M S V. POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES
FILIP ČERNOCH, JAN HUSÁK, ONDREJ SCHÜTZ, MICHAL VÍT
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF MASARYK UNIVERSITY BRNO 2011 CONTENT 5
The publication of the book has been financially supported by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Czech Republic Office. CONTENT
Scientific Board of Masaryk University prof. PhDr. Petr Fiala, Ph.D., LL.M. INTRODUCTION ...... 9 Mgr. Iva Zlatušková prof. RNDr. Zuzana Došlá, DSc. Ing. Radmila Droběnová, Ph.D. RESEARCH PROCEDURE...... 13 Mgr. Michaela Hanousková doc. PhDr. Jana Chamonikolasová, Ph.D. THE CZECH REPUBLIC...... 19 doc. JUDr. Josef Kotásek, Ph.D. Mgr. et Mgr. Oldřich Krpec, Ph.D. Introduction to Czech politics and the Czech party system ...... 19 doc. PhDr. Růžena Lukášová, CSc. Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09 prof. PhDr. Petr Macek, CSc. Mgr. Petra Polčáková (Tradice, Odpovědnost, Prosperita 09, TOP 09)...... 25 doc. RNDr. Lubomír Popelínský, Ph.D. Public Affairs (Věci veřejné, VV) ...... 30 Mgr. Kateřina Sedláčková, Ph.D. prof. MUDr. Anna Vašků, CSc. Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS) ...... 34 prof. PhDr. Marie Vítková, CSc. Mgr. Martin Zvonař, Ph.D. Czech Social Democratic Party PhDr. Alena Mizerová (Česká strana sociálně demokraticka, ČSSD) ...... 41 Green Party (Strana Zelených, SZ)...... 45 e book has been elaborated as a part of the research project “Selected Issues of Multi-level Governance in Europe” (MUNI/A/0891/2010) e Freedom Union – Democratic Union sponsored by the Masaryk University. (Unie svobody – Demokratická unie, US-DEU) ...... 49 Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak We would like to thank e International Visegrad Fund for financial support of the research. People’s Party (Křesťanská demokratická unie – československá strana lidová, KDU-ČSL) ...... 52 Communist party of Bohemia a Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSČ)...... 59 Pre-publishing review: Dominika Kasprowicz, Ph.D. Sovereignty (Suverenita)...... 65
Cover Illustrated by Lukáš Lehotský National Party (Národní strana, NS)...... 69 Workers’ Party (Dělnická strana, DS) ...... 75 © 2011 Filip Černoch, Jan Husák, Ondrej Schütz, Michal Vít © 2011 Masaryk University Types of electoral manifestos produced by Czech parties ...... 81 Homogenization type ...... 81 ISBN 978-80-210-5658-9 Postmodern type ...... 83 6 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES CONTENT 7
European type ...... 85 e Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO)...... 147 Communist type ...... 88 Polish National Party (Polska Partia Narodowa, PPN) ...... 151 Populist type...... 89 Nationalist type ...... 91 Alliance of the Democratic Le (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD)...... 154 Conclusion ...... 93 Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) ...... 158 HUNGARY...... 95 Self-defense of Polish Republic (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SRP) ...... 161 Introduction to Hungarian politics and the Hungarian party system ....95 e League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) ...... 166 Fidesz-MPP (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Párt)...... 99 Types of election manifestos produced by Polish political parties...... 170 Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSzP)...... 104 Religious-nationalist type...... 170 Conservative-nationalist type...... 172 Alliance of the Free Democrats Liberal-nationalist type ...... 174 (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SzDSz)...... 109 Liberal type...... 175 Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF)..... 113 Conclusion ...... 177 Politics can be different (Lehet Más a Politika, LMP) ...... 117 JOBBIK – Movement for a Better Hungary SLOVAKIA...... 179 (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom) ...... 120 Introduction to Slovak politics and the party system...... 179 Party of the Hungarian Justice and Life Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS) ...... 183 (Magyar igassák és élet part, MIÉP) ...... 125 People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Types of election manifestos produced by Hungarian (Ľudová strana – Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko ĽS-HZDS) ...... 190 political parties...... 128 Isolationist type ...... 128 Direction – Social Democracy (Smer – sociálna demokracia)...... 196 Greater nation type ...... 128 Freedom and Solidarity (Sloboda a Solidarita, SaS)...... 200 Paternalistic type...... 131 Alliance of the New Citizen (Aliance nového obcana, ANO)...... 203 Anti-nationalist liberal type...... 132 Most – Híd (Bridge, Most – Híd)...... 205 Conclusion ...... 134 Party of the Hungarian Coalition POLAND ...... 137 (Strana maďarskej koalície – Magyar Koalíció Pártja, SMK)...... 206 Introduction to Polish politics and the Polish party system ...... 137 Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – Demokratická Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS)...... 141 strana, SDKÚ-DS) ...... 209 8 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES INTRODUCTION 9
Christian-Democratic Movement (Krestansko-demokraticke hnuti, KDH) ...... 213 INTRODUCTION Slovak People’s Party (Slovenská ľudová strana, SĽS)...... 216 People’s Party – Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana – Naše Slovensko)...... 218 Types of election manifestos produced by Slovak parties...... 220 is publication strives to contribute to the discussion about nation- alism, national identity and related aspects in the region of Central Nationalist type ...... 220 Europe, specifically in the countries of Visegrad cooperation – the Cultural-nationalist type...... 225 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. e publication also Liberal-skeptic type ...... 228 provides a new theoretical approach for classifying the political par- Rightwing liberal type ...... 230 ties of these states according to their national discourses. Another Minority type ...... 232 positive aspects of this publication is the attempt to better under- Conclusion ...... 233 standing of recent political developments related to national issues in central Europe. is attempt can be considered as a reaction towards the Europeanization of central European politics and its manifesta- NATIONALISM IN THE VISEGRAD REGION...... 235 tions at the common European level. Nationalist approach...... 236 e undertaken research did not only focus on radical and ex- tremist parties but on all relevant political parties and forces within National-conservative approach ...... 239 these countries, with specific emphasis on the inclusion of politically Exceptionalist approach ...... 240 irrelevant parties which represent nationalistic currents within the re- Liberal approach ...... 242 spective societies. e phenomenon of nationalism is thus researched Anti-nationalist approach ...... 243 in the political context. e publication maps the different approaches Other approaches ...... 244 towards identity politics and to understanding of nation within the political scene of each country and the region as a whole. is could be helpful, for example, for media investigations and could also stimu- CONCLUSION...... 247 late further political research in this area. At the same time we may also find inspiration for further discus- BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 253 sions about European identity and its variations, about the role of nations in contemporary Europe and within the European Union. Manifestos and programs ...... 257 Historically, the so-called Visegrad countries are countries with Other primary sources ...... 259 strong cultural and national traditions. Yet a lack of knowledge and Websites of the political parties and subjects ...... 260 recognition about these countries in the so-called “old Europe”, and also within the Visegrad region itself, has sometimes caused inap- propriate perceptions and in turn has thus provoked patriotic and national feelings in the Visegrad countries which may have been subsequently reflected in the political declarations of country repre- sentatives abroad. 10 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES INTRODUCTION 11
ree out of the four Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic, Po- and remain hidden in the discussion about European integration land and Hungary, have used significant historical experience with within the EU. But, as with all over the world, we can observe many their own state structures in the middle ages, and modern Slovaks radical national voices in central Europe as well. have their own strong state identity and national feelings, which cre- e central European region is world-renowned for the so-called ates rich bases for traditionalist and historical nationalism in this ‘Velvet Divorce’ of the Czech and Slovak nations: the historical pro- countries. However, this publication does not address the historical gression from one common state of Czechoslovakia to an independ- realities and the national mythologies of the nations covered, nor ent Czech Republic and an independent Slovakia. Both states are the political vocabulary about them; but it is primarily focused on still oen referred to as brothers. Similarly, the minorities of Slovaks regarding nation and how it is politically used and what could this residing in the Czech Republic, and vice versa, are not small and the say us about the national identity of political parties and thus also connections among families and friends are incredibly huge and about the countries in general. is can help us better understand the widespread. is velvet divorce took place in a newly re-established actual political and societal situation in Europe, as well as touch on democracy, and the role of political leaders and their parties was sig- the question of European identity. In particular, we have assessed the nificant. Research and studies have indicated that for ordinary citizens approaches of the various political parties toward minorities within independence was not so important but their silent support to the the countries, something which also has its own value for further parties, especially in Slovakia, was crucial in determining the out- research. come. is recent historical example is one of the obvious examples as is publication is of course geographically based in a region to why ideas regarding nation and national feelings and connotations that has witnessed many changes of state traditions and borders, a are worth studying and analyzing. region that has hosted the political and armed games and adventures To continue this small comparison, slightly different is the divorce of many other nations, yet the region has now duly arrived in the era experience of separating Slovakia from their historical entity before of European cooperation and integration typical for the 21st century, Czechoslovakia, which was held under the leadership of Hungary. a century which should be informed by the terrifying history of na- Aer First World War and the Trianon treaty resolution, many Hun- tional chauvinism performed in the past on the European continent, garians remained in the area of the new Slovak territory cooperating and still lingering today. e central European region has its own at that time with Czechs. e leading artificial nation idea was in fact very real experience of the results of national chauvinism as well as at that time Czechoslovakism. Hungary was defeated and lost the dysfunctional internationalism, and how these can be easily abused to majority of its territory – many millions of Hungarians overnights restrict democracy and freedom, and moreover lead to the introduc- became citizens of newly created states. is came about not as a re- tion of totalitarianism. sult of democratic discussion in the countries but as an international Yet the idea of European cooperation and friendship is not new to agreement aer the world war. is principle turned out to be wrong the region. We can look back, for example, to the 15thcentury and the in Germany, leading to the worst national chauvinism in human his- Bohemian King George from Poděbrady and his “message of peace”, tory and, ultimately, World War Two. It is no wonder that Hungarians reminiscent of the European Union’s proposal for our times. Or to sought revenge and the repercussions of this resonate even now in the early 19th century and to the Polish professor Wojciech Bohu- Hungary’s democratic society and party system. e so-called “Tri- mil Jastrzebowski and his “Dra for a European Constitution”. ere anon trauma” is typical for many of the relevant political parties in have been many discussions about central European integration and Hungary, as research has shown. unions in the past. ese concepts have not been realized because of e revival, too, of the Polish state aer the war was crucial in many external and internal factors. Some of the factors are still alive forming central Europe, yet even in the 20th century the trauma of 12 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES RESEARCH PROCEDURE 13 the partitions of Poland could not be readily forgotten, in the interwar period as well as nowadays with its continuing strong hold among RESEARCH PROCEDURE the Polish nation. e solutions how to survive in such conditions performed by the domestic inhabitants, leaved tracks in the common identity. Traumas and ambitions hidden under the oppressions of other national entities are strongly connected to the identity of in- In our research we strive to describe the way political parties under- dividuals and groups, and as such can be used for political purposes. stand and deal with issues which are connected with the nationalism To avoid uncontrolled reactions within the political scene requires and nationalistic ideology. In this book we will try to identify how knowledge and insight of all this aspects, about their connotation and political parties in the Visegrad region perceive the role of national or political manifestations by different groups and parties. cultural identity in politics and everyday life of the citizens and how In short, the national aspects and historical reminiscences in the they perceive otherness, minorities and foreign influences. Doing so region are clear, and the democratic system could easily be open to we will not just identify attitudes and thinking of the political parties abuse from other changes derived from these “hidden powers” of but since political parties are the most relevant representatives of the societies. e task for democratic systems is thus to pay attention to citizens we will be able to draw also some conclusions for the state of these issues and to follow the links to the political scene and its rep- their respective societies. To be sure we do not claim that political par- resentatives in the form of political parties. And towards this end this ties and their ideologies represent attitudes and ways of thinking of publication is trying to contribute. their voters not to mention of all the citizens of their respective states without oen important deviations and anomalies. Rather we argue that political parties are at least important indicators of the opinions in the society and that with the acceptance of the deviations and incoherencies one can reasonably draw some conclusions from the analysis of the political parties which are relevant for the societies. Above drawn reasoning indicate which parties are of our concern in this book. Since our goal is to cover the broadest possible spectrum of the society and our means are political parties we inevitably have to take into consideration all political parties represented in the leg- islative bodies of the four Visegrad countries. at means that we will take into account manifesto of the party if it was part of the assembly preceding the election or it entered parliament as a result of it. is criteria selects for the analysis almost thirty parties – eight parties in the Czech Republic, six in each Hungary and Poland and ten parties in Slovakia.1 In addition to these parties we will also focus on the parties which while not represented in the legislative bodies of the four countries,
1 Higher number of parties in Slovakia is the consequence of the rather unstable party system. 14 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES RESEARCH PROCEDURE 15 are prominent representatives of the so called extreme-right in their therefore are more probably to be influenced by its actual moods. countries. e inclusion of these parties which in many cases hardly Finally electoral manifestos are convenient for their comparability represent more than one percent of the electorate is necessary in as they are issued in the roughly same time, they respond to similar order to get comprehensive picture about ways identity politics and state of the society and international affairs, but in the same time are nationalism takes in the four Visegrad societies. For those reasons we covering all areas of the life of the countries. In electoral manifestos included into the research also National Party, Workers’s Party and one has opportunity to compare different parties’ policies in specific Sovereignty in the Czech Republic, Party of Hungarian Justice and areas and doing so in number of cases one can easily identify differ- Life in Hungary, Polish National Party in Poland and Slovak People’s ences between approaches of two or more parties. Party and People’s Party – Our Slovakia. Summarized we included We decided to include into research only manifestos issued for into research thirty seven parties from four countries. the general elections i. e. elections to national parliaments of the four Ideology approaches and attitudes of the political parties are phe- countries. Municipal and regional elections are usually dominated nomena which are constantly changing and it is difficult to catch them by the different issues depending on the constituency and body they in the form of stable variables. Every political party and its ideology are about to constitute. Oen one party presents many distinctive or messages are in the constant process of definition and redefinition. manifestos suited for specific regional and municipal circumstances. Actual communicated attitudes of the parties today can substantially erefore it would be too disturbing in our analysis to include and differ from what the very same parties presented yesterday, not even consider all the different electoral arenas. to mention their manifestos issued years ago. is uncertainty how- Similarly European elections are oen conducted and fought in ever does not mean that parties and their actual opinions or ideolo- different manner than national elections. Manifestos of the Visegrad gies are indescribable. One should be aware of the transiency of the political parties for elections to European parliament are derived or specific state of the discourse within the parties and to focus on the significantly influenced by the manifestos of their European parlia- most relevant and stable data he has at his disposal. In the case of mentary factions and centrals. Also they are focused on the issues political parties in this book we chose to follow election manifestos. connected with the functioning and policies of the European Union ere are several reasons for this decision. rather than national issues. Manifestos designed in alike manner are In this book we have mainly focused on election programs and clearly not of our interest since their approach towards issues we manifestos of political parties to avoid speaking about particular is- are interested in could be obscured and significantly changed due sues and individual politicians, whose words oen resonate in the me- to interfering variables from European level. at is not to say that dia. e party election programs should represent the respective party approach of the Visegrad political parties towards European Union discussions and views, and – by extension – the thoughts of the wider is not very interesting topic even tightly connected to our topic. population. At the same time they enable us to not become stuck in However inclusion of the European election manifestos would cause particular cases, but to follow broader trends. Manifestos are repeat- significant deviations in comparison with manifestos for general elec- edly issued by all relevant political parties for the occasion of the elec- tions which would be in the end incomparable with each other. tions and therefore they are easily obtainable even in cases of smaller Finally we will also exclude popular presidential elections. It is parties. In the same time manifestos are in most of the cases product mainly for the fact that such an election took place just in two2 out of the of the party discourse and as such they represent parties more that four Visegrad countries and therefore there is no space for comparison statements of individual members of the parties. Also manifestos are less dependent on the current events than other issue specific party 2 Poland and Slovakia. In the Czech Republic and Hungary president is elected by declarations which usually respond to particular events in society and parliament. 16 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES RESEARCH PROCEDURE 17 of the presidential candidates. We can certainly not compare them to is way we obtained exhausting charts of references and contexts the declarations and statements of the presidential candidates who are in which political parties addressed above mentioned issues. Analysis elected by deputies as it is a case in the Czech Republic and Hungary of these documents helped us to develop specific understanding of because their primary audience is completely different. Different au- the mostly unarticulated paradigms and premises of the parties under dience suggests different tactics and choice of vocabulary. examination. To conclude for the reasons of easier comparability and coherence While it is self-evident that different parties have different - ap of the manifestos we will take a look only on the general elections proaches to many, if not most, of the political and social issues, some in four countries. In the cases of the Czech Republic and Poland we relevant similarities between the different parties can be observed in will neglect elections to the upper houses of the parliaments, senates. their definitions of the nation, the nation state and relations among Since we are focused on the post EU accession period in the Visegrad nations in general. We thus tried to draw some connections based countries we covered in each country two general election. In the upon the manifestos and analysis of them. We categorized them into Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia it is a case of the elections in several groups according to the basic principles and attitudes inherent 2006 and 2010, in Poland 2005 and 2007.3 in the manifestos. ese groups were set up always for the manifestos e plurality of ideas is very broad and therefore questions come of one Visegrad country with the use of the charts of references. So to mind as to what exactly does it mean to be nationalistic? What does we constructed specifically national types of approaches to the issues it look like? Which connotation does it imply? What is the difference concerning issues connected with national identity and perception of between nationalism and legitimate patriotism, or the feeling of na- the other nations. tional belonging? To what extent is nationalism an issue of identity Groups of the manifestos with similar approaches represent and to what extent one of politics? And what are the links between? broadly similar mental constructions of the reality concerning na- How do political forces and political parties work with this phe- tionalism rather than coherent and homogenous types with one rigid nomenon and how is it perceived in a democracy? is last question definition and worldview. ere are sure to be differences among the reflects this publication’s attempt to find answers within this specific manifestos in the same group which we surely will mention in the region. In order to answer these questions we made content analysis proper chapters. of the manifestos in our focus. We looked on the way political parties In the next step we took a look on the already established nation- in their documents refer about: ally specific approaches and we tried to find similar structural atti- • nation tudes and perceptions of the social world in respect of the issues we • national identity are interested in. We paired and grouped most similar groups from • minorities four examined countries. We calculated some commonalities and • foreign investments extracted essential differences, leading to the classification of mani- • other nations festos of political parties within specific categories in line with their • national culture and traditions inclusion of nationally relevant aspects. is categorization is then a • international institutions new achievement that links together the parties according to national • neighbour countries indicators from the election manifestos and thus exceeds the tradi- • personal authonomy tional classification of political families along established ideological • or any reference and use of “national” contours.
3 e election 2011 in Poland took place aer finishing of researching procedure. THE CZECH REPUBLIC 19
THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Introduction to Czech politics and the Czech party system
As in other central and eastern European (CEE) countries, the mod- ern Czech party system is bound to the transformation year 1989. We analyse nationalistic tendencies in the Czech party system aer 1989, and the most important part of our analysis is focused on the period between 2005 and 2010. In this period there were three elections in the Czech Republic: parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2010, and the European Par- liament election in 2009. e most significant characteristic of the period aer 2005 is that the Czech Republic like all Visegrad coun- tries had become a member of the European Union, economic and social transition had been successfully achieved and the political and party systems had been anchored at the modern west-European level (Hloušek 2005: 443). In the first years aer 1989 the party system was built up by creat- ing a new (democratic) structure and by “drawing” a new ideological map of Czech policy. e first cleavage in early democratic system was the tension between the Communist party (Komunistická strana Československa – KSČ) and the reform movement called Civic Fo- rum (Občanské fórum – OF) in the post-revolution time. In the first democratic election aer the communist era, OF gained more than 50 percent of all votes (Hloušek 2005: 443). Due to this election vic- tory for OF, KSČ was marginalised from the leading role in the politi- cal and party system, though it continued to be a relevant actor in the Czech party system. e first democratic election provided the opportunity for- de veloping new political topics within Czech politics. In contrast with other Visegrad countries, the main cleavages in Czech politics were centred on socio-economic themes and then national questions. e accent given to the national question in the beginning of the 1990s was mainly caused by the fragmentation of Czechoslovakia 20 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 21
(Československá federativní republika – ČSFR) in 1992. Even so, the 1992 and 1996, ODS, KDU-ČLS and ODA formed ruling centre-right national question has never been a mainstream topic within Czech coalitions (Vodička 2010: 288–302). politics (Kopecký 2006: 126–127). anks to a relatively stable political environment during the e next step in developing the modern party system in the Czech 1990s (and especially from 1992); a classical socio-economic cleavage Republic was the 1992 general election. roughout 1991 and 1992 has developed. is process was reflected in the 1998 general election, the centre-liberal wing underwent fragmentation. e declining of when the social democrats had their best result to date. eir strong OF in the early 1990s and its evolution into new political parties position was confirmed in the general election of 2002 (Hloušek 2005: made the party system a little bit uncertain. e Civic Democratic 446). e strong role of ČSSD in the Czech party system is confirmed Party (Občanská demokratická strana – ODS) originated from the by the fact that in 2002 Miloš Zeman lost his position as party leader OF environment (Pšeja 2004: 456). e leader of ODS, Václav Klaus, and was replaced by a less charismatic politician – Vladimír Špidla emerged as a right charismatic leader, and due to his personal engage- (Hloušek 2005: 447). Nevertheless, the classical le-right division was ment, ODS won the general election in 1992. e centre-right trend in established. ČSSD was the leading Czech party for eight years. In its Czech politics led to the strengthening of ODS’s position as the leader first period in government (1998–2002), ČSSD constituted a one- of the rightwing groups. party-minority government. e functioning of the le cabinet was e social democrats (Česká strana socialně demokratická – ČSSD) made possible thanks to a special bilateral agreement (Opposition exceeded the five percent threshold necessary for parliamentary par- Agreement) with the second biggest party, ODS. is agreement was ticipation in the 1992 election. is was perceived as an important based on sharing political power and influence within state institu- opportunity for reclaiming the role of ČSSD, the oldest political party tions (Hanley 2004: 523–524). in the Czech Republic. In the same year ČSSD elected its new leader In its second period of government (2002–2006), ČSSD formed – Miloš Zeman. His personal role in promoting social democrats to a coalition with two smaller political groupings: the centre-liberal the leading role in the le wing political spectrum was crucial. During Freedom Union (Unie svobody-Demokratická unie – US-DEU) and the first half of the 1990s ČSSD became the biggest political and ideo- the centre-conservative Christian democrats (KDU-ČSL) (Kopecký logical challenger of ODS (Hloušek 2005: 443–445). e increasing 2006: 128). is coalition exercised just a minimum majority in the role of ČSSD resulted in the second biggest gain of votes in the 1996 parliament, and thus the second half of this period featured many general election. e leading role of the social democrats was con- personal disputes not just in the government but also in all of the firmed in the early general election (because of internal party crisis government political parties. ČSSD changed its prime minister twice, of ODS) in 1998. ČSSD over-turned the hegemony of the communist the liberal US-DEU entered a deep existential crisis, and in the 2006 party and other le-orientated formations in the lewing political general election US-DEU did not got enough votes to reach the 5 per- grouping. cent limit. In the early 1990s Christian democrats (Křesťanská a demokrat- e general election in 2006 confirmed the embedding of the ická unie – Československá strana lidová – KDU-ČSL) returned to the Czech party system – aer two periods in opposition a right-centre democratic party system. KDU-ČSL occupied a more central position government led by ODS came to power again. e elections in 2006 compared to ODS and de facto created a conservative centre of the and, partly, in 2002 confirmed the dominant right-le (or rather bi- party system. e political rightwing of the Czech system was sup- polar) conflict line in the party system. Socio-economic tensions were plemented and completed by a right-liberal party, Civic Democratic not very variable during this period – ODS was and is a supporter of Alliance (Občanská demokratická alliance – ODA). is political the deregulation and liberalisation of the market, and during the pe- formation also originated in the OF. Aer the general elections in riod between the two World Wars KDU-ČSL developed as a conserva- 22 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 23 tive Christian party, strongly rooted in rural areas. During its time in system because of their high preference for transatlantic coalition government ČSSD emphasised social topics, the maintenance of mar- in contrast to the need to strengthen the European level of military ket regulation and the sense of a social-market economy. Although cooperation. In the case of internal tensions within ČSSD concerning the unreformed communist party has been a part of the Czech party the US radar, there are unanswered questions about whether this deci- system, the party has never exerted significant power or influence on sion was made in favour of domestic gains or because of the principal Czech politics. As many scholars argue, the main reason is the struggle (European) orientation. e communist party identified itself with a resulting from the uncooperative position of KSČM (Komunistická non-military paradigm and against the Atlantic orientation of Czech strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM) and the party`s de facto isolation from foreign policy (Vodička 2010: 290). the main flow of Czech policy (Vodička 2010: 292). During the administration of the centre-right coalition, the Czech e last period (2005/6–2010) is also the basis for our research. political system faced the never ending internal tensions within the e significant feature is a missing binding factor (or goal) of Czech coalition due to the uncertain parliamentary majority of the coalition. politics, as for example membership of NATO or the EU. Another In March 2009 Mirek Topolanek’s government lost a parliamentary significant factor is a deepening importance of socio-economic cleav- vote of confidence. In the period before the early general election age and confirmation of the strongly entrenched right-le division in that resulted, two political parties that strongly influenced the Czech Czech politics (Hloušek, Kopeček 2008: 547). political scene were set up. e conservative party Tradition, Re- We can set out two external facts that have affected the Czech sponsibility and Prosperity 09 (Tradice, Odpovědnost, Prosperita 09, domestic environment. e first one is the negotiating and approval TOP 09) originated from the conservative KDU-ČSL. e party has of the Lisbon Treaty, and the negotiating of a possible location for adopted the right-conservative and pro-European position on the an American radar system in the Czech Republic and Poland. e political spectrum. e second political group, Public Affairs (Věci Lisbon Treaty gained more public exposure thanks to the president veřejné, VV), has presented itself as a centre-liberal party. and the former prime minister and former chief of ODS, Václav Klaus e centre-right coalition government of ODS, TOP 09 and VV (Marek, Baun 2010: 37). His leading role in domestic discussions on was formed aer election results in 2010, with ODS as the strongest European integration and its future direction also influenced tensions part of coalition. Although ČSSD gained most votes, social demo- within the ODS. e internal contradiction in the ODS did not have crats had no possibility to lead the government (Havlík 2011: 72). e any impact on the creation of a possible “European cleavage” in Czech election in 2010 has shown a possible increase in electoral volatility domestic policy. Other relevant political parties supported the Lisbon within the centre and the right of the ideological spectrum (Pink, Treaty and it came into force as soon as was possible. e European Valterová 2010). discussion was rather between supporters of president Klaus and the e party system in the Czech Republic embodies a continuous anti-Klaus wing. development from the personal and fragmented system to the struc- e US radar system and its possible location introduced a clear tured institutional system with professionalization and effectiveness cleavage into Czech politics. e division of right and le parties of (mass) political party organisations. Since the post-transition party was significant for the subsequent public and political controversy. system stabilisation it is more difficult to establish a new party group- ODS and KDU-ČSL, as promoters of the transatlantic coalition, were ment that would become a relevant actor (Hloušek 2005: 451; Rohr- supporters of the presence of the American radar system. e Green schneider, Whitefield 2010: 63; van Biezen, Kopecký 2007: 243, 250). Party (SZ) was split, with some members adopting a pragmatic ap- In the long term the importance of national issues is less impor- proach and others, as pacifists, who are principally against any mili- tant than basic socio-economic cleavage and other topics rising up tary issues (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 185). ČSSD opposed the radar over time. Only during two voting periods of the Deputy Chamber 24 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 25 was a populist and strong national Republican party (Sdružení pro – Sovereignty, National Party and Worker’s Party – that participated republiku – Republikánská strana Československa, SPR-RSČ) part of respectively in the general elections of 2006, 2009 and 2010. the significant party spectrum. For both the republicans and the com- munist party, national questions have a great political importance. Both parties advocated strongly against membership in NATO and Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09 the EU, the sell-offs of Czech industry and the further globalisation of (Tradice, Odpovědnost, Prosperita 09, TOP 09) the national economy. On national questions, KSČM, the successor of the communist party (KSČ), defines itself as more nationalistic than TOP 09 was founded in 2009 via separation from the Christian Dem- the social democrats (Kopecký 2006: 141). ocrats due to a long time tension between the conservative wing and Due to the upcoming entrance of the Czech Republic into the EU, the more liberal wing. is new party has gained a lot of popularity the topic of national interests in the EU and the question of sover- thanks to the role of the chairman, Prince Karel Schwarzenberg, who eignty arose aer 2000. Although ODS portrayed itself as a Euro-real- was nominated as the leading person of the political party. ist party and ČSSD, in comparison to ODS, as a bigger supporter of e main reason during this period for TOP 09’s growing popular- European integration, the EU-cleavage never became a determinant ity was the very tough and personal rivalry between the two main po- factor of Czech policy. is can be explained partly by the lack of a litical parties. e lack of responsibility in the Czech politics in 2009 relevant political opposition to Czech membership of the EU (Vachu- (non-confidence in the government during the Czech presidency of dova 2008: 869). A common political goal for ODS and ČSSD was to the European Council by social democrats) helped to anchor such a enter the EU as soon as possible. Aer the successful conclusion of the new political movement in the political system. e reason for this negotiating process, and now aer more than five years of member- anchoring was the separation from the Christian Democrats – from ship, possible European cleavage in Czech politics has not arisen and its inception TOP 09 had a good structural, financial and political become an influential determinant on domestic matters (Hloušek, basic. Moreover, at the time of its establishment TOP 09 already had Kopeček 2008: 546–547). its own club of senators in the Upper Chamber of the Czech parlia- In addition, due to the post-war settlement (in the years 1945–1948) ment (Eibl 2010: 84). the Czech Republic is an ethnically homogenous country. is is one TOP 09 is a modern conservative-liberal party with an emphasis of the most important reasons for nationalism – also, at the time of on political and social responsibility. Its ideological origins relate the splitting Czechoslovakia Czech politicians did not exploit the national party to the Christian-Jewish European heritage (Marek, Baun 2011: topic to boost their popularity. In the long-term perspective, the party 45). Further fundamental elements of TOP 09 are the liberty of in- system competition of the early 1990s has developed into a principally dividuals, the family as a fundamental part of society, the common socio-economic conflict (Hloušek, Kopeček 2008: 546–547). responsibility of individuals to society, the shared values of state, Since our study focuses on the period aer accession to the EU, rule of law and social solidarity in terms of free market and public that means from 2005 to 2010, the subjects of our study are the fol- good. e party’s foreign policy placed an emphasis on transatlantic lowing parties: ODS, ČSSD, KSČM, KDU-ČLS, TOP 09, VV, US-DEU, relations (similar to ODS) and the European dimension of foreign SZ, Suverenita, NS, DS. However, for the purpose of this study we policy, similar to KDU-ČLS. Comparing to KDU-ČLS, TOP 09 has should also examine some parties and movements which were not as strengthened its priorities of responsibility in domestic and foreign politically influential as the parliamentary parties but that represent policy (TOP 09 2011). the most visible and radical nationalistic element in the political life of Although the party was founded just before the planned general the country. In the case of the Czech Republic there are three parties election in autumn 2009, surveys of public opinion polls suggested 26 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 27 that TOP 09 would achieve creditable election gains. e original Republic to allied partners in security and economic international intention of the party “founders” was to bring more new representa- organisations. e most important organisations in terms of com- tives from “outside politics” into politics. e leading candidates for mitments are the EU and NATO. e relations of these commitments election were the former representatives of the Christian Democrats. are reciprocal – TOP 09 links the security and common obligation is resulted in the very common argument from many opponents to historical experience. e EU and NATO are the most important that TOP 09 had only changed the name of the party, but not the per- security partners. TOP 09 supports the integration of the EU in de- sons and the policy. Furthermore, Vice-chairman Miroslav Kalousek fence matters, but the prime role in defence issues belongs to NATO. had been KDU-ČSL chairman during the period 2003–2006 (Fiala e accent on the European dimension and the supporting of the EU 2007: 125). eir final election gains in the 2010 election had not been is clearly visible here. Although security integration within the EU expected by the party’s leaders nor by the public – gaining 18 % of all is not the most pressing issue, the emphasis on security and defence votes caused, TOP 09 became the second strongest political party of (supranational and international) cooperation shows the importance the right and the third strongest party overall (Pink, Valterová 2010). of security issues within TOP 09’s program. One key dimension of security is the energy security of the Czech Election manifesto 2010 4 Republic. e connection to European policy is very narrow and the importance of the security dimension will be more and more impor- For this analysis we can use only one election program, due to the tant. e key institutions of the Czech energy sector (ČEZ, ČEPRO founding of the party in 2009. For some of the issues which help us to etc.) should remain under Czech ownership. e main reason is to create the complex ideological context of the party, we rely on the pre- keep this very important industry sector under state control and to vious political activity of key persons in the party. As we point out in avoid the possible labyrinthine ownership of various key companies. the analysis below, the basic premises of the ideological grounds of the ere is also some fear as a result of the Russian activity in the “gas party can be regarded as being similar to the Christian Democrats. crisis” in 2009 and its knock-on consequences on Czech industry and TOP 09 is a typical example of a conservative party – the strong politics. e party’s support for the European dimension of energy emphasis on societal traditions and also the traditional function of policy is also clear in its backing for the European pipeline project the state in terms of its dividing into cities and rural areas. In con- Nabucco and the further integration of the European energy market, nection with conservative values there is a need for flexibility and and also the technical dimension of energy. e main goal of the TOP minimisation of the state bureaucracy in public administration. is 09 energy policy is to prevent the blackmail of the Czech Republic issue was strongly pointed out in the 2010 campaign, not for reasons even in the EU priority role in this policy area. TOP 09 also supports of principle, but due to TOP 09’s belief in the need for budgetary the self-sufficiency of the Czech Republic in electricity, and has a posi- cuts. e emphasis on regionalisation, decentralisation and the tra- tive attitude towards further developing this position. ditional development of the regions also came about because of an In comparison with ODS, the European policy of the party has a initial cooperation with the party called Movements of Mayors and strong accent, the main political challenger. TOP 09’s more supportive Independents (Hnutí starostů a nezávislých). European policy is defined by its belief in shared commitments within e security issue is a key TOP 09 value. e main meaning of se- the EU, as well as support for the Lisbon Treaty. In its manifesto TOP curity is in terms of foreign policy and of the obligation of the Czech 09 also supports entry in to the Eurozone, the system of the common European currency the Euro. e strength of this support is not totally 4 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme the unanimous, but the party calls for dialogue with possible opposition 2010. parties in order to reach a common position. 28 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 29
Comparing TOP 09 with KDU-ČLS in their basic premises, the individual responsibility together with support for the free integrated European policy is very similar. e more right-liberal and competi- market highlight the strong role of the Czech Republic in these eco- tive approach is more significant in the case of TOP 09 (Eibl 2010: nomic issues. is political course can also be recognised not only in 84). e emphasis on responsibility in domestic policy issues is also the party’s economic policy but also in its definition of foreign policy reflected at the European level. is is well illustrated by the case of priorities. Besides the two basic foreign policy pillars there is a very the EU’s debt and bailout crisis between 2009 and 2011.5 is ap- important economic dimension – the promoting of state economic proach of pragmatic EU-supporting policy can also be well seen interests in the foreign dimension of its policy. is means that the in the case of the Lisbon Treaty. e general view of the party is to state is still a key actor in promoting a liberal economy. endorse European integration.6 e emphasis on a strong role for the Although the issue of human rights is not explicitly mentioned Czech Republic in the EU can be used as an argument against the in- in the TOP 09 election manifesto, the equality of minorities and the creasing role of supranational institutions. Principally, the party sup- guaranteeing of their rights is included in the preamble of the mani- ports the EU and, in general, also European integration. e starting festo. Human rights are not of paramount importance, but the party point for understanding the TOP 09 European policy is, for the one defends the basic principle of these rights and the rights of minorities thing, down to the heritage of European Christian-Jewish values, and as one of European values. On one side, the low priority given by the at the same time, the emphasis on the responsibility of individuals party to these issues is linked to the fact that the Czech Republic is a (TOP 09 2011). nationally-homogenous country. e free market plays a very important role in the party’s politics. Nevertheless, TOP 09 defends the rights of the Romany minority e importance of further liberalisation is very significant in the case and rejects any kind of oppression and discrimination.7 of opening and finalising the European common market within the At its core, the TOP 09 election manifesto emphasizes conserva- EU. TOP 09 is against barriers in the four basic freedoms of the com- tive values and supports the development of a traditional landscape mon European market and also in the Common Agriculture Policy divided between cities and the countryside. is also means agricul- (CAP). In general, TOP 09 welcomes only minimal intervention in tural encouragement for traditional areas of the Czech Republic and the free market. the maintaining of a typical landscape and support for programs ese traditions sit in possible contrast with the general support that aim to further develop the typical use and traditional face of the for free trade and the free market not only in the EU. As mentioned landscape. above, in the case of the party’s accent on finishing the common One example of a strong commitment to traditional use of the market and general support for the globalised free market is a signifi- national landscape is the forestry industry, considered to be a valu- cant strong role for the Czech Republic. e Czech Republic should able national resource that must be maintained for cultivation for profit from its strong position within the EU and generally from the future generations. However also in its forestry policy is a significant economic aspects of the globalised world economy. e emphasis on role for the effectiveness of the free market. From the economic point of view, the party wants to prevent growing (economic and societal) 5 Although TOP 09 presents itself as an EU-supporting party, all members of the par- differences between cities and villages due to the conservation of ty leadership of the party (including Chairman Karel Schwarzenberg) have declared the agricultural industry and other landscape activities. Generally, that the Czech Republic will not take part in European Financial and Stability Fund. 6 But there is no mention of whether TOP 09 supports deepening integration and the constitution of a stronger supranational institution, or if there is a need for slowing 7 is policy is supported by the fact that the leadership of the party strongly rejected down EU integration. e outcome of this approach is that externally the party either the outbreak of arson violence against the minority Romany population in northern supports the deepening of integration or its slowing (TOP 09 2010). Moravia in April 2009. 30 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 31 the party opposes any further globalising and commercialising of e party defines itself as a centre liberal party that emphasizes the traditional values. deepening of democratic tools in the public sphere such as forms of TOP 09 places itself in the centre-right of the political spectrum, as direct democracy, the direct vote of local mayors and the president, a party that supports European integration (Eilb 2010: 84). e party the law on referendum etc. Other policy issues are very difficult to is in favour of accepting the common European currency – the Euro identify because the election manifesto itself is inherently contradic- – which is seen as a big transfer of national sovereignty towards a su- tory (Havlík 2010: 34). On the one hand VV deems itself to be a so- pranational institution. Support for this integration is limited in two cially sensitive party, on the other hand VV is very restrictive in social ways: the first involves security issues, and the second is the ongoing policy and indirectly the social policy is aimed against excluded mi- unifying of national and cultural identities within the EU. norities. Suggested activities to secure cleanness and security in public In the case of security issues, the state’s security has the primary places by a special “VV Guard” were deemed highly controversial.8 In role. It also dominates over European integration. e state must be the program manifesto there are more inherent contradictions which confident about ensuring its own security. In military matters NATO present difficulties for specifying the party’s clear, inherent, ideologi- has a significant role as a guarantor of European and Transatlantic cal structure. stability. e so security dimension is the issue of energy security. ere is a clearly visible unwillingness towards and scepticism to- Tab. 1: Electoral performance of VV wards transfers of national sovereignty. Although the party supports European integration, preservation Elections EP 2009 2010 of a traditional way of agriculture, landscape and development of Votes 2.4 10.88 countryside has a higher priority. e biggest emphasis is on forestry Seats 0 24 having as a national heritage. Source: Statisticall Office of the Czech Republic
Public Affairs (Věci veřejné, VV) Although the party has been active for more than 10 years, it is very surprising that when it comes to some of VV’s basic political is- Public Affairs (Věci veřejné, VV), the third member of the current sues there exist a huge information gap. Also on the big policy issues government, was established in 2001 as a party primarily focused on that have dominated in the Czech Republic over the last five years, Prague’s communal policy. Since 2002 Public Affairs has had a repre- such as the possible existence of American radar on Czech terri- sentation in the local authority in the Prague 1 district and the party tory or the negotiating process of the Lisbon Treaty, VV has rarely did not stand for the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of discussed them (Marek, Baun 2010: 46). It may be assumed that the 2006 (Havlík 2010a: 31). e first step towards a higher public profile party supported the Lisbon Treaty because of higher efficiency for the party was the European Parliament election in 2009. e first and flexibility, but further analysis falls down due to missing data election success took place in 2010. e party gained nearly 11 % of (Věci veřejné 2009). the vote and entered the Chamber of Deputies and became a mem- All of these anomalies can be explained by the fact that, in terms ber of the centre-right coalition government led by ODS. e main of ideology, the party is not internally coherent and can be defined as topic of VV in the election campaign in 2010 was “remove all the old dinosaurs from politics”, which means that the party emphasized the 8 e controversial issue of self-defending public area is in strict contrast with the personal exchange within political structures (Věci veřejné 2011). proclamation to the liberal standards of policy (Brandejská 2011). 32 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 33 a populist, protest party. Any attempt at further ideological definition of the European policy, there is no clear specification as to whether fails due to strong pragmatic tensions in the manifestos. the position of VV is positive or negative. As mentioned above, it is very difficult to construe a serious description for the party’s (Euro- Election manifesto 2010 9 pean) policy, due to the absence of a fundamental, ideological basis for the manifesto. As mentioned above, no precise ideological description of the 2010 Generally, the European policy of VV is more to do with selectively manifesto election can easily be made. e election manifesto is picking the gains of European integration than an argument-based outlined in a lot of mostly technical details. e broader ideological policy or clear attitude. is assessment is supported by the fact that embedding is missing; instead the program is filled with technical security matters are mostly mentioned without any reference to the proposals across all policies. e basic political theses are mentioned EU, energy policy concerns with domestic issues and the European very briefly and in some cases they contradict each other. level is visible only because of common cooperation aimed at oil and e main political goal of the party is the strengthening of de- gas exporting countries, especially Russia. mocracy and stronger voter’s connection with politicians. erefore e party’s self-definition as a liberal party is in strong contradic- the analysis of the manifesto is based on flowing, basic ideological tion with its restrictive social policy. e main goal of the election elements. One could argue that due to the emphasis on direct de- manifesto is to prevent the misusing of social support. e party mocracy the party will follow the liberal premises of its policy. We defines itself as a liberal party, which is a very debatable statement can show a practical example in the case of European policy. e because at the same time the party fails to emphasise human rights party supports European integration, the European single currency, at all. Its European policy does not seem to be a liberal program. e further liberalisation of the common market and also integration in most important point of the program is the emphasis on the efficiency terms of security issues. Yet at the same time VV favours European of the EU, liberalised services and efficient use of the European funds. policy based on careful enlargement of the EU, rejects the admission e party supports joining the Euro zone, but just on the condition that of Turkey and rejects using the EU as a tool for finance acquisition. the debate on accepting the Euro will be led by experts instead of poli- e party proposes that the common energy policy should be based ticians. e party’s call for supporting traditional Czech exporters and on consultations with delivering countries and generally calls for the goods to the European Union is absolutely against liberal principles. building of energy infrastructure. Any positive attitude towards the As a political party VV does not have any strong ideological core. EU is not clearly visible in its calling for greater efficiencies at the e party’s self-definition as a liberal party has many imperfections. European institutions and fewer administrative burdens. e social policy is incoherent: the party oscillates between support- VV is just one political party of the current government coali- ing people in need and a restrictive social policy. e European policy tion which wants stronger control over immigrants coming in to the oscillates between encouragements for deepening European integra- Czech Republic and explicitly states that “only the working, impeccable tion while at the same time promoting Czech national interests. It and taxpaying foreigner is a welcome guest in the Czech Republic”. ere seems that for VV the EU is merely a tool for financing national is neither comment on the settlement of immigrants nor any men- projects. Overall, the party’s simplified definition of the European tion of national minorities. e common European immigrant policy policy is “picking gains” of European integration. ese gains are not should be based on reasonable fundamentals. Similar to other issues political or ideological but rather the practical outputs of the integra- tion, for example the use of financial aid from the European funds. In 9 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme other words, supporting the EU is more or less framed in terms of a in the 2010. pragmatic or calm support. 34 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 35
Civic Democratic Party namely in the case of Beneš decrees aer accession (Havlík 2006: (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS) 70–71). is strong national focus reached its peak in the 2002 elec- tion campaign. e former leader Klaus declared that the ODS would Civic Democratic Party is the dominant conservative formation in not support such a form of the EU accession. e ODS defeat in the the Czech Republic. e beginning of its political activity dates back 2002 election was caused by the previous special bilateral agreement to the early 1990s due to the fragmentation of OF. Václav Klaus led the with ČSSD and partly by misusing this negative approach towards the conservative elements inside the OF. Not long aer the general elec- EU and European integration in general. Despite these growing nega- tion in 1990, Klaus was elected as the chairman of OF and he started tive tendencies against the EU, ODS supported the accession of the creating a new party based on conservative neoliberal ideas (Kopeček Czech Republic to the European Union and subsequently voted “yes” 2011: 257). ODS was the most successful political party in the elec- in the referendum (Hloušek, Jarošová, Kaniok 2007: 32–33). tions of 1991, 1992 and 1996, and Klaus became the prime minister Substantial ideological change did not arrive with the new party on three occasions. Under the leadership of Klaus ODS was the most leader Mirek Topolánek. e former chairman was replaced in important actor in the economic and political transition (Pšeja 2004: November 2002 by the less charismatic and more moderate Mirek 444–446). Liberal economic thinking became the most influential Topolánek. e European Parliament election and continuing period political stream of the first part of the 1990s. In this period ODS in opposition did not change the basic policy premises of ODS. e managed to merge with a smaller party called Christian Democratic national focus did not reach as much importance compared to 2002 Union (KDU) and to define itself against other centre-right political but the Euro-sceptic policy approach was not changed. Socio-eco- parties. is successful process of political and ideological dominance nomic issues once again rose to prominence (Mareš 2006: 130–132). was the foundation for the very strong personal role of Václav Klaus in Czech politics (Kopecký 2006: 130). Tab. 2: Electoral performance of ODS e year 1997 was critical for ODS. e increasing role of the social democrats coupled with internal tensions within the party led Elections 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 to the resignation of the Klaus cabinet in 1997. e critical wing of Votes 29.73 29.6 27.74 24.47 35 20.22 ODS founded a new centre-liberal party and became the ideological Seats 66 68 63 58 81 53 challenger of ODS. In the general election of 1998, ODS was defeated by the social democrats and was forced into opposition (Hloušek Source: Statistical Office of the Czech Republic 2005: 450). is moment used to be defined as a turning point in European In the 2006 general election ODS gained the biggest number of politics. Although ODS continued to support the integration of the votes and formed a centre-right coalition government with KDU-ČSL Czech Republic into the EU, the number of critical voices increased. and the Green Party. e government reality ensured that the Euro- A certain part of ODS was very critical of further political integra- sceptic tone was soened (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 198). e internal tion, against monetary harmonisation and creating a common foreign tension within the party appeared again in 2007. e negotiating of policy. e party increasingly started to define itself as a defender of the Lisbon Treaty and its final version caused a strong dispute between Czech national interests in Europe (Hanley 2004: 526–527). President Klaus’ followers and those of the moderate wing around Prime Personally Václav Klaus started with the promotion of certain Minister Topolánek. e shiing of European policy towards pragma- events in the 20th century, namely World War 2 and its consequences. tism was followed by the Czech EU-Presidency in 2009 which can be One specific Czech issue was the guarantee of post-war arrangements understood as a peak of EU-education or rather the “Europaisation” 36 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 37 of ODS. e consequence of this process was the exit from the party interests. e Czech Republic should be an active and self-confident of Václav Klaus in December 2008 (Hricová 2010: 49). member of the EU. In 2009 ODS experienced its hardest internal crisis since 1997. e e foundations of a practical European policy in the 2006 election crisis resulted in a successful Parliamentary vote of no confidence in manifesto are the rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution the government. Following this, a new conservative political party for Europe (TCE) and its determinants of integration. ODS supposes called TOP 09 was formed and weakened the dominant position of that the EU can easily function on an integration basis of the Treaty of ODS as the dominant right-conservative party (Havlík 2010b: 72). Nice. ere should not be more shis of competencies or sovereignty In the 2010 general election ODS was defeated by ČSSD. Despite the towards a supranational body. One significant feature is a negative huge vote loss, ODS maintained the strongest position in the right- attitude to the common foreign and security policy. ODS proposes conservative sphere. Under the leadership of ODS a centre-right gov- that this sovereign policy should remain within the competencies of ernment coalition was formed again with TOP 09 and VV as coalition member states. e integration in this policy must be based on vol- partners. untary activity and must maintain the principle of unanimity. is means that ODS is in favour of differentiated integration or flexible Election manifesto 2006 10 integration in general. Further focus on European policy comes with the ODS emphasis e election manifesto “Together for a Better Life” is the outcome of on the equality of member states inside the EU. e most unequal the party’s long-time opposition program. e most visible feature policy is the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). ere is still so much of the manifesto is criticism of previous governments and “waiting asymmetry that the subsidy must be redefined as soon as possible. to get a chance” to become the government party again. In contrast In connection with calling for equality, all aspects of discrimination with previous ideological development this election manifesto is less must be eliminated. ODS does not refer just to the technical regula- focused on national topics and more moderate in terms of European tions but also the political dimension of such discrimination is dif- integration. ficult to remove. e EU should avoid harmonising or regulating the e manifesto attempts to evaluate the first years aer the acces- tax and fiscal policies of member states. Similar proposals lead to the sion to the EU and defines new priorities for European policy. ese erosion of national sovereignty. priorities are more practical than fundamental. In general, ODS sup- Further, there is an emphasis on economic a political gain is sup- ports the EU as a community of states and opposes the supranational port of spreading of economy a political stability in terms of enlarge- direction of integration. e main goal of the EU lies in economic ment of the EU. ODS supports the accession into the EU of the Balkan integration as well as integration in the practical matters of (eco- states and also Turkey. e reason for the accepting of Turkey is clear nomic) policies. ODS evaluates the basic economic and political gains – the EU is more of an economic than a political union. of membership – indisputably, membership must be understood as e election manifesto strongly emphasises the partnership of the a fulfilment of a fundamental goal of Czech foreign policy. In the Czech Republic and the EU with the USA and NATO. e transat- longer term, membership brings political and economic stability. On lantic partnership is the most important factor in European secu- this view, the Czech Republic must be a loyal partner inside the EU, rity. In this sense, this partnership is a basic foundation of western but to the extent that the EU will not act contrary to Czech national democratic principles and must be further developed. is is also the main reason for supporting the establishment of the American radar 10 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in system in the Czech Republic. NATO is identified as an organisation the 2006. that guarantees stability for Euro-Atlantic civilisation. 38 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 39
ODS supports a more restrictive immigration policy in the Czech known promoters of the idea that the EU acts in favour of the key EU Republic. e perception of unwelcome immigrant or foreign work- countries. ers is that these people have caused a growth in criminality and that In contrast to previous manifestos, in the 2010 general election the they misuse the Czech social system. erefore there is also a need most important European issue was the universal focus on western for a more restrictive asylum policy. ose restrictions should be a (Europe and USA) democratic values and their defence. In com- motivation against the illegal employment of foreigners. parison to the 2006 election manifesto, the emphasis on European One practical consequence of Czech membership in the EU is integration as a poorly running process is less marked. e manifesto the higher number of foreign trucks on Czech roads.ODS wants to also a mention that ODS has been trying to offer an alternative at- resolve this problem by reclaiming Czech roads for Czech drivers. Un- titude to integration since 2009. Aer the 2009 election, ODS (namely fortunately, no further detailed description is provided. e demand the European Party leader Jan Zahradil) was the key factor in the is populist and a rationality based request, which runs contrary to foundation of the new parliamentary grouping the European Con- generally supporting the EU. servative and Reformist Group (Euractiv.cz 2009). e positive at- e dominant topics in the 2006 election manifesto are economic titude towards the enlargement of the EU confirmed the will for the and social issues. e question of nationality or sovereignty is margin- accession of Turkey and the endeavour to enlarge the EU in general. alized but still remain the basic ideological fundamentals of ODS. e EU is a symbol of the guarantee of human rights and endeavours to spread European values and stability. ese arguments are used Election manifesto 2010 11 to justify further economic integration followed by enlargement of the Union. e ideological concept of the election manifesto remains the same – e continuing interest in good bilateral relations with the USA is the pragmatic Euro-realist approach is still the basic presumption of still visible in the 2010 manifesto. Although cooperation with the USA the ODS foreign policy. New challenges that have cropped up in the on the installation of the radar system was not successfully realised, intervening period are included. e most important features of this ODS still declares a readiness for a possible new security cooperation. manifesto are the stronger emphasis on economic (and social) issues is cooperation must be based on long-term predictability. and the energy policy. is policy started to become more important A new dimension to this relation is the developing of energy policy, aer the “gas crisis” in 2009. potentially to obstruct Russian activities in the Czech Republic and e general emphasis on rejection of European integration has in Europe. Apprehension about Russian foreign policy is strongly weakened and shied to a more pragmatic dimension. ODS pulled present in the energy policy. erefore ODS calls for wider coopera- back from its Euro-sceptic approach and started to be realistic in tion in energy policy at the European level. is kind of reasonable evaluating its EU policy. e attitude has become rather the “pick- cooperation is the EU not just assuring against possible non-friendly ing the gains” of European integration instead of rejection of inte- activities mostly caused by Russia but also reflects a new dimension gration in general. Also and as with previous manifestos, the 2010 of internal cooperation in security matters. ese developments must election program defined as one of the most important priorities be based primarily on the creation of crisis management and then the principle of equality in the European policy. is issue is a herit- broader technical cooperation (pipelines, electricity grids etc.). e age of the previous political activity of Václav Klaus, one of the well peak of the energy cooperation is specified as the common European energy market, and nuclear energy has a special position. Due to the 11 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme strong position of the Czech state and the energy concern ČEZ, ODS in the 2010. emphasises self-sufficiency in electricity. e Czech Republic should 40 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 41 strive to strengthen its position as an electricity exporter. is is to Czech Social Democratic Party avoid the potential blackmail of the Czech Republic. (Česká strana sociálně demokraticka, ČSSD) ODS supports linkages with compatriots in foreign countries. is strengthening should be an instrument for improving the image of e Czech Social Democratic Party was re-established during the the Czech Republic in the world. e emphasis on the contact or the 1990–1992 and quickly became the strongest le wing party. In the connections are not, primarily, nationally orientated but the main first years aer the Velvet revolution, ČSSD was faced by strong com- concern is to promote a better image of the country. petition on the le wing by KSČM. Unlike in other CEE countries, Generally, throughout the period aer the Czech accession to the ČSSD had a social and political advantage thanks to the long history EU, the European policy has been coherent in its essentials and at the of the party, the oldest political party in the Czech Republic. is was same time the policy is getting more pragmatic. e new dimension very helpful for the party standing up against the Communist party of European policy – energy security – is extended in the content in the early, post-revolution period. Although the elections in 1990 of the 2010 manifestos. is is partly a knock-on effect of the Czech and 1992 could refer to the revolution, the anti-communist backlash presidency and partly a calling for the defending of state interests. e brought weak and unsatisfactory election results. ČSSD got just a few significant point is the missing wide consensus on energy security on votes over the 5 % limit. Subsequent changes in the leadership brought to the policy level. ODS calls for better coordination (new compe- gains, however. e new party leader Miloš Zeman made the party tence) but in the manifestos misses the institutional background for act more confrontationally towards the centre-right government strengthening the coordination. Although the party supports flexible (Hloušek 2005: 448–449). integration it is not applied in this case. Aer the consolidation of the party, ČSSD rose in prominence In its European policy we can still see a visible legacy of the na- and became the most relevant challenger to ODS. In the 1996 elec- tional emphasis peak dating back to 2002. Despite opposing to nega- tion ČSSD had its best election gains, winning the second strongest tive sides of the integration, ODS still supports Czech membership position in the Czech party system (Kopecký 2006: 129). In the 1998 in the EU and the further developing of its position inside the EU. election called early, the party won the election outright. In the period erefore is it important to be an active player within the European from 1998 to 2006, ČSSD was the strongest governmental party. From policy sphere. 1998 to 2002 this constituted minority government with the support Due to its emphasis on the liberalized free market, ODS stresses of ODS, and in the period from 2002 to 2006 there was the emergence the positive image of the Czech Republic in the world. To serve this of a ČSSD minimum majority centre-le cabinet with conservative purpose, cooperation with compatriots is welcome. If we compare KDU-ČSL and liberal US-DEU. e first cabinet is commonly under- this idea with other CEE countries, this emphasis is purely economic stood to have come about because of the strong role of Miloš Zeman, and not political. the chairman of the party. In the period 2002) 2006 the party had to One significant feature is the promoting of transatlantic relations change its leader three times. From deep crisis Jiří Paroubek saved the in terms of sharing democratic values and on security issues. e party, but his new leadership did not bring about election victory in most important pillar of European security should be NATO, in co- either the 2006, 2009 or 2010 election. Aer the 2010 election defeat, operation with the EU security structures. Paroubek resigned from the chairman position.12
12 Paroubek resigned because of the weak election victory – the party was supposed to gain close to 30 %. e election result 22 % has benn condiser as a weak (lidovky.cz 2010). 42 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 43
Tab. 3: Electoral performance of ČSSD are: the need for the equality of the basic member states within the EU, and the defending of national interests. e European policy of Elections 1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 ČSSD endorses the broader involvement of the Czech Republic in the Votes 4.11 6.53 26.44 32.31 30.2 32.32 22.08 integration process. In practical terms, this means support for join- Seats 0 16 61 74 70 74 56 ing the common currency system (the Euro), the sharing of mutual European values, and identification of individuals with these values, Source: Statistical Office of the Czech Republic and more supranational integration shi. ČSSD strongly reject the narrow interpretation of European integration in terms of economic Over the last 20 years ČSSD has shared with ODS the main goal integration or harmonization. Although the party is in favour of the of Czech foreign policy and supported Czech entrance into NATO in free European market and one internal market, the main political goal 1999 followed by membership of the EU in 2004. In 1996 the ČSSD is the stronger promotion of common values. Contrary to this general leadership confirmed the commitment to the accession of the Czech policy is the requirement on the cutting of the temporary period in Republic to the EU as early as possible (Hloušek 2004: 448). At the the labour market in the old EU member states. same time, the party strongly rejected national feelings that could e most important interest of the Czech Republic, according to lead the country into international isolation. Similar to ODS, the So- ČSSD, has to be the good functioning of the EU and the sufficient influ- cial Democrats promoted themselves as defenders of Czech national ence of the Czech Republic within the EU institutions. is goal must interests. In comparison to ODS, ČSSD defends these interests more be based on a long term perspective. On contrary strong position of in a rhetorical way. ČSSD supports deeper integration of the EU, par- the Czech Republic contribute to strengthening of the EU in general. ticularly in the decision making process, transparency and effective- is positive attitude to European values is visible also in other ness (Kozlová 2007: 65–67). In ČSSD policy, emphasis on transatlantic aspects. e Social Democrats support a stronger emphasis on hu- security cooperation is missing and the importance of NATO is less man rights and the constituting of multicultural society in general. fundamental (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 38–39). e main goal of state is immigrant and minority-friendly policy is further developed security in the sense of so power is to promote deeper and more by an emphasis on the integration of excluded minorities. e party intensive security and military integration within the EU (Marek, supports more intensive integration and motivation of the Roma mi- Baun 2010: 38). nority. e most effective policy for their integration is education and positive illustrations of successful members of this minority. Together Election manifesto 2006 13 with social support there is a need for stronger observation of equality within the society. is support is connected with a strong rejection e manifesto is internally split. erefore it is not easy to define of growing neo-nationalism, mostly in excluded areas. a one clear (issue) specification. On the one hand the EU is a sup- In the case of the immigrant and minority support ČSSD advo- porting pole, and on the other hand there is the need for defending cate for better integration of minorities, concretely for equal access to national interests and defending Czech national homogeneity. Due education and the school system. In favour of a positive immigration to its proximity to the EU accession, in its European orientation policy, the party supports cultural, religious, and national tolerance. the manifesto is similar to the policy of ODS. ese two principles Equality should be promoted mostly in religious issues – all churches must be perceived as equal with the same social respect. 13 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in Contrary to the emphasis on tolerance and equality, the party the 2006. wants to support Czech national culture. e main goal of this policy 44 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 45 is to avoid the unsatisfactory commercialization of the national cul- e issues behind the European policy are a little bit more prob- ture. is call is also supported by ČSSD’s promoting of a positive im- lematic and are contradictory to the anti-national European policy. age of the Czech Republic abroad. In connection with this promotion, e energy issue serves as a good example. Although the EU tries the party calls for the further development of the Czech language to to promote a common policy, the ČSSD priority is energy self-suf- support better integration and the identification of not just minorities ficiency. e party supports the strong energy position of the Czech but of all individuals. Republic in the central European region. e state interest must be also to defend Czech strategic companies and further privatization is Election manifesto 2010 14 not welcomed. e same position applies too to forestry and the river basin industry. is election manifesto reflects recent political and economic develop- A more national-friendly policy also applies to immigration policy. ments. e internal manifesto development is easily seen in the soer ČSSD supports the idea that all immigrants are welcomed, if they emphasis given to minority and human rights issues. e internal fulfill adaptation criteria such as basic knowledge of the Czech lan- direction of the manifesto involves more strengthening of economic guage, and basic moral and ethical principles. A further issue is ČSSD’s issues and actual pre-election public discussion. e most visible as- specific support for Slavic immigrants from south or south-east Eu- pect is the emphasis given to energy issues and, surprisingly, the ideo- rope. ese steps should lead to the strengthening of Czech cultural logical proximity of ČSSD to the conservative party, namely ODS. e identity and its promotion in domestic matters. principles of the European policy remain unchanged. Very interesting ese two ideologically different streams of the policy make any yet at the same time very confusing is the focus on Slavic immigration. overall evaluation very difficult. One explanation may be the ideologi- e European policy of ČSSD has not changed very notably. e cal influence of Jiří Paroubek’s chairmanship of the party. In the 2009 basic ideological underpinnings are similar to those from the 1990s. election campaign Paroubek spoke up for strengthening the position e basic goals of the European policy remain the joining of the of Czech workers in companies. e second explanation is based on Euro currency, the equality of all member states, equal conditions in the consequences of the economic crisis and the call for cuts in unem- agriculture, and the EU as a guarantee for security and stability in the ployment. Generally, the fundamental impulse of the national and the Czech Republic and in Europe in general. European policy remains very similar, but the actual specific emphasis When it comes to the promotion of a common foreign policy, it is on particular issues in the manifesto tends to give preference to the interesting to note the emphasis on human rights and the acknowl- Czech people or Czech industry. In this regard the ČSSD program edgement of all types of discrimination, but at the national level a does not reflect actual mainstream national policies. similar focus is less important or is missing completely. One positive outcome from EU activities can be the creation of a more integrated asylum and immigration policy. e goal is to go behind harmoni- Green Party (Strana Zelených, SZ) zation and to shi integration to a new quality level. e accent on European equality is also mentioned as an issue vis-a-vis the tolerance e history of the Green Party goes back to the Czech opposition of minorities. In this context there is a need to prevent the ongoing movement called Charta 77. Although Charta 77 was a human rights discrimination of the Roma minority. movement, in a broader sense Charta 77 was in contact with pacific and ecological movements in general. Aer 1990, key individuals of 14 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in ecological movements realized the environmental dimension of the the 2010. post-revolution policy within Civic Forum. e fragmentation of 46 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 47
Civic Forum in the period 1990–1991 did not lead to the founding of Greens became a member of the centre-right government together any relevant political formation. Most representatives succeeded in with the Christian Democrats and gained four ministerial posts to the Civic Forum and a smaller centre-right party, the Democratic (Vodička 2010: 291). Party. e 1990s were for the Green Party the time of a deep lethargy. A negative result of this new pragmatic policy soon followed. e eir first positive election result was in the 2002 general election, issue of the basing of the American radar system on Czech soil saw the when they received 2.4 % of the vote. is electoral outcome was very beginning of internal party tension. Election failure in 2009 brought helpful in terms of raising social awareness of the party and because about the resignation of the party leader Martin Bursík (Hloušek, of state financial support (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 98–99). Kopeček 2010: 99). e new and less charismatic former Minister of e party was led by the duo of Jan Beránek and Jan Patočka. Education Ondřej Liška was not able to take up the previous election Both of them wanted to push their vision of the green policy on the success and the Green Party became a non-parliamentary party again. function of the party. e principles of their policy were emphasis e Green Party promotes a pro-European policy – they sup- on deeper democratic principles, on gender equality, human rights, ported the Lisbon Treaty, the continuing of the enlargement proc- a minimal military budget etc. Generally, the most important issues ess, the strengthening of the supranational institutions, and deeper were the emphasis on pacifism (the rejection of any foreign military integration in general. e European defence system (in military bases in the Czech Republic), more democracy in the public sphere terms) could replace NATO in military affairs, according to the party and the creation of a stronger civic democratic society. is goal was (Votrubová 2007: 102). defined by Jan Patočka as a “neo-democratisism” (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 99). Due to the accent on human rights, the party supported the Election manifesto 2006 15 Roma minority and its effective integration in the society. e dual leadership of Beránek and Patočka made any further suc- One of the manifesto features is the evident effort to present the cessful development impossible. Aer low gains in the 2004 election, manifesto as strikingly as possible. e green-pragmatic attitude is both Patočka and Beránek resigned. e new party leadership under clear – the party places stronger emphasis on general societal issues, Marin Bursík positioned the Green Party along a more centre and while the core environmental issues are mentioned, but feature less pragmatic direction (Hloušek, Kopeček 2008: 532). is change be- prominently. e main manifesto issues are a focus on human rights, came evident in the 2006 election when the party gained 6.3 % of the gender equality and the promotion of democratic tools in society. vote along with six representatives in the Lower Chamber. Citizens should be more involved in decision-making processes at all levels. anks to stronger participation, politics will become more Tab. 4: Electoral performance of SZ transparent and predictable. In the case of human rights, the party generally calls for a stronger emphasis on anti-discrimination in rela- Elections 1990 1992 1998 2002 2006 2010 tion to all minorities. is is the case of the Roma minority that has Votes 4.1 6.52 1.12 2.36 6.29 2.44 been undermined for a long time. Seats 0 0 0 0 6 0 e high priority given to human rights is evident in many of the manifesto’s issues. Foreign policy should act in favour of human rights Source: Statistical Office of the Czech Republic and should be less dependent on economic interests. Indirectly, this
e Greens were elected mostly by post-material and liberal voters 15 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in and they replaced the liberal centre of the Czech party system. e the 2006. 48 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 49 is a continuation of the long term emphasis of the Czech Republic’s the EU includes also support for Turkey’s inclusion. e enlargement official foreign policy, towards Cuba, Belorussia and African dictator- process ensures the widening and opening of the peace and pros- ships. e principle of non-discrimination is emphasised also in the perity sphere. is definition is a key permission for the continuing European policy. As is the case with other parties, the Greens want enlargement process. to ensure that all member states have an equal position in the EU. e human rights dimension must be an inseparable part of the For the Green Party the European Union gives the opportunity to foreign policy of the Czech Republic and the EU too. In domestic mat- increase the role of the Czech Republic in the world. at also brings ters the emphasis on human rights is evident when it comes to minor- the responsibility for the world. Furthermore, the EU should empha- ities’ issues, especially in the case of the Roma minority. e Greens sise human rights in its foreign policy. strongly reject the further discrimination of Roma, caused for exam- e anti-military flavour of the policy can be detected in the case ple by placing Roma children in special schools for mentally weak of the possible installing of the American radar system – Greens ve- pupils. Generally, the Green Party rejects any form of discrimination. hemently rejected this proposal. Generally, the normative emphasis When it comes to immigration policy, the party wants to make on human rights and the “constituting of a better world” is evident the Czech Republic more open to immigrants and to support them in the manifesto in a pragmatic way. is was one of the one of the when they are settling in the country. e following issue is the need reasons for the 2006 election success – the party succeeded in shiing of successful immigrant integration and the principle supporting a its policy in a more pragmatic direction. multicultural society in the Czech Republic. is is very closely as- sociated with tolerance. Generally, the Greens support the teaching of Election manifesto 2010 16 tolerance that should start in elementary school. Equality for the Green Party essentially concerns gender equality. is manifesto includes the further development of the post-modern e party supports the strengthening of women’s rights and their and post-national policy dimension. ese ideological principles are bigger representation in politics. e party also supports a special evident in the emphasis on national identity, human rights and the relation with Slovakia. In the border region the party calls for the rights of minorities. Finally, there is a strong emphasis placed on the development of common cooperation programs and encourages Pro-European policy. making bilingualism, in the region more common. All the issues concerning the EU support integration. Deeper e Green Party is a party that focuses on a broader issue level, and supranational integration is the most significant feature of the mani- domestic matters are mostly understood in terms of their correlation festo. Integration is needed in many different policies: in foreign and with other global policy issues. Any emphasis on national interests or security policy (Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP), the any defending of typical Czech positions is totally absent from the further development of common military troops, a strong European manifestos analyzed above. Parliament, an accent on common cultural and ecological heritage, the integration of asylum and immigration policy. Like other post- modern parties, the Green Party also incorporates the human rights The Freedom Union – Democratic Union dimension in its manifesto and promotes this complex issue with no (Unie svobody – Demokratická unie, US-DEU) concrete evidence. Support for continuing the enlargement process of e Freedom Union came about due to the fragmentation of the Civic 16 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in Democratic Party. e clincher for the ODS split was the long time the 2010. internal tension caused by the dubious financing of the party. Klaus’s 50 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 51 opponents were more liberal in societal issues and the new party that crats (Hloušek, Kopeček 2008: 531). e Social Democrats’s role in emerged had more varied opinions in contrast with the ideological this was very dominant and the party was not able to explain its gov- environment of chairman Klaus. e Freedom Union was the de facto ernment presence sufficiently. liberal movement within ODS (Hloušek 2005: 449). e resultant lack of electoral support showed in the 2006 election e Freedom Union was founded in 1998 and in the early election when the party gained just 0.3 % of the vote and become a non-par- in the same year gained representation in the Chamber of Deputies. liamentary party. In January 2011 the party was officially ended (Unie In 2002 the Freedom Union merged with the smaller right-liberal svobody 2011). party Democratic Union (DEU), with the new name of this new party becoming US-DEU (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 142). Election manifesto 2006 18 e ideological profile and orientation of the party was more liberal-centrist than ODS. e party supported EU integration and e election program was significantly influenced by the ideological the integration of the Czech Republic into western structures. Similar and political instability of the party followed by long term low voting to OSD, US-DEU emphasized strong transatlantic relations with the preferences. e leadership of the party tried to attract the interest of USA. One of the most significant priorities was support for the free young people, in most cases first-time voters. e party leadership’s market, with a corresponding positive attitude towards globalization. justified the manifesto by stating that this was the last chance to gain votes from anyone. Tab. 5: Electoral performance of US-DEU e manifesto has a fully post-modern and very liberal outlook and basis, and tries to reflect recent developments in society. e Elections 1998 200217 2006 program does not seem like an election program as such, but rather Votes 8.6 14.27 0.3 like a protest program of some young movement with a distinctly Seats 19 8 0 unconventional character. e manifesto’s ideological bases are the emphasis on equality and Source: Statistical Office of the Czech Republic a positive attitude to any kind of personal self-definition. Freedom Union supported the legalization of euthanasia, an equal attitude to e liberal profile of the party resulted thanks to the electoral gender, tolerance and social equality for all. Military and security is- demand for a centre-right liberal party. Aer the demise of Civic sues deceived less importance in comparison with social issues. ere Democratic Alliance (Občanská demokratická alliance, ODA) there is no mention of foreign affairs or any kind of broader context of was no relevant political party that would provide a liberal program the manifesto, although the manifesto emphasizes tolerance and the in Czech politics. is fact led in the beginning to an increasing of right to self-determination, and further (greater) embedding of hu- support for ODS, that was then followed by a decline in ODS popular- man rights, the European Union, etc. ity (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 138, 141–142). In the 2002 election the e definition of the party based on the 2006 election manifesto is party also secured representation in the Chamber of Deputies, but at confusing. e post-modern, unconventional framing and presenta- the same time started to question its own ideological base. e main tion of the manifesto does not refer to any previous political activity reason for this was the fact that the party constituted a government of the party in general. Although the party defined itself as a liberal coalition with the Social Democrats and with the Christian Demo- 18 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in 17 In 2002 US-DEU ran in coalition with KDU-ČSL. the 2006. 52 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 53 party, the post-modern manifesto was a little bit “overly” liberal. e traditional Christian values as well as social-democratic principles party leadership of the party did not confirm whether the manifesto and is generally deemed to be a centrist party, thus widening its own was meant seriously. On fundamental issues, the party represented the coalition potential and allowing it to be a governmental party in more liberal centre-right position in Czech politics. than half of the democratic period of the Czech Republic19, in that time forming coalitions with the bigger right wing as well as le wing parties (ODS and ČSSD). On the other hand this ideological contra- Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak diction led oen to inside frictions and also the decline of the party People’s Party (Křesťanská demokratická unie – in last year’s could be seen in the tension between more le and more československá strana lidová, KDU-ČSL) right values among the members.20 During the 1990s, the electoral successes of KDU-ČSL were around KDU-ČSL was officially registered on November 12, 1991 (MVČR 8 %, in the 2002 election in coalition with Freedom Union – Demo- 2011) but the history of the party is much older and represents the cratic Union it gained 14.27 % of the (meaning 680 671) votes. In the continuity of the Christian democratic ideology stream since the 19th parliamentary election of 2006, KDU-ČSL reached 7.22 % (meaning century (MVČR 2011). 368 706) of the votes, thus securing 13 seats in the Lower House. In e Czechoslovak People’s Party (ČSL, Československá strana the European election of 2009 its overall percentage share of the vote lidová) was founded in 1919 as a common project of smaller Czech, was nearly the same with 7.64 % but only 180 451 votes, yet this still Moravian and Slovak catholic formations working already during the meant two seats in the European Parliament. To compare it with the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy until the end of World War One. ČSL elections of 2004, the number of elected MEPs is the same but the was also the only non-le party which was able to operate aer World electoral support was 9.57 % with 223 383 votes won. War Two, during the so-called Second Republic with limited democ- e 2010 general election was the party’s biggest disappointment racy until 1948 when the Communists took over. since the 1990s: with a 4.39 % share of the vote and only 229 717 votes ČSL survived also during communist-era totalitarianism as a dem- won, it was the first election where KDU-ČSL did not reach the 5 % onstration of fake plurality, but gleichschalted by the Communist party threshold to be part of the Lower house of the parliament. within the so called National Front (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 167). Af- is failure was primarily caused because of the establishment of ter the Velvet revolution in 1989, ČSL started searching for their place the new party TOP 09 by one of the former leaders of KDU-ČSL, Mi- within the newly established democratic system in Czechoslovakia. roslav Kalousek, who attracted many KDU-ČSL members to TOP 09. For the 1990 election Christian democratic subjects and platforms ran e coming election to Upper House of the Parliament – Senate was for election under the common coalition Christian and Democratic very important to hold the position of the party on the national level. Union (KDU, Křesťanská a demokratická unie). Aer the election, this KDU-ČSL won two seats and this allowed them to at least renew its coalition was disbanded because of internal disagreements but ČSL own political grouping in the Czech Senate. registered KDU in 1991 as a new political party, and in 1992 merged both these parties into one – the Christian and Democratic Union – 19 Until 31. 12. 1992 also Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 169). 20 In 2009 one of the former leaders of the party, Miroslav Kalousek, split from the KDU-ČSL originally represented Christianity and Christian and party and founded the more conservative and right wing values based party TOP 09, traditional conservative values as stated above, but since 1990s it which drained substantial numbers of members from KDU-ČSL. In the subsequent 2010 general election, TOP 09 won 16.7 % of the vote and KDU-ČSL received only has profiled itself as a non-confessional party for all people even if 4.29 %, thus failing to reach even the threshold of 5 % required to enter the Lower most of the members are still connected to the Church. It represents house of the Czech parliament. 54 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 55
See the detailed voting support and gains in the table. based in Christian values, individuality and responsibility. Moreover, human and civil rights are at the heart of the manifesto and the par- Tab. 6: Electoral performance of the KDU-ČSL ty’s politics, with an emphasis on the inclusion of individual property rights. At the same time, though, the KDU-ČSL philosophy tries to Elections 1990 1992 1996 1998 200221 2006 2010 broaden these property issues with a more spiritual and higher sense Votes 8.42 6.28 8.08 9 14.27 7.22 4.39 of humanity. However, economic growth is also a key element for KDU-ČSL and therefore they remain a classic materialistic party Seats 19 15 18 20 22/31 13 0 with some spiritual superstructure and ideals which could be further Source: Statistical Office of the Czech Republic promoted, e.g. with anti-consumerist society rhetoric or unnecessary wealth accumulation. Anti-consumerism in KDU-ČSL cannot be seen e electorate of KDU-ČSL is typically based in the Moravia as a sign of post-materialism in this case. Also the stated support for region (the eastern part of the Czech Republic) which is not a new multiculturalism is not really an indication of post-materialism but phenomenon as the Christian parties and the ČSL was throughout reflects support for human values as such. ese aspects are indicated history stronger in Moravia. e party has even tried to present itself in the party ideological roots and Christianity. as a ‘catch all’ party, though this attempt does not appear to have been e multiculturalism of KDU-ČSL is portrayed particularly very successful. Since 1996 KDU-ČSL has been a member of the Eu- through the integration of minorities as well as the cultural preserva- ropean People’s party (EPP). tion of them within the Czech Republic. KDU-ČSL is anti-extrem- ist, antiracist and anti-xenophobic24. ere remains a real danger of Election manifesto 2006 22 extremism in the Czech Republic among some groups and the party proposes an active approach against them. ey pledge restructur- e motto of KDU-ČSL in the 2006 general election was “Quit power” ing of the foreign police office and a rise in the number of minority (Klidná síla) and “Choose the mind” (Volte rozum). Ideologically the members in police ranks, as well as a specific law aimed at ending program is based on European Christian-democratic values. An violence connected with sport – something which is frequently con- interesting aspect is the moderate anti-communism which appears nected with xenophobic behaviour in the Czech Republic. Economic in the front section of the Preamble. However, following the general immigration is welcomed and also cultural acceptance of foreigners election of 2006, the former leader of the party Miroslav Kalousek23 is natural for KDU-ČSL. At the same time, too, a form of Czechness presented the possibility of how to construct a government together is promoted in the sense of a specific cultural heritage of inhabitants, with the Social democratic party and with the silent support of the the value of the (historically multicultural) society as such, support Communists, though he did so as a concession to solve the stalemate situation aer the election (IHNED 2006). 24 is is the position according at least to the program. In the period December e central parts of the manifesto are conservative values as well 2006 – May 2009, Jiří Čunek, the chairman of the party, gained notoriety because of as support of (traditional) families and family life, morality which is his specific solution for Roma issues in his local district of Vsetín, when he as city mayor initiated the relocation of some Roma families out of the city, a move explained 21 KDU-ČSL in this election ran in coalition with Freedom Union – Democratic by the maladjusted behaviour of the families and the socio-economic impact on the Union (US-DEU). city. is type of solution proposed by Čunek was debated nationally and broadly 22 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in criticized by human rights activists. However, there is no common consensus if this the 2006. acting was really discriminatory or was only strict step aer exhaustive process of 23 Since 2009 a member of the TOP 09 party. more pleasant solutions. 56 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 57 to Czech farmers and traditional cras. Minorities are seen from an 1996, and states that it is ready to continue work together with other individualist perspective and the principle of collective is not applied. colleagues in the interests of Europe, at the same time as using the EU Everyone is considered to be part of some minority even if they are in order to support Czech interests. For KDU-ČSL, the EU primarily not aware of that. means cooperation in a positive sense. KDU-ČSL also devotes a special subchapter to the Roma minority e pro-Europeanism of the party can also be clearly observed which would like to integrate into general society while maintaining in its position towards the continuation of European integration, its cultural specifics. e proposed solution focuses on the education enlargement of the EU (with the exception of Turkey because of its of Roma children from pre-school education, as from the point of different roots of traditional values which are not based in Christian- view of KDU-ČSL Roma children are oen discriminated against25. ity), support for the common market, and support for the European Furthermore, the issue of unemployment within Roma communities common security and defence policy. should be tackled specifically in coordination with the NGO sector. According to KDU-ČSL, the EU is not a threat to the sovereignty e NGO sector in its plurality and civil society should be sup- of the country. Within the manifesto there is one subchapter devoted ported and included further in other solutions and sectors, especially to the EU and its foreign policy agenda, but also recalled in other cultural and social services. parts of the manifesto are European revocations, e.g. it is stated that KDU-ČSL warns de facto against populism, especially in the European and Czech politics are going to be more interconnected sense of abuse of phrases as order or national interests. On the other and interdependent. e transfer of EU legislation into the Czech Re- hand, a slight populist line can be observed within the program, but public legislation should be undertaken with reference to the Czech in the overall context all the requirements and ideas are democrati- reality and context. However, European legislation is welcomed to cally legitimate and are not interpreted in a nationalistic way, we can strengthen the positive impact of the Czech legislation. speak more about patriotism in this case than nationalism. KDU- KDU-ČSL is based on the promotion of multilateralism and com- ČSL stresses the equality of European nations, respectively partner pliance with the obligation towards the international community, es- relations. e Czech Republic should not became the workshop of pecially NATO. Active involvement in NATO is one of the basics for Europe and the issue car wrecks from abroad being sold in the Czech the international security of the country. At the same time KDU-ČSL Republic is also seen as problematic, contrary this is mentioned in the proposes peaceful solutions and open, respectful international dia- subchapter of traffic safety and therefore there could be only hidden logue. Nonetheless, the legacy of Christian values should be, accord- nationalistic appeal found. However, from time to time some other ing to the program, part of foreign policy. KDU-ČSL is pro-Israel and national poetic phrases can also be detected in the manifesto, which pro-NATO, and there is also a small amount of pragmatic scepticism may also have an influence on voter intentions. towards Russia, especially in the field of energy security. KDU-ČSL is generally strongly pro-European when it comes to economic as well as political matters. is validates the KDU-ČSL Election manifesto 2010 26 emphasis on the belonging – and the imperative of belonging – of the Czech Republic to the core of the European integration process and e motto of the 2010 general election was ‘e better in ourselves’ to Europe as such. KDU-ČSL considers itself to be an integral part (To lepší v nás) and the campaign was run in the framework of the slo- of the European Peoples Party, in which it has been a member since gan ‘Good day is when…’ and many variations that targeted different
25 is is also a fact proved, for example, by the European Court of Human Rights 26 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in see European Court of Human Rights 2007. the 2010. 58 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 59 social and political groups, e.g. ‘Good day is when the family meets’, or Communist party of Bohemia a Moravia ‘Good day is when the health is good, when grandchildren like meals, (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSČ) when I get top marks at school’, etc. e 2010 KDU-ČSL manifesto as such is also stable in terms of e Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) was official- ideology line, though small shis in some areas are discernible. To ly registered on November 28, 1990 (MVČR 2011) but the origins of compare with the 2006 manifesto, this one does not speak about the party date back to 1921 when the Communist party of Czechoslo- minorities specifically. Also the Roma issue is not mentioned at all, vakia (KSČ) was founded as a result of the separation of the Marxist which can be explained by the controversial politics of the party platform from the Social democratic party.28 Aer World War II start- chairman Jiří Čunek in the intervening period, as mentioned above. ed, the Communist party became one of the most important actors Dealing with Roma issues in any way would be perceived badly for in Czechoslovak politics, winning the election in 194629 and starting the party. to gain more influence in the administration and important minis- In general, the program is also a bit less conservative than earlier, tries, police, media etc. However, another election was planned for which can be ascribed firstly to the breakaway of part of the conserva- 1947 and Communist support was endangered because of the rising tive membership base that switched to the newly established party popularity of other parties such as the Czechoslovak National Social TOP 09, and secondly because of the strong profiling of TOP 09 itself Party. Strategic activities to take over politics in Czechoslovakia were as a hard conservative party – therefore there was a logical need for started, campaigns discrediting political rivals etc.30 By the end of the a more concrete KDU-ČSL identity. However, the basics party values of family, human and civil rights, responsibility, and pro-Europeanism 28 During the so called second Czechoslovak Republic (1938–1939) the Communist remained intact. party of Czechoslovakia was officially forbidden and was active only illegally. Many members of the banned party departed to the Soviet Union where they were in touch One of the emergent topics is the gambling problematic, where in with Soviet communists under Stalin’s influence. Some stayed illegally in Czechoslova- part of the manifesto we can read specific information that the late kia and were also active in the resistance during the Nazi German occupation. phase of gambling can lead to homosexual prostitution, which could 29 e Communist party was stronger in the Czech territory, in the Slovak terri- be considered as populist xenophobia. At the same time some re- tory the sister Slovak Communist party was second and some distance behind the Democratic Party. Because of the larger population in the Czech territory, thus the search confirms this thesis but other research does not – the research Communists were the general winner in Czechoslovakia. 27 outcomes in this area are really divided. However, in this context this 30 e triumphal ending of the communists’ pursuit of power came in February 1948 kind of issue seems to be highly politically incorrect from a party that when the democratic ministers resigned and the Communists pushed the Czechoslo- holds human rights and plural individuality and freedoms as one of vak president Edvard Beneš to form a government comprised only of Communist ministers. is event was supported strongly by the Soviet Union, while Beneš did not its highest principles – yet its own electorate is conservative on these get any real support from western countries, and finished up by appointing a restruc- questions. turalized Communist government. is event became known to the Communists as KDU-ČSL is a traditional modern European party, which operates Victorious February. In fact, it is one of many proofs of how democracy can be weak also with popular and national issues, but in general the use or pro- and can allow totalitarian structures to come power. Between the years 1948 and 1956 motion of such issues is very low. we can speak of a Stalin period when many politically monsterous processes and purg- es occurred. One of the most notorious of these concerned Milada Horáková or Rudolf Slánský who was until trial Secretary general of the Communist party of Czechoslova- kia and became an illustration of how the revolution devours its children. e political space became totalitarian under the rule of the Communist party. During the 1960s, and especially in 1968, with the new leader Alexandr Dubček came the short period of
27 liberalization called the Prague Spring. However, all public hope of liberalization came More basic information on this problematic issue e.g. at www.world-science.net. to an end with the occupation by the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union in August 1968. 60 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 61
1980s the Communist party was losing its dominance and the Velvet All of these attempts have been unsuccessful. However, the banning revolution in November 1989 saw the end of the totalitarian regime in of the Communist party in the Czech Republic has become a kind Czechoslovakia. e Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia were of political evergreen in the country. KSČM argues that the raising as such created on December 21, 198931 with the purpose to establish of this question is sometimes used to hide or distract from other a territorial organization as a counterpart to the Communist party of political issues or problematic reforms. is interpretation has oen Slovakia. On April 7, 1992 the Communist party of Czechoslovakia been given to the latest such governmental initiative in 2011. Internal as a federation of the Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia and analyses from the Ministry of Interior have shown that there is no the Communist party of Slovakia came to an end (Strmiska, Hloušek, legal reason to ban the Communist party but the Government of the Kopeček, Chytilek 2005: 447). Since Czechoslovakia dissolved, only Czech Republic still decided in its resolution nr. 554 on July 20 2011 the Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia has been active in the that the Ministry of Interior should prepare a proposal for banning Czech Republic and still represents the continuity of the Communist KSČM (Vláda ČR 2011). party of the Czechoslovak totalitarian communist regime, though the However, since the regime changed to democracy there has been Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia has apologized for the an unwritten agreement between other political parties in the Czech “bad” and totalitarian practices. Republic about excluding KSČM from high level policy-decision Some more radical or more reformist wings le the party aer the processes; however in the real political life there are many contacts revolution and throughout the 1990s. Nonetheless, the program of and KSČM has already become a legitimate part of the political sys- the party is based on the Marxist tradition and communist ideology tem in the Czech Republic. Moreover, in the last decade Social demo- as such. KSČM tries to get escape from the label and the historical cratic party in particular has relied on silent support from KSČM on legacy of communism in Czechoslovakia, particularly the totalitarian some decisions against right wing political solutions or to support practices connected with Stalinism and Brezhnevism, and presents some leist decisions which could not get support from other mostly itself as a party representing democracy and the interests of regular centrist or right parliamentary parties. citizens striving for social change toward socialism in a democratic way. According to the political declaration of the IV congress of Tab. 7: Electoral performance of the KSČM KSČM in 1995, socialism is incompatible with any social, national, religious or any other oppression or the violation of human rights Elections 1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 (KSČM 1995). Votes in % 13.24 14.05 10.33 11.3 18.51 12.81 11.27 Since the Velvet revolution, there have been many different at- Seats 32 35 22 24 41 26 26 tempts to ban the KSČM because of the problematic historical legacy. Source: Statistical Office of the Czech Republic is period was followed by so called normalization, when not only politics and econo- my but also social and cultural life was under the total control of the Communist party. KSČM is a member of the European parliamentary group Euro- 31 e official registration as stated above was done nearly one year later in November 1990, but the discussions about the Czech “subunit” under the Czechoslovak Com- pean United Le/Nordic Green Le (GUE/NGL) where KSČM was munist party and the counterpart to Communist party of Slovakia started logically also an observer before the Czech Republic joined the EU. Since it earlier. During the period of normalization, Czech Communists did not feel the need first participation in European elections in 2004, KSČM members of for their own Czech unit, because all of Czechoslovak politics was undertaken by the the European parliament has been active within this parliamentary supreme role of Communist party of Czechoslovakia as was stated in the Constitu- tion – however the Constitution from the end of 1960s gave the Slovaks autonomy grouping. KSČM is also striving to unite leist powers across Europe, at least on paper. not only in the EU as stated in its manifesto, which should be done 62 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 63 through the European Le party. However even KSČM is not a full lidi) which tried to target different social groups with an individual member of this European political party and has only the status of approach. observer (European Le 2011). KSČM was very critical of the estab- In the preamble of the manifesto KSČM states that it offers its own lishing congress, where it actively participated – the organisational political program within the reality of a capitalist society but that it problems and structural democratic deficit of the congress and the does not reconcile itself with capitalism as such. As noted, its long term emergent party were unacceptable for KSČM, as well as the fact that priority is social change towards socialism via democratic means. the European party was compelled to be established because of the As stated in the manifesto, the basic values of the KSČM ideology top-down motivation given in the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. not coming are: freedom, democracy, equality, anti-discrimination, human rights, from the democratic grassroots level. Still KSČM hopes that European responsibility, family, anti-militarism, internationalism and opening Le could be the unifying platform for far le powers within Europe. to global society, anti-xenophobia, dialogue in international relations, Despite the problematic history of the party, electoral support for critique of consumer society, and the social integration of the disad- the ideological program is still high and KSČM has made an impact in vantaged. Also multicultural society is welcomed and minorities are every election since the Velvet revolution – in that time it has always perceived to be part of society. been represented in the parliament as well as subsequently in the Eu- Anti-discrimination towards homosexual partnerships is also stat- ropean Parliament. is is largely due to the still very high member- ed. However, the program is very unfriendly towards foreign interest ship base. Even aer massive decrease of members aer the fall of the groups, such as the Sudetendeutschen Landsmanscha and any kinds old regime, at the beginning of 1992 KSČM had still nearly 355,000 of efforts to revise the post World War Two order, including the so members, which translates to around one third of the Czech base called Beneš decree. KSČM also calls for the closing of the office of the from the end of the old regime (Fiala, Holzer, Mareš, Pšeja, 1999: 180). Landsmanscha in Prague, which may be explained in line with the By 2009 the party had nearly 72,000 members, still the highest sovereignty principle, yet is not particularly friendly towards other number of party members in the Czech Republic (Idnes.cz 2009). nations and ethnic groups, nor is it in keeping with the multicultural Another particular reason is the fact that KSČM became for some society that KSČM promotes. voters a protest party against the problematic transition and reform A major part of the position of KSČM in the manifesto is dedicated politics of the democratic governments. to nation related issues. Sovereignty is one of the key points which In the 2006 parliamentary elections, KSČM won 12.81 % of the diverse opinions on foreign policy within the party which is caused vote, which translates to 685,328 votes, and 11.27 % of the vote, which by the idea of internationalism deeply rooted in the party’s ideol- translates to 589,765 votes. In the European Parliament election of ogy. Sovereignty is also connected to patriotism, national traditions, 2009, KSČM picked up 14.18 % of the vote, which translates to 334,577 support for the mother tongue (meaning Czech), national heritage votes. Overall results of the KSČM see in the table. and the fostering of legitimate national pride, but still – in line with its internationalist values – advocating for a friendly approach and Election manifesto 2006 32 openness towards other nations and ethnic groups. One specific con- nection is towards the army, which should defend only the interests of e election campaign of 2006 adopted the motto “We have other so- the Czech Republic and Czech youth should be educated for national lutions” (Máme jiné řešení) and “With people for people” (S lidmi pro self-defence. KSČM’s anti-militaristic doctrine prohibits support for NATO and military operations within NATO and outside the Czech 32 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in Republic. At the same time the party’s internationalism makes it sup- the 2006. port the Shengen area and Euro-regionalism, which ought to serve the 64 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 65 strengthening of infrastructure in the border regions and enable more strengthened by the negative approach toward the European com- contact between people on different sides of the borders. mon external service and military structures ready to operate outside However, KSČM is a euro-sceptic party and has generally denied the EU. Positive rhetoric towards the EU is generally not common, the economic as well as the political aspects of EU membership. Ac- which is also interesting to compare with the European election cording to political scientists such as Havlík or Mareš, we can observe manifest of a year earlier which could be labelled as pro-European a so called European dilemma inside KSČM. Politologist Miroslav but in socialistic way. Mareš has shown in this context schizophrenia within communistic KSČM represents a unique example of a party operating a totali- ideology. On the one hand the EU is perceived as a platform for the tarian communist regime in the past and yet a still living structure realization of internationalist ideas, and international cooperation of that is proud of many things done during the totalitarian period. Its the political le, which is an argument for positively viewing the EU; popular appeal remains fairly strong in terms of the party program yet on the other hand there is a perception of the EU as incarnation where national issues are oen mentioned. At the same time the na- of imperialism and capitalism, which would lead toward a negative tionalism of the Czech Communists is not as strong as is usual in perception of the EU among Czech Communists (Havlík 2009: 120). other Visegrad countries and could be viewed as average in compari- From the KSČM manifesto it is clear that the EU is perceived son. KSČM is standard when it comes to its remaining emphasis on as a political tool in a pragmatic way. e party position regarding social division and the class struggle, which denies the transforma- accepting the Euro as the national currency is not really clear but tion towards fully democratic parties respecting human rights in the invokes respect and readiness of the economy as well as the political whole range. KSČM’s anti-liberal economic approach is problematic system of the Czech Republic. e European bureaucracy and demo- also in relation to the party’s position vis-a-vis the EU – there can cratic deficits are also criticized by KSČM. be said to be a conflict between the internationalism of the working class and humans as such. is remains a tension line within the par- Election manifesto 2010 33 ty’s identity, which also has an impact on the perception of national identity. e rhetoric of the KSČM manifesto in 2010 is clearly influenced by the global economic crises and is much more anti-capitalist in nature than in 2006; it is especially hostile towards foreign capital and trans- Sovereignty (Suverenita) national corporations. e main values referring to the party ideology are mostly the same, but there is less observable emphasis on interna- e Sovereignty we discuss from the period 2005–2010 is in reality tionalism and global opening. e multicultural society is no longer more a trust of different small parties, coalitions and other groups and promoted, and minorities and homosexuals are also not mentioned individual politicians for whom public sovereignty34 is the key issue in e Sudeten question, however, is still mentioned. politics, and therefore is an issue that unifies all of them. European issues also receive less exposure: the manifesto gives no is trend was principally accommodated by the Party of Com- mention to Schengen or to the Euro. On the other hand the principle mon sense which, since 2002 (MVČR 2011a), has worked as a kind of of equality for small countries in the EU is required. Anti-militarism and the requirement to secede from NATO still remains and is further 34 e Sovereignty issue gained its own importance and became a mobilizing factor for these political groups and parties principally against the European Constitution, 33 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the Lisbon Treaty and deepening European integration, but it is not meant uniquely the 2010. in this EU direction. 66 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 67 incubator for talented politicians. e founder of the party, Petr Han- members of other subjects which are close to Bobošíková and partici- nig, is a music producer who has said he searched for musicians but pated in the common project in previous elections. he would like to search also for talented politicians (Strana zdravého e importance of this cooperation could be seen through the de- rozumu 2011). One of the “talents” who became significant and fo- velopments that affected the Party of Common sense. As of 20. 7. 2009 cused on the issues of Sovereignty was Jana Bobošíková, who also its name was changed to Sovereignty – Party of the Common sense experienced a turbulent life in politics.35 e program of the Party (Suverenita, Suverenita – strana zdravého rozumu). is name was of Common sense is focused on domestic issues and the interests valid until January 26, 2010 when a new change came into force and of “ordinary people” and self-employed. e party was registered on the party became Suverenity – e block of Jana Bobošíková, Party 5. 3. 2002 (MVČR 2011a). of the Common sense (Suverenita – Blok Jany Bobošíkové, Strana Until its cooperation with Jana Bobošíková and her party Poli- zdravého rozumu). Since November 30, 2010 the party’s name is once tics 21,36 and more specifically until 2009 and the preparation for again Suverenity – Party of the Common sense (Suverenita – Strana the European Parliament election, the Party of Common sense was zdravého rozumu), and the new independent Suverenity – Block of more or less irrelevant. Jana Bobošíková sought re-election in Euro- Jana Bobošíková takes the lead. e success of this formation will pean Parliament and remained as the head of the coalition project have to be evaluated aer some election in the future. Another party that was officially described as the “Sovereignty project”. e aim close to this trust is the Party of dignified life,37 which has Jana Vol- was to develop one candidate list from all the partner parties for fová as the chairwoman – who was earlier active within the Social the European election in 2009 and for the Czech parliamentary democrat party. election 2010. Electoral support in the 2006 national election was 0.46 %, which e project kept going until 2011 when a new independent politi- means 24,828 votes, in 2010 3.67 %, whitch means 192,145 votes. In cal party was established: Sovereignty – e Block of Jana Bobošíková the European election of 2009 the gain was 4.26 %, which means (Suverenita – Blok Jany Bobošíkové) that siphoned off many of the 100,514 votes – this was close to obtaining the 5 % of the vote thresh- old necessary for parliamentary representation. 35 Jana Bobošíková became famous originally as a TV moderator of political de- Sovereignty parties are not connected at the European level and bates. e first political engagement we can ascribe to her later in 2000 and 2001 even Bobošíková as an MEP for the 2004–2009 term remained non- when she became provisional director of the public Czech TV coverage during the aligned. so called crisis in Czech TV when many of the editors rebelled against possible political influence on Czech TV. Jana Bobošíková became the provisional director of the institution and de facto stayed against the revolt. In 2004 she ran as an inde- Tab. 8: Electoral performance of the Sovereignty pendent in the European parliament elections where she was elected for the term 2004–2009 and was a non-aligned MEP. Since 2006 she has been the leader of the Elections 2002* 2006 2010 new political party Politics 21 (Politika 21). She is the most important speaker for the Sovereignty issue within this block and this also brought her close to Václav Klaus, Votes 0.22 0.46 3.67 since 2003 and until now the president of the Czech Republic. At the same time Seats 0 0 0 she became candidate for the presidential election in 2008 (against Václav Klaus) when she was picked up for the candidature by the Communist party of Bohemia Source: Statistical Office of the Czech Republic and Moravia (KSČM). She cooperated with the Party of Common sense and in 2011 established a new political party named aer her: Sovereignty – Block of Jana Bobošíková. 37 Created in 2003 as “Free” (Svobodní), since 11.5.2007 under the name of Party of 36 Since 21. 2. 2011 changed to Sovereignty – Politics 21 according to the Ministry dignified life (Strana zdravého života) and since 22.2.2011 as Sovereignty – Party of Interior registry of political parties and movements (MVČR 2011). the dignified life (Suverenita – strana ůd stojného života) (MVČR 2011) 68 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 69
Election manifesto 2006 38 and it calls for an independent and sovereign acting toward outside EU countries as well as the autonomous possibility of foreign trade e 2006 manifesto was actually only a very short document of ten outside the EU. points. Point eight point stated that: “Citizens of the Czech Republic Sovereignty advocates also for the family as a traditional social must have in common with other states the same rights as are given to unit and for more engagement of woman in politics. Furthermore, the citizens of these stated in the Czech Republic. Moreover, until there discrimination of decent citizens by indecent citizens who happen to will not be visa-free contact for our citizens, we will also demand visa be are supported by the dysfunctional state administration should be duty also for the citizens of these countries (USA etc.)”. According to removed, a coded reference to problematic Roma issues. Sovereignty the coding within this research, we attributed this point to issues of would also like to oppose illegal immigration – first it should be sovereignty and national pride. stopped vigorously and, second, the situation of illegal immigrants in the Czech Republic should be monitored as well so that they are no Election manifesto 2010 39 longer exploited because of still being humans with rights. e manifesto is focused also on the reformation of the constitu- e 2010 manifesto was a more precise document and the relevant tion and the institutional system of the Czech Republic, e.g. cancel- positions are, of course, emphasis on national sovereignty, national ling the Senate as the second chamber of the Parliament, as well as pride, territorial integrity and national heritage. e Czech Republic the introduction of direct elections for the presidency as well as the should not became the shovel of Europe but its brain (and, therefore, introduction of direct democracy mechanisms. more support for science is needed) and should the prestige of the Sovereignty could be considered as a stream representing the Czech Republic should be strengthened abroad. e Czech Republic national-populist appeal which was provoked by the European Inte- should also become a focus point for energy transfer or a transporta- gration and social conflicts in the society. It is highly dependent on tion artery, and Czech agriculture should be supported more. personal level and engagement, specifically of Jana Bobošíková. One of the most specific issues is the negative approach toward the Lisbon Treaty, which was a continuation of Jana Bobošíková’s po- litical views as well as the European Parliament manifesto 2009. e National Party (Národní strana, NS) Lisbon Treaty issue is, in the view of Sovereignty, also connected with the Sudeten Germans problem and their possible property claims. e Czech National Party was officially registered by the Ministry of erefore the party rejects all efforts to revise the post World War Interior on October 31, 2002 (MVČR 2011). e party was dissolved Two order, including the Beneš decree. For Sovereignty the Lisbon to all intents and purposes on December 1, 2009 when the members of Treaty also represents the immoral attempt of the stronger to un- the Land Board resigned from all of their functions. is came shortly dermine the weaker within Europe. erefore we can also ascribe aer the resignation of the Chairman of the party, Petra Edelman- the party’s perception of the EU as a tool for its own interests. e nová, on October 7, 2009 (Lidovky.cz 2009). She had been leading the manifesto is also de facto critical toward the external EU policy, party since its inception, despite resigning aer the election debacle in 2006; however a party congress had unanimously restored her (Jansa 2007: 18). In 2010 no activity from the party has been observed de- 38 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2006. spite the Party is still officially registered. 39 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in According to a governmental Report on Extremism from 2010 the 2010. (MVČR 2011b), some activists from the National Party were con- 70 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 71 sidering founding a new party, but in the end they took over the e first attempt to establish the National Party dates back to 1996, leadership of the Czech Movement for National Unity (ČHNJ, České when the members of the civic association National Front of Castist hnutí za národní jednotu40) and changed its focus to anti-Islamism, (Národní front castistů41) established an initiative group but their ef- just as the National Party had done during the European parliament forts were not successful. Year 2000 brought renewed efforts by the election campaign of 2009, or by the end of 2006 with their public most powerful civic association at that time within the patriotic field, event “Burn the Muslim hate”. e report also refers to the financial the so-called Patriotic Front (Vlastenecká fronta). Once again the problems of the National Party. e official termination of the party Ministry of Interior did not register the party because of the unful- is still not concluded according to the Registry of political parties and filled criteria of the registration. is failure to register led aerwards movements at the Ministry of Interior, but even the website of the also to a schism within the initiative group. Two separate initiative party has been closed down and no new information has appeared groups in common conflict were established according to the leaders publicly. involved in the process (MVČR 2000)– Pavel Sedláček, subsequently e last election the National Party participated in was the Euro- connected also to the newly established civic association Vlast.cz pean parliament election of 2009 when its electoral support reached (Homeland.cz),42 and Pavel Sibřina who was in charge of the second only 0.26 %, meaning 6263 votes. In the parliamentary elections of attempted registration but was unexpectedly recalled from the lead- 2006, its public support was 0.17 %, with 9341 votes. To compare with ing position and replace again by Sedláček. Sibřina and his followers the European election in 2004 when the National Party was in a coali- continued to try on their own. Both these groups have been trying to tion with the Czech National Social Party called National Coalition register the National Party and both of them were again denied by the (Národní koalice), the common result was 0.12 % of the vote (with Ministry of Interior (Jansa 2007: 8–17). 2944 votes) despite their public activity against joining EU in the pre- e story continued with the appeal of both groups to the High ceding months. In the regional elections of 2008 a candidate from the Court. At the end the Court abolished the decision and the Ministry party stood in only two out of 14 regions of the Czech Republic and of Interior had to have registered the National Party according to the the results were 0.41 % (1628 votes) in the Central Bohemia region initiative group led by Pavel Sedláček (Mareš 2003: 124) e ongoing (Středočeský kraj) and 0.28 % (1083 votes) in the Moravian-Silesian assembly of the party elected Petra Edelmannová as new leader and Region (Moravskoslezský kraj). e performance on national as well Pavel Sedláček remained as one of the most prominent organizers of as European level you can follow in the table, European dimension is the public party events. Unfortunately for the party, the whole process included to illustrate the last election results of the National Party. was complicated as stated above and took too long for the party to be ready for the parliamentary election in 2002. Tab. 9: Electoral performance of NP It should be stated that the party is not in any case the successor of the Czech National Party that was established in the nineteenth Elections EP 2004 2006 EP 2009
Votes 0.12 0.17 0.26 41 Castist comes from the Latin “Castis omnia casta” (All chaste chaste). It was a civic Seats 0 0 0 association interested in the old Slavic traditions and in the revival of the moral and ethical values of society. Association is not working anymore. Source: Statistical Office of the Czech Republic 42 e Vlast.cz association was established in 2000 and became more famous because of the web portal and newspaper of the same name. But the vice-chairman of the as- sociation was also the leader of one of the initiative groups for establishing the Czech National Party, the one that was successful in the end. See more on thein website 40 More information you can find on thein website http://chnj.cz/. www.vlast.cz. 72 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 73 century as the first Czech political party.43 Despite this the party es- To illustrate the most racist and demagogical demands: “e incon- tablished in 2002 sometimes referred itself to the historical party and venient Roma population which will not be willing to take the citizens’ remarked on its ideological and historical legacy. duties seriously, they will be voluntarily deported to their homeland One of the most well-known affairs of the National Party took – India”, or “We will stop the import of Africans with their dangerous place in January 2006, when the party tried to install a memorial inconveniency, infections and disrespect to human life, and also Asian for the victims of World War Two in Lety u Písku, where there was people with their cheap products and plagiarism”. a concentration camp specialized during the war on the internment On European questions, the manifesto copied the ideas mentioned of the Czech Roma population. e National Party tried to relativ- also in the manifesto of 2006 and added some more aspects such as a ize the historical suffering of the Roma population interned in this demand for equality within the EU, an anti-Lisbon Treaty approach camp especially with speeches on different days during January that nevertheless continues the trend of the Constitutional treaty re- when party members were gathered there. ey used the contro- jection and anti-EU campaigning in the time of EU entry referenda, versy of the historical facts about the camp, its development and or the requirement of nullifying the Schengen Treaties and re-intro- conditions as well as the fact that during the communist dictator- ducing border controls. ship a pig fattening farm was built there, which is still there today. e National Party called also for a common approach against In 2010 the official memorial was rebuilt and cultivated by the state the Islamisation of Europe as well as for stopping immigration and thanks also to the provocative happening caused by the National starting repatriation. Strong conservatism was also promoted. How- party. ever, the first point of the manifesto to focus specifically on Czech, Another big issue in the public eye was the attempt by the Na- Moravian and Silesian people stated the leitmotif of the program: tional Party to present a racist election advert in the public media aid for Czechs was supposed to be demagogically financed from the before the election to the European Parliament in 2009. Public TV EU’s structural funds, which were described as never-ending funds and Radio decided, aer the first runs of the advert, and because of for the support of economies in the third world. e question of the its anti-constitutional character, to shut it down from broadcasting. Euro currency had to be put to a referendum vote, and the National e advert was called “Final solution to the Gypsy question” and was Party stated it was against joining the Euro. Another issue illustrated openly racist, the same as the party manifesto for European Parlia- the shi of the party’s ideology was an apology to the Serbs, because ment elections 2009. However, if there had been any doubts about Kosovo should be Serbia. the National Party’s credentials as extremist, radical or racist in the e party’s international contacts among the relevant political first years of its existence, the election manifesto and the campaign groups in Europe were patchy. e National Party tried to establish of 2009 dispelled them. Categorical nationalism, xenophobia, racism, some international connections at the European level, e.g. with the an anti-Roma stance, Islamophobia and anti-globalism appeared very Union for Europe of the Nations Group in European Parliament, but strongly. With national categorising and anti-immigrant rhetoric, the the position of the party was not strong enough to be relevant for campaign of 2009 became very controversial as well as at times dema- European cooperation. Its contacts, as far as they went, were therefore gogic and full of stereotyping. more usually at the bilateral level with other national parties such as Vlaams Block or Slovak National Party. Some contacts were also es- tablished with Front National in France, with some Scandinavian and 43 e Czech National Party was established as the first Czech political party in 1848 from the Czech urban population, and was later famous also as the “Old Czechs” Baltic country parties, as well as Croatian and Italian parties (Jansa (Staročeši). e party tried to represent Czech interests within the Austrian and sub- 2007: 35). sequent Austrio-Hungarian monarchy. 74 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 75
Election manifesto 2006 44 In terms of ideology, the party is vehemently anti-communist as well as being anti-liberal. It confronts consumer society and trans- e central points of the manifesto are conservative values, national national capital. Also post-modern values are ignored: the family is pride and the goodness of being Czech45, as well as sovereignty, seen as a central point, with the strong role of the father, individual national interests, national states and therefore also rejection of freedom and motivation seen as essential. National party ideology is European supranationalism. e national state is seen as the final opposed to all forms of liberating homosexual relationships. historical achievement and as an object of basic faith. Also statism as e manifesto’s stress on categorical morality, patriotism and such is evident – citizens and minorities should be loyal to the idea nationalism lead “only”46 to xenophobia and anti-immigrant rheto- of the nation state. Still in 2006 we can also observe the requirements ric and solutions such as the rejection of economic migration and of protection of cultural identity by minorities but no positive dis- the repatriation of inconvenient migrants. e immigration policy crimination should be undertaken. Nationalism is perceived through should be tightened and, for example, a complex language examina- historicism and traditionalism and its roots are in the ancient world, tion should be required before the granting of citizenship. Asylum Christianity and among Celtic and Slavic tribes on the historical ter- issues are respected but the status of political immigrants should also ritory of the Czech Republic. e manifesto refers also to the Slavic be strengthened. Integration of the immigrants is considered to be sense of belonging which was common among Czech patriots in the widely bad by the National party because of in securing social and nineteenth century. moral assurances within the society. International order, according to the National Party manifesto, Governance should be centralized and the regional structure dis- should be based on mutual respect, sovereignty and territorial in- solved. Local units as cities and districts should be bordered according tegrity. e United Nations is seen as the leading international actor to historical principles.47 Furthermore, communalism, home law and even if it is not seen as an ideally working institution. Europe is seen home guard are required and should ensure law and order within com- through its exceptionality and on the European continent coopera- munities. Serious crimes should be punished with a renewed death tion under the concept of “Europe of homelands” is preferred as the penalty. e state should take its authority from the citizens. At the same National Party refers to De Gaulle conception. erefore the Czech time authority should also run from the state to the citizens – the legal Republic ought to step out from the European Union. e program, authority and the natural one ought to inspire respect from citizens. however, also steps to a level lower and formulates its opinion within EU. e National Party therefore rejects the Euro as the national cur- rency, the European constitution is seen as a death document and Workers’ Party (Dělnická strana, DS) enlargement of EU should not really take place – in particular the entry to the EU of Turkey is strongly opposed, as well as Romania and e Workers’ Party was officially registered by the Ministry of Inte- Bulgaria. ere is a strong negative sentiment towards Sudeten Ger- rior on December 20, 2002 under the name “New power” (Nová síla) mans and all efforts to revise post World War Two orders are denied. (MVČR 2011). In January 2003, a constituent congress took place and NATO is also negatively perceived and therefore the Czech Republic should leave this organisation. 46 “Only” meaning if we are comparing the 2006 manifesto and the European mani- festo of 2009 which is far more extreme and radical. 44 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in 47 However, it is not stated according to which historical principles, or from which the 2006. period – the only given explanation is if the local units as cities and districts are on 45 More generally, the goodness being of nationality, respectively of European na- historical land borders, between Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. It is not dealing with tionalities. the conditions within historical lands. 76 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 77 it was decided also to change the party name to Workers’ Party. Later of 2006, the Workers’ Party ran together with five other political par- on, because of its connection to the neo-Nazi scene since 200748 and ties and non-affiliated candidates in the coalition called Law and Jus- throughout its political life, the party had come to the attention of tice (Právo a spravedlnost). Together they received 0.23 % of the vote the state and was accused of being unconstitutional. e party was that means 12,756 votes. In the European election in 2009 they won officially deleted from the Register of Political parties and movements 1.07 % of the vote that means 25, 368 votes. In the regional election on November 1, 2010 under a decision of the Supreme Administrative of 2008 Workers’ Party co-operated with the Workers’ Party of Social Court of the Czech Republic from the February 17, 2010 concerning Justice in the coalition Workers’ Party – No to fees in health (gaining the dissolution of the party.49 e leadership of the Workers’ Party, as from 0.56 to 1.28 % of the vote according to the regions, and in total well as most of its members, had just switched to Workers’ Party of 26 226 votes) and in the Pilsen region (Plzeňský kraj) as the Workers’ Social Justice which was originally established in 2004 as a party of Party – No to the US Radar, 1.47 % of the vote, meaning 2639 votes). the Czech Republic’s inhabitants (MVČR 2011). e former Chair- man of the Workers’ Party, Tomáš Vandas, became by the end of 2010 Tab. 10: Electoral performance of DS the new chairman of the Workers’ Party of Social Justice, but this took place aer the parliamentary and local elections in 2010. Within the Elections EP 2004 2006 EP 2009 period of this research (2005–2010), Workers’ Party together with the Votes 1.07 0.23 0.18 National Party was the most important far right political group in the Seats 0 0 0 Czech Republic. Workers’ Party tried to continue the tradition of workers move- Source: Statistical Office of the Czech Republic ments from the nineteenth century and its notable counterparts are the Hungarian party Jobbik and the Freedom Party from Austria, well e historical roots of the Workers’ Party are based in the Coali- known for its former leader Jörg Haider. ey did not refer to them- tion for Republic – Republican Party of the Czechoslovakia50 and its selves as being either a le or right political party, stating that this is an followers, including the youth organisation Republican youth. It is obsolete concept – instead they divided political parties under either thought that the leaders of the new Workers’ party recruiting from the liberal or popular (also populist) headings. Workers’ Party is consid- surrounding Republicans broke the alliance because of the controver- ered to be, of course, popular and we can also state confidently that it sial financial affairs of the Republicans. is populist. e party has tried to find problematic topics among peo- Workers’ Party gained notoriety mostly for two reasons. First, their ple, and to offer public sounding solutions. However, the association members and followers were very active in public demonstrations with the neo-Nazi scene also radicalised the ideological platform. Workers’ party established international contacts with the German 50 Later on the Coalition was replaced by the Republicans of Miroslav Sládek, who NPD, Nationaldemokratische Partei and the Slovak civic association was the leader of the original Coalition but because of financial affairs and its bank- ruptcy had to change parties in order to survive in politics. e Coalition was founded Slovak Community (Bach 2009: 37–38). by the end of 1989 and was the leading political party in the extreme right wing spec- e considered nationalwide elections participated in by the Work- trum throughout the 1990s. For most of the 1990s it was also a parliamentary party. ers’ Party were the parliamentary election of 2006 and the European In the middle of the 1990s, the party had around 500,000 voters: in the 1996 election Parliament election of 2009. For the national parliamentary election 8.01 % meant 485,072 votes, in the 1998 election only 3.9 percent meant 232,965 votes, and also meant loss of representation in the Parliament (Czech Statistical Office). e party’s success was mainly down to the charismatic and provocative leader Miroslav 48 See for example Mareš, Vojvodová (2010) or Bach 2009. Sládek, famous for his rhetorical skills and racist statements mostly directed at the 49 According to the MVCR 2011b. Roma minority. 78 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 79 which also attracted high numbers of neo-Nazis from the Czech Re- Workers’ Party money became the measure of success in society, public, and second because of the creation of the so called National especially money earned quickly and easily at the expenses of em- Guard. In this they took inspiration from Jobbik in Hungary, a fact of- ployees. Employees of all kinds, including the self-employed, are also ten mentioned by the representatives of the party, especially the leader considered as the main electoral base and are equated as the workers Vandas. e first use of the National Guard came during a Gay Pride of the society. march in Brno in 2008, but the most notorious actions took place in e Workers’ Party declared itself to be a political, non-confes- the second half of 2008 in the housing estate Janov in the town of sional party that respects the pluralist and democratic constitutional Litvínov, where there is an excluded Roma community. order of the Czech Republic and therefore also takes the responsibility On November 24, 2008 the Government of the Czech Republic of possible participation in power. However, as shown below in the decided on the proposal for the High Court to dissolve the Workers’ discussion of the party’s program, this could not really be an exact Party. In March 2009 the Court decided that the governmental pro- definition of the party’s profile and seems more to do with the require- posal was unjustified. e decision of the Court was presented by the ment to dress itself up as a democratic, conformist party. party as a victory and in March 2009 the youth branch of the Workers’ e central points of the manifesto to emerge are: employment, Party – called Workers’ Youth – was registered; among others it was strong morality and ethics Czechs as a priority, racism, historicism, publishing the magazine National Resistance. neutrality in foreign relations and national sovereignty. Historicism is In early autumn 2009 the government repeated their proposal connected with an emphasis on the Czech national history and tradi- with a more concrete accusation, and ultimately the Workers’ Party tions, culture and patriotism, as well as the introduction of forms of was dissolved by Court decision on February 17, 2010. e leadership historical legislation such as “Home law”51 or the reincarnation of old of the party used this as an opportunity to appeal the decision, but traditional citizens’ structures such as guilds or changing the educa- this was denied by the Court on May 27, 2010. In October 2010 the tional system. Workers’ Party accused the Czech Republic at the European Court of Racism could be identified within the manifesto, e.g. with the de- Human Rights of violating the party’s right to a fair trial and therefore mand to change the Constitution in order to enable determination also the right of assembly and freedom of speech (MVČR 2011b). according to nationality, which should be stated on personal iden- As the Workers’ Party was dissolved before the election of 2010 and tification documents. Another highly undemocratic and nearly also there was a common candidate program within the nationalist coali- racist aspect is the proposal to expel immigrants from the country, tion in 2006, we are analysing the 2008 manifesto as the representative especially given the justification used, namely that the Czech Republic program document of the party for the researched period. In fact, it should not be the “cesspool of Europe” and full of immigrants from was based on the ground of discussion around the election 2006 and especially eastern Europe and post-Soviet countries. was the ideological base for the manifest for European Parliament election 2009 as well as it was expected to use it for Parliamentary 51 Also domestic membership or a kind of community belonging right it was a legal institute in the Austrian monarchy since 1849, later on Austria-Hungary and also dur- election 2010. ing the first and second Czechoslovak Republic, as well as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia until 1948. e intention of this legal institute was the guarantee of stay Workers’ Party manifesto in the local community and poor provision in the charge of the community if the individual was unable to provide for themselves. To obtain the right to a home was In the preamble of the political program can be found an invoca- possible only as the child of the father who is a member of the community, for the wife of a community member, if the local office agreed on behalf of long-term vacation, for tion dedicated to the change of moral and ethical framework in the example, or spending the community budget, or as an outsider coming for a clerical Czech Republic aer the Velvet revolution of 1989. According to the post in the community. 80 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 81
Czech identity is strongly promoted. Asylum is to only be awarded Types of electoral manifestos in special cases if there is the precondition of the asylum seeker being produced by Czech parties qualified and able to be assimilated in the society, including national traditions and culture. is also illustrates that the reference to de- As in other Visegrad countries we have focused on the policy di- mocracy and pluralism in the invocation of the manifesto could be mensions that conceptualize issues of ethnicity, understanding and taken seriously only in the context of political party fighting, not on preservation of the national identity and relations with nations and the personal level and with respect to human beings. erefore we can supranational organizations. e second defining dimensions come also deduct that the nation is seen more via the blood principle – or in a category where the nation was not mentioned at all. e poles of ius sanguis – than via citizens and the human approach which seems the relevant parties are not significantly large but when we take into to be very limited on special cases. account also the extreme-right parties, the divergences are evident. Even more dangerous is the combination of this with aspects of We have defined five categories within the Czech election manifestos. strengthening the state controlling system, justice and policy, intro- We now define and set out the individual categories based on the ducing morality securing law and also renewing the death penalty, two general elections (2006 and 2010) and the European Parliament even if it is stated only for extremely serious crimes such as crimes election in 2009. against children, mass murders, but also terrorism which could be ex- plained from different perspectives and according to different meas- Homogenization type ures. Historical land boundaries should be renewed to strengthen traditional land and territorial identity. e first grouping of electoral manifestos consists of ideologically Another chapter is given over to resisting abortion, homosexuals various parties: all manifestos of the Civic Democratic Party (lib- and homosexual partnerships, and the promotion of anti-consumer- eral-conservative party), the electoral manifesto of the Czech So- ism including restricting foreign capital, protectionism and the rejec- cial Democratic Party (social democracy) and a subcategory of the tion of selling land abroad. homogenization type formed by the Christian Democratic Union- e Czech Republic should be a strictly sovereign and unitary Czechoslovak People’s Party. country with national integrity. It should be a neutral state within In general terms, the common features of these manifestos are the foreign relations; it ought to step out from NATO and the EU, and emphasis on defining state sovereignty and its unity. Although this should not provide any development aid to third countries. Within manifesto group covers European integration issues slightly different, Europe cooperation should be established only on the basis of a “Eu- the emphasis on shared national awareness is evident. e next defin- rope of nations”. As stated above, the state would be anti-immigra- ing feature of the homogenization type is the accent on human rights tion according to the Workers’ Party, and also anti-eastern Europe and the promotion of a general equality principle. e last feature is oriented. the careful attitude to international cooperation, although there is a small inherent tension within the category. ese manifestos define the Czech Republic as a country with a common national and cultural heritage and acknowledge the mem- bership of the Czech Republic to the European space, a country common culture and values at the same time. e position of the country in the European value system is not automatically followed by a stated requirement for deeper integration of the EU. e value 82 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 83 of national culture must be defended by both domestic and foreign e last category of the homogenization manifesto is the careful issues. In domestic matters is the manifestos strongly welcomed sup- attitude given to immigration and integration issues. Although ČSSD port for the Czech language as a tool for identifying individuals with should hold an immigrant friendly position, ČSSD supports immigra- the state. Surprisingly, ČSSD place a stronger emphasis on defending tion primarily from the south-east Slavic nations. A similar awareness the national culture than does the liberal-conservative ODS. e at- is evident also with ODS that supports immigration based on working titude of ČSSD to national issues seems to be a little bit fragmented reasons and not for the settlement of incoming immigrants. in contrast to its attitude on support for EU integration. In contrast e subcategory of the homogenization type is the Christian-ho- to ČSSD, ODS puts an emphasis on the self-confident promoting of mogenization type. e differencing feature of this subcategory is the state interests in foreign relations, especially in issues concerning emphasis on Christianity of type. KDU-ČSL supports the traditional the EU. religious dimension in Czech politics. e party promotes a focus on e integration category covers the attitude to European integra- equality, human rights, supporting EU integration, a more open at- tion, and the question of possible further deepening of the integration titude to immigrants and their integration into the majority society. process. ere is an interesting policy development on this from the e category corresponds to an emphasis on unifying national Social Democrats. Although ČSSD presented a very European pro- identity and projecting a self-confident state towards the external gram for the 2009 European election, the manifesto (for the national world. All three ODS manifestos fit in to this category. As mentioned election) one year later was shied to a more national tendency. ere- above, in the case of ČSSD there is an interesting development to- fore the accent on the open European policy is weakened – the party wards the nationalizing of its manifesto. e question is whether this still supports accession to the Euro-zone but less emphatically and is a single issue case or will the Social Democrats continue to nation- over a longer time period. EU integration is supported less strongly alise their manifesto in the future. by ODS. e party supports a more instrumental EU integration fo- cused on the economic dimension of the EU. At the same time ODS Postmodern type is opposed to the continuing sovereignty shi at the supranational level on fundamental policy issues such as foreign policy and tax and e parties that belong to the postmodern type are situated in the (lib- fiscal harmonization. eral) centre of the Czech party system. is entails a very fundamental e range of the European policy variation between the parties is difficulty: the volatility of the electorate in this part of the political also evident on security and military issues. e liberal-conservative spectrum. In the analyzed period one liberal party was marginalized party, ODS, traditionally emphasizes the transatlantic cooperation, (US-DEU) and another lost its relevance during its participation in and the most serious security guarantee can only be provided by the government (Green party). e increasing role of the Green party NATO. e Social Democrats, in contrast to ODS, support the further around 2006 indirectly caused the decline of US-DEU. Although these military and security integration of the EU. At the same time ČSSD two parties are basically different – the environmental Green Party emphasized less transatlantic cooperation. and the centre-right US-DEU – within the Czech political climate e human rights category is strongly promoted by the Social these parties are understood to be ideologically similar. Democrats but ODS also mentions this policy. ČSSD emphasized the In the case of US-DEU we have analyzed just one election mani- Roma minority as a discriminated national minority in the Czech festo from the 2006 election. e party gained only 0.3 % of the votes Republic. Generally, both parties promote the equality principle, not in the 2006 general election and did not participate in the subsequent only in the case of an equal attitude towards minorities, but also in the 2009 and 2010 elections. e Green Party obtained its best election re- case of human rights and among the member states of the EU. sult in the 2006 election and 2010 failed to reach the 5 % threshold. 84 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 85
e identifying categories of the postmodern type for Green Party European type and US-DEU are the accent on human rights, the equality principle and the anti-military policy and a kind of pacifism. For the Green e basic feature of the European type is the openness to European Party there is evidently a long term policy emphasis on these issues. integration and to the EU in general. e manifestos included under In the case of the US-DEU we can analyze just one manifesto that is this grouping emphasize national interests but these interests are particularly different from previous manifestos in the 1998, 2002 and shied to the European level. e primary goal of the manifestos is 2004 elections. an efficient EU with effective policy tools and a transparent functional e human rights issue is typical for postmodern parties that em- structure. At the same time the manifestos call for a self-confident role phasize a normative or rather moral dimension of politics. erefore for the Czech Republic in foreign policy and also within the EU. e this policy is one of the key policy dimensions. e parties do not next categories within this type are: an accent on human rights, equal- emphasize human rights in terms of the Human Rights Convention ity of minorities and resistance to the commercialization of society. but the human rights topic is mentioned in the manifestos. In contrast e manifestos of TOP 09, KDU-ČSL 2010, and ČSSD 2006 conform to other types of manifestos, the postmodern manifestos do not have to the European type. any specific chapter concerning human rights. at can be under- e emphasis on the strong role of the Czech Republic in eco- stood as their promoting of another three aspects of human rights: nomic and political issues does not refer to the accent on sovereignty economic, social and political rights. and the rejecting of further supranational integration or further e equality category is based on their promotion of an equal at- shiing of sovereignty towards the EU. e significant feature is the titude when it comes to gender and minority matters. Especially in the need to constitute such a position that the Czech Republic will be case of the Green Party, gender equality is very much pushed. Similar an equal partner not because of the blackmail potential but due to to the human rights category, the Roma minority is also mentioned. its abilities. ere is an evident difference here from the homog- e Greens stress equality in the education system. US-DEU empha- enization type that puts the emphasis on both state and strong sizes an equal attitude in a general way and its promotion of general sovereignty. is is a pragmatic policy to avoid influence loss and equality is evident in many chapters. at the same time to maintain a strong state position. ere is a slight An anti-military attitude is generally typical for “green” parties. Al- differentiation between the manifestos – the 2006 ČSSD mani- though both parties want to fulfil the Alliance commitments (NATO festo promotes a European emphasis more in the political than the and the EU for Greens), they call for the decreasing of the national practical (pragmatic) sense. e attitude of TOP 09 refers to the military budget. e parties call for conflict resolution through the “ideal” combination of a strong state position (attitude) and a sup- use of non-military means. At the same time the Greens empha- portive policy towards the EU. Due to the ideological similarity of size the security and military cooperation of the EU. e attitude TOP 09 and KDU-ČSL, the attitude of the Christian democrats is of US-DEU is not clear on this issue, due to its very short election similar. manifesto. e EU category covers the party support for political cooperation e elaboration of the Green Party manifestos consists of stable and the emphasis on economic integration. All manifestos positively foundations. ere is also an evident continuing shi at the European refer to the Euro-zone entry and realize the fundamental political and policy level, with the emphasis on broader and deeper cooperation economic integration shi. In the case of the Euro zone, the possibil- within the EU. e Green Party in particular promotes societal poli- ity to accept the common currency is the basic example of economic tics together with a certain level of morality. integration (economic gains) and deeper political integration (sover- eignty shi). 86 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 87
e manifestos are slightly different in their advocacy of national Christianity principles. is religious attitude is used as a general interests. TOP 09 emphasizes the broader support for an active role approach for making party policy, including on human rights. On the of the Czech Republic and does not accentuate the national inter- human rights issue, KDU-ČSL mentions the problematic situation of est or nationalization of the European policy too much.52 e Social the Roma minority, the need to integrate the minority and to avoid Democrats use the term “national interests” and promote them differ- any further rotting of the societal situation.54 ently. Above all, in the 2006 election manifesto (in this type) there is e last category is the negative attitude to the commercialization an internal policy tension between the European policy and the effort of the society. e parties do not use the term “nation” but rather use to push national interests. is manifesto tension was the reason for aversion to the commercialization of the traditional way of life and the classification of the 2010 election manifesto as the homogeniza- values. e common feature of the manifestos is the emphasis on tion type. e effort to be a European party and defend the national developing a state identity in a globalized world. Surprisingly, the cat- interests is, in the long term, an internal conflict and any “policy flex- egory is constituted by conservative parties and social democracy. ibility” will depend on the personal profile of the party leader and on Overall, the aversion to commercialization does not mean that the societal demand for certain manifesto issues.53 In the long term manifestos (parties) oppose further international integration or sup- KDU-ČSL promotes a clear European policy and internal tension port for the continuing globalization process. e manifestos describe could come with any conservative shi and consequently a policy how the parties oppose only a certain feature of globalization and featuring less EU support. principally support the gains made via globalization in economic and Further divergence in this category is the attitude to European se- social terms. e conservative parties (KDU-ČSL and TOP 09) want curity. Both the Social and Christian Democrats promote the priority to defend the culture against commercialization. e Social Demo- on security issues at the European level and less with the linkage to crats do not define their negative position along cultural lines but the transatlantic alliance. In contrast, TOP 09 emphasizes European generally support the need to further develop the mother tongue as a security (military) cooperation. But with the same relevancy TOP 09 common binding feature. promotes security cooperation within the framework of NATO or e European type of manifestos has a common interest in a well- partly on a bilateral basis with the USA. functioning EU and, at the same time, in the influential role of the e category of human rights and equality is handled differently Czech Republic therein. e parties share common European values in the manifestos. ČSSD promotes the human rights issue with more such as an emphasis on human rights, the equality principle and the emphasis than the two other parties. e Social Democrats concern integration of minorities. On identity issues the manifestos refer to in this policy issue centres on the Roma minority and the need for both maintaining cultural unification and excessive globalization. their integration into the majority society. In the context of human During our analyzed period, KDU-ČSL has developed from the rights, Social Democrats associate this issue with the rejection of dis- homogenization type to the European type with less emphasis on crimination against immigrants and all minorities in general. KDU- national identity issues. ČSSD, in contrast to the Christian Democrats, ČSL relates the minority policy and the human rights dimension to has moved from the European type to the homogenization type. Sur- prisingly, both conservative parties (TOP 09 and KDU-ČSL) occupy 52 Each party proclaims that it will defend the national interest. at is the vital inter- a very similar type of position. est of the party for the successful development of the country. 53 e personal role of the former leader of ČSSD, Jiří Paroubek, has been seen to be significant in the case of having a stronger emphasis on national issues in the mani- 54 In 2010, there was a controversial instance from the former KDU-ČSL party leader festo – for example a speech of his speech in Kutná hora where he said that immigrants Jiří Čunek who became famous due to his solution for the Roma minority living in were taking jobs for Czechs. his home district Vsetín. 88 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 89
Communist type European (neo-) communist parties that on the one hand reject the “ideology” of European integration while, on the other hand, the same One specific type of election manifesto is the Communist type. A par- integration offers them the possibility to institutionalize international ticularity of the whole manifesto is the split emphasis on international cooperation. cooperation and general support for European integration, yet at the KSČM acts positively in the case of human rights, the rights of same time the rejection of the ideological bases of this integration. A minorities and general equality. e party emphasizes the interna- further particularity is the accent on traditional communist ideology, tional (liberal) dimension of its ideology. In contrast to the European such as cooperation with other communist parties in Europe. type, KSČM strongly emphasizes anti-discrimination, anti-racism as e significant feature of the manifestos is the communist ideol- well as openness to the global society. e very positive approach to ogy that has adapted to the conditions of the globalized world. e national minorities and the openness to the world result in the party’s party defines its ideological principles in terms that are familiar to accent on a multicultural society. KSČM emphasizes minority and traditional communist parties, with significant emphasis on the class state equality as well as societal equality – gender, gay and lesbian struggle and the workers’ revolution. Practically, the party promotes etc. Surprisingly, the party does not mention the Roma minority and its ideology in a pragmatic way. its problematic position in the Czech Republic. At the same time the KSČM strongly supports a self-confident position for the Czech party has a negative view on the German Sudetendeutschen Land- Republic, particularly on political issues. Although the party wants to manscha.55 promote its international policy and cooperate on the international KSČM’s anti-capitalist and slightly anti-globalization outlook is ev- level with other communist or radical le parties, KSČM still empha- ident in its rejection of the commercialization of the national culture sizes state sovereignty, patriotism and national culture. It is surprising and heritage. In comparison to the European type, KSČM’s emphasis that economic issues are absent; the party instead concentrates its is directed primarily against the globalized, capitalist system followed focus on the political dimension. e significant mention of eco- by the need for defending the national heritage and culture. nomic issues related to the national question is the negative attitude e Communist type is specific due to the internationalized com- expressed by KSČM to globalization and liberalized free market flows, munist ideology that causes an inherent tension between opposing which can be defined as an anti-capitalist approach in the policy. e capitalism, the neoliberalized world economy and globalization, on accent on the strong role of the Czech Republic supports the emphasis the one hand, and, on the other hand, the emphasis on societal open- on national self-defence in a military and societal way. us the party ness to the world in the case of supporting multiculturalism and rejects further security and military cooperation with NATO as a tool cooperation with other national le parties. In contrast to the inter- of liberal interventionism. national policy focus of the party, there is a clear and strong emphasis e European policy of KSČM presents an internal ideological on national sovereignty and identity. policy dilemma. e party emphasizes cooperation with other na- tional parties and international organizations – the internationalism Populist type of communist ideology – but above all the party rejects the neo-lib- eral policy approach to the economy and integration in general. e With this type it is difficult to exactly define the ideological policy party criticizes the lack of democracy in the institutional schema and structure of the manifestos. ere is an assumption that the policy is- in the decision-making process of the EU. Acceptance and Czech sues were chosen due to a possible bias of certain voters to the party membership of the Euro may be possible only if it favours the Czech economic situation. On this point there is a similarity with other 55 For more on this see the description of KSČM above. 90 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 91 manifestos and, consequently, there is only a weak binding ideological e category of border protection is relevant in Sovereignty. e feature. Very common topics of the populist type are: a negative at- party rejects any kind of post world war revisionism that could titude to or awareness of immigrants and possibly also other national lead to the contesting of the legality of the Beneš Decrees and their minorities, the strengthening of Czech national sovereignty, the pro- continuing relevance in a globalized world. is issue is connected moting of Czech interests in the EU and, at the same time, a rather with rejection of the Lisbon Treaty because of the Sudeten-Ger- negative approach to the supranational integration of the EU. In a man issue and partly because of the possible increasing number of way the manifestos strengthen some particular issues like traditional immigrants. values. All of the manifestos presented by Sovereignty conform to the e manifestos of the populist type are not easy to define ideologi- populist type. e next party belonging to this type is Public Affairs cally. We can sum up several common features of these policies. e that promote more moderate issues. most evident is the strict immigrant policy or, rather, anti-immigrant e first category within this type is the call for strong Czech policy. Another feature is the distant attitude to the EU and to fur- sovereignty and an emphasis on the effective promoting of Czech ther supranational integration. Another policy issues different that is interests. Sovereignty supports the strengthening of the political di- caused by populist policy style. mension of its external affairs. erefore the party stresses national sovereignty, national pride, territorial integrity and national heritage, Nationalist type and adds that the Czech Republic should prevent a “brain drain” of Czech scientists to other (big) European states. e nationalist type of manifesto comprises the two most relevant Both parties present a kind of awareness of supranational inte- nationalist parties – Workers’ Party (Dělnická strana) and National gration. In the case of Public Affairs, the weak awareness is caused Party (Národní strana). Both are, in comparison to the other de- by the support for the Lisbon Treaty and the general emphasis on scribed parties, irrelevant parties because of their lack of presence an effectively functioning EU. Sovereignty focuses on support for in any chamber of Parliament. e nationalist type of the manifestos intergovernmental integration (cooperation) and the party expresses is a very ideological minority trend, and none of the relevant parties a very negative position to the recent integration development. e (with election gains over the 5 % threshold) comes anywhere close to party rejects the Lisbon Treaty because of the Sudeten-German issue the policy issues included in this manifesto type. and their possible property claims, and also because of the unaccept- e typical features of the manifestos are a strong emphasis on na- able sovereignty shi at the supranational level and the unacceptable tional sovereignty, racism and xenophobia, rejection of the integrated superiority of the big member states. role of the Czech Republic in the EU, an emphasis on conservative e anti-immigration category fits both parties very well. Public values, a negative attitude to the Roma minority and the revital- Affairs supports labour-immigration, but the settlement of foreign izing of the historical suffering of the Roma people during World citizens is not welcomed. e problem, for Public Affairs, is also that War Two. criminality may be caused by immigrants. Sovereignty promotes a Both parties that fall within this type strongly emphasize national stronger anti-immigrant policy. e party wants stronger monitoring sovereignty in political and social issues. e parties resigned on of incoming immigrants and their activities in the Czech Republic. deeper proposal on economical or political autarky. Related to the is kind of policy may have its roots, at the election time, in the emphasis on national identity, the parties strongly stress patriotism, continuing economic crisis that has led to increasing general concern nationalism and the traditional value of the family. ey neglect any about jobs. is is a practical example of using a populist issue to try kind of military or security cooperation (NATO) and also reject to increase votes. the continuation of the globalization process and the liberal world 92 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES THE CZECH REPUBLIC 93 economy. erefore the parties strongly accentuate national sover- Conclusion eignty but at the same merely criticize the current state of the world without offering any relevant alternatives. e most relevant political parties (ODS, ČSSD, TOP 09 and KDU- e parties reject any further immigration to the Czech Republic. ČSL) share a common consensus when it comes to a moderate empha- Minority rights issues are related to the Roma minority. ey refuse sis on national issues and their overlapping into politics. ese parties any kind of integration and openly support the departure of the Roma are separated only in two categories and constitute the mainstream in population from the Czech Republic. the emphasizing of national issues. e most divergent issues are the e National Party stresses the primordial nature of the Czech European dimension of the policy and the “openness” of the country nation, and therefore the nation must be defended against harmful to immigrants and foreign cultures in general. influences. In comparison to the National Party, the Workers’ Party is European policy is, between the parties, differentiated between more moderate on this issue. Also, in the case of the relation between EU-integration support and a reserved attitude towards EU-integra- state and citizen, the Workers’ Party is more moderate. e National tion reserved. In the analyzed period, ODS has the most homogenous Party emphasizes the superiority of the state over the citizen. In gen- policy concerning the EU and the defending of the national interest. eral, this implies an increasing role for the state and to deeper control In the case of ODS, there is a clear orientation on economic issues over society. e Workers’ Party suggests broader state control – jus- and less on the need to defend or promote the nation. Although for tice, police. some issues the European policy is very reserved, in the long term Both parties stress self-defence and military issues. e goal is to perspective the party supports European integration. In the homog- avoid any kind of external attack on the state and to be convincing enous category we have seen a very interesting shi taking place with about strengthening military capacities. ČSSD: it has moved from the European type the 2006 election to Unsurprisingly, the parties refuse any kind of supranational coop- the homogenous category in the 2010 election. Although the party eration and, therefore, the EU’s activities are principally negative and strongly accents the positive gains of European integration, the em- harmful to state sovereignty. phasis on homogeneity trends is, for the above named parties, the e parties strongly accentuate conservative values, giving espe- most evident. cially high importance to morality, the family and patriotism. e goal e manifestos categorized in the European type put more em- of this emphasis is (in connection with the accent on sovereignty) to phasis not only on a positive attitude towards the EU but also on the reinforce the strong identification of citizens with their nation and to substantial openness of the nation – the emphasis on human rights, lead them to defending the national interest. the mentioning of policy issues in the broader European context. As we mentioned above, the nationalist type is the marginal type e postmodern type in Czech politics is very fluid, and none in the Czech politics. is marginal role is evident from the long term of the political parties of the postmodern type was significantly perspective. e parties involved here focus on very controversial influential. e typical feature of this category is the post-national and intolerant issues that could lead to the radicalization of soci- and post-democratic accent, the broad liberty of individuals and ety. No other type mentioned here is close to the nationalist type at the emphasis on human rights in both the domestic and European its core. contexts. Of particular mention is the communist category – KSČM sup- ports international cooperation and tries to promote itself as a mod- ern le party, with its support for EU integration and (le) social accent, on human rights too. Nonetheless, the communist ideology is 94 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 95 prevalent – a priori the party opposes the neo-liberal integration of the EU and is vigilant about German post-war revisionism. HUNGARY e populist and national types of manifestos are not part of the mainstream of Czech political discussion that determines also public opinion. Although some issues of the populist type are mentioned in the homogenization category, the accent is significantly moderate. Introduction to Hungarian politics e manifestos of the populist type are oen inherently contradictory and the Hungarian party system – for example, the manifesto of Public Affairs that emphasizes pro- European attitudes in its policy program but at the same time openly e 1989 Election Act of Hungary established a two round mixed advocates a more restrictive immigration policy. election system for parliamentary elections. e Hungarian par- e nationalist type is significant for our research goal, and also liament is unicameral and consists of 386 members. e election adds to the understanding of nationalist tendencies in society – yet system is three-tier, combines elements of majority single-mem- practically the influence of these parties is marginal and out with ber-constituency (district) and the proportional party list election mainstream Czech politics. system. Hungarian voters vote with two ballot papers (Schiemann, Benoit 1997: 2–5). One ballot paper is for voting individuals as MPs through the two round majority systems, with some more specifica- tions about the percentage of votes to continue to second round. As individuals 176 MPs are voted in each election, one per constituency. e second ballot paper is for the party lists which are voted on the regional level directly and on the national level indirectly recounted. In total there are a maximum of 210 MPs elected from the parties’ lists. Up to 152 seats are distributed by proportional representation in 20 regional, multi-member constituencies. e rest, but at least 58 seats, are reallocated on a national list to compensate for disparities in the parties between the distribution of votes and National Assembly constituency seats. e national list can apply only to a party with at least 7 regional lists. Each of the voting strands has a specific percent- age quorum for validity of the choice. e first democratic election took place in March and April 1990, and showed an overwhelming preponderance of democratic parties. e main winners were Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) which won with 24.7 % of the vote but, according to the electoral system, gained 42.7 % of the seats (165 seats). In close pursuit came Alliance of Free Democrats with 21.4 % of the vote and 23.8 % of the seats (92). ird place went to the Independent Smallholders Party with 11.8 % of the vote and 11.1 % of the seats (43). In fourth place came the Hun- garian Socialist Party with 33 seats and 10.9 % of the vote. Also Fidesz 96 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 97 and KDNP featured with 8.9 % and 6.6 % respectively of the vote, and Fidesz became a nationalistic party fighting for the national interest both securing 21 seats. of Hungarians both at home and abroad. But the change in the Fidesz e government was created by József Antall from MDF as prime identity was effective when the party won the 1998 election with minister and in coalition with KDNP and FKgP. With a new post- 29.48 % of the vote and 148 seats. MSzP did not lose so many votes, communist government, and aer years of oppression, the political but all the same lost the “electoral bonus” on party lists against Fidesz focus was on national issues and the need to tackle the historical and voters placed them in second place with 32.92 % of the votee and legacy of Hungarians and their minorities abroad. However, the first 134 seats. FKgP slightly increased its electoral support to 13.15 % and democratically elected government failed to become popular because obtained 48 seats. However the Alliance of Free Democrats lost more of the slow economic transformation and its focus on controlling the than 12 % of its previous share of the vote and obtained only 24 seats public media. Antall died in office in 1993 and was replaced by his this time. Also MDF lost nearly 9 % of its share of the vote and held Interior minister Péter Boross who continued the national conserva- on to17 seats. e last parliamentary party became the Hungarian tive approach. Justice and Life Party (MIÉP, Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja) which e second democratic election in 1994 showed fully how the was created in 1993 aer the separation of radical nationalists from first governments were unable to do anything to solve Hungary’s MDF. e leading figure in the party was the writer István Csurka. economic woes. With 33 % of the party vote and 54.1 % of the seats in e name of the party refers to the injustice that Hungarians suffered total, the Hungarian Socialist Party won the election. Despite having with the Trianon Treaty and the struggle for its revision, as well as to gained this majority of 209 seats, the Social democrats decided to cre- the lifestyle controlled by the economically liberal and global powers ate a coalition with the second placed Alliance of Free Democrats in which defines also the political program. In the election MIÉP won order to reach the two thirds majority within the Assembly. 5.47 % of the vote and 14 seats. Another reason for the coalition was also the image of the govern- Fidesz created a center-right government with MDF and FKgP. ment, with the post-communist Social democrats opting to show a ey tried to cut taxation ties and to expand the liberal social pro- democratic side so as not to recall the memories of one-party gov- gram. e government was reorganizing the working processes in ernance during the Communist era. At the same time, though, SzDSz administration and bureaucracy was taken under their control. Orbán strongly opposed the Communist regime and therefore this coalition also made the office of prime minister stronger and introduced the with the Social democrats was a surprise to the general public. How- new institution of the constructive vote of no confidence, inspired ever, the partnership and cooperation between these parties remained by the German model. In 2001 the so-called status law was passed even until 2008 when SzDSz broke up a governmental coalition. Back concerning Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries and to the 1994 election, third placed MDF took 38 seats, which was the simplifying the access of ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring biggest loss. FKgP finished with 26 seats, KDNP with 22 seats and countries for working and studying as well as ensuring social and Fidesz, as a newly established real political party since 1993, with health benefits to them in Hungary. 20 seats. e election in 2002 captured the attention of the public and the Aer the unsuccessful election of 1994, Fidesz changed its ideology media because of the very even opinion poll ratings for both the Fi- from liberal to national-conservative. In 1995 they also changed the dezs camp and the opposition Social democrats camp. e election name to Fidesz – Hungarians People’s Party (Fidesz – MPP). Under turnout indicated the importance given to this election, with 73.51 % the leadership of Viktor Orbán, the party started to be proactive and voter participation. e Fidesz-MDF coalition attracted 41.7 % of up to the next election in 1998 Fidesz-MPP became the most danger- the voter and reached 188 seats. However, the Socialist party gained ous rival to the governmental coalition. 42.05 % of the vote and 178 seats, but together with Alliance of Free 98 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 99
Democrats ensured an overall coalition with 198 seats, and therefore trends and requests more environmental protection and deliberative also got the opportunity to create the government. Other parties were democracy. e NGO as well as the newly established political party largely unsuccessful and only four political parties remained in par- tries to change the political style in Hungary. However in the Euro- liament from 2002. e 2004 European parliament election showed pean Parliament election of 2009, another tendency in Hungarian the popularity of the Socialists’ government when the party alone won society emerged: national radicalisation. ree of 22 seats were won half of the 24 Hungarian seats in the European parliament, winning by Jobbik-e movement for social change with 14.77 % of the vote. 47.4 % of the vote. e winner of the election was the nationalistic Fidesz with 14 seats e election in 2006 brought the re-election of the Socialists, lead and 56.23 % of the vote. With 17.37 % of the vote, MSZP saw its 5 seats by Ferenc Gyurcsány. MSZP won 105 seats thanks to 41.73 % of the won in 2004 drop to only four in this election. MDF won one seat with vote. Fidesz and KDNP had 42.01 % of the vote and 97 seats. SzDSz 5.31 % of the vote. secured only 4 seats with 6.40 % of the vote. MDF did not even reach e election of 2010 forcibly showed the radicalisation as well as 5 % of the vote but still won 2 seats thanks to the direct candidate elec- the changes underway within the Hungarian party system and soci- tion round. e election also approved the separation between Fidesz ety. Fidesz honed in on the two thirds majority of the seats in parlia- and MDF when MDF withdrew its third candidates against Fidesz ment and won 206 of them – even if the electoral support percentage in the second round of the election. e election also confirmed the was “only” 52.73 %, the Hungarian election system did the rest. e trend since 1998 of a bipartisan constellation within the Hungarian second placed party was MSZP with only 28 seats and 19.3 % of the party system. vote. Jobbik made it to third place, with 26 mandates and 16.67 % of e Socialist party continued but in September 2006 a recording the vote. e new party Politics Can Be Different came in fourth, tak- of Prime Minister Gyurcsány emerged publicly with him saying that ing 5 seats with 7.47 % of the vote. e election of 2010 destabilised the government was lying to the people about the economic situation to some extent the party system in Hungary which had been more or of the country: “I had to pretend for 18 months that we were governing. less constant since 1998, and opened a new era in Hungarian politics. Instead, we lied morning, noon and night.” 56 Along with links to the Christian faith, the presence of nationalist In spite of the demonstrations and general awareness about the elements is one of the most important factors behind the right– intentional lying, Gyurcsány refused to resign. e approach to the le breakdown in the Hungarian party system. is division is there- demonstrations was heavily criticized because of the police’s use of fore axiological, not socio-economic (Benda 1999: 110). violent practices to secure social order. Nationalistic politicians en- joyed the opportunity and started to gain political capital with their criticism of the Socialist government and the practices meted out Fidesz-MPP (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, against the public. Ultimately, Gyurcsány decided to resign in 2009 Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Párt) supposedly because of his exhaustion in struggling for reforms. e president decided not to declare an early election for so short a period e party was founded in 1988 as an organization of the radical liberal and Gyurcsány was replaced. student movement. Aer 1990 Fidesz underwent a transformation In 2009 a new political party Politics Can Be Different (LMP, Lehet process in order to become more electable. e party dealt in clas- Más a Politika) was founded which originated in a civic association sical liberal cosmopolitical policies. In its early days liberal ideology founded a year earlier. e ideology is in keeping with green political dominated within the party. e party opposed the new democratic government not only on economic reform grounds but also because 56 Find the full speech of Gyurcsány provided by the BBC in English at BBC (2006). of the emphasis on nationalism. In 1993 the party shied to take on 100 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 101 a conservative policy with a so national focus. Viktor Orbán was Christian values of Europe. In general the party supports European elected as the new chairman of the party. is ideological shi had a integration as well as the possible entry of Hungary into the Euro positive consequence with a resultant growth in political support and zone (Fidesz 2009). In the 2010 election the party gained a majority and the party began to be the most important challenger of other in parliament and formed a one-party government. right formations (Batory 2008: 270–271). As a result of its ideological turn, the focus shied to classical Electoral manifesto 2006 57 conservative values: – support for families, the liberalized economy with the free market, and a minimalistic state bureaucracy. Aer do- is manifesto is built on opposing the socialist government. Although ing badly in the 1994 election (the party gained just 10 % of the vote), Fidesz is in economic matters typically liberal, the party refused to the party started closely cooperating with conservative formations. propose liberal reforms in health care, or the liberalizing of certain is shi embraced the use of typical conservative slogans like Chris- state services. One of the explanations for this is a growing emphasis tianity, family or fatherland. In the second half of the 1990s, Fidesz on national interests and national identity. e national issue is one of took on the role of the biggest right party, and aer the 1998 election the most significant policy dimensions of the entire manifesto. constituted a centre-right government (Stankov 2006: 91). e shi to e party defines the Hungarian nation as a unique nation and the right on cultural and national issues lead to a slight lewards shi rises alo the “Hungarian way of life”. e common Hungarian iden- in economy issues like opposing of all structures of the Hungarian tity must be based on a shared national “myth” and on emphasizing economy, privileges for the banking sector and the call for ending the historical heritage. Budapest should be the capital city for all Hungar- health care system (Houšek 2005: 492). ians living in Hungary and abroad. e fundamental step for build- Aer the 2002 election the party went into opposition role and con- ing a common identity is to integrate or rather unify all Hungarians sequently increased its right liberal accent on economic issues such living in the Hungarian hollow – Slovakia, Serbia, Romania and also as lower taxation, the reduced role of the state, predictable economic Hungarians living in foreign countries further afield. All Hungarians conditions, and support for small- and medium-sized businesses etc. must share a common solidarity with the nation and must promote e nationalist tendencies of the party oscillated between radical and the traditional values of the nation. e country should protect itself moderate nationalism. e party puts an emphasis on a strong role against harmful influences. e identity of all individuals is defined by for the Catholic Church, the defending of language and culture. is the motherland. e party assigns a high importance to the anchoring emphasis was in the late post-revolution period developed in a deeper of the national culture and national identity in general. An important way (Körösényi et. al 2009: 526). societal value is also the emphasis on Hungarian families as a basis In the 2006 election the party again lost the possibility to form for national society. the cabinet and remained in opposition for the next four years until Education on national identity should be a part of the general the 2010 election (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 200). During its second school system. is education should include a patriotic upbringing period of opposition the party was not able to build consensus with in line with traditional national values. anks to this knowledge the centre-le government on the key issues of national development. Hungarians living in Hungry can share the common “myth” with Problematic too was the activity of Fidesz during the anti-govern- Hungarians living abroad. is will lead to a stronger connection with ment demonstrations. the national heritage and passing it on for future generations. e European policy of the party is based on more national in- tegration and the deepening of economic integration in favour of 57 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme the free market. e EU should also more strongly emphasize the in the 2006. 102 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 103
e question of national minorities is not easy to evaluate. e is concern influences the party’s positions in economic issues, and most problematic is the situation with the Roma minority. Fidesz la- social and foreign affairs. beled the Roma minority as an uncivilized minority. is problematic On economic issues, the party calls for the strengthening of the relationship with the Roma is not negative. e party understands Hungarian economy – primarily, more support for small- and me- the need for the integration of the minority into the majority society. dium-sized companies and supporting companies in the creation of Generally, the party understands the Roma as a natural part of the new jobs. In connection with societal issues the party emphasizes Hungarian nationality, and all minorities are also part of the Hungar- greater production from Hungarian companies for Hungarian people. ian identity. In a practical way, Fidesz wants to support the introduc- is will lead to the creation of new jobs and consequently to greater tion of Roma culture to the majority society. is integration must awareness of national identity. Hungarians must also more actively start with the securing of sustainable social conditions like access to use “Hungarian fair trade” for domestic suppliers. is strong national drinking water. emphasis is also part of the negative attitude to the supermarkets and Hungarians living abroad should be a natural part of Hungarian similar transnational companies. e party sees transnational compa- foreign policy. e party practically supports the creation of a “net- nies as destroyers of the unique Hungarian identity. work of Hungarian relations”. e party supports European integra- In the social sphere, Fidesz places importance on strong and good tion, but puts the emphasis more on instrumental integration and less national leadership. e party wants to promote the basic feature of promotion of a supranational approach. A further key aspect of the good governance, which should be helpful to ensure the creation of a party’s European policy is an accent on the equality of all member predictable and secure environment. On social issues the party puts a states and support for the ongoing enlargement process of the EU, strong accent on support for families – the basic units of society. e especially in the case of Croatia. state policy must be family friendly to support the healthy develop- ment of families. e principle goal is to avoid social and economic Electoral manifesto 2010 58 threats. e accent on traditional values is also visible in the support for farmers and Hungarian agriculture. e party declares its general e fundamental aim of the manifesto is to deal with the deep eco- support for Hungarian culture and the language. nomic and political crisis. Not long aer the 2006 election the socialist Foreign issues for Fidesz are based on the fact that Hungary has a prime inister Ferenc Gyurcsány claimed to have deceived the public good natural condition to be an important European state. Hungary about the true condition of the Hungarian economy. e deception of should promote confident relations with the EU, the USA and also Gyurcsány had followed a crisis of public trust in the political system, with other key world states. A strong Hungary will be a responsible and thus this was one of the most significant features of the Fidesz partner for other member states in the EU. manifesto. Fidesz believes that the socialist government, due to its passivity, Fidesz emphasizes the core values of Hungarian society: work, caused the growth of extremism. is is mainly the problem of the home, family and health. To ensure these fundamental values there is Roma minority. e solution to this problematic issue is the integra- a need to promote a stable and secure societal environment. Security tion of the minority into the majority society. e first step is to secure here is not meant in terms of stronger policing but mostly in terms better access to education via student loans with low interest pay- of the societal consensus on the unique role of the Hungarian nation. ments attached. e general answer to the Roma issue is the building of a successful family policy to ensure essential conditions for positive 58 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme development. Fidesz describes its basic principles of minority policy in the 2005 in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 104 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 105
Although Fidesz was in the early 1990s a pure liberal party, the in- and became a mainstream social-democratic party. is achievement ternal development of the party caused a significant shi from purely can be illustrated by its membership of the Socialist International and economic liberal ideas to a greater evaluation of the negative role of the Party of European Socialists. transnational companies and their harmful influence on Hungarian With the elections of 2002 we can observe bipolar tendencies in traditions. Hungarian politics, with Fidesz-MPP and MSzP as the respective European integration must be based on the cooperation of nation poles. MszP, with the support of SzDSz in the second round of the states. e swi transfer of national sovereignty towards suprana- elections, managed to gain 42.1 % of the vote and to form together tional institutions is not welcomed. In the case of Fidesz there is a very with the liberals a second government, this time led by non-party interesting internal development regarding the role of the state. e nominee Péter Medgyssy. However his premiership was brought liberal support for the free market sits alongside the national identity. down in 2004 when MSzP’s coalition partner SzDSz lost confidence e emphasis on a strong nation and on the unique role of Hungary in him and the Socialists replaced him with the popular Ferenc Gy- in Europe is a significant feature of the party’s policy. e most im- urcsány. Gyurcsány became the chairman of MSzP and led the party portant focus of the 2010 manifesto is the call for a strong leading in the highly emotive and tense general election of 2006. Aer a tough role from the government. Aer the discrediting of the Socialist party, fight, MSzP and SzDSz managed to sustain the coalition and govern- Fidesz defined itself as the only leader that can ensure security and ment against Fidesz-MPP and MDF. economic development. Tab. 11: Electoral performance of MSzP
Hungarian Socialist Party Elections 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSzP) Votes 10.9 33 32.9 42.1 43.2 19.3 Seats 33 209 134 178 190 58 Hungarian Socialist Party was established in 1989 formally as a completely new party in the wake of the new democratic history of Source: National Election Office of Hungary Hungarian politics. However, MSzP was in fact formed by the former members of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party which dissolved It took just several months, however, for the election victory of the itself at the very same convention. socialists and the establishment of their third government to turn to In the first free elections to the Hungarian parliament in 1990 the failure. In September 2006 a secret tape of an informal speech Gyurc- Socialists were the victims of their communistic roots and the party sány made to socialist deputies was released. On this tape Gyurscány received just 10 % of the vote. However, four years laters and under frankly and crudely admitted that his previous government had done the leadership of Gyula Horn, MSzP gained one third of the vote nothing and that in the election campaign socialists deliberatively and formed a coalition government with the liberal SzDSz which laid to the public in order to win. In spite of the fact that Gyurcsány happened to be the most vigorous enemy of MSzP in the revolution survived as prime minister and chairman of the party, subsequent year of 1989. Horn’s cabinet realized many socially painful policies demonstrations in Budapest caused sharp falls in MSzP’s approval and pushed forward the economic transformation of Hungary. ese ratings and voter preferences. much needed policies however led to electoral defeat for the Socialists In 2009 Gyurscány finally stepped down from both the premier- in the 1998 general election by the liberal-conservative Fidesz-MPP ship and chairmanship of MSzP. By this time SzDSz had aleady le in 1998. MSzP fully transformed itself from a post-communist party the coalition. e MSzP politician Gordon Bajnai took over as head 106 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 107 of the government until the general election of 2010 in an effort to policies are helping foreign Hungarians and they also facilitate the restore the party’s good name. However in the elections the Socialists reunification of the divided Hungarian nation. received only 20 % of the vote and went into opposition. In 2010 Attila While primarily addressing national identity and the national Mesterházy became the chairman of the party. interest, MSzP was also dedicated to the protection of minorities. e Hungarian state had a duty towards the Hungarian nation but Electoral manifesto 2006 59 it also served citizens belonging to ethnic minorities. In this respect the government of the republic should abide by the civic principle. In their electoral manifesto of 2006 MSzP strongly emphasized the Among citizens, for example, there is no difference between Hungar- principle of national unity but in the same time distanced itself ian orRoma. is is why MSzP fought against the discrimination and from primitive nationalism and praised the protection of minori- segregation of the Roma population. It was in the best interests of the ties and tolerance. For MSzP the central referential subject of the state to help the Roma to integrate into society. political program was the national community. In the opinion of the Socialists, one of the most important roles of the government Electoral manifesto of 2010 60 was to protect the national interest of the Hungarian nation. Nation in this context was understood as the community of Hungarians at One can observe a transformation in the political and ideological home and abroad. All those who spoke Hungarian and embraced character of the Socialists between the elections of 2006 and 2010. Hungarian cultural heritage are part of the nation. For the Socialists Both their worldview and the topics they addressed radically changed there was a distinct Hungarian identity which was present in each between these two elections. e main concerns of the 2010 manifesto Hungarian. is identity deserved protection and moreover should were the rise of the extreme right and fear for the democratic founda- be supported and cultivated for the future. It was of great impor- tions of society. tance to ensure the continuation of the nation and, especially, of its In many places the manifesto admitted the mistakes of the previ- distinctive identity. MszP, for example, stressed the need for a higher ous socialist governments and also the poor state of the economy, birth rate. but it also warned against the simple solutions of the far right. MSzP National identity was not obtained by right of birth but rather as a feared that the authoritative tendencies of the right would undermine result of acculturation. From that acculturation came affiliation to the democracy in Hungary. e Socialists referred to national pride and national body. Consequently, Hungary as a state should take respon- patriotism but pointed out that these true and legitimate values are sibility not just for Hungarian citizens but also for Hungarians living perverted by extremists and possibly will be used by them to grasp in foreign countries – especially those who resided in neighbouring power in the country in order to push forward policies which will countries. On several occasions the manifesto stressed this conviction spread hatred and will eventually lead to discriminatory policies and and it went even so far as to suggest that Hungary should support the the rejection of liberal and democratic values. autonomy claims of Hungarian minorities in foreign countries. All To tackle the problems Hungary had faced, MSzP suggested the this at the same time as calling for improvements in relations with cooperation of all elements of Hungarian society without regard to those very same countries. In balancing these two goals of the mani- ethnicity, religion, social status or political affiliation. e Socialists festo, the EU proved to be crucial. According to MszP, the EU and its rejected the idea that there is an evil side and a true Hungarian side
59 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in 60 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2006. the 2010. 108 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 109 in Hungarian political life. On the contrary, their goal was to empowe Alliance of the Free Democrats the excluded and marginalized of the country. at is why the mani- (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SzDSz) festo dealt with the protection of minority rights, especially those of Roma people who were systematically discriminated against. MSzP Alliance of the Free Democrats has its roots In the opposition move- considered it to be a national shame that it is impossible for some ment in the second half of the eighties. Original loose network of people to get out of social deprivation and that their children are, the intellectuals transformed into political party in November 1988. from birth, condemned to a similar life. For MszP, Roma were not Two years later in the first free general election SzDSz as an liberal to be treated as burdens on the shoulders of Hungarian society. e platform of the anticommunist opposition ended second with only manifesto of 2010 described them as fellow citizens and really tried small gap aer the nationally – conservative MDF. Winner formed to treat them like that. first democratic government of the Hungary with two smaller parties From the above-mentioned it is also clear that MSzP in 2010 was FKgP and KDNP and SzdSz served as main opposition party. Four less concerned with defending national identity and more worried years later SzDSZ again finished second in the elections. is time about liberal values. Several times in the manifesto the Socialists ad- however SzDSz with its almost twenty percent of the votes lost to the vocated a modern version of society built upon openness, the activi- post – communist MSzP. Surprisingly SzDSz decided to join forces ties of civic associations and human rights. In general it supported with the Socialists and therefore end fierce animosity between two social diversity and in the conflict of majority and minority interests parties. New government of the socialist Gyula Horn implemented it stood behind minorities. For them the nation was not defined in austerity measures in order to conclude transformation of the Hun- terms of ethnicity but rather by a shared language and culture or garian economy. historical experience. Into that definition of the nation fit all citizens who wished to be identified as Hungarians. e manifesto explicitly Tab. 12: Electoral performance of SzDSz emphasized the belief that identity is a self-imposed choice of the individual. Elections 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 Finally the MSzP manifesto for the elections of 2010 criticized the Votes 21.4 19.7 7.6 5.6 6.4 0.25 tendencies of the Hungarian right to close itself off from the world Seats 92 64 24 20 4 0 and from Europe. For the Socialists it was of crucial importance to strengthen European cooperation, especially in a time of crisis. It Source: National Election Office of Hungary also called for improvement of relations with neighbouring coun- tries which were threatened by the policies suggested by the political ese drastic policies associated with the Minister of Finances right. Hungary should cultivate it relations with the outside world, Lajos Bokros were one of the reasons SzDSz lost popular support and especially in the European context, in order to again become a stable consequently performed poorly in the 1998 general elections gaining partner and a prosperous democracy. In this respect, we did not de- just 7.6 % of the votes. Due to the electoral catastrophe of the liber- tect any attempts to suggest meddling in the internal affairs of those als coalition government fell and reemerged aer four years of the countries with significant Hungarian minorities, as was the case in Fidesz –MPP government. In the 2002 and 2006 elections SzDSz get the 2006 manifesto. only 5.6 respectively 6.4 % of the votes. However its importance in the government making secured for SzDSz important position in the political system. In 2009 European elections however liberals gained less that three percents of the votes and did not entered European 110 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 111
Parliament. is result was just prelude of the electoral wipe out of crete policies and measures aiming at improvement of the social and SzDSz in 2010 general elections. economic situation of this community. Liberals strongly spoke against practice of segregated schools and discrimination in the employment 61 market. However not just Roma population was targeted by those Electoral Manifesto of 2006 policies since SzDSz stressed need for tolerance programs especially SzDSz based its electoral manifesto from 2006 on the several princi- in the educational system which would tackle explicit as well as subtle ples which guided its policies. First of all liberals approached Hun- prejudices towards Roma. garian citizens. Citizens were not members of the Hungarian nation In the 2006 manifesto of the SzDSz there is separate chapter dedi- together with the members of the ethnic minorities. SzDSz considered cated to antidiscrimination policies. Equal opportunities as they are every human being to be individuality which defines itself and which mentioned in the Hungarian constitution and other relevant docu- chooses its own identity. is conviction had several important con- ments was in the opinion expressed in manifesto not implemented sequences for the policies and attitudes of the party. First, since each into reality. Women, Roma, disabled and other groups were still in person is unique individuality state should not interfere into the lives disadvantageous situation in comparison of the majority men’s situ- of its citizens. is mean that state authority should not prefer par- ation. Besides these marginalized groups manifesto also addressed ticular model of life, religion or cultural identity. All these issues are problems of the sexual minorities. It stated that state should not judge supposed to be of an autonomous decision of the person. is attitude life choices of its citizens and therefore it should not prefer traditional is clearly manifested in the way manifesto dealt with the churches. marriage to same – sex partnership. SzDSz advocated complete separation of the state and religious or- SzDSz also addressed issue of the Hungarian minorities in the ganizations. For liberals church was just another nongovernmental neighboring countries. It supported cultural cooperation across the organization and should be treated a such. borders and also special rights of the foreign Hungarians in Hungary. From the fact that every citizens is free to chose his own cultural However manifesto also emphasized that any further cooperation affiliation and identity stems also conviction that diversity is value to should not be pushed through as an internal issue of Hungary but be pursued. at is why SzDSz was not afraid of the globalization and it should be subject to bilateral cooperation of the host country and of its effects on the Hungarian society. On the contrary it supported Hungary. In accordance with that SzDSz were supportive of the au- multiculturalism and proposed targeted subsidizing of besides tradi- tonomy for the foreign Hungarians under the conditions that it does tional also alternative art and culture. In this respect we should prob- not contradict international or national laws and that majority of the ably mention also suggestion to liberalize immigration policy which affected country is in favor of such a measure. would according to SzDSz enrich Hungarian society. Liberals made clear in their manifesto from 2006 that they are Similarly liberals in their manifesto though about the ethnic mi- advocates of the further European integration. ey perceived Hun- norities especially Roma minority. eir culture was to be protected. garian future in Europe as inevitable and necessary. In called for the SzDSz proposed several policies and measured aimed at prevention of earliest possible date of adoption of the common European currency. loss of their cultural heritage and especially of their languages. Roma Furthermore SzDSz fully supported further integration of the Union were considered as important as any other citizens of the country and and strengthening of the power of the European Parliament. Similarly SzDSz dedicated significant part of its electoral manifesto to list con- manifesto stressed need for cooperation with both European coun- tries and USA. SzDSz admitted that Europe and Washington can have 61 is chapter is based on SzDSz Electoral Manifesto: Freedom, Competition, Soli- arguments with each other but these were not bases for primitive anti darity, 2006–2010. – Americanism. is strategic cooperation should survive. 112 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 113
Electoral Manifesto of 2010 62 ian citizens should embrace together with their local and national also their European identity. ey hoped that in a long term European Manifesto of the SzDSz for the general election of 2010 is delibera- federation would be established on the liberal and democratic values. tively lessen its emphasize on the promotion of the minorities and Union was the only way how to deal with the new challenges the na- excluded communities and consequently it is more concerned with tion states can not handle. the situation of the Hungarians in other countries. Liberals explicitly Important issue of the political manifesto of SzDSz in 2010 was admitted that this step was undertaken in order to attractive more situation and cfate of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring voters who do not consider themselves to be part of any minority countries. In contrast with its position in 2006 SzDSz stressed the group. In spite of this shi manifesto did not resigned on the protec- connection between them and Hungary. In its opinion Hungary has tion of the rights of the minorities. SzDSz in its own words did not an obligation to everybody who proclaims himself to be Hungarian. want state or party to replace minority self – administrative bodies in In the same time minorities should not be used by political parties as their task of cultivating and promotion of the minority culture and playing cards and politicians should let those communities of Hun- preserving its identity. However state has moral and constitutional garians to decide what is the best for them. Hungarian government obligation to intervene whenever minorities face discriminatory ac- should be supportive of their demands even in the case of autonomy tions and treatment. which should also be discussed with the involved country. In any case Examined manifesto declared on several occasions its dedication however SzDSz considered autonomy and self – determination to be to liberal values. Among those most important were tolerance of the the best guarantees of the minority rights. other ways of life, minority autonomy, civil society, secularism and human rights. ose values were to be pursued in domestic as well as in the foreign policy. In accordance with those SzDSz supported Hungarian Democratic Forum global anti – discriminatory measures and further reform United Na- (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF) tions Human Rights Council. In domestic policy liberals advocated secular state. Hungarian Democratic Forum was formed in 1987 as an organiza- SzDSz claimed that it stands behind every person which is affected tion opposed to the communist regime. For two years MDF was the by anti – liberal attitudes and policies. is was certainly issue of the main negotiator of regime change and aer the fall of the one party disabled people and of the Roma population. Manifesto suggested system MDF emerged as the most popular political party. Under the trainings for policemen and other public servants to manage dealing leadership of József Antall the party won the first free general elec- with tense situations involving Roma. Also it supported employment tions, gaining almost a quarter of the vote, and formed a coalition of the Roma citizens in the state administration. Most importantly government with FKgP and KDNP. However in the following three liberals called for decisive action against inhumane living conditions years two major blows hit the party. First, the death of its chairman of the Roma in more that forty slums all over the country. Antall in 1993 was followed by internal conflict between the moderate European Union and its further integration and enlargement was and nationalist wings of the party. is struggle led to the expulsion important part of the foreign policy of the SzDSz. Liberals perceived of the nationalists from the party63. In 1994 MDF lost the election and Union as an instrumental alliance and in the same time as a commu- almost half of its voters from 1990, and it went into opposition. nity of shared values. Since Europe is their wider homeland Hungar- 63 ese were led by the writer István Csurka and aer their expulsion they formed 62 is chapter is based on SzDSz Electoral Manifesto 2010. the new extreme right Party of the Hungarian Truth and Life. 114 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 115
Tab. 13: Electoral performance of MDF identity which was shaped by the 1,000 year tradition of Hungarian statehood. During that time the common interests and values shared Elections 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 by all Hungarians were created. Very important in this respect was Votes 24.7 11.7 2.8 41.164 43.2 19.3 the Christian tradition which was embraced by the Hungarian nation. Seats 33 209 134 178 190 58 e manifesto quotes the first chairman of the MDF and the former prime minister of Hungary, Józseff Antall, who is alleged to have said Source: National Election Office of Hungary on his deathbed that he wants a Christian Hungary in order that it has a future. In accordance with his wish, MDF did not understand a In 1996 another internal struggle broke out within the party re- secular state either as an atheist or a religiously neutral state. Its mani- sulting in the secession of the liberal wing of the party. By the time festo declared that MDF will cooperate with the Christian churches as of the general election of 1998, MDF had lost almost all of its sup- is natural for a Hungarian party. porters and won just 2.8 % of the vote. However some candidates of From the crucial and strategic role of the Hungarian identity and the party entered the parliament due to support from Fidesz-MPP cultural heritage stems the state’s duty to take care of the national cul- in the second round of the plurality component of the elections in ture and to create such conditions that it will be further nourished and single-member constituencies. anks to this cooperation MDF also grows. Among these conditions, the manifesto explicitly mentions the entered government as the junior partner of Fidesz-MPP. Aer four key role of the public media. State broadcasters should spread so- years in government both parties decided to join forces. However, called new and old Hungarian values and they should also facilitate even this cooperation was not sufficient and the coalition comprising “intellectual and emotional comprehension” of both the Hungarian Fidesz-MPP and MDF lost theelection to MSzP. In the new parliament and European identity of the Hungarians. 24 deputies from MDF formed a separate and independent group. In Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries were also the general election of 2006 the party once again ran alone and man- considered to be an integral part of the nation and, moreover, a part aged to just pass the required 5 % threshold, securing eleven seats in which deserves the same treatment and rights as Hungarian citizens. the parliament. Similarly MDF succeeded in the European election of For this purpose MDF supported dual citizenship for Hungarians 2009. However, one year later it failed to get even 5 % of the vote and from neighbouring countries or at a least statute on Foreign Hun- with 2.7 % hence lost its parliamentary status. garian Citizenship that would give a list of special rights for foreign Hungarians. e manifesto also firmly advocated support for the Electoral manifesto of 2006 65 autonomy efforts of the Slovak, Serbian or Romanian Hungarian minorities. It stressed the need for unity within those communities e MDF electoral program for the elections of 2006 focused exten- in order to achieve their goals and for measured foreign policy which sively on the strengthening of the Hungarian identity and the reunit- would not confront the affected states but rather mediate with them. ing of the Hungarian nation within and also across borders. e main e foreign policy proposed by in this manifesto would alter the focus of the manifesto was the Hungarian nation defined by its culture orientation of Hungarian diplomacy towards closer cooperation with and historical heritage and without regard to borders. In this respect Germany, seen by MDF as the most important and decisive player a special and crucial role was played by the distinctive Hungarian in European and regional politics. Besides Germany, the manifesto proposed strengthened cooperation with Poland, the Baltic States, 64 MDF ran in the electoral coalition with the much stronger Fidesz-MPP. Croatia and Slovenia. In the context of the above described policies 65 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2006. towards Romania, Serbia and Slovakia, this choice of countries seems 116 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 117 almost to be an attempt to create a coalition whose purpose is to Politics can be different (Lehet Más a Politika, LMP) generate pressure on the three countries with significant Hungarian minorities. In this respect the proposal to establish a National Guard Politics can be different is a relatively new party in Hungarian politics from volunteers in order to cope with natural disasters or with foreign which is partly the by-product of the crisis of confidence in politics aggression sounds like the logical complement to this aspect of MDF’s and political parties aer the election in 2006. LMP is also a response foreign policy agenda. to rising nationalist tendencies in Hungarian society. Alongside the above-mentioned policies and attitudes, the MDF From its beginnings LMP was a group of concerned citizens, later manifesto also praised the modern values of equality, human rights becoming a civic association. In 2009 LMP was transformed into an and tolerance. e national media should inform about the rights official political party and it subsequently took part in the elections of the citizens and spread tolerance in society. MDF viewed cultural for the European Parliament. In its first election the new party gained diversity and the free competition of lifestyles and identities posi- 2.61 % of the vote, thus failing to enter the European Parliament. tively. However, while stressing these values, the attitude of the party However, less than year later in spring 2010, LMP succeeded in the towards immigration and refugees seemed to contradict these values. general election, and with 7.48 % of the vote managed to enter the MDF suggested that the best form of immigration policy in Hungary Hungarian parliament as the first new party in more than ten years.67 would be a firm but human one. Since the government was formed by Fidesz-MKP, the sixteen depu- ties of LMP went into opposition. At the time of writing this book Electoral manifesto of 2010 66 LMP had the status of observer in the European Green Party.
e MDF manifesto for the election of 2010 differs greatly from the Tab. 14: Electoral performance of LMP previous one. It still refers to national identity and community, which is of great value and should be nourished and protected. For MDF, Elections EP 2009 2010 Hungary equated to dignity and it still deserved it. In the understand- Votes 2.61 7.48 ing of MDF, the nation remained the same community as it was in Seats 0 16 the 2006 manifesto. However in the 2010 manifesto MDF emphasized this identity moment of its program much less and, on the contrary, Source: National Election Office of Hungary it was much more eager to stress the cooperation of all the elements from across Hungarian society. It called for a unity of “nation and Electoral manifesto of 2010 68 citizens” within Hungary. is call was partly the result of what MDF perceived as a national crisis caused by eight years of socialist rule e political program of LMP’s 2010 electoral manifesto runs to a coupled with the global economic crisis. Its manifesto and program healthy 280 pages and it addressed several issues which are of interest was supposed to give back dignity and self-confidence to the citizens for us. e LMP manifesto was entitled ‘Strategy for a Sustainable Fu- and the nation. ture, Integrative Society and Renewed Democracy’. ese three prin- In 2010 MDF also advocated programs oriented at the inclusion ciples in short outline the main topics of the party’s political program. of the Roma population into society. Its manifesto also emphasised social inclusion, equality and anti-discrimination. 67 LMP shares this achievement with another new parliamentary party, Jobbik- Movement for a Better Hungary. 66 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in 68 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2010. the 2010. 118 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 119
e very long document takes a detailed look at the problem of pov- worsening the current situation and inflaming hatred in society. LMP erty and social exclusion in Hungarian society, and the same issue was expressed fears about the destabilization of the democratic founda- also examined in respect to the exclusion and social problems of the tions of Hungarian society and the state if both the penetration and Roma community. acceptance of radical right continues. In this respect the party was e manifesto states clearly that the situation of the Roma popula- especially concerned by the activities of the Hungarian Guards. tion in Hungary is unacceptable. e document analyses in detail the When referring to the Roma ethnic group, the manifesto used the overall social and cultural situation of the Roma, and through this terms ‘Roma’ and ‘Gypsy’ interchangeably. For LMP it was of second- analysis supported its claims that the situation that Roma people in ary importance how one refers to the community. LMP were not Hungary are in is not a consequence of their nature but rather of their supporting an essentialist approach towards communal and national disadvantageous status in society and of the inefficient policies of the identities. For example, the manifesto emphasised that it does not previous Hungarian governments. push the Roma to construct their ethno-nationalistic culture and Among the most negatively perceived realities in respect of the identity. On the contrary, it expressed the opinion that every separate discrimination of the Roma population in Hungary were the segre- community should be autonomous in this respect and that identity gation practices towards the Roma in the educational system of the or culture is a very relative and volatile phenomenon. In this respect country. is segregation was in place from the lowest levels of the there was no concern even with multiple identities. is approach is state provided education. e ramifications of such discrimination obviously applicable also to other communities than the Roma and were decisive because for LMP the problem of unemployment was even for nations. connected with the level of education. To put it simply, the probability LMP strongly and explicitly supported the openness of Hungary of being unemployed increases with a lower level of education. So and an open society in general. It did not see immigration as an alien where there is discrimination towards a specific community in educa- colonization but rather as an opportunity and economic necessity. e tion, there will also be a problem of unemployment for the members manifesto advocated for less strict standards for the denization and of the same community. erefore, in the view of LMP, Roma children moreover it considered immigrants and their cultures to be of great were born into a society where there was only one option le for benefit to Hungarian society. For LMP diversity and multiculturalism them. For LMP it was unacceptable to live in a country which treats are values in themselves. at is why it called for such conditions for its citizens in such a way. immigrants in Hungary under which they will be able to nourish and e above explained attitude also served as a basis for an offensive cultivate their own culture. Without respect for the cultural heritage on the radical and nationalist elements of Hungarian society. e of the immigrants and minorities there was the threat of discrimina- manifesto criticized those who gained political capital on account of tion of other – non-Hungarian – ways of life. And as it was pointed simple and populist attacks on the Roma people. Besides the already out above, discrimination leads to social exclusion. mentioned analysis, the manifesto pointed out that Roma people are In the international arena LMP advocated the same principles as not to be blamed for the economic problems of Hungary, as has been in domestic politics. e manifesto they put forward was strongly the interpretation of the nationalists.69 Moreover, the radical right and pro-European in the sense that it praised the idea of integration of politicians who were playing the “gypsy card” were accused by LMP of the European countries and complemented the European project for removing conflict and war from the continent. However, LMP took a rather critical stance when discussing the economic and social poli- 69 In the manifesto there are figures which support the claim that pensions and social benefits payments were distributed between the majority population and the Roma cies of the EU. For LMP one of the most important tasks of the EU in roughly the same ratio. and for that matter also of transnational organizations in general was 120 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 121 to tackle the problems which exceed the power of individual states. the far-right MIÉP and Harmadik Út, the MIÉP-Jobbik-Harmadik Social injustice and inequalities, together with the protection of hu- Út coalition. e coalition gained 2.2 % in the election and broke up man rights, were viewed as the most serious among such issues. aerwards. e demonstrations in 2006 against the former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány of the socialist MSZP were for Jobbik a catalyst towards the main nationwide arena. Jobbik activists and sup- JOBBIK – Movement for a Better Hungary porters were very active during the demonstrations and gained public (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom) visibility. It could be interpreted as evidence that economical troubles can be a breeding ground for nationalism. Jobbik-Movement for a Better Hungary was formed as a party in Oc- e activities of Jobbik’s members and followers resulted eventu- tober 2003 from the movement of the same name. e creators of the ally in the creation of the so-called National Guard, a paramilitary far- movement were primarily conservative university students and there right organisation that very quickly became known not only across are still many young people among its supporters. However, it is not Hungary but also in Europe, where fears were growing about the rise a generational organization; nationally and locally known politicians of nationalism in Europe, especially given the Hungarian historical and experts have joined its ranks since the beginning. connotations and memories of the cooperation of Hungarian nation- e crippled state of the conservatives following their unexpected alists with Hitler’s Germany during World War Two. e call to revise defeat in the 2002 election played a role in the transformation of Job- the Trianon Treaty and the post war orders started to be viewed very bik into a party. Another was the recognition of the failure of the problematically, and the view from abroad in particular discredited entire Hungarian political elite considering the tasks undertaken Jobbik substantially. e party’s efforts to deal with Roma-related in 1990. Jobbik writes about themselves on their website (Jobbik problematic issues only increased the dismay. 2011). However, scholars labelled the party variously as (neo) fas- e ceremonial induction of the first 56 members of the National cist, anti-Roma, anti-Semitic and homophobic; the party of course Guard was celebrated near to the presidential Palace, with a large au- denied this. dience of approximately 4000 people attending. e members of the Jobbik was created as a social movement and its official political guard were also blessed by some priests from Hungarian churches, start-up took some time. At first it seemed that compared to MIÉP thus rooting them symbolically in the cultural and social ground of (Hungarian Truth and Life Party, Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja) Job- Hungary. e founders of the Guard stated that the EU and NATO are bik was more modernist and less radical. It was possible to discern not a sufficient security guarantee because two out of the three tradi- a difference in the rhetoric and proposed actions and ideas, between tional enemies of Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, are also members the “hard” approach of MIÉP and the “so” approach of Jobbik. How- of these organisations. e guards should have become also the basic ever, the gradual radicalization of Jobbik brought its own fruits and framework for the National Self-defence. Jobbik began to be more popular thanks to its radicalization. With As the Guard’s base expanded, it became notorious mostly because the foundation of its own paramilitary organisation, It was clear that of its engagement in areas with higher “Gypsy” and Roma popula- any description of Jobbik’s “so measure approach” towards national tions. Street demonstrations of power, the “guarding” of problematic politics was no longer appropriate. In 2004 Jobbik was one of the few areas, and provoking local Roma became their main tasks. Aer the parties in Hungary not in favour of joining the EU, promoting instead initial actions, the authorities had enough materials for prosecu- an independent and proud Hungary. tions and in 2009 the Guard was prohibited by the Court. On July e first relevant election that Jobbik participated in was in 2006 2, 2009 the decision was confirmed by the appeal court. However, but as a marginal political party – Jobbik formed a coalition with even some Jobbik members were sceptical about the creation of the 122 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 123
National Guard and did not agree with this step. On the other hand, serve the interests of Hungary and provide both an environment and they did not have the power to stop the initiative from the inside the living standards that people deserve. e state should not only and thus some of them le the party because of disagreement on this redistribute wealth but also promote national economic actors. Neo- matter. liberal economic policies should be replaced by protectionism and Since 2008 we have been able to observe the autonomous attempt the defence of national businesses, farmers and production. Natural of Jobbik to participate in official power at first in the European elec- resources should be defended as well, and national wealth should be tion of 2009 and subsequently in the national election of 2010. In 2009 fostered and protected. its support reached 14.77 % of the vote, enough for three seats in the For Jobbik, the Hungarian economy means the whole area of the European Parliament. e national election of 2010 saw Jobbik pick Carpathian basin, as well as areas populated by Hungarians living up 47 seats and 996,851 voters (National Election Office 2011). Job- abroad – Jobbik refers to this as the Hungarian economic zone. Hun- bik became the third most powerful party in Hungary and within the gary’s debts should be tackled and loans should be made possible in National Assembly represents the opposition. the future only to projects that support the national economy. Home We can also observe personal interconnections with other far- businesses should be protected and no advantages should be given right parties in Hungary, especially with Fidesz where, for example, to international capital in Hungary. e national economy would Krisztina Morvai was active and who since 2009 represents Jobbik also need a strong nation-serving bank which should outweigh the in the European Parliament. Also Tomás Gaudi-Nagy, one of the multinational banks’ ownership of traditional banks in Hungary. In leading representatives of Jobbik, was close to Fidesz’s leader Victor short, an economy of national protectionism and anti-liberalism, one Orbán. that is anti-transnational companies and that is environmentally and e autonomous nationalistic connection to Europe can also be socially friendly should be installed. seen in the party’s affiliation within a European political group. Jobbik Agriculture is very important for Jobbik and food self-sufficiency is a member, even the founder, of the EANM Alliance of European is required, as well as “going local” food markets. A land law should National Movements. However, the Jobbik members of the European be prepared that ensures that land can be sold only to Hungarians, Parliament are not affiliated to any parliament faction and have re- and young Hungarian local farmers will have the right of first refusal. mained non-aligned. e countryside should be repopulated by young people taking care of nature cultivation. Electoral manifesto 2010 70 is nationalistic asset is the leitmotif in all sectors as mentioned above. Even the countryside is seen through the prism of a national Jobbik’s election program of 2010 is even more complex than the Eu- appeal, as is done also by some Slovak nationalist parties – this is ropean manifesto, though it harks back to the same ideological and something, for example, which in the Czech Republic would not philosophical roots and bases. feature in any political discussion. Nationalism is connected to his- Nationalism is the leading principle that cuts across all relevant toricism, rooting in Christianity and ancient culture and philosophy. and possible spheres of politics and society in the opinion of Jobbik. National pride, national values, national unity, national awareness, Even the economic approach of Jobbik is defined as ‘Eco-Social Na- patriotism, national justice, national interests, statehood, the ius tional Economy’. According to the party, the economic system should sanguis approach – all of these touchstone categories are leading to more radical categories such as national messianic, national fatalism 70 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in and the claim for “Big Hungary” bringing to one national state all the the 2010. Hungarians for blood. Hand in hand with the Big Hungary goal is also 124 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 125 condemnation of the Beneš Decrees as one of the historical injustices would (in the eyes of Jobbik) allow the problem to be tackled more meted out to the Hungarian nation, as well as the revision of the Tri- directly. anon Treaty and post world war orders. ere is no clear indication of Jobbik’s inclination towards the Foreign policy should be less dependent on the west, and more Jewish population – the only indicator that it could be an issue for focused on the east. Jobbik’s position towards NATO is not really the party would be that the issue is excluded even from the historical clearly stated, but seems to be one of toleration, but only as an ad- background of Europe when Jews and Jewish culture are not men- ditional way of ensuring national self-defence. Jobbik is euro-sceptic tioned as one of the roots of European civilization, something which as in the 2009 European election – the Lisbon Treaty is rejected as is usually mentioned. But this is too weak as evidence to make some well as the trans-national EU paradigm; a Europe of Nations should conclusion about this particular issue which is oen discussed in con- be installed, but generally we can see the interest on Common Europe nection to Jobbik’s politics72. integrated by other means than is done today. e EU does not mean Europe and does not cover European values as such, thinks Jobbik in the manifesto. If European integration should go in an actual supra- Party of the Hungarian Justice and Life national direction, Hungary should evaluate its further stay in the EU. (Magyar igassák és élet part, MIÉP) We can find even some populist rhetoric regarding EU functioning which can sometimes confuse the readers of the manifesto. Moreover, In 1993 the radical nationalist wing of MDF abound writer István Hungary is definitely not perceived as a natural part of the EU.71 At Csurka was expelled from the then ruling party. In the same year the same time international relations should be based on realism and Csurka and his followers formed a new party: MIÉP. It claimed to be a realistic approach. the third way between le wing socialism and rightwing neo-liberal- Social life and social aspects are crucial for Jobbik. erefore com- ism. munitarian and civil society are supported as a mediator of human In its first general election the new party gained almost two per- relations but also as a possible tool for social security. Nevertheless cent of the votes. However, four years later MIÉP entered parliament individuality remains an important factor of humanity which en- when it secured 5.5 % of the vote. It even beat MDF, which managed hances plurality in society. Plurality is welcomed and this principle to attract less than 3 % of the voters. In the new parliament MIÉP went also extends to the issue of minorities. into opposition when it was not invited into the government formed e socially disadvantaged and minorities should be integrated by Fidesz-MPP and other rightwing parties. Aer four years of parlia- into society but are asked to be loyal to the State. Even the Roma mentary performance MIÉP failed to repeat its success and with 4.4 % population is perceived to be part of society, but with very specific was le outside parliament. For the next elections Csurka formed a problems which should be tackled. e Roma population is seen as a coalition with other nationalist parties, among them Jobbik. However problem in relation to coexistence with the majority of society, and even this was not enough to gain more voters and the coalition did therefore specific methods should be applied to deal with the issue. even worse than four years previously. e party has remained in the No positive discrimination but equal integration is called upon. Job- shadow of the younger and more active Jobbik since 2006, thus ex- bik is also striving to use the historical term of “Gypsy crime”, which plaining why it did poorly in the last general election in 2010.
71 Moreover, Jobbik leader Gábor Vona declared later in 2011 that Turanism is more 72 However, some rhetorical issues against Jews were mentioned in the media and important for Hungary than for all the Euro-Atlantic alliance, for more see the Jobbik public debates, which open the question about opinions of some individuals from the website www.jobbik.com. party to this issue. 126 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 127
Tab. 15: Electoral performance of MIÉP e second dominant feature of the 2006 MIÉP manifesto are con- Elections 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 spiracy theories. e examined document oen speaks of the modern colonization of Hungary. is colonization is seen in the dominance Votes 1.6 5.5 4.4 2.2 0.03 of foreign capital and its influence over Hungarian politics. Seats 0 14 0 0 0 e colonizers are represented by multinational corporations, for- Source: National Election Office of Hungary eign banks and capital, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and – most importantly – by the EU. Foreign capital is control- led by Americans and Jews. Capture of the Hungarian industries and Electoral manifesto of 2006 73 economy began with the first socialist government in 1994 and has continued since. MIÉP accused MSzP, SzDSz and the liberal elements e MIÉP manifesto for the 2006 election was dominated by two of Hungarian society of collaboration with these colonizers. However complementary elements. e first of these elements was a nation- the end of their rule over the globalized world is near at hand. e centric worldview. MIÉP translated every social or international issue EU, for example, will dissolve soon, according to the views expressed into the perspective of nations. In its understanding nations were not in the manifesto. just communities sharing a culture and a common language. Nations e globalized world dominated by the United States and control- were transcendental entities which exist on their own and engage to- led by bankers and investors (mostly of Jewish origin) is facing im- gether in a natural struggle for resources and influence. In the case of manent catastrophe. Angry and impoverished coloured nations will Hungarian nation, MIÉP stressed its long tradition which goes back break the world order. MIÉP perceived such a development as posi- to the first Hungarian king Saint Stephan I. e manifesto also men- tive because it will allow Hungarians and Hungary to free themselves tioned Mathias Corvinus, another Hungarian king who became the from the rule of neo-liberal capitalists. In the aermath of this break- subject of popular legends and folk culture. MIÉP advocated a return up there will be a world where nation states will try to survive virtual- to the values and spirit that these kings stand for. Hungarian national ly on their own. Only those nations with strong and proud traditions identity was forged by Christianity and European civilization. will prevail. MIÉP stressed that Hungary could be one of those states, An important definitional feature of the nationalism presented in but first of all it has to take the necessary steps to protect its identity the examined manifesto is its partly racial character. European na- and way of life against a liberal media and a corrupted political elite. tions are described as white. Aer the Second World War the age of Regarding the Roma minority and their status in society, the western domination in the world ended. e only power le – the manifesto emphasized that there is no tradition of inherent conflict United States – was captured by bankers and their interests. is situ- between the Hungarian majority and the Roma minority. e conflict ation led to the emergence of the coloured nations of Asia and Africa. arose only in the communist era with its paternalistic policies. In the opinion of MIÉP these nations will grow so rapidly that the MIÉP suggested policies which should help the Roma community west will eventually be flooded by them. e manifesto judged that a to get educated and consequently to get a job. Even in this respect the blending of the races and breeds will have a negative effect on Europe, party demonstrated that it does not consider Roma and Hungarians once the flagship of civilization. For MIÉP, multi-cultural society has to be of the same value or to have the same capabilities. Roma were no culture at all, and that is why it leads to disorder. encouraged to educate themselves, although it also stressed that Roma pupils will not be attending the same classes as Hungarian children 73 e analysis of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in – they can do so only when they earn the right through special talent the 2006. or hard work. 128 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 129
Types of election manifestos produced measure is its positive effect on the Hungarian nation. To put it in by Hungarian political parties other words: the well-being of the Hungarian nation was the moral value through which one should consider one’s acts. is approach Isolationist type had a decisive influence on the policies and measures chosen by the political parties. But let us first take a look at the reason why, this is e first type of Hungarian political manifestos consists only of one so and how the documents of the greater nation group portrayed the MIÉP manifesto for the general election of 2006. Since we examined Hungarian nation. this manifesto in detail above, there is no need to exhaustively de- For Fidesz-MPP, Jobbik and MDF (in the context of its 2006 scribe the main features of the isolationist category. Let us just men- manifesto), the Hungarian nation is more than just the sum of Hun- tion the main characteristic of this group. garians sharing the same values, history and culture. e nation is According to MIÉP, nations are objectively existing entities that, a more super-temporal and complex phenomenon. e nation and in the international arena, are represented by nation states. States its identity is not primarily dependent on the characters, values and and governments are reflections of the nation’s values and culture achievements of living Hungarians. Rather it poses certain essential and therefore they have a moral duty to introduce such policies and characteristics which are represented by and inherent to all members measures that will ensure the nation’s long term survival. Survival is of the Hungarian nation. ese characteristics were shaped through- here understood not just as simple preservation of the lives of mem- out the centuries by the common history of the Hungarian Kingdom bers of the nation but also as conservation of its cultural heritage and by the homeland where most Hungarians lived for the last thou- and distinctive spirit. For the isolationist approach, the Hungarian sand years. Hungarian soil and way of life were so important for the nation is shaped by its Christian values, common history, connection nationalist parties that they even called for the prohibition of selling with the soil, way of life and at least partly by the colour of the skin. Hungarian soil to foreigners. Christianity and its values also had a de- National identities should be protected from destructive and alien fining influence on the character of the Hungarian nation. Affiliation influences from abroad and the state should take care of this. Its role to Christianity and to the Christian moral code is especially stressed is especially important in defending the nation from the plot set up by MDF, which suggested that even if the state is officially secular it by international capital and banks against the Hungarian nation. e does not mean that the government could not be affiliated with the nation, backed by the state’s authority, should expel foreign influence Christian church. in Hungary and rather build a society based on traditional values. Bearing in mind the nation-centric approach of Fidesz-MPP, Job- bik and MDF in respect of its 2006 manifesto, we should also point out Greater nation type that the examined manifestos dedicated themselves to the protection of the identities and cultures of other communities too. In fact they e group of manifestos stressing a greater nation is predictably considered traditional minorities to be part of the nation. If there was defined by its concern for the Hungarian nation. is notion tran- an inherent moral value in the existence of Hungarian identity and scends virtually all the chapters of the manifestos of Fidesz-MPP, culture, the same went for other nations; and even if the Hungarian MDF’s manifesto from the 2006 general election and also, with some state is not the original state of the minorities living in Hungary, they important differences, that of Jobbik. should receive protection and the rights to live according to their own e approach of the greater nation group is mostly visible in the traditions and wishes. way all four manifestos justified the policies they proposed. e most Since there is an inherent moral value in the promotion and culti- rightful cause and also reason for implementation of the policy or vation of the nation, nationalist manifestos considered the state and 130 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 131 its government to be morally obliged to pursue these values. e economy and its national wealth. However, these specific differences state primarily represents its constituting nation and because of that do not alter the common understanding and worldview of the parties it should preferentially take care of its wellbeing. National identity as classified as falling within this group. it was defined above should be strengthened among the citizens of the state. For this purpose, nationalist parties are willing to use state Paternalistic type resources and even model them in order to achieve this goal. In this respect all available state resources should be used for the education Two electoral documents form the next identified type of manifes- system, through public media and diplomacy, to the armed forces. tos. e approach of the paternalistic parties can be interpreted as As we already explained for nationalist manifestos, the nation is an attempt to find a compromise between the aggressive nationalist not defined by national borders and consequently the role and duty of politics and the attitude which dismisses the inherent value and im- the national state are not limited by artificially drawn borders but, on portance of national identity. Paternalistic manifestos try to closely the contrary, they have to transcend them. e logical consequence of follow the national interests of the Hungarian nation and at the same the nationalist worldview was reflected in an assertive foreign policy time to ensure equality for all citizens. is was the approach of the towards those countries which possessed significant Hungarian mi- 2006 MSzP and 2010 MDF manifestos. norities. For Fidesz-MPP, Jobbik and MDF it was a question of the e notion of the national community, with its shared spirit and highest importance to reunite the Hungarian nation again. is goal values, appealed to the paternalistic documents. For them, everybody was not advanced literally, at least not in public. Rather the mani- who shares a common language and cultural background with the festos of these parties centred on advocacy for autonomous status Hungarians belongs to the national community. e paternalistic par- and powers for Hungarians abroad. e nationalist parties were also ties understood the nation to be defined by shared experiences, his- prepared to support foreign Hungarian communities without regard tory, values and cultural heritage. By embracing th Hungarian identity for the governments of the involved countries. However they deserve one becomes Hungarian because one shares and understands what is not only financial, cultural and political support from their homeland it to feel like Hungarians. In this definition of the nation there is no but since they are an integral part of the nation, and the Hungarian need for blood or even soil because it is fully supplemented by the state is a body and tool of this nation, Hungarians outside Hungary shared spirit. is spirit, though, should be cultivated among all those should have the right to influence Hungarian politics and public life. who consider themselves to be Hungarians. at is the reason why all three parties in the examined manifestos In the specific circumstances of Hungary this definition of the -na supported the establishment of some kind of preferential status for tion had important consequences, especially for foreign policy issues. foreign Hungarians with the sum of civil rights. Significant Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring Romania, Slo- Jobbik represents the more radical version of the above described vakia, Serbia but also Ukraine, Austria and Croatia were considered category. All of the features defining this group of manifestos are to be an integral part of the Hungarian nation. ese communities of more explicitly present in the Jobbik manifesto of 2010. Besides the foreign Hungarians should be supported in their struggle to sustain already mentioned features, Jobbik also explicitly stressed its aver- their identities and cultural heritage. e paternalistic parties advo- sion to postmodern values which were destroying traditional families. cated autonomy for Hungarian minorities in the countries where ese were in sharp contrast to the values of the Hungarian identity. conditions for such a step existed. In this respect European regional Finally Jobbik, more than the other two parties falling into the greater policies were considered to be very helpful. However, both MSzP in nation category, emphasized its distrust towards foreign capital and 2006 and MDF in 2010 would not risk conflict and confrontation with investments. Jobbik saw it as an attempt to take over the Hungarian their neighbours over this issue. 132 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 133
With all the emphasis on the shared national identity there is a only manifesto of LMP and the 2010 election manifesto of MSzP meet danger that one would neglect the second half of the story. Besides the characteristics of the anti-nationalist type. national spirit and culture, the paternalistic manifestos paid atten- Understanding of identities and their construction is a crucial tion also to the citizenry and civic values. Both parties in their re- element that distinguishes anti-nationalist election documents from spective documents stressed that the state’s role and duty is towards the other types of manifestos. All of the documents of this last type both the nation (as defined above) and to the citizens of the country at least briefly explain their view on the emergence of identities, without regard to their identities and worldviews. is duty is not their role in the life of an individual as well as in the life of the state. just a formal claim but it translates itself into the policies aimed at SzDSz, LMP and MSzP in 2010 believed that identities are not given the integration of the Roma population into the society. Both MSzP and primordial. Rather each person and community decides more or and MDF in the examined manifestos stressed the need to solve less intentionally about the allegiances, loyalties and cultural milieu the cycle of social exclusion of Roma people. e first step in this it wishes or feels that it wants to belong to. Identity is an issue of effort should be reform of the education system to prevent segrega- choice more than anything else. In this respect the mentioned parties tion of Roma pupils and also to get them out of non-stimulating stressed the right of every group or citizen to choose its own language, environments. culture or religion. Paternalistic manifestos in general condemned aggressive and e fact that identities are not something that a citizen is born simplistic nationalism based on the rejection of everything non- with gives less credit to the ideologies and attitudes which mount the Hungarian. However they acknowledged the importance and value of national identity in the centre of their political program. If the nation national identity for all those who feel like Hungarians. It is important is not a moral value itself, issues concerning the cultural policies, edu- and, at the same time; the state’s duty to cultivate the national culture cation, migration and even foreign affairs become less emotional and and to make it possible for Hungarians to be proud of their nation. At categorical. is leaves enough space for policies that aim at mutual the same time the state should not promote Hungarian national in- understanding and protection of minorities that are no longer consid- terests and its culture at the expense of other communities and ethnic ered to be a potential threat to the nation. Consequently, there were no minorities. On the contrary, it should make sure that these groups also more national interests in the sense of the interests of the cultural and receive support for their culture and, more importantly, that they are spiritual community but rather state interests, defined by the state’s protected from any kind of discrimination. responsibility for all of its citizens. In harmony with this approach, anti-nationalist manifestos saw the Anti-nationalist liberal type state as a neutral actor which should not promote or give preference to any specific cultural tradition, interpretation of history or set of e last type of Hungarian political manifestos is, for their antipa- values. On the contrary the government should protect all communi- thy towards and condemnation of the nationalist political style and ties and especially those which faced social exclusion. Because of this, ideology, called anti-nationalist. e parties and documents falling all three parties SzDSz, LMP and MSzP dedicated whole chapters into this group significantly differ from the previous group by their of their manifestos to evaluate and propose measures and policies commitment to the individual rather than the collective. ere is no which aimed at the integration and empowerment of Roma citizens. collective identity without individuals who shape it. Nations or other Among others they all called for effective abolishment of segregation communities are not spiritual entities which bear some moral value. in the educational system which systematically discriminates against Anti-nationalist-liberal manifestos stressed that only individuals are Roma pupils. SzDSz, LMP and MSzP expressed their strong opposi- the subjects and objects of moral acts. Both manifestos of SzDSz, the tion to the exploitation of the social ramifications of the problems 134 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HUNGARY 135 connected with the deprivation and exclusion of Roma population to nation of fieen million Hungarians in and outside the borders. e political games of the rightwing parties. Anti-nationalist parties were notion of the united nation is very important in Hungarian politics worried that anti-Roma and anti-minority sentiments would eventu- and certainly it is very difficult to get solid electoral support without ally undermine the democratic and liberal foundations of Hungarian stressing the importance of the ties with Hungarian communities society. abroad. e Hungarian nation as a community is a very broadly ac- Moreover, for the anti-nationalist parties it was not just right to cepted perception. At the same time we should also note that among protect minorities but they also valued the diversity. e variety of the the Hungarian parties there was only one which defined the nation in different cultures and lifestyles was praised by these parties and they terms of ancestry and race. Other parties, even those which embraced wanted to make conditions in Hungary such that different cultural the nation-centric worldview were considering minorities to be part communities will flourish there. On account of this, the anti-nation- of their nation. alist parties had a more positive attitude to immigration and also to the alternative arts. e anti-nationalist parties were in general pro-European. ey considered Hungary and its society to be clearly part of the European cultural space. ey advocated for an open Hungary that embraces the European values of tolerance, equality and human rights. ey also stressed the fact that in the modern world new challenges keep crop- ping up and that the nineteenth century design of the nation state is not able to cope with these challenges without the help of other states. is is the raison d’être of the European project and all three parties supported the further deepening of European integration. SzDSz even went so far as to call for the establishment of a European federation.
Conclusion
Based on the previous analysis one can easily reach the conclusion that Hungarian political life and its party system went through deci- sive changes between the general elections of 2006 and 2010. ese changes manifested themselves particularly by the polarization of the party system and by the deepening of the ideological gap between the relevant political parties. is tendency is illustrated on the one hand by the rise in support for the greater nation type of manifestos and, on the other hand, by the shi of the MSzP and MDF parties towards a less nationalistic approach in their manifestos. With the exception of the anti-nationalist group, in general the Hungarian types of electoral manifestos commonly spoke about a POLAND 137
POLAND
Introduction to Polish politics and the Polish party system
Poland’s early democratic transition period ran from the revolution- ary year of 1989 to 1990/1991. e most significant feature of the Polish party system is the fact that forty years of one-party domi- nation has been followed by the establishing of an anti-communist revolution movement Solidarity (Solidarność). e early transition was notable for the non-party form of political organization that was prevalent. Consequently, in the first free post- revolution election the party system was incredibly fragmented and electoral volatility was extremely high (Szczerbiak 2008: 417–418). As in other CCE countries, dominating in the first phase was the very issue of a successful democratic transition issue rather than the constitution of a stable party system. Instead of the democratic tran- sition, economic reform was one of the key issues of the newly born political system. Although the party system was strongly fragmented, the new (post-communist) elite reached a consensus on economic re- form. is consensus was subsequently followed (1993–1997) by the centre-le government led by SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD), the successor of the communist party. e lack of a party system did not prevent ongoing consensus on the economic and democratic transition of the country (Millard 2009: 782). e 1991 election offered the new possibility of participation on democratic reforms, and a high number (29) of political parties par- ticipated. is was caused by the fact that there was no existing vote threshold in the 1991 general election. e most successful party was the liberal UD (Unia Demokratyczna, UD) that gained only 12.3 % of the vote. UD formed a centre-right minority government with smaller right-conservative, liberal and centre parties (Porozumienie Centrum (PC), Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe, ZChN).74
74 e total number of government parties was seven. 138 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 139
e high number of political parties was not the only problem present Prawicy, AWP) was formed and together with UW (Unia Wolności, in the party system. e fragmentation of the political system was UW) formed a centre-right government led by Jerzy Buzek. ere was not the only factor; a further important role in this was played by the a clear tendency to establish a stable bipolar party system. Further- personal animosities between the communist successor parties but more, the new government continued with economic transformation, also between the successor parties of the revolutionary movement although the heterogeneity of the coalition was very high. Gener- Solidarity. Due to internal tensions within the government, president ally, governments in Poland promoted a much greater consensus Lech Wałęsa disolved the Sejm (the Polish parliament) and opened for economic and institutional reform than for establishing a stable the door to an early election in 1993 (Svačinová 2011: 132). and transparent party system (Frye 2010: 218). For example, Millard In 1993 the Sejm approved a constitutional change to the national defines this high instability as the “party tourisms” of Polish politics voting threshold (5 % for parties and 8 % for coalitions) which led to a (Mirlland 2009: 785). drop in the number of parliamentary parties to 6. Despite this, nearly e fragmentation of the centre-right government started in one third of voters voted for parties which were not able to pass the 1999 and reached its peak in the 2000 presidential election. Due to 5 or 8 % threshold (Szczerbiak 2005: 100). is institutional change internal tensions in both government parties and dissatisfaction with strongly affected parties coming from the Solidarity movement. In the economic and societal development, public support for the minority 1993 election every parliamentary party lost a large amount of votes.75 government was very low. But the le SLD and centre PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) e presidential election loss of AWS leader Marian Krazaklewski avoided losing this election and gained the best results of all parties. was the first step towards the fragmentation and disintegration of the During the governmental negotiations SLD and PSL formed a cen- AWS. UW was also going through a fragmentation process at that tre-le coalition under the leadership of PSL Chairman Waldemar time. Combined, this resulted in the fatal general election loss of 2001. Pawlak (Kopeček 2005: 511–513).76 In contrast to the situation of the centre-right parties, the homogeni- During the subsequent government period SLD promoted more zation and unifying process of the le parties has been successfully liberal politics and supported economic reforms like privatisations, accomplished. e coalition of SLD-UP (Sojusz Lewicy Demokra- market liberalization etc. SLD shied to the most EU supporting po- tycznej-Unia Pracy, SLD-UP) gained 41 % of the vote. Although the sition. e development of the party system in this period laid down coalition expected election gains of over 50 % of the seats in the Sejm, the basics of the classical right-le slip in the political system. e first the voting result was the most successful in the Polish modern party indication of fragmentation along these lines appeared during the system post-1989 (Szczerbiak, Bil 2008: 5–6). Consequently SLD-UP governing period of SLD and PSL, caused by continuing economic formed a government with the centrist PSL, under the leadership of transformation and also by internal tension within the cabinet (Mat- Prime Minister Leszek Miller.77 thes, Zimmer 2010: 248–249). Around the year 2000, dissatisfaction in Polish society was at a very By the 1997 election, stability rooted in the party system. e di- very high level. In this societal environment two populist parties took viding on the le and right of the political spectrum seemed to be on more significant roles: Self-defense (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej fulfilled. Quite some time before this election a centre-right conserva- Polskiej, SRP) and the League of Polish Families (Polskie Stronnictwo tive party Election Action Solidarity (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Ludowe, PSL). ese parties defined themselves as the true defenders of the national interest and identity. In both cases the most significant 75 KPN lost 82 % of its votes in comparison to the 1991 election (Millard 2009: 782). 76 Although Pawlak was the leader of the minority party in the coalition government, feature was the personal role of the leaders. Some time before the he gained the prime ministerial post due to the specific post-election negotiations (Svačinová 2011: 126). 77 In the 2011 election Miller ran as a candidate of Self-defence (tnv24 2011). 140 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 141
2001 election, two political parties were founded that subsequently the 2010 presidential election. Aer the 2007 election, Civic Platform become highly influential in Polish politics. Law and Justice (Prawo formed a centre-right government with PSL. i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), led by the twin tandem of brothers Jaroslaw e current state of the Polish party system can be defined as mod- and Lech Kaczynski, was founded due to the fragmentation of AWS erate pluralism. In contrast to the situation in 1991, only a few relevant (Rojčík 2003). Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, OP) originat- parties feature presently in the party system (Szczerbiak 2008: 223). ed from UW. Donald Tusk, the current prime minister of Poland, was Although there is a lack of party system stability, the successful eco- elected as the party leader (Szczerbiak, Bill 2009: 447–448). nomic and democratic transition was fulfilled. e 2011 election will Although the centre-le government had a very good starting show whether the Polish party system remains uncertain and with a position, due to internal tension in SLD PSL le from the govern- high level of voter volatility, or if national cleavage has become a key ment led prime minister Marek Belka (Kopeček 2005: 517). e issue across Polish politics. 2004 European election saw SLD lose its position as the strongest Since our study focuses on the period aer accession to the EU political party and aer that SLD faced marginalization. e bipolar (namely from 2005 to 2010), the subjects of our study are the follow- party system was not maintained and together with new issues within ing parties: PO, PiS, PSL, SLD, SRP, LPR and PPN. However, for the politics, socio-economic issues and was no longer the main feature purpose of this study we should also examine PPN which was not so of the party system. Together with the growing role of Law and Jus- politically influential as a parliamentary party but has nonetheless tice and two smaller populist parties, the most significant feature of represented the most visible and radical nationalistic element in the Polish politics became national cleavage. e effort to stabilize the political life of the country. In the case of Poland there is one party party system had therefore failed. e move towards national issues – PPN (Polska Partja Narodowa) – which competed respectively in opened new splits in Polish politics. It should be noted that this was the general elections of 2006 and 2010. a little bit unusual for this late post-revolutionary period (Szczerbiak 2007: 436) e 2005 election was won by Law and Justice. Aer failed negotia- Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) tions with Civic Platform the party formed a minority government. In 2006, Law and Justice enlarged the government with the aid of is conservative party was founded in 2001 due to the fragmentation the populist parties Self-defense and the League of Polish Families. of AWS, the bearer of the revolution ethos. PiS started to unify the However, corruption scandals that hit Self-defense and continuing conservative branch of Polish politics. e key persons were the twin internal disputes led to the disintegration of the cabinet and to the brothers Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczyński, who were familiar to the pub- early election in 2007 (Millard 2009: 782–785). lic from the revolution and later in different political positions. Lech e backdrop to the 2007 election was the high polarization of Kaczyński was minister of justice in the previous government (as a society. Economic issues were less important in comparison to issues member of the AWS party). Partly due to his popularity PiS gained of national identity and national interest. A high level of election 9.5 % of the vote (Kopeček 2005: 520). volatility across the whole political spectrum was now tangible. In Most PiS issues were influenced by the activity of the Kaczyński general voter preferences shied more to the right. Although Law and twins. ey were publicly known thanks to their very strong anti- Justice gained more votes than in the 2005 election, most of the votes communist opinions and their moral emphasis on social matters.78 As were gained by Civic Platform under the leadership of Donald Tusk 78 (Jasiewick, Jasiewick-Betkiewicz 2007: 1063–1065). e leading role e Kaczyński brothers publicly impeached former president Lech Wałęsa on the charge that he cooperated with the state police and that he was a confidante of the of Civic Platform was confirmed in the 2009 European election and in communist-era intelligence forces. 142 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 143 a result of his ministerial role, Lech Kaczyński attained an image of ther ideological PiS essentials are its conservative views on the family the hard and uncompromising fighter against violence and any kind and marriage, along with its aversion to gay and lesbian partnerships of disorder in Poland. From the outset, the party’s emphasis on law (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 203). and justice was, due to its election success in the 2001 election, had a During the period of le-liberal government PiS obtained a boost major influence on all issues associated with Polish politics. in popularity. Due to corruption and the ideological discrediting of is fundamental focus remained unchanged: a deep-rooted anti- the le, PiS gained a strong argument for justifying both its moral communism, a focus on Christianity and morality, a social focus on revolution and its call for the “new beginning”. In the 2005 election PiS policies, the call for a strong Poland in Europe, the need for special re- gained the best voting result ever (27 %) and forged a coalition with lations with the USA and close attention to Russian activities (Kaniok two controversial smaller parties: Self-Defense and League of Polish 2006: 129). e party defines security as the primary goal of its policy Families. e polarization of public opinion and the controversial and this is defined in moral terms (with reference to the communist politics of the government led to an early election in 2007. PiS was heritage). Further policy goals are social security and the role of Po- not able to maintain its strongest party position as in the 2005 election land in world politics. and had to move into opposition (Szczerbiak 2008: 236).
Tab. 16: Electoral performance of PiS Election manifesto 2005 79
Elections 2001 EP 2004 2005 2007 EP 2009 e 2005 election took place just aer the start of Polish membership Votes 9.5 12.7 27 32.1 27.4 in the EU and aer the unsuccessful governing of the le coalition. Seats 44 7 133 166 15 e manifesto put a strong emphasis on the self-determination of the Polish nation. is determination is based on consciousness of Source: National Electoral Commission of Polish Republic Poland’s historical role and the recent possibility to become a strong nation within European politics and be the leader of the CEE region. During the liberal le government (2001–2005) PiS increased its is role is only possible if the security of the nation and citizens is accent on a “moral” post-communist revolution (Pavovský 2006: 54). ensured. e manifesto defines as a starting point the moral revolu- e party proclaimed that only it could deal with the communist tion and clear reconciliation with the communist past. In societal heritage and supported a bigger lustration of all important functions terms this is the way in which to avoid a moral decline in society and in public administration. Of significance is the party’s attitude to to constitute a strong (or tough) nation. European integration. Due to the strong role of Poland the last inte- On economic issues the party supports the free market and its gration development deemed to be unsatisfactory. e EU should be positive effect on the Polish economy. constituted on De Gaulle’s concept – the EU as a Europe of nations. e party defines the position of Poland in Europe as a strong e party’s European policy is fundamentally not negative against the state with deep roots in history. Very evident is the party’s negative EU. PiS supports the common currency but with a couple of excep- position towards Russia, as a result of historical experience – the three tions, for example a slower accepting process. PiS would rather pro- times division of Poland, the occupation during the Second World pose a more flexible integration (Mudde 2007: 166). Very prominent War and the following communist era. Other foreign relations are is the strong accent on the role of the USA and NATO on European security. National sovereignty is also an unassailable value – the na- 79 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme tion state alone can ensure security and justice for individuals. Fur- in the 2005. 144 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 145 oen influenced by these experiences. is is the reason for a strong Election manifesto 2007 80 emphasis on national sovereignty and the prominent role of Poland in Europe. e next election manifesto did not see any significant ideological In this context of questionable relations with Russia, PiS strongly development taking place. e 2007 early election is understood as a supports the diversification of energy supplies. e party also sup- referendum on the conservative policy of PiS. e two years of gov- ports the strengthening of the Polish position in the CEE region erning with two national and populist parties led to strong dividing and promotes the aspiration to take on the role of regional leader. of the society. No doubt the role of PiS as the leading party in the National identity is the defining issue of the Polish position in cur- government has been reflected very controversially and the call for rent European politics. e definition can be found in the country’s a new society and the pureness of government style has been shown Christian heritage, the emphasis on national security, responsibility to be highly questionable. Although the party gained more votes than for the nation, the strong role of families, patriotism, and also the in the 2005 election, it had to accept an opposition role. One of the EU as a part of the national identity. e party calls for confident reasons for the higher vote result is the gaining of votes from PiS’s delimitation to the strong European states. Nevertheless, the party ex-partners in government due to its stronger emphasis on national opposes any kind of aggressive nationalism that could be harmful for topics and the minimizing role of LPR and S. Poland. e most significant manifesto feature is the detailed, elaborate Eu- Generally, for PiS European integration is a positive way in which ropean policy and the strengthening of trans-atlantic ties. Surprising- to cooperate between nation states and for ensuring the strong role of ly, the manifesto more strongly considers the question of the German the EU in world politics. On the negative side, the party specifies the minority in Poland and bilateral relations generally. is is surprising current discourse related to European integration. e EU is defined as this issue was not discussed in the previous manifesto.81 as a social project that rejects the sovereignty of the member states. It e European policy started to be more supportive on practical goes on, stating that the present state of the EU is more satisfactory for issues. PiS emphasize the need for more transparency in the EU as big member states. e party rejected the Treaty on European Union well as the equality principle for CAP. In a more fundamental way, and also the Lisbon Treaty. Poland’s entry in to the monetary union the manifesto shied to more pragmatic expressions. e party calls should be made carefully and more in the long term, though timings for broader use of the subsidiarity principle (similar to German con- are not specified in the manifesto. servatives), the modernizing of the functional structure of the EU, On security issues, the most important partners are NATO and and a more positive attitude to the completion of the internal market. the USA. Military integration within the EU is not enough to secure Yet still, the party recognizes the hegemony of the big member states. Polish security. e party’s accent on the “big Polish nation” does not is is the kind of awareness resulting from deeper integration. In run contrary to its positive attitude to human rights and the support- general PiS supports European integration and the further enlarge- ing of minorities. PiS is careful to support a multicultural society. e ment of the zone of stability and peace. party’s attitude does not correspond to the supporting position in any On security policy the most important actor remains NATO fol- other western European country. at is why we have used the word lowed by the USA. PiS openly supports the installation of the Ameri- “careful”. Obviously, PiS supports Poles living abroad and their connection 80 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme with Polish culture and the nation. in the 2007. 81 e reason may be increasingly confrontational relations with Germany during the national conservative government. 146 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 147 can rocket defense system in Poland. In the broader context, this helps The Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) to promote Polish interests in the foreign policy. In regional CEE af- fairs, PiS continues to call for a stronger role for Poland. e Civic Platform (PO) calls itself a liberal conservative Christian In general the minority policy comes about clearly from the need democratic political party, and is a member of the European People’s for solving the problematic situation of the German minority in Po- Party in the European Parliament (Poland EPP 2011). Official regis- land as well as the Lithuanian minority. Similar to the 2005 election tration of the party took place on March 5, 2002 and since June 2003 manifesto, the party strongly supports Polish citizens living abroad. Donald Tusk has been the leader of the party – he is also the current In the manifesto the party calls for a higher number of homecoming Prime Minister of Poland. Polish citizens. PiS wants to create a special program for citizens re- Since 2007’s early election82, caused by the scandals of the lead- turning from abroad that would financially support them. According ing party Law and Justice, PO has been the strongest political party to the 2005 and 2007 manifestos, the party supports enhanced promo- in Poland, controlling 207 out of 460 seats in the lower chamber of tion of Polish culture abroad. It should be added that in this regard the parliament (the Sejm). In the upper chamber, PO’s superiority is even party calls for the discovering of national roots defining Poland as a more pronounced with 53 out of 100 seats under its control. Since the large nation. Due to the experience of the last government, the party election 2010 is presidential position next political institutions suc- calls for a final reconciliation of the German minority in Poland and cessfully gained by PO. e leading candidates were Bronisław Maria an improvement in bilateral relations in general. Political mistrust of Komorowski for PO and Jarosław Aleksander Kaczyński, brother of Russia can readily be detected in the emphasis given to diversifying the deceased former president Lech Aleksander Kaczyński, for Law energy sources. PiS’s European policy in the period 2005–2007 has and Justice (PiS). Komorowski gained a slight majority with 53.01 % shied from a general negative to a pragmatic negative. of the vote and thus became President of the Polish Republic. e interesting point of the manifesto is the resurrected problem- e historical roots of PO lie in the political evolution in Poland atic relation with Germany. e conflict issue involves the legacy of of the 1980s which led to the revolution and partial oblivion by the the war on the one hand and on the other the admitting of possible end of 1980s. German demands on modifying the post-war reconciliation system. In 1980 a new political movement emerged in Poland as a result In one practical way, PiS refuses the existence of the Centre for Dis- of the great strike at the Gdansk Shipyard. It was called Solidarity placement, which is based in Berlin (CT24 2010). is problematic (Solidarność) and was originally comprised of independent workers relation between Poland and Germany is down to the populist-con- unions led by electrician Lech Wałęsa, the future first president of the servative government in charge during the period 2005–2007. Polish Republic. e party’s core beliefs refer to an emphasis on creating a confident e Solidarity movement combined the interests of workers and Polish nation. Primarily PiS calls for the strengthening of national the liberal intellectual streams in Poland, the combination of which identity, Christian grounds and a high level of morality in the public was crucial for the political development through the 1990s. Unlike sphere. Not long aer the party’s founding, PiS placed strong em- ten years ago the workers didn’t go out and clog the streets but stayed phasis on reclaiming ethics and morality aer the post-communist inside the factories and refused to work until their demands were met. period. A highly significant point is also the emphasis on national Other than raising some purely labour improving conditions like free culture, language and historical heritage. e party tries to define Saturdays and longer maternity leave, they also posed political ques- Poland’s position in European politics between the two great power tions and considerations, such as independent unions and censorship states Germany and Russia. 82 National Electoral Commission of Polish Republic (pkw.gov.pl). 148 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 149 restriction. e former in particular would mean the end of the unri- Tab. 17: Electoral performance of PO valled political power of the communist party in Poland. Soon aer it was formed, Solidarity as a social movement had Elections 2001 EP 2004 2005 2007 EP 2009 around nine million followers, representing nearly one third of the Votes 12.68 24.1 24.14 41.51 44.43 Polish workforce. Seats 65 15 133 209 25 e communist authorities conceded to the demands of Solidarity and on August 31, 1980 a treaty between the workers and the official Source: National Electoral Commission of Polish Republic authorities was signed. Among other things this led to the publication of an independent newspaper but Solidarity had to be cautious about e unification of AWS was short-lived and before the election in the liberal progress because of the potential Soviet intervention which 2001 a new political party, Civic Platform, emerged also from AWS was executed against Czechoslovakia in 1968. members, this time joining with those who had le the Freedom Un- However, the Polish authorities didn’t give up completely and on ion party (Unia Wolności), among whom was Donald Tusk. Both AWS December 13, 1981, martial law was declared across the country and and Freedom Union failed to reach the required quorum for entry all executive powers were entrusted to the newly created Military into the parliament, with AWS in fact ceasing to exist by 2001. Council of National Salvation. Solidarity was banned and its followers Electoral support for PO is the following: in the 2005 Sejm election, arrested. Despite tough repression, Solidarity operated as an under- PO won 133 seats with 24.14 % of the vote. In 2007 it captured 209 ground movement until the fall of the iron curtain in 1989 when it re- seats with 41.51 % of the vote. e European Parliament election of emerged, and in February 1989, in semi-free elections, the party gained 2009 was even more successful, PO winning 25 seats with 44.43 % of all the possible parliament positions (most of them were still reserved the vote83. Civic Platform has become the major party in Poland. for the communist party). Solidarity’s last election victory was in 1997 and as of now the party has only around half a million followers. Election manifestos 2005 and 2007 84 Solidarity was a social movement, as stated above. A more politi- cally oriented formation can be traced to 1996 when over 30 different Both of these manifestos are ideologically very similar and the ap- political parties joined together as Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). proach toward nationalism is stable in both. erefore we present Credit for this unification is claimed by the International Republi- both of them together, so as not to repeat. can Institute (IRI 2011). e reason for the reunification of different For the election in 2005, PO’s ideological approach was that the “post-Solidarity” groups, right, liberal and anti-communist political state should be here for citizens. As was also stated earlier, PO would parties, was a reaction to the election of 1993 when the United Le like to free the energy of Poles. On economic issues, PO is an eco- won and the right part of the political spectrum seemed to be lost nomically pro-liberal party. In the 2005 election, the main approach and fragmented. However, despite many attempts to support the right, to voters was the slogan that Poland deserves an economical miracle. anti-communist stream within Polish politics, only AWS was success- e election was also perceived as a turning point for the self-identi- ful. Yet the Union party (UN), for example, stayed out of the newly fication of Poland in the west as well as within the eastern model of formed rightwing coalition, and as it did not cooperate also on candi- chaotic democracy. PO thus offered “European normality”. date lists with other outside staying subjects, UN became the only one real right party competitor to AWS. UN was created as a fusion of the 83 National Electoral Commission of Polish Republic (pkw.gov.pl). Democratic Union and the Liberal-Democratic Congress, also post- 84 e analysis of the election manifestos are based on general election programme Solidarity parties who emerged just aer the regime change in 1989. in the 2005 and 2007. 150 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 151
PO was calling for the reunification of Polish people as had been peals to its responsibility to contribute to world security and progress the case during the heyday of Solidarity. Poland should be modernized through its own development, military strength and active participa- in line with traditions, with a desire for freedom typical for Poland tion in international organizations. and in relation to a traditional system of values which is based on the ten commandments of Christianity. Family, nation, community and state should cooperate together for the common good. And Poland Polish National Party (Polska Partia Narodowa, PPN) was a common good, common pride and joint work. As the manifesto stated, it was just Poland! Polish National Party was established in March 2004 before the first PO would like to restore the republican ideals based on patriot- elections to the European Parliament in Poland. e party is led by ism and a sense of belonging to Europe, and more specifically to the Leszek Bubel who is its best known and virtually only visible member. EU, including the common currency. We can define the party as hav- Bubel is well known in Polish society for his anti-Semitic songs which ing an appeal to national awareness that combines modernism and he recorded with his rock band and then released on the internet, and Europeanism. e EU is one of the national interests for PO. Other also for publishing several anti-Semitic books. national interest of Poland should be according PO fight for within Other than for Bubel’s anti-Semitic media releases, the party re- the EU. Polish identity is tragic history as well as a modern responsible ceived national media attention in 2006 for the trial of Karol Golinski, Europe. Christianity is the foundation, as well as the bridge between member and candidate of PPN, who was alleged to have attacked the past and future. Poland should become a sovereign actor in the multi- Chief Rabbi of Poland, Michael Schudrich. In spite of this media at- national arena of interests and the west should no longer teach Poland tention, PPN did not gain any prominence or substantive support. e what to do. Polish people can find out for themselves. newly formed party did not succeed in the 2004 European elections e foreign policy emphasis on EU and NATO structures par- and the same goes for the general election of 2005 and the presidential ticipation, despite Poland’s opting out from the Fundamental Rights election of the same year. PPN declined to take part in the next early Charter which is part of the Lisbon Treaty, as well as orientation to- general election of 2007 and the presidential elections of 2010. wards the USA. PO will also work to improve the fragile relations with the Russian Federation and support Ukraine’s “westernization”, which Tab. 18: Electoral performance of PPN might also cause the first goal to be annulled. However PO realizes the historical disadvantage, and thus seeks to base the relationship with Elections EP 2004 2005 Russia on reason and long term sustainability. Further focuses are Votes 0.4 29 partnerships, with special emphasis on the eastern partnership. Seats 0 0 PO’s social opinions are conservative. In Christian Poland it is no surprise that the Ten Commandments are considered to be a corner- Source: National Electoral Commission of Polish Republic stone of society; more surprising might be PO’s claim that they are one of the foundations of western civilization. Postmodernism is not in vogue within PO, thus the legalization of homosexual marriages, Electoral manifesto 2005 church separation from state, so drugs legalization or euthanasia stand outside the party’s goals. Since PO values life in its pure form, e political program of PPN is completely centred on the notion no form of genetic research is supported to overcome this axiom of of the Polish nation and its survival in the world. is focused con- humanity. PO realises the size and importance of Poland and thus ap- centration is expressed by three principles which are explicitly men- 152 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 153 tioned and are prominent in the manifesto: patriotism, nationalism to “judaize” Catholicism. In this respect the manifesto suggests that and statism. priests should be defenders of patriotism. Patriotism is defined in the document as love for Poland which However it is not just the church that should be the place where stems from mere membership of the Polish nation. is love goes so the defence of the Polish identity should take place. In accordance far that one should be willing to sacrifice even one’s own life. Nation- with the principle of “statism” all of a state’s resources should be put alism is understood similarly. It is the belief that nations are entities into this fight. is is especially the case for schools, civil society and of essential importance in life and that its members should defend sport. All of these are described by PPN and its manifesto to be un- the honour and good name of their nation. is principle is universal der the influence of foreign forces of globalization. Due to this, PPN and is valid for all the nations in the world. Finally, the principle of wants to reclaim Polish control over education through diminishing statism assumes the role of the nation state. is role is to be a pro- foreign influence over textbooks in schools and strengthening the na- tector of the interests of the nation, especially against foreign forces tion’s history education. Similarly they proposed taking market forces and capitalism which are trying to erode Polish society. e forces out of Polish sport. For the same purpose as control over education conspiring against Poland and the Polish nation are mentioned in and sport, PPN proposed a law prohibiting foreign ownership of the the manifesto many times as well as in almost all the possible con- media. e media, for PPN, are seen as the propaganda arm of the texts and chapters. Behind the conspiracies there are multiple entities anti-Polish and anti-Christian forces. According to PPN, the national – from the European Union through the Bilderberg Group to Jews interest and patriotism should also be imminent in the judiciary and and Zionism. legal system. e first and the most important value which the PPN mani- Nations, as they are perceived by PPN, are not just spiritual com- festo deals with is the Polish nation. is nation is understood as munities. Nations are endowed with territories. Soil which belongs to an objective entity of moral value. Each member of the nation has one nation should be governed and owned only by that nation. From an obligation towards it – especially to defend its sovereignty and this belief stems the conviction that states, or rather nations, have the cultural heritage. erefore stress is placed not just on the survival of holy right to defend their territories against other nations and against the nation in terms of its people but also on the protection of their the international evil forces of those who control globalization. Con- specific identity and culture. PPN see this culture as being based upon sequently PPN and its manifesto proposed policies which aimed at Christianity and the so-called Latin civilization, and formed by thou- restoring Polish sovereignty over its own land. Among these policies sands of years of history. However PPN rejects the view that considers there is the prohibition of foreign ownership of Polish soil, regulation nations to be simply the outcomes of external and internal influences of the amount of foreign capital in the national banking sector and throughout the ages. Rather they tend to understand it as unchange- also of the cheap foreign goods which are said to ruin Polish indus- ably based upon the Latin version of Christianity. is irrevocability tries. Similarly PPN is against immigration which is considered to be of the Catholic fundament in Polish identity is seen as eternal and can the main cause of Poland’s high unemployment. Moreover, the mani- be documented, for example, by the recognition of Holy Mary as the festo called for the re-nationalization of Polish industry which fell into Queen of Poland. foreign hands during the process of privatization in the early 1990s. According to PPN, Polish identity has been under constant attack However not just capitalism and globalization are deemed to be a from foreign forces which are trying to create a new type of men out threat to the sovereignty of the Polish state. PPN were also against fur- of Polish youth. For this purpose are deployed malls, western popu- ther EU policies that aim to interconnect the so-called euro regions. lar culture and false ideals of tolerance. Even the Catholic Church In several places the manifesto stressed that these policies are meant was not spared, and PPN claims that churches were used in order to disintegrate the Polish state and its sovereignty. Similarly perceived 154 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 155 are other integrating tendencies and policies within the EU. PPN several months he also resigned. e third SLD – PSL government, called for a Europe of strong nation states, and it instead preferred led by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, survived until the general election cooperation with other Slavic states than with Brussels. Moreover, in of 1997. In this race SLD gained more than 27 % of the vote, but even order to get rid of the influence of the great powers – Moscow, Brus- such a high number was not enough to form a government and for sels and Washington – PPN suggested further economic cooperation four years SLD remained in opposition. with the states of Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America. Generally we could speak about Tab. 19: Electoral performance of SLD To sum up it can be concluded that PPN’s political program and ideology was centred on the moral category of the nation. Members Elections 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 of nations are obliged to serve the best interest of their respective na- Votes 11.91 20.41 27.13 41.04 13.1 13.15 tions. States are created to be an expression of the nation’s strength Seats 48 171 164 216 55 53 and its rule over its members and territory. Polish identity is defined by the Latin cultural heritage and Catholicism, that is still of the Source: National Electoral Commission of Polish Republic highest moral value. e Polish nation, according to PPN, is under constant and imminent threat from the transnational forces of those who intend the destruction of all nations and the creation of one In 1999 most of the SLD coalition parties agreed to form a single world order. e EU and globalized capitalism are two of the many party under the same name. Two years later SLD overwhelmingly faces of these threats. won the general election85 under the leadership of Leszek Miller. Subsequently SLD formed a government with PSL which in 2003, however, le the coalition aer disputes over agricultural policies. Alliance of the Democratic Left From 2003 to 2005 SLD governed together with the smaller Labor (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) Union (Unia Pracy, UP) in a minority government. Approaching the end of the term internal conflicts within SLD resulted in of the de- Alliance of the Democratic Le was officially established in May parture from the group of thirty deputies led by the speaker of the 1999. However the roots of this party are in the fall of the communist Sejm, Marek Borowski, who immediately established a new party: regime in Poland and the transformation of the former communist Social Democracy of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Polska, SdPl). Due party Polish United Worker’s Party into the social – democratic Social to this development, Miller resigned and the transitional govern- Democracy of the Polish Republic (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospo- ment of Marek Belka was formed with the support of le elements of litej Polskiej, SdRP). the Sejm. From 1991 SdRP entered electoral coalition with a number of e general election of 2005 resulted in a major defeat for SLD, lewing parties and movements under the name SLD. e coalition which received just a little bit more than 11 % of the votes. e leader- won general elections in 1993 and formed a government with the ship of the party resigned in response to this fiasco and Wojciech Ole- agrarian PSL which also obtained the right to nominate the prime jniczak replaced Józef Oleksy as the leader of the party. For the early minister. Aer two years Waldemar Pawlak had to resign and his gov- general election of 2007, SLD joined forces with other lewing par- ernment was replaced by the second SLD – PSL government, this time ties, namely UP, SdPl and Democratic Party, coming together under led by SLD politician Józef Oleksy. However the new prime minister was accused of cooperation with the Soviet secret service and aer 85 In the electoral coalition with the small Labor Union. 156 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 157 the leadership of Poland’s former president, Aleksander Kwaśniewski. ety. All of these values were understood as characteristics of modern However the coalition of the le named Le and Democracy was not nations and they were part of what SLD understood to be European as successful as its predecessors, gaining just 13 % of the votes. Aer culture and its principles. the election the coalition quickly disbanded in 2008. e manifesto for the 2005 general election expressed its open- ness also in its approach to foreign policy and international politics. Electoral manifesto of 2005 86 SLD was a strong supporter of Poland’s membership of the EU and, moreover, of its further integration. SLD was, for example, in favour e SLD manifesto for the 2005 election, besides other issues, con- of the European Constitutional Treaty and the common European fronted the rising wave of nationalism in Poland and the politics of security and defence policy. Similarly the socialists warned against identity. SLD did not refer to the Polish nation in its manifesto and Polish isolationism. SLD did not entirely reject the value of patriotism rather made reference to different social groups or citizens within and national pride, but it did not want to force it upon the citizens of Poland. Poland and it rather suggested that such things be experienced. SLD’s In 2005 the Socialists considered it important to address the issue view was that Poland should become a modern European nation of the political exploitation of Polish history, and the artificial con- through contact and integration with the rest of the continent, and in struction of myths and legends about Polish fate. e 2005 manifesto, this manner become respected. therefore, condemned the falsification of history by some elements of Polish society and its political use. To put it in their own words, they Electoral manifesto of 2007 87 fought against nationalistic imaginations. SLD saw a great danger arising from the influence of a nationalistic interpretation of history Many elements of the 2005 manifesto were emphasized even more in in the national education system. It wasn’t just simple nationalism the electoral program of the Le and Democracy coalition in 2007. that was perceived as a problem, but SLD was also concerned by Aer two years of the PiS, Self-defence and LPR government, the so- the influence of religion and especially the Catholic Church on the cialist manifesto observed and commented on an even greater social political system as well as society as a whole. For socialists it was suf- and political penetration by religion and nationalism. In particular, ficient to build the country on the principles of civic secularism that the influence of the Catholic Church over education was, for LiD, a would prevent religion from colonizing the political and cultural life great concern. Religious organizations should be twinned with other of the state. elements of modern civil society to erode the church’s monopoly. So the manifesto of 2005 was very clear in defining what it was e examined manifesto was dedicated to liberal values. In general opposed to, but what did SLD actually stand for? terms it called for the observance of human rights within the state Analysis of its program brings the conclusion that the socialists legislature and tolerance in society. Particularly it again stressed the supported an open society. is openness manifested itself in the fact importance of gender equality but it also addressed issues associated that the manifesto emphasized issues of tolerance and human rights with excluded communities and individuals, and supported policies but also, for example, gender equality. SLD strongly rejected racism against the segregation of the disadvantaged and handicapped. and xenophobia and called for anti-discrimination measures. SLD Just as it was against the imposition of religious values and was also supportive of the development and expansion of civil soci- morality on pupils in schools, the LiD manifesto also rejected the
86 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme 87 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2005. in the 2007. 158 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 159 construction of historical animosities and grievances between Poland Tab. 20: Electoral performance of PSL and its neighbours. For socialists, history and its relics were of no rel- evance in the contemporary Europe which faced its own problems. Elections 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 Poland should be open towards Europe and especially towards its Votes 8.67 15.4 7.3 8.98 6.96 8.91 neighbours. To build a modern state, the manifesto supported Eu- Seats 48 132 27 42 25 31 ropean integration. In accordance with its values it also stressed the importance of solidarity with countries outside of Europe. is mani- Source: National Electoral Commission of Polish Republic festo clearly rejects the assumption that exclusively defined national interest and nation are of moral value. In the following general election in 1997 both coalition parties suffered great losses. PSL managed to get just 7.3 % of the vote and Polish People’s Party lost more than one hundred seats in the Sejm. Aer the election the (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) party leader Pawlak was replaced by Jarosław Kalinowski. Kalinowski led PSL into the general election of 2001 which saw a return of the Polish People’s Party was renewed immediately aer the fall of the lewing government. However PSL did not improve its gains as sig- communist regime in Poland in 1989. PSL played an important role nificantly as SLD, receiving just 9 % of the vote. is disappointing in the Second Polish Republic aer the First World War. However result could be explained by the success of the new radical agrarian under the regimes of Józef Piłsudski the party lost its influence in party, Self-Defence of the Polish Republic. In 2003, and due to grow- Polish politics. During the Second World War PSL took part in the ing disagreements88 with SLD, PSL le the government and went into exile government. Aer the war PSL was controlled by the commu- opposition. In 2004 Janusz Wojciechowski replaced Kalinowski as nists and went under the name United People’s Party (Zjednoczono the leader of the party, to be again replaced in 2005 by Pawlak.89 In Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZLN). the general elections of 2005 and, subsequently, in 2007, PSL gained Aer the first general election in 1989, many parties were formed respectively seven and nine percent of the vote. In 2005 the party who claimed to be following in the footsteps of PSL. In 1990 most of remained in opposition but aer 2007 joined government as a junior them merged with the transformed ZSL. is new formation took partner of the centre-right Civic Platform. the historical name of the party in order to distinguish itself from the satellite party of the communist regime. PSL, under the leadership Electoral manifesto of 2005 90 of Waldemar Pawlak, proved to still have potential appeal in Polish politics, gaining almost nine percent of the votes in the 1991 general e electoral program of PSL for the election of 2005 was mostly election. Even higher gains came in the early election of 1993. PSL fin- concerned with foreign capital and its influence in Poland. PSL criti- ished second, behind the post-communist Democratic Le Alliance, cized the process of privatization: the transfer, according to the party, with 15.4 % of the vote. e two parties formed a lewing government of Poland’s national wealth into the hands of foreign investors. e under the premiership of the PSL leader Pawlak. However Pawlak’s 88 e two coalition parties disagreed over agricultural policies (Kopeček 2005: 517). government survived just two years. In 1995, aer several months of 89 Wojciechowski later le the party and with other former PSL politicians formed conflict with President Wałęsa and falling approval ratings, Pawlak its own PSL – Piast. was replaced in office by Józef Oleksy from SLD. 90 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2005. 160 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 161 manifesto suggested that foreign investors and capital were exploiting Electoral manifesto of 2007 91 Poland and the Polish population. Because of this the contracts made between the state and foreign investors should be opened and carefully ere are significant differences between PSL’s electoral documents audited. However it was not just unprofitable contracts and disad- in 2005 and 2007, but let us first of all examine those areas which are vantageous conditions which PSL stood against. Its 2005 manifesto more or less similar. criticized the concept of foreign ownership of strategic businesses e PSL manifesto of 2007 still considered Polish identity and cul- and sectors of the national economy. According to PSL, limitations ture to be the object of the state’s protection. Patriotism was still the to foreign ownership should apply to the energy sector, state forests, powerful force behind many of the proposed policies, and a strong railway companies and even the media. e state should also sup- Poland in the international arena remained the main purpose of the port Polish enterprises and businesses. On several occasions the foreign policy. However, what changed was the party’s view about manifesto also called for limits to the growing number of super- how to achieve this goal. PSL in 2007 called for a European Poland markets which have a negative effect on Polish commerce. From the because a “strong Poland means Europe in Poland”, and also that above-mentioned, it can be concluded that PSL perceived economic any improvement of Poland’s international position is possible only globalization as a negative trend. In spite of some very protectionist through internal change. e manifesto also supported improving policies and distrust towards foreign capital, the examined mani- relations – that had deteriorated in the foregoing years – with neigh- festo did not consider foreign capital as being used by political forces bouring countries. abroad. In order not to be misconstrued, PSL still held to the idea of an EU Just like most of Poland’s political parties, PSL was concerned consisting of free nation states, but the distinction between the EU about Polish identity and culture in the globalized world and in- and Poland became less clear in the 2007 manifesto. PSL in 2007 also tegrated Europe. e PSL manifesto addressed, therefore, the issue added a more liberal agenda into its program, with support for civil of protecting national identity by conserving the Polish language society, human rights and European values. In contrast with the 2005 and Christian values. e party’s rejection of same-sex marriage document, in the 2007 manifesto there is no sign of the same focus on and euthanasia adhered to this position. In the view of PSL, Chris- protectionism or fear of foreign capital. To sum up, we can conclude tian values are fundamental to European culture and therefore that PSL altered its negative attitudes towards the outside world. the party also pledged to push Christian values in the European institutions. In order to cultivate and secure both Polish identity and culture, Self-defense of Polish Republic Europe should remain just a free organization of sovereign nation (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SRP) states. Patriotism is an integral part of the PSL political manifesto of 2005, and in line with this Poland should be respected in Europe due e party was founded in 1992 due to the fragmentation of the La- to its historical achievements and its significant size and power. PSL bour union of Farmers “Self-defense”. e party is evidently a populist advocated an active, confident and sovereign foreign policy in Europe party with anarchical and agrarian influences. e most important and also around the world. Within its foreign policy proposals, PSL person in the party was its chairman, Andrej Leper.92 Leper’s party was in favour of terminating the military involvement of the Polish role was very strong: he could decide on the exclusion of any member army in Iraq. 91 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2007. 92 e party leader Andzrej Leper died in August 2011. 162 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 163 of the party and he was the most important person when it came to In this period the party received a lot of publicity mainly due to policy-making (Szcerbiak 2008: 228). e party was generally very the controversial performance of Andrej Leper and due to the final much geared around the personality of its chairman. phase of the EU membership negotiation. e 2005 election saw more Although the party was not successful in the 1995 and 1997 elec- success for the party and it became a government party together with tions, the success in the 2001 election was very surprising. e party the League of Polish Families and Law and Justice. is involvement tried to achieve wider renown and popularity through very contro- in the government led to public resistance to the participation of the versial campaigns against the political establishment and the Catholic party, and following corruption scandals caused a significant break- Church (Kopeček 2005: 521).93 up of Self-defense and the loss of election votes.94 In the 2007 election As a result of the populist character of its political program, it is the party was marginalized (Matthe, Ziemmer 2010: 249). difficult to define SRP in terms of ideology. e fundamentals of the e European policy of the party is based on a strong critique of party are agrarian emphasis, rejection of capitalism but also social- the integration project. Although the party does not reject the fun- ism and liberalism, the restoration of morality in society, and a strong damental idea of European integration, the latest developments of emphasis on the defence of national sovereignty and cultural heritage the EU are definitely perceived negatively. e main critique is the (Pavlovský 2006: 54–55). lack of sovereignty in the EU and the lack of possibility to defend SRP’s aversion to that free market and the liberal economy is be- the national interest. e party opposed the negotiating of the Treaty cause the party views these as being antithetical to traditional values establishing a Constitution for Europe and its successor, the Lisbon and especially harmful for rural areas. ose activities whose goals Treaty (Pavlovský 2004). e recent integration process has failed to are centred on accumulation of profits and predatory competition, take account of Christian roots. e party also opposes Poland’s pos- commercializing and perverted consuming are defined by the party sible joining of the common currency, the Euro. Although the party as “evil activities”. SRP opposes globalization, especially the influence supports Polish membership in the EU, it calls for a renegotiation of of private capital and private banks. Most of the party’s voters were membership conditions more in favour of Poland. located in rural areas that were strongly impacted by the post-com- e party rejects any further Polish participation in foreign mili- munist transformation. e highest level of disillusion in these areas tary missions and further special relations with the USA. Self-defense was reached around the year 2000 (Breindl 2003). Not unexpectedly, is also opposed to the participation of Poland in the Iraq war and to therefore, the general dissatisfaction of voters resulted in the best elec- strong support for US positions in world politics, mostly because of tion result (10.3 %) for the party. a lack of gains for offering such support and/or cooperation (Kaniok 2007: 128–129). Tab. 21: Electoral performance of Selfdefense Election manifesto 2005 95 Elections 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 Votes 0.03 2.78 0.08 10.2 11.41 1.53 e manifesto mostly reacts to Poland’s early membership of the EU. Seats 0 0 0 53 56 0 e manifesto fulfils the populist precondition. e most important policy dimension is the focus on defending the national interest, Source: National Electoral Commission of Polish Republic 94 One of the reasons for this dramatic election loss was the founding of a new party that broke away from Self-defence. 93 In 2008 a Judge convicted Leper of sexually abusing a female colleague from the 95 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme party secretariat (aktualne.cz 2011). in the 2005. 164 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 165 national culture and national identity. e national emphasis follows Election manifesto 2007 96 on from the anti-liberal emphasis and opposition to globalization. is opposition is not principally caused by regional or agricultural e early election in 2007 did not bring about any significant change issues but in the defence of the national identity. in Self-defense’s policy agenda. e party maintained its anti-globali- e party’s strong anti-globalization agenda is directed to Wash- zation positions, together with the emphasis on national interest and ington as the “birthplace of globalization”. e key international or- identity. Although the discussion about the Lisbon Treaty arose, the ganizations do not consider the national sovereignty of their member election manifesto does not reflect this qualitative change at all. SRP states and that is also harmful for Poland. International capital flows primarily bases its manifesto on domestic policy issues and the inter- harm the Polish people too. nal erosion of the society. All citizens who want to rescue Poland must vote for Self-defense, e most important issues are the promotion of national identity, as the introductory motto of the manifesto has it, and this clearly national culture, the strengthening of national sovereignty and the corresponds to the national policy of the party. e party holds a rejection of the contemporary economic system. Self-defense argues negative attitude to the privatization of national (state) companies. All that the neoliberal economic system misuses Polish resources and important industrial sectors must be owned by Polish citizens or the does not bring any positive gains for Poland. Its support for the EU state. e party is against any further promotion of neoliberal theory is more in a practical and technical way. Although Self-defense pro- in the economy.International capital flows degrade Poland, just as motes an ambivalent attitude towards the EU, there are some issues the colony of transnational companies does too, and Poland is not where the party supports the EU line. able to defend its national interests. Poland should be shown greater SRP speaks for the stronger definition of citizens. For the state is respect from western countries. Self-defense supports a stronger na- important to reach the respect of its institutions by the citizens. is tional economy and national ownership of Polish companies, and at thesis refers to the economic policy. ere is a highly significant role the international level Poland should protect its economic interests. for state institutions or Polish companies, and therefore strong na- e focus on developing a universal goodness party is one of its basic tionalization of the Polish economy. le policy ideas. Its European policy is not in principle negative. SRP Self-defense of Polish Republic is a populist protest party with an demonstrates a positive attitude to European integration and also to unclear ideological definition. e most significant policy goal is the possible entry into monetary union. But the principle motivation is strengthening of national feeling and national identity. Significant for to ensure Polish national interests. e Euro must be gains bringing, the promoting of national interests is the rejection of the world liberal otherwise the party will not change its rather negative position. economic system, followed by the negative attitude to transnational In general, the party emphasizes national identity together with a companies. Although the party rejects European integration, in prin- call for rejecting the current liberal economic system. Linked to this ciple the party is not against integration. SRP supports the integration rejection, the party offers a new political and economic system called of sovereign states but not the creation of a deeper, supranational a “third way” – that is, neither liberalism nor socialism. Furthermore, institution. An interesting point is the requirement to renegotiate the the party wants to promote more the influence of the Catholic Church entry conditions of Poland into the EU in order to strengthen national in society. is is one of the possible ways in which to strengthen sovereignty and the national interest. national identity. On social issues, the party supports a moderate so- cial policy and better safeguarding of the poorest citizens. e party emphasizes the promotion of human rights not just domestically in 96 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme Poland but also in foreign policy. in the 2007. 166 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 167
The League of Polish Families Tab. 22: Electoral performance of LPR (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) Elections 2001 EP 2004 2005 2007 e party was founded shortly before the 2001 election and emerged Votes 7.87 15.92 7.91 1.3 as the sixth party in the Sejm having gained 7.9 % of the vote. Al- Seats 38 10 34 0 though the grouping represented itself as a regular political party, the League was registered only four months prior to the election as Source: National Electoral Commission of Polish Republic a formation of various national, right-populist and ultra-catholic groups: Catholic-National Movement, Polish Agreement and Na- e party wanted to push through constitutional reform and tional Party. e formation was led by Maciej and Roman Gietrych. remove all passages that go against Poland and Polish citizens and anks to cooperation with the ultra-national broadcaster Radio against Roman Catholic roots (Kupka, Laryš, Smolík 2009: 78). Fur- Maryja, the League was able to successfully reach out and speak ther policy goals are the rejection of legally based homosexual mar- to a radical nationalist, religious rightwing electorate that recruited riages and euthanasia, the limitation of foreign capital flows in Poland, from the previous right-national Solidarity formations (Szcerbiak national solidarity in economic issues and protectionism in trade. e 2008: 226). party promotes a strongly negative attitude to the privatizing of Polish e League’s first relevant election success was in the 2001 general companies and banks to foreign owners (Pavlovský 2006: 53–54). is election with an 8 % percent gain of the vote. e initial key role was should result in a strengthening of national identity and state sover- played by a Catholic priest, Tadeusz Rydzyk. He became a non-formal eignty. is kind of policy should strengthen national corporativism. ideological leader due to his connection with Radio Maryja (Kopeček Initially the party focused just on national religious issues. Before the 2005: 522). His influential role helped the League stay in the public in- 2005 election the League tried to develop its program across more formation mainstream – on the one hand in the influential national- policy areas (Hloušek 2005: 522). Catholic segment of society, and generally in the public eye thanks to On foreign policy issues the party rejected Poland’s membership his controversial activities. of the EU. Due to this being a non-achievable goal, the party evolved In the 2005 election the party repeated its previous good result this demand into the need for renegotiating the conditions of Polish and gained 8 % of the vote. In 2006 LPR established a coalition with membership of the EU. Naturally, the party opposed the adopting PiS and Self-defense, which resulted in the internal break-up of the of the Lisbon Treaty. e League also has a very negative attitude party. e basic reason for the party’s failure in the 2007 election was towards Germany and Russia.97 e EU is understood as an effective the ending of the proclaimed support of Radio Maryja and dissatis- German tool in its effort to exert control over Poland (Kaniok 2007: faction with the party’s governmental engagement with Self-defense, 128). e party was also opposed to the negotiations on the possible namely with Andrzej Lepper due to his sexual and corruption scan- location of the American rocket defence system (Hloušek, Kopeček dals (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 226–227). 2010: 227). e party puts a strong emphasis on national sovereignty that should be in close connection with the Catholic Church and gen- erally with the Christian tradition. Its ideological basis follows the traditional Christian-national party. 97 e party blames the Jews for causing the communist era in Poland (Breindl 2003). 168 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 169
Election manifesto 2005 98 openly very against any cooperation with these two strategic states. All key parts of the Polish energy sector (for example the transmission e manifesto strongly emphasizes Polish national interests and the system) must remain in state ownership. need to protect national identity and state sovereignty. is national e EU is a negative example of international cooperation; there- focus is evident across all policy dimensions. e issues of identity fore Poland must leave the EU. If this is not possible, the government are supplemented by an emphasis on the Catholic Church and its must renegotiate the membership conditions under the equality prin- role in society. e basis of the party’s economic policy is the call for ciple. e League puts emphasis on cooperation with Polish citizens self-sufficiency – in agriculture, industrial and human sources, the living abroad, including in the EU. Anti-globalization tendencies are natural conditions of the country and the politically self-sufficient an important part of the manifesto. Transnational companies ought and Europe-independent policy direction. to pay higher taxes and must be faced with more strict conditions on e important dimension of national identity is the morality of the their business. society. Moral grounds are based on Christian principles – the tradi- tional value principle. is emphasis should bring about a strong and Election manifesto 2007 99 independent nation. e support for the national culture positively affects the moral and ethical development of Poland. is must be e 2007 early election was a negative moment for the party because the basic step in reclaiming the traditional morality and prosperity of the deep loss of votes and the threat of marginalization. During of the Polish nation. the government period (2006)2007), the ideology of the party had All activities of the bureaucracy should bring benefits to the Polish developed in a more pragmatic fashion, though fundamentally it had state. is premise must be also used in foreign policy. anks to remained unchanged. this emphasis the Polish nation can avoid the negative influence of e strong emphasis on nation and national identity is fulfilled globalization and the liberalized free market. e transformation of by the accent on family values, regional development and agriculture the Polish economy was too liberal and the stated offered to transna- and general dissatisfaction with the fragmentation of society. e tional companies the possibility to “steal Poland”. is transformation party is the only party to promote a pure national policy with respect was followed by degradation of the nation. e negative influence of to the Catholic Church. e European policy is based on rejecting the globalization is clearly visible in Poland’s regions and their disinte- Lisbon Treaty, the common Euro currency and strengthening the po- gration. e erosion of traditional Polish families is another of the sition of the Polish language. e manifesto contains just four political features of negative liberal globalization. e state must ensure the points and is no longer than one page. conditions for the healthy development of Polish families in favour of e success of the League of the Polish families is caused by using a the Catholic Church and the state must also actively defend the insti- sophisticated policy which has a mixed focus on national identity and tute of the family. e emphasis on strong Polish regions is reflected (miss-)using the Catholic Church. Although the policies of the party in the agriculture policy. It means that Poland must be self-sufficient are very heterogeneous and internal cohesion is low, the national in agricultural products. and religious goal is very strong. e decline of the party was mainly Sovereignty and independence in foreign affairs can be secured by caused due to the loss of the protest party label and the general decline self-sufficiency in energy matters. ese issues must be understood in of strong national tendencies. e 2007 election loss experienced by case of problematic relations with Russia and Germany. e party is Self-defense is another example of the pragmatic policy shi.
98 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme 99 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2005. in the 2007. 170 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 171
Types of election manifestos produced to observe the wellbeing and survival of the nation. If needed, Poles by Polish political parties should even give their life to defend the nation and its values. So for the religious-nationalist type of electoral manifestos it is a definitional Aer close analysis of the manifestos of the relevant political parties feature to consider the nation as more than just a community of peo- and coalitions in Poland for the elections in 2005 and 2007, it is time ple who share the same history, language and cultural background. undertake another step and attempt to identify the relevant connec- e nation, in the view of the nationalist parties, defines its people, tions and relations between them. In turn this will serve as a basis for and not the other way around. dividing the manifestos into groups of similarly oriented documents. Now the question is how LPR and PPN addressed this unique and It should be kept in mind that this kind of division and generaliza- objective identity of the Polish nation. Both parties in their manifestos tion are made at the expense of absolute accuracy. In other words, the made clear that the most important element defining Poles and the fact that two parties or their manifestos are in the same group does Polish nation are Christian values. Christianity, in its Catholic version, not necessarily mean that these documents and parties have exactly was proclaimed to the most essential element for the identity of their the same beliefs. Rather we should understand these groups as rela- nation. tively loose categories which are held together by similar paradigms PPN even suggested entitling the holy Mary as the Queen of Po- rather than by similar policies or even ideologies. land. At this point we should again stress that for the parties of the In Poland we can identify four general manifesto types which dif- religious-nationalist category, the Christian identity and Catholic af- fer significantly one from the other when considering the electoral filiation of Poland is not just a historical accident but is rather a divine manifestos between 2005 and 2007. plan dating from the beginning of the world. rough Catholicism, Poland belongs to the wider, so-called Latin civilization which roughly Religious-nationalist type overlaps with western and central Europe. is is also the reason why both parties called for more Christian values in the European Union. e first group identified aer analysis of the manifestos of the Besides Christianity, which served as a spiritual content and basis, relevant Polish political parties is formed by the documents of the there were also other elements crucial to the definition of the Polish parties which centred their political message on two highly valued nation. e nationalist manifestos stressed that Polish soil is part of the elements: the nation and Catholicism. Two parties and their electoral Polish identity and it should never be in the hands of other nations, or documents fit the above-mentioned description: the League of Polish even foreign investors. Especially in the case of PPN there was anoth- Families and the Polish National Party. Both parties had a clear vision er feature which was defining for “Polishness” – for nationalists it was of Polish identity and they wanted to preserve this identity against the important to stress the Slavic origins and character of the Polish na- outside world. tion. is point of view stemmed the bond with other Slavic nations. Both parties and their three manifestos were thinking about na- Such emphasis on the moral value and the importance of Chris- tions as objective categories that have real materialization in the phys- tian values, and, consequently, of the Polish identity is the reason why ical world. Each and every nation has its own unique identity. is nationalist manifestos dedicated significant room to the evaluation identity is not understood as an object of outside forces that help to of threats which can possibly endanger these values. LPR and PPN shape it, and so to say construct it, but rather national identity is seen were very perceptive in this respect, and they identified the growing as a given and therefore its preservation is one of the most important demonstration of the progressing postmodern morality and its attack goals of the Polish state. But it is not just something for the state but on the essential Polish identity. Both parties refused to tolerate values also for every member of the nation who has the moral obligation alien to their perception of “Polishness”, for example homosexuality. 172 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 173
To combat these tendencies the nationalist manifestos called for more political parties and their manifestos belong in this category: Law and patriotism in national education, to enable teaching about Polish Justice and Self-defence. Despite many differences between the politi- achievements and heroism throughout history. Furthermore, educa- cal programs of these two parties, they share several premises which tion should contain Christian teaching and values. make them similar in their understanding of the nation, patriotism However this offensive of the new morality, that contradicted the and the outside world. Polish national identity, was promoted not just in the form of a sim- e first and most important aspect of the conservative-national- ple ideology but also via a subtle way of economic colonization and ist group of manifestos is their preoccupation with the power and commercialization of everyday life. LPR and PPN were concerned greatness of the Polish nation, its state and history. It is of great im- by the influence that foreign capital had gained in Poland, and both portance for these manifestos to underline the fact that Poland is one supported the restriction of foreign investment and also rather pro- of the big European nations, even powers – one which stood against tectionist economic policies. In this respect, it is interesting to note the Russian and German influence in central and Eastern Europe and shared hostility towards shopping malls. ey were seen as the killer paid for it. Consequently PiS and Self-defence criticized the logic of of Polish commerce and of family values. international politics that gives too much power and influence to the e electoral documents of the nationalist type tend to see con- great powers and lets other nations without a chance shape their own spirators against Christian and Polish values, and these conspirators fates. Poland needs to be respected by other countries and the great are mostly identified with the transnational and international organi- powers should deal with it as an equal. Poland should have stronger zations which were seen as the vehicles of the erosion of the Polish, influence on the EU and generally occupy a more powerful position and generally of all unique national identities. In this respect PPN and in international politics. its manifesto were much more radical than the manifestos of LPR. Poland as a state is an expression and result of the Polish national PNN was explicit in pointing to Jews and Zionism as one of the major movement – the historical aspirations and rights of the Polish nation forces behind the forces threatening Christianity, Poland and Polish which is the main raison d’être go Polish statehood. Poland should be identity. e EU was especially negatively perceived and criticized by the vehicle to carry the Polish national interest and also its defender. both parties. An important role for Poland was not just to take care of Poles at home e examined manifestos were strictly against further integration but also to negotiate and, if needed, assertively defend advantageous and they even called for secession from the EU. According to the living conditions abroad. For these reasons the conservative-national- parties involved, the European project served the interests of people ist manifestos stressed the need for a strong and capable state, able to ahead of those of the Polish nation. To counteract the influence of the defend itself and its interests. Furthermore, the crucial role of the state negatively perceived foreign forces, the nationalist documents tend in the life of the nation has consequences also for the members of that to stress the need for new alliances especially with the Slavic nations nation. ey should respect and be obedient to the state institutions. – these alliances should better fit the interests of the Polish nation. e authority of the state and also obligations towards the nation should be strengthened by governmental policies, especially through Conservative-nationalist type the educational system. According to the conservative-nationalist parties, patriotism is one of the basic values which should lead the In this type are Polish electoral manifestos which stressed the im- nation. e extensive role of the state and its authority is stressed portance of the protection of Poland’s national interest, its greatness strongly, especially by the Self-defence manifesto of 2005. and identity, but did not see the outside world as an imminent threat For conservative-nationalist parties, the Polish nation is the cen- and more importantly did not divine the origins of the nation. Two tral point of reference. Its identity and culture is for them of special 174 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 175 moral value. e Polish nation was shaped by its tragic history and its experience. ere is no divine plan or any ideal picture of the Polish strength, which has given birth to modern Poles and Poland should nation. be honoured. Part of this Polish identity is Christianity and its moral With this in mind we also have to point out that the liberal-nation- values which are personalized in John Paul II. ese values are part of alist manifestos praised patriotism as a very important value which the wider European civilization together with values such as freedom should be present in society. In contrast with the previous types, and human rights. All these values are today in danger of postmodern however, they did not suggest a use of public resources or even of revolution and Poland should defend them not just at home but also the educational system to strengthen national pride and patriotism in the EU. among children. Also patriotism was not the basis for an overly asser- In accordance with the above-mentioned principles of statism and tive foreign policy. Patriotism did not mean that there could not be European civilization, the state authority should be respected also by friendly and cooperative relations with neighbouring states. However, minorities and immigrants, while at the same time, in the opinion of unlike the parties of the liberal type, the liberal-nationalist parties the conservative-nationalist parties, minorities should enjoy the same stressed the need for the respectful and equal treatment of Poland by rights as enjoyed by members of the Polish majority, and their culture its foreign partners. and identity should also be protected. For PO and PSL, the EU was important for Poland especially be- cause Poland profited from its EU membership and approval of any Liberal-nationalist type further integration depended on whether it would be advantageous for Poland or not. is is not to say that liberal-nationalist parties were ree electoral documents form the third type of Polish manifestos. not pro-European in general terms, but that the degree of integration Both documents of Civic Platform and the 2007 electoral manifesto of the European club should be a question for pragmatic considera- of the Polish People’s Party represent the liberal-nationalist approach tion not of ideological directive. Similarly, when it comes to bilateral in understanding the Polish nation, its interests and relations with relations with Russia and Germany, there was no need to air historical other nations. ese three manifestos are attempting to somehow find grievances but rather to rely on unemotional diplomacy. a path between the essentialist approach of the previous two types Finally we should also mention that the manifestos of the national- and the relativistic approach of the following group. In 2007, PO and liberal type were much more dedicated to liberal values such as hu- PSL tried not to reject the idea of the importance of the heritage and man rights, equality, tolerance etc. e main reason for the existence culture of the Polish nation, but at the same time to be open and tol- of the state was to protect the rights and liberties of its citizens, and erant to otherness. therefore individuals were more important than the state. In this e notion of nation was important in the manifestos of both PO respect we can again notice a striking difference from the previous and PSL. ey oen referred to Polish identity which was shaped by groups that advocated much more for an active role of the state in the Christian values. However, we can clearly distinguish the liberal-na- society and especially in the shaping of its values. e national liberal tionalist from conservative-nationalist understanding of these terms. manifestos rejected this attitude. For the latter, the nation and its characteristics are of a transcendental and crucial value and this value has to be protected and conserved. Liberal type On the other hand, the former approach considers the nation to be a community of people who share a common language, history, culture e last group of Polish manifestos is composed of the electoral docu- and, to a certain extent, also values. e nation is a dynamic organ- ments of SLD from 2005 and LiD from 2007, so in fact we can say that ism which was put together by history and shaped by similar life the liberal category consisted also of other socialist parties besides 176 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES POLAND 177
SLD. However, to prove this claim one should analyze the documents Conclusion of the UP, SdPl and DS separately and not under the decisive influ- ence of SLD as it was in 2007. Let us now examine and define this last Polish political parties have proved to be stable in the way they ap- category of Polish manifestos. proach the topic of nationalism, national culture and relations with Liberal manifestos tend to neglect or even make no references to other countries. With only one exception the manifestos of the Polish the nation and its identity or culture. If there is a mentioned national parties from different elections fall into the same categories. Only the culture, it is not understood to be of a higher value than other cultures. PSL manifesto from 2007 broke with the 2005 manifesto and met the ere is no reason to assume that the heritage and culture of one conditions to be classified as a liberal-nationalist document. e sta- particular nation is of a higher value than that of any other national ble character of Polish parties in this respect is even more surprising culture. erefore liberal manifestos reject the falsification of history when one considers the similarities and common features of three out and of the nation’s achievements. of the four types in Poland. One would presuppose that this proximity e construction of national myths is, on the contrary, considered would results in more changes in the basic approach of the manifestos. to be dangerous because they feed unhealthy feelings of greatness and One reason for this can be seen in the fact that two elections took superiority, and this eventually leads to intolerance, xenophobia and place within the space of two years. racism. at is the reason why the parties of the liberal category call ree groups bearing the adjective nationalist share a common, for the demythologization of the national education. Similarly it is the more or less explicit perception of the Polish identity. e stress they agenda of the liberal manifestos to stress the need for the removal of put on it may differ, as too may the implications they drew from it, the Catholic Church’s influence in the school system in Poland and, fur- but nevertheless they in some form recognize its existence. e mani- thermore, to eliminate its decisive influence in the Polish political sys- festos of all three categories referred to the Christian tradition as well tem and society. e liberal type of manifestos is not explicitly against as its European identity, and finally to the heroic and tragic history religion but it rather prefers the secular organization of civil society. of Poland. None of this was present in the manifestos of the liberal For the manifestos of the fourth group it is typical to stress the parties. On the contrary, SLD denounced the artificial construction importance of human rights in the domestic legislation but also as of national myths. one of the main principles of the foreign policy of the country. Hand in hand with the human rights approach there are values such as tol- erance, openness, equality and anti-discrimination. All these are the principles which are considered by the socialist parties of the liberal group to be part of the European heritage. e liberal manifestos are in favour of the European project and even supportive of further European integration – for example, in the form of the European Constitutional Treaty. is positive approach towards the EU is part of a wider principle applied to foreign policy by the parties from the liberal category. Neighbouring countries are not considered to be a potential threat as they were in the past. Simi- larly, alien influences are not treated as negative forces which should be prevented from destroying the distinctively Polish culture. Poland should become better by isolating itself but rather by openness. SLOVAKIA 179
SLOVAKIA
Introduction to Slovak politics and the party system
e Slovak Republic came into existence in 1993 aer the so-called Velvet Divorce. However the formation of the distinctively modern Slovak party system preceded the birth of the separate Slovak state. is arrived in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union and com- munist regimes in central and Eastern Europe when democratic par- ties emerged aer 40 years of communist rule in Czechoslovakia. De- spite the fact that Czechoslovakia was one political entity, two rather separate party systems emerged in the two parts of the country – the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. ere were no parties suc- cessfully operating in both parts of Czechoslovakia. is virtual po- litical division can be illustrated by the existence of two separate civic movements during the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia – Civic Forum in the Czech part of the country, and Public Against Violence (Verejnosť proti násiliu, VPN) in the Slovak part. Public Against Violence was a wide political movement formed by the intellectual elite in the wake of the Velvet Revolution on the 20th of November 1989. It won first parliamentary elections in the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia but soon lost support aer the popular prime minister from VPN Vladimír Mečiar le the party.Along with his fol- lowers Mečiar formed Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS), which replaced VPN as the domi- nant political force in the Slovak Republic aer the 1992 elections. e first government in the Slovak part of the federation was formed by VPN which played the role of the senior partner in the coalition until the secession of Mečiar’s HZDS. e Christian-Democratic Move- ment (Kresťansko demokratické hnutie, KDH) was the second largest coalition party, and it occupied the post of the prime minister aer the split in VPN. e minor partner in the coalition was the small liberal-conservative Democratic Party (Demokratická Strana, DS). In addition to ĽS, the main opposition parties to HZDS were the Slovak 180 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 181
National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS), which declared its For their part the Hungarian minority parties merged into Party of intention to continue in the tradition of the historic Slovak National Hungarian Coalition (Strana maďarskej koalície, SMK). In 1998 six Party which was established in the nineteenth century as the main parties entered the National Council of the Slovak Republic. Despite representation of Slovak political demands within the Austro-Hun- the fact that HZDS won the elections, the majority government was garian Empire, and the transformed Communist Party of Slovakia, re- formed by the three opposition parties – SDK, SMK, SDĽ and the named as Party of the Democratic Le (Strana demokratickej ľavice, new Party of Civil Understanding (Strana občianskeho porozumenia, SDĽ). Besides these three parties there were three parties representing SOP). SNS was the sixth party which entered parliament (Kopeček Slovakia’s Hungarian minority: the Hungarian Christian-Democratic 2007: 106–109). Movement (Maďarské kresťansko demokratické hnutie, MKDH), Co- e period 1998–2002 is marked by divisions and splits in virtu- existence (Spolužitie) and the liberal Hungarian Independent Inicia- ally every parliamentary party except for SMK. Because it was formed tive (Maďarská nezávislá iniciatíva, MNI) (Kopeček 2006: 161–166). primarily as an electoral coalition division of SDK into several par- Aer the general elections of 1992, HZDS formed a minority gov- liamentary groups, this was anticipated by many. Besides the groups ernment which was supported by SNS and partly by SDĽ. Vladimír of the SDK founding parties – KDH, DS, Slovak Social-Democratic Mečiar became prime minister of the Slovak Republic for the second Party and Green Party – a new parliamentary group was formed and time. On the national level he held talks with his Czech counterpart a new party was simultaneously established consisting mainly of Václav Klaus about the future of Czechoslovakia which ended in the former KDH and DÚ members, including Prime Minister Mikuláš dissolution of the federation and the birth of the separate Czech Re- Dzurinda. is new Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (Sloven- public and Slovak Republic. Soon aer several prominent HZDS and ská demokratická a kresťanská únia, SDKÚ) became the central right SNS members of parliament broke away from the coalition majority wing party in Slovakia. and formed a new party – Democratic Union (Demokratická Únia, SDĽ also paid the price for entering a coalition dominated by DÚ). In cooperation with opposition parties – KDH, SDĽ, MKDH right wing parties. One of the most popular politicians of the coun- and Coexistence – DÚ formed a new provisional government which try, Róbert Fico, le the party in 1999 and established around him a led the country until the early elections of 1994. new centrist and protest party called Direction – ird Way (Smer In 1994 HZDS formed a coalition with SNS and the small com- – tretia cesta, Direction). Other politicians from SDĽ followed suit munist party Union of the Workers of Slovakia (Združenie robot- aer an internal struggle between conservative and reformist wings níkov Slovenska, ZRS). e opposition consisted of KDH, DÚ, SDĽ of the party. e reformist formed Social – Democratic Alternative and Hungarian minority parties. During the third premiership of (Sociálne – demokratická alternatíva, SDA). On the side of the op- Vladimír Mečiar between 1994 and 1998 political life and society be- position, major conflict arose in SNS between longtime chairman of came highly polarized. Mečiar and his government were oen accused the party Ján Slota and newly elected Anna Malíková-Belousovová. of authoritative practices and abuses of power. is polarization gave is led to the creation of Real Slovak National Party (Pravá sloven- birth to a new dominant cleavage in politics and even society which ská národná strana, PSNS). Both parties appealed to the same group was defined by one’s attitude towards Vladimír Mečiar. of voters and therefore a split of the votes of SNS has resulted in the It also led to the cooperation and integration of the opposition absence of either of them in the National Council since the elections political forces. e most important event in this respect was the of 2002 (Kopeček 2006: 198–202). establishment of Slovak Democratic Coalition (Slovenská demokrat- e general elections of 2002 brought to power the second govern- ická koalícia, SDK), consisting of KDH, DÚ, DS and two minor par- ment of Mikuláš Dzurinda of SDKÚ which formed a parliamentary ties – Slovak Social-Democratic Party and Green Party in Slovakia. majority with KDH, SMK and the new liberal Alliance of the New 182 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 183
Citizen (Aliancia nového občana, ANO). HZDS was again le in op- block which is dominated by the social-democratic Direction. SNS position together with Direction and, for the first time in democratic can be considered as part of this block because none of the right wing history, the Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunistická strana Slov- parties is willing to cooperate with it in coalition; on the other hand enska, KSS). During the term the ANO party disintegrated and several it seems to share the same social and nationalistic attitudes as Direc- members of parliament from SDKÚ broke away and established the tion. ĽS-HZDS stands somewhere between these two blocks. Between new party Free Forum. 2002 and 2006 it cooperated with the right wing coalition and was In spite of these events the right wing government managed to prepared to enter any possible government. At the same time Mečiar survive almost a full term and fell just half a year before the scheduled declared in 2010 that the best model of the government for Slovakia elections. However early elections in June 2006 delivered a clear vic- aer the general elections would be two party coalitions of Direction tory for Fico’s Direction which meanwhile turned into a self-avowed and ĽS-HZDS. social-democratic party. Fico chose to form his government with the Since our study focuses on the period aer accession to the EU reunited SNS and Mečiar’s HZDS. Due to the disintegration of liberal (from 2005 to 2010), the subjects of our study are the following par- right wing parties, the opposition consisted just of three former coali- ties: ĽS-HZDS, SDKÚ, Direction, KDH, SMK, ANO, KSS, SNS, SaS and tion parties – SDKÚ, KDH and SMK (Kopeček 2007b: 46–50). finally Most-Híd. However for the purpose of this study we should Four years later this relatively stable coalition was replaced again also examine some parties and movements which were not as po- by a right wing government. is change was facilitated by the elec- litically influential as the parliamentary parties but that have and are toral failure of ĽS-HZDS which obtained just 4.3 % of the votes and representing the most visible and radical nationalistic element in the for the first time in 20 years was not represented in the National political life of the country. In the case of Slovakia there are two such Council. At the same time the new liberal right wing party Freedom parties: People’s Party of Slovakia (Slovenská ľudová strana, SĽS) and and Solidarity (Sloboda a Solidarita, SaS) was successfully established People’s Party – Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana – Naše Slovensko, ĽSNS). and joined Iveta Radičova’s government of SDKÚ, KDH, SaS and Both parties took part in the general elections of 2006 and 2010. Most-Híd.100 Most-Híd is a party founded by splinters from SMK and led by its former chairman Béla Bugár aer SMK became dominated by a more radical wing led by new chairman Pál Csáky. SMK, similar Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS) to ĽS–HZDS, got only 4.3 % of the votes and did not enter parliament (Mesežnikov 2011b: 60–61). Slovak National Party claims to be the oldest Slovak political party, As can be seen, at least since the general elections of 2002 one can tracing its roots to the 19th century Slovak National Party. However identify two competing party blocks. e centre-right block consists this historical SNS was rather an honorary party representing all of SDKÚ, KDH, Hungarian minority party101 and a party representing political groups nationally self-defined as Slovak. Moreover, there is liberal right wing voters.102 On the other side there is a less consistent no traceable continuity among these two subjects from 1938 to 1990. With the exception of the period from 2002 to 2006, SNS was a per- 100 Most and híd mean ’bridge’ in Slovak and Hungarian respectively. manent parliamentary party. 101 SMK or Most-Híd. However it is necessary to stress that Most-Híd defines itself Since March 1990 when it was established, SNS has experienced rather as a party of cooperation of Slovaks, Hungarians and other minorities than several internal conflicts and secessions. Almost immediately aer exclusively a party of Hungarians in Slovakia. 102 ANO and SaS are two with parliamentary representation. Besides them there was the first general elections in 1990, Stanislav Pánis, a proponent of the the party Hope (Nádej) which was created aer the disintegration of ANO and acted ultra-nationalistic faction of SNS, le the party and formed the party as part of the ruling right wing coalition. Slovak National Unity (Slovenská národná jednota, SNJ). In 1993 a 184 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 185 struggle between the liberal and nationalistic wings of the party re- Election manifesto of 2006 103 sulted in the secession of the party leader Ľudovít Čermák and his followers and the election of a new chairman, Ján Slota. SNS was part Slovak National Party’s campaign and manifesto for the elections of of the majority in the two governments of Vladimír Mečiar from 1992 2006 were conducted under the slogan “We are Slovaks. For Slovaks to 1993 and from 1994 to 1998. Slovak government”. is slogan in and by itself captures the key no- tion and goal of SNS in 2006. e main purpose, stated several times Tab. 23: Electoral performance of SNS in their manifesto, was to establish a government composed only of Slovak political parties, meaning without any party representing Elections 1990 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 ethic minority interests, especially those of the Hungarian minority 104 Votes SNS 13.94 7.93 5.4 9.07 3.32 11.73 5.07 in Slovakia. e creation of this so called “Slovak government” was Votes PSNS 3.65 necessary, according to SNS, because Slovak national interests were in grave danger. Two principal sources of danger were identified by Seats 22 15 9 14 0 20 9 the SNS 2006 manifesto. Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic e first of these dangers was the threat of so-called Hungarian chauvinism and revisionism. In the view of SNS, Hungarian political Aer the elections pf 1998 SNS found itself in opposition and representation, either in Hungary or in neighbouring countries where many started to question the leadership of Ján Slota who was repeat- there is a significant Hungarian minority, is trying to change the bor- edly seen drunk in public. In 1999 Anna Malíková replaced Slota, ders established aer the First World War. is is driven by the so- becoming chairwoman of the party, and internal tension resulted in called Trianon trauma evident in Hungarian political representation the splitting of the party and the creation of Real Slovak National and society. In the view of SNS, Hungary has still not accepted the re- Party by Slota and his followers. Both parties shared a principal ide- sults of the first and second world wars and plans to regain its territo- ology and policies and so they competed against each other for the ries lost as a result of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. same electorate, resulting in an almost equal division of their votes in In this respect SNS accused Party of Hungarian Coalition of loyalty the general elections of 2002 and the first absence of the SNS in the and subordination to the Hungarian government, its leadership and National Council since 1990. goals. According to the SNS manifesto, both SMK and Budapest were Following this electoral defeat for both parties, SNS and PSNS guilty of infringement of Slovak laws and of the attempts to enforce again merged in 2003 with Slota as party chairman – in 2006 SNS extraterritorial Hungarian laws in Slovakia. In accordance with this gained 11 % of the votes and became the third biggest parliamentary view, SNS strongly condemns the secession of Kosovo from Serbia faction and, aer eight years, also part of the ruling coalition with and rejects any possibility to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state. Direction as the senior coalition partner and ĽS-HZDS as the junior is positioning is connected with the interpretation of minority partner. In the general elections of 2010 SNS lost more than half of policies conducted in the eight years of the first and second govern- its votes and with 5. 07 % barely entered the National Council. ese ments of Mikuláš Dzurinda. SNS suspected SMK and Hungary of the results were interpreted by Slota as a clear defeat. misinterpretation of minority rights in order to weaken the authority SNS was a member of the Union for the Europe of Nations political of Slovak laws in southern Slovakia. In this respect SNS stressed that group from 2002. From 2009 it contributed to the group’s strength in the European Parliament via its single deputy, Jaroslav Paška. 103 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2006. 104 As opposed to the governments which ruled Slovakia eight years before. 186 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 187 the concept of rights as such is not the problem. On the contrary its in southern Slovakia which attempted to make Hungarian culture manifesto explicitly expressed concerns about the rights of the smaller dominant in sovereign Slovak territory. To counter Hungarian influ- ethnic minorities. SNS suggests that eight years of SMK control over ence over the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the SNS manifesto on the minority rights agenda favoured Hungarians and disadvantaged several occasions emphasizes that every citizen should be obliged to others. Yet in this respect SNS claimed that the rights of the Roma speak Slovak. Second, a very negatively perceived process was globali- minority, the second largest minority in Slovakia, were sufficiently zation, which in the words of the manifesto creates easily malleable guaranteed and that they need no more affirmative action. cosmopolitan citizens that lack bonds to their families and nations. Concerning Roma, the SNS manifesto rejected the more radical To be fair, SNS did accept international cooperation and processes opinion that problems generally connected with this minority group which has led to peace among sovereign nations. What troubled SNS are of ethnic or racial origins. SNS expressed the opinion that issues were the liberalization, commercialization and dechristianization of concerning Roma settlements, unemployment etc. have rather social Europe which was destroying what they saw as the Latin-Slavic iden- than ethnic roots – this is also why there is no need for affirmative ac- tity of the Slovak nation. Not only was this a by product of globaliza- tion. However, SNS was not concerned just about the rights of smaller tion, but rather SNS understood these processes as intentionally de- minorities but also about the rights of the Slovak population in the signed by those who oppose Christianity or a nationalistic approach ethnically mixed territories. In short, SNS claimed that the execution to society. Similarly, multiculturalism was perceived. In the words of and misinterpretation of Hungarian minority rights harms and dis- the manifesto, the self-consciousness of the nation was being blunted criminates against ethnic Slovaks living in southern Slovakia. Similar by the influence of alien cultures. is is why, as a policy against terror- logic was applied to the issue of foreign Slovaks. For SNS too much ism and sectarianism, SNS proposed to tighten up the requirements attention was being paid to minorities in Slovakia and therefore the for the official recognition of religious communities and churches. government was neglecting the cultural life of foreign Slovaks. Furthermore, in other references to Islamic culture SNS called for the e second threat to the Slovak nation perceived by SNS and ex- full support of India against expansive Islam in central Asia. In order plicitly mentioned in its manifesto was more of a cultural character. to support and protect the cultural identity of the Slovak nation, SNS SNS was concerned by alien cultural influences which, it said, would emphasised the state promotion of patriotism and national pride. It eventually lead to a loss of the distinctively Slovak identity. In order also advocated Slovak ownership of the media in Slovakia. to better understand this danger we should first understand how the A further phenomenon which SNS considered to be putting Slo- nation is understood in the 2006 SNS manifesto. vak identity in danger was the continuing European integration and e nation is more than simply a summary of the citizens – it is an ‘Europe-ization’ of Slovak politics. SNS feared that any weakening of entity with its own, distinctive identity. Mankind, in the understand- the authority of the national state would lead to the harmonization of ing of SNS, is divided into nations which are primary functional enti- the cultures of the European nations. While in principle SNS praised ties. at is why the “nation state is the highest form of the national European cultural heritage and also admitted the contributions of life” and also the only guarantee of the survival of the nation. It is the European Union, it also advocated for a Europe of national states necessary to stress that the nation is a value itself and, therefore, the rather than one European nation. Also Europe, for SNS, was more loss of an identity or merger with another nation are considered to than the European Union. Much more than cooperation with coun- be morally unacceptable. tries of the EU, SNS also promoted alliance with the Slavic countries, is threat, as perceived by SNS, to the cultural identity of the Slo- especially with Russia. e coalition of Slavic countries should serve vak nation manifested itself in several related phenomena. e first of to counter the perceived Hungarian threat and to conserve the dis- these has already been mentioned above: assertive Hungarian policies tinctively Slavic identity of Slovakia. 188 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 189
To sum up the SNS manifesto for the general elections of 2006, Basin, members of SMK and Most-Híd were labelled as part of Hun- the nation is understood as the primary value of reference. How- garian politics and disloyal members of the Slovak parliament. To ever the nation is not defined by race or blood but rather by culture, face the real and immediate threat of Hungarian revisionism, SNS shared history and most importantly by language and values. In the called for an alliance with other ‘threatened’ countries, namely Serbia, view of the SNS manifesto of 2006, nation states are the most natural Croatia, Austria, Ukraine and Romania. organizational entities for people to live in. e main purpose of the In general SNS understood national minorities to be an integral nation state is to defend national identity from alien influences. SNS part of Slovak society. In the manifesto of 2010 Slovak cultural did not distinguish between the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and heritage was defined as the sum of the culture of Slovaks and the the Hungarian government in Budapest. Hungarian political repre- cultures of ethnic minorities. At the same time it is necessary to sentation as a whole is working against Slovak national interests, with point out that the Slovak Republic was considered by SNS to be the one goal: to reunite all the Hungarian population in central Europe national state of the Slovak nation and it exists fully and simply to in one country by annexation of at least some parts of Slovakia and serve the interests of the Slovak nation. In this respect SNS strongly other neighbouring countries. Slovakia is understood primarily as the emphasized the need for Slovak language education for children in nation state of the Slovak nation. erefore, while not denying the kindergartens, especially in ethnically mixed regions and for mem- concept of minority rights, SNS was very cautious in applying them. bers of minority groups. e manifesto also mentioned that the It considered minority rights to be granted by the state rather than state should provide broadcasting in the Slovak language in these being defined by some higher principle. regions. As we can see, minorities were respected but they should also be Election manifesto of 2010 105 prevented from expanding at the expense of the ethnically Slovak population. e SNS manifesto in 2010 also paid attention to the In 2010, and aer four years in the government, SNS entitled its elec- Roma minority and its specific social problems. e language of the tion manifesto ‘Politics of Continuity’. In the manifesto, SNS empha- manifesto explicitly attributed to the Roma minority several nega- sised several key issues concerning national identity, minorities and tive traits, for example their exploitation of the social welfare system. national interests. Roma public community service workers should be inspected. SNS e relationship between Slovakia on the one side and Hungary would apply a control mechanism to solve the problems of this mi- and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia on the other became once nority. Among other things, the state should establish special board- again the central topic of the manifesto. is time SNS emphasized the ing schools for Roma pupil, increase the police presence in Roma set- purposeful and systematic efforts of the Hungarian government for tlements and ghettos, and finally it should define the goal and educate the breakaway of southern Slovakia and its annexation by Hungary. a new generation of Roma intelligentsia. SNS accused Hungary of territorial, militant and political expansion- e ultimate goal of SNS was the protection of the distinctive Slo- ism which should face resistance. Dealing with the issue of Slovak- vak identity which SNS believed is based upon Christian and national Hungarian relations, the manifesto did not differentiate between the values. According to the SNS manifesto these values are the prerequi- representation of Slovak Hungarians and Hungary as a country. For sites of a successful and fulfilled life. On the other hand, globalization their presence within the Forum of the Deputies of the Carpathian and cosmopolitanism were seen as destructive to these true values. School education should, in the opinion of SNS, fight the negative 105 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme influences of commercialization and globalization and also actively in the 2010. promote patriotism, Christian values and national culture. e need 190 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 191 for this kind of education did not concern just the school system, but ĽS-HZDS was formed in April 1991 aer the internal conflict in rather it should influence all the citizens of the country. For example, the senior coalition party Public against Violence. e chairmanship athletes should be taught to be proud to represent the Slovak Repub- of the party withdrew its popular Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar lic. Facing the grave and immediate danger of Hungarian expansion- from office. As a consequence Mečiar and his followers le VPN and ism, it is necessary to strengthen the nation. Also, society should be formed the new party ĽS-HZDS. Mečiar has been the one and only prevented from moral decline. chairman of the party since then. In the subsequent general election, In its 2010 manifesto SNS also emphasized the need for economic ĽS-HZDS won with the landslide support of 37 % of voters. Due to the sovereignty and autarky, especially in the sectors of food produc- electoral system it took almost half of the seats in the National Council. tion and energy industry. SNS did not trust foreign capital and big Between the years 1992 and 1994 many prominent figures le ĽS- corporations, preferring Slovak companies instead. Concerning the HZDS, mostly because of the political style of its chairman Mečiar. European Union, SNS still advocated for a Europe of sovereign nation However, none of these defections harmed ĽS-HZDS considerably states and criticized the bureaucracy of the European institution. SNS and it managed to win the next elections. In 1994 ĽS-HZDS formed would cooperate with the countries of central and Eastern Europe. its second government and Vladimír Mečiar already his third. In the SNS advocated for the establishment of an organization of and further following years the coalition of ĽS-HZDS, SNS and the small Union cooperation between Slavic countries. of the Workers of Slovakia ruled Slovakia in a way which was consid- As we can see, SNS in its manifesto for the general elections of ered by many to be authoritative and Mečiar was accused of misuse 2010 defined the nation in terms of values and culture. It included of state power to curb the democratic process and of the attempt to ethnic minorities into the definition of national culture but still the influence elections. state is to serve Slovaks primarily as a nation. is approach can be discerned by the suggested treatment of the Roma minority in the Tab. 24: Electoral performance of ĽS-HZDS manifesto. Rather than speaking about helping this community, the manifesto calls for control of this ethnic group. Also very apparent Elections 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 is the polarized understanding of Slovak-Hungarian relations. SNS Votes 37.26 34.96 27 19.5 8.79 4.32 considers almost the entire community of the Hungarian minority in Seats 74 61 43 36 15 0 Slovakia to be disloyal to the country of their citizenship, and consid- ers them to be a ‘fih column’ of Hungarian revisionism. For SNS, Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic it is clear that Hungarian political representation is plotting against Slovak’s territorial integrity. In 1998 ĽS-HZDS again won the general election, but due to the wide coalition against its political style and methods it lost its coali- tion potential and ended up in opposition. e subsequent electoral People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia term was marked by internal conflict between Mečiar and his right (Ľudová strana – Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko ĽS-HZDS) hand Ivan Gašparovič, who then le the party with some of the most prominent members of the party. is development further weak- Movement for a Democratic Slovakia has been one of the most influ- ened ĽS-HZDS which lost almost 10 % in the next general election, ential political parties in the modern history of Slovakia. ĽS-HZDS and while still coming first in the election the party was clearly in won four of the six elections it took part in. However its gains con- decline. is trend was confirmed in the general election of 2006 tinuously and considerably fell from election to election. when Mečiar’s party polled just 9 % and became the second smallest 192 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 193 party represented in the National Council. At the same time, though, be as necessary as a guarantee of national interests, especially regard- the coalition potential and consequently the political relevance of the ing the above-mentioned sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the party grew and ĽS-HZDS became a junior partner in the coalition same time ĽS-HZDS in 2006 did not restrict national cultural heritage led by Direction. Four years later, however, ĽS-HZDS did not obtain to just Slovak culture but also included the cultural traditions of the enough votes and remained outside the parliament for the first time ethnic minorities. e civic principle is most visible in the guarantee in its history. of the protection and cultivation of the cultures of the minorities, Due to ĽS-HZDS’s unclear ideological profile, the party faced prob- but is also evident for example in the call for equal access to educa- lems in establishing ties with the transnational associations of parties tion. Both principles – national and civil – came into conflict when and even political groups within the European Parliament. For a long ĽS-HZDS stated that none of the above guarantees for the minorities time ĽS-HZDS aspired to membership of the group of the European should be the basis for discriminating against the majority or for a People’s Party-European Democrats, but it was rejected due to disa- threat to integrity. greement by the three other Slovak members of the group: SDKÚ- e national principle in the 2006 manifesto was clearly understood DS, KDH and SMK. Aer the European elections in 2009 the only as the primacy of the Slovak national interest, which however should elected deputy of ĽS-HZDS, Sergej Kozlík, became a member of the be followed in a manner in accordance with European standards of parliamentary group Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. protection for ethnic minorities. In this regard, it is very interesting to note the connection made by the manifesto between support for Election manifesto of 2006 106 minority cultures in Slovakia and support provided for Slovak com- munities in foreign countries. In the words used in its manifesto of e political manifesto of ĽS-HZDS in 2006 was built around three 2006, ĽS-HZDS would propose the monitoring and solidarization of pillars. Beside the social pillar, the third one in the manifesto, the first the symmetric development of both minorities in Slovakia and Slovak pillar was Christianity which should be based upon the tradition of minorities abroad. is entails that a higher level of minority protec- saints Cyril and Methodius. In this respect ĽS-HZDS also understood tion is in some way dependent upon the level of protection which is Slovak culture as part of the wider European cultural tradition. Chris- received by Slovak minorities in the countries. In this respect we can tian traditions, together with other values, were supposed to be the in practice see a symbiosis of the national and civic principle: the Eu- basis for the educational system. e second pillar of the manifesto ropean standard of minority rights protection should be guaranteed revolved around national and civic principles. e national principle by Slovakia to its minorities, yet higher standards should be earned. “rose from the fact that ĽS-HZDS is cofounder of the Slovak Repub- A significant part of the manifesto is dedicated to the so-called lic”. e civic principle is derived from the belief in tolerance and “Roma problem”. Issues concerning the living conditions of the Roma respect among all citizens. Further in the manifesto there are sections people were understood primarily as a social problem and due to this outlined in accordance with the first principle, others which follow characterisation social programs were supposed to solve the prob- the second principle and there is also a part where the two principles lem. In this respect all the relevant tools proposed by the manifesto are in tension. focused on education, employment and small entrepreneurship of the In its 2006 manifesto ĽS-HZDS is concerned with the sovereignty Roma people, and there is no cultural or traditional reference. and integrity of Slovakia. at is why it considered a national army to To sum up, the ĽS-HZDS manifesto for the general election of 2006 was dedicated to tolerance, openness and minority protection. ese 106 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme values were understood as basic European values which should be in the 2006. observed when dealing with minorities. At the same time, it is evident 194 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 195 that all of the above-mentioned principles are dependent upon the connection with higher criminality it was explicitly suggested that interests of the Slovak nation: minority rights are to be respected, as there was need for more policemen in Roma settlements. Regarding is expected from any modern European country, as far as they do not the Hungarian minority, ĽS-HZDS opposed cooperation between the threaten the Slovak character of the Slovak Republic or its territorial Hungarian political representation and Slovak Hungarian politicians. integrity. Furthermore, minority rights could serve as a tool in secur- ĽS-HZDS supported the distribution of Slovak education, books and ing Slovak minorities abroad. Finally, it is useful to stress that national magazines in order to strengthen national pride and patriotism, espe- interest and national principle are not understood in the primordial cially among foreign Slovaks. e Slovak language was to be granted sense of the word ‘national’ but rather as a cultural category. We can special protection in order to be the main means of communication. presume that that is also the reason behind the social program solu- National integration was also the reason for ĽS-HZDS strongly refus- tion for the so-called “Roma problem”. ing all kinds of racial and ethnic intolerance. e second tendency present in the ĽS-HZDS manifesto of 2010, Election manifesto of 2010 107 which could be interpreted as being opposed to the civic understand- ing of the nation, was a strong concern and almost fears of coopera- Aer four years in the ruling coalition, in its manifesto for the general tion between the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Hungarians election of 2010 ĽS-HZDS stood by its three pillars: social, national across the Danube. ĽS-HZDS opposed the activities and even the and Christian. Besides the spiritual value of the Christian faith for existence of the Forum of the Deputies of the Carpathian Basin. On individuals, it is also considered by ĽS-HZDS to be of cultural value several occasions the manifesto mentioned a refusal of any kind of for the Slovak nation and for every society, since “Christianity is a revisionism and questioning of the Trianon Treaty. Moreover, ĽS- symbol of an orderly society”, thus making it a condition of a civilized HZDS opposed not just territorial but any kind of autonomy for the country. ĽS-HZDS took credit for the founding of the Slovak Republic Hungarian minority. Finally, policies aimed at supporting specifically and again stressed its national character. In the 2010 manifesto there Slovak music and Slovak literature was a third tendency found in the is clearly less space dedicated to the civic principle, and much more manifesto, attesting to more of a nationalistic than a civic approach given to the protection of Slovakia and Slovak national interests. ĽS- from ĽS-HZDS in its 2010 manifesto. HZDS declared that it understood the Slovak nation to be a modern In 2010 ĽS-HZDS stressed the need for the defence of Slovakia, political nation and that it does not differentiate between citizens on but in principle it stuck to its understanding of the nation and its the bases of ethnicity. relation to the state and minorities from its 2006 election manifesto. At the same time, and in a way contradicting this, three simultane- ĽS-HZDS’s program of 2010 aimed at two main objectives. First, it ous tendencies within the 2010 manifesto are discernible. wanted to cut the political connection between the Hungarian mi- e first of these tendencies is an inclination towards national nority in Slovakia and Hungary because it was this connection which integration of rather than development of minority cultures. e was perceived as a threat to the integrity of Slovakia. Second, the manifesto openly called for integration of the Slovak nation. Re- manifesto called for the integration of the Slovak nation in order to garding the Roma population, ĽS-HZDS suggested that boarding solidify the Slovak character of the Slovak Republic. is accords with schools should be established specifically for Roma children in order the policy of the control of the Roma population and its integration to remove them from an insufficiently stimulating environment. In into Slovak society. In this respect, a major role is played by language and cultural policies. 107 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2010. 196 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 197
Direction – Social Democracy Tab. 25: Electoral performance of Direction-SD (Smer – sociálna demokracia) Elections 2002 EP 2004 2006 EP 2009 2010 Direction – ird Way was formed in 1999 by Robert Fico, the popu- Votes 13.46 16.89 29.14 32.01 34.79 lar figure of the then coalition Party of the Democratic Le. Fico le Seats 25 3 50 5 62 the party and also the parliamentary majority because of continuing corruption and an unfulfilled government program and promises. Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic Fico and his new party, which defined and positioned itself beyond the right-le dichotomy, quickly became very popular among voters Election manifesto of 2006 109 partly due to its protest appeal and its refusal of both Mečiar and the heterogeneous anti-Mečiar coalition. In the elections of 2002, Direc- e manifesto of Direction – Social Democracy for the 2006 elec- tion – ird Way took over the whole electorate of the SDĽ, and al- tion was less concerned with identity, minorities and the nation and though it gained fewer votes than the opinion polls had predicted, it more with social issues. Direction – SD emphasized the affiliation established itself as a relevant political force. Between 2002 and 2006, of Slovakia to Europe and its European tradition and values. On Direction – ird Way moved from the centre to the le of the politi- this point the 2006 manifesto of Direction – SD can be described as cal map. e reason for this move was simple – the recently formed pro-European. However it also called for a more open foreign policy government was composed of centre right parties which had no in- oriented not only towards the west but also to the east. In the words tention to cooperate with Direction, and at the same time besides the of the manifesto – a foreign policy oriented in all four directions. Communist party of Slovakia there was no relevant party represent- Related to distrust of foreign powers, Direction – SD stressed the ing the le in the National Council. importance of energy security and independence for Slovak national In 2004 Direction merged with most of the remaining le wing interests. parties108 in Slovakia and changed its name to Direction – Social De- In respect to minorities, the 2006 manifesto considers these groups mocracy. In the general election of 2006 Direction won with almost to be an integral part of Slovakia. As it states it, Slovak culture is a sum 30 percent of the votes and formed a coalition government with ĽS- of the cultures on the territory of Slovakia and that of foreign Slovaks. HZDS and SNS. During the first premiership of Róbert Fico, Direc- We can see thus that to be a member of the Slovak nation even with- tion – SD was criticized by the Party of the European Socialists for out Slovak citizenship constitutes a strong bond between the state and its decision to form a government with SNS, which was perceived as the foreign ethnic Slovak. e Manifesto of Direction – SD in 2006 an extreme right wing party. Furthermore relations with neighbour- addressed one minority group in particular: issues concerning the ing Hungary deteriorated due to several incidents in both countries. Roma people were referred to as problems associated with their “sta- Aer four years of being in government Direction – SD managed to tus in society”. Direction – SD would solve these problems by further improve its electoral gains and again won in 2010, this time with more integration of the Roma population into Slovak society. than 34 percent of the votes. In spite of this Direction – SD failed to In conclusion, the 2006 election manifesto of Direction – SD find enough partners to form a government and was forced into op- saw Slovakia as an independent country which should be regarded position. as such by other countries. A strong and confident foreign policy,
109 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme 108 Again, with the exception of KSS. in the 2006. 198 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 199 based on independence and sovereignty from any foreign power, was mention that for Direction – SD not to recognize the independence of a condition of Direction – SD. In this context we should also appreci- Kosovo was not just in accordance with international law but also an ate the emphasis laid down by the manifesto on the European identity indication n of a responsible political decision since its independence of Slovakia, as Europeanism was considered as essential to be modern, could be perceived as some sort of a pattern which could threaten prosperous and progressive. Slovakia in future. In this respect the manifesto also states that there friendly but also equal relations with neighbouring countries should Election manifesto of 2010 110 be established. e election manifesto of 2010 was also dedicated to the promo- e Direction – SD election manifesto of 2010 was marked by the ur- tion of the humanistic values of democracy and tolerance, and on gent task of defending the Slovak Republic from external threat. One the other hand to countering racism, intolerance, anti-Semitism, of the most central principles of the manifesto was interests defined discrimination and all kinds of xenophobia. In this spirit part of the as national and state. Contrary to the national interests, in its com- manifesto also deals with issues associated with marginalized Roma mon meaning for Direction – SD, it was necessary to stress both the people. Direction – SD discusses in its manifesto issues concerning national and state character of the interests and thus the underlining marginalized Roma communities, not the problem of the Roma pop- nationalistic approach to the state. ulation as a whole. However, when it came to the issue of nationalism, State interests whom were to be defended were the interests of the manifesto condemned only aggressive forms of nationalism. At the nation which constitutes the state. In the case of Slovakia it was the same time it praised patriotism and proposed education in the the Slovak nation. Nation and state interests had to be protected and context of national pride and also Christian traditions. National cul- foreign policy was the main tool in achieving this goal. e manifesto ture was considered by Direction – SD to be the basis of the identity thus called for the strengthening of the international status and posi- and of the spiritual life of the Slovak society, and therefore all students tion of the Slovak Republic, for example by securing positions and from elementary to university level should receive education in the functions for Slovak representatives in the international organizations spirit of national, historical and cultural values and tradition. us and their bodies. Again a great deal of importance was put on energy we can identify a clear distinction made by Direction – SD between security and diversification of energy sources. Similarly Direction desirable national pride and patriotism on the one hand and danger- – SD emphasized the need for the so-called intellectual security of ous aggressive nationalism on the other. the country. To sum up, in the 2010 election manifesto the nation is understood In order to pursue national and state interests, the manifesto as a basic political entity centred on a culturally defined Slovak nation. proposed to enter into strategic partnership with foreign countries Cultural and historical foundations of the nation should be protected which would guarantee the sovereignty and integrity of Slovakia, and cultivated by the nation state’s education system. However, this thus suggesting that these were not sufficiently guaranteed by exist- did not entail exclusion of minorities – on the contrary, while main- ing structures. Among these partnerships, specifically mentioned taining the foundations of the nation, minorities are to be respected were those beyond the European Union, especially with the Russian and they also should enjoy protection. As the manifesto puts it, na- Federation. A sense of potential danger was further strengthened by tional integrity should be strengthened by equal rights for all social the attitude towards the independence of Kosovo. It is important to citizenship. Foreign policy is also perceived as a tool which serves to protect the Slovak character of the Slovak Republic and the republic 110 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme itself. Direction – SD called for a cautious foreign policy which would in the 2010. be aware of the potential danger to the territorial integrity of the state. 200 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 201
is was also the reason for pursuing confident and pragmatic diplo- Tab. 26: Electoral performance of SaS macy in order to further guarantee the security of Slovak national and state interests. Elections EP 2009 2010 As can be seen, the political program of Direction – SD as ex- Votes 4.75 12.14 pressed in these above-mentioned election manifestos went through Seats 0 22 substantial transformation in the period 2006–2010. While in 2006 the manifesto was supportive of the integration of the Roma popula- Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic tion and was a supporter of the European Union and of European values in Slovakia, four years later the party emphasised other values more passionately: namely patriotism and national heritage. While Election manifesto of 2010 111 remaining a party that condemns racism, it also stressed the need for building national pride in order to be able to protect Slovakia and its SaS presented two tendencies in its 2010 manifesto. e first tendency Slovak identity from external threats. was dominated by social and internal issues addressed in the pro- gram; the second tendency is more related to analysis of the party’s foreign policy principles and goals. e latter tendency is represented Freedom and Solidarity (Sloboda a Solidarita, SaS) by SaS’s strong commitment to the principles of equality, tolerance, human rights, freedom and secularism. ese principles are almost e political party Freedom and Solidarity is relatively new in the omnipresent in the manifesto – the party supports the legalization of Slovak party system. e party was founded by economist Richard gay marriage and some kinds of so drugs. It strongly opposes any Sulík and some other entrepreneurs and economists mainly from Bra- church involvement in public affairs and proposes the fiscal separa- tislava. Sulík served as an advisor fewer than two ministers of finance tion of the state and churches. In the manifesto there are no references from both the right wing government of Mikuláš Dzurinda and the to the Slovak nation. Clearly the target audience of the manifesto is centre le government of Róbert Fico. Sulík was the main designer of intended to be citizens of the Slovak Republic rather than members the Slovak pension system reform and thus active in some capacity in of the Slovak nation. politics before founding SaS. SaS also chose a similar approach vis-a-vis the Roma minority e new party was established in 2009, in time to take part in the and the so-called “Roma problem”. e manifesto did not address European elections of the same year. SaS gained almost five percent any problems associated with the Roma population and rather of the votes. Although the result was not enough to enter the Euro- spoke about the problem of Socially Excluded Communities. SaS pean Parliament, many including Sulík considered these results to acknowledged that most of the members of these communities are be fairly good. Before the general election of 2010 SaS persistently Roma, but it refuses to make a direct link between Roma identity criticized Fico’s government and refused to enter any potential coali- and membership in the Socially Excluded Community. e mani- tion with Direction – SD. Following the general election SaS man- festo draws a connection between state policies towards excluded aged to enter parliament, even becoming the third largest party communities and their present social status and situation. When it with more than twelve percent of the popular vote. SaS also became mentioned Roma population as an ethic group it was when refer- part of the newly formed government led by Iveta Radičová from ring to the discrimination of Roma children in the school system. It SDKÚ – DS. 111 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2010. 202 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 203 recognized the problem of the over-representation of Roma pupils modate the different values and lifestyles of its citizens. For SaS in schools for mentally defective children. On this issue SaS strongly the state was more a service providing institution for its citizens opposed Roma segregation and suggested policies which aim at rather than a historical fulfillment of the Slovak national aspirations. non-discriminatory practices in the classification of pupils’ mental e role of state, as seen by SaS, was to guarantee the liberty of its capacities. citizens from any threat, be it clericalism, nationalism, or foreign In general, openness and tolerance were also present in the part countries. of the SaS manifesto dealing with foreign policy. SaS praised open- ness to the outside world. In respect to the tensions between Slovakia and its southern neighbour Hungary, SaS called for de-politicization Alliance of the New Citizen of the disputes and a shi in dealing with them to a more unemo- (Aliance nového obcana, ANO) tional and practical atmosphere. Hungary was considered by SaS to be Slovakia’s nearest ally together with the Czech Republic and Po- e liberal Alliance of the New Citizen was registered by the Slovak land, and deterioration of these mutual relations was considered to Ministry of Interior in May 2001. e party was closely connected be the work of populists in both countries. e manifesto also called with the Markíza TV channel, owned by businessman Pavol Rusko for the respecting of minority rights and their improvement on both who actually became the first chairman of the party. Other person- sides of the Slovak-Hungarian border. Finally SaS highly valued the alities working at the channel became prominent members of the international engagement of the Slovak Republic. Slovakia should party’s leadership – including among others Ľubomír Lintner and take on responsibility for international peace and stability through Eva Černá. international development cooperation and participation in foreign ANO was formed a year and a half before the 2002 general elec- peacekeeping missions. tion, with the only purpose being to succeed and enter the National However, in spite of all of the above-mentioned, there is a clear Council. In 2002 the party proved to be a successful project when it tendency of the SaS manifesto towards scepticism in international gained a little more than eight percent of the votes and became part of cooperation, especially related to the European project. While sup- the centre-right coalition together with SDKÚ – DS, KDH and SMK. porting Slovak membership in the European Union, SaS also cau- Participation in the government, however, brought a series of scan- tiously approached any further integration into the Union. Each step dals which resulted in the departure of several prominent politicians towards further transfer of competencies from the states to the Union from the party. is development led to defeat in the 2004 European is to be conditioned by approval of the National Council. Beyond this, elections in which ANO acquired slightly less than the required five not everything derived from the European Union was considered to percent threshold and failed to enter the European parliament. Before have a positive effect on Slovak society. In this respect we should the general election of 2006 there remained just a few people from also interpret the party’s cautious approach towards Turkey and the original party leadership and ANO competed with several liberal its membership in the European Union. SaS refused full member- rightwing formations, one of which was formed by deserters from ship and instead advocated a privileged partnership for the Islamic ANO. ese circumstances led to yet another electoral defeat in 2006 country. and thus the party’s absence from the National Council. From 2007 In conclusion we can say that the SaS party gave preference to the chairman of the party was Róbert Nemcsics, however the party liberty and tolerance, the two main values transcending its election did not participate in the subsequent European elections of 2009 and manifesto. For SaS the Slovak Republic was not the nation state of the general election of 2010. the Slovaks. Rather the party saw the role of state to be to accom- 204 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 205
Tab. 27: Electoral performance of ANO Most – Híd (Bridge, Most – Híd)
Elections 2002 EP 2004 2006 e official name of the party Most – Híd consists of the Slovak and Votes 8.01 4.65 1.42 Hungarian words for bridge. It was formed in 2009 by Béla Bugár and Seats 74 0 0 other politicians defecting from the Party of the Hungarian Coalition. Bugár served as a chairman of the SMK – MKP for almost ten years Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic from 1998 to 2007. In 2007 he lost intra-party elections to Pál Csáky who represented the more radical platform of the party. Aer several conflicts with the party’s new leadership, Bugár le SMK – MKP and Election manifesto of 2006 112 together with his followers and some intellectuals of Slovak national- ity founded Most – Híd. In contrast to SMK – MKP, this new party e political program of ANO for the 2006 general election is clearly was supposed to be a platform of cooperation for all citizens of the a liberal document with minimum appeals to national feelings. ANO Slovak Republic regardless of their nationality. From its beginnings, was strongly committed to human rights and tolerance. ANO rejects the party was accused by some politicians of the right wing opposi- not only racism and xenophobia but also nationalism as a concept. tion to be the fih column of the Direction – Social Democracy party. ANO stressed anti-nationalism and explicitly valued individuals However when it became more probable that Most – Híd will succeed over the state. e state is in this meaning understood as a service SMK as main representative of the Hungarian minority other right organization for the citizenry. It should pursue the common good wing political parties changed their rhetoric. for all citizens of the state without regard to their ethnicity. Similarly ANO detached itself from arbitral Christian morality and supported Election manifesto of 2010 113 typically liberal issues such as the rights of sexual minorities, and specifically civil union for same-sex couples. e Most – Híd party manifesto for the general election of 2010 was is opposition towards a nationally defined state does not mean carefully written in order to represent a program of cooperation that ANO completely omitted nationally specific references. On the and tolerance among Slovakia’s citizens, including minority groups. contrary, its manifesto mentioned Milan Rastislav Štefánik, the first In the Most – Híd manifesto of 2010 tolerance and minority rights Czechoslovak Minister of War and one of the most popular Slovak enjoyed special importance and relevance. It was also stressed in politicians, it supported the use of tourism as a way to promote the the document that there is not just one minority in Slovakia, but Slovak Republic abroad and it called for an active foreign policy in rather many of them, and that attention should be paid to each and order to support Slovak exports and to protect Slovak energy security. every one. In respect to the European Union, ANO was a strong supporter of Of course Most – Híd could not ignore the issue of Slovak-Hun- further integration, especially the adoption of the common European garian relations, and its manifesto fully addressed this topic. Instead of currency. ANO was also open towards immigration and towards reciprocal attacks and tensions, it proposed true cooperation between Hungary, which it considered to be a good neighbour rather than a the two countries in order to solve their disputes. Both should focus threat to national sovereignty. on the well being of Hungarian and Slovak minorities in their respec-
112 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme 113 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2006. in the 2010. 206 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 207 tive countries. In this respect we should also understand the support Tab. 28: Electoral performance of SMK of the Most – Híd party for decentralization and regionalization. Elections 1998 2002 EP 2004 2006 EP 2009 2010 Votes 9.12 11.2 13.24 11.68 11.33 4.33 Party of the Hungarian Coalition Seats 15 20 2 20 2 0 (Strana maďarskej koalície – Magyar Koalíció Pártja, SMK) Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic e Party of the Hungarian Coalition was formed before the general election of 1998 in response to the amended election law which made In 2007 Béla Bugár was replaced as party chairman by his long- the candidacy of coalitions of parties in elections pointless114. SMK time deputy Pál Csáky. Csáky represented the more nationalistic wing was formed by three parties representing the Hungarian minority in of the party, oen connected with the former leader of Coexistence, Slovakia: the Hungarian Christian-Democratic Movement, Coexist- Miklós Duray. Aer two years of internal struggle, Bugár together ence and the Hungarian Civic Party. By 1998, these three parties had with his supporters le SMK and formed the Most – Híd party. is cooperated together for six years already, and therefore they had no secession had decisive consequences for the party. In the 2010 general problem to adjust to the new circumstances and to merge into one election most of the Hungarian votes were taken by Most – Híd and party. e chairman of the Hungarian Christian-Democratic Move- SMK, with 4.33 percent of the vote, for the first time in twelve years ment, Béla Bugár, became the leader of the new party. failed to even enter the National Council. SMK has proved to be the most stable party on the Slovak political scene for almost ten years. Not only has it kept all internal struggles Election manifesto of 2006 115 private and none of the prominent members of the party have le, SMK has also managed to have very stable election results. It gained As would be expected, the election manifesto of SMK is focused on 10.2 percent of the votes in the 1998 general election and became the protection of minorities and of their rights in Slovakia. e Hun- part of the so-called anti-Mečiar coalition. In 2000 SMK was accepted garian minority was at the centre of the manifesto but it did not make into the European People’s Party as a full member. e stability of a difference between Hungarian and other minorities in respect of the party and its performance was proved in the general election their rights. SMK called for the strengthening of ethnic minorities in of 2002 when it got more than 11 percent of the votes and entered Slovakia and for the protection of their cultural heritage. It strongly the centre-right coalition for the second time. SMK achieved great opposed any type of discrimination. To achieve this manifesto sug- success in the first European elections in Slovakia in 2004 when it gested better institutional arrangements to articulate minority in- gained 13.24 percent of the votes and two seats. In 2006 SMK again terests in the government. Among other things, an ombudsman for got 11.7 percent of the votes but this time went into opposition, while minorities and a special agency dealing with their problems were Slovak National Party formed a coalition with Direction – Social considered. An important part of the SMK manifesto of 2006 was Democracy. the proposed establishment of a Hungarian university which should be part of the minority educational system and would be set up to protect their language and culture. For SMK cultural diversity was of 114 e amendment set up a threshold for entering the National Council of the Slovak Republic of ten percent of the popular vote for coalitions of two parties, 15 percent of the vote for coalitions of three parties etc, thus leaving the electoral coalition meaning- 115 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme less since the threshold for a single party was five percent. in the 2006. 208 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 209 true value. Similarly, broadcasting should be available in the Hungar- nation legislation. All of these tools should serve to empower the ian language. In accordance with its minority focus, SMK also put Roma population and to integrate it into the majority society. emphasis on the issue of decentralization and the support and devel- As regards foreign policy, SMK remained in favour of the Euro- opment of the Slovak regions, with particular emphasis on southern pean project. e manifesto of 2010 praised both the integration and Slovakia. enlargement of the European Union. SMK called for cooperation SMK was a strong supporter of Slovakia’s European membership between Slovakia and Hungary and for the further improvement of and its further integration into the Union. Especially important in their relations. Membership of and integration into the Union were this regard was the Euro, the common European currency, which ac- two of the major means for achieving this goal. is was also seen as cording to the manifesto should be adopted by Slovakia as early as helpful in uniting those Hungarians once separated by the border. possible. e manifesto also supported Turkey’s admission into the As can be seen, SMK made some important shis in the presenta- European Union. tion of its program between 2006 and 2010. While in both manifestos SMK stressed the need for protection of minorities and their cultural Election manifesto of 2010 116 heritage, in 2010 we can also observe a more assertive attitude to- wards this goal. is assertiveness stemmed from the increasingly e SMK manifesto for the general election of 2010 is in many re- keenly felt fear of cultural assimilation of the Hungarian minority spects similar to the one from 2006. However there is also a clear and in Slovakia. visible change in perspective. While in 2006 SMK considered that Hungarian and minority interests in general ought to be observed, by 2010 the overall situation of Hungarians in Slovakia was viewed not Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – as positively as previously. We should note that the manifesto of 2006 Democratic Party (Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská is concerned with discrimination against the Hungarian community únia – Demokratická strana, SDKÚ-DS) in Slovakia. SMK warns against assimilation of the minorities into the Slovak majority. In this respect SMK stressed the need for free use of e Slovak Democratic and Christian Union was formed in 2000 as a the mother tongue for all citizens. Hungarian identity is still a very response to an internal struggle in the Slovak Democratic Coalition, visible element of the 2010 manifesto. SMK called for the organization a party established as an electoral coalition of five parties in 1997. of Hungarian interests, for example in the form of youth organization, Christian-Democratic Movement, Democratic Union, Democratic media or a Hungarian university. In order to strengthen Hungarian Party, Social-Democratic Party of Slovakia and Green Party in Slova- identity SMK also supported closer ties with Hungary. is goal was kia formed this coalition before the general election of 1998, however to be achieved by cross border cooperation and the connection of the due to a new amendment to the electoral law they would need to Slovak and Hungarian public road systems. get 25 percent of the votes to enter the National Council. is was e manifesto of 2010 addressed not just Hungarians but also the the reason why they took part in the establishment of the new party second biggest minority group: Roma. For SMK, Roma people should SDK. SDK competed in the election instead of the five parties, and the be integrated into the majority population. is should be achieved entire membership of the new party was comprised of the leaders and through special adjusted programs for Roma as well as anti-discrimi- politicians of the five coalition parties. SDK succeeded and aer the election led as a senior partner the wide, so-called anti-Mečiar coali- 116 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme tion. During 1999 and 2000, the leadership of the SDK, under Mikuláš in the 2010. Dzurinda and Ivan Šimko (originally from KDH), pushed for further 210 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 211 integration of the right wing parties in SDK. However, these attempts In the 2006 general election SDKÚ managed to get 18.35 percent met with resistance from the original parties, especially in KDH and of the vote, but this result was not enough to prevent the formation DS. Due to these tensions, Dzurinda and Šimko le the SDK project, of the first government of Róbert Fico from Smer – SD in which and together with the reformist wing of KDH and a significant part SDKÚ was not represented. In the same year the smaller DS merged of DÚ formed SDKÚ.117 with SDKÚ, changing its name to SDKÚ-DS. Between 2006 and 2010 An internal struggle in the main government party SDK did not SDKÚ-DS went through several smaller internal divisions and rup- result in a serious weakening of the coalition and it survived for a tures, ending most notably with the dissolution of the whole Bratisla- full term until the general election of 2002. In this election SDKÚ va regional organization of the party. Alongside this development the proved to be a successful project, gaining more than 15 percent and party also experienced a rise in the popularity of the former Minister overall second place. SDKÚ formed a coalition with other centre of Social Affairs, Iveta Radičová, who joined SDKÚ-DS in 2006. In right parties and Dzurinda formed his second government. In 2003 2009 Radičová run for the presidency with the support of most of the conflict in SDKÚ arose as a result of the so-called ‘small group’ af- right wing parties. Competing against the incumbent Ivan Gašparovič fair. Internal strife led to the formation of a platform inside the party in the second round, she lost, gaining 44.47 percent of the votes. Sub- and subsequently the separate party Free Forum. Several prominent sequently she became the electoral leader of SDKÚ-DS in the general figures of SDKÚ le the party, among them Ivan Šimko and Zuzana election of 2010 in which SDKÚ-DS proved to be the strongest right Martináková118. SDKÚ lost seven members of parliament but the wing party with 15.42 percent of the vote. Aer the election Radičová coalition survived for almost the whole term until 2006. In 2004 and became the first female prime minister of Slovakia, leading the centre 2005 two important elections took place. In the European Parliament right coalition of SDKÚ-DS, SaS, KDH and Most-Híd (Mesežnikov election SDKÚ notched up its biggest electoral success when it came 2011b: 60–61). first in the race with more than 17 percent of the vote. However a year later the party suffered a significant defeat in the presiden- Election manifesto of 2006 119 tial race when its nominee – the Minister of Foreign Affairs – did not even proceed into the second round of the election (Kopeček e political program of SDKÚ for the election of 2006 referred spo- 2007: 388–392). radically to national bases of interest or concerns. e manifesto of 2006 addressed national culture and identity when they are in con- Tab. 29: Electoral performance of SDKÚ-DS nection with cultural policies. SDKÚ however did not understand national culture as the heritage of the Slovaks as a narrowly defined Elections 2002 EP 2004 2006 EP 1999 2010 community. Rather it meant culture produced by the people of Slo- Votes 15.09 17.09 18.35 16.98 15.42 vakia, of Slovak origin in the territorial sense of the word. Slovakia as Seats 27 3 31 2 28 a state of all citizens was valued by the manifesto. at is why SDKÚ emphasised the positive image of the country abroad. e reception Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic of Slovakia abroad should be shaped by both the presentation of cul- tural heritage and, more importantly, by responsible and active per- formance on the international stage. In this respect SDKÚ supported 117 In 2000 the small political grouping Union of the Contractors, Entrepreneurs and Farmers also merged with SDKÚ. 118 Subsequently in 2004 Šimko was also ousted from Free Forum and he went on to 119 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme establish the marginal Christian party Mission 21 – New Christian Democracy. in the 2006. 212 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 213 the involvement of the Slovak Republic in the operations of NATO. language. Regarding Slovak-Hungarian tensions, the manifesto stated Slovakia should be considered as a reliable and responsible ally. e that there is no real conflict between the two nations but rather arti- manifesto drew a similar conclusion vis-a-vis the European Union. ficial problems invented by those who wish to profit from them. As in SDKÚ supported integration of the Union and adoption of the com- 2006, the manifesto of 2010 maintained its liberal approach towards mon European currency. society. SDKÚ-DS stressed the importance of equality, individualism In general terms the manifesto emphasized respect for human and the development of civil society. It also remained a strong sup- rights and it valued tolerance and individualism. ese principles porter of European integration and Slovakia’s reliable involvement in were mirrored in the call for equality of all citizens and in condemna- NATO activities. tion of the social exclusion and segregation of the Roma population. e manifesto put a high value on civil society based upon individu- alistic and active citizens. According to SDKÚ, Slovak foreign policy Christian-Democratic Movement should be concerned with human rights in the developing world and (Krestansko-demokraticke hnuti, KDH) should not neglect them. Christian-Democratic Movement was formed in the wake of the Election manifesto of 2010 120 Velvet Revolution by dissidents and other elements of the Catholic anti-communist opposition in Slovakia. In the first free elections in In 2010 SDKÚ-DS presented a manifesto which addressed the issue Czechoslovakia in 1990 KDH received almost one fih of the votes in of national culture in greater length than was done in 2006. Slovak the Slovak part of the Federation. KDH joined the coalition govern- cultural heritage should not just be supported but it was connected ments both on the level of the Republic and also on the federal level. with national pride and, moreover, with patriotism. Similarly the e Government of the Slovak Republic formed with the winning manifesto praised the protection of the Slovak environment. How- VPN and DS and government of the Federation with Civic Forum, ever this greater emphasis on the cultivation of Slovak culture and the winner of the elections in the Czech Republic. environment was still described in the wider terms of Slovakia as a In 1991 internal struggle in the senior coalition partner VPN led to community of all its citizens. It is also important to mention that not the division of the party, and in order to secure the continuation of the only was more space dedicated to cultural policies and protection, it coalition VPN offered the post of prime minister to KDH’s chairman, was similarly given to policies related to minorities and the relation Ján Čarnogurský. In the 1992 general election KDH suffered great between the majority population and minorities. losses, gaining just 8.9 percent of the vote. Its coalition partners fared e manifesto of 2010 addressed Roma issues and called for prag- even worse and failed to enter the National Council. Following the matic and responsible solutions in contrast with more populist calls. election victory of HZDS, KDH went into opposition where it stayed ere is no simple way in which to deal with the complex problem of until Mečiar’s first government fell in 1994. In 1994 KDH, together the social exclusion of the Roma, but it should be achieved through with other opposition forces, formed a provisional government which education and motivation. SDKÚ-DS was also concerned with the led Slovakia until the 1994 general election. At this election, however, future of the diminishing Ruthenian minority in the north-east of the the dominance of the HZDS and its partners was again evidenced. In country and supported programs aimed at protecting the Ruthenian the increasingly tense political atmosphere stretching from 1994 to 1998, KDH played the role of the central opposition party (Kopeček 120 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme 2007: 305–314). in the 2010. 214 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 215
Tab. 30: Electoral performance of KDH Election manifesto of 2006 122
Elections 1990 1992 1994 1998121 2002 2006 2010 e political program of the Christian-Democrats for the general Votes 19.21 8.89 10.08 26.33 8.25 8.31 8.52 election of 2006 was built around the idea of a sovereign, independent Seats 31 18 17 42 15 14 15 and responsible state. While Slovakia should be part of the European Union and also an active member of NATO, these affiliations should Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic not limit the range of powers and tools which the Slovak government is able to use in cases where it has to deal with important issues or Before the election of 1998 KDH joined forces with other opposi- crises. For this reason KDH rejected the idea of a centralized Euro- tion parties from both the right and the le of the political spectrum pean Union and any future attempts to harmonize the tax policies and formed the political party Slovak Democratic Coalition. e of the European countries. Furthermore, KDH strongly opposed the leader of SDK was prominent KDH figure Mikuláš Dzurinda. In the possible recognition of an independent Kosovo. explosive election that followed, the parties of the anti-Mečiar op- KDH regarded the Slovak nation as a community of common Chris- position succeeded in keeping HZDS and SNS from power. However, tian culture and shared life experiences. For the party the ethnicity of shortly aer the formation of the government disagreement arose in citizens was not important, nor was the specific national culture he em- SDK between those who preferred to fully integrate the original par- braces or the language he is speaking. Of more importance is whether ties into SDK and those who insisted on the autonomy of the original he shares the wider cultural heritage of Christian civilization or if he is parties of the Coalition. is conflict was resolved when Dzurinda ready to embrace and accept this paradigm. From this attitude towards and his followers le KDH and formed the new party SDKÚ. is cultural differences were derived policies that the manifesto was advo- internal struggle within the main government party did not bring cating for. is is the case in particular for asylum policies: KDH called about its fall, and both parties – SDKÚ and KDH – stayed as part of for cautious asylum inquiries in order to prevent misuse of this institute. the coalition (Kopeček 2006: 199). Christianity also played an important role in the KDH message. It praised In the general election of 2002 KDH failed to maintain its posi- Andrej Hlinka, the Christian autonomist politician from the interwar tion as the strongest right wing party when it picked up just 8.25 era. However, while preferring a similar cultural background and Chris- percent of the vote, half as many as SDKÚ. Both parties, together tian values, KDH also stressed the need for equality, freedom and au- with SMK and ANO, formed the government. Aer several conflicts tonomy of all citizens. So, one can conclude that the examined manifesto with its coalition partners, KDH finally le the coalition six months did not try to impose Christian values on society as a whole but rather before the scheduled election in 2006. e 2006 election was won emphasised their importance and relevance even in the modern era. by Smer – SD which chose as its coalition partners HZDS and SNS, thus consigning KDH to opposition. However the right wing parties Election manifesto of 2010 123 – including the Christian-Democrats – returned to power four years later (Mesežnikov 2011b: 60–61). e KDH manifesto from 2010 was, just as four years previously, concerned with the independence and sovereignty of the Slovak
122 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme 121 In 1998 general elections KDH run in coalition with other opposition parties and in the 2006. therefore the result of these coalition is certainly not representative in respect of the 123 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme support of the KDH. in the 2010. 216 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 217
Republic. e European Union was considered to be of great im- Tab. 31: Electoral performance of SĽS portance for Slovakia. However, while acknowledging this, KDH also stressed that while seen as the only option the Union should be Elections 1998 2002 EP 2004 2006 still approached cautiously and the state should have control over its Votes 0.27 0.02 0.16 0.16 future perspectives. In this respect KDH supported the principle of Seats 0 0 0 0 subsidiary and unanimity in key issues such as foreign policy of the Union. Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic In its 2010 manifesto KDH emphasized that Slovak society should be built on the principles of tolerance, equality and respect to the in- dividual. is was emphasised in particular when addressing the issue Election manifesto of 2006 124 of the exclusion of the Slovak Roma population. e manifesto called for such measures that would prevent discrimination of the Roma e election manifesto of SĽS is an example of the perfect fusion of but at the same time stimulate their self-responsibility. Integration of the nationalistic and Christian fundamentalist approach. e exam- the Roma population into the society was seen as a very important ined document perceived the Slovak nation to be of eternal moral goal. e cultural tolerance of KDH, however, had its limits. e party value granted by God. God created nations as well as giving them land approached people of completely different cultures with suspicion, to cultivate it. e reason for the existence of the nations is that only in especially those which were not built upon Christian traditions. Ac- the national community can one achieve true spiritual development. cordingly, KDH supported strict asylum policies and they rejected full SĽS believed that it is God’s command for members of the nation to membership of the European Union for Turkey. love their nation. But in the view of SĽS, God not only created nations but he is also active in determining the fate of nations. Nations should obey God. If a nation acts faithfully God will protect its people and Slovak People’s Party (Slovenská ľudová strana, SĽS) lands. at is why it is of great importance to follow the command- ments and moral laws. However, according to SĽS, the moral health Slovak People’s Party was registered by the Ministry of Interior in of the Slovak nation is in grave danger and under attack from west- April 1990, however the party claims that it is the inheritor and suc- ern liberal ideology. e manifesto puts into one category of liberal cessor of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party which ruled Slovakia from moral decay such things as promiscuity, prostitution, homosexuality 1938 to 1945 during the existence of the fascist Slovak Republic, the and paedophilia. In order to prevent the total moral deconstruction of vassal state of Nazi Germany (Kupka – Laryš – Smolík 2009: 57–58). the nation, SĽS proposed Christian and national education. e Executive president of SĽS is Jozef Sásik, though the party also However SĽS noticed not just a subtle attack on the values and recognizes election leaders. Since 1990 three men have led the party: morality of the Slovak nation, it was also concerned with an imminent Jozef Prokop, František Kalenský and recently Andrej Trnovec (SĽS threat from Hungary. e Hungarian minority was seen as an alien website). SĽS took part in the general elections of 1998, 2002 and 2006. element in Slovak society and SĽS proposed several policies which In the last ones SĽS reserved several positions on the ballot paper for aimed at curtailment of the rights of the Hungarian and generally any representatives of the organization Slovak Brotherhood. In spite of ethnic minority. For example, the manifesto called for the cancellation this move nothing helped and SĽS has remained a politically marginal party. SĽS did not participate in the general election of 2010. 124 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme in the 2006. 218 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 219 of the office of the deputy prime minister for minorities, European In 2005 the Ministry of Interior registered political party Slovak Union and human rights, the establishment of a Slovak school in Brotherhood – National Party. However aer several months the every village and, finally, the same amount of education in the Slovak Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic dissolved the party due to language for all citizens. infringement of the law. e reason for the dissolution of the party In its manifesto SĽS also focused on the military and defence was that its statute violated the law by calling for the establishment capabilities of the Slovak Republic. To be able to defend Slovakia in of corporativist regimes. As a result of this, members of the Brother- future it is necessary to strengthen the readiness of the Slovak nation hood and its party ended up on the electoral list of the SĽS in the 2006 for war. SĽS called for the establishment of the National Guard that election. However, SĽS gained just about 0.16 percent of the vote, and would consist of at least 250,000 men. Besides this it would trans- the Slovak Brotherhood was looking for something more successful form sport organizations in such a way as to prepare young people in the future (Kupka – Laryš – Smolík 2009: 49–57). In 2009 the sup- for combat. Finally, the Slovak army should not be fighting abroad porters and members of the Slovak Brotherhood took control of the but rather be based in Slovakia to defend the country. Keeping in already existing Party of the Friends of Wine and changed its name to mind these policies, the manifesto also called for the rejection of the People’s Party – Our Slovakia125. e party took part in the subsequent logic of international relations based upon conflict and supported general election in 2010, gained 1.33 percent of the vote, though not the adoption of a truly cooperative approach to international poli- managing to enter the National Council. Marián Kotleba was leader tics. Part of the imperialistic and conflict-based international order of the Slovak Brotherhood for most of the active engagement of the was the European Union, regarded by SĽS as a totalitarian state organization, and he also led the ballot of the ĽS – NS in the 2010 and also an international financial system that, according to SĽS, general election. was set up in order to impoverish the Slovak nation. e manifesto supported protectionist policies giving preference to Slovak entre- Election manifesto of 2010 126 preneurs and capital, and even the renationalization of privatized industry. Analysis of the electoral program of the ĽS – NS is hindered by the fact that the party did not propose a comprehensive document and rather issued just a list of the principles and ideas it supported. In People’s Party – Our Slovakia spite of this and due to the prevalence of the issues connected with (Ľudová strana – Naše Slovensko) nationalism in the ĽS – NS manifesto, we are still able to identify core elements of the nationalistic ideology of the party and its opinions e roots of the People’s Party – Our Slovakia can be traced back into towards issues we are interested in. the nineties when the Slovak Brotherhood organization was formed. For ĽS – NS the defence and survival of the Slovak nation was the As one of many extreme right groups in Slovakia it went unnoticed most important and long-term goal. e electoral document empha- by the general public until the first few years of the new millennia. sised several threats that ĽS – NS wanted to protect Slovakia from. e media started to pay attention to the Slovak Brotherhood aer e first danger was seen to derive from the Roma population. e its members started to attend memorials of important events from manifesto likened Roma to parasites and called for the suspension of Slovak national history. e members of the Brotherhood wore dis- 125 tinctive uniforms that resembled the uniforms of the paramilitary For a short period of time in 2009 and 2010, the official name of the party was People’s Party of Social Solidarity. is was changed in February 2010. fascist Hlinka’s Guards. e Brotherhood and their uniforms became 126 e analysis is of the election manifesto is based on general election programme a symbol and face of the extreme right. in the 2010. 220 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 221 their social benefits. Roma were perceived as an alien element with tions. Man is born into an objectively existing community – the na- no rights within the Slovak state. Similar sentiments were aimed at tion. Since the nation is the basic political unit, it should also be the Hungarians, considered by ĽS – NS to be an even greater danger to sovereign master in its own affairs. at is why the nation states exist. the Slovak nation than Roma. ĽS – NS was concerned by the anti- e existence of nation states is the natural consequence and expres- Slovak chauvinism of the Hungarians. In their perception Hungarians sion of the existence of nations. Each nation is endowed with territory, were actively undermining Slovak statehood in order to change the language, culture and identity. ese should be protected by the state. borders between the two states. To counter both of these threats, ĽS at is the reason d’être of its existence. e state should be the tool – NS proposed the formation of a home defence militia which would to cultivate and develop the nation; however members of the nation serve as a defensive body for the nation. also have a moral commitment towards the nation. is commitment In the international arena, the manifesto called for independence is not derived from the fact that community – state and nation – took from foreign powers and multinational institutions – be it the Euro- care of its member. is commitment has rather the character of a pean Union or transnational corporations. In these respect ĽS – NS moral commandment which is simply the consequence of the fact sought to fight against the preferential treatment of foreign investors that one is its member. in Slovakia. Moreover the manifesto stated that it would act in the Despite the fact that these parties are nationalist by nature (as is interests of the Slovak nation, regardless of the policies and opinions evidenced by the analysis of their manifestos) we should make clear of the European Union. a distinction between these parties and groups that believe in the superiority of some nations over others. e analyzed parties do not regard the nations of the world fitting in to a hierarchical order. Rather nations are naturally defined units and identities for man, but Types of election manifestos produced by Slovak parties certainly not ranks. Nations are rather self-developing and it is down Nationalist type to them to rise above other nations. Keeping this in mind, it should however be mentioned that there is certainly not equality among na- e first group of manifestos consists of documents which addressed tions. For example, for ĽS-NS, Roma people were mostly parasites. members of the Slovak nation rather than Slovak citizens. e main us we can conclude that while parties with nationalist manifestos recipient of the policies in these manifestos was the Slovak nation, and do not consider certain nations to be created superior to others, they for this reason we call these manifestos nationalist. e nation is the do tend to generalize differences between them. us SNS, SĽS and central point of these documents and most of the policies proposed ĽS-NS share the same ideological background – they think about na- by them are justified and derived in order to serve the nation and its tions as objective entities with distinctive identities and cultures, but interests. what does it mean in the specific case of Slovak nation. Let us now is nationalist approach was predominant in the manifestos of deconstruct the definition of the Slovak nation and nationalism as it three examined parties: Slovak National Party, Slovak Popular Party is seen by these parties and as it is portrayed in their manifestos. and Popular Party-Our Slovakia. ese three parties – SNS in both For the nationalist approach in the manifestos of the Slovak par- 2006 and 2010 – considered themselves to be the only true propo- ties, it is very usual to use three basic principles as their program- nents of the national interests of the Slovak nation. In their worldview matic pillars. ese three are national, social and Christian principles. nations are basic, natural, primordial and eternal units into which ese three also represents the values which should be the guide for mankind are divided. It should also be mentioned that these parties every member of the Slovak nation. e national principle is applied – in particular SĽS – stress the transcendent and divine origin of na- by the above-mentioned parties in their cultural and educational 222 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 223 policies. All four manifestos called for designing education in order in 2006 SNS wanted to control their population and accused them of to strengthen patriotism and national pride. A stress on the Slovak exploiting the social security system. language is also important for these manifestos, as if the language Finally, Christianity is considered by SNS, SĽS and ĽS-NS to be a was the main defining feature of the nation and more importantly of fundamental pillar of Slovak national identity. Christian values are national sovereignty. SNS and SĽS emphasized that the Slovak lan- especially important for SĽS. e core of the notion of this Christian guage must be used in every corner of the Slovak Republic. In some tradition is the so-called heritage of the “Salonika brothers”, saints way the usage of Hungarian in the south of the country constitutes Cyril and Methodius. Devotion to Christian values is also apparent a threat to the nation. e national approach is also identifiable in in the concern for European cultural heritage. Negatively expressed it the definition of the national interest in the manifestos under exami- can also take the form of hostility towards other cultural and religious nation. e national interest does not just entail the prosperity and traditions, principally Islam. security of the country and its citizens, but also the defence of the dis- e similarities between the four manifestos and the three parties tinctive identity of the Slovak nation. is identity should be threat- reach far beyond their divining of the concept of nation and their ened by neither foreign forces nor domestic forces – particularly by construction of the Slovak nation. Possessing the same assumptions minorities. about the transcendent nature of nations does not necessarily de- e national principle in the manifestos of the first type expresses termine the same interpretation of history, international affairs and itself in the approach towards foreign policy. e parties with na- the contemporary world, however in the manifestos of SNS, SĽS and tionalist manifestos stress the importance of cooperation and unity ĽS-NS it is the case. All three parties share the common sentiment of among Slavic countries respectively nations. In this respect there is an the existence of a direct threat to the Slovak nation. In the view ex- apparent bias towards Serbia and especially Russia, as it is the biggest pressed by the four manifestos of the nationalist type, the distinctively Slavic nation and furthermore has both an imperial history and the Slovak national and Christian culture is in immediate danger. e status of major power in the international community. Also notice- most prominent source of this danger are, for sure, Hungarians. e able is some restraint in emphasizing cooperation with the Czech Re- Hungarian nation is portrayed as one which is tirelessly conspiring public and the Czech nation. For example, when listing Slavic nations against the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and, more specifically, in its 2010 manifesto, SNS mentioned the Czech Republic third from against the Slovak nation. In the view of these manifestos Hungarians the end despite the fact that there are objective reasons for the country are nostalgic about their imperial history and they are not content having the closest relations with the Czechs. At the same time, the first with the breakdown of the Hungarian Kingdom. Moreover, accord- two mentioned nations were Serbia and Russia. ing to the Slovak nationalists, they are still trying to reverse history e social principle is oriented towards the community character in order to reunite the lost territories. e Hungarian government is of the nation. ere should be no citizen in need. e social princi- working towards this goal together with the Hungarian diasporas in ple is not to be understood strictly as solidarity exclusively within neighbouring countries. at is why the Hungarian minority and its the Slovak nation. Ethnic minorities are not excluded; however the representation in Slovakia are perceived as disloyal, and it needs to social principle is to be applied in the conditions of secured national prove its loyalty. However, the preferred resolution of the problem interests. For example, there is a clear bias against the employment posed by the existence of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia would of employees who speak only Hungarian. e social principle in the be its full cultural assimilation. manifestos of the three parties also reaches its limits when dealing Another threat being faced by the Slovak nation is represented by with the Roma minority and their social status. Without any restrain, liberal and postmodern influences that, in the view of the manifestos ĽS-NS called the gypsies (as they address Roma people) parasites, and of the first group, are destabilizing the value system – based upon 224 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 225
Christianity – of the Slovak nation. Among these unwelcome influ- Cultural-nationalist type ences are materialism and consumerism, as well as the liberal agenda of gay and lesbian rights. Most of these are perceived as western e next group of manifestos represents a considerable proportion products of destructive relativism which is destroying the solid value of the Slovak population at least when we will consider results of the order provided by Christianity. Besides this moral threat to the nation general elections of 2010. e parties and their manifestos which did there is another one which is imported from the west and is strength- not centred its political message around the concept of primordial ened by globalization. SNS, SĽS and ĽS-NS were all very concerned exclusive and eternal nation but still emphasized high value of the with the power of transnational corporations and their influence in national culture and preservation of its heritage are part of the second the Slovak Republic. ese companies were perceived as agents of group. ese parties were very sensitive to the external threats but foreign interest in the Slovak Republic. us, in the manifestos of the they also stressed its pro European attitudes and respect for human nationalist type, there is also a stress on the autochthony. Both these rights and protection of minorities. We will refer to the approach em- threats of relativism and international capital are present in the EU. bedded in the second group of manifestos as culturally – nationalistic. at is why, while stressing the European identity of the Slovak nation, Both manifestos of the Popular Party – Movement for the Democratic SNS, SĽS and ĽS-NS are against European integration and the loss of Slovakia and manifesto for the 2010 elections of Direction – Social sovereignty. ese nationalist manifestos rather call for a Europe of Democracy are part of the nationally – conservative type. sovereign nation states without central control from Brussels. All documents in this category were using the concept of the As is apparent from its description, the nationalist type of mani- Slovak nation and its interests oen. However in contrast with the festos is defined through several key principles. First and foremost, manifestos of the nationalistic group the definition of the nation was the nationalist manifesto is centred on the concept of the nation as less rigid and more importantly membership to Slovak nation was of objective entity. It is addressed to the members of this nation. e no relevance to the citizenship and to the relation among the citizen state is the expression and tool of the nation which serves to defend and the Slovak Republic. For ĽS – HZDS and Smer – SD notion of its interests. e interests of the nation lie in its survival and in the nation was important but it was not central term of their ideology. survival of its distinctive identity. at is why while national minori- Moreover they defined nation in terms of the cultural heritage rather ties are respected they are of secondary concern to these manifestos, than some transcendental principles and primordial affiliations. To and should be of secondary interest also for policymakers and the put it in other words it is culture which defines a nation not the other state power. e Slovak identity is based on the Christian tradition way round. erefore membership in the constitutive nation of the and should be protected from the destructive influences of liberalism, Slovak Republic is in comparison with the nationalistic approach less globalization and relativism. e Slovak Republic should be sovereign exclusive. All the citizens are considered to be part of the Slovak na- and it should maintain its powers in order to ensure that the Slovak tion in the very moment they are loyal to the Slovak Republic, they identity does not melt in the European pot. However, these similari- speak Slovak language and they embrace Slovak cultural and histori- ties should not overshadow the substantive differences between three cal heritage. of the parties and their four manifestos. While without doubt they For the manifestos of the second category it is symptomatic that constitute a nationalist category, the manifestos do also differ. SĽS, for they emphasize the strengthening of national pride in the members example, is much more concerned with Christianity and protecting its of the Slovak nation and also the allegiance and loyalty to the Slovak values than the other two parties. ĽS-NS on the other hand is much Republic amongst all of its citizens. Smer-SD and ĽS-HZDS wanted more radical in its formulation than SNS and SĽS, yet still operates to achieve this goal through the nurturing and cultivation of the within the same paradigm. national culture. Also, the cultural-nationalist manifestos proposed 226 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 227 education aimed at strengthening patriotism among students of all ment and Hungarian minority in Slovakia. ey were strongly against levels of the school system with an appropriate history and litera- any extra-territorial influence for Hungary in Slovakia. ey certainly ture curriculum. Smer-SD and ĽS-HZDS chose a similar approach did not suggest, as did the nationalist manifestos, that the Hungarian regarding language policy. In their opinion all the citizens of the nation conspires against Slovak sovereignty and territorial integrity, Slovak Republic must speak Slovak. All of these policies were de- but they would not permit any strengthening of the autonomy of the signed to make sure that the Slovak Republic will preserve its Slovak Slovak Hungarians in fear of possible future demands which could character. go far beyond what is considered by Smer-SD and ĽS-HZDS to be in Despite these strongly assertive policies, the cultural-nationalist the interest of the Slovak nation. Consistent with this fear, both par- manifestos showed respect to the culture and traditions of the ethnic ties refused future recognition of the Kosovar independence which minorities living in Slovakia and considered them to be an integral they saw as a dangerous precedent. In this respect ĽS-HZDS stress part of the heritage of the whole country. erefore as soon as the the importance of potent military power to secure the sovereignty goal of protecting Slovak national interests was secured there was and territorial integrity of the state. On the other hand Smer-SD room for the support and nourishment of ethnic minorities and of proposed cooperation and new alliances to secure Slovak interests their culture. in the future. All three electoral documents falling into the cultural-nationalist is brings us to the other distinctive feature of the cultural-na- group in many places emphasized tolerance and respect for minor- tionalist manifestos. A strong and independent international position ity rights and their freedoms, and at the same time they condemned was highly valued in all three documents of the second category. It racism and discrimination. A combination of these values with the was important not just to be a reliable and stable partner in the inter- cultural approach towards defining the nation described above is national community but the cultural-nationalist approach also em- identifiable in the way both parties addressed the Roma minority phasized a respectful and strong position which the Slovak Republic and its social problems in their manifestos. ey proposed policies should enjoy. aimed at “normalization” of the Roma population. Both parties were In conclusion we should stress the main differences between the in favour of the establishment of special boarding schools for Roma nationalist and cultural-nationalist approaches as they were identified pupils where they would be educated and raised in order to integrate in the manifestos of the Slovak parties. In both ĽS-HZDS manifestos into the Slovak population. ese efforts do not mean that Smer-SD or and also in the 2010 manifesto of Smer-SD we can see a strong intent ĽS-HZDS called for full cultural assimilation of the Roma population. to serve and protect the national culture and interests. However, the e integration was meant primarily in terms of social and political nation is here defined interms of the language, culture and values issues – not cultural. However, if some Roma abandon their cultural rather than ancestry and blood. Consequently, a member of the heritage and they feel themselves to be Slovaks it will be fully accept- nation could be virtually anybody who speaks Slovak. e Slovak able for the cultural-nationalist approach to count them as members Republic is understood primarily as the nation state of the Slovaks of the Slovak nation. but, through equal citizenship, ethnic minorities are also considered However, in contrast with the liberal values of tolerance and mi- to be part of the state and they should enjoy the same rights as the nority rights there is strong opposition expressed in all three mani- members of the Slovak nation. e three documents forming the festos to any kind of autonomy for the ethnic minorities. is con- cultural-nationalist category view normality and order to be of the cerned even cultural self-governance. Of course opposition towards highest value and the focal point of political life. Slovakia should not the autonomy of the minorities has to be put into the wider context. be a state where there is no clear uniting understanding of its core Both parties were sensitive to every step of the Hungarian govern- identity, values and history. e nationalism of these manifestos is evi- 228 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 229 denced by their devotion to the natural arrangement of the affairs in sceptic manifestos addressed the problems that Roma communi- the state – there should be a constitutive nation which together with ties are facing. For example, SaS considered these problems to be a loyal national minorities runs the state as a proud member of the EU result of inadequate social policies in the past. ese were coupled and the international community. with the discrimination of the Roma population by the majority in everyday life. All three parties proposed measures which aim to Liberal-skeptic type integrate the Roma communities into Slovak society. is integra- tion was understood in terms of social inclusion rather than cultural e third group of the election manifestos consists of the documents assimilation. In this respect all three parties are loyal to their liberal of very heterogeneous parties. Both manifestos of the Christian- approach. Democratic Movement as well as the manifesto of the Freedom Overall, we can easily conclude that the manifestos of the liberal- and Solidarity party, together with the 2006 election manifesto of sceptic approach tend to support human and minority rights and the Direction-Social Democracy, formed a group of liberal scepticism. values of tolerance and equality. At the same time, all three parties in In contrast with the two previous groups, the parties of this group this group stressed responsibility as another highly important value. and their manifestos barely refer to the nation and other issues con- All these values are considered to be part of the common European nected with cultural differentiation among citizens. ey did not heritage and all three parties were in their respective manifestos differentiate between the majority and minority rights and cultural stressing that Slovakia is part of the wider European community of heritage. However, the parties belonging to this group stressed in their countries which share this heritage. manifestos the independence of the country, the need for responsibil- However a strong allegiance to the European identity and values ity and scepticism when it comes to international cooperation. is does not necessarily imply a positive attitude towards the European tension between the liberal approaches towards issues of identities in project. KDH with SaS and Smer-SD in 2006 were supporters of combination with scepticism in foreign policy gives the name to this Slovakia’s membership of the EU. All of them perceived it not just category. as an unavoidable and necessary step towards economic prosperity e parties of the liberal-sceptic group do not explicitly tackle the and international recognition but also as an act of historical justice concept of the nation. ey do not consider ethnically defined nations because Slovakia is part of Europe. At the same time the liberal-scep- to be of any importance in politics. Instead the four manifestos of this tic manifestos were not uncritically enthusiastic about the EU. ey group addressed their messages to citizens of the Slovak Republic unanimously criticized the EU’s discriminatory practices. ey were without regard to their mother tongue, cultural background or an- also reserved about further integration and the further transfer of cestry. e political program and policies they proposed are designed powers from the states to Brussels. On this issue we should mention to serve the country and its population rather than any specifically that this tendency was less present in the manifesto of Smer-SD than defined group within its borders. Of course there are references to na- in the manifestos of the other two parties. In accordance with the tional culture or cultural heritage; however these are used specifically above-mentioned is also the attitude taken by all three parties regard- in connection with support for Slovak arts and cultural institutions. ing EU enlargement. In general they strongly supported EU enlarge- Moreover wherever there is a statement regarding Slovak national ment, but on the other hand equally strongly opposed the possible culture there is also a complementary passage describing support for membership of Turkey. In this case we can see the limits of the liberal minority culture and art. tolerance and openness of KDH, SaS and Smer-SD. In accordance with their rejection of the nationalist discourse When considering how the liberal-sceptic parties viewed foreign and their embracing of a liberal and pragmatic approach, the liberal- policy issues and international relations, we have to conclude that 230 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 231 they were all concerned with matters of independent decision-mak- also towards the international community and the European project. ing, autonomy in acting and lack of foreign influence. Beneath these e parties whose manifestos form the fourth group are considered milestones there is an apparent desire for the respectful treatment of to be centre-right in their political orientation, and that is why we will Slovakia by other countries and acknowledgement of its status as a refer to them and their category as rightwing liberal. modern and developed European country. However, in contrast with At the beginning of the description of the main features of the the manifestos of the previous two groups, the liberal-sceptical idea of rightwing liberal approach it would be useful to point out that this respectful treatment was based on a pragmatic rather than nationalist group is actually, in its views and policies, very similar to the previ- approach towards other countries. is is clearly manifested by the ous one. Both the rightwing liberal and the liberal-sceptic groups fact that none of the four manifestos in the category of the liberal- are not stressing the concept of the nation and focus rather on the sceptical documents dedicated a significant part of their political citizenry of the state. is, however, does not mean that rightwing message to the Slovak-Hungarian tensions and quarrels. liberal parties do not mention in some places of their manifestos Despite all these similarities between the manifestos of KDH, SaS national culture and the need for its cultivation, or even the exist- and Smer-SD, we should also mention the deep differences which ence of a national identity. However, these are understood as wide divide these otherwise very similar approaches. We have already categories that, while being referred to as national, are rather under- mentioned the more enthusiastic attitude of Smer-SD (expressed stood as being defined by the territory of Slovakia not by the Slovak in its 2006 electoral manifesto) towards the EU and further integra- nation. tion. However there is another issue which divides the liberal-sceptic Rightwing liberal parties are generally liberal in their approach group. KDH as a Christian democratic party considered European towards foreign and alien elements in society. ey value the indi- and consequently Slovak culture and values to be Christian in ori- vidual and its rights more than the unquestionable authority of the gin. On the other hand, SaS took a rather extreme view on the is- state. According to these parties the state should also refrain from sue of religion and its role in society and politics. However, while encouraging its citizens to choose one particular set of values or way admitting that this difference has some relevant consequences for of life. On the contrary, the state serves and protects its citizens. It the definition of Slovak and European cultural heritage, we do not should prevent the discrimination of minorities and if anything then consider this difference to be of decisive importance. In other words, just facilitate their inclusion into Slovak society. e manifestos in the fact that both parties differ on the issue of what are the roots this category are not fixed on the issues of Slovak language and his- of Slovak and European culture, and what role should religion and tory. ere is no objective value in the usage of a majority language church assume in modern society, does not mean that their basic by all citizens and also there is no need for all citizens to be proud of approach towards the concept of nation and ethnicity are not of the Slovak history. same kind. However, unlike the liberal-sceptic parties, rightwing liberal parties tend to be open to foreign influences. is feature is most Rightwing liberal type prominent in the way these parties and their respective manifestos deal with the issue of European integration. In contrast to the group ree parties and their electoral documents from the fourth type of of liberal-sceptic documents, they tend to be more open-minded and manifestos: ese are the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union- one would say almost uncritical of the EU and its further integra- Democratic Party, Alliance of a New Citizen and Most-Híd party. tion. ere is one important exception: the manifestos of SDKÚ-DS ese three parties exhibit in their manifestos a great deal of open- strongly oppose the harmonization of taxes in the EU. ness not just towards all minorities and citizens of the country but 232 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SLOVAKIA 233
Minority type Conclusion
e last identified group of manifestos in Slovakia consists of the elec- In Slovakia, as anywhere else, one can find election manifestos which toral documents of the single party of the Hungarian minority. e have a strong focus on the issues of ethnicity, preservation of national Party of Hungarian Coalition is in a special situation in comparison identity and relations with other nations, and those manifestos which with the other parties. SMK declares to be a party of the minority and do not touch on these issues or even do not mention the word nation its manifestos really are dedicated to the promotion of the interests at all. Between these two poles there are many parties and manifestos of that specific electorate. Its orientation on ethnic minority voters is which combine both approaches. also the main reason SMK constitutes a separate category by itself. Its Among five types of approaches identified in Slovakia one would preoccupation with minority rights is on the one hand a typical sign futilly look for manifesto which expresses unconditional and full of liberal tendencies but it cannot be fully interpreted as such in the openness to the external influences and which would completely specific case of SMK. denounce community approach towards politics and public affairs. e manifestos of SMK are devoted to equality, tolerance and mi- On the other hand parties which would define nations as prescribed nority rights but these are also too oen associated with the Hungar- cathegories are definitely not mainstream in Slovakia and only one ian minority and the region of southern Slovakia where most of the of them has parliamentary representation. Most of the Slovak par- Hungarian minority lives. is aspect of the SMK manifestos could liamentary parties – in their manifestos – define nation as cultural be interpreted as nation-centric. e policies and proposals contained and political community. ey differ primarily on the issue how to in the SMK election documents are not just about implementing and treat other cultural traditions or influences which are not familiar to protecting the rights of minorities and especially Hungarian minori- Slovak cultural context. is is the case especially with Hungarian ties, but these are oen set up to further promote the Hungarian lan- and Roma communities which are principal representatives of others guage and culture. Hungarian identity and heritage were considered in Slovakia. Also globalization and European integration are playing to be in peril in Slovakia and it was of great importance for SMK to important role in the discourse between cultural-nationalist, liberal- ensure their survival. Assimilation of the Hungarians was seen as a sceptic, rightwing liberal and minority types. great threat. For SMK this was not just a question of minority rights In this respect we can say Slovak political spectrum is somehow but rather in the interest of the Hungarian nation as a whole. It should similar to Czech one. Mainstream parties share similar approaches be mentioned that this element of the political program was devel- in their manifestos, while more extreme approaches – nationalist in oped and emphasised in the 2010 manifesto while it was of secondary both countries and post-modern in the Czech Republic – are suffering importance in SMK’s electoral document of 2006. of low representation in legislative bodies. Difference is that while in Due to the subtle fear of assimilation and possible discrimination th Czech Republic more visible and influential used to be parties of (or even assimilation), SMK policies were strongly focused on further post-modern type in Slovakia there is strong nationalistic party in European integration since the EU was seen as a guarantee of minor- parliament. ity rights in the member states. Moreover, European policies aiming at strengthening subsidiary and regional governance were in harmony with SMK’s goals. However, SMK saw the European dimension of its program also in terms of identity, not just policies. Hungarians, like Slovaks, were considered by SMK to be part of the wider community of European nations. NATIONALISM IN THE VISEGRAD REGION 235
NATIONALISM IN THE VISEGRAD REGION
Aer careful examination of the electoral documents and manifestos of the political parties from the four Visegrad countries, we were able to sort them into categories according to their understanding of identities and handling of nationalist issues. ese categories were constructed in the narrow national contexts of the four countries respectively in order to accurately capture not just the general world- view of those parties but also its translation into the local language, imagination and symbols. In the national comparison main dividing issues and approaches emerged among the parties. A shared environ- ment and referential categories helped to stress the different positions and attitudes of the examined documents and thus constitute groups of manifestos according to the dividing lines in the issues of particu- larly national character. Also, without a common national environ- ment, it would not be possible to identify common understandings less or more explicitly present in the manifestos of the political parties of one country. Now aer the identification of the groups of the manifestos on the national level and elaboration of their specifics in detail, we are equipped to draw links between identified groups in the four Viseg- rad countries in order to propose more general types of approaches expressed in the electoral manifestos of the political parties from the Visegrad region. While specific groups of manifestos constructed on the national level and according to the dividing lines based upon na- tional context are country specific, they certainly are oen connected to the groups of manifestos identified in the other Visegrad countries. e character of these ties is of course more subtle and linked to the general worldview of the party, its values and categories in which it translates the social and political life. Our intention at this stage is not to create artificial associations of the groups from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Rather we aim at identifying similar approaches where they really exist. In the cases of types which argu- ably do not have counterparts in other countries we do not hesitate 236 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES NATIONALISM IN THE VISEGRAD REGION 237 to leave them unassociated. Corresponding with this approach, we their nation is based on the perception of the true picture of it. is did not try to include into the proposed categories types of docu- picture is mostly frozen in the past and is highly mythologized. For ments from all four countries at the expense of the accuracy of those Hungarians it is the time of the great Hungarian kings – Saint Stephan categories. I. or Mathias Corvinus. For Slovaks it could be the age of Great Mora- via and its rulers127 Rastislav and Svätopluk I. or the era of the Second World War Slovak Republic. For Polish parties such a time could be Nationalist approach seen in the age of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or in the nineteenth century struggle for independence. So nationalist manifes- e easily identifiable group of nationalistic manifestos is defined not tos admit that the character, mentality and culture of the nation were just by the mere fact that documents included in this category are shaped throughout history but they claim that this process is more the most radical manifestos in their respective national context. Such or less already fulfilled and that the modern age should not alter the an approach would be simplistic and rather unconstructive. While it foundations which define the nation but rather only modernize its is true that all four countries are in this category represented by the external features. most radical nationalist type of manifestos, we should also stress that A very strong constitutive element of the nation is Christianity. In this category is defined by a shared understanding of human socie- the context of Slovakia and especially Poland, general Christian values ties and the contemporary world which differs from the opinions ex- or civilization are explicitly Catholic ones. Christianity is seen as the pressed in the other manifestos, and not just by its far most extreme backbone of the moral order which defines civilized – Christian – na- position on the political map. e group of nationalist approach is tions. In some manifestos the Christian element connects the exist- formed by the respective nationalist groups of Czech and Slovak par- ence of the nation with a divine plan. From the divine authority stems ties, by the isolationist manifesto of MIÉP from Hungary and by the the moral value of the nationalism and patriotism. To serve a nation religious-nationalist group identified in Poland. is to obey God’s commandment. Even when nationalist documents e first and most important feature of the nationalist manifestos claim their positive attitude towards national minorities, they usually throughout the Visegrad countries is their perception of the nation approach non-Christian immigration with hostility. By these divine and its relation to individuals. As mentioned many times before in intentions nations occupy their respective lands. e connection be- the chapters dedicated to the respective nationalist groups of the four tween the nation and the soil of its ancestors is also very important, countries, for the parties and documents falling into this category especially for Polish but also Slovak and Hungarian nationalist elec- the nation is the key element of their political message. ey are ad- toral manifestos. dressing members of their respective nations with a highly emotional Another feature common to all nationalist manifestos is threat. e appeal. Members of the nation are called to rise and vote for the party nation as defined in the previous paragraphs faces the grave danger of in order to protect the existence of the nation. In this understanding losing one of its constitutive elements. Most prominently represented the word “nation” means more than just the sum of individuals or the is the threat to national values and the Christian tradition which community of shared values and culture. are systematically attacked by the postmodern and liberal culture Nationalist documents define the nation as an entity which exists imported from Western Europe and the United States. Nationalist as an objective category with a fixed meaning. e existence of the nation with its characteristics – culture, mentality, religion, territory, 127 We use in the context of Great Moravia the word “ruler” rather than “king” or customs and historical experience – is the result of historical fate. For “prince” in respect of the ongoing debate in Slovakia about the actual title used by all parties falling into this category, the core or defining character of Svätopluk I. of Great Moravia. 238 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES NATIONALISM IN THE VISEGRAD REGION 239 documents criticize these influences and mark them as materialism, their respective nations to be the victims of the aggressive nations and commercialism and perversion. Most of the parties belonging to this of historical injustice. is is certainly the case with the Hungarian category are calling for more control of the state over the media and nation and the Trianon peace treaty, but also of Polish experience with academic life of the country in order to prevent the spread of these the Russian and German annexations and the Slovak perception of anti-national values. In general, nationalist manifestos were advocat- 1000 years of existence of the Kingdom of Hungary. ese grievances ing the change of the educational system in order to stress the spirit from history are not time bound and the nationalist approach would of patriotism and national pride in the educational process. even advocate that history will repeat itself. erefore one should not A similar danger was perceived by the parties of the nationalist be overly satisfied with the current state of affairs because the aggres- category also in economic globalization. rough the liberalization sion of other nations could strike once again. of commerce, for example, as a result of membership in the EU, tran- snational corporations are exploiting the nation while foreign powers and forces are taking control of the national wealth. ese alien forces National-conservative approach are oen linked to the mainstream political parties in the country. In this regard, a very prominent issue is ownership of the soil. Most of e populist manifestos from the Czech Republic, the conserva- the nationalist parties called for the prohibition of or a moratorium tive-nationalist documents from Poland together with the Slovak on the selling of national land to foreigners. In the case of Slovakia manifestos of the cultural-nationalist type share a similar approach there was also the prominent fear of Hungarian revisionism and of which stresses the primacy of the national interest in politics and their attempts to take Slovak land and annex it. state policies over individual self-interest. is approach proved to be e nationalist categories of all the four countries approached mi- very influential especially in the first two countries – in Poland and norities and especially immigrants with suspicion. ey understood Slovakia – where it was represented by the senior government parties: traditional minorities as aliens allowed to stay in the country. e PiS and Smer-SD. nationalist manifestos granted them human rights and sometimes Most of the parties and documents of the national-conservative conditionally minority rights, however the members of the minorities approach are mainly interested and focused on the role of the nation were not supposed to have influence over national government and state. e adjective national is a serious issue in these documents. Na- state policies. Should the need arise; it would be completely justifiable tions are communities of shared values, culture and living experience to strip them of their freedoms and privileges. Even less welcomed and all of those are shaped by common history. For the national- were immigrants and members of non-traditional minorities. ese conservative approach lineage and ancestry are not so important were seen as complete strangers with no connection and legitimate but instead cultural heritage is. For the protection of the nation and relation to the country, state and its services. All parties belonging its shared cultural heritage it is of great importance to sustain the to the nationalist group were advocating strict immigration laws in national character of the state. In other words, the main interest of order to prevent a flood of aliens oen regarded as less educated and the nation is to have the state dedicated to its protection and that is civilized. A homogenous society with no cultural diversity is an ideal possible only when the state recognizes its specific national character. model for these nationalist parties. In general all elements of society at is also the reason why the manifestos composed according to this which differ and divert from the “national standard” are seen as an approach are concerned with the politics of symbolism. In accordance unwanted burden and potential threat to stability. with this, they stress the need for measures and policies which aim to e nationalist parties tend to perceive historical conflicts among strengthen patriotism and national pride among the members of the the countries as fated struggles between nations. ey oen picture nation and citizens. 240 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES NATIONALISM IN THE VISEGRAD REGION 241
To be part of the national body one has to feel like its part and, type, the Hungarian protective type, the Polish liberal-nationalist preferably, to be perceived so by others. One has to embrace the na- type and partly the Slovak liberal-conservative type we can trace the tional culture and express loyalty to the nation and state in order to exceptionality approach. be a legitimate member of the nation. However keeping in mind this e parties and their respective manifestos embracing this ap- we should also understand that the national-conservative approach proach are primarily addressing the citizenry of the state rather than is not hostile to other nations or national minorities. e nation and any ethnic or national group in particular, and fully embrace the idea security of the national state are the primal goals of the national- of equality and rights for all citizens. At the same time, however, they conservatives but as long as these are secured their policies towards tend to be cautious about cultures and influences with which they are minorities are – on paper at least – conducted in accordance with not familiar. is mixture of formal liberalism and informal suspicion minority rights and freedoms. is is clearly evident in the way that towards the outside world is the defining and distinctive feature of the national-conservative manifestos approached the Roma minority. third approach. e main concern of these documents was integration – normaliza- e principles which make up the foundations of the approach of tion – of the Roma people, not their assimilation or exclusion. the exeptionalists towards society, nationalism and the state are fully e parties of the national-conservative approach tend to advocate grounded in liberalism. ey do not divide citizens according to their assertive and confident foreign policies in their electoral manifestos. ethnic or national background – on the contrary all citizens are equal Respectful treatment and high credit in the eyes of other countries and have the same rights and responsibilities. e state represents not is of great importance. ey reject being vassals of the great powers, just the national majority but all citizens and there is no reason for the be it Washington, Moscow or even Brussels. National-conservatives preferential treatment of any particular culture, language or tradition. demand a dignified position in the international community and e state serves all without regard to one’s background. is does not especially in the EU. In this respect the manifestos belonging to this mean that it should neglect a cultural policy aiming at the conserva- group tend to be sceptical towards the further integration of the EU. tion and cultivation of tradition and heritage – support for culture In the case of Poland – the biggest of the four Visegrad countries and art should be focused on all the segments of society. – this tendency is most apparent. However, while expressing their At this point, however, one would notice that while the excep- independence and sovereignty from western European countries, na- tionalist documents stress liberal values, rights and equality among tional-conservative documents also emphasize the rightful member- citizens, they are not so supportive of importing new and strange ship of their respective countries in the EU. In their understanding, cultural influences and value systems. To be clear, they do not mind central Europe is an integral part of European civilization that was any foreign culture because it does not originate in their country, but wrongfully separated from it for more than 40 years. It is important rather they express concerns over cultures which are not based upon that other countries acknowledge this fact. generally familiar, traditional European values. Influences that are strikingly different and exotic are not considered by exceptionalists to be applicable and appropriate for their countries. ey consider Exceptionalist approach European civilization, with its successes and liberal tradition, to be the most suitable and even the best in general. Electoral manifestos that are fully dedicated to liberal and demo- We should still bear in mind that even when exceptionalist mani- cratic principles of governance, and that at the same time tend to be festos do express their uneasiness with different cultural contexts, in cautious about outside influences, form the third approach found in general they do not suggest that the state should directly discrimi- Visegrad countries. In the documents of the Czech homogenization nate towards those. Rather their suspicion transcends itself into strict 242 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES NATIONALISM IN THE VISEGRAD REGION 243 immigration rules and, more importantly, in foreign policy issues. Ex- words, human rights and equality are applied to every human be- ceptionalist parties emphasized autonomy and sovereignty for their ing and the state is obliged to pursue them not just in regard of its respective countries in the international arena as an irreplaceable nationals. condition for independent acting in foreign affairs. ey supported e parties that were led by the liberal approach in their mani- membership of their countries in the EU but at the same time they festos were in general explicitly very supportive of the EU with its tended to be rather pragmatic and thoughtful about further EU in- further integration. ey did not see any threat in the opening of their tegration. First and foremost, they pursued their national interests in respective countries to the outside world and especially to the Euro- the EU, not any ideological goal of achieving a united Europe. pean project. ey saw the EU and its integration as a natural process and considered its results to be benefiting the participating countries and all their citizens. However, at the same time they tended to em- Liberal approach phasize that other countries should respect the Czech Republic and Slovakia respectively. In the perception of the European or rightwing e next examined approach is represented by the documents of the liberal groups, the Visegrad countries are an integral part of Europe Czech European type and the Slovak rightwing liberal type of mani- and their citizens deserve the same treatment as the citizens of other festos. e parties included in these two categories share a similar countries. understanding of society and the wider world. e liberal approach is defined by an embracing of liberal values in the programmatic docu- ments of the parties. ere are no significant references to the nation Anti-nationalist approach in any other meaning than simply society, the sum of the citizens of the country. e liberal manifestos did not label citizens or people in ree types of manifestos identified in the four Visegrad countries general according to their national or even cultural background. ey – Czech postmodern, Hungarian anti-nationalist and Polish liberal addressed not collective bodies, communities and groups but rather types – share the approach which we call anti-nationalist. Its most citizens as individuals. Even if the parties of the European group distinguishing feature is explicit rejection of the nationalist ideol- in the Czech Republic and the rightwing liberal group in Slovakia ogy, policies and approach towards politics. In this respect, and as referred to the nation – mainly in terms of national culture – they the name chosen for this approach suggests, the anti-nationalistic did so not to stress the national character of the referred issue. For approach was the very opposite of the nationalist one. ey rejected example, support of the national culture was understood as a general the notion of the nation as defined by nationalists. Besides human- service that should be provided by modern society and not as a tool ity as a whole there is no community which bears any moral value. to strengthen national awareness among citizens. Individuals are not just more important than any kind of collectively In accordance with this, the state is in the understanding of the – they are the only criterion by which we should measure the actions mentioned groups of manifestos a genuinely neutral service pro- of individuals and states. vider for the citizens. It should not make differences between citizens e antipathy of the anti-nationalist parties towards what they based on their language, religion or culture in general. Unlike in the perceived as the artificial illusions of nations reflected itself in their case of the exceptionalist approach, the state should treat similarly strong opposition towards cultural and educational policies that were not just the citizens of the state but rather all the people who are set up to strengthen national feelings, pride and patriotism among citi- in its jurisdiction. us liberal ideas and values should transcend zens, especially pupils. e anti-nationalist manifestos warned against the formal limits and territorial boundaries of the state. In other the constructing and rewriting of the national history by politicians. 244 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES NATIONALISM IN THE VISEGRAD REGION 245
ey considered such attempts to be dangerous and they feared a new Let us start with the Czech communist approach that combines wave of nationalism in society that would result in xenophobia and a call for international unity and cooperation with strong distrust eventual discrimination against minorities and immigrants. of the international community and organizations. is seemingly Not only did the manifestos embracing anti-nationalism reject the contradictory scenario is a result of the specific type of ideology nationalist point of view, they called for exactly the opposite kind of which is embraced by the orthodox communist KSČM. is ideology society that the nationalist parties advocated for. e anti-nationalist stresses international cooperation on the one hand, but on the other manifestos valued diversity and multiculturalism and their policies that cooperation is viewed in a class paradigm that is hostile towards supported the creation of society based on these values. Consequently the liberal and capitalist version of globalization. e communist type they advocated for support and protection for minorities and their of manifesto distinguishes itself from the liberal and anti-national- cultural heritage. All anti-nationalist documents called also for the re- ist approach by its references to the nation as the basic constitutive spect and protection of the new minorities, mainly sexual ones. In line body of international politics. It was concerned with the demands with these policies there was also the attitude of the anti-nationalists of the organizations of the ousted Sudeten Germans and the highly towards immigration. Since they did not believe in nations and other valued strong international standing of the Czech Republic. It was collectivises, they were promoting the open society and state. also against the present form of the EU that was viewed as a delivery In foreign policy issues, the anti-nationalist parties advocated mechanism for capitalist interests in Europe. On the other hand, the international solidarity among countries and continents. More than Czech communist type differs from the national-conservative and the other parties they stressed the reason and necessity of foreign nationalist approach due to its emphasis on the equality of all people, development aid and considered it to be the obligation of the central social inclusion and human rights. ere is no distinctive value in European countries to increase their share of international aid. e national identity and the nation itself. anti-nationalists predictably supported globalization and European e greater nation type of electoral manifestos from Hungary integration was also perceived as a very positive process, at least for shares common features with both the nationalist and national- the fact that it managed to surpass nationalism and confrontation in conservative approaches and therefore it is impossible and would be Europe. artificial and counterproductive to include it into any of these two categories. e Hungarian greater nation type of manifestos meets the criteria of the above described nationalist approach. e two share a Other approaches dedication to and central interest in the concept of the nation. Also the role and nature of the state is seen similarly. However, in some im- Besides the above described broad approaches towards nationalism portant aspects it decisively differs from it. e greater nation group among the Visegrad region parties, there are three types of manifestos of documents does not exclude traditional ethnic minorities from from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia which are so differ- the definition of the nation, which is the focal point of its program. ent and unique in the manner in which they address and understand For Fidesz-MPP, Jobbik and MDF there is a core of the nation which the nation that they form their own categories. ese are the Czech was represented by the Hungarians who embrace the national, cul- communist, Hungarian greater nation and Slovak minority types. tural and historical heritage, and their mother tongue is Hungarian. All of these three types were already analyzed in detail in the cor- Among those core Hungarians there are also included Hungarians responding chapters. us we will not repeat ourselves, but rather we from neighbouring countries. en there are other members of the will at this point just examine the relation of these categories to the nation who belong to the minorities which have resided in Hungary approaches we described above. (or the Hungarian Kingdom) for centuries. ese minorities – Roma 246 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES CONCLUSION 247 people, Germans or Croats – inherited and are part of the cultural heritage of the Hungarian nation. eir interests overlap with the CONCLUSION interests of ethnic Hungarians and therefore they are considered to be part of the nation as long as they are loyal to it. In this respect the great nation approach more resembles the national-conservative group of manifestos. In the previous chapter we identified eight distinctive approaches e cause of the difficulties we are facing with the classification of adopted by the political parties from four Visegrad countries in their the minority type of manifestos represented by Slovak SMK is obvi- political manifestos. Five of those approaches were found in three or ous. SMK is primarily the party of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia all four countries. ose approaches share basic convictions and opin- and as such it perceived many issues connected with identity and ions which are not rooted in the specific nature of the countries but nationalism very sensitively. SMK is, on the one hand, very liberal and could be considered the main approaches towards national identity calls for a wide range of minority rights, and stresses the values of co- in general. ey form a polarized continuum between two extremes operation and tolerance. It is also a supporter of European integration in the thinking about nation and identities. One pole, represented by and is in general open to foreign influences. At the same time, howev- our nationalist type of manifestos, sees nations as the focal point of er, the party explicitly emphasizes the importance of national identity life, morality and politics. e second pole, called in this book anti-na- and cultural heritage, which seemed to be the central points of SMK’s tionalist, insisted that nations and other similar categories are just ar- manifestos and political program. Certainly it is understandable but tificial and even harmful social constructs which should be uprooted, it results in a very distinctive and unclassifiable approach. at is why and moreover that true value lies in the differences between people we are concluding that the minority type of electoral manifestos form and the diversity of society. their own category in Visegrad countries. Between these two extremes we managed to identify three ap- proaches that could be placed on the continuum defined by those two. e national-conservative, exceptionalist and liberal categories form a logical path from the nationalist to the antinationalist approach. e national-conservative worldview still perceives the nation as an important and objective category, but it also sets limits for its influ- ence on politics and everyday life and, what is even more important, on the rights of the minorities. e next approach does not place some higher value into the notion of nation or other communities. However, it replaces the essentialism of the previous two categories with the conviction of the cultural exceptionalism, and therefore it is cautious about new and foreign influences. e nature of the differences and dividing lines between the cat- egories described in the previous chapter are probably the best way how to demonstrate their approaches in the Visegrad countries. 248 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES CONCLUSION 249
Tab. 32: Approaches in the Visegrad countries vourite’s opinions and attitudes also in other areas of life. is is true especially when one thinks about the development in Hungary aer C O U N T R Y 2006 general elections. When the nototorious tape of Ferenc Gyurc- Visegrad region Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia sány’s speech to the members of the MSzP leaked into the media,
postmodern anti-nationalist liberal anti-nationalist public opinion turned against socialists and in favour of their main rival Fidesz-MPP. e anger felt by the voters enabled Fidesz to enter European rigth-wing liberal liberal the election of 2010 with the same approach in identity issues as four liberal- years earlier and yet win more than half of the votes. Certainly this homogenized protectivist liberal nationalist exceptionalist conservative mere fact does not prove that all the voters of Fidesz-MPP shared its conservative- cultural- national- populist worldview but, as we can observe, their self-identification with the nationalist nationalist conservative second Orbán government influences their perception of the political greater-nation greater-nation A P R O C H approach approach style of Fidesz-MPP and Orbán. religious- nationalist isolationist nationalist nationalist nationalist minority communist other approach
Certainly the approaches described above should not be treated as fixed and rigid categories which exhaustively explain all the phe- nomena and particularities mentioned or in other way present in the electoral manifestos of the Visegrad political parties. Such an ambi- tion was never declared and would be fated to fail from the begin- ning, since such a goal would require to completely resigning on the generalization and conceptualization of the opinions and worldviews expressed by the examined documents and focus. Such an approach would lead to the identification of as many categories as manifestos. Bearing in mind the limited and modest ambitions of the pro- posed categories, we should also stress that on the other hand the identified approaches indicate how the political representatives of the people perceive social and political realities in the modern world. is perception is crucial in many ways since it shapes not just the general political program of the relevant political parties but also the everyday language used by the most powerful political figures. e language and selection of the words used in a particular situation is not just evidence of the mental world of the speaker but it also subtly shapes the worldview of the listener. Especially when he supports a speaker’s policies in some areas of life, he is tempted to adopt his fa- 250 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES SUMMARY 251
Each country chapter is shortly introducing the political system SUMMARY of the country and its development including the most important country politics since 1989 when new democratic systems started to be created. Further are introduced researched political parties, their backgrounds and developments as well as their electoral achieve- e publication Political Parties and Nationalism in Visegrad Countries ments. Respective electoral manifestos from the researched period strives to contribute to the discussion about nationalism, national are explored in detail and with special focus on the issues related to identity and related aspects in the countries of the Visegrad region, the national identity, awareness and approaches of the parties. All of namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. e main the researched country manifestos are than analyzed together which focus is on the most important democratic political actors – relevant originate in the typology of the national approaches of the parties, political parties and selected nationalistic and far right parties of respectively their manifestos. us it is possible to follow which kinds the region to be able affect also specific reference approaches of the of tendencies and national approaches are applied in all the Visegrad nationalistic awareness in the central European societies. countries in recent time. By some cases we can also observe that the Political parties are tackled as the most important political actors national approaches of some political parties are not stable but flex- shaping the public discussion and reality and at the same time serving ible in the narration toward the electorate. as a mirror of the most important different perceptions of the nation Last main chapter of the book is going behind the (national) state and the positions toward minorities in the society. e researched structure and analyze the country types of national approaches in the materia of the political parties are the election manifestos in respec- wider regional perspective. In the national comparison main dividing tive national-wide elections. Election manifestos are considered as issues and approaches emerged among the parties and the Visegrad- the informative channel of the political communication between the wide analyzes shows that some of them are more important in the political parties and their electorates. At the same time we cannot whole region and some are more country specific. At the end the ana- presume that the other statutory documents of the political parties lyze shows typology of five important approaches of the political par- are relevant and known to the electorate even if they are important for ties in the region toward national issues and their perception. ere the political research and the understanding of the political parties as could be some detailed differences among the parties within one type, social institutions. e perception of the messages what is the nation but the level of extraction made them not so much important for this and the position toward minorities could be different in this regard purposes. e resulting national party approaches are according the but cover the real image of the social perception of this phenomenon authors Nationalist, National-conservative, Exceptionalist, Liberal in specific time frame. and Anti-nationalistic approach. e specific types of approaches e researched period is recent, since 2005 until 2010, which cov- which do not have any counterparts within other countries in the ers time when all the countries are already members of the European Visegrad region are the so called Czech-communist approach, Hun- Union and the societies and political scenes already should be sta- garian graeter nation approach and Slovak minority approach. bilized aer the regime changes in the 1989 and thus can illustrate the diversity of the discussion about nationalisms in the European Union. e main parts of the book are four chapters dedicated to each of the countries and the final analyzes of the explored similarities in the whole Visegrad region. 252 POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES BIBLIOGRAPHY 253
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POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONALISM IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES
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