in support of his contention. I did not see any merit in the contention of Mr. Chin and dismissed the application with costs. The following classic passage from the judgment of Sir William de Grey found in The Duchess of Kingston’s Case 1 Smith’s Leading Cases (13th Ed) 644 is a statement of the leading principles of res judicata. The principles of res judicata are codified in section 6 of our former Civil Procedure Code which is the same as section 11 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code. It was at one time thought that as the words used in section 6 were “has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit” the principles of res judicata could not apply to proceedings in the same suit. The Privy Council, however, held in the case of Ram Kirpal v Rup Kuari 11 IA 37; ILR 6 all 269, 274 that upon general principles of law an interlocutory judgment in a suit was binding upon the parties in every proceeding in that suit. Their Lordships said: Section 6 of our former Civil Procedure Code did not draw any distinction between an issue of fact and an issue of law. An issue of law operates as res judicata in the same way as an issue of fact. In both cases, however, the matter must have been directly and substantially in issue in a former proceeding between ||Page 76>> the same parties or their representatives in interest.

“The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall be not adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter — whether on a question of fact or a question of law — has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where section 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings.” The subject of the ground of attack in Enclosure 9 fully covers the subject of attack in Enclosure 33 and, therefore, in my view, the defendant is barred from reagitating the same or a part of the same matter which has already been finally adjudicated upon by Mr. Justice Chang Min Tat. The defendant did not appeal against that decision and so far as Enclosure 9 is concerned the judgment of Mr. Justice Chang Min Tat, in my view, is final and conclusive at this stage of the proceedings. The rule is that a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence becomes a matter which was constructively in issue. A E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-467 matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence in the former application but which was not alleged as such a ground of attack or defence is for the purposes of the plea of res judicata deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former application, that is to say, though it may not have been actually directly and substantially in issue it is still regarded as, having been constructively, directly and substantially in issue. There can be no distinction between a claim that was actually made and a claim which might and ought to have been made. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points on which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and to pronounce its judgment thereupon but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time. It is only where the plea which is sought to be raised in the subsequent proceedings was not available to the party at the time of the previous proceedings that the decision cannot be constructively res judicata. The rule of constructive res judicata is really a rule of estoppel. The question now raised has already been heard and finally decided. It constitutes but a part of the prayer in the former application. It was not collaterally or incidentally but directly and substantially in issue when Enclosure 9 was heard and decided. The answer to the matter is simple. The defendant’s only remedy was by way of an appeal against the decision of Mr. Justice Chang Min Tat. The matter was heard on merits and finally decided. It is not capable of readjudication by the same court in the same suit. The defendant could certainly reagitate the matter before the Federal Court if the plaintiff finally succeeds in obtaining judgment and an appeal is filed against that judgment. The law, as I understand it, is that the defendant is precluded from filing a second application in respect of a matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier application (Enclosure 9) in this very court. If a decision has been given with respect to a matter or part of a matter in controversy between the parties by a court of competent jurisdiction it remains binding in the subsequent stages of the same proceedings in the same court and cannot be re-opened in that court. In my view an erroneous decision irrespective of whether it is on a question of law or fact operates as res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision seems to have no bearing upon the question whether it operates as res judicata or not. Until that decision is reversed or set aside on appeal its finality and binding force remain operative on the parties. Practice and Procedure — Appeal — Cause of action — Plea of res judicata — When applicable Limitation — Right becoming unenforceable — Question of res judicata Evidence — Res judicata — Right in rem — Claim in personam This was an appeal from the decision of the High Court ( [1971] 2 MLJ 214) which had dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for a declaration. The appellants, legal personal representatives of the late Haji Ahmad, claimed for a declaration that the respondent, as registered proprietor of a half undivided interest in two parcels of land, held the same in trust for the appellants. The material facts were that in Civil Suit No. 120 of 1958, the plaintiff, Haji Ahmad, sued for specific performance of a jual janji agreement. He pleaded the contract, full payment of the agreed price and his being given possession of the lands and titles thereto upon making such payment. The relief claimed by him from the defendant (who was the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-468 respondent’s late husband) was the execution of a transfer of the lands in his favour. The present appellants’ pleaded that after such payment, the respondent remained on the land register merely in the capacity of trustee, and was bound by law to convey the said lands to the rightful beneficial owner. In the court below, the claim was defeated by a plea of res judicata by virtue of a judgment of the Court of Appeal in Mek v Haji Ahmad [1960] MLJ 133. The question before the Federal Court was whether the appellants’ rights could be defeated by the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Held, by a majority, allowing the appeal: the appellants were entitled to the declaration, as prayed, and for the consequential relief that the proper registering authority do cause the necessary entries and memorials to be made in the issue and register documents of title for the appellants to be registered as proprietors of the lands concerned in respect of the undivided interests as claimed. Per Ong C. J. (Malaya), allowing the appeal: “The plea of res judicata was wholly misconceived. The Court of Appeal, in effect, affirmed the decision of the lower court relating to the substantive rights of the appellants, and reversed the learned judge on a pure question of procedure relating to limitation… my opinion is that the trial judge in this case was bound by that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal — regardless of its views on the unenforceability of the jual janji agreement — as decided that Haji Ahmad must be accepted as the equitable owner of the lands. No question of res judicata — concerning limitation only — can possibly derogate from the judgment establishing the rights of the purchaser. This vital part of the judgment was wholly ignored or overlooked by the trial judge…. What the appellants now seek is not specific performance of the agreement, but the muniments of title successfully established in court — which, as a cause of action, is a horse of a totally different colour from that pleaded in Civil Suit No. 120 of 1958”. Per Ali F.J., dissenting: “The series of facts relied up by the appellants for their present claim are substantially the same as those relied upon by the plaintiff in the 1958 Civil Suit. They are being deployed now by the appellants to support a claim under a different name which is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to the principle that in the public interest there should be an end to litigation. In this case, the plaintiff had only one cause of action founded on the right, contractual or equitable, to have the lands transferred to him. As the learned trial judge was only concerned with the question whether the appellants were estopped from taking further action, it is only right that the case should go back to the High Court to be disposed of on the merits”. Per Ong Hock Sim F.J., allowing the appeal: “The appellants assert their title and interest, which is a right in rem, to the lands. Res judicata only bars specifically the appellant’s claim in personam… the court has powers now under section 417(1) of the National Land Code to make such order as it thinks just and proper… the maxim to be applied is ubi jus ibi remedium.” In answer to the statement of claim, the respondent’s defence was res judicata. The learned trial judge held that, by reason of the judgment of Thomson C.J., constituting res judicata, the obligation to transfer, whether ex contractu or considered as an equitable obligation, was barred and “the question of a constructive trusteeship cannot arise”. The key

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-469 to his decision may be found in the following passage of the ||Page 160>> judgment:—

“If it is shown that the cause of action in both are the same i.e. the same point or points have been decided against the parties or their privies, then the defence of res judicata must succeed…. The declaration which the plaintiffs seek in prayer (a) of their statement of claim appears to me to have been raised in substance in the course of the appeal and therefore constitutes one of the points adjudicated upon therein …. The plaintiffs can indeed be said to be trying to re-open the same subject of limitation in respect of matters which could have been brought forward in Civil Action No. 120 of 1958”.

“The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.” Indeed, the plea of res judicata was wholly misconceived. By this plea it seems to me that the respondent, by her defence, is hoist on her own petard. The Court of Appeal in effect affirmed Hill J. on one point — relating to the substantive rights of the litigants — and reversed the learned judge on a pure question of procedure. Statutes of limitation which bar the enforcement of a right by action are rules of procedure only: see 24 Halsbury, 3rd Ed. page 181. A right which becomes unenforceable merely by reason of limitation does not ipso facto perish or vanish into thin air: see Holmes v Crowther [1970] 1 WLR 835 where it was held that, although under section 18(5) of the Limitation Act, 1939, arrears of mortgage interest outstanding for more than six years are irrecoverable by action, the mortgagors nevertheless were only entitled to the equitable remedy of redemption provided that they paid all arrears of mortgage interest, whether statute-barred or not. If, as in that case, equitable rights did not perish by reason of limitation, can this same defence be set up here to deny the rights of a beneficial owner to be granted his claim to the legal title? In short, my opinion is that the trial judge in this case was bound by that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal — regardless of its views on the unenforceability of the jual janji agreement — as decided that Haji Ahmad must be accepted as the equitable owner of the lands. No question of res judicata — concerning limitation only — can possibly derogate from the judgment establishing the rights of the purchaser. This vital part of the judgment was wholly ignored or overlooked by the trial judge. The question which arose for the consideration of the trial court was whether the appellants’ action was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of court by reason of the fact that the said dispute being the subject matter of a previous litigation — Civil Suit No. 120 of 1958 — between the said Haji Ahmad bin Yusof and the respondent had been finally disposed of by the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1959 [1960] MLJ 133. This involves the consideration of the rule of estoppel per rem judicatam or res judicata. No evidence was adduced at the trial but a statement of agreed facts was filed to enable the trial court to consider the point. In the court below the appellants’ reply to the plea of res judicata was stated thus: that the appellants’ present claim for a declaration of trust is based on a new and different cause of action arising from an equitable obligation of the vendor, as constructive trustee, to transfer the disputed lands. The cause of action in Civil Suit No. 120 of 1958, the appellants argued,

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-470 arose solely or mainly from a contractual obligation. The learned trial judge, Wan Suleiman J. was, however, of the view that whatever might be the cause of action both contractual and equitable obligations were points which have been raised and decided by the Court of Appeal. He referred particularly to the following passage from the judgment of Thomson C.J. [1960] MLJ 133:

“I believe I state the rule of the court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but ||Page 162>> which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”

“… I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.” ONG HOCK SIM FJ This is an appeal by the plaintiffs against the decision of Wan Suleiman J. given in the High Court at Alor Star, dismissing their claim for a declaration that the defendant, as registered proprietor of a half undivided interest in two parcels of land situate in Yen, Kedah, holds the same in trust for the plaintiffs, and for consequential orders and reliefs. The claim was defeated by a simple plea of res judicata, by virtue of a judgment of the Federation Court of Appeal given on December 4, 1959. I think that, on the judgment of Hill J., which was in no way affected by that of the Court of Appeal, the appellants should be entitled to the declaration sought. Is this court powerless, merely by reason of the cause of action pleaded by Haji Ahmad, to give the appellants any relief? What they now pursue is a different cause of action from specific performance sought by their father, the Haji. They assert their title and interest, which is a right in rem, to the lands. The judgment of Hill J. is conclusive on this point. Res judicata only bars specifically their claim in personam. In my view, for which support may be found in the judgment of Thomson J. (as he then was) in Bachan Singh’s case, the court has powers now under section 417(1) of the National Land Code as it then had under the Land Code to make such order as it thinks just and proper. As I have said earlier, the maxim to be applied is ubi jus ibi remedium. The declaration to which the appellants are entitled serves no purpose without the further consequential order. For my part, I think it is right that an order be made, as a necessary corollary to such declaration, that the proper registering authority do cause the necessary entries and memorials to be made in the issue and register documents of title for the appellants to be registered as proprietors of the lands concerned in respect of the undivided interests as claimed. Practice and Procedure — Res Judicata — Conditions to be fulfilled The plaintiff and the defendant had entered into an agreement on January 17, 1962 whereby the plaintiff agreed to erect eight plank houses for the defendant on the

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-471 latter’s land. The payment was to be by advances and instalments. On August 2, 1962 the plaintiff commenced an action in the sessions court in which he claimed the balance due to him including the instalments due up to the end of July 1962 and judgment was given in his favour. Subsequently the plaintiff brought an action in the High Court claiming payments of the balance of the monthly instalments totalling $5,000. The defendant raised the plea of res judicata. Held: the claim for the balance of $5,000 could not be heard in the sessions court and was never before that court and there was no merit whatsoever in the plea of res judicata and therefore judgment must be given for the plaintiff. Clause 8(e) of the agreement (Exhibit A1) stipulated for payments of fourteen monthly instalments of $250 each. The plaintiff had included in his claim in the sessions court monies which were due to him up to 2nd August 1962. The claim included only two of the fourteen monthly instalments which the defendant had agreed to pay. The present claim of the plaintiff is in respect of the balance of the twelve monthly instalments totalling $3,000. The defendant has now raised the plea of res judicata and at the trial of this suit the following preliminary issue was framed: “Is the claim of the plaintiff in the present suit barred by res judicata?” Mr. Shunmugam, counsel for the defendant, very rightly at the end of the arguments submitted that if the defendant’s plea of res judicata failed, there should be judgment for the plaintiff as prayed as there was no other plea sustainable on behalf of the defendant. The law of res judicata was contained in section 6 of the former F.M.S. Civil Procedure Code. It finds no place in our present Rules of the Supreme Court. I do not know why. In order to render a prior decision conclusive in a subsequent suit it must appear from the record of the former suit that the particular matter sought to be concluded was necessarily determined. “Res judicata” said Lord Romilly in Jenkins v Robertson (1867) LR 1 HL 117,

“by its very words means a matter upon which the court has exercised its judicial mind and has come to the conclusion that one side is right and has pronounced a decision accordingly. In my opinion res judicata signifies that the court has, after argument and consideration, come to a decision on a contested matter.” In this particular case it cannot be said that the question of the payment of the twelve instalments due from the defendant was ever before the learned president. The parties were never heard on that. The principle of res judicata can only apply if there is an identity of issue to be tried and the issue has already been decided on merits in the previous proceedings There can be no res judicata regarding a cause of action that has arisen subsequently to the previous suit. The essential requirement for the application of the principle of res judicata is that the actual issues in the two suits must be identical. Where the question at issue is not the same in the two proceedings the principle of res judicata does not apply. The question at issue in Malacca Sessions Court Civil Action No. 49 of 1962 was whether the defendant had paid to the plaintiff at the time of the institution of that action a sum of $2,565 or $2,085. That issue had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s claim in the present suit. The leading case on the subject is the Duchess of Kingston’s (1776) 1 Leach CC 146; 168 ER 175; 2 Smith’s LC 13th Edn 644 case and the following classic passage from the judgment of Sir William de Grey is a statement of the leading principles of res judicata:

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-472 The president of the sessions court was not competent to try the present suit and on that ground also the plea of res judicata cannot succeed. To constitute a matter res judicata the following conditions must be fulfilled: I am of the view that there is no merit whatsoever in the plea of res judicata raised by the defendant. There will thus be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $3,000 and costs. Landlord and tenant — Control of Rent Ordinance, 1948, s 13 (1)(f) — Res judicata — Whether applicable to Rent Assessment Board orders — Discontinuance in earlier proceedings The applicant had applied to the Rent Assessment Board for leave to eject the respondent under section 13(1)(f) of the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1948. After filing of the defence by the respondent, the applicant filed a notice of discontinuance and the application was struck off. But over 6 months later she filed a fresh application on the same grounds and with the additional ground of alternative accomodation offered. The respondent pleaded the defence of res judicata under the provisions of O. 16, r.3 of the Subordinate Courts Rules. On a reference to the High Court in a case stated by the President of the Board,— Held: (1) the doctrine of res judicata cannot be invoked if the issue between the parties in the second proceedings is not substantially the same as that in the first proceedings. Proceedings before a Rent Assessment Board are quite different in essence from proceedings between parties before a Court. The Board makes no final determination of any question. It can only give permission to commence proceedings; (2) even assuming that the doctrine could be applied, there are few cases under the Control of Rent Ordinance in which the doctrine is applicable because the circumstances between landlord and tenant are constantly changing, particularly so under section 13(1)(f). SPENSER WILKINSON, J This was a case stated by the President of the Rent Assessment Board under the provisions of section 10 of the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1948. The point of law for decision was whether the defence of res judicata as provided for in Order 16 rule 3 of the Subordinate Courts Rules applied to the present application before the Board. The actual question as put by the President of the Board in the case stated reads as follows:—

“Does the defence of ‘res judicata’ properly apply in this case, and if so, does it constitute a bar to any further proceedings before the Board in respect of the same premises while owned by the same applicant and occupied by the same respondent.”

“3. Withdrawal shall afford a defence by way of res judicata to subsequent proceedings unless— (a) it occurred before the filing of the defence, or, if no defence is filed, before the trial or hearing of the proceedings, or (b) the Court has granted leave to institute fresh proceedings. In my opinion the use of the expression “by way of res judicata” in Rule 3 indicates that such a defence can only be raised in those cases where the well-known doctrine of res judicata applies. This doctrine is clearly explained in the judgment of Brett, M.R. in the case of In re May 28 Ch D 316 in the following words:—

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-473

“The doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine applicable only to records. It is a very substantial doctrine, and it is one of the most fundamental doctrines of all Courts that there must be an end of litigation, and that the parties have no right of their own accord, after having tried a question between them and obtained a decision of a Court, to start that litigation over again on precisely the same questions. Therefore this was a judgment, and, if there was nothing else the existence of the first judgment, would be a bar to the new litigation upon precisely the same point between the parties.” I think the important part of this passage is the use of the expressions “precisely the same questions” and “precisely the same point”. The doctrine of res judicata cannot be invoked if the issue between the parties in the second proceedings is not substantially the same issue as that in the first proceedings and I do not think that the intention of Rule 3 is to alter this principle. In my opinion the effect of the Rule is to put the determination of a suit or proceeding by way of withdrawal upon the same basis as the determination of a suit by judgment. Whether the first case is actually determined or merely withdrawn if the plaintiff or applicant can show that in his second suit different considerations arise from those which have been decided or raised in the first then the earlier proceedings are not a bar to the later proceedings. I am in considerable doubt as to whether the doctrine of res judicata can be applied at all to proceedings in which all that can be asked for or obtained is permission to bring proceedings. Even assuming, however, that the doctrine could be so ||Page 133>> applied there are in my opinion few cases under the Control of Rent Ordinance in which the doctrine is applicable because the circumstances as between landlord and tenant are constantly changing. The application in the present case was based on the provisions of paragraph (f) of section 13(1) of the Ordinance. Under that paragraph four matters have to be considered:— Of these four points the second may for the purposes of the present discussion be looked upon as fixed, because once the notice to quit has been given and expired the contractual tenancy is determined. But all the other three points are in their nature variable. At one time the requirement of the landlord for occupation by himself or his family might be unreasonable but at a later stage it might have become reasonable; alternative accommodation might be available at one time but not at another; and the balance of hardship may vary from time to time. If during the six months which elapsed between the withdrawal of the first application and the commencement of the second the situation had changed in any of the above respects, then it seems to me that it is not a question of attempting to bring fresh evidence to support a claim which has already been adjudicated upon but a question of giving evidence regarding a new state of affairs. I find some support for this view in the judgment of Buhagiar, J. in the case of RS Mohamed Sultan v Liak Jee Song (1952) MLJ 171 at page 173, where in considering the question of res judicata in a landlord and tenant case he said:— Mr. Abdoolcader urged upon me that the whole principle upon which res judicata is based is that there must be an end to litigation and that if I were to construe Order 16 rule 3 as not creating a bar to a second suit in a case like the present there would be no end to litigation. This point was also dealt with in the same judgment of Buhagiar, J. where he said:— In my opinion, therefore, the plea of res judicata can only be raised where the issues to be decided in the second proceeding are precisely the same as those in the first and this will

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-474 seldom be the case in applications based upon section 13(1)(f) of the Control of Rent Ordinance. In the particular case before me I think the issues in the second application were different and the plea of res judicata, therefore, fails. My answer to the question raised by the Board in this case is that the defence of res judicata does not apply in this case and does not constitute a bar to the further proceedings sought to be brought before the Board by the applicant. Will — Construction — Conflicting judgments of the same Court on the same subject matter between the same parties — Res judicata Vaux for the 1st defnedant. Walters for the 2nd defendant. Koek for the plaintiffs. Res judicata is one of the forms of estoppel. Estoppel must be pleaded. (O.20, r.14). A judgment in rem is good against all the world and is conclusive though not pleaded. A judgment inter partes is good against the parties and their privies but must be pleaded. [ R v St Pancras (Inhabitants) Peakes NPC 219]. Everest & Strode, 3rd ed. p. 320. Both the first and second judgments are judgments inter partes. The first judgment was not pleaded as an estoppel in the second case. The second judgment is therefore valid. As to the doctrine of estoppel against estoppel. Poulton v Adjustable Cover & Boiler Block Co [1908] 2 Ch 430. In this case there was a judgment inter partes followed by a judgment in rem. It was held that there was no authority for the doctrine of estoppel against estoppel. R v Hutchings (6 QBD 300). Lord Selborne said obiter that if there were two estoppels by way of two judgments in rem the matter might be at large. In this case there are two judgments inter partes and no plea of estoppel in the second case. The second case was decided on evidence before the Court. The first judgment not being pleaded an estoppel could only be considered as evidence. Evidence Ordinance, section 40. Vooght v Winch 2 B and Ald 662. On the matter of the construction of a will a Judge of first instance should not regard himself as bound by the decision of another Judge of first instance. 19 Hailsham 256. If therefore the second judgment does not estop the first judgment the matter must be at large. Ameer Ali, 8th ed. 817; Jiwan Lal v Behari Lal AIR 1918 Lahore 392. But the plea of res judicata by the first judgment was not available in the second case.

(a) It is not sufficient that the matter was determined by the first action, it must appear that it was controverted as well. ( Langmead v Maple 18 CBNS 255 at pp 270 and 271). There is evidence that the matter was not controverted in the first case. (b) Also to establish a plea of res judicata there must be a deliberate acting on the judication. E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-475

Everest & Strode, 3rd ed., pp. 75, 76 and 321. Dundas v Waddell LR 5 App Cas 249; Lam Kin Sang v Cheang Kok Sang [1930] SSLR p 20 at p 45 seq As to merits. Gift to a class. Re Moss Kingsbury v Walter [1901] App Cas 187 at 192 seq Same rules apply to income as to capital. Re Powell [1898] 1 Ch D 227; Re Dunster [1909] 1 Ch 103; Re Spiller 18 Ch D 614; Re Hornby 34 LTNS 6; Re Sanders LR 1 Eq 675. As to estoppel the Court referred to the following cases:— In re Defries 48 LT 703; Lockyer v Ferryman 2 App Cas 519; Greathead v Bromley 7 TR 455; Harding v Livesey 21 B 227; Peareth v Marriott LR 22 Ch D 182. The first of the two conflicting judgments is effective, and in any event is right. The second judgment is a nullity, or should be treated as a nullity, and in any event is wrong. As to the second judgment being a nullity it was made in respect of the same subject matter and between the same parties as the first judgment. It was not competent for this Court to have given the second judgment at all. See Badar Bee v Habib Marican Noordin [1909] App Cas 615 at p 622. The question is one of jurisdiction to give the second judgment. If the true view is that the Court was not competent to give the second judgment, then the parties could not confer competence or jurisdiction by suppression or forgetfulness of the first judgment and neither could any failure to plead, confer jurisdiction. See further the judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Shaw in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] App Cas 155 at p 165. It is no answer that the first judgment was not pleaded in the second action because the principles referred to above are not based merely upon the desirability of saving a party from being vexed twice for the same case, but also on grounds of public policy. See Lockyer v Ferryman 2 App Cas 519 at p 530. If parties are not permitted to litigate the same matter between themselves for the second time they cannot force themselves to be permitted by suppression or forgetfulness. It follows that if the second judgment had come to the knowledge of the Court during the hearing of the second case, the Court itself might have interfered and declined to continue the hearing of the second case. If this were not so the rule of public policy referred to, would be unenforceable. It follows that the mere fact that the second judgment was not pleaded in the second action by one or other of the parties cannot be decisive. In truth the failure of a party to plead an estoppel might prevent him from raising the matter, but the Court would not be so prevented. If it be true that the matter is one of jurisdiction, the pleading point raised by Mr. Vaux ||Page 115>> is not a good one. The truth is that when there is res judicata, the original cause of action is gone and can only be restored by getting rid of the res judicata. See per Lord Selborne in Lockyer v Ferryman 2 App Cas 519 at p 528. If there was no cause of action to try in the second action, the judgment must be a nullity. The matter is analogous to the case where the Court gives judgment against a non-existent defendant or in favour of a plaintiff not entitled to sue. In such a case the Court is bound on its own motion after hearing the parties interested to set the judgment aside. Lazard Bros v Banaue Industrielle de Moscow [1932] 1 KB 167; Daimler Co v Continental Tyre Co [1916] 2 App Ca 307 at p 337. This principle was re-affirmed in the House of Lords in Lazard Bros v Midland Bank Ltd [1933] App Cas 289 at

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-476 p 296. If the want of a plaintiff or defendant makes a judgment a nullity, a fortiori the absence of something to try and which was the supposed basis of the judgment must make the judgment a nullity. The second judgment is therefore either a nullity or should be treated as a nullity. See further Burr v Anglo-French Bank Co Ltd 149 LT 282. The second action was in any event an abuse of the process of the Court and the judgment therein could be set aside as such and therefore should be treated as set aside as such and therefore should be treated as set aside already. The Court has a general power to set aside proceedings which are an abuse of its own process. Harrison v Mitchell Fitz-G 303 94 ER 767. See also MacCarthy v Agard [1933] 2 KB 417; and Reichel v McGrath 14 App Cas 665 at p 668. Such a power would be useless if the Court were dependent upon the willingness of the parties to raise points in their pleadings. Huntley v Gaskell [1905] 2 Ch 656 is an example of the striking out by the Court of more than it was asked to do. Woodland v Woodland [1928] P 160 is an example of the Court raising on its own motion a matter of estoppel, though the case is admittedly not very clear. If these arguments are wrong and the question is one of estoppel against an estoppel it is submitted that the first judgment must stand and that the matter is not at large. The opinion of Parker J. in Poulton v Adjustable Cover & Boiler Block Co [1908] 2 Ch 430 at p 435 is to be preferred to the very bare view expressed in Coke upon Littleton 352 b, which latter view does not expressly apply to estoppel arising in connection with judgments. The matter therefore is not at large and the earlier judgment must hold good. If the matter is at large then the first judgment was right. Where all the beneficiaries of a bequest are named the gift cannot be a class gift, Bain v Lescher 11 Sim 397; 59 ER 926; Smith’s Trust 9 Ch D 117; Re Bentley 110 LT 623. With reference to the alleged effect of words of contingency referred to by Murison C.J. in the second judgment the case of Re Spiller 18 Ch D 614 does not have the effect suggested. See Halsbury, Vol. 28, para. 1205. See Jarman on Wills, 7th ed., 413 and Theobald on Wills, 8th ed., 882. There is an intestacy. The general principles affecting estoppel by record require that the judgment on which the estoppel is relied must be final, that the questions at issues must be the judgment must be inter partes unless it is in rem. In this action the parties are —

The trustees are therefore bound by both the 1909 and 1925 judgments and the question is, which of these judgments prevails. As to the doctrine of estoppel against an estoppel, see 13 Halsbury’s Laws of England (Hailsham’s Edition), p 448; R v Hutchings 6 QB 300; Poulton v Adjustable Cover & Boiler Block Co [1908] 2 Ch 430. Res judicata is an absolute bar to further proceedings. Badar Bee v Habib [1909] App Cas 615. This case proceeded on the principle that the Court is not competent to review a previous decision not open to appeal. Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] App Cas 155. In both these cases knowledge of the previous decision was before the Court. A res judicata must be pleaded; otherwise it is not available as an absolute bar. 13 Halsbury’s Laws (Hailsham’s Edition) 435; Bullen & Leake, 661; Vooght v Winch 2 B and Ald 662. As to the position of a judgment which could not properly have been given if the full facts had been known to the Court, see Gt NW Central Ry v Charlebois [1899] App Cas; [1899] App Cas 114 at p 124. As to the sanctity of judgments see RMKRM v MRMVL [1926] App Cas at p 768. If the matter of construction of the gift to Tan Hoon’s sons be at large, the question, is it a gift to a class or to three persons named. The principles on which class gifts are determined are to E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-477 be found in Kingsbury v Walter [1901] App Cas 187. The death of one of several named legatees creates no lapse. In re Spiller 18 Ch D 615. Nor does the revocation of a gift to one of several daughters as tenants in common. In re Dunster [1909] 1 Ch D 103. As regards costs, see In re Buckton [1907] 2 Ch at p 414. Vaux in reply.

30. The last of these propositions depends upon a determination as to where in the will the true residuary disposition occurs; does it commence with the words, “All the residue of my real and personal estate I give to my said trustees, upon trust, etc., etc.”; or does it consist only of the disposition which commences with the words, “At the expiration of which period. … I direct my trustees … to divide the whole of my property, etc., etc.?” I think that upon a consideration of the will as a whole (including the earlier directions to set aside a “monthly payment fund”), there can be no doubt that the residuary clause begins at the earlier point referred to and that it is clear that the share that Tan Kye Teng might have received does not, if it lapses, accrue to the residuary fund, the corpus of which is to be finally divided up at some future date. 31. The dispositions of tenth shares of income were therefore dispositions of residue and, since a lapsed share of residue does not fall back into residue, the questions remain as to whether there is an intestacy as to Tan Kye Teng’s intended share or whether it accrues in equal parts to the shares to be paid to his brothers. 32. As to this I respectfully concur in the view taken by the Chief Justice (Sir W. Hyndman Jones) in the 1909 suit and dissent from that taken by the Chief Justice (Sir William Murison) in 1926. 33. It is true that the point was, apparently, not argued in 1909 while it was fully discussed in 1926; it is true also that there was no written judgment in the first case while Sir William Murison gave reasons and cited authorities for coming to the conclusions that he did come to. Nevertheless, in my view, the authorities support the first view to the exclusion of the second. ||Page 118>> 34. I have not, in coming to this conclusion, lost sight of the principles which have been laid down as fundamental principles in the construction of wills and which have, naturally, again been stressed before me. The first of these principles is that the golden rule must be to ascertain the true intention of the testator. The second is that a testator must be presumed not to have intended an intestacy. 35. If the Courts of Chancery had been content to enunciate those two principles and to leave the matter there the task of a Court in construing a will would have been no easier than it is but might possibly in many cases have resulted in a construction more in keeping with the testator’s actual intentions. The Chancery Courts, however, have not been content to leave the matter there. The true intention of the testator must, in the first place, be sought in the words which he has chosen to employ in seeking to express those intentions, and there exists such a multitude of decisions laying down what meanings the Courts ought to assign to the use of certain words, or phrases or to dispositions enunciated in a certain manner, that the main principles to which I have referred are almost lost sight of in the mess of authority which now binds a Court to

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-478 construe certain words in certain definite ways. The resulting position is well stated in the words of Mr. Jarman which are printed as Chapter LIX of the 7th edition of his well-known treatise on Wills. It is so, I think, in this case. The Court cannot go seeking the testator’s intention at large if the words that he has used must, in accordance with authority binding on the Court, be construed in one way only. 36. If a gift is a gift to a class and one of that class predeceases the testator the class merely contracts and the share of the remaining members of it becomes proportionately increased. But a gift cannot be construed a gift to a class if all the persons who are to benefit by the gift are designated by name or by other certain indications of identity. That appears to be a well recognised rule, and although exceptions have been made to it, as to most rules, the rule must be applied in all cases which do not clearly come within one of the exceptions covered by authority. One of these exceptions is that the naming of one or more members of a class when the context makes it clear that the named and unnamed beneficiaries are nevertheless treated as forming one class between them, does not result in a specific gift to the named member ( cf> Kingsbury v Walter [1901] App Cas p 187 where the named beneficiary was also a niece and would also have attained the age of 21 before becoming entitled to her share). Another exception is that the exclusion from a class of some specified or named member of that class does not prevent the other specified or unnamed members from remaining a class [ In re Dunster [1909] 1 Ch 103]. Another exception is said to be this: that although a number of persons may each be named they nevertheless constitute a class if there be added to their enumeration words of contingency which clearly show that the whole gift is to be divided amongst such of them only as qualify after taking that contingency into account. I can understand that, for example, a bequest of a fund “to be equally divided among such of my nieces Jane, Dorothy, Mary and Ellen as shall before my death have married Englishmen” might be construed as a gift to a class, although all the possible candidates for qualification are named, since the number who will qualify remains uncertain. But I do not think the exception goes further. Its existence in that form is asserted in Jarman 7th ed. p. 407) but not in Theobald or in Underhill & Strahan, and Jarman states as the authority for it the cases of Re Hornby 7 WR 729; Sanders v Ashford 28 Beav 609 and Re Spiller 18 Ch D 614. If the decision in the first of these cases be examined it seems to me that nothing in it turned upon the question as to whether the gift to be divided among four named persons (not apparently belonging to any class) to which number a fifth named person was to be added if he was alive at the date of the will. In fact he was not; and the will was therefore read as if his name had never appeared in it. In Sanders v. Ashford the testator bequeathed real estate to his nieces Elizabeth, Ann, Mary, Martha and Sarah to be divided among them “(if more than one)” as tenants in common and the inclusion of the words in the brackets was construed as showing that the testator intended that if only one survived, the whole of the property should go to her and that he had therefore clearly showed his intention that there should be no intestacy of the share of any niece dying in his life time. The third case cited, that of Re Spiller, was the authority relied on by Sir William Murison for the construction which he placed upon the will in the present case. In that case the testatrix gave the residue of her estate equally between a number of

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-479 named persons and such of the children of J.G. as were living at the date of her will. To begin with the named persons apparently bore to the testatrix or to each other no such relationship or common qualification as could in any case have constituted them a “class.” If they had, the addition to their number of an unnamed and indefinite number of the progeny of J.G. might have constituted the whole body as being one indefinite in number and to that extent a “class” [ cf. In re Jackson 25 Ch D 162 and Re Stanhope’s Trusts 27 Beav 201]. But the decision, in any case, does not proceed upon the ground that this was a gift to a class. There were in fact no children of J.G. living at the date of the will and the decision merely follows that in Re Hornby in saying that there was no intestacy of the share that might have gone to children of J.G. because there were no such children and there was therefore no such gift. 37. Can it be said, in the present case, that there is such a contingency added to the enumeration of the testator’s nephews as to render the gift one to a class, that is, only to such of them as should qualify to receive it? I think not. The gift is primarily one “equally among the following persons … namely, my nephews, Tan Yew Koh, Tan Yew Ghee and Tan Kye Teng,” that is a gift of one third of such share each to three specified and named individuals. ||Page 119>> 38. It has been suggested that the addition of the words “in case they shall survive me” imports a contingency. I do not think so since their omission would not in this case have modified the position. Any person named in a will as a beneficiary can take, unless the contrary is definitely stated, only if he does survive the testator. Here, I think, the words are only used to introduce the direction that, if any nephew does not survive the testator, the nephew’s stock is to take in his stead; but the gift nevertheless remains one of three distinct thirds each to a named nephew (or his stock). 39. It has also been suggested that the addition of the words “the sons of my deceased brother Tan Hoon” coupled with the use of similar words in the disposition of the first tenth share shows clearly the intention of the testator to benefit as a class each of the stocks of his two deceased brothers, especially since the same amount is to be divided among 5 named sons of one brother as among 3 named of the other: (It was admitted that the nephews named included all the sons of the testator’s two brothers). It may be that that really was in the testator’s mind; it may be that if the bequests had been phrased in slightly different a manner — for example, if the testator had written “equally among such of the sons of my deceased brother Tan Hoon, namely Tan Yew Koh, Tan Yew Ghee and Tan Kye Teng, as shall survive me” a Court might have held the gift to be one to a class. It is not open, however, to a Court to enter into such speculation where the words actually used are clear and there is binding authority for saying that where there is an unconditional gift of a fund to be shared amongst persons all of whom are named or clearly identified the share of any one of them who dies before the testator will lapse [ cf. Bain v Lescher (1840) 11 Sim 397; 56 ER 926; In re Smith’s Trusts (1878) 9 Ch D 117; Re Bantley (1914) 110 LT 623]. 40. There is no question here of any right of survivorship. That the gift is one not in the form of a joint tenancy but of a tenancy in common is made clear by the use of the words “equally among the following persons.” In my opinion, therefore, the share

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-480 which might have gone to Tan Kye Teng lapsed when he predeceased the testator and is now divisible, as on an intestacy, among the next-of-kin. 41. There is however the question of res judicata still to be considered. Our Evidence Ordinance deals with the effect of certain judgments in rem (section 41) and with estoppel in pais and other special kinds of estoppel (sections 115 to 117) but it does not deal specifically with the question of res judicata in connection with actions in personam. That the principles recognised, in that connection, in England are also applicable here seems, however, clear from the advice tendered by the Privy Council in Bardar Bee’s case [1909] App Cas at p 615. Mr. Walters on behalf of the next-of-kin argued that the first adjudication had disposed of the matter and that the second must be disregarded. Mr. Vaux on behalf of Tan Yew Ghee argued, firstly, that estoppel must be pleaded in order to be relied on and that not having been pleaded in the second suit it must be taken as having been waived so that the second decision (that of 1926) was the only one which could now be regarded as constituting anything in the nature of estoppel by res judicata; alternatively, that there was “an estoppel upon an estoppel” and that this “put the matter at large.” 42. One of the essentials of what is sometimes described as an “estoppel by matter of record” is that the parties should in each case have been the same. It has been suggested, though not stressed, that that condition did not exist in the present case. It has been stated that the nephews, Tan Yew Koh and Tan Yew Ghee had, in 1909, newly arrived in this Colony and were not represented only because they were content to leave matters in the hands of the trustees, not realising that two of these had personal interests in the question which were opposed to their own. That may be, but neither Tan Yew Koh nor Tan Yew Ghee was a minor at the time he was served and both had an opportunity of appearing and of being heard personally or by counsel: if they did not choose to do this the responsibility was theirs and their voluntary abstention from the proceedings cannot affect the legal effect of any decision therein given. Then it was said that in the 1925 proceedings Tan Lian Chye was far away in China, was ignorant that proceedings were being taken, and was represented only by the Official Assignee who had no means of ascertaining the facts which would have served to protect the interests of Tan Lian Chye. Again all that may be quite correct, but, in law, Tan Lian Chye was properly represented before the Court on the second occasion and to that extent the judgment of the Court must bind him as much as if he himself had been present. 43. Apart from these suggestions it is clear that the Court was in each case the same and was a Court competent to decide the issue; that the issue in both cases was identical; that the parties were the same; and that all who could be affected by the decision of the Court were in each case represented before the Court — that is to say, for the purposes of the present issue, the trustees, the three nephews and the next-of-kin. 44. If it were accurate to say that because of these two contrary decisions the matter is now at large and open to a third adjudication by the same Court which has already twice pronounced upon it, I would, as I have already intimated, decide the question in the same way as it was decided in the first suit, in 1909. 45. I do not however think that where each so-called estoppel is one of record, the matter

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-481 is put at large because the second adjudication is contradictory to the first. The question of the effect of one estoppel against another was considered in the case of Poulton v Adjustable Cover and Boiler Block Coy reported in [1908] 2 Ch and in that case (at p 435 of the report) Parker J. doubted whether there is any real authority for the proposition that “an estoppel upon an estoppel puts the matter at large.” Whether such a result might ensue where there existed two matters of estoppel of different categories and inconsistent with each other it is not necessary for me to consider. It is sufficient for the present purposes to say that the ||Page 120>> very cautiously phrased obiter dictum of Lord Selborne in The Queen v Hutchings (1881) 6 QBD at p 303 and the statement in Coke on Littleton do not, in my view, constitute sufficient authority for holding that, when one and the same Court has given two decisions inconsistent one with the other and those decisions are given on the same point and between the same parties, that Court is, as a result, given the opportunity of again and for the third time adjudicating on the matter, possibly in a way inconsistent with both of the previous decisions. I do not think our law can produce a result as foolish and vexatious as that. 46. Mr. Vaux argued that the parties who might have pleaded an estoppel in the 1925 suit must be taken to have waived it and that all the parties, indeed, may have consented to a fresh adjudication. He suggested that the parties who might have pleaded the estoppel may have decided not to plead it because they knew that such a plea would fail because there had been no “deliberate acting upon the adjudication as between all the parties interested.” 47. In so far as this argument must be based on fact, the answer is that there is no evidence either way. It is certainly strange, if the adjudication of 1910 had been and was being acted upon, that the trustees should come to the Court for fresh directions as to what it was their duty to do. The truth is probably that the administration of the trust had been lax and unbusinesslike; certain affidavits filed in Originating Summons No. 142 of 1929 (which also has reference to this estate) certainly suggest that this was the case. I am not entitled, however, to venture into the realms of conjecture and so far as anything can be assumed it should rather be that the trustees had acted in accordance with the order of the Court of 1909. Omnia praesum muntur rite esse acta. 48. So far as Mr. Vaux’s contention is based on law he relies on a passage to be found at pages 75 and 76 of Everest & Strode’s Treatise on the Law of Estoppel (3rd ed.) which states that there are five elements which “generally speaking” are necessary to establish the plea of “res judicata.” The fifth of these elements is said to be “a deliberate acting upon the adjudication as between all the parties interested.” The learned authors cite certain decisions as authority for this proposition. The main authority appears to be the speech of Lord O’Hagan in the case of Dundas v Waddell reported at pp 269 and 270 of 5 App. Cases. If that speech is carefully studied, however, I think it will be found impossible to rely on it as an authority for this alleged fifth element. Lord O’Hagan certainly stresses the [ fact that there had been a “deliberate acting” on the adjudication to which he is referring. In other reported cases also where such a fact existed Judges have laid stress on it, but neither Lord O’Hagan nor any other Judge, I think, has ever intended to lay down the proposition that a deliberate acting upon an adjudication was a sine qua non to a plea of estoppel by

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-482 record. The other cases cited in Everest & Strode do not appear to support such a proposition (see especially the judgment of Willes J. in Langmead v Maple 18 CBNS 270), nor is the necessity for the existence of this “fifth element” suggested in Halsbury nor, so far as I know, in any other textbook. I cannot think that a judgment in rem required to be acted upon before it can constitute a res judicata, nor do I consider that where a litigant has obtained a judgment in personam in his favour but has not chosen to act upon it, that can give his opponent the right to bring him again into Court to litigate the same matter over again. 49. So far as it may be material I think I must assume that the 1925 suit was brought entirely per incuriam, all the parties (and their legal advisers) having forgotten or being ignorant of the former adjudication. If that had not been so it would have been the duty of the trustees’ solicitors to have mentioned the matter to the Court even had they formed the opinion that, for some reason, the question of res judicata could not be raised. It would, moreover, have been the obvious duty of the Official Assignee to have raised the question in the interests of Tan Lian Chye and his creditors. These considerations and the fact that there is no mention of the former proceedings in the judgment of the Chief Justice, satisfy me that in 1925 the proceedings of 1909 had been inadvertently and entirely overlooked by everybody concerned. 50. Mr. Walters has argued that if the Official Assignee was ignorant of the former adjudication he cannot be said to have waived the estoppel since waiver can only exist where there is knowledge of the right waived. This argument I think is sound, [ cf. Ex parte Chambers (1855) 1 Deacon, pp 243–4] but Mr. Vaux put the matter, if I understood him correctly, as one of pleading rather than of deliberate waiver and argued that, since estoppel was not pleaded, the Court must proceed as if the parties had deliberately waived the estoppel and that it was therefore free to proceed as if no matter of estoppel existed. 51. If proof of the previous record were a mere matter of evidence then mere ignorance of the existence of that evidence would not be an excuse for not putting it before the Court unless it were shown that knowledge of the existence of the record could not have been obtained with the exercise of all proper diligence and inquiries. I do not think any diligence on the part of the Official Assignee would, in all the circumstances, have discovered the existence of the 1909 proceedings but it is perhaps unnecessary to decide this point. 52. It is clear that a party who wishes to raise a matter of estoppel should generally plead it. Everest and Strode (at p. 317, 3rd ed.) state this to be “necessary, or at any rate advisable.” The Annual Practice, in a note to Order 19 r.15 — corresponding to our Order 20 r.14 — lays it down that “estoppel must be specially pleaded, unless there is no opportunity to do so,” and cites an Irish case the report of which is not available to me. In the case of Re Defries 48 LT at p 704, Pollock B. cited a dictum of de Grey C.J. in an old case that “if the defendant has had the opportunity of pleading a judgment and has not done so he may be considered to have waived the estoppel” but went on to say that “unless the Court is driven, by the party’s not pleading the judgment, to the conclusion ||Page 121>> that he has waived the estoppel, the estoppel will not fail.” There is much old learning on the point but most of it is based on the intricacies and niceties of E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-483 old forms of pleading. The decision in Vooght v Winch 2 B & A 662, 106 ER 507 cited by Mr. Vaux, for example, appears to be, on this point, merely a decision as to the rules of pleading as they then existed. [See also Dawson v Gregory (1845) 7 QB 756 in which that case was unsuccessfully cited]. In one of these old cases, that of Needler v. Bishop of Winchester, Hobart at p. 227, it is said, however, that matters of records can be given in evidence but need not be pleaded. Neither in our Rules and Forms nor in those of the Supreme Court in England is it definitely laid down that estoppel by record must be pleaded, but I am content to accept that, as a matter of practice and procedure, this should be done. It is, however, merely a matter of procedure and not one going to the root of a litigant’s rights. If he fails to plead what he should have pleaded he may find himself mulcted in certain costs if and when he tries to introduce the issue, but if his plea is such as to affect the legality of the transaction which is being discussed and the true state of things comes to the knowledge of the Court, the Court will be bound to give no judgment which will sanction something illegal or void. In the case of In re Robinson’s Settlement (reported in [1912] 1 Ch D) one of several trustees omitted to plead the Moneylenders Act but that omission was held by the Court of Appeal to be immaterial. “I would point out,” says Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton (at p. 726 of the report), “that these rules are meant to assist the administration of the judicial functions of the Court, and they are not meant to introduce rigid technicalities which would militate against full justice being done by the Court … no formal waiver of the point would be binding because the transaction was illegal. But even in the case of any other ground of defence the not putting it in the pleadings is not a waiver …” Lord Justice Brickley (at p. 727 of the report) says, “Order XIX r.15 provides that the defendant must by his pleading do various things, but it names no consequences if he does not do those things … Where the defendant ought to plead things of that sort the rule does not say that if he does not the Court shall adjudicate upon the matter as if a ground valid in law did not exist which does exist. If in the course of the proceedings it was proved that the deed sued upon was a forgery and the defendant does not plead it or did not know it was a forgery, the Court would not give judgment upon the deed on the footing that it was a valid deed.” 53. What is then the position when a Court proceeds to adjudicate upon an issue between parties before it and does so in ignorance, shared by all the parties, that it has already previously adjudicated? All the advocates who have argued the present case admitted that it would at least have been in the discretion of the Court if, during the hearing, the true position had come to light, to have struck out the second proceedings as an abuse of the process of the Court. I think it would have been more than a matter of discretion. I think it would have been the duty of the Court to have struck out the proceedings. “The object of the rule of res judicata,” said Lord Blackburn, in the case of Lockyer v Ferryman (1876) 2 App Cas at p 530, “is always put upon two grounds — the one public policy, that it is the interest of the State that there should be an end of litigation, and the other, the hardship on the individual, that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.” It is on the second ground that the rule of pleading is based: if a defendant wishes to complain that he is being twice vexed in the same cause then he must plead this plea and not let it take his opponents by surprise. The first ground,

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-484 however, is much wider and one which, in my view, goes rather to the jurisdiction of the Court. 54. “When there is res judicata,” said Lord Selborne in the same case (at p. 528 of the report), “ the original cause of action is gone, and can only be restored by getting rid of the res judicata.” If an action be brought,” said Lord Kenyon in Greathead v Bromley (1798) 7 TR 455, 101 ER 1073, “and the merits of the question discussed between the parties, and a final judgment obtained by either, the parties are concluded, and cannot canvass the same question again in another action, although perhaps some objection or argument might have been urged upon the first trial, which would have led to a different judgment.” “I apprehend,” said Willes J. in the case of Langmead v Maple 18 CBNS at p 271; 144 ER at p 447, “that if the same matter or cause of action has already been finally adjudicated on between the parties by a Court of competent jurisdiction the plaintiff has lost his right to put it in suit either before that or any other Court.” “It is not competent for the Court,” said Lord Macnaghten in the case of Badar Bee v Habib Merican Noordin [1909] App Cas at p 623, “in the case of the same question arising, between the same parties, to review a previous decision not open to appeal.” “Parties are not permitted,” said Lord Shaw in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] App Cas at p 165, “to begin fresh litigations because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case …” 55. It is true that in all these cases and in all the others discussed before me the point of res judicata had in fact been raised but none of the learned Judges whose dicta I have quoted stated this to be a sine qua non and their language is s ch as to suggest that there is no jurisdiction in the Court to entertain the same question again. Mr. Vaux suggested that when Lord Macnaghten said the Court was not competent to review its own decision all that he meant was that the Court should not do so if the plea of res judicata was raised and established, but I think the word “competent” goes deeper than that and I cannot assume it to have been used per curiam. That a Court is competent to try an issue must mean, I think, that it has no power to adjudicate on it, not that, on certain facts being proved, it may proceed to decide that issue but ought to decide it in a certain way. The “competence” of a Court was very recently discussed in the case of Gilbert v Ching 154 LT p 195, and was there treated as being one of jurisdiction: “The question being one,” said Lord Maugham (at p. 198), “of the jurisdiction of the Court in regard to the subject matter of the proceedings, it would be clear, if English law was applicable, that the objection might be taken ||Page 122>> at any time, and even on appeal, although it was not raised in the Court of first instance. Indeed it would appear to be pars judicis to take the objection, if it seemed to the Court to be well founded. It is in our jurisprudence well settled that parties cannot by agreement delay, or otherwise confer jurisdiction upon a Court as regards subject matter.” “The jurisdiction of a Court,” said the Lord Chancellor in Donald Campbell & Co v Pollak [1927] App Cas at p 804, “does not depend on the pleadings or admissions of the parties to a suit and, however such a question may emerge, it is (I think) impossible for this House to pass it by and to give its decision on the basis of the existence of a jurisdiction which may or may not have been conferred.” 56. It is true that I am in no sense a Court of Appeal from the decisions of the Judges who adjudicated in 1909 and in 1926 but, the point having been taken and established

E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-485 before me, I think I am bound to take the view that the adjudication of 1926 was one made without jurisdiction, since the original jurisdiction of the Court was spent and it had no jurisdiction to reviews its own decision, as if on appeal whatever the parties might plead or not plead, whatever they might agree between them, conceal or ignore. (See cases cited in the Empire Digest Vol. 16, sections 162–169). If I sue upon a simple contract debt and get judgment, the simple contract debt becomes merged in the specialty and ceases to exist. Now then can I again ask a Court to adjudicate on what no longer exists? Similarly if a question has been decided as between trustees and beneficiaries that issue no longer exists betweeen them. [ Cf. Livesey v Harding (1855) 21 Beav 227, 52 ER 846; Peareth v Marriott (1882) 22 Ch D 182; Re Surfleet’s Estate (1911) 105 LT at p 583]. It is true that in all these cases the plea of res judicata was actually raised, but whether it is raised or not, no Court of first instance has any right to purport to decide an issue that no longer exists. [ Cf. also Davis v Browne (1851) 14 Bear 127]. 57. It is also true that, on the face of things, the Court in the 1925 suit acted within the jurisdiction; but jurisdiction must depend on the real facts of a case and not on mere appearances, and I think there can be no doubt that, had the parties and the Court known of the previous decision, the Court must have said that it had no jurisdiction to decide the issue placed before it or, to put it another way, that its jurisdiction to do so was ousted, once it became apparent that the issue was no longer existent between the parties. The position in this case, to-day, is analogous to that in which a Court has given judgment against a party who is afterwards discovered to be non-existent; in such a case Lord Justice Scrutton (in the Lazard Bros case reported in [1932] 1 KB and at p 624 of that report) gave it as his opinion that if it comes to the knowledge of the Court … the Court is bound, after hearing the parties interested, of its own motion to set the judgment aside. Such a judgment is null and void.” Mr. Koek called my attention to another case the circumstances of which bear some analogy to the present case. In Great N.W.C. Railway & others v. Charlebois & others, a decision of the Privy Council reported in [1899] Appeal Cases, a declaratory judgment had been obtained, by consent, on a contract, no suggestion being the made by any of the parties that the contract was ultra vires. Afterwards a suit was instituted with a view to setting aside the contract and the judgment. “As the contract on the face of it,” said Lord Hobhouse (at p. 124 of the report), “is quite regular and its infirmity depends on extraneous facts which nobody disclosed, there was no reason whatever why the Court should not decree that which the parties asked it to decree. Such a judgment cannot be of more validity than the invalid contract on which it was founded.” In this case, similarly, once it is established before me that the issue between the parties was then non-existent, the judgment of 1926 on that issue must, in my opinion, be treated as being null and non-existent. 58. The matter may, perhaps, be put in another way, namely, as one of evidence. So far as the present summons is concerned it has been proved and admitted before me that there exists a judgment of this Court, of 1909, deciding the very same issue between essentially the same parties. This is conclusive proof of what the rights of the parties are and I can look to nothing which has happened since that judgment, nor consider that any such thing can have enabled the parties again to canvass those rights. E LAW JOURNAL BY MARCEL JUDE SEARCH RES JUDICATA-486 59. To sum up: I think that the judgment of 1926 must be disregarded, and that the judgment of 1909 decided the question between the parties, and bound and still binds the trustees of the will.

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