Morocco and the Near East : Reflections on Some Basic Differences

Morocco and the Near East : Reflections on some basic differences Author(s): EDMUND BURKE Source: European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie, Vol. 10, No. 1, Survivances et permanences or Continuity and Re- enactment (1969), pp. 70-94 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23998624 Accessed: 18-04-2019 18:15 UTC

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Morocco and the Near East : Keflections on some basic differences

The comparative sociological study of the countries of the Middle Eastern culture area for the nineteenth century can scarcely be said to have begun. But such studies can do much to help us come to a more precise estimate of the functions which particular institutions might fill, and the weight they could be required to bear in different parts of the Middle East during the critical period of the onset of modernization. It is the purpose of this article to begin to make some of the kinds of distinctions which set off different parts of the Middle East one from another, using the case of late nineteenth century Morocco. It is hoped that the analysis which follows will stimulate the same kind of critical examination of the institutions of other seg ments of the Middle East culture area. Even if it does not accomplish this objective, such an exercise may be useful if in studying the Moroccan modifications of some of these basic institutions, it can shed light on why Morocco was significantly different and therefore perhaps on the nature of these institutions themselves. In the pages which follow, it will be argued that despite a tendency to view Morocco as a slightly more backward and weaker version of the Near East, it differed in several fundamental respects. To begin with, the geographical, ecological and historical circumstances in which nineteenth century Morocco came to be were rather different from those which shaped the destinies of Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and even (to a lesser extent) Iraq at the same period. Even more significantly, there were crucial differences between a number of the major compo nents of nineteenth century Moroccan society. With no intention of being exhaustive, I shall examine some of these differences in historical and comparative terms, focusing on three important aspects of pre French Morocco: Islam, the city, and the administration. It will be suggested that in the predominently rural and tribal context of nineteenth century Morocco, politics was conducted less in terms of imposed official religious and administrative norms, and more in

Archiv, europ. sociol., X (1969), 70-94.

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MOROCCO AND THE NEAR EAST terms of a network of social linkages based upon Moroccan popular Islam. Some of the consequences of this fact in a country which was undergoing rapid changes as a result of the commercial pene tration of the West will be pointed out. One by-product of this study might be that by concentrating upon the interrelatedness of the various geographical and social segments which composed the Moroccan empire, rather than on the great diversities, a more coherent view of the turbulent years at the beginning of the twentieth century may begin to emerge. Finally, despite real similarities between the Arab East and the Arab Far West, and the many historical and social continuities, Morocco was different, and these differences, although subtle, are subject to analysis.

i. Geography and history.

A consideration of the factors which marked the emergence of a new Moroccan empire should begin with an assessment of the geographical and historical circumstances which together combined to determine its peculiar evolution. To a great extent geography has shaped the kind of organized social and political life possible in Morocco. Attention will first be focused, therefore, on those geo graphic features which have a bearing on Morocco's relations with a wider world, its ecology and its political development. "Jazirat al-Maghrib" the classical Arab geographers called North Africa, "the island of the West", and if the phrase fits North West Africa in the broader sense, an island surrounded by the Mediterra nean and the Sahara, it can with equal appropriateness be applied to the Moroccan segment of the Maghrib. Cut off from the rest of North Africa on the East and South by the Atlas mountain chain and a pre-Saharan steppe area which extended almost to the Mediter ranean, Morocco was bounded to the West by the Atlantic ocean, with a coastline that was renowned for its treacherous tides, sand bars, and the absence of good natural harbors. To the North, access from the Mediterranean coast was blocked by the formidable barrier of the Rif mountains. This combination of geographical factors served to cushion Morocco from outside influence, giving it more time to re spond, and permitting it to accept or reject such influences on more nearly its own terms. The prédominent ecological influence on Morocco has undeniably been its mountains, especially the Atlas chain. These mountains have not only served to isolate Morocco on its landward side, they

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms EDMUND BURKE also intrude at various points into central Morocco, arresting the rain clouds borne in on the prevailing winds from the Atlantic and create, in effect, a series of micro-ecologies within the larger Moroccan one. Because of them, the area between Algeria and Morocco has become a vast semi-arid steppe, and the steep valleys of the Middle and High Atlas are well-watered and capable of supporting considerable popu lations. Since the mountains divide Morocco into more than a dozen major ecological areas, the need to adapt to the exigencies of a different environment have led to the evolution of a series of partially autonomous units within the Moroccan empire. The possibilities of political development in Morocco were simi larly influenced by the topography. Because of the mountains, the problems of internal communications and security were that much greater for any would-be centralized government. Regions could (and periodically did) seek to adopt a more autonomous state, although all were ultimately condemned by ecology and the trade routes to membership in a greater Moroccan entity. Further, again largely because of the mountains, tribalism could remain a pronounced characteristic if Morocco into the twentieth century, for in addition to sheltering large populations, the mountains provided a refuge to inhabitants of the nearby plains if the central government became too insistent in its claims. The history of Morocco, therefore, is largely one of the unending tug of war between the forces of region alism and the central power. Until the early fifteenth century Morocco (and Northern Africa in general, whose fate it tended to share) were major political and economic forces in the western Mediterranean. Morocco was then linked to the Near East by important ties of trade and common reli gion, and to an extent, common culture. Urbanism, the steady expansion of the Arabic language and a more orthodox brand of Islam among the inhabitants of the plains, and the gradual develop ment of a sedentary peasantry were all characteristics of this earlier period. The significance of the trans-Saharan gold trade in the economy of the western Mediterranean has been attested by scholars of the period (i). Morocco's position at the head of one of the major trans-Saharan caravan routes allowed it to control a portion of this gold trade, and played an important role in its prosperity during this

(i) Cf. the magistral work of Fernand et le Maghreb (Paris 1966) and E. W. Bovill, Braudel, La Méditerranée au temps de The Golden Trade of the Moors 2 (London Philippe II (Paris 1949). Also, Charles 1968). Emmanuel Dufourq, VEspagne catalane

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MOROCCO AND THE NEAR EAST time. But from about the mid-fifteenth century, when the decline of the Merinid dynasty (1196-1549) and a shift in the gold routes became apparent, Morocco began to close in upon itself. This period of decline coincided with a prolonged period of civil and dynastic strife. Only with the consolidation of the lAlaw! dynasty (1654-present) did conditions begin to improve. By that time, however, an important series of transformations had taken place in conditions of life in North Africa. The major elements of the Morocco of the nineteenth century had their origins in the changes and new orientations of the critical years from 1500-1654 (2). Considered schematically, four major and interrelated develop ments can be seen to characterize these years. First, this was the period of Moroccan attempts to expell the Spanish and Portuguese 'crusader' forces who had seized numerous enclaves along the coasts. In this fight, which culminated in 1578 with the Battle of the Three Kings and the defeat of the Portuguese, the religious brotherhoods, or turuq (sing, tariqa), especially distinguished themselves. Stepping into the breach left by the weak and heavily compromised later Merinids, popularly acclaimed saints, known as marabouts (Ar. murabtïn, sing, mur abat), assumed the leadership of the anti-crusader turuq. In so doing they not only succeeded in galvanizing the popu lations into action, they also stored up immense spiritual capital for themselves and their descendants, capable of being transmuted into political influence. The blurring of roles of saint and shaykh of a brotherhood appears to have become generalized during this period. A second and related development was the emergence of new dynasties, the Sa(adian (1549-1654) and their successors, the (Alawi, which were able to capitalize on the weaknesses of the later Merinids and Wattasids and the regional divisions among the brotherhoods and other maraboutic forces to come to power. In their rise to hegemony the Sa(adians and fAlawis, although almost constantly obliged to defend their claim to the throne, had an important legitimizing factor on their side: they both claimed sharifian origin, that is, descent in the line of the family of the Prophet. Sharifs had long been especially venerated in Morocco (the first Moroccan dynasty, the Idrissid, was of sharifian origin), and many sharifian families had settled there. Now, with the emergence of the Sa(adians, sharifism was reintroduced as an important criterion in determining the legitimization of rule,

(2) Despite their importance, these cent years sharifian dynasties have been briefly have received little study by historians but suggestively of analyzed by Auguste Cour North Africa. The three-cornered strugglein his L'établissement des dynasties des Chérifs between crusaders, Ottomans, and theau Maroc nas (Paris 1904).

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that is, it acquired a political connotation to accompany its religious ones. No sooner had the European adversaries been disposed of than a new threat took its place—the anti (Alid designs of the Ottoman Ghazi dynasty of Khayr al-Din, based in Algiers. It is the rivalry between the Sharifians and the Algerian Ottomans which marks the third important development whose consequences played a role in the creation of a changed Morocco. The contest, which continued in attenuated form until the French began the conquest of Algeria (1830), involved a persistent struggle par personnes interposées as Sharifians and Ottomans each sought to utilize the interconnected networks of tariqa membership which stretched over North Africa, the Ottomans working through Qadiriyya-affiliated turuq, and the Sharifians through the Darqawiyya and related orders (3). Only occasionally would open hostilities between the two parties break out, and one would launch an invasion to succor a revolt fomented by its partisans within the other's territory. The struggle with the Ottomans of Algeria thus served to further divide Moroccans, and to enhance the politiza tion of many of the brotherhoods which had begun with the resist ance to the Iberian invaders. (Others among the turuq, it must be mentioned, remained truer to the traditional a-politicism of the Sufi orders of the Near East). Several other consequences flowed from the successful Moroccan resistance to the threat posed by the Algerian Ottomans. First, because Morocco was never directly incorporated within the Ottoman Empire and sphere of cultural diffusion, its new synthesis of tribal ism and popular Islam could survive virtually intact into the twen tieth century. Second, in the face of the real and growing economic problems caused by the influx of American precious metals to the European economy, the inability of the two to live together harmo niously meant that both diverted scarce resources and energies from more essential concerns. Finally, since Morocco's immediate neigh bors, Algeria and Spain, were themselves weak and comparatively insulated from many of the changes then taking place in Europe, it was spared the kind of close, and ultimately beneficial contact which compelled the Ottoman empire to adapt itself to face the growing challenge of the West. The fourth factor which played a role in shaping post-sixteenth

(3) A beginning to the painstaking made bytask Pierre Boyer, Contribution à l'étude of piecing together the history ofde thela politique polit religieuse des Turcs dans la ical use of the turuq by the Ottomans régence and d'Alger, Revue de VOccident musul (Alawis in the nineteenth century man has et been de la Méditerranée, I (1966), 11-50.

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MOROCCO AND THE NEAR EAST century Morocco was the vast movement of Berber populations from the Sequia el Hamra (Säqiya al-Hamrä) in the extreme south of Morocco into central Morocco (4). This great migration, the origins of which are obscure, began around the end of the fifteenth century and gradually gained in amplitude in the centuries which followed. The predatory expansion of these Berber tribal groups across the Atlas mountains and into the rich central plain left the Moroccan central governments in a weak and defensive posture, and the country more irrevocably Berber than before. Urban Arab Muslim civili zation on the model of the Near East, if it had in fact ever been a dynamic element in Moroccan society, languished and went into a long decline. The tendency toward organized sedentary life in the plains, always precarious in Morocco, was seriously set back by the Berber encroachments. Originally purely administrative divisions of the country into 'submitted', i.e. tax-paying, and 'dissident', or non-tax-paying zones tended to harden into an implicit recognition of a realm divided along ethnic lines. Out of the period of great historical flux which was the century and a half beginning around 1500, Morocco underwent a series of changes which resulted in the emergence of a new social and political synthesis which lasted into the twentieth century. Whatever simila rities Morocco may once have possessed to the Arab East, by the middle of the seventeenth century they were largely dissipated, leaving institutions and patterns of action which bore names similar to those of the Near East, but whose content had somehow been transformed. A stalemate society had replaced a dynamic medieval Muslim state.

3. The Moroccan style of Islam.

Due partly to the Moroccan historical experience, especially the crisis of the sixteenth century, and partly to the correspondingly greater weight of rural and tribal factors in Morocco, a unique style of Islam gradually evolved which helps in large measure explain the differences between al-Maghrib al-Aqsa and the Arab East. The various components of this 'Moroccan Islam' have long been iden tified. We have already seen how the fraternal orders, or turuq, and sharifism acquired a political content and role to accompany their

(4) These Berber population movements, Lesne, Historique d'un groupement ber which resemble the tribal migrations of bère : les Zemmour (Paris 1959), thèse African history, have not been sufficiently complémentaire pour le doctorat ès lettres, investigated by historians. Cf. Marcel Paris.

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms EDMUND BURKE religious one. In addition, other frequently cited aspects of the Mo roccan version of Islam included the greater importance of the worship of Sayyid-s or popularly acclaimed saints, the notion of baraka (lit erally, 'blessing') or special indications of divine favor, including the ability to intercede on the behalf of others attributed to certain indi viduals, and the important role played by the different sorts of W (literally, 'shame') sacrifice which placed a man's personal honor before God and his neighbors in jeopardy if he did not grant a certain favor. These components were only with difficulty separable from their involvement in the complex net of relationships which form Moroc can society. The interrelationships among these elements, and their place in the larger whole will become clearer in the pages which follow (5). At least three important distinctions between the Islam of the Arab Provinces of the Near East, and the Islam of Morocco will first be made so that the subsequent more detailed discussion of the turuq, marabouts, and sharifism will have greater meaning. To begin with, as an analytical tool it may be useful to employ the rudimentary distinctions of an official and popular Islam as used by Gibb and Bowen (6) and consider the two areas. Such a classificatory scheme, crude though it may be, does have the advantage, for our purposes, of making explicit a sometimes implicitly assumed division of Islam as ulamâ or official religious elite would have it practice (in strict obe dience to the injunctions of the Koran, the traditions and the law), and Islam as it was actually practiced by the bulk of the population (in accordance with custom, magico-religious beliefs, with a strong tendency toward association with semi-orthodox sufi orders). The important point here—without going into the question of the undoubt ed influence of popular Islam in the Near East—is that in Morocco as a result of the urban decline and the upsurge of tribalism, official Islam occupied a much weaker position. In Morocco, therefore, popular Islamic beliefs and patterns of action tended to mold the lives of most men, even those of the lulamä. The forms which this Moroccan popular Islam adopted were not, however, strikingly different from those of the Near East. Saint wor

(5) On Islam in Morocco, cf. the review XXVII (1927). 114-1 IS and especially article of Jacques Berque, Quelques problè Edward Westermarck, Ritual and Belief in mes de l'Islam maghrébin, Archives de socio Morocco (London 1926), 2 vols. logie des religions, II (1957), 3-20; also (6) H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Edmond Doutté, Notes sur l'Islam magh Islamic Society and the West (London rébin : Les Marabouts (Paris 1900) ; Edouard New York/Toronto 1957), Vol. if Part 2, Michaux-Bellaire, "Islam marocain", pp. 70-80. and other essays in Archives marocaines,

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MOROCCO AND THE NEAR EAST ship, the notion of baraka, veneration of sharifs, popular religious brotherhoods, and even a sacrifice akin to Moroccan {ar sacrifice could be found in the Near East, especially but by no means exclusively among the Bedouin and other predominently tribal societies. What was distinctive about the Moroccan case was the functions which these religions structures performed. In Morocco the different expressions of popular Islam, from the turuq to (ar sacrifice, all acquired political functions to accompany their social and religious ones. Only in periods of social upheaval, like the aftermath of the Mongol inva sions and the crusades, did the sufi orders in the Near East assume an overt political role, but for the most part other institutions existed there which could more conveniently accomplish the same ends. Baraka, popular saints, and the rest, rarely have been seen as performing manifestly political functions in the modern Near East, whereas in Morocco such instances are commonplace. A third distinction between the Near Eastern and Moroccan styles of Islam relates to the role of popular religious beliefs and patterns of action in the society as a whole. Crucial in the Moroccan case was the integrative function of Moroccan popular Islam. The various ele ments of Moroccan Islam shared one thing in common: all tended to serve as a means of cross-cutting kinship and regional bonds, of putting the individual in a close and religiously-sanctioned relation ship with others which he might otherwise be incapable of sustaining. Unless this basic and fundamental role of Islam as a sort of social cement is grasped, it is difficult to come to any clear understanding of the way most human relationships in Morocco tend to elude the cate gories established for the Near East and assume an ambiguous quasi religious and social character. In the Near East, with its long tradi tion of urbanism, where Islam is generally identified as an urban religion, and where the links between town and tribe were more solid this ambiguity was less pronounced. One of the long-recognized characteristics of North African and especially Moroccan Islam has been the existence of holy men or popularly acclaimed saints respected for their baraka, who lived among the tribes. Often these individuals were able to pyramid several generations of recognized baraka-endowed saints into the creation of a holy lineage. Treatment of these 'marabouts' as the French called them (from the Arabic murâbit, tied, i.e. tied to God, or perhaps vice versa) has until recently been largely descriptive in the literature, rather than systematically analytical. We now know more clearly, as Ernest Gellner has demonstrated, that the murabit tended to perform the valuable function of mediator between hostile

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms EDMUND BURKE tribes or clans (7). Living generally near the borders between tribes major segments of tribes, the muräbit helped make peace between warring groups, arranged the payment of diya, or blood money, and intervened on request in countless ways to ease transactions, provide assistance to merchants traveling through the region under his mezrag (literally, 'lance', a variety of (ar), or protection. From his position on the margin of society, he could, by adroit manipulation of his influence, achieve a real political importance in his own right in a certain region. Though the marabout was in a potentially exposed position, lacking a tribe or great numbers of kinsmen to protect him, he was able to capitalize on the veneration which tribesmen had for him as a possessor of the baraka. Thanks to this spiritual influence (and his own native wit) the muräbit provided a link and buffer between groups who might otherwise be continuously at war, and enabled trade (on which even the tribes depended) to be conducted on a more than local basis. For these services he of course collected a suitable percentage of offerings, and these provided the means of his continued success. If all depended on whether a marabout had the baraka or not, one of the prime practical demonstrations that a person had indeed been so blessed was his ability to provide for travelers, and those in need. The more successful among the holy lineages were able to institute a kind of taxation system, known as ziyara (Ar., 'visit'), among their client tribes. The rest had to content themselves with the sponta neous offerings of the faithful. Since the supply of saints always exceeded the demand, would-be holy men had to satisfy the requests of their clientele, and know when and when not to intervene in dis putes. The consequence of impolitic behaviour might be a growing belief among the tribesmen that the baraka (always a fickle and un merited grace) had left one individual and gone to another. Further, a marabout was often several men of religious influence rolled into one. The roles of Awlad Sayyid ('sons of the saint'), shaykh of a tariqa, and sharif often tended to cumulate in one and the same man, especially if he aspired to more than a very precarious local influence on disparate groups. One finds, therefore, that the tendency was for two or more roles to coexist, as in the case of one of the leaders of resistance to the French in the Fez-Meknès area, Sïdï Rähü, (F. Sidi Raho). This man was from the tribe of Ait Seghrou chen of Imouzzer, south of Fez, who although Berber, claim Idrissi sharifian descent. His father was Sidi Mahnün (F. Sidi Mimoun),

(7) Ernest Gellner, Saints of the Countrymen Atlas, (Paris/The Hague 1963), pp. 145 in Julian Pitt-Rivers (ed.), Mediterranean 159

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a well-known saint of the region, and from this two-fold position of religious influence Sidi Rähü was able to create continual difficulties for the French. His early headquarters was at Anosseur, south of Sefrou (Ar. Sifrü), a fine strategic position near the meeting point of the territories of four tribes. He acquired his very considerable hold over sizeable elements of these tribes through the regular means of great asceticism and piety, and often traveled alone, clad only in a few rags through the rugged territory between tribes. This, together with his zeal for the jihäd against the French invader, endowed him with an immense amount of baraka in the eyes of the Berber tribes men (8). Sidi Rähü can thus be seen as an almost classic example of the politically active marabout, living in the marginal areas between tribes, practicing asceticism in a very public manner, and in his later days, a leader of the holy war. As a type he represents one way in which Moroccans saints, by constantly seeking to maximize the possibil ities of a situation, reached across kinship bonds in an attempt to englobe wider support and therefore achieve greater power. Just as the word marabout can refer to a blurring of several differ ent roles, so also the term zäwiya, often used to mean a tariqa, in fact is subject to a similar confusion. Before getting into our discus sion of religious brotherhoods in Morocco, therefore, a brief look at its various meanings seems in order. There is, first of all, the zäwiya as organization which refers either to a specific religious brotherhood, or in a more limited sense of the term, to one of the affiliated lodges of a specific tariqa. A second sense of the term exists: the zäwiya as place, often used to describe the tomb of a sayyid, or the lodge of a local marabout. To make matters even more confusing, the word marabout, in addition to its more common meaning of a saintly person, living or dead, may also be used in the same sense as the second meaning of zäwiya—the saint's tomb itself, together with its out buildings. The blurring of the term zäwiya is naturally connected with the confusion over the word marabout, and though this confusion exists chiefly in the French use of the two words, it is also evident in the maghribï Arabic. The religious brotherhoods are the second important characteristic of the Moroccan style of Islam which will be examined. Some of the reasons for their emergence to assume political prominence on the local or even national level have already been discussed. The major concern here will be to examine in more detail the functions which the turuq performed in the circumstances of prolonged urban decline, (8) Maurice Le Glay, Les chefs de la II (1918), 227-279. résistance berbère : Sidi Raho, France-Maroc,

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms EDMUND BURKE weak central government and tribalism in nineteenth century Mo rocco. The brotherhoods will be considered in several ways—first in comparison to the marabout, and then more broadly—in terms of their functions at ascending levels of social complexity (the individ ual, the community, and the wider world). Given the overwhelming rationalist bias of the existing (French) literature on the brotherhoods in North Africa, this analysis will not be as complete as it might be (9). We still lack a sound sociological study of why people joined the brotherhoods, or what they meant to the society. The tariqa can be said to have represented a more highly formalized version of the sort of religious-cum-political influence possessed by the muräbit. The brotherhood thus had distinct membership, separated from the mass by a sworn allegiance to the master of the or der, the Shaykh, then the muqaddim, and progression through the different grades of initiation each with its own ritual and occult secrets. There was also a more institutionalized means of collecting the offerings of the faithful on an annual or bi-annual basis, known, as in the case of offerings to a marabout, as ziyara. It was, in fact, a kind of religious taxation. Like the marabouts, the brotherhoods tended to recruit their following from among certain tribes or groups ; the Tijaniya, for example, were recruited chiefly among the officials and wealthy merchants. A man could, however, be simultaneously a regularly initiated member of several turuq, whereas he could only deal with one marabout at a time. It is the notion of member ship which is crucial, for both the marabout and the shaykh of a local branch of some brotherhood tended to gather adherents in a similar way; they were often, indeed, the same man. In both cases, the begin ning of success came when a numerous and devoted clientele became attracted to the holy man, persuaded by his baraka, religious wisdom, and political astuteness of the correctness of their path. The prolifera tion of purely local and often ephemeral turuq in Morocco parallels the number of local murâbitïn who appear and disappear with equal rapidity without gaining any enduring influence or reputation. A final similarity, the more important brotherhoods and marabouts were kept in line by special favors from the sultan, tax exemption, the use of government lands, or gifts of money or goods, so that they might not

(ç) Ever since the pioneering studytranscribed, of and spiritual geneologies, or O. Depont and X. Coppolani, Les confréries silasil have been patiently unraveled. A religieuses musulmanes (Algiers 1897), more therepromising approach, using history and has been considerable attraction tosociology the fin by Georges Drague (pseud, for de siècle rationalist approach. Memberships Georges Spillmann), Esquisse d'histoire reli have been quantified and tabulated, gieuse chants du Maroc (Paris 1956), hesitates before and prayers (dhikr and wird) faithfully finally adopting the same path.

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MOROCCO AND THE NEAR EAST be too greatly tempted to capitalize on their undoubted power (10). On the level of the individual, the brotherhoods, by substituting spiritual (i.e. fictive) bonds of kinship for ties of blood and common nurture sought to create a new society, composed of the brother members. The turuq provided an initiate with a sense of belonging to a universal and on-going religious community—those who sought God via a mystical 'way' or 'path' (the meaning of the word tariqa). In a period of political dislocation and decentralization they undoubtedly satisfied the felt spiritual needs of many. In the absence of a radiating higher religious influence from the cities, the brotherhoods played an important part in bringing Islam to the rural areas. More importantly, the brotherhoods provided a means of cross cutting local kinship ties and gaining access to a broader range of potential allies. In the circumstances of tribal Morocco with inter group feuding rife, a special importance was naturally attached to this function. (See below, section three). Specifically, this cross cutting function often found expression in a kind of patron-client relationship between the local shaykh and his adepts. In return for providing spiritual direction, arbitration of quarrels, food and shelter for traveling brethren, education of a very rudimentary sort for young boys, and meals at certain occasions, the local shaykh could expect to receive in return the regular ziyara, occasional supplementary offer ings in kind, and a degree of obedience which fluctuated with the shaykh's personal influence and power. As viewed from the top, the inter-connected system of local lodges which constituted a religious brotherhood could also constitute a kind of extended patron-client network. The head of the order received annual ziyara from his local shaykh-s, along with a report on each lodge. Since it was his religious influence which provided an important legitimation of the shaykh, if he had not in fact selected him, the head of the order held the careers of his local shaykh-s in his hands. Brotherhoods could, therefore, under certain circumstances function somewhat like political parties, and it appears to have been in this way that the Ottoman-Sharifian rivalry was conducted (n). Such powers as they did have were extremely limited, owing to the constant pull of tribal and regional loyalties and needs. One may

(io) Special mention must be made of (ii) The partisans of the order founded the important brotherhood of the sharifs by Shaykh Ma al-(Aynayn at court and of Wazzän, in northwestern Morocco, who in the Gharb region similarly tended to had very considerable privileges given them act as a party. Mission Scientifique du by the sultans. See E. Michaux-Bellaire, Maroc, Rabat et sa région, tome IV, Le La maison d'Ouezzan, R.M.M., V (1908), Gharb (Les Djebala) (Paris 1918), p. 60. 23-89.

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hypothesize from the history of the struggle with the Algerian Otto mans that the brotherhoods only had overt national political influence where their interests were congruent to those of its members in a specific region. The sharifs constitute the third element of our triptych of Moroccan Islam. A preceding section has already treated the emergence of sharifism as an important means of the legitimation of rule. The importance of sharifism in Morocco did not stop there, however, its pervading influence was felt on most aspects of Moroccan life. So deeply embedded in the fabric of Moroccan society was the venera tion of sharifs that problem of analysis becomes extremely complex. The very number and variety of sharifs and putative sharifs which are found in Morocco is bewildering enough in itself. But the diffi culty goes beyond questions of number and kind. On one hand, for example, it is possible to see sharifism in Morocco as an ascribed status, a kind of caste or nobility of blood. And sharifism does exhibit some of the marks usually associated with a caste: sharifs were heavily endogamous, and many of the high status roles in Moroccan society were occupied by individuals claiming sharifian descent. But on the other hand, unlike most castes, one could find sharifs at all levels of the society, including beggars, and possession of an impeccable sharifian geneology was no guarantee of success. Perhaps sharifian status is best considered as a necessary but not sufficient attribute of the successful individual. Especially in the rural areas marabouts and shaykh-s tended to claim to be sharifs if they sought more than a local influence. Sharifian status without baraka could not however help a man much, although if he was popularly recognized to have baraka, a claim to sharifian status could be an important additional factor working for him. As has been seen, post-sixteenth century Morocco was characterized by cities which were in a state of decline, the introduction of tribalism as a continuing factor of disequilibrium and disorder, and a central government which was caught in the middle, unable to govern effec tively. In such circumstances, the role of the sultan became less that of chief executive and primary decision maker, and more that of an interest-broker between the various opposed factions of the realm. The sultan can thus be conceived of as being something like a 'super marabout': a marginal man-negociator who exercised power less by constraint, than by assertion of his religious prestige and baraka in the complicated and never-ending bargaining process between the different families and interest groups. Like the marabout or the sharif, he was a man living in the society but by virtue of his sharifian

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MOROCCO AND THE NEAR EAST origins never really of that society. Again like the marabout, his power came from his willingness and ability to use the social leverage inherent in his position. He could abuse this power, or he could abdicate it, but he could never stop being the sultan, the primary possessor of the baraka in the country and the paramount sharif. Finally, so all-embracing and pervasive in its influence was Moroccan Islam, that it shaped even the state. Moroccan and Near Eastern styles of Islam thus tended to differ in important respects. Some of them have been examined here, although others of course exist. In the Near East other institutions, a bureaucracy, a land holding class, a docile peasantry, in fact a whole range of intermediary bodies existed and helped take up some or the burden which in Morocco was borne primarily by religion. In Morocco the rural, tribal, and decentralized nature of the society did not permit this. To bridge the gap between city and country, sultan and citizen, one of the few available mediators was Islam. The style of Islam which evolved in Morocco was thus more overtly political than that of the heartland of the Middle East.

3. The Moroccan city.

From the scattered travelers' reports which constitute our chief sources about medieval Moroccan cities we can get some idea of their earlier splendor. Thus we can more accurately assess the pro longed decline which began as a result of the crisis, while others, like Fez and Marrakech, appear to have suffered a temporary loss of population and a decline in importance. In the new kind of society which gradually emerged, the rural areas became dominant, with the cities reduced to a secondary role. In the centuries following, the fate of the cities was linked to the fortunes of the dynasty—under a strong sultan, the tribes would be kept in check and the cities would flourish, while under a weak ruler the reverse would pertain. Profound differences appeared between the Near Eastern and Moroccan city where this had not previously been the case. But what were some of these differences, more exactly? To begin with the ecological situation and physical characteristics of the Moroccan city, one can note a number of evident distinctions from the classic Near Eastern urban area (12). In the Near East,

(i2) It is only recently that serious 313. reflec and the recent work of I. M. Lapidus, tion upon the nature of the Near Muslim Eastern Cities in the Later Middle Ages city has begun to produce results. (Cambridge, Cf. Gibb Mass., 1967). and Bowen, op. cit., Vol. I, Part I, pp. 276

«3

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cities tended to be situated in the midst of an ecologically favorable zone, a sort of 'green belt' of farms and agricultural villages. These villages were inhabited by sedentary de-tribalized peasants, many of whom were heavily in debt to usurers in the cities and did not own their own land. By the nineteenth century many of the Near Eastern cities had grown beyond the limits of their old walls and begun to encroach on the nearby farmlands. In Morocco, by way of contrast, the pattern was rather different (13). A widespread settled village life, a sedentary and docile peasantry, urban dwelling landlords and usurers, all of these do not seem to have existed in Morocco before the beginning of the twentieth century. Irrigated gardens just beyond the walls of the city occupied the labor of an indeterminate, although considerable portion of the city's inhabitants. Apart from these gardens, which gave the city the appearance of an oasis, the uncultivated tribal areas came up virtually to the walls. Because of the absence of Near Eastern-style landlords and peasants, a key link between urban and rural areas was missing in Morocco, and the task of administering and maintaining order was made that much more difficult. The tribes played a much greater role in determining the fate of the city, although Near Eastern cities occa sionally also had reason to fear the tribes. Damascus in the eighteenth century, for example, saw the tribes swoop down upon it more than once. In physical layout, Moroccan cities adhered to the Near Eastern pattern, being divided into a number of semi-autonomous units, or quarters, separated from each other by walls and gates. But the four makhzan cities where the sultan and his court alternately resided, were in fact two cities—the old Arab mercantile city and a newer garrison and government town—which were separated from one another by walls, as well as mutual suspicions and hostilities. The quarrels between Fez al-Jadid (the makhzan city) and Fez al Balï (old Fez), which often spilled over into armed revolt, with the inhabitants of old Fez joining forces with the tribes against the sultan, are typical in this regard. Cities did not automatically represent the forces of civilization and order as opposed to anarchic warring tribes in Morocco the way they tended to in the Arab East. The distinction in Morocco between what constitutes a city, and what a rural hamlet, that is, between madïna and qarya was clear.

(iß) From an abundant literature on NEAU, Fez avant le protectorat (Casablanca Moroccan and North African cities, one 1949) work clearly stands out, Roger Le Tour

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Partly, as Berque suggests, it was a functional division—a number of activities were customarily represented in the city which were not all present in the hamlet: commerce, artisanry, and education (14). Partly, as Marçais suggests, it was institutional. A city generally had one or several principal mosques (where the Friday sermon was given), a public bath (for ritual purification), and a number of süqs or bazaars (15). At least for Morocco one might add the radiating influence of the tomb of a patron saint as a fourth institution of distinct urban character. The prominence of Fez was closely linked to the bénéficient presence of Mawlay Idriss, and the other cities all had their great patrons. As in the Near East, the division of the inhabitants of a Moroccan city into definite social groups (not quite classes) tended to follow the city's segmentation into quarters. Residence, and to an extent occupation and social position tended to go together, although in Morocco social mobility was probably greater. As with the case of the sharifs, to be born into a wealthy urban family did not necessa rily assure a tranquil life. For example, the sons of Sï Torres, a prominent minister under the sultan Mawlay al-Hassan (d. 1894), lacked the ability to follow in their father's foot steps. One became a cobbler, the other proprietor of a sweet shop in Tetouan (Ar. Titäwiri) (16). Fez appears to have been somewhat of an exception to this rule, for at least two important groups tended to develop influential family dynasties which resemble those of the Near East, the old families of Fez merchants, and those of Andalusian origin. Other Moroccan cities, which lacked large populations of either of these two groups, undoubtedly showed less social stratification, and Fez must be regarded as an exceptional Moroccan city. An examination of the relations between the city and populations living around it shows clearly the inferior position of the urban areas in Morocco in pre-French times. These relations can be concep tualized in two ways: the city as pseudo-oasis, and the city as super süq. Like the oasis, which lives in a kind of uneasy symbiotic relation ship with the Bedouin nomads, always at their mercy yet bound to them by ties of trade and mutual need, the Moroccan city lived in fear of tribal depradations, yet relied upon them for a considerable

(14) Jacques Berque, Médinas, ville l'Institut d'études orientales [Alger], XXI. neuves et bidonvilles, Les Cahiers de Tuni (16) Cited in Walter B. Harris, The sie, VI (1958), p. 15. Land of an African Sultan (London 1889), (15) William Marçais, L'islamisme et p. 268. Thus social mobility in the cities la vie urbaine, Articles et Conférences followed the general pattern already observ (Paris, Maisonneuve, 1961), Publications de ed for the rural areas.

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proportion of its trade. With the lucrative long distance trade firmly in the hands of a few wealthy Arab and Jewish merchants, the lesser merchants and shop keepers were dependent upon trade with tribes men, as were the artisans who fabricated many of the products which the merchants sold (17). With the power of the realm split between the tribes and the armies of the sultan (neither of whom had any special ties to the city), Moroccan cities learned to avoid taking exposed positions during times of crisis until certain of which side was going to win. But the tribes were also, although to a lesser degree, dependent on the cities, for in them they could most readily obtain modern firearms, ammunition, fine cloth, supplementary grain supplies, and prestige goods of all kinds. Neither could get along well without the other, even though the balance of power remained on the side of the tribes. For purposes of analysis, the Moroccan city can also be viewed as an expended version of the country market, or süq, though obviously it was more as well. As with the süq, which was generally held once a week on the borders of several tribes and close to the tomb of a local saint, disturbances within the confines of the city were regarded as a direct threat to the well-being of all, and were punished by stiff secular sanctions. So serious an offense was it to "break the süq", in fact, that supernatural sanctions were attached to such actions as well, for the sacred zone around the süq, or haräm, could not be the scene of violence (18). In much the same way, due to the protection of its patron saint, the city was considered to constitute an inviolable area. One can almost speak of the city being protected from the tribes less by its walls than by its patron saint. Finally, linking the city and its hinterland were the itinerant traders, many of them Jewish, who traveled from süq to süq under the protection, or mezrag, of prominent tribal leaders (19). Men without an extended group of kin, from whom no direct threat was likely, the traders could cut across local and kinship ties and ensure the

(17) It should also be mentioned that the in the Early Empires (Glencoe 1957), pp. 188 lesser merchants and artisans of makhzan 217; also Walter Fogg, The Organisation cities were dependent upon the expendi of a Moroccan Tribal Market, American tures of a court in residence—a phenome Anthropologist y XLIV ( 1942), 47-61. On the non first noted by Ibn Khaldùn. Cf. sacredness of süqs, Said Guennoun, La E. Gellner, Tribalism and Social Change, montagne berbère (Paris 1933). in W. H. Lewis (ed.), French Speaking (19) For a clear picture of these itinerant Africa, The Search for Identity (New York, merchants, cf. E. Michaux-Bellaire, Fès Wallsen, 1965), pp. 107-118. et les tribus berbères en 1910, Bulletin de (18) On süqs see esp. Francisco Benet, l'enseignement publique du Maroc (1922), Explosive Markets: The Berber Highlands, 3-10. in Karl Polanyi et al., Trade and Market

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conduct of trade in all but the worst of times. In the absence of other developed connecting links between city and country, the constant difficulty of communications and the mutual suspicion with which tribesmen tended to regard those not of their kin, the itinerant merchant played an important role in the economic life of the country. Indeed, if he had not existed, he would have to have been invented. On the other hand, one can speculate that if it had not been for the highly developed system of weekly rural markets in Morocco, there might have been a greater development of true village life (20). The picture of Morocco's cities, as it has been presented here, was probably accurate for much of the nineteenth century. But by the coming of the French in 1912, the movement of urbanization which can already be noted during the latter half of the century had probably considerably changed the face of most Moroccan cities, certainly of those along the coast. Several of the more significant aspects of this movement can be briefly sketched in here. It is notable, for example, that a considerable percentage of the newly urbanized were rural Jews, so that by 1912 approximately one-fifth of the population of all major Moroccan cities was Jewish. Under the pressure of rapid population increases, the malläh (Fr. mellah), or Jewish quarters, were soon swamped to overflowing, and living conditions deteriorated. In the first years of the twentieth century also the first important devel opment of absentee landlordism is noted, along with the speculative purchases of land around the cities, and a rise in lending to the country folk at usurious rates of interest. These changes were set in motion by the increasing commercial penetration of the West into Morocco during the last quarter of the nineteenth century (21). Generally speaking, the new landlords and speculators appear to have been protégés of Europeans, or otherwise exempted from royal jurisdiction. Prior to the end of the nineteenth century urban ties with capitals to invest preferred not to place it in land, where tribal depradation might place the investment in jeopardy, but rather to place it in com merce. The imminent arrival of the French, and the guarantee of security of title and a growing European demand for land changed all of that, and forms part of the larger story of vast economic disloca tions caused by the penetration of European commerce.

(2o) This in any case was the opinion Sociological of Review, XXXII (1940), p. 105. Walter Fogg. Cf. his "Villages, Tribal (21) Mar The far-reaching nature of these kets, and Towns: Some Considerations changes Con have been analyzed by Jean-Louis cerning Urban Development in the MieseSpanish in his important Le Maroc et l'Europe and International Zones of Morocco", (Paris The 1961/1963), 4 vols.

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4. The Moroccan administration.

Although there are certain outward similarities between the Moroc can and Ottoman administrations, both being hierarchically organized extensions of the royal court, the functions which the two performed differed considerably. In fact, one feels at times that Morocco was a country virtually without an administration, although this too, perhaps, misses the real point. Some of the consequences of Moroc co's lack of a developed bureaucracy were incalculably greater pressure placed on the functionally rudimentary council of vizirs and the sultan, the virtual autonomy of regional authorities, and the constant danger of dissident movements which would threaten the security of the state when there was not strong willed and politically skilled sultan. The absence of an Ottoman-style bureaucracy meant that one more link between the cities and the rural areas was missing. Taken togeth er with the absence of a docile peasantry and a class of absentee landlords, it meant that tax collection, corvée labor, and the military impressment of civilians were rendered that much more difficult (22). In contrast to the pattern of administration which tended to prevail in the Ottoman Arab provinces, where instructions were passed down the hierarchy of command from the vizirs to the local officials and some action in at least minimal response to these instructions was taken, in Morocco the sultan, because he lacked a cadre of local bureaucratic officials, was compelled to rely upon his powers of persua sion, or ultimately upon force or the threat of force. Now his powers of persuasion, as has been seen above, were not inconsiderable, for he was the preeminent baraka-endowed individual in the country. These supernatural attributes gave him considerable leverage in the complicated and delicate maneuvering of daily political life. However, should a tribal governor refuse to foreward the tax receipts, normal political attempts to induce compliance failing, force became the only recourse. The council of vizirs, known as the makhzan, was an inarticulate and functionally rudimentary body which consisted in 1900 of five vizirs and about sixty regular secretaries. They had few specialized duties and little ability beyond a talent for political intrigue. The

(22) Cf. Eugène Aubin (pseud, for Des et limites de son pouvoir, Bulletin de la cos), Le Maroc d'aujourd'hui (Paris 1904), Société de géographie d'Alger (1909), pp. 172-257 for the classic description of the 438-470; and R. Maudit, Le makhzen ma makhzan. Also, Henri Gaillard, L'admi rocain, R.C.y XIII (1903), 293-304. nistration au Maroc : le makhzen, étendue

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makhzan came into being during the Sa(adian period, and repre sented a copy of Ottoman Ghazi military organization in Algeria. The word makhzan referred initially to the tribes offered tax and other privileges in return for providing military service on a regular and hereditary basis, and only later came to be employed to designate the 'central government' in Morocco largely because the sultans tended to draw their officials from the families of the jaysh tribes (23). Gradually during the course of the nineteenth century, under the pressures of contact with the West, a more specialized economic and foreign affairs section, recruited from among the abler of the Anda lusians, began to emerge, and the influence of the old makhzan families declined. This, however, never involved more than a handful of individuals, and in the absence of educational reforms represented little more than a slight broadening of the base of recruitment of such officials, not meaningful response to the European challenge. On the level of the rural administration the inarticulate and inade quate nature of the system was even more apparent. Qaid-s were most often selected by their tribes, whether ultimately they were in fact directly appointed by the sultan or merely proposed for nomination to the office by a tribal jama(, or council. In either case they had to have sufficient personal authority to be able to impose their will or their gestures of command remained symbolic. But because of the tenuous links between the local level and the makhzan, individuals who possessed such personal authority tended to employ it in feather ing their own and their clients' nests, rather than faithfully foreward all collected tax revenues to the capital. Rural security depended largely upon the collective personal author ities of the various qaid-s, and on their continuing acceptability to their tribes. It was the qaid-s who called out the local haraka (Fr. harka) or militia, which was composed of those men in a tribe with sufficient wealth to afford a horse and a mounted retainer. It was the haraka which put down local disorders. A qaid, therefore, had to avoid offending these local notables or he might find himself deserted by them in a time of crisis (24). Cities generally would have a small garrison of imperial troops which were drawn from the jaysh tribes and placed under the command of the local pasha. In the event of wide

(23) It should be emphasized, lest the the Negro Buwakhir survived until the point be overlooked, that these jaysh tribes French conquest. were in no way comparable to the Mamluk (24) On the haraka, see F. Michaux slave armies of the Near East. The one Bellaire and G. Salmon, Les tribus arabes experiment with a slave army in Morocco de la vallée du Lekkous, Archives marocaines, under the sultan Mawlay Ismail was ulti IV (1905), pp. 141-143 mately inconclusive, though remnants of

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spread disorders which the local forces were unable to cope with, the dispatch of an imperial mahalla (Fr. mehalla) became the only recourse. Such instances were, however, to be avoided, for not only did a full scale punitive expedition constitute a drain on the royal treasury, it included a large element of risk because the mahalla was generally about as well armed, trained and led as the tribes. The sultan in turn had to avoid alienating the local governors: the conse quences could be the loss of this throne. Lacking a cadre of bureau crats endowed with sufficient powers, local administration in Morocco was bound to be vulnerable to the effects of the inevitable local quar rels. A further weakness of the system was that no distinction was made on the local level between tax-collectors and administrators, although such a division of function did exist, if not always in practice in the Near East. Instead the qaid was responsible for collecting the taxes, as well as local administration and security. With no check on the amount of taxes which he exacted built into the system, he tended to take what the population would bear. Such system of accounting as there was concerned itself not with assessment, but merely with recording the amount received. Only in the makhzan did one find a group of financial specialists, and these from the last part of the nine teenth century, when the economic crisis consequent to European penetration made their invention a necessity. This rudimentary system of tax collection was not without its own informal checks and balances, however. Since a qaid-s' political roots were generally in the tribe where he served, and there were often several notables who coveted his office for themselves, he had to be careful not to go too far (25). His rivals could dispatch a delegation to court with a large bribe to bring about his recall, or they could foment a local revolt, and then refuse to aid the qaid in putting it down. In such circum stances it is not surprising that a tribe would seek at the earliest oppor tunity to throw off the makhzan yoke and seek the life of the nontax paying tribes. As a system of administration and taxation it was only slightly better than no system at all: the wonder is that it func tioned as well as it did. In addition to the increasing specialization of makhzan officials mentioned above, other important changes in the Moroccan system of administration took place toward the end of the nineteenth century under the pressures of Western penetration. On the level of the rural administration the tendency was for the sultans (especially the great

(25) On the various means rebel notables could employ to oust an undesired qaid, Ibid.

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Mawlay al-Hassan) to fragment rural power among a greater and greater number of qaid-s, partly to increase imperial revenues from the bribes paid for appointment, and partly to decrease the threat of a successful regional secession movement by playing on the mutual suspicions and jealousies of the qaid-s. The result of this change was to weaken and further corrupt a system which was tenuous at best (26). Taken together with a second factor, the rapid increase in the number of rural notables who consented to become protégés of an European Power in order to escape tax and other local responsibil ities, it resulted in the decline in revenues to the treasury and in rural security. The abandonment of the system of fragmenting rural governorships on the death of Mawlay al-Hassan led to the emergence of great qaid-s in areas where there were sufficiently strong and resource ful leaders. The financial and economic crisis which stemmed from the effects of Western commercial penetration of the Moroccan economy sealed the doom of the old system. Much of this is not unlike the general outlines of the economic and political decline of the Arab Provinces of the Ottoman Empire prior to colonial conquest. But though the general pattern was familiar, the Moroccan response was so weak and hesitant as to be scarcely comparable. There was little change in Moroccan institutions be cause institutions, as such, were so little characteristic of Morocco. There were two possible responses to the growing economic diffi culties in which Morocco found itself at the beginning of the twentieth century: one could either reform the local administration and taxation systems (which is to say, create them), or one could reform the army so that it could impose its will on rural dissidents. Both methods were tried, and both failed, for generally the same reasons: the lack of a pool of educable or educated individuals on which to, the absence of a supporting environment favorable to change, and the great haste with which the reforms were attempted. In the ensuing debacle, it came as almost a relief when Morocco slipped under French dominance in 1912.

5. Conclusion.

In the preceeding pages I have examined some of the major com ponents of pre-French Morocco, notably, Islam, the city, and the administration. Other important subjects could also profitably be

(26) The practice of dividing tribal discussed by Jules Erckmann, Le Maroc governorships by Mawlay al-Hassan is moderne (Paris 1885).

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms EDMUND BURKE examined in the same manner—one thinks especially of the tribe and Moroccan rural society. To sharpen the awareness of how Morocco was different, comparisons were made with similar institutions in the Middle East, using the tableau provided by Gibb and Bowen for illustrative purposes. It is true that studies now in progress would tend to alter the image of the Middle East as presented by Gibb and Bowen, and portray it as more like Morocco with respect to the influence of popular or rural behavior patterns. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, powerful currents of change in the Middle East had clearly tipped the balance in favor of the urban areas and the central powers. Early nineteenth century reforms had done much to increase the power of the state to intervene in men's lives. The degree of importance of popular Islam had declined, and along with it the need for the lulamä to intercede and mediate conflicts. The rapid development of a class of urban-dwelling absentee land lords, and of an indebted and submissive peasantry were also charac teristic of the nineteenth century. Western schools founded in the Middle East had produced a small but influential intelligensia, interest ed in furthering the development of liberal nationalism. Allied with them at times were the liberal religious scholars of whom Muhammad Abduh is perhaps most representative. These new '•ulamä were interested in the reform of Islam, that is the purging of superstitious, i.e. popular, practices. Far-reaching economic changes decisively altered many of the social and political patterns which had hitherto existed, giving the state powers which the sultans had only dreamed of, and increasing the ease of communications within the area many fold. Turning to Morocco, the significance of some of the differences between it and the Middle East which have been treated above becomes more evident. Considered within the context of rapid change which characterized the late nineteenth century, in the absence of strong bureaucratic institutions, of a large absentee land owning class and a docile peasantry, of an influential 'modernizing' intelli gensia, and of a strong 'high' Islamic center of influence radiating from the cities, Morocco possessed serious disadvantages when it came to self-transformation, or defensive modernization to resist the West. The relative weakness of the urban centers deprived the Moroccan state of an important weapon in combatting rural values. Because there was no developed bureaucratic tradition or provincial administration in the sense that there was one in the Middle East, in order to secure central control over the outlying areas the necessary institutions had to be created virtually from scratch. Then there had

This content downloaded from 128.114.188.17 on Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:15:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MOROCCO AND THE NEAR EAST to be a long breaking-in period before the more tradition-minded folk would accept them, and time was a commodity which was in short supply when Morocco finally had to face the West after 1900. The deeply entrenched popular religious beliefs tended to give much greater strength to conservative arguments against secular and religious inno vations. Not until after 1900 did a small liberal nationalist group develop among young men who had traveled in the Middle East. They were able to gain some influence only briefly in 1905, when they induced the sultan 'Abd al-(Azïz to summon an advisory council to debate the proposed French reforms (27). The absence of western style schools was a major reason for the lack of such an intelligensia, although experiments with a 'Palace School' had been conducted under Muhammad IV (1859-1873) (28), and the large Jewish minority had the benefit of the Alliance israélite universelle schools in the ports (29). The result of all of this was that Morocco tended to follow the general pattern of the Middle East's political development, but at a great distance. When changes did begin to occur, they were greatly hampered by the non-existence of structures and institutions upon which to build. After 1900, when the dangers of a French take-over became imminent, changes took place with great rapidity, and Morocco went through the same general stages of imperial advance and indigenous response as most of the countries of the Middle East, only in Morocco these stages tended to telescope and to] run together. Summing up, to the historian with a sociological turn of mind (or the sociologist with an historical bent), the comparative study of late nineteenth century Moroccan institutions with those of the Middle East can be of assistance in isolating some of the roles which these institutions can be called upon to play in situations of rapid social change, and what constitutes an aid or a bloc to change. In the preceding analysis some of these institutions have been discussed, and new light has been thrown on them. Only a more systematic and detailed comparative study of the kind attempted here can fully elucidate which were the fundamental conditions for successful change in the Middle East culture area, and which were mere reflec tions of a particular social and political environment. By comparing institutions and the role which each performed within particular

(27) Cited in 'Alal al-Fasi, Al-Harakat chives marocaines, XVIII (1919), pp. 284-285. al-Istiqläliyah fï al-maghrib al-cArabt (Marra (29) André Lecoq, Les écoles israélites kesh 1948), pp. 106-107. au Maroc, Quest, dip. et col., XXXI (1911), (28) A. Péretié, Les medrasas de Fès, Ar pp. 682-683.

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Middle Eastern countries it may be possible to gain further insights in to the organization of society and the nature of change in the nine teenth century *.

* Materials for the preceding article were gathered while the author was in Morocco and France (1965-1967) under the auspices of a N.D.E.A.-related Ful bright-Hays Fellowship. The conclusion, statements and opinions made in the article are those of the author and in no way obligate the Fellowship Program.

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