Political Women

Under what conditions are political elites responsive to social movements, and when do social movements gain access to political elites? This book explores this question with regard to the women’s movement in the U.S., asking under what conditions are Congress and the presidency responsive to the women’s movement, and when will the women’s movement gain access to Congress and the presidency? The book systematically compares the relations between political leaders and each of the three waves of the women’s movement—848–1889, 1890–1928, and 1960–1985, in light of the political dynamics that each wave faced. The author utilizes perspectives and methods from the fields of Political Science, Sociology, and History to illustrate the ways in which changing political dynamics impacted the battle for both women’s suffrage and the Equal Rights Amendment. The book clearly demonstrates the importance of a dynamic institutional analysis of social movement-political elite relations. The author argues that without such an analysis we cannot fully understand the conditions under which legislation of interest to movements will be lobbied for by presidents, introduced into Congress, granted hearings, receive favorable reports, and be reported to the floors of the House and Senate. A significant addition to the study of women’s history and American Studies, Political Women illustrates the important roles that political leaders played in the battle for women’s suffrage and the ERA and demonstrates the political savvy among women suffrage activists who recognized the institutional barriers present in the U.S. political system and fought to overcome them. Alana S.Jeydel is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Oregon State University. She has published research on the impact of women in the U.S. Congress in Political Research Quarterly and her work on the women’s movement in the United States has appeared in Congress and the Presidency and White House Studies. She is currently co-authoring a book, Participation and Protest: Women and Politics from a Global Perspective with Dr. Sarah Henderson. Routledge Research in Gender and History

1 The Women’s Movement and Women’s Employment in Nineteenth Century Britain Ellen Jordan

2 Gender, Sexuality and Colonial Modernities Edited by Antoinette Burton

3 Women’s Suffrage in the British Empire Citizenship, nation and race Edited by Ian Christopher Fletcher, Laura E.Nym Mayhall and Philippa Levine

4 Women, Educational Policy-Making and Administration in England Authoritative women since 1800 Edited by Joyce Goodman and Sylvia Harrop

5 Women, Gender and Labour Migration Historical and global perspectives Edited by Pamela Sharpe

6 Women, Accounting, and Narrative Keeping books in eighteenth-century England Rebecca Elisabeth Connor

7 Gender and Women’s Education Katharina Rowold

8 Political Women The women’s movement, political institutions, the battle for women’s suffrage and the ERA Alana S.Jeydel Political Women The women’s movement, political institutions, the battle for women’s suffrage and the ERA Alana S.Jeydel

LONDON AND NEW YORK First published 2004 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2004 Alana S.Jeydel All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Jeydel, Alana S., 1968– Political women: the women’s movement, political institutions, the battle for women’s suffrage and the ERA/Alana S.Jeydel. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-415-34660-6 (alk. paper) 1. Feminism—United States—History. 2. Women’s rights—United States—History. 3. Women in politics—United States—History. 4. Elite (Social sciences)—United States. 5. United States— Politics and government. I. Title. HQ1418.J49 2004 305.42′0973–dc22 2004001292

ISBN 0-203-33531-7 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-415-34660-6 (Print Edition) Contents

List of tables vii Abbreviations and acronyms x

1 Introduction 1 2 Theoretical context 7 3 Operationalization of terms and methodology 20 4 The first wave: 1848–89 28 5 The second wave: 1890–1928 84 6 The third wave: 1960–85 143 7 Conclusion 196

Appendix A Sources of data 200 Appendix B The year state suffrage amendments passed 206 Bibliography 208 Index 213

Tables

3.1 Determinants of POS for Congress 24

3.2 Determinants of POS for presidency 25

3.3 Determinants of access and response 25

4.1a POS first wave—the House 30

4.1b POS first wave—the Senate 31

4.2 Rules of the House and changes 33

4.3 POS first wave—Presidents 38

4.4a Access House of Representatives—first wave 46

4.4b Aceess Senate—first wave 47

4.5a Response House of Representatives—first wave 49

4.5b Response Senate—first wave 50

4.6 Access Presidents—first wave 63

4.7 Response Presidents—first wave 63

5.1a POS second wave—House 86

5.1b POS second wave—Senate 87

5.2 House rules and changes 89 5.3 POS second wave—Presidents 95

5.4a Access House of Representatives—second wave 100

5.4b Access Senate—second wave 101

5.5a Response House of Representatives—second wave 103

5.5b Response Senate—second wave 104

5.6 Access Presidents—second wave 120

5.7 Response Presidents—second wave 121

6.1a POS House—third wave 144

6.1b POS Senate—third wave 146

6.2 House rules and changes 147

6.3 POS Presidents—third wave 150

6.4a Access House of Representatives—third wave 161

6.4b Access Senate—third wave 162

6.5a Response House of Representatives—third wave 162

6.5b Response Senate—third wave 163

6.6 Access to Presidents—third wave 169

6.7 Response from Presidents—third wave 169 Acknowledgements

There are innumerable individuals who need to be thanked for their aid in this endeavor. Without the help of countless professors, my dissertation committee, fellow graduate students and current colleagues, librarians, archivists, and computer support people this book would not have been written. In particular I would like to thank Sarah Henderson for her frequent words of support and encouragement that this manuscript could be a book. Also, many thanks to the librarians and archivists at the Arthur and Elizabeth Schlessinger Library at Radcliffe College. They were a great help in the finding, retrieving, and copying of documents and offering moral support while I was there doing research. I would also like to thank the National Organization for Women and the Women’s Equity Action League for making their papers available to me. I also offer many thanks to the Dirksen Congressional Center and the Caterpillar Foundation for their support in funding some of the research for this book. The costs associated with doing research and the difficulty in finding funding are well known to all academics, thus the support the Dirksen Congressional Center and the Caterpillar Foundation provided was greatly appreciated. I must also offer heartfelt thanks to my husband, Dave Picciotto, who was, as always, a constant source of emotional, mental, and spiritual support throughout this project. And thanks to my very patient step-son, Daniel Picciotto, who, during the first go round of this project, read King Arthur on the bed while I furiously typed away. Finally, this book is dedicated to my late parents, Alan and Virginia Jeydel, who always believed in my ability to accomplish this (at times) daunting task, and who taught, by example, that women could pursue any field or occupation they so chose, and to my daughter, Freya, who stands as a constant reminder that there are things much more important than work. Abbreviations and acronyms

AERA American Equal Rights Association AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations AWSA American Woman Suffrage Association CEO chief executive officer CPOS closed political opportunity structure CU Congressional Union EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission EO Executive Order ERA Equal Rights Amendment GFWC General Federation of Women’s Clubs NAWSA National American Woman Suffrage Association NOW National Organization for Women NWP National Woman’s Party NWSA National Woman Suffrage Association OPOS open political opportunity structure POS political opportunity structure RM resource mobilization SMO social movement organization STMA Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act UAW United Auto Workers WCTU Women’s Christian Temperance Union WEAL Women’s Equity Action League

1 Introduction

Under what conditions are political elites responsive to social movements, and when do social movements gain access to political elites? Political scientist Michael Lipsky once asked: ‘Under what conditions will relatively powerless groups receive official recognition and responsiveness?… Formulation of such questions directs attention to describing contexts and political constellations in which the American political system is more or less open and responsive’ (emphasis added).1 Almost thirty-five years later this question has not been adequately answered. This research explores the ebb and flow of political elite responsiveness (to social movements) and social movement access (to political elites) through a comparative longitudinal analysis of the three waves of the women’smovement: 1848–89, 1890–1928 and 1960–85. It focuses on the political opportunity structure as a major determinant of the degree of responsiveness and access, and as a key determinant of relations between social movements and political elites. The political opportunity structure is a term used to describe the political climate and institutional arrangements of a political system. It is composed of the level of electoral stability, level of unity among elites, mass opinion and powers granted to party leaders.2 How these indicators are measured is discussed in Chapter 3. Political elites are those individuals who are either elected or appointed members of the institutional political system at the national, state and local level, and who also have the ability to exercise power in the political system.3 This includes, but is not limited to, elected representatives, heads of state and bureaucratic leaders. More will be said on political elites in Chapter 3. This volume enters into two debates in the literature, one concerning access and responsiveness, the other concerning the nature of relations between social movements and political elites. On one side of the debate regarding responsiveness and access is the work of political process/political opportunity theorists, like Costain, Jenkins, McAdam, Piven and Cloward, and Tarrow (among others). They argue that the state of the political opportunity structure accounts for, in large part, the degree of both social movement access to political elites and political elites’ responsiveness to social movements.4 On the other side of the debate are resource mobilization theorists, like Freeman, McCarthy and Zald, and Jenkins and Perrow, who argue that the level of available resources in society, along with the presence or absence of movement entrepreneurs and external allies (leaders of interest groups, labour unions, etc.), accounts for, in large part, the degree of access and responsiveness.5 Political women 2

This study addresses this debate by showing that both theories are useful when combined, but incomplete when taken alone. The assumption in resource mobilization theory that external allies are necessary in gaining access to political elites is helpful in explaining how social movements gain access. Where resource mobilization theorists are lacking is in their analysis of when allies will emerge among the political elite. This is where political process/political opportunity theory enters. Political elites will be more responsive to social movements when the political opportunity structure is open(ing). This research also identifies and specifies aspects of the political opportunity structure that condition social movement access to, response from and interaction with political elites. The literature is replete with discussions of the political opportunity structure,6 and among scholars studying it there exists a general acceptance and understanding of the variables that define it.7 There is no satisfactory operationalization of these variables, however, and without this it is impossible for scholars to test the validity of the concept of a political opportunity structure. The research informing this study seeks to overcome this problem. This research also attempts to reconcile the debate concerning the nature of relations between social movements and political elites. On one side lie political opportunity theorists, like Costain, McAdam, and Piven and Cloward, who argue that relations with political elites are detrimental to social movements, as political elites attempt to push social movements in more politically orthodox directions, thereby diffusing their potential for more radical, far-reaching change.8 On the other side are resource mobilization theorists who view political elites as not only helpful to movements but as active proponents of their causes. In the middle lie other political opportunity theorists, like Tarrow, who neither discourage nor embrace relations with elites, but simply argue that they are inevitable. This research untangles these differences by showing that the political opportunity structure is a key determinant of the relations between social movements and political elites.9 To examine these theories, this study analyses three different phases of the women’s movement: 1848–89, 1890–1928 and 1960–85. The year 1848 marks the dawn of the women’s movement (and this wave) because the first woman’s rights convention was held in Seneca Falls, New York in 1848; 1889 is considered the end of this wave because it marks the end of the separation of the two leading suffrage organizations, the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) and the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA). The second wave begins in 1890 because that was the year the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) was formed, born of the merger between NWSA and AWSA. The birth of NAWSA marks the beginning of a unified woman suffrage movement. The end of the second wave is signified by 1928. At that date, the women’s movement was no longer able to speak with a unified voice, because it was made up of too many diverse groups that could no longer concur on a common purpose or goal in the post- suffrage era. It is also the year that the Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act (STMA) lapsed. Under the STMA, money was to be given to the states to promote welfare and hygiene during maternity and infancy. The lapse of this act marks the end of a period of government attention to women’s issues (suffrage, maternity, child welfare). John F.Kennedy was elected President in 1960 and, in 1961, created the President’s Commission on the Status of Women. This commission was designed to show that the Introduction 3

Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was unnecessary, but its ultimate result was to help spawn the women’s movement. The President’s Commission brought women together to discuss their problems, created the notion that government would be responsive, spurred the creation of mini-commissions in the states, and planted the seeds for a mass-based movement. In 1982, the ERA failed to get the necessary three-quarters of the states to ratify it. Over the next few years there were a few failed attempts to get the ERA through Congress again. The movement began focusing its energies elsewhere, and the movement quietened down. Consequently, 1985 is used as the last year of the wave. There was still activity on the part of women, but the movement had no rallying cry to motivate the troops. While other work has examined a single or multiple phases of the women’s movement, there has been no systematic comparison of the relations between political elites and each of the three waves, in light of the political opportunity structure each one faced. The fruits of such analysis may then be applied to the study of other social movements.

Overarching questions

I expect that openings in the political opportunity structure permit movements to increase their impact and influence upon political elites and to achieve desired policy outcomes. Openings in the political opportunity structure occur when there is a combination of the following conditions: divisions among political elites, unstable political alignments, mass opinion favourable towards the social movement issue, and rules governing Congress that do not grant party leaders the power to assign members and chairs to committees, refer legislation, etc. (specific combinations discussed in Chapter 3). Openings in the political opportunity structure shift the balance of power among political elites, thereby disrupting the status quo. Political elites will be left scrambling to claim (or reclaim) their position in the political system. For instance, Costain argues that during an unstable political alignment ‘politicians and political parties are actively involved in seeking out bases of political support. A group of newly organized people will be viewed as potential supporters by political entrepreneurs.’10 Thus, during an unstable political alignment the women’s movement had more leverage with political elites because ‘as has been argued in relation to blacks, neither party could afford to forfeit competition for women’s votes…’11 Or, for example, one could argue that woman suffrage became more attainable after the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, which boasted over 100,000 members, endorsed suffrage—politicians seeking re-election (or election) recognized the potential of this voting bloc of women. Such a period of transition will offer social movements greater leverage with political elites. Furthermore, I expect that during an open political opportunity structure (OPOS), there will exist multiple access points to political elites, thus offering a social movement more venues upon which to present and pursue their claims. As Costain notes, ‘the structure of political opportunity for a women’s movement had expanded rapidly in the early 1960s… Changing circumstances emanated from the president, Congress, executive agencies, and competing elites within the government and parties.’12 Political women 4

I also expect that social movements will experience little to no access to or response from political elites during a closed political opportunity structure (CPOS). A closed political opportunity structure will exist when few to none of the conditions that define an open political opportunity structure exist—i.e., no divisions exist among elites, there are either stable political alignments, or unstable ones where the political parties are not in need of the social movement’s constituency,13 mass opinion is not favourably disposed towards the movement’s goal(s), and party leaders in Congress have the power to assign members and chairs to committees, refer legislation, etc. A closed political opportunity structure will mean that a social movement’s resources (votes, constituents, cause, etc.) are of no use to political elites. Thus, social movements will have little access to or responsiveness from political elites. As McAdam notes regarding the lack of black electoral influence, despite their numerical strength, from 1876–1930 ‘the geographic alignment of political loyalties, coupled with disenfranchisement, destroyed whatever chance blacks might have had of mobilizing any semblance of national electoral leverage’.14 Furthermore, I expect that social movements will risk co-optation by political elites when they enter into relations with them during a closed political opportunity structure. If a closed political opportunity structure exists, social movements may be forced to rely on political elites in hopes that they will champion the social movement’s cause. This alliance, however, may be made on terms that are less than favourable for the social movement’s goals. Political elites may have leverage in such a situation, and thus be in a position to dictate the terms of the alliance. During an open political opportunity structure, however, such co-optation by political elites is not inevitable as social movements have resources (and thus leverage) that political elites need at such times. Finally, I also expect that there are different types of response from members of Congress and the President. There may be concrete responses—responses that specifically address the goals of a social movement (such as enactment into law of a bill). These responses are most likely during an open political opportunity structure, for the reasons discussed above. There may also be mixed responses—responses that address social movement concerns, but do not result in a concrete response (such as legislation or an executive order that creates an agency the purpose of which is beneficial to the social movement, but not its ultimate goal). Such responses are most likely to occur while a political opportunity structure is in the process of opening or closing. During such periods the social movement has some leverage, but its resources are of only limited use to political elites. Finally, there may be co-optive responses—responses that try to assuage the social movement (e.g. verbal support, introduction of a bill that has a slim chance of passage). Such responses allow the member of Congress and/or the President to look good in the eyes of the social movement (and the public), and arguably may quell the social movement—it feels its concerns are being addressed and thus does not need to work so hard. Such responses are more likely during a closed political opportunity structure. Introduction 5

Key research questions

Extant research on the political opportunity structure and social movements prompts the following questions. How do divisions within elites affect their relations with social movements? How does elite divisiveness affect social movement access to political elites and their responsiveness to social movements? Tarrow argues that social movements will tend to be more successful (gain more access) where party unity is weak.15 For example, after the 1910 revolt the low levels of party unity in the House of Representatives arguably helped the suffrage movement influence parties and attain its goal.16 This research examines the effect of party unity on access and response through an analysis of party unity in Congress from 1869–89, 1890–1928 and 1960–85, in conjunction with the actual access and response the women’s movement received from Congress. What is the effect of electoral instability on the relations between social movements and political elites? Costain, McAdam, Perrow and Jenkins, and Tarrow, argue that unstable political alignments (electoral instability) force political elites to find new constituents.17 As Costain notes regarding the women’s movement of the 1960s, ‘the power of a mobilizing women’s movement became greater relative to government because many alignments within the party system dissolved … The Democrats and Republicans were looking for organized blocs of voters to help build a new majority governing coalition.’18 This research examines the effect of electoral stability on the relations between social movements and political elites through an analysis of the electoral conditions during each wave, in conjunction with the movement’s access to and response from Congress and the Presidents. Finally, how do the rules that govern Congress affect a social movement’s ability to gain access to Congress or the types of responses it might receive from it? I expect that when rules grant party leadership considerable power (ability to assign members to committees, ability to assign chairs of committees, ability to assign a bill to a specific committee, ability to decide whether a bill receives a hearing, etc.) then social movements may have a more difficult time gaining access to and see very little response from Congress. In sum, I expect that social movements will gain little access to or response from Congress or Presidents, during a closed political opportunity structure. And, I expect that social movements will gain access to and response from Congress and Presidents during an open political opportunity structure. Finally, I expect that movements risk co-optation during a closed political opportunity structure, and have a better chance of remaining autonomous during an open political opportunity structure.

Notes 1. Michael Lipsky, Protest in City Politics (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally and Company, 1970), p. 13. 2. See Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 3. This study focuses on political elites at the national level. Power in the political system will be defined as control over resources that may be used solely by elected and appointed members of government institutions. Such resources include, but are not limited to, the Political women 6

ability to vote yay or nay on any given piece of legislation, the ability to determine the composition of a committee in the legislature, the ability to determine the chairs of said committees, the ability to grant a hearing to groups lobbying the legislature and the ability to veto a piece of legislation. 4. Anne Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); J.Craig Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930– 1970 (Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Francis Fox Piven and Richard A.Cloward, Poor People’s Movements (New York: Vintage Books); Tarrow, Power in Movement. 5. Jo Freeman, The Politics of Women’s Liberation (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1975); J.Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow, ‘Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Workers Movements (1946–1972)’, American Sociological Review 42 (1977), pp. 249–67; John D.McCarthy and Mayer N.Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: a Partial Theory’, in Social Movements in an Organizational Society, Mayer Zald and John D.McCarthy (eds) (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books, 1987), pp. 14–42. 6. See Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion; Peter K.Eisenger, ‘The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities’, American Political Science Review 67 (1973), pp. 11–28; Jenkins and Perrow, ‘Insurgency’; Herbert P.Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1 (1986), pp. 57, 85; McAdam, Political Process; Tarrow, Power in Movement. 7. These include the level of electoral instability, level of unity among elites and the institutional arrangements of the state. But see the discussion in Chapter 2 of political process/opportunity theorists. 8. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion; McAdam, Political Process; Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements. 9. Tarrow, Power in Movement. 10. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 24. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., p. 40. 13. For instance, during the Reconstruction era the Republican Party attempted to expand its constituency but it was interested only in extending the vote to blacks (and not to women), arguably because it hoped that blacks, if enfranchised by the Republican Party, would repay them with votes, whereas it may have felt that women, if enfranchised, would vote the way their husbands did. Furthermore, the Republican Party may have realized that it could get only one group enfranchised at a time and that to add women to the mix was to risk getting nothing at all. 14. McAdam, Political Process, p. 70. 15. Tarrow, Power in Movement. 16. David Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1972). 17. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion; McAdam, Political Process; Jenkins and Perrow, ‘Insurgency’; Tarrow, Power in Movement. 18. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 136. 2 Theoretical context

A number of current theories attempt to explain the relations between social movements and political elites, including when social movements gain access to political elites and when political elites will be responsive to social movements. Most prominent among these are resource mobilization and political process theory/political opportunity theory. While exploring the literature concerning social movement-political elite relations we must also examine the process by which movements come into existence, maintain themselves and disperse. This will aid in understanding the questions regarding social movement-political elite relations. The three schools of thought that deal with questions of emergence, maintenance and dispersion are the classical, resource mobilization and political process/political opportunity schools.

The classical model

The classical model emerged after the Second World War. This model is a psychological based model of discontent. It encompasses a number of different variations including mass society (Kornhauser), collective behaviour (Smelser; Turner and Killian), rising expectations (Davies) and relative deprivation (Gurr).1 Though differences exist among these they all share a few common assumptions. All believe that a social movement is the result of some structural strain in society that leads to a disrupted psychological state in individuals and ultimately the creation of a social movement. Structural strain can be the result of such social changes as industrialization, rapid urbanization, economic depressions/recessions and war. Structural strain fosters feelings of tension and alienation from society. Members of society attempt to ameliorate these psychological tensions by coming together and forming a social movement. As Kornhauser argues, ‘social atomization engenders strong feelings of alienation and anxiety, and therefore the disposition to engage in extreme behavior to escape from these tensions’.2 Smelser echoes this sentiment, arguing, ‘some form of strain must be present if an episode of collective behavior is to occur. The more severe the strain, moreover, the more likely is such an episode to appear.’3 Social movement formation is seen to be the result of a need to relieve psychological tensions rather than the desire to achieve a political goal. As McAdam comments, ‘the motivation for movement participation is held to be based not Political women 8 so much on the desire to attain political goals as on the need to manage the psychological tensions of a stressful social situation’.4 Oberschall argues that classical theory (or breakdown theory as he calls it) is in agreement on three central propositions: 1. Social movements, religious sects and extremist groups, as well as manifestations of individual disorganization (e.g. crime, suicide, divorce, mental illness, etc.) will flourish in periods of rapid social change and dislocation. 2. The greater the hardship from dislocation, the higher the indices of disorganization, and in turn, the greater the number of movements and sects, and the more numerous their adherents. 3. The most uprooted, isolated and dissatisfied people are the most likely adherents of movements and sects, as well as the most likely to engage in crime, commit suicide, experience mental breakdown, and the like.5 Eventually, Oberschall notes, reformers, elites and governments restore stability to the system through the creation of new institutions, and uprooted individuals forge new bonds that return their sense of well-being. As this process of healing takes place, participation in social movements, sects and such decreases (and eventually disappears), as they no longer serve any purpose.6 Also within the classical school is pluralism. In the United States, pluralists argue that the institutional make-up of the country renders the system highly permeable and responsive to all interests. In the pluralist tradition, all groups will attain recognition at some time, and no specific portion of society wields disproportionate power. Every minority will eventually become part of the majority. This ensures openness and responsiveness. As Dahl argues:

I defined the ‘normal’ American political process as one in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision … When I say that a group is heard… I mean that one or more officials are not only ready to listen to the noise, but expect to suffer in some significant way if they do not placate the group, its leaders, or its most vociferous members… Thus the making of governmental decisions is not a majestic march of great majorities united upon certain matters of basic policy. It is the steady appeasement of relatively small groups.7

Thus, any group may enter the political system, and no group is banned from participating. This model cannot explain why social movements emerge. According to the pluralist model, challenges to the existing order are unnecessary; thus, social movements are unnecessary. Since the classical school views social movement activity as spontaneous behaviour by discontented individuals it does not address social movement maintenance, success and interaction with political elites. Rather, the classical school argues that social movements follow a natural life cycle from spontaneous development to diffusion or institutionalization (e.g. as an interest group). As Jenkins notes, ‘in most classical analyses, social movements are seen as inevitably undergoing an endogenously Theoretical context 9 determined natural development or life cycle leading from unstructured spontaneity to ossification and collapse or institutional accommodation’.8 The first, and most obvious, objection to classical theories of insurgency is the supposed link between strain and the emergence of collective action. Strain is usually present in society, and yet social movements are not always present. As Turner and Killian argue, ‘there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement…’9 And yet despite the continued existence of discontent social movements are not always present. It becomes problematic that strain alone is enough to foster the emergence of social movements. As McAdam argues, ‘at best system strain is a necessary, but insufficient, cause of social movements’.10 Second, the classical theorists would have us believe that social movements erupt spontaneously with no cause, apart from dislocation, and no organizational base. In their model, some form of social disruption leads to dislocation and anomie and results in collective challenges. They do not analyse the context that led to the movement, which allowed it to build, nor do they recognize some of the necessary prerequisites for movement emergence: solidarity, organization and opportunity. Instead, movements are spontaneous occurrences, composed of alienated individuals who find each other and rebel. Furthermore, there is little discussion of how isolated, discontented individuals come to work together. Isolated individuals do not a social movement make. As McAdam argues, ‘isolated individuals do not emerge, band together, and form movement groups. Rather…it is within established interactional networks that social movements develop.’11 It becomes clear that the picture painted by the classical theorists is inadequate as an explanation of social movement emergence, maintenance and diffusion and provides no insight into their interaction with political elites. Classical theory is useful to this analysis because it forces one to seek other ways to explain social movement emergence, and what their relations with political elites will be like. Social movements do gain access to and response from political elites. It is unlikely that this would occur if social movements were spontaneous groups, with short life-spans, and composed of irrational individuals. Since political elites do grant access and respond to some social movements, it would be useful to understand under what conditions they occur. Finally, only by studying classical theory can one understand why resource mobilization theory and political process/political opportunity theory emerged.

Resource mobilization

Resource mobilization (RM) theory emerged in the 1970s, largely in response to the perceived inability of the classical theorists to explain the eruption of social movements in the 1960s. It became clear to scholars (as quoted previously) that there always exists enough discontent in society to supply the mass base for a movement. RM theorists sought to answer when this discontent transformed itself into a movement. There are a number of resource mobilization theorists, including Zald, McCarthy, Jenkins, Perrow and Piven. They frequently espouse varying models. Some general themes, however, run through all strands of RM theory.12 Political women 10

RM theorists do not like the classical school’s focus on the psychological state of individuals. RM theory views actors as (Downsian) rational, not as discontented, anomic individuals acting out their inner confusion.13 This is one of the major contributions of RM theory to the social movement literature. Furthermore, RM theorists argue that the focus on the psychological state of actors has been at the expense of other crucial aspects of collective action. As McCarthy and Zald comment, ‘the heavy focus upon the psychological state of the mass of potential movement supporters within a collectivity has been accompanied by a lack of emphasis upon the processes by which persons and institutions from outside of the collectivity under consideration become involved’.14 RM theory argues that social movements require organization and a hefty supply of continuous resources to emerge and maintain themselves.15 Simply put, movements arise when there is an increased level of prosperity in society. Increased prosperity brings excess wealth that individuals and groups are willing to donate to the social movement of their choice. ‘As the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite publics increases, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to the social movement sector increases.’16 Thus, movements are involved in a competition for sponsors, and the movement that survives is the one capable of continually attracting resources (people, money, sponsorship, etc.). Once this age of prosperity comes to a close, so too will most social movements. Another requisite for social movement emergence is social movement entrepreneurs. These issue entrepreneurs are professional organizers who identify a sector of discontents and organize them into a social movement. As McCarthy and Zald argue, ‘grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations’.17 Perrow and Jenkins found support for this hypothesis in their analysis of farm workers’ movements. They argue that ‘the impetus for both [movements] came from the interjection…of a professionally trained cadre backed by outside sponsors. Farm worker discontent remained unexpressed in any organized way until outside organizers arrived on the scene.’18 These entrepreneurs then serve as the leadership of the movement and chart the course the movement will follow.19 RM theorists view the role of political elites as positive. They argue that social movements also require external allies to gain access to political elites. Social movements need political elites to be, if not supportive, at least neutral regarding social movement goals. If many political elites oppose a movement, then it will not be able to gain policy success. If many political elites are supportive, or at least neutral, however, then a movement has at least a chance of policy success. Elite neutrality means that social movements will not meet with repression, and that elites may not have an established position in opposition to the movement. As Perrow and Jenkins observe in their analysis of two farm workers’ movements, ‘our evidence shows that…a successful challenge depended upon the intervention of established liberal organizations and the neutrality of political elites’.20 There is no discussion of co-optation, which is not surprising given the positive view of political elite involvement. Upon examination of RM theory, one discovers a number of contributions and points of contention. The major contribution, as previously mentioned, is its recognition that social movement actors are rational individuals. RM theory also makes a very clear and useful differentiation between the social movement and its organization(s). This differentiation helps one identify the actors that Theoretical context 11 make up a social movement. The organization that frequently develops in a social movement is called the social movement organization or SMO. McCarthy and Zald define it as ‘a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a counter movement and attempts to implement those goals’.21 From informal, personal networks to full-fledged formal national directorates, most social movements have several constituent formal organizations. These formal organizations direct the activities of their respective constituents and of the social movement as a whole. These organizations frequently take the form of interest groups (for instance the Sierra Club would be considered an SMO of the environmental movement) and lobby the government for the social movement’s goals. In general, these organizations form out of existing networks of individuals in the movement. Finally, RM theory is particularly useful in explaining the emergence and maintenance of certain social movements—those with SMOs that closely resemble or are in the process of becoming interest groups. At the same time, however, it does little to explain those social movements that do not have SMOs that resemble interest groups. For instance, RM theory has trouble explaining the poor people’s movements during the depression that Piven and Cloward examine. The movements they examine had no SMOs, existed during a period of economic privation (not prosperity), and yet were successful in attaining their demands.22 A primary point of contention concerning RM theory is that it grants little to no role to the mass base in the generation of collective action. As McAdam notes, ‘most versions of the model contain an implicit assertion of powerlessness on the part of most segments of the population’.23 Instead, social movements emerge when professional issue entrepreneurs decide the resources exist for the emergence and maintenance of a social movement.24 McAdam and Perrow both question this assertion in their separate analyses of the civil rights movement. As Perrow notes, ‘the leadership of both of these key initial phases of the movement was black…’25 Second, RM theory gives too much credit to elites and outside organizations in the emergence of social movements. In RM theory, elites (political and otherwise) are portrayed as active supporters and facilitators of social movements. Jenkins and Perrow argue that a main reason for the success of the farm workers’ movement was the ‘massive outpouring of support, especially from liberals and organized labor’.26 As McAdam notes, ‘we are left to conclude that elite funding sources (foundations, government agencies, etc.) are willing, even aggressive, sponsors of social insurgency’.27 Such an assumption does not seem probable given the challenging nature of most social movements—elites in the United States do not normally support and fuel disruption of the status quo (although they do channel people into orderly protest). This is a far too rosy picture painted of the relationship between political elites and social movements. This assumption of elite support, however, does not appear so odd if one examines the groups that many RM theorists classify as social movements. For instance, McCarthy and Zald analyse Common Cause, the American Friends Service Committee and the Fellowship of Reconciliation.28 These organizations are interest groups and public interest lobbies—they may have developed out of a social movement, but they do not have the mass base that most social movements have—people who believe they are part of a movement, even if they do not belong to an organization.29 Thus, the assumption that elites are active supporters and catalysts of social movements is not surprising, given the Political women 12 groups analysed. As McAdam argues, ‘the limits of the model’s applicability stem from the failure of its proponents adequately to differentiate organized change efforts generated by excluded groups and by established polity members’.30 Finally, there is the somewhat tenuous link between increasing prosperity and the emergence of social movements. As Perrow notes, ‘the civil rights movements emerged…before any rise in prosperity and without any increase in activity from the churches and foundations’.31 If an increase in prosperity was a necessary pre-requisite for social movement emergence, then the RM theorists are hard pressed to explain the rise of movements during periods of economic adversity, such as the depression of the 1930s. Piven and Cloward cite the emergence of a number of movements during this period, including the unemployed workers’ movement and the industrial workers’ movement.32 Finally, we would also expect to see movements disappear with a decrease in prosperity. Costain’s research on the women’s movement shows that this is decidedly not the case— although the movement is not the same as it was in the 1960s or early 1970s, it certainly has not disappeared, despite the recession of the 1980s.33 Resource mobilization theory is pertinent to this research because it informs the central debate regarding the relations between social movements and political elites. RM theory sees these relations as generally positive and mutually beneficial, irrespective of the political conditions. They do note that political elites may not always be supportive of a social movement’s goal, but they do not explore under what conditions they are, or are not, supportive.

Political process/political opportunity theory

Many of the early adherents of political process theory were RM theorists. They subscribed to the basic tenets of RM but recognized the need to examine the political environment in which a social movement emerges and grows (see Tilly 1978, Oberschall 1993, Gamson 1975, and Jenkins and Perrow 1977). The movement away from RM developed with theorists who placed more emphasis upon the political environment, and less upon the resources mobilized. As Costain notes in her use of political process to analyse the women’s movement, ‘Political process theory sees the political system as the crucial determinant of the movement’s timing and success within a forbidding environment.’34 Concomitantly, a subset of political process theorists began to analyse social movements in the context of the ‘political opportunity structure’ (POS) in which they emerged. Political opportunity theorists generally fall into two camps: those who analyse relatively stable aspects of the POS (such as institutions, state strength, political party system), and those who analyse fluid, changing aspects of the POS (i.e., political alignments, level of unity among elites). The fluid nature of the POS was initially discussed by Lipsky who, in analysing protest in city politics, asked, ‘is it not sensible to assume that the system will be more or less open to specific groups at different times and in different places? If this is so, research should be directed toward building theory which will help in identifying those conditions and characteristics which accompany system responsiveness.’35 Theoretical context 13

Other theorists analysing the fluid aspects of the POS include Piven and Cloward, and Perrow and Jenkins, who argue that the political environment in which movements arise and grow shapes their effectiveness.36 McAdam, Tarrow, Jenkins, Costain, and Maguire further utilize and expand upon the fluid nature of the POS.37 Though formulations differ, the main variables discussed as defining the political opportunity structure include ‘the degree of openness or closure of the polity; the stability or instability of electoral forces; the presence or absence of allies and support groups; and divisions within the elite or its tolerance or intolerance of protest’.38 According to these theorists, the POS may change as a result of any number of societal disturbances that disrupt the political establishment. As McAdam argues: ‘The point is that any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities. Among the events and processes likely to prove disruptive of the political status quo are wars, industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic changes.’39 Any of these processes may spark changes in the political opportunity structure because they disrupt the balance of power within the polity. They in turn reveal weaknesses in the governing coalition, thus encouraging individuals to act. As Tarrow argues, ‘Social movements form when ordinary citizens…respond to changes in opportunities that lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies and show where elites and authorities are vulnerable.’40 Eisenger initially proposed the concept of a stable POS when analysing the structure of protest in American cities. He argues that: ‘Such factors as the chief executive, the mode of aldermanic election, the distribution of social skills and status, the degree of social disintegration, taken individually or collectively, serve in various ways to obstruct or facilitate citizen activity in pursuit of political goals.’41 Tilly then adopted the notion of a stable POS. He argues that the POS for challengers is dependent upon the structure of political institutions and the relative positioning of other actors in the polity.42 Kitschelt also adopted the notion of a stable POS. He looks at a nation’s institutions and argues that the POS is determined by the political output structures (e.g., how the state translates demands into policy. The state is then characterized as either ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ and the political input structures (e.g. the type of legislature, the number of political parties, etc.) make the system either ‘open’ or ‘closed’).43 The POS structure determines a social movement’s experience in a country because every country is marked by differing degrees of permeability determined by its input and output structures.44 Katzenstein and Mueller have compiled recent work on stable aspects of the POS. They conclude that their research has shown that certain types of political parties are more detrimental to social movement success.45 Specifically, parties of the left tend to co- opt social movements. Finally, work by Meyer has pointed to the Madisonian structure of the United States government as conducive to social movement access to the political system, due to the high degree of permeability granted to it by the framers.46 He further notes that this permeability tends to fragment, co-opt and dissipate social movements. The responsiveness and accessibility of government leaves social movements with no purpose, and leads to their institutionalization as interest groups.47 The POS alone, however, does not account for the emergence of social movements. Social movements emerge when a favourable interaction between external, Political women 14 environmental factors (i.e. the POS) and internal factors, singular to the movement occurs.48 Internal factors include such things as the level of indigenous organization (personal networks) of the aggrieved population and the level of collective consciousness of the aggrieved population—the notion that something is wrong and can be changed through collective efforts. As McAdam concludes:

What seems to account for the generation of black insurgency in the mid 1950s are the three factors discussed in connection with the political process model. First…the ‘structure of political opportunities’ confronting blacks gradually improved during the period from 1930–1954, thus affording insurgents more leverage with which to press their demands. Second, this expansion in political opportunities contributed to a growing sense of political efficacy within the black population as insurgents came to redefine existing conditions as subject to change through collective action. And third, with the simultaneous growth of three institutions—the black churches and colleges, and NAACP chapters—the southern black population developed the indigenous organizational strength needed to mount and sustain a social movement.49

Tarrow, however, highlights the importance of opportunities, arguing that grievances and resources are of little use without opportunities, ‘for if it is political opportunities that translate the potential for movement into mobilization, then even groups with mild grievances and few internal resources may appear in movement, while those with deep grievances and dense resources—but lacking opportunities—may not’.50 The maintenance of a social movement is seen to be dependent on a continuation of those circumstances that led to its emergence. As Jenkins argues, ‘in general, a straightforward continuation of the favorable conditions that lead to the emergence of a sustained challenge creates the most favorable circumstances for its further development and success’.51 Jenkins further argues, however, that opportunities alone are not sufficient for a social movement to attain its goals; it must also have ‘effective strategies’, i.e. ‘opportunities without effective strategies are like thoroughbred horses with inexperienced jockeys, their potentials will be unmatched by successes at the finish line’.52 McAdam mirrors this sentiment, arguing that the same mix of internal and external resources that shaped a movement’s emergence will condition its development.53 Some political opportunity theorists argue that to maintain themselves movements must also attain some level of internal organization.54 Without internal organization, movements lack focus and direction, and will eventually diffuse. McAdam argues that ‘for the movement to survive, insurgents must be able to create a more enduring organizational structure to sustain insurgency’.55 This view is in direct contrast to that of Piven and Cloward, who argue that organization is not necessary for reforms to be implemented by elites—in fact they find that most movements attain their greatest gains before organization and that organization generally leads to the diffusion of a movement (i.e., elites co-opt potential insurgents and mainstream them).56 For instance, in analysing the unemployed workers’ movement of the 1930s, Piven and Cloward conclude that ‘instead of exploiting the possibilities of the time by pushing turbulence to its outer limits, the leaders of the unemployed set about to Theoretical context 15 build organization and to press for legislation, and in so doing, they virtually echoed the credo of officialdom itself’.57 Also, regarding the industrial workers’ movement, they conclude, ‘the unorganized disruptions of industrial workers in the 1930s produced some political gains, but the organized electoral activities of the unions could not sustain them’.58 According to Piven and Cloward, movements that develop any organizational structure play into the hands of the political elite. Political elites attempt to quell disruption by channelling a movement’s energy into legitimate forms of political behaviour by offering symbolic concessions; this task is decidedly easier if there are movement leaders to whom elites can appeal. Leaders become obsessed with maintenance of the movement, view concessions from political elites as facilitating the maintenance of the movement, and thus lose sight and grasp of the energy and potential of the movement. Concessions from elites, as well as the efforts to integrate the leaders into the system (which isolates them from potential supporters) work to create the image of a benevolent and responsive government. Support for the movement diminishes among the public, and the tide of public opinion begins to turn against the movement.59 Overall, political process and political opportunity theorists argue that social movements will gain access to political elites when the political opportunity structure is open(ing). As previously noted, what these theorists lack is a satisfactory operationalization of the variables that compose the political opportunity structure. Furthermore, political process/political opportunity theory (both fluid and stable POS theorists) does not present a unified voice on the relationship between political elites and social movements. Piven and Cloward argue that interaction with political elites (or relying on external resources they may provide) leads to co-optation of movement leaders as political elites attempt to channel the movement’s disruptive energies into legitimate forms of political behaviour.60 They further note that not only do political elites attempt to co-opt leaders, they also ‘transform the political climate which makes protest possible’ by portraying an image of government benevolence and responsiveness.61 Tarrow argues that the normal path of a social movement is towards either total diffusion or institutionalization (i.e., as an interest group or political party).62 Diffusion may result when a movement adopts ever increasing levels of violence to voice its demands—this is met either by repression from authorities, thus diffusion, or it divides the movement (i.e., some will not believe violence is the answer), thus diffusing its energy. Institutionalization results when movements abandon their disruptive tactics in attempts to gain concrete reforms for their adherents. As Tarrow argues, ‘as the excitement of the disruptive phase of a movement dies… movements institutionalize their tactics and attempt to gain concrete benefits for their supporters through negotiation and compromise—a route that often succeeds at the cost of transforming the movement into a party or interest group’.62 But all is not lost, the transformation of a movement into an interest group is not an unwanted occurrence—it is a positive transformation and leaves in its wake politically socialized people, changes in political culture and alterations in political institutions and practices.64 Thus, interaction with political elites is inevitable during a social movement’s existence. Furthermore, this interaction is not viewed as an evil to be avoided, but rather something to be skilfully navigated. McAdam argues that interaction with political elites becomes a necessity as the maintenance of a movement requires resources well beyond those available from the Political women 16 indigenous base.65 Leaders must seek external sources of support. External support from political and non-political elites, however, ‘grants considerable control over movement affairs to the source from which the resources are obtained’.66 Thus, leaders end up pursuing goals acceptable to movement sponsors, which are not generally the same as those that the movement initially formed to pursue. McAdam argues that co-optation is avoidable, but does not offer clear insight how. In Costain’s analysis of the women’s movement, she finds that movements get co- opted by political elites at certain points in time depending on the origination of policy initiatives: ‘movements get co-opted…as legislative objectives that originate in Congress pull them in politically orthodox directions. Movements are also capable of pushing policies through Congress, largely through their impact on public opinion.’67 Movements are most likely to have the upper hand and thus legislative initiative and public support with political elites, when political opportunities render the government weakened (e.g., when there is some combination of unstable political alignments, competing elites, political parties are searching for new constituents, etc.), thus shifting the balance of power.68 Furthermore, Costain argues that the women’s movement, in choosing to pursue the ERA primarily, was not co-opted by government. Instead, she concludes that the women’s movement, due to its lack of hierarchy and thus lack of a unified voice, was amenable to pressure from the government to pursue the goal of equality (i.e., ERA and not special needs legislation like day care funding).69 Though the issue of social movement organization is of great importance to understanding the fate of a social movement, the situation described by Costain certainly sounds like co-optation. Costain’s research is a start in clarifying the variables that effect political elite-social movement interaction. Further clarification is necessary, however. Political opportunity theory is useful to this research because it can clear up when a social movement will have more access, response and increased leverage with political elites—political elites may be more responsive to social movements during an open political opportunity structure. More research is necessary, however, on the specific aspects of the political opportunity structure that affect social movement access to political elites. This research attempts to define and operationalize the specific aspects of the POS that affect the relations between a social movement and political elites. Despite specifics in and among all the models discussed, it appears that two views emerge regarding the interaction between political elites and social movements. On one side is a positive view of this interaction—political elites may be active supporters of social movements, not compromising movement goals (Jenkins, McCarthy and Zald, Perrow and Jenkins) or they may be an inevitable occurrence, to be avoided if possible (McAdam), or to be accepted as the normal course of cycles of protest (Tarrow). On the flip side is an uncompromisingly negative view of this interaction—elites co-opt movement leaders in attempts to quell their disruptive politics and in doing so initiate a downward spiral of diffusion of the movement—disruptive politics coupled with no organizational structure is the path to follow (Piven and Cloward). This research attempts to show that both RM theory and political opportunity/ political process theory are useful, when parts of both are combined. As RM theory argues, political elites can be useful (and necessary) to the attainment of the goals of a social movement, but it cannot be assumed that political elites are capricious in their decision Theoretical context 17 when to be helpful. Political process/political opportunity theory is useful at this point because it attempts to identify political conditions under which political elites are more likely to be helpful to a social movement. The terms are not adequately operationalized, however, and there is no agreement when, or even whether, relations between social movement and political elites are beneficial for social movements. This research attempts to meld and build on various aspects of both theories in an attempt better to understand the relations between social movements and political elites. Furthermore, the research questions/hypotheses, outlined in Chapter 1, emerge directly from the literature discussed in this chapter. The indicators used to study these questions are discussed in Chapter 3.

Notes 1. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959); Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Ralph H.Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1957); James C.Davies, ‘The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion’, in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969); Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). 2. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, p. 32. 3. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, p. 48. 4. McAdam, Political Process, p. 9. 5. Anthony Oberschall, Social Movements (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers, 1993), p. 18. 6. Ibid. 7. Robert A.Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 145–6. 8. Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency, p. 21. 9. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behavior, 2nd edn (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 251. 10. McAdam, Political Process, p. 11. 11. Ibid., p. 15. 12. Perrow argues that RM theory has two strands, which he labels RM I and RM II. He terms RM I a political process model and he includes Oberschall, Tilly and Gamson as its devotees (William A.Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1975). Formulated by McCarthy and Zald in 1973, RM II is oriented towards an economic model. Though this division sounds useful, this analysis will seek to highlight some of the common themes that run through both strands. Charles Perrow, ‘The Sixties Observed’, in The Dynamics of Social Movements Mayer Zald and John D.McCarthy (eds) (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1979). 13. Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency, p. xiii. 14. John D.McCarthy and Mayer N.Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, in Social Movements in an Organizational Society, Mayer N. Zald and John D.McCarthy (eds) (New Brunswick, NJ and Oxford: Transaction Books, 1987), p. 17. 15. Turner and Killian, Collective Behavior, p. 251. 16. McCarthy and Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization’, p. 25. 17. Ibid., p. 18. 18. Jenkins and Perrow, ‘Insurgency’, p. 252. Political women 18

19. For the relevance of ‘outsiders’ to the emergence of social movements, see also Gary T.Marx and Michael Useem, ‘Majority Involvement in Minority Movements: Civil Rights, Abolition and Untouchability’, Journal of Social Issues 27, no. 3 (1971), pp. 81–104. 20. Jenkins and Perrow, ‘Insurgency’, p. 251. 21. McCarthy and Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization’, p. 20. 22. Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements. 23. McAdam, Political Process, p. 22. 24. McCarthy and Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization’. 25. Perrow, ‘The Sixties Observed’, p. 202. 26. Jenkins and Perrow, ‘Insurgency’, p. 264. 27. McAdam, Political Process, p. 25. 28. McCarthy and Zald, Social Movements, p. 22. 29. The National Organization for Women (NOW) is an interest group, but it is part of a mass- based social movement composed of many different organizations and informal groups. 30. McAdam, Political Process, p. 24. 31. Perrow, ‘The Sixties Observed’, p. 202. 32. Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements. 33. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion. 34. Ibid., p. 12. 35. Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, p. 14. 36. Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements; Jenkins and Perrow, ‘Insurgency’. 37. McAdam, Political Process; Sidney Tarrow, ‘Struggling to Reform: Social Movements and Policy Change During Cycles of Protest’, Western Societies Occasional Paper no. 15, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1983. Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest (Ithaca, NY: Western Societies Program Occasional Paper no. 21, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1989); Tarrow, Power in Movement; Jenkins The Politics of Insurgency; Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion; Diarmuid Maguire, ‘Opposition Movements and Opposition Parties: Equal Partners or Dependent Relations in the Struggle for Power and Reform’, in The Politics of Social Protest, pp. 199–228. J.Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 199–228. 38. Tarrow, Struggle, Politics and Reform, p. 34 citing Jenkins and Perrow, ‘Insurgency’. 39. McAdam, Political Process, p. 41. 40. Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 18. 41. Eisenger, ‘The Conditions of Protest Behavior’, p. 11. 42. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA, Amsterdam, London: Addison-Wesley, 1978), pp. 98–100. 43. Herbert P.Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1 (1986), pp. 57–85. 44. Ibid. 45. Mary Fainsod Katzenstein and Carol McClurg Mueller, The Women’s Movements of the United States and Western Europe (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1987). 46. David Meyer, ‘Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political Opportunity and the End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement’, Sociological Forum 8, no. 2 (1993), pp. 157–79. 47. Ibid. 48. McAdam, Political Process, pp. 39–40. 49. Ibid., p. 230. 50. Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 18. 51. Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency, p. 22. 52. Ibid., p. 228. Theoretical context 19

53. McAdam, Political Process, p. 52. 54. See ibid.; Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency; and Tarrow, Power in Movement. 55. McAdam, Political Process, p. 54. 56. Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements. 57. Ibid., p. 91. 58. Ibid., p. 175. 59. Ibid., p. 34. 60. Ibid, p. 30. 61. Ibid., p. 34. 62. Tarrow, Power in Movement. 63. Ibid., p. 112. 64. Ibid., p. 172. 65. McAdam, Political Process. 66. Ibid., p. 55. 67 Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 134. 68. Ibid., p. xv. 69. Ibid., p. 138. 3 Operationalization of terms and methodology

This chapter provides definitions of the terms used in this book, as well as outlining the methods used to conduct the research. It also details where the data were obtained, and why specific measures were chosen.

Definitions

I adopt Tarrow’s definition of a social movement as ‘collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities’.1 This definition captures several important elements of social movements. First, the notion of a collective challenge highlights the outsider status of social movements. As McAdam notes when using Gamson’s notion of challengers, ‘excluded groups, or challengers, to use Gamson’s term, are groups whose interests are routinely “organized out” of institutionalized political deliberations because of their lack of bargaining leverage’.2 Social movements are not political insiders or accepted members of the institutionalized political system. To attain their goals they must challenge elites, authorities and the status quo. Also, this definition’s focus on common purposes and solidarity aids in explaining why people would take part in a social movement. A common purpose unites potential members and encourages them to challenge elites, authorities and the status quo, while solidarity translates this common purpose into action.3 Furthermore, it helps us differentiate movements from other forms of collective action, such as riots, which may have a common purpose but infrequently have any solidarity or sustained interaction with any elites. Political elites are those individuals who are either elected or appointed members of the institutional political system at the national, state, or local level, and who also have the ability to exercise decision-making power in the political system. This includes, but is not limited to, elected representatives, heads of state and bureaucratic leaders. CEOs of corporations, religious leaders or the like are not included (although they may control important resources such as money, manpower and name recognition) because they do not have decision-making power. Such non-political elites do not make the ultimate decision as to whether or not a social movement is repressed or its desired goals (bills Operationalization of terms and methodology 21 passed, executive orders issued, etc.) conceded. Non-political elites are not generally capable of causing the policy changes in the system that social movements are pursuing. Non-political elites, however, are discussed in light of their assistance as allies of social movements. Co-optation is defined as a situation where a social movement’s leaders are drawn into institutionalized politics by political elites, and/or where a movement accepts the aid of political elites and finds its goals placed on the back burner or diluted by those political elites.4 Political opportunity structure is a term used to describe the political climate and institutional arrangements of a political system. It is composed of the level of electoral stability, level of unity among elites (the degree of party unity), mass opinion, and powers granted to party leaders. Regarding Congress the POS is classified as open if all four indicators of the POS fall on the open side (low party unity, high electoral instability, rules granting no power of appointment, etc., to party leaders, favourable mass opinion) (see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). It is classified as closed if all four indicators fall on the closed side (mid-high party unity, normal or extremely stable electoral conditions, unfavourable mass opinion and powerful party leaders). The POS is classified as modified open if three of the indicators fall in the open category, and it is classified as modified closed if three of the indicators fall in the closed category. It is classified as mixed if the indicators fall two and two. Regarding the presidency the POS is composed of two measures of electoral instability and mass opinion (there is no measure of party unity for the presidency and there are no party leaders for the President). The POS is classified as open when both measures of electoral instability indicate that the President is unsafe/unstable and mass opinion favours the movement issue. The POS is classified as closed when both measures of electoral instability indicate that the President is safe/stable and mass opinion does not favour the movement issue. The POS is modified open when any two of the three measures indicate that the POS is open. And it is modified closed when any two of the three measures indicate that the POS is closed. How these indicators are measured is discussed in the methodology section of this chapter. For purposes of examining the interaction between the women’s movement and each institution of the United States political system I classify each Congress and presidency according to the method above. I recognize that each institution is but one aspect of the POS of the whole political system.

Methodology

This study utilizes the comparative case method to analyse the three waves of the women’s movement in the United States. The focus in each of the waves is on the following: (1) in the first wave—equal rights, and the rumblings of the demand for woman suffrage; (2) in the second wave—the demand for woman suffrage and the beginnings of the push for the ERA; and, (3) in the third wave—the eventual demand for ERA. There is continuity among these waves because each issue sought to expand constitutionally guaranteed rights. Often, moreover, some leaders of one wave went on to be instrumental in the formulation of the next wave. This work utilizes McGlen and Political women 22

O’Connor’s division of the women’s movement into three waves with a few minor adjustments. They divide the movement into 1848–75, 1890–1925, and 1966–present.5 I, too, begin the analysis of the first wave in 1848, but extend it until 1889—the point immediately before which the two separate women’s suffrage organizations, the National Woman Suffrage Association and the American Woman Suffrage Association, decide to stop working separately and merge into one organization dedicated solely to the attainment of woman suffrage. I begin the second wave in 1890 with the formation of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (the merger of the two aforementioned groups), and end it in 1928 with the lapse of the Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act, arguably the point at which the women’s movement went into hibernation (except for some elite-sustained activity). Finally, I begin the third wave in 1960. Though there was no mass-based women’s movement in 1960, John F.Kennedy was elected President and in 1961 he created the President’s Commission on the Status of Women. This commission was designed to show that the ERA was unnecessary, but its ultimate result was to help spawn the women’s movement. Before this time the battle for the ERA was fought primarily by the Women’s Party. Its membership was small, and it focused its efforts on lobbying Congress, not creating a mass-based movement. The President’s Commission brought women together in a forum where they could discuss their problems. It created the notion that the government would be responsive to any demands women might have, it spurred the creation of mini-commissions in the states, and ultimately planted the seeds for a mass-based movement. In 1982, the ERA failed to get the necessary three-quarters of the states to ratify it. Over the next few years there were a few failed attempts to get the ERA through Congress again. The failure of the ERA, the inability to get it through Congress again, along with the conservative ascendance to the White House, diffused the movement’s energy. The movement began focusing it energies elsewhere, and the movement quietened down. Thus, 1985 is the last year of the wave. There was still activity by women, but the movement had no rallying cry to motivate the troops. The analysis draws on both qualitative and quantitative data from each of the three periods to assess systematically, and to compare, the opportunity structure, and degree of access and elite responsiveness of each period. Sources of primary documentation about the three waves of the women’s movement include: the Library of Congress, which houses the papers of the National American Woman Suffrage Association, Carrie Chapman Catt and various presidential papers; the National Archives, which holds petitions and other documents submitted to congressional committees; and the Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library, at Radcliffe College, which houses the papers of the National Organization for Women and the Women’s Equity Action League. I analysed these papers to examine each group’s goals, internal operations, tactics, attitudes and anecdotal evidence of access to and response from Congress and the Presidents. To measure the political opportunity structure for each wave, I examined the following: (1) Party unity scores in Congress. Party unity scores are the percentage of times 50 per cent of one party opposes 50 per cent of the other party on roll call votes. The sources of this data are in Appendix A. Party unity is used as one indicator of the POS because it is a measure of party strength. If members are voting together frequently then parties are said to be strong or unified. A unified party may present a barrier to Operationalization of terms and methodology 23 social movement issues—members are more likely to vote the party line if parties are unified (or incur the wrath of party leaders). If the issue is not part of the party line then it will have trouble gaining enough support. On the other hand, if parties are not unified, members may feel free to vote as they please, and thus a social movement issue may stand more of a chance. For these reasons high levels of party unity are seen as unhelpful to social movements, and low levels of party unity are seen as helpful to social movement issues, because members may be more willing or able to vote their personal preferences. For each wave I calculated a mean and standard deviation from the scores. Scores that were one standard deviation, or more, above the mean were considered indicative of high party unity. Scores that were one standard deviation, or more, below the mean were considered indicative of low party unity. Scores that fell in between these two points were considered indicative of middling levels of party unity. High party unity scores contribute to a closed POS, because they indicate that parties are unified, and not amenable to outside issues. Low party unity scores contribute to an open POS, because they indicate that parties are not unified, and thus amenable to outside issues. Middling- level party unity scores also contribute to a closed POS, because they indicate that members are voting together with considerable regularity (that is, generally more than 50 per cent of the time, 50 per cent of one party is opposing 50 per cent of the other), and thus are not as open to outside issues. The specific scores that constitute high, low and middle for each wave are discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. (2) Electoral instability in Congress, another measure of the POS, is defined as the percentage of freshmen in each new Congress. I created a frequency distribution (for each wave) of the number of seats turned over in each election. Those years that were more than one standard deviation above the mean were classified as high turnover years (electorally unstable). Those years that were one standard deviation or more below the mean were considered electorally very stable years. Electoral instability contributes to an open POS, because members will be looking for new/more constituents. Very stable years contribute to a closed POS, because members are not in need of new/more constituents. Those scores that fell in between the two points are considered normal years—where there is neither extreme instability or stability. Such years contribute to a closed POS, because of the general lack of instability. As there exists no pressure to gain new constituents, members will not be as open to outside issues. The specific scores for each wave are discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. (3) Electoral instability in the presidency, another indicator of the POS, is measured by two indicators. First, state presidential returns are one indicator of presidential electoral instability. For each election year the Democratic percentage of the vote in each state was correlated with the preceding election year. Low correlations (below .7) indicate high levels of electoral instability, and thus contribute to an open POS.6 High correlations (.7, or above) indicate low levels of electoral instability, and thus contribute to a closed POS. Presidents are not concerned about their constituency base because it is stable. The second indicator is the national level difference in the percentage of the two-party vote. Small differences (less than six percentage points) indicate electoral instability.7 Electorally unstable years contribute to an open POS because Presidents will be in search of new/more constituents to ensure their re-election. Where both measures indicate electoral instability, the POS during the presidency is classified as open. Political women 24

(4) Another indicator of the POS is the rules governing Congress. The rules analysed are those that grant power to party leaders in both houses (Speaker of the House, Majority Leader, Minority Leader and the whips). These were analysed to determine the institutional barriers facing social movements. For example, I examined the powers granted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who, during certain Congresses, could determine the flow of legislation, committee assignments, appointment of chairs of committees and the creation of new committees, etc. Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives, Senate Manual, Containing the Standing Rules, Orders, Laws and Resolutions Affecting the Business of the U.S. Senate, Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United States, Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, volumes I–XI, and Deschler’s Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, volumes I–XI were used to determine the powers granted to the party leaders during each Congress. When the rules grant powers to party leaders, such as the ability to assign members to committees, appoint chairs, determine flow of legislation and/or recognize speakers on the floor, this contributes to a closed POS because these powers are a potential roadblock for movements. If a party leader has the aforementioned powers, and is not supportive of the social movement issue, then he can use these powers to prevent the issue from getting through Congress. If a party leader supports a social movement’s goal, however, and has these powers, then his powers can be useful to the movement, but, at first, most social movement issues are not mainstream issues that party leaders support. In general, party leaders with the aforementioned powers will pose problems for social movements. When the rules do not grant these powers to party leaders, then this contributes to an open POS. (5) A final indicator of the POS is mass opinion concerning the goal(s) of a social movement. When mass opinion is favourably disposed towards the issue, this contributes to an open POS. Public support is another tool to use on political elites. Public support should help convince them of the prudence of voting for the social movement issue. When mass opinion does not favour the issue, this contributes to a closed POS. Because no public opinion poll data exist for the first and second waves, I used the level of organized group support for the movement’s goal as a surrogate measure of public opinion. For example, when the suffrage movement gained the support of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs in 1914 (with over a million members) and other groups, the goal of woman suffrage could be said to have public support. During the third wave, I used public opinion poll data to Table 3.1 Determinants of POS for Congress

POS Open when Closed when Party unity low normal to high Electoral instability high normal to low Rules in Congress no powers to party leaders powers granted to party leaders Mass opinion favourable unfavourable Operationalization of terms and methodology 25

Table 3.2 Determinants of POS for presidency

POS Open when Closed when Measure A—national vote Difference is less than 6 per Difference is 6 per cent or greater difference cent Measure B—state correlations correlation less than .7 correlation is .7 or greater doesn’t Mass opinion favours issue favour issue determine the mass opinion towards the ERA—the social movement goal under analysis here. When polls indicated 60 per cent or more support for the issue, then this was considered indicative of favourable mass opinion (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Access to Congress (see Table 3.3) is measured by the number and type of groups/people testifying in congressional hearings (for or against the issue) and the number of hearings held in each Congress.8 Hearings are considered a measure of access because Congress does not have to hold hearings on any particular issue/ measure. Committees can pick and choose what bills receive hearings. Thus, if a bill is a subject of a committee or subcommittee hearing, this indicates that the social movement has attained access to Congress. I hypothesize that social movements will receive few to no hearings when the POS in Congress is closed. Whether the group/person is testifying in support of or opposition to the issue, and the number of witnesses in support or opposition testifying is important because, again, the committee decides who will testify. If the committee is opposed to the bill it can invite witnesses who will provide testimony in opposition. Access to the President (see Table 3.3) is measured by the attention paid to women in party platforms, the number of meetings that pro-suffrage or ERA groups have with the President, the number of meetings that other women’s groups, not explicitly working for suffrage or ERA, have with the President, and the creation of specialized offices regarding women. These are considered indicative of access because they indicate that the President is willing to listen to the concerns of the movement. Attention to women in the party platform was determined through an analysis of the party platforms. I was not looking for ‘how much’ attention was paid, but rather to the existence of attention, and what was said. The number of meetings with pro-suffrage or ERA groups was determined by counting the citations to meetings found in the private and Public Papers of the Table 3.3 Determinants of access and response

Indicator Indicator Access Congress: Response Congress: Number of hearings Number of bills introduced Number of witnesses Number of bills reported Number of bills brought to floor Number of bills passed Access President: Response President: Political women 26

Number of meetings with SM groups Number of public pronouncements re: SM issue Number of meetings with women’s groups Number of public pronouncements re: women Special offices created Number of executive orders re: women Attention to women in party platform Number of laws re: women signed

Presidents. In the case of suffrage, it was also determined through an analysis of the six volumes of The History of Woman Suffrage. For ERA, it was also determined by looking through the NOW and WEAL Collections at the Schlesinger Library. The position of groups testifying was determined through analysis of the six volumes of The History of Woman Suffrage and hearing transcripts. The number of meetings with other women’s groups (and their positions) was determined through analysis of the Public Papers of the Presidents, the six volumes of The History of Woman Suffrage, and the papers of the NOW and WEAL collections. A women’s group was rather loosely defined. Any group of women, organized for any purpose, is considered a women’s group here. But, when a President met with ‘women appointees’ this was not considered a women’s group. These women were there together only because they had been invited by the President. Invitation is important, but they are not a group seeking access or response. The creation of special offices/commissions was determined by looking at the executive orders issued and the private and public papers of the Presidents. Though some of these measures of access could be considered measures of response (operationalized below), they have been chosen because they indicate to the social movement the likelihood that it may gain (or has gained) access to that branch of the government. Thus, if a party mentions women in its platform, this is an indicator that the President is approachable on the subject. Congressional response (see Table 3.3) to the social movement is measured by the number of relevant bills introduced, the number of bills that get out of committee, the number of bills brought to the floor, and the number of times bills are passed in one and/or both houses.9 These indicate response because they show that Congress is paying attention to the movement and willing to do something about the movement’s concerns, though in varying degrees. Response is response to the demands of the movement, not to access attained. As discussed in Chapter 1, the introduction of bills, with little other response accompanying it, may be viewed as a co-optive response, most likely under a closed POS. It is politically easier to introduce a bill than to vote for it in committee or on the floor.10 Overall, these indicators show that Congress is not just letting the movement vocalize its problems, but that Congress is actively addressing/ responding to them, though in varying degrees. Presidential response (see Table 3.3) is measured by the number of public pronouncements regarding suffrage or the ERA, the number of public pronouncements regarding women, the number of Executive Orders regarding women and the number of pieces of legislation concerning women signed.11 These indicators show response because they demonstrate that the President is actively doing something about the movement’s concerns. The President is not just meeting with the movement. Rather, he is going on public record as supporting the movement and/or its goals, and paying them more than lip service by enacting legislation or issuing executive orders. Operationalization of terms and methodology 27

The information in Table 3.3 for the third-wave Presidents is taken from the Public Papers of the Presidents. For each President who served during the third wave, I looked under: woman, women, ERA, civil rights, NOW, WEAL and sex discrimination. The following Presidents served during the third wave: Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan. No public papers exist for Presidents during the first and second waves. Thus, I relied on the Presidents’ private papers, collections of their writings and biographies. The private papers are primarily composed of correspondence and are indexed according to personal or organizational names. For each President who served during the first and second waves, I looked under the following names: Susan B.Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, Henry Blackwell, Alice Paul, Anna Howard Shaw, Carrie Chapman Catt, Helen Gardener, National Woman Suffrage Association, American Woman Suffrage Association, National American Woman Suffrage Association and National Women’s Party (for the organizations I also looked under each organization’s initials). The Presidents who served during the first and second waves were: Taylor, Pierce, Buchanan, Lincoln, Johnson, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, Cleveland, Harrison, McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, Harding and Coolidge.

Notes 1. Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 4. 2. McAdam, Political Process, p. 24. 3. Tarrow, Power in Movement, pp. 4–5. 4. This definition encompasses aspects of co-optation used by both Piven and Cloward and McAdam. 5. Nancy E.McGlen and Karen O’Connor, Women, Politics, and American Society (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995). 6. Gerald Pomper uses this method to determine electoral instability. See Gerald Pomper, ‘Classification of Presidential Elections’, Journal of Politics 29 (August 1967), pp. 535–56. 7. J.Mark Wrighton and Peverill Squire, ‘Uncontested Seats and Electoral Competition for the U.S. House of Representatives Over Time’, Journal of Politics 59, no. 2 (May 1997), p. 453. Though they are discussing House elections, the use of 56 per cent as the point at which an elected candidate is considered safe or non-marginal applies to candidates for any office (in a two-party election). 8. For the sources of these, and all the following data, see Appendix A. 9. The sources for these data are discussed in Appendix A. 10. Costain and Costain (in Katzenstein and Mueller, The Women’s Movements, p. 23) also use the number of bills introduced as a measure of congressional response, arguing that ‘Introducing a bill or joint resolution is an easy way for members of Congress to express sympathy and interest in a particular issue area without committing themselves or their staff to spending time or effort working to get the bill passed after it is introduced. Most bills that are introduced constitute a symbolic act by a member of Congress designed to win favor with constituents, special interests or the news media.’ 11. The number of public pronouncements regarding the issue at hand was determined by counting the number of times the President mentioned the issue (found in the private and public papers of the Presidents). If the President discussed ERA twice in one address, this was considered only one public pronouncement, since it was on one occasion. The number of times a President discussed women was determined the same way as for the previous measure. The sources for the executive orders and legislation are in Appendix A. 4 The first wave: 1848–89

This chapter analyses the first wave of the women’s movement: 1848 to 1889. It will discuss why these years were chosen, the state of the political opportunity structure, what type of access and response I expect to find in light of the political opportunity structure, the actual access and response the movement received, and then finally, after each section, a discussion of whether the access and response received was what was expected in light of the political opportunity structure. The year 1848 marked the dawn of the women’s movement (and this wave) because the first woman’s rights convention was held in Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848. This meeting was organized by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, two women working in the abolition movement who were to become leading figures in the struggle for woman’s suffrage. Elizabeth Cady Stanton was born in 1815, the daughter of a lawyer. Her marriage to Henry Stanton, an abolitionist, helped seal her political fate. She became active, with her husband, in the abolition cause and, ultimately, in the drive to secure women their political rights. Lucretia Mott was born on the island of Nantucket in 1793 to a Quaker family. At the age of eighteen she married James Mott, also a Quaker. They became active in the abolition movement and their home became a stop for run-away slaves. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott met for the first time in June of 1840, in London, where they were both delegates to the World’s Anti-Slavery Convention. Though the Seneca Falls conference was held in 1848, the seeds of it were sown in 1840 at the World’s Anti-Slavery Convention in London. Upon their arrival, Stanton and Mott found that women were not permitted to participate as delegates. The British organizers, it appeared, had never intended that women should participate as delegates, as such participation was against English custom.1 This rejection of women as delegates highlighted for Stanton and Mott the need for a woman’s rights meeting and ‘as Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton wended their way arm in arm down Great Queen Street that night…they agreed to hold a woman’s rights convention on their return to America’.2 As Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler, two suffrage activists, argue, ‘thus the unwarranted rejection of properly accredited delegates by the World’s Anti-Slavery Convention, solely because they were women, gave impulse to the organized demand of women…for justice in every sphere of action’.3 The first wave: 1848–89 29

The year 1889 is considered the end of this wave because it marks the end of the separation of the two leading suffrage organizations, the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) and the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA). These two associations merged in 1890 to become the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). The AWSA and NWSA will be discussed in detail later. The creation of the NAWSA marks the beginning of an era. From that point on there was a more united effort by woman suffrage activists to gain the franchise.4 The movement to secure to women their political rights encompassed many separate goals. Those attending the Seneca Falls meeting had drafted and passed a list of demands including ‘equal rights in universities, in the trades and professions; the right to vote; to share in all political offices, honors and emoluments; to complete equality in marriage, to personal freedom, property, wages, children; to make contracts; to sue and be sued; and to testify in courts of justice’.5 The only resolution that was not unanimously adopted was one regarding the elective franchise—many feared it would defeat other demands they viewed as more rational, and make the movement look ridiculous in the eyes of the public.6 Thus, during this wave woman’s rights activists worked towards a variety of aims, with woman suffrage being but one. Before the Civil War, they worked mainly at the state level, attempting to secure changes in property and marital laws. With the end of the Civil War, the question of Negro suffrage took on national political significance. Many woman’s rights activists saw this time of change as an opportunity to gain woman suffrage too. It is at this point that the woman’s rights movement becomes primarily, though not exclusively, a woman’s suffrage movement.

The political opportunity structure

The political opportunity structure (POS) that the woman’s movement faced during this wave differed between the Congress and the presidencies.

Congress The POS for Congress during this wave varied between the two houses. There is no single POS for Congress as a whole. I do not expect the actions of the two houses to mimic one another. The House and the Senate are different bodies, which behave according to different rules, norms and procedures. Though they may react similarly to national electoral trends, it does not follow that their levels of party unity would be similar, or that their party leadership would behave similarly. Each one, too, should interact with outside actors, such as social movements, in divergent ways. During the first wave the POS in the House was fairly closed—fifteen of twenty Congresses were closed and five were modified closed. No Congresses during this wave were open or modified open (see Tables 4.1a and 4.1b). Political women 30

Table 4.1a POS first wave—the House

Congress Party unity* Electoral instability Rules Mass Overall (percentage) (percentage) opinion POS 31 normal some con closed (1849–51) (53.1) Speaker (unfavourable) power** 32 normal same con closed (53.3) 33 unstable same con modified (60.5) closed 34 unstable same con modified (57.5) closed 35 very stable same con closed (40.2) 36 normal same con closed (45.1) 37 normal same con closed (53.9) 38 unstable same con modified (58.1) closed 39 normal same con closed (44.3) 40 normal same con closed (46.0) 41 normal same con closed (49.2) 42 mid (74) normal same con closed (1871–73) (46.5) 43 mid (73) normal same con closed (52.0) 44 mid (71) unstable same con modified (58.0) closed 45 mid (73) normal same con closed (46.6) 46 high (76) normal same con closed (42.3) 47 mid (69) very stable same con closed (31.8) 48 mid (65) normal same con closed The first wave: 1848–89 31

(51.5) 49 mid (67) very stable same con closed (38.0) 50 low (53) very stable same con modified (1887–89) (35.6) closed Sources: see Appendix A. Party unity*=do not have prior to 42nd Congress **=see Table 4.2 for Speaker powers during this wave Table 4.1b POS first wave—the Senate

Congress Party unity* Electoral instability Rules Mass Overall (percentage) (percentage) opinion** POS 31 none no vast con modified (1849–51) powers open 32 same same con modified open 33 same same con modified open 34 same same con modified open 35 same same con modified open 36 same same con modified open 37 same same con modified open 38 same same con modified open 39 same same con modified open 40 same same con modified open 41 same same con modified open 42 same same con modified open 43 same same con modified open 44 same same con modified open Political women 32

45 mid (65) same same con modified (1877–79) open 46 mid (74) same same con modified open 47 high (81) same same con modified open 48 low (64) same same con open 49 low (63) same same con open 50 high (78) same same con modified (1887–89) open Sources: see Appendix A. Mass opinion**=does not affect Senate till direct elections Party unity*=cannot get prior to 45th Congress

The first indicator, party unity in the House, was at middle levels—it was neither high (very unified parties) nor low (disunified parties) for more than one Congress at a time. The mean party unity score during this wave was 69, with a standard deviation of 6.55. Party unity scores of 76 or higher (one standard deviation, or more, above the mean) were considered high and party unity scores of 62 or below (one standard deviation, or more, below the mean) were considered low.7 These middling levels of party unity indicate fairly unified parties, where members toed the party line by voting with the party fairly often. Parties that vote together can be a boon or a bust for issues—if the party looks favourably upon the issue, then party unity is helpful. If the party does not look favorably upon the issue, however, then the issue may have a tough time gaining adherents. The middling levels of party unity indicate that the parties were voting together with some regularity, and thus, along with other measures to be discussed, contributed to the modified closed nature of the POS in the House during this wave. The second indicator is electoral instability, measured by the percentage of freshmen elected to each new Congress. The higher the turnover, the greater the electoral instability. I posited that electoral instability would make members of Congress amenable to social movement issues, since the members would be in search of constituents and their votes. Lack of electoral instability would indicate that members would not be in need of new constituents, and thus not as amenable to social movement issues. Electoral instability in the House fluctuated during this wave, but in only four of twenty Congresses can it be called unstable. The mean electoral instability score during this wave was 48.18, with a standard deviation of 7.77. Electoral instability scores of 55.95 or higher (one standard deviation, or more, above the mean) were considered indicative of electorally unstable years. Scores of 40.41 or less (one standard deviation, or more, below the mean) were considered indicative of electorally very stable years. ‘Normal’ indicates that member turnover was neither very stable (more than one standard deviation below the mean) nor unstable (more than one standard deviation above the mean). ‘Normal’ electoral instability is considered one indicator of a closed POS, since members are not in real need of new constituents. The first wave: 1848–89 33

The overall picture for electoral instability in the House during this wave was one of a lack of electoral instability. In most elections turnover was normal (neither high turnover nor low) or was low. This contributed to the modified closed nature of the POS in the House in this wave. The third indicator of the POS is the House rules. The rules are used to determine the strength of the various party leaders. In the House, the party leader of importance in the first wave is the Speaker. The Majority Leader in the House did not exist before 1899. Before that time the chair of the Ways and Means was seen as the Majority Leader, and from 1899–1919 the Ways and Means chair was officially recognized as the Majority Leader.8 After 1919 the two positions became separate offices. The Minority Leader was always present in the House. The first official whip of the majority party was appointed by Speaker Thomas B. Reed (R-Maine) in the House in 1897. The rules granted the Speaker of the House some important powers during the first wave. He could: • preside at sessions of the House; • preserve decorum and order; • put questions; • decide points of order; • announce the results of divisions and teller votes; • became a member of the Rules Committee (in 1858); • appoint standing and select committee members and their chairs; and • vote in all cases of ballot by the House.9 The power to appoint committee chairs and their members is a tremendous power, because it grants the Speaker a measure of control over members’ voting decisions. Should party members oppose the Speaker’s wishes on a vote then they may find themselves assigned to less prestigious committees, or removed as chairs the next time assignments are made. Similarly (and linked) to party unity, a strong Speaker can be either a help or a hindrance for an issue. Should the Speaker support the issue, then his power to punish can compel votes. Should he not support the issue, however, his power to punish can prevent others in favour from voting for the issue. Thus, along with the rules, the Speaker’s personal preferences must be considered. As mentioned, many social movement issues are not (at least initially) mainstream issues, and thus not in major party platforms (were they mainstream issues there would be little need for a social movement). As a result, social movement issues are, generally speaking, not issues of major concern to Speakers. In sum, when the rules grant party leaders powers, such as those discussed above, then the rules are considered ‘closed’ (see Table 4.2). They will be a Table 4.2 Rules of the House and changes

Congress Rules adopted (or changed from previous)* 30th 1849– Speaker: (in effect by this Congress) 51 1 Standing and select committee chairs appointed by Speaker (Rule X) Political women 34

Dates from 11/23/1804. 2. Standing committee members are appointed by the Speaker (Rule X). Adopted 1/13/1790. 3. He shall preserve order and decorum—may not punish a member but may name his name. If extreme disorder in Committee of Whole he may take chair and restore order without formal rising of the committee (Rule I clause 2). 4. He decides all questions of order subject to an appeal by any member (Rule I clause 4). 5. When two members rise at once the Speaker names who gets to speak first (Rule XIV clause 2). 6. In the absence of a quorum (in Committee of the Whole) 15 members, including the Speaker, may compel the attendance of absent members (Rule XV clause 2a). 7. Refers all public bills to their respective committees and authorized to dispose of business on the Speaker’s table without action by the House—except on House bills with Senate amendments (Rule X and Rule XII). His referrals can be challenged. When House itself refers a bill it can send it to any committee without regard to rules of jurisdiction (Hinds IV section 4375). 31st No pertinent changes 1851– 53 32nd No pertinent changes 1853– 55 33rd No pertinent changes 1855– 57 34th Speaker: 1857– 59 1. First time he becomes member of the Rules Committee. He may appoint members of the Rules Committee and serve as its chairman (Rule X, but also precedent). 35th No pertinent changes 1859– 61 36th No pertinent changes 1861– 63 37th No pertinent changes 1863– 65 38th No pertinent changes 1865– 67 The first wave: 1848–89 35

39th No pertinent changes 1867– 69 40th No pertinent changes 1869– 71 41st No pertinent changes 1871– 73 42nd No pertinent changes 1873– 75 43rd No pertinent changes 1875– 77 44th No pertinent changes 1877– 79 45th No pertinent changes 1879– 81 46th Speaker: 1879– 81 1. Speaker shall appoint all select committee members (Rule X clause 6f, adopted in 1880 but practice had existed since early days of the House, but the House, prior to 1880, had occasionally taken this power from the Speaker). 2. When any member desires to speak he must rise and respectfully address the Speaker (and no one else) and must speak on the topic at hand (Rule XIV clause 1, adopted in 1880 but derives from older rules from 1789 and 1811). In 1881 the Speaker declined to entertain an appeal on his decision of recognition—this practice exists to present times. 3. The Speaker appoints the chair of the Committee of the Whole (Rule XXIII clause 1). Re: Rules Committee: 1. Becomes a standing committee (Rule XI). Speaker first made a member in 1858 (by resolution) (Hind’s IV section 4321). 2. It shall have five members, with the Speaker being one (Rule X). 47th No pertinent changes 1881– 83 48th No pertinent changes 1883– 85 49th No pertinent changes Political women 36

1885– 87 50th No pertinent changes 1887– 89 * All citations of clauses of rules are from H Doc 277 Serial Set number 13585—earlier or later editions of the House Manual may alter the clause number. hindrance to social movement access and response, and indicative of a closed POS. When the rules grant party leaders few powers, as exemplified by the post-1911 House (to be discussed in Chapter 5), then the rules are considered ‘open’. They will not hinder social movement access and response, and will indicate an open POS. It does not appear that Speakers, during the first wave, exercised their power to punish very frequently. They did make assignments of members and chairs to committees, however, thereby moulding the opinion of the committees and making committee members beholden to the Speaker (and his views). These powers afforded to the Speaker, along with middling levels of party unity, and fairly stable electoral conditions, contributed to the modified closed nature of the POS in the House during the first wave. The fourth indicator is mass opinion regarding woman suffrage. There were no opinion polls at this time, thus mass opinion is determined by an analysis of primary and secondary sources, such as The History of Woman Suffrage. Mass opinion is considered to shift, from con to pro suffrage, when a large number of clubs, labour unions and the like, supported woman suffrage. Mass opinion was against woman suffrage during this wave. There was little public support for it, and few clubs or labour unions supported it.10 Graham notes that the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and the National Association of Colored Women were the only associations or clubs to support woman suffrage during the late 1800s and early 1900s.11 Regarding public opinion in the 1860s, McGlen and O’Connor comment, ‘public opinion, including that of most women, was generally negative, and more often than not hostile, toward expanded political rights for women’.12 McGlen and O’Connor also comment that during the next few decades after the 1860s, the women’s rights movement did not meet with much policy success or have public support because ‘their views were simply seen as too radical by many’.13 If mass opinion is in favour of an issue, then this will contribute to an open POS. When mass opinion is in favour of a social movement issue, political elites will be constrained in their actions (need to be responsive), and this will open up the POS. When mass opinion is against a social movement issue, this will contribute to a closed POS, because political elites will be responsive to their constituencies. The state of the POS in the Senate in the first wave is one of modified openness (see Table 4.1b). The POS during eighteen of the twenty Congresses was modified open, and during the other two it was open. One of the indicators, party unity before 1877, was not utilized. There is no compilation of the roll call votes for those years since the specifics of most roll call votes were not recorded. Of the party unity scores available, it fluctuated from a low of 63 to a high of 81. The mean party unity score was 70.8, with a standard deviation of 7.15. Scores of 77.95 or more (one standard deviation, or more, above the mean) are considered high party unity scores. Scores of 63.65 or lower (one standard The first wave: 1848–89 37 deviation, or more, below the mean) are considered low party unity scores. Two Congresses had high party unity scores (47th, 50th), two had mid-level party unity scores (45th, 46th), and two had high-level party unity scores (48th, 49th). Mid-level party unity scores are expected to contribute to a closed POS because they indicate that senators of each party were voting together with considerable regularity. The parties would be unified and not amenable to outside influences. Another indicator is electoral instability. There was no electoral instability during the first wave because senators were not directly elected at the time. I posit that lack of electoral instability makes senators feel safe. They do not need to be responsive, since they fear no reprisal from constituents. Thus, lack of electoral accountability contributes to a closed POS. There were no powers of appointment or bill referral, etc. granted to party leaders since the Senate was (and is) a very egalitarian body, regarding dispersion of powers. In the Senate, before the Civil War, there were no ‘easily identifiable floor leaders…and no formally elected party leaders’.14 It was not until around 1911–13 that the Senate began electing a single Majority and Minority Floor Leader. It was also not until this period that the Senate came to use a whip, with the Democrats adding the whip to their leadership in 1913 and the Republicans in 1915. The lack of rules in the Senate should make senators freer to vote their individual preferences. Because there are so few rules, those who support suffrage have the space/freedom to put it on the agenda. This should contribute to a more open POS for a social movement. The final indicator is mass opinion. As discussed, mass opinion was anti-woman suffrage during this wave. This unfavourable mass opinion should contribute to a closed POS. It does not in the Senate, however; senators were not directly elected during this wave. They had no need to be responsive to mass opinion.15 Thus, unfavourable mass opinion will have no effect on the state of the POS for the Senate during this wave. Overall then, I found a POS in Congress that varies from one house to the other. In the House, the POS was predominantly closed to modified closed. One would expect a social movement to receive little to no access and/or response from the House during this wave.16 Whatever response is given, however, may be co-optive and not concrete. That is, members of Congress may grant response to the movement only to assuage it—the movement will feel as if its issues are being addressed and stop or lessen its pursuit of them. The response, however, will be short-lived or not fully carried out. For example a committee may report a bill, but with no intention of having it called up to the floor for debate and a vote. In the Senate, the POS was modified open. The indicators do not work well for this wave (no electoral instability, no party unity, mass opinion irrelevant), however, and thus the argument that the POS is modified open is a weak one. Nevertheless, one would expect the suffrage movement to receive some access and response from this body. This is primarily due to the lack of rules constraining member action in the Senate. Furthermore, the response should be concrete (favourable committee reports, votes on the floor) since members are freer to do as they choose (no strong leaders). Political women 38

Presidency The POS for the presidencies, during this wave, was predominantly a modified closed one (see Table 4.3). The POS during the first three presidencies (Presidents Tyler, Pierce and Buchanan) and Ulysses S.Grant’s first administration was closed. It was not expected that these Presidents would offer any access or response. The POS during seven of the eleven presidencies was modified closed, indicating that those Presidents would not be very amenable to the demands of a social movement. These Presidents may offer co- optive response, though. They may wish to assuage the movement. This would be evidenced by a few promises to think about the issue, but never publicly endorsing it or doing anything concrete to get it through Congress. Two elections, as measured by the state correlations, were unstable: 1864 and 1872. This result is expected since these elections are generally considered to be (or near) realigning elections, and state returns would highlight the shifting electorate.17 Five elections, as measured by difference in the two-party vote, show the President to be unsafe: 1860, 1876, 1880, 1884 and 1888. Though apparently surprising, since there had just been a realignment, with the benefit of hindsight it is not so surprising. The realignment that had just occurred was not from one party to another (where we then might expect the two-party difference in the vote greatly to favour the new dominant party), but rather a shift in the electoral base of the Republican Party. The Republican Party did not add to its numbers, it merely experienced a shift in the demographics of the people who voted Republican. Thus, it is not odd that, though the Republican Party continued to win elections, it did so with small margins (from the election of 1860 to the election Table 4.3 POS First Wave—Presidents

President and Measure A: state Measure B: difference in Mass Overall year elected correlations two-party vote opinion POS (percentage) 1848 Taylor stable (.79) safe (6.0) con closed 1852 Pierce stable (.78) safe (8.0) con closed 1856 Buchanan stable (.81) safe (16) con closed 1860 stable (.89) unsafe (−9.0) con modified Lincoln/Johnson closed 1864 Johnson unstable (.55) safe (10) con modified closed 1868 Grant stable (.85) safe (6.0) con closed 1872 Grant unstable (.62) safe (12) con modified closed 1876 Hayes stable (.75) unsafe (−3.0) con modified closed The first wave: 1848–89 39

1880 stable (.88) unsafe (.02) con modified Garfield/Arthur closed 1884 Cleveland stable (.90) unsafe (.26) con modified closed 1888 Harrison stable (.93) unsafe (−.80) con modified closed Sources: see Appendix A. of 1892 it lost only two elections: those of 1884 and 1892). Furthermore, we now know that another realignment occurred in 1896, and thus the unsafe elections that preceded it are not so odd, but rather a potential harbinger of what was to come. Overall then, the POS during the presidencies of the first wave is predominantly modified closed. One would expect a social movement to receive very little to no access and response from Presidents. Any response may be co-optive, as opposed to concrete, since the POS was predominantly modified closed, and women had negligible political leverage.

Type of access and response expected in light of POS

In the House one would expect to see the suffrage movement receive little to no access during this wave. There should be few hearings, and the hearings that do occur should have very few pro-suffrage witnesses. Regarding response in the House, one would expect to see few suffrage bills introduced (and those introduced would be introduced by the same people), few favourable committee reports on suffrage bills, few brought to the floor, and none passed by the full House. Any of these things indicates a lack of response because they indicate that members and committees are barely reacting to the issue. Furthermore, due to the modified closed nature of the POS during this wave, any response would probably be co- optive. That is, it may be designed to assuage the suffrage movement (and have women members urge husbands, brothers, male friends and relatives to vote for the benevolent representatives) with no intention of acting concretely (i.e., debate on floor and/or voting on the bill). Though difficult to measure such behaviour, insider accounts (hearings, newspaper articles, suffragist writings, correspondence) might offer some insight into this occurrence. Regarding access in the Senate, one would expect to see more hearings and more pro- suffrage witnesses than in the House. Furthermore, regarding response, one would expect to see more suffrage bills introduced in the Senate, more favourable committee reports, and possibly even debate and votes on the floor (though it is considered unlikely that a suffrage bill would pass, since the POS is not open consistently). In regard to access to the Presidents, one would expect there to be very little attention to women’s issues in the party platforms, and that the President would meet with suffrage groups and other women’s issues groups (such as temperance) few to no times. Regarding response, one would expect there to be few to no positive public pronouncements regarding suffrage, few to no positive public pronouncements regarding Political women 40 women’s issues, few to no executive orders regarding women’s issues, and very little legislation regarding women’s issues. One would expect no access or response to those Presidents before Lincoln, since the suffrage movement did not wage a campaign at the federal level prior to Lincoln. Furthermore, any access and/or response may be co-optive (as discussed under Congress)—designed to assuage the suffrage activists.

Access and response received by the suffrage movement

Key people and organizations: their aims and strategies As briefly discussed earlier, before the formation of an organized woman’s right movement, some women had been working actively in the United States in the abolition and temperance movements. One such woman was Susan B.Anthony. Anthony was a Quaker, and an activist in both the anti-slavery and temperance movements. In 1847, Anthony made her first public speech at a Daughters of Temperance meeting in Canajoharie, NY.18 The Sons of Temperance had formed in 1840, in New York. The Daughters of Temperance formed very soon afterwards. The purpose of both of these organizations was to educate people about the evils of alcohol, and to urge the New York State legislature to prohibit its production, sale and consumption. It was Anthony’s work in the temperance movement that awakened her feelings regarding woman’s inferior social and political situation.19 Although women were accepted and welcomed into reform movements such as abolition and temperance, their speaking in public was not. Women frequently encountered resistance from audiences when they attempted to speak in public, or before audiences that included men. One such example was the Grimke sisters, who were active participants in the abolition movement. Angelina and Sarah Grimke had freed their slaves in 1828, and moved north to advocate the abolition of slavery. Catt and Shuler note that ‘they began speaking publicly in favor of abolition and were mobbed many times’.20 Public sentiment viewed women speaking in public as improper, and many men felt that women had little to offer to political discourse. When Abby Kelly, Angelina Grimke and Lucretia Mott, three abolitionists, began to speak at anti-slavery conventions with mixed company (men and women), a clerical appeal was issued ‘and sent to all clergymen in New England, calling on them to denounce in their pulpits this unmannerly and unchristian proceeding’.21 Concomitantly, in part as a result of their experiences in the abolition and temperance movements, some women had developed an interest in the question of woman’s rights. Many women felt they could personally relate to the social and political injustices suffered by slaves. Furthermore, the abolition and temperance movements laid the groundwork for a woman’s right movement. They brought women together who previously had little regular contact; the plight of the slaves highlighted for women their common political and social ills; and women acquired the leadership skills necessary to lead a movement. As DuBois argues regarding women’s involvement in the anti-slavery movement, ‘they laid the groundwork for a feminist movement by articulating a set of demands for women’s rights and by acquiring the skills and self confidence necessary to The first wave: 1848–89 41 offer political leadership to other women’.22 Thus, the network for a woman’s rights movement evolved out of women’s involvement in the abolition and temperance movements.23 Eight years after the World’s Anti-Slavery Convention, in London, Stanton and Mott set to work to plan the first woman’s rights meeting, to be held in Seneca Falls, New York, in July 1848. Family (raising children) and other commitments had prevented their doing so at an earlier date. Before the meeting, Stanton and Mott prepared a declaration of sentiments to be read at the convention and, they hoped, to be endorsed by those present. The final document was paraphrased, line for line, from the Declaration of Independence, and was entitled the Declaration of Principles. The meeting was well attended, by both men and women. As mentioned, those eight years between the World’s Anti-Slavery Convention and the Seneca Falls meeting had awakened a number of people to the need for woman’s rights reforms. All the resolutions of the Seneca Falls meeting were passed unanimously, except one: woman’s right to the franchise, which was carried only by a small margin.24 The Seneca Falls meeting was followed, two weeks later, by a meeting in Rochester, New York. Both of these events gained national attention. As Catt and Shuler note, ‘newspapers throughout the country regarded them as an innovation worthy of comment and full press accounts were carried far and wide’.25 Not all the commentary was positive, however, and there was much mocking of the woman’s rights activists. Then in October 1850, a National Woman’s Rights Convention was held in Worcester, Massachusetts. Eleven states were represented, and another meeting was scheduled for the following year. In fact, from 1850–60 (with the exception of 1857), there was a National Suffrage Convention held each year.26 In 1850, Anthony made the acquaintance of Stanton, at an anti-slavery meeting in Seneca Falls. The two were to become close friends, and arguably the cornerstone of the woman’s rights, and later suffrage, movement. Around 1852, Anthony and Stanton, both members of the Daughters of Temperance, withdrew from it when they discovered that they could attend the Sons of Temperance’s meetings but were not permitted to speak. They were there, according to the men, ‘to listen and learn’.27 They formed the Woman’s State Temperance Society (in New York), and worked actively for the temperance cause. Women also continued to work actively in the abolition movement, frequently using the abolition platform to champion their rights. When the Civil War erupted, the woman’s rights movement became inactive—many women feeling their duty was to aid the country, not themselves. As Stanton et al. note, ‘no conventions were held for five years; no petitions circulated for her civil and political rights; the action of state legislatures was wholly forgotten’.28 Some women formed the Sanitary Commission, which recruited nurses, provided medical supplies and ran hospitals, and Stanton and Anthony formed the Woman’s National Loyal League in 1863. It was composed of loyal women of the North whose stated aim was to ‘educate the nation into the true idea of a Christian Republic’.29 It also worked actively to obtain a constitutional amendment to ban slavery. As Stanton et al. comment regarding the activity during this period, ‘Loyal Leagues were formed, and petitions by the hundred thousand for the emancipation of the slaves rolled up and sent to Congress.’30 When the war ended, the leaders of the woman’s rights movement expected to be able to pick up where they left off (if not in a slightly better position due to their contributions Political women 42 to the war effort) and to continue the fight for their rights, but things were not to be so simple. Strong organizational ties to the abolition movement and dedication to the war effort had taken their toll on the movement. It found itself organizationally weak after the war and faced with a much altered political climate. Buechler argues that ‘the abolitionist movement inhibited the development of women’s rights organizations by providing an existing organizational network’.31 DuBois echoes this sentiment, arguing that ‘the movement’s close political relationship with abolitionism further restrained its organizational growth, in that its ability to rely on the organizational resources of the American Anti-Slavery Society meant that it did not develop its own’.32 As DuBois further notes, ‘women’s rights activists subordinated all other interests to the fate of slavery, and suspended feminist activity for the length of the war. When they returned four years later, to consider the future of woman’s rights, the political context within which they did so had been completely altered’ (emphasis added).33 With the end of the war, on 18 December 1865, came the Thirteenth Amendment, which emancipated the slaves. Emancipation placed Negroes in the precarious position of being no longer slaves but not yet citizens. After the emancipation of the slaves, the Republican Party introduced the Fourteenth Amendment, which was intended to clarify the position of Negroes as citizens of the United States. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, did not explicitly grant Negroes the suffrage. Thus, the American Anti-Slavery Society, the main abolition society in the United States, reorganized itself around the issue of Negro suffrage and urged Congress to enfranchise the newly freed slaves. Emancipation brought the question of political rights to the national agenda and, as DuBois argues, ‘reinforced the [woman’s] movement’s tendency to focus on woman suffrage by making the issue of political rights a question of national political significance’.34 With Congress, the President and the public focused on the question of Negro suffrage, the woman’s movement thought it rational to press their kindred issue of woman suffrage too. If the government was going to enfranchise one class of citizens, why not two? Thus, the woman’s rights movement became increasingly focused on the issue of woman suffrage, since that was the issue upon which all eyes in the nation were focused. The leaders of the woman’s suffrage movement saw this convergence of interests as a sign that the two movements should co-ordinate their efforts. Some abolitionists, however, did not concur. Despite this, at the first woman’s rights convention held after the war, on 10 May 1866, it was proposed that the anti-slavery societies and the woman’s right societies merge into one society. The proposal was unanimously adopted, and the American Equal Rights Association (AERA) was born of some abolitionists and some woman’s rights supporters.35 Members of the newly formed organization believed that, due to their war effort and dedication to abolition, the Republicans would extend the franchise to all, without regard to sex or race. They actively began urging Congress to extend the ballot to all citizens, not just the Negroes, arguing that, ‘We propose no new theories. We simply ask that you secure to ALL the practical application of the immutable principles of our government, without distinction of race, color, or sex.’36 The AERA also decided that, since there was to be a constitutional convention in New York that year, it should focus its energies on demanding that an amendment be adopted to secure equal rights to all citizens. The first wave: 1848–89 43

Divisions quickly arose among the ranks of the AERA, especially over the proposed Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. A few years before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, abolitionists recognized that it failed to secure the right to vote to the Negro. They began to formulate an amendment to guarantee this vote. At a meeting of the National Loyalists Convention (one of the Loyal Leagues formed during the Civil War) in 1866, what would become the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution was written by Anna Dickinson, Frederick Douglass and Theodore Tilton— it contained no mention of woman suffrage. To aggravate the situation further, the Republican Party adopted a position on suffrage that divided female abolitionists into those who favoured the Republican strategy of focusing solely on Negro suffrage, and those who felt that if both woman and Negro suffrage were not adopted concomitantly, then neither one should be. Stanton and Anthony belonged to the latter faction, and actively campaigned against the Fourteenth Amendment. To their chagrin, the Fourteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution on 28 July 1868. The woman’s rights activists next focused their efforts at attempts to get the voting rights of women secured in this Fifteenth Amendment. In May 1869, a convention of the American Equal Rights Association met. It became clear, during this meeting, that the organization was divided as to what its primary focus should be: Negroes’ rights or woman’s rights. As Anthony comments, ‘out of the broad differences of opinion on the amendments… divisions grew up between Republicans and abolitionists on the one side, and the leaders of the woman suffrage movement on the other. The constant conflict on the Equal Rights platforms proved the futility of any attempt to discuss the wrongs of different classes in one association.’37 The convention divided into two camps. On one side were those who believed the primary focus should be on Negro rights (led by Frederick Douglass), and on the other side were those who felt the primary focus should be on woman’s rights (led by Stanton and Anthony). Frederick Douglass, a leading abolitionist, argued that, ‘When women, because they are women, are hunted down through the cities of New York and New Orleans; when they are dragged from their houses and hung upon lamp posts…when they are in danger of having their homes burnt down over their heads…then they will have an urgency to obtain the ballot equal to our own.’38 Anthony did not concur with this statement, and argued that if anyone were to be given the ballot then it should be the most intelligent first: ‘the old anti-slavery school say women must stand back and wait until the Negroes shall be recognized. But we say, if you will not give the whole loaf of suffrage to the entire people, give it to the most intelligent first’39 When the AERA decided to support the Fifteenth Amendment, Stanton and Anthony decided to leave the organization. The American Equal Rights Association was not willing to serve as the organizational basis of the woman’s rights movement. Just a few weeks after the AERA convention, disgusted and disillusioned with their association with both Republicans and abolitionists, and with AERA support of the Fifteenth Amendment, Stanton and Anthony formed the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA). It worked for woman suffrage and sought a broad range of reforms in the areas of work, marriage and education. Due to its experience with the Republican Party and abolitionists, NWSA explicitly rejected male leadership, party affiliation, or any entanglements with abolition. Furthermore, it proposed to change its tactics from Political women 44 lobbying Congress to bringing its questions before the courts if Congress did not grant a declaratory act regarding woman suffrage that winter.40 In August of 1869, a letter was sent out from Boston from members of the New England Woman Suffrage Association calling for the creation of a national association, the primary concern of which was woman suffrage: ‘Without deprecating the value of Associations already existing, it is yet deemed that an organization at once more comprehensive and more widely representative than any of these is urgently called for.’41 The letter was signed by Lucy Stone, Caroline Severance, T.W.Higginson, Julia Ward Howe and George H.Vibbert. These people had remained members of the AERA, but felt the necessity of a national organization that would draw on the membership of the numerous pre-existing state suffrage organizations and co-ordinate their efforts. They further believed that once Negroes had seen their rights secured in the Constitution, then the Republicans would actively support woman suffrage. This new association was called the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) and, unlike NWSA, focused primarily on the issue of woman suffrage. The AWSA steered away from issues, such as divorce, that it felt were controversial. The AWSA believed that if controversial issues were pursued then suffrage might become associated with such controversy, thus hindering the attainment of woman suffrage. The AWSA, unlike NWSA, sought the support of abolition men and Republican leaders. This split lasted until 1890, when they merged to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). NWSA pursued woman suffrage in a number of ways. First, it argued that since women were citizens, the Fourteenth Amendment secured for them the right to vote. As Catt and Shuler note, ‘many Senators, Representatives of Congress and eminent lawyers in all parts of the country interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as securing the vote to Negroes and to women’.42 Thus, on 20 April 1871, Sara Andrews Spencer and Sarah E.Webster (both suffrage activists), along with seventy other women of the District of Columbia, attempted to vote. They were not allowed to, however, as they had previously not been allowed to register to vote.43 Then, on 5 November 1872, Anthony and thirteen other women voted in Rochester, New York.44 A few days later, a Deputy United States Marshall appeared at the homes of the women who voted, and arrested each one on the criminal charge of ‘having voted without having a lawful right to vote’.45 In 1872, Virginia Minor, a member of NWSA, also attempted to register to vote in her home town of St Louis, Missouri. Her husband, Francis Minor, an attorney, had believed since 1869 that the Fourteenth Amendment granted women the right to vote. At a woman suffrage convention in St Louis in October 1869, he and his wife both addressed the convention concerning their belief that women had the right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment. Copies of their addresses were placed on the desks of every member of Congress that same year.46 Then, at the urging of Supreme Court Justice Samuel P.Chase, Francis Minor urged his wife to attempt to vote, in hopes that she would be refused; they could then take their case to court. The case did go to court, but the Missouri courts rejected his argument. They then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case (Minor v. Happersett). The Supreme Court handed down a decision in 1875, which set forth the principle that suffrage was not a right of citizenship. As a result of this decision the tactic of voting was abandoned.47 After the failure of the Minor case in 1875, NWSA refocused all of its energy on the demand for a woman suffrage amendment. The first wave: 1848–89 45

The AWSA favoured a state-by-state approach to suffrage. It devoted the vast majority of its efforts to attempting to secure woman’s right to vote in the state constitutions. It reasoned that this strategy would eventually lead to a constitutional amendment, as the more women who could vote at the state level, the greater their influence could be at the national level: ‘it [AWSA] recognizes the far greater importance of petitioning the State legislatures. First—because suffrage is a subject referred by the constitution to the voters of each State. Second—because we cannot expect a congress composed solely of representatives of States which deny suffrage to women, to submit an amendment which their own States have not yet approved.’48 NWSA was slightly discredited in its early years by what were viewed by many as some unfortunate attachments (past and present). The first was Stanton and Anthony’s earlier association with George F.Train, a shady financier who financed their publication of the radical newspaper, The Revolution. This association became even more marred when Train left the country (early 1868), defaulting on his financial obligation to Anthony. Another unfortunate association was with Victoria Woodhull, a suffrage activist who also actively espoused free love. Woodhull’s radical ideas alienated many NWSA members and, arguably, the public. As Henry Blackwell (married to Lucy Stone) noted in a letter to Stanton in 1872, regarding both Woodhull and Train’s effect on public opinion and membership, ‘And Woodhull and G.F.T. (George Francis Train) repelled ten [people] where they drew one.’49 Unsure of where to turn, the suffrage movement (NWSA and AWSA) looked again to the Republican Party. In 1872, a glimmer of hope appeared in the form of a ‘splinter’ in the plank of the Republican Party platform: ‘the Republican Party is mindful of its obligations to the loyal women of America for their noble devotion to the cause of freedom. Their admission to wider fields of usefulness is viewed with satisfaction; and the honest demand of any class of citizens for additional rights should be treated with respectful consideration.’50 NWSA issued a statement regarding this plank: ‘We see in it the thin edge of the entering wedge that shall break woman’s slavery in pieces and make us at last a nation truly free…this great party, this progressive party, having taken the initiative step, will never go back on its record…’51 Later in this statement NWSA urges: ‘Let us throw our whole influence of voice and pen into this campaign, and in making it a success for the Republican Party, make it a success for ourselves …in every possible way throw the whole weight of your influence on the side of the Republican Party… Remember that we owe it a debt of gratitude…’52 And Henry Blackwell (AWSA) in a letter to Elizabeth Cady Stanton (NWSA) immediately after the 1872 Republican convention urges: ‘Let a dozen really wise, estimable, intellectual women, keeping selfish considerations and personal egotisms in the background, identify themselves with the Republican Party…and by their power of speech and pen contribute materially to its success—and the Republican Party in this four years will be a unit for Woman Suffrage.’53 NWSA and AWSA continued to focus their efforts at obtaining woman suffrage, albeit in different ways. NWSA continued actively to lobby Congress, presenting petitions, memorials and bills for the enfranchisement of women, in every Congress. The AWSA worked a little at the national level, but primarily continued its state-by-state approach. Neither group met with much success. In 1889, the two groups recognized that, though they disagreed on a few points, they agreed on the most important: the need for Political women 46 women to have the vote. They also recognized that their efforts might be more fruitful if they combined their resources and efforts, so in 1890, the two organizations merged to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA).

Congress—access and response There was access sought and achieved during the first wave (see Tables 4.4a and 4.4b). Suffrage activists made personal visits and wrote letters to representatives, sent petitions, memorials, addresses and the like and gained access to Congress in the way of hearings and pro-suffrage witnesses.54 Twenty-four hearings were held in Congress (ten in Senate and fourteen in the House) from the time the first petitions regarding woman suffrage were sent in 1865 until the close of the first wave in 1889. It must be noted that a few of the hearings were regarding woman suffrage in the District of Columbia and the territories (six), and not regarding an amendment to the Constitution. Regarding response from political elites, there was a limited amount, and it varied by house (see Tables 4.5a and 4.5b). Twenty-three suffrage bills were introduced (six of these were to extend the vote to women in the District of Columbia and the territories), there were eleven committee reports (six unfavourable, five favourable—four of which were in Senate and one in the House), and the woman suffrage amendment was brought to the floor once (in the Senate in 1887), where it failed. I will now address the specifics of the access sought and achieved, and the response of the political elites in each Congress. Before 1865, no access was sought by the suffrage movement to Congress. The movement looked to states only for recognition of woman’s rights.55 During the Thirty- ninth Congress (March 1865–March 1867) no access was attained and no response was received in either house, but there was access sought. In 1865, Table 4.4a Access House of Representatives—first wave

Congress Number of hearings Number of pro- Number of anti- POS suffrage witnesses suffrage witnesses 31 no hearings sought or not applicable not applicable closed attained (na) (na) 32 same na na closed 33 same na na modified closed 34 same na na modified closed 35 same na na closed 36 same na na closed 37 same na na closed 38 same na na modified The first wave: 1848–89 47

closed 39 0 0 0 closed 40 0 0 0 closed 41 2 (1 DC and 1 for 1) ?* 0 closed V.Woodhull) 2) 9 42 1 1 0 closed 43 1 (DC) 1 0 closed 44 1 (DC) 4 0 modified closed 45 4* 1) 3 0 closed 2) 1 0 46 1 11 0 closed 47 1 0 0 closed 48 1 4 0 closed 49 1 8 0 closed 50 1 8 0 modified closed Totals 14—average of 1 bill 50—average of 4 0 a Congress witnesses a Congress Sources: see Appendix A. DC=bill for the right of women to vote in District of Columbia *=one hearing in each house was on woman suffrage, but not on a constitutional amendment for such ?*=all pro, according to accounts in Stanton et al., but no exact number given and no account in CIS

Stanton and Anthony recognized the full impact that the insertion of the word ‘male’ into the Constitution would have—if ratified it would mean that another constitutional amendment would be necessary to grant women suffrage. They immediately encouraged women to send petitions to Congress asking for an amendment that would prohibit the states from disfranchising citizens on the ground of sex (the first ever).56 No amendment was introduced to such effect, however, and no hearings were held in either house. Table 4.4b Access Senate—first wave

Congress Number of Number of pro- Number of anti- POS hearings suffrage witnesses suffrage witnesses 31 no hearings sought not applicable not applicable modified or attained (na) (na) open 32 same na na modified open Political women 48

33 same na na modified open 34 same na na modified open 35 same na na modified open 36 same na na modified open 37 same na na modified open 38 same na na modified open 39 0 0 0 modified open 40 1 (DC) 0 0 modified open 41 1 (DC) 7 0 modified open 42 1 ?* 0 modified open 43 0 0 0 modified open 44 1 (DC) 4 0 modified open 45 2* 1) 13 1) 0 modified 2) 1 2) 0 open 46 1 9 0 modified open 47 0 0 0 modified open 48 1 8 0 open 49 0 0 0 open 50 2 1) 11 0 modified 2) 8 open Totals 10—average of 1 bill 61—average of 5 0 a Congress witnesses a Congress Sources: see Appendix A. DC=bill for the right of women to vote in District of Columbia *=one hearing in each house was on woman suffrage, but not on a constitutional amendment for such The first wave: 1848–89 49

?*=all pro, according to accounts in Stanton et al., but no exact number given and no account in CIS

The elite response in the Thirty-ninth Congress was negligible because the Republican Party, which controlled Congress, did not want to link Negroes’ rights and woman’s rights. Leaders argued that such a link might damage the possibility of gaining Negro suffrage and ultimately destroy the party’s chance of remaining in power at the next election: ‘Republicans felt that on the success or defeat of “Negro suffrage” hung the life or death of their party.’57 This was the ‘Negro’s hour’.58 Republicans recognized that only by gaining the black vote could they be Table 4.5a Response House of Representatives— first wave

Congress Number of bills Number and type Number of bills Did bill(s) POS introduced of committee brought to pass? reports floor 31 not applicable not applicable (na)— not applicable not closed (na)— no federal campaign (na)— applicable no federal no federal (na)— campaign campaign no federal campaign 32 na na na na closed 33 na na na na modified closed 34 na na na na modified closed 35 na na na na closed 36 na na na na closed 37 na na na na closed 38 na na na na modified closed 39 0 0 0 0 closed 40 2 0 0 0 closed 41 3 1 unfavourable 0 0 closed 42 3 0 0 0 closed 43 0 0 0 0 closed 44 0 0 0 0 modified closed 45 1 0 0 0 closed Political women 50

46 1 0 0 0 closed 47 1 1 favourable 0 0 closed 48 1 1 unfavourable 0 0 closed 49 1 1 unfavourable 0 0 closed 50 1 0 0 0 modified closed Totals 14—average of 1 1 favourable 0 0 bill a Congress 3 unfavourable Sources: see Appendix A. Table 4.5b Response Senate—first wave

Congress Number of bills Number and type Number of Did bill(s) POS introduced of committee bills brought pass? reports to floor 31 not applicable not applicable not applicable not modified (na)— (na)— (na)— applicable open no federal no federal campaign no federal (na)— campaign campaign no federal campaign 32 na na na na modified open 33 na na na na modified open 34 na na na na modified open 35 na na na na modified open 36 na na na na modified open 37 na na na na modified open 38 na na na na modified open 39 0 0 0 0 modified open 40 2 0 0 0 modified open 41 0 0 0 0 modified open The first wave: 1848–89 51

42 0 0 0 0 modified open 43 0 0 0 0 modified open 44 0 0 0 0 modified open 45 1 3 unfavourable 0 0 modified open 46 1 0 0 0 modified open 47 1 1 favourable 0 0 modified open 48 1 1 favourable 0 0 modified open 49 1 1 favourable 1 1 failed open 50 1 1 favourable 0 0 modified open Totals 8—average of less 4 favourable 1 1 failed than 1 bill a 3 unfavourable Congress Sources: see Appendix A. sure of controlling the South and preventing the Democrats from winning the next election. Woman suffrage was not a politically useful tool for the Republican Party. Blacks voting, on the other hand, was: ‘Southern blacks were a pro-northern force in the heart of the confederacy and this linked their enfranchisement to the preservation of the Union’s victory and the protection of the Republican Party’s power…feminists could make no such claims of partisan benefit or political expediency for woman suffrage.’59 Thus, the woman’s suffrage movement had no political leverage with which to influence the party in power. Without such leverage they were left out in the cold. Disgusted by Republicans’ abandonment of their cause, woman suffrage advocates briefly allowed Democrats to espouse the call for suffrage. As Stanton et al. note, ‘the Democrats readily saw how completely the Republicans were stultifying themselves and violating every principle urged in the debates on the 13th amendment, and volunteered to help the women fight their battle… The Democrats treated the petitioners [suffrage activists] with respect, and called attention in every way to the question.’60 This friendship was short-lived, however, as the Democrats failed to place a suffrage plank in their 1868 party platform. It was also clear that many abolitionists, as well as Republicans, were none too eager to ally themselves with the woman’s suffrage movement and help them change the wording of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. The ascendance of their long-time allies, the Republicans, into power gave abolitionists hope that their policy goals would be attained. Abolitionists wanted nothing to interfere with their goals. They feared that Political women 52 woman’s suffrage was not popular either with political elites or with the masses, and that, due to its unpopularity, if it were part of the Fourteenth Amendment it might harm the amendment’s chances of passing. Thus, abolitionists were hesitant to support woman’s suffrage or urge changes to the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment lest it harm the chance of its passing. As DuBois notes, ‘Abolitionists’ increased political power made them more reluctant to support feminist demands than they had been before the war.’61 Abolitionists liked their position, and did not intend to jeopardize it with other issues. It must be noted that as originally written by Representative Thaddeus Stevens (R- Pennsylvania), the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the word ‘male’. It had based representation upon the number of legal voters in the state, not just males. Protest was so great from conservative Republicans, however, that Stevens was forced to insert the word ‘male’.62 Charles Sumner also confessed ‘that he had covered nineteen pages of foolscap in his effort to formulate the amendment so as to omit the word male’.63 At the 1866 Woman’s Rights Convention, the first held since May 1860, an address to Congress was written urging it to consider the woman question and not to pass the Fourteenth Amendment with the word ‘male’ in it. Little attention appeared to be paid to this call. In the second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress (10 December 1866), however, a lengthy debate took place in the Senate on the enfranchisement of women as it pertained to a bill to regulate the franchise in the District of Columbia. During the debate over this bill, Senator Edgar Cowan (R-Pennsylvania) moved to strike the word ‘male’ from the bill. He argued:

I shall never give my consent to the disfranchisement of females who live in society, who pay taxes, who are governed by the laws, and who have a right, I think, even in that respect, at times to throw their weight in the balance for the purpose of correcting the corruptions and the viciousness to which the male portions of the family tend… Taxation and representation ought to go hand in hand.64

This debate marked the first time the ‘woman question’ was discussed in Congress. The AERA was also active trying to gain access to Congress. In 1867, it sent a memorial to Congress protesting against distinctions in rights of suffrage on account of colour or sex. But no access was achieved and no response was received. The Fortieth Congress (1867–69) saw very little access achieved in either house (one hearing in the Senate), but response in both. On 26 January 1869, Anthony called on Senator James Harlan (R-Iowa), chair of the Committee on the District of Columbia, and asked him if he would grant a hearing on DC suffrage. He agreed, and seven pro-suffrage witnesses appeared and no anti-suffrage witnesses (I will henceforth note only the existence of anti-suffrage witnesses if there were any; if not mentioned, that is because there was none). Response in the Fortieth Congress came in the form of four bills introduced in Congress (two in the House and two in the Senate). In 1868, the first resolution to enfranchise women was introduced in the Senate by Senator Samuel C.Pomeroy (R- Kansas), and a few days later a similar resolution was introduced in the House by Representative George W.Julian (R-Indiana).65 Bills were also introduced by Senator The first wave: 1848–89 53

Henry Wilson (R-Massachusetts) and Representative George Julian, to allow the women of DC to vote. Women were still hopeful that the Republican Party would reward both their war work and their support of abolition with the granting of their political rights. They were to be disappointed. As Stanton et al. note, women sent many petitions in support of the Thirteenth Amendment, ‘but when the proposition for the Fourteenth Amendment was pending, and the same women petitioned for their own civil and political rights, they received no letters of encouragement from Republicans nor abolitionists’.66 The Forty-first Congress (1869–71) saw access achieved in both houses and response granted in the House. Regarding access, there were three hearings on woman suffrage, two in the House and one in the Senate. Regarding response, there were three bills introduced (all in the House) and one majority committee report (unfavourable in the House). Regarding access sought, on 21 January 1871, three suffrage activists, Belva Anne Lockwood, Caroline Winslow and Susan Edson, presented a memorial to Congress asking for the word ‘male’ to be stricken from a DC better government bill. No action appears to have been taken on this memorial.67 There was also, during the Forty-first Congress, some access sought by anti- suffragists. During the winter of 1870 or 1871 (no exact date given), a Mrs Dahlgren and a Mrs Sherman presented an anti-suffrage petition and memorial to Congress. Anti- suffrage agitation was not yet prevalent, and this early evidence of it foreshadows the movement that was to grow in opposition to woman suffrage. Concerning access, one of the hearings was in January of 1870, before a joint committee on DC (this counts as one hearing for the Senate and one hearing for the House). It was regarding a bill to enfranchise the women of DC (introduced in 1868 by Senator Wilson and Representative Julian). The number of witnesses is unknown, but according to accounts in volume two of The History of Woman Suffrage, they were all pro-suffrage witnesses. There was no committee report for this bill. On 19 December 1870, Victoria Woodhull, the aforementioned suffrage activist and free-love advocate, submitted a memorial to Congress that was presented in the House by Representative Julian and in the Senate by Senator Isham Harris (D-Tennessee). The memorial was referred to the Judiciary Committee, and a hearing was held in the House on 11 January 1871. Nine pro-suffrage witnesses appeared. Woodhull’s argument is lengthy, but a small portion must be quoted to exhibit her concise logic:

Women, white and black, belong to races, although to different races. A race of people comprises all the people, male and female. The right to vote can not be denied on account of race. All people included in the term race have the right to vote, unless otherwise prohibited. Women of all races are white, black, or some intermediate color. Color comprises all people, of all races and both sexes. The right to vote can not be denied on account of color. All people included in the term color have the right to vote unless otherwise prohibited.68

There is some debate as to whether Woodhull actually wrote this memorial. One scholar (who was also a reporter who attended NAWSA conventions), Rheta Childe Dorr, argues that ‘it read like a legal brief, which indeed it was…the weight of the evidence indicates Political women 54 that its author was the Hon. Benjamin F.Butler of Massachusetts, a known admirer of Mrs Woodhull’.69 Regarding response, in 1869, Representative George Julian introduced three woman suffrage bills—one was a bill to extend the suffrage to women in the territories, one was a joint resolution to enfranchise women through a Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution (15 March 1869), and the last was a bill to extend the franchise to women in Utah (25 March 1869). Woodhull’s memorial received an adverse majority committee report from the House on 30 January 1871, and a favourable minority committee report, on 1 February 1871 (written by William Loughbridge, R-Iowa, and Benjamin Butler, R- Massachusetts). This favourable minority committee report is important because it is evidence that some representatives were willing to go on record in favour of woman suffrage. The Forty-second Congress (1871–73) saw access to both houses in the form of two hearings (one in each house), and response in the form of three bills introduced (in the House). Belva Anne Lockwood received a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee on 14 July, 1871. At this hearing she presented a petition, and argued in support of woman suffrage bills. She was the only witness. There was also access to the Senate. Mrs Isabella Hooker, a woman suffrage activist, along with Stanton, Elizabeth Bladen, Olympia Brown, Anthony and Josephine Griffing, presented a memorial to the Senate in 1872, asking for woman’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and that woman suffrage advocates be heard at the bar of the Senate. This memorial was referred to the Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary Committee did not permit the women to hold a public meeting in the Senate, arguing that ‘it would not be consistent with the usage and rules of the Senate to admit memorialists to appear and advocate their claims before the Senate, nor for the committee to ask the use of the Senate Chamber for public discussion before them’.70 The Judiciary Committee did grant the suffrage activists a hearing in January 1872. Hooker, Stanton and Anthony testified. There was also response granted during the Forty-second Congress, though not all positive. In 1871, Representative Julian moved to strike the word ‘male’ regarding qualifications for voting in a DC better government bill. Three bills regarding woman suffrage were introduced in the Forty-second Congress. On 24 January, Representative Benjamin Butler introduced a suffrage petition, containing 35,000 signatures for a declaratory law to assure the right of suffrage to women citizens.71 This petition was referred to the Judiciary Committee. On 29 January 1872, Representative Isaac Parker (R-Missouri) introduced a bill to allow women to vote and hold office in the territories of the USA. This bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee. Then, on 4 March 1872, Representative William T.Jones (R-Wyoming) introduced a bill to extend suffrage to women. There were no hearings (even in later Congresses) or committee reports on these bills or petitions. Regarding the anti-suffrage movement, the Senate chair was requested to present a petition on 29 January 1872, on behalf of the ladies of Munroe County, Indiana, against woman suffrage. This petition was referred to the Judiciary Committee. The Forty-third Congress (1873–75) saw very little access (only in the House) and no response. There was one hearing and no bills introduced or committee reports written. NWSA sought access by submitting a petition asking that the word ‘male’ be stricken from a DC better government act. The petition was presented in the House by The first wave: 1848–89 55

Representative Davies for Representative Butler and referred to the Judiciary Committee. A hearing was held on 21 January 1874, before the House Judiciary Committee, regarding the above-mentioned bill. There was one pro-suffrage witness and no committee report. The only occurrence of interest during this Congress was the debate that occurred over Senator Aaron Sargent’s (R-California) move to amend a bill, regarding the Territory of Pembina, so that women could not be disfranchised. Women suffrage activists were hopeful—woman suffrage in a territory would be akin to an experiment that, if ‘successful’, would be a model for woman suffrage in the states. Their hopes were to be dashed, however, as the Amendment was rejected. The Forty-fourth Congress (1875–77) saw access in both houses in the form of two hearings, and no response from either house (no bills introduced, no committee reports). There was also a new form of access sought by movement members: petitioning for one’s political rights. Joslyn Gage started this trend when she petitioned for her political rights as a citizen of the United States. Her petition was presented by Elias Leavenworth (R- New York) in the House, on 24 January 1877, and a bill was introduced to this end on 5 February 1877. After Gage petitioned for her rights, a ‘number of similar petitions were sent from different parts of the country’.72 Also, during this Congress, NWSA presented a petition to Congress asking that women be allowed to vote in DC. This petition was presented in the House by Representative Samuel Cox (D-New York) and in the Senate by Senator Sargent. It was referred to the Committee on DC in both houses. Both houses granted a hearing to NWSA, and four pro-suffrage witnesses spoke at each hearing. Finally, over 10,000 petitions were presented to Congress during the last session of the Forty-fourth Congress, asking for a Sixteenth Amendment (woman suffrage) to the Constitution.73 At the request of Senator Oliver Morton (R-Indiana), a friend of the suffrage movement, the petitions were sent to the Committee on Privileges and Elections. No action was taken upon these. The Forty-fifth Congress (1877–79) saw an increased amount of access (compared with previous Congresses) in the form of six hearings (two in the Senate and four in the House—one from a subcommittee) and response in the form of two suffrage bills introduced (one in each house), and three committee reports (none was favourable). NWSA Utah delegates presented a memorial in 1879, against the bill to disfranchise the women of Utah. The memorial was referred to the Judiciary Committee (no account of which house). Then on 24 January 1879, Senator Wheeler (NY) presented a petition of Stanton, Gage and Anthony, praying for passage of SJ Res 12 (Sixteenth Amendment—woman suffrage), and asking that the House Judiciary Committee ‘be relieved from further consideration of a similar resolution’.74 The amendment had come to a tie vote in the House Judiciary Committee, on 5 February 1878. The woman suffrage movement wished it to be removed from the committee and dealt with on the floor of the House. Anti-suffragists were also at work during this Congress, trying to gain access. In 1877, Utah (presumably the government, no mention of who specifically) sent a memorial to Congress asking for the disfranchisement of the women of the territory. In addition, Mrs Dahlgren and Mrs Sherman (both anti-suffragists mentioned previously) were allowed on to the Senate floor to present their case. And finally, in 1878, Mrs Dahlgren memorialized the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections against the submission of a Sixteenth Amendment.75 Political women 56

In January of 1878, four hearings were held in the House and one in the Senate. The Senate hearing was before the Committee on Privileges and Elections and concerned a bill introduced that Congress by Senator Sargent. There were thirteen pro-suffrage witnesses. The first hearing in the House was before the Judiciary Committee and concerned a bill introduced that Congress by Representative Julian; there were three pro- suffrage witnesses. The second hearing was granted a week after the NWSA convention. Dr Mary Walker, a Civil War hero, Mrs Mary Tillotson and Mrs N.Cromwell obtained a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee urging them to report favourably on woman suffrage.76 The third hearing was granted to Isabella Hooker on 30 January, and was held before the Judiciary Committee. The Subcommittee on Territories in the House also granted a hearing to two woman suffrage activists, Dr Mary Walker and Sara Andrews Spencer (who had attempted to vote in DC in 1869), who spoke in opposition to a bill to disfranchise the women of Utah. Delegates to the NWSA convention also attempted to get a hearing before the whole Congress. Senator Sargent and Representative William Kelley (R-Pennsylvania) introduced resolutions on 10 January 1878, to this effect, but both were rejected.77 In the Senate, the Committee on Privileges and Elections granted a hearing to Isabella Hooker on 22 February 1878 ‘by request of a large number of Senators’.78 Anthony and Matilda Joslyn Gage (another woman suffrage activist) presented a memorial for a Sixteenth Amendment, asking that it be read in the open Senate. It does not appear, though, that these women met with success in gaining access. Regarding response from Congress during the Forty-fifth Congress, Senator Sargent introduced a joint resolution on 10 January 1878 asking that the right to vote not be denied on account of sex. This joint resolution became known as the Susan B.Anthony amendment. Representative Julian introduced a similar amendment in the House. Senator Sargent’s joint resolution received a hearing, as discussed, and received an adverse majority committee report. There was no committee report on Representative Julian’s joint resolution. The second committee report during this Congress was also negative and was regarding the hearing granted to Hooker on 22 February, in the Senate. Senator Bainbridge Wadleigh (R-New Hampshire) wrote this adverse majority committee report for the Committee on Privileges and Elections. There was also a favourable minority report written by the dissenting members of the committee. The third unfavourable majority committee report came at the end of January 1879. It was concerning the petition presented by Senator Wheeler, on behalf of Stanton, Gage and Anthony of NWSA, praying for passage of Senate Joint Resolution 12 (SJ Res 12—a woman suffrage amendment). In opposition, Senator George Hoar (R-Massachusetts) wrote a minority committee report favourable to SJ Res 12 (on 1 February 1879). This was the first favourable committee report, of any kind, regarding a woman suffrage bill in the Senate. Suffragists felt that this minority committee report was a providential sign.79 Finally, Senator Hoar presented 120 petitions of AWSA to the Senate on 4 February 1878. The unfavourable atmosphere of the Committee on Privileges and Elections was not lost on the woman suffrage movement. They noted that the previous chair of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections, Senator Morton, was a friend to woman suffrage and had specifically asked that bills on woman suffrage be referred to his committee so that they might receive proper consideration.80 With Morton’s departure also departed the chance that woman suffrage bills would receive ‘proper consideration’. The first wave: 1848–89 57

The Forty-sixth Congress (1879–81) saw access in the form of two hearings (one in each house) and very little response in the form of two bills introduced. Regarding access sought by the woman suffrage movement, in 1880 NWSA presented 250 petitions with over 12,000 signatures to the Senate and the House.81 There were also over 300 petitions presented by women, praying for removal of their political disabilities.82 Access received in the Forty-sixth Congress consisted of two hearings. One hearing was held in the Senate on 23 January 1880. Nine NWSA delegates testified. The other hearing occurred in the House in January 1880. Eleven NWSA delegates testified. These hearings were closed to the public and most of the members of committees showed up. Stanton et al. comment that this high rate of attendance highlighted the growing level of respect for the movement: ‘these private sessions with most of the members present, and the close attention they gave to each speaker, were strong proof of the growth of our reform, as but a few years before representatives sought excuses for absence on all such occasions’.83 Response came in the form of two suffrage bills introduced in the Forty-sixth Congress, one in the Senate by T.W.Ferry (R-Michigan), on 19 January 1880, and one in the House by George B.Loring (R-Massachusetts). As noted above, both of these bills received hearings, but they received no committee reports. The response to the 250 petitions presented by NWSA was mixed. In the Senate, they were read on the floor on 14, 16, 20 and 21 January, and then referred to the Judiciary Committee. The response in the House was not so positive. The reading of petitions in the House requires unanimous consent, and Representative J.J. Davies (D-North Carolina), whose state had not sent a petition, objected.84 There was disagreement in the House as to whether or not the committee proceedings should be printed for NWSA. After much debate the measure to print the documents was passed.85 On 29 April 1879, a resolution was submitted to the Committee on Rules in both the House and the Senate, to create a select committee on woman’s rights, and on 16 February 1880, Senator McDonald introduced a resolution regarding the creation of a woman’s rights committee. Then on 27 March 1880, Representative James Garfield (R- Ohio) and Representative Randall (D-Pennsylvania) reminded the chairman of the Committee on Rules, Representative William Frye (R-Maine), that nearly a year previously he had been instructed by that committee to report a resolution regarding the creation of a woman’s rights committee.86 This resolution was referred to the House calendar. NWSA took this bipartisan support as a positive sign: ‘this was a proof of the advancing status of our question that both Republican and Democratic leaders regarded the “right of women” worthy of consideration of a special committee’.87 No more action regarding this special committee occurred in the House during this Congress. On 20 January 1881, Senator McDonald attempted to get his resolution for the creation of a special committee called up. He argued:

We have standing committees upon almost every other subject, but none to which this class of citizens can resort. When their memorials come in they are sometimes sent to the Committee on the Judiciary, sometimes to the Committee on Privileges and Elections, and sometimes to other committees. The consequence is that they pass around from committee to committee and never receive any consideration.88 Political women 58

The question was referred to the Committee on Rules in the Senate, where it failed. The Forty-seventh Congress (1881–83) saw little access (one hearing in the House) and response in the form of two bills introduced (one in each house) and two favourable committee reports (one in the House and one in the Senate). Mrs Jane Graham Jones, Mrs May Wright Sewall and Susan B.Anthony together sought a hearing before the House Committee on Rules, and were granted one on 23 January 1882. The topic of discussion during this hearing is unknown, as there are no details concerning it in volume three of The History of Woman Suffrage. The response during this Congress was considerably greater than the access achieved. In the House, John White (R-Kentucky) made a motion for the creation of a select committee on woman’s rights, and on 25 February 1882, a Select Committee on Woman Suffrage was created (it lasted only one Congress, and was allowed to lapse in 1884). In addition, on 10 July 1882, Representative White of Kentucky introduced a woman suffrage bill, which was referred to the Select Committee on Woman Suffrage. On 1 March 1883, there was a favourable majority committee report on this bill. This was the first, and only, favourable majority committee report to be received by the woman suffrage movement during this wave. In the Senate, during the Forty-seventh Congress, the response granted was also substantial (there was no access attained in the Senate). In 1882, Senator Hoar was successful regarding the creation of a woman’s rights committee. On 13 December 1881, the Senate Committee on Rules reported the resolution for the creation of this committee. Debate on this proposed committee ensued in the Senate on 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 December and 9 and 21 January 1882. There was much debate on both sides of the issue. The debate frequently centred on the merits of woman suffrage, rather than the need of a special committee. Much of the sentiment was opposed to woman suffrage. One senator, who was against the creation of this committee, argued,

Sir, there are some ladies…who are zealously engaged in this cause, and they have flooded this hall with petitions, and have called their women’s right conventions all over the land. I assail not their motives, but I deny that they represent the women of the United States. I say that if woman suffrage obtains, the worst class of the women of the country will rush to the polls and the best class will remain away by large majority.89

Another senator echoed a similar sentiment, arguing that he was against suffrage because

No matter if there are a number of respectable ladies who are competent to vote and desire it to be done, because of the very fact that they cannot be allowed this privilege without giving all the mass of ignorant colored women in the country the right to vote, thus bringing in a mass of ignorance that would crush and degrade the suffrage of this country almost beyond conception…90

Those in favour of the committee, such as Senator McDonald, argued, ‘It seems to me to be very appropriate to consider this question now, and provide some place in the Capitol, some room of the Senate, some branch of the government, where this class of applicants The first wave: 1848–89 59 can have a full and fair hearing…’91 Senator John A. Logan (R-Illinois) echoed a similar sentiment, arguing:

I deem it proper and right, without any committal whatever in reference to my own views, that they [women] should have that committee. It is nothing but fair, just, and right that they should have a committee organized as nearly as can be in the Senate in favor of the views they desire to present. It is treating them only as other citizens would desire to be treated before a body of this character.92

The resolution was carried on 21 January 1882, and a Committee on Woman Suffrage was created. The creation of this Committee on Woman Suffrage was to prove of great use to the woman suffrage movement. On 5 May 1882, Senator Elbridge Gerry Lapham (R-New York) introduced a bill to extend the suffrage to women. It was referred to the newly created Woman Suffrage Committee. This bill did not receive a hearing, but it did receive a committee report, with a favourable majority and an unfavourable minority. This majority committee report was the first ever favourable majority committee report in the Senate, and along with the creation of the Woman Suffrage Committee, gave the woman suffrage movement reason to feel that the tide was turning in their favour. One of the first few bills the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage considered was a bill introduced on 11 January 1882, by Senator John Tyler Morgan (D-Alabama). This bill was a bill to disfranchise the women of Utah. It appears that this bill received scant attention from the Woman Suffrage Committee. The Forty-eighth Congress (1883–85) saw the suffrage movement receive access, in the form of two hearings (one in each house), and response, in the form of two bills introduced (one in each house) and two committee reports (one favourable in the Senate and one negative in the House). The Select Committee on Woman Suffrage in the House was allowed to lapse during this Congress, and all woman suffrage bills were referred, again, to the Judiciary Committee. Though the Rules Committee had refused to report a resolution creating such a committee, it authorized Speaker Warren Keifer (R-Ohio) to present the question to the House. Though the question was concerning the creation of a select committee, the debate centred on the merits and demerits of woman suffrage. One representative feared: ‘There shall be no one to nurse the babies, no one to superintend the household, but all shall go into the political scramble…’93 Speaker Keifer argued in favour of the creation of a committee, stating,

For sixteen years there has been held in this city, annually, a convention composed of representative women from all parts of the country. These conventions, as well as various State and local conventions, have been appealing for relief; and they ought not to be met by the statement that we will not even give the poor privilege of a committee to whom their petitions and memorials may be referred.94

The House voted 85 yays to 124 nays, against the creation of this committee. Then on 7 February 1884, Representative White tried again to secure this committee, but the House Political women 60 refused to allow a vote.95 The Senate renewed this committee, and continued to do so until suffrage passed both houses. Access in the Senate consisted of a hearing on 7 March 1884. There were eight pro- suffrage witnesses from the NWSA convention. One witness, Mrs Caroline Gilkey Rogers, argued:

Where did man get the authority that he now exercises to govern one-half of humanity; from what power the right to place woman, his helpmeet in life, in an inferior position? Came it from nature? Nature made woman his superior when it made her his mother—his equal when it fitted her to hold the sacred position of wife. Did women meet in council and voluntarily give up all their rights to be their own law-makers? The power of the strong over the weak makes man the master. Thus, and thus only, does he gain the authority.96

Access in the House consisted of a hearing on 8 March 1884, also for NWSA delegates. There were four pro-suffrage witnesses. One witness argued that Congress had to act on this measure because the masses never would.97 Another witness argued that the protection of men was not a fair trade for denial of the ballot:

We are told that men protect us; that they are generous, even chivalric in their protection. Gentlemen, if your protectors were women, and they took all your property and your children, and paid you half as much for your work, though as well or better done than your own, would you think much of the chivalry which permitted you to sit in street cars and picked up your pocket-handkerchief?98

Response in the Senate came in several forms. On 6 December 1883, Senator Lapham introduced a woman suffrage bill (hearing held on 7 March, as discussed). On 28 March, this bill received a favourable majority committee report with an adverse minority committee report. Then on 6 February 1885, Senator Thomas Palmer (R-Michigan) tried to bring up on the floor of the House the joint resolution for a woman suffrage amendment, which had been favourably reported on 28 March 1884. It appeared that the Woman Suffrage Committee was favourably disposed towards the movement. In the House, response was mixed. On 10 December 1883, Representative White introduced another woman suffrage bill. This bill received a hearing on 8 March 1884, as mentioned, and received an unfavourable majority committee report on 24 April 1884, with a favourable minority committee report. What is noteworthy here is that the favourable committee report of March 1883 (Forty-seventh Congress) was written by the Select Committee on Woman Suffrage. This select committee was allowed to lapse, however, in the Forty-eighth Congress. And the unfavourable committee report, of April 1884, comes from the House Judiciary Committee, to which woman suffrage bills were referred again after the select committee was abolished. To get a flavour for the chasm of opinion that existed between these two committees it is necessary to quote a brief excerpt from each of their reports. First, the Select Committee on Woman Suffrage: The first wave: 1848–89 61

there is no condition, status in life, of rich or poor; no question, moral or political; no interest, present or future; no ties, foreign or domestic; no issues, local or national; no phase of human life, in which the mother is not equally interested with the father, the daughter with the son, the sister with the brother. Therefore the one should have equal voice with the other in molding the destiny of this nation.99

Next, an excerpt from the House Judiciary Committee report:

To permit the entrance of political contention into the home would be either useless or pernicious—useless if man and wife agree, and pernicious if they differ. In the former event the volume of ballots alone would be increased without changing results. In the latter, the peace and contentment of home would be exchanged for the bedlam of political debate and become the scene of base and demoralizing intrigue.100

The vast difference of opinion here is enlightening. The membership of the Judiciary Committee was unsympathetic to the cause of woman suffrage—suffrage could never get a favourable majority committee report from this committee. In fact, the only favourable majority committee report woman suffrage ever received during the first wave was from the Select Committee on Woman Suffrage. The Forty-ninth Congress (1885–87) saw access, in the form of one hearing in the House, and response, in the form of two bills introduced (one in each house), two committee reports (one negative in the House and one favourable in the Senate), and debate and a vote on the Senate floor. The only access attained was in the House. It came in the form of a hearing on 20 February 1886, before the House Judiciary Committee. There were eight pro-suffrage witnesses. Stanton et al. note that there was no hearing in the Senate in 1886 because a favourable committee report was pending.101 Response in the House was not great. Representative Thomas B.Reed (R-Maine) introduced a woman suffrage bill on 1 February 1886. This bill received the aforementioned hearing on 20 February 1886, and an adverse majority committee report on 6 May 1886, with a favourable minority committee report. In the Senate, the situation was slightly improved. There was no access attained during this Congress. On 9 December 1885, however, Senator Henry W.Blair (R-New Hampshire) introduced a bill to extend suffrage to women. This bill received no hearing, but did receive a favourable majority committee report and an adverse minority committee report, on 2 February 1886. Later that year Senator Blair tried to get this bill called up, but Senator Francis M.Cockerell (D-Missouri) objected and consideration of the resolution was postponed. On 25 January 1887, however, Senator Blair again called up this resolution. This time he was successful, and the resolution was debated before the full Senate and voted upon on 25 January 1887. It did not receive enough votes and failed with 16 yays and 34 nays. The Fiftieth Congress (1887–89) saw a fair amount of access, in the form of three hearings (two in the Senate and one in the House), and some response in the form of two bills introduced (one in each house) and one committee report (favourable in the Senate). Political women 62

On 2 April 1888, a hearing was held in the Senate with statements by the International Women’s Council (eleven pro-suffrage witnesses). Then on 24 January 1889, the Committee on Woman Suffrage granted a hearing, where eight pro-suffrage witnesses testified. Access in the House consisted of one hearing and one audience before the House. In 1888, Mrs Sallie Bennett Clay, a woman suffrage activist, obtained an audience before the House. Then on 28 January 1889, there was a hearing before the Judiciary Committee with eight pro-suffrage witnesses. Regarding response in the Senate, on 12 December 1887, Senator Blair introduced a woman suffrage amendment, yet again, and on 7 February 1889, there was a favourable majority committee report, with an adverse minority committee report, regarding the bill that had received a hearing on 24 January 1889. As noted, there was basically no access attained in the House during the Fiftieth Congress and the picture for response was not much brighter. The only response granted in the House in this Congress was that on 4 January 1888 Representative Reed introduced a woman suffrage bill. In sum, there were fairly equal amounts of access gained by the suffrage movement to both houses of Congress during the first wave. It must be noted that access was sought and begun only after the first wave had been under way for a while. It is with response that the differences between the houses arise. Much more positive response was granted by the Senate during the first wave. Though more bills regarding woman suffrage were introduced in the House than in the Senate (fourteen versus eight), the former did not surpass the latter anywhere else. There were seven majority committee reports in the Senate, four of which were favourable, versus four majority committee reports in the House, one of which was favourable. Both houses created a Select Committee on Woman Suffrage, but only in the Senate was it maintained (it lapsed in the House after one Congress). And it was only in the Senate that a woman suffrage bill was debated and voted upon on the floor of that house. It appears the POS in the Senate was more open than that in the House. The lack of powerful party leaders and the lack of electoral concerns combined to make the Senate more amenable to the concerns of the woman suffrage movement. It provided the suffrage movement with access and positive response. The House, with its fairly strong Speaker, unfavourable mass opinion, considerable electoral stability, and party unity, combined to make the House less amenable to the concerns of the woman suffrage movement. It provided the movement some access, but scant response.

Presidencies—access and response Though no President during this wave actively opposed woman suffrage, none of them was particularly amenable to it either. According to the indicators, the suffrage movement received very little access to any of the Presidents during the first wave (see Table 4.6). Furthermore, the movement received exceedingly little response from any of the Presidents (see Table 4.7). The problem lies not with the indicators, but rather with the lack of published Public Papers of the Presidents before President Truman. Without such public papers it was impossible to ascertain the exact number of times that a President met with the suffrage movement or other women’s groups. Thus, I had to rely on the The first wave: 1848–89 63 private papers of Presidents, which are indexed according to proper names and not topics. I could not look up ‘women’, but rather had to look up ‘National Woman Suffrage Association’, and the like. Table 4. 6 Access Presidents—first wave

President and Attention to Number of times Number of times POS year elected women in suffrage groups met other women groups platform with President met with President 1848 Taylor 0 0 0 closed 1852 Pierce 0 0 0 closed 1856 Buchanan 0 0 0 closed 1860 0 0 0 modified Lincoln/Johnson closed 1864 Johnson 0 0 0 modified closed 1868 Grant 0 0 0 closed 1872 Grant R—discuss 0 0 modified women* closed 1876 Hayes R—discuss 3 0 modified women* closed 1880 Garfield 0 0 0 modified closed 1881–84 Arthur 0 3 0 modified closed 1884 Cleveland 0 1 1 modified closed 1888 Harrison 0 0 0 modified closed Sources: see Appendix A. *=see discussion in text for specifics Table 4.7 Response Presidents—first wave

President and Number of Number of Number Number of POS year elected public public of laws signed pronouncements pronouncements executive re suffrage re women orders 1848 Taylor 0 0 0 0 closed 1852 Pierce 0 0 0 0 closed 1856 Buchanan 0 0 0 0 closed Political women 64

1860 1* 6 re war effort 1 0 closed Lincoln/Johnson 1864 Johnson 0 3 re education 0 3 modified 3 re war closed 1868 Grant 0 0 0 21 for both closed administrations 1872 Grant 0 0 0 see above modified closed 1876 Hayes 0 0 0 7 modified closed 1880 Garfield 0 0 0 0 modified closed 1881–84 Arthur 0 0 0 5 modified closed 1884 Cleveland 0 0 0 14 modified closed 1888 Harrison 0 0 0 8 modified closed Sources: see Appendix A. *=before elected

Using this method I invariably missed some pertinent information because, though I did know the names of pertinent suffrage organizations, I did not know the names of all the women’s organizations that existed during the first wave (this is also a problem with the second wave). The key words I used to conduct my search are discussed in the methodology chapter. The examination of the private papers, however, did yield some enlightening information. There was no access or response during the presidencies of Taylor, Pierce or Buchanan (covering the years 1848–60). Furthermore, there was nothing to be found in any of their papers regarding any access or response to the suffrage movement. This is not surprising considering the fact that, although women began to organize in 1848, their efforts were not focused on the national government, as discussed, but rather on state governments. It is with Lincoln that we begin to find response to women, though no access attained. It must be noted that I found little indication from suffrage accounts of access sought, thus lack of access attained may not be that startling a finding. Women were busy with war work, not with pursuing their political rights. There is some evidence, though, through which we can glean Lincoln’s views on woman suffrage. In a letter written by him in 1836, when campaigning for a local government office in Sangamon County, Illinois, Lincoln states, ‘I go for all sharing the privileges of the government, who assist in bearing its burdens. Consequently I go for admitting all whites to the right of suffrage, who pay taxes or bear arms (by no means excluding females).’102 Although this statement predated the women’s movement and Lincoln’s presidency, it is none the less The first wave: 1848–89 65 noteworthy. Lincoln, however, was preoccupied with a Civil War and freeing the slaves during his tenure in office, and according to Stanton et al., was not willing to risk his new party for woman suffrage:

During the prolonged debates on these amendments [Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth], those who watched the progress of political sentiment and understood the drift of events, struck the key-note of reconstruction in ‘universal suffrage and universal amnesty’, but they were speedily silenced or condemned. Abraham Lincoln saw that this was the true policy, and counseled it in private. But he was influenced by those who misjudged the signs of the times, and for the success of his party and his own re-election, he yielded to weak counselors.103

This, however, is a somewhat biased account and there is no other evidence to corroborate this assertion on the part of NWSA. Regarding response to women, Lincoln did, however, make six public pronouncements of thanks regarding women’s war efforts. Thus, the efforts of women during the war were recognized, but not in the way the woman’s rights movement hoped (i.e. with a woman suffrage amendment, or at least a public endorsement). The papers of Andrew Johnson reveal no access attained by the suffrage movement, but they do indicate a small degree of response on his part towards women. Again, however, it must be noted that there was little evidence, from suffrage papers or Johnson’s private papers, of any access sought (no requests for meetings, letters written, etc.). Dorr, however, notes that Johnson subscribed to The Revolution, Stanton and Anthony’s suffrage newspaper (financed by George F.Train).104 Dorr records the conversation between Anthony and Johnson as follows, ‘“I don’t want to subscribe to any more papers,” said Johnson gruffly. “Look at that table over there—just piled up with mail I haven’t had time to open. Besides, I never read papers.” “You’ll read this one,” Susan said confidently… “Here’s your two dollars,” he said.’ His response, like his predecessor, was to recognize women’s war efforts, and he made three public pronouncements to such effect. He also made three public pronouncements regarding the need for women to receive some education. Finally, he signed into law three bills concerning pensions for widows of Civil War soldiers. This, again, was not exactly what the woman suffrage movement was looking for, but it was not without hope for President Johnson: Stanton et al. note that the woman suffrage movement believed that ‘even the President [Johnson] has said that if women in the District of Columbia shall intelligently ask for the right of franchise, he shall by no means veto it’.105 He was never given the chance to sign a woman suffrage bill into law, however, and thus his level of support is unknown. The administrations of Ulysses S.Grant (1869–76) granted little access to the suffrage movement and little response. Again, there is little evidence that suffrage groups sought much access to Grant. Suffragists did, however, attempt to gain access to the political parties. They tried to gain admission to the party conventions, in hopes of urging them to adopt a woman suffrage plank. This access sought did result in access attained, in the form of attention to women in the Republican Party platform. The Republicans discussed women in the platforms of 1872 and 1876. The platform of 1872 read: ‘The Republican Political women 66

Party is mindful of its obligations to the loyal women of America for their noble devotion to the cause of freedom. Their admission to wider fields of usefulness is viewed with satisfaction; and the honest demand of any class of citizens for additional rights should be treated with respectful consideration.’106 The Republicans, although not willing to include a woman suffrage plank, were willing to recognize their work and the legitimacy of their claims. Why this plank? It is possible that the Republicans may not have wanted to see women working with the Democrats and campaigning against them in future elections. This assertion is not without merit. First, the Democrats did try to befriend the suffrage movement in the late 1860s–early 1870s. George F.Train, an active Democrat, financed The Revolution. And Stanton et al. note, regarding the Republican treatment of the woman suffrage movement, ‘but the Democrats seeing the inconsistency of the Republicans, did advocate our cause, present our petitions in Congress, and frank our documents to all parts of the country’.107 Second, as noted earlier, NWSA was quite pleased with this ‘splinter’—they felt that it was a sure sign that the Republican Party was on their side and would aid them in the cause. NWSA also issued a statement (quoted earlier) urging all their members to work especially hard for the election of Republicans in the coming election. There is evidence, too, that the suffrage movement viewed President Grant as a friend to woman’s rights. As Stanton et al. comment, ‘his course since his elevation to the Presidency has always been favorable to increased rights for women. He officially recognized their competency and has given them many governmental positions.’108 I, however, found no evidence of his officially recognizing their competency, in either suffrage collections or his private papers. Regarding response, Grant offered little. The only indication of any response was that during his administration he signed a considerable amount of legislation concerning women into law—twenty-one pieces. Much of this legislation dealt with widowers and wives of veterans of the Civil War. The favourable opinion of Grant held by the woman suffrage movement was perhaps fuelled by the plank in the 1872 Republican platform. During the presidency of Rutherford B.Hayes there was a little access sought and attained, and very little response. One type of access came in the form of the plank in the 1876 Republican platform that stated:

The Republican Party recognizes with approval the substantial advances recently made toward the establishment of equal rights for women, by the many important amendments effected by Republican legislatures, in the laws which concern personal and property relations of wives, mothers, and widows, and the appointment and election of women to the superintendance of education, charities, and other public trusts. The honest demands of this class of citizens for additional rights, privileges and immunities should be treated with respectful consideration.109

The only other access attained by the suffrage movement during Hayes’s presidency was that he met three times with NWSA delegates, once in 1878 and twice in 1879. The 1878 meeting concerned an exposition to be held in Paris that was to showcase the advancement in industry made around the world. The 1878 meeting was fruitful in the eyes of the delegates because Hayes had ‘named the different classes of industries for The first wave: 1848–89 67 which no commissioners had been appointed, asked the ladies to nominate their candidates, and assured them he would favor a representation by women’.110 The first meeting in 1879, however, was not as fruitful. NWSA delegates were received by President Hayes in January 1879, and complained to him that he had failed to address the concerns of women in his annual message. They also urged him to recommend to Congress ‘that women equally with men be protected in the exercise of their civil and political rights’, and that he address the concerns of women in his next annual message.111 Soon after this meeting, NWSA delegates from Utah were received by the President. They addressed to him their concerns regarding the disfranchisement of women in Utah, and he asked them to set forth the facts in writing so that he might properly weigh this matter.112 The only response from Hayes, however, was that he signed seven pieces of legislation concerning women into law (one permitted women attorneys to argue before the Supreme Court. Belva Anne Lockwood, a suffrage activist, had lobbied for this law.) There is no evidence of his responding to any of the aforementioned requests. The correspondence and personal papers of Hayes reveal that he was not a supporter of woman’s suffrage. Hayes stated in his diary on 27 April 1870 that ‘the proper discharge of the functions of maternity is inconsistent with the like discharge of the duties (the political duties of) citizenship’.113 Thus, his lack of response to the suffrage movement may not be surprising. The presidency of Garfield was a brief one (elected 1880, died 1881). There was access sought (letters written, meetings held), very little access attained (one meeting, and not even during his presidency), and no response attained. On 6 February 1880, Lucy Stone wrote to him requesting that he present to the House of Representatives the ‘petition of James Scott and 51 others for a Sixteenth Amendment woman suffrage to the Constitution so that women may vote on the same terms as men’.114 There is no indication that Garfield did any such thing. Garfield’s position on suffrage was ambiguous. While-in Congress he declared himself in favour of a House select committee on women’s rights.115 He then turned down requests to speak at an AWSA mass meeting in December 1871 (before becoming President).116 And during a meeting with Susan B.Anthony during the election of 1880 (the only access attained), he expressed doubts about pressing woman suffrage during this presidential campaign.117 He went on to say, in a letter to Henry Blackwell, Lucy Stone’s husband, on 17 July 1880: ‘While I am in favor of enlarging the sphere of woman’s usefulness I have never seen my way clear to advocating women’s suffrage until it was evident that the majority of the women themselves desire it.’118 Garfield further stated in a letter of 24 August 1880, to Susan B.Anthony (in response to hers of an earlier date): ‘I am open to the freest discussion and fairest consideration of your question. I have not yet reached the conclusion that it would be best for the women of the country that she should have the suffrage…that fruit is not yet ripe on my tree.’119 Furthermore, Garfield argued that even if he personally supported suffrage, it was not his place to advocate it or to request Congress to consider it. The Republican Convention of 1880 mentioned nothing regarding woman’s suffrage and thus it was not for him to consider: ‘do you not think it would be a violation of the trust they have imposed on me to speak for them’.120 Political women 68

Garfield continuously sounded as if he might change his mind, and this arguably fuelled the woman suffrage movement’s hopes that he could be convinced. Repeated pleas, however, were met with no concrete response. Why did Garfield do this? He may have hoped that his responses would assuage the movement, quelling its potential for disruptive behaviour (campaigning against the Republican Party), and hoping that the women would campaign for the Republican Party in the upcoming election. As discussed earlier, the suffrage movement did flirt briefly with the Democratic Party in the early 1870s, and the Republicans may have wanted to keep the woman suffrage movement on their side, without actually granting its demands. The potential for NWSA to throw its weight behind the Democratic Party was a real one. As Anthony commented to Garfield in a letter of 9 September 1880:

The Republican Party did run well for a season in the ‘line of liberty’; but since 1870, its congressional enactments, majority reports, Supreme Court decisions, and now its presidential platform, show a retrograde movement …limiting the power of the national government in the protection of United States citizens against the injustice of the States, until what we gained by the sword is lost by political surrenders. And we need nothing but a Democratic administration to demonstrate to all Israel and the sun the fact, the sad fact, that all is lost by the Republican Party, and not to be lost by the Democratic Party. 121

Thus, Garfield may have been trying to placate the woman suffrage movement in hopes of preventing their going over to the Democrats. Chester A.Arthur had been Garfield’s Vice President, and succeeded him when Garfield was assassinated while in office. The presidency of Arthur (1881–84) saw a little access sought, a little access granted, and very little response. Access consisted of three meetings with NWSA delegates, and the only response was that he signed five pieces of legislation concerning women (widows’ pensions and such) into law. Arthur’s position on suffrage could not be clearly gleaned from his private papers. In the autumn of 1881, Anthony, Mrs Jones, Miss Snow and Miss Couzins met with Arthur asking if, in his annual message to Congress, he would urge it to create a standing committee on woman’s rights and to pass a Sixteenth Amendment (on woman suffrage). Arthur had little to say upon the topic. The only clue we have as to his views comes from an exchange with Susan B.Anthony upon receiving 100 delegates from an NWSA convention on 6 March 1884. He replied to Anthony’s question ‘Ought not women have full equality and political rights?’ with ‘We should probably differ on the details of that question.’122 There is no concrete proof that Arthur responded to the request of Anthony, Jones, Snow and Couzins. Stanton et al., however, note that early in the first session of the Forty-seventh Congress Senator Hoar and Representative White introduced resolutions for the creation of a committee on woman’s rights—they close this sentence with an asterisk that footnotes the meeting that Anthony, Snow, Jones, and Couzins had with Arthur in the autumn of 1881.123 This would indicate that Stanton et al. appear to view the two events as connected—but there is no way of knowing definitively, since there is no record of Arthur urging upon Congress, in his annual message, those requests of the The first wave: 1848–89 69 women. There is no further evidence of Arthur’s views on the suffrage question, nor does it appear that the woman suffrage movement pursued him (no records in private papers or suffrage collections of letters exchanged, invitations to speak extended, or other meetings held). Grover Cleveland (the first Democrat since before the Civil War) was elected in 1884, served one term, and after a hiatus of one term, was re-elected. His first presidency was marked by access sought, and very little access attained or response granted. Regarding access, he met twice with women’s groups (one suffrage and one women’s issues). One of the meetings was with a suffrage group in 1887– NWSA delegates who went to protest against the disfranchisement of women in the Washington territory. The second meeting was in 1888, when he received a delegation of women from the International Council of Women (Stanton had conceived of the idea for this group). Cleveland offered no response to the movement, except for signing into law fourteen pieces of legislation concerning women—most of this legislation, however, dealt with appropriations and not substantive rights for women. There is evidence of two letters written to Cleveland by woman suffrage activists, one from Susan B.Anthony asking, ‘May I not hope that in your forthcoming message to Congress you will urge the passage of a resolution submitting to the several state legislatures a proposition to amend the national constitution as to protect women of all states and territories in the enjoyment of the right of suffrage.’124 The other is from the Woman’s Suffrage Association of Philadelphia, asking him to give thoughtful consideration to the political claims of women.125 He did not urge Congress to pass such an amendment and there is no evidence that he replied (or even gave thought) to the Philadelphia group. On the contrary, Stanton et al. note that Cleveland had protested against women taking part in government, as it would interfere with the home.126 Benjamin Harrison (Republican) was elected in 1888, and served one term; the first half of his presidency thus falls in the first wave. Harrison granted no access and very little response to the suffrage movement. The only response came in the form of eight laws concerning women signed into law. The suffrage movement sought little access to Harrison. NWSA wrote him a letter on 30 June 1888, requesting that, in his letter of acceptance of the presidential nomination, he state his belief that all citizens should have the right to vote (women being considered citizens).127 There is no evidence that he replied to this letter nor that he made this statement in his letter of acceptance. Thus, we see very little access and very little response from the presidencies during the first wave. Almost all the Presidents granted a meeting, or two, to woman suffrage groups, and signed some legislation regarding women into law. None publicly endorsed suffrage, either in messages to Congress or public pronouncements, and none publicly repudiated it (though some did in private). They all appeared to sit on the fence—not actively supporting, but willing to listen to the demands of the woman suffrage movement. Overall, there was little in the way of assistance granted by any President to the woman suffrage cause. The POS during most of these presidencies was mixed, and it would be expected that during such a POS the President might grant some access and response to a social movement. A limited amount of both access and response was granted—very few meetings with suffrage groups, only one meeting with a women’s group, women discussed in only two party platforms (Republican) and no support of suffrage, no public Political women 70 pronouncements regarding suffrage, only a few pronouncements regarding women’s war effort, and an average of five pieces of legislation regarding women signed by every President after Lincoln. Not as much, though, as would be expected considering the POS. Why? Suffrage does not appear to have been an issue on the agenda of any of the Presidents of this wave. It did not have to be: although they were not safe or stable electorally, women had little political clout to offer. Women could not yet affect the political fate of a President. They could campaign and influence male votes, but arguably this was not enough to instil fear in any presidential candidate.

Conclusion

Although the proposed woman suffrage amendment did not pass even one house of Congress during this wave, there were some achievements earned by the suffrage movement that could give them hope for the future. First, it was made clear that a Woman Suffrage Committee (or a favourably composed committee, such as the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections under Senator Morton) would give the woman suffrage amendment fair consideration and improve its chances of reaching the floor. There was not one favourable majority committee report, in either house, before the creation of Woman Suffrage Committees. When the Senate created its own committee in 1882, four favourable majority committee reports (one in each Congress after the creation of the committee), debate on the floor, and a vote by the full Senate, were, arguably, the result. In the House, the only favourable majority committee report of the first wave came from the Select Committee on Woman Suffrage. Once it was let lapse no other favourable majority committee reports were written during this wave. Thus, the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage was a boon to the suffrage movement and highlighted the need for another one to be created in the House. Another achievement for the suffrage movement in the first wave was that the movement had gained some devoted friends in both houses of Congress. Although their numbers were not great, they provided the movement with inroads into both houses by presenting petitions and memorials, introducing suffrage bills, arguing the case for woman suffrage, writing favourable minority and majority committee reports, arguing for the creation of select committees on woman’s rights, and attempting to get the suffrage amendment called up on the floor for debate. Without such allies the suffrage movement would have had little success with Congress. One final achievement was that the suffrage movement, from 1869 on, received fairly regular hearings along with pro-suffrage witnesses. Being granted a hearing, even before an unsympathetic committee, was useful to the suffrage movement. The suffrage movement was given plenty of copies (generally around 10,000) of the committee prints of the proceedings—the movement could circulate these proceedings, thus increasing public awareness of the issue (and all for free, a great help to any movement with limited resources). As Stanton et al. note regarding the usefulness of these copies, ‘the equally able congressional debates, reported verbatim, read by a large constituency in every State of the Union, did an educational work on the question of woman’s enfranchisement that cannot be overestimated’.128 Furthermore, the hearings permitted the women, many of The first wave: 1848–89 71 whom were not used to speaking in public, to hone their skills and solidify their arguments. On the other side, however, there were some failures during the first wave. First, the lapse of the Select Committee on Woman Suffrage in the House was a great disappointment and loss to the movement. It was clear before its creation that the Judiciary Committee was not interested in the issue of woman suffrage and became painfully clear after the select committee was let lapse. As Stanton et al. note, questioning the usefulness of their petitions in light of the lack of response, ‘having petitioned our lawmakers, State and national, for years, many from weariness have vowed to appeal no more; for our petitions, say they, by the tens of thousands, are piled up in the national archives [sic], unheeded and ignored’.129 The suffrage movement had not garnered enough allies yet in the House. Without a Woman Suffrage Committee and without enough friendly representatives, the woman suffrage amendment had little chance of getting through the House. Another failure or disappointment for the movement was not being allowed to read its 250 petitions on the floor of the House in 1880, as it was permitted to do in the Senate. Such access may have educated a few members (who were not on the Judiciary Committee) about the number of constituents who supported woman suffrage. Most members, however, never heard the arguments first hand for or against woman suffrage, nor were they aware of the amount of public support for woman suffrage, because the Judiciary Committee never permitted the amendment to get out of its committee and come before the full House. Thus, the failure of the woman suffrage amendment ever to be debated on the floor of the House was another loss for the movement during this wave. The fate of the amendment seemed to be in the hands of the thirteen or so members of the Judiciary Committee. One final failure for the movement during this wave was the lack of a presidential ally. Not one of the Presidents during this wave was a supporter of woman suffrage (or willing to be one publicly). While the influence of a President on Congress may not have been great during this wave, it cannot be denied that any public endorsement, especially from the President of the United States, would have aided the movement. Was the access and response received by the movement during this wave what might be expected, considering the POS? This section will discuss whether the amount of access attained in the House and the Senate is what one would expect, considering the POS, and then will discuss whether the amount of response granted from each body is what would be expected. It will then move on to discuss whether the amount of access and response granted from the Presidents is what one would expect, in light of the POS. Finally, if the access and response granted is not what was expected in light of the POS, I will discuss possible reasons for this. In the House, the amount of access received is in general what one would expect, considering the POS (see Table 4.4a). The POS during five of the House Congresses was modified closed, where one would expect a little access. The POS during fifteen Congresses was completely closed, where one would expect little to no access. In thirteen of the fifteen closed Congresses, the response granted the movement is what was expected. There were one or zero hearings per Congress, with a few pro-suffrage witnesses. In two of the closed Congresses (Forty-first and Forty-fifth), the response granted is greater than what was expected. In the Forty-first Congress, the movement was Political women 72 granted two hearings, and in the Forty-fifth, the movement was granted four hearings. It appears that these two Congresses were anomalies. During no other Congresses did the movement receive more than one hearing. During the five modified closed Congresses, the suffrage movement received some access in the form of one or zero hearings per Congress, and some pro-suffrage witnesses. This is what one would expect. Though zero hearings were not entirely expected during modified closed Congresses, it is not odd here. The lack of hearings came before the movement was seeking access to Congress. Thus, regarding access, the amount attained in the House is what one would expect, considering the POS. The occurrence of a hearing during a closed Congress is not very odd. The granting of hearings to the suffrage movement became customary. Congress came to expect the movement to request one, and it got into the habit of granting one per Congress. Therefore, at least one hearing per Congress could be expected. The increased amount of access during a modified closed Congress (Forty-fifth) is not as easy to explain. One of the hearings was before the Subcommittee on Territories and concerned a bill to disfranchise the women of Utah. Suffrage was not the true concern here, polygamy was. Representative Julian had introduced a bill in Congress in 1869 to grant suffrage to the women of Utah in the hope that they would eliminate polygamy, but this was not the result. Congress wanted to disfranchise women in Utah to punish the territory for maintaining polygamy.130 This hearing, seen in this light, is not indicative of response to the suffrage movement. Rather, it is a reaction to polygamy in Utah. The other three hearings, however, concerned woman suffrage. Their occurrence during this modified closed congress is an anomaly. Never before, and never again, was the movement to receive so many hearings in one Congress. Regarding access in the Senate, the amount attained is fairly consistent with what one would expect (see Table 4.4b). The POS was modified open during eighteen Congresses, where one would expect some access. The POS was open during two Congresses, where one would expect much access. During the first nine Congresses of this wave (Thirty-one to Thirty-nine), during which the POS was modified open, the movement received no access. This is not surprising because the movement did not begin to seek access until after the Civil War. In five of the modified open Congresses, the movement attained some access in the form of a hearing per Congress. This is primarily what would be expected. One might expect more hearings, but since the movement did not generally seek more than one hearing per Congress, it is not odd that that is all they attained. During one of the modified open Congresses (Forty-third) and one of the open Congresses (Forty-ninth), the movement received no hearings. This is not what was expected. These appear to be anomalies. Perhaps because the movement did not have many resources yet (money or people), it could not seek much or attain much access. During three of the modified open Congresses (Forty-fifth, Forty-sixth, Fiftieth), the movement attained some access in the form of at least one hearing per Congress (two in the Forty-fifth, one in the Forty-sixth, and two in the Fiftieth). This is what was expected (if not slightly better). Finally, during one of the modified open Congresses (Forty-seventh), the movement received no access, according to the indicators. It is during this Congress, however, that the Committee on Woman Suffrage was created. The hearings for the creation of this committee served as surrogate hearings for suffrage. The first wave: 1848–89 73

In neither house did the state of the POS appear to affect the number of pro-suffrage witnesses testifying at hearings. The number varied generally from as few as four to as many as eleven, with there being no relationship between the state of the POS and the number testifying. The number of witnesses appeared to be dependent only upon how many delegates NWSA sent from their convention. Is the amount of access attained in the House and the state of the POS related? I would argue yes. The movement received very little access during the modified closed and closed Congresses (with two exceptions). This is what was expected. The House had a fairly strong Speaker, high levels of party unity, mass opinion was unfavourable, and there was very little electoral instability—it had a fairly closed POS. Suffrage was not an issue for many congressmen. There was no political need for it and no benefits to be reaped from it. Congress granted a hearing each Congress to assuage the movement—it became a custom, and placated the movement. Stanton et al. note, regarding the hearings that NWSA received every Congress, ‘during each of these conventions it was the custom for committees of the Senate and House to grant hearings to the leading advocates of this [woman suffrage] proposition’ (emphasis added).131 Is there a connection between the amount of access attained and the state of the POS in the Senate? I would argue there is. The POS in the Senate was modified open during a majority of the Congresses. One would expect the movement to receive considerable access, given this POS, and yet it received similar amounts as the House (with its closed POS). As with the House, hearings were granted year after year, in part as a matter of courtesy, and in part because some members were genuinely interested in the question of woman suffrage. It is not odd that the movement received only one hearing per Congress; that is all it sought, but other access was attained in the Senate that was not measured by the indicators (and not obtained in the House). A Woman Suffrage Committee was created and maintained, suffrage petitions were consistently presented on the floor (this was denied in the House, on occasion), and in one instance, the Senate requested a hearing from Isabella Hooker. Senators granted more access than representatives. The rules in the Senate made it a more open body. Senators were freer to do as they pleased— they had no fear of party leader reprisal. They could grant the suffrage movement access if they so chose. The response received in the House is what one would expect, considering the POS. In modified closed and closed Congresses one would expect very little response granted by the House, and that response would be co-optive rather than concrete—that is, one would expect only one or two suffrage bills introduced, no committee reports and/or no favourable majority committee reports, and no suffrage bills brought to the floor or voted upon. This scenario holds true in the House. There was a total of fourteen woman suffrage bills introduced in the House during the first wave, and, with the exception of three closed congresses, there was never more than one bill introduced into any Congress. This is exactly what would be expected, considering the POS. The number of representatives introducing the woman suffrage bills is also noteworthy. Seven representatives introduced these thirteen bills. These seven representatives would probably have introduced these bills irrespective of the political conditions—they were die-hard woman suffrage supporters. Thus, the paucity of bills and representatives introducing them indicates the lack of importance accorded the woman suffrage question. Representatives were electorally stable, mass opinion was against Political women 74 suffrage, they were governed by a fairly strong Speaker, and voting with their party. There was no political need to respond to the suffrage movement. Those who did, did so purely out of personal support for the issue. There were only four committee reports written in the House during this wave, and only one of them was a favourable majority. This favourable majority committee report was written during a closed congress (Forty-seventh). This is not what was expected. This favourable committee report was the fruit of the Select Committee on Woman Suffrage. This committee was created during this Congress and existed only for this one Congress. The creation of this committee is also not what was expected during a closed Congress. Overall, the lack of favourable majority committee reports and the state of the POS do coincide. But why was this committee created during a closed Congress? The creation of the Select Committee on Woman Suffrage is what one would expect in an open or modified open Congress, not in a closed Congress. There is little in the committee proceedings to shed light on this question, but a number of potential reasons do present themselves. First, though the Judiciary Committee and much of the House were not favourably disposed to the question of woman suffrage, they did believe in the right of US citizens to petition the government and be heard. As Representative James B.Belford (R-Colorado) asked of his brethren when discussing reasons for the creation of a committee on woman’s rights, ‘Is not the right of petition a constitutional right?’132 Speaker Keifer echoed his sentiment, arguing, ‘The right of petition belongs to all persons within the limits of our republic.’133 Thus this committee’s creation, in either house, may have been done out of this belief in the right of citizens to petition the government. Another possibility is that its creation may have been a co-optive response, on the part of the Republican Party (who controlled both houses), designed to quiet the suffrage movement, while not expecting the new committee to behave any differently from the way in which the Judiciary Committee had. There is a quote from a senator, regarding this assertion that the Republican Party was only trying to co-opt the movement when many of its members championed the cause of the creation of a woman’s rights committee. This quote from Senator John Morgan (D-Alabama) is lengthy, but interesting. He argues:

In as much as this measure, I understand, has been made a party measure by the decree of caucus… I cannot be convinced against these facts that this new movement in favor of female suffrage means anything more than to add another patch to the worn-out garment of Republicanism…and which they now seek to patch further by putting on the delicate little silk covering of woman suffrage. I do not believe that this movement has its roots and branch in any sincere desire to give to the women of this land the right of suffrage. I think it is a mere party movement with a view of attempting to draw into the reach of the Republican Party some little support from the sympathy and interest they suppose the ladies will take in their cause if they should advocate it here. No bill, perhaps, is expected to be reported. The committee will sit and listen…and the subject will be passed by without any actual effort to secure the passage of the bill.134 The first wave: 1848–89 75

This quote, though far from definitive evidence (and from a senator), does lend some credence to the assertion that the creation of the Woman Suffrage Committee may have been a ploy, by the Republican Party, to placate the woman suffrage movement, with no intention of letting woman suffrage pass the House. Finally, Stanton et al. argue that the impetus for the creation of a woman’s rights committee came from the influx of new members into the Forty-sixth Congress. They argue that the Forty-sixth Congress ‘contained an unusually large portion of new representatives, fresh from the people, ready for the discussion of new issues, and manifesting a chivalric spirit toward the consideration of woman’s claims as a citizen’.135 There is no way of knowing if this statement is correct, but the percentage of first-term members in the Forty-sixth Congress was 42.3 and in the Forty-seventh (when the committee was actually created) it was 31.8—thus there was an influx of new members into the Forty-sixth Congress, many of whom were probably re-elected into the Forty- seventh. Thus, if some were favourably disposed towards a woman’s rights committee in the Forty-sixth Congress, it is likely that many of them were still there during the Forty- seventh. Turnover in the election of 1882 (to the Forty-eighth Congress), however, was 51.5 per cent. It may have been that a number of the members defeated had been those who voted for the creation of the committee. An analysis of the election results for 1882 shows that sixty-five of the 115 members who voted for the Woman Suffrage Committee in 1882 (Forty-seventh) did not return to the Forty-eighth Congress.136 Thus, only fifty members returned to the Forty-eighth Congress who had voted for the Woman Suffrage Committee. Though this argument can only explain why the committee was let lapse, it still provides some insight. Which of these reasons is correct? There are not enough data to make a final determination, but it does appear that some combination of all three is plausible. The right to petition argument is an easy answer—the Constitution states that it is a citizen of the United States’ right to petition the government. The co-optation argument is appealing because it fits in neatly with what is expected under a modified closed POS. Finally, the turnover argument is helpful in explaining why the committee was not re- created—the loss of sixty-five definite pro-committee votes. It is likely that all three of these things contributed to the demise of the Woman Suffrage Committee in the House. The amount of response granted by the Senate is primarily what was expected. There was one suffrage bill introduced into every Congress from the Forty-fifth onwards. Before that Congress, there were no bills concerning woman suffrage introduced (except during the Fortieth). This lack of suffrage bills is slightly at odds with what was expected. But since the woman suffrage amendment was not even introduced in Congress until 1878 (Forty-fifth Congress), this lack of bills is not so odd. Before that Congress, most of the action on suffrage concerned suffrage in the territories and Washington, DC. Though pertinent to a discussion of response, these bills were not the primary focus of the suffrage movement. As in the House, what may be of interest is the number of different members doing the introducing. In the Senate, there were six senators who introduced the eight suffrage bills. Thus, a small number of bills were introduced, but by a variety of senators. Considering this small number of bills, the variety of senators is indicative of some response. There were seven committee reports in the Senate—four Congresses with one committee report each (Forty-seventh to Fiftieth), and one Congress with three committee Political women 76 reports (Forty-fifth, all unfavourable). Four of these committee reports were favourable and were written during either modified open or open Congresses. This is what was expected. The three unfavourable committee reports, however, were written during a modified open Congress; this result was not expected. Upon closer examination, this result is not so odd. These three committee reports came from the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections which, during the Forty-fifth Congress, was chaired by Senator Wadleigh. Senator Wadleigh was opposed to woman suffrage. In fact, Stanton et al. note that the previous chair of this committee, Senator Morton, was pro-suffrage, and had specifically asked that suffrage bills be referred to his committee, so that they could receive fair consideration.137 Response was not favourable from a chair opposed to woman suffrage, and probably never would be, irrespective of the political conditions. All four of the favourable majority committee reports in the Senate were written once the Committee on Woman Suffrage was created (the committee was created during a modified open Congress), and during modified open, or open Congresses. This is what was expected And the woman suffrage amendment received debate and a vote on the floor of the Senate during an open Congress. This too, is what was expected. In summary, in most Congresses in the House, one or fewer suffrage bills were introduced, and no favourable majority committee reports written. This corresponds with the state of the POS at the time. It appears that the House was closed to the issue of woman suffrage during this wave. The paucity of members introducing woman suffrage bills, the existence of only one favourable majority committee report, no floor debate and no vote by the full House in twenty-five years attests to this. But did this occur because of the state of the POS? I would argue that the state of the POS can explain the amount of response granted. Parties were fairly unified, there was very little electoral instability, mass opinion was against suffrage, and the position of Speaker had some powers that made it formidable. The House was not an open institution—members were not in need of new constituents and they did not perceive that public opinion was behind woman suffrage. As Representative William Maybury (D-Michigan) argued for the majority in an adverse committee report of 1884:

Your committee are of the opinion that while a few intelligent women, such as appeared before this committee in advocacy of the pending measure, would defy all obstacles in the way of their casting the ballot, yet the great mass of the intelligent, refined and judicious, with the becoming modesty of their sex, would shrink from the rude contact of the crowd and, with the exceptions mentioned, leave the ignorant and vile the exclusive right to speak for the gentler sex in public affairs.138

Furthermore, many Southern Democrats were unwilling to enlarge the population of Negro voters by granting the suffrage to Negro women. For instance, in 1880 the Democratic Party refused to put a suffrage plank in their party platform because ‘of the objection of the extreme Southern element which feared the political recognition of Negro women of the South’.139 Democratic dislike for the issue can be seen from the results of the vote for the renewal of the Select Committee on Woman Suffrage. There were 85 yeas and 124 nays; of the 124 nays, 120 were Democrats, and of the 85 yays, 13 The first wave: 1848–89 77 were Democrats.140 Overall, during this wave, the majority of the House felt no need or desire to make overtures or even pay much attention to the woman suffrage movement. The modified closed nature of the POS during most of this wave was open enough to grant the movement some access without granting much real response. It appears that the amount of response received in the Senate correlates with the state of the POS. The Senate was a more open institution than the House during this wave (it granted more response to the suffrage movement). There were no rules granting a party leader the power to punish a member for not voting the party line. Members could do as they pleased. They could offer response to an issue (that did not have public opinion behind it) because there were no strong party leaders dictating their every move. The rules in the House, which granted the Speaker some considerable powers, the electoral stability, the unfavourable composition of the Judiciary Committee, the unfavourable mass opinion, and the fairly high levels of party unity, all tend to point to the House as a closed political opportunity structure during the first wave, especially when contrasted with the Senate. The lack of rules granting any member power over other senators tends to point to the Senate as a fairly open political opportunity structure. The findings are what one would expect. The suffrage movement received a little access (which, politically, costs nothing) to the House and very little to no response from it, whereas in the Senate, the suffrage movement received a little access and some response (especially compared to that received from the House). The amount of access and response received by the suffrage movement from the Presidents is what one would expect considering the POS during each presidency. The POS during the first three presidencies of this wave were closed, and there was no access or response attained by the suffrage movement. The POS during the remaining presidencies were all classified as modified closed (with the exception of Grant’s first administration, which was closed). Under such electoral conditions one would expect the President to grant little to no access and response to the suffrage movement. Regarding access, one would expect few to no occurrences of one or more of the following: a party platform to discuss women but not endorse suffrage, and the President to meet once or twice with suffrage or women’s groups. Regarding response, one would expect few to no occurrences of one or more of the following: a couple of public pronouncements regarding women (but not likely suffrage since that might be politically risky and might be expected only under an open POS), possibly an executive order regarding women, and some legislation signed regarding women (but nothing politically risky—only pensions for widows and such). President Lincoln did not grant access according to the indicators, but then there is no indication that any was sought by the movement. He did, however, grant some response in the form of public pronouncements about women and he signed one executive order regarding women. President Johnson did not grant access either (there is also no indication that any was sought), but he did grant some response in the form of public pronouncements regarding women, and he signed a few pieces of legislation. President Grant offered almost no access or response during his first administration, which was expected, considering the POS. During his second administration he granted some access to the movement in the form of a plank regarding women in the party platform and he did offer a little bit of response in the form of legislation signed regarding women. Political women 78

President Hayes also offered access in the form of a plank in the party platform and three meetings with suffrage groups. His response was minimal but he did sign some legislation concerning women, including one law that permitted women attorneys to argue before the Supreme Court. President Garfield granted almost no access (he met with Anthony once before he was President) but did reply to correspondence from suffrage activists. He did not, however, grant any response—considering the fact that he died one year into his term this may not be all that surprising. President Arthur granted access by meeting with woman suffrage groups twice and granted some response by signing some legislation concerning women. President Cleveland also granted a little access by meeting with a suffrage group once and a women’s group once, and his response was similar to the others in that he signed some legislation concerning women. Finally, President Harrison granted no access (though there is no evidence that any was sought) and granted a little response in the form of legislation concerning women. Thus, we see a majority of the presidencies exhibiting modified closed political opportunity structures and offering very little access and response. Are the two related? Can we make the connection between the state of the POS and the amount of access and response received? It would be nice to argue that since the first three Presidents of this wave had closed political opportunity structures, and there was no access attained or response received, that the two are correlated. It is difficult to state this conclusively, however, because, as noted, the suffrage movement did not seek much access to the national government before 1865. Thus, a lack of access and response may be due only to the lack of access sought and not the POS. It does appear, from correspondence and personal papers, that the presidencies of this wave were fairly closed to the issue of woman suffrage, and any response sounded co- optive as opposed to concrete. Presidents did not publicly endorse woman suffrage, but nor did they publicly come out against it. At the same time, none of them refused to meet with woman suffrage activists (although some did refuse to speak at their meetings), and at times they sounded supportive of woman’s rights. The Presidents of this wave tended to wonder if this were the right time to pursue woman suffrage. They argued either that it was the ‘Negro’s hour’, or that public sentiment was unknown, or that when a majority of the women of the nation desired it they would grant it—all of which sound like a way to pass the buck. That is, none of the Presidents wanted to go out on a political limb and risk losing any present or future constituents. These excuses were a way of saving face and saying to the suffrage movement, ‘I would support woman suffrage but…’ This may have been political game-playing, but that does not harm the argument. Presidents were unwilling publicly to endorse woman suffrage and potentially lose votes but they were also not willing to disregard the woman suffrage activists, and potentially lose their future votes or the votes of their husbands, brothers or male suffragists. This all seems to fit well with the modified closed state of the POS during most of the presidencies. In sum, it appears that the POS goes far in explaining the amount of response attained in both the House and the Senate during the first wave. During modified closed or closed Congresses the suffrage movement tended to receive less response from Congress. In the Senate the lack of rules granting party leaders powers helps explain the response granted to the movement. And in the House, the party unity, electoral stability, strong Speaker and sensitivity to public opinion resulted in little response granted. In both houses, the state of the POS appears to explain the amount of access attained. The movement tended The first wave: 1848–89 79 to receive hearings during modified open or open Congresses, and to receive fewer, or none, during closed or modified closed Congresses. There are, however, a few exceptions to this general rule. Finally, the state of the POS does appear to explain the amount of access and response granted (and what kind of response) by the presidencies. Presidencies that had a modified closed POS tended to offer the movement very little access and response and failed to grant any concrete response in the way of public endorsements of woman suffrage or urging Congress to pass a woman suffrage bill.

Notes 1. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B.Anthony and Matilda Joslyn Gage (eds), History of Woman Suffrage, volume 1 (New York: Arno and the New York Times, 1969), p. 55. 2. Ibid., p. 61. 3. Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler, Woman Suffrage and Politics (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1923), p. 17. 4. McGlen and O’Connor also use 1890 as the beginning of the woman suffrage movement, in part due to the creation of the NAWSA. See Nancy McGlen and Karen O’Connor, Women, Politics, and American Society (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 7. See also Sara Hunter Graham, Woman Suffrage and the New Democracy (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1996). 5. Stanton et al., History, vol. 1, p. 73. 6. Ibid. 7. The mean and standard deviations were calculated so that one could see how the party unity scores fluctuated relative to the wave. I did not use one continuum of scores for all three waves because what could be high scores for one wave might be low scores for another, thus masking the true nature of party unity in the wave. 8. Randall Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1967). 9. George B.Galloway, History of the House of Representatives, 2nd edn, revised by Sidney Wise (New York: Thomas Y.Crowell, Co., 1976), p. 10. 10. One exception here is the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, which came out in support of woman suffrage in 1879. 11. Sally Hunter Graham, Woman Suffrage and the New Democracy (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 9. 12. McGlen and O’Connor, Women, Politics, p. 27. Though this quote refers to the 1860s, it can be inferred that public opinion was not favourable to expanded women’s rights in the decades before that either. 13. Ibid., p. 7. 14. Randall Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1969), p. 24. 15. Senators were, in general, responsive to their state legislators, who elected them, and state legislators were elected by the masses, so there is a very indirect link to the public. But this link is tenuous, and on most issues senators could behave as they wished without fear of repercussions from the public. Also, due to their longer tenure in office (six years versus two for representatives), senators are more immune to the vagaries of public opinion. 16. As discussed in Chapter 3, access will be measured by the number of hearings in each house, and the number of witnesses for and against suffrage at each hearing. Response will be measured by the number of bills introduced, favourable or unfavourable committee reports, how many times the bill was brought to the floor of either house, and the number of times it passed either house. Political women 80

17. For instance see Gerald Pomper, ‘Classification of Presidential Elections’, Journal of Politics 29 (August), pp. 535–66. 18. Stanton et al., History, vol. 1, p. 41. 19. Ibid. 20. Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage, p. 14. 21. Stanton et al., History, vol. 1, p. 81. 22. Ellen Carol DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 19. 23. Buechler also argues that the women’s movement of the nineteenth century suggests that ‘participation in other social movements can be a vital proximate cause’ of the emergence of an independent social movement. Steven Buechler, Women’s Movements in the United States (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press, 1990), p. 40. 24. Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 77. DuBois notes that after Seneca Falls there ‘is no further evidence of reluctance within the movement to demand the vote’ (DuBois, Feminism, p. 41). 25. Catt and Shuler, Women Suffrage, p. 20. 26. Ibid., p. 26. 27. Ibid., p. 22. 28. Stanton et al., History, vol. 1, p. 747. 29. Ibid., p. 891. 30. Ibid., p. 747. 31. Buechler, Women’s Movements, pp. 20–1. 32. DuBois, Feminism, p. 51. 33. Ibid., p. 52. 34. Ibid. The American Anti-Slavery Society was the key abolition society in the United States before and directly after the Civil War. 35. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 172. 36. Ibid., p. 169. 37. Ibid., p. 400. 38. Ibid., p. 382. 39. Ibid., p. 383. 40. Ibid., pp. 495–6. 41. Ibid., p. 757. 42. Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage, p. 92. 43. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 587. 44. Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage, p. 99. 45. Ibid., p. 100. 46. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 411. 47. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 58. 48. Ibid, p. 104. 49. Henry Blackwell to Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 8 June 1872, containers 28–9, reel 19, folder: E.C.Stanton, NAWSA collection, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 50. Thomas H.McKee (ed.), The National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties 1789–1905 (Baltimore, MD: The Friedenwald Company, 1906), p. 152. 51. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 518. 52. Ibid., p. 519. 53. Henry Blackwell to E.C.Stanton, 8 June 1872, containers 28–9, reel 19, folder: E.C.Stanton, NAWSA collection, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 54. For each Congress I have attempted to cover all the access sought by the suffrage movement. There is the chance, however, that I might have missed a memorial or a petition here and there since Stanton et al. are not always specific in their references to petitions, The first wave: 1848–89 81

memorials and the like. It was difficult at times to discern if the accounts were discussing the same petition/memorial or a separate one. In addition, the accounts in Stanton et al. would frequently make general statements about ‘petitions’, ‘memorials’, and there was no way to determine exactly how many they were referring to. 55. Stanton et al., vol. 2, p. 171. 56. Ibid., p. 91. 57. Ibid., p. 322. 58. Ibid., p. 94. 59. DuBois, Feminism, p. 57. 60. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 95. 61. DuBois, Feminism, p. 55. 62. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 354. 63. Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage, p. 42. 64. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 104. 65. ‘History’, containers 71–2, reel 51, National American Woman Suffrage Association Collection, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 66. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 94. 67. A memorial is a request, on the part of individual citizens, for Congress to take some action on a topic. A petition is similar, but is signed by numerous supporters of the cause. Petitions must be introduced by a member of Congress. A memorial can be submitted by any US citizen. 68. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 445. 69. Rheta Childe Dorr, Susan B.Anthony: The Woman Who Changed the Mind of a Nation (New York: Frederick A.Stokes Company, 1928), p. 234. 70. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 499. 71. Ibid., p. 515. 72. Ibid, vol. 3, p. 60. 73. Ibid., p. 61. 74. Ibid., p. 130. 75. Ibid., pp. 71 and 101, respectively. 76. Ibid., p. 103. 77. Ibid., pp. 70–1. 78. Ibid., p. 104. 79. Ibid., p. 131. 80. Ibid., p. 104. 81. Ibid., p. 154. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid., p. 155. 84. Ibid., p. 154. 85. Ibid., p. 174. 86. Ibid. 87. Ibid., p. 175. 88. Ibid., p. 190. 89. Ibid., pp. 201–2. 90. Ibid., p. 209. 91. Ibid., pp. 190–1. 92. Ibid., p. 207. 93. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 31. 94. Ibid., p. 33. 95. Ibid., p. 36. 96. Ibid., p. 39. 97. Ibid., p. 43. Political women 82

98. Ibid., p. 44. 99. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 263. 100. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 49. 101. Ibid., p. 78. 102. Roy P.Basler (ed.) The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. I (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), letter of 13 June 1836. 103. Stanton et al., vol. 2, pp. 314–15. 104. Dorr, Susan B.Anthony, p. 201. 105. Stanton et al., History vol. 2, p. 221. 106. McKee, The National Conventions, p. 152. 107. Stanton et al., History, vol. 2, p. 320. 108. Ibid., p. 518. 109. McKee, The National Conventions, p. 172. 110. Stanton et al., History, vol. 3, p. 72. 111. Ibid., p. 129. 112. Ibid., p. 130. 113. Charles Richard Williams (ed.), Diary and Letters of Rutherford B.Hayes, vol. III (Ohio State Archeological and Historical Society, 1924), p. 105. 114. Lucy Stone to James A.Garfield, 6 February 1880, series 4, reel 21, vol. 23, p 12, James A.Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 115. Stanton et al., History, vol. 3, p. 142. 116. Series 4, reel 21, vol. 23, p. 12, James A.Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 117. Stanton et al., History, vol. 3, p. 185. 118. James A.Garfield to Henry Blackwell, 17 July 1880, series 6a, reel 118, vol. 19, p. 80, James A.Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 119. James A.Garfield to Susan B.Anthony, 24 August 1880, series 6a, reel 118, vol. 19, p. 134, James A.Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 120. Ibid. 121. Stanton et al., History, vol. 3, p. 186. 122. George Frederick Howe, Chester A.Arthur: A Quarter Century of Machine Politics (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1934), pp. 257–8. 123. Stanton et al., History, vol. 3, p. 198. 124. Susan B.Anthony to Grover Cleveland, 16 November 1885, series 2, reel 24, Grover Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 125. Woman’s Suffrage Association of Philadelphia to Grover Cleveland, 2 June 1885, series 2, reel 24, Grover Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 126. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 125. 127. NWSA to Benjamin Harrison, 30 June 1888, series 1, reel 9, Benjamin Harrison Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 128. Stanton et al., History, vol. 3, p. 58. 129. Ibid. 130. Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage, p. 127. 131. Stanton et al., History, vol. 4, p. 14. 132. Ibid., p. 32. 133. Ibid. 134. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 212–15. 135. Ibid., p. 142. 136. Data on re-election taken from Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774–1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1989). 137. Stanton et al., History, vol. 3, p. 113. The first wave: 1848–89 83

138. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 50. 139. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 182. 140. Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 34–5. 5 The second wave: 1890–1928

This chapter analyses the second wave of the women’s movement: 1890–1928. It will explain why the years were chosen, discuss the state of the political opportunity structure for Congress and the presidencies, and what is expected from political elites considering the POS. It will then discuss the key suffrage people and organizations, and the actual access and response they received from each Congress and presidency. Finally, it will conclude with a discussion of whether the access and response received were what was expected, given the POS, and if not, possible reasons why. The year 1890 was the one in which the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) was formed. It was born of the merger between NWSA and AWSA. It will be discussed, in detail, in the section on key organizations. The year 1928 signified the end of the women’s movement’s ability to speak with a unified voice—it was made up of too many diverse groups. As McGlen and O’Connor comment, ‘the fragile coalition that made up the suffrage movement soon disintegrated, however, when its diverse constituent groups could no longer agree on a new post-suffrage agenda’.1 With the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, the women’s movement had lost a common rallying cry. As Anna Howard Shaw, past President of NAWSA, lamented, ‘I am sorry for you young women who have to carry on the work in the next ten years, for suffrage was a symbol, and now you have lost your symbol. There is nothing for women to rally around.’2 It is also the year that the Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act (STMA) lapsed. Under the STMA, money was to be given to the states to promote welfare and hygiene during maternity and infancy. The lapse of this act marked the end of a period of government attention to women’s issues (suffrage, maternity, child welfare). Around this time, the movement divided into two camps: simply put, those who supported an Equal Rights Amendment and those who did not. Those who supported this amendment felt that it was the only way to grant women true equality with men. And those who did not felt that it would nullify all the protective legislation for women— legislation that was necessary to ensure their safety in the workplace. Thus, 1928 marks the end of an era of a strong, unified and motivated women’s movement.3 During this wave the movement had just one aim: woman suffrage. Though many women continued to work towards reforms in the realms of education, marriage, and property laws, the primary focus of NAWSA was woman suffrage. NAWSA stopped working for such things as divorce reform, trade unionism and the legalization of prostitution. These reforms were too controversial and impinged on the potential success The second wave: 1890–1928 85 of woman suffrage. NAWSA realized that to appeal to a mass of people it needed to adopt a more conservative agenda (as AWSA had); the above reforms were far from conservative. This unity of purpose (on suffrage) allowed NAWSA to focus all of its resources, both people and money, on attaining the vote. The focus of NAWSA was on amending both state constitutions, and the Federal Constitution. This was a compromise reached between NWSA and AWSA. Each favoured an alternate route to attain suffrage. Amending the state constitutions was a slow and painstaking process, and met with many defeats. As the report of the NWSA sixteenth annual convention noted in 1884, ‘the one lesson taught by the successive defeats we have suffered in Kansas, Michigan, Colorado, Nebraska and Oregon is the hopelessness of longer waiting on the decision of the masses’.4 On the other hand, some suffrage activists (primarily in AWSA) recognized early on that women voting at the state level was crucial to attaining a suffrage amendment. In the words of one suffrage activist, Maud Wood Park, ‘Baffled in their attempts to get help from the Congress, suffrage leaders in the 1870s began to realize that Federal action was unlikely so long as women were without political power.’5 NAWSA hoped that if they amended enough state constitutions, then women would vote in enough states to affect national, electoral contests. Women’s votes would place pressure on Congress to amend the Federal Constitution. To this end, it continued its efforts at the state level, and strengthened its efforts at the national level, concomitantly.

The political opportunity structure

The political opportunity structure (POS) that the woman’s movement faced during this wave differed between the Congress and the presidencies. I will now discuss the POS that the movement faced in each house of Congress and the presidencies.

Congress During the second wave the POS in the House was fairly closed (see Table 5.1a). Eight of twenty Congresses were modified closed and five were completely closed. Four Congresses were modified open, and three Congresses were mixed: two indicators were closed and two were open. Ten consecutive Congresses were modified closed or closed (1895–1915), and the modified open Congresses came in clusters of two Congresses each, 1917–1921 and 1925–29. The first indicator, party unity in the House, was predominantly at middle levels (see Table 5.1a). Ten of twenty Congresses were classified as having middle levels of party unity. Four Congresses had high levels of party unity and six had Political women 86

Table 5.1a POS second wave—House

Congress Party unity Electoral instability Mass Rules POS (percentage) (percentage) opinion 51 high (83) unstable con strong modified (1889–91) (38.1) (unfavourable) Speaker closed 52 low (43) unstable con same mixed (43.8) 53 low (47) unstable con same mixed (38.1) 54 mid (70) unstable con same modified (48.6) closed 55 high (79) unstable con same modified (37.9) closed 56 mid (75) normal con same closed (30.1) 57 mid (67) normal con same closed (24.4) 58 high (90) normal con same closed (31.3) 59 mid (74) normal con same closed (21.0) 60 mid (57) normal con same closed (22.5) 61 high (80) normal pro same modified (1909–11) (19.5) (favourable) closed 62 mid (60) normal pro strong modified (30.5) Majority closed Leader 63 mid (62) normal pro strong modified (34.4) Majority closed Leader 64 mid (58) normal pro No mixed (27.2) strong leaders 65 low (45) very stable pro same modified (16.0) open 66 low (46) normal pro same modified (1919–21) (22.7) open 67 mid (60) normal na same modified (23.6) closed The second wave: 1890–1928 87

68 mid (59) normal na same modified (27.1) closed 69 low (45) very stable na same modified (16.3) open 70 low (53) very stable na same modified (1927–29) (13.3) open Sources: see Appendix A. na=not applicable, suffrage was out of Congress Table 5.1b POS second wave—Senate

Congress Party unity Electoral instability Mass Rules POS (percentage) (percentage) opinion* 51 high (80) not applicable con powerful modified (1889–91) (na) leaders closed 52 mid (59) na con same modified closed 53 mid (72) na con same modified closed 54 mid (56) na con same modified closed 55 high (76) na con same modified closed 56 high (77) na con same modified closed 57 high (76) na con same modified closed 58 high (79) na con same modified closed 59 mid (66) na con same modified closed 60 mid (65) na con same modified closed 61 high (80) na pro end of modified (1909–11) powerful closed leaders 62 mid (56) na pro no powerful mixed leaders 63 mid (73) stable pro same mixed (1913–15) (10.0) 64 mid (60) unstable pro same modified Political women 88

(18.0) open 65 low (44) normal pro same modified (16.0) open 66 mid (64) normal pro same mixed (1919–21) (17.0) 67 high (76) unstable na same modified (18.0) open 68 low (47) normal na same modified (12.0) open 69 low (44) normal na same modified (13.0) open 70 low (42) stable na same modified (1927–29) (10.0) open Sources: see Appendix A. *Mass opinion does not affect senators till directly elected low levels of party unity. The mean party unity score was 62.65 with a standard deviation of 13.77. Thus, party unity scores of 76 or greater (one standard deviation, or more, above the mean) were considered high. Scores of 49 or below (one standard deviation, or more, below the mean) were considered low, and scores that fell between 50 and 75 were considered middling.6 Middling levels of party unity indicate fairly unified parties, where members toed the party line by voting with the party fairly often. These party unity scores indicate that parties were voting together, with some regularity. These scores, along with other measures to be discussed, contributed to the modified closed nature of the POS in the House during much of this wave. The second indicator, electoral instability in the House, tended to go in waves. The mean score was 28.32 with a standard deviation of 9.35. Scores of 37.67 or higher (one standard deviation, or more, above the mean) are considered electorally unstable years. Scores of 18.97 or lower (one standard deviation, or more, below the mean) are considered electorally very stable years. Scores that fall between 18.97 and 37.67 are considered electorally normal years because there is neither a lot of turnover nor very little turnover—turnover is ‘normal’. The Fifty-first to the Fifty-fifth Congresses were all classified as unstable. The Fifty-sixth to the Sixty-eighth were all classified as normal (with one exception in the Sixty-fifth Congress of extreme stability). And the last two Congresses, the Sixty-ninth and Seventieth, were very stable. Normal electoral conditions are taken to be of no special use to social movements because political elites are in no need of new constituents. Their electoral constituency, from the past election, is probably sufficient for re-election. As a result, electoral conditions in fifteen of the twenty Congresses were not conducive to improved relations between the woman suffrage movement and political elites. Thus, the overall picture is a lack of electoral instability. Lack of need to appeal to new constituents may have contributed to the predominantly modified closed nature of the POS in the House during the second wave. The second wave: 1890–1928 89

The third indicator, the House rules, gave the Speaker the power of appointment, referral of legislation, and recognition of speakers on the floor, for eleven of the twenty Congresses during this wave (see Table 5.2). The Speakership developed into an all- powerful position during the 1890s and the first decade of the 1900s. In 1890, Thomas B.Reed (R-Maine) was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives. Reed was disgusted with the total lack of legislative output that had marked the 1880s. He felt this inability to produce legislation was the result of the rules. The rules had been interpreted as allowing the minority party the use of dilatory tactics. This prevented the majority party from enacting any legislative programme. When Reed assumed the Speakership he did not adopt the rules of the previous house; rather, he wrote some new ones, designed to end such dilatory tactics. The new rules stated: • a vote is valid if a quorum is actually present but not voting; • obviously dilatory motions designed to obstruct business do not need to be entertained; and Table 5.2 House rules and changes

Congress Rules 51st 1889– Speaker: 91 1. He shall appoint all conference committee members (Rule X, clause 6f, adopted in 1890—as with select committees this practice had existed since early days of the House). 2. A member or the Speaker may demand that the names of members ‘sufficient to make a quorum in the Hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the Journal…and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum…’ p. 500 HDoc 277, serial number 13585—in other words a vote is valid if a quorum is actually present but not voting (Rule XV, clause 3, adopted 14 February 1890 but ‘merely formalized a principle already established by a decision of the chair’ p. 500 fn). 3. No dilatory motion shall be entertained by the Speaker (Rule XVI, clause 10, adopted in 1890). Committee of the Whole: 1. Quorum in Committee of the Whole set at 100 (had previously been whole House) (Rule XXIII, clause 2, adopted in 1890). 52nd Quorum rule dropped as was dilatory rule. 1891–93 53rd Quorum rule adopted again. 1893–95 54th Dilatory rule readopted. 1895–97 Re: Quorum: 1. Members arrested for not showing up to vote in the Committee of the Whole when the presence of a quorum has been questioned will vote (Rule Political women 90

XV, clause 4, adopted in 1896). 55th No pertinent changes 1897–99 56th No pertinent changes 1899– 1901 57th No pertinent changes 1901–03 58th No pertinent changes 1903–05 59th No pertinent changes 1905–07 60th No pertinent changes 1907–09 61st 1909– Legislative procedure: 10 1. Discharge rule adopted (Rule XXVII clause 4, 17 June 1910). 2. Calendar Wednesday rule adopted 1 March 1909 (Rule XXIV, clause 7). 3. Unanimous consent calendar created (Rule XIII, clause 3, adopted 15 March 1909). Re: Rules Committee: 1. The Speaker shall no longer be a member of the Rules Committee (Rule X, resolution to this effect was introduced on 19 March 1910 by George W.Norris of Nebraska). 2. Membership increased to ten, members elected by House, and chair shall be elected by members of committee (H Res 502, introduced by George W.Norris of Nebraska). 62nd Speaker: 1911–13 1. Standing and select committee members and chairmen are elected by the House (Rule X, clause 3 adopted 5 April 1911). Seniority becomes norm for choosing chairmen (Cannon VIII, section 2202). 2. Speaker removed from Rules Committee (Rule X). And the Rules Committee is now elected by the House and membership increased to ten members from five (Rule X). 3. The Speaker’s right to recognize or refuse to recognize members seeking to address the House is restricted—Galloway cites this as a change but I cannot find what rule it is. 4. Calendar Wednesday rule is retained and strengthened (Rule XXIV, clause 7). 5. Preserved unanimous consent calendar. 63rd No pertinent changes 1913–15 The second wave: 1890–1928 91

64th No pertinent changes 1915–17 65th No pertinent changes 1917–19 66th No pertinent changes 1919–21 67th No pertinent changes 1921–23 68th Rules Committee powers are curbed. 1923–25 69th Discharge Petition: 1925–27 1. Discharge petition must be signed by a majority of the members of the House (meaning 218 members). Rule XXVII, clause 4 (before this less than a majority of signatures was needed). 70th No pertinent changes 1927–29 Sources: see Appendix A.

• the Speaker could refer all public bills to their respective committees and was authorized to dispose of business ‘on the Speaker’s table’ without action by the House—except on House bills with Senate amendments…7 The Speaker’s powers were also enhanced by his ability to: • appoint all the standing committees of the House; • designate their chairmen. • He was chairman of the Committee on Rules; and • he had unlimited power of recognition.8 Thus the Speaker, by dint of these powers, could ‘determine the legislative opportunities of individual members…able to determine what business the House should consider [and]…he could decide what matters would come before the House and discipline members who failed to comply with his wishes’.9 This strong Speakership was also utilized, in the early 1900s, by Speaker Cannon. As Ripley notes, ‘Speaker Cannon didn’t make changes in the formal rules, but used them to promote his own legislative preferences and to stifle the preferences of progressive Republicans and Democrats.’10 In 1910 a revolt against this all-powerful Speaker occurred. The revolt of 1910 was the consequence of an alliance between insurgent Republicans and members of the Democratic Party. Democratic Party members were tired of: • their inability to address the concerns of their constituents, due to Cannon’s control of the legislative agenda; • his ability to enforce party discipline through control of committee assignments; and • the further abuse of power by the assignment of chairs to his personal allies. Political women 92

The reforms attempted to dilute the Speaker’s power, thereby preventing such abuse from ever occurring again. The reforms: • enlarged the Rules Committee from five members to ten; • removed the Speaker from the Rules Committee; • eliminated the Speaker’s power to assign chairs; and finally • eliminated the Speaker’s ability to assign members to committees. The effects of the reforms were not felt immediately, as strong caucus government characterized the first few years after Cannonism. Caucuses were meetings held by each party, of all party members. Their purpose was to discuss party policies, settle differences of opinion, behind closed doors, and show a united front on the floor. The caucus permitted the majority party to air its differences in private, and then, on the floor, pose a unified front. As George B.Galloway, a Congressional scholar, notes, until around 1918 the parties ‘held frequent caucuses at which party policies were vigorously discussed and differences settled. Every major measure of a session was considered in party caucus and members were bound to abide by its decisions.’11 Champ Clark was elected Speaker (after Cannon) when the Democrats came to power in 1910. Clark preferred to leave party management to Majority Leader Oscar Underwood. The Democratic caucus adopted rules that allowed Underwood to create party unity, and become a strong party leader. Underwood could bind the majority of the party to individual pieces of legislation, while in caucus.12 As Peters notes, members were bound to a position through ‘general and specific commitments to the leadership in the process of securing Committee assignments, district patronage, office clerk hire, and other favors’.13 As Ripley notes regarding Underwood, he ‘was the primary legislative leader of his party and overshadowed the Speaker’.14 Caucus government ended with the onslaught of the war, and the ascendancy to Majority Leader of Claude Kitchin. Kitchin did not agree with Wilson’s position on the war. As Ripley comments, ‘the increasing involvement of the United States in the War and the accession to the majority leadership of Claude Kitchin, who did not agree with Wilson on the War, destroyed the usefulness of the binding caucus as a tool for gaining majority party victories’.15 The existence of a strong Speaker or Majority Leader, as during the first half of this wave, is one indicator of a closed POS. Thus, when a party leader is vested with those powers discussed under Reed, Cannon and Underwood, this is one indicator of a closed POS. When the Speaker, or other party leaders, do not have such powers, as exemplified by the post-1915 Congresses, this is an indicator of an open POS. In sum, the power of the Speaker and the Majority Leader during the first half of this wave contributed to the modified closed nature of the House. The final indicator is mass opinion regarding woman suffrage. There were no opinion polls at this time. Thus, mass opinion is determined by an analysis of primary and secondary sources, such as the History of Woman Suffrage. Mass opinion is considered to shift from anti- to pro-suffrage, when a large number of clubs, labour unions and the like supported woman suffrage. Mass opinion was anti-woman suffrage until around 1911. In 1906 the General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC) began to work in support of woman suffrage.16 By 1911, NAWSA could claim that over 26 million people were members of clubs that endorsed woman suffrage.17 The second wave: 1890–1928 93

The state of the POS in the Senate during the second wave is fairly closed until 1911, and then opens up (see Table 5.1b). Twelve of the twenty Congresses are modified closed, five are modified open and three are mixed (two indicators are open, two are closed). All the modified open Congresses occurred after 1911. One of the indicators, party rules, shows that there were no powers of assignment, referral and so on granted to party leaders. This lack of a strong party leader indicates an open POS, because members can do as they please. They would have no fear of punishment for voting in opposition to the wishes of the party leader. Obviously, if all or a majority of senators are opposed to woman suffrage, then the lack of a leader is of no consequence. Or, as mentioned concerning the House, the existence of a party leader, supportive of woman suffrage, would be helpful to the movement. Nevertheless, members will be more amenable to outside influences when they do not have to do the bidding of a strong party leader. As measured here, this indicator indicates an open POS. There is a period of exception to this lack of a strong party leader. The rules of the Senate did not grant any party leader the power of assignment, referral or recognition, etc., during any Congress of this wave. There was a period, however, from 1890 to approximately 1910, characterized by a quartet of strong party leaders. These four senators were Aldrich (R-Rhode Island), Allison (R-Indiana), Spooner (R-Wisconsin) and Platt (R-Connecticut). As Ripley comments, ‘“The Four” dominated the work of the senate from the mid 1890s until 1905, when Platt died, and the remaining three began to divide on important substantive issues.’18 Aldrich and his cronies controlled much of the action in the Senate, including committee assignments, caucus decisions and the like. As Ripley notes, ‘Aldrich, Allison, and their group, controlled the Republican Party in the Senate [the majority party] and, through it, the entire Senate by influencing the committee assignment process, the decisions made by the caucus, the decisions made by the principal standing committees, and the scheduling of decisions made by the Steering Committee.’19 Such control helped close the POS to the suffrage movement. Thus, the period from 1890–1910, under party rules, contributed to a modified closed POS in the Senate. Another indicator, party unity, was at predominantly middling to high levels for a majority of the second wave. Seven Congresses exhibited high levels of party unity, nine exhibited middling levels of party unity, and four exhibited low levels of party unity (all of these four occurred after the direct election of senators). The mean party unity score for this wave was 62.5 with a standard deviation of 12.87. Party unity scores of 75 or greater (one standard deviation, or more, above the mean) were high party unity scores. Scores between 51 and 74 were middle-level party unity scores, and scores of 50 or lower (one standard deviation, or more, below the mean) were considered low party unity scores. Overall, these middling to high levels of party unity contributed to the modified closed to closed nature of the POS. Another indicator, the level of electoral instability, cannot be measured until the Sixty- third Congress (1913–15). This is because senators were not directly elected prior to that Congress. I posit (as in Chapter 4) that the lack of electoral concerns before the Sixty- third Congress made senators feel safe: they could do as they pleased. This would close the POS for a social movement. Thus, the lack of electoral concerns would contribute to a closed POS in the Senate. Political women 94

Of the Congresses where electoral instability can be measured, the mean score was 13, with a standard deviation of 3.19. Scores of 17.84 or higher (one standard deviation, or more, above the mean) are considered electorally unstable years. Scores of 11.06 or lower (one standard deviation, or more, below the mean) are considered electorally very stable years. Two Congresses were classified as very stable (Sixty-third and Seventieth), two Congresses were unstable (Sixty-fourth and Sixty-seventh), and four Congresses were normal (Sixty-fifth, Sixty-sixth, Sixty-eighth and Sixty-ninth). The normal to stable elections would contribute to a closed POS. The final indicator is mass opinion. Mass opinion during most of this wave was unfavourable towards the woman suffrage question (as discussed in the section on the House). It was not until around 1906–11 that mass opinion began to shift. As noted, by 1911, NAWSA had the endorsement of clubs, the membership of which totalled over 26 million people.20 The year 1911 is taken as the one at which mass opinion shifts decisively, from against suffrage, to pro-suffrage. Favourable mass opinion is an indicator of an open POS, and unfavourable an indicator of a closed POS. Even though mass opinion was against woman suffrage before 1911, this did not affect the Senate and thus does not affect the POS. Overall, then, I found fairly similar political opportunity structures in the House and the Senate. The POS in the House was fairly closed for a majority of the first half of the second wave. It does appear that it began to open up around 1911–15. One would expect a social movement to receive little to no access and/or response from the House during the first half of this wave. Furthermore, what response is offered is expected to be co- optive as opposed to concrete (as discussed in Chapter 4). After 1911, one would expect an increase in response. The POS in the Senate was modified closed for a majority of the first half of the wave, with the POS opening up after 1911 (the five modified open Congresses all occurred after this year). Thus, one would expect a similar pattern in the Senate, as is expected in the House, with the movement gaining more access and response from this body after 1911.

Presidency The POS during the majority of the presidencies of this wave was modified closed to closed (Table 5.3). The POS during four of the ten presidencies (1900, 1904, 1908 and 1924) was closed. During presidencies with a closed POS both measures of electoral instability indicated that the President was safe/stable and mass opinion did not favour woman suffrage. The POS during four presidencies was modified closed (1888, 1892, 1912 and 1920). The POS during two of the presidencies, 1896 and 1916, was modified open. Overall then, the POS during the presidencies in the second wave was predominantly modified closed to closed. But there were a few windows of opportunity. The woman suffrage movement should receive little to no access or response during the modified closed or closed POS presidencies. They should receive some concrete access and response during the modified open POS presidencies. And finally, any access and/or response the movement receives during the modified closed and closed presidencies should be co-optive, rather than concrete. The second wave: 1890–1928 95

Type of access and response expected in light of POS

In the House one would expect to see the suffrage movement receive little to no access or response during the first half of this wave, due to the modified closed and closed nature of a majority of the Congresses. After 1911, one would expect the suffrage movement to receive some access and response, due to the opening nature of many of the Congresses. Regarding access during the first half of the wave, there should be few to no hearings, few pro-suffrage witnesses and some anti-suffrage Table 5.3 POS second wave—Presidents

President and Measure A state Measure B difference in Mass POS year elected correlations two-party vote opinion (percentage) 1892 Cleveland stable (.71) unsafe (4) con modified closed 1896 McKinley unstable (.54) unsafe (4) con modified open 1900 McKinley/ stable (.82) safe (6) con closed Roosevelt 1904 Roosevelt stable (.87) safe (20) con closed 1908 Taft stable (.94) safe (10) con closed 1912 Wilson stable (.94) safe (28) pro modified closed 1916 Wilson stable (.92) unsafe (4) pro modified open 1920 Harding stable (.91) safe (28) pro modified closed 1924 Coolidge stable (.97) safe (30) not closed applicable Sources: see Appendix A. not applicable=suffrage now an amendment witnesses. Regarding response, one would expect to see few to no suffrage bills introduced (and by only a handful of members), unfavourable majority committee reports, no bills brought to the floor for debate, and no bills passed by the full House. Furthermore, due to the nature of the POS before 1911, any response should be co-optive. Response will be designed to assuage the suffrage movement (get it off their backs), with no intention of acting concretely (i.e. debate on floor and/or passing the bill). After 1911, one would expect to see the opposite of that stated above. In the Senate, regarding access and response, one would expect to see a similar pattern as exhibited by the House. The Senate was modified closed for all of its Congresses, before 1911. And it was modified open for a majority of its Congresses from 1911 on. Political women 96

One would expect to see little to no access or response during the first half, followed by consistent access and response after 1911. Regarding access, during the first half there should be few to no hearings, few pro-suffrage witnesses and some anti-suffrage witnesses. Regarding response, during the first half there should be few to no suffrage bills introduced (and by only a handful of members), unfavourable majority committee reports, no debate on the Senate floor, and no bills passed. After 1911, the opposite of that just stated is expected to occur. The presidencies during which the POS was modified closed or closed are expected to offer little to no access or response to the suffrage movement. Regarding access, there should be little to no attention to women’s issues in the party platforms, and the President should meet seldom, if at all, with suffrage groups or other women’s groups. Regarding response, one would expect the Presidents to make few to no positive public statements regarding suffrage or women’s issues, few to no executive orders regarding women’s issues, and little legislation signed regarding women’s issues. During the modified open political opportunity structures, one would expect Presidents to behave in a manner opposite to that stated above. They should offer some access and response to the suffrage movement. During the modified closed and closed political opportunity structures, any access and/or response should be co-optive—designed to assuage the suffrage movement and gain the votes of their male relatives, friends and activists. In the end, however, the suffrage movement would receive little in return, only empty words.

Access and response received by the suffrage movement

Key people and organizations: their aims and strategies In 1890, AWSA and NWSA merged to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). NAWSA believed in the need for a Federal amendment to the Constitution, but they also recognized the necessity of working at the state level. They believed that if women could vote at the state level then this would place pressure on their respective congressmen in Washington, DC. Only when enough women controlled the fate of their congressmen, was it likely that woman suffrage would receive serious consideration by Congress. The state-by-state route was depressing. The process was slow and painstaking, victories rare. Amending state constitutions was no simple task. In some states, special sessions of legislatures had to be called to deal with state constitutional amendments; in others, they met only every other year, among other obstacles. Furthermore, as McGlen and O’Connor note, state campaigns lacked organization, women allies and public support: ‘state suffrage campaigns suffered from inadequate organization, a limited number of women who supported the measure, and a lack of a more general popular support’.21 Furthermore, liquor interests hindered state work. The liquor industry feared that if women gained the suffrage then they would vote for prohibition. Liquor interests consequently worked vigorously to block woman suffrage in many states. As Kate Gordon, Corresponding Secretary of NAWSA, noted in a letter to William H.Taft, in 1907, ‘we [NAWSA] realize one point of real opposition,—that is, the control of political The second wave: 1890–1928 97 conditions by the organized liquor element… In all our States this Association has put itself on record to oppose, everywhere, woman suffrage.’22 By 1900, only four states (Wyoming 1869, Colorado 1893, Utah 1896 and Idaho 1896) had granted suffrage to women, and by 1913, only six more had been added.23 Furthermore, in 1914 and 1915, suffrage referenda were lost in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New York. These losses forced NAWSA to take a hard look at itself and its efforts. One result of this self-analysis was the selection of Carrie Chapman Catt as the new president in 1915. NAWSA came to believe that gaining woman suffrage through amending state constitutions was nearly impossible. Two active suffragists, Mary Beard and Florence Kelly, conducted a study of state constitutions and concluded, ‘The recommendation of President Wilson and the Democratic Platform to extend suffrage by the states only is a virtual denial of suffrage, owing to the practical impossibility of amending more than twenty state constitutions.’24 NAWSA, however, persevered at the state level. With Catt at the helm they instituted her ‘winning plan’, which targeted the thirty-six states most likely to ratify a federal woman suffrage amendment. Catt’s leadership skills quickly became evident. Membership in NAWSA increased from 100,000 members to 2 million members in two years.25 Furthermore, by 1916, eleven states had granted full suffrage to women, bringing the number of electoral votes up to ninety-one. As Maud Wood Park notes, ‘hard as the state by state road was, it led by 1916 to full suffrage for women in eleven states…with Illinois’ presidential suffrage added, there were ninety-one members of the electoral college for whom women were entitled to vote. No longer were they a negligible factor in national politics.’26 As Kraditor notes, ‘Alice Paul…felt that the time had come when women could cease begging for their rights. With ninety-one votes to be cast in the electoral college…women could now rely on their own votes to enfranchise the women in the U.S.’27 By 1916, the political power of women was not lost on many congressmen. Representative Raker, chair of the Woman Suffrage Committee, reminded his fellow, recalcitrant, Southern, Democrats that ‘the Speaker and the chairmen of committees held their positions because women in the Western states had voted Democrat in 1916’.28 Furthermore, a case can be made that women voting had a definitive impact on the 1916 presidential election. In an extremely close election, Wilson won with 277 electoral votes to Hughes’s 254. Wilson would have lost the election had he not won California’s thirteen electoral votes (women had full suffrage in California). In fact, one suffragist, Mrs Root of Long Beach, California, claimed to have had a definitive impact on this election when she ‘with $ 125 made a personal campaign that increased 600 normally Democratic votes in her district into 6600, thus carrying California and the United States for the re-election of President Wilson’.29 The popular vote in California was 465,936 for Wilson and 462,516 for Hughes, a difference of 3,420 votes—Mrs Root’s 6,600 votes would indeed have been decisive. If Wilson had not carried California he would have lost the whole election by three electoral votes. While NAWSA was pursuing this state-by-state strategy, the Congressional Union (CU) was conducting a Federal campaign. The CU was founded by Alice Paul and Lucy Burns. Both of these women had spent time in Great Britain working with the suffragists there, most notably Emmeline Pankhurst. The CU was initially part of NAWSA, but Political women 98 broke with the association in 1914 over tactics. The CU believed in holding the party in power (which until 1918 was the Democrats) responsible for the failure of suffrage, and using militant tactics when necessary. The CU did not, however, work for Republicans. They purely believed that the party that ran the government controlled what legislation passed. The CU later formed a political party for women, the National Woman’s Party. Eventually the CU and the National Woman’s Party became one. NAWSA attempted to counter this party-in-power strategy by arguing that such a strategy had no application to US politics. The US system very rarely met the conditions necessary to say that there was a party in power. As Kraditor notes regarding NAWSA’s position, ‘since an amendment to the Constitution required a two-thirds vote in Congress, the “party in power” theory might have been valid at that time only if the Democratic party controlled two-thirds of the seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives’.30 This was not the case during Wilson’s administrations, and thus it was useless to attempt to follow this strategy. Suffrage would pass only if it obtained enough votes from members of both parties. The tactics of the CU were quite similar to those of the British woman suffrage movement. They focused their energies on campaigning against Democrats and picketing the White House and Congress. During the First World War, the focus of the CU’s picketing was frequently Wilson’s own words regarding protecting democracy abroad. The CU argued that Wilson was not even protecting democracy at home if half the population could not vote for their leaders. NAWSA did the best they could to distance themselves from the CU, and support the administration’s war effort. In a letter from NAWSA to Joseph Tumulty, secretary to President Wilson, in 1917, they asked the President to head a small group composed of party leaders of both parties. They wanted this group to affiliate themselves with NAWSA to show the world ‘their approval of the non-partisan policy and the non- militant methods of this, the oldest and largest body of suffragists in the United States’.31 NAWSA believed that if they remained non-partisan, non-militant, and if they dedicated themselves to the war effort, then their efforts would be rewarded when the war was over (similar to what the suffragists believed during the Civil War). As Carrie Chapman Catt stated in a letter to President Wilson, in May of 1917, ‘We hoped that our willingness to serve our country even only half armed would appeal to the men with whom you and we must deal in Congress as good and sufficient reason for our enfranchisement…’32 Nevertheless, the CU attracted quite a bit of attention. Many suffragists were imprisoned for their picketing of the White House. While in prison, some of them (most notably Alice Paul) went on hunger strikes to protest about their incarceration as political prisoners. Public sentiment toward the CU was iffy, but Graham argues that ‘by November 1917, many Americans were alarmed at prison conditions and angered by Wilson’s apathetic attitude toward the federal suffrage amendment’.33 Important to note, however, was the effect the CU had on President Wilson, and on the members of the Democratic Party. Charles Beard commented in a letter to Carrie Chapman Catt in August of 1916 that: ‘The National Association has been begging at the door of political conventions for many a year without avail, simply because it wielded no instrument except women’s silent influence…. It was only when the women [National Woman’s Party] threatened to use their votes against the party that would not emancipate all women that suffrage was recognized by the national parties.’34 The second wave: 1890–1928 99

Militant tactics ‘woke up’ the parties. Women were no longer going peacefully to ask for their rights, they were going to demand them. Arguably, Wilson, tired of the picketing, the bad press, and fearful of losing Democratic seats in Congress in 1918, chose the lesser of two evils, and supported NAWSA and the Federal suffrage amendment. As Graham argues:

Wilson did not advocate the amendment out of a personal commitment to social justice and progressivism. His support was instead motivated by a grudging recognition of political reality. Wilson realized by late 1917 that in order to maintain the integrity of his demands for democracy abroad, he would have to acknowledge the right of women to democratic participation at home.35

There is evidence that Wilson recognized that the only way to end the picketing by the CU was the passage of the woman suffrage amendment. As a confidant of Wilson’s commented in a letter to him, regarding a conversation they had, ‘as you [Wilson] said today the picketing will doubtless continue and the only ultimate solution and the only one which will satisfy the critical situation that now exists is the passage of the Anthony amendment’.36 Wilson reiterated this sentiment in another conversation with a confidant, one month later. He argued that the only way he could urge passage of woman suffrage was to add it to the war programme, which he was justified in doing, if he felt an emergency existed.37 The woman suffrage amendment passed the House on 10 January 1918 by a very narrow margin of 274–136.38 The Senate presented tough prospects. Republicans did not want to see Democrats get credit for something they could pass in the next Congress, which they would control. Carrie Chapman Catt, president of NAWSA, warned Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo (Wilson’s son-in-law), that ‘The Republicans planned overwhelming support for the amendment, thus putting the responsibility for a defeat on the southerners.’39 President Wilson decided to address the Senate on 30 September 1918. He urged the senators that ‘There is and can be no party issue involved in it [passing the amendment]’ and that the adoption of such an amendment must be done through the Federal government because ‘the method of state action proposed in the party platforms of 1916 is impracticable within any reasonable length of time, if practicable at all’. Adoption of this amendment was ‘necessary to the successful prosecution of the war’.40 Wilson and NAWSA overestimated his influence upon the Senate. The amendment was defeated. This defeat helped NAWSA and the CU to see eye to eye, albeit temporarily. They immediately began campaigning against those senators who had voted against the woman suffrage amendment. As suffragist Maud Wood Park commented, ‘our next battleground was chosen the day after the defeat. We had to see to it that at least two unfriendly Senators were not re-elected.’41 Their attack was successful. Two senators, one Democrat and one Republican—NAWSA insisted on non-partisanship—were defeated. Senator Weeks (R-Massachusetts) and Senator Saulsbury (D-Delaware) were victims of women’s electoral power. The vote in the Senate came up again on 10 February 1919 and once again the amendment lost, this time by one vote. By the Sixty-sixth Congress, six more states had Political women 100 given presidential suffrage to women, and the electoral vote stood at 326. On 24 May 1919 the vote in the House on the woman suffrage amendment was 304 yays to 89 nays, and in the Senate on 4 June 1919 the vote was 66 yays to 30 nays.42 The woman suffrage amendment had passed both houses and was on to the states.

Congress—access and response There was access sought and access achieved during the second wave. NAWSA, and later the CU too, made personal visits, wrote letters, sent petitions and memorials, testified at hearings, campaigned and picketed. They sought a great deal of access during every Congress. The suffrage movement gained access, during this wave, in the form of hearings and pro-suffrage witnesses. As a general rule, delegates from the annual NAWSA convention received one hearing in each house, every Congress. Thirty-five hearings were held in Congress (eighteen in the Senate and seventeen in the House) during this wave. All of these hearings, except one, concerned a Federal suffrage amendment. The one concerned suffrage in the District of Columbia. There was response from political elites during the second wave. The response during the first half of the wave, 1889–1910, was fair. From 1911 onwards, the movement attained an increased amount of response (see Tables 5.4a and 5.4b), as compared with the first half of the wave. Table 5.4a Access House of Representatives— Second Wave

Congress Number of Number of pro- Number of anti- POS hearings suffrage witnesses suffrage witnesses 51 (1889– 1 1 0 modified 91) closed 52 2 1) 4 1) 0 mixed 2) 15 2) 0 53 1 13 0 mixed 54 1 16 0 modified closed 55 1 9 0 modified closed 56 1 5 4 closed 57 1 9 0 closed 58 1 6 0 closed 59 1 8 0 closed 60 1 9 0 closed 61 1 9 1 modified closed The second wave: 1890–1928 101

62 1 11 and 1 unknown 1 modified closed 63 1 15 6 modified closed 64 1 16 12 mixed 65 2 1) 9 1) 3 modified 2) 17 2) 10 open 66 0 0 0 modified open 67 (1921– na na na modified 23) closed 68 na na na modified closed 69 na na na modified open 70 na na na modified open Totals 17 172 (average of ten 37 (average of two witnesses a hearing) witnesses a hearing) Sources: see Appendix A. na=not applicable, suffrage out of Congress unknown=witnesses’ position unknown, could not determine from accounts in Stanton et al. or CIS indices

During the first half, twenty-four suffrage bills were introduced, by thirteen members— four senators and nine representatives. There were thirteen bills in the House, and eleven in the Senate. In addition, during the first half, there were five favourable majority committee reports and two unfavourable. Of the favourable majority committee reports, one was in the House and four were in the Senate. One of the unfavourable committee reports was in the House and one in the Senate. Finally, during the first half, there was no debate of the amendment on the floor of either house, and no votes taken by either house. Table 5.4b Access Senate—second wave

Congress Number of Number of pro-suffrage Number of anti- POS hearings witnesses suffrage witnesses 51 (1889– 1 4 0 modified 91) closed 52 2 1) 20 1) 0 modified 2) ?* 2) 0 closed 53 1 14 0 modified closed Political women 102

54 2 (1 DC) 1) 6 (DC) 1) 0 modified 2) ?* 2) 0 closed 55 1 11 0 modified closed 56 1 8 2 modified closed 57 1 12 0 modified closed 58 1 13 0 modified closed 59 1 8 0 modified closed 60 1 10 0 modified closed 61 1 9 0 modified closed 62 2 1) 1 1) 0 mixed 2) 21 2) 1 63 1 10 and 8 unknown 3 mixed 64 1 20 6 modified open 65 1 20 6 modified open 66 0 0 0 mixed 67 (1921– na na na modified 23) closed 68 na na na modified open 69 na na na modified open 70 na na na modified open Totals 18 206 (average of eleven 18 (average of one witnesses a hearing) witness a hearing) Sources: see Appendix A. na=not applicable, suffrage out of Congress unknown=witnesses’ position unknown, could not determine from accounts in Stanton et al. or CIS indices ?*=all pro, but no record of number The second wave: 1890–1928 103

During the second half of the wave, sixty-one total suffrage bills were introduced into both houses—forty in the House and twenty-one in the Senate. They were introduced by twenty-eight congressmen—fourteen senators and fourteen representatives. During the second half of the wave, there were also ten favourable majority committee reports and four unfavourable. Three of the favourable committee reports were in the House and seven in the Senate. All four of the unfavourable majority committee reports were in the House. Finally, the woman suffrage amendment was brought to the floor seven times— three times in the House and four times in the Senate, and it was voted upon seven times—it passed Table 5.5a Response House of Representatives— second wave

Congress Number of bills Number and type Number of Did POS introduced of committee bills brought bill(s) reports to floor pass? 51 (1889– 1 1 favourable 0 0 modified 91) closed 52 1 0 0 0 mixed 53 1 1 unfavourable 0 0 mixed 54 2 0 0 0 modified closed 55 1 0 0 0 modified closed 56 2 0 0 0 closed 57 0 0 0 0 closed 58 1 0 0 0 closed 59 1 0 0 0 closed 60 1 0 0 0 closed 61(1909– 2 0 0 0 modified 11) closed 62 6 0 0 0 modified closed 63 6 1 unfavourable 1 f modified closed 64 6 2 unfavourable 0 0 mixed 65 14 3–1 unfavourable and 1 p modified 2 favourable open 66 (1919– 7 1 favourable 1 p modified 21) open Political women 104

67 na na na na modified closed 68 na na na na modified closed 69 na na na na modified open 70 na na na na modified open Totals 52 (average of three 4 favourable 2 passed 3 bills per Congress) 5 unfavourable 1 failed Sources: see Appendix A. na=not applicable, suffrage had passed Congress Table 5.5b Response Senate—second wave

Congress Number of bills Number and type of Number of Did POS introduced committee reports bills brought bill(s) to floor pass? 51 1889– 1 1 favourable 0 0 modified 91 closed 52 1 2 favourable 0 0 modified closed 53 1 0 0 0 modified closed 54 2 1 favourable 0 0 modified 1 unfavourable closed 55 0 0 0 0 modified closed 56 1 0 0 0 modified closed 57 1 0 0 0 modified closed 58 1 0 0 0 modified closed 59 0 0 0 0 modified closed 60 1 0 0 0 modified closed 61 1909– 1 0 0 0 modified 11 closed 62 1 0 0 0 mixed The second wave: 1890–1928 105

63 4 2 favourable 2* 1f mixed 64 6 2 favourable 0 0 modified open 65 10 2 favourable 2 2f modified open 66 1919– 7 1 favourable 1 p mixed 21 67 na na na na modified closed 68 na na na na modified open 69 na na na na modified open 70 na na na na modified open Totals 29 (average of two 11 favourable 5 1 passed bills per Congress) 1 unfavourable (on 3 failed DC) 1 no further action Sources: see Appendix A. *=1 had no further action taken after debate, 1 was voted on na=not applicable, suffrage had passed Congress the House twice and failed there once, and it passed the Senate only once, failing three times. The Fifty-first Congress (1889–91) saw access attained and response granted, by both houses. Regarding access, there were two hearings (one in each house) and some pro- suffrage witnesses at both, with no anti-suffrage witnesses (anti-suffrage witnesses will be noted, henceforth, only if there were any). Regarding response, there were two bills introduced, one in each house. Furthermore, there were two committee reports, both favourable, one in each house. Specifically, the access in the House during this Congress consisted of a hearing before the Judiciary Committee, on 11 February 1890. There was one pro-suffrage witness. The response consisted of Representative Henry Baker (R-New Hampshire) introducing a woman suffrage bill, on 13 January 1890, and a favourable majority committee report from the Judiciary Committee. The committee report said in its conclusion:

The disfranchisement of twelve millions of people, who are citizens of the United States, should command from us immediate action. Since the women of this country are unjustly deprived of a right so essential to complete citizenship in a republic as the elective franchise, common Political women 106

justice requires that we should submit the proposition for a change in the fundamental law to the State Legislatures, where the correction can be made.43

This was the last (and first) favourable majority committee report in the House until the Committee on Woman Suffrage favourably reported it in 1918. It was also the only favourable majority committee report, ever, from the Judiciary Committee. The chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Ezra B.Taylor, was pro-suffrage. He was chair for the Fifty- first Congress only. His daughter was Harriet Upton, treasurer of NAWSA. A majority of the committee was also pro-suffrage. The pro-suffrage members of this committee all ceased to be members of Congress after the Fifty-first Congress (except one, who lasted through the Fifty-second). One was not renominated, one did not run, and two were not re-elected. The six Southern members of the committee were opposed.44 Thus, one can see how the make-up of a committee can affect the fate of a bill. Other response of interest was a letter from Speaker Reed to Susan B.Anthony, on the occasion of her seventieth birthday.45 In the Senate, the access during this Congress consisted of one hearing before the Committee on Woman Suffrage, on 8 and 24 February 1890. There were five pro- suffrage witnesses. The response took the form of one bill introduced by Senator Henry Blair (R-New Hampshire), on 4 December 1889. There was also a favourable majority committee report, to accompany this bill, on 12 August 1890 (a result of the hearing in February). The committee report argued:

to deny the submission of this joint resolution to the action of the Legislatures of the States is analogous to the denial of the right of justice in the courts. It is to say that no plaintiff shall bring his suit; no claimant shall be heard; and whatever may be the result to the friends of woman suffrage when they reach the Legislatures of the States, it is, in our belief, the duty of Congress to submit the joint resolution…’46

The Fifty-second Congress (1891–93) also saw access achieved and response granted. Access took the form of four hearings held (two in each house), with pro-suffrage witnesses. Response took the form of two suffrage bills introduced (one in each house), and two favourable majority committee reports (both in the Senate). There were two hearings held in the House during this Congress. The first was held on 18 January 1892, with four pro-suffrage speakers. The second was held on 17 February 1892. At this hearing there were NAWSA delegates from twenty-six states, and fifteen of them testified. Both of these hearings were held before the Judiciary Committee (as all are in the House, unless otherwise mentioned). The Judiciary Committee, for the first time, was composed of a majority of Democrats. Democrats, in general, were not supporters of woman suffrage. Suffrage activists had a difficult enough time with the Judiciary Committee when it was majority Republicans. This new majority did not bode well for change in the committee’s response to suffrage. Regarding response in the House, Representative Halbert Greenleaf (D-New York) introduced a woman suffrage bill, on 5 January 1892. The second wave: 1890–1928 107

There were two hearings held in the Senate during this Congress. The first was held on 20 February 1892. There were twenty pro-suffrage witnesses. Lucy Stone, one of the witnesses, noted that women were at a distinct disadvantage in pleading their case, because they had no political clout: ‘I come before this committee with the sense which I always feel, that we are handicapped as women in what we try to do for ourselves by the single fact that we have no vote. This cheapens us. You do not care so much for us as if we had votes, so that we come always with that infinite disadvantage.’47 The second occurred in January of 1893, and an unknown number of woman suffrage delegates from NAWSA testified. The response consisted of one bill introduced, and two favourable majority committee reports—one in 1892 concerning the hearing on 20 February, and the other on 4 January 1893. Also, during the second session of this Congress, C.Corbin presented an anti-suffrage memorial requesting a hearing. There is no evidence that this hearing was granted. During the Fifty-third Congress (1893–95), there was access attained and response granted. The response was not positive. The access consisted of two hearings, one in each house, both with pro-suffrage witnesses. The response consisted of two bills introduced, one in each house, and one unfavourable majority committee report in the House. Access was sought in the form of 375 letters sent by NAWSA to members of Congress, asking for their stance on woman suffrage. Fifty-nine replied favourably for full suffrage, twenty-five for qualified suffrage, and sixty-five were totally opposed.48 Furthermore, in 1893 NAWSA arranged for petitions to be sent to Congress from twenty states, and for letters to be written to nineteen senators considered friendly to suffrage. Only one responded.49 The hearing in the House occurred in 1894 and thirteen pro-suffrage witnesses testified. The response in the House consisted of one bill introduced on 31 January 1894, by Representative John C.Bell (Populist-Colorado), and an adverse majority committee report in 1894. The hearing in the Senate occurred on 21 February 1894, with fourteen pro-suffrage witnesses testifying. Response during this Congress consisted solely of one bill introduced by Senator Edward Wolcott (R-Colorado). The Fifty-fourth Congress (1895–97) saw access attained in the form of three hearings (two in the Senate and one in the House) and some pro-suffrage witnesses. There was also response granted in the form of four bills introduced (two in each house) and two committee reports, both in the Senate. One was favourable and one unfavourable. The access in the House consisted of one hearing, held on 28 January 1896. This hearing was held for the delegates to the annual NAWSA convention, and sixteen of them testified. Stanton noted in her testimony: ‘Our failure to secure justice thus far has not been due to any lack of character or ability in our advocates or of strength in their propositions, but to the popular prejudices against woman’s emancipation.’50 Response in the House consisted of two suffrage bills introduced. One was introduced on l0January 1896, and the other on 20 January 1896. They were introduced by Representatives Stephen Northway (R-Ohio) and John Shafroth (R-Colorado), respectively. Access in the Senate during this Congress consisted of two hearings. The first was held on 28 January 1896, before the Woman Suffrage Committee (all hearings in Senate are before this committee unless otherwise noted). Nineteen delegates from the NAWSA annual convention testified. The second hearing concerned woman suffrage in the District Political women 108 of Columbia. This hearing was held on 24 March 1896. There were six pro-suffrage witnesses. Response in the Senate consisted of two bills introduced. On 3 January 1896, Senator George Hoar (R-Massachusetts) introduced a woman suffrage bill, and on 23 March 1896, Senator Wilkinson Call (D-Florida) introduced one. Response also came in the form of two committee reports. The first committee report was unfavourable and concerned the woman suffrage amendment. The second committee report was on 23 February 1896. It was favourable and concerned the DC suffrage bill. The Fifty-fifth Congress (1897–99) saw access attained in both houses, but very little response from either. Access consisted of two hearings, one in each house, with some pro-suffrage witnesses. Response consisted only of one bill introduced in the House. In 1897, the Congressional Committee of NAWSA wrote letters to every member of Congress to ascertain their position on woman suffrage. The response rate was substantial—three-quarters of them replied.51 The hearing in the House occurred on 15 February 1898, with nine pro-suffrage witnesses. Alice Stone Blackwell (daughter of Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell) argued that women and the masses are conservative in their views, and that all reform movements are led by the few:

It is often said that the chief obstacle to equal suffrage is the indifference and opposition of women, and that whenever the majority ask for the ballot they will get it. But it is a simple historical fact that every improvement thus far made in their condition has been secured, not by a general demand from the majority, but the arguments, entreaties, and ‘continued coming’ of a persistent few… All this merely shows that human nature is conservative, and that it is fully as conservative in women as in men. The persons who take a strong interest in any reform are always comparatively few, whether among men or women, and they are habitually regarded with disfavor, even by those whom the proposed reform is to benefit.52

There was no committee report. The only response in the House during this Congress was one suffrage bill introduced on 21 June 1897, by Representative Shafroth. The hearing in the Senate occurred on 15 February 1898, with eleven pro-suffrage witnesses. Stanton et al. note that only two Senators were present for this hearing.53 Despite the lack of members of the committee present, the hearing was crowded with other senators and the public. One suffrage witness attacked the question from the standpoint of women as taxpayers, and asked, ‘What shall we say to a Government that gives land in the severalty to the Indian, supplies him with tools and rations, puts a ballot in his hand, and then says to the American woman who purchases the same right to land, “You shall not have the political privileges of American citizenship?”’54 There was no committee report. There was no response granted by the Senate during this Congress. The Fifty-sixth Congress (1899–1901) saw access and very little response. The access consisted of two hearings, one in each house, with some pro-suffrage witnesses. The response consisted of three suffrage bills introduced, two in the House and one in the Senate. Regarding this lack of response, Susan B.Anthony commented at the annual convention of NAWSA in 1900: ‘One reason why so little has been done by Congress is The second wave: 1890–1928 109 because none of us has remained here to watch our employes [sic] up at the Capital… We need a watching committee…’55 An example of access sought during this Congress was that in 1899, NAWSA sent letters to members of Congress asking them to omit the word ‘male’ from the constitution of the new territory of Hawaii. This attempt was to no avail—the word ‘male’ was inserted, effectively barring women from voting. NAWSA also urged Congress to investigate the effects of woman suffrage in equal-franchise states. They felt that such an investigation could only show the benefits of women voting. No such investigation, however, was conducted. The hearing in the House was on 13 February 1900. There were five pro-suffrage witnesses, and, for the first time, there were anti-suffrage witnesses. The history of the anti-suffrage movement is a bit hazy. The first anti-suffrage organization was called the Association Opposed to the Further Extension of Suffrage to Women.56 Eventually, this organization became known as the Association Opposed to Suffrage for Women, but one scholar, Susan Marshall, cites them as being called the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage.57 In the various volumes of The History of Woman Suffrage, however, what appears to be the same group (because the president is the same) is called the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage or the Anti Suffrage Association or the National Anti Suffrage Association. Thus, in the following discussions it will be referred to by whatever name it was given in The History of Woman Suffrage. The anti-suffrage movement dates from 1872, but was fairly sporadic until the suffrage movement gained some successes in the western states in the 1890s.58 The movement was most firmly established and active in the eastern states. It was most active from 1912–16, and could claim a membership in 1916 of 350,000 adult women.59 The anti-suffrage witnesses had showed up for the hearing without being invited. They would not have been admitted had it not been for the equanimity of Susan B.Anthony. She insisted that they be allowed to present their views. Four of them testified. Mrs Arthur Dodge, an anti, argued: ‘The mere fact that this amendment is asked as a compliment to the leading advocate of woman suffrage on the attainment of her eightieth birthday, is evidence of the emotional frame of mind which influences the advocates of the measure, and which is scarcely favorable to the calm consideration that should be given to fundamental political principles.’60 Stanton et al. note that at no point during the hearing had anyone referred to Anthony’s eightieth birthday.61 The response in the House consisted of two woman suffrage bills introduced. The first was introduced on l0 January 1900, by Representative Shafroth. The second was introduced on 2 January 1901, again by Representative Shafroth. There were no committee reports during this Congress. The hearing in the Senate was on 13 February 1900. There were eight pro-suffrage witnesses and two anti-suffrage witnesses. Again, the anti-suffrage activists showed up without invitations and would not have been admitted had it not been for Susan B.Anthony’s insistence. The only response in the Senate during this Congress consisted of one woman suffrage bill, introduced by Senator Francis Warren (R-Wyoming) on 30 January 1900. There were no committee reports. The Fifty-seventh Congress (1901–03) saw some access attained and very little response. The access consisted of two hearings with pro-suffrage witnesses (one in each house). The response consisted of one woman suffrage bill introduced in the Senate. The hearing in the House was on 18 February 1902. Nine delegates from the NAWSA annual convention testified. There was no response from the House during this Congress. Political women 110

The hearing in the Senate was also on 18 February 1902. Twelve delegates from the NAWSA annual convention testified. All members of the committee were present. At the end of the testimony, NAWSA said, ‘What we should like better than anything else is that Congress should appoint a committee of investigation, and that such a committee should investigate the result of woman suffrage in the States where it has already been granted… So sure are we its report would be favorable that we are perfectly willing to stake our future on it.’62 The same was also asked of the House. The response consisted of a woman suffrage bill introduced by Senator Warren on 16 December 1901. There were no committee reports during this Congress and neither house responded to the plea for an investigative committee. The Fifty-eighth Congress (1903–05) saw access in the form of two hearings with pro- suffrage witnesses, one in each house. There was very little response granted by this Congress. Only two suffrage bills were introduced, one in each house. In 1904, NAWSA encouraged their members, and women in general, to protest against the proposed state constitutions of Oklahoma and Arizona, which permitted suffrage to be denied on account of sex. Women sent letters to their senators, urging them to alter the constitutions. On 16 December 1904, Senator Albert Beveridge (R-Indiana) notified them ‘that the Senate committee had unanimously voted to strike out the objectionable word “in accordance with your very reasonable request”.’63 The hearing in the House was on 16 February 1904, with six pro-suffrage witnesses from the NAWSA convention testifying. The chair of the Judiciary Committee, John J.Jenkins (R-Wisconsin), made clear to all, before the hearing began, that he did not support woman suffrage.64 Since Congress did not appoint an investigative committee to look into the effects of equal suffrage, NAWSA brought speakers from Colorado to testify on the topic. At the conclusion of the hearing, Carrie Chapman Catt asked the committee, ‘That you will this time make a report to the House of Representatives and if you do not believe that we are right, for Heaven’s sake make an adverse report. Anything will be more satisfactory than the indifference with which we have been treated for many years.’65 The movement was getting desperate for some type of response from Congress. For even an unfavourable committee report meant that the committee had considered the issue, and was giving the House or Senate the opportunity to do the same. The response in the House consisted of one bill introduced by Representative Shafroth, on 18 December 1903. There was no other response from the House during this Congress. Regarding the reason for this lack of response (in both Senate and House), Stanton et al. note, ‘there was not, however, enough political influence back of the appeals for the submission of the Federal Amendment for woman suffrage to compel the committees to make reports which would bring the subject before Congress’.66 The hearing in the Senate was on 16 February 1904. Thirteen pro-suffrage witnesses testified. The only response came in the form of one bill introduced on 11 November 1903, by Senator John H.Mitchell (R-Oregon). There were no committee reports. In fact, Stanton et al. note that ‘during many winters Miss Susan B.Anthony had remained in Washington until she obtained a committee report from these committees, but after she ceased to do this, although the hearings were still granted, nobody made it an especial business to see that the committees made reports and so none was made and action by Congress seemed very remote’.67 The second wave: 1890–1928 111

The Fifty-ninth Congress (1905–07) saw access attained by suffrage activists and very little response, yet again. There was access in the form of one hearing in each house with pro-suffrage witnesses. The only response was one bill introduced in the House. The hearing in the House occurred on 15 February 1906. Again, eight delegates from the NAWSA convention testified. One Southern delegate noted that, of the seven Southern members of the committee, not one appeared to be present.68 One witness, Mrs Kelley, the daughter of former representative William D.Kelley, a suffrage supporter, noted that it would get more and more difficult to get suffrage to pass (in the states), as more and more immigrants, with conservative views regarding the role of women, became citizens: ‘Every time we come there is some gain to record, but, between the times, at least, 1,000,000 new immigrants have come into this country who will have to be brought to the American way of thinking about women before they will vote to give the ballot to those who are born here and whose forefathers have asked that we be enfranchised.’69 The response came in the form of one suffrage bill introduced by Representative Franklin Mondell (R-Wyoming) on 19 January 1906. Yet again, there were no committee reports during this Congress. The hearing in the Senate took place on 15 February 1906. Eight pro-suffrage witnesses testified. There were no bills introduced during this Congress and no committee report for the hearing. The Sixtieth Congress (1907–09) saw access attained in the form of two hearings, one in each house, with pro-suffrage witnesses. This Congress saw very little response. Only two bills were introduced, one in each house. The hearing in the House took place on 3 March 1908. Nine NAWSA delegates testified in support of woman suffrage. The only response from the House was one suffrage bill, introduced by Representative Robert C.Davey (D-Louisiana) on 27 January 1908. The hearing in the Senate took place on 3 March 1908. Ten NAWSA delegates showed up to testify in support of woman suffrage. Vera Goldthwaite, a suffrage activist, presented a memorial on woman suffrage to the House. The only response granted was one suffrage bill, introduced by Senator Warren, on 30 January 1908. There is no text given of the hearings, in either the House or the Senate, in The History of Woman Suffrage. The Sixty-first Congress (1909–11) saw access attained and very little response granted. The access consisted of one hearing, in each house, with some pro-suffrage witnesses. The only response was three bills introduced, two in the House and one in the Senate. NAWSA sought access in the form of one final petition to Congress, asking for the submission of a Federal woman suffrage amendment. The petition was begun in 1908. NAWSA sent petitions to their state organizations to be distributed to local groups, and returned to NAWSA for delivery to Congress. By the time this was done there were around 160,000 petitions and 16,000 letters.70 These petitions were delivered to Congress, via a parade. They were then personally placed in the hands of the senators and representatives, who had agreed to present them to Congress. This was the last time this was done by NAWSA. In 1910, NAWSA also sent letters to candidates to Congress, asking their position on woman suffrage. In all, they sent letters to 378 Democrats and 293 Republicans; 135 of the former and 89 of the latter responded; 93 Democrats and 65 Republicans favoured Political women 112 full or partial suffrage for women; 13 of the Democrats and one of the Republicans were completely opposed; and 29 Democrats and 23 Republicans were non-committal.71 Finally, it was in 1910 that NAWSA appointed a special congressional committee to remain in DC, and ensure that woman suffrage bills got committee reports. As previously noted, NAWSA had noted that once Susan B.Anthony stopped remaining in DC for the winter, the committee reports had also stopped. They felt that a congressional committee that remained in DC, and was a constant presence in the capital, would help the woman suffrage bill get reported. The committee was composed, mainly, of wives of senators and representatives. As Stanton et al. note, ‘no busier women could have been selected and beyond making excellent arrangements for the hearings, the committee was not active’.72 The hearing in the House took place on 19 April 1910. Nine pro-suffrage witnesses testified on behalf of woman suffrage. Mrs Upton, a NAWSA delegate, pleaded with the committee to grant a committee report, favourable or unfavourable: ‘I beg of you to let all the world know why the women of the United States, who by hundreds of thousands have petitioned you to submit this amendment, ought not have at least this request considered and a report on it made.’73 The only response in the House took the form of two suffrage bills introduced. They were introduced on 19 and 22 February 1910 by Representatives Mondell and William Rucker (D-Missouri), respectively. The hearing in the Senate was also on 19 April 1910. Nine pro-suffrage witnesses testified. Dr Shaw, a NAWSA delegate, argued that as a democracy, the USA was a failure:

We have never tried universal suffrage but if that which we have is a failure the cure for it is not to restrict it but to extend it, because no class of men is able to represent another class and it is much truer that no class nor all classes of men are capable of representing any class or classes of women.74

Senator Shafroth also testified on behalf of woman suffrage, and argued: ‘The exercise of any power of government not emanating from the consent of the governed…is despotism.’75 Also in 1910, a memorial on woman suffrage was presented to the Senate. The only response was one suffrage bill introduced, on 21 February 1910, by Senator William Borah (R-Idaho). One of the major obstacles facing the woman suffrage movement, in the House, from the Fifty-first to the Sixty-first Congresses, was the power of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. This era is characterized by Speaker Thomas B.Reed (R-Maine) and Speaker Joseph Cannon (R-Illinois). Reed, as discussed, became disgusted with the lack of legislative output in the House. He believed this paucity of product was due to the dilatory tactics used by the minority party. Reed instituted new rules that increased the Speaker’s power and decreased the power of the minority party. Cannon built on the powerful Speakership that Reed had created. Cannon believed in centralized leadership and responsible party government, whereby the majority party faithfully supported and legislated that which was espoused in the party platform. Cannon, however, not only pushed through the legislative agenda of the majority party, he also used his powers to promote the agenda of his allies and thwart that of his foes. As The second wave: 1890–1928 113

Garrison Nelson notes, ‘in 1903 Cannon became Speaker and used his power of committee assignments, the chairmanship of the Rules Committee, and control over the floor to further the fortunes of his fellow conservative Republicans’.76 Gannon was not fond of the progressive Republicans and utilized the powers of the Speakership to squelch any progressive Republican agenda and to divide the Democrats. One item on the progressive platform was woman suffrage. Another problem that faced the suffrage movement during these Congresses was the chair of the Judiciary Committee in the House. Chairs and committee members were appointed by the Speaker and frequently reflected his political agenda. The Judiciary Committee was not favourably disposed to the issue of woman suffrage. A woman suffrage amendment was introduced and referred every Congress (except the Fifty- seventh) to the Judiciary Committee. Hearings were held and memorials and petitions presented, only promptly to be sent to the National Archives. In the words of NAWSA, ‘having petitioned to our law-makers, State and National, for years, many from weariness and despair have vowed to appeal no more, for our petitions, say they, by the tens of thousands, are piled up mid the National Archives unheeded and ignored’.77 Thus Cannon’s tenure as Speaker arguably made it more difficult for suffrage to receive a fair hearing in the Judiciary Committee. In 1910, some insurgent Republicans, along with the Democrats, staged a revolution in the House. They ousted Cannon and rewrote the powers of the Speaker, significantly reducing his power (discussed in detail earlier). The Sixty-second Congress (1911–13) began to show signs of improving conditions for the suffrage movement. The movement attained access and increased levels of response. There were three hearings, two in the Senate and one in the House, and response was increased with seven suffrage bills introduced (six in the House and one in the Senate), although still no committee reports. Furthermore, Stanton et al. note that this year there was no need for NAWSA to request members of Congress to introduce woman suffrage bills; they did it of their own accord, in both houses.78 In 1912, Alice Paul was placed at the head of the congressional committee of NAWSA. One of the first things she did was organize a woman suffrage parade. The parade was held in Washington, DC, the day before the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson. Somewhere between eight and ten thousand women marched in it.79 Although the parade itself was important, it was the reaction of the crowd that made it memorable. People spat at the women, called them names, and generally harassed them. As Catt and Shuler recount the proceedings: ‘Women were spat upon, slapped in the face, tripped up, pelted with burning cigar stubs and insulted by jeers and obscene language…’80 The police were incapable of maintaining order and soldiers were called in from nearby Fort Meyer. Congressional Senate hearings and investigations were held concerning the poor conduct of the Washington, DC police department, and ultimately, the Chief of Police was dismissed. In the House a hearing took place on 14 February 1912, and was continued on 13 March. Eleven pro-suffrage witnesses testified, and one anti-suffrage witness was invited. The anti-suffrage movement was better organized at this point. It is not entirely clear why there were not more anti-suffrage witnesses. It does not appear that they were prevented from testifying, but rather that they either did not seek as much access, felt one or two witnesses were enough, and/or did not believe that woman suffrage was likely to pass. Response was much increased during this Congress in the House. Three woman suffrage bills were introduced in 1911—on 4 April, 5 May and 8 May by Representatives Rucker, Political women 114

Mondell and Edward Taylor (D-Colorado), respectively. Then in 1912 three more suffrage bills were introduced, on 2, 5 and 16 January by Representatives Abraham Lafferty (R-Oregon), John E.Raker (D-California) and Victor Berger (Socialist- Wisconsin), respectively. These were three new names—the pool of representatives introducing woman suffrage bills was growing. Access in the Senate consisted of two hearings on woman suffrage bills during this Congress. The first was on 16 February 1912, with one pro-suffrage witness. The second hearing was on 13 March 1912, with twenty-one pro-suffrage witnesses and one anti. Response was not great. There was one suffrage bill introduced, by Senator John D.Works (R-California), on 29 February 1912. There were no committee reports for either of the hearings. For both houses, there was access in the Sixty-third Congress (1913–15) and response was vastly increased. Regarding access, there were three hearings, one in the Senate and two in the House. All had pro-suffrage witnesses, but an increased number of anti- suffrage witnesses. Regarding response, there were ten suffrage bills introduced (six in the House, four in the Senate), three committee reports (two favourable from the Senate, one unfavourable from the House), three suffrage bills were debated by full houses (two in the Senate and one in the House), and two suffrage bills were voted on upon the floor (one in the Senate and one in the House—both failed). NAWSA had become disgusted with the lack of response from the House Judiciary Committee, so they turned to President Wilson for redress. Although not a convert to the notion of woman suffrage, Wilson suggested that the suffragists petition the Rules Committee of the House for a Woman Suffrage Committee (one had existed in the Senate since 1878).81 A hearing was granted, and on 3–5 December 1913, there was a hearing in the House regarding the creation of a Woman Suffrage Committee. This hearing is not counted towards the total number of hearings (it was not concerning a suffrage amendment), but it is pertinent to a discussion of access. It was well attended and attracted much attention, from pro- and anti-suffragists alike. There were twenty-eight pro-suffrage witnesses and twenty-four anti-suffrage witnesses. Pro-suffrage activists felt that many of their problems getting a woman suffrage bill through the House stemmed from the Judiciary Committee. They were disgusted by the inattention to woman suffrage by the Judiciary Committee, and the known anti-suffrage position of its chair, Edwin Y.Webb (D-North Carolina). The suffrage activists argued that the Judiciary Committee, ‘to which constitutional amendments are referred, is and always has been so occupied with other important questions, that it has never been able to give the consideration due to this measure’.82 On a more sarcastic note, Dr Shaw argued during this hearing:

It has thus far been impossible to secure any sort of a report by the Judiciary Committee… We realize that this is a body of men who have a great many questions before them, and that their time is taken up with the discussion of those questions, some of which they consider of more importance than the freedom of one-half of the people of the United States, and therefore we can not expect them to do more than they can.83

Other suffragists argued, in less cordial terms, that ‘the women of the country have been unfairly dealt with by the Judiciary Committee’.84 The second wave: 1890–1928 115

The vote in the Rules Committee was split, with four voting favourably to report the measure, and four opposed. It was then moved that it be reported without recommendation, and there was a tie vote.85 Signatures were obtained by Democrats to meet in caucus to discuss it. Representative Oscar Underwood (D-Alabama), Majority Leader, however, called a meeting in his office before the scheduled caucus meeting. The upshot of this meeting was that, by a vote of 123 to 55, it was decided that woman suffrage was a state question, and thus there was no need for a committee.86 No action was taken on the creation of a committee until 24 September 1917, when the Rules Committee finally approved the creation of a Woman Suffrage Committee (to be discussed under the appropriate Congress). Other access during this wave came in the form of a hearing, on 3 March 1914. Members of the Congressional Union, NAWSA, and the Federal Women’s Equality Association testified (fifteen in all). The Federal Women’s Equality Association was formed in 1902, to obtain a bill to enable women to vote for senators and representatives. This was the first time they testified at a hearing for a Federal amendment and did not discuss their other cause. There were also six anti-suffragist witnesses. Response was also much increased from the House during this Congress. On 7 and 21 April 1913, five suffrage bills were introduced by Representatives Mondell, Taylor, Lafferty, Raker and Carl Hayden (D-Arizona), and then on 6 April 1914, Representative Alexander Palmer (D-Pennsylvania) introduced a woman suffrage bill. This bill became known as the Shafroth-Palmer amendment, and created much friction within NAWSA. This amendment was conceived of, and written by, members of the NAWSA Congressional Committee, in 1914. Some members feared that the traditional woman suffrage amendment would not pass, because of the many members of Congress who argued for states’ rights in the matter of suffrage. They wrote a new amendment that was designed to assuage states’ rights advocates. It was a somewhat complicated amendment, but the gist of it was that it would let the people of each state vote for or against suffrage, every year, for as long as they wanted, until it passed. Once a state passed woman suffrage, it was a permanent fixture, and women could vote—there was no waiting for ratification by three-quarters of the states. This new version stirred up some controversy in NAWSA, and in 1915 the association decided that it would support only the traditional woman suffrage amendment, accepting no substitutes.87 In addition, for the first time since the Fifty-third Congress, there was a committee report from the Judiciary Committee, on 19 May 1914. It was unfavourable. The Rules Committee was persuaded to permit a vote on this bill (Bristow-Mondell version—the traditional woman suffrage amendment). The Rules Committee reported this bill on 12 December 1914, and on 12 January 1915 it was voted on by the full House, for the first time ever. After the Rules Committee reported the bill, the Congressional Committee of NAWSA instigated a letter-writing campaign. They had state organizations send letters to their congressmen ‘and the result was that thousands of letters and telegrams poured into the offices of the Congressmen’.88 These letters did not convince enough members. The bill failed, 174 yays to 204 nays. Though it failed, however, this was an event to be remembered and a harbinger of things to come. As Stanton et al. comment, ‘the Federal Amendment had for the first time been debated and voted on in the House of Representatives, receiving 204 noes, 174 ayes, a satisfactory result for the first trial’.89 Political women 116

In the Senate the access was fair and the response was vastly greater during this Congress. On 19, 21 and 26 April there was a hearing on the Bristow-Mondell version of the woman suffrage bill. One day was granted to NAWSA, one day to the Federal Women’s Equality Association, and one day to the Anti-Suffrage Association. The Anti- Suffrage Association was in full swing by this point, but perhaps it was a little late. The tide was finally turning in favour of woman suffrage. Response from the Senate came in many forms during this Congress. Four woman suffrage bills were introduced. On 7 April 1913, Senator George Chamberlain (D- Oregon) introduced one, and then on 12 and 20 March 1914, Senators Wesley Jones (R- Washington), Shafroth and Joseph Bristow (R-Kansas) introduced woman suffrage bills, respectively. There were also two favourable majority committee reports during this Congress. The first was in May of 1914. It was on the Shafroth-Palmer version of the woman suffrage bill. The second committee report was on 7 April 1914, on the Bristow- Mondell version of the bill, and, for the first time since 1887, there was debate on the floor—twice. On 31 July 1913, there was debate on the floor on the Bristow-Mondell amendment, but no further action was taken. The second debate was in March of 1914, also on the Bristow-Mondell amendment. A vote was taken after this debate on 19 March. The amendment failed, 35 yays to 34 nays. The Sixty-fourth Congress (1915–17) also saw access and a great deal of response, from both houses. Regarding access, there were two hearings, one in each house. There were also many pro-suffrage witnesses and a fair number of anti-suffrage witnesses. Regarding response, there was a total of twelve suffrage bills introduced—six in each house. There were also four committee reports, two unfavourable in the House and two favourable in the Senate. Finally, on 13 December 1917, the House voted to create a Special Committee on Woman Suffrage. Stanton et al. note: ‘this was done against the vigorous opposition of the Judiciary Committee, which for the past forty years had prevented the question of woman suffrage from coming before the House for a vote. At this time [this Congress] it reported the Federal Amendment “without recommendation” and tried to prevent its being referred to the new committee.’90 Also during this Congress, the Congressional Committee of NAWSA decided to interview, by letter, all the congressional candidates in the 1916 election, to ascertain their position on woman suffrage. In doing this, they hoped that they could alert their members to the positions on suffrage of their representatives, and, they hoped, get any unfriendly members unseated. There is no evidence that they were successful. The hearing in the House was on 16 December 1915. There were sixteen pro-suffrage witnesses and twelve anti-suffrage witnesses, and the antis received another hearing six weeks later, on 1 February 1916. Regarding response, there was a lot granted, but not all was positive. Six suffrage bills were introduced. The first five were introduced on 6 December 1915, by Representatives Raker, Mondell, Edward Keating (D-Colorado), Taylor and Hayden. The sixth was introduced on 29 March 1916, by Representative Hayden. On 9 February 1916, a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee reported the woman suffrage bill, without recommendation, to the full committee. On 15 February 1916, the full committee sent the bill back to the subcommittee with instruction to hold it until December. The Congressional Committee of NAWSA was infuriated. It attempted to get the Judiciary Committee to take the amendment up again. It appeared that it had succeeded, as the committee agreed to do so on 14 March 1916. Chairman Webb, The second wave: 1890–1928 117 however, permitted a motion to postpone all constitutional amendments, and thus the bill was tabled. As mentioned, Webb was opposed to woman suffrage and presented a large obstacle to the amendment ever getting out of the Judiciary Committee with a favourable report. The second committee report was on 15 December 1916—it was without recommendation to pass. Thus, the movement was granted a great deal of response during this Congress, but much of it was unfavourable. In the Senate, there was a hearing on 15, 16 and 20 December 1915. One day was given to the Congressional Union, one day to NAWSA, and one day to the Anti-Suffrage Association. All told, there were twenty pro-suffrage witnesses and six anti-suffrage witnesses. In addition, on 17 April 1916, the National Anti-Suffrage Association submitted an argument to the Senate. The response was great and positive during this Congress. In total, six suffrage bills were introduced. On 7 December 1915, three of them were introduced by Senators George Sutherland (R-Utah), Charles S.Thomas (D-Colorado) and William H.Thompson (D-Kansas). Then on 13 May 1916, Senator Wesley Jones introduced a fourth woman suffrage bill. Finally, on 19 January 1917, Senator Miles Poindexter (R-Washington) introduced two woman suffrage bills. There were two favourable majority committee reports during this Congress. The first came after the December 1915 hearings—it was a favourable majority. The second came on 8 January 1916. It too was a favourable majority. The Sixty-fifth Congress (1917–19) saw access attained and a great deal of response granted by both houses. There were three hearings, two in the House and one in the Senate, both with pro-suffrage witnesses and anti-suffrage witnesses. Regarding response, there were twenty-four suffrage bills introduced (fourteen in the House, ten in the Senate), five committee reports (two favourable and one unfavourable in the House, two favourable in the Senate), debate on the floor three times (once in the House and twice in the Senate), three votes by full houses (one in the House and two in the Senate), and finally, one bill passed in the House. The Special Committee on Woman Suffrage, in the House, was in full swing. And as Stanton et al. note regarding it, ‘a new era had dawned and a Committee on Woman Suffrage had been formed, whose chairman, Judge John E.Raker of California, by advice of Speaker Clark, had introduced another resolution for the submission of the amendment which was sent to this committee…’91 The committee was composed of seven Democrats and six Republicans; all but three ended up reporting in favour of the amendment. Regarding access in the House, on 15 May 1917, there was a hearing with nine pro- suffrage witnesses and three anti-suffrage witnesses. There was another hearing on 3–7 January 1918. One day was given to NAWSA, one to the National Woman’s Party, and one to the Anti-Suffrage Association. This was the first hearing held by the newly created Woman Suffrage Committee in the House. In all, there were seventeen pro-suffrage and ten anti-suffrage witnesses. Although the number of anti-suffrage witnesses appears large, Catt and Shuler comment that ‘legislative committees divided the time [in hearings] equally between suffragists and anti-suffragists’.92 Thus, numbers may mean little. It is important that the committees invited anti-suffragists to testify, but the variation in the numbers testifying may have depended only on how many the association sent for their allotted time; it may have nothing to do with the committee inviting more anti-suffrage witnesses. Other access attained during this congress was the hearing on 18 Political women 118

May 1917, which resulted in the creation of the Woman Suffrage Committee, on 13 December 1917. There was also a great deal of response from the House during this Congress. A total of fourteen woman suffrage bills were introduced. On 2 and 4 April 1917, six were introduced by Representatives Raker, Jeanette Rankin (R-Montana), Mondell, Keating, Hayden and Taylor. Then on 15 and 18 December 1917, seven were introduced by Representatives Philip Campbell (R-Kansas), Hayden, Taylor, Keating, Rankin, Raker and Mondell. Finally, on 28 February 1919, Representative Raker introduced another woman suffrage bill. There were also three committee reports from the House during this congress. The first came on 11 December 1917. It was an unfavourable majority committee report and included an amendment to limit the ratification period to seven years. The second committee report came on 8 January 1918. It was a favourable majority committee report, the first one since the Fifty-first Congress, with minority views. The third committee report was on 1 March 1919, and it too was a favourable majority committee report. It appeared that the Woman Suffrage Committee was making a vast difference to the fate of the woman suffrage amendment. Finally, the woman suffrage amendment received debate and a vote on the floor of the House on 10 January 1918. It passed with 274 yays to 136 nays. Access to the Senate consisted of a hearing on 20, 26 April, 3 and 15 May 1917. Twenty pro-suffrage witnesses testified and six anti-suffragists testified. There was response, though some was favourable and some unfavourable. Ten suffrage bills were introduced. Six were introduced on 4 April 1917, by Senators Thompson, Robert L.Owen (D-Oklahoma), Shafroth, Andrieus Jones (D-New Mexico) and two by Poindexter. Then on 13, 20 and 28 February 1919, four woman suffrage bills were introduced, by Senators Wesley Jones, Edward Gay (D-Louisiana), Kenneth McKellar (D-Tennessee), and Andrieus Jones. There were also two favourable committee reports from the Senate during this Congress. The first was on 15 September 1917—it was unanimous. The second was in February of 1919. Two debates on the floor and votes also occurred during this Congress. The first floor debate and vote were on 1 October 1918. President Wilson had just addressed the Senate, on 30 September 1918, urging them to pass the amendment as a war measure. The amendment failed by two votes (62 yays, 34 nays). Wilson again addressed Congress on 2 December 1918, urging them to submit the amendment (his arguments are quoted previously). The second debate and vote came on 10 February 1919. Again, the amendment failed, this time by only one vote (63 yays, 33 nays). The Sixty-sixth Congress saw no access attained but the ultimate in favourable response granted; the amendment passed both houses. Other response came in the form of fourteen woman suffrage bills introduced (seven in each house), two favourable majority committee reports (one in each house), and two floor debates (one in each house). In the House there was no access attained, but there was much favourable response. Seven woman suffrage bills were introduced, on 19 and 21 May 1919, by Representatives James Mann (R-Illinois), Raker, Taylor, Hayden, Thomas Blanton (D-Texas), Mondell and Burton French (R-Idaho). Then, without a hearing, there was a favourable majority committee report from the Woman Suffrage Committee on 20 May 1919, with minority views. Then on 21 May 1919, the woman suffrage amendment was called up for debate and voted upon. It passed with 304 yays and 89 nays. The second wave: 1890–1928 119

There was also no access attained in the Senate, but there was response granted. On 20 and 23 May 1919, seven woman suffrage bills were introduced by Senators Andrieus Jones, Grove Johnson (R-California), Wesley Jones, Poindexter, Lawrence Sherman (R- Illinois) and Gay. On 28 May 1919, the Woman Suffrage Committee favourably reported the woman suffrage amendment. It received debate and a vote on the floor, on 4 June 1919. It passed—56 yays to 25 nays. It was on to the states. In sum, some access was attained by the suffrage movement in both houses during this wave. There were no drastic differences in access attained among the Congresses. In all Congresses, in both houses, at least one hearing with pro-suffrage witnesses was attained. And in a few Congresses, two hearings were attained. It is with response that there is variation in the amount granted. The movement began the wave receiving some response from both houses—a few bills introduced and a few favourable majority committee reports. The tide turned during the Fifty-fifth Congress. From then until the Sixty-first Congress, the amount of response was negligible from both houses—a few bills and no committee reports at all. Then, after 1911, things improved. Beginning with the Sixty-second Congress (1911–13), the movement was granted response—an average of six bills introduced in each house, during each Congress, favourable majority committee reports in each house, debate on the floor, and floor votes. Thus, regarding response, there is a clear trend, in both houses, from limited response during the first half of the wave to a vastly increased amount of response during the second half of the wave. Although both houses display similar trends in access and response, there are some differences. The Senate, overall, granted more favourable response to the movement than the House. All the committee reports in the Senate were favourable, whereas, in the House, there were no favourable committee reports until 1917, when the Committee on Woman Suffrage was finally created. The Senate had maintained a Committee on Woman Suffrage ever since it was first created, in 1882. The Senate, with its lack of strong party leadership (after Aldrich) was a more open POS. The House, with its strong party leaders, electoral stability (at times), high party unity and need to heed mass opinion, was a closed POS—at least until some of these political conditions altered. Once the strong leadership dissipated, party unity declined and mass opinion shifted, the POS in the House opened up, albeit tentatively at first.

Presidencies The presidencies during this wave were not particularly open to the issue of woman suffrage. According to the indicators, the movement received negligible access to most of the Presidents during this wave (see Table 5.6). Furthermore, regarding response, the movement did not fare much better (see Table 5.7). The movement was granted scant response from the Presidents of this wave. As I began to discuss in Chapter 4, the movement received no access to President Benjamin Harrison (R-1888–92) and very little response. The only response came in the form of eight pieces of legislation concerning women. There is also little evidence that the movement sought much access to President Harrison. In 1888 (the first wave), however, NWSA wrote a letter to candidate Harrison asking him to interpret the declaration in the Republican Party platform as recognizing women’s right to vote. The Political women 120 platform stated, ‘we recognize the supreme and sovereign right of every lawful citizen to cast one free ballot in all public elections and to have that ballot duly counted’.93 The letter was ignored. During the second presidency of Grover Cleveland (D-1893–96) the movement received no access to this President. The only response granted by this administration was the enactment of seven pieces of legislation concerning women. Some of the legislation dealt with an investigation into women’s work and wages in DC, that women could be appointed to the Board of School Trustees in DC, and women’s property rights in DC. NAWSA sought access to Mrs Cleveland. In 1894 Susan B.Anthony wrote to her asking her to meet with members of the NAWSA Table 5.6 Access Presidents—second wave

President Attention to women Number of times Number of times POS and year in platform President met with President met with elected suffrage groups women’s groups 1888 Harrison none 0 0 modified closed 1892 none 0 0 modified Cleveland closed 1896 Republicans discuss 0 0 modified McKinley women* open 1900 Republicans discuss 1 0 closed McKinley women* 1903–04 same* 0 0 closed Roosevelt 1904 none 2 0 closed Roosevelt 1908 Taft none 1 0 closed 1912 Wilson none 6 1 modified closed 1916 Wilson Democrats and 9 0 modified Republicans support open woman suffrage* 1920 Harding Democrats and 0 0 modified Republicans support closed woman suffrage* 1924 Coolidge Democrats and 0 2 closed Republicans discuss women* Sources: see Appendix A. *=see discussion under each presidency for specifics The second wave: 1890–1928 121 convention. The reply was negative and was sent by Robert O’Brien (secretary to the President), who stated, ‘Mrs Cleveland has handed me your note of this date and asks me to express her regrets that it will be impossible for her to appoint a time when she could see the company in whose behalf you write.’94 Then in 1896 Susan B.Anthony sent another message to Mrs Cleveland, asking if some members of NAWSA might call on her. This time she replied in the affirmative and about thirty NAWSA delegates, mostly from western states, were received.95 There is no account in volume four of The History of Woman Suffrage as to what the proceedings of the meeting were. Though Cleveland never spoke on the topic of suffrage, his leanings can be gleaned from a speech he made to the students of University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in February 1892: ‘The gentleness and loveliness of woman do not cause us to forget that she can inspire man to do deeds of greatness and heroism; that as a wife she often makes man’s career noble and grand, and that as mother she builds and fashions in her son the strong pillars of state.’96 Cleveland focused on Table 5.7 Response Presidents—second wave

President Number of Number of Number of Number of POS and year public public Executive laws elected pronouncements pronouncements Orders issued re suffrage re women 1888 0 0 0 8 modified Harrison closed 1892 0 0 0 7 modified Cleveland closed 1896 0 0 0 4 modified McKinley open 1900 0 0 0 0 closed McKinley 1903–04 0 0 0 3 closed Roosevelt 1904 0 7 3 11 closed Roosevelt 1908 Taft 0 0 1 3 closed 1912 2 0 5 (for both 17 (for both modified Wilson administrations) administrations) closed 1916 7 0 see above see above modified Wilson open 1920 1 1 0 2 modified Harding closed 1924 0 4 1 13 closed Coolidge Sources: see Appendix A. Political women 122 the role of woman as wife and mother. He was not interested in her quest for political rights. President William McKinley (R) served for two consecutive terms (1897–1904), but died in office during his second term and Theodore Roosevelt, his Vice President, assumed office. This presidency granted a marginal amount of access to the suffrage movement. The Republican Party platforms of 1896 and 1900 both discuss women. In 1896 it states that: ‘The Republican Party is mindful of the rights and interests of women. Protection of American industries includes equal opportunities, equal pay for equal work, and protection to the home. We favor admission of women to wider spheres of usefulness, and welcome their co-operation in rescuing the country from Democratic- Populist mismanagement and misrule.’97 Then in 1900 they stated: ‘We congratulate the women of America upon their splendid record of public service in the Volunteer Aid Association and as nurses in camp and hospital during recent campaigns of our armies in the East and West Indies, and we appreciate their faithful co-operation in all works of education and industry.’98 In 1900, too, President McKinley met with 200 NAWSA members. After the meeting he invited Susan B.Anthony upstairs to meet Mrs McKinley, who had been too sick to attend the reception. The President and his wife sent Anthony away with an armful of lilies, as Mrs McKinley wished to send some message to the NAWSA convention.99 The only response was four pieces of legislation concerning women during his first administration, and three pieces of legislation concerning women during the second. NAWSA, however, asked President McKinley to appoint Mrs Bertha Honore Palmer to the post of Commissioner from the United States to the Paris Exposition and Mrs May Wright Sewall as delegate to represent the organized work of women in the United States. Both appointments were made.100 Thus, some response, not captured by the indicators, did occur. Theodore Roosevelt (R) was elected to the presidency in 1904 and was in office until 1908. The access he granted the suffrage movement was three meetings with suffrage groups. Regarding response, he made seven public pronouncements regarding women’s issues, signed three executive orders regarding women, and signed eleven pieces of legislation concerning women. One of the executive orders is of interest. It was a directive to investigate the working conditions of women and children. NAWSA sent letters to Roosevelt in 1905 and 1908, urging him to recommend the submission of a Sixteenth Amendment (woman suffrage) in his message to Congress. He did not do this on either occasion. Finally, as they had done during past elections, before the election of 1908, NAWSA wrote letters to the delegates to the presidential nominating conventions (all parties), requesting that they include a suffrage plank in the platform. They met with no luck. Much was hoped of Teddy Roosevelt. His senior thesis at Harvard was entitled ‘The Practicability of Equalizing Men and Women before the Law’. In this thesis he had commented that ‘in an ideally perfect State strict justice would at once place both sexes on an equality’.101 Little, however, was gained from this presidency. There was some access. He spoke at one National American Woman Suffrage Association meeting. On the occasion of Susan B.Anthony’s birthday in 1904, the President and Mrs Roosevelt met with Anthony and NAWSA delegates. Then, on 15 November 1905, he received Anthony, Mrs Upton, and Mrs Harper. He granted them a long interview, at the end of The second wave: 1890–1928 123 which Anthony gave him a long list of requests. He did not comply with any of them, nor did he further communicate with the committee that called upon him.102 Finally, Anthony was invited by President and Mrs Roosevelt to attend the Army and Navy reception at the White House in 1904. In 1906, Roosevelt sent a letter of congratulations to Anthony on her birthday. These last two are not counted towards meetings with suffrage groups, but they are of interest in regard to access. They indicate a degree of familiarity between the President and one of the key leaders of the movement—a willingness to be seen in public as having friendly relations. There was response granted by Roosevelt, but not what NAWSA hoped for. NAWSA claimed that, though repeatedly asked, Roosevelt never made any statement regarding woman suffrage during his seven years as President.103 Furthermore, when Susan B.Anthony wrote him during his last term, asking him to ‘come out once more for suffrage, as he had done while Governor of New York, no reply was returned except a formal acknowledgment from Mr Roosevelt’s secretary of the receipt of the letter’.104 It appears evident from a letter Roosevelt wrote to Harriet Taylor Upton, treasurer of NAWSA, in 1908 that he was not a strong supporter of suffrage for women:

Personally I believe in woman’s suffrage, but I am not an enthusiastic advocate of it because I do not regard it as a very important matter. I am unable to see that there has been any special improvement in the position of women in those States in the West that have adopted woman suffrage, as compared with those States adjoining them that have not adopted it.105

Roosevelt did speak publicly about the need for investigation into the working conditions of women in industry (six times), and issued a directive telling the Department of Commerce and Labor to conduct such an investigation. While President, however, he did not speak publicly regarding suffrage. And when he was a candidate for the Republican nomination in 1916, he was incensed that Carrie Chapman Catt had the gall to ask him what his position was on the issue, stating, ‘It is a little difficult for me to give a statement to any person, male or female, who won’t take the trouble to read what I have publicly said.’106 This is a surprising retort from someone who stated at one point that he believed in woman suffrage and at another time that he ‘did not regard it as a very important matter’.107 William Howard Taft (R) served from 1909–12. He granted scant access and response. He met with NAWSA once, and signed one executive order regarding women and three pieces of legislation. It does not appear that suffrage activists sought many interviews with him, but numerous letters were written to Taft, requesting to know his position on woman suffrage (I found twenty-five). Other letters were written requesting him to state his position publicly or to change his position. I found ten that fell into these last categories. The administration of William Howard Taft was no friend to suffrage. Access was almost non-existent. Before becoming President he attended a celebration for Anthony on the occasion of her eighty-sixth birthday.108 He spoke, but did not discuss suffrage. Then in 1910, Taft agreed to give a welcome address to the NAWSA convention. NAWSA told him that his acceptance would not be construed as his advocacy of woman suffrage.109 He did speak, but did not advocate woman suffrage. He noted: ‘when I was sixteen years old Political women 124 and was graduated from the Woodward High School of Cincinnati, I took for my subject “Woman Suffrage” and I was as strong an advocate of it as any member of this convention …but in the actual political experience which I have had I have modified my views somewhat’.110 His speech did not sit well with some members of the audience, as some hissing occurred. NAWSA leaders were sufficiently embarrassed by this hissing that the Committee on Convention Resolutions voted and passed a resolution to send him a letter of apology for the rudeness. Later, Taft sent his regrets to an invitation to attend a mass meeting in commemoration of Lucy Stone’s birth. In 1912, before the election, Taft received numerous letters from state suffrage societies and the like, requesting him to tell them his position on suffrage. In his private papers in the Library of Congress, I found record of twenty-five such letters, and there were more requesting him to have support for woman suffrage written into the Republican platform (five), or to take a position on suffrage, since Roosevelt and LaFollette had (five). The letters concerning taking a stand tended to express the sentiment that, if he didn’t come out for woman suffrage, then the Republicans would have no chance of winning the 1912 election. There was, as might be expected, little response regarding suffrage from Taft. He responded to few of the letters discussed above. Furthermore, party activists, such as John Davey and the Republican National Committee (RNC), were urging Taft to reconsider his position.111 Charles Hilles, chairman of the RNC, cabled Taft in June 1912, stating, ‘Our friends being deluged with requests for plank favoring woman’s suffrage. Will be glad to learn your wishes.’112 A note attached to this telegram, signed WHT, read, ‘I don’t think the matter is of national consequences.’113 The Republican National Committee wrote to Taft, asking him, ‘Have you thought of moderating your views?’114 Then in a letter of 14 June 1912, J.D.Brannan, a party activist, wrote to Taft asking him to consent to a plank in the Republican platform favouring the extension of suffrage to women. It appears that they were concerned that his position might harm his re-election chances. Taft replied to one request asking him to state his position with, ‘My position on the issue I have stated, and I do not care to change it, especially in the midst of a campaign like this.’115 He further commented to Hilles: ‘I cannot change my view…just to suit the exigencies of the campaign, and if it is going to hurt me I think it will have to hurt me…. It is really a matter for state action…’116 Taft did lose the election of 1912, but there is no way of knowing whether the suffrage issue was of consequence. Neither access nor response was to be received from the Taft White House. It is with the presidencies of Woodrow Wilson (D-1913–20) that there is a shift in the amount of access attained and response granted to the suffrage movement. During his first administration, access was attained by the movement. He met with suffrage groups six times and once with a women’s group. Regarding response, he made two public pronouncements regarding woman suffrage, signed five executive orders and seventeen pieces of legislation (these last two numbers are for both administrations). One of the executive orders is of interest. It permitted Federal employees to participate in woman suffrage societies. During his second administration access increased. He met with suffrage groups nine times and the Democratic Party platform discussed woman suffrage, for the first time ever, in 1916 (as did the Republican Party platform). The Democratic platform stated, ‘we recommend the extension of the franchise to the women of the country by the states The second wave: 1890–1928 125 upon the same terms as men’.117 Response was also increased during his second administration. He made seven public pronouncements regarding woman suffrage and, as discussed above, signed some executive orders and legislation concerning women. Wilson also wrote eighteen letters to representatives and senators urging them to support and vote for woman suffrage, five letters urging state legislatures to ratify a state suffrage amendment, and nine letters urging states to ratify the Federal amendment. During the 1912 campaign, suffragists sought to determine Wilson’s position on suffrage. Since Roosevelt and LaFollette had come out in favour of suffrage, they thought Wilson might, too. As a close friend to Wilson, Oswald G.Villard, however, stated in a letter, ‘he would prefer defeat to stultifying himself by coming out for a measure in which he does not believe’.118 Wilson was not completely convinced of the merits of woman suffrage, and felt that no matter what his personal convictions were, it was a state question. In a letter to Governor Foss of Massachusetts he stated, ‘I may say to you very frankly that I do not think that it would be best to bring the woman suffrage question into the national campaign … It is not a national question but a state question… My own judgment in the matter is in an uncertain balance, I mean my judgment as a voting citizen.’119 Thus, during Wilson’s first administration he was not heartily behind woman suffrage at the Federal level. He stated, when asked, that it was a question best left to the states. Furthermore, when asked to urge Congress to consider the woman suffrage bill, he repeatedly argued: ‘I set myself this very strict rule when I was Governor of New Jersey and have followed it as President, and shall follow it as President—that I am not at liberty to urge upon Congress in messages, policies which have not had the organic consideration of those for whom I am a spokesman.’120 Regarding access, he met with pro-suffrage groups six times from 1912–16. Regarding response, he spoke publicly on it twice—one time when he stated that he would vote pro- suffrage in his home state of New Jersey. In his meetings with pro-suffrage groups he constantly reiterated his belief that it was a state question, that he was, as leader of the party, supposed to work only for that which the party had supported in its platform. In private, Wilson expressed grave doubts about the benefits of woman suffrage. A guest at the White House recorded in his diary his recollection of a conversation: ‘at breakfast this morning the President announced that he was to receive a deputation of Suffragists after luncheon. “Suffrage for women,” he said, “will make absolutely no change in politics—it is the home that will be disastrously affected. Somebody has to make the home and who is going to do it if the women don’t?”’121 Furthermore, in 1914, Dr Anna Howard Shaw, president of NAWSA, asked Wilson to declare the first Saturday of May Woman’s Independence Day. He did not do so. By October 1915, however, Wilson had decided to vote for suffrage in his home state of New Jersey. He stated that he felt women deserved the privilege and responsibility, but that he was voting only as a citizen, and not as leader of his party—suffrage was still a question to be left to the states.122 Many suffragists took this as a sign that Wilson had been brought over to their side. Carrie Chapman Catt, after an interview with President Wilson in August 1916, said she felt he could be convinced to endorse a suffrage amendment. The White House promptly issued a statement saying that President Wilson had not changed his mind on suffrage.123 Wilson did, however, address the NAWSA annual convention in Atlantic City, on 8 September 1916 (candidate Hughes was also Political women 126 invited, but could not attend due to a speaking tour). Wilson did not come out in favour of woman suffrage, but did state that he felt the force of history was behind it, and its occurrence was inevitable: ‘I have not come to ask you to be patient, because you have been, but I have come to congratulate you that there has been a force behind you that will beyond any peradventure be triumphant and for which you can afford a little while to wait’.124 It appears that Wilson, even if he believed in a Federal suffrage amendment, felt he could not come out in favour of one before the 1916 election, that many would interpret his change of heart as a political move to gain votes: ‘I should seem to the country like nothing less than an angler for votes…’125 In the election of 1912, Republicans had been divided. This division arguably allowed Wilson to win the election. Wilson received 42 per cent of the national popular vote, Taft 23.2 per cent and Roosevelt 27.39 per cent. Had the GOP been unified, and those who voted for Roosevelt voted for Taft, then there might have been a different electoral outcome. Wilson was aware of his potentially unstable electoral base, and the possibility of a unified Republican Party defeating him in the 1916 election. Wilson was not willing to compromise his beliefs and angle for votes, but he may have hoped that crumbs of access and response would assuage the suffragists, especially those who could vote. He could then put off the suffrage question for another term. As Mrs Frank M.Roessing, chairman of the NAWSA Congressional Committee, noted, regarding the political climate of the 1916 election, ‘neither of the great parties is willing to take one unnecessary step which in its judgment may tend to add to the number of its adversaries or to its vulnerable points in some particular section of the country’.126 The 1916 election was close. The popular vote was 49.2 per cent for Wilson to 46.1 per cent for Hughes. As discussed earlier, had Wilson lost California he would not have won the election, and, arguably, if women had not voted for Wilson in California, he would not have won this state. It was not until Wilson’s second administration that the picture looked brighter for the suffragists. Access increased a bit; he met nine times with pro-suffrage groups. Response also increased. Wilson was a great help in the creation of the Woman Suffrage Committee in the House. The chair of the Rules Committee was Edward Pou (D-North Carolina), an anti-suffragist and staunch ally of E.Y.Webb, chairman of the Judiciary Committee. Creation of a Woman Suffrage Committee looked bleak given this wall of southern anti-suffrage representatives.127 The suffragists, however, would not give in. They asked Wilson if he might write a letter to Pou urging the creation of a Woman Suffrage Committee. Wilson complied with their request. In a letter to Pou dated 14 May 1917, Wilson stated:

I have a letter from Mrs Helen H.Gardener, in which she says she has been told that you had said that you would report out a proposal for such a committee if I should approve. On the chance that I may be of some slight service in this matter, which seems to me of very considerable consequence, I am writing this line to say that I would heartily approve.128

Thus, Wilson helped persuade Pou to stop blocking the creation of a Woman Suffrage Committee, and urged southern Democrats to vote for such a committee.129 The vote for The second wave: 1890–1928 127 the committee followed sectional lines, with approximately twelve southern Democrats voting yay and over fifty voting nay.130 The Committee on Woman Suffrage favourably reported the Anthony amendment three times from the time of its creation, until suffrage finally passed both houses, in 1919. Furthermore, the composition of the committee was very different from that of the Judiciary Committee (the Speaker was no longer appointing members or chairs). The latter never contained more than a few adherents to the suffrage cause, and often had a southern chair who was vehemently opposed to woman suffrage (Clayton, Democrat- Georgia, 1912–14 and then Webb, Democrat-NC 1914–1918). The Woman Suffrage Committee was overwhelmingly made up of pro-suffrage representatives (who were on the committee by choice). The composition of the committee in the Sixty-fifth Congress was ten pro-suffrage representatives and three anti-suffragists, and in the Sixty-sixth it contained eleven pro-suffrage and one anti-suffrage.131 A favourable committee report was inevitable with this make-up. Response also increased during Wilson’s second term. Wilson made seven public statements on suffrage, one of which was a statement to Congress in January 1918, urging them to vote for suffrage, and another an address to the Senate, in the same year, also urging them to vote for woman suffrage. Wilson’s change of heart, however, was gradual. For a long time he remained committed to his belief that suffrage was a state question, especially since the Democratic platform of 1916 asserted such. His change from a state’s rights advocate, to an avid supporter of a Federal amendment, was gradual. A year before the election of 1916, he met with a group of women, composed of envoys from the Woman Voter Convention and from the first national convention of the Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage. He stated during this meeting, ‘I hope I shall always have an open mind, and I shall certainly take the greatest pleasure in conferring in the most serious way with my colleagues at the other end of the city [Congress] with regard to what is the right thing to do at this time concerning this great matter.’132 Wilson appeared to be leaving the gate open so that he had room to change his mind. Then, as discussed earlier, Wilson wrote to Chairman Pou (at the request of Helen Gardener) to urge the creation of a Woman Suffrage Committee in the House and later wrote to Representative Heflin urging him to vote for the creation of a such a committee.133 It is difficult to believe that Wilson was not aware that the creation of such a committee would allow suffrage a fairer hearing and, ultimately, might result in the passage of the amendment. An even stronger measure of Wilson’s growing commitment to the cause of suffrage was the eighteen letters he wrote to senators and representatives in an attempt to persuade them to vote for suffrage. He also wrote six letters/telegrams to state legislatures, urging them to pass a state suffrage bill, or congratulating them on their passage of one. Finally, he sent nine letters to state legislators and governors, urging them to pass the Federal suffrage amendment. Furthermore, in 1917, Secretary of the Interior Franklin K.Lane spoke at the NAWSA annual convention. His presence was taken by the association as a sign that Wilson was now advocating a Federal suffrage amendment: ‘The presence of Secretary Lane added much prestige as well as political significance to the program, for it was interpreted as an indication that President Wilson had advanced from a belief in woman suffrage itself to an advocacy of the Federal Amendment…’134 Political women 128

Why did Wilson change his mind? It is argued that it was women’s contribution to the First World War that changed his mind. I would argue that it was a combination of factors. Both Germany and Poland had refused women the right to suffrage during the Great War, and no one wanted to be lumped in the same category as these two countries. Furthermore, Wilson had come to realize that women already had a great deal of political power, and they could use that power to imperil the careers of many Democratic congressmen (and did). Furthermore, as noted earlier in this chapter, a case can be made that women voting had a definitive impact on the 1916 presidential election. In an extremely close election, Wilson won with 277 electoral votes to Hughes’s 254, and would have lost had he not won California’s thirteen electoral votes (women had full suffrage in California, but it is not known how many women voted for Wilson; see the discussion of Mrs Root of Long Branch). Thus, it appears that the First World War may have been a convenient excuse to change his opinion, when in reality it was the impending election of 1920, and that women could remove the Democrats from power, if they so chose. The measures of access and response for Presidents Warren G.Harding (R-1921–24) and Calvin Coolidge are incomplete. There were no private papers for them in the Library of Congress and no published public papers. Information was gathered from collected essays and biographies, and other secondary sources. It appears that there was access granted by both presidencies. Both political parties discussed women in their 1920 and 1924 party platforms. It also appears that Coolidge met with women’s groups twice during his tenure. Regarding response, there was some granted by both presidencies. Harding made one public pronouncement regarding woman suffrage, one public pronouncement regarding women, signed two pieces of legislation, and appointed four women to government posts requiring Senate confirmation. One was to the post of Assistant Attorney General, and the other three were to heads of bureaux. Coolidge made four public pronouncements regarding women, signed one executive order, and signed thirteen pieces of legislation regarding women. Harding worked to get the Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act through Congress. This appears to have been prompted by political considerations. As one biographer commented, ‘Harding persisted in pushing the bill even though many of his conservative friends cautioned him not to do so. Harding’s motivation was essentially humanitarian, but he was also influenced by the realization that large numbers of women voters enfranchised under the woman suffrage amendment were yet to be captured by either major party…’135 Harding also signed the Cable Act in 1922. This bill changed citizenship requirements. An American woman no longer lost her citizenship by marrying a foreigner eligible for citizenship. He also named Mabel Walker Willebrandt Assistant Attorney General, opened the diplomatic service to women, appointed women to head three bureaux, refused to let women go from government service as an economy measure, and attempted to create a Department of Social Welfare.136 Thus it appears that Harding worked fairly hard to woo women. This can be explained, perhaps, by the fact that women were an unknown quantity when they first got the suffrage. No one knew how they might vote—as a bloc, or as their husbands did? Harding was not willing to risk votes speculating. Women were voters, and thus a constituency to be captured. The second wave: 1890–1928 129

Coolidge did not court women in the same way as Harding had. He let Sheppard- Towner expire, believing that such measures should be left to the states.137 Perhaps he recognized, after the 1924 election, that women had not voted as a bloc. He was thus not particularly concerned about catering to them. In sum, the suffrage movement received very little access to most of the presidencies of this wave. They were not sold on the idea of suffrage, nor were they convinced that the pubic was. They did not ignore the movement, but nor did they grant it concrete response. They granted it some access, accompanied by just a little response, enough to let the movement think they were concerned about the issue, and giving it their fullest attention, but not enough to jeopardize their position in the public’s view. It is really only with Wilson that the movement begins to gain some consistent access to a President. The previous Presidents met occasionally with woman suffrage groups, and two Republican Party platforms discussed women, but none of them, publicly or privately, supported woman suffrage. Response was only slightly better. Presidents consistently signed legislation into law regarding women, and some signed executive orders regarding women, but it was not until Wilson that a President made a public statement regarding woman suffrage, positive or negative. In addition, only Roosevelt discussed women, in general, in any public pronouncements. Finally, it appears that Harding began to court women as voters, but this conclusion is tentative due to the lack of access to private papers.

Conclusion

The woman suffrage movement had many achievements during this wave, the most notable being the passage of the woman suffrage amendment, but there were a number of other achievements that enabled the woman suffrage amendment to be passed. First, it had been made clear, during the first wave, that a Woman Suffrage Committee would probably give the amendment fair consideration and most likely a favourable committee report. The continued existence and favourable committee reports of the Select Committee on Woman Suffrage in the Senate attested to this. Of the twelve majority committee reports in the Senate, during this wave, only one was unfavourable. In the House, there was no Committee on Woman Suffrage until 1917. There were six committee reports, during the second wave, before its creation. One was a favourable committee report and five were unfavourable. Once the committee was created it issued three favourable reports. Such a committee was not enough. There were eight congresses in the Senate, from the Fifty-fifth to the Sixty-second, where there was no committee report at all. Despite this, it was clear that a Woman Suffrage Committee was a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the amendment to receive fair consideration in both houses. Another achievement for the movement was the attainment of woman suffrage in many of the states, before the Federal amendment. The amending of state constitutions was a slow and painstaking process, but it produced results. As women gained the suffrage in many states, their congressmen became more responsive to their demands. Women could organize to campaign against and vote against any congressmen who did not support woman suffrage. As McGlen and O’Connor argue regarding the impact of Political women 130 women in the 1918 election, ‘the political clout of the suffragists produced the defeat of two powerful opponents of the amendment. When this show of force was coupled with the addition of several more states into the suffrage column…quick passage of the Nineteenth Amendment was virtually assured.’138 Arguably, women were successful in displacing some unfriendly members of Congress. Another achievement for the movement was the support of President Wilson. This support came late in the game, but nevertheless, it came. Wilson spoke to Congress on behalf of woman suffrage, urged representatives to support the creation of a Woman Suffrage Committee, wrote letters to members of Congress, wrote letters to state governors, and wrote to state legislators, urging them to support woman suffrage. Wilson’s influence was debatable, however: the amendment failed to pass the Senate the day after he addressed them, and Wilson felt, before this address, that many senators were irritated with his interference in general. As he stated in a letter to Helen H.Gardner, ‘I have done a good many things privately, which are not known, adding thereby to the impression on the part of some Senators…am bringing unusual and, perhaps in their minds unwarranted pressure to bear.’139 On the other hand, as discussed earlier, he did appear to have influence with representatives concerning the creation of the Woman Suffrage Committee in the House. Although his influence with Congress and state legislators was debatable, his support was still a coup for the movement. Never before had a President come out in public support for woman suffrage. His endorsement could only grant legitimacy to their demand. Another achievement for the suffrage movement was the support of other nationally recognized groups. Conservative groups (groups that did not work for radical change, such as divorce reform or legalization of prostitution), such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and the General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC), not only provided mass support, but also legitimized the movement in the eyes of conservative legislators and masses. The temperance issue lent an air of conservatism to the issue of suffrage—women using the vote to rid the nation of the evils of liquor was appealing to much of the public. It fitted in well with the public expectations of women’s sphere: protecting the home and her children from the evils of alcohol. As Miss Antoinette Knowles, chairman of the Committee on Church Work in NAWSA, commented, ‘by standing for temperance many churches could be obtained for meetings that would not be opened for those purely on suffrage’.140 The support of groups such as the GFWC meant that the movement had hundreds of thousands more people who could place pressure upon Congress. For instance, in 1906, NAWSA asked the Congressional Committee of the GFWC if its 4,000 individual clubs could ask their members of Congress what their stance on woman suffrage was. As a result, thousands of letters of query flooded Congress.141 The numbers of groups that endorsed suffrage grew every year. As NAWSA noted, by 1909, ‘29 national associations have endorsed woman suffrage; 14 others have taken action on some phase of the question; 20 State Federations of Labor, 16 State Granges and seven State Letter Carriers’ Associations have endorsed it’.142 By 1911, NAWSA notes that endorsements had been given by associations totalling 26 million members.143 Many of these members were men and could vote. Congress could not ignore such numbers for long. Finally, as with the first wave, the existence of devoted allies in Congress, and the receipt of regular hearings, were both achievements for the movement. Their allies in The second wave: 1890–1928 131

Congress, though few, presented petitions and memorials, wrote favourable majority and minority committee report, introduced suffrage bills, argued the case for woman suffrage and argued for the creation of a Woman Suffrage Committee. Without such allies, the suffrage movement would have had little success with Congress. The receipt of regular hearings was also an achievement for the movement. These hearings, even those before an unsympathetic committee, were useful for the movement. The printed proceedings, given to the movement for free, were a valuable way of disseminating information to the public about woman suffrage.144 On a separate, but not unrelated note, is the impact of the Great War on the Nineteenth Amendment. The war altered the political climate. As discussed earlier, both Germany and Poland (the enemy) did not allow women to vote, and the USA did not want to be lumped into the same category as they. It was difficult for Wilson (and other elected representatives) to explain how the USA, a democratic country, had similar laws to those of the enemy. Thus, the First World War can be seen as contributing to a more open political climate for woman suffrage. It is wrong, however, to give all the credit for the passage of woman suffrage to the war. The Nineteenth Amendment passed as a result of the more open POS that emerged after 1910, and although the world war was not a quantifiable measure used here, it appears that it did assist in this opening. Before the passage of the woman suffrage amendment, the movement had a number of failures, too. One such was the lack of a Woman Suffrage Committee in the House until 1917. Its existence during the first wave had proved its usefulness. It had given the only favourable majority committee report of the wave. The failure to get a Woman Suffrage Committee created before 1917 was a setback for the movement. As noted, the Judiciary Committee was not favourably disposed towards the issue of woman suffrage. Thus, it was impossible for the amendment to get out of that committee and receive consideration before the full House. Another failure for the movement was the lack of a presidential ally before Wilson’s second term. None of the Presidents would publicly (or privately) endorse woman suffrage. It appears clear that the influence of a President upon Congress is debatable, but the public endorsement of woman suffrage, from a President, could only have aided the movement in terms of public support and legitimacy of their cause. Were the access and response received by the movement, during this wave, what would be expected considering the POS? In the House, the amount of access received is what was expected, considering the POS (see Table 5.4). In modified closed Congresses (House or Senate), it was expected that the movement would receive a hearing with pro- suffrage witnesses. During closed Congresses, it was expected that the movement would receive no more than one hearing. During modified open to open Congresses, it was expected that the movement would be granted two or more hearings with pro-suffrage witnesses. Eight of the House Congresses were modified closed, where one would expect very little access attained. Five of the Congresses were closed, where one would expect no (or very little) access attained. Four Congresses were modified open, where one would expect some access attained (but two were post-suffrage). Three Congresses were mixed (two indicators were open, two closed), where some access would be expected, because the POS is not closed. In the six modified closed Congresses (Fifty-first, Fifty-fourth, Fifty-fifth, Sixty-first, Sixty-second and Sixty-third—Sixty-seventh and Sixty-eighth were post-suffrage), the Political women 132 movement received a little access in the form of one hearing, per Congress, and some pro-suffrage witnesses. This is what was expected. In the five closed Congresses (Fifty- sixth, Fifty-seventh, Fifty-eighth, Fifty-ninth, Sixtieth), the movement also received one hearing, per Congress, and some pro-suffrage witnesses (no fewer than during modified closed). This is also what was expected (little to no access). Only two of the four modified open Congresses fell before suffrage was passed (Sixty-fifth and Sixty-sixth). During one of these two Congresses, the movement received two hearings with some pro- suffrage witnesses (Sixty-fifth), and during the other one, the movement received no hearings (Sixty-sixth). The results for the Sixty-fifth Congress are what was expected considering the POS. The results for the Sixty-sixth Congress are not what was expected, but upon examination, this result is not so odd. The amendment was passed during this Congress, and arguably Congress felt there was no more need for hearings. Everyone, at this point, knew the arguments for and against woman suffrage; hearings would have been superfluous. Finally, there were three mixed Congresses (Fifty-second, Fifty-third and Sixty-fourth). During these Congresses, the movement received hearings (one each in Fifty-third and Sixty-fourth and two in Fifty-second). This result is not odd, considering that the granting of hearings had become customary, and the POS was not closed. Thus, regarding access in the House, the amount of access attained is predominantly what was expected in light of the POS. Regarding access in the Senate, the amount attained is primarily what was expected (see Table 5.4b). During nine of the twelve modified closed Congresses (Fifty-first, Fifty- third, Fifty-fifth, Fifty-sixth, Fifty-seventh, Fifty-eighth, Fifty-ninth, Sixtieth and Sixty- first—Sixty-seventh was also modified closed, but occurred after suffrage was passed), the movement received one hearing, per Congress, with some pro-suffrage witnesses. This is what was expected. During two of the modified closed Congresses (Fifty-second and Fifty-fourth), the movement received two hearings, per Congress, with pro-suffrage witnesses. This result was not entirely what was expected. There were five modified open Congresses (Sixty-fourth, Sixty-fifth, Sixty-eighth, Sixty-ninth and Seventieth), but only two fall before suffrage was passed (Sixty-fourth and Sixty-fifth). During these two Congresses the movement received one hearing (Sixty-fourth and Sixty-fifth). It was expected that the movement would receive at least two hearings during modified open Congresses. There were also three mixed Congresses (Sixty-second, Sixty-third and Sixty-sixth). During one Congress it received two hearings (Sixty-second), better than expected, and during the Sixty-third the movement received one hearing, which was expected during a mixed POS. During the Sixty-sixth the movement received no hearings, but this is not entirely unexpected since the Senate passed suffrage during that Congress. Why these exceptions to the expectations? The movement may have, as a general rule, received only one hearing per Congress, because that is what the movement sought. One hearing per Congress had become customary. NAWSA did not ask for more, and the Congress did not think to offer more. The modified closed Congresses with two hearings (Fifty-second, Fifty-fourth) may be anomalies, and the two modified open Congresses, where there was only one hearing in each, may have received all that was expected. Thus, the amount of access attained by the movement to the Senate is primarily what was expected in light of the POS. The second wave: 1890–1928 133

Why did the movement seek only one hearing per Congress? NAWSA had no committee permanently stationed in DC until 1910. It appears that the years that the NAWSA convention were not held in DC, there was no hearing. Thus in 1895, 1897, 1899, 1901, 1903, 1905, 1907, 1909, 1911, 1916 and 1919, when the convention was held outside DC, there was no hearing in either house. During the years of 1890, 1892, 1893, 1894, 1896, 1898, 1900,1902, 1904,1906, 1910, 1912, 1913, 1915 and 1917, when the convention was in DC (or very close—Baltimore in 1906 and Philadelphia in 1912), there was a hearing in both houses. The only exceptions are in 1891, 1908, 1914 and 1918. In 1891, the convention was in DC but there was no hearing. In 1908, the convention was in Buffalo, NY, and there was a hearing. In 1914, the convention was in Nashville and there was a hearing in the House. Finally, in 1918, there was no convention, but there was a hearing in the House. These last two exceptions occurred after the creation of the NAWSA Congressional Committee. Thus the location of the NAWSA convention appears to go a long way towards explaining the lack of hearings in certain years. Is the amount of access attained in the House and the Senate related to the state of the POS? I would argue that it is. The suffrage movement attained a limited amount of access to both the House and the Senate during modified closed or closed Congresses. There is a definite change in the POS beginning with the Sixty-second Congress in the Senate, and the Sixty-fourth in the House. The movement did not receive an increased amount of access, according to the indicators, but it attained access in ways not measured by the indicators. For instance, the Committee on Woman Suffrage was created in the House during the Sixty-fifth Congress. This committee created a much-needed point of access for the woman suffrage movement. What prompted the change in the POS? Arguably, the decreased power of the Speaker, the decrease in party unity, occasional electoral instability and the growing strength of the President all contributed to the changing nature of the POS. As these conditions altered, there were fewer barriers to access. Furthermore, the movement was changing. It was gaining more members, more support from national associations, and more political clout as more and more women could vote (this will be discussed in greater detail during the response section). The combined influences of fewer barriers in Congress and increased movement strength go a long way in explaining the increased access attained by the movement during the second half of this wave. The response granted by the House is predominantly what was expected (see Table 5.5a). In modified closed Congresses (House or Senate), it was expected that there would be little to no response, and any response would be co-optive. In other words, it was expected that only one or two suffrage bills would be introduced, no favourable committee reports, and no debate and votes upon the floor. In closed Congresses, it was expected that there would be no response, or at the most, a suffrage bill introduced. Finally, in modified open to open Congresses, it was expected that some response would be granted—a few or more suffrage bills introduced, favourable majority committee reports, debate on the floor and votes upon the floor. During four of the six modified closed Congresses (Fifty-first, Fifty-fourth, Fifty-fifth and Sixty-first—Sixty-seventh and Sixty-eighth were post-suffrage), the amount of response granted was what was expected. There were one or two bills introduced, no committee reports (except one favourable during the Fifty-first), and no debate or votes Political women 134 on the floor. The favourable committee report was an anomaly. The committee, for that Congress, had a pro-suffrage chair and majority. The favourable committee report was the result of the rare make-up of the committee for that Congress. The response for two of the modified closed Congresses (Sixty-second and Sixty-third) is not exactly what was expected. Six suffrage bills were introduced, during each Congress, and once there was debate and an unfavourable floor vote. The debate and the result of the vote are not at odds with what was expected, but the number of bills introduced is. Arguably, as public opinion shifted from anti-suffrage to pro-suffrage, representatives became a bit more responsive. They were not, however, yet ready fully to commit themselves to suffrage. The response granted during the five closed Congresses (Fifty-sixth-Sixtieth) is what was expected. There was zero or one bill introduced in each (two in the Fifty-sixth), and no committee reports, debate or votes. The response granted during the two modified open Congresses (Sixty-fifth and Sixty- sixth) is what was expected. There were bills introduced (fourteen and seven in the Sixty- fifth and Sixty-sixth, respectively), favourable committee reports, and debate and favourable votes upon the floor. In addition, the response granted during the three mixed Congresses is what was expected—there was some response, but nothing concrete. During two of these Congresses there was one bill introduced (Fifty-second and Fifty- third) and during the Fifty-third there was one unfavourable committee report. Representatives were not yet willing to support woman suffrage, and, as discussed, the Judiciary Committee was a huge obstacle to the movement. It granted the movement no response during this whole wave. Finally, during the third mixed Congress (Sixty-fourth), there were six bills introduced and two unfavourable committee reports. Overall, the amount of response granted by the House is what was expected, in light of the POS. It is also interesting that there is a decided shift in the amount of response granted and the state of the POS during this wave. The wave begins with one modified closed and two mixed Congresses, where the movement received some response: a few bills introduced and a few favourable committee reports. Then, from the Fifty-fifth to the Sixty-second Congress there is almost no response granted (just a few bills introduced), and the Congresses are classified as modified closed or closed. Then, beginning with the Sixty- third, there is a marked increase in the amount of response granted. Two of these Congresses are classified as modified open (Sixty-fifth, Sixty-sixth), one as modified closed (Sixty-third), and one as mixed (Sixty-fourth). The response granted in the Senate is primarily what was expected (see Table 5.5b). In eight of the twelve modified closed Congresses (Fifty-third, Fifty-fifth, Fifty-sixth, Fifty- seventh, Fifty-eighth, Fifty-ninth, Sixtieth and Sixty-first-Sixty-seventh was post- suffrage), there was one suffrage bill introduced, no committee reports, no debate on the floor and no votes upon the floor. This conforms to what was expected, in light of the POS. In three of the modified closed Congresses (Fifty-first, Fifty-second and Fifty- fourth), there was one suffrage bill introduced (two in the Fifty-fourth), and favourable majority committee reports. These favourable majority committee reports are at odds with what was expected during a modified closed POS. The favourable committee reports might be due to the existence of the Woman Suffrage Committee. Although there were middling to high levels of party unity, and strong party leaders (Aldrich and his cronies), perhaps they did not significantly affect the members of the Woman Suffrage Committee. Perhaps these members felt perfectly at ease to do whatever they desired regarding The second wave: 1890–1928 135 woman suffrage. They had little to fear in the way of public reprisal, and may have felt they could report woman suffrage favourably, if they so chose. During one of the modified open Congresses (Sixty-fourth), the response granted is what was expected. There were six suffrage bills introduced, favourable majority committee reports, debate on the floor and votes on the floor. During one of the modified open Congresses (the Sixty-fifth—Sixty-seventh-Seventieth were post-suffrage), the response is slightly better than what was expected. Ten bills were introduced, there were two favourable committee reports and there was debate and a vote upon the floor (where it passed). During one of the mixed Congresses (Sixty-second), the response granted is what was expected—there was only one bill introduced and nothing else. Finally, during two of the mixed Congresses (Sixty-third and Sixty-sixth), there was considerable response. Bills were introduced (four and seven respectively), there were favourable committee reports, debate on the floor and a favourable floor vote. In sum, the amount of response granted by the House to the suffrage movement is what was expected considering the POS. Thus the amount of response granted in both the House and the Senate is what was expected considering the POS. In both houses there was limited to almost non-existent response granted to the movement from the Fifty-fifth to the Sixty-first Congress. There was one, or occasionally two, bills introduced, and that was all. The Speaker of the House was strong, Aldrich and his cronies ran the Senate, party unity was high, and electoral conditions, for the most part, were normal to very stable. Members of Congress had no use for the women suffrage activists. But beginning in the Sixty-second Congress there was a change in the POS. The Speaker had been dethroned, Aldrich and his cronies had died or broken up, party unity was dropping, mass opinion was shifting and there were occasional periods of electoral instability. The movement began to be granted more response. Furthermore, the movement was getting stronger. As noted, by 1911, the movement could claim the support of national associations totalling 26 million members.145 No longer could the movement be viewed as a group of independent-minded women who did not speak for the general populace. They had the endorsement of a variety of associations, from conservative groups like the WCTU and the GFWC, to more liberal groups, like the American Federation of Labor. Furthermore, many of these groups were composed of voters: men and women from equal-suffrage states. Representatives and senators (and the parties they represented) may have felt that they could no longer placate the movement by introducing one suffrage bill per Congress, at the movement’s request. They needed to take the initiative, and woo women to their side. It is clear that both parties, from the Sixty-second Congress onwards, were trying to woo women. In the House, seven Democrats and six Republicans were responsible for all the introductions. In the Senate, seven Democrats and seven Republicans were responsible for all the introductions. Before the Sixty-second Congress the situation was different. In the House, four Democrats and five Republicans (but with one Republican doing a majority of the introductions) were introducing the suffrage bills. And in the Senate, five Republicans and zero Democrats were introducing the woman suffrage bills. Thus the suffrage issue became a bipartisan issue, beginning with the Sixty-second Congress. Neither party felt it could afford to lose the votes of women. The amount of access attained and response granted to the suffrage movement, from the presidencies, is what was expected, considering the POS (see Tables 5.6 and 5.7). There were two presidencies where the POS was modified open (McKinley first term, Political women 136

Wilson second term), four where it was modified closed (Harrison, Cleveland and Harding), and five where it was closed (McKinley second term, Roosevelt both terms, Taft, Wilson first term and Coolidge). All of the modified closed presidencies offered little to no access or response to the movement, with the exception of Wilson. Harrison granted no access and little response to the suffrage movement. The only response was eight laws signed concerning women. Cleveland granted a little access—two meetings with suffrage groups, and little response—seven pieces of legislation signed. Wilson, although not a suffrage supporter during his first term, is the anomaly of the modified closed presidencies. He met with suffrage groups six times and women’s groups once. Regarding response, he made two public pronouncements regarding suffrage (although not endorsements), signed executive orders and legislation. Harding (modified closed) is inconclusive due to the lack of access to his private papers. The Republican Party platform did discuss women in 1920, but there is no evidence that he met with women’s groups. He did appear to grant limited response. He made one public pronouncement regarding suffrage, one regarding women, signed two pieces of legislation, and appointed four women to public office. The modified open POS of McKinley was not what was expected. The Republican Party platform of 1896 did discuss women, but this was the only access the movement attained during his first term. And the only response during his first term was four pieces of legislation signed. The modified POS of Wilson was better than was expected. During his second term he was the most active of all Presidents during this wave. Although slow to be won over, once he came out in favour of woman suffrage he worked hard for its passage. His second term is marked by an increased amount of access attained and response granted. Regarding access, the Democratic Party platform endorsed woman suffrage (although leaving it to the states) and Wilson met nine times with suffrage groups. Regarding response, Wilson made seven public pronouncements regarding suffrage, signed executive orders regarding women, and signed legislation regarding women. Finally, the four closed presidencies follow fairly closely what was expected. During McKinley’s second term he offered little access or response. During the second term (and Roosevelt’s ascension) he met with NAWSA delegates once, the Republican Party discussed women in its platform, and the only response was three pieces of legislation signed. During Roosevelt’s presidency the only access attained by the movement was two meetings. There was response, although it did not address suffrage. Roosevelt made seven public pronouncements regarding women, signed three executive orders and eleven pieces of legislation. This response is at odds with what was expected of a closed POS. The majority of Roosevelt’s announcements, executive orders and legislation concerned women in industry. The industrial revolution was beginning and Roosevelt believed that industry needed some watching. Thus it is not odd that he was concerned about protecting women in industry. His presidency was responsive only to certain women’s issues, and suffrage was not one of them. Taft’s presidency granted very limited access and just as limited a response. He met once with a suffrage group and, regarding response, he signed one executive order and three pieces of legislation. The second wave: 1890–1928 137

Coolidge is also difficult to assess. As mentioned, I could not obtain access to any of his private papers. It does appear, however, that Coolidge granted some access and response to women. The Republican Party platform discusses women, and there is evidence that Coolidge met with women’s groups. Regarding response, he made at least four public pronouncements regarding women, signed one executive order and signed thirteen pieces of legislation. In sum, the access and response from the Presidents is generally what was expected in light of the POS. The presidencies that exhibited modified closed and closed POS characteristics granted very little access or response to the suffrage movement (Wilson, first term, being the exception). One of the two modified open presidencies exceeded what was expected (Wilson), and one did not even meet the expectations. Are the state of the POS and the amount of access and response related? I would argue yes. None of the Presidents of this wave, with the exception of Wilson, second term, was a suffrage supporter. An analysis of their private papers and correspondence with suffrage groups shows that they were hesitant to come out in public support or repudiation of woman suffrage. The electoral conditions for the majority of this wave rendered the Presidents safe or stable, and there was limited public support for woman suffrage until around 1909–11. Presidents were in no need of new constituents or the support of a social movement, and they did not have to fear public reprisal. Those Presidents who were not safe or stable recognized that women had little political leverage, and thus there was little need to woo them. At the same time, there was also no need to push them away. They were active in politics, could campaign for or against a candidate, and had male friends and relatives who could be influenced. It was not until the election of 1912 that women had political clout. As Miss Elizabeth Upham Yates, chairman of the Committee on Presidential Suffrage of NAWSA, noted, ‘the conspicuous position that women suddenly attained in American politics in 1912 was due to the fact that in six States women were able to determine the choice of thirty-seven presidential electors’.146 No longer could women, as voters, be ignored. A presidential candidate had to address women’s issues or risk losing their votes. The 1912 election resulted in a modified closed POS—Wilson was fairly safe. There was no urgency to assuage women and woo them to his camp, but he did recognize that they could not be completely ignored, and thus offered some limited access and response. The 1916 election, however, resulted in a modified open POS. It was imperative that Wilson reach out to women, at some level, in hopes of gaining their support. For in gaining their support for himself, he gained it for the Democratic Party as a whole. His party controlled Congress and thus the legislative agenda. He did not want to risk losing seats in the election of 1918 over woman suffrage. Overall, I find that no one measure of the political opportunity structure is a sufficient condition for access to or response from political elites. Rather, all the indicators must be taken together: the level of electoral instability, the rules governing Congress, the level of party unity and mass opinion. When examined in this light, it is clear why the suffrage movement gained access to and responses from political elites between 1911 and 1920. The rules governing Congress had been altered to allow more say from the party rank and file, the levels of party unity were decreasing, there were periods of electoral instability and mass opinion shifted in favour of suffrage. Finally, the movement increased its political leverage—in the 1912 election, over a million women would vote. Political women 138

Why did suffrage pass? One could argue that the large margins of victory on the Nineteenth Amendment were due to the vast number of representatives and senators who hailed from full suffrage states,147 and although this appears to be the case, it does not tell us much about the interaction between the suffrage movement and Congress (and the political parties). It is not particularly earth-shattering that congressmen from suffrage states would probably vote pro-suffrage. What is interesting is the evolution of Congress and the presidencies from relatively closed structures, immune to influence from a strong social movement (the movement had hundreds of thousands of members by 1900 and this number increased to around two million when Carrie Chapman Catt assumed the Presidency of NAWSA)148 to much more open structures, amenable to influence. This evolution must be viewed in the light of the structural and political changes that occurred during this period, the reforms of 1910 that removed a ‘czar’ Speaker, one capable of controlling the assignment of chairs and committee members, to a considerably weaker position, the ascendance of the seniority system for choosing committee chairs, which led to a southern monopoly of many key committee chairs—Judiciary and Rules among them, and the weakening of parties (arguably a result of the 1910 reforms) that allowed congressmen to vote as they pleased and not be tied to the party platform or Speaker’s agenda. The rise of the modern President, who took an active role in formulating and working for a legislative agenda, must also be noted. All of these changes created more access points for the suffrage movement. The aforementioned changes that occurred from 1900–20 altered the political opportunity structure and opened it to the suffrage movement. These openings not only permitted the suffrage movement access, but prevented its co-optation by any one party. The suffrage movement remained an independent actor (or actors in some cases) capable of influencing electoral politics and maintaining its autonomy. Never once did it have to resort to partisan allegiance to achieve influence or gain its desired goal.

Notes 1. McGlen and O’Connor, Women Politics, p. 10. 2. Quoted in ibid., p. 38. 3. McGlen and O’Connor also use 1890–1928 as one period of the women’s movement. 4. Reports of the Annual Conventions of the NAWSA, vol. 1884–1900 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Rare Book Collection) section I, no. 72, p. 143. 5. The National American Woman Suffrage Association, Victory, How Women Won It (New York: H.W.Wilson Co., 1940), p. 71. 6. Calculating the mean and standard deviation for each wave allows one to see how the scores fluctuated relative to each wave. A mean and standard deviation for all three waves combined would mask information. Scores that are low for one wave might be high for another wave—the score that looks low when compared with other waves may actually indicate unified parties. One mean and standard deviation would hide such information. 7. Galloway, History of the House, p. 56. 8. Ibid., pp. 56–7. 9. Ibid. 10. Ripley, Party Leaders, p. 19. 11. Galloway, History of the House, p. 145. The second wave: 1890–1928 139

12. Ronald M.Peters, The American Speakership (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 93. 13. Ibid., p. 94. 14. Ripley, Party Leaders, p. 25. 15. Ibid., p. 40. 16. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 210. McGlen and O’Connor, however, note that the GFWG did not ‘endorse’ suffrage until 1914. 17. Ibid., p. 320. 18. Ripley, Power in the Senate, p. 27. In this discussion, the period of their rule is extended till 1910, because the three still held considerable sway over senators. See David Brady, Richard Brody and David Epstein, ‘Heterogeneous Parties and Political Organization: The U.S. Senate, 1880–1920’, in The Changing World of the U.S. Senate, John Hibbing (ed.) (Berkeley, CA: IGS Press, 1990), pp. 39–57. 19. Ripley, Power in the Senate, p. 27. 20. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 320. 21. McGlen and O’Connor, Women Politics, p. 28. 22. Kate Gordon to William Howard Taft, 7 September 1907, William Howard Taft Papers, section 3, reel 70, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 23. See Appendix B for a list of states and the date suffrage was granted there. 24. Mary Beard and Florence Kelly, ‘Amending State Constitutions’, HR 65A—H8.14, Box 340, the National Archives, Washington, DC. 25. Buechler, The Transformation of the Woman Suffrage Movement (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1986). 26. NAWSA, Victory, p. 79. 27. Aileen Kraditor, Ideas of the Women’s Suffrage Movement 1890–1920 (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 192. 28. James A.Watson, Jr, ‘A Testing Time for Southern Congressional Leadership: The War Crisis of 1917–1918’, Journal of Southern History 44, no. 1 (February 1978), p. 33. Rep. Cantrill of Kentucky also warned his Southern brethren not to commit political suicide (ibid.). 29. Press clipping, C.W.Barron, Boston News Bureau, HR65A—H8.14, Box 340, the National Archives, Washington, DC, 1 January 1918. 30. Kraditor, Ideas, p. 199. 31. NAWSA to Tumulty, 1 January 1917, NAWSA Collection, container 29–31, reel 18, Tumulty folder, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 32. Carrie Chapman Catt to Woodrow Wilson, 7 May 1917, The Private Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 42 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 237. 33. Sally Hunter Graham, ‘Woodrow Wilson, Alice Paul, and the Woman Suffrage Movement’, Political Science Quarterly 98 (1984), p. 677. 34. Harriet Stanton Blatch and Alma Lutz, Challenging Years: The Memoirs of Harriet Stanton Blatch (New York: G.P.Putnam’s Sons, 1940), p. 266. 35. Graham, ‘Woodrow Wilson’, p. 678. 36. John A.H.Hopkins to Woodrow Wilson, 18 July 1917, Private Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 43, 1983, p. 213. 37. 13 August 1917, Private Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 43, 1983, p. 436. 38. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., p. 810. 39. Watson, ‘A Testing Time’, p. 31. 40. Woodrow Wilson, ‘Equal Suffrage’, 30 September 1918, 65–2 Congress, S. Doc. 284. 41. NAWSA, Victory, p. 137. 42. The vote in the House in May was a non-recorded vote. The vote in the Senate was recorded: Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 1 sess., p. 635. 43. Stanton et al., History, vol. 4, p. 163. Political women 140

44. Ibid. gives names and positions of members. Information on re-election was ascertained from the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774–1989 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1989). 45. Stanton et al., History, vol. 4, p. 164. 46. Ibid., pp. 162–3. 47. Ibid., p. 191. 48. Ibid., p. 217. 49. Ibid., p. 218. 50. Ibid., vol. 5, p. 268. 51. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 287. It does not report what the responses were. 52. Ibid., pp. 320–1. 53. Ibid., p. 305. 54. Ibid., p. 315. 55. Ibid., p. 366. 56. Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage, p. 271. 57. Susan E.Marshall, ‘Ladies Against Women: Mobilization Dilemmas of Antifeminist Movements’, Social Problems 32, no. 4 (April 1985), pp. 348–62. 58. Ibid., p. 349. 59. Ibid. 60. Stanton et al., History, vol. 4, p. 383. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid., vol. 5, p. 49. 63. Ibid., pp. 129–30. 64. Ibid., p. 111. 65. Ibid., p. 116. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid., p. 377. 68. Ibid., p. 188. 69. Ibid., p. 191. 70. Ibid., pp. 274–5. 71. Ibid., p. 320. 72. Ibid., p. 377. 73. Ibid., p. 304. 74. Ibid., p. 292. 75. Ibid., p. 298. 76. Garrison Nelson, ‘The Modernizing Congress, 1870–1930’, in The Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System, Joel H.Silbey (ed.) (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994), p. 142. 77. ‘Appeal for a Sixteenth Amendment’, 1 January 1877, NAWSA, HR44A H8.4, the National Archives, Washington, DC. 78. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 339. 79. Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage, p. 242. 80. Ibid. 81. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 376. 82. NAWSA to Champ Clark, 10 April 1917, HR65A-H8.14, Box 340, the National Archives, Washington, DC. 83. Hearing on resolution to establish woman suffrage committee, House, H.Doc. 754 (63–2) 6754, CIS US Serial Set Index. 84. Petition from Anne H.Martin and Mrs S.W.Belford of the Nevada Women’s Civic League, 3 May 1916, HR64A-H13.6, National Archives, Washington, DC. 85. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 397. 86. Ibid. The second wave: 1890–1928 141

87. Ibid., p. 452. 88. Ibid., p. 449. 89. Ibid., p. 439. 90. Ibid., p. 538. 91. Ibid., p. 577. 92. Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage, p. 272. 93. Stanton et al., History, vol. 4, p. 436. 94. ‘Report of the 26th Annual Convention of NAWSA February 15–20, 1894’ in Reports of the Annual Conventions of the NAWSA, vol. 1884–1900 (Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Rare Book Collection), p. 140. 95. Stanton et al., History, vol. 4, p. 265. 96. George F.Parker (ed.) The Writings and Speeches of Grover Cleveland (New York: Cassell Publishing Co., 1892), p. 355. 97. McKee, The National Conventions, pp. 304–5. 98. Ibid., p. 346. 99. Stanton et al., History, vol. 4, p. 384. 100. Ibid., p. 367. 101. Henry F.Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, Inc., 1931), p. 470. 102. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 137 fn. 103. ‘Presidential Candidates on Woman Suffrage’, 19 April 1912, reel 137, series 1, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 104. Ibid. 105. Elting E.Morrison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 6 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 1341. 106. Theodore Roosevelt to Carrie Chapman Catt, 6 June 1916, reel 360, series 2, vol. 104, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 107. Morrison, The Letters, p. 1341. 108. Letter of 3 February 1906, reel 54, series 3, William H.Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 109. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 269. 110. Ibid., p. 270. 111. John Davey to William H.Taft, 16 September 1912, and Charles Hilles to William H.Taft, 12 August 1912, reel 426, series 6, no. 2112, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 112. Charles Hilles to William H.Taft, telegram, 13 June 1912, series 6, no. 2112, reel 426, William H.Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 113. William H.Taft, handwritten note, 8 July 1912, series 6, no. 2112, reel 426, William H.Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 114. Charles Hilles to William Howard Taft, 12 August 1912, reel 426, series 6, no. 2112, William H.Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 115. Letter of 11 September 1912, reel 426, series 6, no. 2112, William H.Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 116. William H.Taft to Charles Hilles, 14 August 1912, in Henry F.Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, vols 1–2 (New York: Farar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939), pp. 824–5. 117. Donald Bruce Johnson (ed.), National Party Platforms, vol. 1, 1840–1956 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1978). The Republicans stated, ‘The Republican Party, reaffirming its faith in government of the people, by the people, for the people, as a measure of justice to one-half the adult people of this country, favors the extension of the suffrage to women, but recognizes the right of each state to settle this question for itself’ (Johnson, National Party Platforms, p. 207). Political women 142

118. Oswald G.Villard to Susan W.Fitzgerald, 14 August 1912, Woodrow Wilson Private Papers, vol. 25, 1978, p. 29. 119. Letter of 17 August 1912, Woodrow Wilson Private Papers, vol. 25, 1978, p. 42. 120. Woodrow Wilson to Delegation from NAWSA convention, 8 December 1913, Woodrow Wilson Private Papers, vol. 29, 1979, p. 22. 121. 15 January 1915, Woodrow Wilson Private Papers, vol. 32, 1980, p. 22. 122. Press release, 6 October 1915, Woodrow Wilson Private Papers, vol. 35, 1980, p. 28. 123. 2 August 1916, footnote 1, Woodrow Wilson Private Papers, vol. 37, 1981, p. 514. 124. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 498. 125. Woodrow Wilson to Ellen Duane Davis, 15 August 1916, Woodrow Wilson Private Papers, vol. 37, 1981, p. 529. 126. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 503. 127. One result of the 1910 reforms was the ascendance of the seniority system of appointing chairs. When the Democrats returned to power in 1910 they brought with them a cadre of senior southern representatives. Thus would begin the era of southern control of many important committee assignments—effectively blocking many pieces of legislation, suffrage among them. These representatives brought with them their own agenda, which included a strong adherence to states’ rights and a desire to curb the black vote. 128. Woodrow Wilson to Representative Pou, 14 May 1917, container 31–31, reel 21, folder Woodrow Wilson, NAWSA Collection, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. 129. Watson, ‘A Testing Time’, p. 30. 130. Congressional Record, 65 Congress, 1 session, 7374, 7376 (24 September 1917). 131. Committee assignments were taken from the Congressional Directory (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1918 and 1919). Their positions regarding suffrage were taken from the roll call vote of 10 January 1919—Congressional Record, 65 Congress, p. 810. 132. Remarks to a Group of Women, 6 December 1915, Woodrow Wilson Private Papers, vol. 35, 1980, p. 293. 133. 13 June 1917, Woodrow Wilson Private Papers, vol. 42, 1983, p. 496. 134. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 520. 135. Robert K.Murray, The Harding Era; Warren Gameil Harding and His Administration (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1969), p. 408. 136. Eugene P.Trani and David L.Wilson, The Presidency of Warren G.Harding (Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977). 137. Ibid., p. 106. 138. McGlen and O’Connor, Women Politics, p. 37. 139. Woodrow Wilson Private Papers, vol. 48, 1985, p. 404. 140. Stanton et al., History, vol. 5, p. 162. 141. Ibid., p. 210. 142. Ibid., p. 249. 143. Ibid., p. 320. 144. Ibid., p. 191. 145. Ibid., p. 320. 146. Ibid., p. 369. 147. Maud Park argues, ‘Among our supporters that day were five Senators who had previously voted a “no”, but who changed to our side because of suffrage gains in their states’ (NAWSA, Victory, p. 139). 148. Ibid., p. 123. 6 The third wave: 1960–85

This chapter analyses the third wave of the women’s movement: 1960–85. The chapter discusses why these years were chosen, the state of the political opportunity structure, the type of access and response I expect to find in light of the POS, the actual access and response received, and it concludes with a discussion of whether the access and response received was what was expected in light of the POS. The year 1960 is taken as the first of the third wave for a few reasons. The National Organization for Women did not form until 1966, nor did much other activity by women begin before the late 1960s, but although there was no large-scale organized women’s movement at this time, there was activity by women, activity that indirectly and directly led to the formation of an organized women’s movement later in the decade. Activity by women never ended after suffrage was achieved. From the 1930s to the 1950s, there was no mass movement by women, but there was activity, conducted by such groups as the National Woman’s Party, the League of Women Voters and other groups. This activity has been called an ‘elite-sustained movement’, and as Buechler comments, it ‘contributed to the reemergence of a more prominent women’s movement in the 1960s…’1 The year 1960 is also useful as a starting point because it is the one in which John F.Kennedy was elected President. Kennedy, though no supporter of the ERA, did recognize the contribution of women to his election. In 1961, he created the President’s Commission on the Status of Women. This commission was designed to take the focus off the ERA, but its ultimate result was to help spawn the women’s movement. It brought women together to discuss their problems, created the notion that government would be responsive and spurred the creation of mini-commissions in the states. This will be discussed in more detail later. Suffice it to say that the commission, the first of its kind, is one of the seeds from which the women’s movement grew. In 1982, the ERA failed. It did not get the necessary three-quarters of the states to ratify it. Over the next few years there were a few failed attempts to get the ERA through Congress again. The failure of the ERA, the inability to get it through Congress again, along with the conservative ascendance to the White House, defused the movement’s energy. NOW began focusing its energies elsewhere (during the last few years of the ratification battle, NOW had focused most of its energy on the ERA), and the movement quietened down. Thus, 1985 is taken as the last year of the wave. There was still activity by women, but the movement had no rallying cry to motivate the troops. Political women 144

The women’s movement encompassed many separate demands. A few of its goals were the legalization of abortion, the attainment of equal opportunity in the workplace and in education, and equal pay for equal work, but a major aim of the movement was to get the ERA ratified. With the Civil Rights Movement successfully winning blacks some of their rights, women saw this time as an opportunity to gain similar rights for themselves.

The political opportunity structure

The political opportunity structure (POS) that the women’s movement faced during this wave differed between the Congress and the presidencies. I will now discuss the POS that the movement faced in each house of Congress and the presidencies.

Congress The POS for Congress varied between the two houses. During the third wave the POS in the House was fairly closed for the first five Congresses of the wave, and then opened up, a bit, for the last seven Congresses Table 6.1a). Four congresses were closed (Eighty- seventh, Eighty-eighth, Ninetieth and Ninety-first), one was modified closed (Eighty- ninth), one was modified open (Ninety-fourth), and six were mixed (Ninety-second, Ninety-third and Ninety-fifth-Ninety-eighth). One of the indicators, party unity, was at middling to high levels for most of this wave. The mean party unity score was 41.25, with a standard deviation of 7.43. Party unity scores of 49, or higher (one, or more, standard deviations above the mean), were considered high party unity scores. Scores of 34, or lower (one standard deviation, or more, below the mean), were considered low party unity scores, and scores between 34 and 49 were considered mid-level party unity scores. Three Congresses had high-level party unity scores (Eighty-seventh, Eighty- eighth and Eighty-ninth), seven Congresses had mid-level scores (Ninetieth, Ninety-first and Ninety-fourth-Ninety-eighth), and two Congresses had low scores (Ninety-second and Ninety-third). Although the mid-level scores appear low (as compared with mid-level scores during the first two waves), they indicate fairly partisan parties. Congressional Quarterly reports that the scores began to rise in 1975 and 1977,2 and ‘the House took on a more partisan flavor in 1983 than it had in 1982 or 1981’.3 Thus, these (seemingly low) mid-level scores, for this wave, indicate fairly unified, partisan, parties. The middling to high levels of party unity contributed to the fairly closed nature of the House during the first five Congresses of this wave. Another indicator, electoral instability, was normal or very stable, for a majority of this wave. Eight of the twelve Congresses were normal (Eighty-sixth, Eighty-seventh, Eighty-ninth, Ninety-second and Ninety-fourth-Ninety-seventh), two Table 6.1a POS House—third wave

Congress Party unity Electoral instability Rules Mass POS (percentage) (percentage) opinion 87 high (54) normal strong unknown closed The third wave: 1960–85 145

(1959–61) (12.6) committee chairs 88 high (48) normal same same closed (15.2) 89 high (52) unstable same same modified (19.%) closed 90 mid (47) normal same same closed (16.8) 91 mid (36) very stable same same closed (8.3) 92 low (29) very stable same pro mixed (12.2) 93 low (33) normal same pro mixed (15.4) 94 mid (36) unstable chairs pro modified (19.8) weakened open 95 mid (42) normal same pro mixed (15.2) 96 mid (38) normal same pro mixed (17.2) 97 mid (43) normal same pro mixed (16.8) 98 mid (37) normal same pro mixed (1983–85) (18.2) Sources: see Appendix A. Mass opinion not applicable pre 1972—no public opinion polls asked about it. were very stable (Ninetieth, Ninety-first) and two were unstable (Eighty-eighth, Ninety- third). The mean score was 15.63, with a standard deviation of 3.19. Years with scores of 18.82 or greater (one standard deviation, or more, above the mean) were considered electorally unstable, and years with scores of 12.44, or lower (one standard deviation, or more, below the mean), were considered electorally very stable years. The lack of electoral instability for much of this wave contributed to the fairly closed nature of the House. The next indicator is the House rules. The rules for the first six Congresses of this wave granted the committee chairs certain powers. The chairs could decide what bills would receive hearings, what witnesses would testify, whether or not a bill received a report (and whether it was favourable or unfavourable), what subcommittees members were assigned to, and what subcommittee a bill was Political women 146

Table 6.1b POS Senate—third wave

Congress Party unity Electoral instability Rules Mass POS (percentage) (percentage) opinion 87 mid (43) very stable no great unknown modified (1959–61) (7.0) powers closed 88 high (52) normal same unknown modified (12.0) closed 89 mid (41) normal same unknown modified (8.0) closed 90 mid (46) very stable same unknown modified (7.0) closed 91 low (34) normal same unknown modified (14.0) open 92 low (36) normal same pro modified (10.0) open 93 mid (39) normal same pro mixed (13.0) 94 mid (42) normal same pro mixed (11.0) 95 mid (43) unstable same pro modified (17.0) open 96 mid (44) unstable same pro modified (20.0) open 97 high (47) unstable same pro modified (18.0) open 98 mid (46) very stable same pro mixed (1981–83) (5.0) Sources: see Appendix A. referred to. All of these powers were coupled with the fact that it was very difficult to remove a chair from his position. The seniority system had become accepted as the way by which chairs got and maintained their positions. Thus, as long as a chair was re- elected, he maintained his position; it was almost impossible to remove him. The situation was akin to that under Cannon in 1910. As Rohde comments, ‘in many ways this situation was reminiscent of the House in 1910 under Cannon: members of the majority party were frustrated by the arbitrary exercise of institutional power which prevented them from securing the passage of policies they supported’.4 It was not until 1975 that chairs were elected by the House, thus challenging their autonomy. When chairs have those powers discussed above, as happened before the Ninety- fourth Congress, the rules are considered as contributing to a closed POS. When the rules do not grant party leaders, including chairs, such powers, then they The third wave: 1960–85 147

Table 6.2 House Rules and Changes

79th Committees: 1945–47 1. Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 stat 812) the 44 committees of the 79th Congress were consolidated into 19 (Rule X, clause 1). 83rd Committee procedure: 1953–55 1. No measure or recommendation shall be reported from a committee unless a majority of the committee are actually present (Rule XI clause 22a, part of Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, adopted 3 January 1953). 87th Re: Rules Committee: 1961–63 1. Size of the committee increased to 15 members—this is maintained through the 92nd Congress. 88th No pertinent changes 1963–65 89th No pertinent changes 1965–67 90th No pertinent changes 1967–69 91st No pertinent changes 1969–71 92nd Committee procedure: 1971–73 1. Each standing committee shall adopt written rules governing its procedures (Rule XI, clause 2a, adopted on 22 January 1971, part of Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970). 2. Open hearings and meetings may be covered by TV broadcast, radio, photography…(Rule XI, clause 3a, part of Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, adopted 22 January 1971 Re: quorum: 1. If a quorum is not present the Speaker may direct the call of the House be taken by electronic device (Rule XV, clause 5—clause 4 [see 1895–97] is now subject to clause 5). Re: Speaker: 1. Prohibition against Speaker serving on Rules Committee was removed from the rules in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (Deschler ch. 17, section 52, p. 771). 93rd Committee procedure: 1973–75 1Meetings of committees and subcommittees will be open to the public except when Political women 148

concerning matters of national security (Rule XI, clause 2g1, adopted on 7 March 1973) 94th Referral of bills: 1975–77 1. The Speaker is authorized to refer a matter (bill) to more than one committee (if the subject matter falls under the jurisdiction of more than one committee) (Rule X, clause 5, adopted 3 January 1975). Committee and chair assignments: 1. Nominations of members to committees are made by the party caucus (Rule X, clause 6a1, adopted 3 January 1975). 2. Chairs elected by House from nominations submitted by majority party caucus (Rule X, clause 6c, adopted 3 January 1975). 3. Speaker must appoint a majority of members who support the House position, as determined by the Speaker, to conference committees (Rule X clause 6f). Committee procedure: 1. Each standing committee with more than twenty members shall create at least four subcommittees (Rule X clause 6d, adopted 14 January 1975). 2. Each committee is authorized to have printed and bound testimony and other data presented at hearings (Rule XI, clause 1c, adopted 3 January 1975. Re: Rules Committee: 1. All reference to committee size was removed effective 3 January 1975. 95th No pertinent changes 1977–79 96th No pertinent changes 1979–81 97th No pertinent changes 1981–83 98th No pertinent changes 1983–85 are considered as contributing to an open POS. Overall, the strength of the chairs contributed to the closed nature of the POS during the first five Congresses of this wave. I will, however, examine how the strong chair of the Judiciary Committee was circumvented. The final indicator is mass opinion. Mass opinion is measured by public opinion poll questions on ERA. Public opinion polls did not begin to ask people their opinions on ERA until 1972, after it passed Congress. Thus there are no public opinion poll data before 1972. Nor is it likely that the masses had much of an opinion on ERA; it was not a widely discussed topic. It was a goal of many women’s groups (NWP, NOW), but it had not yet spread to the masses. From 1972 onwards, public opinion polls consistently found support among the public for ERA. As Katzenstein notes, ‘even in non ratified states, The third wave: 1960–85 149 public opinion since 1972 consistently favored the amendment, often by wide margins’.5 Steiner also notes that from 1974 on, the Gallup polling organization found favourable opinion towards the ERA, with the only exceptions being 1977 and 1979: ‘the percentage of favorable answers never fell below 56, that of opposition responses never exceeded 34’.6 He goes on to note that ‘intermittent reports on national polls from other major polling organizations indicated equally favorable results’.7 Thus, mass opinion, from 1972 on, was pro-ERA. This favourable mass opinion is expected to contribute to an open POS. As noted, there was no measure of mass opinion before 1972, but it is known what organized labour’s opinion was on ERA. Until 1971, almost all unions were against the ERA. They feared it would invalidate protective legislation for women. In 1970, however, the United Auto Workers endorsed the ERA. One possible reason why they decided to do this was because of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohibited discrimination on account of sex, thereby invalidating many state protective laws (since protection is inherently discriminatory). The invalidation of these laws made it easier for labour to change its position. Once it had done so, it became possible for pro- labour Democrats to vote for the ERA and not alienate their labour constituency. The state of the POS in the Senate during this wave was fairly closed for the first four Congresses, and then opened up (see Table 6.1b). The POS during four of the twelve Congresses was modified closed (Eighty-seventh, Eighty-eighth, Eighty-ninth and Ninetieth), it was modified open during five Congresses (Ninety-first, Ninety-second, Ninety-fifth-Ninety-seventh), and it was mixed during three (Ninety-third, Ninety-fourth and Ninety-eighth). Party unity was at middling to high levels during most of this wave. The mean score was 42.75, with a standard deviation of 4.71. Scores of 47, or higher (one standard deviation, or more, above the mean), were considered high party unity scores. Scores of 38, or lower (one standard deviation, or more, below the mean), were considered low party unity scores, and scores between 38 and 47 were considered mid-level scores. As with the House, these mid-level scores were considered indicative of fairly unified, partisan parties. From 1977 onwards, parties in the Senate began showing signs of increased partisanship, as evidenced by their voting together on an increasing basis. Eight Congresses had mid level scores (Eighty-seventh, Eighty-ninth, Ninetieth, Ninety-third- Ninety-sixth and Ninety-eighth), two had high scores (Eighty-eighth and Ninety- seventh), and two had low scores (Ninety-first, Ninety-second). These middling to high- level scores contributed to the closed nature of the POS during the first four Congresses. The next indicator, electoral instability, was normal to very stable, for most of this wave. There was little electoral instability. Only three of twelve Congresses can be classified as electorally unstable. The mean score was 11.83, with a standard deviation of 4.56. Scores of 16.39, or greater (one standard deviation, or more, above the mean), were indicative of electorally unstable Congresses. Scores of 7.27, or lower (one standard deviation, or more, below the mean) indicate electorally very stable congresses. Scores that fell in between indicate normal levels of electoral instability—that is there was neither high nor low turnover. As stated in previous chapters, normal levels of electoral instability contribute to a closed POS because members are not in need of new constituents. Three Congresses were very stable (Eighty-seventh, Ninetieth and Ninety- eighth), six were normal (Eighty-eighth, Eighty-ninth and Ninety-first–Ninety-fourth), Political women 150 and three Congresses were unstable (Ninety-fifth, Ninety-sixth and Ninety-seventh). The normal and very stable electoral conditions contributed to the closed nature of the POS during the first four Congresses. And the electoral instability contributed to the modified open nature of the Ninety-fifth to Ninety-seventh Congresses inclusive. Another indicator, Senate Rules, granted no powers like those held by chairs in the House (nor did they grant any other powers that would permit party leaders control over the voting decisions of members or fate of a bill) to any party leaders during this wave. As with the first two waves, the Senate maintained its egalitarian nature during the third wave. There were no party leaders who had the power to pressurize members into voting a specific way, or decide upon which committee a member would sit. This lack of strong party leaders indicates an open POS and contributed to the fairly open nature of the Senate during much of this wave. The final indicator, mass opinion, once it was measured, was favourable towards ERA during this wave. Thus, as with the House, favourable mass opinion is expected to contribute to an open POS during this wave. In sum, we see a POS in the House that is fairly closed for the first five Congresses, and then opens up for a bit. The closed nature of the POS during the first five Congresses should be a hindrance to the women’s movement, making it more difficult for it to get its demands addressed concretely by the House. As the POS opens up, this should aid the women’s movement in its quest to gain access and response from the House. The POS in the Senate is modified closed for the first four Congresses of this wave, and then appears to open up for much of the remainder of the wave. The woman suffrage movement should have difficulty gaining access and response from the Senate during the first four Congresses, and then, the access and response received by the women’s movement should improve from the Ninety-first Congress onwards.

Presidencies The POS during the presidencies of this wave alternated predominantly between open and modified closed (see Table 6.3). According to measure A (state correlations), four of the seven presidencies were unstable: Kennedy/Johnson, Johnson, Nixon (first term), and Carter. And three presidencies were stable: Nixon/Ford (second term) and Reagan (both terms). According to measure B (percentage difference in two-party vote), three presidencies were unstable: Kennedy/Johnson, Nixon (first term) and Carter. And four presidencies were considered stable: Johnson, Nixon/Ford and Reagan (both terms). Finally, mass opinion was pro-ERA from the time the polls began asking about it in 1972 until the end of the wave. Table 6.3 POS Presidents—third wave

President and Measure A State Measure B Difference in Mass opinion POS year elected correlations two-party vote (percentage) 1960 Kennedy/ unstable (.38) unstable (. 16) unknown, no open Johnson polls asked yet 1964 Johnson unstable (.06) stable (22) same mixed The third wave: 1960–85 151

1968 Nixon unstable (.66) unstable (.8) same open 1972 Nixon/Ford stable (.76) stable (24) pro-ERA modified closed 1976 Carter unstable (.06) unstable (2) pro-ERA open 1980 Reagan stable (.84) stable (10) pro-ERA modified closed 1984 Reagan stable (.79) stable (18) pro-ERA modified closed Sources: see Appendix A.

Overall, three presidencies were open: Kennedy/Johnson, Nixon (first term) and Carter. One presidency was mixed: Johnson, and three presidencies were modified closed: Nixon/Ford and Reagan (both terms). It is expected that the open presidencies will grant the most access and response to the woman suffrage movement, the modified closed presidencies the least (and any will be co-optive) and that mixed presidencies will grant some access and response, but such access and response may be co-optive, rather than concrete.

Access and response expected in light of the POS In the House, one would expect to see the movement receive very little access during the first five Congresses (Eighty-seventh-Ninety-first), accompanied by increased amounts of access in the following seven. During the first five Congresses, there should be few to no hearings, and any hearings that are granted should have more anti-ERA witnesses than pro.8 The remaining seven should have a few hearings per Congress, accompanied by more pro-ERA witnesses than anti. Hearings are posited to indicate access because they show that a committee is willing to hear the demands/concerns of a group. Committees do not have to hold hearings when a bill is referred to them. Thus, when a committee grants a hearing, with pro-movement witnesses, this is considered a positive sign. Regarding response from the House, one would expect to see very little, to no response, during the first five Congresses. This response is expected to increase during the last seven Congresses of the wave. During the first five Congresses, one would expect to see few ERA bills introduced (and by the same members), few (or no) favourable reports, few (or no) bills brought to the floor, and none passed by the full House. Any of these indicators is evidence of a lack of response. They show that representatives are not concerned with the issue. A few members may introduce bills and work for the cause— but they are most likely diehard supporters; the political consequences of their actions are not their primary concern. A lack of the above indicators shows that a majority of members are not responding to the demands of the movement. Regarding access in the Senate, there should be very little access attained by the movement during the first four Congresses, due to their modified closed nature. There should be an increased amount of access attained in the following eight Congresses, as the POS during five of those eight is modified open. Thus, there should be few to no hearings during the first four Congresses, followed by a few hearings per Congress, Political women 152 during the following eight. Also, there should be more anti-ERA witnesses than pro-ERA witnesses present at any hearings during the first four Congresses. The last eight Congresses should have more pro-ERA witnesses than anti-ERA witnesses. Regarding response from the Senate during the first four Congresses, one would expect to see few ERA bills introduced, few favourable reports, few (or no) bills brought to the floor, and no bills passed by the full Senate. During the last eight Congresses, one would expect to see an increased amount of response, evidenced by more ERA bills introduced, favourable reports, bills brought to the floor, and bills passing the full Senate. Finally, during the first four Congresses, any response can be expected to be co-optive, due to the modified closed nature of the POS during those Congresses. Response may be designed to assuage the movement (introduce a few bills), with no intention of acting concretely on the issue (no debate on floor or bills passed). Hearings, newspaper articles, writings from members of the movement, correspondence should offer some additional support for this supposition. Regarding access to the presidencies, during the presidencies with an open or mixed POS one would expect there to be some attention to women’s issues and ERA in the party platforms, the Presidents should meet with pro-ERA groups and other women’s groups, and offices or committees regarding women might be created. Regarding response, one would expect the Presidents to make positive public pronouncements regarding ERA, positive public pronouncements regarding women, execute executive orders regarding women and sign legislation regarding women. Furthermore, those presidencies during which the POS was mixed are expected to offer less access and response than presidencies during which the POS was open. Any response from presidencies during which the POS was mixed may be co-optive. Such response may be designed to assuage the movement, lure movement members to their camp, and ultimately offer no concrete results. During presidencies with a modified closed POS it is expected that there will be little to no access or response, and any should be co-optive.

Access and response received by the women’s movement

Key people and organizations In 1961, President Kennedy created the President’s Commission on the Status of Women. Kennedy appointed Esther Peterson from the Women’s Bureau of the Labor Department and Eleanor Roosevelt to head the commission. Both of these women opposed the ERA. They believed that it would invalidate all protective labour legislation for women— legislation needed to shield women from unfair labour practices. The purpose of the commission was to analyse the laws of the Federal government, note where they discriminated against women, and submit a report of their findings to the President. The commission made twenty-four specific recommendations and concluded that the ERA was an unnecessary piece of legislation. The commission, which was designed to quell discussion of the ERA, actually ended up inadvertently fuelling it. The commission brought women together from throughout the government—women previously isolated from each other—and made them painfully aware of the discrimination that did exist in the laws. As Buechler comments, ‘the The third wave: 1960–85 153 unintended and unanticipated consequence of the Commission was to facilitate mobilization, because it became an effective agency in the pursuit of other women’s goals, promoted visibility of women in governmental positions, and institutionalized a forum for heightened discussion of women’s issues within the government itself’.9 The commission spawned ‘mini’-commissions in all fifty states—their purpose being to conduct a thorough analysis of each state’s laws regarding women, and submit a report of their findings to their state governments. Similar results occurred at the state level, and the net result of all of this was to facilitate the mobilization of a mass women’s movement. As Freeman comments, regarding the effect of the state commissions, ‘these commissions created an embryonic communications network among people with similar concerns’.10 One of the immediate consequences of the commission was the passage of the Equal Pay Act in 1963. Then, in 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act passed with the word ‘sex’ in it. The addition of the word ‘sex’ was initially viewed as a way to cripple the Civil Rights Act and not to aid women. Representative Howard Smith (D-Virginia) added the clause to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that prevented discrimination against women. He believed this clause would be viewed as a joke, and thus allow fellow representatives to vote nay without appearing racist.11 This plan backfired. Arguably, the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and the presidential and state commissions, fuelled women’s expectations regarding their rights, led them to believe that the government was open to their demands, and that it would play an active role in changing their status. That the government did not live up to women’s expectations may have facilitated the formation of the women’s movement. As Buechler argues, ‘the fact that it [government] failed to meet these expectations increased the pace of movement mobilization’.12 In June of 1966, the Third National Conference of State Commissions was held in Washington, DC. A resolution was proposed at the conference by Kay Clarenbach, Betty Friedan and other women. This resolution urged the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to treat sex discrimination as seriously as it treated race discrimination. In discussing the impetus for this resolution, Betty Friedan notes,

Kay Clarenbach and some of the others felt, at that time, that everything that was needed could be done in the framework of the state commissions. Others felt that the time had come for leadership and action from women and men free to organize and speak out as individuals. But all of us shared the feeling that something immediate and urgent had to be done about the enforcement of Title VII in respect to sex discrimination. (emphasis in text)13

The conference officials, however, refused to bring the proposed resolution to the floor, arguing that ‘these would be interpreted as criticisms of the Johnson administration, which had organized the conference’.14 This action did not sit well with the women who had proposed the resolution. It appeared that the government was willing to go only so far—that its own commissions might not be the best vehicle for demanding women’s rights. Alice Rossi, in a letter to Betty Friedan in September of 1966, noted this very problem with the state commissions, Political women 154

One of the major reasons I am delighted to see a new organization in the forming is to have a large organization totally independent of the political system. This has been the undoing of state commissions on the status of women; they can not engage in any strong direct pressure since they are keyed to the state political system; their function is thus purely advisory, with no bite whatsoever.15

At lunch that day, these women decided that there existed a need for an NAACP for women. By the end of the day, the National Organization for Women (NOW) had been formed, with just a handful of members. By October of 1966, NOW was incorporated with 300 charter members. The women in government and professional women who were forming NOW did not represent the whole women’s movement. Beginning in the early 1960s, numerous young women (primarily the under-thirties set) had become active in the civil rights movement and the student movement. Through groups like the Southern Christian Leadership Council, the Congress of Racial Equality, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and the Students for a Democratic Society, women were becoming politicized as their sisters had, who participated in the abolition and temperance movements in the 1800s. They came to recognize that the men in these groups did not value their contributions, nor did they view women’s rights as a legitimate concern. As Costain notes, women working in the Civil Rights Movement frequently found that they were ‘pushed into menial tasks’—used as secretaries.16 Women working in the New Left met with similar fates. They found that it was male-dominated and completely uninterested in women’s issues. Again, Costain notes that ‘efforts to discuss women’s issues at a 1965 SDS convention were shouted down’, with insulting epithets.17 Furthermore, as Buechler notes, ‘by 1965, whites were being eased out of some of the major civil rights organizations which were responding to the appeal of black power and black nationalism’.18 Thus numerous women were left with a strong sense of a need for change and no place in which to channel it. One result of the politicization and subsequent disillusionment of these women was the formation of numerous, local, women’s liberation groups. These groups tended to meet informally and chat about their lives, thereby raising their consciousness of women’s issues. They tended to use non-traditional forms of political participation, such as protests and picketing. One such example was the protest at the Miss America Pageant in Atlantic City from which the legend of bra-burning arose. No bras were actually burned, but the visual image remained attached to this branch of the movement. This caused many women in the ‘older’ branch to disclaim bra-burning as one of their methods. Many of the women from the ‘younger’ branch would later join some of the mainstream organizations of the women’s movement, such as NOW. But just as many would remain outside organized politics, preferring to work for change from there. One of NOW’s first actions was to make the government aware of its existence and then push for the addition of ‘sex’ to Executive Order 11246 (which prohibited discrimination in the government on account of race):

Our first order of business was to make clear to Washington…that someone was watching. When we went to the Hill to meet with Mr Macy, The third wave: 1960–85 155

with the Attorney General, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to ask that the mandate against sex discrimination be enforced…to ask that the President use his powers to do more than make token speeches and token appointments of women and issue an Executive Order to end sex discrimination in the Government and by Government Contractors, to ask that new civil rights legislation forbid sex discrimination in jury service, they listened. (emphasis in text)19

NOW was quick to make its presence in DC felt, wasting no time in approaching political elites. NOW wrote to President Johnson in November 1966 urging that ‘you amend Executive Order No. 11246 at your earliest convenience by adding the word “sex” after the word “color” in each place where the phrase “race, creed, color, or national origin” appears in the Order’.20 President Johnson signed executive order 11375 on 13 October 1967, which added the word ‘sex’. NOW’s influence on this addition is unknowable. Costain, however, argues that Johnson used his office as a ‘bully pulpit’ to advocate equal job opportunities for women.21 This fits in well with another assertion of Costain’s that ‘it seems likely that the prospect of a bloc of women’s votes, along with evidence that the New Deal voting coalition that had kept the Democrats in power since 1936 was coming apart, pushed candidates and parties to court women as a constituency in ways that had not been evident since the 1920s’.22 Thus, the creation of NOW highlighted the potential of women to vote as a bloc, and to this end, Johnson courted women, hoping that the Democratic Party might gain new constituents as a result of these efforts. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance was set up to enforce the executive order, but it was none too keen on doing so. It was not until 14 January 1969 that it published proposed guidelines, and it was not until eight months later that it held public hearings on these proposed guidelines. The guidelines, once published, were useless. As Freeman notes, ‘the guidelines promulgated on June 9, 1970, were so seriously watered down that they seemed more harmful than helpful’.23 Thus, though NOW met with initial success in getting executive order 11246 amended, it took much longer for it to get the office created to enforce the executive order actually to do so.24 NOW, which initially began with the limited agenda of convincing the executive branch and the EEOC to amend some specific laws (such as EO 11246), quickly realized that there was much more that needed to be done concerning women’s issues, and that conventional politics might not be the only path. At its second national conference it wrote a Bill of Rights for women that included support for ERA and reproductive rights. Furthermore, members began to picket and use sit-ins as a means of political expression. As Costain notes, ‘after its second national conference, NOW not only adopted a more radical agenda of issues, but its tactics became less conventional… Members…started picketing EEOC offices throughout the United States,’ and they sponsored ‘a week of sit- ins, picketing and demonstrations against male-only public accommodations’.25 The upshot of this turn was to alienate some members (and potential ones). Among those that NOW alienated were United Auto Worker members, and members who felt that abortion and non-conventional tactics were inappropriate. This later group broke from NOW and formed the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL). WEAL focused primarily on legal and economic issues and used conventional tactics. As Bernice Sandler comments on WEAL’s founding, Political women 156

WEAL was founded in 1968 by Elizabeth Boyer… She was concerned with NOW’s focus on abortion and by NOW’s use of demonstrations as a technique. She therefore decided to set up a more ‘middle of the road’ group which would appeal to more ‘conservative’ and larger groups of women… She set up WEAL so that it dealt only with issues concerning legal and tax inequities, education and employment…26

For instance, in the late 1960s and early 1970s they became involved in litigation against government agencies, attempting to force them to monitor laws prohibiting sex discrimination.27 WEAL was the more moderate voice of the women’s movement. Costain, however, notes that by 1973 WEAL, frustrated with its attempts to get the government to change its policies by using peaceful protest, had changed its tune and was supporting abortion rights and didn’t turn its nose up quite so high at alternative forms of political participation.28 There occurred another split in the ranks of NOW at the 1968 national convention. The New York chapter proposed changes that would have moved NOW from a hierarchical structure to a more participatory, democratic one. This proposal was rejected and a schism resulted. Ti Grace Atkinson, the leader of the New York chapter, left NOW and formed a new group called the October 17th Movement (later known as The Feminists). Buechler argues that this schism was just the beginning of the organizational divide between the women’s liberation sector and the ‘older’ branch: ‘the 1968 schism between the national organization and much of the New York branch represents the beginning of the sharpest divide between the bureaucratic orientation of NOW and the collectivist orientation of the women’s liberation sector of the movement’.29 Many of the local branches of NOW were more interested in and influenced by women’s liberation and were averse to too much organization and hierarchy. This question of organization and hierarchy versus a more collectivist orientation was apparent at the formation of NOW, as a letter from Alice Rossi to Betty Friedan shows: ‘I do not think that such an organization should be a tiny group of elite persons, since there are so many situations in American society in which what will be politically and socially effective is not just direct personal influence, or quotes from prominent women, but the pressure represented by numerical strength.’30 This problem was continually to resurface for NOW. An attempt to reconcile the different branches of the women’s movement occurred in 1969, when the First Congress to Unite Women was held in New York, and a few others were held in other cities the following year. This effort bore little fruit. It did not result in any kind of an umbrella organization but, as Freeman argues, women from both branches came ‘to realize that a diverse movement might be more valuable than a united one. The multitude of different groups reached out to different kinds of women, served different functions within the movement, and presented a wide variety of feminist ideas.’31 They ultimately all agreed to disagree, and work together wherever and whenever possible.32 The year 1970 was a turning point for NOW. In June, NOW filed a blanket complaint of sex discrimination against 1,300 corporations receiving Federal funds. Then on 26 August, they held a strike to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of suffrage. All feminist groups supported this activity in some way. The strike brought the movement to the public’s attention: ‘it was the first time that the potential power of the movement became publicly apparent; and with this the movement came of age… The sheer numbers The third wave: 1960–85 157 shocked everyone—including the organizers—and made it clear that the movement would now have to be taken seriously.’33 Another result of the strike was to swell the ranks of NOW, with chapters often growing by as much as 50 to 70 per cent.34 Thus, by the early seventies there were numerous women’s groups (NOW, WEAL and older ones such as the National Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, the League of Women Voters and the American Association of University Women) representing the whole political spectrum, working to change the position of women in society. As Costain notes, this array of groups meant that ‘organizationally…significant resources were now available to mount an effective challenge to the status quo’.35 On 22 March 1970, the ERA passed both houses of Congress. Neither NOW, nor any organization of the women’s movement, recognized the need for ratification efforts when the ERA passed. Because the ERA passed with such overwhelming majorities, in both houses, it appeared unstoppable in the state legislatures, but this was not to be the case. By the late 1970s the movement recognized that the ERA was stalled in the states and would require quite a bit of work to get it through. By 1975, thirty-four states had ratified the ERA—just four states short of the necessary three-quarters. Of the remaining states in 1977, a majority were in the south (eleven of fifteen) and very few gave any indication of being a friend to the ERA. One consequence of this solid opposition in the south was that NOW and other women’s organizations looked to President Carter to provide strong leadership in support of the ERA. Women’s organizations hoped that since Carter was a southerner his urgings would have a favourable impact on southern legislators. As a Washington Post article commented in March of 1977, ‘a significant reason for feminist leaders’ believing that stepped-up White House support is crucial to success is the little- noticed fact that opposition to the ERA is centered largely in the Solid South, a region where the new President is thought to have decisive influence’.36 Thus, NOW and other groups consistently lobbied President Carter to play an active role in the ratification campaign, urging him to do all he could to convince democratic legislators to vote for ratification in their states. This was a reasonable tactic for NOW to pursue. For not only was Carter a southerner, but most of the state legislatures where ERA still needed to be ratified were controlled by Democrats. Thus, the expectation that a call or letter from the President might sway fellow congressmen, and that if swayed, this would affect the ERA’s chances of being ratified, was well founded. As Karen DeCrow, president of NOW in 1976, notes, ‘since the state legislatures of fourteen of the sixteen unratified states are controlled by Democrats, the Democratic Party, could, if it chooses, ratify the ERA very soon’.37 These phone calls did not appear to make a great deal of difference to ratification efforts, however, and may have actually hindered them. Some legislators in North Carolina were actually put off by Carter’s interference in what they considered a state affair. As one Washington Post article notes, regarding Carter’s efforts in North Carolina, ‘several Senators called by either the President or the First Lady grumbled privately this was none of their business’.38 Had the leaders of the third wave read up on their history they would have seen that President Wilson met with a similar reaction when he wrote and cabled state and Federal legislators on behalf of women’s suffrage (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, southern legislators could not ‘understand his [Carter’s] involvement with a question they regard as irrelevant’.39 Finally, it is doubtful that a few phone calls were enough. Southern opposition was quite strong. NOW recognized this and so did Political women 158 columnists from the Washington Post. As Coleman Fritchey comments, ‘one Dixie legislator tells me he doubts if a single one of his Southern colleagues is married to an active feminist. So if Carter is to turn the region around, it is going to take more than lip service and a few telephone calls.’40 NOW, and other women’s organizations, consistently urged Carter to do all he could for the ERA. It appears that Carter thought he was playing an active role in the ratification efforts, however, and in fact he appeared surprised when asked a question by Christine Candela, President of WEAL, regarding his limited role in the ERA ratification efforts: ‘I asked Carter if it was his intention to continue playing a largely background role with regard to the ERA ratification drive. His response was to evince surprise that I would describe his role as “background” given the monthly meetings and his willingness to appear at a fund-raiser.’41 In 1980, an election year, Carter did two things in an attempt to improve his image with women. One, the White House compiled a list of the efforts of President Carter and his family on behalf of the ERA.42 Second, in January of 1980 Carter announced that he would work harder to get the ERA ratified.43 The ratification campaign did not improve. In Nevada in 1977, the Senate passed the ERA, and the state assembly killed it, exhibiting what NOW called ‘turncoat voting’ where ‘eleven of the 24 no votes are cast by Democrats who ran on pro-ERA slates and accepted campaign assistance from NOW and other pro-ERA groups’.44 In the other unratified states the picture looked bleak. Many of the states, as noted, were southern, where opposition to the ERA was the strongest. Then in 1975, the Democratic Party announced that it would not hold its Democratic National Convention in any state that had not yet ratified the ERA. Though this was intended as a gesture of support to the women’s movement, it may have actually hindered the ERA in some states. In a letter from Casey Hughes of NOW to Robert Strauss, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Hughes comments, ‘the Democratic National Committee’s decision to include as a factor in their site selection criteria whether a state had ratified the ERA has hurt us immensely in our activities to lobby the constitutional amendment through the final four state legislatures needed for ratification’.45 NOW and other women’s organizations realized that the deadline for ratification was approaching quickly (1979) and the picture looked grim. In March of 1977, two law students, Alice Bennett and Catherine Timlin, suggested that NOW seek an extension of the ratification deadline, arguing that the Constitution does not stipulate that amendments must be ratified within a specific period. Thus NOW began to lobby actively for an extension, and in March of 1977, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman (D-New York) introduced a bill to extend the deadline for the ERA. In 1978, the NOW national board declared a state of emergency for the ERA—all energies and resources were redirected towards the passage of the extension deadline. On 15 August 1978, the House passed the extension, and on 6 October the Senate followed suit. ERA had until 30 June 1982. With one battle over, another was to begin. In May of 1979, legislators from Idaho, Arizona and Washington state filed suit in Federal court, declaring the extension unconstitutional and seeking to prove that a state that previously ratified a constitutional amendment could rescind such ratification (before the three-quarters approval). The Idaho case was assigned to one Judge Marion Callister, who as well as being a judge, also held a high position in the Mormon Church (regional representative). The third wave: 1960–85 159

The Mormon Church was active in the anti-ERA movement. NOW was convinced that such an individual could not adjudicate on such a case without bias and attempted to have him removed from the case. Though the Department of Justice did move to disqualify Callister, they would not put a ‘rush’ on the case. NOW wanted the decision made quickly; they feared that if it were not decided promptly then the question of recession would hinder the passage of the ERA. NOW met with no luck in its efforts to have the case bumped up. Even Carter would not intervene on its behalf, seriously angering NOW. NOW retaliated by not endorsing Carter’s candidacy in the 1980 election.46 Carter responded by cancelling his meeting with NOW regarding the Callister case and instead met with representatives of other women’s organizations. On the day of the meeting, NOW demonstrated outside the White House, arguing that ‘President Carter has failed to take women’s issues, especially the Equal Rights Amendment, seriously during his presidency. He is holding a brief multi-issue “showcase” meeting with women’s leaders instead of the serious meeting that had been requested on the issue of the disqualification of the Mormon priesthood leader presiding over the ERA extension case in Idaho.’47 The picture failed to improve. In July of 1980 the Republican Party, for the first time in forty years, reversed its position of support for the ERA in its platform. Only seven years earlier a letter from the Republican National Committee to all Republican state legislators had argued that ‘a vote for ratification is in the finest tradition of the Republican Party’.48 Now the Grand Old Party was arguing that it was up to the states to decide the fate of the ERA and there would be no interference to this end from party leaders or party organization. Furthermore, their candidate, Ronald Reagan, publicly stated his opposition to the ERA. In a letter to NOW he argued that he was for the E and R but not the A: ‘I’m convinced that what we disagree on is the means for achieving equal rights for women, not the goal.’49 In the election in November Carter lost, and the United States elected the first President openly to oppose the ERA in forty years. The ratification effort continued to meet with obstacles over the next two years. The Justice Department decided that the Callister case was not ripe for decision, arguing that ‘the ratification of the proposed amendment has not occurred and will never occur if three additional states don’t ratify the proposed amendment by the July 1, 1982 deadline. The Department will oppose NOW’s efforts to expedite the appeal, since the entire matter may be rendered moot in the months ahead.’50 This decision was even more aggravating since the White House had received a letter, signed by twenty-two leaders of anti-ERA groups, the day before the decision (asking that the appeal to expedite not be granted), and the White House had placed a phone call to the Justice Department only hours before it released the above statement.51 The Reagan administration was doing all it could to block the ratification of the ERA. On 30 June 1982, the battle for the ERA was over; it had failed to attain the necessary thirty-eight states.

Congress: access and response There was much access sought and a little access achieved during the third wave. There were twenty hearings regarding ERA (fourteen in the Senate, six in the House).52 Some of these hearings were subcommittee hearings (at least one in each house). Two of the hearings (one in each house) were ERA extension of deadline for ratification hearings, Political women 160 and fifteen of these hearings were held during the Ninety-eighth Congress (1983–85) when ERA was reintroduced. It is not clear which of these last hearings are subcommittee hearings, or if they are even all separate hearings.53 Regarding response from Congress during the third wave, there was a limited amount (with the exception of bills introduced). Regarding bills introduced, there was a vast discrepancy between the houses. Eight hundred and eighty-nine ERA bills were introduced into the House, twelve were introduced into the Senate. Thirteen bills to extend the deadline were introduced into the House, and one into the Senate. There were four reports on ERA, all favourable, two in the House and two in the Senate. One of each was a subcommittee report. ERA was brought to the floor a total of six times, five times in the House and once in the Senate. Finally, ERA passed a total of three times and failed twice. In the House it passed twice and failed twice, and the Senate passed it once. The ERA deadline extension bill received one favourable report (from the House), was brought to the floor twice (once in each house), and passed twice (once in each house). I will now address the specifics of the access sought and attained, and the response of the political elites, in each Congress, but first, I must give some history of the ERA in Congress, before the third wave. The ERA was first put into writing by Alice Paul, and first introduced into Congress in 1923 by Senator Charles Curtis (R-Kansas) and Representative Daniel Anthony (R- Kansas), a nephew of Susan B.Anthony. The first hearings were held by the Senate Judiciary Committee on 7 February 1924 (unrecorded), and by a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee in the House in 1925. The ERA was introduced in every session of Congress, in both House and Senate, from that point onwards. The amendment met with little success, arguably due to the strong influence of labour and its desire to see protective legislation for women remain on the books, thus protecting men’s jobs. Many women’s groups also supported protective legislation for women, but for different reasons: they believed women were physically different than men, and these physical difference necessitated legislation to prevent their exploitation by industrialists and protect them physically.54 In the Senate, a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee held hearings in 1925, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1938, 1945 and 1956. The subcommittee reported the ERA favourably to the full committee, with or without hearings, in 1937, 1941, and twice in 1943. The full committee held no hearings. The full committee reported the ERA favourably to the floor in 1938 (tie vote), 1942, 1943, 1946, 1948, 1949, 1951, 1953, 1956, 1957 and 1959. The ERA received a vote on the floor of the Senate in 1946, 1950, 1953 and 1960 (Senate voted to add a rider to it and sent it back to committee). The ERA passed in the Senate in 1950, 1953 and 1960, all three times with Hayden rider attached. The Hayden rider preserved states’ protective legislation, thereby crippling the ERA. There was not quite so much activity in the House. A subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee held hearings in 1945 and 1948. The subcommittee reported it favourably to the full committee (with or without hearings) in 1936, 1937, 1939, 1941 and twice in 1943. The full committee held hearings on the ERA in 1925 and 1932. The full Judiciary Committee voted favourably on the ERA in 1942, but never reported it to the floor. The full committee did report the ERA favourably to the floor of the House in 1945 and 1948. The ERA received no votes on the floor of the House. A discharge petition was initiated The third wave: 1960–85 161 in the House in 1943 and failed. Although ERA did not meet with a favourable end during this period, it did receive some attention. As noted, NOW did not form until 1966; limited access was thus sought to Congress before its formation. Most access was sought by the NWP. Although they were active, they were not a mass-based movement. Most of their efforts revolved around hanging out in the lobbies of Congress, and urging congressmen to support ERA. There was no access attained, in either house, in the Eighty-seventh, Eighty-eighth, Eighty-ninth or Ninetieth Congresses (see Tables 6.4a and 6.4b), but there was some response (see Tables 6.5a and 6.5b). Response came in the form of bills Table 6.4a Access House of Representative—third wave

Congress Number of Number of pro-ERA Number of anti-ERA POS hearings witnesses witnesses 87 (1959– 0 0 0 closed 61) 88 0 0 0 closed 89 0 0 0 modified closed 90 0 0 0 closed 91 0 0 0 closed 92 1 19 5 anti mixed 3 unknown 93 na na na mixed 94 na na na modified open 95 1 unknown unknown mixed 96 na na na mixed 97 0 0 0 mixed 98 (1981– 4* unknown unknown mixed 83) Totals 6 19 5 Sources: see Appendix A. *=number of dates listed, cannot determine if that is actual number of hearings unknown=could not determine number of witnesses from any accounts Political women 162

Table 6.4b Access Senate—third wave

Congress Number of Number of pro-ERA Number of anti-ERA POS hearings witnesses witnesses 87 (1959– 0 0 0 modified 61) closed 88 0 0 0 modified closed 89 0 0 0 modified closed 90 0 0 0 modified closed 91 2 (1 1) 29 1) 6 modified subcommittee) 2) 14 2) 8 open 92 0 0 0 modified open 93 na na na mixed 94 na na na mixed 95 1 unknown unknown modified open 96 na na na modified open 97 0 0 0 modified open 98 (1981– 11* unknown unknown mixed 83) Totals 14 43 14 Sources: see Appendix A. *=number of dates listed, cannot determine if that is actual number of hearings unknown=could not determine number of witnesses from any accounts Table 6.5a Response House of Representatives— third wave

Congress Number of bills Number and type of Number of bills Did POS introduced committee reports brought to bill(s) Floor pass? 87 (1959– 140 0 0 0 closed 61) 88 103 0 0 0 closed The third wave: 1960–85 163

89 122 0 0 0 modified closed 90 152 0 0 0 closed 91 266 0 1 1 pass closed 92 94 1 favourable 2 1 fail mixed subcommittee 1 pass 1 favourable committee 93 not applicable na na na mixed (na) 94 na na na na modified open 95 13 1 favourable 1 1 pass mixed 96 na na na na mixed 97 3 0 0 0 mixed 98 (1981– 9 0 1 1 fail mixed 83) Totals 902—average of 3 favourable 5 3 pass 75 a Congress 2 fail Sources: see Appendix A. na=ERA had passed Table 6.5b Response Senate—third wave

Congress Number of bills Number and type of Number of bills Did POS introduced committee reports brought to bill(s) Floor pass? 87 (1959– 0 1 favourable 0 0 modified 61) closed 88 1 1 favourable 0 0 modified closed 89 1 0 0 0 modified closed 90 1 0 0 0 modified closed 91 1 1 favourable 1 0 modified subcommittee open 92 6 1 favourable 1 1 pass modified open 93 na na na na mixed Political women 164

94 na na na na mixed 95 1 0 11 pass modified open 96 na na na na modified open 97 1 0 0 0 modified open 98 (1981– 1 0 0 0 mixed 83) Totals 13—average 1 4 favourable 3 2 pass bill a Congress Sources: see Appendix A. na=ERA had passed introduced and favourable reports. In the House, 140, 103, 122 and 152 bills were introduced into the Eighty-seventh, Eighty-eighth, Eighty-ninth and Ninetieth Congresses, respectively, but there were no reports and no bills brought to the floor. In the Senate, there were zero, one, one and one bills introduced into the four Congresses, respectively. In addition, during the Eighty-seventh and Eighty-eighth Congresses, there was a favourable report during each Congress. The NWP was lobbying Congress, but meeting with limited success. The Ninety-first Congress (January 1969–January 1971) saw some access attained and response granted. Access came in the form of hearings in the Senate. The Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing in May 1970. This was the first hearing held since 1956. These hearings were the result of an interesting occurrence. On 17 February 1970, a group of women from NOW, led by Wilma Scott Heide, interrupted subcommittee hearings concerning granting eighteen- year-olds the vote. These women demanded that the chair of the subcommittee, Birch Bayh (D-Indiana), hold hearings on ERA. He not only held the hearings, but became an active supporter of ERA. The testimony from these hearings is lengthy, but a few quotes are useful to highlight the divergent views of those for and against ERA. Those most heartily against ERA were labour unions’ members. They feared that ERA would repeal protective labour legislation that was necessary to women. As Myra Wolfgang, vice president of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, stated, ‘The elimination of laws regulating hours women may work permits employers to force them to work excessive overtime, endangering not only their health and safety, but disrupting their entire family relationship. The women in the work force who are in the greatest need of the protection of maximum hour legislation are in no position to fight for themselves.’55 Countering this position, many argued that protective legislation was discriminatory, that it ensured that women could only do certain jobs and at lower pay than men. As Mrs Myra Ruth Harmon, president of the National Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, Inc., argued: The third wave: 1960–85 165

Thus we contend that today, special so-called protective legislation for women has become restrictive, burdensome, and discriminatory… These laws will prohibit women from being bartenders but allow them to be barmaids, to serve the drinks they cannot mix, and at a lower pay. In some States women cannot work overtime in factories but laundry, hotel and restaurant workers, agricultural and domestic laborers are often exempt from the hours limitation … Special labor legislation for women restricts as fully as it was originally intended to protect. These laws operate to prevent millions of women from competing on equal terms with men…56

All the arguments for and against did not focus solely on the protective legislation question. Many analysed the benefits ERA would bring to women in the areas of education, employment, pay, and as a symbol of women’s intellectual equality with men, among other things. This hearing was followed by a full committee hearing in September 1970. There were twenty-nine pro-ERA witnesses and six anti-ERA witnesses at the subcommittee hearing. At the full committee hearing there were fourteen pro-ERA and eight anti-ERA witnesses. There was still no access to the House. There was response in both houses. In the House, there were 266 separate bills introduced, and ERA was brought to the floor, voted on and passed. ERA (in this Congress, as well as preceding and succeeding) was introduced by a vast number of members, not by a few who repeatedly introduced it. This indicates the growing support for the amendment. Representative Martha Griffiths initiated a discharge petition, to get the ERA out of committee, on 11 June 1970. The petition was filed on 11 June and by 20 July it had the required 218 signatures. Discharge petitions are not generally successful. According to Oleszek, ‘from 1931 through 1994…more than five hundred discharge petitions were filed, but only forty-six attracted the required signatures and only nineteen bills actually were discharged and passed by the House’.57 The low rate of success raises the question of why this one succeeded. Steiner offers four reasons why members would have signed this petition: 1. Fairness: ERA had been introduced into Congress for forty-seven consecutive years and party platforms had supported it for twenty-six; ‘a member could feel that to sign the petition was not to assure passage of an ERA, but only to endorse a minimum of procedural fairness’.58 2. Self-protection: Women were an important electoral force: ‘electoral self-interest pointed in favor of signing the petition’.59 3. Contemporaneous hearings on discrimination: Representative Green’s hearings on discrimination in education ‘served as a surrogate for Judiciary Committee hearings on an Equal Rights Amendment’; furthermore ‘Green’s own independent record gave wavering members confidence in the hearings’.60 4. Martha Griffiths’s determination: finally, Griffiths’s dogged efforts to get the bill out of committee were key to the success of the discharge petition.61 Some combination of these reasons appears logical to explain why members decided to sign the discharge petition. As a result of the discharge petition ERA reached the floor of the House, and, on 10 August 1970, the House passed the ERA 352 to 15. This was the first action by the full House on ERA since 1923. Political women 166

There was some response in the Senate, but not as much as in the House. One bill was introduced, there was one favourable subcommittee report, and ERA was brought to the floor, but no further action was taken on it. The ERA was reported favourably to the full committee on 28 June 1970, but with many riders attached. The ERA met with some determined opposition, in the form of Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC). On 17 August 1970, he offered an amendment to the ERA that retained all state protective legislation, and prevented women from being drafted. Ervin held Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on this amendment in September 1970, and on 7 October debate went to the Senate floor, where irrelevant riders were added to the ERA, effectively defeating its purpose. No further action was taken on the bill because proponents did not want to pass an ERA with Ervin’s riders. There was access and response during the Ninety-second Congress (1971–73). Access in the House consisted of one hearing—a subcommittee hearing in March and April 1971. There were nineteen pro-ERA witnesses at the hearing, five anti-, and three with unknown positions. There had been no hearings in the House Judiciary Committee from 1948 to 1971. In the Judiciary Committee the ERA faced a powerful opponent, the chairman of the committee, Emanuel Cellar (D-NY). The committee chairs in the House, before 1975, were quite powerful. They could: 1. arrange the agenda of the committee; 2. appoint subcommittees; 3. refer bills to subcommittees; 4. decide what pending measures shall be considered and when; 5. call committee meetings; 6. decide whether or not to hold hearings and when; and 7. handle reported bills on the floor.62 These powers granted chairmen in the House considerable control over the fate of legislation. As Galloway notes, ‘they are in a position to expedite measures they favor and to retard or pigeonhole those they dislike’.63 Cellar was staunchly against the ERA. He represented a district composed primarily of black and middle-class Jewish constituents. As Steiner notes, ‘many of the latter [Jewish constituents] worked or had worked in the garment industry where unions remained intensely opposed to an ERA because of its impact on the protective legislation they had struggled to accomplish’.64 Cellar used his vast powers as committee chair to prevent any hearings on the ERA. The rules governing Congress during most of this wave (till 1975) permitted great autonomy to the chairs of committees. They received the position due to their seniority, and once there, there was little that could be done to remove them. Furthermore, they had a great amount of control over the flow of legislation in committees, and could kill a bill very easily. Thus, even if other members of Congress wanted to grant the women’s movement access, Cellars could prevent it. As Greenberg argues, regarding Cellar, ‘he never even let the ERA get out of committee to the House floor. Such tactical manipulation of the political and congressional processes contributed greatly to the ERA’s long dormancy period despite its increasing popularity.’65 Challenging a chairman was not a viable option for committee members or most members of Congress. Members risked their reputations in Congress if they chose to do so. As Steiner notes: The third wave: 1960–85 167

The power inherent in the position of chairman made it politically dangerous as well as procedurally difficult for a member to challenge a chairman’s discretion in connection with meetings, hearings, and reports… Even in the unlikely event of success on a particular bill, in the long run the challenger could not expect to move much else past an embarrassed and probably outraged chairman. In the more likely event of failure, the challenger would have lost his immediate objective, exposed his weakness, and alienated the chairman all at once.66

One committee chair, unsupportive of the ERA, hindered the women’s movement’s chances of gaining access to Congress from 1948 onwards in the House. There was no access to the Senate during this Congress. Response in the House was mixed. There were ninety-four bills introduced (fewer than previous Congresses), two favourable reports (one was from the subcommittee), ERA was brought to the floor twice, where it failed in June of 1971 and passed in October 1971. The ERA was reported favourably by a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee in April, but with riders. On 22 June 1971, the full committee voted 32–2, over Cellar’s opposition, to report the amendment to the House. The committee, however, had added the Wiggins amendment, which exempted women from the draft, and allowed differential labour standards for men and women. Once again, the ERA was crippled. The Wiggins amendment, however, was defeated on the floor, 265–87, and, on 12 October 1971, the House passed the ERA, 354–23, with no amendments. There was also response in the Senate. Six bills were introduced, there was one favourable full committee report on 14 March 1972, and it was brought to the floor, voted upon and passed. The Judiciary Committee had reported the ERA, without any amendments (though Ervin fought it every step of the way, offering amendments till the end), and finally, on 22 March 1972, the Senate passed the ERA with no changes, 84–8. The ERA was off to the states for ratification. The Ninety-third (1973–75) and Ninety-fourth (1975–77) Congresses are not applicable to this discussion. ERA had passed Congress and was on to the states for ratification, but it had been saddled with a seven-year ratification deadline. If it failed to be ratified by the necessary number of states by the end of seven years, it failed to become a part of the Constitution. Thus, as 1979 approached, movement members decided to put more pressure on unratified states; in 1977, NOW declared an economic boycott of them. Groups that supported ERA refused to hold conventions in unratified states in the hope that the loss of revenue would prompt them to reconsider their position. In March 1977, two NOW members, Catherine Timlin and Alice Bennett (law students), suggested that NOW seek an extension of the deadline for ratification. The argument was that the Constitution stipulated no time limit for ratification of amendments. Accordingly, NOW turned its efforts towards trying to get an extension on the deadline. Bills were introduced to this effect and hearings held. The Ninety-fifth Congress saw some access to both houses, and some response. In the Senate, there was a hearing, in August 1978, regarding a bill to extend the deadline for ratification. There was similar hearing in the House in November 1978. Response came in the form of thirteen extension of ratification deadline bills introduced in the House, and one in the Senate. One was introduced by Representative Elizabeth Holtzman on 29 October 1977. Political women 168

This bill called for a seven-year extension of the ratification deadline. There was a favourable report from the House, but none from the Senate. The NOW board of directors declared a state of emergency on the ERA in February 1978. All the organization’s resources and energies were to go towards winning the extension deadline and towards ratification campaigns. On 9 July 1978, more than 100,000 people trekked to Washington, DC to march in a parade to demonstrate support for the extension bill.67 The extension bill was brought to the floor of both houses. On 15 August 1978, the House passed it, 233–189, and on 6 October the Senate followed suit, 60–36. ERA had until 30 June 1982 to get the requisite three-quarters of the states to ratify it. The Ninety-sixth (1979–81) Congress is also not applicable to the discussion, but the requisite number of states failed to ratify the amendment, and thus the movement was back to square one. During the Ninety-seventh Congress (1981–83) there was no access attained in either house, but there was a little response: three ERA bills were introduced into the House and one in the Senate. The situation appeared to improve in the Ninety- eighth Congress (1983–85): there was access to both houses. There were eleven hearings in the Senate and four in the House. Regarding response, there were nine bills introduced in the House, and one in the Senate. There were no reports from either house. In the House, ERA was brought up on the floor on a motion to ‘suspend the rules and pass’. This required a two-thirds vote, which was not attained. Activity on ERA ceased for a time. In sum, we see no access attained and very little response, from either house, during the first four Congresses of this wave. The House had strong chairs, middling to high levels of party unity, normal or very stable electoral conditions, and strong opposition from organized labour. It is during the last eight Congresses of this wave that the situation improves. Access was attained and response was granted, by both houses. The chairs in the House were eventually stripped of many of their powers, party unity declined for a few Congresses, mass opinion was favourably disposed towards ERA, and organized labour changed its position to one of support for ERA. After a fifty-year battle, ERA passed Congress.

Presidencies—access and response Two Presidents during this wave were opposed to ERA (Kennedy and Reagan), three were supportive, though in varying degrees (Nixon, Ford, Carter) and one never came out for or against it (Johnson). The women’s movement attained varying degrees of access and response to the Presidents of this wave (see Tables 6.6 and 6.7). Even those Presidents unsupportive of ERA paid attention to women. There was moderate access and response granted to the women’s movement by Kennedy. Regarding access, the Democratic Party platform discussed the need of equality for women, stating, ‘we support legislation which will guarantee to women equality of rights under the law, including equal pay for equal work’.68 There was, however, no explicit mention of ERA. A year after his election, Kennedy was questioned during a news conference as to his commitment to the platform: The third wave: 1960–85 169

Table 6.6 Access to Presidents—third wave

President *Women Number of Number of Number of POS and year discussed in meetings with meetings with offices re elected platform? ERA focused women’s women groups groups created Kennedy Democrats 0 5 3 open 1960 discuss women Johnson Democrats 0 9 1 open then 1963 discuss women mixed after ’64 election Nixon 1968 no mention in 0 5 3 open then 1968, but support modified ERA in ’72 closed after ’72 election Ford 1974 same as above 0 7 1 modified closed Carter 1976 Democrats 11 19 6 open support ERA Reagan 1980 Republicans 0 22 4 modified and 1984 renege on ERA— closed 1980 but discuss and 1984 women Sources: see Appendix A. *=see text for specifics of platforms Table 6.7 Response from Presidents—third wave

President Number of public Number of public Number of Number POS and year pronouncements re pronouncements re executive of laws elected ERA women orders Kennedy 0 14 3 7 open 1960 Johnson 0 35 3 9 open then 1963 mixed after ’64 election Nixon 1968 4 25 3 43 open then modified closed after ’72 Ford 1974 8 19 4 17 modified closed Carter 1976 63 51 7 28 open Political women 170

Reagan 6 anti-ERA 56 2 28 modified 1980 and closed 1984 1980, 1984 Sources: see Appendix A.

‘Mr President, the Democratic platform…promises equal rights for women, including equal pay, and to wipe out job opportunity discriminations… What have you done for the women, according to the promises in the platform?’ ‘Well, I’m sure we haven’t done enough. I must say I am a strong believer in equal pay for equal work, and I think that we ought to do better than we’re doing.’69

A month later, Kennedy created the President’s Commission on the Status of Women (‘the commission’). Upon the creation of the commission, he commented, ‘Women should not be considered a marginal group to be employed periodically only to be denied opportunity to satisfy their needs and aspirations when unemployment rises or a war ends. Women have basic rights which should be respected and fostered…’70 It appears that Kennedy was feeling pressure from women. Kennedy was not in favour of the ERA, but he claimed to support equality of opportunity for women, and recognized that he could not ignore women as a constituency.71 A few months after its creation, Kennedy told the members of the commission the two reasons why he had created it: ‘One is for my own self-protection… The other reason is because this is a matter of great national importance.’72 Although there was no mass sustained, ‘organized’ women’s movement before 1966, it is still appropriate to speak of the ‘women’s movement’. The NWP, and other women’s groups, such as the National Women’s Business and Professional Clubs, and the League of Women Voters, were all active in making women’s presence known to the government. Thus we can speak of Kennedy granting access to the women’s movement because there were women’s groups that could and did press him. The NWP lobbied Kennedy, and as discussed earlier, it was arguably in response to this lobbying effort, and in attempts to quell the desire for the ERA, that the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women was created. Though the commission did not come out in support of the ERA, it fuelled the women’s movement. The commission brought women in the Federal government together, and spawned state commissions, which brought women in the state governments together. Bringing women together made them acutely aware of the discrimination that existed in the government (both Federal and state). Furthermore, it created a point of access to the governments for women. Where before, women’s groups had to approach men to be heard, they could now approach women—women in positions of authority. As a result of the commission’s work, two more entities were created, the Citizens Advisory Council on the Status of Women and an Interdepartmental Commission on the Status of Women. Kennedy also met with women’s groups five times. Most of the meetings were with elected women officials, female delegates from foreign nations and wives of elected officials. His comments were always supportive of women’s right to equal pay, but they still held a note of conservatism—that women’s primary responsibility was the home. During an interview with Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt (one of the chairmen of the The third wave: 1960–85 171 commission), Kennedy commented, ‘we want to be sure that women are used as effectively as they can be, to provide a better life for our people—in addition to meeting their primary responsibility, which is in the home’.73 In May 1963, at a breakfast with the wives of senators and representatives, he commented,

I can’t think of any occupation which gives a woman a greater chance to play a more useful role in every way than in the profession of politics. To support your husbands as you do, to have them fulfill their lives in national service, to meet your responsibilities to them, to your children, to your country—I think this is really why there are so many happy women who are living under some difficulties yet carry on their work.74

Even during his comments upon signing the Equal Pay Act in 1963, which prohibited capricious discrimination against women in payment of wages, he stated, ‘It is extremely important that adequate provision be made for reasonable levels of income to them, for the care of children which they must leave at home or in school, and for protection of the family unit.’75 Kennedy recognized that he needed to appeal to women, but he still maintained traditional views of their place in society. Regarding response, Kennedy granted a modest amount, especially considering he was in office for only three years. He made fourteen public pronouncements regarding women, issued three executive orders and signed seven pieces of legislation. As noted above, his comments regarding women constantly reiterated his belief in their right to equal pay for equal work, but they also tended to note that women’s primary responsibility was to the home. Even upon the presentation of the final report of the commission he commented:

I think that we should concern ourselves with two or three main areas: one, working women, what arrangements we can make for them so that they can maintain themselves, their homes, their husbands, their children, make sure that their children are protected; and that we give encouragement to the development of institutes, structures in our society which will make it easier for women to fulfill their responsibility to their children… Then, we have an obligation to the skilled, the trained, the unusual women.76

One of the three executive orders created the commission, another was a directive to Federal agencies to prohibit discrimination in the employment of women, and the third created the Citizens Advisory Council on the Status of Women and an Interdepartmental Commission on the Status of Women. Both of these were the fruits of the report of the President’s Commission on the Status of Women, which found no need for ERA, but that work needed to be done to prevent discrimination against women. The legislation primarily dealt with appropriations to the Women’s Bureau in the Department of Labor (six). The seventh piece of legislation was the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The Equal Pay Act was also the fruit of the commission. The act was the first piece of legislation in US history to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. It required employers to pay equal compensation to men and women who performed equal work. Political women 172

Johnson granted a bit of access and response to the movement. Regarding access, the 1964 Democratic Party platform had a section on equal opportunity for women, Johnson met nine times with women’s groups, and created one office/commission concerning women. The 1964 Democratic platform stated that ‘we will support legislation to carry forward the progress already made toward full equality of opportunity for women as well as men’.77 Regarding this platform Johnson stated during a press conference on 1 February 1964: ‘I supported that platform and embraced that platform, and stated that view in 43 States in the Union. I realize there has been discrimination in the employment of women, and I am doing my best to do something about it. I am hopeful that in the next month we will have made substantial advances in that field.’78 Johnson met with women’s groups nine times, including the League of Women Voters, recently appointed women in government, the International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union, and other groups of women in the government. A majority of these meetings were before the 1964 election (he met five times with women’s groups in 1964, alone). During these meetings he always reiterated his desire to increase the number of women in government, and improve upon equal opportunity for women. For instance, in his remarks in Pittsburgh to the League of Women Voters, in April 1964, ‘we must make use of the talents of women in government if we expect to have better government…’ and later in that speech he said, ‘There are a great many more women that have taken high places, but we haven’t begun yet.’79 Then, in an address to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, he commented, ‘We want you to go out on the high-ways and the byways and tell the young women of America that this is no longer a stag Government, this is no longer a stag administration, and no longer is there anything like a one-man’s army.’80 Finally, during his remarks to the 1964 Campaign Conference of Democratic Women, he commented on the numbers of women he had appointed to government: ‘In the last 3 months almost 200 women have been appointed to positions of responsibility in the Federal Government. Almost 600 women have received promotions to upper grades above $10,000 per year.’81 Johnson worked very hard, before the 1964 election, to increase the number of women in government. The commission he created was the New Study Group for Women, established in 1966. The commission was intended to study careers for women, and, as Johnson stated, ‘I expect the members of this study group to probe deeply into the problems of the working woman. I want them to tell us which career fields appear to offer the greatest promise for our women. I want them to tell us what our colleges and universities can do to help young women to prepare and to train for these fields.’82 He also hoped that this group would suggest ways to change employers’ attitudes towards hiring women, and how to make government service more attractive to women.83 Johnson granted the movement some access, but arguably he could have increased the women’s movement’s access to other political elites. As when Wilson encouraged Pou to create a Women’s Suffrage Committee in the House, Johnson could have done the same with Cellar. As Steiner argues, had Johnson wanted to, he could have influenced Emanuel Cellar to hold hearings on the ERA: ‘President Johnson might have persuaded Emanuel Cellar to unlock the Judiciary Committee …but Johnson’s interests and priorities, like those of John F.Kennedy, were with other causes.’84 Johnson was deeply involved with civil rights legislation and was still a labour-oriented Democrat. He did not want to alienate women, and may have genuinely believed in equal rights, but he was too The third wave: 1960–85 173 involved in other issues, and still loyal to labour. One of the women’s groups he did meet with was the International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union, a staunch opponent of the ERA. There was no discussion of ERA during this meeting. Regarding response, Johnson made thirty-five public pronouncements regarding women (fifteen from 1963–64 and twenty from 1965–68), issued three executive orders and signed nine pieces of legislation. Johnson was viewed as an active lobbyist for his legislative agenda. When NOW formed, Johnson was one of their first lobbying targets. Johnson was arguably responding to women before the formation of NOW. In 1964 alone he made fifteen public pronouncements regarding women, many dealing with his attempts to include more women in government positions (as mentioned above). Though possibly an election year ploy to draw in women voters, he claimed that his attention to women was sincere, and would continue: ‘And if there are any doubting Thomases, I want them to know that our determination to enlist women in this administration is not a sporadic, election year objective. It will be a continuing aim, not because it is politic, but because it is sound.’85 His attention to women definitely waned after the election: he made only twenty public pronouncements regarding women from 1965–68, as compared with the fifteen in 1964 alone. Johnson also issued three executive orders. One was to create the New Study Group for Women. Another one was executive order 11246. This required equal employment opportunity in government with no discrimination based on sex, religion, race, colour or national origin, and stated that affirmative action would be taken to ensure that applicants were employed. The third executive order was 11478. This amended 11246, and required the head of each executive agency to establish and maintain an affirmative programme of equal employment opportunity. It also required the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to consider cases concerning sex discrimination. Johnson signed nine pieces of legislation, five appropriations bills for the Women’s Bureau of the Department of Labor. One was the proclamation of Women’s Voters Week. On the substantive side, he signed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prevented discrimination against women, and he repealed section 165 of the revised statutes relating to the appointment of women to clerkships in the executive department. He also signed a law to establish a Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the Navy. On the face of it, this law sounds uninteresting, but it permitted women, for the first time, to serve as lawyers in the Navy. Finally, although Johnson did not lobby Congress on behalf of the ERA, his meetings with women’s groups, attention to women’s issues and appointments of women to government posts encouraged women to believe that change was possible and that the government might be a willing player. Nixon was the first President to endorse the ERA publicly. He granted the movement a bit of access and some response. All the access, except the Republican platform, was granted during his first term. Regarding access, the 1972 (but not 1968) Republican Party platform endorsed the ERA, Nixon met with women’s groups five times and created three offices/commissions. The Republican platform of 1972 dealt extensively, for the first time, with women. It states its commitment to achieving equal rights for women, discusses the present administration’s commitment to women and states its dedication to ratification of the ERA, among other things. Nixon created three commissions/offices. One was the Advisory Committee on Economic Role of Women, established in 1972. The committee was to ‘appraise programs and problems in this crucial area [the nation’s Political women 174 economy]’.86 In creating this committee, Nixon argued, ‘Women are playing an increasingly important role in the economy of our Nation. We in this Administration believe that women must have full equality of opportunity and freedom of choice to pursue their careers, whether they be in the home or outside of the home.’87 Another was the Task Force on Women’s Rights and Responsibilities, established in 1969, and the third was an Office of Women’s Programs created within the Executive Office. Nixon also met with women’s groups five times. These meetings were with the League of Women Voters, the Republican Women’s Conference, the National Federation of Republican Women (twice) and Delegates to the Girls Nation. All of these meetings occurred before the 1972 election. There were no meetings with women’s groups after the election. Thus, Nixon did grant the movement limited access. He also assisted the movement in attaining access to and response from Congress. Nixon, as noted, was one of the first Presidents to announce publicly that he was for the ERA. In 1972, he wrote a letter to the Senate Minority Leader (in response to one he had written Nixon) stating, ‘Throughout twenty-one years I have not altered my belief that equal rights for women warrant a Constitutional guarantee—and I therefore continue to favor the enactment of the Constitutional Amendment to achieve this goal.’88 The Senate passed the ERA that month. Furthermore, his Task Force on Women’s Rights and Responsibilities was the first presidential commission to come out in favour of the ERA. This task force, as well as the advisory committee and the Office of Women’s Programs, helped women gain access to political elites and legitimized their concerns. With more women in government coming out of the woodwork in support of the ERA, and more women being placed in positions of authority, it appeared likely that the women’s movement would find more political elites amenable to their concerns, and ultimately more access and response from them. Why did Nixon do all this? The political potential of women was not lost on him. In an address to Delegates of the Girls Nation he notes, ‘the role of women is tremendously important from a political standpoint, because all election statistics presently show that there are more women who are potential voters than there are men. So, any candidate for office had better get along well with women.’89 Thus Nixon recognized that after his slim victory in 1968 he could not afford to alienate women voters, and thus needed to recognize them and work for their interests. Regarding response, Nixon made four public pronouncements regarding ERA, twenty- five public pronouncements regarding women, issued three executive orders and signed forty-three pieces of legislation. Regarding ERA, beginning with a letter on 18 March 1972 to the Senate Majority Leader, Nixon reiterated his support for ERA four times. In his State of the Union Message to Congress on Human Resources in March 1973, he stated, ‘Additionally, in the year ahead, we will continue to support ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution so that American women—not a minority group but a majority of the whole population—need never again be denied equal opportunity.’90 In his twenty-five public pronouncements, Nixon constantly repeated his dedication to equal opportunity for women, and his goal of appointing more women to government positions. Upon appointing Helen D.Bentley as chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission in 1969, he commented, ‘Mrs Bentley is representative of the extremely well-qualified women we have been able to bring into Government service. As The third wave: 1960–85 175 a knowledgeable lady in a man’s world, she has gained a reputation for being the best there is. That, in the long run, is what we are looking for in any position.’91 Then in 1971, in a memorandum about women in government, he commented, ‘The Nation’s many highly qualified women represent an important reservoir of ability and talent that we must draw on to a greater degree. In this Administration we have firmly espoused the rights of women, and we must now clearly demonstrate our recognition of the equality of women by making greater use of their skills in high level positions.’92 One final example: by 1972 Nixon could claim that his administration had appointed more women to places of responsibility than any previous administration.93 Nixon issued three executive orders and signed forty-three pieces of legislation into law. One of the executive orders created the Task Force on Women’s Rights and Responsibilities (similar to Kennedy’s commission), another created the Advisory Committee on the Economic Role of Women, and the third was a programme to increase the hiring of women in the Federal government. The majority of the legislation that Nixon signed prohibited sex discrimination in various Federal programmes and acts. Only five pieces were proclamations for such things as International Women’s Year, the Fiftieth Anniversary of the League of Women Voters and the Fiftieth Anniversary of Woman Suffrage. Thus we see with Nixon committees/task forces created, legislation signed and much verbal commitment to the issue of women’s rights and ERA. Furthermore, his actions created more access points for the women’s movement and led to more responses from all parts of government regarding their concerns. Many in the women’s movement, however, did not view this as enough. As Aileen C. Hernandez of NOW stated in a letter to Nixon, ‘you have stated your support of the Equal Rights Amendment, and yet we have not seen evidence that you are matching your long verbal commitment with the leadership that is necessary to put the words into action’.94 Letter writing, creating committees, signing legislation and the like was not enough. Nixon felt that this was enough, that he could do no more concerning the ratification process, except state that his administration supported the ERA. As his White House aide, Jack Butram, said in an interview with a newspaper reporter, ‘there is only so much “tinkering” the administration can do with the ratification process “before you get a lot of people’s noses out of joint.”’95 Lobby as they might, the women’s movement was going to get no more out of Nixon. Ford offered a bit of access and some response to the movement. Regarding access, the 1972 Republican Party platform endorsed ERA (discussed under Nixon), Ford met with women’s groups seven times, and created one office/ commission. The commission he created was the National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year, the activities of which would ‘reinforce our continuing national commitment to women’s rights’.96 Ford appeared to support ERA. During most of his meetings with women’s groups he commented on the necessity for, and his support of, it. When he addressed the graduating women at Holton-Arms school, in Bethesda, MD, he stated, ‘Before America completes its Bicentennial celebration, I hope the equal rights amendment will be part of the United States Constitution. For ERA also stands for a new era for women in America, an era of equal rights and responsibilities and rewards.’97 Most of the women’s groups Ford met with, however, were not like those that Nixon or Carter met with. Ford met with the Daughters of the American Revolution, and did not Political women 176 discuss women’s rights; he met with the Women’s Forum on National Security, and again did not discuss women’s rights; and he spoke at the graduation ceremony quoted above. He did not tend to meet with overtly political groups. He did address the National Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, where he noted his support while in Congress, of the ERA, and wished them luck in their efforts to get it passed.98 This did not sound like a President who was willing to go the distance for ERA. Ford also met with the Citizens Advisory Council on the Status of Women and the National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year. He said nothing of interest to the former group, but appeared to take a more active stance on women’s rights with the latter. He expressed his support of ERA, and his belief that change could not wait for its ratification: ‘But injustice cannot await upon politics, nor upon the lengthy public discussion which has already delayed ratification of this constitutional amendment. The time to act is now. Therefore, I have today directed the Attorney General to develop…a plan to review the entire United States Code.’99 It appears that Ford was attempting to avoid ERA, but do something to please women. Overall, women did not attain much access to Ford. The groups he tended to meet with were not political in nature, nor did he discuss equal rights with them; he discussed ERA, but attempted to avoid any responsibility for it. Regarding response, Ford made eight public pronouncements regarding ERA, nineteen public pronouncements regarding women, issued four executive orders and signed seventeen pieces of legislation. Of the four executive orders, one was an extension of an earlier one, and one extended one he issued. Thus, he issued two substantive executive orders, one of which created a Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year, and the other was a memo to department heads urging equal opportunity in employment. Ford supported the ERA but preferred to let his wife, Betty, do most of the public speaking on the topic. He did reiterate eight times his support for the amendment, but he did no telephone calling or letter writing to encourage state representatives or senators to vote for it. NOW hoped that Ford presented a better political climate, and in a letter to their membership, argued that now was the time for ERA to be ratified, ‘because of the new political climate created by President Ford and the strong support of the ERA expressed by President Ford and the support and eagerness to campaign for the ERA offered by Betty Ford’.100 Their hopes were not to be fulfilled, however. Ford supported the ERA, but his endorsements were less than zealous. When asked by a reporter at a news conference if he would get on the phone and call a few state legislators, he responded, ‘Well, I think Betty does a fine job in this effort. I, of course, voted for the equal rights amendment when I was in Congress. My record is clear. She is an effective spokesman, and I see no decrease in her enthusiasm for this. So, come next year, I expect she can speak for both of us’ (emphasis added).101 Not exactly the strong support the women’s movement had hoped for. As Steiner notes, regarding Ford and the ERA, ‘the bad luck of the ERA is that during two crucial years when it most needed a strategist of the Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon school, Gerald Ford found it expedient to hand this ball off to his wife’.102 Thus, some response was granted by Ford, but it was not as concrete as the movement had hoped. A few states ratified the ERA, but with no input from Ford. The third wave: 1960–85 177

Carter’s presidency was different: he offered increased amounts of access and response. Regarding access, the 1976 Democratic platform endorsed the ERA, Carter met with ERA groups eleven times, he met with other women’s groups nineteen times, and created six offices/commissions. Carter was a change for the women’s movement. He created the National Women’s Business Enterprise Policy (1979), the National Advisory Council for Women (1978) (renamed the President’s Advisory Committee for Women in 1979), an Interdepartmental Task Force on Women (1978), a Department of Justice Task Force on Sex Discrimination, a Task Force on Women Business Owners (1977) and a National Advisory Council on Women’s Education Programs (1978). The Task Force on Women Business Owners was created to address the lack of current and accurate information on the problems that face women business owners. As Carter commented, ‘This Administration wants to encourage women to become business owners to mitigate conditions and practices that place women at a competitive advantage, and to enhance Federal assistance to women entrepreneurs.’103 The National Advisory Committee for Women was designed to advise Carter on the steps necessary to achieve equality for women, and the Interdepartmental Task Force on Women was to review ‘the applicability of initiatives designed to promote the full equality for American women…and consult regularly with the committee.104 The purpose of the National Advisory Council on Women’s Education Programs was, ‘to make recommendations… regarding policy, programs, and the allocation of funds for the improvement of women’s education’.105 Carter also directed the National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year to convene a National Women’s Conference in 1977. This was to ‘draw up recommendations for ending the barriers to women’s equality in the United States’.106 These new or extended groups served as access points to political elites for the women’s movement, and created an air of governmental complicity. Some of the groups Carter met with were, the National Federation of Democratic Women, the National Women’s Political Caucus, the National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year, the League of Women Voters, the National Council of Negro Women and coalitions of various representatives of women’s groups. At almost all meetings he reiterated his commitment to ERA and other legislation that offered improved opportunities and equality for women. For instance, six weeks after his inauguration he met with a group of representatives of women’s groups, and stated,

I’ve done the best I could along with many of you to get the Equal Rights Amendment passed… And in my public statements more recently… I have never equivocated about it… We have appointed strong, vigorous, sometimes controversial, women spokesmen to positions of crucial importance … And my own effort to ensure adequate women to represent you and others in this country will be continuing.107

At a meeting with the League of Women Voters in May 1980, he stated, ‘We’ve still got one major unmet need, and that is to have the equal rights amendment ratified… Again, we’ve made some progress. We’ve had, I think, 6 women Cabinet officers in 200 years; I’ve appointed 3 of them—not enough, not enough. And we’ve got 32 Federal judges now who are women, and I’ve appointed 28 of the 32.’108 He met with more women’s Political women 178 groups than any of his predecessors, and appeared to offer more access to the women’s movement than any previous President. Regarding response, Carter made sixty-three public pronouncements regarding ERA, fifty-one regarding women, issued seven executive orders and signed twenty-eight pieces of legislation. His support of ERA never wavered, and he did not pass the buck on to his wife, Roslyn, as Ford had done. He put in a plug for ERA whenever the opportunity presented itself, not just when meeting with those who would like to hear it. He discussed it during his State of the Union Addresses, before the Georgia General Assembly, in remarks to the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, at a fundraising dinner for himself and Vice President Mondale, and to the National Urban League, to name a few. For instance, when addressing the National Urban League he stated, ‘I’m here today to renew my permanent pledge to you, that I will never relent in our joint pursuit of equal rights, equal opportunity, and equal dignity for everyone who lives in America.’109 When addressing the Civil Service Employees Association he commented,

We’ve got unmet needs in civil rights, in human rights. And one of the most important things that’s impressed on my mind today: I’m the father of a beautiful little girl; I’m the grandfather of a beautiful little girl, and I want to be sure that when my daughter and granddaughter face the future, they have the same equal rights as men guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States.110

He also stated his support of ERA whenever asked about it on radio call-in shows or at town meetings. For example, when questioned about his commitment to ERA, at a town meeting, he answered, ‘I am strongly in favor of the ratification of the ERA.’111 And during a telephone call-in programme he stated, ‘we do need to give women equal rights. They’ve been cheated too long. They don’t have equal pay for equal jobs, and I think that this equal rights amendment [sic], which is very simple and very clear, would be a good thing for our country.’112 Some of the legislation he signed provided for privacy for rape victims, prohibiting discrimination in the workplace due to pregnancy, the Educational Equity Act, and the deadline extension for ERA. President Carter, and his whole family, became actively involved in efforts to get the ERA ratified. As noted, he spoke publicly on his support for ERA, addressed the Illinois state legislature, as well as other legislatures, and wrote and/or called numerous state representatives and senators urging them to ratify the ERA. All of this was to no avail: not one state ratified the ERA while Carter was in office, and as noted earlier, some were annoyed with his interference. NOW did not view Carter as active in the realm of women’s rights and the ERA. They felt that Carter was not doing enough for the ERA, and that if he would work harder, he could get it passed. Sixty-three public statements in support of the ERA, fifty-one statements in support of women’s issues, commissions and task forces, and letters and calls to state representatives and senators, were not enough. Only ratification of the ERA was enough for the women’s movement. That ratification was the movement’s ultimate goal is not odd. What is odd is the movement’s belief that a President could do more than Carter did. How does a President convince state legislators (who dislike Federal The third wave: 1960–85 179 intervention in their affairs) to vote for an amendment, aside from calling or writing to them? NOW ultimately withdrew their support for Carter in his 1980 re-election bid. Reagan, during the 1980 campaign, came out against the ERA, but he quickly attempted to convince women that he was on their side. Reagan wrote a letter to NOW, immediately before the election, explaining that he was all for women’s rights, and they did not realize all the work he had done over the years for women’s rights:

I was disappointed to read that your convention in San Antonio attacked my position on women’s rights. I believe that many of you may be unaware of my record in support of equal rights and opportunities for women, which includes 14 specific bills I have advocated and signed as governor… I have been working to promote women’s rights since long before it became fashionable to do so.113

Reagan’s ‘woman problem’ continued throughout the campaign. One of his strategists, Lyn Nofziger, advised Reagan that appointing a woman to the Supreme Court was ‘the best thing to do politically’.114 It was clear to Reagan, and to his strategists, that he had a woman problem, and needed to do something about it. NOW also recognized that Reagan had a problem with women, and credited his promise to appoint a woman to the Supreme Court, and conduct a review of statutes, to this problem: ‘throughout the campaign, Ronald Reagan clearly had a problem with women, as a constituency, to the point that he felt obliged to make a special pitch by promising the appointment of a woman to the Supreme Court and a statute by statute approach to remedying discrimination based on sex’.115 The election of 1980 was one of the first times that a gender gap in voting was evident. A summary of the exit polls done by NOW shows that not only was there a gender gap in the 1980 election, but that it was growing ‘from 8% on November 4, 1980 to twice that, 16% on August 17, 1981. Although voter turnout last fall was low, particularly among Democrats, the election day spread between men’s and women’s choices translated into 3.3 million votes.’116 Reagan had less support from women than men, and may have felt that it was not a politically wise move potentially to alienate 50 per cent of the voting population in the next election. Ultimately, Reagan granted a great deal of access to women’s groups—he met with varying women’s groups more than any previous President, twenty-two times, and created four specialized offices/task forces (only Carter exceeded him in this measure, creating six). The majority of his meetings with women’s groups were right before the 1984 election, from 1983–84 (nineteen versus two for the other three years). The specialized offices/task forces were also all created during his first term. Reagan established the President’s Advisory Committee on Women’s Business Ownership (1983), the Task Force on Legal Equity for Women (1981), the Fifty States Project (1981) and the White House Coordinating Council on Women (1982). The Task Force on Legal Equity for Women was designed to ‘ensure that current and future Federal regulations do not discriminate because of sex’.117 Reagan also commented, upon the creation of this task force, that the Attorney General was going systematically to review all laws and regulations to identify gender-based discrimination.118 Reagan initially claimed that he created this task force, that it had not Political women 180 been done before, but, in actuality, this project was started by Ford, continued by Carter and continued by Reagan. A reporter at a news conference in 1982 called Reagan on this: ‘The task force is one that was started by Jerry Ford. It was funded by Carter.’ Reagan responded, ‘That’s right… I do not claim that I started the task force.’119 On a few occasions, however, he claimed to have started this task force. In fact, upon its creation, he stated, ‘For the first time, there will be a working Task Force, with a clear Presidential mandate, for this express purpose.’120 In January 1982, during the State of the Union, he commented, ‘We launched a new Task Force on Legal Equity for Women and a Fifty States Project that will examine State laws for discriminatory language.’121 The Fifty States Project instructed every governor to appoint a representative to review the state laws to identify sex discrimination. As just noted, Reagan professed to have been the first to create such a project, but the Fifty States Project sounded strangely similar to the state commissions created after Kennedy created the President’s Advisory Commission on the Status of Women. The White House Coordinating Council on Women was created to ‘serve as a focal point for the coordination of policies and issues that are of particular concern to women. The Council will also work on the appointment of women and the development of policy and programs by regularly bringing women’s concerns to the attention of the President…’122 This is the only commission/task force that was entirely ‘new’ to Reagan’s administration. Finally, the President’s Advisory Committee on Women’s Business Ownership was created in 1983 to ‘review the status of businesses owned by women; foster, through the private sector, financial, educational, and procurement support for women entrepreneurs; and provide appropriate advice to the President…’123 This task force bore a strange resemblance to one Carter created on women business owners. The reason these inconsistencies are important is that Reagan was trying to convince women that he was granting them more access than his predecessors by creating these ‘new’ entities, but in actuality he was only continuing projects started by previous Presidents. It would appear that Reagan was attempting to assuage women and win them over before the 1984 election. Reagan met with no pro-ERA groups, and the women’s groups he did meet with tended to be conservative in nature (groups representing Republican women leaders). Regarding response, Reagan made six public pronouncements in opposition to the ERA, fifty-six public pronouncements regarding women, issued two executive orders and signed twenty-eight pieces of legislation. The two executive orders created the President’s Advisory Committee on Women’s Business Ownership and the Task Force on Legal Equity for Women. The majority of Reagan’s public pronouncements regarding women were from 1983–84, immediately before the next election (versus zero during 1985). All of his public pronouncements constantly reiterated his commitment to creating equality for women, without the ERA, and the numerous appointments of women he had made. Regarding the ERA, when addressing the representatives to the Fifty States Project, he commented, ‘Then there’s the question of the ERA and, while it’s true that I do not believe that it is the best way to end discrimination against women, I do believe with all my heart that such discrimination must be eliminated.’124 This was his standard response regarding ERA. When discussing women in government he stated, ‘And in spite of the mistaken notions we are somehow lagging in women appointments, the truth is just the opposite. After 8 months in office, we have selected as many women to serve in top The third wave: 1960–85 181 policymaking posts as the previous administration had at the end of the first entire year, and more appointments will follow.’125 When discussing women, Reagan usually noted that he had appointed more women to government policymaking positions than any of his predecessors. By 1984, Reagan could claim that ‘out of the 4000 appointments that I can make in government, almost half of those are women. There has never been anything like that. Secondly, there’s never been three women on the Cabinet before, as there are now. And I have appointed the first woman to be a Justice of the Supreme Court.’126 Reagan clearly recognized the gender gap, and the perception that he lacked interest in women’s issues, and was responding to this. He stated at a luncheon with the Women Business Owners of New York, ‘The simple truth is I’ve been frustrated by the perception that’s been created about my supposed lack of interest in the welfare of women, and I’m going to take advantage of this opportunity to reveal some things.’127 He went on to outline the women he had appointed to government positions, Cabinet positions, the Supreme Court (one woman), and the task forces he had created to help achieve equality for women, among other achievements. He also noted that the Justice Department had completed its review of all the laws and regulations, and that his administration had taken steps to amend those laws that discriminated against women: ‘We have already proposed legislation to correct 122 [of 140] of them. Of the remaining 18, 6 are still under study, the rest favor women and will remain unchanged.’128 Thus, Reagan offered access and response in a concerted attempt to win women over to his side, especially before the 1984 election, but the access and response were anti-ERA, and viewed as insincere by many women in the movement. As one NOW release stated, ‘Reagan may fool some of the people some of the time… But not most of the women.’129 During the early eighties, the women’s movement showed signs of being co-opted by the Democratic Party. Before this point, the women’s movement had remained strictly non-partisan. As an article in The Militant (a movement newspaper) in 1978 argued, ‘In the short run it is only by building a powerful and self reliant movement that women will have a tool, a weapon, for forcing concessions from the Democrats and Republicans.’130 Beginning in the early eighties, however, the movement felt that political conditions were no longer conducive to non-partisan politics. The rise of Reagan, and the conservatives of the Republican Party, made it very difficult for NOW to attempt to work with the Republicans. As Ellie Smeal, once president of NOW, commented in a letter to NOW activists, ‘ERA proponents can no longer ignore the demonstrated opposition of the Republican political leadership to the Equal Rights Amendment and to women’s rights. The issue is rapidly becoming, despite the efforts of Republicans who believe in individual rights, a partisan issue.’131 Later in the letter, she argued, ‘The suffragists held the party in power responsible for the defeat of the 19th amendment. It is time we held the Republican Right responsible for blocking the ERA.’132 This focus on partisan politics detracted from NOW’s lobbying efforts, as money normally spent on lobbying went towards electoral politics. As Costain and Costain argue, regarding this drain on the lobbying resources, ‘NOW’s political resources were fully committed to electoral politics with little staff time or money left for lobbying.’133 These political resources tended to be spent on Democratic candidates who were viewed as more sympathetic to women’s issues than the Republican right. The movement became increasingly associated with the Democratic Party, and as Costain and Costain argue, ‘in attempting to perpetuate and widen the gender gap through financial Political women 182 contributions to sympathetic candidates and to use the media to articulate the policy content of the gender gap, women’s groups were quickly drawn into the Democratic Party’s political orbit’.134 Partisan politics, as discussed in Chapter 2, can weaken a movement, as it drains it of its resources, draws its leaders away from the movement and into governmental posts, and indicates to the party with whom it is working that it has the movement under its thumb. All of this ultimately drains the movement of its energy and ability to make demands on political elites. One party knows that the movement will not work for it, and thus has no reason to respond to it, and the other party knows that the movement will work for it, no matter what, and thus has no reason to respond to it: it is a no-win situation. This is the situation in which the women’s movement found itself in the early eighties, and from which it had to extract itself to have political leverage again. In sum, we see the movement gain the most access and response from presidencies during which the POS is open. Kennedy, Johnson (pre-1964 election), Nixon (first term), and Carter (Reagan, first term, is the exception) all granted the movement quite a bit of access and response. Carter offered the most of all of them, and this may be related to the movement being at its organizational peak. Ford is an exception. He offered some access and response during what was a modified closed POS, but since Ford was never elected to his office (neither Vice President nor President), he may have been unsure of who his re-election constituency was. He may have felt that he could afford to alienate almost no one. This would explain the access and response granted: he needed women’s votes, but was willing to go only so far to get them. By meeting with women’s groups, publicly endorsing ERA and espousing women’s rights, he hoped to draw some women into his camp, without having to campaign actively for ERA. Reagan is another exception. Both of his terms had a modified closed POS. Reagan made a few overtures to the movement before the 1980 election, but it is before the 1984 election that we see the most. The gender gap in the 1980 election may have prompted Reagan to attempt to win some of those women over to his side through public endorsements of women’s rights and meeting with women’s groups (albeit conservative ones). During the mixed and modified closed POS presidencies, the movement received decidedly less access and response. Both access and response dropped off with Johnson’s second term (mixed), Nixon’s second term (closed) and Reagan’s second term (closed). Johnson decided not to run again, but Nixon and Reagan could not run again, and thus had no need to increase their re-election constituency.

Conclusion

Although ERA was not ratified by the necessary number of states, the movement had some achievements. Although not directly a result of movement agitation, the successful discharge petition in Congress was an achievement for the movement, showing that a chair could be circumvented, and that the movement had support in Congress. The ability of chairs to block legislation that had overwhelming congressional support led, in part, to the reforms that took place in Congress in the mid-1970s. The clear, overwhelming support also indicated that ERA would pass Congress soon. This achievement highlights another one: the devoted friends the movement had in Congress. They provided the movement inroads into both houses by introducing bills and The third wave: 1960–85 183 discharge petitions, signing discharge petitions, arguing the case for ERA, writing favourable reports, attaining a ratification deadline extension and reintroducing the ERA after it failed to be ratified. The movement also had some presidential allies. Kennedy and Johnson, although not supporters of ERA, did support women’s rights, and arguably, they created a context within which they could be discussed: presidential commissions, task forces and the like. Nixon, Ford and Carter all endorsed the ERA, and all worked to get it ratified by the states, although in varying degrees. Presidential support was, most likely, a positive force upon public opinion. A third achievement for the movement was the passage of ERA by Congress. Its passage was the culmination of a fifty-year struggle, if its inception is taken to be the first time it was introduced in 1923, or a 124-year struggle, if its inception is taken to be Seneca Falls. The NWP, and eventually NOW, worked very hard to get it through, and its passage is due, in part, to the persistent lobbying efforts of a devoted cadre of women in the NWP. The movement also had some failures/disappointments during this wave. The most obvious was the failure of ERA to be ratified by enough states. ERA had become a rallying cry for the movement, and one upon which many women could agree. It was not as divisive as abortion, and thus provided an impetus and energy to the movement. Its failure was a disappointment to many in the women’s movement who believed that passage of ERA was important for equal rights, but its failure was also a disappointment because, as when suffrage passed, it signalled the end of a tide of women’s activism on the mass level. The movement no longer had a unifying goal. Even though ERA could be reintroduced, the momentum was lost. The movement was discouraged and worn out. Nor did the movement have the surge of positive energy that ERA’s passage would have provided. The movement lapsed into a period of lessened activity. Another failure for the movement, connected to that discussed above, was the movement’s failure to recognize the need for ratification activity immediately after ERA passed. It passed with such overwhelming margins that the movement felt that ratification was guaranteed. Their awareness that this was not the case came a little late. By the time they realized that ratification was not a sure thing, they had to expend their energies on attaining a ratification deadline extension. In addition, the opposition had plenty of time to organize. Although a separate topic unto itself, the rise of anti-ERA forces is important to note. Stop-ERA, an anti-ERA group led by Phylis Schlafley, quickly organized and gained momentum as national sentiment turned conservative in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Stop-ERA successfully rode the tide of conservatism that was sweeping the USA. It was very adept at working at the state level. It worked hard lobbying state legislators and breeding anti-ERA sentiment among the electorate. Had the women’s movement worked for ratification at the state level immediately after the ERA passed Congress, they might have had more success there. There is no such thing as a ‘sure thing’. A final failure for the movement was NOW’s attempt at partisanship in the 1980 election. NOW’s decision not to support Carter did nothing to aid the cause. NOW alienated a friend it needed. Carter did not abandon his support of ERA, and did continue to meet with other pro-ERA women’s groups, but NOW saddled itself with another chore on top of ERA ratification: where to find an ardent supporter of ERA who had political clout Furthermore, its decision was not universally supported by its leadership and Political women 184 membership, thus creating (exacerbating) internal divisions. As a Newsweek article commented on 7 January 1980: ‘at the meeting of the NOW board last month, a split developed over strategy. Some leaders worried that the dump-Carter move would destroy what bargaining power NOW still had…’135 Attempting to get anti-ERA state legislators out of office should have been NOW’s main political focus, not denying their support to a pro-ERA President. Was the access and response received by the movement what was expected in light of the POS? This section will discuss whether the amount of access and response gained in the House and the Senate is what was expected considering the POS, whether the amount of access and response granted by the Presidents is what was expected considering the POS, and then will close with a discussion of why the access and response granted was different from what was expected (if it was). In the House, the amount of access attained is what was expected considering the POS (see Table 6.4a). The POS during five of the House Congresses was closed, it was modified closed during one, it was mixed during six and modified open during one. During the modified closed Congresses it was expected that the movement would receive very little access, and during the closed Congress, it was expected that the movement would receive very little to no access. During both the modified closed and closed congresses (all from 1960–71), the movement received absolutely no access. Though it was expected that the movement would receive some access during modified closed Congresses, the results are not odd. Chairmen of committees could decide what bills would receive hearings. The chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Emmanuel Cellar, was against ERA, and decided that no hearings would be held. It was not until he was challenged (Martha Griffiths 1970 discharge petition) that he acquiesced. Why wasn’t he challenged earlier? There is no definitive answer, but there are some educated guesses. First, challenging chairs was not likely to be beneficial to one’s political career. Whether you were successful or failed, your future relations with the still powerful chair would be decidedly bleak. Second, organized labour was against ERA before 1970. In 1970 the UAW came out in support of ERA, and in 1973, the AFL-CIO endorsed it, but before 1970, it was not a politically wise move for labour Democrats to endorse the ERA (Democrats controlled Congress for most of this wave). Once the UAW endorsed it, however, this removed one roadblock for Democrats. Third, it was not clear before the late 1960s that there was a large bloc of women behind the ERA. With the new mass movement combined with the old, elite-based movement, a formidable bloc of women voters presented themselves. Finally, discharge petitions, the only way forcibly to get a bill out of committee, are rarely successful. Members do not believe it wise to circumvent the committee system (why they chose to this time is discussed earlier in the chapter). There may be other suppositions, but it is fairly clear why no member had challenged Cellar before 1970; it was not politically wise or useful. Thus, the lack of hearings during modified closed Congresses is not odd. During the mixed and modified open Congresses it was expected that the movement would receive some access (a few hearings per Congress). In the House, the movement received some access. In 1971, during a mixed Congress, the ERA received its first hearing since 1948 (subcommittee hearing; the last full committee hearing was 1932). In all applicable mixed and modified open Congresses (all of which occurred after 1971), The third wave: 1960–85 185 there were hearings on ERA. By ‘applicable’ I mean any Congresses during which ERA would have been discussed—those Congresses before its passage (all before Ninety- second), those Congresses during which extension of the deadline was an issue (Ninety- fifth), and those Congresses after it had failed to be ratified (Ninety-seventh and Ninety- eighth). During the Ninety-fifth Congress (mixed) there were hearings on a ratification extension deadline bill, and during the Ninety-eighth Congress (mixed) there were hearings on ERA again. The only mixed Congress during which there were no hearings was the Ninety-seventh (1981–83). ERA failed to be ratified in June of 1982; there were thus only six months left during this Congress for hearings to be held. It is not odd that hearings were not held during this short period of time: the movement and members of Congress needed time to gather their forces to begin another battie. Access in the Senate was also what was expected (see Table 6.4b). There were four Congresses during which the POS was modified closed (Eighty-seventh-ninetieth). The movement received no access during these Congresses. Then, during all applicable modified open or mixed Congresses, except two, the movement received access. In 1970, during a modified open Congress, there were hearings on ERA for the first time since 1956. Then, in 1978, during a modified open Congress, there was a hearing on the bill to extend the ratification deadline of ERA, and finally, in 1983, during a mixed Congress, there were hearings on ERA. In only two modified open Congresses did the movement receive no access, the Ninety-second and the Ninety-seventh. The reason for the lack of hearings during the Ninety-seventh Congress is the same as for the House: ERA had just failed to be ratified, and there were only six months left during the Congress. There was barely time to introduce bills, let alone schedule hearings. It is more difficult to explain the lack of hearings during the Ninety-second Congress. Perhaps because ERA appeared to be on a roll, and the House was holding hearings, the Senate saw no need to hold any, and decided instead just to report it to the floor. Finally, in both houses, the state of the POS and the number of pro- and anti-ERA witnesses appear to be related. This was not the case during the first and second waves, when the number of witnesses for either side appeared to be dependent only upon how many delegates the national association sent, and there was no strong, organized opposition until early in the twentieth century. During the modified open and mixed Congresses of this wave, there were decidedly more pro-ERA witnesses invited to testify at the hearings (see Tables 6.4a and 6.4b). It must be noted, however, that this was not a period (Ninety-first and Ninety-second Congresses) of strong opposition to ERA. Although there was still some labour opposition, the UAW had come around, as had many organizations, and the anti-ERA movement led by Phyllis Schaffley was not yet organized. Nevertheless, had the committees wanted to invite more anti-ERA witnesses than pro- they probably could have found enough people to do so. Thus it appears that the state of the POS and the number of witnesses, in modern Congresses, are related. The committee has the power to decide whom shall be invited to testify, and can tip the balance in whatever favour they so choose. As Hansen argues, when studying the access agricultural concerns received from Congress, ‘in granting access, lawmakers give serious, sustained attention to the policy views of their favored informants’.137 Had members of Congress not felt that ERA activists were their ‘favored informants’, they would not have invited so many to testify. Political women 186

Is the amount of access attained in the House and the Senate related to the state of the POS? It appears to be. During the closed and modified closed Congresses, in both houses, there were middling to high levels of party unity, stable electoral conditions, strong committee chairs (in the House), organized labour in opposition, no strong, mass-based movement and no access granted. All of these factors, when combined, made it very difficult, if not impossible, for ERA. ERA had no political benefit to offer members, and the women’s movement was not yet organizationally strong. It had no political clout with which to bargain. It was not until the movement was stronger, part of labour had endorsed ERA and the POS became more open that ERA had any success in Congress. The response in the House is primarily what was expected considering the POS (see Table 6.5a). During the first four Congresses the POS was closed for three, modified open for one, and the movement was granted little response, save for bills introduced. During these four Congresses, a large number of bills were introduced per Congress (140, 103, 122 and 152 respectively), and these bills were introduced by a bevy of members, not just a repeated few. Support for the amendment was widespread. It would appear that members were willing (or able) to respond up to a certain point. There were no reports, and no bills brought to the floor. It was close to impossible to get ERA out of committee due to Chairman Cellar, and most members were not willing to take the political risks involved in challenging him. During the fifth Congress of the wave, the Ninety-first, the POS was closed. During this Congress, the response attained is not what was expected. Two hundred and sixty-six bills were introduced, and ERA was brought to the floor, voted upon and passed. Why? The discharge petition is why ERA was brought to the floor and voted upon. But why was the petition successful, and why did it pass the full House? The reasons may be those discussed earlier in the chapter (see Steiner), along with a few others. Members may have acted out of fairness: ERA had been introduced for nearly fifty years, and been denied hearings, due to one man, for almost forty years—ERA deserved its day. Although the POS shifted, the allies and gains made in previous Congresses were not eradicated. Such bonds can endure from Congress to Congress. There were also hearings occurring in the subcommittee of the Education Committee (a subcommittee chaired by Edith Green, D- Oregon) regarding equality in education, which could serve as surrogate hearings for ERA. In addition, the UAW had endorsed ERA, and the women’s movement was organized and out there. Members of Congress could no longer ignore the potential bloc of women voters. Thus, although the POS was closed, it began to change, as evidenced by its mixed nature in the next Congress, and this benefited the ERA. During the mixed Congresses and modified open Congress, the response granted is what was expected. During the Ninety-second Congress, during which the POS was mixed, there were many bills introduced, favourable reports, ERA came to the floor twice, where it failed once (June 1971) and passed once (October 1971). Then, during the other applicable Congresses, Ninety-fifth, Ninety-seventh and Ninety-eighth (all mixed), the response was what was expected. During the Ninety-fifth there were bills introduced, a favourable report, floor debate and the ERA extension of ratification deadline bill passed. Then, during the Ninety-seventh, there were ERA bills introduced (three), but nothing else. This is not odd since ERA had just failed to be ratified, and there were only six months left in the Congress. There was not time to report, debate, or vote upon a bill. During the Ninety-eighth there were nine bills introduced, no reports, but ERA came to The third wave: 1960–85 187 the floor, where it effectively failed. This response—not a lot, but not nil—is what was expected since the Congress was not entirely open. The response in the Senate is also what was expected in light of the POS (see Table 6.5b). During the first four Congresses of this wave, the POS was modified closed and there was very little access attained. During these Congresses there was one bill introduced per Congress (except Eighty-seventh, which had zero), two favourable reports (Eighty-seventh and Eighty-eighth) and nothing else. Then, beginning in the Ninety-first Congress, the POS began to open up. The POS during the remaining Congresses of this wave was either modified open (Ninety-first, Ninety-second, Ninety-fifth, Ninety-sixth and Ninety-seventh) or mixed (Ninety-third, Ninety-fourth and Ninety-eighth). During all applicable Congresses, the response granted was what was expected. During the Ninety- first there was one bill introduced, one favourable subcommittee report, and ERA was brought to the floor, where no further action was taken. Then, during the Ninety-second, there were six bills introduced, one favourable committee report, and, it was brought to the floor, voted upon and passed on 22 March 1972. During the Ninety-fifth Congress there was one ERA ratification deadline extension bill introduced, no report, but it was brought to the floor, voted upon and passed. Finally, during the Ninety-seventh and Ninety-eighth Congresses, there was one ERA bill introduced in each Congress. More response was expected from the Ninety-seventh, because it was modified open, but the lack of response is not odd since there were only six months left in the Congress when the ERA failed to be ratified. With the Ninety-eighth, the lack of response is not odd either, because the POS during this Congress was mixed. Thus, the POS was not entirely open, and there was limited response granted. Is the amount of response received from both houses, and the state of the POS, related? I would argue yes. In both houses, limited response was granted to the movement during Congresses in which the POS was closed or modified closed. Party unity was at middling to high levels, electoral conditions were stable, chairs could decide what bills would receive hearings, what witnesses would testify, whether or not a bill received a report (and whether it was favourable or unfavourable), to which subcommittees members were assigned, and to which subcommittee a bill was referred (in the House); organized labour was opposed to ERA, the movement was not organizationally strong yet and, as a result, there was very little response granted. All of these factors combined to make ERA an unattractive issue. There was little reason to grant the movement response. Nor could members grant response, even if they wanted to, given the power of the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. Thus, apart from the success of the discharge petition during a Congress with a closed POS, the response granted was what was expected in light of the POS. In both houses we see the POS transform from fairly closed during the first four Congresses in the Senate, and the first five in the House, offering little to no access or response, to one that is more open during the remainder of the Congresses, offering increased amounts of access and response. The power of chairs in the House was curbed, party unity decreased for a short time in both houses, there were unstable electoral conditions in the Senate for a while, and mass opinion favoured the ERA. On top of these changes, organized labour endorsed ERA, and the movement became organizationally strong. Under such conditions, the movement attained access and was granted response by both houses. Political women 188

Also of interest regarding congressional access and response is the access and response the ERA got from Congress before the formation of a mass-based women’s movement. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the ERA received attention from both houses from the 1930s–1950s, despite the lack of a mass-based movement. Why? No complete explanation is possible here, but some speculation is due. The ERA passed the Senate in 1950, 1953 and 1960, all three times with the Hayden rider attached, which preserved states’ protective legislation, thereby weakening the potential effect of the ERA. In the House, the ERA was reported favourably to the floor twice in 1945 and 1948. But it never received a vote on the floor, and was not reported again until Martha Griffiths’s discharge petition in 1970. One possible reason for the attention to the ERA in the 1940s and 1950s was the changed attitude of the American people after the Second World War. Women assumed many new and varied positions in industry, business and society during this war. Perhaps legislators were more willing after the war to believe women were due equal rights with men, and it must be remembered that the Senate passed the ERA with the Hayden rider attached. Thus, the ERA was not such a potentially revolutionary tool with this addendum. States were still allowed to have protective legislation for women. In the House the ERA did not receive much attention. The subcommittee reported it favourably numerous times (1936, 1937, 1939, 1941 and 1943), but the full committee did not grant it much attention (see discussion earlier in chapter), and the full House never voted on it. One other possible reason for the attention the ERA received in the 1930s– 1950s was the National Woman’s Party. This was not a mass-based movement, but made its presence felt in Congress. It spent a great deal of time lobbying representatives to support the ERA; perhaps its persistence paid off. By constantly lobbying representatives the NWP may have convinced some legislators that the ERA was necessary and created the impression that they had more members than they did (and thus more political leverage). Regardless of why there was ERA activity, the NWP served as a crucial link between the woman suffrage movement and the contemporary women’s movement. The amount of access and response received by the movement from the Presidents is primarily what was expected considering the POS. It was expected that presidencies during which the POS was open would offer the movement some access and response. Furthermore, it was expected that presidencies during which the POS was open would tend to offer the movement more access and response than those during which the POS was mixed or modified closed. Presidencies during which the POS was open did tend to grant the movement more access and response than presidencies during which the POS was mixed or modified closed (see Tables 6.6 and 6.7). Kennedy, Johnson (first term), Nixon (first term) and Carter all granted more access to the movement than Johnson (second term) or Nixon (second term). The only oddity is Reagan. Reagan had a modified closed POS (both terms), and granted vast amounts of access and response to women, according to the indicators. Reasons for this will be discussed. Kennedy met with women’s groups five times, the Democratic platform espoused equality for women, and he created three offices/commissions concerning women. One of these was the President’s Commission on the Status of Women. This commission arguably helped fuel the organization of the women’s movement, as it brought women together and gave them a forum in which to discuss their common problems. Regarding The third wave: 1960–85 189 response, he made fourteen public pronouncements regarding women, issued three executive orders and signed seven pieces of legislation. Johnson, before the 1964 election, also granted the movement access and response. He met with women’s groups five times and stated his support of the Democratic platform’s pledge to equality for women. Regarding response, he made fifteen public pronouncements regarding women. During his second term, during which the POS was mixed, the access and response he granted decreased a bit. During the four years of his presidency he met with women’s groups four times and created one commission for women, the New Study Group for Women, which was designed to examine careers for women. Regarding response, he made twenty public pronouncements, issued three executive orders and signed nine pieces of legislation. It is clear that his attention to women began to wane after the 1964 election. Nixon, during his first term (open POS), granted the movement access and response. He met with women’s groups five times and created three offices/ commissions for women. Regarding response, he made one public pronouncement regarding ERA, twenty-two regarding women, issued three executive orders and signed nineteen pieces of legislation. In Nixon’s second term, during which the POS was mixed, the amount of access and response decreased. He met with no women’s groups and created no offices/commissions for women. Regarding response, he made three public pronouncements regarding the ERA, three regarding women, issued no executive orders and signed twenty-four pieces of legislation. These decreases are too marked to be attributable to his shortened tenure in office, due to his resignation. Ford is a bit of an anomaly. The POS during his presidency is modified closed, but it can be argued that since Ford was never elected, he may have been unsure of his re- election constituency and unwilling to alienate any potential bloc of voters. Thus it was expected that Ford would offer some amount of access and response, and more than would be expected of a closed presidency. This is the case. Regarding access, during his short tenure, Ford met with women’s groups seven times and created one office/commission regarding women. Regarding response, he made eight public pronouncements regarding ERA, nineteen regarding women, issued four executive orders and signed seventeen pieces of legislation. Carter’s presidency, during which the POS was open, offered the movement the most access and response of any President. He met with pro-ERA groups eleven times, women’s groups nineteen times and created six offices/commissions for women. Regarding response, he made sixty-three public pronouncements regarding ERA, fifty- one regarding women, issued seven executive orders and signed twenty-eight pieces of legislation. Why did Carter respond so to the women’s movement? One answer is that he won in 1976 by a narrow margin, and was attempting to draw in more constituents by responding to the women’s movement, but if this were the case, why did Ford not make the same attempt? He technically had no re-election constituency, and yet he tended to pass the buck on ERA to his wife, Betty. Perhaps the answer lies in whether or not an incumbent is challenged for his party’s nomination, and if so, the political leanings of the challenger. Ford was challenged for the presidential nomination in 1976 by Ronald Reagan, an extremely conservative Republican (if that is not a tautology). As Costain comments, ‘when Ford began to face a strong challenge for his party’s 1976 presidential nomination Political women 190 from conservative candidate Ronald Reagan…he increasingly stepped away from his earlier ringing support of the ERA’.137 We also see that when Carter faced a challenge from Ted Kennedy, in the 1980 election, he increased his attention to women (despite his falling out with NOW). As a Newsweek article commented, ‘NOW’s split with Carter has thrust the women’s movement squarely into the nomination fight between Carter and Senator Edward Kennedy—and forced both of them to step up their efforts to win women’s votes in 1980.’138 Thus the existence of and ideological bent of a challenger may have influenced the amount of response that an electorally insecure President granted the women’s movement. Reagan is a bit of an anomaly. The POS during his two terms was modified closed, and he granted women, if not the movement, much access and response. Regarding access, he met with women’s groups twenty-two times and created four offices/commissions regarding women. Regarding response, he made fifty-six public pronouncements regarding women, issued two executive orders and signed twenty-eight pieces of legislation. Although not a measure, he also appointed the first woman to the Supreme Court. Reagan was not in favour of the ERA, and he made six public pronouncements to that effect. Thus, on the face of it, Reagan offered a great deal of access and response. Reagan was attempting to assuage the women’s movement, and draw them into his camp, but to no avail. His message appealed only to the conservative women with whom he tended to hold meetings. He attempted to draw women in because the 1980 election results indicated that there was a clear gender gap. Reagan may have felt that he could not afford to alienate such a large portion of the voting population in the next election. Most of Reagan’s access and response comes before the 1984 election, and drops off after his re-election. For instance, Reagan made zero public pronouncements regarding women in 1985, and twenty-five in 1984. In retrospect, the large amount of access and response granted by Reagan is not that odd. Though the levels offered rival the open POS of Carter, and surpass the open POS of other Presidents, Reagan was attempting to appeal to women to bolster his re-election constituency, but was not willing to offer the concrete response the movement wanted: support of ERA. Once he was re- elected, his attention to women dissipated substantially. A final note. I have argued that presidencies, during which the POS was open, tended to offer the movement more access and response than those during which the POS was mixed or modified closed. Clearly the open POS of Carter offered the movement vastly greater amounts of access and response than the open POS of Kennedy. I would argue that these presidencies can be grouped together because the amount of access and response granted is relative to the time. The movement was barely in existence when Kennedy was President. Thus the amount of access and response was quite a lot considering the lack of a strong, mass-based movement. On the other hand, the movement was at its height during Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan’s presidency. Thus it is reasonable to expect that what was considered a decent amount of access and response from Kennedy would not be considered such under Nixon, Ford, Carter or Reagan. Is the amount of access and response granted and the state of the POS related? I would argue that it is. Those presidencies during which the POS was open tended to grant the movement more access and response than those during which the POS was mixed or closed. When Presidents needed to increase their electoral constituency, and recognized the political clout of women, they appealed to women voters. Once they were re-elected, The third wave: 1960–85 191 could not run for a third term (or decided not to run for a second), and were thus no longer in need of increasing their re-election constituency, their attention to women dropped off significantly. Presidents responded to the women’s movement when it was politically useful to do so. This is not to say that some of them did not genuinely believe in what they were saying or doing—that would only make it easier—but rather that they recognized the political usefulness of the movement, and granted it access and response to attain the desired goal of re-election. Once re-elected, there was no impetus to work very hard to draw women into the fold. In sum, it appears as if the POS goes far in explaining the amount of access and response granted by both houses of Congress. Congresses during which the POS was modified closed or closed tended to offer the movement very little, to no access or response. Congresses during which the POS was open, modified open or mixed tended to offer the movement some access and response. Finally, the state of the POS can also explain the amount of access and response granted to the movement by the Presidents. Presidencies during which the POS was open tended to offer more access and response than presidencies during which the POS was mixed or closed.

Notes 1. Buechler, Women’s Movements, p. 26. 2. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, ‘Voting Studies’, 1979, p. 29-C. 3. Ibid, 1983, p. 26-C. 4. David W.Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 8. 5. Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, ‘Feminism and the Meaning of the Vote’, Signs 10, no. 1 (1984), p. 4. 6. Gilbert Y.Steiner, Constitutional Inequality (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institutions, 1985), p. 27. 7. Steiner, Constitutional Inequality, p. 27. 8. ERA passed during the Ninety-second Congress, so technically there would be no hearings after that Congress. There were, however, ERA extension bills and hearings, and when ERA failed to be ratified by enough states, more ERA bills were introduced. Thus, the existence of bills, hearings etc. for those two items will be considered here. 9. Buechler, Women’s Movements, p. 27. 10. Freeman, The Politics, p. 53. 11. Buechler, Women’s Movements, pp. 27–8. 12. Ibid., p. 29. 13. Betty Friedan, ‘How NOW Began’, Folder: Presidential Reports, Letters, etc. 1966–76, Box 43, National Organization for Women (NOW) Collection, Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Cambridge, MA, p. 3. 14. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 45. 15. Alice S.Rossi to Betty Friedan, 28 September 1966, Folder: NOW Correspondence Membership 1966–67, Box 14, NOW Collection, Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library (AESL), Cambridge, MA. 16. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 30. 17. Ibid., p. 31. 18. Buechler, Women’s Movements, p. 32. 19. ‘Report of the President’, November 1967, Folder: Presidential Reports, Letters, etc. 1966– 76, Box 43, NOW Collection, AESL. Political women 192

20. Letter from NOW to President Johnson, 11 November 1966, Folder: Presidential Reports, Letters, etc. 1966–76, Box 43, NOW Collection, AESL, p. 4. 21. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 52. 22. Ibid., p. 40. 23. Freeman, The Politics, p. 75. 24. Ibid., p. 76. 25. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 46. 26. Bernice Sandler to Eric F.Goldman, 25 February 1976, Folder: Notes on History 1973–78, Box 1, Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL) Collection, AESL. 27. Anne Costain and W.Douglas Costain, ‘Strategy and Tactics of the Women’s Movement in the United States: The Role of Political Parties’, in The Women’s Movements of the United States and Western Europe, Mary F.Katzenstein and Carol M. Mueller (eds) (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1987), p. 200. 28. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 49. 29. Buechler, Women’s Movements, p. 64. 30. Rossi to Friedan, 28 September 1966, Folder: NOW Correspondence Membership 1966–67, NOW Collection, AESL. 31. Freeman, The Politics, p. 83. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., p. 84. 34. Ibid., p. 85. 35. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 51. 36. Clayton Fritchey, ‘White House-Keeping for the ERA’, Washington Post, 12 March 1977, p. A19. 37. Karen DeCrow, ‘NOW Goes to the Democratic Convention’, Folder: Democratic Convention 1976, Carton 8, NOW Collection, AESL. 38. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, ‘Carter and the ERA: A Misplaced Priority’, Washington Post, 9 March 1977, p. A11. 39. Ibid. 40. Fritchey, ‘White House-Keeping’, p. A19. 41. Christine Candela, ‘To: WEAL Board, State Presidents and Convenors’, Folder: 17, Box 3, NOW Collection, AESL. 42. See the attachment on a letter from Sarah Weddington to Pamela Pierce, 2 February 1980, ‘Passage of the ERA: A Summary of the Efforts of Jimmy Carter’, Folder: 119, Correspondence I, Box 16, NOW Collection, AESL. 43. ‘Carter to Try Harder to get ERA Ratified,’ Folder: Carter on ERA, Box 53, NOW Collection, AESL. 44. ‘History of the ERA’, Folder 16, Box 3, NOW Collection, AESL. 45. Casey Hughes to Robert Strauss, 15 May 1975, Folder: Legislative Office, Box 26, NOW Collection, AESL. 46. The election of 1980 was the first one where NOW could have legally endorsed a candidate. The IRS had informed them that endorsements would not jeopardize their tax-exempt status as long as it was not their primary purpose. 47. Nancy Thompson, ‘For Immediate Release’, 12 December 1979, Folder: 119 Correspondence I, Box 16, NOW Collection, AESL. 48. Letter from Republican National Committee to Republican legislators, 20 January 1973, Folder: ERA Printed, Carton 9, NOW Collection, AESL. 49. Letter from Ronald Reagan to NOW, 13 October 1980, Folder: 24, Box 3, NOW Collection, AESL. 50. Department of Justice, ‘For Immediate Release,’ 5 January 1982, Folder: 117, Box 16, NOW Collection, AESL. The third wave: 1960–85 193

51. Mary Thornton, ‘U.S. Stance Further Jeopardizes ERA’, Washington Post 6 January 1982, p. A5. 52. All of the information in this section on hearings and reports is taken from the following sources: the CIS indices; Congressional Digest 22 (January–December 1943): 105–6; Congressional Research Service report 85–36; Hazel Greenberg, ed. and compiler, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Bibliographic Study, compiled by the Equal Rights Amendment Project, Anita Miller, Project Director (Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1976). 53. Data for the Ninety-eighth Congress taken from CRS report 85–36. It covers all constitutional amendments introduced from 1969–84. It also provides legislative histories on some of the amendments, ERA being one. Under the heading of ‘hearings’ it lists fifteen dates during the Ninety-eighth Congress. It does not indicate whether or not these were committee or subcommittee hearings, or even if they are all separate hearings. 54. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 27. 55. Catharine Stimpson (ed.), Women and the ‘Equal Rights’ Amendment (New York and London: R.R.Bowker Company, 1972), p. 93. 56. Stimpson, Women, p. 13. 57. Walter J.Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996), p. 153. 58. Steiner, Constitutional Inequality, p. 16. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid., p. 17. 61. Ibid., p. 18. 62. Galloway, History of the House, p. 81. 63. Ibid. 64. Steiner, Constitutional Inequality, p. 15. 65. Greenberg, The ERA, p. xiv. 66. Steiner, Constitutional Inequality, p. 14. 67. ‘Chronology of the Equal Rights Amendment’, 84-M216, Box 3, Folder 17, NOW Collection, AESL. 68. Johnson, National Party Platforms vol. 2, p. 589. 69. John F.Kennedy, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Services, 1961), p. 709. 70. Ibid., p. 799. 71. Ibid., p. 1962, p. 130. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid., p. 342. 74. Ibid., 1963, p. 362. 75. Ibid., p. 465. 76. Ibid. 780. 77. Johnson, National Party Platforms, vol. 2, p. 645. 78. Lyndon B.Johnson, Public Papers of the Presidents (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1963–64), p. 259. 79. Ibid., pp. 533, 536. 80. Ibid., p. 581. 81. Ibid., p. 595. 82. Ibid., 1966, p. 227. 83. Ibid. 84. Steiner, Constitutional Inequality, p. 32. 85. Lyndon B.Johnson, Public Papers, 1963–64, p. 209. 86. Richard M.Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Record Service, 1972), p. 881. 87. Ibid., p. 880. Political women 194

88. Ibid., p. 444. 89. Ibid., 1971, p. 864. 90. Ibid., 1973, p. 143. 91. Ibid., 1969, p. 646. 92. Ibid., 1971, p. 580. 93. Ibid., 1972, p. 784. 94. Aileen C.Hernandez to Richard M.Nixon, no date, Folder: President’s reports, letters etc., 1966–76, Box 43, NOW Collection, AESL. 95. ‘Nixon Quietly Aids Women’s Rights’, The Evening Star and Daily News, 2 March 1973, Folder: ERA Printed, Carton 9, NOW Collection, AESL. 96. Gerald R.Ford, Public Papers of the Presidents (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1975), p. 25. 97. Ibid., p. 775. 98. Ibid., 1976, p. 523. 99. Ibid., p. 1948. 100. Karen DeCrow, ‘Dear Friend’, Folder: ERA, Box 15, NOW Collection, AESL. 101. Gerald R.Ford, Public Papers, 1975, p. 974. 102. Steiner, Constitutional Inequality, p. 35. 103. Jimmy Carter, Public Papers of the Presidents (Washington, DC, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1977), p. 1429. 104. Ibid., 1978, pp. 680–1. 105. Ibid., p. 1086. 106. Ibid., 1977, p. 525. 107. Ibid., p. 356. 108. Ibid., 1980, p. 830. 109. Ibid., p. 1500. 110. Ibid., p. 2006. 111. Ibid., p. 880. 112. Ibid., 1977, p. 300. 113. Letter from Ronald Reagan to NOW, 13 October 1980, Folder: 24, Box 3, NOW Collection, AESL. 114. ‘And Justice for Us’, Folder: A Compilation of ERA Materials, Carton 77, NOW Collection, AESL. 115. Toni Carabillo, ‘No Mandate for Dinosaurs’, National NOW Times, December and January 1980–81, carton 77, Folder: No Mandate for Dinosaurs, 84-m216, NOW Collection, AESL. 116. ‘Women Can Make the Difference’, Folder: A Compilation of ERA Materials, Carton 77, NOW Collection, AESL. 117. Ronald Reagan, Public Papers of the Presidents (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1981), p. 1174. 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid., 1982, p. 989. 120. Ibid., 1981, p. 1174. 121. Ibid., 1982, p. 77. 122. Ibid., p. 1084. 123. Ibid., 1983, p. 902. 124. Ibid., 1981, p. 901. 125. Ibid., p. 811. 126. Ibid., 1984, p. 1011. 127. Ibid., p. 469. 128. Ibid., p. 470. 129. NOW, Box 6, Folder: Republican Party-Reagan, 85-m21, Now Collection, AESL. The third wave: 1960–85 195

130. Diane Wang, ‘Women and Political Action: Is Backing Democrats, Republicans “Realistic”?’, The Militant, 7 April 1978, Box 3, folder 17, 84-m216, NOW Collection, AESL. 131. Letter from Ellie Smeal to NOW Activists, 5 February 1982, Folder: Republican Action Project, Box 55, NOW Collection, AESL, p. 2. 132. Ibid. 133. Costain and Costain, ‘The Political Strategies’, p. 207. 134. Ibid., p. 210. 135. ‘What Women Want’, Newsweek 7 January 1980, p. 29. 136. John Mark Hansen, Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919–81 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1991), p. 22. 137. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion, p. 92. 138. ‘What Women Want’, Newsweek, 7 January 1980, p. 29. 7 Conclusion

I began this study with a few objectives. In this chapter I return to these objectives, attempting to summarize the empirical and theoretical findings. My first objective was to highlight the usefulness of resource mobilization and political opportunity/ political process theories when combined. My second objective was to operationalize the political opportunity structure. There exists a general understanding and acceptance of the variables that define the POS, but without a satisfactory operationalization of it there is no way for scholars to test the validity of the concept. My third objective was to show that the POS is a key determinant of the relations between social movements and political elites. I hoped to show that the POS determines whether social movements gain access to and/or response from political elites. Part of this third objective was that I wanted to show that there are different types of response that political elites can offer. Specifically, political elites will offer co-optive responses under a closed POS and concrete responses under an open POS. The final aspect of this third objective was that I hoped to show that the POS also determines, in part, whether a social movement remains autonomous from political elites, or is co-opted by them. Another objective in this chapter is to draw comparisons among the three waves—how were they similar and different in regard to the POS and the access and response they received? I will do this while discussing the other objectives. My final objective is to reflect on how the approach used here could be used to study other social movements. First, the idea in resource mobilization theory that external allies and resources are necessary conditions for social movement success is useful when combined with the idea in political opportunity/process theory that the POS determines social movement access to and response from political elites. The three waves of the women’s movement all had success at the Federal level when they had resources (money, organization and members), external allies (friends in Congress, business, unions, etc.), and the POS was open (electoral instability, low party unity, favourable mass opinion, lack of powers to party leaders). Efforts on the part of groups in each wave did not meet with success when those conditions were not met (suffrage before 1910, and ERA before the late 1960s, and the late 1970s till the early 1980s). Neither resource mobilization nor political opportunity/process is enough on its own to explain the women’s movement’s relations with political elites, but when both are taken together we get a clearer picture of when the women’s movement gained access to and response from political elites. Conclusion 197

Second, I met with some success operationalizing the POS. Regarding Congress, the measures appear to help explain when the women’s movement gained access to and response from political elites. Overall, the three waves showed similar patterns—when the POS was modified open or open the movement received more access and response than when it was modified closed or closed. During the first wave the movement received very little access and/or response from political elites in the House and the POS was closed. While in the Senate, with a more open POS, the movement gained increased access to and response from political elites. During the second wave the amount of access and response the woman suffrage movement received increased when the POS in both houses opened up after 1910. Regarding the third wave, the movement also gained more access to and response from political elites during those Congresses where the POS was modified open or open versus those where it was modified closed or closed. One disadvantage is that the indicators are not very good for the first wave in the Senate. This is because there are no party unity scores for the Senate for most of the wave, there is no electoral instability measure because they were not directly elected yet, and mass opinion is irrelevant also because they were not yet directly elected. Thus, the measures still need to be fine-tuned for this era. Regarding the Presidents, the measures also appear to help explain when the women’s movement gained access to and response from the Presidents. In all three waves, the Presidents with an open or modified open POS tended to grant the movement more access and response than those with a closed or modified closed POS. Presidents tended to cater more to the movement when they were electorally unstable/unsafe and mass opinion favoured the movement issue. They spoke publicly about the issue and women more, they met with movement groups and women’s groups more, and they issued more executive orders and signed more legislation regarding women. Finally, there is still a need for an overall measure of the POS for the whole political system. It was useful in this analysis to analyse the POS of each institution in the political system. In doing this I could examine the specific types of access and response from each institution. This was useful because the political climate that affects access to and response from each institution is frequently different. An overall measure, however, would be useful and should be created. Third, the POS was a key determinant of the relations between the women’s movement and political elites. Resource mobilization theory views relations with political elites as helpful and necessary for the movement. Some political opportunity/process theorists see these relations as detrimental to the movement, while others see them as neither good nor bad, just unavoidable. What they all fail to consider is that the relations between social movements and political elites depend on the political climate—the POS. Not only did the women’s movement gain increased access to and response from political elites during an open POS, but it gained concrete as opposed to co-optive response and maintained autonomy as opposed to being co-opted. An open POS made it necessary for political elites to offer access and response to the women’s movement. Under an open POS political elites were in need of the resources that the women’s movement had (members, votes, issues). Thus the women’s movement had increased political leverage with political elites under an open POS. Furthermore, when the POS was open, political elites offered concrete responses (e.g., bills brought to floor, voted on and passed) because they were in need of the movement’s resources. The movement recognized its Political women 198 increased political leverage, and thus was not easily assuaged by lip service, and not easily co-opted by political elites. When the POS was closed the women’s movement was more likely to grasp at any response it could get from political elites. Political elites recognized their advantage, and thus offered only co-optive responses (designed to assuage the movement and not really change the status quo). Under a closed POS the movement risked being co-opted by political elites as it became more and more willing to accept whatever morsels were offered it (examples being the movement during the first wave with the Republican Party and during the third wave with the Democratic Party). During the first wave the woman suffrage movement did not have political leverage with political elites. The POS was closed in the House and the presidencies for most of the wave and the movement was not yet organizationally strong. Consequently, the movement was not in a good bargaining position: it received very little access or response, and the response was co-optive—some public pronouncements regarding women (not suffrage), a few meetings with the various Presidents, some legislation regarding women, some bills introduced and some hearings. There were few favourable reports, however, suffrage did not pass Congress, and no President made a positive public pronouncement regarding woman suffrage or lobbied Congress for it. The movement, although it remained autonomous, potentially compromised this a few times. For instance, when the Republican platform of 1872 mentioned that the demands of women should be considered, the movement declared that it should put all of its force behind electing Republicans to office. In the end, the Republicans were elected, and did nothing to aid the cause of woman suffrage. During the second wave conditions were a bit different. The POS began to open up in all areas after 1910 (both houses of Congress, and a few Presidents). The woman suffrage movement also became organizationally stronger in the post-1910 era. This, along with the opening POS, gave the woman suffrage movement more political leverage with political elites. Specifically, it was successful in attaining the creation of a Woman Suffrage Committee in the House, gaining a presidential ally (Wilson—and arguably playing a key role in changing his mind to support woman suffrage), and seeing woman suffrage become an amendment to the Constitution. Not once did the movement swoon when a party platform mentioned that women should be listened to. Political elites came to recognize that women had political clout (many could vote in states) and could not be ignored as a constituency if one wanted to be re-elected. Finally, during the third wave the movement maintained its autonomy and attained concrete responses until the late 1970s, early 1980s. At that time the conservative leanings of the new Republican leadership forced the movement to look primarily to the Democratic Party. The movement became very closely aligned with the Democratic Party and arguably lost some of its bargaining power. The Democrats expected the movement to support them because it had no one else to whom to turn. Democrats did work for women’s issues, but arguably the movement had lost a bargaining chip. If the Democrats were not as attentive or did not work as hard as the movement felt they should, the movement could not threaten to take its votes elsewhere because there was no elsewhere. Republicans were not friendly towards movement issues and if movement members did not vote at all they risked seeing more Republicans elected, which could make matters worse. Conclusion 199

In sum, resource mobilization theory and political opportunity/process theory, when combined, offer a more complete picture of the relations between social movements and political elites. Second, the operationalization of the POS for Congress and the presidency appears to work well. This work aids in the creation of measures of the POS so that others may test the validity of the concept. The measures are weak for the Senate during the first wave, however, and a measure of the POS for the political system as a whole still needs to be created. Finally, this work shows that the POS is a key determinant of relations between political elites and social movements. All three waves gained similar amounts of access to and response from political elites when the POS was similar. Under an open POS the movement gained more access to and response from political elites than under a closed POS. Furthermore, response under a closed POS tended to be co-optive, whereas under an open POS the response tended to be concrete. In addition, the various waves of the women’s movement were better able to maintain their autonomy under an open POS than under a closed POS. How can this approach be used to study other social movements? This approach should be quite useful in the study of these. Specifically, it could be used to examine another social movement, like the women’s movement, that spans many years. For instance, it could be applied to a study of the abolition movement and its subsequent development into the Civil Rights Movement, or the labour movement. Doing this would help determine if the measures of the POS are applicable to more than one movement. If they are not, they may need to be refined, and if they are, then the reliability of the measures is increased and the study of social movement/political elite relations is taken a step further. Or the approach could be used to examine two different social movements that existed at the same time. As with the long-term, single social movement study, this could help determine whether the measures of the POS explain the relations between political elites and two different social movements, or if they were an anomaly that worked only for the women’s movement. Finally, the measures could be adapted to foreign political systems and social movements. If the measures are transferable across political systems then this would aid the comparative study of social movements, as well as strengthen the reliability of the measures. If they do not work, then the measures may be culturally bound, or again, an anomaly that worked only for the women’s movement. No matter in what form, the work done here should be continued and built upon. Further study of the relations between social movements and political elites can only improve our understanding of political systems, how they respond to challenges, and under what conditions they grant access to challengers. Appendix A Sources of data

Political opportunity structure data

Electoral instability

Congress House 1849–1929: Nelson Polsby, ‘The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives’, APSR 62 (1968), pp. 144–68. Senate 1914–29: Robert C.Byrd, The Senate: Historical Statistics 1789–1989, Wendy Wolf (ed.) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993). House and Senate 1960–84: Julie Rovner, ‘Turnover in Congress Hits an All-Time Low’, Congressional Quarterly (19 November 1988), pp. 3362–5.

Presidency

Correlations of state returns Gerald Pomper, ‘Classification of Presidential Elections’, Journal of Politics 29 (August), pp. 535–66. William LeoGrande and Alana Jeydel, ‘Using Presidential Election Returns to Measure Constituency Ideology: A Research Note’, American Politics Quarterly 25, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 3–18.

Percentage difference of two-party democratic vote Absolute vote totals from which to calculate this: National Party Platforms compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1978), vol. 1, 1840–1956; vol. 2, 1960–76, and 1980.

Party unity (as measured by party vote scores, 50 v. 50)

1870–1930 (House and Senate) Garrison Nelson ‘The Modernizing Congress, 1870–1930’, in The Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System, Joel H.Silbey (ed.) (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994), pp. 131–56. Appendix A 201

1960–85 (House and Senate) Taken from Congressional Quarterly for each Congress.

Congressional rules Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives. Published biennially as a House document. Senate Manual, Containing the Standing Rules, Orders, Laws and Resolutions Affecting the Business of the U.S. Senate, Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United States. Published biennially as a Senate document. Clarence Cannon, Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, vols I–XI (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1941). Lewis Deschler, Deschler’s Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, vols I–XI (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1977).

Mass opinion

First wave Stanton et al., The History of Woman Suffrage, vols 1–4 (New York: Arno, 1969). Sally Hunter Graham, Woman Suffrage and the New Democracy (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1996). Nancy McGlen and Karen O’Connor, Women, Politics, and American Society (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995).

Second Wave Stanton et al., The History of Woman Suffrage, vols 4–6 (New York: Arno, 1969).

Third Wave Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, ‘Feminism and the Meaning of the Vote’, Signs 10, no. 1 (1984). Gilbert Y.Steiner, Constitutional Inequality (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985).

Access and response

Access to Congress

Groups testifying Congressional Information Service (CIS) Indices for suffrage and ERA.

Hearings held CIS indices. The Congressional Record. Appendix A 202

The Equal Rights Amendment: A Bibliographic Study, Hazel Greenberg (ed.), compiled by the Equal Rights Amendment Project (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976).

Congressional Response

Bills introduced 1789–1889: Serial Set vol. 3550 pt 2 H Doc 353 pt 2, 54–2. 1889–1926: Serial Set vol. 8546 S Doc 93, 69–1. 1926–63: Serial Set vol. 12445 S Doc 163, 87–2. 1963–69: Serial Set vol. 12840 S Doc 91–38, 91–1. 1969–84: Congressional Research Service report 85–36.

Bills reported CIS indices Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Schuler, Woman Suffrage and Politics (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1923). Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage, 13 February 1900, pp. 1–45. NAWSA collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, container 53, reel 36, ‘Questions and Answers on the Equal Rights Amendment’. Congressional Digest (with a published history of the ERA—early years)—vol. 22, January–December 1943, pp. 105–6. The Equal Rights Amendment: A Bibliographic Study (cited above). Bills voted on upon the floor Same citation as Bills reported. Number of bills that passed Same citation as Bills reported.

Presidential access and response

Access Attention to women’s issues in party platform Johnson, National Party Platforms, cited above. Number of meetings with President (suffrage or ERA groups) Suffrage Carrie Chapman Catt Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, manuscript division. NAWSA Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Manuscript Division. NAWSA Rare Book Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Rare Book Division. Charles Richard Williams, Diary and Letters of Rutherford B.Hayes (Ohio State Archeological Society, 1924). Arthur Link (ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vols 22–65 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976–91). Appendix A 203

Roy P.Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ, 1953). Charles Richard Williams, The Life of Rutherford B.Hayes (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914). Paul Bergeron (ed.), The Papers of Andrew Johnson (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1992). David C.Mearns (ed.), The Lincoln Papers (New York: Doubleday Co., 1948). Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1859–1865 (New York: The Library of America, 1989). Harry J.Brown and Frederick D.Williams (eds), The Diary of James A.Garfield 1872– 1874 (Michigan State University Press, 1967). John Y.Simon (eds), The Papers of Ulysses S.Grant vols 1–16 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973). The Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt parts 1–4 (New York: P. F. Collier and Son, reprinted in 1970 by Kraus Reprint Co.) Theodore Roosevelt, William Griffith (eds), The Roosevelt Policy (New York: Current Literature Publishing Co., 1919). George F.Parker (ed.), The Writings and Speeches of Grover Cleveland (New York: Cassell Publishing Co., 1892). Justus D.Doenecke, The Presidencies of James A.Garfield and Chester A.Arthur (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1981). Theodore Clarke Smith, The Life and Letters of James Abraham Garfield (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1925). George Frederick Howe, Chester A.Arthur: A Quarter Century of Machine Politics (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1934). Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (Boston: Macmillan Company, 1919). Elting E.Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vols 1–8 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951–54). Robert K.Murray, The Harding Era (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969). Randolph C.Downes, The Rise of Warren Gamaliel Harding: 1865–1920 (Ohio State University Press, 1970) Fred Israel (ed.), The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents 1790–1966, vols 1–3 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967).

ERA

Public Papers of the Presidents. National Organization for Women Collection, Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Cambridge, MA.

Meetings with President—other women’s groups

Suffrage Same citations as under Number of meetings with President—suffrage. Appendix A 204

ERA Same citations as under Number of meetings with President—ERA.

Creation of specialized offices, task forces etc.

Suffrage

Private Papers of the Presidents. Published collected works as cited under Number of meetings with President—suffrage. NAWSA collection. Catt collection. Executive orders (from CIS Index to Presidential Executive Orders and Proclamations 30 April 1789 to 4 March 1921 and 4 March 1921 to 31 December 1983).

ERA Same names and terms discussed under Number of meetings with President: ERA.

Public Papers of the Presidents. NOW collection. Executive orders.

Response

Number of public pronouncements regarding suffrage and ERA Suffrage Same names and terms as discussed under Number of meetings with President—suffrage.

Private Papers of the Presidents. Collected works of Presidents as cited under Number of meetings with President— suffrage. NAWSA collection. Catt collection.

ERA Same names and terms as discussed under Number of meetings with President—ERA.

Public Papers of the Presidents. NOW collection.

Number of public pronouncements regarding women in general Suffrage Same names and terms as discussed under Number of meetings with President—suffrage.

ERA Same names and terms discussed under Number of meetings with President—ERA.

Number of executive orders Appendix A 205

CIS indices as cited earlier.

Number of pieces of legislation signed regarding women All from the index of United States Statutes.

Archives NAWSA Rare Book Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. NAWSA Manuscript Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Carrie Chapman Catt Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Private papers of various presidents pre-Woodrow Wilson, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. National Organization for Women Collection, Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library (AESL), Radcliffe College, Cambridge, MA. Women’s Equity Action League Collection, AESL. Women’s History Project, National Archives, Washington, DC. Appendix B The year state suffrage amendments passed

Full suffrage to vote in all Federal elections granted by state unless otherwise noted. Pres. Suffrage: presidential suffrage, could vote in presidential elections only. Year State Electoral votes 1890 Wyoming 3 1893 Colorado 6 1896 Idaho 4 1896 Utah 4 1910 Washington 7 1911 California 13 1912 Oregon 5 1912 Kansas 10 1912 Arizona 3 1913 Illinois—Pres. Suffrage 29 1914 Montana 4 1914 Nevada 3 1917 North Dakota—Pres. Suffrage 5 1917 Nebraska—Pres. Suffrage 8 1917 Rhode Island—Pres. Suffrage 5 1917 New York 45 1917 Arkansas—could vote in primaries 9 1918 Michigan—Pres. Suffrage 15 1918 Texas—could vote in primaries 20 1918 South Dakota 5 1918 Oklahoma 10 Appendix B 207

1919 Indiana 15 1919 Maine—Pres. Suffrage 6 1919 Missouri—Pres. Suffrage 18 1919 Iowa—Pres. Suffrage 13 1919 Minnesota—Pres. Suffrage 12 1919 Ohio—Pres. Suffrage 24 1919 Wisconsin—Pres. Suffrage 13 Year State Electoral votes 1919 Tennessee—Pres. Suffrage 12 1920 Kentucky—Pres. Suffrage 13

Total number of presidential electors for whom women could vote before the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment was 339 out of 531.1

Notes 1. NAWSA, Victory, pp.161–4. Bibliography

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Abolition 46 Abolitionists 45–6, 53 American Anti-Slavery Society 44 American Association of University Women 162 American Equal Rights Association (AERA) 44–6, 54 American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) 2, 24, 29, 32, 46–8, 58, 70, 87–8, 98 Anthony, Susan B. 29, 42–3, 45–6, 49, 54, 56–8, 60, 68, 70–2, 82, 85–6, 107, 110–2, 114, 122, 125–7, 166 Arthur, Chester A. 29, 40, 66, 71, 81

Bennett, Alice 164, 173 Blackwell, Henry 29, 47–8, 70, 84, 86, 109 Bristow-Mondell amendment 118 Buchanan, James 29, 40, 66–7 Burns, Lucy 100

Callister, Marion 164–5 Cannon, Joseph 114–5 Carter, Jimmy 29, 155–5, 162–5, 174–5, 182–6, 187, 189–91, 196–8 Caucus 117 Cellar, Emmanuel 178–9, 191–3 Civil Rights Movement 149, 159, 207 Civil War 32, 39, 43, 45, 57, 69, 71, 75, 101 Clarenbach, Kay 158 Cleveland, Grover 29, 40, 66, 71, 81, 86, 97, 122–4, 140 Cleveland, Mrs. Francis 122–3 Committee Chairman 112, 114–6, 119–20, 127, 129–30, 138, 141–2, 149–53, 170, 172–4, 176, 191, 193–5 Committee on Woman Suffrage 61–2, 73–4, 76, 78–9, 99, 107, 109, 117, 120–2, 130–1, 133–5, 137, 139, 178, 206 Coolidge, Calvin 29, 97, 124, 131–2, 140–1

Daughters of Temperance 42 Democratic Party platform 53, 174, 196 Discharge petition 171, 191–2, 195 Douglass, Frederick 45 Draft, the 171, 173 Index 214

Economic boycott 173 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 158, 160, 179 Equal Pay Act 158, 177 Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) 3, 18, 23–4, 27–3, 87, 148–9, 153, 155–7, 162–7, 170–85, 187– 198, 204 Ervin, Sam 171–4 Executive Order 11246 159–60, 179 Executive Order 11375 160

Fifteenth Amendment 45–6, 67 First Congress to Unite Women 161 Ford, Gerald 29, 155–5, 174–5, 182–4, 186, 189–90, 197–8 Ford, Mrs. Betty 183, 197 Fourteenth Amendment 44–7, 53–4, 56, 67 Friedan, Betty 158, 161

Gage, Matilda Joslyn 57–8, 82 Garfield, James 29, 40, 66, 70–1, 81, 86 gender gap 186, 188–9, 198 General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC) 26, 134, 139 Grant, Ulysses S. 29, 40, 66, 68–9, 81 Green, Edith 194 Griffiths, Martha 171, 195 Grimke, Angelina 42 Grimke, Sarah 42

Harding, Warren G. 29, 97, 124, 131–3, 140 Harrison, Benjamin 29, 40, 66, 72, 81, 86, 122, 124, 140 Hayden rider 195–6 Hayes, Rutherford B. 29, 40, 66, 69–70, 81, 86 Hilles, Charles 127 Hoar, George 58, 60, 71, 109 Holtzman, Elizabeth 164, 173 Howe, Julia Ward 46

Johnson, Andrew 40, 66–7, 81 Johnson, Lyndon B. 29, 155–6, 160, 174–5, 178–9, 183, 189–90, 196

Kennedy, John F. 3, 24, 29, 148, 155–7, 174–7, 179, 187, 189–90, 196, 198 labor: see unions LaFollette 127–8 League of Women Voters 148, 162, 176, 178, 180–1, 184 Lincoln, Abraham 29, 40–1, 66–7, 72, 81, 85 Lockwood, Belva Ann 54–5, 69

Majority Leader 26, 35, 39, 89, 94–5, 117, 181 Index 215

McKinley, William 29, 97, 124–5, 140 Minority Leader 26, 35, 39, 180 Minor, Virginia 46 Minor vs. Happersett 47 Mormon Church 164 Mott, Lucretia 31, 42–3

National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) 2, 24, 29, 32, 46, 48, 55, 83–5, 87–8, 96, 98–102, 107–120, 122–3, 125–7, 129, 131, 134, 136–7, 141–2 National Association of Colored Women (NACW) 38 National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage 110, 119 National Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs 162 National Loyalists Convention 45 National Organization for Women (NOW) 24, 27, 29, 148, 153, 159–66, 170, 173–4, 179, 181, 185–6, 188, 190–1, 197 National Women’s Party (NWP) 29, 100–1, 120, 148, 166, 170, 176, 190, 196 National Woman’s Rights Convention 53 National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) 2, 24, 29, 32, 46–8, 56–9, 62, 65, 67–72, 76, 86–8, 98, 122 Negro suffrage 44–5, 50 New England Woman Suffrage Association (NEWSA) 46 New Left 159 New York State legislature 42, Nineteenth Amendment 87, 134–5, 142 Nixon, Richard 29, 155–6, 174–5, 180–3, 189–90, 196–8

October 17th Movement 161 parades 115, 174 Paul, Alice 29, 99–101, 115, 166 Peterson, Esther 157 Pierce, Franklin 29, 40, 66–7 President’s Commission on the Status of Women 3, 24, 148, 157, 176–7, 187, 196 Pou, Edward 130–1, 178

Rankin, Jeannette 120 ratification of ERA 174, 185 Reagan, Ronald 29, 155–5, 165, 174–5, 185–9, 196–8 Reed, Thomas B. 35 Republican National Committee 127, 164 Republican Party platform 47, 180, 206 Revolt of 1910 5, 142 Roosevelt, Eleanor 157, 176 Roosevelt, Theodore 29, 97, 124–9, 132, 140–1 Rossi, Alice 158, 161

Schlafley, Phyllis 190, 193 Shaw, Anna Howard 29, 87, 114, 129 Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act (STMA) 3, 24, 87, 132 Sixteenth Amendment 55, 57–8, 70–1, 125 Index 216

Sons of Temperance 42 Speaker of the House 26, 35–6, 38, 61, 76–7, 91–6, 99, 107, 114–5, 120, 130, 137, 139, 142, 152 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady 29, 31, 42–3, 45–50, 53–4, 56–9, 63, 67–8, 71–4, 76, 78–9, 82–6, 111–2, 114–5, 118, 120 Stone, Lucy 29, 46–7, 70, 86, 108–9, 127 Susan B.Anthony amendment 58, 101, 130

Taft, William H. 29, 97, 99, 124, 126–7, 129, 140–1 Taylor, Ezra B. 107 Taylor, Zachary 29, 40, 66–7 Third National Conference of State Commissions 158 Thirteenth Amendment 44, 53–4, 67 Tilton, Theodore 45 Timlin, Catherine 164, 173 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 153, 158, 179 Train, George Francis 47, 68 Truman, Harry 65 Tyler, John 40

Underwood, Oscar 117 unions 100, 117, 130, 139, 153, 170, 172, 178–9, 184 Upton, Harriet Taylor 107, 114, 126

Webb, E.Y. 130 Wilson, Woodrow 29, 94, 97, 99–102, 115–6, 121, 124, 128–33, 135, 140–2, 163, 178, 206 Woman’s State Temperance Society 43 Woman’s National Loyal League 43 Women’s Bureau of the Labor Department 157, 177, 179 Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) 38, 83, 134, 139 Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL) 24, 27, 29, 161–2 Woodhull, Victoria 47, 49, 55 World’s Anti-Slavery Convention 31, 42 World War II 195