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Rmeyersdissertation2002.Pdf (1.831Mb) A HEURISTIC FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES AND ETHICS, AND A PSYCHOMETRIC INSTRUMENT TO MEASURE ADULT ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND WILLINGNESS TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Ronald B. Meyers, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2002 Dissertation Committee: Joe E. Heimlich, Adviser Approved by Herbert Asher Donald C. Hubin __________________________ Tomas Koontz Adviser Graduate Program in Natural Resource Copyright by Ronald Bennett Meyers 2002 ABSTRACT The need for instruments to objectively and deeply measure public beliefs concerning environmental values and ethics, and relationship to environmental protection led to a project to integrate analytical techniques from ethics and educational psychology to identify beliefs in theories of value and obligation (direct and indirect), develop a 12- category system of environmental ethics, and a psychometric instrument with 5 scales and 7 subscales, including a self-assessment instrument for environmental ethics. The ethics were tested for ability to distinguish between beliefs in need to protect environment for human interests versus the interests or rights of animals and the environment. A heuristic for educators was developed for considering 9 dimensions of environmental and the ethics, and tested favorably. An exploratory survey (N = 74, 2001) of adult moral beliefs used 16 open-ended questions for moral considerability of, rights, treatment, and direct and indirect moral obligations to the environment. A 465 - item question bank was developed and administered (N = 191, 2002) to Ohio adults, and reduced to 73 items in 12 Likert-type scales (1-7, 1 strongly disagree) by analyzing internal consistency, response variability, interscale correlations, factorial, and ANOVA. The results (beliefs concerning the general environment): Scale 1) Environmental Capacity (suffer mentally and physically) µ= 5.0, ą= 0.85; 1.1) Conativity, µ= 4.2, ą= 0 ii .84; 1.2) Sentience, µ= 5.0, ą= 0.85; Scale 2) Value, µ= 5.0, ą= 0.92 ; 2.1) Intrinsic Value, µ= 3.4, ą= 0.84 ; 2.2) Animal and Environment‟s Rights, µ= 4.95, ą= 0.90; Scale 3) Moral Need to Protect, µ= 5.0, ą= 0.84; 3.1) Moral Acceptability of 4 Uses (medical research, zoo's, eating, killing to eat) µ= 4.8, ą= 0.89; 3.2) Usefulness, µ= 5.54, ą= 0.89; 4) Environmental Ethic ą = 0.73 (95% in ethics 7-12, the ecological ethics), highest population mean: "Ecological Phenomenalism", then "Ecological Ecocentrism"), modal category: "Ecological Ecocentrism" ; and Scale 5) Willingness to Protect Environment, Legally, µ=5.2, ą= 0.83. One factor per scale (2 factors for 2 dimensional environmental ethics scale). ANOVA: 4 scales independent, Scale 5 dependent: high predictive capacity -adjusted r2= 0.78. Scales demonstrated good reliability to measure complex moral beliefs. iii Dedicated to my grandmother and mother, whose love of learning enriched my life, and my brother. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank my advisor, Joseph E. Heimlich. His open and substantial support of my academic explorations into environmental education and environmental ethics is deeply appreciated. My gratitude is also extended to Herb Asher, who provided critical support to my studies and wise counsel for my endeavors. To Tom Koontz, I give my thanks for his invaluable assistance. To Bill Hall goes my deepest appreciation for his commitment to the success of students. Without his steadfast support and patience this project would never have succeeded. I am indebted to Don Hubin, Dan Farrell, and Bernie Rosen for the consideration, time and energy they invested to support my exploration into philosophy. My thanks go to Karen Mancl. Her considerateness, patience, cheerfulness, and faith in my abilities were of great comfort and inspiration. I also wish to thank John Rohrer for his commitment to my graduate work and his openness to the many projects it engendered. Finally, my thanks to all my teachers, and to those who have invested their lives in the pursuit of truth, knowledge, and an improved world. v VITA April 5, 1961 Born - Providence, Rhode Island, USA 1985 - 1986 Intern, Chesapeake Bay Program, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1986 - 1991 Environmental Scientist, Division of Water Quality Management and Planning. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency 1986 B.S. Watershed and River Basin Planning and Policy, The Ohio State University 1991 - 1992 Regional Program Director, Ohio Citizen Action 1992 - 1995 Community Organizer, South Side Settlement House 1995 - 1999 Graduate Research Associate, The Ohio State University Extension 1996 M.A. Public Policy and Management, The Ohio State University 1999 - 2001 President, Council of Graduate Students, The Ohio State University 2001 - 2002 Graduate Research Associate, The Ohio State University, Division of Student Affairs 2002 Lecturer, and Research Associate, Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, and Environmental Studies Program, University of Chicago vi PUBLICATIONS Research Publication 1. Division of Planning. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. 1988. State of Ohio Lake Erie Phosphorus Reduction Strategy, Revised Edition. Columbus, Ohio. 2. Division of Water Quality Planning and Assessment. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. 1989. Buck Creek Watershed Nonpoint Source Assessment. Columbus, Ohio. 3. Division of Water Quality Planning and Assessment. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. 1990. Vermillion River Watershed Nonpoint Source Assessment. Columbus, Ohio. 4. Heimlich, J. E. & Meyers, R. B. 1999. Method Boundness Among Zoo and Park Educators. Environmental Education Research, 5, 1. Bath, England. 5. Jackson, G. & Meyers, R.B. 2000. Challenges of Institutional Outreach: A COPC Example. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, 5, 1. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Office of Policy Development and Research: Washington, D.C. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Natural Resources vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract .......................................................................................................................... iv Dedication ...................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................... v Vita ................................................................................................................................. vi List of Tables ................................................................................................................. xii List of Figures ................................................................................................................ xiv Chapters: 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 Public and academic concern for the environment .................................................. 6 History and purpose of environmental education .......................................... 13 Materials Guidelines for Excellence in Environmental Education ... 16 Research challenges in environmental values and ethics ............................. 17 Affect ................................................................................................. 20 Environment values and ethics .......................................................... 24 New Environmental Paradigm ........................................... 41 Research needs .................................................................................. 41 Purpose of the study ...................................................................................... 43 Research objectives ........................................................................... 43 Methods from environmental ethics .................................................. 44 Normative ethical theories and environmental normative ethical theories .................................................. 45 Continuum of Environmental Entities ................................ 46 Methods from educational psychology ............................................. 51 Constructs and variables to investigate ............................................. 51 Assumptions and limitations ......................................................................... 53 Summary ....................................................................................................... 55 Definition of terms ........................................................................................ 56 viii 2. Literature Review..................................................................................................... 65 Education ....................................................................................................... 65 History and purpose of environmental education .......................................... 66 The challenge of environmental values and ethics in environmental education ................................................................... 70 Materials Guidelines for Excellence in Environmental Education ... 73 Research on environmental values and ethics ............................................... 77 Environmental education ................................................................... 77 Affect .................................................................................
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