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THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 69 1 - 15 March 2011 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 In the CENTRAL region, are fired at the Ariana Hotel in Sabari area and AOG 7 Northern Region AOGs are returning, in num- in Taloqan. The IMF OP in have responded with IEDs. Western Region 15 bers, to both Logar and War- Burka, Baghlan province In Kunar, the IMF reloca- Eastern Region 18 dak. The premature detona- continues while an NGO tion from the Pech valley tion of a BBIED in Chaki employee was found dead inspires AOG response, 24 Southern Region Wardak district, of the latter, in mysterious circumstances while mortars impact ANSO Info Page 29 suggesting some inexperi- in Dushi district. In Jaw- Asadabad. In Nangahar, enced new members. In zjan, AOGs form check- two IEDs target a political Daykondi, AOG continue to posts on the main roads rally in Jalalabad - aimed at YOU NEED TO KNOW struggle for freedom of between Shibergan and unseating the provincial • Unprecedented levels of movement in Kajran and Andkhoy and Mazar. In Governor - while others seasonal violence in Hel- Gizab. In Parwan, a female Samangan, the IMF target target music shops in an mand NGO worker is murdered on AOG in Dari-Suf. In intimidation campaign. • Ongoing political instability her way to work, while a Badakshan, crude IEDs Suicide devices target the in Nangahar group of seven Taliban strike two separate NGOs DAC of Sherzad and an • Nuristan is in transition - to “reconcile” in Ghorband. in acts of intimidation while IMF convoy in Bati Kot. AOG control in Sar-i-Pul seven previ- In Nuristan, AOG con- In the NORTHERN re- ously reconciled AOG re- tinue to consolidate power • Ongoing spectacular attack gion, BBIEDs target ANP capability in Kunduz turned to being AOG. and isolate the ANSF who leadership and new recruits are now without IMF sup- in Kunduz, in an ongoing In the WESTERN region, port. In Laghman, an IED campaign of assassination rockets target the Herat ANSO is supported by kills a Provincial Council and intimidation, especially in airport while a member of member while in Paktya a Chahar-Dara, while in Imam the upper house of parlia- small IED injures two in a Sahib the Taliban Shadow ment was temporarily ab- a vegetable market. District Governor is killed in ducted in Chisti-Sharif. In an IMF raid. In Chimatal, Farah, NGO staff were In the SOUTHERN re- Balkh an NGO compound is embroiled in arrests of sus- gion, the combination of robbed by up to 30 armed pected AOG while in Ghor indiscriminate and targeted men while AOG are return- an unusually high profile killing continues to take a ing to Chahar Bolak. In attack targeted the District massive toll on both the Faryab, AOG reconcile in Governor of Charsada. ANSF and civilian popula- Maimanna, while in the tion. In Nimroz the ANBP Dashta-Laili area of Dawlata- In the EASTERN region, arrested ANP carrying bad a BBIED targets the IMF have significantly 50kgs opium in an ANP convoy of the provincial po- stepped up their operational vehicle. lice chief. In Takhar, RPGs tempo in Khost, particularly THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 Political violence initiated by 40 AOGs in Kabul Province re- in the hands of IEA fighters, at- 30 mained limited to a single RPG tended by thousands including top 20 round shot from a distance in Uz- GOA officials and other VIPs in 10 Dashte Barchi, AOG attacks bin Valley, presumably targeting 0 an ANP post. The events in other against public places & venues regional centers in the North & have not resumed. East of the country undoubtedly Shakardara rose to prominence KABUL AOG KABUL Crime shaped the threat reporting for with this cycle’s single IED place- the capital city, which continued ment & discovery (in Baghi Man- between two Kuchi clans, during which the in the usual volumes and included galay). The discovery marked just leader of one of the parties was killed. The mostly generic reports on AOG the third seizure of an emplaced consequent shootout led to an additional three operations. Typical targets IED for this district in ANSO casualties inflicted by the harmed qawm in re- (security-related or high-profile, data collection since its inception, taliation. Reportedly, the elders engaged in ne- incl. public venues) and patterns in addition to a single (RC)IED gotiations while ANSF stayed away from the (close-range IED and complex detonation in November 2008, conflict. The incident is reminiscent of the attacks, multiple indirect fire at- presumably intended for, but January clash in the informal settlement of tacks) dominated the reporting. missing, an IMF convoy. In the Charaye Qambar, PD 5, also featuring a killing The time-line remains more of a neighbouring Paghman, gas cylin- and an ensuing fight, following the escalation specific factor, since mid- to late- ders filled with explosives were of a community dispute (in this case, peace was March coincides with several high located and secured on two occa- brokered by the intervention of an elderly who -profile events, including an ex- sions along the district roads in arrived for this purpose from Urozgan, and the pected speech on the Transition by Paghman (Arghandi Payeen and ANP arrested the individual charged with the the President during the Naw- Karezak Arghandi). initial murder). NGOs with operations in the rooz, public events and celebra- Conflicts over resources (access to informal settlements, where resources are of- tions linked to the new year, re- land, water but also to services ten scarce and tensions extremely high among newal of UNAMA mandate by provided by third parties) are not the neighbours, will always benefit from main- UNSC, and the IMF leadership’s unheard of in the region, and one taining a discrete awareness of similar disputes report on the security process so such report came to light during in order to avoid the eventual repercussions on far. Despite several ‘occasions’ this cycle. The late February in the programming, and adversely, to prevent such as the commemoration of Bagrami saw a violent clash over a the programming from becoming a stake in the violent death of Baba Mazari long-standing land issue erupt such conflicts. NGO Incidents PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 Following the agricultural achieve- ments of the previous period, and side Bamyan and Kabul (with the once again devoid of significant exception of Surobi). This process - no image file - security incidents, Panjshir came merely reflects the fact that the to the fore with the GOA & province remains virtually un- IMF’s announcement of the prov- touched by the overall political ince being slated for the first conflict, a trait which is likely to round of security transition along- persevere in the future. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR 50 This Report Period 0 AOG return from the winter 40 break, as well as accounts of addition to an AOG IDF attack, 30 AOG coordination for the spring all of these coming after the fatal 20 clash in Charkh. campaign, were the constant fea- 10 tures of security reporting from In the morning of 28 February, a 0 Logar this period. An assembly of joint IMF/ANA unit came under AOG leaders in Baraki Barak, close-range SAF & RPG attack in called after the large IMF-led push Charkh DAC. After the IMF and LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime in Charkh, reportedly saw the IEA ANP took positions inside a and HIG leaders exchange, in a building, the incoming fire caused and another IED facilitator detained. Several cooperative manner, their views the structure to collapse, burying other arrests followed later on, with the AOG on the steps forward. Needless to several operatives under rubble. 1 riposting by an inaccurate RPG attack against say, such coordination stands in IMF, 4 ANA and their civilian an ANP CP in Charkh DAC. It is also known, blunt opposition to the develop- translator were killed, and an addi- however, that an important Charkh com- ments in the neighbouring Nirkh tional 3 IMF sustained injuries mander managed to relocate to Baraki Baraki of Wardak, where the IEA pur- during the course of action. The & Puli Alam, and alongside the cousin of his sues a hostile stance towards the incident sparked a series of joint deceased colleague, joined the coordination local HIG network. Incident re- IMF – ANA operations focused efforts mentioned above. porting has so far included 5 inci- on the disruption of a local AOG dents in Muhammad Agha (two network, presumably responsible In this context, NGO access strategies com- IED emplacements on the Kabul for the 28 February attack. At bined to the local awareness, stakeholders’ ac- – Logar road, and three police least two local IEA commanders ceptance and the parties’ willingness to recog- actions in the traditional hotspots (incl. a cousin of a reputed com- nize NGOs as neutral humanitarian actors will of AOG activity) and a series of mander based in Baraki Barak) remain critical preconditions for NGO safety IMF-led operations in Charkh in were killed in the targeted strikes, during the up-coming spring season. NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 The restive southern districts of 40 Kajran and Gizab hosted all 6 RCIED strike against an IMF SF 30 detachment, for which one IMF incidents (4 AOG initiated) re- 20 ported from Daykundi this cycle.
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